80 

Stand 4

American Preparations

Directions: Retrace the route on Russell Avenue back to South Avenue. Turn right on South Avenue and drive approximately 0.6 miles and 

turn left to enter Hickam Air Force Base through Porter Gate (this gate is 

usually unmanned and open during normal duty hours). Once through the 

gate, immediately turn right on Porter Avenue. After .1 mile you will have 

to go 180 degrees around the water tower and turn onto Julian Avenue. 

Julian Avenue will turn into Worthington Avenue. Turn right on 1st Street 

and then turn right on Vickers Avenue. Vickers Avenue will turn to the left 

where it becomes Fort Kam Road. Take Fort Kam Road and turn right on 

Harbor Drive. Travel until you see a black seacoast artillery position on 

the right. Park in the lot behind the battery. This is Battery Hawkins (the 

Air Force uses the battery for storage).

Orientation: You are standing at Battery Hawkins. Battery Hawkins 

was named for US Army Brigadier General (BG) Hamilton Smith Hawkins, a West Point graduate (1855) and Commandant of Cadets at West 

Point (1888-1892). Hawkins took part in the Battle of San Juan Hill (Cuba, 

1898), leading the Sixth and Seventh Regiments in the famous charge up 

the hill. The battery was completed in 1914 and mounted two 3-inch rapidfire cannons that were meant to cover the minefield guarding the entrance 

to Pearl Harbor. The entrance to Pearl Harbor is just to your front. Ford 

Island is to the north.

Description: The Kingdom of Hawaii granted coaling rights to the 

US Navy in 1887, beginning a long association for the Navy in Hawaii. In 

1898 the United States annexed Hawaii, and it became a US territory in 

1900. The United States used the Honolulu Harbor until 1912, when Pearl 

Harbor was opened as a major forward operating base.

As the Navy started using Pearl Harbor as a major base, the US Army 

began stationing troops in Hawaii to defend the port. The first contingent 

of troops was small; some infantry with field artillery and engineers were 

assigned at Schofield Barracks. As the Navy presence grew, the Army’s requirement for defensive organization concurrently grew. The Army established a board of officers to determine requirements, and it recommended 

a significant array of coastal artillery positions for defending Pearl Harbor 

and other important facilities in Hawaii. By 1915 the Army had established Fort Ruger, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Armstrong, and Fort DeRussey 

as facilities to house coastal artillery positions. In all the Army constructed 

15 batteries, housing 54 guns (14-inch and 12-inch guns, 12-inch mortars, 
81

and smaller rapid-fire weapons like the 3-inch guns at Battery Hawkins 

as shown in figure 56). The Army also set up mine defenses for the Pearl 

Harbor entrance by constructing mine wharfs, casemates, and warehouses 

at Fort Armstrong.

The 1920s saw a drastic increase in the Army’s presence in Hawaii. 

In 1921 the Army organized the Hawaiian Division, consisting of two 

brigades of two infantry regiments, three field artillery regiments, an engineer regiment, a tank company, and assorted support troops. The division 

consisted of 13,000 men, with a requirement for expansion to 20,000 during wartime. The Hawaiian National Guard was reorganized at this time 

and allotted two infantry regiments, the 298th and 299th (900 men each in 

peacetime but would expand to 3,000 each in wartime).

Figure 56. Battery Hawkins, early 1920s.

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82 

As the mobile defenses improved, so did the coastal defenses. In 1921 

two mobile regiments, the 41st Coast Artillery Regiment (Railway) and 

the 55th Coast Artillery (Towed), arrived in Hawaii. The 41st moved its 

weapons (originally 12-inch mortars but later changed to 8-inch guns) 

around on railcars on the Oahu Railroad and Land Company’s lines and 

provided 360-degree coastal defense for Oahu. The 55th was armed with 

155mm mobile guns pulled by Caterpillar tractors. The 14 existing fixed 

coast defense batteries were organized into the 15th and 16th Coast Artillery Regiments (Harbor Defense) in 1924. With the advent of the airplane 

as a major weapon, the arrival in 1921 of the 64th Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft [AA]) and its 28 3-inch AA guns marked a milestone in 

Hawaii’s defense. In 1925, to provide improved command and control, all 

of the coast artillery regiments were brigaded under the Hawaiian Separate 

Coast Artillery Brigade.

The next major change for Army ground units came in 1940 when the 

251st Coast Artillery Regiment (California National Guard) arrived with 

20 mobile 3-inch AA guns to supplement the island’s air defense. Additionally, in July 1941 the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments (AA) 

were organized on Oahu and armed with 20 3-inch AA guns each. Hawaii 

now had four AA regiments, so the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) was 

organized to provide them with command and control.

By 1941 the coast artillery of Hawaii had grown to eight regiments—four coastal defense and four AA. To improve command and 

control, the Hawaiian Department added the Hawaiian Seacoast Defense 

Command as a “brigade” headquarters for the coastal defenses and converted the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade to the Hawaiian 

Coast Artillery Command, commanded by Major General (MG) Henry 

T. Burgin. 

Also in 1941 the ground force organization changed. The Hawaiian 

Division was broken up and converted into the 24th and 25th Divisions. 

Each division had two active duty regiments and a “round out” regiment 

from the Hawaiian National Guard. With the change in organization came 

a change in mission. The 24th Infantry Division (-) would defend the 

northern half of Oahu, and the 25th Infantry Division (-) would defend the 

southern half of the island, including critical site security (Pearl Harbor oil 

tanks, Honolulu water and electric plants, etc.). The 298th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, was responsible for defending Koko Head, 

and the 299th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, would defend 

Maui, the Island of Hawaii, Kauai, and Molokai.
83

The Army Air Forces became a member of the military organization 

of Hawaii in 1917 when the 6th Aero Squadron arrived. For the next 23 

years, the air corps expanded as aircraft became more prevalent and as 

Figure 57. 

Figure 58. 
84 

assets became more available. In August 1919 the 5th Composite Group—

consisting of an observation squadron, two pursuit squadrons, and two 

bombardment squadrons—was organized on Oahu at Wheeler Army Airfield (AAF). In 1927 the air corps increased its pursuit squadrons to five 

and created the 18th Pursuit Group. In 1931 the 5th and 18th Groups were 

combined and formed the 18th Composite Wing (which later would be redesignated the 18th Bombardment Wing). In November 1940 the air corps 

significantly increased its capability by adding the 15th Pursuit Group, 

11th Bombardment Group, and 14th Pursuit Wing (composed of the 15th 

and 18th Pursuit Groups). To provide overall command and control for all 

air corps elements, the Hawaiian Air Force was organized on 2 November 1940. It consisted of the 14th Pursuit Wing (Wheeler AAF/18th Air 

Base Group) and the 18th Bombardment Wing (at the newly constructed 

Hickam AAF/17th Air Base Group).

In December 1941 the US Army had 42,857 men assigned to the 

Hawaiian Department, commanded by LTG Walter C. Short. The Army’s 

mission was to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base (and the fleet berthed 

there), the City of Honolulu and its harbor, and other installations. The 

Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command was at or near full strength. The Hawaiian Seacoast Defense Command had more than 100 guns in 33 fixed 

battery positions, the men were well trained, and ammunition was stored 

at the batteries. The 53d Coast Artillery Brigade had two regiments at half 

strength and two at full strength, they were short equipment (they had 86 of 

Figure 59. 
85

98 3-inch guns, 20 of 120 37mm guns, and 113 of 246 .50-caliber machine 

guns), and only the 64th Coast Artillery Regiment had ammunition at its 

battery locations (the assumption was there would be enough notice of an 

attack to issue ammunition). The two infantry divisions were at about 85 

to 90 percent of their authorized strength, but many of the junior enlisted 

personnel were recent draftees while many of the junior officers were activated reservists who recently arrived from CONUS. The Army Air Forces 

were near authorized personnel strength and had 152 pursuit aircraft (99 

modern P-40s and 53 P-36/26s) and 45 bombers (12 modern B-17s and 33 

obsolete B-18s) based at three airfields with a few auxiliary airfields used 

only for training. Ammunition was not readily available when they were 

parked at their home fields.

(The staff ride leader may want to move to the edge of the water in 

front of the battery to discuss naval preparations.)

The Navy had used Pearl Harbor as a forward operating base since 

1912, but it did not assign capital ships there until 1939 when the Hawaiian Detachment, consisting of an aircraft carrier, eight cruisers, and 16 

destroyers, was based there. The Pacific Fleet was home ported on the 

west coast (its main base was San Diego) until May 1940, when after completing naval maneuvers, President Roosevelt ordered the Pacific Fleet to 

remain at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to Japanese expansion. The facilities 

at Pearl Harbor were inadequate and required extensive improvement and 

expansion to service the fleet. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander, 

Pacific Fleet, constantly requested reinforcing ships to increase the size 

and capability of his forward-deployed fleet. Instead, Washington determined that the Atlantic (where the Navy was supporting the convoy effort) 

was the main effort and ordered Kimmel to send 25 percent of his fleet to 

the Atlantic—the carrier Yorktown; the battleships Mississippi, Idaho, and 

New Mexico; four cruisers; 17 destroyers; and some auxiliary and supply ships. By December 1941 the Pacific Fleet consisted of three aircraft 

carriers (one of which was on the west coast undergoing overhaul), nine 

battleships (one of which was on the west coast undergoing overhaul), 22 

cruisers, 53 destroyers, 69 submarines, and 78 PBY aircraft.

The Pacific Fleet’s mission was to conduct decisive naval combat operations against an enemy fleet, and as such, it spent most its time at sea 

training for this mission. In port, ships only took basic self-security measures because naval responsibility for defense fell on the 14th Naval District (Task Force 4), commanded by Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Bloch 

had a difficult mission because he had no major assets assigned to him for 

this mission. He had to “borrow” ships to defend the harbor and PBYs for 
86 

reconnaissance. Any ship defending the harbor was not preparing for war, 

and the PBYs were the fleet’s long-range aerial reconnaissance asset that 

had few flying hours available for harbor security. In December 1941 the 

Pacific Fleet was a well-manned, well-trained naval force prepared for 

maritime combat. When in port the ships were not immediately prepared 

to engage in combat.

The US Marine Corps had a small complement of troops and equipment on Oahu. Ewa Field was home to Marine Air Group 21, consisting 

of VMB-232, VMJ-252, VMF-211 (Rear Echelon), and VMB-231 (Rear 

Echelon). The marines had 10 fighters, 29 bombers, and eight other aircraft at Ewa on 7 December. A complement of 652 marines were assigned 

at Pearl Harbor in the 1st Defense Battalion (-), 2d Engineer Battalion, 3d 

Defense Battalion, and 4th Defense Battalion. These marines had four 5-

inch AA guns, eight 3-inch AA guns, 20 .50-caliber machine guns, and 16 

.30-caliber machine guns. Additionally, 16 ships—eight battleships, two 

heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and two auxiliaries—had Marine Corps 

detachments embarked. In December 1941 the marine ground elements 

were well trained and prepared for combat with ammunition readily available. The Marine Corps aircraft had well-trained pilots but did not have 

ammunition readily available for the planes.

Vignette: Both Kimmel and Short were concerned about having 

enough assets to defend Pearl Harbor. In May 1941 Kimmel wrote the 

CNO:

The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring 

pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft 

guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment to Hawaii and to 

insure [sic] priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

The naval forces available to Commandant are meager to 

the point of nonexistence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, 

recreation, and resustinance and must afford protection of 

the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must 

be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom 

of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—

possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the 

necessities for defense of that base. (IPHA, part 22, 364).

Teaching point 1. Combat readiness. Does any US military unit have 
87

enough equipment, personnel, training, or money to be completely prepared for war?

The staff ride leader should have the students discuss things that prevent their military units from being 100-percent combat ready. Some of 

these issues (not a comprehensive list) are training time; personnel shortages; training distracters; training assets, such as fuel, ammunition, and 

training areas; and equipment shortages. Once you determine that a unit is 

rarely 100-percent combat ready, lead the group to discuss what units can 

do to mitigate the dilemma.

Teaching point 2. Preparedness. Most of the units in Hawaii on 7 December 1941 did not have ammunition readily available, believing there 

would be enough notice to issue ammunition. Does this problem exist 

today?

The staff ride leader can have the students discuss how really ready 

their units are today to engage in combat immediately. Did any military 

unit have the ability to defend on 11 September? Have them talk about 

where their wartime ammunition is and how long it would take to have 

their asset (ship, airplane, tank, soldier, marine) ready to respond to a 

threat. Once this is determined, ask them if in this time of possible surprise terrorist attack this practice is wise. Another possible issue to explore 

is why we do not have ammunition readily available (safety, ammunition 

maintenance, accountability).
88 

Stand 5

“Joint” Defenses

Directions: Retrace your route back on Harbor Drive. Turn left on 

Fort Kam Road. Travel a short distance and turn left on Seaman Avenue. 

Turn into the dirt parking lot on the left just after the turn. Park and walk 

to the large battery. This is Battery Hasbrouck.

Orientation: You are standing at Battery Hasbrouck. Battery Hasbrouck was named for BG Henry C. Hasbrouck, West Point class of 1860, 

who as an artillery officer, served in the Civil War and the Modoc War. The 

battery was completed in 1914. It housed eight 12-inch M1908 mortars 

that were housed four to a pit (you can see the steel base rings embedded 

in the concrete). These breech-loading seacoast mortars could fire a 700-

pound projectile 15,200 yards. The entrance to Pearl Harbor is in front of 

the battery (to the south), and Ford Island is to the north.

Description: General Marshall wrote LTG Short with guidance when 

Short assumed command of the Hawaiian Department: “The fullest protection of the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us, there can 

be little question about that. . . . Please keep in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, 

and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel.” 

Marshall had clearly communicated Short’s mission and Short understood. 

It is important to remember that the first common link in the chain of 

command between Kimmel and Short was President Roosevelt. Kimmel

Figure 60. Battery Hasbrouck, early 1920s.

National Archives
89

and Short would have to work out any joint plan as a “gentleman’s agreement.”

Twelve days after assuming command, Short wrote to Marshall to 

explain his first impressions of the Hawaiian Department. He described 

his meetings with Kimmel and Bloch and provided a positive impression 

about the ability to work jointly. Short went on to detail his eight priorities for Hawaii’s defense; cooperation with the Navy was number one on 

the list. Short understood his mission and was working to improve ArmyNavy cooperation and the defense of Hawaii.

Air Corps Commander MG Frederick L. Martin and Commander, 

Patrol Wing 2 (Task Force 9, etc.) Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger developed the first joint agreement between the Navy and Army. Published on 

31 March 1941, the Martin-Bellinger Report, as it has come to be known, 

described their estimate of the Japanese threat to Hawaii. Prophetically, 

they wrote in the Possible Enemy Action paragraph:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceeded by:

 1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the 

operating area.

 2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships 

and installations in Pearl Harbor.

 3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous 

form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be 

launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred mile.

* * * * *

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability 

that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite 

of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us 

in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be 

slow to start.

To prevent the Japanese surprise attack that they described, Martin and 

Bellinger, cognizant of the shortage of long-range reconnaissance aircraft, 

described the action open to them: “Run daily patrols as far as possible to 

seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with 

present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable 
90 

measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.”

The report went on to detail how the two branches would locate and 

attack any fleet (using both Navy and Army long-range aircraft under 

Navy control) and defend against any air attack using all fighters on the 

island—Army, Navy, and Marine Corps under Army control. Additionally, 

the aviators detailed an aircraft readiness system that identified percentages 

of aircraft prepared for combat and a time limit for launching the aircraft.

On 11 April 1941 Short and Bloch (acting for Kimmel) published the 

most comprehensive joint plan for defending Hawaii, the Joint Coastal 

Frontier Defense Plan (JCFDP). This gentleman’s agreement between the 

Army and Navy detailed the delimitation of areas, established a Joint Planning Committee to continue joint planning, listed tasks for each service, 

required each service to write supporting defensive plans, and obligated 

further agreements on allocating supplies and services. The plan’s joint 

task was “to hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and 

protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.” The Army was tasked “to hold 

Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.” The Army had 16 requirements to 

accomplish the task (defending Oahu, bomber support for naval aircraft 

in major offensive sea operations, etc.), including establishing an Aircraft 

Warning Service (AWS).

In the plan the Navy was tasked “to patrol the Coastal Zone and to 

control and protect shipping therein; to support Army forces.” The 16 requirements spelled out how the Navy would accomplish its task; the most 

important was “distant reconnaissance.” The Army had only 12 aircraft 

capable of conducting long-distance patrols, and the Navy had 72 PBYs, 

so the Navy assumed responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

The two services now had good joint plans for defending Pearl Harbor 

and the other critical installations in Hawaii. They delineated responsibilities, attempted to overcome shortages and weaknesses of the other service, 

and tried to use the particular strengths of each service. However, the plans 

had two flaws—their success depended on advance notice and good intelligence.

In October and November 1941 the Navy and Army discussed establishing a joint headquarters for both commanders, but Kimmel thought the 

disadvantages outweighed the advantages and decided not to collocate. 

However, the services did create the Joint Harbor Control Post, which had 

elements from the Coast Artillery, Air Corps, Fleet Air Arm, Submarine 
91

Force, and the Naval District to command and control the water around 

the port. The commanders thought this facility could accomplish the same 

thing as a joint headquarters.

Part of the JCFDP called for the Army to establish the AWS, a service 

consisting of radar stations, observation posts, and an air-warning center 

for command and control. By December 1941 the Army had six SCR-270 

mobile radar stations and three SCR-271 fixed radar sites. Locations had 

been found and coordinated for the six mobile locations, and they were operational in December 1941. The three fixed sets lacked some equipment, 

and no terrain was coordinated for their emplacement. Some of the locations selected were on US Park Service property, and the War Department 

was having difficulty getting Interior Department permission to emplace 

the radars on their property because they would be an eyesore.

The radar sets were under the Army Signal Corps’ control, much to the 

chagrin of the Air Corps, which thought the radars should be under its control. The radar operators had gone to sea with Navy ships equipped with 

radar to learn how the radar worked and to train on the systems, which 

were similar to the ground stations. All of the radars and observation posts 

were connected by telephone to the Air Warning Center at Fort Shafter. 

There plotters marked the flight paths of located targets so the center’s director, with assistance from Navy and Air Corps liaisons, could determine 

Interceptor Command

Radar Units Long-Range Air

Reconnaissance Ships at Sea

Air Warning

Center

Director

Air Corps

Liaison

Navy

Liaison

Civilian

Aviation

Liaison

Aircraft

Controller

Antiaircraft

Controller

53d Coast

Artillery Bde

14th Pursuit

Wing

Navy

Aircraft

(in port)

Marine/Navy

Marine Antiaircraft

Aircraft

Interceptor Command

Radar Units Long-Range Air

Reconnaissance Ships at Sea

Air Warning

Center

Director

Air Corps

Liaison

Navy

Liaison

Civilian

Aviation

Liaison

Aircraft

Controller

Antiaircraft

Controller

53d Coast

Artillery Bde

14th Pursuit

Wing

Navy

Aircraft

(in port)

Marine/Navy

Marine Antiaircraft

Aircraft

Figure 61. 
92 

if the planes were friendly or an enemy. If the planes were enemy or undetermined, the director could ask the pursuit liaison to launch aircraft.

To maximize the radar’s potential, the Hawaiian Department decided 

to create the Interceptor Command based on a model the British were using. BG Howard C. Davidson, Commander, 14th Pursuit Wing, would 

command the Interceptor Command. The command would consist of 

AWS (under Air Corps control), the 14th Pursuit Wing, the 53d Coast 

Artillery Brigade (AA) (with control of Marine Corps AA), and a liaison 

section from the Navy to control Navy and Marine Corps fighters. The key 

for the Interceptor Command was the Air Warning Center at Fort Shafter, 

where aircraft were tracked and determined to be an enemy or a friend. 

If determined to be an enemy, the director could launch fighters (Army, 

Navy, or Marine Corps) and coordinate AA protection. During a joint exercise on 12 November 1941, US Navy aircraft launched from a carrier 80 

miles from Oahu were seen by the radars, and within 6 minutes, fighters 

were launched and intercepted the “aggressors” 30 miles from Oahu. The 

Army and Navy now had tested a reliable system for defending Oahu from 

the air and planned to activate the Interceptor Command in late December 

1941.

Vignette: Shortly after assuming command, Short wrote of his impressions of the Navy commanders and his thoughts on jointness: “Since 

assuming command, I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel 

and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable 

and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view 

there will be no hair splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any 

decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the 

Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce 

the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that 

they will take exactly the same view. From my brief intercourse with them 

I feel that our relations should be extremely cordial.” (IPHA, part 24, 

1,835.)

Teaching point 1. Joint command. Did Kimmel and Short have an effective joint command?

The staff ride leader should have the students discuss the joint command structure’s effectiveness and weaknesses. Items to consider during 

the discussion include the command arrangement (there was no formal 

joint command and no joint doctrine), colocating the commanders (Did 

the two have to be together, or could they communicate via phone?), and 

delineating tasks. (All like task units such as bombers, fighters, and AA 
93

units worked for a single commander.) Once the students have discussed 

this, ask them if today, with factors like Goldwater-Nichols, we are better 

at being joint. Items to consider here include sharing assets (How much 

do the marines like to “share” their aircraft with the air component commander and the Army like to “share” Patriot missiles?), communications 

(How well do the individual service’s communications interface with the 

others?), cultural difference, and doctrinal differences.

Teaching point 2. Dependence on early warning. Were the joint plans 

too dependent on having enough early warning?

The staff ride leader can have the students discuss how dependent 

the JCFDP (of which the Martin-Bellinger Report became an annex) 

was on having early warning. It was a good plan, but to be effective, the 

United States had to conduct reconnaissance in a 360-degree fan around 

the island. Due to assets, this was impractical. When the discussion on 

the JCFDP wanes, ask the students if today’s planners are too dependent 

on having “enough notice.” Ask them if the assumptions in today’s plans 

allow for a “buildup” phase or time to get ready (condition setting). Ask 

the students if transformation (units of action, composite wings, etc.) is 

the answer.
94 

Stand 6

Preparedness and Early Warning

Directions: Drive back up Seaman Avenue and turn left on Fort Kam 

Road. After a short distance, pull into the parking lot on the left (you can 

see Pearl Harbor inlet from the road). Park and walk to the water.

Orientation: Standing at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Every ship 

entering or departing the harbor has to pass through here. Pearl Harbor 

anchorage is to the north. Fort Kamehameha is to the southeast.

Description: The Army and Navy each had a system of alerts that 

numbered 1 through 3. Unfortunately, the Army’s system had 1 as the most 

minor alert, and 3 was full alert. The Navy did the opposite; 3 was the 

minor alert, and 1 was full alert. This difference was not known to either 

service and would lead to problems later in the year.

Throughout 1941 the US forces in Hawaii spent their time training 

and standing alerts to defend the island, based on warnings from Washington. Various levels of joint exercises were conducted on 26 February, 

3-5 March, 24 March, 19 May, 12-24 May, 13 October, 27 October, 10 

November, and 12 November. All through the year, alerts were called that 

required the services to exhibit different levels of preparedness and curtailed training. The first alert of the year was on 3 March, and the next was 

conducted 25-30 July.

On 26 November the Japanese government rejected a US proposal 

that would have calmed the situation between the two nations. Washington 

decided that war was closer than ever and on 27 November sent warnings 

out to all subordinate commanders around the world. Kimmel received his 

message that started with, “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.” The message went on to detail how negotiations had broken down 

and that Japan would strike somewhere within the next few days (the Philippines, Thai Peninsula, Kra Peninsula, and Borneo were mentioned in the 

message). It ordered the naval commanders to “Execute an appropriate 

defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in [Navy 

war plans].” Kimmel pondered the message but assumed the message 

meant the Japanese would attack somewhere other than Pearl Harbor. To 

continue his training regimen, his only action was to authorize the depth 

charging of any submerged submarine detected around Oahu.

Short also received a warning from the War Department informing him 

that negotiations with Japan had terminated and that hostile action could 

occur at any moment. He was told that the United States desired Japan 
95

to make the first overt act but that this should not restrict his defensive 

preparations. He was told to take measures to prepare, but not to alarm, 

the civilian populace and to report the actions he had taken. The Navy had 

told Short that the Japanese carriers were in home waters, and he knew that 

Japan did not have aircraft with sufficient range to reach Hawaii from any 

of the Mandate Islands, so he determined that sabotage was his greatest 

danger. He therefore ordered alert 1, which called for protection against 

sabotage. Each coastal battery, AA position, and key facility was guarded 

24 hours a day, and aircraft were lined up wingtip to wingtip for easier 

guarding. If Short had selected alert 2 or 3, he would have had to issue 

ammunition to all of his positions, and he was sure this action would alarm 

the civilian population, a direct violation of his orders.

Once he decided on alert 1, Short sent a message to the War Department, “RURD [Reference your radiogram] 472 report department alerted 

to prevent sabotage liaison with Navy.” The next day, 28 November, Short 

received a reply from Army Adjutant General MG Emory S. Adams: “critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against 

subversive activities . . . initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide protection of your establishments, property, and equipment 

against sabotage.” As a precaution, Short also ordered the AWS to be in 

full operation from 0400-0700 everyday. (It was also in operation from 

0700-1100 and 1200-1600 Monday through Friday for training.) Short 

informed Kimmel that he had gone to alert 1, but Kimmel thought alert 1 

was the highest alert.

After Kimmel gave his antisubmarine instructions, reports of suspected submarines were so numerous that the sightings became routine. Additionally, a few ships even dropped depth charges on suspected sightings. 

From 27 November until 7 December the Navy inshore patrol maintained 

vigilance while the Army defended against saboteurs.

Early on the morning of 7 December, five Japanese fleet submarines 

launched the midget submarines they had carried from Japan. Concurrently, minesweepers Condor and Crossbill were sweeping the entrance 

of Pearl Harbor for any mines (Japanese submarines were able to plant 

mines). At 0342 Condor’s crewmembers spotted a periscope in the restricted area just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor and blinked a message to the USS Ward, the destroyer on inshore patrol. Lieutenant William 

W. Outerbridge had just assumed command of the Ward two days prior, 

but he did not hesitate to take his ship to general quarters and hunt for the 

submarine. Outerbridge searched for the submarine for the next 38 minutes but gave up and secured from general quarters at 0453.
96 

At 0630 the USS Antares, a supply ship, was entering Pearl Harbor 

with a lighter in tow when its captain noticed a conning tower of a semisubmerged submarine following them. Ward was again notified and went 

to general quarters at 0640. Outerbridge maneuvered his old four-stack 

destroyer within 50 meters of the submarine and opened fire with 4-inch 

guns. The second shot hit the submarine where the conning tower joined 

the hull of the submarine. Ward immediately dropped a full pattern of 

depth charges on the sinking submarine. A PBY on patrol also dropped 

depth charges on the target. Outerbridge immediately reported to the Naval District watch officer: “We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped 

depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area.” The report 

worked its way up the chain until it reached Kimmel, who also received a 

report from Patrol Wing 2, reporting their attack on the submarine. Kimmel was not certain this was a real attack because of all the reports of 

submarines earlier in the week, but he ordered the ready-duty destroyer to 

the area. The Navy never informed the Army of the sighting.

The AWS had gone into operation at 0400, 7 December and was 

scheduled to shut down at 0700. At the Opana Radar Station, Private Joseph Lockard had been instructing Private George Elliot on operating the 

radar. When the two learned that their transportation would be late, Lockard decided to keep the station operating to continue training. At 0702 

Elliot observed a large formation of airplanes approaching Oahu from the 

north (the first Japanese attack wave), which puzzled the two soldiers as 

they discussed what to do.

Finally, Lockard and Elliot decided to call the Air Warning Center 

at Fort Shafter. The operator at the center told Elliot that everyone had 

already departed but then noticed Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, the pursuit

Figure 62. USS Ward.

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officer who had been on duty that morning. Elliot explained that his station 

was tracking the biggest sighting they had ever seen and gave Tyler all of 

the pertinent information. A friend had told Tyler that a flight of 12 B-17 

bombers was scheduled to arrive from the north that morning (Opana was 

Figure 63. Radar track from Opana Radar Site, 7 December 1941.

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in fact tracking them, too), so he told Elliot not to worry about the sighting. 

Elliot and Tyler continued to track the Japanese planes approaching Oahu 

for the next 19 minutes, and with the Japanese planes 20 miles away, the 

men shut down at 0739 when their transportation arrived. Tyler did not 

inform anyone of the report, so the Navy did not know of the sighting.

At 0740 Commander Fuchida, the Japanese air commander, ordered his 

planes that were approaching Oahu “undetected” to form into attack formations.

Vignette: Lieutenant Tyler was on duty at the Air Warning Center for 

only the second time on 7 December and was only there as the center’s 

pursuit officer, not as director or aircraft controller. While being questioned 

for the Roberts Commission (an investigative commission convened after 

the attack), Tyler reflected on the moment: “Well, perhaps I should have 

done something. I don’t know, but it seemed to me that there was still 

nothing irregular, that they probably might be friendly craft. So I thought 

about it for a moment and said, ‘Well don’t worry about it,’ and went back 

awaiting the hour and time until the next relief.” (IPHA, part 22, 221.)

Teaching point. Reporting. With two very significant events occurring 

before the attack, why were the Army and Navy surprised?

There are many approaches the staff ride leader can use for this discussion. One approach is to discuss “crying wolf.” Ask the students how 

natural it is to not say anything because you are afraid people will think 

you are crying wolf. Ask the students how you can prepare and train your 

soldiers/sailors/airmen/marines to report anything that they think is suspicious. Are we better at this today? Read the students the following transcript between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) headquarters 

(HQ) and one of its command centers (CC) on 11 September 2001 at 0949. 

They are discussing United Flight 93 that ultimately crashed in Pennsylvania at 1003 (this is after two planes had hit the World Trade Center and 

one had hit the Pentagon):

FAA HQ: They’re pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.

CC: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?

FAA HQ: Oh, God, I don’t know.

CC: Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably in 

the next 10 minutes.

FAA HQ: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.

Another approach is talking about information sharing. Query the students: “The Navy had one piece of information and the Army had another. 

If one commander had both pieces of information, would he have been 

better prepared for the attack?”
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Stand 7

Japanese Air Superiority

Directions: Leave the parking lot and turn left on Fort Kam Road. 

When the road bends to the right, it becomes Vickers Avenue. Take Vickers Avenue for approximately 0.8 mile until you see a large white building—Pacific Air Force (PACAF) HQ—on the right. Parking is difficult 

at this location. First, attempt to park in the parking lot before reaching 

the building (west of the building). You may have to drive past it, turn 

left onto Atterbury Circle, and park by the 15th Air Base Wing HQ. Once 

you are parked, walk to PACAF HQ and conduct the stand in the grass by 

the building (there are numerous locations on the building where damage 

from 7 December is still visible).

Orientation: We are now going to transition to the attack on Pearl 

Harbor itself. It is important that we look at the results of when we fail. 

This building is home to the PACAF HQ. In December 1941 it was the 

Hale Makai (“House by the Sea” in Hawaiian) Barracks. Completed on 30 

September 1941 (but troops had been occupying parts of it since January 

1940), the barracks housed 3,200 soldiers and was the largest barracks in 

the Army. Besides housing 3,200 soldiers, it had a large mess hall in the 

center that the troop wings all connected to, two barbershops, a dispensary, 

a tailor shop, a laundry, and a PX shoppette.

Description: At 0530, 7 December 1941 the Japanese 1st Air Fleet 

was 230 miles north of Oahu when the cruisers Tone and Chickuma

launched seaplanes for reconnaissance missions. One airplane was tasked 

to observe Pearl Harbor while the other was to see if there were any ships 

in the Lahaina Bay anchorage, which the Pacific Fleet sometimes used. 

The aircraft over Lahaina Bay reported it was empty; the Pearl Harbor 

aircraft reported nine battleships, a heavy cruiser, and six light cruisers in 

the harbor. Its pilot also provided a weather report of the area (the winds 

were 14 meters from the east, and the ceiling was 1,700 meters with 70-

percent cover).

At 0600 the Japanese started launching their first-wave airplanes, of 

which 183 of the planned 189 successfully launched. Japanese Air Commander Fuchida formed his aircraft with the high-level bombers leading at 

9,800 feet, the dive bombers to their left at 11,000 feet, the torpedo bombers to the right at 9,200 feet, and the fighters dispersed throughout. As soon 

as the first wave was gone, the Japanese fleet continued sailing to the south 

while the second-wave aircraft were brought up from the hangar decks to 

prepare for launch. At 0715 167 of the planned 171 planes for the second 
100 

wave took off for Oahu. A total of 350 Japanese planes would attack US 

ships and facilities.

The Japanese had many contingency plans for the attack, including plans for complete surprise and plans if they were detected. If they 

achieved surprise, the slow and vulnerable torpedo planes would lead the 

attack, but if surprise was lost, the dive bombers would lead so the American AA gunners would be firing high into the sky when the torpedo planes 

approached. At 0740 Fuchida determined that the Japanese had achieved 

complete surprise and fired a single signal flare to indicate that. All of the 

planes moved into position except one group of fighters. Fuchida assumed 

that group had not seen the flare, so he fired another one. Seeing the second flare, the dive bombers assumed that the Japanese had not achieved 

surprise and they were to lead the attack. The torpedo planes did not see 

the second flare and still assumed that they would lead the attack. After 

months of planning, the plan was unraveling because of a simple signal 

error.

The 40 torpedo bombers with fighter escort broke off from the formation north of Oahu to fly down the western side of the Waianae Range, 

where they divided into two groups. One group would attack from the 

northeast, and one would attack from the southeast. Twenty-five dive 

bombers with fighters departed the formation to attack Wheeler AAF from 

two directions. Twenty-six dive bombers with fighter escort would attack 

Hickam AAF and Pearl Harbor NAS. With Fuchida in the lead, the 49 

Figure 64. Japanese planes prepare for takeoff, 7 December 1941.

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high-level bombers flew around the west side of Oahu and planned to approach Pearl Harbor from the southwest.

At 0750, 25 “Val” dive bombers and seven Zero fighters arrived over 

Wheeler AAF and started their attack. In response to alert 1, all Army 

fighters in Hawaii were lined up on the tarmac parked wing to wing. The 

Vals dropped their bombs and made a few strafing passes, and the Zeros 

also strafed once they were sure there were not fighters in the air. Some of 

the dive bombers, once they had dropped their bombs, proceeded to Ewa 

Field to strafe the Marine Corps aircraft there.

At 0752, shortly after the attack commenced on Wheeler, the Japanese 

struck the PBYs of Patrol Wing 2 at Kaneohe. Nine Zero fighters made numerous strafing passes at the large floating planes, some ashore and some 

tied to their berths in the water. In just 8 minutes, many of Kaneohe’s aircraft were burning, and the sailors tried to save as many as they could. One 

of the Zeros departed Kaneohe and strafed Bellows Field, a small auxiliary 

field, causing minor damage.

Nineteen fighters accompanied the torpedo bombers, and when they 

arrived over Ewa at 0753, they did not see any American planes in the air, 

so they broke off to strafe the marine aircraft parked wing to wing. Nine 

Val dive bombers attacked the 35 PBYs at Pearl Harbor NAS on Ford 

Island at 0755. The Japanese pilots dropped their bombs on the parked 

aircraft and the hangars at the southern end of the island, destroying or 

Figure 65. First-wave plan.
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badly damaging 26 aircraft in short time.

The aircraft of the 18th Bombardment Wing at Hickam were, for the 

most part, parked wing to wing when the Japanese arrived at 0800. Seventeen Val dive bombers and eight Zero fighters attacked the vulnerable 

aircraft, the hangars, and the barracks, killing 25 men in the barracks mess 

hall. Hickam was in flames when the Japanese planes departed. In short 

time the Japanese had crippled the American air capability and ensured 

that enemy aircraft would not hinder the planes tasked to attack Pearl 

Harbor.

Vignette: The Japanese caught the Americans “flat-footed” on the 

morning of 7 December. There are many accounts of service members 

being initially shocked by the attack but quickly overcoming it to do their 

duty. MG Frederick L. Martin, Commander, Hawaiian Air Force remembered his reaction to the attack: “This was about—this bombing was occurring probably less than a mile from my position. I saw the red circle on 

the wing tip of this airplane as it pulled out, and I knew it was Japanese. I 

rushed back to the telephone, called General Davidson, who was in charge 

of the intercept command, to tell him to get his pursuit ships in the air just 

as fast as he could, and he said they were being attacked at the same time 

and that they were struggling to get their ships in position so they could get 

them off.” (IPHA, part 22, 194.)

Figure 66. Wheeler AAF under attack, 7 December.

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Teaching point. Air superiority. Ninety-four of 183 planes of the first 

wave were dedicated to the air superiority role. Did the Japanese dedicate 

too many assets to this mission?

Air superiority always makes for a good discussion, and the staff ride 

leader can take full advantage of this while leading the discussion by being 

the “devil’s advocate.” If students say the air superiority mission was key, 

remind them that the extensive fuel tank farm on Pearl Harbor was never 

attacked and ask if 51 dive bombers could have caused that key installation any damage. If they say the Japanese dedicated too many assets to air 

superiority, remind them that only 14 American planes got into the air that 

day, but they shot down 11 Japanese planes. Once this discussion fades, 

ask them if air superiority is the most important operation today. Compare 

and contrast using aircraft in support of ground forces versus using the 

planes to gain and maintain air superiority. Again, being the devil’s advocate will work for this part of the discussion.
104 

Stand 8

Japanese Torpedo Attack

Directions: Travel west on Boquet Boulevard. Turn right on Moore 

Street and immediately turn right on Julian Avenue. Go 180 degrees 

around the water tower and go northeast on Porter Avenue. Enter Pearl 

Harbor through the Porter Avenue gate and turn right on South Avenue. 

After 1 mile, at the stop sign, bear to the left on North Street. After 0.4 

mile, turn right on Makalapa Road and exit Pearl Harbor. Turn left on State 

Route 99 (Kamehameha Highway), drive 1.2 miles, and turn left to enter 

Ford Island on Ford Island Boulevard. You will have to stop at the security gate (just like when you entered Pearl Harbor the first time). From the 

security checkpoint, drive 1.1 miles and turn right on Saratoga Boulevard. 

Drive 0.5 mile and park in the lot by the water. Dismount and move to the 

monument with the flagpole.

Orientation: Standing at the USS Utah memorial. On 7 December the 

USS Utah was berthed here, a space often occupied by aircraft carriers. The 

USS Utah was a Florida-class battleship commissioned in 1911 that saw 

service at Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1914 and in the Atlantic during World War 

I. Due to the limits of the Washington Naval Treaty, it was converted to a 

radio-controlled target ship in 1931. The Navy also used the Utah as an AA 

training ship by adding the requisite guns/machine guns and instructors.

Figure 67. Pearl Harbor at 0757, 7 December 1941.
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On 7 December the Utah was moored here at berth F-11. The USS Raleigh, a light cruiser, was moored in front of it, and the USS Tangier, a 

seaplane tender, was moored aft of it. Across Ford Island to the east was 

Battleship Row where all of the battleships moored.

Description: At 0757, 7 December 1941 the Japanese began their attack on the ships in the harbor. Sixteen “Kate” torpedo planes approached 

the west side of Ford Island where aircraft carriers usually moored when 

in port. Despite warning not to waste their torpedoes on small or noncombatant ships, two planes’ torpedoes slammed into the USS Utah, and one 

torpedo hit the USS Raleigh. In 13 short minutes, the Utah capsized, trapping 58 sailors who are still entombed to this day. The USS Raleigh started 

to list heavily and was in great danger of rolling over, but Herculean efforts by the crew and other sailors saved it from overturning. Some of the 

Japanese torpedo pilots attacking from the west realized these were poor 

targets and flew over Ford Island to attack ships on the other side. One 

torpedo the Japanese dropped passed under the minelayer USS Oglala and 

hit the USS Helena, a light cruiser. The concussion from the explosion on 

the Helena holed the Oglala, and it capsized at 1000.

While the attack was going on to the west, 24 Kate torpedo bombers approached Battleship Row from the east. Using Southeast Loch as a 

Figure 68. Torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. A geyser rises from the

USS West Virginia after it has been hit by a torpedo.

The USS Utah and USS Raleigh have also been hit.

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guide (described by someone as a “bowling alley leading right to Battleship Row”), the planes approached Battleship Row where the USS Oklahoma and USS West Virginia were centered in their windshields. Within 

5 minutes, five torpedoes had opened the port side of the Oklahoma, and 

it began to roll over. Soon, “Abandon ship!” was ordered, and the sailors 

tried to escape as the Oklahoma continued to roll over, only stopping when 

its superstructure stuck in the mud. The Oklahoma lost 429 men that day. 

Seven torpedoes in rapid succession hit the West Virginia, and only the 

counterflooding the captain ordered saved it from the same fate as the 

Oklahoma. It settled to the bottom with the deck barely awash with 106 of 

the crew killed, including the captain, Mervyn Bennion, who earned the 

Medal of Honor. Subsequent torpedo pilots sought other targets to hit, and 

two torpedoes hit the USS California. Prepared for an inspection the next 

day, all of its hatches were open, so the ship quickly flooded and eventually sank with her deck awash, 98 of the crew perishing. One of the last 

planes slammed a torpedo into the USS Nevada, causing damage but not 

a fatal blow.

Forty torpedo planes attacked that morning and hit with 19 torpedoes—48-percent hit rate—sinking battleships Oklahoma, West Virginia, 

and California. Torpedoes sank the target ship Utah and minelayer Oglala, 

and the cruisers Raleigh and Helena were badly damaged. Five of the 40 

torpedo planes were shot down and 10 were damaged.

Vignette: Commander Jesse Kenworthy, Jr. was the executive officer of the USS Oklahoma and the senior officer aboard (the captain was 

ashore on authorized pass). In his official report, he recalled how quickly 

his ship was doomed:

As I attempted to get to the Conning tower over the decks 

slippery with oil and water, I felt the shock of another 

very heavy explosion on the port side. By this time the 

ship was listing from 25 to 35 degrees and was continuing 

to list further. It was now obvious that the ship was going 

to continue to roll over and I climbed over the boat deck 

toward the starboard side. Men were beginning to come 

up from below through hatches and gun ports and from 

them it was learned that the ship was filling with water 

in many spaces below. As I reached the starboard side, I 

met Lieutenant Commander Hobby, the First Lieutenant, 

and with him concluded that the ship was fast becoming 

untenable and that an effort should be made to save as 

many men as possible. The word was passed for all hands 
107

to abandon ship, and the men were directed to leave over 

the starboard side and to walk and climb over the ship’s 

side and onto the bottom as it rolled over. At about this 

time another heavy explosion was felt on the port side 

and the ship began to roll over rapidly. The men went 

over the starboard side, climbing over the side and bottom 

and many went into the water to swim to the Maryland. 

(Enclosure E to CINCPAC action report, Serial 0479, 15 

February 1942, World War II Action Reports, Modern 

Military Branch, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.)

Teaching point. Persistence. Why was the Japanese torpedo attack so 

incredibly successful?

The staff ride leader can let the students discuss this as they see fit, 

but one area should be emphasized. Fuchida knew there was a problem 

with using torpedoes at Pearl Harbor, but he solved the problem from the 

bottom up by gathering the best torpedo plane crews and giving them the 

latitude to solve the problem the way they saw fit. Let the students discuss 

this, and ask them how the US military solves difficult problems today. 

Ask them if it solves problems from the bottom up or from the top down.
108 

Stand 9

Japanese High-Level Attack

Directions: Retrace your route back on Saratoga Boulevard. At the 

traffic circle, go 180 degrees around and continue on Saratoga Boulevard 

to the yield sign. Continue straight and park in the parking lot. Dismount 

the vehicle and walk to the water.

Orientation: The mooring pylon to the front is where the USS Tennessee was tied up on 7 December. The USS Arizona Memorial rests over 

the middle of the Arizona, and the white buoy marks the front of the ship. 

Southeast Loch is directly to your front. The rest of the battleships were 

moored to the south.

Description: As the torpedo planes ravaged the Pacific Fleet, Fuchida personally led the high-level bombers from the southwest toward 

Battleship Row. The high-level bombers were in 10 triangle groups of 

five planes each (one group only had four planes because one high-level 

bomber aborted on takeoff), and each group had a battleship as its target. 

As established during training, the planes were flying at 11,000 feet, and 

when the experienced lead aircraft dropped its bomb, the entire group released its 1,750-pound bombs. Fuchida had briefed his high-level pilots to 

go around for a second pass if their target was obscured, and some groups 

had to make two or more passes. Fuchida led the first group toward his 

target, the USS Nevada, but it was obscured and they went around.

The next three groups and the sixth group dropped their bombs on 

the Tennessee and West Virginia. Two bombs hit the Tennessee, but the 

bombs had a low-order detonation. The first bomb hit turret 2 and rendered 

all three guns inoperable, and the second bomb penetrated turret 3 and 

damaged one of the guns. Two bombs also hit the sinking West Virginia

but did not explode. The first bomb pierced turret 3 but did no damage. 

The second bomb penetrated the deck and was later found on the second 

deck. The fifth and ninth groups aimed their bombs for the Arizona. Two 

bombs hit the USS Vestal, a repair ship tied off next to the Arizona. One 

bomb penetrated three decks and exploded, causing fires and flooding. 

The second bomb passed completely through the ship without exploding and caused more flooding. Four bombs hit the Arizona. One bomb 

hit turret 4, and two more bombs hit the aft portion of the deck. A fourth 

bomb hit the deck near turret 2 and passed through two decks before exploding. The explosion punctured an oil tank and caused an intense fire 

that ignited a small powder magazine (1,000 pounds of propellant used 

to launch the ship’s observation aircraft), causing the 14-inch and 5-inch 
109 Naval Historical Center Naval Historical Center

Figure 69. Battleship Row as seen from a Japanese high-level bomber.

Figure 70. The USS Arizona exploding after being hit by a high-level bomb.
110 

magazines to explode. Ninety-nine tons of powder was in those magazines, and when they exploded they demolished the ship’s bow. Along 

with Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, commander of Battleship Division One, 

and Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh, 1,177 of the Arizona’s 1,700-man 

crew were killed.

The seventh, eighth, and Fucida’s groups dropped their bombs on 

the USS Maryland, which was hit by two bombs that only had low-level 

detonations. One of the small explosions however, caused extensive flooding. The last group was tasked to bomb the USS California, but smoke 

from the furiously burning Arizona blanketed Battleship Row, and all of 

the bombs missed their targets. Twelve of 49 bombs from the high-level 

bombers hit their targets (a 24-percent hit rate), and in six of those hits, 

the bombs malfunctioned. However, one bomb found a “lucky” spot, destroyed a battleship, and killed more than 1,000 men. None of the highlevel bombers was shot down, but eight were damaged.

Vignette: Lieutenant Commander Samuel G. Fuqua, Damage Control 

Officer of the USS Arizona, was the senior surviving crew member. He 

was awarded the Medal of Honor for his coolness, leadership, and concern 

for his sailors on 7 December. He remembered 7 December:

Figure 71. Battleship Row after the first wave; the USS Arizona

is burning, and the USS Oklahoma has capsized.

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I glanced up. I saw a bomb dropping which appeared to 

me was going to land on me or close by. The next thing I 

remember I came to on deck in a position about six feet 

aft of the starboard gangway. I got to my feet and looked 

around to see what it was that had knocked me down. 

Then I saw I was lying about six feet from a bomb hole 

in the deck. . . . I would judge about 8:15 or 8:20 I saw a 

tremendous mass of flames, the height of 300 feet, rise in 

the air forward, and shook the ship aft as if it would fall 

apart like a pack of cards. . . . Being that the ship was no 

longer in fighting condition, I ordered the remaining people in the after turrets to abandon ship . . . at about 0845, I 

made a thorough search of the after part of the ship, which 

was accessible, for wounded and injured personnel. . . . I 

finally left the ship myself at 0915, and proceeded to the 

receiving barracks at Pearl Harbor to report in.

Fuqua returned to the Arizona two days later after the fires were out and 

continued the story: “We found the admiral’s body on the boat deck, or 

we found a body which I believe to be the admiral’s body on the boat 

deck, just at the foot of the flag bridge ladder. The captain’s body was 

never found. However, 

the captain’s ring and 

some coat buttons were 

found on the flag bridge.” 

Rear Admiral Kidd and 

Captain Van Valkenburgh 

were also awarded the 

Medal of Honor. (IPHA, 

part 23, 634-36.)

Teaching point. Dealing with disaster. How 

did Lieutenant Commander Fuqua, after being knocked unconscious 

by a bomb and seeing his 

ship destroyed and most 

of the crew killed or horribly wounded, remain 

calm, provide leadership, 

and take care of his sailors? Figure 72.

Lieutenant Commander Samuel G. Fuqua.

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 Fuqua was an inspiration to all who saw him that day; men commented on how his coolness inspired them and how they listened to his 

every instruction, even in the chaos that was the USS Arizona. His ship 

had blown up around him and was burning furiously; dead lay everywhere 

and horribly burned and wounded men begged for assistance. Many men’s 

lives were saved because of his actions that day. On 11 September there 

were numerous instances of Americans dealing with disaster and trying 

to bring order from chaos (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went 

to the site of the Pentagon attack and assisted with casualty evacuation). 

The staff ride leader should have the students discuss how today’s military 

“makes” leaders who can remain calm in the worst possible scenario and 

continue to provide leadership to ensure that critical tasks and missions 

are accomplished.
113

Stand 10

Japanese Second Wave

Directions: Retrace your route back to the traffic circle and drive 3⁄4 

of the way around. Drive southwest on Ford Island Boulevard. After 0.8 

miles (when the road starts to bear to the right), turn left into the large 

parking lot and park at the water’s edge.

Orientation: Standing at the southern part of Ford Island. The seaplane ramp and base were just to the southwest where the modern building 

on the edge of the water now stands. The flagpole and monument across 

the water are on Hospital Point and mark the USS Nevada Memorial. The 

dry dock where the USS Pennsylvania, USS Downes, and USS Cassin

were berthed on 7 December is due east across the loch (there will probably be ships in the dry dock when you are there).

Description: At 0829 the aircraft of the first wave formed up and 

started back for their carriers, but Fuchida remained to observe the second 

wave. As he waited, he took stock of the first wave’s attack. He had complete control of the air, the Arizona was furiously burning, the Oklahoma

and Utah were capsized, the West Virginia and California were badly 

damaged and sinking, and some other smaller ships were damaged. Fuchida had only had eight planes go down, but 52 were damaged. At 0840 

Fuchida spotted the second wave arriving.

Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki led the second wave, 

and at 0854 he ordered the attack. The plan for the second wave was considerably different from the first wave. There were no torpedo bombers 

in the second wave because the planners considered their use too risky 

without the element of surprise. The dive bombers and high-level bombers changed missions; the high-level bombers attacked the airfields, and 

the dive bombers attacked the ships in Pearl Harbor. For the second wave, 

the Japanese had 54 Kate high-level bombers armed with two 550-pound 

bombs (some had combinations of 550 pound and 132 pound bombs), 78 

Val dive bombers armed with a 550-pound bomb, and 35 Zero fighters. 

The aircraft of the second wave started their attack by hitting the 

airfields again. Nine Kates and 18 Zeros attacked Kaneohe at 0900, and 

when they departed, 33 of the 36 assigned PBYs were destroyed or badly 

damaged (three PBYs were on patrol during the attack). Nine of the Zeros 

attacked Bellows Field when they were finished at Kaneohe and destroyed 

10 of the 21 planes there. The other nine Zeros headed to strafe Wheeler, 

but the Army Air Forces had planes in the air now, and six P-40s jumped 
114 

the Zeros heading for Wheeler, destroying four of them and dispersing the 

rest. Twenty-seven Kates and 18 Zeros attacked Hickam AAF during the 

second wave, and when they departed, 18 aircraft were destroyed and many 

more were damaged. Many of the facilities at Hickam were destroyed and 

damaged. Ewa Field was not a specific target for the second wave but was 

the location where the Japanese airplanes would rendezvous before heading back to the carriers. Many planes, while waiting for the others, strafed 

the field, and 33 of the 51 assigned aircraft were destroyed or seriously 

damaged. Nine Kates continued the attack on Ford Island NAS, and by the 

end of the day, 26 of the 35 assigned PBYs were destroyed or damaged, as 

well as many of the hangars and other facilities.

At 0900 the Val dive bombers arrived over Pearl Harbor and started 

to attack ships. Near misses near the cruisers St Louis and Honolulu, the 

destroyers Cummings and Helm, and the repair ship Regal caused different 

degrees of damage to these ships. In Dry Dock 1, the USS Pennsylvania

was berthed aft of destroyers USS Cassin and USS Downes. One bomb 

hit the Pennsylvania, causing minor damage and killing 15 men, but that 

was the only damage that ship suffered. The Cassin was hit twice and the 

Downes was hit once (these may have been bombs aimed at the Pennsylvania), which started massive fires. In an effort to extinguish the fires, the 

dry dock was flooded, causing the Cassin to fall over onto the Downes and 

destroying both ships.

Figure 73. Second-wave plan.
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The USS Raleigh was trying to prevent capsizing from the torpedo 

hits sustained during the first wave when a dive bomber hit it during the 

second wave, causing serious damage. A Val was shot down after releasing its bomb at the USS Curtiss, a seaplane tender. Both the bomb and 

the plane hit the Curtiss and caused extensive damage. The USS Shaw, 

a destroyer in floating Dry Dock 2, was hit by three bombs, starting an 

immense fire. The fire ignited the forward magazine, blowing off the bow 

of the ship and causing a massive explosion that was seen all over Pearl 

Harbor. Miraculously, the Shaw did not sink.

Figure 74. The USS Cassin resting on the USS Downes

after the attack. The USS Pennsylvania is in the foreground.

Figure 75. The USS Shaw explodes on 7 December.

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In port, ships kept one boiler lit to provide power for electricity for the 

ship. The USS Nevada was switching boilers the morning of 7 December, 

and by 0850 it had enough power from the two boilers to get under way. It 

backed out of its berth aft of the blazing Arizona and dashed to get out of 

the harbor to search for the Japanese fleet. The Japanese dive bomber pilots 

spotted the Nevada and concentrated their attack on it, hoping to sink it in 

the harbor’s channel so the harbor would be blocked. Five bombs crashed 

into the Nevada, causing fires and extensive damage. Fearful of it sinking, 

the Naval District ordered the Nevada to beach itself at Hospital Point. 

Against the protests of the crew that wanted to find the Japanese, the Nevada

beached just after 0900 (at the spot marked by the flag across the water).

At 1000 the second wave formed up and headed back to the carriers. 

The second wave was not nearly as successful as the first wave, destroying only three destroyers and damaging some other ships. The Japanese 

had lost six Zeros and 14 Vals and had 16 Kates, 41 Vals, and eight Zeros 

damaged. When Fuchida landed on his carrier, he debriefed his commanders and tallied the attack. He believed he had sunk five battleships and 

damaged four more, and he also thought he had destroyed or seriously 

damaged three cruisers and four destroyers. He did not know specifically 

how many aircraft his crews had destroyed, but he knew he had control of 

the skies. He had lost five Kates, 15 Vals, and nine Zeros, and 34 Kates, 58 

Vals, and 19 Zeros were damaged.

Figure 76. The USS Nevada on fire and trying to head to sea.

Picture taken just north of where you are standing.

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With reports in hand, Fuchida went to see Commander Minoru Genda, 

the 1st Air Fleet Air Staff Officer, and Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the 

commander. He presented his information and recommended another attack on Pearl Harbor’s ships and facilities. Once his briefing was complete, 

he was dismissed, and Genda and Nagumo considered another strike. 

Genda recommended staying in the area and launching another strike in 

the morning, using the night to plan and repair aircraft. However, Nagumo 

was concerned for his fleet. He remembered what happened during the 

exercise in September when US planes located his carriers and “sank” one 

because he lingered in the area. He also did not know the location of the 

American carriers and was concerned that some of his fleet’s smaller ships 

were low on fuel. Additionally, Nagumo had accomplished his mission, 

and not one of his ships had suffered a scratch. Nagumo made his decision; 

he ordered the fleet to set sail for home.

Vignette: On 31 December Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger, Commander, Patrol Wing 2 (Task Force 9, et al.), expressed his surprise that the 

Japanese did not return for another attack: “I talked to Admiral Kimmel 

on the telephone on Sunday about noon, I think, and I said to him then I 

expected another attack at any time . . . they would refuel and come back; 

and as they didn’t do that—I don’t know why because they had a great opportunity.” (IPHA, part 22, 584.)

Admiral Kimmel gave his assessment of what would have happened 

if the Japanese had destroyed the fleet’s oil tanks and facilities: “if there 

had not been a ship in port, they could have done serious damage, and if 

they destroyed the oil which was all above ground at the time and which 

could have been destroyed, it would have forced the withdrawal of the 

fleet to the coast because there wasn’t any oil anywhere else out there to 

keep the fleet operating . . . if they had destroyed the base and the facilities 

in the base and destroyed the oil there it might have been even worse than 

it was.” (IPHA, part 6, 2,812.)

Teaching point. Culmination. Did Nagumo miss an opportunity for 

a decisive victory by not attacking a third time, or did he accomplish his 

mission?

Again, this is an opportunity in which the staff ride leader can play 

“devil’s advocate.” Let the students discuss this for a little while, and if the 

group is leaning toward Nagumo striking again, remind them:

• The fleet’s destroyers and cruisers were very low on fuel.

• One hundred eleven (111) airplanes had been damaged.

• The mission was accomplished; the US Pacific Fleet was crippled 

for six months.
118 

If the group says Nagumo was right for leaving, remind them:

• Japan had air superiority.

• The fuel tanks and facilities were large area targets that required 

minimal planning.

• The chance to locate and sink a US carrier was there, and Nagumo 

had six carriers.
119

Stand 11

Aftermath

Directions: The staff ride leader has numerous options on where to 

conduct this stand (the USS Arizona Memorial or USS Missouri Memorial). The Park Service “may” allow a special trip for military groups (you 

have to be in uniform) to the USS Arizona Memorial at the end of the day, 

but it must be coordinated well in advance. The Navy also allows military 

groups to go to the memorial during nonvisiting hours, but this must be 

coordinated with the Navy well in advance, too.

To get to the USS Arizona Memorial, return to Ford Island Boulevard, 

drive northeast, and leave the island over the bridge. At the traffic light, 

turn right onto Highway 99 (Kamehameha Highway). At the next light, 

turn right and park (parking is very crowded here). Conduct the stand 

down by the water before entering the USS Arizona Memorial Visitor’s 

Center where there is a museum, bookstore, and the entrance to where you 

get on the boat to visit the USS Arizona Memorial.

To get to the USS Missouri Memorial, return to Ford Island Boulevard and drive northeast. At the traffic circle, go 90 degrees and turn onto 

Saratoga Boulevard. Follow Saratoga Boulevard and the signs to the USS 

Missouri. There is an entrance fee but there is a military discount. You can 

conduct the stand on the ship at any place overlooking Pearl Harbor or at 

the Surrender Plaque on board.

Orientation: If conducted at the water at the USS Arizona Memorial 

Visitor’s Center: Standing at the USS Arizona Memorial Visitor’s Center. 

The USS Arizona Memorial is across the water on Battleship Row on Ford 

Island. The Navy yard where the USS Pennsylvania, USS Shaw, etc., were 

berthed is to the southwest.

If conducted on the USS Missouri overlooking Pearl Harbor: Standing on the deck of the USS Missouri. The USS Arizona Memorial is just 

northeast. The Navy yard where the USS Pennsylvania, USS Shaw, etc., 

were berthed is to the southeast. Ford Island is to the west. Hospital Point 

is to the south.

Description: The US Pacific Fleet was devastated by the Japanese attack. Four battleships were sunk—the Arizona, Oklahoma, West Virginia, 

and California—three battleships were damaged—the Nevada, Maryland, 

and Tennessee—four other ships were sunk—the Utah, Cassin, Downes, 

and Oglala—and nine others were damaged—the Honolulu, Helena, St 

Louis, Raleigh, Vestal, Curtiss, Shaw, Cummings, and Helm. Additionally, 
120 

other ships, like the Pennsylvania, suffered minor damage, and some facilities (Floating Dry Dock 2 and Dry Dock 1) were destroyed or badly 

damaged. The Army Air Forces lost 165 aircraft and their airfields were a 

shambles. More than 2,400 servicemen died that day, and another 1,178 

were wounded. The civilians of Oahu also suffered casualties; 68 were 

killed and 35 were wounded. Foretelling 11 September, the Honolulu Fire 

Department responded to the fires on Hickam AAF; three civilian firefighters were killed in the raid and six were injured.

The services immediately started cleaning up from the attack, and the 

primary priority became generating combat power for any eventuality. 

The Navy immediately started repairing its ships. The Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Maryland were quickly repaired and returned to the fleet on 20 

December 1941. The Nevada was refloated and entered Dry Dock 2 on 12 

February 1942 where repairs were made so it could sail to the West Coast. 

It departed Pearl Harbor on 15 March 1942 for Puget Sound Naval Station 

where it was completely repaired and modernized. The Nevada rejoined 

the fleet in December 1942 and participated in the Aleutians Campaign, 

the Normandy invasion, the invasion of Southern France, Iwo Jima, and 

Okinawa.

The West Virginia was raised on 17 May 1942 and moved to Dry 

Dock 1 where temporary repairs were made. It took almost 1 year to make 

enough temporary repairs for it to sail to the West Coast, but it departed 

under its own power in April 1943 for Puget Sound where it was fixed and 

modernized. On 4 July 1944 the West Virginia returned to the fleet and 

participated in numerous campaigns in the Pacific. It was present in Tokyo 

Bay on 2 September 1945 when the Japanese surrendered. The California

was raised on 24 March 1942 and entered Dry Dock 2 for repairs. It departed Pearl Harbor for Puget Sound on 10 October 1942 and was returned 

to the fleet in September 1943. It earned seven battle stars in the Pacific 

during the war.

The Shaw, whose entire bow had been blown off, was fitted with a 

temporary bow, sailed to the West Coast, and returned to the fleet in October 1943. The Cassin and Downes were destroyed, but serviceable equipment and machinery were removed from the ships and placed in newly 

constructed destroyers with the same names, so the Cassin and Downes

“returned” to the fleet. The Raleigh, Honolulu, Helena, St Louis, Vestal, 

Curtiss, Oglala, Cummings, and Helm were all repaired and returned to 

the fleet.

Only three ships that were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 never 
121

returned to the fleet. The Oklahoma was a total loss, and in March 1943 

the Navy used 21 electric winches on Ford Island to right her. It was decommissioned on 1 September 1944 and sold for scrap for $46,000. On 

17 May 1947, while being towed to the West Coast, the Oklahoma sank 

during a storm 500 miles northeast of Hawaii.

Once the Oklahoma was righted, the Navy moved the winches to the 

other side of Ford Island to use on the Utah. Because the Utah was only a 

target ship, the Navy decided to just temporarily roll it out of the shipping 

lane and salvage it later. In 1950, when the Navy realized that the Utah

would never be salvaged, the Navy placed a plaque on it to honor the men 

still entombed in it. On 27 May 1972 the government dedicated the USS 

Utah Memorial in honor of the ship and its brave crew. Each day the Navy 

raises the American flag at the memorial as a tribute to the 58 men who are 

still entombed there.

In July 1942 the Navy conducted a survey on the Arizona and decided 

it could not be salvaged. An attempt was made to remove the dead, but 

after recovering about 100 bodies, the effort was abandoned. The superstructure was removed, and the guns from turrets three and four were 

removed and given to the Army to use in Coast Artillery batteries (one 

battery was completed and one was under construction when the war 

ended). On 1 December 1942 the Arizona was stricken from the list of 

Figure 77. Twenty-one winches right the USS Oklahoma.

Naval Historical Center
122

commissioned ships. In 1950, Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander, Pacific Fleet, ordered that the American flag be flown from the Arizona and 

that a small platform be built. In 1958 the US Congress approved a bill that 

authorized the construction of a memorial, and after raising the required 

funds, the USS Arizona Memorial was dedicated on Memorial Day 1962. 

Today, the memorial commemorates all the men who died during the attack on 7 December 1941.

On 16 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short 

were relieved of their commands. They were never court-martialed, but 

they did appear before eight official government investigations of the attack, one of which blamed them for “dereliction of duty.” For the rest of 

their lives, these two men tried to clear their names.

The 30 ships that comprised the Japanese fleet that went to Hawaii 

returned to Japan. By the end of the war, all but one had been sunk; a 

tanker was the sole survivor. The architect of the plan, Admiral Isoroku 

Yamamoto, was killed on 18 April 1943 when his aircraft was shot down 

by US Army planes that learned his location from code breakers. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who commanded the 1st Air Fleet on 7 December 

1941, killed himself on Saipan on 7 July 1944, two days before the island’s 

capture by US troops. Minoru Genda, the air staff officer who planned the 

attack, and Mitsuo Fuchida, air commander, both survived the war. Genda 

entered politics, and Fuchida became a Christian evangelist.

Vignette: Admiral Yamamoto, on being told of the success of the attack 

on Pearl Harbor, reportedly replied: “We have awakened a sleeping giant 

and instilled in him a terrible resolve.” After the attacks of 11 September 

2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress the feeling of the 

nation—the same feeling the nation had after Pearl Harbor: “Tonight we 

are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief 

has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies 

to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” (President 

George W. Bush, address to Congress, 20 September 2001.)

Discussion point: The staff ride leader should tell the students to think 

about what they have contemplated, thought about, and learned during the 

staff ride. Have them take some time by themselves for self-reflection and 

deliberation before gathering for the integration phase.
123

IV. Integration Phase for the Attack on Pearl Harbor

The integration phase is the most important phase, and no staff ride is 

complete without it. The integration phase allows students to understand 

what happened, why it happened, and most important, what can be learned 

from studying the battle. Integration is the “so what” of the staff ride. The 

staff ride leader should give the students sufficient time for self-reflection 

and thought before bringing them together for the integration phase.

The staff ride leader has numerous options on how to conduct the 

integration phase, but the most important thing is that the students should 

do most of the talking. One technique is to run the integration phase 

similarly to a military after-action review: consider what happened, why 

it happened, and how to fix what was broken. Another technique is to let 

the students freely express what thoughts they have in their mind after 

their period of self-reflection. Once a student provides a topic, the staff 

ride leader can keep the discussion going to get every bit of learning out 

of each topic.

On 11 September 2001 the United States was again a victim of a 

surprise attack that damaged the nation and thrust it into a global war. 

Are there comparisons between 11 September and 7 December? In The 

9/11 Commission Report, Pearl Harbor is mentioned five times in the 

conclusion chapter. The similarities are startling and worthy of study and 

discussion to prevent anything like it from ever happening to the nation 

again.

As you conduct the integration phase, judge the people and judge their 

actions, but do so with compassion. The 9/11 Commission cautioned in its 

conclusion that it was writing with the benefit of hindsight and quoted Roberta Wohlstetter, who in her book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision

wrote, “it is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear; 

we can see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. 

But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings.” 

The following are possible topics to discuss during the integration phase 

of the Attack on Pearl Harbor Staff Ride.

Intelligence. Intelligence was arguably the most significant factor in 

the failures of Pearl Harbor and on 11 September. There are a few areas of 

intelligence the staff ride leader can explore:

a. How can we best gather information about our possible enemies? 

There were many agencies collecting information on Japan before the attack 
123

IV. Integration Phase for the Attack on Pearl Harbor

The integration phase is the most important phase, and no staff ride is 

complete without it. The integration phase allows students to understand 

what happened, why it happened, and most important, what can be learned 

from studying the battle. Integration is the “so what” of the staff ride. The 

staff ride leader should give the students sufficient time for self-reflection 

and thought before bringing them together for the integration phase.

The staff ride leader has numerous options on how to conduct the 

integration phase, but the most important thing is that the students should 

do most of the talking. One technique is to run the integration phase 

similarly to a military after-action review: consider what happened, why 

it happened, and how to fix what was broken. Another technique is to let 

the students freely express what thoughts they have in their mind after 

their period of self-reflection. Once a student provides a topic, the staff 

ride leader can keep the discussion going to get every bit of learning out 

of each topic.

On 11 September 2001 the United States was again a victim of a 

surprise attack that damaged the nation and thrust it into a global war. 

Are there comparisons between 11 September and 7 December? In The 

9/11 Commission Report, Pearl Harbor is mentioned five times in the 

conclusion chapter. The similarities are startling and worthy of study and 

discussion to prevent anything like it from ever happening to the nation 

again.

As you conduct the integration phase, judge the people and judge their 

actions, but do so with compassion. The 9/11 Commission cautioned in its 

conclusion that it was writing with the benefit of hindsight and quoted Roberta Wohlstetter, who in her book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision

wrote, “it is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear; 

we can see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. 

But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings.” 

The following are possible topics to discuss during the integration phase 

of the Attack on Pearl Harbor Staff Ride.

Intelligence. Intelligence was arguably the most significant factor in 

the failures of Pearl Harbor and on 11 September. There are a few areas of 

intelligence the staff ride leader can explore:

a. How can we best gather information about our possible enemies? 

There were many agencies collecting information on Japan before the attack 
124 

on Pearl Harbor. The Army and Navy were each intercepting different Japanese codes, both diplomatic and military. Many different agencies knew 

Japanese agents were conducting espionage on Oahu and worked to prevent it. Before 11 September there were at least 14 different agencies gathering information on al-Qaeda. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, each 

agency concentrated on its specialized mission. The problem, both in 1941 

and in 2001, was that there was no one agency responsible for synchronizing the efforts and analyzing all the information from the varied sources. 

The 9/11 Commission recommended: “The current position of Director 

Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director 

with two main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence 

centers on specific subjects of interest across U.S. government and (2) to 

manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that 

contribute to it.” Ask the students if this is the answer. Have them discuss 

the advantages and disadvantages of this recommendation.

b. What good is having intelligence if you cannot share it with your 

subordinate commanders? Before Pearl Harbor, the United States had very 

good information on Japan’s intentions through “Magic,” but the list of 

people cleared to see Magic was extremely limited. The 9/11 Commission 

observed that the US agencies before 11 September also had good information but were again reluctant to share it. Means and sources need to be 

protected, but how do we exploit the excellent intelligence that we gather? 

The 9/11 Commission recommended: “Information procedures should 

provide incentives for sharing, to restore better balance between security 

and shared knowledge.” Ask the students if this is a realistic solution and 

if it isn’t, how do we get intelligence to the commanders who need it.

Joint. How does the United States best organize itself to detect threats 

and prepare to deal with an enemy? In Hawaii before the attack on Pearl 

Harbor there were many agencies that needed to work together to accomplish the mission, “To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.” The Army and Navy needed 

to work together to accomplish this, and within each of the services, subordinate organizations needed to work together. The Army had ground forces, 

air forces, AA forces, and coast artillery forces, and the Navy had the fleet, 

the district, air forces, and marines. There was no order that required all the 

services and organizations to work together; instead, they relied on their 

professionalism to work toward the common goal.

The 9/11 Commission found problems with interagency coordination 

that hindered our ability to defend against al-Qaeda. Players included the 

CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, and Department of State. Now this list 
125

also includes the Department of Homeland Security. The commission went 

on to mention three reasons for joint action: the virtue of joint planning, 

unity of command, and to simplify the shortage of experts with sufficient 

skills. The third reason, the shortage of experts, has been a problem since 

before Pearl Harbor. Recall how long it took the limited number of code 

breakers to decipher a message and how long it took the limited number 

of linguists to translate the message. To defend against a terrorist threat on 

the United States, the 9/11 Commission recommended: “We recommend 

the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on 

the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). 

Breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC 

should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, 

staffed by personnel from the various agencies.”

Have students discuss if this goes far enough into solving the joint and 

interagency problems. If not, what needs to be done? The US Northern 

Command was established in 2002 with the mission to “Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the 

United States . . . provide military assistance to civil authorities.” The Department of Homeland Security was also created in 2002 with the mission 

to “ prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to 

threats and hazards to the nation.” Ask students how critical it is for these 

two agencies to work together.

Prioritization. How should the United States set defensive priorities 

for the global war on terrorism? The forces in Hawaii in 1941 were not the 

priority for the United States. The ongoing campaign in the Atlantic was 

the Navy’s and Army’s main concern, and the forces in the Philippines 

had priority over Hawaii. Ask students if US leaders had set the correct 

priorities in 1941. The 9/11 Commission identifies that the Department of 

Homeland Security now has to set priorities in allocating limited resources. The commission recommended: “Homeland security assistance should 

be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. Now, in 

2004, Washington D.C. and New York City are certainly at the top of any 

such list. . . . It should supplement state and local resources based on the 

risks and vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should not 

use this money as a pork barrel.” Ask students if this is realistic in this day 

and age. Also ask them what the best way to prioritize limited resources is. 

Ask them how units can best prepare if they are not the priority.

Travel. Is it too easy for the United States’ enemies to freely travel 

within its boundaries? Japanese spies assigned to the consulate in Honolulu were free to roam around the country to gather information on military 
126 

installations and assets, and there was no way to stop them because they 

were not breaking the law. Before the 11 September attacks, the terrorists 

were also free to roam around the country to gather information and to 

prepare for their attack. The 9/11 Commission recommended: “Targeting 

travel is at least as powerful of a weapon against terrorists as targeting 

their money. The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.” Ask 

students how best to prevent foreign nationals who have legally entered 

this country from being able to freely move around to conduct operations 

against us.

Civil liberties versus security. How do we protect our nation and our 

civil liberties simultaneously? The very laws that keep us free also make 

us less secure in our own homeland. Counterespionage agents were prevented from gathering critical information on Japanese spies by such laws 

as the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which prohibited messages 

to and from a foreign country from being intercepted. In the aftermath of 

11 September, Congress passed the Patriot Act that gave more power to 

investigative agencies of the government but many fear erodes our civil 

liberties. As some powers of the Patriot Act are scheduled to expire, the 

9/11 Commission recommended: “The burden of proof for retaining a 

particular government power should be on the executive, to explain (a) 

that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is 

adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate 

guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.” Ask students if the 

loss of certain civil liberties is worth it if it makes the nation safer. Also ask 

them if they feel the country trusts its government enough to have these 

powers.

Vulnerability. How do we mitigate the vulnerability of our facilities 

and assets? Both the installations on Oahu and the assets and targets on 11 

September were vulnerable. Information was easy to obtain because maps 

and photos were easy to acquire. Organizations became predictable, and 

unchanging security measures were overcome. Ask the students how the 

military can mitigate the inherent vulnerabilities of its installations and 

assets. Areas that students should consider include periodic, randomly 

scheduled changes to security precautions and constantly changing schedules and timetables to be unpredictable.

Early warning. How do we ensure that people report possible attacks, 

no matter how improbable they seem? On 7 December the United States 
127

had at least two incidents in which the attackers’ intentions were shown. 

In each case, the American personnel involved concluded that there was 

no possible way that an attack was under way. On 11 September we again 

had some early warning, and even after airplanes started crashing into 

buildings, some people could not believe that we were under attack. Have 

the students discuss how we can ensure personnel report things, no matter 

how improbable, to the proper authorities. Is the “zero defect” mentality 

part of the problem? Are people afraid they will be accused of “crying 

wolf?”

Failures. In what areas did the United States fail before 7 December 

and 11 September? The 9/11 Commission found four types of failures 

before the 11 September attack that were also failures before 7 December: imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. The commission 

believed the United States failed because it did not have the imagination 

to understand the dangers and did not listen to those who imagined the 

“impossible.” It believed that the United States must make the exercise 

of imagination routine. Ask the students how well we listen to those who 

imagine what could happen.

The commission believed that the nation’s weak policies toward alQaeda were a major failing, just as before December 1941 the nation let 

Japan get away with actions that went against its policies. Ask the students 

if weakness and weak policies endanger the nation. Before 11 September 

the nation had opportunities to destroy al-Qaeda command and control 

cells, but it did not have the ability to do so (we tried with missiles). Ask 

the students if preemptive strikes are ever a possibility for the United 

States. Finally, the commission reported that failures in management 

helped result in the 11 September attacks. Different agencies did not share 

information and had conflicting and dissimilar missions. Recall the different missions of the Army and Navy in Hawaii in 1941. Ask the students 

how management can assist in defending the nation.

Battle command. Was it justifiable to lay the blame for Pearl Harbor on Kimmel and Short? The staff ride leader should consider saving 

this topic for the end because many different opinions will be expressed. 

Consider Short and Kimmel not being on the Magic distribution list, the 

numerous messages and warnings they received and the ones they did not 

receive, the actions they took before the attack (joint planning or exercises), their reactions to different warnings, and their communications with 

Washington. This is a great opportunity for students to discuss leadership 

and responsibility.

129

V. Support for a Staff Ride to Pearl Harbor

1. Information and assistance. This staff ride was designed primarily for 

military groups, but with modifications and extensive coordination, civilian organizations can use it as well.

a. The Staff Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted Pearl Harbor staff rides and can provide 

advice and assistance on every aspect of the staff ride. The Staff Ride Team 

can also provide staff ride facilitators to lead a Pearl Harbor staff ride. Visit 

the CSI Web site for information on obtaining staff ride assistance and/or 

leadership. Staff Ride Team support includes background information, 

detailed knowledge of the battle and battlefield, and familiarity with Pearl 

Harbor and surrounding areas.

Address: Combat Studies Institute

US Army Combined Arms Center

ATZL-CSH

 201 Sedgwick Avenue

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Telephone: DSN 552-2078

Commercial (913) 684-2078

Web site: <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/CSI/staff_ride/staffride 

home.asp>

b. Most of this staff ride occurs on active military bases—Naval Station Pearl Harbor and Hickam Air Force Base. In this time of increased security and awareness, it is imperative to coordinate with each installation’s 

military police. Staff ride leaders can take a few steps to make the Pearl 

Harbor staff ride easier:

(1) Use military vehicles or privately owned vehicles with Department of Defense stickers (registered on base/post).

 (2) Every member of the staff ride needs to carry his or her military identification so he or she can enter the installations.

 (3) Coordinate at least one working day before with each installation’s military police:

 (a) Naval Station Pearl Harbor:

 NAVSTA Pearl Harbor Security Office

 370 Fuller Way

Pearl Harbor, HI 96860

(808) 474-6755
130

(b) Hickam Air Force Base:

15th Security Forces Squadron

505 Hanger Ave

Hickam AFB, HI 96853

(808) 449-2392

b. The National Park Service, which maintains the USS Arizona Memorial, can provide advice and assistance to any group desiring to visit the 

USS Arizona. The Visitor’s Center includes a small museum with a film 

on the battle, a bookstore, and restrooms. The Park Service does not usually coordinate special trips to the Arizona, and lines can be up to 3 hours. 

However, the Park Service may be willing to arrange a special visit for 

military groups in uniform. Coordinate with the memorial’s headquarters 

well before your visit.

Address: 1. Arizona Memorial Place

 Honolulu, HI 96818

Telephone: (808) 422-2771, ext 125

Web site: <http://www.nps.gov/usar/>

2. Logistics.

a. Meals. There are many fast food restaurants on Pearl Harbor and 

Hickam AFB, but these may be crowded during meal times. Groups may 

consider packing a lunch and eating at one of the base parks.

b. Lodging. Each base has limited on-base lodging. The US military runs the Hale Koa Hotel, a resort on Waikiki, which accepts service 

members who are TDY. The phone number is 1-800-367-6027, or e-mail 

is <http://www.halekoa.com>.

c. Medical. Each base has a hospital and clinics that are well marked.

3. Other considerations.

a. Most of this staff ride is on active duty military installations. Staff 

Ride leaders should be extremely careful not to venture into off-limits 

areas. Prior reconnaissance of the route is imperative for a successful staff 

ride.

b. Ensure every member of the group has water. Additionally, some 

rest rooms are available on the route, but this should be a consideration.
131

Appendix A

Order of Battle, Japanese Forces

1st Air Fleet: Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo

1st Carrier Division: Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo

Akagi: Captain Hasegawa Kiichi

Kaga: Captain Okada Jisaku

2d Carrier Division: Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon

Soryu: Captain Yanagimoto Ryusaku

Hiryu: Captain Kaku Tomeo

5th Carrier Division: Rear Admiral Hara Chuichi

Zuikaku: Captain Yokokawa Ichibei

Shokaku: Captain Jojima Takatsugu

Support Force: Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi

3d Battleship Division: Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi

Hiei: Captain Nishida Masuo

Kirishma: Captain Yamaguchi Jihei

8th Cruiser Division: Captain Komura Keizo

Chikuma: Captain Komura Keizo

Tone: Captain Okada Tarueji

1st Destroyer Squadron: Rear Admiral Omori Sentaro

Abukuma: Captain Murayama Seitoku

Akigumo: Commander Arimoto Terumichi

17th Destroyer Division: Commander Orita Tsuneo

Hamakaze: Commander Orita Tsuneo

Isokaze: Commander Toyoshima Shunichi

Tanikaze: Commander Katsumi Motoi

Urakaze: Commander Shiraishi Nagayoshi

18th Destroyer Division: Commander Ogata Tomie

Arare: Commander Ogata Tomie

Kagero: Commander Yokoi Minoru

Kasumi: Commander Tomura Kiyoshi

Shiranuhi: Commander Akazawa Shizuo

Supply Group 1: Captain Oto Masanao

Kyokuto Maru: Captain Oto Masanao

Kanemasu Maru: Captain Kanemasu Yoshio

Kokuyu Maru: Captain Hidai Toraji

Shinkoku Maru: Captain Ito Tokutaka
132 

Supply Group 2: Captain Niimi Kazutaka

Toho Maru: Captain Niimi Kazutaka

Nippon Maru: Captain Ueda Konoskae

Toei Maru: Captain Kusakawa Kiyoshi

Submarine Patrol Formation: Captain Imaizumi Kijiro

I-19: Commander Narahara Shogo

I-21: Commander Matsumura Kanji

I-23: Commander Shibata Genichi

1st Submarine Group: Rear Admiral Tsutome Sato

I-9: Commander Fujii Akiyoshi

I-15: Commander Ishikawa Nobuo

I-17: Commander Nishino Kozo

I-25: Commander Tayami Meiji

2d Submarine Group: Rear Admiral Yamazaki Shigeaki

I-1: Lieutenant Commander Sakamoto Eichi

I-2: Commander Inoida Hiroshi

I-3: Commander Tonosuka Kinzo

I-4: Commander Nakagawa Hajme

I-5: Commander Shichiji Tsuneo

I-6: Commander Inaba Michimune

I-7: Commander Koizumi Ki’ichi

3d Submarine Group: Rear Admiral Miwa Shigeyoshi

I-8: Commander Emi Tetsushiro

I-68: Commander Nakamuro Otoji

I-69: Commander Watanabe Katsuji

I-70: Commander Sano Takahi

I-71: Commander Kawasaki Mutsuo

I-72: Commander Togami Ichiro

I-73: Commander Isobe Akira

I-74: Commander Ikezawa Masayuki

I-75: Commander Inoue Chikanori

Special Attack Force (Midget Submarine Carriers):

Commander Yamada Kaoru

I-16: Commander Yamada Kaoru

I-18: Commander Otani Kiyonori

I-20: Commander Yasuda Takashi

I-22: Commander Agata Kiyo

I-24: Commander Hanabasa Hiroshi
133

Carrier Air Group: Commander Fuchida Mitsuo

1st Attack Force: Commander Fuchida Mitsuo

1st Group (high-level and torpedo bombers):

Commander Fuchida Mitsuo

(High-level bombers carried an 800-kilogram [KG] bomb.)

(Torpedo bombers carried an 800 KG torpedo.)

1st Attack Unit: Commander Fuchida Mitsuo (15 Kates from 

the Akagi)

2d Attack Unit: Commander Hashiguchi Takashi (15* Kates 

from the Kaga)

3d Attack Unit: Lieutenant Abe Heijiro (10 Kates from the 

Soryu)

4th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Kusumi Tadashi (10 

Kates from the Hiryu)

1st Torpedo Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Murata 

Shigeharu (12 Kates from the Akagi) (Shigeharu was the 

torpedo plane leader.)

2d Torpedo Attack Unit: Lieutenant Kitajima Ichiryo (12 Kates 

from the Kaga)

3d Torpedo Attack Unit: Lieutenant Nagai Tsuyoshi (8 Kates 

from the Soryu)

4th Torpedo Attack Unit: Lieutenant Matsumura Heita (8 Kates 

from the Hiryu)

2d Group (dive bombers):

Lieutenant Commander Takahashi Kakuchui

(Dive bombers carried a 250 KG bomb.)

15th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Takahashi 

Kakuchui (27* Vals from the Shokaku)

16th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Ema Tomatsu (27** Vals from 

the Zuikaku)

3d Group (fighters): Lieutenant Commander Itaya Shigeru

1st Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Shiga Yoshio (9 Zeros 

from the Kaga)

2d Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Commander Itaya Shigeru 

(9 Zeros from the Akagi)

3d Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Suganami Masaharu (9* 

Zeros from the Soryu)

4th Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Okajima Kiyokuma (6 

Zeros from the Hiryu)
134 

5th Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Kaneko Tadashi (6* 

Zeros from the Shokaku)

6th Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Sato Masxao (6 Zeros 

from the Zuikaku)

2d Attack Force: Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki Shigekazu

1st Group (high-level bombers):

Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki Shigekazu

(High-level bombers carried either two 250 KG bombs or 1 

250 KG bomb and six 60 KG bombs.)

5th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Ichihara Tatsuo (27 Kates from 

the Shokaku)

6th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki Shigekazu 

(27 Kates from the Zuikaku)

2d Group (dive bomber): Lieutenant Commander Egusa Takehige

(Dive bombers carried a 250 KG bomb.)

11th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Chihaya Takehiko (18 Vals from 

the Akagi)

12th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Makino Saburo (27* Vals from 

the Kaga)

13th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Commander Egusa Takehige 

(18* Vals from the Soryu)

14th Attack Unit: Lieutenant Kobayashi Michio (18* Vals 

from the Hiryu)

3d Group (fighters): Lieutenant Shindo Saburo

1st Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Shindo Saburo (9 Zeros 

from the Akagi)

2d Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Nikaido Yasushi (9 Zeros 

from the Kaga)

3d Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Iida Fusata (9 Zeros from 

the Soryu)

4th Fighter Combat Unit: Lieutenant Nono Sumio (9* Zeros 

from the Hiryu)

* One aircraft aborted/crashed during takeoff.

** Two aircraft aborted during takeoff.
135

Aircraft Compilation

(Number of Aircraft Planned/Number of Aircraft Launched)

1st Attack Force

 Kate Kate Val Zero

 High-Level Torpedo

Akagi 15/15 12/12 9/9

Kaga 15/14 12/12 9/9

Soryu 10/10 8/8 9/8

Hiryu 10/10 8/8 6/6

Shokaku 27/26 6/5

Zuikaku 27/25 6/6

Subtotal 50/49 40/40 54/51 45/43

1st Attack Force total 189/183

2d Attack Force

 Kate Val Zero

 High-Level 

Akagi 18/18 9/9

Kaga 27/26 9/9

Soryu 18/17 9/9

Hiryu 18/17 9/8

Shokaku 27/27 

Zuikaku 27/27 

Subtotal 54/54 81/78 36/35

2d Attack Force total 171/167

Carrier Air Group Total 360/350

137

Appendix B

Order of Battle, US Forces

US Navy

US Pacific Fleet: Admiral Husband E. Kimmel

On 7 December 1941 there were 207 ships in the Pacific Fleet, organized into three main task forces. There were 103 ships in Pearl Harbor 

that morning, and the other 104 ships were out to sea. Following are the 

ships that were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941:

Battle Force (Task Force 1)

Vice Admiral William S. Pye

Battleships, Battle Force

Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson

Battleship Division 1

Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd

BB-36 Nevada (Nevada class)—Captain Francis W. Scanland

BB-38 Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania class)—Captain Charles M. 

“Saavy” Cooke, Jr.

BB-39 Arizona (Pennsylvania class)—Captain Franklin Van Valkenburg

Battleship Division 2

RADM D.W. Bagley

BB-37 Oklahoma (Nevada class)—Captain Howard D. “Ping” Bode

BB-43 Tennessee (Tennessee class)—Captain C. E. Reordan

BB-44 California (Tennessee class)—Captain Joel W. Bunkley

Battleship Division 4

RADM Walter S. Anderson

BB-46 Maryland (Colorado class)—Captain D.C. Godwin

BB-48 West Virginia (Colorado class)—Captain Mervyn Bennion

Cruisers, Battle Force

Rear Admiral H. Fairfax Leary

Cruiser Division 6 (Partial)

CA-32 New Orleans (New Orleans class)—J.G. Atkins

CA-38 San Francisco (New Orleans class)—D.J. Callaghan

Cruiser Division 9

Rear Admiral H. Fairfax Leary

CL-46 Phoenix (Brooklyn class)—H.E. Fischer

CL-48 Honolulu (Brooklyn class)—H. Dodd
138 

CL-49 St. Louis (St. Louis class)—G.A. Rood

CL-50 Helena (St. Louis class)—R.H. English

Destroyers, Battle Force

Rear Admiral Milo F. Draemel

Destroyer Flotilla 1

CL-7 Raleigh (Omaha class)—R.B. Simons

Destroyer Squadron One

DD-360 Phelps (Porter class)—E.L. Beck

Destroyer Division One

DD-349 Dewey (Farragut class)—A.J. Detzer

DD-350 Hull (Farragut class)—R.F. Stout

DD-351 MacDonough (Farragut class)—J. M. McIsaac

DD-352 Worden (Farragut class)—W.C. Pogue

Destroyer Division Two

DD-348 Farragut (Farragut class)—G.P. Hunter

DD-353 Dale (Farragut class)—A.L. Rorschach

DD-354 Monaghan (Farragut class)—W.P. Burford

DD-355 Aylwin (Farragut class)—R.H. Rodgers

Destroyer Squadron Three

DD-357 Selfridge (Porter class)—W. Craig

Destroyer Division Five

DD-369 Reid (Mahan class)—H.F. Pullen

DD-371 Conyngham (Mahan class)—H.C. Daniels

DD-372 Cassin (Mahan class)—D.F. Shea

DD-375 Downes (Mahan class)—W.R. Thayer

Destroyer Division Six

DD-365 Cummings (Mahan class)—G.D. Cooper

DD-370 Case (Mahan class)—R. W. Bedilion

DD-373 Shaw (Mahan class)—W. Glenn Jones

DD-374 Tucker (Mahan class)—W.R. Terrlell

Destroyer Flotilla 2

CL-8 Detroit (Omaha class)—L.J. Wiltse

DD-386 Bagley (Bagley class)—G.A. Sinclair

DD-387 Blue (Bagley class)—H.N. Williams

DD-388 Helm (Bagley class)—C.E. Carroll

DD-389 Mugford (Bagley class)—E.W. Young

DD-390 Ralph Talbot (Bagley class)—R. Earle, Jr.
139

DD-391 Henley (Bagley class)—R.H. Smith

DD-392 Patterson (Bagley class)—F.R. Walker

DD-393 Jarvis (Bagley class)—J.R. Topper

Other Destroyers

DD-66 Allen (Sampson class)—D.B. Miller

DD-103 Schley (Wickes class)

DD-106 Chew (Wickes class)—H.R. Hummer, Jr.

DD-139 Ward (Wickes class)—W.W. Outerbridge

Submarines

SS-167 Narwhal—G.W. Wilkins

SS-169 Dolphin—G.B. Rainer

SS-170 Cachalot—W.N. Christensen

SS-199 Tautog—J.H. Willingham, Jr.

Minelayer

CM-4 Oglala—E.P. Speight

Minesweepers

AM-13 Turkey—T.F. Fowler

AM-20 Bobolink—J.L. Foley

AM-26 Rail—F.W. Beard

AM-31 Tern—W.B. Pendleton

AM-43 Grebe

AM-52 Vireo—F.J. Ilsemann

Coastal Minesweepers

AMC-8 Cockatoo

AMC-9 Crossbill

AMC-14 Condor

AMC-30 Reedbird

Destroyer Minelayers

DM-15 Gamble—D.A. Crandell

DM-16 Ramsay—G.C. Simms

DM-17 Montgomery—R.A. Guthrie

DM-18 Breese—H.F. Stout

DM-19 Tracy—G.R. Phelan

DM-20 Preble—H.D. Johnston

DM-21 Sicard—W.C. Shultz

DM-22 Pruitt—E.W. Herron
140 

Destroyer Minesweepers

DMS-14 Zane—L.M. LeHardy

DMS-15 Wasmuth—J.L. Wilfong

DMS-16 Trever—D.M. Agnew

DMS-17 Perry—L.H. Miller

Patrol Gunboat

PG-19 Sacramento—A.L. Warburton

Destroyer Tenders

AD-3 Dobbin—H.E. Paddock

AD-4 Whitney—N.M. Pigman

Seaplane Tenders

AV-4 Curtiss—H.S. Kendall

AV-8 Tangier—C.A. Sprague

Small Seaplane Tenders

AVP-4 Avocet—W.C. Johnson, Jr.

AVP-7 Swan—F.E. Hall

Seaplane Tenders (Converted Destroyer)

AVD-6 Hulbert—J.M. Lane

AVD-11 Thornton—W.F. Kline

Ammunition Ship

AE-1 Pyro—N. Vytacil

Oilers

AO-12 Ramapo—D. Curry, Jr.

AO-23 Neosho—J.S. Phillips

Repair Ships

AR-1 Medusa—A.E. Schrader

AR-4 Vestal—C. Young

AR-11 Rigel—R. Dudley

Submarine Tender

AS-14 Pelias—W. Wakefield

Submarine Rescue Ship

ASR-1 Widgeon—J.A. Flenniken
141

Hospital Ship

AH-5 Solace—B. Perlman

Cargo Ship

AK-17 Vega (at Honolulu)

Stores Issue Ships

AKS-1 Castor—H.J. Wright

AKS-3 Antares—L.C. Grannis

Ocean Tugs

AT-13 Ontario—E.C. Mayer

AT-28 Sunnadin

AT-38 Keosanqua

AT-64 Navajo (12 miles outside the Pearl Harbor entrance)

Miscellaneous Auxiliaries

AG-16 Utah (target ship)—J.M. Steele

AG-31 Argonne—F.W. Connor

AG-32 Sumner—I.M. Truitt

CM-1 (ex C-3) Baltimore (out of commission)

14th Naval District: Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch

Commander, Hawaiian Patrol Wing (also Commander, Task Force 9):

Rear Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger

US Marine Corps

Marine Air Group 1: Lieutenant Colonel Claude A. Larkin (Ewa 

MCAS)

VMB-232

VMJ-252

VMF-211 (rear echelon)

VMB-231 (rear echelon)

Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor: COL Gilder D. Jackson

1st Defense Battalion (-)

2d Engineer Battalion

3d Defense Battalion

4th Defense Battalion

Company A(-), 2d Service Battalion
142

Sixteen ships (eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 

and two auxiliaries) had US Marine Corps detachments embarked.

US Army

Hawaiian Department: LTG Walter C. Short (Fort Shafter)

24th Division: BG Durward S. Wilson (Schofield Barracks)

25th Division: MG Maxwell Murray (Schofield Barracks)

Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command: MG Henry T. Burgin (Fort 

Ruger)

Hawaiian Army Air Force: MG Frederick L. Martin (Hickam 

Field)

18th Bombardment Wing: BG J.H. Rudolph (Hickam Field)

14th Pursuit Wing : BG H.C. Davidson (Wheeler Field)
143

Appendix C

Biographical Sketches

US Leaders and Commanders

Franklin Delano Roosevelt—President of the United States. Roosevelt was born 30 January 1882 in Hyde Park, New York, the fifth cousin 

of President Theodore Roosevelt. He graduated from Harvard in 1903 

with a degree in history before studying law at Columbia University. He 

passed the bar before graduating from law school and never earned his law 

degree. In 1910 he entered local politics as a Democrat. There he earned 

the attention of Woodrow Wilson, who appointed him as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1913. In 1920 he was the Democratic nominee for vice 

president for James. M. Cox, but when Warren G. Harding won the election, Roosevelt returned to private life. In 1921 he contracted polio, and 

despite his valiant efforts, he lost the use of his legs. In 1928 Roosevelt 

returned to public life, being elected governor of New York and reelected 

in 1930.

In 1932 he was elected President of the United States. Roosevelt’s aggressive actions helped bring the nation out of the Great Depression, and 

he was reelected in 1936 and 1940. Roosevelt wanted the United States 

to be neutral in the war that had started in Europe, but actions like the 

Lend-Lease Act allied the United States with the French and British (et 

al.). Roosevelt became a wartime president on 8 December 1941. After 

calling the Japanese attack “a date which will live in infamy,” he asked 

Congress for its approval and declared war. Roosevelt led the nation as it 

continued to mobilize and slowly enter the war. Roosevelt was elected to a 

fourth term in 1944. The Allies had almost won the war when, on 12 April 

1945, Roosevelt suffered a stroke and died at Warm Springs, Georgia. He 

is buried at his family estate in Hyde Park, New York.

White House
144 

George C. Marshall—Chief of Staff, US Army. Marshall was born 

on 31 December 1880 in Uniontown, Pennsylvania. He attended the Virginia Military Institute and graduated in 1901 as the Senior First Captain 

of Cadets. Commissioned in the infantry, Marshall served on numerous 

posts in the United States and Philippines before attending the Army Staff 

College in 1908. Marshall was appointed to the General Staff and served 

during World War I, where many noticed his achievements. After the 

war, he served in continuingly significant positions. He served as aide de 

camp to General John. J. Pershing; was an instructor at the US Army War 

College; commanded the 8th Infantry Regiment; and after promotion to 

brigadier general, commanded the 5th Infantry Brigade. In 1938 Marshall 

was posted to the General Staff in Washington, where he was appointed 

as Chief of Staff, US Army in 1939. He was Chief of Staff on 7 December 1941 but received no blame for the attack. During World War II, he 

supervised the training, armament, and mobilization of 8 million soldiers. 

When the war ended, Marshall retired, but President Truman asked him 

to again serve, first as an envoy to China, and then as Secretary of State 

from 1947-49. As Secretary of State, he developed a plan for Europe’s 

economic recovery that was named after him. He served as Secretary of 

Defense in 1950-51 before retiring for good. In 1953 he was awarded the 

Nobel Prize for the Marshall Plan. Marshall died in Walter Reed Hospital 

on 16 October 1959 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. Combat Studies Institute
145

Harold R. Stark—Chief of Naval Operations. Starke was born on 12 

November 1880 in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He graduated from the US 

Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1903. His initial service included tours on 

the battleship Minnesota, followed by duty with torpedo boats and destroyers. During World War I, Starke served on the staff of the Commander, US 

Naval Forces Europe. After the war, Starke served as the executive officer 

on two battleships, attended the Naval War College, and commanded an 

ammunition ship. Promoted to captain, he commanded the battleship West 

Virginia, Cruiser Division 3, and Battle Force cruisers. Starke had made 

friends with Roosevelt when Roosevelt was the Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy, and Starke was appointed as Chief of Naval Operations in 1939. 

After Pearl Harbor, Starke was replaced as the Chief of Naval Operations 

and assigned to the 12th Fleet in England, where he oversaw preparations 

for and executed the landings at Normandy in 1944. He retired in 1946 and 

died on 21 August 1972 at his home in Washington, DC.

Naval Historical Center
146 

Husband E. Kimmel—Commander, Pacific Fleet. Kimmel was born 

in Henderson, Kentucky on 26 February 1882. Upon graduation from the 

US Naval Academy, Kimmel served on numerous ships, including battleships, and in 1933 he commanded the battleship New York. In November 

1937 Kimmel was promoted to vice admiral and became Commander, 

Cruiser Division 7. In 1939 he was commander, Battle Force Cruisers. In 

February 1941 Kimmel was selected over 32 officers to replace Admiral 

James Richardson as Commander, Pacific Fleet. Kimmel was relieved of 

command on 16 December 1941, but he was allowed to retire in March 

1942. Kimmel was never court-martialed but was found lacking by numerous commissions that investigated the attacks. Kimmel spent the rest 

of his life trying to clear his name. He died at Groton, Connecticut on 14 

May 1958.

Naval Historical Center
147

Walter C. Short—Commander, Hawaiian Department. Short was 

born on 30 March 1880 in Fillmore, Illinois. He graduated from the University of Illinois in 1902 and received a direct commission in the infantry. 

His early postings were to Texas, the Presidio of San Francisco, the Philippines, and Alaska. He served with the 16th Infantry during the punitive 

expedition in Mexico. During World War I he observed French and British 

troops and then organized training for Americans. After the war he went to 

the Army School of the Line, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and was also an 

instructor at Leavenworth. He commanded the 1st Infantry Division and I 

Corps. He assumed command of the Hawaiian Department on 7 February 

1941. He was relieved of his command on 16 December 1941 and allowed 

to retire in March 1942. Short took a job with the Ford Motor Company. 

He died on 3 September 1949 and was buried with full military honors in 

Arlington National Cemetery. Only his wife, son, daughter-in-law, and a 

few close friends attended.

Military History Institute
148 

Japanese Leaders and Commanders

Hideki Tojo—Prime Minister. Tojo was born in Tokyo on 30 December 1884, the son of an army general. He graduated from the Japanese 

Military Academy in 1905. In 1915 he graduated from the war college and 

went to work in the mobilization section of the War Ministry where he 

developed his thoughts on total war as a doctrine for Japan. Tojo wanted 

to reorganize the army and wanted Japan to expand its borders. Tojo 

served in China as Chief of Police Affairs and Chief of Staff of the army 

in China. He was appointed Vice Minister of War in 1938 and Minister of 

War in 1940. As Minister of War, his mobilization plans increased tensions 

between Japan and the United States. On 16 October 1941 Tojo became 

premier when the government was broken up. He was the Prime Minister 

of Japan as well War Minister and Army Chief of Staff, which basically 

made him Japan’s dictator. He remained in this position until he resigned 

on 19 July 1944 because of serious setbacks in the war. After Japan surrendered, Tojo attempted suicide by shooting himself in the chest, but American doctors saved his life. The International Military Tribunal found him 

guilty of war crimes, and he was hanged in Tokyo on 23 December 1948. Military History Institute
149

Isoroku Yamamoto—Commander, Combined Fleet. Yamamoto was 

born on 4 April 1884, adopted by the Yamamoto family, and took their 

name. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1904 and 

was assigned as an ensign on a cruiser during the Battle of Tshushima 

in 1905, where he was wounded and lost two fingers. After recovering 

from his wound, he continued his naval career and continued to progress. 

From 1919-21 Yamamoto studied in the United States at Harvard. In 1923 

Yamamoto was commander of the air training base at Kasumiguara, where 

he became an aviation advocate. In 1926 he started a two-year tour as 

the naval attaché in Washington, and in 1930 he was the Japanese navy’s 

representative to the London Naval Conference. While head of Japanese 

naval aviation, Yamamoto championed aviation and was instrumental in 

developing the Zero fighter and torpedo attack doctrine. He commanded 

an aircraft carrier division from 1933-35, where he impressed many and 

was then appointed as Vice Minister of the Navy. In 1939 Yamamoto was 

named Commander, Combined Fleet. Yamamoto opposed war with the 

United States, but when war became inevitable, he oversaw the Pearl Harbor attack plan. In June 1942 Yamamoto led the Combined Fleet at Midway 

where he lost four aircraft carriers. In April 1943 US intelligence personnel 

decoded Japanese radio traffic and learned that Yamamoto was flying to the 

Solomon Islands for an inspection. The Army Air Forces organized an attack, and on 18 April 1943 shot down Yamamoto’s plane, killing him. National Park Service
150 

Chuichi Nagumo—Commander, 1st Air Fleet. Nagumo was born 

in Northern Honshu on 25 March 1887. He graduated from the Japanese 

Military Academy in 1908 followed by service on battleships, cruisers, 

and destroyers. After a teaching assignment at the Naval Staff College, he 

was promoted to captain and given command of a light cruiser followed 

by command of a destroyer division. In 1934 he commanded the battleship 

Yamashiro. Nagumo was promoted to admiral, and at the start of World 

War II, he became Commander, 3d Battleship Division. In 1939 he was 

promoted to vice admiral and served as President of the Naval Staff College. When Japan formed the 1st Air Fleet, Nagumo was given command 

based mainly on seniority and despite his lack of aviation experience. 

Nagumo led the 1st Air Fleet as it prepared for and executed the attack on 

Pearl Harbor. Nagumo survived the Battle of Midway but lost his command when the United States sank four Japanese carriers. Nagumo was 

given minor commands after Midway, including command of a backwater 

fleet in Vietnam. In July 1944 Nagumo was the commander of the naval 

detachment on Saipan. On 7 July 1944, just two days before the island fell 

to the Americans, Nagumo killed himself.

Naval Historical Center
151

Minoru Genda—Air Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet. Genda was born on 

16 August 1904 in Hiroshima. He graduated from the Japanese Military 

Academy with his friend Fuchida in 1924. He graduated from flight training and became a fighter pilot, earning a reputation as the best fighter 

pilot in the Japanese navy. He also commanded an aerobatic group named 

“Genda’s Flying Circus” that flew demonstrations all around Japan. His 

operational assignments included tours on the carriers Ryujo and Akagi, 

combat duty in China, and instructor duty at flight school. While Genda 

attended the staff college, he wrote extensively on carrier-based air power, 

and his controversial thoughts alienated him from many of his peers. 

He was the assistant naval attaché in London during the blitz. He was 

appointed as the Air Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet in February 1941 and was 

the primary planner for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Genda remained in this 

post until the Battle of Midway cost the Japanese the carriers of the 1st Air 

Fleet. Genda became the senior air staff officer of the General Staff and 

remained in this post until December 1944 when Japan formed Air Group 

343, the most experienced pilots flying the best aircraft, which Genda led 

until the end of the war. From 1959-62 Genda served as the Chief of Staff, 

Japanese Air Force. When he retired from the air force, Genda entered 

politics and served in Parliament until 1986. He died in Tokyo on 15 

August 1989, one day short of his 85th birthday.

Naval Historical Center
152

Mitsuo Fuchida—Air Group Commander, 1st Air Fleet. Fuchida was 

born on 2 December 1902. In 1921 he entered the Japanese Military Academy where be became friends with Genda. Fuchida fell in love with flying 

while at the academy and entered flight school in 1927. Fuchida was the 

Japanese “ace” of high-level bombing and taught it at the flight school. He 

wrote extensively on air tactics while attending the Naval Staff College. In 

1939 he was the flight commander of the Akagi where he met Yamamoto, 

whom he greatly respected. Fuchida next was the Air Officer, 3d Carrier 

Division, but he was soon recalled to the Akagi for combat action in China. 

In August 1941 he was named Commander, Air Group, 1st Air Fleet. In 

this position he supervised the training and led the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

During Midway, Fuchida was recovering from appendicitis and could not 

lead any flights. He was badly injured while evacuating the sinking Akagi. 

Fuchida convalesced until June 1943, and during this time, he wrote analyses of major battles, including Coral Sea and Midway. In June 1943 he 

joined the staff of the now land-based 1st Air Fleet. For the rest of the war, 

Fuchida served as an air staff officer, coordinating the land-based Japanese 

naval air arm. After Japan’s surrender, Fuchida converted to Christianity 

and became an evangelist. He wrote of his wartime service and was interviewed numerous times about Pearl Harbor. He died 30 May 1976. Naval Historical Center
153

Appendix D

Medal of Honor Conferrals for the Attack on Pearl Harbor

The United States awarded 15 Medals of Honor, 51 Navy Crosses, 

five Distinguished Service Crosses, and 69 Silver Stars in recognition of 

valorous service during the attack on Pearl Harbor. The following are the 

names of and citations for the Medals of Honor earned on 7 December 

1941. Asterisks indicate posthumous awards.

*Bennion, Mervyn Sharp. Rank and organization: Captain, US Navy. 

Born: 5 May 1887, Vernon, UT. Appointed from Utah. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard 

of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, during the attack on the 

Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. As Commanding Officer of the USS West Virginia, after being mortally wounded, 

Captain Bennion evidenced apparent concern only in fighting and saving 

his ship and strongly protested against being carried from the bridge.

Finn, John William. Rank and organization: Lieutenant, US Navy. 

Place and date: Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, territory of Hawaii, 7 

December 1941. Entered service in California. Born: 23 July 1909, Los 

Angeles, CA. Citation: For extraordinary heroism, distinguished service, 

and devotion above and beyond the call of duty. During the first attack 

by Japanese airplanes on the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, on 7 December 1941, Lieutenant Finn promptly secured and manned a .50-caliber 

machine gun mounted on an instruction stand in a completely exposed 

section of the parking ramp, which was under heavy enemy machine gun 

strafing fire. Although painfully wounded many times, he continued to 

man this gun and to return the enemy’s fire vigorously and with telling effect throughout the enemy strafing and bombing attacks and with complete 

disregard for his own personal safety. It was only by specific orders that he 

was persuaded to leave his post to seek medical attention. Following first 

aid treatment, although obviously suffering much pain and moving with 

great difficulty, he returned to the squadron area and actively supervised 

the rearming of returning planes. His extraordinary heroism and conduct 

in this action were in keeping with the highest traditions of the US Naval 

Service.

*Flaherty, Francis C. Rank and organization: Ensign, US Naval Reserve. Born: 15 March 1919, Charlotte, MI. Accredited to Michigan. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty and extraordinary courage and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, during 

the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 
154 

1941. When it was seen that the USS Oklahoma was going to capsize and 

the order was given to abandon ship, Ensign Flaherty remained in a turret, 

holding a flashlight so the remainder of the turret crew could see to escape, 

thereby sacrificing his own life.

Fuqua, Samuel Glenn. Rank and organization: Lieutenant Commander (LCDR), US Navy, USS Arizona. Place and date: Pearl Harbor, 

territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941. Entered service in Laddonia, MO. 

Born: 15 October 1899, Laddonia, MO. Citation: For distinguished conduct in action, outstanding heroism, and utter disregard of his own safety 

above and beyond the call of duty during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl 

Harbor, by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. Upon the commencement of the attack, LCDR Fuqua rushed to the quarterdeck of the USS Arizona to which he was attached where he was stunned and knocked down 

by the explosion of a large bomb which hit the quarterdeck, penetrated 

several decks, and started a severe fire. Upon regaining consciousness, 

he began to direct the fighting of the fire and the rescue of wounded and 

injured personnel. Almost immediately there was a tremendous explosion 

forward, which made the ship appear to rise out of the water, shudder, 

and settle down by the bow rapidly. The whole forward part of the ship 

was enveloped in flames which were spreading rapidly, and wounded and 

burned men were pouring out of the ship to the quarterdeck. Despite these 

conditions, his harrowing experience, and severe enemy bombing and 

strafing, at the time, LCDR Fuqua continued to direct the fighting of fires 

to check them while the wounded and burned could be taken from the ship 

and supervised the rescue of these men in such an amazingly calm and 

cool manner and with such excellent judgment that it inspired everyone 

who saw him and undoubtedly resulted in the saving of many lives. After 

realizing the ship could not be saved and that he was the senior surviving 

officer aboard, he directed it to be abandoned but continued to remain 

on the quarterdeck and directed abandoning ship and rescue of personnel 

until satisfied that all personnel that could be had been saved, after which 

he left his ship with the last boatload. The conduct of LCDR Fuqua was 

not only in keeping with the highest traditions of the US Naval Service but 

characterizes him as an outstanding leader of men.

*Hill, Edwin Joseph. Rank and organization: Chief Boatswain, US 

Navy. Born: 4 October 1894, Philadelphia, PA. Accredited to Pennsylvania. Citation: For distinguished conduct in the line of his profession, extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own safety during the attack on 

the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. During 

the height of the strafing and bombing, Chief Boatswain Hill led his men 
155

of the line handling details of the USS Nevada to the quays, cast off the 

lines, and swam back to his ship. Later, while on the forecastle, attempting 

to let go the anchors, he was blown overboard and killed by the explosion 

of several bombs.

*Jones, Herbert Charpoit. Rank and organization: Ensign, US 

Naval Reserve. Born: 1 December 1918, Los Angeles, CA. Accredited 

to California. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary 

courage, and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call 

of duty, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces 

on 7 December 1941. Ensign Jones organized and led a party, which was 

supplying ammunition to the antiaircraft battery of the USS California, 

after the mechanical hoists were put out of action when he was fatally 

wounded by a bomb explosion. When two men attempted to take him from 

the area which was on fire, he refused to let them do so, saying in words 

to the effect, “Leave me alone! I am done for. Get out of here before the 

magazines go off.”

*Kidd, Isaac Campbell. Rank and organization: Rear Admiral, 

US Navy. Born: 26 March 1884, Cleveland, OH. Appointed from Ohio. 

Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and 

complete disregard of his own life, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl 

Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. Rear Admiral Kidd immediately went to the bridge and, as Commander, Battleship Division 

One, courageously discharged his duties as Senior Officer Present Afloat 

until the USS Arizona, his flagship, blew up from magazine explosions 

and a direct bomb hit on the bridge which resulted in the loss of his life.

Pharris, Jackson Charles. Rank and organization: Lieutenant, US 

Navy, USS California. Place and date: Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, 

7 December 1941. Entered service in California. Born: 26 June 1912, 

Columbus, GA. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the 

risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while attached to the 

USS California during the surprise enemy Japanese aerial attack on Pearl 

Harbor, territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941. In charge of the ordnance 

repair party on the third deck when the first Japanese torpedo struck almost 

directly under his station, Lieutenant (then Gunner) Pharris was stunned 

and severely injured by the concussion that hurled him to the overhead and 

back to the deck. Quickly recovering, he acted on his own initiative to set 

up a hand-supply ammunition train for the antiaircraft guns. With water 

and oil rushing in where the port bulkhead had been torn up from the deck, 

with many of the remaining crewmembers overcome by oil fumes, and 

the ship without power and listing heavily to port as a result of a second 
156 

torpedo hit, Lieutenant Pharris ordered the shipfitters to counterflood. 

Twice rendered unconscious by the nauseous fumes and handicapped by 

his painful injuries, he persisted in his desperate efforts to speed up the 

supply of ammunition and at the same time repeatedly risked his life to 

enter flooding compartments and drag to safety unconscious shipmates 

who were gradually being submerged in oil. By his inspiring leadership, 

his valiant efforts and his extreme loyalty to his ship and its crew, he saved 

many of his shipmates from death and was largely responsible for keeping 

the California in action during the attack. His heroic conduct throughout 

this first eventful engagement of World War II reflects the highest credit 

upon Lieutenant Pharris and enhances the finest traditions of the US Naval 

Service.

*Reeves, Thomas James. Rank and organization: Radio Electrician 

(Warrant Officer), US Navy. Born: 9 December 1895, Thomaston, CT. 

Accredited to Connecticut. Citation: For distinguished conduct in the line 

of his profession, extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own safety 

during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 

December 1941. After the mechanized ammunition hoists were put out of 

action on the USS California, Reeves, on his own initiative, in a burning 

passageway, assisted in the maintenance of an ammunition supply by hand 

to the antiaircraft guns until he was overcome by smoke and fire, which 

resulted in his death.

Ross, Donald Kirby. Rank and organization: Machinist, US Navy, 

USS Nevada. Place and date: Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941. Entered service in Denver, CO. Born: 8 December 1910, Beverly, KS. Citation: For distinguished conduct in the line of his profession, 

extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own life during the attack on 

the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. When his station in the forward dynamo room of the USS 

Nevada became almost untenable due to smoke, steam, and heat, Machinist Ross forced his men to leave that station and performed all the duties 

himself until blinded and unconscious. Upon being rescued and resuscitated, he returned and secured the forward dynamo room and proceeded 

to the after dynamo room where he was later again rendered unconscious 

by exhaustion. Again recovering consciousness he returned to his station 

where he remained until directed to abandon it.

*Scott, Robert R. Rank and organization: Machinist’s Mate First 

Class, U.S. Navy. Born: 13 July 1915, Massillon, OH. Accredited to Ohio. 

Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and 

complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, 
157

during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 

December 1941. The compartment in the USS California in which the air 

compressor, to which Scott was assigned as his battle station, was flooded 

as the result of a torpedo hit. The remainder of the personnel evacuated 

that compartment but Scott refused to leave, saying words to the effect, 

“This is my station and I will stay and give them air as long as the guns 

are going.”

*Tomich, Peter. Rank and organization: Chief Watertender, US Navy. 

Born: 3 June 1893, Prolog, Austria. Accredited to New Jersey. Citation: 

For distinguished conduct in the line of his profession, extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own safety during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl 

Harbor by the Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. Although realizing 

that the ship was capsizing as a result of enemy bombing and torpedoing, 

Tomich remained at his post in the engineering plant of the USS Utah until 

he saw that all boilers were secured and all fire room personnel had left 

their stations, and by so doing lost his own life.

*Van Valkenburgh, Franklin. Rank and organization: Captain, US 

Navy. Born: 5 April 1888, Minneapolis, MN. Appointed from Wisconsin. 

Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and 

complete disregard of his own life during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl 

Harbor by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. As commanding officer 

of the USS Arizona, Captain Van Valkenburgh gallantly fought his ship 

until the USS Arizona blew up from magazine explosions and a direct 

bomb hit on the bridge that resulted in the loss of his life.

*Ward, James Richard. Rank and organization: Seaman First Class, 

US Navy. Born: 10 September 1921, Springfield, OH. Entered service in 

Springfield, OH. Citation: For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary 

courage, and complete disregard of his life, above and beyond the call of 

duty, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on 

7 December 1941. When it was seen that the USS Oklahoma was going to 

capsize and the order was given to abandon ship, Ward remained in a turret 

holding a flashlight so the remainder of the turret crew could see to escape, 

thereby sacrificing his own life.

Young, Cassin. Rank and organization: Commander, US Navy. Born: 

6 March 1894, Washington, DC. Appointed from Wisconsin. Other Navy 

award: Navy Cross. Citation: For distinguished conduct in action, outstanding heroism, and utter disregard of his own safety, above and beyond 

the call of duty, as commanding officer of the USS Vestal, during the attack 

on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, by enemy Japanese forces 
158

on 7 December 1941. Commander Young proceeded to the bridge and 

later took personal command of the 3-inch antiaircraft gun. When blown 

overboard by the blast of the forward magazine explosion of the USS Arizona, to which the USS Vestal was moored, he swam back to his ship. The 

entire forward part of the USS Arizona was a blazing inferno with oil afire 

on the water between the two ships; as a result of several bomb hits, the 

USS Vestal was afire in several places, was settling, and taking on a list. 

Despite severe enemy bombing and strafing at the time and his shocking 

experience of having been blown overboard, Commander Young, with 

extreme coolness and calmness, moved his ship to an anchorage distant 

from the USS Arizona and subsequently beached the USS Vestal upon 

determining that such action was required to save his ship.

Another hero from Pearl Harbor was Mess Attendant Second Class 

Doris Miller. Miller was a cook on the USS West Virginia, and during the 

attack, he was assisting the wounded when he was told to assist the mortally wounded captain. After the captain died, Miller manned a machine 

gun and fired at the Japanese planes. Miller had never fired a machine gun 

before but was able to hit one of the attacking planes. Miller was the first 

African-American to be awarded the Navy Cross. Rank and organization: 

Mess Attendant Second Class, US Navy. Born: 12 October 1919, Waco, 

TX. Appointed from Texas. Citation: For distinguished devotion to duty, 

extraordinary courage, and disregard for his own personal safety during 

the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, territory of Hawaii, by Japanese 

forces on 7 December 1941. While at the side of his captain on the bridge, 

Miller, despite enemy strafing and bombing and in the face of a serious 

fire, assisted in moving his captain, who had been mortally wounded, to 

a place of greater safety, and later manned and operated a machine gun 

directed at enemy Japanese attacking aircraft until ordered to leave the 

bridge.
159

Bibliography

While not comprehensive, this bibliography provides a list of publications 

that will be useful for staff ride preparation.

I. Conducting a Staff Ride

Robertson, William G. The Staff Ride. Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1987.

This book is the US Army’s “doctrine” for conducting staff rides and offers 

information on organizing and conducting staff rides.

II. Battle

Barkley, Alben W. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of 

the Pearl Harbor Attack. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946.

Between December 1941 and June 1946 the government conducted official 

inquiries—the Roberts Commission, Hart Inquiry, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 

Navy Court of Inquiry, Clark Investigation, Clausen Investigation, Hewitt Inquiry—into the Pearl Harbor attack. These investigations gathered numerous 

valuable documents that the Seventy-Ninth Congress compiled during its investigation. The 40 volumes provide valuable information about the attack.

Burlingame, Burl. Advance Force Pearl Harbor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

Press, 1992.

A detailed history of the Japanese submarine operations during the attack.

Cohen, Stan. Attack on Pearl Harbor: A Pictorial History. Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Publishing Co., Inc., 2001.

A superb collection of photos from the attack.

Farago, Ladislas. The Broken Seal. New York: Random House, 1967.

An excellent book on “Operation Magic” before the attack.

Goldstein, Donald M. and Katherine V. Dillon, eds. The Pearl Harbor Papers. 

New York: Brassey’s, 1993.

A first-rate collection of original Japanese documents about the attack.

Kimmett, Larry and Margaret Regis. The Attack on Pearl Harbor. Seattle, WA: 

Navigator Publishing, 1991.

This oversized paperback, available from the US Park Service Web site, is an 

outstanding illustrated (many valuable pictures) volume on the attack.

Lambert, John W. and Norman Polmar. Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl 

Harbor. St. Paul, MN: Motorbooks International, 2003.

This book investigates the culpability of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant 

General Short.
160 

Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.

Arguably, the best single volume for a detailed study of both sides’ preparations, the attack, and the aftermath.

Smith, Stanley H., ed. Investigations of the Attack on Pearl Harbor—Index to 

Government Hearings. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Smith’s index of the 40 volumes the Seventy-Ninth Congress gathered is a 

valuable tool in navigating the exhibits of the investigations. See Hearings Before 

the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

Van Der Vat, Dan. Pearl Harbor: The Day of Infamy—An Illustrated History. 

Toronto: Madison Press Books, 2001.

Another illustrated book on the attack and its aftermath.

Willmott, H.P. Pearl Harbor. London: Cassell & Co., 2001.

This is an excellent recent publication that covers the attack from all perspectives. Do not let the coffee table book look deceive you; this is an excellent 

source.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.

This excellent book details all of the warnings the United States had before 

Pearl Harbor and discusses how it must be able to “filter” the many reports to 

separate the good from the bad to prevent a future attack.

III. Biographies

Roosevelt

Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny. Boston, MA: 

Little, Brown, & Co., 1990.

Good biographies of Franklin abound, but this is an excellent one-volume 

biography.

Kimmel

Beach, Edward L. Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor.

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

A modern-day defense of Kimmel and Short.

Brownlow, Donald G. The Accused: The Ordeal of Rear Admiral Husband Edward 

Kimmel, U.S.N. New York: Vantage, 1968.rk: Vantage, 1968.

A good, general biography of Kimmel.

Kimmel, Husband Edward. Admiral Kimmel’s Story. Chicago: Regnery, 1955.

Kimmel’s defense of his actions concerning the attack.
161

Short

Anderson, Charles R. Day of Lightning, Years of Scorn: Walter C. Short and the 

Attack on Pearl Harbor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.

A brand new biography on a soldier who has been ignored for too long.

Tojo

Butow, Robert J.C. Tojo and the Coming of the War. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 1961.

The definitive biography of Tojo.

Yamamoto

Hoyt, Edwin B. Yamamoto: The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor. New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1990.

A very good biography of Yamamoto.

Fuchida

Prange, Gordon. God’s Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor. New York: 

Brassey’s, 1990.

Gordon Prange interviewed Fuchida extensively for his book At Dawn We 

Slept. He wrote this biography based on those interviews.

Other

Kean, Thomas H., chairman. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New 

York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004.

163

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey J. “Benny” Gudmens was born in Cincinnati, Ohio. He received a B.A. in history from the University of Dayton 

and an M.A. in Civil War studies from American Military University. His 

assignments include platoon leader and company executive officer, 82d 

Airborne Division; airborne company command, 6th Division; assistant 

G3 air, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM; observer/controller, Joint Readiness Training Center; 

battalion operations officer, 5-20 Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington; operations officer, Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas; and operations adviser to the Royal Saudi Land Forces. He is 

currently Chief, Staff Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute, US Army 

Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.