Hon..SamW. Davis

District i.tt,ornsy Civil courts Building Houston 2, Texas Opinion No. V-1484 Re: Several questions, relat; ing to the duties of the district clerk and the district attorney under the uniforrii Reciprocal Dear Sir: E;nforcerflent of Support Act. Your request for ‘an opinion of this office re- ,lates to the official duties of the district clerk and district attorney under the Uniform Reci rocal Rnforoement of Support Act (Arts. 2328b-1 to 

### 23ab3, s 

### v.c.s.1. Thequestions prese@ted by you for deter-ation are:

“1. Did the Legislature intend that the district clerks of their courts should perform the same,duties in these cases orlglnatlng out of the State without requiring deposits or security for costs? 

### n2. Did ths Legislature, by the UIBoi “’ the phrase ‘notify the district or county attor- ~,: neyl intend that It be the mandatory duty of these officials to prosecute or try these aci tSons whenreceived from the Initiating statee?U TheUniform Reciprocal Enfbrcement of Suport Act was enacted into ,Iawby HouseBl12 

### ,192, Aots5nd 

### is Leg., R.S. 1951 ch. tic1es 2328b-1 to 

### 232b-j, V.C.S. Its purpose, ‘as qtated iI 77 p. 643,,and is codified as 4rin Section I,, is to Improve and‘extend by reolproati~ leg&. lslatlon the enforcement of duties of support and%&.,&eke uniform the lawwith respect thereto*

.

There Is no provision & &e ‘Unifoim Act ielatbIng to the payment of c’osts, nor Is ,there a~prpvls~on’expreosly authorizing the district clerk td’require a deposit or other security 

### for aosts... hon.. SamIJoDavis, page 2 (v&+@+)

. that the disArticle 3927, V.C.S.,Tprovides trict clerk shall receive certain fees for services performed ltin civil cases ,I’ andvarious other statutes set out fees and expenses which are taxable as costs in civil cases. Thegeneral provisions with respect to requiring the plaintiff In a civil action to give security for costs are contained ti the following rules of the Texas Bulds of, Civil Procedure:

“Rule 142. Security for Cost.--The qlerk mayrequire from the plaintiff security for costs before issuing any process, but shall file the petition and enter the sameon the dooket. Noattorney or other officer of the court shall be surety in any cause pending In the court, except under special leave of court.~~

“Rule 

### 143. Rule for Costs.--Theplaintiff maybe ruled to give security for costs at any time before final judgment, upon motion of the defendant or any officer of the court interested In the costs, accruing in suoh suit* arid+ST&ch,rnle; be entered aga,inst the pLaintiff andhe fall to comply therewith on or before twenty (20) days af-. ter knowledge or notice that such rule has been entered, the suit shall be dismissed.”

“Rtie 

### 146, Deposit for Costs.--In lieu of a bond for costs, the pafty required to give ,the samemaydeposit with the clerk of court or the justice of the peace such ‘sum as ,the.court 

### orjustice from time to time may designate ‘as sufficient to pay the accrued costs. (I Under‘Rule 

### 145,the clerk maynot require security where the party furnishes satisfactory proof of his inability to give security. Also, certain classes o.fparties are specifically exempted by statute from, giving security. See Arts. 118d (Sec. 6), 279a, 2072, 2072a, 788o-126a, v.c.s.. Even though a party is exempted from giving security, costs are nevertheless assessable and the exemption does not relieve the party from the legal obli ation to pay costs. Roby 23.

### 1108if Hawthorne, 84 S.W.

TeX. Olvr App. 

### 1935,errorvdism.)EHon. SamW.,DaViS, page 3 (V-1484)

Fromthe foregoing wethink It maybe stated as a’.general rule that the,pialntiff in a civil action maybe required to give security for costs unless he Is expressly exempted from this requirement, and costs are assessable in all civil actions unless an applicable s~tatute ,expressly provides otherwise.

InAtt’y Gen. Op. V-1409 (1952) this office i&that a proceeding under Article 2328b-3 is a civil action. Proceedings In the district courts of Texas whenacting as the responding State are lnstltuted by the filing of a certified copy of a petitlo:, the party ipstituting the proceeding is called the pl In ifg and the .rrty against whomit is instituted is called &he e da&

. This terminology indicates to us that the

‘E~islature considered actions of this kind to be of the samegeneral nature as other civil actions.

Since the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act does not contain a provision excepting these civil actions from the general rules relating to costs and security therefor, we agree with your conclusion that the district clerk mayrequire the plaintiff to give security for costs in a suit filed under this act.

In your second question you ask whether the Legislature intended that it be the,duty of the district or county attorney to try these actions whenTexas is the responding State. Section 12 of House Bill 192, which comes under Part III entitled “Civil tinforcement,” reads:

“Whena court of this State, acting as a responding state, ,recelves from the court of an Initiating state the aforesaid copies, It shall (1) docket the cause, (2) notify the District or County Attorney, ( ) set a time and place for a hearing, and (2) take such action as is necessary in accordance with the laws of this State to obtain jurlsdiotlon.l’ This office held In Att’y Gen. Op. V-1409, SUDra, after reviewing the history of the statute, th::lt the Legislature intended to chnrge the district or county attorney with the duty of representing the obllgee in the Texas ::..
.court

. Youhave suggested in the brief accompanying your request that such a construction would render this PrOVislon of the statute unconstitutional, for two reasons: (1) Ii would be violative of Sections 50, 51 and 52 of Article III Constitution of Texas, which prohibit the granting of public mdneyto an individual; (2) this subject matter isYOn. Sam‘& .)avis, page 4 (V-1484)

not embraced In the title of the act andthe provision is therefore void under Section 

### 35ohArticle III of the Constitution.

With reference to th, first constitution,il objection, th3 argument is apranced thar the Constltl,rtion prohibits public officials -:50 Teceive their ~a)- r’r,:*:- the State or any ;olitil.:al sn~~‘.ivi;io~ the:sof, *:;k:.enacting in their official cspacities, fro:1 ,,lving :~-‘r;TY.~ aid to an inr!ividual. But these constitutional i:~o~*isions Gonot ::ro!litit the ex;;eUiture of public moneyfor a public 2uiipose within tile Statels ,:overnmental :io-::ers, even though a class of in:LiviLvAs n;ly i:erive sqmehenefit therefrom. JP2usi.n::.kuthority of Cit.v oi Big* n t - 8 143 S.W.2d ‘/9 (1940) v. i&i’r” 1$;~‘~.‘:~?~~$2 [Tex. Civ. Agp. 1938 & nls ob

jectlon ?,:asai:lsweredin C,;,inion’V-1409, wherein it ;‘ds stated:

“Since the enforcement of the dut,; of support is a matter of public ASwell as private concern, and since the officers of this State will be porformin,g services only In Instances in which reciprocal services will be accorded to this State, -,!eare unable to say th:lt the expenditure of public funds in coq)ensating these offkers and their assistants for the services would not be for a public purpose.”
reads: Section 35 of Article III, Constitution of Texas,

“Nobill, (except general ai>propriation bills, clhich mayembrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject In its title. , ,rhich shall be expressed

ijut if any subject shall be embraced In 371.

act which’ shall not be expressed in the tltie, such act shall be void

‘only as to so muchthereof, as shall not be so expressed.” In considering whether the title of a legislative act gives sufficient notice of its conten-ts to comply with this constitutional provision, several well-established rules mustbe kept in mind. In the first place, the provision should be construed illiberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness fsHon. SamW.Davis, page 

### 5 (V-1484)

unnecessary to the accomplishme:t of the beneficial pur-

“to prevent urpose of the provision is

embracing in an act having one ostensible object, provisions having no relevancy to that object.” Hamilton v. St. Louis. S.S. &T. By. 

### 475( 26) In the rS, 

### -~- 115 Tex. 

### 455,; 283 &i’aourt %d:’ nr ?%idateA Underdriteu case

“It is we!.1 recognized that the purposes of this provision are. to advise the Legislature and the people of the nature of .each particular bill, so as to prevent the Insertion of obnoxious clauses which. otherwise might be Ingrafted on it andbecome the law, andto obviate legislation through the combination,, upon a composite bill, oi’ the votes of the proponeirts of different measures included in It, some of which would not pass upon their merits if separately considered.*’ Another rule,: equaiiy well eetabli’shed, is that the title need not recite all the details of the act. 

### 6,102 S.w.2d 202 

### (1937). case stated the reason for guage: nBut it would be useless and impractioable’for the title to express all of the provlsions @fa partlculer act andthe details of eadi provisitin,. PO*, in such a~:‘casei,this introduotory batter would amount.to ,kmere repetition of the legislation itself, atidwould answer no purpose of abbreviated notice.

. . .A



### 264S’.k. a612 (Tex. Clv. App. 1924) the is s&&ion of **the** Constitution ‘lmer:ly

‘requires the subject of the proposed act to be expreasea in the title or caption; the details and machinery for effectually aiding the object of the bill need not be expressed. I’ It has also been held that the caption is not deficient because it does not contain a separate statement of purpose for each subdivision within the body of the act.

**V.** VQn,

### 20723.W.

368(Tex. 

### CiV,App. 

### 1918). TheConstitution provides for the offices of district, attorney and county attorney In Article V, entltl.ed

.

..Eon. SanY. Davis, page 

### 6 (V-1484)

“Judicial Department.*I These officials are officers of the corilt, and the authority to establish courts and to prescribe the jurisdiction thereof, which is conferred on the Legislature by Section 1 of Article 0 of the Constitution, includes the authority to establish a district attornershlp as an adjunct to the functionin of a organization and

as22 ii!!?&2 &%.%;, @? A

In **VIBW** of the close relationship between the functions performed by these officers and the functioning of the courts themselves, weare of the opinion that the portion of the caption of House Bill 192which reads,

“prescribing the duties of the court whenthis is responding state,” is sufficient to embrace the duties imposed upon the district and county attorneys. the language, Further, wethink

“providing the manner in which the duties of support are enforceable I1also gives suffioient notice of this provision in the statute. As noted above, **the** madhinery for effectually aiding the, object of the 

### bill need not be fully detailed in the caption.

Your brief also raises a question as to whether this provision in HouseBill 192 is in conflict with Rule 308-A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, as amendedeffecUveKarch 1, 1952, and, if so, whether the statute is thereby rendered intiffective. Bythe amendment,which w.~ adopted subsequent to the enactment of House Bill 192, Rule 308;~ authorizes the court to appoint a memberof the bar of his court to represent the cLaimant in a contempt proceeding for enforcement of a support order. The suggested oonflict would arise from this variance in obtaining representation for the obligee,

House Bill 192 makesprovision for the enforo,ement of support orders of the courts of o e State through the aourts of a different State. Rule 30 -A, 8 on the other hena, prescribes a procedure for enforcement by a court of this State, throt!gh contempt prooeedings, of its ownorders for periodical ther as ayments for child support* Therule, eiorigina ly adopted or as amende,d,did not Introduce B a new’remedy; it merely simplified the proaadure for enforcing a remedywhich already existed.

In wcia v. App. 1951, error’ref. n. 239 SrW.2d 

### 169(Tsxd c&v. 1 s.W.2d 297), the CourtHon. SamW.Davis, page 7 (v-1484)

of Civil Appeals.intimated that the procedure set out in Rule 308-A, as well as the remedy, was available to a claimant under a foreign judgment. In reviewing the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, the SupremeCourt held that the remedy of contempt was available under rules ,of comity andPublic policyo It did not hold that Rule 308- Aprovided the exclusive procedure for enforcing the foreign judgment through contempt proceedings, nor did it hold that the procedure under Rule 308-A’was applicable at all to a claimant under a foreign judgment.

Even if It were defixiitely settled that the procedure under Rule 308-A could be employed by an oblige8 ’under a support order from another State, wewould be lnclined to the view that the procedure prescribed in House Bill 192 is complementary to rather than in conflict with Rule 308-A. In the present state of the law, it Is our opinion that these enactments operate in different spheres: the rule in the sphere of domestic judgments and the statute in the sphere of foreign judgments. Wetherefore hold that they 

### are not in conflict. In view of this holding, it becomes unnecessary to consider what effect a confl,ict would have on the statute ..,,

Thedistrict clerk is authorized to require security for costs in suits filed under the Uniform Realprocal Bnforcement of Support Act wherein Texas is the responding State. Arts. 2328b4 to 2328b-3, V.C.S. Thedistrict attorney or county attorney is required to represent the obligee, in a support proceeding filed in a district court of Texas 

### under Art* 2328b-3 wherein Texas is the responding State. APPROVRD: Yours 

### very truly, J, C. Davis, Jr0 County Affairs Division E. Jacobson Reviewing Assistant PRICEDARIRL Attorney General

’ Charles D. Mathews First Assist&t BW:MKWawb Assistants

_-