THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN MILITA

PRESENCE IN EUROPE

Lloyd J. Matthews

Editor

May 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-021-4

ii
Foreword .......................

1. The Future of the U.S.-European Relationship:

Framing the Discussion

John J. Hamre ...................

Questions and Answers ..............

2. The Role of U.S. Forces in Europe

Wesley K. Clark ..................

Questions and Answers ..............

3. Staying in Europe: A Vital American Interest

Klaus Naumann..................

4. America’s Stance Toward Europe: Moving Away

from a NATO-Centered Policy

Ted Galen Carpenter ...............

5. Europe as a Strategic Staging Base for

21st Century Stabilization Operations

Robert H. Scales, Jr. ...............

Questions, Answers and Commentary,

Chapters 3 to 5 ..................

6. The Enlarging Role of NATO

Stephen Larrabee .................

7. Guiding NATO’s Future: A Return to Basics

Charles Glaser...................

8. An Additional Role for NATO: Promoting

Collective Security Elsewhere

Carl Kaysen ....................

Questions, Answers and Commentary,

Chapters 6 to 8 ..................

9. Updating NATO Forces for the 21st Century

Thomas G. McInerney...............

iii
Imperatives for NATO Forces

Jay Garner ..................... 

11.America’s Diminishing Commitment to NATO:

Implications for Service Force Structure

John J. Mearsheimer ............... 

Questions, Answers and Commentary,

Chapters 9 to 11 .................. 

12.Whither the U.S.-NATO Partnership: Consensus

and Dissent

Lloyd J. Matthews ................. 

About the Authors ................... 

iv
1. U.S. European Command and NATO Command 

2. Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Surrounding Region ..

3. Growth of Air Assets ...............

4. Air Operations Snapshot .............

5. Strike Sorties by Date...............

v
Ten years have elapsed since the fall of the Berlin 

which served as a fitting symbol for the end of the Cold 

That historic juncture brought into question the 

edifice of western European security arrangements

North Atlantic Treaty Organization—that had s

Alliance members so well since NATO’s founding in 19

also brought into question the rationale for Ame

continued deep involvement in European security a

With the gradual realization that the Russian men

essentially dead, at least for the next 10 to 15 year

perhaps longer, and with NATO’s missions having ev

well beyond the original purpose of territorial de

debate on both sides of the Atlantic has begun to int

concerning the vital issue of where NATO should be h

and America’s relation to the Alliance.

 To bring an array of informed voices to the debate

institutions—the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of 

of the U.S. Army, the Strategic Studies Institute of th

Army War College, the Irving B. Harris Graduate Sch

Public Policy Studies of the University of Chicago, an

Program on International Security Policy at the Univ

of Chicago—joined hands to sponsor a symposium 

“The Future of U.S. Military Presence in Europe,” h

the University of Chicago on August 4, 1999.

 The present book is an outgrowth of this symposi

is not designed to set forth a literal record of word

events in the mold of the traditional sympo

“proceedings,” but rather is organized as an anthol

individual chapters complemented by selected ques

answers, and comments by symposium participant

attendees. The symposium opening address by D

Secretary of Defense John Hamre (Chapter 1) an

keynote address by the Supreme Allied Commander E

General Wesley Clark (Chapter 2) cogently set the sta

discussion. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 address the first panel 

“Is Europe Still Strategically Important to the U

vii
“Potential New Missions for NATO in the 21

st

 Cen

while Chapters 9, 10, and 11 are devoted to the last 

“What Type of Deployed Forces Does the United S

Require to Meet Its Commitments in Europe?

 Noteworthy among the commentaries is the wrap

pages 124-128 by General Crosbie E. Saint (USA Re

Commander in Chief of U.S. Army Europe during the p

of the Gulf War, General Saint supplied the U.S. Arm

Corps, nominally slated as an element of NATO forc

the coalition command that executed Operation DE

STORM.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

viii
CHAPTER 1

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-EUROPEAN

 RELATIONSHIP:

FRAMING THE DISCUSSION

John J. Hamre

In the history of the United States, there have bee

distinct epochs or periods of American security policy

first was from about 1776 until 1812, though it is a 

hard to find exact demarcation points. It obviously co

the formation of the new republic, which did not ins

form at the end of the Battle at Yorktown. It took q

while for the republic to jell. The early Congress a

immediately threw away the Army and Navy. The Re

Cutter Service, the predecessor of the Coast Guard, be

the de facto Navy for some 10 years because the 

Congress said, in effect, “We don’t need a navy now, we 

need an army.” It cut the Army down to 50 people. It be

clear by 1812 that cutting the Army wasn’t a good idea

it became even clearer when the British in 1814 sail

the Potomac and set fire to Washington. The first epoc

thus one in which we were getting our feet on the gr

getting ourselves organized, thinking about defense

developing the philosophy we were going to ne

undergird the republic for the rest of its history.

The second epoch extends from 1814-1818 roughly 

turn of the century. Obviously, there were some signi

events during that period, like the Civil War. But in te

our international security posture, it was a period whe

United States was relatively free to expand into the 

territories of the North American continent. We wer

content simply with growing into the heartland of Am

We had relatively modest interests overseas, and we 

largely sheltered by the British navy. Thus we 

preoccupied with ourselves during that second epo

ended, of course, with the Spanish American War.

1
imperial phase, saw the United States turn outwa

design annexing territory overseas and making it p

America. The third period was culminated b

expeditionary support for Allied forces during World W

when, in an atypically American act, we sent a large 

overseas, thus involving ourselves in what G

Washington called a “foreign war.” I’m not sure there i

a thing as a foreign war for America any more. Wit

globe today being so small, what were once perceiv

foreign wars now usually seem to be in our own backya

any event, we made a conscious decision to get d

involved in the Great War, and the third epoch drew 

close with the end of that war.

On entering the interwar years—the fourth se

epoch—America chose to retrench. In a way, this p

marked a kind of void in America’s military and se

history. But it was enormously important in a br

sense, for it was the time when the two great forces 

20th century emerged. On one hand, global recession 

leading to the rise of national socialism in German

ultimately to World War II. On the other hard, interna

communism, centered in the Soviet Union, would 

joining in an uneasy marriage of convenience with the 

to combat the Nazi scourge.

The fifth security epoch emerged from the ashes of W

War II—we commonly characterize it as the Cold W

was a time when the traditional international se

order was shattered. In its place a new order em

initially very bipolar in character. That configur

diffused significantly by 1960, but it still dominate

security milieu during the second half of this century 

the historic date of November 9, 1989, when the Berlin 

came tumbling down.

I recall the first time I saw the Wall. It was om

frightening. I never thought in my wildest imagina

would live long enough to see it down. Then I reme

2
got closer, we began to hear this “chink, chink, c

People were chipping away the wall, collecting pieces 

as souvenirs to tourists like me the next day. There 

other people busy with paint and brushes because the 

were worth more if they had paint on them. T

entrepreneurialism at work. Thus the fifth epoch end

1989. We are now 10 years into the next epoch, the 

But what is this new period? It’s very hard to know

know roughly when it started, but we don’t know whe

going. Indeed, where it’s going is the subject of the pr

book.

Though things are still pretty fuzzy, I believe 

possible to discern some of the main features that will 

distinguish this sixth epoch of American security hi

While the United States has emerged as the only 

superpower, it has not established a pax Americana 

sense. Indeed, one trait of the sixth epoch is the distu

ethnic tribalism that now seems to characteriz

international security order. There are some 40 to 50 

struggles going on around the world at this time, so

them dreadful in the carnage and violence they prod

A second trait is the frightening devolution o

resources of violence from the old Soviet empire. 

variety of reasons, those resources are becoming br

available in the new world. This huge arsenal of biol

and chemical weapons, and possibly even compone

nuclear weapons, may fall into the hands of very dang

people. Moreover, the large stable of Russian mi

engineers and scientists left over from the Soviet era 

very well be lured into employment by elements inim

to our security. These are very troubling fall-outs fro

Soviet period.

A third trait is the emergence of strange 

uncontrollable new transnational actors on the s

Guerrilla organizations like that of Osama bin Lade

example, appear able to shift and move in and o

3
deter these sorts of new actors since they are not a

dependent on the normal structures of government wh

and around which deterrence has evolved during the l

years.

But several other transnational forces have emerg

the scene that have implications for our security

globalization of entertainment and information typif

the Internet, for example. The emergence of interna

crime is increasingly difficult to distinguish 

international terrorism. In Colombia, we could soon f

the international stage the first narco-state. Anoth

these transnational forces is disease. Few realize 

profound the changes might be in Africa if the 

epidemic there continues in its current pattern.

Also important to note is the transnational shift o

An American product today may have the computer 

made in China, the software written in India, the han

made in Ireland, the satellite made in Italy, the la

occurring in Russia, and we call it an American tele

system. Ours is a profoundly different world where th

have now gone international, and this trend extends e

armaments. The global spread of armaments an

technology of armaments, as we have seen, flows in 

measure from the disintegration of the old Soviet em

But not entirely because there are now some eme

rogue actors such as North Korea, whose only sou

political pride and cash is the sale of items like N

missiles. 

What, then, are the broader implications of all 

features of the new security epoch? We can only see th

the glass darkly, but some of those implication

beginning to appear at least in dim outline. For 

stability is going to be an increasingly rare phenomen

this new epoch. The previous epoch, the Cold War e

was at least characterized by great inertia. Though 

forces were at work, they moved very slowly. That d

4
seems that many of the international structures that 

created to mediate and manage security problems d

the Cold War epoch are increasingly brittle, 

ineffective, in this new epoch. Recall how unnerved 

were during the Asian economic crisis of 1998 wh

appeared that the World Bank and the Interna

Monetary Fund could not cope because the disruptive 

had grown bigger than the economic and fina

structures put in place by the industrial natio

rationalize the international movement of capital. 

was widespread talk about having to re-engineer the 

system. The problem seems to have abated, at least f

time being, but I’m not at all sure the underlying f

tending toward instability have been rectified. Afte

capital is more global today than at any time in histor

becoming more so.

The United Nations (UN) is increasingly irrel

because of the lack of consensus in the Security Cou

structure that requires unanimity before effective 

can be taken. It is only the rare uncontroversial missio

attracts sufficient support among UN members to pa

way to action. When it comes to a big issue, like the Ba

the UN is frozen into immobility. Thus the structures 

Cold War era are increasingly inapplicable in this 

period. There remains a question mark over NATO i

regard. It is remarkable how NATO evolved to the po

being able to contemplate uninvited military action 

sovereign out-of-area state—it was the tragic situat

Kosovo that made it happen. Yet I worry about what I 

U.S. domestic political reactions to Kosovo and N

operations there.

When General Wesley Clark and I and others wer

NATO conference in June 1999, I was struck b

absolutely consistent view by other governments as to 

the Kosovo situation was all about. It was the first ti

history that NATO went to war for an idea

governments were saying that since they could not j

5
to a transcendent ideal to justify it. In other words, 

not sufficiently noble to go to war for national interes

longer. Governments must have a moral basis su

human rights to justify military action. I was startled 

uniformity of this view. It worries me frankly that cre

political stability is not a sufficiently justifiable reason 

to war. Instead, we have to discover some transce

ideal to justify democracies in acting.

The United States was not immune to such thin

Prior to NATO’s decision to launch Operation AL

FORCE, there was a great deal of domestic question

that regard. Thus, at the very time when we’re confron

world that is more tumultuous and less stable, we app

be experiencing an erosion of the traditional basis on 

democracies are willing to go to war. They seem to be w

to do so only for more idealistic values. One must w

about the staying power of public support in this s

moral environment when the armed forces begin t

casualties.

Everything thus far written in this chapter bears 

but does not answer, the key question—“What is the f

of the U.S. military presence in Europe?” Not hav

crystal ball, neither I nor anyone else can answe

question except to note that it is a subset of a still br

question—“What is America’s security posture going 

in this sixth security epoch? Should we organize and 

ourselves around the policies and structures w

currently are the residue of the previous epoch? Or s

we shift to something that’s radically new, somethin

we don’t yet understand?”

For example, we have a vigorous debate going 

Washington over the F-22 fighter aircraft. The F-2

weapon system designed at the height of the Cold Wa

of our most defense-minded Congressional comm

decided we should live without the F-22 because its 

expense would usurp money for other essential m

6
fight to get it back because it is going to be essent

future war? Or is it an unnecessary relic of the pre

epoch whose purchase would keep us from resourcing 

we really will need for the future? These are very 

questions. In 1997 the congressionally-created Na

Defense Panel criticized DoD for remaining mired 

Cold War past. The implication was that though 

accomplished a little downsizing, we’re continui

maintain the same kind of force we had during the 

War. Moreover, according to this view, such a po

prevents retooling in preparation for the security chall

of the next epoch. Such criticism overlooks the fac

more than once in the last 4 years we’ve had to moun

nearly simultaneous operations. When will the time 

when we don’t have to worry about Korea? Or about Eu

Certainly such worries have not been groundless in th

decade. Thus, to repeat, the question of whether to b

the contingencies from the past or retool fo

uncertainties of the future is not susceptible to an 

answer.

The foregoing question is particularly problemati

relates to the Army. Even though we may be in for a 

period of transition to a radically different force, w

must confront the current challenges, which argu

maintaining pretty much what we look like today. Th

Army needs to be in Europe today because it represen

connective tissue that holds together the security stru

of Europe.

I worry that American public support for forc

Europe seems to be atrophying. Moreover, the Euro

themselves seem not at all certain concerning their se

arrangements for the future. Thus, even if the U.S. 

remains this connective tissue, what is it connecting? 

will it be connecting in 10 years? We have a na

requirement to keep our European allies firmly enga

the debate. This is why we are willing to talk 

intensively with them about their own defense initia

7
to act in the security arena apart from the United State

deeply skeptical that such autonomous capabilitie

eventuate, because the Europeans are not buying w

takes to do that.

1

 But I’m glad they’re talking about i

worst thing that could happen is for them to say, “We 

ever worry about security because the United State

come in if the situation ever gets serious.” Such thi

would be a very serious step in the wrong direction. Th

U.S. Army has to transform itself while at the same 

serving as the connective tissue holding the se

structure together in Europe for the time being.

But if the Army holds onto a nostalgic vision of its 

past, it’s going to atrophy and die. The Army that e

through the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s was 

the finest land forces ever assembled, but simply ha

onto a lighter, smaller version of that force for the fut

not going to work. The Army leadership that le

downsizing in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Un

1989 was thoroughly professional—dispassionate, for

and direct. We need the same sort of resolve today, to

the end that the Army must change itself because it c

simply be what it was and still be relevant to this ne

complex world emerging. But at the same time, the 

must serve the indispensable function of holding tog

the European continent, which right now is som

adrift in thinking about its security requirements.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION. In view of the perceived aversion to casu

on the part of the American public, is it any longer re

to contemplate our involvement in hostilities where bl

likely to be shed?

Dr. Hamre. I was struck by the consensus that e

during the Kosovo operation. The skeptics believed t

we worked our way into the campaign, we had perhaps 

days worth of public support. They were wrong. Even 

8
the terrible refugee exodus, which strengthened 

resolve, the Alliance leadership was quite solid. 

realized that there was an enormous amount at risk 

Alliance fell apart. The necessity for Alliance cohesio

thus lend backbone, even in the face of casualties.

With regard to our own position at home, whe

situation is serious and there is a strong consensus, Am

will go to war fast and will accept casualties. The perce

that America is willing to fight only so long as nobody d

wrong—if war were to break out today in Korea, we’d 

like hell. We’d take lots of casualties, but we wouldn

up until we won. I’m absolutely convinced of that. Bu

contemplated military action not deeply supported b

American people, if we proceed despite that la

broad-based support, we then have to conduct the wa

way that avoids undermining whatever fragile cons

that does exist to carry it out. And therein might be the 

of the criticism that America is not prepared to go t

anymore. When we as a nation are absolutely conv

that it’s in our interest to do so, we will fight. And it d

have to be oil we’re fighting over. We’ll fight for ideas. W

that in Kosovo. What made Kosovo so hard was that w

never developed a profound consensus among our po

leadership over the Balkans at any time during the 

years. The crisis in Bosnia developed quickly, an

military did such an efficient job there that we never h

enter the crucible of public debate and consensus-bu

on why we were there and what we were fighting for. W

need to do better in the future.

QUESTION. Why should the United States unde

European security in the face of European prosperity a

refusal to spend more on defense?

Dr. Hamre. We have a mixed picture. I think th

basic stability in the European defense budgets. They 

to be growing, but at least they aren’t being slashed. 

are effectively eroding, however, because the purch

9
structural impediments. We in the United States spen

times as much each year on research and develop

(R&D) than all of Europe combined. The Euro

investment is further eroded by having stov

establishments that have to be resourced in every cou

We’re not immune to that. We have an Army, Navy, an

Force. We have an awful lot of inefficiencies in the U

States, too. But clearly there is a reduction of the va

the annual input into R&D in Europe because it’s fe

the beast rather than buying new knowledge. Europe 

come to grips with that problem. It would be much be

the United States and its European allies could j

tackle the R&D problem. We’ll always have a s

defense budget, and we’ll always be able to build a forc

our defense industrial base is now so narrow that we 

generate adequate R&D competition to underpin opt

force modernization. It would be best to tackle that pr

on a transnational basis, but I’m not optimistic that w

able to pull that off in the present environment.

QUESTION. Speaking of the power of an idea as oppo

selfish interests as a clarion call for action, we all reca

in November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and the people o

city celebrated with an all-night party in the streets. B

should also recall that earlier in that year, durin

summer months of June through August, somethin

happened that was tremendously inspiring. Young me

women, clothes on their backs and carrying their b

walked out of East Germany and headed west, all in th

of real hazards and an uncertain future. Doesn’t this e

illustrate the power of an idea?

Dr. Hamre. To share in your recollections, d

remember when things were starting to fall apart in 

1989, and the Hungarian government announced t

would no longer stop those who came from East Germ

That it would let them emigrate to the west? A

overnight, 800 East Germans showed up at the 

German Embassy in Budapest, posing a major crisis. 

10
train bound for West Germany and took them o

remember CNN was following the train across the fro

When the train got to Frankfurt, a CNN rep

interviewed a young couple, with the woman holding a 

The reporter asked all the typical inane questions. A

you tired? Aren’t you hungry? Wasn’t this a terrible tr

you know what you’re going to do? All this kind of stu

the end of it, the reporter asked, “Is there anythin

you’d like to say?” The young German father said, 

there is something I’d like to say. I would like to 

America for keeping a place in the world that is free.” 

simple but eloquent statement by the young Ge

captured perfectly what America had been doing f

years—holding up the beacon of freedom for the w

oppressed. Unfortunately, our post-Cold War gene

lacks an equally compelling vision. But the flame i

there, even if it now burns less brightly, and it becom

task of Americans everywhere to nurture that flam

brighten the beacon of freedom for those less fort

throughout the world.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 1

1. The European Union, for example, seems to be talking se

about putting together a rapid-reaction corps of 50,000-60,000 

along with supporting aircraft and warships. See “EU Purs

Military Plans,” The Sentinel, Carlisle, PA, January 23, 2000, p

11
CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROP

Wesley K. Clark

With NATO having just celebrated its 50th birt

with the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wa

behind us, and with NATO’s historic coercive cam

against Serbia now rapidly becoming grist for the mi

historians’ mill, the time seems right to pause and 

stock of where the NATO Alliance stands and wher

headed, with particular attention to the American ro

this chapter, I shall address six broad topics: the impor

of Europe, security challenges facing NATO as it ente

new century, the state of the NATO Alliance t

Operation ALLIED FORCE, lessons from the recent B

conflicts, and winning in the 21st century.

1

THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE

The figures speak volumes. U.S. trade with Eu

amounting to over $250 billion annually, produces 

three million domestic jobs. U.S. companies employ 

million people in Europe. One in 12 factory workers 

United States is employed by a European Union (EU

operating in this country, of which there are some 

Half of the world’s goods are produced by the United S

and the EU. Ninety percent of humanitarian aid disp

throughout the world comes from the United States an

EU. Companies from the EU form the largest inves

block in 41 U.S. states. Fifty-six percent of U.S. fo

investment occurs in Europe. Europe buys 30 perc

U.S. exports. We should note too the large oil an

reserves in the North Sea and particularly in the Ca

basin that provide a strategic hedge against disrupt

supplies from the Middle East.

13
economic interdependence between Europe and the U

States. The economic ties are complemented and reinf

of course, by political, cultural, and diplomatic ties o

standing. The unity of vision and purpose shared by E

and the United States provides enormous leverage as 

partners act in concert to encourage peace and pros

throughout the world. Thus the maintenance of po

and economic stability in Europe remains in the forefr

America’s national interests.

As a result of those interests, we have continu

maintain a strong military presence in Europe, thoug

a far cry from the size of the U.S. Seventh Army at the 

the Cold War, which amounted to 17 or 18 br

equivalents. So far as force structure is concerned, we 

two mechanized divisions in Germany, an airborne br

in Italy, a brigade-size special forces unit, and ass

Reserve and National Guard personnel. The Air Forc

two-plus fighter wings distributed in Germany, 

Turkey, and the United Kingdom, while the 

maintains NATO-assigned aircraft carriers i

Mediterranean much of the time as well as a M

Expeditionary Unit afloat. The numbers come to 6

personnel for the Army, 34,000 Air Force, 10,000 Nav

Marines, and 3,500 reserves, all embraced within a b

of some four billion dollars.

U.S. forces in Europe, though deeply interrelated 

NATO command structure, are not exclusively 

automatically dedicated to NATO. The distinct

achieved through the maintenance of two sep

command structures—the United States Euro

Command (EUCOM) for U.S. forces and the Sup

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for N

commands—with dual-hatted commanders for se

principal elements within the two structures (see Figu

For example, the commander of EUCOM also serv

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) w

NATO. The commander of U.S. Navy Europe (NAV

14
NATO.The commander of U.S. Army Europe (USARE

in Bosnia serving as commander of NATO’s stabiliz

force (SFOR).

EUCOM serves as the backbone for many eleme

NATO, but the United States achieves additional lev

through its command of other national forces via the d

of dual-hatting. All in all, the United States is mak

preponderant contribution to the NATO Alliance.

SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING NATO AT T

TURN OF THE CENTURY—AND BEYOND

We remain in a period of danger. Unlike those 

believed that the end of the Cold War marked the e

serious security challenges, NATO’s statesmen re

immediately that we had not after all reached the e

history. Other security problems were emerging, as 

always have over the course of time, and simple pru

demanded that they be prepared for. But the probabi

occurrence of particular kinds of conflict is different 

than it was during the Cold War. The probability o

15

Figure 1. U.S. European Command and NATO Comm
Cold War, with the chances for intra-failed-state co

regional conflict, conventional war, and the ult

horror—nuclear war—declining rather precipitately a

moved toward the more violent end of the spectr

conflict. But in today’s security milieu, lackin

superpower polarity that often served to impose tense 

in a confrontational world, intra-failed-state and reg

conflicts are now joining with local instabilities 

insurgencies to define the most likely forms of a

conflict. Our task is to deal with these dangers success

while preventing further movement toward the 

serious manifestations of war.

Looking further down the road, we find other se

challenges emerging. Regional instability such as w

seeing today in the Balkans will continue to be a pr

and indeed may well intensify. The rapid proliferat

weapons of mass destruction—particularly chemica

biological—is becoming of paramount con

Transnational threats—refugee movements, terro

criminal activity, environmental issues, scarc

resources—are shouldering forward, demandin

attention of defense planners. The failure of democrac

liberal reform in states of the former Soviet Union coul

pose dangerous security issues.

THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE TODAY

In the face of such an evolving security environ

NATO has continuously adjusted its strategic concept

to remain current and relevant. NATO’s present str

concept, agreed upon at the Washington summit in 

1999, represents an evolutionary adaptation of pos

War policy. Its hallmarks are:

• Broader appreciation of what constitutes se

interests;

• Emphasis upon deterrence and rapid response;

16
• Adoption of a European Security and Defense Id

(ESDI) within the Alliance.

The revised strategic concept reflects a b

appreciation of security interests, recognizing that se

is not the same thing as defense. Though we must 

collective defense as the foundation of security, me

understand that events adjacent to or near Al

countries can have decided impacts upon NATO se

itself.

Deterrence remains important. Though we ha

nation as adversary at this time, it is vital to reta

means to deter the outbreak of conflict wherever it can 

security within the Alliance. We recognize als

essentiality of being able to respond militarily in 

fashion, not only within the borders of NATO countri

also without. Accordingly, we are placing incre

emphasis on rapid-reaction forces.

Technological advancement, of course, has never m

faster than it is moving today. Technology offers chall

as well as opportunities, however, for it is not easy to 

the national militaries within the Alliance at the c

edge of modernization and also interoperable with 

other. It is important for the European pillar of the Al

to do more in this regard.

In sum, NATO’s strategic vision has evolved fr

single-minded focus on the threat from the ea

prevailed during the Cold War, to a European Securit

Defense Identity, more expansive in concept and focus

no identified enemy. This is what both Europe an

United States want. It is time to halt the reduct

resources dedicated to defense—the so-called 

dividend—and face up to the reality that in this 

dangerous world security never comes cheap.

Though the Alliance has no standing enemy, it will 

ebb and flow of events find its attention fixed at time

17
former Yugoslavia having already spawned two con

that demanded NATO’s intervention and with th

unsettled nature of events there showing every prom

requiring long-term Alliance involvement.

In Croatia (see map at Figure 2) we have a 

attempting to become a democracy, living wit

aftermath of war, facing elections in late 1999, govern

a hard-line party, and headed by a president whose h

problems have continued to inhibit his coming to grip

the need for democratization in his country. In Bosn

still have 30,000 NATO and associated troops o

ground. A three-member rotating presidency is in 

representing the Bosnian, Croat, and Serb constitue

Encouragingly, it held together despite the enor

stresses imposed by the war in Kosovo. Refugee

returning, though some remain displaced. The armed 

are increasingly under control. A recent Balkan sta

summit brought progress in terms of calls for reducti

those forces. But we cannot yet claim true reconciliat

Bosnia, even though the people there are gro

accustomed to the taste of peace thanks to NATO’s w

the region.

Montenegro, which was drawn reluctantly int

conflict in Kosovo, remains a province of the so-

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The president, 

Djukanovic, governs an uneasy coalition, with one 

coalition partner striving for independence while he h

works to remain within the Serbia-Montenegro fede

even as he attempts to wrest concessions from Belgra

Albania, though not a part of the former Yugoslavi

caught up in the spreading Balkan problem. Its govern

collapsed in early 1997, leading to intervention by I

forces to restore stability. After withdrawal of the Itali

the fall of 1997, the viability of the government rem

tenuous. Then came the Kosovo crisis and the conse

flood of refugees across the border into Albania

18
Albanians urgently appealed to NATO for assistance, 

was provided. Adjacent to Albania is Macedonia, form

part of Yugoslavia, but now a free and democratic state

troops have been on the ground there since 1993 as pa

United Nations (UN) stabilization and security mi

which correctly anticipated the subsequent flow of e

Macedonia, despite the very real centrifugal political 

loosed in the country, managed to hold together durin

Kosovo conflict.

Finally, of course, there are Serbia and Kosov

Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic remains in power. The eco

is devastated as a result of his exposing the na

instruments of production to NATO attacks. The peop

restive and concerned about the winter season now f

receding. Milosevic is still doing his best to keep his 

on the reins of power. At the center of all the furor is K

itself. We have there today over 30,000 NATO troops o

ground, along with a small Russian contingent. Ref

have flowed back in the largest spontaneous re

diaspora since the post-World War II era. The people 

returned, and the sorting-out process is now proceed

19

Figure 2. Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Surrounding Reg
That is the situation in the Balkans as it exists 

But let’s now flash back to the spring of 1998 to se

NATO conceptualized its response to the emerging co

in Kosovo. Planning proceeded along the following str

axes:

• Coercive air campaign;

• Isolation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

• Humanitarian relief to refugees;

• Continued implementation of the Dayton Accor

We had recognized on March 24, 1999, when th

bomb dropped on Yugoslavia, that an air campai

isolation would not be enough to deter Slobodan Milo

We also had to impose diplomatic and physical isolat

the federal government of Yugoslavia, letting it know 

would be no succor from any quarter and that the co

would be exposed to the full brunt of NATO’s power. W

had to make provision for humanitarian relief to refug

lesson learned from Bosnia. Finally, we had to keep t

on in Bosnia itself, continuing to implement the D

Peace Agreement signed back on November 21, 1995. 

the NATO headquarters was extraordinarily busy 

these multiple tasks.

Our plan was to mount a steadily escalating ser

steps designed to increase pressure on Milosevic in or

secure heightened diplomatic, psychological, and ph

leverage. The first step was to be persuasion—diplo

backed by threat (discussion of the air threat occur

June 1998 followed by issuance of the air threat in Oc

1998). The second step was to be coercion—diplo

backed by force (the air campaign commenced on Mar

1999, with a ground threat possible in June 1999). The 

step, should it prove necessary, would be forcible terr

seizure and securing by ground operations as back

appropriate diplomacy.

20
contemplated above proved most instructive. We tr

persuade President Milosevic not to use military 

against the Kosovar rebels. He wasn’t persu

Accordingly, in October 1998, NATO issued an activ

order for a forthcoming air campaign. General 

Naumann, Chairman of the NATO Military Comm

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, and I as SAC

traveled to Belgrade to confer with Milosevic on se

occasions. On October 25, we issued the air threat dire

him, and it resulted in a respite of some 2 to 4 months 

Kosovo fighting.

After Milosevic had signed off on his promises to N

he offered us brandy and we sat around talking 

philosophical vein. He said, “We know how to deal wi

problem of these Albanians. We’ve done this before

asked where. “In the Drenica region in central Koso

1946,” he told us. We asked what the solution was. H

right out: “We killed them. We killed them all. It 

several years, but eventually we killed them all. And 

we had no problem.”

After this chilling conversation, we knew that the 

was ticking. Sure enough, by March of the next year we 

into a campaign of coercion—diplomacy backed by 

The intent was to—

• Attack, disrupt, and degrade current Serb m

operations;

• Deter any further aggressive Serb actions;

• Degrade Serb military potential.

It was vitally important that the air campaign—fit

called Operation ALLIED FORCE—be a suc

Accordingly, we established several goals to satisf

notion of success, calling them measures of merit:

• Avoid losses;

21
throughout FRY);

• Minimize collateral damage;

• Maintain alliance cohesion.

Each of these goals was important. It was param

that we avoid losses. Why? Because in an air campaig

don’t want to lose aircraft. When you start to lose 

expensive machines the countdown starts against you

headlines begin to shout, “NATO loses second aircraft

the people ask, “How long can this go on?” The answer 

be, “It can go on indefinitely, whatever time it tak

compel Milosevic to comply with the will of the interna

community.” But all realized it could not go on indefini

we were suffering a succession of aircraft losses. Mor

the same argument applied if we were losing air crew

Thus the extraordinary steps to avoid losses.

So far as the other measures of success were conce

obviously we had to hit, hurt, and inhibit the Serb for

Kosovo because Serbian actions there were the casu

itself. Of course, we wanted to strike hard at the str

and infrastructure targets throughout the Federal Re

of Yugoslavia, but the attacks on these fixed targets 

relatively easy compared to gripping the tactical 

themselves. It was unheard-of for an air component to 

a full and successful tactical campaign against fielded 

forces without benefit of a ground component. We kn

would be a huge challenge, particularly give

topographical and vegetative features of the terrain, 

lent themselves to enemy cover, concealment

camouflage.

The minimization of civilian casualties and dam

civilian structures and property—whether Se

Kosovar—was very high on our priority list. This was 

both humanitarian and political reasons. Any la

discrimination between legitimate military target

22
explain what we were doing and maintain public sup

The final measure of success, no less important tha

others, was the maintenance of Alliance cohesio

planning and waging Operation ALLIED FORCE, i

necessary to consider the views and sensitivities of Al

members because a united effort over the long haul w

essential precondition for achievement of military 

political goals.

Operation ALLIED FORCE consisted of 

simultaneous air lines of operation—a strategic atta

Serbia itself and a tactical attack in Kosovo. The str

attack targeted Serbia’s integrated air defenses, com

and control structures, Yugoslav army and Minis

Interior forces, war-sustaining infrastructure 

resources, and military supply routes. In Kosovo

attacks were designed to degrade, isolate, and int

Serbian forces.

From the inception of the air campaign, it wa

intention to make it serious, sustained, and intensi

Between kick-off on March 24 and termination on Ju

the total number of aircraft employed almost tripled—

366 to 912 (Figure 3). These figures would have rise

further had Milosevic not capitulated when he did. Ea

the campaign, reporters kept asking us how many s

and how many strikes were launched, showing an a

endless fascination with the numbers. To accomm

them, we kept tabs. The final figures revealed over 3

sorties, with almost 11,000 strike sorties flown and 

23,000 bombs and missiles launched (Figure 4).

Looking at the number of strike sorties as they 

distributed over the course of the campaign, we see th

manned aircraft strike sorties increased from about 10

day in the beginning to close to 500 on some days 

latter stage (Figure 5). The figures varied day b

depending on weather conditions and the nature 

targets. We used a lot of cruise missiles early i

23
campaign when the targets were more suitable

discontinued their use later. Out of all the devastation 

the air implicit in the foregoing numbers,there were o

incidents of significant collateral damage. I don’t b

any other air campaign in history achieved this deg

precision. 

The air staffers who planned those missions an

airmen who flew them did an absolutely superb job

24

Total Sorties Flown................ 37,465

Strike Sorties Flown............... 10,808

Ordnance Expended

• 23,000+ Bombs and Missiles

• 35% Precision-Guided Munitions

• 329 Cruise Missiles

Figure 4. Air Operations Snapshot.

24 March 10 Jun

Strike 121 355

Air to Air 561 20

Reconnaissance/Unmanned

 Aerial Vehicles 26 72

Suppression of Enemy Air

 Defenses/Jamming 55 74

Tanker 66 228

Other Support 42 63

Total Aircraft 366 912

Cruise Missile Platforms 10 17

Figure 3. Growth of Air Assets
men and women who flew our aircraft daily into the 

over Yugoslavia are the real heroes of this campaign. 

are for the most part anonymous. Their identities wer

confidential to avoid putting their families at risk. Bu

flew over Yugoslavia day after day, night after night, 

continuous antiaircraft missile fire. Despite the fac

none of our pilots lost their lives, there were numerous 

encounters in which aircraft were banged up and a

lost. It was a tough fighting environment, and the succ

our pilots is a great testament to their skill and cour

We need to ask ourselves why the war ended when 

Why did Milosevic toss in the towel? The best explana

that he had finally run out of options. Early on, he ha

number of hopes. Maybe NATO would not muster the 

bomb despite its threats to do so. If NATO did send bom

maybe he could shoot them down in politically t

numbers. Or maybe the bombs wouldn’t be accurate a

could absorb them. Maybe he could embarrass the Al

so that domestic support would erode and coh

disappear. Maybe other nations would rally to his sid

provide assistance. Maybe he would defeat the Ko

forces and all resistance would collapse. Maybe he 

destabilize the entire region and NATO would b

distracted to focus on Serbia. But in the end all 

25

Figure 5. Strike Sorties by Date.

Manned

Aircraft

Cruise

Missiles
accept NATO’s conditions. He waited until the last po

time to accept those conditions and still have a cha

retain power. That was his cold calculation, expla

why—despite telling General Naumann and me in Ja

1999 that keeping Kosovo was more important than s

his head—in the end he gave up Kosovo in an attem

save his head.

LESSONS FROM THE BALKAN CONFLICTS

What did we learn from the Kosovo experience? F

became apparent that rapid, sustained, and de

planning was an absolute must. As mentioned ea

starting in the spring of 1998 NATO headqua

commenced detailed planning, constantly upd

provisional plans in the light of breaking events, a

continued such work at a feverish pace virtually non

through the end of September. Second, we learned 

contrary to expectations, NATO even in post-Cold 

Europe must maintain real warfighting capabilities: 

reaction forces with deployable command and co

Alliance intelligence fusion; air-ground reconnaiss

all-weather, full-spectrum engagement capabilities

interoperable, survivable, sustainable forces.

In particular, intelligence had to be available, no

strategic warning indicators but hard data for imme

targeting. To accomplish this, we had to use air to co

reconnaissance of the ground. The ideal instrument fo

mission proved to be unmanned aerial vehicles, whi

deployed and used effectively for the first time in co

Also, we had to be able to engage the enemy, not just 

bright, clear weather conditions like those in the Ame

southwest where U.S. forces train, but also in the 

where visibility was poor or nonexistent. In short, K

confronted NATO and the men and women who served 

forces with a real warfighting experience.

26
Bosnia, because what we’ve been doing in Bosnia for 

time has relevance to our present task in Kosovo. 

have an impression of peacekeeping as consisting of so

patrolling along a cease-fire line, driving back and fo

jeeps while exuding good will to the locals. But the rea

Bosnia is quite different, presenting a far more co

picture than simple peacekeeping. By way of exa

consider three vignettes: the Serb “rally” at Banja Luk

seizure of Serb radio-television transmission towers; a

unfortunate incident involving returning Serbs at Dr

On September 6, 1997, just before the local Bo

elections, the hard-line parties in the Republika S

(Serb Republic) announced a special Republika-wide “

for the election in Banja Luka. We knew that the gath

was more than a mere rally because the day before w

seized a cache of police uniforms and weapons. Ther

thus very good reason to believe that this so-called pe

rally was in fact dedicated to overthrowing the mod

Serb Co-President, Biljana Plavsic. The situation pres

a tricky military problem, because how can peaceke

forces properly take action against what is represente

democratic rally? The call had gone out for all “coura

and intelligent Serbs” to get on a bus, travel to Banja 

and be with their brothers—and get paid 200 t

Deutsche marks for the experience. From all over B

250 busses loaded up and started to move.

In the meanwhile, as we worked to coalesce po

opinion against the rally on the basis that it represen

threat to democracy and stability in Republika Srpsk

were able to delay the arrival of the busses using non

means. We successfully fostered broad public sent

that the rally was not only unnecessary but illega

threatening as well. And so it came about that by abou

p.m. on September 8, the rally was effectively bann

Bosnian Serb police.

27
to hold the rally anyway. He stood in the square wit

supporters, surrounded by 1,500 hostile Serbs 

supported the moderate Serb president Madam Plavsi

was literally booted off the stage. He took refuge in a n

hotel, and the next day Milosevic called me, saying

must protect his life.” We asked, “Who’s in the hote

him?” Milosevic said, “Oh, just some armed guard

other people. But he is in danger, he is president, a

must be treated with respect.” NATO thus found itself 

position of assisting and protecting the very same har

Bosnian Serb leader who had been a consistent oppon

NATO forces. The episode was the gravest defeat of r

Serb forces in the entire 5-year campaign, and i

inflicted by other Bosnian Serb forces assisted by N

The Banja Luka incident demonstrated th

peacekeeping forces have mobility, information super

interoperability, and sublethal means of engagement

can win in situations where nobody even knows there’s 

a fight.

The second illustrative peacekeeping vignette 

Bosnia relates to the disruptive influence of Serb rad

television. A few weeks after the incident in Banja 

Carlos Westendorp, the EU Peace Envoy and 

Representative in Bosnia, called me and said, “You’ve 

help me with Serb radio-television—it’s undercu

democracy.” Under the authority provided by the 

Atlantic Council, I spoke to Secretary General J

Solana, and we agreed that we would seize control 

television transmission towers at Duga Niva, Udr

Trebevic, and Leotar.

The planning began at 7:00 p.m. on the even

September 30, 1997, in SFOR headquarters. The or

execute went out after midnight, and at 5:00 a.m. th

morning, Italian, Spanish, and U.S. forces moved out t

the towers, each of which was guarded by a small 

contingent. We knew the routes and moved to each sit

an overwhelming display of force, knocked on the door 

28
join us for breakfast—we have some hot coffee.” The 

looked at our tanks and armored personnel car

glanced at their puny AK-47s, and then said, “We’

some hot coffee!” They walked away from the towers

that was it. The operation attracted virtually no hea

but had a huge favorable impact in Bosnia. The key le

were the need for rapid and flexible planning, 

operability, effective engagement capability, mobility

survivability.

The final illustrative vignette from Bosnia occurr

April 24, 1998, even as the situation in Kosovo was he

up. It did not work out successfully like the earlier t

was our policy to encourage all minority refugees to r

to the home areas from which they had fled. In Dr

group of hard-line Croats decided they would get rid 

returning Serbs. Outside Croats, unfamiliar to us an

local authorities, infiltrated the town and gathered in

unruly crowd. They produced incendiary devices 

proceeded to burn some 100 Serb homes plus se

vehicles, moving along planned routes. The Can

battalion responded, but only after the crowd had beg

leave. Lacking nonlethal capabilities, the battalion 

have been unable to prevent the violence within accep

limits of coercion.

The result was a huge setback for the re

repatriation effort in Bosnia. It stopped the endeavor a

cold for 9 months, giving hard-line leaders on all side

life and encouragement. In drawing lessons from the 

incident, we find affirmed the essentiality of 

intelligence, sublethal engagement capab

interoperability, and rapid response, all of which 

lacking or inadequate in this instance. NATO is enga

a continuous process of analyzing its Balkan opera

drawing the relevant lessons and disseminating 

through national channels. We will doubtless con

similar challenges again in the future.

29
from the Balkan experience is the incredible complex

military operations. Every decision, every act, every 

reverberates with tactical, operational, strategic

political implications. The military commander must a

to all four. No matter how small or insignificant an 

may seem in the traditional military sense, the comm

will discover that in today’s security milieu that minor 

may suddenly become the object of consuming inter

the highest councils of state.

WINNING IN THE 21st CENTURY

Looking ahead into the next century, we see a gr

need for rapid-reaction forces within the Alliance. Th

we must retain main defense forces as a hedge ag

uncertainty—against the worst possible contingencie

are going to have to acquire the tools to deal with t

more likely crisis and conflict scenarios outside of N

territory. Thus there will be a strong new effo

strengthen the reaction forces in NATO member na

forces that can be moved quickly to deal with 

instabilities and insurgencies, failed-state situations

regional conflicts in areas that can affect NATO secu

At the Washington summit, NATO members ad

the Defense Capabilities Initiative, conceived to pr

reaction forces that can respond to any possible challen

overmatching the opponent in size, technology, read

and training. These reaction forces would po

information superiority, interoperability, sustaina

broad-spectrum engagement capability, survivability

mobility. This is what it will take to win NATO’s batt

the next century, and I believe we’re on track to obtain 

capabilities. NATO’s force goals and force planning pr

guided by the concept of a European Security and De

Identity, will produce the forces we need to imple

NATO’s new strategic concept.

30
interests, and we can never safely remain indiffere

security in that region out of a misbegotten yearn

return to the isolationism of the 1930s. In pursui

policy of engagement, it is critical for the United Sta

work through NATO so as to benefit from the huge lev

that such association brings. However, it is inevitabl

proper that both NATO and the NATO-U.S. relatio

continue to evolve over time. Evolution and adaptat

the comfortable security fixtures of the past should 

cause for concern, for through such prudent adjustmen

equip ourselves to confront the flux of events that time 

surely bring.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION. I’d like to ask a question not about the B

states but rather about the Baltic states. A member 

U.S. State Department who was recently in the Baltic 

is reported to have said that their membership in NA

practically inevitable. If that took place, how woul

uphold NATO’s treaty obligations to protect those 

from armed attack (North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5

would that involve specifically the deployment of U.S

NATO troops and/or nuclear weapons?

General Clark. I’m not going to speculate on hypoth

or prospective military activities in the form asked, 

will make a couple of points in response to your que

First, the Alliance leaders have said that the door to fu

NATO accession remains open. The Baltic countrie

among those earnestly seeking to join NATO. I w

Lithuania and Latvia recently and had very 

consultations with their leadership. They are makin

headway in terms of transforming and creating a

forces that could be interoperable with NATO. NA

policy in the past has been to first be sure that demo

conditions are met before NATO membership is gra

The Baltics are doing quite well in that regard. We’v

31
action plan to become interoperable, and they are wo

in that direction also. But the decision to extend invita

for membership is a political decision which I co

comment on. Nor could I comment on any hypoth

Article 5 operations or deployments except to note t

the case of the accessions of the first 

countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hung

we’ve said that there would not be a need for NATO fo

deployments there, certainly not nuclear weapons

would there be any large NATO headquarters in 

countries. 

We’re not trying to re-create the division of German

move it further east. It is of fundamental importan

understand what NATO leaders have always told 

Naumann and me: NATO is first and foremost a po

alliance, not a military alliance. It has a broad progr

outreach at multiple levels to provide assurance 

stability throughout Europe. It does this thr

partnerships for peace, through scientific exchanges

through conferences, dialogue, and multiple for

cooperation. It extends assurances of security, it pro

hope, it provides a basis for people in these for

turbulent regions of eastern Europe to believe that 

future they will achieve the stability needed to a

international investment in their countries. This sta

and security form the essential bedrock for all the 

reforms, hopes, and dreams that these societies have. 

NATO is a political alliance first and foremost, w

military component among many others.

QUESTION. I’d like to ask about Task Force Haw

U.S. Apache helicopter and support contingent. Acco

to the newspapers, the United States provided Task 

Hawk to NATO, but never gave it release authori

employment. Can you comment on countries prov

forces, but then not allowing them to be used.

32
NATO normally places conditions on their use. In this 

the decision was made to deploy with a possibility la

employment. That decision to employ was never mad

thus the authority was not passed to NATO.

Task Force Hawk, however, got there in a very eff

way, even though it didn’t meet the early expectatio

timelines that had been publicly announced. Origi

Task Force Hawk was to be deployed into Macedonia, 

the very time when we made the decision to deplo

well-publicized wave of refugees began flooding 

Macedonia, producing a potentially destabil

humanitarian crisis there as well as in Albania

decision was then made to shift its location from Mace

to Albania. This necessitated a much larger force pa

because of the geography and other conditions in Alb

That increase in turn extended the deployment time

Our troops did an excellent job of moving and setting 

the airfield near Tirana.

Task Force Hawk made an enormous contribution 

outcome of the war. Its arrival on the ground signaled 

determination to succeed. The people and governm

Albania immediately recognized it for what it was. 

Force Hawk represented the United States 

NATO—they were visibly there in Albania with boots 

ground. As a result of that, the army of Albania contin

strengthen its performance, it moved to the front

protected its own border. Moreover, it encourage

people of Albania to deal pragmatically with the 

problems in their country. It provided key intelligenc

planning data as we moved into the final days of t

campaign. It was a superb effort.

We were all crushed by the tragic loss of our two A

helicopter pilots who went down on a training miss

Albania. But I can’t say enough for the character an

courage of the men and women of Task Force Hawk

moved in there rapidly in a difficult environment, tr

33
made a profound contribution to the successful outco

the campaign.

QUESTION. When the war in the Balkans began, 

believed that air power would never win the war. B

retrospect, it appears to have done so. Judging from re

in the news media, a larger role for the Air Force is 

offing because of its mounting utility in winning war

you willing to accept that the Air Force has now becom

favorite tool for fighting wars?

General Clark. We know, first of all, that this w

really a war. We call it a war, and for the men and w

who flew over Belgrade I guarantee you it was a war. B

terms of foregoing all hopes for a diplomatic outcom

instead simply crushing the enemy, no we didn’t do tha

operated on multiple levels throughout this campaig

isolated Milosevic, we stabilized the countries in the r

we kept the lid on in Bosnia, we applied pressure th

the air campaign, we kept our NATO resolve intac

along, we said we are winning, Milosevic is losing, a

knows it. He knew it because he couldn’t touch our air

he couldn’t protect his equipment on the ground, an

end was obvious and inevitable. Ultimately, therefo

conceded. But in an air campaign like this, there was 

some specific criterion, some predictable level of dama

which we were assured of attaining the desired result

we always said that the air campaign was working, it w

track, but we wanted to be sure that we had the opport

if necessary, to do other things as well.

When I look at the campaign in retrospect, I se

tremendous contribution made by Task Force Haw

significant impact of the Kosovo Liberation Arm

flushing out the Serbs during the last weeks o

campaign, and the effective use of air power. I thus b

the old rule is still the right rule—that it takes a bal

mix of capabilities to wage modern war and that 

various capabilities must be exploited in differing de

34
military circumstances at hand. The result in Ope

ALLIED FORCE demonstrates that we did exactly th

QUESTION. How did you come up with the measur

success in gauging the success of Operation AL

FORCE?

General Clark. If you look at the measures of succ

prefer to call them measures of merit—you’ll note th

one of the measures could be accomplished tota

absolutely, but only to a certain degree depending o

trade-offs we chose to accept. Are we doing enough to 

friendly aircraft losses while still striking Serb 

effectively on the ground? Are we striking his infrastru

and forces on the ground hard enough or do we have to 

off a little bit to minimize further collateral damage? If 

striking too hard, if we’re causing too many problem

we risking Alliance cohesion? All of these measures of 

were fundamentally at odds with each other, becau

considerations in determining how to design the cam

and how to work it on a day-to-day basis are so difficu

complex. In retrospect, we made many calls that could 

gone another way, but one of the things I learned a long 

ago at the National Training Center is that there’s no 

best way, there’s no single best plan. There are jus

kinds of plans, two kinds of ways—those that might 

and those that won’t work. You have to pick a way 

might work, and then you make it work. That’s what N

did.

QUESTION. Have you determined the cause of the 

the Stealth bomber?

General Clark. An investigation has been accompl

but I’m not at liberty to discuss the details of it here be

Stealth is a classified platform. We have gone throug

mechanics and we know pretty much what happene

remain very confident in our equipment and we’re 

confident in our pilots. I want to say one more ti

conclusion how proud all of us should be of the me

35
there in the air and on the ground in this very ambi

situation. They did a great job for our country an

NATO. They’re the heroes of this campaign and I s

each and every one of them and will never forget th

made trip after trip to Italy, Albania, and Macedonia, 

was an inspiration to meet our young troops, to witne

innovation, the positive attitude, the dedication

determination to succeed. The pilots that flew over K

and watched the burning and the mayhem everyday 

better than anybody else what this campaign was a

They were determined to succeed. And they did.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 2

1. This chapter, under the title “The United States and NAT

Way Ahead,” and without the question-and-answer section, appe

Parameters, Vol. 29, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 2-14.

36
CHAPTER 3

STAYING IN EUROPE:

A VITAL AMERICAN INTEREST

Klaus Naumann

To approach the question of America’s future m

presence in Europe, I shall begin with a brief glance 

situation as I see it today. True, the United States is th

superpower left—economically, politically, strateg

militarily—indeed, it is militarily stronger than 

Washington is at present actively involved in confli

Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. But despite 

American power projection into overseas areas, d

American involvement in foreign political, economic

military affairs, it remains, to quote Samuel Huntingt

lonely superpower that can’t do much alone.” The U

States needs a global partner who can act together 

Washington as a global power. Such a new concept

partnership is required to deal with old and new chall

of the multipolar post-Cold War environment

post-Cold War turmoil in the Balkans, the et

Turkish-Greek-Cyprus crisis, the situations in the M

East, India, and Pakistan, as well as a new Russian-Ch

rapprochement, are some of the hallmarks of this 

world, and in responding to them alone the United S

would find even its vaunted power stretched too thin

The Chinese and Russian defense ministers now m

a regular basis. Beijing’s military procurement po

undoubtedly favorable to Russian products. Fo

Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in his v

Delhi in December 1998 proposed a trilateral relatio

among Russia, China, and India. The Chinese premie

Rongji and Russian president Boris Yeltsin stressed d

their meeting in February 1999 in Moscow the neces

increasing political, economic, and military cooper

They clearly expressed a preference for a multipolar w

37
developments should be watched carefully. True, 

Beijing and Moscow are weak at this time. But that 

change in the next 10 to 15 years. I am sure it will chan

far as China is concerned.

A complicating factor is that we shall be confronted 

the simultaneous presence of three different for

societies and their concomitant forms of war—pre-mo

modern, and post-modern. This is a new develop

suggesting that no single nation—not even the U

States—can any longer pursue national sec

unilaterally. The multifaceted, multidirectional threa

face at the beginning of the third millennium will re

responses by alliances. We will be confronted with non

actors who will use military weapons. We wi

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, includin

most dangerous one, biological weapons. And we migh

see opponents who use information warfare to paraly

very vulnerable modern societies.

We are about to enter a world that will be 

predictable and less stable than the bipolar world whi

brought successfully to an end in 1989. And we will 

world containing another novelty: the United Sta

America, the only superpower, will be vulnerable to at

by nonstate actors. Again, America will need a partne

why should it be Europe, a continent striving to ac

unity but which is far from speaking with one voice

selection of a strategic partner is based on a na

strategic interest. Why is Europe important to the U

States?

Europe is of strategic importance because three 

most important and difficult challenges at the beginn

the 21st century can be successfully tackled only if E

and the United States cooperate more closely than 

before. These three challenges are, first, to manage Ru

weakness; second, to contain the new risks and th

reasons for conflict; and third, to halt the proliferat

38
three challenges in turn.

First Russia. Russia’s transformation is far 

complete. At the moment, Russia is not yet a true demo

nor are there signs of lasting economic stability

Russian elites still believe their country to be number 

the world, although their gross national product equal

of Denmark. They continue to believe military powe

imbue Russia with global importance. Perhaps that 

reason for what I would call the coup of Pristina, w

Russia without prior announcement landed a 200

contingent in the wake of Operation ALLIED FOR

order to forge a role in the Kosovo peacekeeping effort

increasingly believe they must rely on nuclear weap

compensate for their weakness. We have to deal wit

wounded psyche of a continental power that fai

understand it was confronted by a military alliance 

NATO. The Russians have wanted veto rights over N

actions in Europe, and they had to learn during the K

crisis that while NATO was willing to inform th

contemplated actions, it would not grant them any rig

co-decision. This stance will likely be maintained. N

can predict Russia’s future with certainty

disintegration is as possible as its resurrection as a 

player during the first half of the 21st century. The g

danger at this moment, however, is the disintegrat

Russia.

We need to cooperate with Russia and giv

assistance. To this end we need a coordinated Europea

American approach, which in my view could best be ha

by NATO. The task is simply too big for either Europe 

United States acting alone. And without managin

Russian problem, we will never have stability in Eu

nor indeed in the world.

Challenge number two: we need to keep the new 

under control and prevent new forms of conflict. To tha

we’ll again need close U.S.-European cooperation. T

39
human migrations and the shortage of water 

consequence of ever increasing populations. A

beginning of the 1980s, we had some 11 million refug

our globe. Today we are approaching the 30 million 

We learned in Kosovo how quickly refugees can be u

destabilize countries. According to a study commission

the United Nations, by the year 2050 approximate

percent of our world’s population will suffer from a s

shortage of water. People have killed each other for 

grievances than a shortage of water.

Confronted with these new risk-laden reason

conflict, we have to work together to mitigate tension

resolve grievances. People who have nothing to los

easily be seduced by a ruthless regime. Neither the U

States nor Europe can cope with this problem alone, 

neither electorate has a keen interest in what they se

remote and rather unlikely danger. The United State

Europe are the only players who realistically could h

resolve such problems, and even then only by joining f

To this end, we need a well-coordinated effort to 

regional instabilities from growing into global insta

that could engulf us all.

Challenge number three: so far as proliferat

weapons of mass destruction is concerned, we need a 

effort. But such a comprehensive effort is practicable o

we execute it in a steady, incremental way, as is the pr

approach, rather than demanding sudden giant bo

Most nations are simply not aware how urgent the pr

is and thus will be unprepared to acquiesce in drac

solutions. It is particularly important to prevent w

would call “soft” proliferation, that is, the acquisit

weapons of mass destruction by rogue states tha

dispossessed weapons scientists and engineers who 

blueprints for such weapons in the back of their m

There is no hope of preventing any of the various for

proliferation unless the United States and Europe 

common action. What seems obvious is that Europe an

40
solution at all.

The three global challenges discussed above matt

both the United States and Europe. They re

cooperation, not isolated approaches. Europe, of cou

not as militarily strong as it should be. But it is a re

and by and large predictable partner. If the United S

looks around at potential partners, it will not often 

among them these qualifications—reliability 

predictability. Furthermore, Europe is a partner 

shares the same values as the United States, a rare q

among America’s partners around the globe.

I conclude therefore that the European continent 

of strategic importance to the United States. W

Europe, there is little to no chance to keep the ris

America at a distance. And unless those risks are kep

distance, the vulnerability of the United States will inc

as well. On the opposite side—and let me be absolutely 

on this—without the United States in Europe, th

neither security nor stability in Europe itself. For q

time to come, Europe cannot do without the Ame

presence. 

But there are other security interests at s

Economically the United States still finds an impo

export market in Europe, a region in which American 

have invested considerable money and on which thou

of domestic jobs depend. The proposition also wor

reverse, with Europe similarly dependent upon the U

Sates. Europe and the United States need eco

cooperation in order to remain competitive in the 

market in the 21st century. America’s economists know 

better than its defense establishment does. They r

that Europe forms a gateway for the American econo

Eastern Europe, to Russia, and to the Central 

countries ranging from Turkmenistan to Kazakh

These places are potentially areas where consumer 

may be in high demand if everything goes well. But bus

41
European cooperation in enhancing such security 

create the prerequisites for business investment 

emerging marketplace in this enormous region east 

NATO Treaty area.

Moreover, for Americans cooperation betwee

United States and Europe opens the door to the Eur

Union (EU), securing for them a certain measu

influence on this organization, which is, after a

economic competitor of the United States. A conti

American presence in Europe enhances such influenc

allows both parties to better exploit the potential 

EU-U.S. declaration on trade.

But there are at least three other strategic reason

speak for an ongoing American presence in Europe, th

being the geostrategic factor. The United States as a 

and maritime power needs free access to the coastlin

both sides of the Atlantic. The Europeans offer control 

European coastline through America’s participati

NATO and through their preparedness to host Ame

contingents in Europe. Thus, if I understand my A

Mahan properly, an American presence in Europe 

America’s strategic self-interest since it allows the U

States to protect vital sea lines of communications.

Second, as I intimated earlier, we need to keep co

at a distance, which means that a European-Ame

nexus can continue to serve as a launch pad for 

strategic deployments. Reflecting on the Ba

deployments and their promise of being prolonged, w

that the customary stationing of U.S. troops in E

offers a cost-effective solution. It is far cheaper 

temporary deployments from the States, and it is leve

by the concomitant political influence.

Enhanced American influence beyond the Europe 

EU is a third strategic benefit of a continued U.S. pre

With American forces on the continent, the United S

has a cost-effective solution for Partnership for Peace 

42
between U.S. forces and those outside NATO, are one 

better investments in stability and outreach.

For all the foregoing reasons, I regard a strong Ame

presence in Europe as serving U.S. strategic interests 

and as being indispensable for the Europeans. Mor

there are potential benefits for other areas of the world 

Europe is a true prerequisite of American global 

projection capability. Let’s be absolutely candid: witho

American presence in Europe, the United States will 

have the same clout in NATO as it has right now.

Taking into account that all future conflicts will re

coalition efforts, a U.S. presence in Europe is an inves

in winning the European support which after all is st

most reliable support the United States can get. B

maintain a substantial military presence in the abse

an existing threat is possible only if the European

taking their fair share of the common defense burde

their shoulders. The Europeans know that they have 

more. They will be slow in doing this, but they will d

the end. Americans should not forget that the Euro

are doing something which is rarely mentioned i

familiar burden-sharing debates—they are invest

great deal in stabilizing the Eastern European and Ru

situation.

The Europeans also know that military interve

requires the resoluteness to see it through once the de

is taken to go down that road. They harbor no illusio

you can win a war based on air power and technology 

They know that in every conflict there is a need for bo

the ground at the end of the day. And they know that 

will never be an intervention which you can guarante

be casualty-free. The Europeans will in all likel

remain slow in jumping on the military bandwagon du

crisis. But as soon as they are aboard, they will 

through. Kosovo has clearly shown that. After all, it w

43
blink.

Europeans wish to remain America’s partner, and 

invite their friend to keep up its military presen

Europe, which secures its influence on the EU in a 

second to none. The case for a continued robust 

presence in Europe is strong and the argument

compelling. Let me review four points to underli

statement. First, the American military presence in E

means true forward defense of the United State

ensures the vital control of sea lines of communica

Second, the American presence strengthens a u

alliance, NATO, which is, after all, the only allian

which all nations share the same values. Third, s

presence enhances American strategic flexibility, serv

extend U.S. global reach. And fourth, the Ame

presence in Europe ties together the two most p

economic areas. This link will lead over time to incr

cooperation and the reduction of competition. The 

could be an economic global dominance that no one 

challenge. An American presence on the continen

serves U.S. strategic interests and will continue to do 

the foreseeable future.

44
CHAPTER 4

AMERICA’S STANCE TOWARD EUROP

MOVING AWAY FROM A NATO-CENTER

POLICY

Ted Galen Carpenter

Let’s concede at the outset that Europe is 

strategically important to the United States. But in 

way or ways? Certainly not in the narrowest sense. Aft

the United States, given its strategic nuclear deterren

its other military and economic capabilities, could 

survived Europe’s fall during the Cold War. It would 

been a far less pleasant world for the United State

nonetheless the survival of a free and democratic We

Europe during that period was not the equivalent 

survival of the United States. It was important, it w

indispensable, and it is important to make such nu

distinctions in today’s world.

A few years ago, when he was Assistant Secret

State, Richard Holbrooke wrote that “the United Stat

become a European power” and that we should therefo

in that fashion.

1

 On this issue, as on many others, Ri

Holbrooke is dead wrong. The United States is 

European power. The United States is an external 

that has some important European interests. Tha

subtle but very important distinction. Because if Holb

were right, the United States, as a European power, i

as the leading European power, would have to 

concerned as every other significant European power 

every development that takes place anywhere in Eu

That is expecting far too much from us. It is 

sustainable policy.

We need to be more rigorous in our thinking about 

America’s important European interests are. Anyon

identify a number of them, but three stand out that h

45
we want no single power to dominate the continent. W

not want a European hegemon, particularly if that po

hostile to the United States. But, to be blunt about it, 

not want such a hegemon even if it were not hostile 

United States. In shorthand terms, we do not w

repetition of 1939 when Germany made a bid for contin

domination. The second important interest is that Eu

great powers remain at peace with one another

shorthand version of this interest is that we don’t wan

repetition of 1914. And a third important interest, in 

part flowing from the other two, is that we want Eur

be a reasonably stable arena for American trad

investment. Thus we have to have a certain meas

stability on the continent. But again, nuance is impo

What we’re seeking here is general stab

macro-stability, if you will, on the continent. That s

not be confused with the completely unattainable g

micro-stability, where we seek stability everywhere o

continent, at all times, in every single country. T

simply not a feasible goal in any region as diverse as Eu

I would be the first to concede that NATO 

institutional mechanism does secure America’s impo

European interests, and that is a powerful argume

retaining the Alliance. But I would also argue tha

NATO-centered policy has too many undesirable side e

for the United States in a post-Cold War strategic se

To protect our important interests in Europe, w

increasingly being drawn into marginal or even irrel

disputes and problems.

Henry Kissinger put this very well on the eve of NA

military operations against Serbia. Expressin

frustration that more and more Americans shar

Congress, in the foreign policy community, and i

general public—he asked, “Why is it that the United S

is expected to use military force to deal with a problem 

as Kosovo?” He went on to say,

46
problem, or problems of that magnitude, on their own. Af

all, we didn’t expect the European members of NATO to se

troops and to take a sizable portion of the responsibility to d

with the problem in Haiti.

The Europeans expected the United States to take c

that problem by itself. It was in our neighborhood, it w

a hugely serious problem, and Kissinger saw Kosov

European problem much in the same way that we saw 

as our problem.

Such considerations underscore another probl

NATO-centered policy continues to encourage, as 

during the Cold War, an unhealthy dependency men

on the part of the western European powers—what is 

called “free-riding.” Unfortunately, the term free-ridin

come to mean financial free-riding. European memb

NATO underinvest in defense. They free-ride o

security guarantee provided by the United States.

But there’s a more serious aspect of our NATO-cen

policy. Such a dominant U.S. role virtually exclude

creation of effective alternative institutions to deal 

secondary or tertiary security problems in Europ

kinds of security problems that Henry Kissinge

talking about.

NATO, in that sense, is like a great oak tree that b

out the sun for any other plants that might grow up 

shadow. We thus face a serious dilemma. How d

continue to secure America’s important strategic int

in Europe without accepting the collateral bagga

involvement in marginal or even irrelevant dispute

problems? That requires an entirely new strategy

vigorous downloading of responsibility for paro

disputes and secondary threats to the European 

(EU). It was one thing to argue during the Cold War th

West European powers were incapable of neutralizin

threat posed by a military superpower. It is quite an

matter to suggest that a region that is as populou

47
posed by the likes of Slobodan Milosevic. But the 

lesson here is that incentives matter. We cannot expe

West European powers to undertake great initiative

high responsibilities if the United States continues to 

them to off-load a good portion of those dif

responsibilities onto it. Again, incentives do matter.

I want to make it clear that I’m not proposing som

burden-sharing configuration. Disputes 

burden-sharing ratios have represented the most s

and phony debates in the entire trans-Atlantic se

relationship. We have been down that road too many 

over the past half century. The European members of N

have made and broken so many promises of taking g

initiative, of assuming greater responsibility, of mak

greater investment in defense, that no Ame

policymaker can give future promises any degree of res

I am proposing nothing less than burden-shifting

will entail a fundamental change in U.S. policy. I 

there are a great many objections to moving away f

NATO-centered policy or, as some might even s

NATO-only policy. One is that without the U.S. m

presence, without U.S. leadership of NATO, we hav

danger of renationalization of defenses throughout Eu

thus creating the same kind of instability, the same ki

rivalry, that led to the two world wars. That’s an impro

outcome, but one can’t rule it out entirely. Josef Joffe, 

15 years ago, published an important article in F

Affairs titled “Europe’s American Pacifier.”

2

 H

referring specifically to America’s stabilizing ro

preventing the renationalization of defense an

reemergence of national rivalries. He certainly had a 

for the America presence has had that stabilizing effec

I’ve always wondered if Joffe recognized the implicit d

meaning of his title. After all, a pacifier is something w

an infant, and as a parent I can attest that some in

cling to that pacifier as a security mechanism long afte

need to do so. They will never voluntarily relinquish it

48
relationship.

Another reason often heard for maintaining the cu

structure of the trans-Atlantic security relationship i

America’s leadership of NATO and its presence in E

give the United States important leverage in an ar

other issues, particularly economic issues. That be

widespread, but what is striking is the lack of any ta

evidence for it. I have challenged defenders of 

proposition time and again to cite even a couple of sp

examples in which the U.S. security presence and se

leadership role caused the Europeans to make 

concessions on political or economic issues when it w

manifestly in their own best interest to do so. I alwa

this deafening silence from the proponents of the statu

On the other hand, one can cite many examples w

our leverage proved to be minimal to nonexistent, wh

it was trade with Cuba, the embargo against Iran, or 

have you, with the Europeans charting their own p

based on their own wishes and their own interests 

face of American opposition. I’m not suggesting tha

European refusals to accede to U.S. wishes were wro

the case of Cuba, for example, their approach is arg

much more intelligent than the approach adopted b

United States. But the point is simply that there is 

little if any evidence of effective U.S. leverage. If we w

structure that will truly protect our important Eur

security interests without making the United State

babysitter of the Balkans or the future babysitter 

Caucasus, then we need to move away fr

NATO-centered policy.

 For conceptual clarity, our first step must 

distinguish the issue of the existence of NATO and 

membership in NATO, on the one hand, from the issu

continued U.S. military presence in Europe, on the 

hand. Though they tend to merge in the minds of 

observers, these are two separate issues. When NATO 

49
United States would have a permanent military prese

Europe, there were explicit promises given to the 

Senate and the American people that there would 

permanent military presence because it would n

needed. If the Truman Administration and the archite

NATO believed that those were separate issues in 

during one of the worst periods of the Cold War, then s

they are separate issues in a post-Cold War str

setting.

In moving away from a NATO-centered policy

United States must seek to create a more narrowly fo

and informal security relationship between itself a

contractual party and the EU as the other contra

party. That kind of security relationship would serve 

insurance policy against the rise, if that should happe

serious mutual security threat. Right now one doe

exist. A possible model for the kind of U.S.-EU arrange

broached here would be the NATO of 1949, a se

institution in which the United States maint

membership, but did not provide a routine mi

presence. 

Defenders of the current system will decry the l

benefits accruing from NATO’s present integ

command and force structure. But this structure 

created to meet a very specific threat, namely, a pow

military force with forward-deployed forces. Europe w

a perpetual state of crisis, confronting an expansionist 

power. Such is not the strategic setting today, nor is 

prospective strategic setting for the foreseeable f

Therefore, a more circumscribed, narrowly focused

informal security arrangement makes sense.

In short, we need a new security relationship that a

the United States to attend to the possible emergenc

serious mutual security threat without requiring 

undertake burdens and responsibilities that have littl

with its own vital security interests. I am baffled as t

50
Balkans as a powerbroker in the mold of th

Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Such a 

should appeal only to a masochist, and undertakin

certainly not essential for the security and well-being 

United States. Furthermore, over the long hau

undertaking is unsustainable.

The American people are skeptical about our cu

posture in Europe, to put it mildly. The first tim

encounter substantial casualties, support in the Con

and in the public is likely to evaporate. At that 

policymakers would need to worry about the extent 

backlash. Such a backlash could carry over to want

reject the overall security relationship with Europe. T

the danger that those who cling to the status qu

courting.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Richard Holbrooke, “America, A European Power,” 

Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, March-April 1995, p. 38.

2. Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” Foreign Affairs, 

Spring 1984, pp. 64-82.

51
CHAPTER 5

EUROPE AS A STRATEGIC STAGING BA

 FOR 21st CENTURY STABILIZATION

OPERATIONS

Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Toward the end of 1995, I was privileged to launc

then participate in, for some 2 and 1/2 years, the A

so-called Army After Next (AAN) Project, which sou

define the shape and character of landpower beyon

year 2010 and to investigate two of the principal factor

cause styles of war to change—technology and geostr

We had some powerful tools to help us hypothesize 

conflict might look like out beyond 2010, including 

tactical and strategic war games and nume

conferences. AAN war games were conducted at 

Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks, and because 

complexity were extremely difficult to do. The Army’s 

doctrinal revolution had occurred in the late 1970

early 1980s at the operational level, and that was di

enough. But now we were attempting to reestablis

tenets of landpower during warfare at the next higher 

We conducted a series of exercises using force on fo

free-play scenarios. It is really challenging to rep

National Training Center exercises in the computer-

simulations of Collins Hall at the Army War College, b

did it four times.

Collaterally, in conducting a historical inquiry in

changing cycles and patterns of war, we observed tha

has mutated from wars of religion to wars of kings to w

nations to wars of ideology, and so forth. Increasin

became apparent that the fall of the Soviet empire 

foster a new era of wars characterized by ethnic and cu

conflict. Accordingly, we postulated a clash in the year 

involving a newly emergent hegemonic power in c

53
over a small country in southeastern Europe

hegemonic power aimed to achieve its strategi

operational objectives quickly—that is, to put forces o

victim’s ground, disperse them, and then begin a proc

cultural transformation in that country before the U

States could project forces into the region and initia

effective response.

We also made a series of visits, an intellectual odys

you will, to representatives of all the major armies a

the world island. For my part, I spent almost 2 years 

this, enjoying an opportunity to conduct searching disc

with the leaders of most of the armies in eastern and ce

Asia. Based upon impressions gleaned from my vis

similar visits by other AAN Project team member

formulated a general outline of what the nature of co

might be out to the year 2025 and beyond. It tend

confirm our earlier suspicions, based upon hist

investigation, that the most likely causes for conflict d

that period would be ethnic and cultural in nature.

It seemed to us that such conflicts would arise 

those historical borders separating traditio

antagonistic economic, religious, ethnic, nation

cultural groupings. The territories of such disputan

analogous to geological tectonic plates, colliding again

ultimately riding over or sinking under adjacent pla

an eternal friction of heat, strife, and violence. 

collisions have been the occasion of major wars for th

5,000 years. To borrow Samuel Huntington’s famous 

line analogy (“The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign A

Summer 1993), it seemed to us that the greatest pot

for serious combat during our time frame would occur 

these traditional fault lines.

History clearly shows that when the artificial cap

suppress or sublimate ethnic and cultural conflic

removed, the actors revert to this approach and co

resumes. Thus it seemed to us that the maintena

54
on the ability of political structures to manag

inevitable tensions by means short of war. In any eve

were certain we knew where tensions were most lik

flare into outright hostilities. That is why we 

southeastern Europe as the setting for our first war ga

happens that this particular region marks the inters

of not two but three fault lines—Eastern Orth

Christianity, Islam, and Western Christianity.

In talking to the potential major actors, it seemed 

that we were seeing an almost spontaneous proc

change well under way among many of the armies a

the world island. We observed, first of all, a shedding o

War baggage and attitudes. I was struck particula

how quickly armies of the world are relinquishing 

weapon systems and readjusting their style of war to a 

force milieu. Even in large mass armies, such as 

around the Asian rim, we saw a process of streamlinin

lightening of the forces. Perhaps surprisingly, an

interesting phenomenon we observed was an attempt 

officer corps in many of these armies to forego corru

and doctrinaire ideological stances—thus producing a 

mature, professional, and better-educated officer clas

It was also somewhat of a shock to discover 

knowledgeable of American operational methods ma

these officers are. They also are intensely curious abou

Americans fight. More specifically, they are interes

our doctrinal focus on the operational art. These arm

many ways have moved into the era that we faced ba

the early 1970s. Much as we did, they moved from a ta

focus to one more directed at operational ar

operational maneuver. Strategically, they seem be

deflecting the ability of major world powers to interfer

their own hegemonic ambitions, principally by defe

incursions from air and sea.

They are also turning their attention to inform

technologies, but they come at it from a different va

55
chance to talk to my counterpart in that country. Ma

his questions and comments dealt with inform

technology, information warfare, and so forth. His tak

quite interesting. He said,

General, the information age is neutral; you have your styl

war that is facilitated by information technology. It gives 

the ability to see with great clarity and to strike with gr

speed and precision. But in our style of war, informa

technology is also helpful because the Internet and cellu

communications allow us to do what we do best, which is to f

wars of area control; to capitalize on the endurance of 

people; to exploit time and the inherent power of forces on 

defensive to disperse, to go to ground, to control wide area

territory, and still to maintain the ability to mass on demand

The only English term he used during our conversatio

“non-nodal Army,” as contained in the following sen

delivered in Chinese:“ What we seek to build is a non-

army.” He was saying that modern distrib

communications would permit control of massed a

without the necessity of large, cumbersome, hierar

control headquarters.

Thus as the tectonic plates begin to collide i

post-2010 time frame, they are going to bring with the

possibility of collisions between different styles of wa

along these critical lines of contact. It seems to us th

war in Kosovo may very well have provided a foreta

how such warfare might play out in the future.

Beyond the year 2010, though we might not see th

of a true peer competitor, we may very well se

emergence of what was referred to in our AAN stud

“major competitor,” one that uses its inherent streng

counter our inherent weaknesses. In practically 

country I visited, when I asked the question, “Wha

America’s military weaknesses?” the answer that 

back was “aversion to casualties and the political n

end the war quickly.” Therefore, as one officer tol

56
recalled to me the famous response of Ho Chi Minh in 

when a French journalist asked him how he could po

expect to beat the world’s most technologically adv

country: “They will kill many of us, we will kill a few of 

and they will tire first.”

Major competitors out beyond the year 2010 will n

to re-create a bipolar world. They won’t try to matc

United States weapon system for weapon system. The

focus on landpower and the ability to maintain an ar

being. Their object will not be to defeat the United S

but rather to avoid losing. Meanwhile time will take it

or so the thinking goes, on the American popular wil

victory will accrue to our competitor by default. Reme

Vietnam? 

Now what does all this have to do with America’s f

relation with Europe? To go back to the AAN war g

played in 1997 and 1998, in every one of those war g

the critical element in achieving success was the abi

American forces to arrive early and position themsel

as to prevent the enemy from settling in and establ

control over the areas comprising his operationa

strategic objectives. And regardless of the site of a

hostilities—in southeastern Europe, in Northeast As

in the Middle East—Europe remained the critical la

platform.

Though we assumed initially that we would be a

project forces from the continental United States 

enough to block the enemy on the ground and thwa

operational design, we later found that expectation 

totally unrealistic. Some form of forward statio

whether of materiel or forces in being, had to be availa

strategic intermediate staging bases in Europe. The 

already in Europe were usually the ones that arrived 

theater of hostilities first and applied the initial preem

counterstroke. This action was critical because if the e

succeeded in accomplishing his initial objectives, 

57
casualties began to mount, resolve began to erode, 

successful outcome became extremely problematic.

It thus seemed to us in the AAN business that E

would continue to have a vital role to play i

maintenance of global security and stability. It sits a

or near the intersection of three of the most activ

dangerous strategic tectonic plates. Thus, whether as 

of conflict or solution for conflict, Europe remains criti

proximity grounds alone. Moreover, it represents a s

intermediate staging base that proved decisive in a

war scenarios.

Does that mean that the nature of our forces in E

should remain immutable? While our games did not a

that question specifically, they seemed to suggest that 

like humanitarian support, force projection support, C

forward intelligence support, and forward logistics b

are becoming increasingly important.

2

 The possessio

forward logistics base will become particularly essent

may therefore be that over the next 15 to 20 years the n

and character of forces in the region will change to r

these growing support priorities. Whatever the p

nature of the forces in Europe, however, the AAN st

exercises, and war games led me to conclude that E

will continue to be a critical arena for the maintena

global security, and that the United States can 

efficiently and effectively contribute to such secur

retaining appropriate forces in Europe.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Conversation with PLA senior leaders at the Nanjin

Command College, Nanjing, China, August 21, 1998.

2. The acronym C4ISR encompasses command, c

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillanc

reconnaissance.

58
CHAPTERS 3, 4 AND 5

Dr. Carpenter. General Naumann made a point 

the warming relations between Russia and China an

Russian proposal for a triangular alliance among thes

countries and India. It’s important to recognize tha

development is not unrelated to the policies adopted 

United States and its NATO allies. The factors d

Russia, China, and India together are such things a

expansion of NATO’s membership into central Europ

the prospective expansion even further east. Even 

important are NATO’s military actions in the Ba

Many in the West regarded those as morally 

strategically justifiable, but to the Russians, Indians

Chinese, those actions were viewed in a very different 

In some ways this is International Relations Theory 

Just as nature abhors a vacuum, the international s

tends to abhor a unipolar system. The world does not w

global hegemon, even if that would-be hegemon sees 

as a benevolent hegemon, as the United States doe

should therefore expect movements towards the creat

a counter-hegemonic coalition. What we’re seein

probably the first stages of that.

General Naumann. I agree completely.

QUESTION. General Naumann, you said, and I 

accurately, that we give Europe very little credit f

contributions to maintaining stability in Eastern E

and in Russia. I confess, however, that I don’t 

specifically what Western Europe or NATO has done i

regard. Could you clear that up?

General Naumann. NATO’s primary contributio

been the Partnership for Peace Program. That is a pro

to stabilize these fledgling democracies. You should 

forget that though we often speak of these former W

Pact countries as democracies, right now that’s 

formally true. Democracy is a phenomenon just visi

59
ingrained, and as is often the case in history, it is t

economic well-being. Economic well-being and the sta

of democracy have a close interrelationship which I c

quantify exactly, but I know it’s there. If we don’t mak

that these countries prosper economically, there may 

tendency with the people to recall the old system as 

better. For example, we have many people in Ea

Germany over the age of 45, the lost generation 

unification process, who believe the old system was b

There is a similar element in Russia, Poland, the 

Republic, and Hungary. Thus we cannot be sure 

democracy is now ingrained forever. There is a wides

illusion in the United States that democracy i

prevailing system in the world. In truth, democraci

the minority, and may remain so for a long time. Th

have to work to make sure that the new countries sta

course.

Even more important than the Partnership for 

Program is what the European Union nation

contributing economically. Germany, for example

subsidized Russia to the tune of approximately 90 b

German marks. We did not see the result we had hope

The money was presumably one of many drops i

bucket, but at least we made an effort. Germany 

similar gestures with regard to Poland, the Czech Rep

and Hungary. Germany invests money in Bulgari

Romania, and other European countries do the same

European Union will shoulder a tremendous burden d

the membership negotiations with Poland, Hungar

Czech Republic, and Estonia. Should the European 

continue the folly of the common agricultural pol

presently conceived, we will have to open severa

Knox’s to pay the bill. In any case, the effort to inte

Eastern European countries into the European comm

will represent a huge investment in stability

Europeans will have to shoulder the bill. This rea

sometimes not well understood in America.

60
American presence in Europe ever redounds to Ame

economic advantage. I was once closely involved 

important Iranian gas pipeline issue. I can 

categorically that had there not been an American pre

the attitude of the German government would have be

different. As it was, however, the German govern

supported the position of the United States, an ac

much in America’s interest.

Professor Mearsheimer. It seems to me that the cas

sustained and sizable American military presen

Europe has to be based on the argument that we a

pacifier, to use Josef Joffe’s term, in that region, and 

having a stable Europe is a vital U.S. interest. Therefo

should be willing to spend huge amounts of money an

our troops in harm’s way in Europe, because if we d

there will be intense security competition and maybe 

war. But nobody seems to have spelled out what a

likely sources of trouble in Europe. I would like to 

what is likely to go wrong if the United States pu

troops out of Europe? What states are going to a

troublemakers? Russia? That seems highly unlikely. I

economic and military basket case, with little chanc

things will improve much over the next decade, at le

the point where Russia would be a meaningful threa

British and the French? Are they going to cause troub

is it the Germans who are the likely culprits? Are we go

have the second coming of the Third Reich? Or will it 

Second Reich? Are France and Germany going t

involved in a security confrontation? Almost everyon

that Germany is not a threat to cause trouble and that 

is no need to fear it because it is a democracy. Of c

England and France are also democracies. All of this l

me wondering which states are going to cause trou

Europe? Where is the threat to peace that justifi

American military presence? If there is no thre

stability, I say bring the troops home and allow 

Europeans to live in harmony with each other.

61
there as pacifier in the case of intra-European conf

outdated. The reason is that the German question is se

The real reason behind World Wars I and II was the is

Germany’s orientation, whether to the East or to the 

This issue is settled once and forever. Germany belo

the West. It’s firmly tied to the Western commun

nations. The issue of German revanchism is a dead leg

the past. It was a terrible past, and we have all suffered 

it terribly. We Germans, although most culpable in ca

World War II, now know what it means to be divided, a

families we know what it means for children to gro

without knowing their fathers. I belong to a family in 

neither my wife nor I ever had a chance to see our fa

alive since both of them were killed in action in Russi

know what it means to the second generation to gro

without knowing what a grandparent is. It may 

emotional, but it is an impact that one feels 

generations. Germany learned its lesson, an

pacification question is no longer an issue. The Germa

marching nicely in NATO ranks, and there will 

inclination to get out of that line.

Actually, if there is a problem with Germany, it 

the opposite direction. After World War II, you told 

never use our military muscles again. But when Ge

unification occurred, you were among the first who to

“Hey Germans, stand on the parapet and be six feet 

That doesn’t happen overnight. It is a remar

achievement that after a period of only 6 to 7 years Ger

is now prepared to assume its full role and take o

responsibility to fight a war if necessary, as a reliable N

ally. So, to repeat, pacification is not the issue.

The real issue is apart from the power projection 

which General Scales referred to and which from a str

point of view is admittedly important. The predom

rationale for an ongoing U.S. presence in Europe 

management of Russian weakness. No European co

can manage the problem of Russia. Without close 

62
deserves your continued close attention.

It is much better for the United States to be c

involved in European issues than to be a benevolen

passive hegemon sitting some 6,000 kilometers awa

soon as you are back across the Atlantic, yours w

simply one of the many voices that we hear in our gl

interconnected world. Yours is a powerful voice withou

doubt, but you are some distance away from the cen

gravity. I am not arguing that we Europeans should 

from trying to resolve Europe’s own backyard iss

desperately hope that the European Union will hav

guts to tackle them. But this will require some time. 

the end of the day, I would not be opposed to a formula 

under the framework of NATO redefines the relatio

between the United States and Canada on one hand

the European Union on the other. But whether, a

Carpenter seems to suggest, it will be possible fo

United States to enjoy influence without paying the p

a presence, I have my doubts.

Dr. Carpenter. I was trying to think whether ther

any aspect of John Mearsheimer’s comments with w

disagreed, and could not come up with one. I’ll s

comment briefly on General Naumann’s argument th

U.S. military presence and the American leadersh

NATO are needed to help “manage Russian weak

Such an attempt is going to be a counterproductive str

First of all, it’s really impossible for any outside pow

group of powers to manage Russian weakness. Russia

is going to be largely decided by what goes on domestica

Russia. The external inputs may have an effect a

margin, but no more than that. But from the Ru

viewpoint, a NATO-centered policy on the part of the U

States, coupled with a U.S.-dominated, offensively orie

and proactive NATO, an organization no longer comm

simply to the territorial defense of its members, is not 

to promote strong pro-Western, pro-democratic senti

in Russia. Quite the contrary. The word that we at the 

63
contacts specifically with the most pro-democ

pro-Western, pro-capitalist elements in the Ru

political and economic elite—was well summariz

former deputy prime minister Anatoly Chubois, wh

that NATO managed to accomplish with its war i

Balkans what more than 7 decades of communist rule 

not do. That is, NATO created a large reservoir of ge

anti-American, anti-Western sentiment in Russi

added that the nationalist and communist forces were 

“a political present the size of which they could never 

imagined.” We are getting similar comments from 

pro-Western figures in Russia. Therefore, if a U.

NATO with its new mission of conflict resolution 

nation-building is supposed to help manage Ru

weakness, I think that is a disastrously counterprod

strategy.

QUESTION. With regard to the fault line conce

Samuel Huntington’s article, “The Clash of Civilizat

there was an implication by Huntington that co

between Islam and the two Christian factions was m

less inevitable. I wonder whether the fact that NATO 

the Western countries have in general interven

support of Islamic populations in the Balkans has po

mitigated potential Christian-Islamic conflict. W

possibly improve our relations with the Islamic world

Major General Scales. U.S. involvement in that p

the world shouldn’t be focused necessarily on impr

relations with the larger group—the Islamics. Rathe

object should be to diminish the propensity for vio

among all three. If American intervention is som

perceived as siding with Islam, that is counterprodu

Not only is it counterproductive in our long

relationship with the Muslim world, but it would 

increased and unnecessary tensions with Russia. The 

“honest broker” best describes the ideal U.S. role. Af

years of American presence in Europe, the most com

accepted opinion of that presence is that it is la

64
not to support one side or the other but to defuse confl

return to the metaphor of tectonic plates, we seek to m

the tremors that occur at this intersection of three 

lines now rather than marching away and waiting 

earthquake that’s 8.0 on the Richter scale to occur 10 

years down the road.

When the United States removes itself from a thea

never goes back unless drawn back by war. With resp

three of the most critical sectors of the w

island—Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia

hardly a coincidence that there is an American prese

all three. For 50 years that American presence has 

benign and hugely effective. Before we as a nation p

stakes and go back to Fortress America, we have to 

through what the implications of that decision might b

just over the next 10 years, but for the next generatio

Americans have a tough time thinking beyon

immediate horizon. However, for me as a serving so

our window of concern should extend out at least 

years. At that range, one can visualize any num

catalysts that might come along to re-inflame ten

along the critical boundaries we have spoken of. The 

presence of American forces in those regions has pal

the level of violence, permitting us to deal with tr

rather than earthquakes.

QUESTION. If the United States now reverts t

posture of isolationism characteristic of the 1930s, 

the odds high that conflicts and instabilities aroun

world will eventually reach out to engage us in sp

ourselves? Isn’t it better to remain involved and w

prevent conflict rather than remain detached only 

dragged in later when the level of violence is far high

Dr. Carpenter. We need to be leery of such clich

“Fortress America” and “isolationism.” Certainly I’

advocating Fortress America or isolationism or any 

ill-considered extreme. I’m advocating that the U

65
matter, its even more smothering policy in East Asi

advocating that we encourage the development of mu

centers of power in the international system, with th

taking primary responsibility in Europe backed b

United States. The operative phrase is backed by the U

States in a cooperative effort to preserve stability 

security in Europe. In East Asia, I’m advocating that J

and other regional powers take primary responsi

backed by the United States, for ensuring stabilit

security. Such a backup role for the United States m

that it would be the balancer of last resort instead 

intervenor of first resort—or global nanny—which 

current role. Playing such a role, we somet

intentionally discourage initiatives on the part of Ame

allies, more so in East Asia than in Europe, because 

expressions of individualism threaten our primacy w

those security relationships. Whether the strategy of 

nanny was appropriate for the Cold War pe

particularly the early part of the Cold War, is now a 

point. It is not an appropriate role, in fact it 

increasingly dangerous one, for the United States 

current and prospective strategic setting.

General Naumann. I listened very carefully to wh

Carpenter said about the negative opinions of Ru

intellectuals regarding NATO involvement in the Ba

Of course, one can get such impressions in talking 

institutniks. Remember, however, that these institu

have shown remarkable flexibility in changing 

attitudes over the past 15 years. I dare say that w

never learn what the real view of the Russian people i

institutniks and politicians we talk to—the so-

elites—will always construe Western actions so as to 

us for their own failures. That is something tha

Russians are extremely good at. Moreover, regardl

Western policies, whatever Russian leadership em

will very likely be more nationalist than the pr

leadership is. The only way to satisfy the Russians wo

66
that, then you will have “good Russians.” But is paying 

a price in the interests of the United States? It’s defi

not in the interest of the European allies of the U

States.

Dr. Carpenter. In our conversations with the Rus

we are hardly talking to the Russian establishment. 

talking to people who are deeply critical of the Ru

government and horrified at the communist and natio

alternatives. These are people who have pointed ou

the IMF-led strategy and the Western strategy gener

throwing money at Russia are abject failures. In fact, 

our contacts in Russia said, with telling irony, “You 

the IMF ought to eliminate the middle man and s

transfer the money directly to the offshore bank accou

the Russian financial oligarchy, not sending it th

Moscow. That is just a waste of time.”

The Russians are certainly not expecting any more

don’t expect that their country is going to be treated 

equal of the United States. But they do expect a c

amount of respect. They expect that Russia will be tr

as a major power in the international system, not tr

with contempt, not denied a significant policy voic

instance in the Balkans, as though that’s a region in 

Russia has never had any meaningful interests. Wh

through clumsiness or through Russiphobia, 

pursuing a policy of humiliating Russia at 

opportunity. That is the effect. Russia has other op

They don’t have to passively submit to such treat

What we’re finding is their cozying up to China, effo

create a counter-hegemonic coalition, and arms transf

recipients we are loath to see get them.

67
CHAPTER 6

THE ENLARGING ROLE OF NATO

Stephen Larrabee

It seems self-evident that the security structures 

Cold War might not be appropriate for deterring the ty

challenges that the United States faces in the future

proposition has direct relevance to NATO’s missions

now and in the future. The security environment in 

NATO finds itself has changed significantly since 198

old security environment was characterized by a 

uni-dimensional threat. This threat involved a po

direct attack on NATO territory. NATO’s forces, ther

were structured to deter such an attack. They tended 

tank-heavy, and they relied largely on conscript f

Britain and the United States being the exceptions.

The new security environment is quite different

challenges and risks today are far more diverse, far 

ambiguous, and far less predictable. They include e

conflict, they include terrorism, and they include the s

of weapons of mass destruction. At the same tim

geographic focus of these challenges has changed. Th

no longer, with the possible exception of Turkey, a 

threat to NATO territory. Most challenges that NAT

face come from beyond NATO’s territory. But as we’ve 

in Bosnia and Kosovo, these challenges can still ha

important impact on the security of Alliance members

result, NATO needs to be able to move, to respond to a 

spectrum of risks and threats. It still needs the res

capabilities to carry out Article 5 missions, that is, mi

for NATO’s collective defense, but at the same time it 

the capability to carry out so called non-Article 5 mis

These are missions of external crisis response 

management similar to those NATO carried out in B

and Kosovo. The fact is that most challenges and risk

NATO is likely to face in the future are non-Article 5 th

69
much more resemble those in Bosnia and Kosovo tha

attack that was expected during the Cold War. These t

have implications for NATO’s core structures and mis

They mean that NATO will increasingly need the capa

to deploy forces beyond its borders, that it will nee

capability to project force and power.

More specifically, in order to deal with these 

challenges NATO will need forces that are more m

flexible, sustainable, and survivable. The forces will n

be capable of deploying beyond NATO territory, and 

will need to be more interoperable in order to carr

effective coalition operations. The Defense Capab

Initiative, which was approved at the Washington Su

in April 1999, is designed to address these requirem

There were calls for improvements in five areas: mo

and deployability; sustainability and logi

survivability; effective engagement; and command, co

and communications. If these improvements are 

NATO will be in a better position to address and det

new threats it’s likely to face in the coming decade.

The proposition that somehow the United Sta

trying to be a global nanny and preserve its prima

Europe is simply wrong. On the contrary, what the U

States is trying to do is push its allies to take up 

responsibility for defense not only against threa

Europe, but against threats that emanate from b

Europe. This is precisely what the Defense Capab

Initiative is designed to do—not to preserve primacy, 

get the Europeans to improve their capabilities and t

more responsibility. There has been considerable cri

in the United States and especially in some pa

Congress of the new NATO. The basic complaint i

since NATO worked well for 50 years, there is no n

change it. As one senator said, “If it ain’t broke, why f

However, this view ignores the fundamental changes 

European security environment that have taken place 

1989. If NATO does not change—and I believe it al

70
challenges, it risks becoming increasingly irreleva

NATO does not address the key security challenges, 

not be able to retain public support over the next decad

remains configured against a threat that no longer ex

simply will not be credible.

But most of the Alliance’s militaries, particular

European militaries, are configured to defend border

are no longer threatened. Britain and Franc

exceptions, while Italy and the Netherlands also are m

away from this posture. It is not that Europe lacks en

forces, but that they have the wrong type of f

European forces are and remain very manpower-h

while underequipped with modern weapons 

equipment. Countries of the European Union field abo

million men, while the United States, with all its 

responsibilities, has 1.4 million men under arms. Sin

Europeans spend so much on manpower, there is 

money left over for research and development, acquisi

operations, and maintenance. For example, Germany, 

and Greece, together fielding 800,000 military pers

which is close to 60 percent of the U.S. total, spend o

percent of what the United States does on procureme

One source of the problem is that most European ar

except for Britain and Luxembourg, rely on conscri

Conscription produces more manpower than is need

the missions that NATO must carry out today

particularly tomorrow. Europe therefore will have to 

towards a professional Army. France and Spain 

already made the decision to do this. Pressure on the r

the European militaries to do so is likely to increase

developing a professional Army entails expenses of its 

especially in the initial phase, and funding will be di

to achieve in an era of declining or flattening de

budgets.

In this regard, Kosovo has exercised a beneficial 

Kosovo was for the Europeans a very sobering experie

71
these deficiencies. It underscored the distinction be

quantitative and qualitative superiority. Some 5 perc

the aircraft and four-fifths of the ordnance released ag

Serb targets were American. The gap was partic

glaring in precision guided missiles. At the same tim

Kosovo conflict demonstrated major differenc

performance of individual European allies. France

only 9 percent of NATO’s defense spending, generate

percent of all the strike sorties. There are some sign

the Europeans are beginning to come to grips wit

problem. There is within Europe now a new empha

capabilities rather than simply institutions. There is a

emphasis on building a real European security and de

identity. Whether this impulse will remain simply rh

or not remains to be seen, but nonetheless the empha

there. 

ESDI, the European Security and Defense Ide

could provide the impetus for Europeans to enhance 

capabilities. But it needs to avoid three potential pi

first, de-coupling the United States from Europe; se

duplication of effort; and third, discrimination ag

NATO members who are not EU members, such as N

and Turkey. Some critics in Congress and the United S

military oppose NATO’s new missions. They worry 

these operations reduce the readiness of U.S. force

their ability to respond to threats elsewhere. Thes

legitimate concerns, but in expressing them, they adv

a new division of labor in which Europe would take c

the threats in Europe while the United States looks 

the rest of the world. This view, while superfi

attractive, has several flaws. First of all, over the long 

it would lead to increasing U.S. unilateralism. Secon

United States does not have the military capability to 

or address all the non-European conflicts on its own. T

and most important, it would weaken the trans-At

link. Europe would increasingly be left on its own. T

not a good idea.

72
bargain, a new partnership with Europe, one that is br

and at the same time more equal. In this partnershi

United States would remain engaged in Europe and 

Europe deal with security problems, while Europe a

same time would take up more responsibilities for Eu

In return, Europe would share with the United States 

of the burdens and responsibilities for security b

Europe’s borders. The United States will need all

manage many of the key security problems in the co

decade. The challenges are simply too large for one pow

manage, even one as powerful as the United States. E

will require a partner also, and the United States is its 

likely and desirable partner. Unless Europe beg

assume more of the responsibility for challenges to com

interests, U.S. support for NATO will decline.

Many of these challenges to common interests a

Europe’s outermost periphery and even beyond its bo

such as those in the Persian Gulf. This is not to argu

NATO as an institution should directly address 

threats. It’s unlikely to get 19 nations to take conc

action against a threat as distant as the Gulf. Any mi

reaction would most likely come from a coalition 

willing, composed of several key American allies in Eu

But the NATO force planning process can be used to 

develop the capabilities that would make such a coa

easier to establish and more militarily effective.

 This is not, I want to emphasize, a call for a 

NATO, as some critics have charged. NATO will be a

act only if there is a general consensus within the Allia

do so. This will limit the number of crises in which N

will be able to act, particularly those beyond Eu

borders. But it is important for the United States a

allies to take a broader view of their common interest

the threats to them. As noted earlier, many threats to 

common interests in the future will not be in Europe, b

Europe’s periphery or beyond. The United States a

European partners need the military capability to ad

73
same time more balanced and equal partnership. I

sense, the United States has to move from being a pro

to being a more equal partner with Europe.

74
CHAPTER 7

GUIDING NATO’S FUTURE:

A RETURN TO BASICS

Charles Glaser

I shall start from the assumption that major w

Europe would be a serious problem for the United S

This proposition is arguable, I suppose, but there see

be a sufficient consensus to permit me to accept it and 

move on to its implications.

Since the end of the Cold War, we’ve seen a long 

possible missions for NATO, ranging widely in purpose

of the most important but least discussed is to main

hedge against a resurgent Russia. Another important 

to preserve confidence, stability, and peace among Eu

other major powers in Western Europe. The issue th

renationalization of militaries and what that would do

is also not talked about very much. Preserving peace a

NATO’s other members is a third possibility, Greec

Turkey most prominently. Then we get to the n

missions: promoting the establishment of democrac

free markets throughout Europe; preserving peace a

Europe’s non-NATO members; and combatin

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has begun to 

such new missions, whether they are undertaken by N

itself or by a smaller coalition formed among N

members. Such declared priorities as maintaining 

and stability in Europe broadly defined and prom

democracy and free markets reflect one of the foll

subtexts: either Russia is not worth worrying about no

maybe not in the future, or—and this is actually q

common view—Russia is worth worrying about, if no

then definitely in the future. However, many an

believe this latter rationale will not sell to the publi

75
save it for the authentic uses they think will not sell on 

alone.

The clearest examples of this were the early argu

for NATO expansion. The argument was framed some

like this: we need to expand NATO so that it d

dissolve; it must expand or die. Such an argument rais

question of whether the expansion is justified on it

terms or whether NATO is being preserved for some

else, and if so, what. The same questions app

out-of-area missions. But there is mounting concern 

some of these new missions, these humanitarian 

stabilization interventions throughout Europe, may n

in the United States because they do not address 

American interests. They are important American int

but they are not vital interests. Nonetheless, there has 

a continuing effort to preserve NATO for eventual serv

behalf of America’s truly vital interests by linking N

with peripheral causes that, while certainly importan

well short of vital.

However, the most compelling reason for keepin

Alliance remains the need to deal with Russia—no

Russia of today but the potential Russia down the roa

a weak Russia but a resurgently powerful Russia, 

Russia with goals like those of America and Europe 

Russia whose goals are starkly antithetical to those 

West. Such a rationale has the best hope of preservin

Alliance. It hasn’t been sold by American leaders, b

hunch is that it can be. Far from striving to preserv

Alliance, the new NATO missions are actually a threa

It’s not that these missions are unjustified on thei

terms. Certainly the recent experience in the Ba

where we’ve saved thousands of lives, perhaps te

thousands, and alleviated much human suffering, 

that they are important. But they will over time stra

Alliance and thus make it more likely that when we n

for bigger purposes, it won’t be there or it will b

attenuated to do the job.

76
missions as a way to save the Alliance, implying th

should perform them even if each individual action 

justified on its own terms, because the efforts i

aggregate will justify themselves by preserving NA

would argue the reverse. They may be worth doing on 

own terms, and they’re certainly very valuable fr

humanitarian angle, but we should recognize that 

actually threaten the Alliance and view the trade-of

our eyes wide open. I would argue for narrowing our v

NATO’s purpose, not banning it from taking on these 

missions, not precluding them as an option, but viewin

Alliance differently, in terms of fundamental U.S. inte

Such interests lie in deterring or winning a major 

war. Superficially, one might conclude that I’m stuc

Cold War frame of mine. But it’s not a Cold War fra

mind. It’s a geopolitical or power-oriented frame of 

bent on connecting U.S. vital interests with threats to 

interests. Many actions possibly worth taking ar

related to those interests. We need to be quite clear 

such is the case so that we can properly evaluat

inevitable trade-offs involved in expending resourc

interests that, while worthwhile, are not vital.

Why is hedging against a future Russian threat st

strongest argument for keeping NATO? Recalling the 

possible missions for NATO that I discussed earlier, 

are only two that deal with vital U.S. interests 

European context: addressing the danger from Russi

preventing conflict among Western powers thems

Let’s look at those.

It is both difficult and dangerous to dismis

possibility of a future threat from Russia. Yes, one can 

if he puts aside Russia’s nuclear weapons. The coun

weak, possibly disintegrating, disorganized, and strug

with a variety of political and economic transforma

which it may not accomplish. However there’s a reaso

bet, not a certain bet, maybe less than fifty-fifty, that 

next century Russia will become a strong power again

77
capital. If it puts institutions into place that work, it ca

powerful country again, not in 10 years the way thin

going, but perhaps in 20 or 30. In the long march of hi

the burden of maintaining a strong NATO for another 

years as a hedge against a resurgent, nuclear-armed R

is certainly not excessive.

Russia remains a major nuclear power and will f

foreseeable future unless it collapses in a truly fundam

way. This is not impossible, but it’s not a comforting th

either, since a radical collapse of the Russian govern

would unleash threats to our security that, while dif

in nature, would be no less dangerous. Russia is not a t

to western Europe or central Europe today, but the

some potential leaders of Russia who could pose a t

who could have goals that ultimately threaten the E

lying west of Russian borders. U.S. concern over f

dangerous aggression from Russia is appropriate 

accepts that major war in Europe would threaten vita

interests.

With regard to stability within western Europe it

tend to be more confident than pessimistic. Ren

alization of European forces probably would not le

conflict. But it is possible that we might end up w

nuclear Germany. I don’t think Europe could handle t

well. But such an eventuality could perhaps be made 

acceptable and manageable if it occurred in the conte

more unified European force. That’s another possibil

any event, I don’t see major conflict coming out of we

Europe whether the United States stays or leaves. 

United States stays and we preserve NATO the way i

eliminates any concerns of German nuclearization. I 

look on this as a major benefit because the likelihood o

a move on Germany’s part is so small, but the reassura

on the plus side.

The other American interests associated with 

continuance in NATO are, with all due respect, seco

78
defined American interests in terms of threats to the U

States, its territory, its people, and its sustaining eco

interests. Humanitarian conflicts don’t pose threats to 

U.S. interests. The markets in Europe that we’re inter

in will not be undermined, though they may be strain

some of the collateral impacts of those conflicts. But t

not vital in the sense that we invest tens of billions of d

a year in the areas affected and are willing to sacrifice 

numbers of American lives to pacify them. Of course

actions may be worth taking anyway. That’s an iss

which we need informed debate in this country.

However, to develop a point I broached ea

continuing to pursue such secondary missions and, 

importantly, identifying NATO with those mission

strain and possibly endanger the Alliance. That is a 

course because we require a viable NATO while we wa

the transformation in Russia, and, to some extent, wh

wait out the creation of a unified defense and security 

in Europe. To put attainment of these goals a

represents potentially large costs of pursing seco

missions, although having to pay such costs may hav

probability.

Let’s now look more closely at why pursuit of seco

missions is going to strain the Alliance. These seco

missions are aimed at providing stability and secur

Europe outside of the NATO membership, includin

Balkans. They may even entail admission of new me

beyond the current ones and extending to them Art

protections. This latter idea is, of course, part and pa

the current NATO expansion debate. There is subst

disagreement within NATO about going beyond the pr

geographical confines of the NATO countries. Thus th

likely to be strong support for maintaining the m

oriented on Russia, but far less support for the 

missions.

79
why it escapes the understanding of the elites. I as

relatives and friends who are not in the security a

business, “Are you confident that Russia, now that it’s 

is not going to be a problem for us down the road?” The

“No, I’m not confident at all.” They understan

situation. Fallen states have risen. Weak states 

become strong states. States have recovered from 

misfortunes and become major powers. Russia will d

same. People understand that major war in Eu

particularly nuclear war, would be a threat to the U

States. They realize that Russia is a nuclear power, a

going to face other nuclear powers in Europe. Ask 

“Are you willing to maintain NATO if it doesn’t co

much to hedge against such a threat even though righ

you don’t need to build forces directed against that thre

believe the answer will be yes. It depends on keepin

costs within bounds. The costs of NATO are dropping

they are not inordinate. The forces are smaller. They c

somewhat smaller if necessary. The Quadrennial De

Review barely mentions force requirements for Europ

force drivers are outside of Europe.

Public sentiment on the new missions, however, is 

grabs. It may be that there will be broad support with

United States and NATO for doing these things. The

obviously honorable and important missions. But th

tremendous aversion to casualties, to the use of g

troops. There was no guarantee the war in Kosovo wo

a success. According to the commentaries written d

the war about the impact of a failure in Kosovo on N

there was great concern that the air campaign wou

and that the Alliance would be hurt. Failure would 

undercut the way NATO was defining itself in terms o

missions. Though we have been successful in Kosovo 

far, no one can foresee what the ultimate result will b

can one foresee whether similar undertakings in the f

will be able to avoid failures that rend the Alliance.

80
its primal role—to protect Europe from major powe

Arrangements could be flexible enough to permit a

secondary missions when circumstances demanded 

public resolve was strong, but such missions wou

exceptional as a matter of policy. If NATO chose to d

regarding any proposed interventions, it would not be 

as a defeat for the Alliance since there would 

declaratory policy generating pro forma expectatio

out-of-area involvements. In the near term, NATO 

still want to configure its forces for secondary opera

because, while waiting to see what happens in R

intervention forces will be the only kind it will need. N

will need forces that can be deployed out of its area, 

won’t define itself fundamentally in terms of such a r

will define itself in terms of patient vigilance, helping 

what’s most dangerous over the horizon. There 

inconsistency in such a stance.

How should one characterize such a policy? 

rhetoric is important. Policymakers could say candidl

the policy is a hedge, but this formulation is impolitic, 

our efforts to promote cooperation with Russia. Some 

suggested a less pointed term like “strategic reassuran

“reassurance against great power war,” and this is pro

wisest. The rhetoric and terms need to be worked ou

time. Whatever their precise formulation, they will n

reassure Western Europe about threats from withi

without, and they will need to reassure Russia that NA

not ganging up on it or denying it its rightful place o

international stage.

If we believe that a future Russia is something we 

to worry about, and thus need to be planning for, th

must bear in mind several corollary factors. We need to 

an alliance in place against the time when Russia is s

and dangerous. In the interim, we need to avoid pursu

set of policies that make such a Russia more likely. R

we must pursue policies that help with the transform

of Russia in the desired directions. Some of these polici

81
example, NATO should be wary of taking on new me

at present, particularly the Baltic countries. It wou

wiser to wait until those countries actually begin to 

threat and then deciding. To extend North Atlantic T

Article 5 protection to them now when they don’t n

could be self-defeating. On the American side, we sho

somewhat more willing to make compromises with R

on nuclear policy. National missile defense is a 

example. Surely it is not smart for us to initiate a na

missile defense system that may not be technically fe

and workable but which is still quite unacceptable 

Russia’s perspective.

Economic assistance is another area where the U

States must take a farsighted approach. Such assis

may be far more symbolic than practical, but it’s impo

that we not try to keep Russia down and that Russ

perceive us as trying to keep it down, even though it w

aware of our concern over a possible aggressive tu

Russia in the future. Our approach should be to help R

become strong, even as we encourage to the extent po

its creation of free and democratic institutions an

establishment of firm political, economic, and securit

with the western family of nations.

In sum, I am suggesting a risk-averse approa

NATO. Though some may see this approach a

risk-averse, it has the virtue of going back to bas

returns to the view that NATO is fundamentally a mi

alliance and that the American stake in remain

member is to protect its manifest vital interests. S

posture does not preclude taking on new missions, 

may become increasingly important and pressing i

next decade, but it keeps the priorities clear, a

distinguishing vital interests from the merely import

82
CHAPTER 8

AN ADDITIONAL ROLE FOR NATO:

PROMOTING COLLECTIVE SECURITY

ELSEWHERE

Carl Kaysen

Sentiment today appears divided as to whether NA

original prime mission—mutual defense in a bipolar 

under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—is 

important. In any event, most seem to agree that with

next 10 years it’s hardly likely to be relevant. I would a

however, that 20 years is a better estimate of the time 

in which Article 5 is unlikely to be relevant. Therefor

not think it can be successfully maintained, even 

reassurance or contingent mode, as the central missi

NATO now.

The American government, in urging NATO expa

and leading the way to that result, argued for an exte

of the zone of peace, stability, democracy, and m

economies all tied together in Europe as the centra

mission of NATO. I take an extremely dim view of tha

In expanding NATO, we have already created ne

effects on the security prospects of Europe that far out

whatever gains we have made. I recognize the powe

earnest desire of the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians to 

NATO, and I’m sure that other would-be NATO me

share those desires, but such desires rest on a 

calculation of their interests. There are more eff

interest-serving instruments with which presen

aspiring NATO members can pursue the admirable go

extending the zone of peace, stability, democracy

market economies in Europe.

The European Union (EU) and the Organizatio

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are much 

suitable entities. The OSCE, now comprised of som

83
economic and environmental cooperation, human r

and humanitarian activities. Also, it undertakes a var

preventive diplomatic initiatives designed to d

manage, or resolve conflict touching participant state

have certainly struck OSCE and NATO’s own Partne

for Peace (PfP) program a heavy blow by NATO expa

It remains to be seen whether it’s a mortal wound

wound probably need not be mortal if we don’t press 

further. 

For a variety of reasons, the world’s nation-state s

based on the Westphalian model of 1648 is no longer ev

approximately good description of the globe’s po

organization. The most important reason is the degre

quantity of economic interconnections among nation

not only that we now have massive international flo

capital, it’s not only the international dispersion of job

the fact that we have evolved a set of norms, many of 

embodied in institutions, some of them embodi

intertwining legal codes, that govern not only eco

behavior but are serving a normative role in other inte

activities. If one looks closely at the everyday econom

of the EU states, he will be hard-pressed to describe th

self-sufficient sovereigns relying on the princip

self-help in an anarchic world. They are entangled in a 

web of normative and institutional constraints tha

them what they should and what they shouldn’t do, w

legitimate to think of doing and what’s not legitim

think.

Another factor impelling us to look beyon

nation-state system is the growing ambiguity of 

conflict, ethnic and religious violence, interstate terro

and international crime, all of which tend to spil

borders in one fashion or another and touch us all. 

threats to peace, order, and stability are not confin

Europe or any single region. They are world-wide prob

and they are increasingly demanding internat

attention, involvement, and solutions.

84
Westphalian system is that most governments in the 

today have taken on a decidedly populist cast. Admit

the democracies of central Europe are not deep-r

Russia, for example, has not yet had a complete el

cycle which resulted in an enduring peaceful trans

power within the executive and legislative branches, 

remains to be seen whether the Vladimir Putin presi

can pull this rabbit out of the hat. Thus an exacting t

formal democracy there has not yet been met. But w

say that with very few exceptions, such as North Kore

Iraq, the primary theme of today’s national governme

in some sense pleasing the public. That characteriz

applied even to the communist government in the 

after Stalin. The premiership of Nikita Khrushchev 

despite his note of contempt in applying the phra

government of goulash communism” to it, basically sat

the people. This was so despite the fact that it provid

little goulash for Soviet dinner tables and bought too 

missiles for the Soviet army.

Governments that please the people are influenc

the people. Such governments may not be democrat

popular influence may be distorted; it may be p

repressed; it may be provided with few channels for f

expression—but it’s there. The populist impu

magnified by other elements now manifesting them

on a world-wide scale: the simultaneous sharing of 

information and a large degree of shared culture. Mor

we have a set of entrepreneurs of popular sentimen

non-governmental organizations, that make it 

business to organize such sentiment, canalize it, and 

influence governments, which they do with varying de

of success on various issues. As a result, the boun

sovereignty, that is, the actions which sove

governments may legitimately take in relation to the 

and populations over which they are nominally sove

are increasingly constrained by a steady growth of a w

shared public view of what is right and just.

85
is the concurrent growing relevance of supranational 

of political organization, of which, as noted earlier, th

and OSCE are promising examples. We should do all w

to strengthen and broaden such entities where appro

and particularly to avoid actions that tend to unde

them like the counterproductive expansion of NATO

further regard to perceptions of the evolving status 

nation-state, we may note that states where the rule 

is absent, where security of the person and basic h

rights are routinely denied, are falling more and more 

a cloud of universal opprobrium. The time may not 

distant when such states risk being formally denie

imprimatur of legitimate sovereignty by the interna

community. Humanitarian interventions in retro

states, which are becoming the sanctioned norm 

human suffering and deprivation are intolerable, 

become the occasion for externally imposed political re

What, then, is the task of NATO over the next 10 y

Clearly it will have to be prepared to take on impo

missions on the periphery such as humanitarian 

peacekeeping operations. Beyond these, howeve

should note that NATO has a very significant asset, a

that asset it holds a monopoly. Specifically, NATO 

learned how to raise, train, and operate a multina

military force with efficiency and unity of command. 

an alliance capability is something the world needs m

If one thinks of what a more comprehensive se

architecture might be 10 or 20 years from now, it 

emphasize what we see very faint beginnings of in 

America (Organization of American States), even f

and less coherent beginnings in Africa (Organizat

African Unity), and possibly an organization of 

promise in Europe (OCSE). If these or similar germs 

grow into instruments holding genuine promise for reg

security, they will require some kind of effe

multinational force. Such a force will need to be orga

equipped, rapidly deployable, disciplined, and, 

86
national force—dedicated to humanitarian interve

conflict suppression, and conflict prevention missio

possible. Experience to date says, “Maybe.”

One of the things we could do to make such an ou

more possible is to use NATO, not only as a model b

trainer and mentor. NATO could be employed to teach 

militaries how to organize and equip for alliance wa

and how to execute humanitarian and peace mis

During the Cold War, U.S. forces placed great empha

military-to-military contacts with allied and fri

armies throughout the world, forging bonds of frien

and mutual trust that redounded to the benefit of se

for all parties. Perhaps we can do this again on a larger 

and in the context of NATO assistance to regional se

alliances lying beyond NATO’s own territorial preser

QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTARY

CHAPTERS 6, 7, AND 8

QUESTION. Let’s grant that Russia is NATO’s pr

problem. But what do you do when you have problem

Bosnia and Kosovo that continue to fester, cre

instability and producing such outrages as genocide?

Professor Glaser. I didn’t mean to preclude tho

NATO missions. What I meant to say was that NATO 

sufficient group within NATO should have the opt

dealing with those cases. However, we need to shi

balance of how we describe and think about the purp

the Alliance. Our posture should be that the 

legitimate, important, and long-term purpose of NAT

to the east, although it may not be the most imm

problem facing the Alliance. NATO then has the o

confronted by another Kosovo-like crisis, of declining t

up the challenge for any one of a number of good rea

For example, future governments in NATO may vie

situation differently. They should have the option sim

expressing regret but refusing to get involved. We s

87
into an indefinite commitment to undertake seco

missions. Even today, there are many humanit

problems that NATO refuses to take on. I’m not precl

them, but rather merely urging a clear-eyed examinat

where they stand on our scale of important interests

Dr. Larrabee. The central purpose of an alliance c

be to address a threat which at the moment and fo

foreseeable future doesn’t exist. The real problem 

with Russia is not hedging against its power, but r

managing its weakness. The difficulty thus is no

danger of a nuclear attack, although one can’t comp

ignore that. The more likely difficulty would be the res

loose nukes, and that is where we need to turn our atte

We need not magnify some threat. We need not curry 

support for a threat that doesn’t exist. That would be w

It would make the development of a partnership 

Russia, however difficult and problematic, virt

impossible. I would rather focus on the actual probl

hand, which is to try to develop a partnership with R

Even so, it is important to stipulate that NATO ha

abandoned deterring a residual threat from Russia

strategic concept in every NATO statement always 

about the continued importance of Article 5 and coll

defenses as the core mission. But we must decide wh

put our emphasis in the near term.

QUESTION. We are likely to see an even more exp

growth of world trade and the opening up of new mark

the first half of the 21st century than experienced 

second half of the 20th century. What is the best strate

NATO to follow to promote world economic growt

stability in the first 50 years of the new century?

Professor Kaysen. The prospects for economic grow

good, but uncertain. They are highly contingent on po

stability, and NATO does play a role in that. Europ

remain important to the United States, and 

U.S.-European partnership will play a large ro

88
we will find our security more in the spread of shared n

of what’s right than through other avenues.

Professor Mearsheimer. Implicit in your question a

Professor Kaysen’s answer is the belief that incre

economic interdependence promotes peace. In other w

as states get richer and become more interconnected, 

is a substantial decrease in the likelihood of war be

them. There is a large international relations literatu

this subject and it finds little support for that claim. B

World War I, for example, there was a significant amo

economic interdependence and prosperity in Europ

war still happened. More recently, Saddam Hu

invaded Kuwait in August 1990 in good part be

Kuwait was over-producing its OPEC oil quotas and d

down world oil prices, thus harming the Iraqi eco

which was already in serious trouble from its war ag

Iran between 1980 and 1988. In short, because o

interdependency of Iraq and Kuwait through 

membership in OPEC, Iraq chose to attack its neig

Thus, we should at least have reservations about the 

that economic interdependence produces peace.

Professor Kaysen. The interdependence in exis

before World War I was qualitatively very different 

that prevailing today. It did not have the ki

institutional support that we have nor did 

interdependence occur under the aegis of a benev

hegemon like the United States of today.

QUESTION. With regard to the out-of-area crises 

NATO might address, what would be the limita

Would we go as far south as Sudan, as far east as Pak

Would we address crises other than humanitarian?

Dr. Larrabee. The threats that NATO faces ar

confined to Europe. The types of threats to the com

interest extend beyond Europe’s borders. The fact 

matter is, however, that in order for NATO to take a

it’s going to need a consensus among 19 countries. Th

89
those crises where they feel their interests are tru

stake. Most such instances are going to be in and a

Europe. The term “around Europe” is very ambiguou

that’s because there is no real consensus in NATO 

exactly how far Europe extends. For example, does it e

out into the Mediterranean? The distance and ty

missions would depend on the consensus in NATO itse

and large, that consensus will remain very Europe-orie

QUESTION. If NATO focuses primarily on the long-

mission of monitoring and deterring a resurgent R

while focussing secondarily on near- and mid

interventionist missions, won’t it create conf

regarding core structure, budget, and training f

tactical forces?

Professor Glaser. NATO would basically be i

position of being there in case problems arise someday 

Russia. In the interim, it would have to plan and prepa

more likely missions. NATO would be there as a diplo

statement of U.S. commitment to Europe, in the f

something that may or may not happen. As Russia ch

over time and if the threat changed, then NATO 

evolve quite dramatically in terms of size and types of 

to meet the threat. Of course, skeptics might ask, “I

odd that NATO is buying forces for its secondary pur

and not for its first purpose?” That question would h

be answered, but there is no fundamental contradict

Thus I’m not proposing that we prepare for a Ru

threat now. But when we look at core interests on dow

road, we need to be sensitive to Russian potential. 

believe that once the Americans leave Europe, it will b

hard ever to get them back and reconstitute a s

multinational alliance, then there’s a logic to waiting

is a bit of a hard sell. Am I confident that we can ma

NATO by that argument? No. Am I more confident th

can maintain it by that argument than by attempt

justify it through new missions? Yes. Thus we have 

90
been over for 10 years, and the predominant threat is 

for the foreseeable future. The bad news is that we 

puzzle through what type of alliance we want to keep

this involves us in a more complicated argument

security has become more complicated, but the world 

necessarily more dangerous. If it is more dangerous, I

sure that NATO is well prepared to handle all the da

But there are a couple that it may be prepared to ha

and those are the ones I’ve talked about.

Professor Kaysen. To obtain continued funding 

strong NATO against the possibility of a resurgent R

some 10 years hence will be an impossible sell. If N

doesn’t have serious missions, it can’t be supported. I

illusion to think that we can get support for N

especially in Europe, for an organization that d

address the key security concerns in Europe itself 

That is like telling your neighbor, whose house is o

that the more serious threat from fire is the de

mansion down the street and that we should send th

engines there, while letting the neighbor’s house conti

burn.

QUESTION. For those who do want NATO to su

wouldn’t it be more logical to redefine its ess

proclaiming as its new primary mission humanitaria

peace missions, which are, after all, what NATO is ac

carrying out these days? Why would such missions sh

the Alliance in the long term?

Professor Glaser. It’s a judgment call. My sense i

there’s tremendous ambivalence in the United State

paying high costs for humanitarian interventions, d

the worthiness of the cause. It may be that I’m wron

that, in fact, the American people would commit them

to a full range of interventions in Europe. If they are, t

the short term that’s going to be a better way to se

Alliance. Both Bosnia and Kosovo have turne

reasonably well. It wasn’t guaranteed that they w

91
early rough going did strain the Alliance. It depends o

well you think you can sell this argument. I’m open 

fact that both rationales—remaining primed for a resu

Russia 10-plus years hence, or refocusing on seco

missions today—are going to be hard sells over time. 

we’ve obtained contravening data, the latter rat

might be easier to sell. But if we were sure that Rus

going to be either benign or weak, and if we were sur

there will be no problem between western powers, t

would raise the question whether the United States s

stay in Europe at all. Such a question would touch off 

important national debate, leading to discussion of ho

resources saved should be spent.

QUESTION. In the post-Kosovo environment, what a

prospects and advisability of further NATO expansio

Dr. Larrabee. First, let me comment on Kosovo 

The real problem is not NATO being involved in Kosov

real problem is that 75 percent of the missions were ca

out by Americans. Americans are entitled to ask why 

should have to carry the lion’s share of such a camp

NATO has been trying to redress that balance and g

Europeans in better shape to carry out these missions 

United States won’t have to. If there were a re-bala

and if the Europeans enhanced their capabilities, 

would not be so much of a problem with U.S. support

the question of NATO enlargement, there will be incre

pressures in the wake of Kosovo to enlarge the Allian

part because the countries of southeastern Europe we

on a limb in many cases, providing transit routes, faci

and so forth. There’s a feeling in the region at the mo

for example in Bulgaria and Romania, that since they 

out on a limb to support NATO, it is now pay-back ti

At the same time, I think that such a rationa

expansion is wrong. Our difficulties in Kosovo underli

importance of having members that are in fact contrib

to security, not consumers of it. A problem with the reg

92
much consumers of security and would not make 

contributions to the Alliance. Therefore, NATO will re

a gradualist approach which continues to keep the 

open while undertaking to enhance its candid

capabilities to be useful and contributing members. 

wake of Kosovo, the answer is not to open up a floodga

new members. This would undermine NATO’s capac

carry out many of the new missions it’s going to have, r

than increasing stability in southeastern Europe.

93
CHAPTER 9

UPDATING NATO FORCES

 FOR THE 21st CENTURY

Thomas G. McInerney

NATO forces have been drawn down substantially 

the end of the Cold War in 1989, but the Alliance’s mi

command, control, and staffing apparatus remains i

fully prepared to direct NATO forces in any future mi

decided upon by competent political authority. My pu

in this chapter is to discuss the type of forces the U

States will need to deploy in order to meet its commitm

in Europe, with particular emphasis upon air forces.

The United States maintains about 2.3 wings on N

territory today pledged to the Alliance. They’re not ac

chopped to NATO control until certain conditions ar

but they plan and train for operational commitment 

the aegis of NATO protocols. In addition to the 2.3 win

train and exercise a continuous stream of Guard 

Reserve forces in Europe. It is vital to prepare 

augmentees, who will arrive in time of war.

The aircraft are designed for close air suppor

interdiction, air defense, in-flight refueling, long-

transport, and maritime support. Those are the mi

performed today and that will be required in the futur

been easier for the Air Force to transition to a post-Col

force than the Army. We’ve only had to make some ch

in our support and the way we fund our support activi

give our forces mobility. We now have a much sm

assemblage of air forces compared to the 14 wings pres

the height of the Cold War.

We do a great deal of training in Europe. Training 

Balkan air space while operating out of Aviano, Italy

vital. There was no way, even in a peacetime exercise

we could squeeze in the number of aircraft employ

95
problem when you are using that kind of mass 

operating in those weather conditions. Hard and re

training was what enabled aerial units to accomplish 

they did in Kosovo. The force structure in E

today—some 32,000-33,000 personnel and 230 a

tanker, transport, and fighter aircraft, with a healthy 

precision weapons—seems about right for the forese

future.

During the 11 weeks of Operation ALLIED FORC

7,000 attack sorties represented the highest use of pre

weapons in our history. Fortunately, Mr. Milosevic w

recipient of that ordnance, and any future adversar

commits a similar outrage can expect to see such N

forces coming after him. The Air Force will be invest

these areas, particularly in weapons like the Joint 

Attack Munition (JDAM), a satellite-guided all-we

bomb used with the B-2. The B-2 can carry 16 JDAMs t

and we’re now in the process of modifying the airfram

can drop 78 in one pass. The bomb will hit within se

yards of its target. We don’t call it precision, we 

near-precision. A 2,000-pound bomb going off that clos

precise as it needs to be. With a price tag of less than $1

(the laser-guided versions originally cost $15

thousand per bomb), this new version is far more affor

Clearly, it should be made available to our NATO allie

very important that they train and invest in this asp

air operations.

Prior to and during Operation ALLIED FORC

brought in some 700 aircraft to augment the 230 al

present in Europe. As mentioned earlier, we don’t n

force structure of over 900 aircraft in Europe. We re

about 2-plus wings, and the scope to train, exercise

move our people in and out. The importance of getting 

domain experience for air crews in the area where th

going to operate simply cannot be emphasized en

International air traffic conditions and procedures, 

mention weather and geography, are more diffic

96
trained to operate where they are likely to fight.

For future Alliance operations, one area in whi

need improvement is that of command, con

communications, intelligence, and surveilla

specifically, disseminating in near real time the req

information to air crews so that we can re-task airp

quickly when the necessity arises. In this informatio

we ought to be doing better. Frankly, if I had to giv

grade, I’d probably give us a D. It is a pressing proble

the future force and for the Alliance. We must deve

seamless system, one in which all air crews automat

receive the timely informational wherewithal to op

with optimal effort.

So far as drones—unpiloted aerial vehicles

concerned, we are doing some things we never believ

could do. Initially, we were using them only for surveil

We have now progressed to the point, however, w

drones can target a tank under a tree. We will ne

capitalize on such capabilities in our future force stru

We will need to be able to deploy the machines and ha

proper command, control, communications, intellig

and surveillance to fully exploit their potential. It is 

important that all Allied members receive the 

technology and that they be able to execute elec

warfare. All will need a force structure that w

successful in a Balkan-type environment and can su

against surface-to-air missiles and an integrate

defense system.

Stealth is very important, and the Air Force puts a 

effort into it. The B-2 became the star platform becau

weather degraded the capabilities of other aircraft

B-2s dropping 16 bombs each, thus hitting 32 targets 

great accuracy, provided a very powerful return. 

capability must be part of the future force structure 

available to NATO.

97
anticipating a joint strike fighter, which will be Stealt

such a fighter in significant numbers is 10-15 year

Thus we’re going to have to do with the current air

which is disturbing. The average age of all the aircr

Kosovo was 26 years. Europe as well as the United S

has a major modernization problem in front of it. E

also needs to be thinking in terms of procuring airli

tankers so they’ll have mobility. All these concern

important.

We also need to keep in mind the Sixth Fleet, 

performs the essential role of protecting NATO’s f

Domain experience is vital as well for naval forces. I

not be necessary to have a carrier in the Mediterrane

the time, but carriers do need to be present 4 to 6 mon

year if only for training the naval forces how to op

there.

How do we pay for all this? Today, 70 percent of the 

billion slated for defense goes into what we call tail, th

support infrastructure, overhead, headquarters, etc. 

30 percent goes to the warfighter. We do too many thi

the military that are not core business. We ne

outsource and privatize peripheral endeavors, we ne

close about 35 more bases, and we need to have 

acquisition reform to eliminate costs that don’t add 

That will provide money for high-value items like J

and for the warfighter.

We are working this military too hard. We have bee

procurement holiday. Army trucks are 40 years old

average age of Air Force airplanes is over 20 years. I

oldest it has ever been in our history. We’re depreciati

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines at the rate of 

billion a year. In 1998 we put in only $44 billio

procurement. That’s the procurement holiday. It’s an 

force. The next administration has got to address 

problem. It’s going to have to shift dollars to the warfig

98
modernize the force and meet our present commitmen

need an additional sum of about $300 billion a yea

President has slated only $112 billion per year over a 6

period. The Joint Chiefs have asked for $148 billion pe

over a 6-year period. But we need $300 billion per year 

the problem if we want to fix it the way we used to do. B

should not fix it that way. We should fix it the way 

industry was fixed—by reengineering and reformin

example, there are 40,000 people in the Departme

Defense today who are in the finance and accou

business. None of them pull a trigger. A private 

organization would probably have 8,000. We need to 

the dollars spent on those other 32,000 people t

warfighting side. With such truly fundamental refor

could modernize at considerably less than $300 bil

year additional. 

Thus, merely by using the model of U.S. indust

could pay for modernization. It’s not a complex or hig

model. It’s been proven. It would give us the force stru

we need for the next 10 years, one enabling us to s

NATO with the presence necessary for providing cont

stability. NATO has done its job magnificently for th

50 years. If we make the necessary effort now to mode

its forces, the Alliance can continue to be a succ

presence for peace and security well into the 21st cen

99
CHAPTER 10

MODERNIZATION, RESTRUCTURING

ADAPTATION:

IMPERATIVES FOR NATO FORCES

Jay Garner

In discussing the future military force requireme

Europe, we find ourselves in a fundamentally dif

security environment than that faced prior to 1989. B

find that essentially our force structure hasn’t ch

much since the early post-Cold War drawdown 

completed. In the future, one enduring feature o

Alliance is likely to be that the United States will main

trans-Atlantic commitment to NATO. But the key t

would be whether the United States can achieve a ba

between its peacekeeping role in NATO and elsewhe

one hand, and its more central task of fighting and wi

the nations wars wherever they occur, on the other

United States must successfully adapt itself now for 

varied roles that lie ahead. In the future a premium w

placed on full-spectrum capabilities. However, the obj

of military operations—and it will not change—is to im

our will and restore the peace. The question thus is h

we redesign our forces to achieve this objective.

How much have the forces in Europe changed

much. We’ve reduced quite a bit. We’re smaller, we’re 

modern, but we haven’t changed much in character. O

of capabilities, especially in our Army forces in Euro

essentially unchanged. The Army’s four heavy bri

have no more out-of-sector capability than the four div

we had there 8 years ago. Our NATO allies are f

behind technologically, a development driven b

reduced resources allocated for defense. For exampl

percentage of GDP going into defense in German

declined over the last 8 years from 3 percent down to 

1-1/2 percent. This decline was reflected in Germ

101
Kosovo. The United States flew 80 percent of the 

sorties, 90 percent of the intelligence sorties, and 90 pe

of the electronic warfare sorties. The United States f

little over 80 percent of the precision munitions and ov

percent of the cruise missiles.

While the success of Operation ALLIED FOR

further evidence of the steady improvement i

effectiveness and lethality of air and missile power, 

was still marginal effectiveness of air power ag

Serbian forces because they were hard to find and thus 

to hit. The Kosovo Liberation Army, acting as a surr

ground force, finally flushed them out and made them 

As they began to move, they became easier to hit 

forces.

What appeared to be a tardy deployment of Task 

Hawk into northern Albania highlighted a gro

perception that the Army remained something of a str

dinosaur. The Army needs to restructure itself now r

than postponing its restructuring until the Army After 

(AAN). That sentiment is not intended to denigrat

AAN. Conceptualizing the AAN was a valuable intell

exercise, and the Army should receive immense cred

energetically thinking about the future. But there 

reshaping and refocusing that need to happen in the 

today.

During Operation ALLIED FORCE, most of the N

air forces were unable to fight beside the U.S. Air 

There is thus the need for a comprehensive moderniz

program for key European allies, and there’s the ne

realistic U.S. planning to integrate low- and medium

technology forces with American high-tech forces to pr

an effective capability for coalition warfare. Ideall

would like all our allies to have high-tech forces, but 

meanwhile, we must do a better job blending high

low-tech forces.

102
Certainly they have to be smaller, more mobile, 

rapidly deployable. Yet they have to be more potent, 

capable of achieving decisive effects. They have 

maintained at a high state of readiness, eliminatin

train-and-decay syndrome. The focus of these forces w

the Article 5 heritage of collective defense, provid

hedge against uncertainty. The size of that coll

defense effort will be regulated by our considered evalu

of the Russian threat.

The Alliance of the future must also prepar

non-Article 5 missions and out-of-area operations. It 

be prepared to integrate new members. It must attend 

growing strategic importance of Turkey and the sou

periphery. Our continued dependence on petro

products will bring greater recognition of Turkey’s c

role as a gateway to Asia. It will also sensitize us to th

that future threats to Europe will in all likeliho

preponderantly on the southern periphery.

Thus, as noted above, future forces should be desig

support a hedging strategy. They would retain 

conventional defense capabilities based on our percept

the threat from Russia, but there would be a 

reorientation of our headquarters and forces toward gr

adaptivity through the entire spectrum of mi

operations. 

As we adapt and shape forces for the future, we n

continually analyze the asymmetric responses our 

will meet. We need to ensure that we’re able to 

effectively with each of them. For example, we mu

prepared to counter cyberwar, that is, attacks o

computer systems that support particularly critica

vulnerable functions such as planning, force proje

energy grids, and so forth. We must be able to dea

terrorist attacks, both at home and in Europe, a

ourselves realistically how such attacks will affect ci

populations. The huge and growing threat of missile a

103
If we can’t deal with them, the Alliance will crack. 

future operations will be conducted in u

settings—witness Somalia and Chechnya. Such w

presents special problems that must be anticipate

prepared for. Finally, how do we deal with polit

unengageable targets? What do we do with an enem

puts artillery systems next to schools and hospita

scatters civilians or refugees in and around ta

vehicles? We will have to decide whether nonlethal m

would be appropriate to counter such tactics and, if so

forms the nonlethal means should take.

As we shape forces for the future, we must capital

insights drawn from recent operations such as AL

FORCE. First, we need to analyze the advantage

disadvantages of publicly announcing our game pla

self-imposed operational limitations in advance. 

willing in the future should we be to telegraph our in

Second, we need to reexamine the practice of findin

striking industrial and commercial targets withi

civilian sector. This practice might prove 

counterproductive, especially over the longer term.

1 

we must come to terms with the reality that long-

bombers with precision munitions can realize 

tremendous utility on the future battlefield only 

mobile tactical targets have been forced to move and 

Scattered enemy forces in hidden locations re

relatively immune. Fourth, we note that ground forces 

to be positioned early and within operational reach 

enemy. By doing so, we preserve an important politica

strategic lever that could contribute to the 

termination of conflict. Fifth, we find that joint—r

joint—application of military force is more likely to ac

political objectives rapidly and decisively. Single-s

solutions lack the versatility, tailorability

comprehensiveness inherent in the applicati

full-spectrum violence against the enemy’s will. Mor

if force is worth using at all, it should be applied earl

104
attack in piecemeal driblets was discredited in Vietnam

the lesson still seems not to have sunk in.

What are the changes for U.S. forces in general

forces have to have an adaptive structure to accompl

missions: integration missions on behalf of forces of 

applying for NATO membership, Article 5 mis

out-of-area operational missions, and missions desce

all the way down to the lower end of the spectrum, su

humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking, etc. We n

ensure that U.S. forces are able to adapt to Al

structures and procedures so that we retain our Al

cohesion. There will be continued European reliance 

America’s unique strategic reach and access. One exa

is space, though the Europeans are likely to ente

domain somewhat more ambitiously in the next cen

Another example is troop and materiel lift, which rem

sine qua non for out-of-sector operations. There wil

force structure bill we have to pay, compensating fo

differing capabilities and technology levels of our N

allies. We’ll have to form liaison cells to serve as surro

for interoperability. To meet the full spectrum of mi

obligations, NATO will have to exercise creative inge

in fashioning the best mix of forces for particular missi

With regard to U.S. Army forces, they need 

restructured now, not later, a point made earlie

repeated here for emphasis. They have to 

full-spectrum capability, which will entail medium 

light forces as well as mobile theater missile defense f

There has to be a better balance between speed 

decisiveness, allowing us to get to the fight more rapid

with the wherewithal to defend ourselves and do the jo

example, our future cannon artillery system, the Crus

was designed for yesterday’s fight and not for tomor

Because of its weight and size, we cannot get it to d

battlefields easily. In the expeditionary operations 

future, often in austere environments and where tim

105
active forces. We need to structure accordingly.

Air Force capabilities need to be reprioritized. Str

lift, heavy bombers, UAVs, and space systems are v

important, serving as highly leveraged enablers in f

operations. We need to begin reexamining 

programs—for example, the tactical fighter programs

reassess them in light of the threat and geostr

environment that we’ll likely confront.

To sum up, U.S. forces in Europe haven’t been res

to meet the challenges and demands entailed by the f

geostrategic environment. The Army has to get to the 

quickly, but still with decisive force. There is a 

correlation that we find in our gaming between the len

time it takes to get to the fight and how long the figh

last. Delay translates to prolongation of the war.

Air Force programs should be restructured to refl

early 21st-century environment. Moreover, we ne

redefine air superiority. Air superiority now and i

future is more than superiority over manned aircraf

have to have superiority over the whole spectrum of m

threats also. European forces in general mu

modernized in such a way that they rapidly begin to 

the technology gap existing among the national forces

such steps as these, NATO can expect to meet wha

challenges are presented over the next decade and a 

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 10 

1. See, for example, Bradley Graham, “Report Says NATO B

Killed 500 Civilians in Yugoslavia,” The Washington Post, Febr

2000, p. A2.

106
CHAPTER 11

AMERICA’S DIMINISHING COMMITMEN

 TO NATO: IMPLICATIONS

 FOR SERVICE FORCE STRUCTURE

John J. Mearsheimer

In this chapter, I examine the question of wher

United States is likely to go over the next 20 years w

force structure in Europe. My main conclusions are

that the size of the U.S. military commitment to Eur

likely to shrink steadily over time, and second, that t

Force is likely be the dominant service in Europe durin

time, at the expense of the Army. I should emphasize 

have long argued that independent air power usually 

not play a key role in winning wars. Armies and the ta

air forces that support them are the main determina

victory. In short, wars are won on the ground. Neverth

with regard to the question at hand—U.S. force struct

Europe over the next 20 years—the future lies more 

the Air Force than the Army.

To approach this question, one first has to inquire 

the strength of the American commitment to Europe

tight is the link today? What is likely to happen to tha

in the future? Second, one has to consider the co

keeping peace in Europe, because if the U.S. commitm

Europe is weak, as I argue it is, the United States pro

will not be willing to incur significant costs to be Eu

peacekeeper. And if we are not willing to fight and 

Europe, that has profound implications for U.S. 

structure in that region.

There is no question that Europe, along with Nort

Asia and the Persian Gulf, is an area of great str

importance to the United States. But that fact alone 

not mean that the United States needs to station t

there. The key issue is whether or not there is a thr

107
commitment. My view is that there is no serious thr

American interests in Europe today. Nor is there one o

horizon.

The United States needs a motivating threat fo

reasons. First, the United States is a remarkably s

great power. Located in the Western Hemisphere

separated from the great powers in Europe and Nort

Asia by two giant moats (the Atlantic and Pacific Oc

and it has a huge nuclear arsenal. Secure great p

usually do not go looking for fights. Indeed, they try to 

them. Second, the costs of modern war are often grea

committing forces overseas effectively means putting 

in harm’s way. There has to be a powerful motivating 

for Americans, or any other people for that matter, to a

commitments that might lead to war. I often tell stu

that a good way to think about this issue is to see the 

Saving Private Ryan, and then ask: do we have intere

Europe today that would justify putting American tro

that kind of situation?

I believe that there is only one possible threat in E

(or Northeast Asia) that would justify an American mi

commitment to Europe with its attendant dangers, an

is the presence of a potential hegemon. Specificall

United States does not want any state to dominate E

the way it dominates the Western Hemisphere, be

that powerful rival would be a serious threat to the U

States. In contemporary parlance, the United States 

not want a peer competitor. Instead, it wants a bala

power in Europe. In the event a potential hegemon com

the scene, the United States prefers to remain o

sidelines and let the other great powers in Europe cont

But if they cannot do the job, the United States accep

responsibility. That is the only circumstance in whic

United States is willing to fight and die in Eu

Maintaining peace in Europe, while certainly a des

American goal, is not important enough to justify eng

in deadly European wars.

108
an economic and military weakling. It is certainly no t

to overrun Europe, and there is little reason to think t

will be the most powerful state in Europe 20 years from 

But in the unlikely event that this happens and Rus

once again a potential hegemon, the other Eur

powers—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—shou

able to contain Russia by themselves, and not requir

from the United States as they did between 1945 and 

After all, Germany is now unified and wealthy, which 

not during the Cold War. Furthermore, Russia has 

about half the population of the former Soviet Union, 

makes it almost impossible for Russia to build a mi

machine as powerful as the Red Army. This is not to sa

a wealthy Russia would be a paper tiger, but only to sa

it would not be so formidable that American troops 

have to remain in Europe to contain it.

In the absence of a threat to overrun Europe, it w

especially difficult over the long term to convince Ame

to pay the costs of keeping troops there and run the ri

getting caught in a shooting war.

There are four other factors that raise serious d

about the viability of the American commitment to Eu

First, a substantial and growing percentage of the ci

policymakers who would make the decision to 

American troops into combat have never served i

military. Nor will most of their children. I believe it wo

difficult for leaders in Congress and the executive bra

send lower-class and middle-class Americans out to 

and die when there is no sense of shared risk. Further

the American military is likely to grow increas

distrustful of civilian leaders who lack military expe

and who might be willing to pursue risky strategies be

they would not be putting themselves or their child

harm’s way. All of this is to say that there better be pow

reasons for putting the American military into trouble

around the world. As emphasized, I see no comp

reason why the United States should fight in Europe

109
States is going to be willing to bear the financial co

maintaining U.S. forces in Europe. The American eco

is booming at the moment, and with the budget surpl

now have, it is relatively easy to pay for keeping 10

troops in both Europe and Northeast Asia. But h

anyone believes that happy situation is going to contin

the next 2 decades. Somewhere in the not too distant f

the U.S. economy is going to run into trouble and th

going to be serious pressure to cut defense spending. 

for the Europeans to do more for themselves will be 

loudly and clearly. The problem will be compounded fu

when the so-called baby-boomers start retiring after 

and begin putting pressure on Social Security, Med

and other entitlement programs.

Third, the United States is likely to focus more atte

on Northeast Asia than Europe in the future, because C

might very well be a potential hegemon that can on

contained by a balancing coalition that includes the U

States. If China looks like it might be a peer competito

there is no dangerous threat in Europe, the United S

will almost surely shift large numbers of military asse

out of Europe and into Asia.

Finally, there is the matter of generational chang

national security establishment is presently dominat

individuals who came of age during the Cold War, and 

to see the world very much in terms of that conflict. I in

myself in that category. The American commitme

Europe was a sacrosanct mission in the Cold War, be

the Soviet military threat was concentrated t

Consequently, it is difficult for old Cold Warriors like m

to imagine U.S. troops leaving Europe. However, it 

likely that the younger generations moving up in our 

will feel the same connection to Europe.

Let’s now return to the subject of America’s relucta

suffer casualties, focusing specifically on the recent w

Kosovo. That conflict highlights nicely how little ap

110
Europe. There is much talk about how the pilots who h

bring Slobodan Milosevic to heel were heroes. I have 

respect for those airmen, but I am uneasy about c

them heroes. The Allies flew about 37 thousand sort

the conflict, and there was not a single casualty. Mor

those airmen were flying over Kosovo while massive e

cleansing was taking place on the ground below. Yet

were rarely allowed to fly below 15,000 feet, where 

might have been better able to help the victims, be

Allied leaders feared that they might be shot down. In 

words, the United States and its allies were unwill

risk a single life to alleviate the suffering of the Alba

on the ground.

Furthermore, the Clinton Administration w

horrified by the thought of using American ground for

Kosovo that it said early in the conflict that they 

never be used to invade Kosovo, even though that t

probably would have helped cause Milosevic to quit th

In short, Kosovo provides stark evidence that the U

States is not inclined to fight and die to maintain pe

Europe.

One might argue that Kosovo was of marginal str

significance, and thus is not a good indicator of wh

United States would do if there was a Russian threat, s

Poland or the Baltic states. I do not believe, however

the American people would be willing to fight and 

defense of those countries if Russia or any other 

attacked them. We would certainly be concerned i

happened, and we would protest loudly. But the secu

the United States would not be at risk. Remember th

were able to manage quite well in the Cold War despi

fact that the Soviets controlled most of Eastern Euro

long as there is no mortal threat to the United State

likely to remain on the sidelines if war breaks out in ea

Europe.

111
structure? First, the United States is likely to pull its t

out of Europe over the course of the next two de

mainly because there is no threat in the region s

enough to justify a continued military presence. If a 

war breaks out in Europe, most Americans are likely t

“That’s Europe’s war—let them deal with the prob

Second, as long as U.S. forces remain in Europe, th

Force is likely to play a more important role in the r

than the Army, mainly because the Air Force is inva

less costly to employ in combat than the Army. Specif

there are likely to be fewer American casualties 

chosen instrument is air power instead of ground pow

The problem with relying largely on air power i

there are significant limits on what it can do alone to 

war, especially if the adversary has a formidable mi

Consider the three main cases where the United Stat

employed force since the Cold War ended. It conduc

lengthy bombing campaign against Iraq in early 199

air power alone could not force Saddam Husse

capitulate. A ground invasion was necessary to accom

that goal. American air power was used again in th

summer of 1995 in Bosnia to force Milosevic t

negotiating table. However, it was used in conjunction 

a Croatian and Bosnian ground offensive. Kosovo is th

case where air power alone might have won a war, alth

it is too soon to tell what caused Milosevic to capitul

might be that the KLA’s growing power on the gr

coupled with a NATO threat to invade Kosovo, turne

tide. Regardless, these three bombing campaigns ag

weak opponents point up the limits of air power.

The American national security establishment i

aware of this problem and is working hard to de

sophisticated technologies that can markedly increa

effectiveness of air power. The evolving Revoluti

Military Affairs (RMA), for example, is part of this ef

increase the lethality of American air power. An even 

promising solution to this problem is to use America

112
noted, this is what happened in Bosnia in 1995. Also, 

argued during the recent war in Kosovo that the U

States should have aggressively armed and traine

KLA, and then employed American air power to su

KLA offensives against the Serbs.

Actually, the first time the United States employe

approach to warfighting was in Vietnam in the spr

1972, when the North Vietnamese launched their fa

Easter Offensive. Most American troops were o

Vietnam by that point, so the ground war wa

responsibility of the South Vietnamese Army. Bu

United States provided its ally with extensive air su

and together they won a clear victory in that camp

North Vietnam, however, eventually won the war 

years later in 1975.

In sum, the United States military is likely t

Europe over the course of the next 2 decades, m

because there is no threat in sight to our vital intere

that region. But as long as American forces rema

Europe, U.S. policymakers are not likely to commit 

own ground forces to combat. Indeed, they will proba

to great lengths to avoid using the U.S. Army in com

Europe. When trouble starts, they will instead try to w

war with American air power employed in conjunction 

another state’s ground forces.

QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTARY

CHAPTERS 9, 10, AND 11

QUESTION. With the huge gap between funds req

for military modernization and funds actually slated, 

we in the position of not being able to get there from 

Lieutenant General McInerney. Clearly, all servic

facing certain budgetary strains. That’s one of the re

why we need to reduce our huge infrastructura

administrative tail, enabling us to transfer money fro

113
challenge. No question about it. It’s going to take a 

leadership, and it’s going to require different wa

handling the problem. But it can be solved.

Lieutenant General Garner. It takes money

services are underfunded today, and the Army face

huge problem of not being able to modernize 

recapitalize the force. In fact, it’s almost impossible. 

require fundamental redesign of the force to get us ou

under that economic burden. It’s getting more diffic

recruit because the economy is humming. The repe

deployments that soldiers make result in great pressu

them from their families to get out, especially since so

are not making the money their civilian counterpart

The quality of life facilities are underfunded. Ho

repairs have been put off. Quality of life is poor. We h

force that’s getting extremely old. Yet, in replacing th

force we have to build a new type of force that is more ra

deployable but at the same time is more decisive tha

old one was, all in the face of huge problems in recru

retention, deployment hardships, and quality-o

detractors. To meet such challenges will take money

For the Army, the first area we have to look at 

internal management, trying to increase the productiv

our recruiting force. Over the last 4 or 5 years

proportion of graduating high school seniors going 

college has increased from a little over 40 percent to ov

percent. We’ve lost a third of the market. We have to 

out how we can attract those who have some college. W

it we can offer a young man or woman with some c

background? We have to look to their aspirations an

skills they bring and rethink the issue of our 

structure. We have in the form of warrant ranks a 

class of military positions that could be reassessed, cre

an attractive opportunity to bring highly qualified p

into our service. We must keep them dedicated t

technologies we need, particularly information 

technologies, but treat them in a way more commens

114
the kinds of opportunities we have.

Fortunately, the Army enjoys retention rates in exc

what our original goals were. If we can get young me

women through their first 4-year commitments, wel

half of them will then stay with us. So we’re doing some

right in terms of the experience we’re givin

first-termers. The problem is to attract them in the 

place. The biggest challenge in that regard is to me

aspirations of those who are now going on to comm

colleges and will have technical degrees.

QUESTION. Why are we still struggling with ineff

and expensive government in view of the highly publ

initiatives on reinventing government?

Lieutenant General McInerney. An organization 

changed only if change is driven from the top—

conviction. The Pentagon bureaucracy know

mandatory retirement dates of military drivers, and 

know how long a politician willing to shake things 

going to be around. The bureaucracy can drag thin

until the drivers depart the scene and thus prevent n

reforms from happening. Moreover, we must 

competing with the private sector in areas where the p

sector can do it better. For example, in the Army’s log

modernization, an excellent decision was made to 

commercial system off the shelf. That decision had 

driven from the top.

We’re not getting enough of that type of forcefu

courageous leadership. There is a paralyzing po

concern over civilian jobs. But we’ve closed 97 bases

80 percent of those having been fully closed. We now 

more people from the private sector working on those 

bases than when the government workers were t

They’re putting taxable dollars into the community r

than having their wages paid by the government. We 

how to achieve these soft landings and human

transitions. But we lack the political will. When it com

115
initiative gets out of the Clinton White House. They a

biting the tough bullets. We’re going to have to solve 

problems no matter who the next president might be

Lieutenant General Garner. Unfortunately, with

defense establishment itself, part of the culture 

against a solution. We could achieve enormous savi

defense infrastructure if we contracted more work 

civilian organizations. But what often happens is that 

government organizations that are good candidat

outsourcing belong to someone in the Office of the Secr

of Defense. They are his empire—his turf—and he 

compelled to protect them. The services can’t get at 

Take, for example, Jacques Gansler, now the h

respected DoD acquisition executive. Before, when Ga

served on the Defense Science Board, he looked at 

infrastructures and found that we could save abo

billion dollars by civilianizing them and then applyin

money to core service programs. But now that h

member of the Defense hierarchy, he can’t find one d

Professor Mearsheimer. There’s not much ho

reform of the services and the Pentagon more genera

large part because of the rather benign threat environ

we operate in today The best way to get at this problem 

think about it in terms of interest-group politics. Insi

national security establishment, there are different in

groups, like DoD, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Ma

Then, inside each service we have another layer of in

groups—strategic bombers versus tactical aircraft, 

infantry versus mechanized infantry versus armor, a

forth. These various groups have selfish and cla

interests. To bring order to this sprawling structur

make it work efficiently, there has to be a signi

external threat that makes it imperative to meld the g

into a lean and mean fighting force. In fact, there is a 

literature on this subject, which concludes that mili

tend to operate efficiently only in a high-threat environ

where a state’s survival is on the line. In extremis, you 

116
and foolish ways. But we live in a low-threat environ

today. Consequently, it is unlikely that anyone is going 

able to force effective reform on the Department of De

Not surprisingly, the Quadrennial Defense Review 

futile exercise in reform. Future efforts of that kind a

likely to be much more successful.

QUESTION. Isn’t it the case that the pot

employment of ground forces in Kosovo by NATO was 

ultimately brought Milosevic to capitulate, and no

application of air power? Given that ground forces c

be moved quickly to vital areas overseas, isn’t it w

retain significant ground forces forward-deployed in 

areas? Don’t they provide a large measure of insuran

Professor Mearsheimer. It is hard to make a judgm

this time on what caused Milosevic to capitulate. W

don’t have enough information about his decisionm

calculus. We certainly can come up with plau

explanations, but until we get some concrete evidence 

him or the people around him, it’s impossible to say fo

what happened.

I do think that the threat of a ground invasion 

excellent way to deal with problems like Kos

Nevertheless, I think it will be difficult to convinc

American people to keep ground troops forward-deplo

Europe so that they can be used in future Kosovos. We 

managed to keep U.S. troops in Europe since 1990 beca

has not been costly to us—at least not up to now. Payi

bills has been easy becuse of the prosperity of the C

years, and the human costs have been remarkably 

Remember, we lost no lives in the Kosovo war. But w

not always be so lucky. If we continue condu

out-of-area missions and humanitarian missions 

Kosovo, we risk losing American lives, which I believ

undermine the American commitment to Europe, mak

impossible to maintain a presence there over the long t

117
potential hegemon, doesn’t our continued presence i

commitment to Europe provide a general sen

continuing stability there? Doesn’t it forestall Eur

wars that we might otherwise be drawn into?

Professor Mearsheimer. Looking historically a

American commitment to Europe, as well as the B

commitment to the continent, it is apparent that we bo

drawn into European wars only when there is a pot

hegemon on the continent. The British stayed o

continent from 1815, when Napoleon was finally def

until the early 20th century, because there was no pot

hegemon in Europe. In particular, they did not get inv

in the German wars of unification against Austria (

and France (1870), because Germany was not a pot

hegemon at that point. It is potential hegemon

Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germ

and the post-1945 Soviet Union that bring Britain an

United States into Europe’s major wars.

Lieutenant General McInerney. Let me return 

earlier issue of air power versus ground power. Air 

was successful in Kosovo, but that model will not be

universal. The new Army, by adjusting its force stru

will be more mobile and more responsive. True, air 

can be brought forward a lot quicker than the Army

Army forces stationed in Europe will still play a dom

role in central Europe through their reinforce

capability. The ability to project a more mobile force 

that area to sites elsewhere in Europe or outside of Eur

indispensable.

QUESTION. Wouldn’t prospects for world pea

strengthened if the United States remained dispos

defend forward and nip wars in the bud before they be

great wars?

Professor Mearsheimer. The United States is not 

business of nipping great-power wars in the bud. It de

forces forward to contain potential hegemons 

118
becoming peer competitors of the United States. If th

no peer competitor on the horizon in either Euro

Northeast Asia, the United States is likely to retreat 

Western Hemisphere and maintain few, if any, m

forces in those regions. That has certainly been the pa

of American behavior in the past. Our military commi

to Europe and Northeast Asia in peacetime during the 

War was not the norm; it was a historical anomaly. 

might become a potential peer competitor, however, 

that happens the United States will probably keep tro

Northeast Asia to contain China.

Let me unpack my argument a bit. The United S

and Britain, like all great powers, have perfected the 

buck-passing when it comes to containing dang

adversaries. Specifically, America’s goal is to get 

states to do the fighting and dying for as long as pos

and to intervene only when it is essential to prote

balance of power. For example, the United S

understood clearly in the early 20

th

 century that Wilhe

Germany was a serious threat to dominate Europe

were perfectly content, however, to let France, Russia

Britain deal with the problem while we remained o

sidelines. We finally entered World War I in 

1917—almost 3 years after it started—only beca

looked like Germany was going to win the war and bec

peer competitor. 

We repeated the same pattern when confronted 

Nazi Germany. Americans like to talk about how mora

idealistic the United States is when it comes to fo

policy. Yet, what did we do when Adolph Hitler ca

power in 1933? Nothing. What did we do when he st

World War II in 1939? Nothing. What turned Ame

policy around was the fall of France in May-June 

Hitler was then free to attack the Soviet Union with

second front, and we thought Nazi Germany was lik

win that fight. We feared that Adolph Hitler would do 

Kaiser Wilhelm was unable to do: establish Ge

119
United States. So the United States began feve

preparing for war. We were not guided by noble ideals 

dealings with Nazi Germany. We were motivated in

by the logic of realpolitik. 

In short, we find a powerful impulse in the United S

to pass the buck to other states when faced with a pot

aggressor. This same impulse is found in Britain, wh

why, going back to the 17

th

 century, it has often 

referred to by its European neighbors as perfidious A

Like Britain, the United States is a balancer of last res

Europe. We come in at the last moment and only wh

have no choice.

Did we come in too late in World War II, as some sug

No. Our timing was almost perfect. In World War I

key issue was which state would pay the awful blood p

beating down the German Wehrmacht. Better the 

Union than the United States. Appropriately, i

preferable to invade the continent at Normandy in 

rather than 1943 or, even worse, 1942. The best str

from an American perspective was to let the Wehrmac

the Red Army fight for a few years and then for the U

States to come onto the continent when the Germans 

on the ropes and win the peace. Again, that is how B

and the United States have tended to operate in the 

The historical record is clear on this. Some might say 

the United States had intervened in Europe in the 1

there would have been no World War II. Maybe. Mayb

But if the United States had tried but failed to pr

World War II, it would have been in the thick of the fig

from the beginning of the war, and many more Ame

would have died than was actually the case. 

Lieutenant General McInerney. I am glad not a 

Americans share the foregoing view. We have all he

the enormous degree of economic interdependence be

Europe and the United States. These ties are a reflect

the internationalist stance of American businessm

120
claiming that the growing economic ties got us into W

War II. But internationalism has been very successfu

1945. We’ve had our problems. But clearly the gr

success has been in Europe, and we should continue 

the recipe. Fundamentally, the successful recipe 

remain engaged in Europe with a strategic partne

thinks the way we do, that has great wealth, and t

union with us provides a very stabilizing force for the 

and the future. The American people that I know will 

and fight for what’s right, as will the Europeans, and th

proved it.

QUESTION. Isn’t the policy of disengagement, sa

periods when we’re faced with a hegemon or 

competitor, more representative of the attitud

Congress than those in the executive branch?

Professor Mearsheimer. Yes, I think that the p

administration is less interested in scaling bac

commitment to Europe than is Congress, although the

members of Congress who are quite interventionist in 

outlook. But I should emphasize that I am making w

basically a structural argument, which is to say 

particular individuals and administrations don’t hav

much influence on what happens regarding 

commitment of American forces to Europe. My argum

that powerful structural forces at play in the interna

system and in the United States are going to ma

difficult for any President, whether it is Bill Clinto

Republican, to maintain forces in Europe (and Nort

Asia) in the absence of a potential hegemon. Frank

Roosevelt was certainly internationalist in his inclina

in the late 1930s, but he could not act on his inclin

until the fall of France in June 1940 created a situ

where it looked like Germany might overrun all of Eur

QUESTION. You don’t see a difference between att

of the presidency and attitudes in Congress, gen

speaking?

121
General Naumann. We know what Pres

Roosevelt’s intention was—it was to build a world sa

democracy. If the United States no longer accepts 

ideal, it will never have troops in Europe or Northeast 

But I believe it does. The international structure

institutions erected to assure a stable and peaceful 

are not built of stone. We can change them as circumst

dictate to better adapt to current realities. It may w

that at some point in the future America’s 

commitment to Europe could be adjusted downwar

only after we have created the proper conditions.

Professor Mearsheimer. I understand the argumen

this is a period of profound change and that the U

States has an opportunity to shape it in positive wa

staying put in Europe and working closely with its al

spread norms of cooperation and build powerful institu

that can promote peace. But to be honest, I lo

international politics in a very different way. I think 

states are selfish actors who rarely behave in altr

fashion. The United States, for example, is m

concerned with enhancing its own interests, which m

making sure it remains the most powerful state i

world. As an American, I believe that is a wise goal, be

it enhances the security of the United States. Of c

many people believe that such views are outmoded 

post-Cold War world. I think they are wrong, but only 

will tell whether there has been a real revoluti

international politics.

QUESTION. Where do the French fit into the puz

European security?

Professor Mearsheimer. Throughout most of the 

War, the French had mixed feelings about the Ame

military presence in Europe. They preferred for the 

part a European defense identity independent of the U

States. But the French appear to have changed 

thinking on this matter in the wake of the Cold War. 

122
While France is not as interested as Britain and Germ

keeping the Americans in Europe, the French are at 

not trying to push us back across the Atlantic. How

French thinking could change in the next few years, a

have never been fully comfortable with an Ame

military presence in Europe.

QUESTION. Are there any plans to bring Slo

Milosevic before the International Court of Justice a

Hague?

Professor Mearsheimer. No firm decision has been 

but investigators are gathering evidence on allege

crimes by Milosevic and his lieutenants. But even if th

eventually indicted, it is not clear that they will be br

to trial.

QUESTION. How do the Guard and Reserve fit in

force structure equation?

Lieutenant General McInerney. The Guard and R

play an important role. The Air Force is using Guar

Reserve forces at an increasing rate, and they w

integral to any Air Force military involvement overse

Lieutenant General Garner. The Army Reserv

Army National Guard, and the active Army are going 

together. We can’t fight a war without all three of 

there. As we redesign the active component, the Na

Guard will have to mirror that modernization. Thus 

divest ourselves of heavy systems in the active Arm

will have to do the same thing in the National G

putting them on the modernization ramp with the 

Army.

The Army Reserve will go through a period of rede

and reestablishing its core competencies. The Re

offers tremendous utility, but we had it doing so 

different things that we now need to see where w

consolidate its activities and thus get better use. 

probably taken the Reserve down further than we s

123
next 3 or 4 years.

General Saint. Is the military budget going to get w

Absolutely. On the other hand, has the future of the 

military presence in Europe been decided? No, it ha

been decided. But there has been a change in 

philosophy regarding Europe. The United States, 

with the Europeans, made a considered decision that 

was happening in Kosovo was so unspeakably outra

that we would not let it continue regardless of whet

was occurring in a sovereign country outside NATO

thus decided to intervene. True, the timing and mea

which we intervened, all dictated by pol

considerations, were not such that we were able to pr

significant additional suffering and atrocities. We stil

a guilty conscience about that. But we were success

evicting Serb forces from Kosovo and returnin

Kosovars to their homes under conditions of securit

hope.

Is Europe still important? It remains important 

variety of reasons. The economic reasons are obviou

there are other factors that link us to Europe. For exa

there are more Poles in Chicago than there are in Wa

there are more Croats in Pennsylvania than there 

Croatia, or nearly so. Such affinities generat

obligations on the part of the United States. When ove

kin of U.S. citizens are in danger, an American respon

been predictable.

Europe is important as well for geostrategic rea

Will NATO, with U.S. participation, have new mis

Yes. However, we have lost the predictability of the 

War. We knew who the enemy was. Every unit in the 

had a wartime mission in a particular geographic loc

Each unit knew who the enemy was on the other side 

boundary, and it trained for the encounter. We do not 

an identified enemy today. Thus there is a lev

uncertainty throughout the Army as to which enem

124
achieve certain specified capabilities. That’s not suff

when you’re trying to justify your existence, but it i

that we have to train for capabilities.

For example, we must have mobility, and we w

capitalize on technology so that we put people in harm

only to the minimum extent necessary. The proport

soldiers who were within musket range in the Civil Wa

quite high. The proportion of soldiers subject to dire

nowadays is far smaller. We would rather have 

people up front where the bullets are thickest and m

the back. This doesn’t mean we should neglect work

reduce the tail. But there’s a logic to what we try to d

try to shoot the enemy from longer distances so tha

likelihood of his shooting us is a lot less. In Ope

DESERT STORM, U.S. Army tanks were killing Iraqi 

at well over 3,000 meters, and the Iraqis didn’t even 

our tanks were there. The maximum range of Iraqi ta

about 2,000 meters, two-thirds of a mile less than ours

were sitting there eating their couscous when all of a su

their tanks started blowing up around them. That wa

unnerving, so technology does serve a useful purpose

Our technology affects our force structure an

capability to perform. Where is our force structure goi

we are going to have a variety of missions alon

spectrum of conflict—interventions ranging from send

platoon of medics to the Horn of Africa to teach inhab

how to perform preventive medicine, to an observer m

such as we perform in the Egyptian Sinai, to 

medium-level conflict like Kosovo, to major theater wa

that in the Gulf—then we will require flexible forces ca

of being tailored to meet these different challenges.

The United States does not like to fight alone. It d

make good sense to fight alone. It was once said that th

thing more difficult than fighting alone is fighting 

coalition. But fighting in a coalition is far super

fighting alone. I never really understood that until I be

125
well as others, and I had a tendency to grouse about th

military colleague took me aside and said, “Butch, you 

understand. These are the people you’re going to 

alongside of. These are your compatriots. And if you 

this suspect battalion out of the force structure, yo

have to replace it with an American battalion or do wit

I saw the light. We can’t get along without the Allianc

we can’t get along without friends of like mind, thos

believe in justice, the rule of law, and human dignity

Admittedly, we’re not going to be part of an al

during every military action that we as a nation dec

undertake. Thus the Army will need some kind of tailo

force structure which, combined with Air Force, Navy

Marine complements as appropriate, will form a pa

that can fight without allies and accomplish the jo

assigned to do.

In alliance theory, the commander ought to be a

take three F-16s, four tanks, three bulldozers, and an 

cruiser and make a task force out of them. Then, ag

theory, the commander should be able to turn a dia

reconfigure that task force for an entirely different mi

There is no technical reason why those two action

problematic except the friction in our All

bureaucracies. Such friction can be prohibitive

sometimes the simplest-sounding Alliance actions be

undoable. For example, language problems are 

manageable at the corps level when coordinating a 

because you have a couple of days to work it out. 

working out a language problem at squad level 

somebody’s shooting at you and you have about 30 se

to react is a horse of a different color. We’re work

overcome such frictions in NATO.

Our ability to interoperate and cooperate when ou

interests are at stake is very key. I’ll illustrate this w

true story from my own experience. During preparatio

DESERT STORM in 1990, I got a phone call from Ge

126
you send a division to Saudi Arabia in 60 days?” I 

“Well, Chief, I really think they need a corps. From w

can tell about the situation, they need a comman

control element and about two divisions from me, an

can provide another one from the States.” “I think 

right,” he said, “I’ll call you back.” Later he called m

said, “Yes, we need a corps. Can you send a corps in 60 

I said, “Yes, if you will take care of the politics, a

Washington stays off our backs and lets us get on wi

business.” 

Now let me zero in on the part of the story showin

importance for American commanders to be on 

friendly terms with their Alliance colleagues, a relatio

that derives from our having troops in Europe alongsi

allied troops they’ll be operating with. I made four 

calls, one to a Dutchman, one to a Belgian, and t

Germans. They were the territorial commanders th

whose jurisdictions this 200,000 tons of ammunition, 3

soldiers, etc. were going to pass within 30 to 45 days. 

“Hans, I have a big problem. This is Friday nigh

Monday we’re going to have to start some big-time mo

Can I send somebody to see you?” Hans said, “Absol

Eight o’clock in the morning, I’ll see your man in my 

up north, near the border.” So we sent somebody up 

By Monday morning we had troops on the move.

Now what if I had had to say to Hans, “Good day, Ge

so-and-so, my name is General Saint. We have neve

before, but, pardon me, I would like to borrow all 

trains, stop all your highway movement, close down 

port, change the priority of shipments on the canals, a

be along to talk to you about it and we’ll sign a contr

Monday.” Could we have pulled that off if at every le

our army in Europe we had not had close, long-sta

relationships with the appropriate Dutch, Belgian

German officials? Absolutely not. If we want coope

from our European allies, we’re going to have to stay 

and demonstrate a level of interest that says we’re se

127
to be there so they can see us and get to know us and b

that we are there for the long haul.

In dealing with conflict in Europe, it is in the 

interests of the United States to plan ahead by supp

and remaining at the forefront of the combined institu

arrangements to resolve such conflict, rather 

remaining on our own shores in splendid isolation, dei

to intervene in Europe on an ad hoc basis through occa

crisis management scenarios. Admittedly, there 

going to be a war in central Europe, but it is very un

around the periphery. It is emphatically in Ame

interests to keep a strong enough hand in the ga

assure that the peripheral instability is not allow

destabilize the vital center.

128
CHAPTER 12

WHITHER THE U.S.-NATO PARTNERSH

CONSENSUS AND DISSENT

Lloyd J. Matthews

The Cold War is now 10 years behind us, the W

Pact is a distant memory, the Soviet empire is irretrie

shattered, communism is passé, the consumptive Ru

bear remains in fretful hibernation, while Opera

DESERT STORM in the Gulf and ALLIED FORCE 

former Yugoslavia stand as storied testaments t

decisive superiority of Western arms. Why, then, 

grand strategists and defense policymakers becom

neurotically worried about our future? Why ha

American stance vis-à-vis NATO become so contentio

The answer lies in a simple seven-letter word—hi

Historically, reluctant Americans have manne

bastions only when the Huns were at the gate: Europe 

Great War, 1917; Europe in World War II, 1944; Eur

the Cold War, 1949. When victory was secured and the 

retreated, Americans breathed a sigh of relief, drew 

their forces, and came scrambling home: Europe, 19

Europe 1945-47; Europe, 1992-93. True, NATO remai

place after the Cold War expired, and the United S

having been burned in the past, bestirred itself to le

modest residual force of some 112,000 military person

the Continent. But with the actual commitment of 

forces to wars in Bosnia and Serbia, America’s tradi

aloofness to foreign entanglements found new voice, an

issue of whether we should maintain a perm

complement to Europe’s own indigenous defender

risen once again.

The debate surrounding this issue can be glimps

terms of its two polar positions, with various gradati

between. On one pole are those who support a pow

129
corollary view that NATO should for the present sup

its now-dated Cold War anti-Soviet mission with t

securing political and humanitarian order in outlying 

where instability could adversely affect interests o

North Atlantic region or outrage its moral sensibiliti

On the other pole are those who believe tha

Europeans are quite capable of waging their own war

that the United States should accordingly draw bac

tend its own garden, refusing to be pulled into ove

embroilments not of its own making and having du

connections to its security. This cause has been injecte

the U.S. 2000 presidential campaign by aspiring R

Party candidate Patrick Buchanan, but it is embrac

some in the mainstream parties who otherwise have li

no ideological affinity for Mr. Buchanan’s political ag

Let us first examine the school advocating a robust U.S

in an activist NATO. Perhaps the most forcefu

eloquent upholder of this position is U.S. Ambassador 

United Nations Richard Holbrooke.

In his oft-noted book To End a War (1998)

Holbrooke’s account of the negotiations to stop the fig

in Bosnia, he refers emphatically to the United State

“European power.”

2

 This catchy locution is not of c

literally true, certainly not in a geographical sense no

in a political or economic sense, despite the exte

economic interdependence between the two sides 

North Atlantic and despite the strong political, cul

and ethnic ties of long standing. No one would cavil at s

figure were it a mere harmless exaggeration mad

rhetorical emphasis, but Mr. Holbrooke goes on to inv

with a measure of specific content quite far-reaching 

policy implications. Attend carefully as he here summ

what it means for the United States to define itsel

European power:

The circumstances that led to the collapse of Yugoslavia and 

war in Bosnia were so extraordinary that it is difficul

130
thing, it is that history is unpredictable. There will be oth

Bosnia’s in our lives, different in every detail but similar in o

overriding manner: they will originate in distant a

ill-understood places, explode with little warning, and prese

the rest of the world with difficult choices—choices betwe

risky involvement and potentially costly neglect. But if dur

the Cold War Washington sometimes seemed too ready 

intervene, today America and its allies often seem too will

to ignore problems outside their heartland. There will be ot

Bosnias in our lives—areas where early outside involveme

can be decisive, and American leadership will be required

Mr. Holbrooke speaks here for the interventionist s

of American foreign policy, those who readily te

perceive threats to American security whenever s

instability manifests itself on foreign shores, partic

along the verge of greater Europe. Those who hold 

views are doubtless correct in prophesying future Bosn

“distant and ill-understood places,” but they are pe

less persuasive in predicating American involveme

those Bosnias upon claims that American interests th

are identical to Europe’s.

To argue plausibly for a substantial unity of int

between the United States and the European b

nations, one would have to be able to demonstrate th

political and economic fates of the two are inextricabl

uniquely bound together and that the security conce

the two are essentially coextensive. Howeve

one—REPEAT no one—can demonstrate the truth of 

prepositions, nor can anyone demonstrate that Ame

position would ultimately be enhanced if it accepte

acted upon such ideas. The fact is that our long

interests are devilishly difficult to sort out.

Were the United States to undertake literally the 

European power with its accompanying Euro

perspective and orientation, as opposed, say, to its cur

professed role of generic global power, the elements o

and uncertainty attendant upon such a scenario wou

131
analysis, the future direction of Europe rests upon 

determinative variables. Will Europe successfully un

not? Will Germany ascend to the position of Contin

leader or not? Will Russia in the fullness of time assu

constructive role in the Western community of natio

not?

4

 We don’t presently know the answer to any of 

questions.

Assuming that the United States were welcomed 

open arms by the other European powers in any decis

become something significantly more than the le

alliance partner—and this is an extremely du

assumption—then we could perhaps safely dodge so

the issues inherent in Professor Roskin’s thorny quest

But in that case we would be immediately confronted 

host of new and equally discomfiting questions elsewh

the world, unloosed from Pandora’s box by the 

declaration that it was henceforth casting its lot 

Europe. The delicate balance of security understan

patiently and painstakingly reached by the United S

and its worldwide partners over the last half century 

something to be tampered with lightly. Once a big 

pulled from the bottom of the pile, we simply can’t p

how far and where the other logs will roll. By the 

token, once the United States imparts a major distur

to international security understandings that have ser

long and well, we can’t foresee all the primary effec

alone the secondary and tertiary ripples.

Academics, think-tankers, journalists, and 

commentators have the luxury of forming opinions 

often very strong opinions, and stating them in categ

terms. However, policymakers, regardless of 

pretensions to clairvoyance, will need to approach in a 

cautious vein the weighty question of whether the U

States should exchange nuptial vows with Eu

Promising suitors abound, and the United States as a 

power may find it more fitting to play the field. Any sin

commitment, unwisely made, could do the nation harm 

132
world that steadily grow in importance. Thus, to retu

Richard Holbrooke’s proposition, should the United S

indeed define itself as the alpha male within the Eur

tribe and then begin to act accordingly? One’s answer t

question will in all likelihood condition his reading 

future U.S. military presence in Europe.

There can be little denying that NATO, the pri

instrument through which the United State

manifested its military presence in Europe sinc

Alliance’s inception in 1949, has been a smashing su

at least through November 1989, when the Berlin Wa

and the Soviet Union itself came tumbling down 2 

later. If readers will permit a personal allusion, I ca

recall the scenes of lingering wartime devastation 

suffering from my first visit to occupied West Germa

the summer of 1951—the shell and bomb holes in the 

Frankfurt’s crumbling old Bahnhof, the huge piles of 

arrayed along the streets of Darmstadt, the ubiqu

displaced persons.

When I returned to Europe during the period 1956

a member of the U.S. Army’s 8th Infantry Division, 

Germany was now a member of NATO and well alon

path toward the miraculous economic transformation 

would culminate in the 1980s. Most recently, during 

through Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, an

former East Germany, I observed a reunited German

three new NATO members, all miraculously salvaged 

the ruins of a shattered Soviet empire. Yes, there c

little doubt that in facing down and outlasting the W

Pact and its Soviet masters, NATO provided the se

umbrella for Europe’s historic postwar politica

economic resurrection, not to mention the far-forwar

of defense afforded the United States itself for the du

of the Cold War.

But times change, and though it is certainly reaso

to put a happy face on NATO’s activities between 199

133
view with apprehension such recent NATO initiativ

the actual and promised accession of new members 

eastern Europe and extension of the traditional terr

defense mission under the North Atlantic treaty so t

now effectively embraces out-of-sector humanita

pacification/restorative operations, possibly as far afi

North Africa and the Persian Gulf.

6

Though the concerns of Americans opposed to 

enlargements of NATO’s roles and membership are m

the main reservations are (1) that extension of NA

protective umbrella to arguably marginal states 

needlessly bring us into renewed conflict with Russ

that proliferation of out-of-sector operations 

jeopardize American lives for goals not connected t

vital interests; (3) that an increase of members will i

Alliance resolve and unity of effort; and (4) that sinc

power is finite, any additional investment in Eur

military activities would dilute the resources and e

needed to attend to other pressing obligations on the 

scene.

7

 Moreover, to the extent that such reservations 

to jaundice popular sentiment in the United States, NA

growing baggage could come to adversely affect Ame

commitment to the alliance and to Europe itself.

It is premature, however, to speculate overmuch a

point on future public attitudes. A better approach is 

ahead and settle tentatively upon which American s

toward Europe and NATO is most likely to serve long

U.S. interests, and then trust future president

legislators to lead the people along the gradually rev

path of enlightened self-interest. And what might tha

be? Surveying the 11 authors who contributed pre

chapters in the present book, we find that all appa

believe the United States should remain in N

Disagreement first enters on the question of wheth

should continue to maintain a significant troop presen

the Continent, with Dr. Carpenter and perhaps Pro

Mearsheimer being the only proponents of bringin

134
appears to allow for some continued Air Force pres

Not until we were confronted with a serious peer comp

would he be willing to return major forces overse

commitment to an alliance.

The other nine authors can best be describ

“traditional old-school,” entertaining the belief that d

the end of the Cold War and the disappearance 

near-term Soviet threat, the better part of wisdom l

maintaining and strengthening the Alliance 

retaining a robust U.S. presence. Disagreement withi

group centers mainly on the issues of mission 

membership enlargement, with Professor Glaser ske

of undertaking out-of-sector missions and Professor K

equally skeptical of admitting new members

remaining seven, five of whom are retired or active mi

officers, strongly support the path that NATO has al

set for itself, that is, undertaking all steps necessa

deliver to the population of the Euro-Atlantic are

conditions which allow stability and security to be tak

granted, so that they can be free to focus on eco

development, eradication of poverty, and incr

prosperity.”

9

 In NATO’s view, such a prescription entails cont

evolution and adaptation of all aspects of the All

including structure, function, and membership. N

seeks to establish a process of “dialogue, cooperation

partnership” with the countries of eastern and c

Europe (including Russia and Ukraine) and also with 

members of the Organization on Security and Coope

in Europe (OSCE); to develop close working ties with 

European security structures such as the United Na

Western European Union, and OSCE itself; a

modernize the military command and force structures

particular emphasis upon updating weapons 

equipment of the Alliance’s European members 

improving their interoperability with those of the U

States.

10

135
such initiatives as the Partnership for Peace pro

adoption of a concept for combined joint task forces, su

of the European Security and Defense Identity, deploy

of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (form

Implementation Force) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Forc

of course admission of three new members along 

pursuing a qualification program for prospective addi

members. The foregoing catalogue of initiatives is 

means exhaustive, but it serves to convey the flavo

NATO that, despite its stringent force draw-down 

wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has since 

America’s prodding adopted an increasingly activist s

To this point at least, NATO seems to have pursued a c

fairly well aligned with that espoused by Mr. Holb

though perhaps somewhat less aggressive and decisi

The Alliance has enjoyed a remarkable degr

cohesion during the period of its ambitious post-Cold 

renewal, hanging together even during the centr

stresses imposed by Operation ALLIED FORCE i

spring of 1999. But such continued comity is by no m

assured. If Lithuania or Estonia, for example, succes

satisfies the technical prerequisites for membersh

NATO, an outcome becoming more likely with each pa

year, the Alliance may find its declaratory policy on 

members at odds with prevailing geo-strategic realitie

Russia is sure to object vociferously to such an “annex

of erstwhile Soviet territory, and there may well be t

war.

12

 In such a case, some Alliance members could ge

feet, despite the relative toothlessness of the Soviet b

the time.

Professor Mearsheimer presents a trenchant argu

that the United States is unlikely to underwrite wi

blood and treasure those European wars in which Eu

own blood and treasure are equal to the task. Despi

trenchancy of his argument, however, there rema

strong consensus—though admittedly not a cons

chiseled in stone for all ages—that the United States 

136
pretty much along the trajectory it has followed for th

half century.

The reasons are as much psychological as stra

NATO, as several authors have noted, provides a 

against an uncertain future. President Bill Clinton 

born in 1946, only 3 years before the establishment 

Alliance, so that his entire initiation into the ex

world—the world of geo-politics and internat

security—took place with NATO as an ineluctable 

Like the UN, the Department of Defense, the C

Intelligence Agency, and other such institutions, NAT

familiar and comfortable fixture in the colle

consciousness not only of President Clinton’s generatio

of later generations as well. The United States will 

remain with NATO because it provides a sense of se

and, in its original incarnation at least, an abiding pe

mind. Though often neglected in the calculus of 

strategists, simple peace of mind is an essential fac

any rational reckoning of security. But a patte

out-of-sector interventions seen as excess

adventuresome by member constituencies w

undermine such peace of mind. Realistically, ther

there are built-in limits to how far the Alliance can or s

move toward a full realization of Mr. Holbrooke’s expa

vision.

As a genuinely global power, with vital interests 

Gulf and Northeast Asia as well as in its own hemisp

the United States can never afford to focu

single-mindedly on Europe that its affairs elsewhere s

The shores of America survey the Pacific as well a

Atlantic, and if we must bestride the latter to atten

eastern flank, we must bestride the former to atten

western. Japan and Korea, along with the bu

industrial mini-prodigies lining the southeast Asia 

already hold a major shareholder’s position in the eco

intercourse of this country. China the colossus, with it

portents for good or ill, offers in the long term a 

137
also offers a momentous opportunity in the form 

potential market of 11⁄2 billion ravenously acqui

consumers. The success of the United States and the 

major powers in managing and accommodating to C

entry upon the global stage could well prove to b

decisive political act in this world over the next centu

In the meanwhile, however, Europe remain

sovereign locus of America’s vital interests overseas

NATO remains the principal structure through whi

exercise reciprocal security ties with that continen

shall in all likelihood find it in our continued inter

remain the leading voice and presence in a vibrant, ada

Alliance. Our commitment there, however, mu

judiciously balanced by competing and no less comp

calls for American leadership and involvement from 

points on the compass. Fortunately, Americans are a 

generous, and enlightened people, fully aware that cr

altruism in affairs of state ultimately redounds to thei

benefit and indeed to the benefit of all mankind.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. For a particularly pessimistic view of NATO, see James H. 

“NATO’s Bleak Future,” Parameters, Vol. 28, Winter 1998-

113-123.

2. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: Random 

1998, p. 364.

3. Ibid., pp. 368-369 (emphasis in original). See also R

Holbrooke’s article titled “America, A European Power,” 

Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, March-April 1995, p. 38.

4. Michael G. Roskin, “The Emerging Europe: Power Configu

for the Next Century,” Parameters, Vol. 29, Winter 1999-20

86-97.

5. France, England, Germany, and Greece have in various w

recently questioned whether Europe should play second fi

America the “hyperpower.” See, e.g., Craig R. Whitney, “France 

138
1999, sect. 1, p. 9; also Craig R. Whitney, “NATO at 50: With Na

Odds, Is It a Misalliance?” New York Times, February 15, 1999, 

p. 7.

6. The best succinct survey of NATO activities since 1990 

found in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handboo

Anniversary Edition, Brussels: NATO, 1998, pp. 27-127. F

diverse perspectives, see the feature titled “NATO at Fifty” i

Forces Quarterly, No. 21, Spring 1999, pp. 7-55.

7. For an excellent survey of the issue of NATO enlargem

include an objective discussion of pros and cons along with pro

advocates of the various positions, see Sean Kay, NATO and the 

of European Security, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 19

89-121. See also Wyllie, pp. 113-123.

8. Professor Mearsheimer believes that air forces are n

service of choice in future war because their relatively risk-free 

fighting renders them more appealing to an obsessively risk

president and public. However, there is a strong body of r

indicating that the casualty hypothesis—which holds that Am

public support for a military operation will abruptly dissipa

casualties are taken—is invalid. See, e.g., James Burk, “Public S

for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Ca

Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, Spring 19

53-78; Andrew P. N. Erdmann, “The U.S. Presumption of 

Costless Wars,” Orbis, Vol. 43, Summer 1999, pp. 363-381; and P

Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, “How Many Deaths Are Accept

Surprising Answer,” The Washington Post, November 7, 1999, 

9. NATO Handbook, p. 13.

10. Ibid., pp. 15-17.

11. Mr. Holbrooke, for example, is a strong supporter of 

enlargement. See “America, A European Power,” pp. 42-46.

12. Roskin, p. 95.

139
DR. TED GALEN CARPENTER is vice preside

defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Instit

Washington, DC. He is the author of The Captive 

Foreign Policy Crises and the First Amendment (

Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe’s Wars (1994); 

Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances after the Col

(1992). He is also the author of more than 190 jo

newspaper, and magazine articles and has contribut

chapters to foreign policy collections. A frequent gue

radio and television programs in the United States, Eu

and east Asia, Dr. Carpenter has provided commenta

the CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, 

International, the BBC World Service, and Vo

America. He received undergraduate and graduate de

from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and h

Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the Univers

Texas.

GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK became the Su

Allied Commander Europe on July 11, 1997. He is al

Commander in Chief, United States European Comm

General Clark’s previous assignment was as Comman

Chief, United States Southern Command, Panama, w

he commanded all U.S. forces and was responsible f

direction of most U.S. military activities and intere

Latin America and the Caribbean. Earlier, he was Dir

Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, the Joint Staff, in 

position he was the staff officer responsible for worl

politico-military affairs and U.S. military stra

planning. He also led the military negotiations fo

Bosnian Peace Accords at Dayton. As a captain, he serv

a company commander in the 1st Infantry Divisi

Vietnam during the period 1969-70. General Clark 

White House Fellow in 1975-76 and served as a s

assistant to the Director of the Office of Managemen

Budget. He has also served as an instructor and 

assistant professor of social science at the U.S. Mi

141
Military Academy at West Point, New York. He ho

master’s degree in philosophy, politics, and economics 

Oxford University where he studied as a Rhodes Sc

He is a graduate of the National War College an

Command and General Staff College.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAY GARNER, U.S. 

Retired, is President of SY Technology, Inc. He is a f

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. He has serv

the Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Str

Defense Command; Assistant Deputy Chief of Sta

Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of St

Operations and Plans; and Deputy Commanding Gene

the U.S. Army Air Defense School. He received a bach

degree in history from Florida State University a

master’s degree in public administration 

Shippensburg University. General Garner bega

military service with the Florida Army National G

Following service as an enlisted Marine, he 

commissioned as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Ar

1962.

PROFESSOR CHARLES GLASER is deputy dean 

professor at the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of P

Policy Studies at the University of Chicago. From 19

1996, he served as acting dean of the Harris School, an

following year he was a fellow at the Cente

International Security and Arms Control at Stanford. 

earning his Ph.D. at the John F. Kennedy Sch

Government at Harvard University, he was a post-do

fellow at the Center for Science and International A

Harvard University, and a research associate at the C

for International Studies, Massachusetts Institu

Technology. Before joining the University of Chicag

Glaser taught political science at the Univers

Michigan and served on the Joint Staff in the Pentago

Glaser specializes in international relations, espe

issues of international security and defense policy. 

present symposium on the future of the U.S. mi

142
chaired Panel III, all in addition to his sympo

presentation (Chapter 7).

DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, the 26th Deputy Secret

Defense, was sworn in on July 29, 1997. Prior to assu

the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense he serv

the Comptroller of the Department of Defense (1993-9

Comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant 

Secretary of Defense for the preparation and execut

the defense budget and management improve

programs. Before coming to the Department, Dr. H

served for 10 years as a professional staff member 

Senate Armed Services Committee. During this time h

primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluat

procurement, research and development programs, de

budget issues, and relations with the Se

Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. H

served in the Congressional Budget Office, whe

became the Deputy Assistant Director for National Se

and International Affairs. In that position, he ov

analysis and other support for committees in both the H

and the Senate. Dr. Hamre received his Ph.D. in 1978 

the School of Advanced International Studies, J

Hopkins University. His studies focused on interna

politics, economics, and U.S. foreign policy. In 197

received a B.A. from Augustana College, Sioux Falls, 

Dakota, emphasizing political science and economics

following year he studied as a Rockefeller Fellow a

Harvard Divinity School. Dr. Hamre assume

directorship of the Center for Strategic and Interna

Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, in M

2000.

PROFESSOR CARL KAYSEN is a professor in the C

for International Studies at the Massachusetts Instit

Technology. Dr. Kaysen came to MIT as a visiting pro

in the academic year 1976-77; prior to that, he directe

Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Dr. Ka

scholarly work focuses on the intersection of po

143
the changing concepts of security in the post-Cold 

world, including the shifting boundary between na

sovereignty and international responsibility an

implications for the security policies of individual coun

In 1987 and 1988, Dr. Kaysen was Chairman o

Editorial Advisory Board for the “Nuclear Age Proje

13-part television documentary history produce

WGBH-TV, Boston’s public television station. The 

aired in early 1989. They are now in wide use in colle

the basis of courses in international politics and 

control.

DR. F. STEPHEN LARRABEE is a senior staff mem

RAND in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. in po

science from Columbia University and has taug

Columbia University, Cornell University, New 

University, the Paul Nitze School of Adva

International Studies, Georgetown University, an

University of Southern California. From 1983 to 19

served as Vice President and Director of Studies 

Institute of East-West Security Studies in New Yor

was a distinguished scholar in residence at the Ins

from 1989 to 1990. From 1978 to 1981 Dr. Larrabee s

on the U.S. National Security Council staff in the 

House as a specialist on Soviet-East European affair

East-West political-military relations. He is co-editor 

David Gompert) of America and Europe: A Partnershi

New Era (1997); author of East European Security Af

Cold War (1994); editor of The Volatile Powder Keg: B

Security After the Cold War (1994); co-editor (with R

Blackwill) of Conventional Arms Control and Eas

Security (1989); and editor of The Two German Stat

European Security (1989).

COLONEL LLOYD J. MATTHEWS, U.S. Army, Re

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, has an 

from Harvard University and a Ph.D. from the Univer

Virginia, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces 

College and the U.S. Army War College. His overseas 

144
was a battalion commander; editor of Parameters, th

Army War College quarterly; and the Associate Dean 

U.S. Military Academy. Following retirement from 

Army, he was a project manager in Saudi Arabia 

Turkey. He is the editor or co-editor of seven b

Assessing the Vietnam War (1987), The Parameters o

(1987), The Challenge of Military Leadership (1989

Parameters of Military Ethics (1989), Newsmen 

National Defense (1991), Challenging the United 

Symmetrically and Asymmetrically (1998), and Popu

Diversity and the U.S. Army (1999). Additionally, he 

author of some 100 articles, features, reviews

monographs on military topics in such journa

Parameters, ARMY Magazine, Military Review

Airpower Journal.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS MCINER

U.S. Air Force, Retired, is Chief Executive Office

President of Business Executives for National Secur

national nonpartisan organization of business 

professional leaders whose purpose is to engag

business community in securing America’s future w

more efficient defense establishment. General McIn

retired from military service as Assistant Vice Chief o

of the Air Force and as Director of the Defense Perform

Review, reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In 

capacity, he led the Pentagon’s “reinventing govern

effort, visiting more than 100 leading-edge comm

companies to assimilate their ideas about bus

reengineering. In his 35-year career with the U.S. Air 

General McInerney completed four tours of du

Vietnam, flight reconnaissance missions during the C

missile crisis, and air escort missions in the Berlin Cor

General McInerney earned a bachelor’s degree fro

U.S. Military Academy and a master’s degr

international relations from George Washin

University. He also completed studies at the Armed F

Staff College and National War College.

145
Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor 

Department of Political Science and the College a

University of Chicago. He also is co-director of the Pro

on International Security Policy. Professor Mearsh

specializes in international relations theory, na

security policy, war and international systems

deterrence theory. He is the author of Conven

Deterrence and Liddell Hart and the Weight of History

published by Cornell University Press. He is pre

completing a book on great power politics. He is a gra

of the U.S. Military Academy and received his Ph.D

Cornell University. In the present symposium, Pro

Mearsheimer chaired Panel II in addition to his symp

presentation (Chapter 11).

GENERAL KLAUS NAUMANN recently retired fro

German army as Chairman of the NATO Mi

Committee, a post he held for 3 years. General Nau

was born in Munich and joined the Bundeswehr 

graduation from secondary school. He served on the s

the German Military Representative to the NATO Mi

Committee in Brussels, where he was Chief of the Mi

Policy, Nuclear Strategy, and Arms Control se

Promoted to brigadier general, he was named Deputy 

of Staff (Planning) followed by a two-star assignme

Deputy Chief of Staff (Politico-Military Affairs 

Operations). General Naumann was the Comma

General of I Corps in Münster, from where he was mo

the position of Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces, in 

He was made a four-star general at that time. Amon

many publications, General Naumann is the author 

Bundeswehr in einer Welt im Umbruch (The Bundesw

a World of Transition).

DR. BERNARD D. ROSTKER became the 25th 

Secretary of the Army on October 26, 1998. As the U

Secretary, Dr. Rostker is the Army’s number two ci

leader. He serves as the deputy and senior advisor 

Secretary of the Army. Dr. Rostker assists the Secret

146
organizing, supplying, equipping, training, and mobi

the Army as well as managing its $67 billion annual b

and more than 1.3 million active duty, National G

Army Reserve, and civilian personnel. Prior to beco

Under Secretary, Dr. Rostker was Assistant Secret

the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. In Nove

1996, he was also named Special Assistant to the D

Secretary of Defense for Gulf War illnesses. Dr. Ro

received a B.S. degree from New York University, wh

was a Distinguished Military Graduate of the R

Program and commissioned as a second lieutenant 

Army Reserve. He also holds master’s and doctoral de

in economics from Syracuse University. In the pr

symposium, Dr. Rostker introduced the opening spe

Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, and serv

chairman of Panel I. In April 2000, Dr. Rostke

elevated to the position of Under Secretary of Defen

Personnel and Readiness.

GENERAL CROSBIE E. SAINT, U.S. Army, Retire

born at West Point, New York, on September 29, 193

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1958 an

commissioned as a second lieutenant of armor. Sinc

time, he has commanded units from platoon through 

group. General Saint has served extensively with 

units overseas, including two tours in Vietnam, an

tours in U.S. Army, Europe. His assignments in the U

States also cover a broad range of command and 

positions, including Joint Secretariat, Organization 

Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Executive Service

White House Liaison Officer, Office of the Army Ch

Staff; and Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff of the A

General Saint culminated his military care

Commander of the United States Army Europe, Se

U.S. Army, and Central Army Group (NATO) from 

1988 until his retirement from active service in 1992. 

his retirement, General Saint established a pr

consulting firm specializing in foreign relations, na

147
graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the 

War College. He was awarded a B.S. degree in engine

from the U.S. Military Academy and holds an M. A. d

in international relations from American University. 

present symposium, General Saint served as co

introduced the keynote speaker, General Wesley Clar

delivered the closing remarks.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., b

the 44th Commandant of the U.S. Army War Co

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in August 

Previously, he was the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations and Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine

Army Training and Doctrine Command. General S

served in numerous command and staff posi

throughout the Army. His commands include four ar

batteries, two in Germany and two in Vietnam; an ar

battalion in Korea; and the U.S. Army Field Ar

Training Center, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma. He also serv

Assistant Division Commander, 2d Infantry Div

Eighth U.S. Army. He graduated from the U.S. M

Academy and was commissioned in 1966 as a field ar

officer. He holds master’s and Ph.D. degrees in history 

Duke University.

148
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Director of Research

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Editor

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Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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