1

Filed 2/10/14

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re JOHN Z., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHN Z.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A138728

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J12-01036)

 A140343

In re JOHN Z., a Minor, on Habeas Corpus.

The People charged John Z. with felony attempted burglary in a juvenile wardship 

petition. During proceedings in November 2012, John’s counsel declared a doubt as to 

John’s competency and the court invoked Welfare and Institutions Code section 709, 1

ordering suspension of proceedings and appointing an expert to evaluate John. The 

expert’s February 2013 report stated that John had an IQ of 63 and was not presently 

competent, but the court found the report lacking in detail. Another expert was appointed 

to evaluate John, but a second report was never prepared for the court. Meanwhile, John 

was involved in two alleged batteries at school which were not immediately charged.

On April 18, 2013, when the People offered to allow John to plead to three 

misdemeanors and drop the felony charge, John’s counsel asked the court’s leave to 

withdraw her doubt as to John’s competency. After John’s counsel and the court 

 

1

Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise 

indicated.
2

questioned John on the record, the court accepted John’s admissions and allowed John’s 

counsel to withdraw her doubt.

On appeal John contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence that John was 

competent when he entered his pleas; (2) the juvenile court may not adopt defense 

counsel’s belief that John could assist in his own defense as a judicial finding of 

competence; (3) the court violated the requirement of section 709, subd. (f); and (4) 

defense counsel was ineffective when she argued the disposition without having copies of

police reports of the batteries that John admitted.

We conclude that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to allow John’s counsel to 

withdraw her doubt and could not make a competency determination within the confines 

of section 709 without expert input. The order adjudging John to be a ward of the court, 

pursuant to section 602, is reversed. We direct the trial court to withdraw John’s 

admissions and order proceedings in conformity with section 709. We need not examine 

John’s other assertions of error.

John has also filed a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus which seeks relief 

no different from that which he seeks on appeal. With our decision here, John’s petition 

for writ of habeas corpus is denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

On July 25, 2012, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition, pursuant to section 

602, subdivision (a), alleging that John had attempted a first degree residential burglary.

(Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a), 664.) John, who was then 15 years old, had been with 

two friends who asked him to act as lookout while they broke into a house and John 

agreed, though he told police that he thought his friends were “playing” until he heard the 

sound of an alarm from the house. John and his friends left the scene, but John was 

apprehended because a witness followed him. 

On September 26, 2012, the court found John eligible for deferred entry of 

judgment (DEJ). On November 14, 2012, the court (Commissioner Stephen F. 

Houghton) held a hearing for John to enter a plea for DEJ. The court asked John if he 

was admitting the attempted burglary by his own choice and John answered, “No.” 
3

John’s counsel explained that she had worked hard to help John understand the 

proceedings, but that issues remained and she declared a doubt as to John’s competency. 

The court suspended proceedings, pursuant to section 709, and, on November 26,

appointed John Rouse, Ph.D. to perform an evaluation of John. 

On January 17, 2013, Dr. Rouse informed the court that he had been unable to 

evaluate John because John’s mother failed to bring John for evaluation on each of three 

days he had scheduled with her. On February 5, 2013, the court appointed Edward M. 

Meshberg, Ph.D. to evaluate John and admonished John’s mother to ensure that the 

evaluation occurred. 

On March 15, 2013, Dr. Meshberg submitted a report, based upon a 90-minute 

evaluation, that stated: “Toward the end of the assessment [John] reported he was bored 

and didn’t attempt to answer questions he was asked, even when reminded of the 

potential consequences of what he is facing.” Dr. Meshberg made “rule out” diagnoses 

of mood disorder, attention deficit disorder, and mild mental retardation. John’s IQ was 

reported as “63 on the KBIT-2.” Dr. Meshberg concluded that John was “not competent 

to help his attorney defend him and not competent to stand trial, at this time” and 

recommended that John be given court room training in how a trial proceeds and how the 

various outcomes can affect his life. 

At a hearing on March 19, 2013, the court (Hon. Rebecca C. Hardie) stated that 

that it “found the report of Dr. Meshberg lacking in sufficient detail and not very 

informative or helpful.” The court also considered a probation department report stating 

that John had significant absences from school and had been involved in two fights there. 

The court placed John on home supervision with electronic monitoring. The matter of 

competency was continued. 

On March 26, 2013, the court referred John to Marlon Griffith, Ph.D. for a further 

competency evaluation. 

On March 29, the probation department reported that two days earlier John had 

left his home without the approval of his probation officer. Additionally, John had been 

suspended from school and had failed to inform his probation officer. 
4

On April 2, 2013, the court (Hon. Barry Baskin) referred John to Karen Franklin, 

Ph.D. because Dr. Griffith would only evaluate minors who are at least 17 years old. 

On April 16, 2013, the court2ordered that John be detained because the probation 

department reported that John’s electronic monitor had been removed and a witness 

reported that it had been thrown “through a car windshield.” John admitted removing the 

monitor, but not throwing it at a moving car. 

On April 18, 2013, John’s counsel informed the court that the district attorney had 

offered to allow John to admit three misdemeanor counts and to dismiss the felony 

charge. John’s counsel believed that John understood the situation and she wished to 

withdraw her doubt as to John’s competency so that John could enter a plea. She told the 

court: “I’ve come to realize that a lot of that with John is not about not understanding the 

process, it’s more about the vocabulary that’s used. . . . [W]hen anybody will use certain 

words, he just will not understand them. He doesn’t understand the word ‘waive.’. . . 

[He] doesn’t understand ‘cross-examination.’ And I don’t think that he ever will. He has 

an [individualized education plan]. There’s definitely a block there but I don’t think that 

he is incompetent. I think that it’s really a matter of explaining things at a much more 

basic level.” The court stated that it was happy to question John on the record, but added: 

“It’s a significant matter for me in vacating a prior order. . . . [I]t concerns me because 

when there is a doubt, we have an obligation to the minor to make sure that he or she 

understands.” 

Following a recess, the court stated that it had reviewed the case file and found Dr. 

Meshberg’s report not to be “very helpful on the question of whether the minor was 

incompetent or not. The doctor concluded that he was, but there was, in my view, very 

little information in there about why.” 

John’s counsel responded: “Well, I think that [Dr. Meshberg] addresses his low 

IQ and lack of focus, and I do think that that could be enough to believe that he is not 

competent. You know, I’m not sure that he does have to go beyond that, you know, if he 

 

2

 All proceedings on and after April 16, 2013 were conducted by the Hon. Lewis 

A. Davis.
5

stops answering questions and, you know, has this extremely low IQ, I do think that 

could be enough. [¶] . . . I’m troubled a lot because John is in custody now and, you 

know, I’m concerned about him. . . . I’m saddened that he’s here and I think that—I 

don’t think he’s ever going to be competent in the way that we want him to be. [¶] I 

don’t—there’s a developmental delay. He doesn’t need medications. You know, I don’t 

think he needs training. I think things need to be just explained to him very slowly. And, 

you know, word choice needs to be very, you know, thoughtful and basic. And so I just, 

you know—and there is this offer of misdemeanors. That was what I was trying to get all 

along even before, you know, proceedings were suspended. It’s my advice that he takes 

it. You know, he understands. He does want to admit the charges. He understands that. 

He doesn’t want a trial. You know, so I’m just—I’m just a little bit torn because, you 

know, I do want to go forward with him forward today with this so that he can move on.” 

John’s counsel and the court then proceeded to ask John questions. John was able 

to identify his counsel as his attorney and stated that her role was to try “to get me up out 

of here.” John did not recognize the district attorney and was not able to explain the role 

of a prosecutor. John said it was the “police” who charged him with crimes. He 

explained that the role of the judge was to “tell you how long you got—like, how long 

you got to spend your time in here.” According to John, “A trial is people that come in 

and they choose, like, if you are guilty or—if you are guilty or not.”3 

John said that a felony was worse than a misdemeanor and that he wanted to admit 

he was guilty rather than go to trial. The court asked John why a felony was more serious 

than a misdemeanor and John replied: “A felony too much serious because it’s much 

worser and stuff. And a misdemeanor is more better to me than a felony. . . . Cause a 

felony, like, you spend more time up in here.” John said he understood that by admitting 

the charges, a trial would not happen and that he wanted to admit he was guilty 

“[b]ecause a trial—at trial, it’s more worser.” 

 

3

 Neither John’s counsel nor the court asked John if he understood that if the 

matter proceeded to trial, he would be tried by the judge and not by a jury.
6

The court then proceeded to ask whether John understood standard Boykin/Thal

admonitions. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.)

The prosecutor moved to amend the petition to allege misdemeanor attempted 

second degree burglary as count 2 (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b), 664) and two 

misdemeanor batteries on school grounds as counts 3 and 4 (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. 

(a).) The court granted this motion and dismissed the original count of felony attempted 

burglary. John entered pleas of no contest to the three misdemeanor counts. The court 

stated: “The court accepts each of the no contest pleas as admissions. The court finds 

that the minor [has] been advised of his constitutional rights. He’s made a knowing, 

intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights. He’s entered his pleas of no contest to 

counts 2, 3, and 4 in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner.” The court also stated: 

“For the record, I should say that I’m granting this—obviously, by having [taken] his 

pleas I’ve granted Ms. Murray’s motion to withdraw her declaration of a doubt. The 

record shows that detailed questioning of the minor conducted by Ms. Murray and by the 

court, I am satisfied that he understands the proceedings. Ms. Murray, you represent that 

he’s been in a position to assist you, if necessary?” John’s counsel answered “yes” and 

the court stated: “So I adopt that as my finding. And that’s the reason for the unusual 

procedure of allowing you to withdraw your declaration of a doubt.” 

At a disposition hearing on May 2, 2013, the court adjudged John a ward of the 

court. John was committed to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility for nine 

months. A motion to reconsider disposition was denied by the court on June 6, 2013. 

A timely notice of appeal was filed on May 20, 2013. 

DISCUSSION

To be mentally competent to stand trial, a defendant “must be capable of 

understanding the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him,” “must 

comprehend his own status and condition in reference to such proceedings,” and “must be 

capable to assist his attorney in conducting his defense, or be able to conduct his own 

defense in a rational manner.” (People v. Conrad (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 361, 369-370.) 

The conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process 
7

and state procedures must be adequate to protect this right. (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 

U.S. 375, 378.) The standard for competency is no different for a defendant who is 

pleading guilty than for one who is going to trial. (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 

389, 397-398.)

The “ ‘essentials of due process and fair treatment’ ” apply to juvenile proceedings 

as well as to adult criminal proceedings. (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 30.) Juvenile 

incompetency is not defined solely “in terms of mental illness or disability,” but also 

encompasses developmental immaturity, because minors’ brains are still developing. 

(Timothy J. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847, 860.)

In California juvenile proceedings, section 709 governs competency 

determinations and provides, in relevant part: “(a) During the pendency of any juvenile 

proceeding, the minor’s counsel or the court may express a doubt as to the minor’s 

competency. A minor is incompetent to proceed if he or she lacks sufficient present 

ability to consult with counsel and assist in preparing his or her defense with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding, or lacks a rational as well as factual understanding, of 

the nature of the charges or proceedings against him or her. If the court finds substantial 

evidence raises a doubt as to the minor’s competency, the proceedings shall be 

suspended. [¶] (b) Upon suspension of proceedings, the court shall order that the 

question of the minor’s competence be determined at a hearing. The court shall appoint 

an expert to evaluate whether the minor suffers from a mental disorder, developmental 

disability, developmental immaturity, or other condition and, if so, whether the condition 

or conditions impair the minor’s competency. The expert shall have expertise in child 

and adolescent development, and training in the forensic evaluation of juveniles, and 

shall be familiar with competency standards and accepted criteria used in evaluating 

competence. The Judicial Council shall develop and adopt rules for the implementation 
8

of these requirements.”

4

 Incompetency must be established by a preponderance of the 

evidence. (§ 709, subd. (c).)

Section 709 makes no provision for a court to withdraw its order suspending 

proceedings so that the minor’s competency can be determined at a hearing with input 

from an expert. We find no cases that deal with whether, or under what circumstances, a 

juvenile court has the discretion to withdraw orders made pursuant to section 709, 

subdivisions (a) and (b). However, cases concerning due process requirements when 

determining competency in the adult criminal context are instructive.

In adult criminal proceedings, the question of competence is governed by Penal 

Code section 1368, which provides, in relevant part: “(a) If, during the pendency of an 

action and prior to judgment, a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental 

competence of the defendant, he or she shall state that doubt in the record and inquire of 

the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is 

mentally competent. If the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court shall 

appoint counsel. At the request of the defendant or his or her counsel or upon its own 

motion, the court shall recess the proceedings for as long as may be reasonably necessary 

to permit counsel to confer with the defendant and to form an opinion as to the mental 

competence of the defendant at that point in time. [¶] (b) If counsel informs the court 

that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall 

order that the question of the defendant’s mental competence is to be determined in a 

hearing which is held pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369. If counsel informs the court 

that he or she believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may nevertheless 

order a hearing. Any hearing shall be held in the superior court. [¶] (c) Except as 

provided in Section 1368.1, when an order for a hearing into the present mental 

competence of the defendant has been issued, all proceedings in the criminal prosecution 

shall be suspended until the question of the present mental competence of the defendant 

has been determined.” Like Welfare and Institutions Code section 709, Penal Code 

 

4

 The Judicial Council addressed the requirement placed upon it in section 709, 

subdivision (b), in California Rules of Court, rule 5.645.
9

section 1369 requires the appointment of a psychiatrist or psychologist to evaluate the 

defendant’s competency.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 was introduced into the code in 2010. 

(Stats. 2010, ch. 671, § 1.) Prior to 2010, the state conceded, and the California Supreme 

Court did not challenge, that “the protective reach of Penal Code section 1368 extend[ed]

to section 602 proceedings in juvenile court.” (In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 

430, fn. 14, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Phillips (2000) 

83 Cal.App.4th 170, 173.)

The California Supreme Court has held that once substantial evidence points to the 

incompetency of an accused, “no matter how persuasive other evidence—testimony of 

prosecution witnesses or the court’s own observations of the accused—may be to the 

contrary,” the accused has a constitutional right to a competency hearing. (People v. 

Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518.) “[W]hen defendant has come forward with 

substantial evidence of present mental incompetence, he is entitled to a [Penal Code] 

section 1368 hearing as a matter of right . . . . The judge then has no discretion to 

exercise.” (Ibid.)

In People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531 (Hale) the trial court expressed a doubt as 

to defendant’s competency on the record and appointed psychiatrists to evaluate 

defendant. (Id. at p. 535, fn. 5.) However, no hearing was ever held and after 

continuances the defendant entered a plea and the case proceeded to trial. (Id. at p. 536.) 

The Hale court held that “[o]nce the trial court ordered the hearing, as it reasonably did, it 

could not simply vacate the order, sub silentio.” (Id. at p. 540.) The People asserted that 

defendant’s changed mental condition obviated the need for a competency hearing, but 

the court held that “[t]his argument [was] misplaced. As stated earlier, [Penal Code] 

section 1368 ‘requires that if at any time during the pendency of a criminal case a doubt 

arises as to mental competency, all criminal proceedings must be suspended until a 

hearing has been conducted to determine whether the defendant is presently mentally

competent.’ [Citation.] Indeed, once a doubt has arisen as to the competence of the 

defendant to stand trial, the trial court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case against 
10

the defendant without first determining his competence in a [Penal Code] section 1368 

hearing, and the matter cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel.” (Id. at pp. 540-

541.)

In People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335 (Marks), the court reiterated its holding 

in Hale that “once a trial court has ordered a competency hearing pursuant to [Penal 

Code] section 1368, the court lacks jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings on the 

criminal charge or charges against the defendant until the court has determined whether 

he is competent. This determination is mandated by the federal constitutional 

requirement of due process and by unambiguous California statutes.” (Id. at p. 1337.) In 

Marks, defense counsel “expressed severe doubt” as to defendant’s competency and 

based on that representation, the trial court expressed a doubt as to defendant’s 

competency on the record and ordered a competency hearing. (Id. at p. 1338.) The trial 

court appointed two psychiatrists to examine defendant. (Ibid.)

Before a competency hearing was held, defense counsel told the trial court, “ ‘I 

think all [Penal Code section] 1368 matters have been resolved’ ” because the reports of 

both the appointed psychiatrists indicated that defendant was competent. (Marks, supra, 

45 Cal.3d at p. 1339.) There was no further reference in the record to any proceeding to 

determine defendant’s competency to stand trial. (Ibid.) Defendant was tried by a jury 

and convicted, but the Marks court reversed because a Penal Code section 1368 hearing 

had not been held. (Marks, at pp. 1339-1340.)

The Marks court believed that the trial court most likely construed defense 

counsel’s statement that all Penal Code section 1368 matters had been resolved as a 

waiver of the competency issue. (Marks, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1340.) The court stated: 

“As we emphasized in Hale, however, ‘. . . the matter is jurisdictional, and cannot be 

waived by counsel. [Citations.] . . .” ’ [Citation.] This principle is well established and 

understood. A widely used guide for trial judges states: ‘Regardless of defense counsel’s 

opinion, a hearing on the issue of defendant’s mental competence must be held if the trial 

judge has declared a [Penal Code] section 1368[, subdivision] (a) doubt which has not 

been formally resolved.’ (George, L.A. Super. Ct. Crim. Trial Judges’ Benchbook (Jan. 
11

1985 ed.) p. 130, italics added.) The obligation and authority to determine a defendant’s 

competency belong to the trial court or jury, not to the defendant’s counsel.” (Marks, at 

p. 1340.)

We discern no reason why the demands of due process would allow a court to be 

any less rigorous in juvenile proceedings than Hale and Marks require in adult 

proceedings. The People do not argue otherwise. Instead, the People argue that “Hale

and Marks are inapplicable here because there was no longer a doubt of competency 

raised once defense counsel withdrew her doubt. The court never formally raised a doubt 

of appellant’s competency. Thus, the procedure of section 702 [sic] to determine 

competency and further hearing on the matter was no longer required. Defense counsel 

withdrew her doubt once she realized that she could properly communicate with appellant 

and that he had a basic understanding of the proceedings.” 

The People’s argument is not persuasive. The court explicitly invoked section 709

after John was apparently unable to understand a simple question posed by the court and 

John’s counsel expressed a doubt as to John’s competency. The court, as provided in 

section 709, subdivisions (a) and (b), suspended proceedings and appointed an expert to 

evaluate John so that the question of John’s competency could be determined at a 

hearing. By taking these actions, we must presume that, as provided in section 709, 

subdivision (a), the court found that substantial evidence raised a doubt as to John’s 

competency.5 Because there was substantial evidence indicating that John was not 

 

5

 A court has the discretion to order a competency hearing even if evidence of 

incompetency does not rise to the level of “substantial evidence,” which has been defined 

as “evidence that raises a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to 

stand trial.” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 738, 742, overruled on another 

ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89.) Here, nothing in the record 

indicates that the court determined that John’s present incompetence was not supported 

by substantial evidence and that the court invoked section 709 solely at its own 

discretion. The People cite no cases that would support a conclusion that counsel’s 

statement of doubt as to John’s competency, together with John’s apparent inability to 

understand a simple question posed by the court, does not constitute substantial evidence. 

If there were any doubt whether substantial evidence supported a finding of 

incompetency, that doubt was removed by Dr. Meshberg’s report, which found John not 
12

presently competent, a competency hearing was required and under Hale and Marks, that 

hearing could not be waived by John’s counsel, which is what she attempted to do by 

withdrawing her doubt as to John’s competency.

What distinguishes this case from Hale and Marks6is that the court examined 

John on the record and, based on those responses, accepted John’s pleas and found that 

John had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights. Based on the 

statement by John’s counsel that John was able to assist her, the court allowed John’s 

counsel to withdraw her doubt about John’s competency. The People appear to regard 

these proceedings as a determination of competency. 

The court understood that John’s counsel’s request to withdraw her doubt as to 

John’s competency was unusual. The record presents no reason to doubt that John’s 

counsel and the court acted in what they believed to be John’s best interest, and we 

appreciate that the court understood that a minor’s counsel is often in the best position to 

ascertain whether the minor understands and can assist in his or her own defense. 

Nevertheless, as we have discussed, John’s right to due process required the court to 

conduct a competency hearing and, assuming that the court did make a competency 

determination, as the people argue, that determination was not made in accord with 

section 709.

Both John’s counsel and the court questioned John on the record.7 The court also 

relied upon the statement of John’s counsel that John was able to assist her. What was 

 

to be presently competent. (See Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 540 [“these psychiatric 

reports . . . constituted ‘substantial evidence’ within the ambit of section 1368”]; People 

v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 519.) 

6

 Another distinguishing feature is that John admitted charges alleged in the 

section 602 petition while the defendants in Hale and Marks proceeded to a jury trial. 

This is not a relevant difference, however, because what violates due process is the 

conviction of a defendant who is legally incompetent. As we have noted above, the 

demands of due process in the determination of competency do not distinguish between 

the routes taken to conviction.

7

 The court’s questioning, for the most part, consisted of Boykin/Thal 

admonitions. Because these admonitions only call for an expression of understanding 
13

missing, if the court indeed made a competency determination, was what both Penal 

Code section 1369 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 clearly intend to be the 

center of such a determination—the reports and/or testimony of experts who have 

evaluated the defendant for legal competency. The centrality of expert reports is 

demonstrated by the rule that a formal adversary hearing on the issue of competence is 

not required if the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulate that the competency 

determination be made by the court based on the written reports of the court-appointed 

experts. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 903-905.)

Because a section 709 hearing was required and expert opinion in the form of 

reports and/or testimony plays a central role, the court had two options: either schedule a 

formal competency hearing at which Dr. Meshberg could testify concerning his report, 

because the court found the written report to be inadequate, or wait for the evaluation and 

report by Dr. Franklin. The court did not have jurisdiction to allow John’s counsel to 

withdraw her doubt concerning John’s competency and could not make a competency 

determination within the confines of section 709 without considering the evidence of 

experts.

 

from the defendant and do not call for the defendant to explain procedures or concepts, 

they have very limited usefulness in a determination of competency.
14

DISPOSITION

The order adjuding John to be a ward of the court, pursuant to section 602, is 

reversed. The trial court shall withdraw John’s admissions and shall order proceedings in 

conformity with section 709.

_________________________

Brick, J.*

We concur:

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

_________________________

Richman, J.
15

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Lewis A. Davis

Attorney for Appellant Patricia N. Cooney, under appointment by the

Court of Appeal

Attorneys for Respondent Attorney General of California

Kamala D. Harris

Dane R. Gillette

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Gerald A. Engler

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Eric D. Share

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Huy T. Luong

Deputy Attorney General