In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-2340

UNITED STATES of AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES BOLDEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98-CR-936-1--George W. Lindberg, Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2001--DECIDED January 31, 2002

 Before BAUER, RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit

Judges.

 RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Charles Bolden

was charged in a three-count indictment

with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and

possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute. Mr. Bolden was convicted on

all three counts at a bench trial. At

sentencing, the district court adjusted

Mr. Bolden’s offense level upward by two

levels for obstruction of justice. Mr.

Bolden now challenges both his conviction

for drug conspiracy and the upward

adjustment. For the reasons set forth in

the following opinion, we affirm

thejudgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

 In December 1998, Nathaniel Nettles-Bey,

an acquaintance of Mr. Bolden, became an

informant for the Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA). Nettles-Bey

informed the DEA that he knew of an

individual who would sell him cocaine. On

December 15, 1998, in cooperation with

the DEA, Nettles-Bey arranged to buy

cocaine from Mr. Bolden at the home of

Marcus Davis in Blue Island, Illinois.
 DEA Special Agents Daniel Foley and

Robert Glynn conducted surveillance of

Davis’ home on the morning of December

16. Mr. Bolden, Nettles-Bey and Davis met

inside Davis’ house. After Mr. Bolden

left Davis’ house, Nettles-Bey met with

Agent Foley and gave him a package

containing approximately one kilogram of

cocaine which he said he had received

from Mr. Bolden. Agent Glynn followed Mr.

Bolden by car to Harvey, Illinois, where

he stopped Mr. Bolden and arrested him.

B. District Court Proceedings

 Mr. Bolden was charged with one count of

conspiring to distribute in excess of

five kilograms of cocaine, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. sec.sec. 846 and 841(a)(1),

and two counts of possession with intent

to distribute in excess of 500 grams and

two kilograms of cocaine, respectively,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1).

Mr. Bolden’s trial was set for July 12,

1999. Mr. Bolden, however, failed to

appear, and a bench warrant was issued.

The trial ultimately commenced more than

two months later. Mr. Bolden waived his

right to a jury trial. At the bench

trial, the government presented testimony

from Marcus Davis and Agents Foley and

Glynn.

 Davis testified that he met with Mr.

Bolden at Doghouse Records, a record

store managed by Mr. Bolden. Davis asked

Mr. Bolden if he was still "in the game,"

a reference to the sale of cocaine. Tr.

of Sept. 27, 1999, at 70. Mr. Bolden told

Davis that he was still "in the game" and

asked him to "give me a call if you know

somebody want to get something." Id.

 Davis subsequently asked Nettles-Bey if

he knew anyone who wanted to buy cocaine.

A few days later, Nettles-Bey called

Davis and asked him to contact his

cocaine source. Davis then told Mr.

Bolden that his "cousin," meaning

Nettles-Bey, wanted to "get something."

Id. at 71.

 Davis further testified that he arranged

a meeting between himself, Mr. Bolden and

Nettles-Bey at his home. When Mr. Bolden

arrived at Davis’ home, he gave NettlesBey a plastic bag containing a package

wrapped in duct tape. Nettles-Bey

examined the package, which contained a

white powder, and then paid Mr. Bolden.
Davis, the middle-man, received $500 from

Mr. Bolden when Nettles-Bey told him that

he wanted to buy two more grams of

cocaine. Davis scheduled another meeting

with Mr. Bolden at Davis’ home.

 According to Davis, Mr. Bolden came to

Davis’ home on December 16 and gave

Nettles-Bey a large detergent box. After

Mr. Bolden left Davis’ house, Nettles-Bey

removed two packages from the box, placed

one in a closet and placed the other back

in the box./1

 DEA Agent Foley testified that he

observed Mr. Bolden arrive at Davis’

house on December 16 and enter carrying a

large detergent box. After the meeting

was over and Mr. Bolden drove away,

Nettles-Bey met with Agent Foley and gave

him the detergent box. Agent Foley found

a package containing approximately one

kilogram of cocaine inside.

 Agent Glynn testified that he followed

Mr. Bolden by car to Harvey, Illinois,

after Mr. Bolden left Davis’ home. When

Agent Glynn was informed by other DEA

agents that Nettles-Bey had received a

kilogram of cocaine from Mr. Bolden,

Agent Glynn stopped Mr. Bolden and

arrested him. Agent Glynn stated that he

read the Miranda warnings to Mr. Bolden,

who agreed to speak with him. According

to Agent Glynn, Mr. Bolden admitted that

he had just delivered two kilograms of

cocaine in a detergent box to Davis and

another individual and that he had

delivered two kilograms to the same

individuals two or three weeks earlier.

Agent Glynn told the court that the

package containing the second kilogram of

cocaine was recovered from Davis’ house

later that afternoon.

 Agent Glynn also testified that Mr.

Bolden admitted that he obtained about

six to seven kilograms of cocaine per

month from his supplier, Ivan Eberhardt,

and that he had been engaged in business

with him for about a year. Cooperating

with the DEA, Mr. Bolden contacted

Eberhardt to arrange a meeting. Agent

Glynn testified that he observed Mr.

Bolden meet with Eberhardt on the

following day, December 17. The

Government and Mr. Bolden stipulated to

the admission into evidence of phone

records documenting calls between Mr.

Bolden and Eberhardt.
 After considering the evidence presented

at trial, the court found Mr. Bolden

guilty. Mr. Bolden was convicted on one

count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine

and two counts of possessing cocaine with

intent to distribute. The court adjusted

Mr. Bolden’s offense level upward by two

levels for obstruction of justice because

of his failure to show up for his

original trial date. Mr. Bolden objected

to the upward adjustment, arguing that

there was no proof that his failure to

appear had been willful. The court

overruled his objection. The district

court sentenced Mr. Bolden to a term of

168 months on the conspiracy count and

two terms of 60 months for the two

possession counts to be served

concurrently with each other and with the

conspiracy sentence.

II

DISCUSSION

A.

 Mr. Bolden submits that his conspiracy

conviction should be reversed because of

insufficient evidence. We must uphold a

conviction if any reasonable factfinder

could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979); United States v. Menting, 166

F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 1999).

Overturning a verdict is appropriate only

when the record contains no evidence,

regardless of how it is weighed, from

which a factfinder could determine guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States

v. Granados, 142 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th

Cir. 1998). To convict Mr. Bolden of

conspiracy, the Government needed to

prove that a conspiracy existed and that

Mr. Bolden knowingly joined it. United

States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884, 889 (7th

Cir. 1999).

 Mr. Bolden submits that his confession

was the sole evidence supporting his

conspiracy conviction. We cannot accept

this argument. The district court had

before it not only Mr. Bolden’s

confession but also the testimony of

Davis and of the DEA surveillance agents

who had observed Mr. Bolden meet with

Davis and with Eberhardt. The Government

and Mr. Bolden also stipulated to the
admission of telephone records that

evidenced calls made by Mr. Bolden to his

cocaine supplier.

 Mr. Bolden contends, however, that all

the evidence presented against him at

trial, with the exception of his

confession, supported only the charges of

possession with intent to distribute and

not the conspiracy count. This argument

has no merit. Much of the evidence

presented at trial supported both the

charges of possession with intent to

distribute and the conspiracy count.

Davis testified not only that Mr. Bolden

distributed cocaine to Nettles-Bey, but

also admitted that he conspired with Mr.

Bolden to distribute the cocaine and

received payment for his services as

middle-man. Likewise, Agent Foley’s

surveillance of Mr. Bolden revealed not

only that Mr. Bolden distributed cocaine

to Nettles-Bey, but also that Davis was

present during these transactions which

took place at Davis’ home. Agent Foley’s

version of events was consistent with

Davis’, and the testimony of both

witnesses established that Mr. Bolden

conspired with Davis to distribute

cocaine to Nettles-Bey. Furthermore,

Agent Glynn’s observation of a

meetingbetween Mr. Bolden and Eberhardt,

who supplied his cocaine, established not

only that Mr. Bolden intended to

distribute cocaine, but that he conspired

with his cocaine supplier to do so.

Finally, the telephone records that

document communication between Mr. Bolden

and Eberhardt further substantiated the

existence of a conspiracy. This evidence

taken together provided a sufficient

basis for the district court to find Mr.

Bolden guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of conspiracy, as well as possession with

intent to distribute.

 Mr. Bolden also objects strenuously to

the sufficiency of the evidence used to

establish the quantity of cocaine

involved in the conspiracy. The

Government relied upon Mr. Bolden’s

confession to establish that he conspired

to distribute more than five kilograms.

Mr. Bolden argues that his confession,

standing alone, was insufficient evidence

to establish the quantity of cocaine at

issue here. Drug quantity, however, is

not an element of the offense of

conspiracy to distribute. See 21 U.S.C.

sec. 846; United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d
919, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). In Mr. Bolden’s

case, drug quantity was relevant only to

sentencing, not to the determination of

guilt. See id.

B.

 Mr. Bolden also challenges the

sentencing court’s upward adjustment of

his offense level for obstruction of

justice. The determination that a

defendant obstructed justice is a finding

of fact, which this court reviews for

clear error. United States v. Stokes, 211

F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000). If a

sentencing judge finds that a defendant

has obstructed justice, the judge shall

increase the offense level by two levels.

U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1; Stokes, 211 F.3d at

1045. "Willfully failing to appear, as

ordered, for a judicial proceeding" is an

example of obstructive conduct that will

justify such an upward adjustment.

U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1, application note

4(e). This court reviews interpretations

of terms used in the sentencing

guidelines, such as "willful," de novo.

United States v. Teta, 918 F.2d 1329,

1332 (7th Cir. 1990).

 Mr. Bolden argues that there was no

evidence that his failure to appear at

trial was "willful." In support of this

argument, Mr. Bolden points out that he

did not attempt to engage in illegal

activities, flee the jurisdiction, alter

his appearance, or otherwise elude the

authorities in the time that elapsed

between his failure to show up for his

trial and his arrest pursuant to a bench

warrant at his home four days later.

 A defendant’s failure to appear is

"willful," however, if the defendant knew

that he was required to appear in court

and "voluntarily and intentionally"

failed to do so. Teta, 918 F.2d at 1334.

Mr. Minkus, Mr. Bolden’s attorney, told

the court that Bolden was absent "against

[his] strong and repeated advice." Tr. of

July 12, 1999, at 3. When the court

recessed to allow Mr. Bolden the

opportunity to show up for his trial, Mr.

Minkus paged Mr. Bolden. Mr. Minkus

reported to the court, on the record,

that Mr. Bolden had called in response to

the page and stated that he was not

coming to court. Mr. Bolden knew that his

presence was required in court on his

trial date and nevertheless decided not
to attend.

 Furthermore, an upward adjustment for

obstruction of justice is appropriate

when a defendant’s actions have had a

"delaying effect on the administration of

justice." United States v. Gilleylen, 81

F.3d 70, 72 (7th Cir. 1996). Mr. Bolden’s

refusal to come to court, even at his

attorney’s urging, necessitated his

arrest; because of his actions, his trial

did not begin until more than two months

after it was originally scheduled. See

Teta, 918 F.2d at 1335 ("It is difficult

to imagine conduct that more clearly

interferes with the administration of

justice than a defendant’s failure to be

present. When the disposition of the

charges cannot proceed until the

defendant’s presence is secured, and when

he must be brought to court under arrest,

. . . there is obstruction of justice.").

 It was not necessary that Mr. Bolden

attempt to flee the jurisdiction or

forcibly resist arrest when apprehended

in order for his behavior to constitute

obstruction. We have upheld upward

adjustments for obstruction of justice

many times when defendants failed to

appear for judicial proceedings,

necessitating the issuance of a bench

warrant. See, e.g., United States v.

Green, 114 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1997)

(upward adjustment for obstruction of

justice appropriate when defendant failed

to appear for sentencing hearing);

Gilleylen, 81 F.3d at 72 (upward

adjustment for obstruction of justice

appropriate where defendant failed to

appear for pretrial conference but

appeared voluntarily before a bench

warrant was executed); Teta, 918 F.2d at

1333-34 (upward adjustment for

obstruction of justice appropriate where

defendant failed to appear for

arraignment and was subsequently arrested

on a bench warrant). The fact that Mr.

Bolden made no attempt to elude

authorities, who found him in his home,

may have been a "point in his favor," but

did not require "that he get a pass under

sec. 3C1.1." Gilleylen, 81 F.3d at 72.

The district court did not err in finding

that Mr. Bolden willfully obstructed

justice.

Conclusion

 Because the government presented
sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Bolden

guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable

doubt and because the sentencing court

did not commit clear error in finding

that Mr. Bolden obstructed justice, we

affirm the judgment of the district

court.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTE

/1 The record does not reflect why Nettles-Bey

placed one of the packages in Davis’ closet.