NORTH KOREAN CIVIL-MILITARY TRENDS:

MILITARY-FIRST POLITICS TO A POINT

Ken E. Gause

September 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-257-8
iii

FOREWORD

Civil-military relations is one of the most challenging dimensions 

to deal with regarding North Korea. It is a topic that is difficult—if 

not impossible—to quantify with any real precision. Yet few subjects 

are more crucial to understanding that country. After all, since 1998, 

Pyongyang’s foremost policy has been declared as “military-first.” 

While experts debate the precise meaning and significance of this 

policy, considerable consensus exists that it gives the leading role to 

the Korean People’s Army (KPA)—as all services of the armed forces 

of North Korea collectively are known. Hence, military leaders in 

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are very powerful and 

influential figures. Who are they? What kind of power and influence 

do these leaders wield, and how do they exert it? How do KPA leaders 

interact with dictator Kim Jong Il and their civilian counterparts? Mr. 

Ken Gause sets out to answer these questions in this monograph.

It is the third in a special series entitled “Demystifying North 

Korea.” These monographs constitute the first phase of a major 

project being conducted by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) under 

the direction of Dr. Andrew Scobell. The earlier monographs, both 

written by Dr. Scobell, are North Korea’s Strategic Intentions (July 2005) 

and Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System (March 

2006). SSI is pleased to publish this very important series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

KEN E. GAUSE is the Director of the Foreign Leadership Studies 

Program of the Center for Strategic Studies, CNA Corporation, in 

Alexandria, VA. He is the author of numerous articles and book 

chapters on the North Korean leadership, including “The North 

Korean Leadership: System Dynamics and Fault Lines,” in Kongdan 

Oh Hassig, et. al., North Korean Policy Elites (Alexandria, VA: Institute 

for Defense Analyses, 2004); and “Sino-North Korean Military 

Relations: Comrades-in-Arms Forever?” China Military Digest

(London: Janes Publications, April/May 2004).
v

SUMMARY

Unlike the study of other authoritarian regimes, first the Soviet 

Union and more recently China, which have given rise to a cottage 

industry of analysis on all aspects of things military, the same cannot 

be said of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the armed forces of the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In the small world of 

Pyongyang watchers, articles and books devoted to the KPA are few 

and in most cases deal with the armed forces themselves (order of 

battle) rather than the high command that oversees the machinery. 

This monograph examines the role of the KPA within the power 

structure of North Korea. The author describes the landscape of 

military and security institutions that ensure the regime’s security 

and the perpetuation of the Kim dynasty. He also highlights the 

influential power brokers, both civilian and military, and describes 

how they fit into the leadership structure. Finally, he considers 

the role of the KPA in regime politics, especially as it relates to the 

upcoming succession and economic reform.

An understanding of the North Korean leadership does not mean 

only recognizing the personalities who occupy the top political 

positions within the regime. In his landmark book, Shield of the 

Great Leader, Joseph Bermudez noted that over its 50-year history, 

the DPRK has developed into one of the most militarized countries 

in the world, with the KPA existing alongside the Korean Worker’s 

Party (KWP) as the two cornerstones of the regime. During this 

time, the role of the high command and its ties to the leadership and 

decisionmaking have changed. 

The KPA was founded on February 8, 1948, approximately 7 

months before the founding of the DPRK. As Kim Il Sung struggled 

to consolidate his power over the regime, his old comrades-in-arms, 

with whom he had fought against the Japanese, helped him purge 

the factional groupings and their leaders. After he had secured his 

power, Kim Il Sung relied on the KWP to rule the country. The high 

command played its role within the decisionmaking bodies of the 

state, but it paid its loyalty to the party and the Great Leader. 

When Kim Jong Il succeeded his father as the supreme leader in 

1994, he faced a regime divided among numerous factions, many of 
vi

which did not owe allegiance to him. As a consequence, he embarked 

on a campaign of reshuffling briefs, purging the more dangerous 

elements of the regime, and making way for a new generation of 

leaders who would coexist and then slowly replace their elders. At 

the same time, he began to move more authority from the KWP and 

to place it within the purview of the military. This transformation of 

authority culminated in 1998 at the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly, 

when the National Defense Commission eclipsed the Politburo as the 

supreme national decisionmaking body. In the years since, the term 

“military-first politics” (son’gun chongch’i) has been used to signify 

the privileged status the KPA holds throughout North Korean society 

and to stress that the regime’s sovereignty rests upon the military’s 

shoulders.

This monograph tracks the rise of the military inside the North 

Korean leadership and presents the backgrounds of key figures 

within the high command and the formal and informal connections 

that bind this institution to Kim Jong Il. As the first generation has 

passed from the scene, Kim has consolidated his grip on the military 

slowly by promoting loyalists to key positions throughout the 

apparatus. He has promoted more than 1,200 general-grade officers 

on 15 occasions prior to April 2006. This has not only secured Kim’s 

power, many have argued it has enhanced the military’s influence 

over him, especially when compared with its influence over his 

father. 

The question facing many North Korea watchers is the extent to 

which the military figures into decisionmaking. This report argues 

that, while the military has grown in stature and influence over the 

last decade, it remains one of many players within the North Korean 

policymaking process. The lines of authority and information within 

the regime are complex, consisting of formal and informal channels. 

The military has numerous avenues into the Kim apparatus, and on 

many issues have what amounts to a veto authority. This apparently 

was made clear recently by North Korea’s decision to cancel the 

test run for train services between North and South. But this does 

not mean that the military is the primary decisionmaker; that role 

still belongs to Kim Jong Il, even though he must weigh seriously 

military thinking on issues that reach far beyond the national security 

realm.
vii

This monograph also argues that the KPA is not a monolith, but 

is made up of a range of views, some more hard line than others. 

Some senior figures within the high command are rumored to have 

pushed for reforms both internally and in terms of foreign policy, 

while many younger field commanders are believed to hold some of 

the hardest of the hard line views. But one area where there seems to 

be wide agreement throughout the military leadership is the need to 

fund the armed forces adequately because it is on their back that the 

nation’s security depends.

In the next few years, the North Korean leadership will face the 

implications of the “military-first policy” in very stark terms. If Kim 

Jong Il is to begin to bring the civilian economy out of the dark ages, 

the military will have to share some of the burden. But whether 

the high command will be willing to trade some of its “weapons 

for ploughshares” is not certain, given the current tensions on the 

peninsula. In the mix of what is already a contentious argument over 

guns versus butter is an unfolding succession struggle as Kim seeks to 

name his heir apparent. As in any totalitarian regime, the succession 

issue is huge and impacts decisionmaking across the board. 

There is a note of caution when reading this report. The subject 

matter deals with information that is unfolding and will continue 

to shift in the coming months and years. The author has made 

every effort to validate through numerous sources the information 

contained on the various personalities, but in some cases it is still 

opaque. The reason for this is simple. Information on North Korean 

leadership issues is a closely held secret inside the Hermit Kingdom. 

The actions and activity of individual leaders are more often rumor 

than subject to check and verification. 

NORTH KOREAN CIVIL-MILITARY TRENDS:

MILITARY-FIRST POLITICS TO A POINT

INTRODUCTION

On February 8, 2005, at the conclusion of an unprecedented 

military-party policy meeting, the North Korean high command 

pledged its loyalty to Kim Jong Il, praising his leadership and the 

military-first policy. Two days later, North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs announced the country’s possession of nuclear weapons and 

indefinite suspension of participation in the six-party talks. This 

declaration signaled a shift in North Korea’s public diplomacy, which 

had until then been based on innuendo and obfuscation. Since the 

declaration, North Korea has returned to and again left the six-party 

talks, but has hinted at its willingness to forgo a nuclear capability if 

certain conditions are met.

It would be easy to dismiss North Korea’s actions as just a 

continuation of its bellicose and confounding foreign policy strategy, 

which it trots out from time to time when it either feels cornered by the 

international community or wants increased levels of international 

aid. However, it should be cautioned that this strategy does not exist 

in a vacuum. These events come in a period of dramatic change 

within the North Korean ruling structure, both in terms of personnel 

and organization. Some of the more dramatic include:

• Rumors of an on-going succession struggle to name an heir 

apparent to Kim Jong Il;

• At least two major explosions in North Korea over the last 2 

years, neither of which has been adequately explained;

• The death of Ko Young Hui, Kim Jong Il’s wife/mistress;

• The alleged arrest of Chang Song Taek, considered by many 

to be the number two man in Pyongyang; and,

• A reorganization of key power institutions, which have 

oversight for the military and security apparatus.

For many Pyongyang watchers, this movement within the 

elite suggests a major struggle for power is taking place within the 
Hermit Kingdom. Others believe it signals not so much a struggle 

for power as a realignment of control by Kim Jong Il to clear the 

way for significant changes in policy. Regardless of the reason, Kim 

Jong Il’s ability to garner the support of the leadership, especially 

the military’s, will be critical in dictating the future character of the 

regime. 

The context through which leadership is implemented in the 

country is just as important as whether or not a struggle for power is 

ongoing inside North Korea. Little doubt exists that the environment 

in which politics is conducted inside the regime is evolving. When 

Kim Il Sung was alive, the Korean Workers Party (KWP) was the 

central organizing force for ruling the country. Under Kim Jong Il, 

the party has been replaced by the military (the Korean People’s 

Army [KPA]) in this role. Under the banner of “military-first 

politics,” the adulation that was once reserved for the party has 

shifted to the military, and its presence can be felt in every aspect 

of political and social life. The profound nature of this shift is made 

clear in the 1998 amendments to the constitution, which Kim used to 

place his stamp on the regime, where the state presidency was for all 

intents abolished and all real power shifted to the National Defense 

Commission (NDC). As such, if Kim were to die suddenly, the party 

or the state would not assume authority; the military establishment 

would.

The character of the KPA high command has changed in the 

decade since Kim Jong Il came to power. While members of the 

first (partisan) generation still hold posts of power, the day-to-day 

management of the military has begun to shift to the second and third 

generations. The era of a single senior military figure tied closely to 

the party and the Great Leader has been replaced by a system in 

which control within the KPA is more dispersed, and many channels 

lead back to Kim. In this way, Kim Jong Il has been able to secure 

his control over the military, a goal that is ultimately at the heart of 

“military-first politics.” 

Kim Jong Il’s goal of consolidating his power has constrained 

North Korea’s ability to carry out other policies, especially if they 

involve reform. While the military establishment is not a monolith 

and represents a wide range of policy views, as a whole it is far less 
amenable to change than other parts of the system (including the 

KWP). The high command fears such change could lead to civil 

unrest and disorder. In addition, a move toward greater economic 

liberalization, for example, could shift budgetary priorities away 

from the military toward the civilian sector, something the military 

leadership does not see in its best interest. Since 2005, indications 

are this “guns versus butter” argument has manifested itself in an 

apparent struggle between the KPA and KWP for control over the 

direction of the country.

The succession struggle is a further complication undermining 

the system’s ability to conduct policy. Over the last few years, this 

struggle has been underway as Kim Jong Il endeavors to name an 

heir apparent. As various individuals and institutions line up in 

support of particular successors, the result could be a galvanizing 

effect whereby factions are formed from leaders with similar vested 

interests. Whether or not the KPA supports Kim’s efforts is not yet 

clear. That the high command has been reshuffled and its chains 

of command have been altered suggest that it may be a source of 

concern.

This monograph examines the role of the KPA within the power 

structure of North Korea. The author describes the landscape of 

military and security institutions that ensure the security of the regime 

and the perpetuation of the Kim dynasty. He also highlights the 

influential power brokers, both civilian and military, and describes 

how they fit into the leadership structure. Finally, he considers 

the role of the KPA in regime politics, especially as it relates to the 

upcoming succession and economic reform.

NORTH KOREAN POWER STRUCTURE

The North Korean political superstructure is a complicated 

mosaic of shifting and interlocking, but relatively, simple institutions, 

resting upon the entrenched foundation of one-man dictatorship, 

in which all powers are delegated from Kim Jong Il. Both the party 

and state apparatuses, in terms of both their relationships with one 

another and the relationships of various organs within the party 

and state structures to each other, are creations of Kim Jong Il (and 
his father). They are designed not to limit the Suryong’s (supreme 

leader’s) power, but to limit that of his subordinates and potential 

rivals and to facilitate the consolidation of his own authority. 

Conflicting lines of authority between party and state provide an 

ad hoc system of crosschecks and balances. Although various party 

and state institutions are invested with certain well-defined formal 

functions and powers, identifiable lines of legal responsibility, and 

specified procedures, the actual process is different.1 The formal legal 

framework often is violated by a body of secret and unpublished 

circulars, regulations, decrees, orders, resolutions, and so on, which 

supercede published norms. 

As a system, power and influence within the North Korean 

regime exist within four loci simultaneously:

• The Party apparatus;

• The military and security apparatus;

• A family-based patronage system; and,

• Among three generations of leaders.

Furthermore, like most authoritarian regimes, North Korea has 

both a formal political structure and an informal one. Traditionally, 

the formal structure of power has been composed of the party 

apparatus and state apparatus. Since the late 1990s, the profile of the 

military in the formal power structure seems to have risen.

Key members of the formal leadership include:

• Kim Yong Nam: Presidium President of the Supreme People’s 

Assembly (SPA) and titular head of state;

• Pak Pong Chu: Premier; and,

• Yi Yong Mu: Vice Chairman of the National Defense 

Commission (NDC).

The informal leadership controls the real power in North Korea, 

however, by virtue of its proximity to Kim and its control over the 

flow of information, and it has been subject to less change. This 

Praetorian Guard is linked to the Great Leader either by blood ties or 

by bonds developed over decades of service to the Kim family. Kim 
relies on this group of loyal servants to enforce order throughout the 

system and to provide advice in the decisionmaking process.

Key members of the informal leadership include:

• Members of Kim Jong Il’s family, but their status is shifting 

due to the succession; 

• Kye Ung Tae: Party secretary for security;

• Kang Sang Chun: Chief of Kim Jong Il’s personal secretariat;2

and,

• Kang Sok Chu: First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Evolving Leadership Dynamics in the Kim Jong Il Era.

Kim Jong Il’s leadership style and the decisionmaking process in 

North Korea do not fit the classical totalitarian model. Although no 

doubt exists that it is “a system within a system”—a key characteristic 

of Stalinist regimes—the linkages are not as well-defined, and the 

flow of power and information through the system is less institutionalized and more often a function of personal connections. Kim Jong 

Il undoubtedly has the final word in the decisionmaking chain, but 

he appears to allow debate and influence to flow up through the 

system. This has been illustrated on a number of occasions when he 

apparently changed a decision after the military weighed in.

He promotes a system whereby he is the focal point for many 

separate chains of command. This, in turn, leads to a scramble 

for influence at the next echelon of power. This hub-and-spoke 

approach to regime management has created a system of checks and 

balances with regard to the decisionmaking process. The interplay 

between the high command and elements within the foreign policy 

apparatus illustrates turf battles as a feature of the North Korean 

decisionmaking process. Although Kim tries to extend his reach 

throughout the system, there is some evidence that he encourages 

the system to analyze and vet issues and narrow options before 

passing policy initiatives up to him. This suggests that any attempt 

to understand how North Korea will react to a particular initiative or 

stimulus must look beyond the Great Leader.

Kim Jong Il’s legitimacy is intertwined with the philosophy of 

“self-sufficiency” (the juche philosophy). As is the case for many 
ideologically driven regimes, it is incumbent on the North Korean 

leadership to reconcile any new policy initiatives with the central 

tenets of the existing ideology. Kim Jong Il has some latitude to 

stretch ideology to fit diverse situations, but he must be careful not 

to get ahead of the apparatus, which sees “juche thought” as a key 

pillar to its existence—the pillar that rationalizes its relationship to 

the Great Leader.

MILITARY-FIRST AND REGIME POLITICS IN 2005

Many have speculated that the military-first policy (son’gun 

chongch’i) has meant the elevation of the military in the control 

and overall decisionmaking process of the regime.3 What should 

be understood is that this reorganization had more to do with the 

restructuring of power and influence than it did with the North 

Korean decisionmaking model. Kim has realized that his ability 

to rule is linked firmly to the support of the military and security 

agencies. Placing the NDC at the pinnacle of the leadership structure 

accommodated the importance of this pillar of support. 

By elevating the status of the NDC in 1998, Kim Jong Il harnessed 

the expertise within the senior leadership critical to national security 

decisionmaking. Under Kim Il Sung, control of the armed forces 

was exercised through the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). The 

information flow was directly through the chain of command: the 

Korean People’s Army (KPA) to Central Military Committee (CMC) 

to Kim. With the restructuring of the regime in 1998, Kim Jong Il has 

engineered a more direct relationship with the military. Information 

travels through various channels from the KPA and security forces 

directly to Kim’s office via his personal secretariat. This gives the high 

command several avenues through which to gauge Kim’s thinking 

on a particular issue, and then exert influence.

The new NDC provides Kim with a forum for discussion to 

inform him of both the internal and external issues involved in 

complex diplomatic decisions. By bringing together the most 

powerful elements within the national security establishment and 

giving it official sanction, Kim’s departures from the policy lines set 

down by his father have some political cover.
Despite its elevated status, the military’s role in decisionmaking 

does not appear to be one of leader on policy initiatives, but one of 

counsel. This is reinforced by how major policy initiatives are released 

to the public. For example, the February 10, 2005, declaration on 

nuclear weapons was made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not 

the NDC, suggesting that even on important strategic decisions, the 

decisionmaking process is not relegated to the military, but is more 

collegial. In this case, senior foreign policy and military officials were 

included in the deliberation process. Their inputs were transmitted 

to Kim’s secretariat, which took the lead on incorporating his 

adjustments.

Shifting Influence: KWP vs. KPA.

One of the hallmarks of the Kim Jong Il era has been the evolution 

of power away from the KWP and toward the KPA.4 In the wake of 

the revision of the constitution in 1998, making the NDC the highest 

state body, there has been a dramatic reshuffling of the official 

leadership rankings.5 Members of the NDC have begun to overtake 

Politburo and Secretariat members. A clear example of this is Vice 

Marshal (VMAR) Cho Myong Nok, the Director of the General 

Political Bureau and first vice chairman of the NDC. On O Chin U’s 

funeral list in 1995, he was ranked 95th. By 2001 at the 10th SPA, he 

had risen to third. (See Figure 1.)

Another indication of the military’s growing influence is the 

shifting composition of those who accompany Kim on his guidance 

inspections. Because of Kim’s reluctance to preside over meetings and 

due to his preference for behind-the-scenes national administration, 

the role of the Politburo and other traditional centers of power have 

deteriorated, while the positions of those who accompany Kim on 

his on-the-spot guidance tours (such as members of the Secretariat 

and military) have been enhanced. Figure 2 provides an overview of 

Kim’s public activities (mostly guidance inspections) since 1998.6 In 

2005, Kim made 124 appearances, including 59 inspections of military 

facilities, 21 inspections of economic facilities, and 21 diplomatic 

appearances.7
KIS Funeral O Chin U Session 1 55th KWP Session 4 Session 5 Yon Hyong Funeral 10th SPA Anniversary 10th SPA 10th SPA Muk Funeral

1994 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2005

1. KCI, Great Leader, KCI KCI KCI KCI KCI KCI

NDC Chairman, KWP (moderate) Gen Sec (KIS’s eldest 

son)

2. O Chin U, MPAF Kang Song San Kim Yong Nam, Kim Yong Nam Kim Yong Nam Kim Yong Nam Cho Myong President, SPA (conservative) Nok (chairman, funeral committee)

3. Kang Song San, Yi Chong Ok Hong Song Nam, Pak Song Chol Cho Myong Nok Cho Myong Nok Kim Yong Nam PM/Politburo Member PM (moderate) (conservative, (KIS’s cousin) but open to limited 

reform)

4. Yi Chong Ok, VP/ Pak Song Chol Yi Chong Ok Kim Yong Chu Hong Song Nam Hong Song Nam Pak Pong Chu, PM Politburo Member (conservative) (moderate)

5. Pak Song Chol, VP/ Kim Yong Chu Pak Song Chol Hong Song Nam Kim Yong Chun Kim Yong Chun Kim Yong Chun Politburo Member (conservative, but (Husband of KIS’s open to limited cousin) reform)

6. Kim Yong Chu, VP/ Kim Yong Nam Kim Yong Chu Kim Yong Chun Kim Il Chol Kim Il Chol Kim Il Chol

Politburo Member (conservative) (KIS’s younger 

brother)

7. Kim Pyong Sik, VP Choe Kwang Cho Myong Nok, Kim Il Chol, MPAF Chon Pyong Ho Yi Ul Sol Chon Pyong Ho Dir., GPD, CMC (conservative) member, 1st Vice 

Chair, NDC

8. Kim Yong Kye Ung Tae Yi Ul Sol, Cdr, Yi Ul Sol Yon Hyong Muk Paek Hak Nim Yi Yong Mu Nam, Nam, MFA/ Guard Command, (reformer) (conservative) Politburo Member CMC/NDC

9. Choe Kwang, Chon Pyong Ho Kim Il Chol, Paek Hak Nim, Yi Ul Sol Chon Pyong Ho Choe Tae Pok

Chief GS/Politburo Vice MPAF, CMC Min of People’s (conservative) Member member, Vice Security, CMC/NDC Chair, ND

10. Kye Ung Tae, Han Song Yi Yong Mu, Yang Hyong Sop Yang Hyong Sop Han Song Yong Yang Hyong Sop Politburo Member/ Yong CMC member, (moderate) Secretary Vice Chair, NDC 

11. Chon Pyong Ho, So Yun Sok Kye Ung Tae Han Song Yong Paek Hak Nim Kye Ung Tae Choe Yong Nim Politburo Member/ (conservative) KWP Secretary 

(munitions), NDC 

Member

12. Han Song Yong, Kim Chol Man Chon Pyong Ho Kye Ung Tae Yi Yong Mu, Kim Chol Man Kim Ki Nam

Politburo Member/ Vice Chair of KWP 

Secretary NDC 

(husband of KIS’s 

niece)

13. So Yun Sok, Polit- Choe Tae Pok Han Song Yong Kim Chol Man Kim Chol Man Yi Yong Mu Kim Chung Rin, KWP buro member Secretary (mass orgs)

14. Kim Chol Man, Choe Yong Nim Kim Yong Chun, Choe Tae Pok Kye Ung Tae Yang Hyong Sop Hong Song Nam Politburo member (C) Chief of GS, NDC

member

15. Choe Tae Hong Song Nam Yang Hyong Sop, Yang Hyong Sop Han Song Yong Choe Yong Nim Kwak Pom Gi, Vice PM

Pok, Politburo VP SPA

Member (C)/KWP 

Secretary (international affairs)

16. Choe Yong Nim, Yang Hyong Sop, Choe Tae Pok, Choe Yong Nim, Choe Yong Nim Kim Yun Hyok Ro Tu Chol, Vice PM 

Min. Metallurgy Ind., Chairman, SPA, Chairman, SPA Prosecutor General,

Vice PM, Politburo Politburo Member Politburo Member ©

Member (C) (C) (Son-in-law,

KIS’s paternal 

aunt)

Figure 1. Formal North Korean Leadership Ranking (continued).
17. Hong Song Nam, Hong Sok Hyong, Kim Chol Man, Kim Kuk Tae, KWP Kim Yun Hyok, Kim Yong Tae Chon Sung Hun, Vice PM/Politburo Chair State Plan- NDC Member Secretary, Dir Cadre SPA Vice PM

Member (C) ning Committee, Dept. (conservative) Politburo Member 

(C)

18. Kang Hui Won, Yon Hyon Muk, Yon Hyon Muk Kim Chun Nin, KWP Yu Mi Yong, Yu Mi Yong, Kim Yong Dae, Vice PM/Politburo Politburo member Secretary SPA Standing VP SPA Chairman SDP

Member (C) (C) (Kim family Committee member

Chairman member) RYu Mi Yong, CCP

Paek Se Pong (NDC(?)

Figure 1. Formal North Korean Leadership Ranking (concluded).8

Trend in Public Activities Since 1998

Military

Economic

External

Other

Total Activities

Number of Activities

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

70 69

73 83

99 91 97

124

48

6 2

14

43

18

6 2

1212 12

21 212123 25

16 16

6

17

11

39

20

38

39

20

11

52 52

59

14

19

‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05

Year

Figure 2. Overview of Kim Jong Il’s Public Activities.

In 2003, military officers replaced KWP officials as the most 

represented group within Kim’s entourage. In 2004 and 2005, more 

than half of his public activities were related to the military, through 

which he checked the military’s battle preparedness and manifested 

military-first politics and his determination to safeguard the system. 

A total of 42 officials accompanied Kim Jong Il to his public activities 

in 2005; four more than accompanied him in 2004.

• Military officers made up the largest share of entourage 

members, who included Kim Yong Chun (18 times), Kim Il 
10

Chol (21 times), Yi Myong Su (43 times), Hyon Chol Hae (43 

times), and Pak Chae Kyong (44 times).

• Among party officials, Kim Ki Nam (from 16 times to 31), 

Kim Kuk Tae (from 9 to 18), and Choe Tae Pok (from two to 

21) accompanied him more often than in the past. Yi Chae 

Il, a first deputy director (from 3 times to 25), and Hwang 

Pyong So, a deputy director (from zero to 33 times), emerged 

as close aides to Kim Jong Il within the party. 

• Among Cabinet officials, Kang Sok Chu (from 8 times to 20) 

accompanied him more frequently than before with regard 

to external issues. The standing of Premier Pak Pong Chu 

(from five to 29) seemed to have increased significantly in 

connection with the economy.

The number of officials who accompanied Kim more than 10 

times increased from 6 in 2004 to 14 in 2005. The number of those 

who accompanied him more than 10 times varies: 12 officials in 2001, 

12 in 2002, 11 in 2003, 6 in 2004, and 14 in 2005. (See Figure 3.)

KIM JONG IL AND THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

Kim Jong Il’s relationship with the KPA has been unique in the 

variety of power relationships within North Korea. The KPA is by 

far the strongest force in North Korea, and is the only group that 

can truly challenge Kim’s rule. North Korea is the most militarized 

country in the world, with 1.1 million troops out of a total population 

of 23 million (almost 5 percent). The military officially consumes 

15.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and unofficially more 

than 30 percent, according to estimates by the South Korean Defense 

Ministry.10 Therefore, whoever rules North Korea must control the 

military. 

Unlike his father, who was a guerrilla leader against the Japanese 

in Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s, Kim Jong Il has no military 

background. In a system that puts a premium on military service, 

this was interpreted as a critical weakness that would potentially 

undermine his credibility to become supreme leader. Kim Il Sung 

tried to overcome this deficiency by incrementally increasing his 
11

	 Name	 Title	 Frequency

2003

 1 Hyon Chol Hae Director, Organization Bureau, General Political Department 36

 2 Pak Chae Kyong Director, Propaganda Bureau, General Political Department 34

 3 Yi Myong Su Director, Operations Department, General Staff 31

 4 Kim Yong Chun Chief of general staff 22

 5 Kim Ki Nam WPK secretary 18

 6 Yi Yong Chol First deputy director, Organization and Guidance Department 17

 7 Kim Kuk Tae WPK secretary 16

 8 Kim Yong Sun WPK secretary 15

 9 Choe Chun Hwang First deputy director, Propaganda and Agitation Department 14

10 Kim Il Chol People’s armed forces minister 12

11 Chang Song Taek First deputy director, Organization and Guidance Department 12

2004

1 Hyon Chol Hae Director, Organization Bureau, General Political Department 55

2 Pak Chae Kyong Director, Propaganda Bureau, General Political Department 51

3 Yi Myong Su Director, Operations Department, General Staff 47

4 Yi Yong Chol First deputy director, Organization and Guidance Department 35

5 Kim Yong Chun Chief of general staff 21

6 Kim Ki Nam WPK secretary 15

2005

1 Pak Chae Kyong Director, Propaganda Bureau, General Political Department 44

2 Yi Myong Su Director, Operations Department, General Staff 43

3 Hyon Chol Hae Deputy director, General Political Department 43

4 Hwang Pyong So WPK deputy director, Military Department 33

5 Kim Ki Nam WPK secretary 31

6 Pak Pong Chu Cabinet premier 29

7 Yi Chae Il First deputy director, Propaganda and Agitation Department 25

8 Kim Il Chol People’s armed forces minister 21

9 Choe Tae Pok WPK secretary 21

10 Yi Yong Chol First deputy director, Organization and Guidance Department 21

11 Kang Sok Chu First vice foreign minister 20

12 Kim Yong Chun Chief of general staff 18

13 Kim Kuk Tae WPK secretary 18

14 Kim Yang Kon Councilor, National Defense Commission 10

Figure 3. Status of Officials Who Accompanied Chairman Kim 

Jong Il (More Than 10 Times) to His Public Activities.9

son’s institutional control over the military. In 1980, Kim Jong Il 

was appointed first vice chairman of the CMC, the KWP’s channel

 to the leadership for defense affairs. This position allowed him to 

make major policy statements on a wide variety of issues affecting 

the military. In 1990, at the first meeting of the 9th SPA, he was 

appointed first vice chairman of the NDC, the state institution for 

overseeing defense policy implementation. Over the next 3 years, 

he was made Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (December 

1991), promoted to the rank of marshal (August 1992), and appointed 

chairman of the NDC (April 1993).11
12

During this period, Kim Jong Il used his institutional control 

over the armed forces to develop several conduits through which he 

could keep abreast of military affairs. He apparently received daily 

reports from the General Staff, the General Political Bureau, and the 

Political Security Department. Within this three-channel system, 

the General Political Bureau kept him informed on the activities of 

all the general grade officers of the KPA. In addition, the Central 

Committee’s Organization and Guidance Department, which he still 

controls, maintained surveillance over the General Political Bureau, 

thus ensuring that the Dear Leader was the sole beneficiary of the 

most comprehensive information on KPA personnel.

When Kim Jong Il assumed power in 1994, a new mission was 

assigned to the KPA: “Safeguard the command post of socialist 

revolution led by supreme leader Kim Jong Il.” Thus, the KPA was 

required to become the primary guardian of the new leader. This 

new responsibility was enforced through a number of carrots and 

sticks.12

Carrots.

• Increases in defense budgets despite ever-deepening economic 

crisis;

• Material benefits and privileges to the high command; and,

• Promotions among the senior officer corps.

Sticks.

• Overlapping command structures to keep the military in 

check;

• Institutionalizing checks and balance mechanisms within the 

army;

• Increased surveillance of the military by the security 

services;

• Divide-and-control senior military commanders; and,

• Intensifying ideological indoctrination of the army.

Beginning in 1997, Kim began to formalize the military’s 

enhanced status under the slogan that “the party is the very army, 

and the army is the very party.”13 Furthermore, it was announced, 

“the army is the people, the state, and the party.”14 Against this 

backdrop, the KPA has made substantial inroads into the party and 
13

state sectors. The number of active generals within the key party 

and state organs—Politburo, Central Committee, and the SPA—

has increased significantly.15 Since the formal announcement of the 

Kim Jong Il regime at the 10th SPA in 1998, the military appears to 

have achieved parity, or even surpassed, with the KWP in terms of 

influence.16

Promotions within the KPA High Command.

On assuming the post of supreme commander of the KPA in 

December 1991, Kim Jong Il stepped up his drive to control the KPA 

by assigning his men to key military posts. By April 2006, Kim, acting 

as the supreme KPA commander, had granted promotions to about 

1,200 general-grade officers on 15 occasions, such as the birthdays of 

the Kim father and son (April 15 and February 16), KPA Founding 

Day (April 25), Armistice Agreement Day (July 27), North Korea’s 

Foundation Day (September 9), and the KWP’s Foundation Day 

(October 10). Also through frequent personnel reshuffles, he posted 

loyal officers to important duties. (See Figure 4.) 

Changing of the Generational Guard.

Another strategy Kim Jong Il has employed to secure control over 

the KPA has been his treatment of the generation question in the 

high command. When Kim came to power, the military leadership 

could be divided into three groups, whose priorities and aspirations 

did not always match.17 The first (so-called “partisan”) generation, 

was composed of those military leaders who fought along side Kim 

Il Sung in the war against Japan. (See Figure 5.) While this group was 

fiercely loyal to the Great Leader, the state of its relationship with Kim 

Jong Il was far from clear. Three marshals whose support was vital 

to Kim’s survival led this generation: MAR O Chin U (Minister of the 

People’s Armed Forces), VMAR Choe Kwang (Chief of the General 

Staff), and VMAR Kim Kwang Chin (Vice Minister of the PAF). The 

second group was made up of generals in their 60s who occupied 

most of the posts just below the leadership level. The final group, the 

third generation, was made up of thousands of field officers, many 

of whom had studied abroad.
14

National Defense Commission

Date	 Occasion	 Supreme Commander Orders	 (and CMC) Decisions

April 1992 80th birthday of 664 promotions with Cho Myong Nok.,

(664 promotions) President Kim Il Sung Kim Il Chol, and 14 others promoted

from colonel general to general

July 1993 40th anniversary of the Chae Chun Kil, Yi Su Hyon, and 12

 (99 promotions) Armistice Agreement others promoted from major general to

lieutenant general; Yom Tae Kyong, 

Kim Yong Su, and 83 others promoted 

from senior colonel to major general

October 1995 50th anniversary of the Kim Ha Kyu, Hyon Chol Hae, and Kim Choe Kwang and Yi Ul Sol promoted

(14 and five Workers’ Party of Korea Pyong Yul promoted from colonel from vice marshal to marshal; Cho 

 promotions, general to general; Chon Ki Yon, Yi Myong Nok, Yi Ha Il, and KimYong

respectively) Myong Su, and three others promoted Chun promoted from general to vice

from lieutenant general to colonel marshal

general; Kim Hyong Yong, Kim Tong

Kyun, Choe Pu Il, and Yi Chu Ul 

promoted from major general to 

lieutenant general; Kang Pyo Yong 

and Yi Kyong Hwa promoted from 

senior colonel to major general

February 1997 55th birthday of General Kim Kyok Sik, Chu Song Sang, Kim

(six promotions) Secretary Kim Jong Il Song Syu, and Pak Chae Kyong 

promoted from colonel general to

general; Pak Yong Ha and Yi Chang 

Hwan promoted from major general 

to lieutenant general

April 1997 85th birthday Kim Il Chol, Chon Chae Son, Yi Ki So,

(123 promotions) anniversary of the late and Yi Chong San promoted from

President Kim Il Sung general to vice marshal; Chong Chang 

Yol promoted from colonel general to

general; Kim Yong Un, Yi Yong Hwan,

and six others promoted from 

lieutenant general to colonel general; 

Choe Sang Yo and 36 others promoted 

from major general to lieutenant 

general

April 1998 86th birthday Choe Song Su promoted from

(22 promotions) anniversary of the late lieutenant general to colonel general;

President Kim Il Sung Chong Kyong Hong promoted from

major general to lieutenant general; Ko 

Ki Su and 19 others promoted from

senior colonel to major general

September 1998 50th anniversary of the Yi Yong Mu, Vice Chairman of the

(two promotions) DPRK National Defense Commission, and 

Kim Yong Yon, president of the 

Mangyongdae Revolutionary School,

promoted to vice marshal

April 1999 87th birthday Yi Pyong Sam promoted from

(79 promotions) anniversary of the late lieutenant general to colonel

President Kim Il Sung general; Kim Son Chu promoted

from major general to lieutenant 

general; Kim Tong Il and 70 

others promoted from senior

 colonel to major general

Figure 4. Senior Military Promotions Under Kim Jong Il as 

Supreme Commander (continued).
15

April 2000 88th birthday Yi Myong Su promoted from

(44 promotions) anniversary of the late colonel general to general; Yi Chan

President Kim Il Sung Pok and Kim Kum Son promoted

from lieutenant general to colonel 

general; Kim Sung Bom and five 

others promoted to lieutenant 

general; 35 colonels were promoted 

to major general.

April 2001 89th birthday Kang Tok Su promoted from

(19 promotions) anniversary of the late lieutenant general to colonel general;

President Kim Il Sung Kim Chong Sik and two others 

promoted from major general to 

lieutenant general; Yun Yong Kil and 

14others promoted from senior 

colonel to major general

April 2002 90th birthday Chang Song U promoted to vice

(55 promotions) anniversary of the late marshal; Kim Yun Sim, Kim Chong

President Kim Il Sung Kak, and Yo Chun Sok were promoted 

to full general; six lieutenant (two-star)

generals to colonel generals, five major

(one-star) generals to lieutenant generals

 and 40 colonels to major generals

July 2003 50th anniversary of Pyon In Son, Kim Hyong Yong, Choe

(24 promotions) victory in the great Hyong Kwan, Yi Tae Won, Sim Sang

fatherland’s Tae, Chi Yong Chun promoted to 

liberation war colonel general; 10 promoted to 

lieutenant general; and 8 promoted to 

major general

April 2004 92nd birthday Pak Won Sik, Yim Sang Ton, Yu Che

(73 promotions) anniversary of the late Hwan, Chon Chang Chin, Kim Hui

President Kim Il Sung Yon, Yun Chae Kon, Cha Kyong Il, 

and Kim Yong Chun promoted to 

lieutenant general; 65 others promoted 

to major general

April 2005 93rd birthday Yom Sung Il, Choe Chung Hwa, and

(34 promotions) anniversary of the late Chon Kwan Sik promoted to

President Kim Il Sung lieutenant general; 31 others

promoted to major general

April 2006 94th birthday Yi Pong Chuk, Choe Pu Il promoted to

(37 promotions) anniversary of the late colonel general; Kang Pil Hun, Pae

President Kim Il Sung Chang Pok, Kim Chong Ho, Yi Kyong 

Hwan promoted to lieutenant 

general; 31 others promoted to 

major general

Figure 4. Senior Military Promotions Under Kim Jong Il as 

Supreme Commander (concluded).18

Kim’s strategy for handling the old guard made it easy for 

them to follow their inclination to support the new leader. O Chin 

U was rumored to be very close to the Kim family and was one of 

the primary supporters of dynastic succession. In an article written 

in 1975, he pledged that the military would strive to maintain the 

Kim Il Sung/Kim Jong Il regime and be faithful as the Army of the
16

Name	 Position

MAR Yi Ul Sol Former Commander, Guard Command

VMAR Paek Hak Nim Former Minister of Public Security

VMAR Kim Ik Hyon Former Director, KWP Civil Defense Department

VMAR Choe Myong Nok Director, General Political Bureau

Figure 5. Key First Generation Military Leaders.

party.19 With this as a precedent, other generals published articles 

pledging their loyalty on the subsequent anniversaries of the party 

and the KPA. In 1993, both Choe Kwang and Kim Kwang Chin made 

a point of pledging their loyalty to Kim Jong Il in major anniversary 

speeches.20

Kim Jong Il repaid this loyalty by not forcing the old guard to 

retire, or more drastically, subjecting them to a purge.21 In fact, when 

O Chin U died in 1995, Kim left the minister’s position vacant for 

more than 7 months before naming a new minister, Choe Kwang, 

another member of the old guard. Likewise, although Choe died in 

February 1997, the post was left vacant until September 1998, when 

Kim Il Chol was appointed.

Kim’s core support within the high command is based within 

the second generation of revolutionaries. Many of these officers 

attended the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute with Kim, and 

currently occupy key military posts throughout the establishment. If 

the regime comes under attack, especially from within the leadership, 

this faction will be the mainstay of Kim Jong Il’s power.22 But, it 

should be noted several of these officers are now being retired or 

removed from critical positions. (See Figure 6.)

Name	 Position

VMAR Yi Ha Il Former Director, KWP Military Department

VMAR Kim Yong Chun Chief of the General Staff 

VMAR Kim Il Chol Minister of the People’s Armed Forces

VMAR Pak Ki So Former Commander, Pyongyang Defense Command

VMAR Chon Chae Son Former Commander, 1st KPA Corps

GEN O Kuk Yol Director, KWP Operations Department

GEN Kim Tu Nam Chief, Kumsusan Memorial Palace

GEN Hyon Chol Hae Deputy Director, General Political Bureau

GEN Kim Kyuk Sik Commander, 2nd KPA Corps

Figure 6. Key Second Generation Military Leaders.
17

Indications are that Kim also is reaching out to the third generation 

of military leaders. Currently, these officers are rising within the field 

commands or exist at the second and third echelons of the central 

military command structure. The North Korean political leadership 

(and especially Kim Jong Il) looks on this generation with some 

concern because it does not have direct links to the revolutionary 

period. In some quarters, this generation is seen as susceptible 

to the allure of capitalism. For that reason, special attention has 

been devoted to inculcating this generation, as well as the fourth 

generation, with ideological and cultural education. Kim also has 

begun to promote officers from the third generation to key posts 

within the high command and establish personal, yet informal, links 

with others. (See Figure 7.)

Name	 Position

VMAR Chang Song U Director, KWP Civil Defense Department

GEN Pak Chae Kyong Deputy Director, General Political Bureau

GEN Won Ung Hui Former Chief, Military Security Command

GEN Kim Myong Kuk Commander, 108th Mechanized Corps

GEN Kim Ha Kyu Commander, Artillery Command

COL Gen. Yi Myong Su Director, General Staff’s Operations Bureau

COL Gen. Kim Hyong Yong Commander, 815th Mechanized Corps

Figure 7. Key Third Generation Military Leaders.

Kim’s Military Support System. 

In addition to promotions and his treatment of the generation 

question, Kim has instituted a dedicated support system within 

the KPA. As mentioned earlier, as part of his hub-and-spoke 

decisionmaking style, Kim often circumnavigates direct chains of 

command in order to give himself alternate reservoirs of information.23

This allows him to access information that may otherwise be denied 

through formal channels such as the NDC and CMC. It also allows 

him to keep tabs on the senior leadership. He has done this within the 

military by forming alliances within such critical KPA institutions as 

the General Political Bureau and the General Staff. 

Pak Chae Kyong/Yi Mung Su/Hyon Chul Hae. Three military leaders 

who appear to be on the rise because of Kim’s patronage are General 

Pak Chae Kyong, General Yi Myong Su, and General Hyon Chul Hae. 
18

All three reside within the second echelon of the military leadership 

and appear to have been tapped by Kim as sources of information 

and intelligence. 

General Pak Chae Kyong is a vice director of the General Political 

Bureau (GPB) and oversees propaganda ideological training for the 

KPA. He has been given the responsibility for ensuring military 

loyalty to the Kim dynasty. He also is personally responsible for 

oversight of programs to further the personality cult of Kim Jong 

Il and for ideological education in the military. Apparently, Pak 

has been given permission to report directly to Kim on a variety of 

issues, bypassing the GPB chain of command.24

General Yi Myong Su is the director of the General Staff’s 

Operations Bureau, which is responsible for all operational aspects 

of the KPA, including the general operational planning for the Air 

Force, Navy, Workers’-Peasants’ Red Guard, and Paramilitary 

Training units.25 A close associate of Chang Song U,26 Yi has a direct 

channel to Kim Jong Il.27 In cases of emergency, Kim can bypass the 

chain of command and communicate directly with the Operations 

Bureau. 

General Hyon Chol Hae, the former General Political Directorate 

(GPD) vice director for organization, was appointed to the new post of 

vice director of administration,28 which is responsible for overseeing 

Kim’s visits to military units. A graduate of the Mangyongdae 

Revolutionary Institute, he was tapped by Kim Jong Il as a rising 

star in the early 1990s when he was director of the General Logistics 

Department.29 In his current position, he plays a key role in helping 

Kim maintain tight control over the military.30 In addition, this job 

allegedly carries with it the more sensitive responsibility of grooming 

Kim’s successor in the matter of military affairs. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

In addition to the informal connections to the supreme leader, the 

KPA has a formal structure, through which command and control is 

carried out. (See Figure 8.) At the top of the command structure sits 

the NDC and the Supreme Commander. Under the 1972 constitution, 

the Chief of State was invested with the command and control of the 
19

armed forces. This was revised in the 1992 constitution where this 

authority was transferred to the NDC chairman, thus investing in 

this position the authority of the Supreme Commander. It has the 

power to declare war, issue mobilization orders in an emergency, 

promote senior military officers, and guide the armed forces and 

defense construction work. The Central Military Committee (of the 

KWP) is next in order of seniority—it is tasked with the administrative 

tasking of the North Korean armed forces and interacting with critical 

KWP defense-oriented institutions. Below this level, the Ministry of 

People’s Armed Forces and the General Staff oversee the day-to-day 

operations of the forces.

Figure 8. Command and Control of the Armed Forces.

NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION

On September 5, 1998, the 10th term of the SPA, the North Korean 

parliament, ushered in the Kim Jong Il era. During its first meeting 

since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, the parliament amended the 

constitution to overhaul the ruling system and approved a sweeping 

reshuffle of major offices as proposed by the ruling KWP. At the heart 

of these revisions was the NDC, which was restructured and now 

defined as the nation’s most powerful organ, with Kim Jong Il in the 
20

new position of chairman. His role was described by the North Korean 

media as that of the supreme leader in charge of spearheading the 

nation’s political, military, and economic organizations; safeguarding 

the entire state system of the socialist fatherland and the fate of its 

people; and maintaining the nation’s defense capabilities.

The elevation of the NDC to preeminent status placed Kim’s 

unique stamp on the North Korean regime through the creation of a 

quasi-wartime crisis management system. Originally implemented 

in 1994 and formalized in 1998 ostensibly to manage a deteriorating 

economy and a growing confrontation with the United States over 

North Korea’s nuclear program, this system provides a framework 

for Kim Jong Il to build and isolate his power. It remains in effect 

probably to prevent a coup and to cope with the country’s serious 

internal problems, thus guarding against internal instability. 

Operating under a crisis management mode allows Kim Jong Il, as 

either the Supreme Commander or chairman of a staunch group of 

loyalists who staff the NDC, to direct the military forces easily and 

legitimately, affect military personnel changes, mobilize the country 

to a war footing, and command sectors of the economy. The elevated 

the status of the NDC also has allowed Kim Jong Il to harness the 

expertise within the senior leadership critical to national security 

decisionmaking. 

NDC Membership.

The membership of the NDC is tied closely to its mandate of 

“overall military management.” It is a body of leaders of the high 

command and military logistics, including the Ministry of People’s 

Armed Forces, General Staff, rear forces, political affairs, and the 

Second Economic Committee.31 Unlike some other leadership 

bodies, such as the Politburo, membership on the NDC does not 

appear to be in any way linked to ceremony. The members on this 

commission are there because they have a particular competency 

or have responsibility for a critical security-related portfolio. (See 

Figure 9.)
21

Chairman Kim Jong Il

First Vice Chairman Cho Myong Nok

Vice Chairman Yon Hyong Muk (died in October 2005)

Vice Chairman Yi Yong Mu

Member Kim Il Chol

Member Kim Yong Chun

Member Chon Pyong Ho

Member Choe Yong Su (?)

Member Paek Se Pong (?)

Figure 9. NDC Membership.

A major question facing Pyongyang watchers is whether this 

rise in the KPA’s role in the formal leadership is a result of Kim’s 

ability to co-opt the military’s support for his rule or, conversely, 

his acceptance of the growing power of this interest group. Those at 

the top of the leadership list, such as Cho Myong Nok (Director of 

the General Political Bureau), Kim Il Chol (Minister of the People’s 

Armed Forces), and Kim Yong Chun (Chief of the General Staff), at 

least are known to be close associates of Kim Jong Il. Their loyalty is 

key to running the armed forces.32

Cho Myong Nok. VMAR Cho Myong Nok, a former commander 

of the North Korean Air Force, was appointed director of the General 

Political Bureau in the mid-1990s. He is considered a close associate 

of Kim Jong Il and is the foremost leader in political affairs among 

North Korea’s military elite. He is a member of both the KWP Central 

Committee and the CMC. He is responsible for the ideological 

indoctrination, training, and reliability of the North Korean military. 

Cho enjoys a reputation as an excellent tactician, but how much clout 

he actually wields with Kim Jong Il on military issues is questionable. 

Cho accompanies Kim on tours of military units in the field and made 

a key speech commemorating the third anniversary of Kim Il Song’s 

death in special ceremonies on July 8, 1997.33 In October 2000, he led 

a North Korean delegation to the United States, which for a time laid 

the foundation for the easing of tensions between the two countries. 

Kim Il Chol. VMAR Kim Il Chol was appointed Minister of the 

People’s Armed Forces in September 1998, filling a vacancy left by 

MAR Choe Kwang, who died in February 1997. A former commander 

of the Navy (a post he held since 1982), Kim’s promotion to his current 
22

post represents the highest rank and position of authority ever 

attained by a North Korean naval officer.34 His appointment came as 

a surprise to many North Korea watchers. It is speculated that he was 

brought into the leadership as a counterweight to Cho Myong Nok. 

In other words, by creating two centers of power within the high 

command, Kim Jong Il is able to elicit their loyalty by maintaining 

each as a check on the other.35 In the wake of his demotion from NDC 

vice chairman to member at the 11th SPA meeting in September 2003, 

his political status is unclear.

Kim Yong Chun. VMAR Kim Yong Chun was appointed Chief 

of the General Staff Department in 1995, after uncovering a plot by 

the 6th Corps, which he commanded.36 This action endeared him to 

Kim Jong Il, and he has been considered a close confidant ever since. 

As Chief of the General Staff, Kim is responsible for all operational 

matters involving North Korean troops. While he is subordinate to 

Kim Il Chol and the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces,37 in reality 

Kim Yong Chun wields more influence by virtue of his unfettered 

access to the Great Leader.

Yi Yong Mu. The NDC’s impact on the formal leadership lineup 

was made clear by 2001, when Yi Yong Mu, vice chairman of the 

NDC, dramatically catapulted to the 12th spot. Yi began his rise 

in the early 1960s when he became the first deputy director of the 

General Political Bureau (GPB). In the early 1970s, he entered the CC 

and SPA and, in 1974, he became director of the GPB and a member 

of the Politburo. Three years later, he mysteriously vanished from 

public view, not to reappear until 1988 when he was listed as an 

associate CC member.38 After serving in a number of posts in the 

state apparatus,39 in 1998 he was appointed vice chairman of the 

NDC and promoted to the rank of vice marshal. Yi allegedly is tied 

to the Kim family through marriage.

Chon Pyong Ho. Chon has oversight for military logistics within 

the KWP Secretariat and also has served on the NDC since 1990. His 

career has been based in the party apparatus, first serving in the KWP 

Central Committee’s Organization Guidance Department (OGD) and 

later in the Machine Industry and Commercial Affairs Department.40

Even though he is not in the military, he has long been considered 

one of the crucial figures in military policy decisionmaking. His 
23

advanced age (79), however, has led many to speculate that his role 

within the Kim Jong Il administration has begun to decline. But 

until another leader emerges who can equal his expertise in military 

logistics, his position within the hierarchy appears safe.

Yon Hyong Muk. Yon Hyong Muk, who served as premier during 

the third 7-year economic plan (1987-93) and as member of the 

NDC since 1998, was promoted to vice chairman of the commission 

as part of the reshuffle of the NDC that took place at the 11th SPA 

in 2003. Yon Hyong Muk entered the leadership in 1974 and rose 

through the state apparatus to become Premier in 1988. But, as 

North-South ties worsened, he was dismissed and sent to run the 

remote northerly Chagang province. He made a name for himself by 

leading a campaign to build local power stations and was recalled to 

Pyongyang to take a place on the NDC. For the last few years, Yon 

was the only other member of the leadership (besides Kim Jong Il) to 

sit on the Politburo, Secretariat, and NDC. Yon Hyong Muk died in 

October 2005.

Choe Yong Su. Choe Yong Su replaced Paek Hak Nim as Minister 

of Public Security in July 2003 and assumed a position on the NDC 

in September 2003. Chu Sang Song replaced Choe as the country’s 

senior police official, although the latter retained his place on the 

NDC. In September 2003, Choe assumed the post of Chairman of the 

SPA’s Legislative Committee. It is hard to reconcile Choe’s current 

position with membership on the NDC.41 The fact that his name did 

not appear on the funeral committee list for Yon Hyong Muk would 

suggest that Choe has been dropped from the NDC.42

Paek Se Pong. Paek Se Pong, a SPA member, joined the NDC as 

part of the reshuffle in 2003. His real identity has been a mystery 

to Pyongyang watchers ever since. Some have speculated that he 

is attached to Kim Jong Il’s bodyguard service.43 Others have said 

that Paek Se Pong is an alias for Kim’s second son and alleged heir 

apparent, Kim Chong Chol.44

North Korean media reporting on the recent state funeral Yon 

Hyong Muk suggests that Paek Se Pong may have been stripped 

of his NDC membership and possibly reassigned as an official in 

the party Central Committee. Pyongyang radio and the party daily 

Rodong Sinmun’s listing of the state funeral committee placed the 
24

name of Paek Se Pong well below the traditional position reserved for 

officials of NDC status. Paek’s name on the funeral committee list—a 

deliberately ordered listing of 49 members of the senior leadership—

was placed apart from the first 16 members of the committee, who 

are party Politburo members and alternate members, NDC members, 

and Central Committee secretaries.45 Although the media report of 

the funeral committee list refers to the officials only as “chairman” 

and “members” and not by official position, it is apparent that the 

list follows the North’s customary protocol ranking.46

Aging Elite.

A cursory examination of the NDC membership reveals that it 

is populated with old men, many of who are not in good health. 

(See Figure 10.) Cho Myong Nok, who was in charge of Yon Myong 

Muk’s funeral, is known to have had several treatments in foreign 

countries (primarily China) due to chronic renal failure and is in 

precarious health. Yi Yong Mu, at age 82, is the oldest official holding 

a government position among the military defense sector. His health 

also is known to be fragile. 

Name	 Position	 Illness	 Treatment

Kim Jong Il NDC Chairman Heart disease, kidney, North Korea, 

and liver ailments China*

Yon Hyong Muk NDC Vice Chairman Heart disease. France/Russia

Died in October 2005.

Cho Myong Nok NDC Vice Chairman Kidney disease China

Kim Il Chol NDC Member Health problems Europe

Paek Nam Sun Minister of Foreign Affairs Kidney disease China/Singapore

Choe Ik Gyu Minister of Culture Heart disease Germany

Yi Ul Sol Former Commander, Diabetes and heart disease

Guard Command

Im Tong Uk First Vice Director, Lung cancer Russia

KWP United Front Department

Kim Yong Il Vice Foreign Minister Heart Disease China

Kim Kyong Hui Kim Jong Il’s sister Heart Disease North Korea

* According to some rumors, Kim used part of his unannounced trip to China in January 2006 to receive a 

health checkup. “National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il is in Beijing,” Seoul MBC TV (January 

11, 2006).

Figure 10. Key Leaders’ Illnesses.47
25

Other NDC members, including Kim Yong Chun (age 69), Kim 

Il Chol (age 72), and Chon Pyong Ho (age 79), are reaching the end 

of their active careers. Despite the fact that Choe Yong Su and Paek 

Se Pong are known to be younger than Kim Jong Il, the fact that 

important position holders of the most important government organ 

will likely die or step down in the near future could prove to be a 

major handicap for North Korea. It also shows that general change is 

taking place very slowly.48

The death of Yon Hyong Muk will not cause any sudden position 

change. But if others, such as Cho Myong Nok or Yi Yong Mu, also 

die in the near future, Kim Jong Il will find it difficult to fill in the 

power gap quickly, thus contributing to the already unpredictable 

internal power struggle inside North Korea.

CENTRAL MILITARY COMMITTEE

According to Article 27 of the KWP constitution, the CMC 

oversees implementation of the party’s military policies, guides 

development and production of munitions, and has command and 

control over North Korea’s armed forces.49 Established in 1962, the 

KWP CMC “debates and decides on methods of implementing the 

Party’s military policies.” The CMC is also responsible for selecting 

the Supreme Commander subject to the ratification of the KWP 

Central Committee.

Since the restructuring of the regime in 1998, the relationship 

between the Great Leader and the armed forces has changed 

fundamentally. Under Kim Il Sung, control of the armed forces 

was exercised through the KWP. The information flow was directly 

through the chain of command: KPA to CMC to Kim. As noted 

earlier, with the restructuring of the regime in 1998, Kim Jong Il has 

engineered a more direct relationship with the military. As such, the 

KWP’s role in the relationship between the supreme leader and the 

armed forces seems to have diminished.50 According to some North 

Korea watchers, since the 1998 restructuring and the elevation of the 

NDC, the CMC no longer plays a vigorous role in military policy.51

(See Figure 11.)
26

Position Name

Chairman Kim Jong Il

Member O Kuk Yol (Director, KWP Operations Department)

Member Paek Hak Nim (former Minister of Public Security)

Member Kim Chol Man (Alternate Member of the Politburo)

Member Kim Kang Hwan (former Director, Military Affairs Department)

Member VMAR Yi Ul Sol (former Commander, Guard Command)

Member VMAR Cho Myong Nok (Director, General Political Bureau)

Member VMAR Kim Il Chol (Minister of the People’s Armed Forces)

Member Choe Sang Uk (former Director, Artillery Guidance Bureau)

Member Yi Pong Won (Deputy Director, General Political Bureau)

Member General Kim Tu Nam (Chief, Kumsusan Memorial Palace)

Member VM Kim Ik Hyon (former Director, KWP Civil Defense Department)

Member MAR Yi Ha Il (former Director, KWP Military Affairs Department)

Member Kim Myong Kuk (Commander, 108th Mechanized Corps)

Member VMAR Pak Ki So (former Commander, Pyongyang Defense Command)

Member Yi Yong Chol (First Deputy Director, KWP Organization and Guidance

Department)

Member VMAR Kim Yong Chun (Chief of the General Staff)

Figure 11. CMC Membership.52

In recent years, there has been much speculation about the CMC. On 

occasion, official North Korean communiqués would make mention 

of the body, as in 1997 when Kim Jong Il expressed his condolences 

to Jiang Zemin on the death of Deng Xiaoping.

I am shocked to learn that Comrade Deng Xiaoping passed away due to 

illness. On behalf of the Korean Workers’Party [KWP] Central Committee, 

the KWP CMC, the DPRK Government, and all the Korean people, and in 

my own name, I wish to express deep condolences to you and to the CPC 

Central Committee, the PRC Government, the fraternal Chinese people, 

and the families of Comrade Deng Xiaoping through you.

In the same year, Kim’s election as KWP Secretary General was 

publicly endorsed by both the CMC and Central Committee.

However, after 1998, mention of the commission virtually 

stopped in the North Korean press. In the last few years, a series of 

alleged CMC internal documents have surfaced in Japan and South 

Korea.53 One document dated April 2004 laid out instructions from 
27

Kim Jong Il, who was described as the chairman of the KWP CMC, a 

position that was rumored to be vacant since Kim Il Song’s death.54

These regulations were issued in an attempt to “tighten internal 

discipline.” But, if authentic, what is interesting is that the CMC 

recognizes the supremacy of the NDC. The “Regulations” provide 

for concentrating all political, military, diplomatic, and other powers 

in the hands of the NDC, and “the decision of NDC Chairman Kim 

Jong Il on all issues is to be obeyed.”

While there is little doubt that the CMC has been diminished in 

stature, it still appears to play an important role on three levels. First, 

in coordination with the Central Committee, the CMC is responsible 

for propagating the party line on military policy. 

Second, as will be discussed below, the CMC is populated with 

people critical to regime security. It is the one part of the KWP 

organizational structure which continues to play a role in power 

politics within the regime. 

Third, on the policy side, the CMC appears to play a facilitation 

role, ensuring that relevant parts of the KWP apparatus fulfill their 

defense-related responsibilities. This is most clearly visible with 

regard to procurement policy. After the Ministry of the People’s 

Armed Forces (MPAF) establishes requirements through the General 

Staff Department, they are sent to the NDC, which validates them 

and passes them to the CMC. Since much of the defense industry 

exists within the KWP, the CMC is the logical institution to oversee 

the translation of military requirements into munitions.55

Membership.

Kim Jong Il became a member of the CMC in the wake of the 

Sixth KWP National Congress held in October 1980, when he was 

elected one of the five members of the Political Bureau Standing 

Committee of the party Central Committee, and was concurrently 

made a member of the Central Committee Secretariat. The CMC 

served as his most formal link to the military until May 1990, when 

he assumed office as the first vice chairman of the NDC.

Unlike the Chinese dual CMCs in the state and party apparatuses, 

the North Korean CMC does not share identical membership with 

the NDC. With the exception of Cho Myong Nok and Kim Il Chol, 
28

both of whom became members of the CMC in 1980 (the same year 

Kim Jong Il did), and Kim Yong Chun, none of the members are dualhatted to the NDC. Membership in the CMC appears to be linked to 

specific channels of authority and security-related information. Its 

membership includes a number of lower-ranking officials who are 

either close to Kim Jong Il or play a critical role in regime protection. 

These are men that Kim Jong Il has relied on to exert his control 

over the country and provide unique intelligence critical to national 

security policy.56 As such, it could be argued that Kim utilizes 

information gathered through the CMC to inform deliberations in 

the NDC.

Links to KWP.

O Kuk Yol. The Operations Department is responsible for waging 

espionage activities abroad, including infiltration into Japan and 

South Korea, SOF operations, and kidnappings.57 The department 

also oversees the training of the country’s elite intelligence agents. 

Since the early 1990s, the director of this department has been General 

O Kuk Yol, a former Air Force commander and chief of the General 

Staff.58 He has been referred to as Kim Jong Il’s alter ego and belongs 

to the core group of supporters within the second generation of the 

military leadership. In the last year, however, there has been much 

speculation over O Kuk Yol’s relationship to Kim. In November 2004, 

reports surfaced that O Se U, O Kuk Yol’s son, had defected to the 

United States. The impact and veracity of these reports is not clear. 

However, O Kuk Yol, by all indications, still holds his post as head 

of the KWP Operations Department.

Yi Ha Il. The Military Affairs Department has been the source of 

great speculation among North Korea watchers. It was assumed that 

it served a liaison function with the defense establishment, but its 

responsibilities were unclear. Recent reports suggest that its portfolio 

includes handling the administrative affairs of the NDC.59 The NDC 

has jurisdiction over the creation and abolition of central agencies in 

the defense sector, appointments and dismissals of key military 

leaders, and the proclamation of war status and mobilization. 

The Military Affairs Department is responsible for collecting the 

information necessary to make these decisions and then delivering 
29

the NDC’s decisions to party, administration, and military 

organizations. The director of this department from 1982 until recently 

was VMAR Yi Ha Il.60 Another member of the second generation of 

military leaders, Yi has been a close associate of Kim Jong Il since the 

early 1980s. Yi has been mentioned in the press as late as February 

2005 as part of Kim’s birthday festivities. However, he was not on 

the leadership rostrum at the central report meeting commemorating 

the event. The last time he was seen on the leadership rostrum was 

in July 2004 to mark the 10th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s death.

Kim Ik Hyon. VMAR Kim Ik Hyon is a first generation military 

officer, who moved throughout the military and party apparatus. 

In the early 1970s, he was the commander of the 4th Corps before 

being promoted to the General Staff (deputy chief) and later to the 

Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (vice minister). In 1991, he became 

the director of the KWP Civil Defense Department, which oversees 

the country’s reserve units. He apparently was replaced by Chang 

Song U, the brother of Chang Song Taek, as head of the KWP Civil 

Defense Department in February 2005.61 No mention has been made 

in recent years of his status on the CMC.62

Kim Kang Hwan. Colonel General Kim Kang Hwan was a rising 

star in the KPA from the late 1960s to the 1980s. In 1968, he was 

promoted to major general at the age of 38 because his father’s close 

relationship to the Kim family.63 In the 1970s, he became the deputy 

chief of the operations bureau of the MPAF and later commander 

of the 1st Corps. His links to Kim Jong Il apparently go back to 

the mid-1970s when he led the purge of Kim Yong U, chief of the 

General Political Bureau, who had expressed resentment toward 

the Dear Leader’s philosophy of monism, one of the fundamental 

principles of juche thought. Following Kim Jong Il’s formal accession 

to power in 1980, Kim Kang Hwan’s career advancement moved 

quickly with his appointment as deputy chief of the General Staff 

and later to director of the party’s Military Department (taking 

over from Kim Tu Nam). By the early 1990s, he was considered one 

of the “gang of three” (with O Kuk Yol and Kim Tu Nam) within 

the KPA, who upheld Kim Jong Il’s military line. Since the mid1990s, however, Kim Kang Hwan’s career has stalled. At present, he 

does not appear to hold a formal portfolio.
30

Yi Yong Chol. Yi Yong Chol is the first vice director of the KWP 

OGD, the most powerful of all the 22 Central Committee departments. 

It has the responsibility for vetting senior appointments above the 

provincial secretary level within the KWP, vice director and above 

within the Cabinet, and general grade officers within the military 

and security forces. It also carries out political surveillance and 

investigations. It has close connections to the KWP’s CMC and the 

MPAF’s General Political Bureau. Yi is responsible for the military 

affairs portfolio within the OGD. 

Links to Security Apparatus.

Yi Ul Sol. MAR Yi Ul Sol is the only other marshal in the North 

Korean armed forces besides Kim Jong Il. He began his military career 

with the Chinese Route Armies and, after attending a Soviet military 

academy, rose through the ranks of the KPA. He was appointed to the 

CMC in 1968 and the NDC in 1990. Since the mid-1980s, he has been 

the commander of the Guard Command, which is responsible for the 

security of Kim Jong Il and other senior leaders.64 Because of Yi’s age, 

he apparently stepped down as director of the Guard Command. 

But until his retirement from the NDC in 2003, his age had not been 

seen as detracting from his influence within the leadership.65

Paek Hak Nim. VMAR Paek Hak Nim is a member of the first 

(partisan) generation that is slipping from the ranks of power. Until 

his retirement in 2003, he was the Minister of Public Security. He 

was close to Kim Il Sung, but never enjoyed the same status under 

Kim Jong Il, although he was appointed to the NDC in 1998, a 

position he lost in 2003. Like fellow “partisan generation” member 

Yi Ul Sol, Paek Hak Nim has disappeared from the front row on the 

speaker’s platform during public celebrations, a likely sign that he 

no longer figures prominently in regime politics. For that reason, his 

membership on the CMC is questionable.

Pak Ki So. Until 2003 VMAR Pak Ki So was in charge of 

the Pyongyang Defense Command. He is a second-generation 

revolutionary, who is known for his expertise in mechanized 

army corps. He served as a member of the 79th Supreme People 

Assemblies, and was confirmed to have served as a member of the 
31

KWP Central Committee in 1986 and the CMC in 1995. He led the 

Mechanized Army Corps in 1986, and was entrusted with the major 

responsibility of defending Pyongyang in 1995. He was promoted to 

the rank of General in 1992 and to VMAR rank in 1997.66

Kim Tu Nam. General Kim Tu Nam is the chief of the Kumsusan 

Memorial Palace, which is where Kim Il Sung’s body lies in state. He 

also is the chief of the Office of Military Officers, which is responsible 

for watching officers in the KPA. The headquarters for this office has 

a total of 21 men: the military officer (office chief), 5 assistant military 

officers, and 15 staff members. In addition, Kim has an “operation 

team” made up some 120 top cadres from the KPA and the KWP.67

Kim Tu Nam is the youngest of three brothers of Kim Yong Nam, 

chairman of the SPA Standing Committee (equivalent to parliament 

president). A graduate of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute, 

Kim held candidate status in the Politburo and was head of the 

KWP Military Department in the early 1980s.68 He has served as an 

instructor to Kim Jong Il in military science.69 Kim Tu Nam played 

a significant role in establishing the monolithic leadership system in 

the military. 

Links to High Command.

Kim Chol Man. Kim began his career in the military, serving with 

the Communist Chinese Route Armies in the 1930s and 1940s before 

rising through the KPA apparatus in the 1950s and 1960s to become 

deputy chief of the General Staff.70 In 1970, he became a member of 

the Politburo and, 10 years later, a member of the CMC. In the 1990s, 

he was put in charge of the Second Economic Committee, taking 

over for Kim Jong Il.71 Since the late 1990s, his status and influence 

within the leadership appears to have risen. Some sources indicate 

he was appointed to the Secretariat.72

Yi Pong Won. A graduate of Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute 

and the Kim Il Song Higher Party School, General Yi Pong Won served 

as responsible secretary of the Kaesong Municipal Party Committee, 

responsible secretary of the South Hamgyong Provincial Party 

Committee, and deputy director of the Organization and Guidance 

Department of the party Central Committee. In December 1986, he 

was appointed as deputy bureau chief in charge of organizational 
32

affairs of the GPB of the KPA, which oversees political and ideological 

works within the military.73 He is a military ideological expert, and 

has been rumored as a possible successor to Cho Myong Nok as 

director of GPB. He also is rumored to be a rival of O Kuk Yol.74 His 

position on the CMC has been a subject of speculation, especially in 

the late 1990s, when it was rumored he was purged for harboring 

“antiparty” sentiments and publicly executed.75

Choe Sang Uk. Colonel General Choe Sang Uk, another graduate of 

Mangyongdae Revolutionary Institute, has been listed as a member 

of the CMC since 1980, presumably brought in as part of the military 

turnover related to Kim Jong Il’s rise to the post of heir apparent. Very 

little is known about his background other than his appointment in 

the 1980s as director of the Artillery Guidance Bureau.76 The bureau 

supposedly has control over North Korea’s ballistic missiles.

Kim Myong Kuk. General Kim Myong Kuk is a second generation 

military leader and graduate of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary 

Institute and military schooling in the Soviet Union (Frunze Military 

Academy). His career began to be noticed in the mid-1980s when he 

served as the director of the General Staff’s Operations Bureau. He 

is noted as an expert in operational planning. He also has overseen 

the planning for many of the key military demonstrations, including 

the military parade commemorating the 60th anniversary of the 

founding of the military in April 1992, and the 50th anniversary of 

the founding of the party in October 1995, as well as several of the 

KPA’s major military exercises. He was elected a candidate member 

of the KWP Central Committee in June 1989 and a full member in 

December 1991. By the mid-1990s, his star was firmly on the rise 

as he was appointed commander of the 108th Mechanized Corps (a 

frontline corps responsible for operations along the demilitarized 

zone [DMZ]). He was appointed to the CMC in 1995.

While serving as a military aide to Kim Jong Il in the 1990s, he 

instructed the leader on three-dimensional warfare, and presented 

him with a plan for strengthening North Korea’s armed forces. 

According to defector accounts, Kim Myong Kuk “has unofficial 

channels through mid-level commanders that link the Ministry of 

People’s Armed Forces with the offices of Kim Jong Il.” Kim Jong Il 

makes use of this channel to better understand the thinking within 

the lower ranks of the KPA high command.
33

Ministry of People’s Armed Forces.

The MPAF is responsible for management and operational control 

of the armed forces. Prior to 1992, it was under the direct control of 

the president, with guidance from the NDC and the KWP Military 

Affairs Department. The 1992 state constitution shifted its control to 

the NDC.77

The minister the PAF officially figures next in the chain of 

command of North Korea’s armed forces after the NDC, but his 

office has no control over policymaking or decisionmaking in the 

KPA. (See Figure 12.) The minister of defense, in normal times, has 

responsibility for matters such as the procurement of weapons, 

defense research and development, intelligence gathering, and 

military training. Foreign exchanges and liaison are the province of 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The armed forces have little input 

into this area, although it is consulted. Even when there are direct 

military talks between North Korea and another state, the military 

participants are briefed closely as to what they may say by the KWP 

hierarchy.

Position	 Name

Minister VMAR Kim Il Chol

Vice Minister General Yi Pyong Uk

Vice Minister General Yo Chun Sok

Vice Minister General Kim Chong Gak

Vice Minister Colonel General Kim Yang Chom

Vice Minister Colonel General Yi Tae Il

Vice Minister Lieutenant General Yi Yong Su

Vice Minister Major General Kim Sang Ik

Director, Cadres Bureau Colonel General Kim Ki Son

Figure 12. Ministry of People’s Armed Forces.

North Korea’s military structure combines elements of similar 

structures in China and the former Soviet Union. The General Staff 

is organizationally under the command of the Ministry of the PAF, 

which is answerable to the chairman of the NDC. Functionally, 

however, the two are separated. In peacetime, the ministry takes 

charge of military administration, while the General Staff is 

responsible for operational command. During wartime, the Supreme 
34

Commander would exercise both military administration and 

operational control directly through the General Staff, bypassing the 

Ministry of PAF. This dual chain of command ensures that only Kim 

Jong Il in his capacity as Supreme Commander is able to take the 

military command at anytime, regardless of peacetime or wartime.

General Staff.

The General Staff Department exercises operational control over 

the military. It oversees military strategy, operations, training, and 

exercises. It also has direct command over the Ground Forces corps 

(artillery corps, tank corps and light infantry), the Naval command, 

the Air Command, and the Air Defense command.78 (See Figure 13.)

Position Name

Chief VMAR Kim Yong Chun

Deputy Chief Lieutenant General Hwang Chol San

Deputy Chief Lieutenant General Kim Kang Hwan

Deputy Chief Colonel General Chi Ki Son 

(President, Kim Il Sung Military University)

Deputy Chief Major General Yi Hong Sun

Deputy Chief VMAR Yi Chong San

Deputy Chief VMAR Chon Chae Son

Deputy Chief Lieutenant General Kwon Chung Yong

Deputy Chief Colonel General Pak Sung Won

Deputy Chief Lieutenant General Yi Pong Yuk

Director, Communications Bureau Colonel General Kim Hyong Ryong

Director, Operations Bureau General Yi Myong Su

Director, Reconnaissance Bureau General Kim Tae Sik 79

Director, Signals Bureau Lieutenant General Yi Hyong Yong

Director, Combat Training Bureau Lieutenant General Pang Kwan Pok

Director, Special Operations Bureau General U Myong Won

Director, Engineering Bureau Colonel General Kim Yang Chom 80

Director, Equipment Bureau General Kang Chang Ho

Director, External Affairs Bureau General Yi Sang U

Director, Military Supplies/Mobilizaation Bureau VMAR Yi Chong San

Director, Construction Bureau General Pak Yun Hwal 81

Director, Military Publishing Bureau General Cho Il Sok

Commander, Navy ADM Kim Yun Sin

Commander, Air Force Colonel General O Kum Yol

Commander, Artillery Command General Kim Ha Kyu

Border Security Bureau N/A

Cryptographic Bureau N/A

Electronic Warfare Bureau N/A

Foreign Currency Earning Bureau N/A

Military Police Bureau N/A

Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau N/A

Ordnance Bureau General O Yang Pang

Geological Bureau N/A

Transportation Bureau N/A

Figure 13. General Staff. 82
35

General Political Bureau.

The GPB is a political instrument of the regime to ensure political 

control over the army. (See Figure 14.) It undertakes politicoideological works in the armed forces in support of the directives of 

the KWP Central Committee. It has its own organizational structure 

and personnel at every level of the chain of command, through which 

it collects information on the behavior of officers. 

Position Name

Director VMAR Cho Myong Nok

Vice Director, Organization General Hyon Chol Hae

Vice Director, Propaganda General Pak Chae Kyong

Director, Personnel Bureau General Kim Ki Son

Figure 14. General Political Bureau.

General Logistics Bureau.

The General Logistics Bureau (GLB) is responsible for rear service 

support to the KPA, such as: supply, transportation, housing, pay, 

and medical services. Throughout the early 1990s, Hyon Chol Hae 

headed the bureau. In 1996, the North Korean press announced that 

he had been appointed as a vice director of the General Political 

Bureau, suggesting that he left his post in the GLB. Since then, Hyon 

has been referred to on occasion as still head of the GLB, but this 

could be due to errors in reporting.83 No other person has been 

publicly identified in this post.

Army Corps.

The North Korean ground forces are composed of a number of 

corps (infantry, mechanized infantry, tank, artillery, and security), 

which is further broken down into combat divisions and brigades. 

(See Figure 15.) Its force structure has been changed a few times since 

the 1980s for either operational or security reasons. The most dramatic 

reshuffle took place in 1995, when the 6th Corps was dissolved after 

a corruption scandal was uncovered involving significant numbers 
36

of the command and political staff and local government officials. 

The corps’ units were absorbed into the 9th Corps, which previously 

had been located in the Wonsan area. A new corps (as yet unnamed) 

was formed in the Wonsan area.84

Figure 15. North Korea’s Military Deployment.85

In 2003, between the annual promotions and the reshuffle of the 

corps,86 all of the commanders have been elevated to at least colonel 

general, with some commanders holding the rank of full general.87

(See Figure 16.) Whether this was done in an attempt to boost morale 

within the third generation of officers or as a means of enhancing 

cohesion within the armed forces and making it more beholding to 

Pyongyang is unclear. It could also be a reflection of the military-first 

policy, which is the foundation of the regime’s rule.
37

Name Command Predecessor Comments

N/A I Corps VM Chon Chae Son N/A

Gen. Kim II Corps Third Generation. Deputy military 

Kyuk Sik attaché to Syria. Links to 815th 

Mechanized Corps. Member of

the KWP CC. Allegedly close to 

Kim Jong Il. One of few regional 

commanders to travel outside of 

DPRK.

N/A III Corps VM Chang Song U N/A

N/A IV Corps Gen. Chu Sang Song (now N/A

Minister of Public Security)

N/A V Corps Gen. Kim Song Kyu N/A

Col. Gen. VII Corps Gen. Yo Chun Sol Member of the 11th SPA.

Pyon In Son

Col. Gen. VIII Corps Links to the II and V corps.

Kim Yong Un Member of the 10th SPA.

Gen. Kim IX Corps Col. Gen. Chong Ho There are rumors Kim has 

Hyong Yong Kyun been replaced.

Col. Gen. Choe Wonson Lt. Gen. Yi Chong Bu Member of the Hyong Kwan 

Corps 11th SPA.

Gen. Kim 108th Third Generation. Mangyongdae

Myong Kuk Mechanized graduate. Links to the General

Corps Staff’s Operations Bureau. Member

CMC. Adviser to Kim Jong Il.

Col. Gen. 425th Links to 108th Mechanized Kang 

Tong Yun Mechanized Corps. Member of the KWP CC.

Corps Allegedly related to Chong Suk, 

Kim Jong Il’s mother.

Col. Gen. 806th Gen. Kang Yong Ho Links to the 

Paek Sang Ho Mechanized 425th Mechanized Corps.

Corps

Col. Gen. 815th Corps Third Generation. Former 

Kim Hyong Yong Mechanized commander of the IX Corps. 

Corps Close to Kim Jong Il.

Col. Gen. 820th Third Generation. Links to

Chon Ki Yon Armored the Tank Guidance

Corps Bureau. There are rumors 

Chon has been replaced.

Col. Gen. 620th Links to IX Corps. Alternate 

Chong Ho Kyun Artillery member of the KWP CC. There

Corps are rumors Chong has been

replaced.

Gen. Artillery Col. Gen. Choe Sang Uk Member of the KWP CC. Close to

Kim Ha Kyu Command Kim Jong Il. 

Figure 16. Corps Commanders.
38

While there is very little information in the public domain 

concerning the KPA at the Corps level,88 a few points can be gleaned 

from an historical analysis of the various commanders.

• Horizontal loyalties (such as military academy classes) appear 

to be restricted, as are career bonds that could come about 

between officers through sequential appointments to same 

commands.

• First time promotions to corps commandership (especially 

front line corps) appear to come from divisions within those 

corps.

• There are lateral transfers from front line corps to rear area 

corps and vise versa.

• It is not uncommon that commanders have commanded or 

have links to more than one corps.

• It is not uncommon for commanders to serve time in senior 

level commands (General Staff, Artillery Command) before 

returning to the corps.

• On occasion, commanders have backgrounds in other services 

(Air Force, Navy).

• Corps commanders have very little interaction with provincial 

secretaries. Adherence to chains of command is mandated.

• Senior corps officers normally rank between 60-80 on protocol 

lists, but their influence often is not reflected because of ties 

they sometimes have to senior KPA officials or Kim Jong Il.

• When purges occur at the senior level of the high command, 

it can lead to reshuffles in the corps because of links with 

military leaders now out of favor.

• With very few exceptions, corps commanders do not travel 

outside North Korea.

The Other Services: Navy and Air Force.

Traditionally, the Army has dominated the North Korean military 

system. The key patronage systems that guarantee the survival of 

the regime reside within the ground forces. Kim Il Sung and now 

Kim Jong Il have relied primarily on key generals and marshals 

to consolidate and hold onto power. As a consequence, the Army 
39

has garnered the most influence among the services. For all intents 

and purposes, this relative imbalance in power among the services 

persists. 

Navy. In recent years, there have been some indications that 

the North Korean Navy’s status has begun to rise.89 General Kim 

Yun Sim’s (the commander of the Navy) rise through the ranks has 

been rapid, considering the promotion system in North Korea is 

notoriously slow and cumbersome and based on an officer’s links to 

a critical patronage system. His career began in the late 1970s, but he 

was not identified publicly until 1991 when he became commander of 

the West Sea Fleet. He was promoted to lieutenant general and made 

deputy commander of the Navy in November 1996. One year later, 

he was promoted again to colonel general and appointed commander 

of the Navy, replacing Kim Il Chol, who became Minister of the PAF. 

While Kim Yun Sim is rumored to be a brilliant naval tactician, he 

also has proven himself in recent years to be adept at surviving the 

Machiavellian landscape of North Korean politics. Even though he 

exercised direct control over the North Korean naval units during the 

June 1999 West Sea battle in which the North was roundly defeated, 

he was not purged. In fact, he was promoted to a full general in April 

2002. He is ranked in the 30th position within the North Korean 

leadership.

Following the June 2002 West Sea incident, Kim Jong Il’s interest 

in the Navy was highlighted both in the North and South Korean 

press. Broadcasts and magazines based in Pyongyang even went so 

far as to note that “Chairman Kim attaches so much importance to 

the Navy that he thinks the Navy should be developed as the axis 

of North Korean military strength in the future.” While this may be 

an overstatement, it does draw attention to the fact that the Navy’s 

profile has been on the rise in recent years.

Air Force. The Air Force has been the launching pad for several key 

figures in the North Korean regime. O Kuk Yol was its commander in 

the early 1970s. Cho Myong Nok commanded the KPAF for 17 years 

(1978-95) before turning over the reins to the current commander, 

Colonel General O Kum Chol. Like Kim Yun Sin, O Kum Yol has 

proven himself an adept regime survivor. He was one of the few Air 

Force survivors from the 1992 purge of the Soviet-educated cadre 

within the high command.90
40

Unlike the Navy, the Air Force has stagnated over the decades. 

The force has become obsolete with limited access to spare parts 

and constant fuel shortages. In terms of power politics, there is no 

indication that the Air Force has any influence beyond issues directly 

related to its mission. 

REFORMING THE PRAETORIAN GUARD

In the last few years, those institutions invested with responsibility 

for regime protection have been reshuffled. In some cases, the 

commanders have died and in other cases retired. Three key figures 

play a prominent role in guaranteeing the security of the regime from 

internal threats. (See Figure 17.) In all three cases, many assume that 

command now resides with officers from the third generation.

Name	 Command	 Predecessor	 Comments

N/A Pyongyang Defense VM Pak Ki So N/A

Command

Col. Gen. Guard Command MAR Yi Ul Sol Rising star in the Guard Kim Sung

Bom (?) Bureau since 2000. No official 

announcement.

Col. Gen. Military Security Gen. Won Ung Links to the VII and IX corps.

Kim Won Command Hui

Hong 

Figure 17. Praetorian Guard.

Guard Command.91

The Guard Command’s origins date to 1946, when the elements of 

the 90th Training Command were carved out to provide security for 

North Korea’s emerging leadership. It has gone through a number 

of reorganizations and, since the 1990s, has grown in importance as 

the heart of the regime’s praetorian guard.92

Although formally subordinated to the MPAF, the Guard 

Command reports directly to Kim Jong Il in his capacity as head 

of the KWP.93 It is responsible for the personal security of Kim and 

other high-ranking officials, as well as surveillance of high ranking 
41

political and military officials. It also shares responsibility for the 

defense of the capital with the Pyongyang Defense Command and 

the Pyongyang Antiaircraft Artillery Command. Located in Puksaetong, Moranbong-kuyok, and Pyongyang, the corps-sized Guard 

Command is equipped with tanks, artillery, and airplanes. One 

brigade is deployed at each villa of Kim Il Song and Kim Jong Il 

located throughout North Korea.

According to numerous sources, the long-time commander 

of the Guard Command, Yi Ul Sol, retired in 2003. His successor 

has not been announced. However, it should be noted that some 

speculation points to Colonel General Kim Song Bom as the new 

commander.94 Kim, like many other senior officers in the Guard 

Command, apparently is part of the third generation. His rise in the 

Guard Command has been rapid. He was promoted to lieutenant 

general in October 2000, selected to the 11th SPA in 2003, and was 

quoted in the North Korean press in February 2005 when he made 

a speech at a MPAF meeting lauding Kim Jong Il as the “heart and 

soul” of the KPA. He was at that time identified as a colonel general, 

which is in line with other corps level commanders.95

Pyongyang Defense Command.

The Pyongyang Defense Command is the corps-level unit 

responsible for the protection of Pyongyang and the surrounding 

areas. It takes its tasking from the General Staff, but has close ties 

to Kim Jong Il. Prior to the 1980s, it was subordinated to the Guard 

Bureau (now Guard Command), but was part of a realignment to 

streamline the chain of command and deconflict information flow. 

The Pyongyang Defense Command is composed of 70,000 troops and 

numerous tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery systems. 

It works closely with the Third Corps in ensuring the security of the 

capital.96

Since 1995, VMAR Pak Ki So was in charge of the Pyongyang 

Defense Command. According to informed sources, he was replaced 

in 2003, most likely for age reasons (he was born in 1929).97 No 

successor has been announced publicly. Many, however, believe his 

successor hails from the third generation.
42

Security Command.

The Security Command exists as an additional layer of security 

within the armed forces and as a counterweight to the GPB.98 Its 

ultimate portfolio is the insurance of regime security through 

surveillance of the military. It is organized under the MPAF, but 

works under the direct control of the State Security Agency. Like the 

GPB, it has its own agencies at every level of the military down to 

the battalion level. Through its own field agencies, it seeks out antiregime activity, investigates political crimes, and conducts extensive 

political surveillance. Even the political officers of the General 

Political Bureau are not immune from its close scrutiny.

The Security Command was upgraded from a bureau in the mid1990s, allegedly in response to its contribution to uncovering the 

corruption in the 6th Corps in 1995. In 1998, the command assumed 

responsibility for key internal security and law enforcement activities, 

until then the jurisdiction of civilian authorities. Then commander 

Won Ung Hui was asked to spearhead the “corruption” investigations 

against officials and KWP cadres who had contacts with South 

Koreans and other foreigners in the context of attracting foreign 

investment in Nampo, Najin, and Sonbong, the centers of foreign 

business construction and ostensibly economic liberalization.99

In May 2004, Won Ung Hui died of an unnamed illness and 

was succeeded by Colonel General Kim Won Hong, an officer 

who was first identified publicly in 1997 when he signed Choe 

Kwang’s obituary. His career appears to have been confined to the 

field commands, especially the 7th and 9th corps. Last year he was 

rumored to have been demoted in connection with the leaking of the 

bird flu epidemic in North Korea. He allegedly was reduced in rank 

to lieutenant general for failing to manage effectively the telephone 

use by foreign trade firms operated by the military.100

THE KPA AND REGIME POLITICS

Periodically, totalitarian regimes need to undergo a transformation 

in politics and relationships among personnel and institutions. This 

is a natural outcome of a leader’s paranoia or his efforts to carry out 

policy reforms. A body of evidence suggests that North Korea may 
43

be involved in such a transformation. Over the last year, Kim Jong Il 

has taken steps to both secure his power and, some believe, position 

the country for much needed flexibility in economic policy. Whether 

or not the KPA supports Kim’s efforts is not yet clear. The fact that 

the high command has been reshuffled and its chains of command 

have been altered suggests that it may be a source of concern.

Unfolding Succession Struggle.

One major reason, many contend, Kim has sought to restructure 

the regime is to ensure the continuation of his family’s dynasty. Over 

the last few years, a succession struggle has been underway inside 

North Korea as Kim Jong Il endeavors to name an heir apparent. As 

various individuals and institutions line up in support of particular 

successors, the result could be a galvanizing effect whereby factions 

are formed from leaders with similar vested interests. Early 

speculation was that the military and security apparatus had thrown 

their support behind Kim Chong Nam,101 Kim Jong Il’s oldest son, 

while Kim’s personal apparatus was trying to lay the foundation for 

anointing one of his two sons (Kim Chong Chol, Kim Chong Un) by 

his late third wife/mistress, Ko Yong Hui.102 If this were true, such a 

situation could potentially place the most powerful elements of the 

regime apparatus in opposition with one another, thus diverting the 

leadership’s attention from anything other than internal politics.103

The notion of dynastic succession in the communist era has not 

always been something the military has supported readily, and even 

revolted against it in a coup attempt in the early 1990s. In the late 

1990s, the military allegedly was sold on the idea that Kim Chong 

Nam would take over from his father, as Kim Jong Il did from Kim 

Il Sung. After a decade of purges, many believed that the military 

finally had come to terms with this decision. Over the last few years, 

however, the situation has changed dramatically. Kim Chong Nam 

has been in forced exile, periodically emerging in various countries. 

According to some reports, he has escaped at least two assassination 

attempts in Austria and China. His ties to his father apparently have 

been severed. According to many media accounts, Kim Chong Il has 

tried to push the military to shift its support to Kim Chong Chol, Ko 

Young Hui’s first son. 
44

This shift in the KPA’s position (if it has happened) probably is 

due in large part to the retirement or purging of key military and 

security officials. In April 2004, the de facto number two leader, Chang 

Song Taek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, disappeared from public 

view, only to reappear just recently at public functions.104 Chang’s 

two brothers have played critical roles in the security apparatus 

protecting Kim Jong Il. Chang Song U, who had begun his rise under 

Kim Il Sung, was the commander of the 3rd Corps, while Chang 

Song Kil was deputy commander of the 4th Corps and later political 

commissar of the elite 820th Tank Corps. Both are believed to have 

been moved to less sensitive posts.105 Choe Yong Su, the Minister of 

Public Security (another ally of Chang Song Taek) was replaced in 

2003.

More evidence of Kim’s apparent strategy to bring the KPA 

under control appeared in the election of deputies to the 11th SPA 

in August 2003. What was most notable about this election, in which 

half of the 687 deputies from the 10th SPA election was replaced, is 

that 11 officers with vice marshal and army corps commander level 

ranks lost their deputy positions. It is quite unprecedented for four 

frontline army commanders, such as Pyongyang Defense Command 

Commander Pak Ki So and 1st Corps Commander Chon Chae Son, 

as well as four mechanized corps commanders, including 108th 

Mechanized Corps Commander Kim Myong Kuk, to not be included 

among the deputies.

EFFORTS AT ECONOMIC REFORM: GUNS OR BUTTER

In addition to laying the foundation for his succession, Kim Jong 

Il has had economic reasons for restructuring his relationship with 

the KPA. If any meaningful reforms are to take hold in North Korea, 

the defense budget will have to bear some of the cutbacks. 

North Korea’s Defense Spending.

The share of North Korea’s defense spending in 2004 (according 

to North Korean official announcements) accounted for 15.5 percent 

of the total state budget,106 an increase of 0.1 percentage points 

over 2003. Defense expenditures actually spent increased from a 14 
45

percent level until 2002 to 15.7 percent in 2003, reaching a 15 percent 

level for the first time. (See Figure 18.) The trend indicates that North 

Korea has been building up arms as tension persists on the Korean 

peninsula since the outbreak of the North Korean nuclear issue. The 

actual amount of defense spending cannot be known because North 

Korea does not disclose actual amounts when it discusses budget 

plans.

Year	 1999	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004

Share of budget 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.4% 15.4% 15.5%

Amounts spent 14.5% 14.3% 14.4% 14.9% 15.7% —

Figure 18. Trend of Changes in North Korean 

Defense Budget Shares.107

Many within the North Korean leadership apparently feel that the 

country now stands at a crossroads where it has to decide whether 

to continue to compile a wartime budget or shift to a peacetime 

budget. Prime Minister Pak Pong Chu has pushed for limited market 

reforms, as well as some engagement with the outside world. To 

many, the military-first policy has proven an economic disaster, 

inhibiting the reduction of sanctions and South Korean and Chinese 

assistance, which are critical to the country’s survival.108 The military 

elite (or at least the harder-line elements within the high command), 

fearing a loss of status and the control it won from the KWP in the 

late 1990s, allegedly has moved to block the country’s early ventures 

into capitalism.

In 2005, the KWP apparently floated a plan designed to readdress 

the economic imbalance caused by a policy of favoring the military 

almost to the exclusion of every other sector, which the military 

immediately challenged. The plan allegedly was tied to Kim’s “new 

thinking” on the economy. In the months leading up to the meeting, 

Kim had given indications that he supported a readjustment to the 

budget, focusing on agricultural development.109 The tension within 

the system over this issue came to a head in March at a scheduled 

meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly, which allegedly was 

called off following increased friction between the KPA and KWP 
46

over the upcoming budget. Such a shift in strategy, hardliners 

feared, would have necessitated a return to the six-party talks in 

order to continue bargaining for economic support in return for not 

developing a nuclear capability. It could have conceivably led in time 

to the renunciation of nuclear weapons, which would have brought 

the 10-year military-first policy to an end.110

Legitimacy of Reforms.

Some experts believe that the momentum of North Korea’s 

economic reform is irreversible. Reading between the lines of 

statements coming out of Pyongyang, it appears that Kim Jong Il 

in 2004-05 began to push for a change.111 Several factors apparently 

have given rise to his new thinking at this time.

• The backwardness of industry and inefficiency of the 

system can no longer sustain the existing mode of economic 

operation.

• In order to take advantage of inter-Korean projects, such 

as the construction of Kaesong industrial estate and the 

relinking of the cross-border Seoul-Shinuiju railway line, the 

new thinking sought to reinforce the ideological discipline 

and the operation of the system.

• The Chinese model of socialist development (i.e., maintaining 

a political system centered on the Communist Party, while 

pursuing a market economy framework) has generated new 

expectations and inducement to emulation.112

During his recent trip to China (January 10-18, 2006), Kim spent a lot 

of time inspecting Wuhan, Yichang, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Shenzhen, 

and other places.113 He personally visited China’s special economic 

zones. During his meeting with Chinese leaders, Kim pointed out that 

North Korea attached great importance to developing the economy. 

He expressed a willingness to further strengthen exchanges and 

cooperation with China to explore ways for development in line with 

the national situation of his country. He noted, “During the course 

of our visit, we saw the brilliant achievements of China’s southern 

cities, especially the special economic zones, in all fields. . . . This fully 

proves that China’s policy of reforms and opening up is correct.”114
47

South Korean officials point out that North Korean economic 

policy normally is impacted following Kim’s trips to China. 

They, however, debate the lasting effects of resulting changes in 

guidance. One noteworthy point is that the changes in the North 

Koreans’awareness at present are occurring faster than the changes 

in the economic structure. To date, it is difficult to assess either their 

degree of actual implementation or their impact. Despite “signs of 

accrued economic activity,” a recent report noted, “there seems to 

be an emerging class of disadvantaged urban population, faced with 

growing unemployment due to the closing of factories and reduced 

opportunities for alternative employment.”115

If his intentions are sincere about accomplishing macroeconomic reform, Kim cannot put off forever his choice between a 

military-first policy and a viable North Korean economy. Whichever 

direction he goes, it means risky choices in terms of regime survival. 

It also means that Kim must be secure in his leadership in order to 

take on entrenched barons, both political and military, within the 

leadership.

CONCLUSION

Over the last decade since Kim Il Sung’s death, Kim Jong Il’s 

alliance with the military has been a key buttress to his rule. The 

KPA has been converted into a political tool of the regime and has 

made a great contribution to the longevity of the Kim Jong Il regime 

by eliminating any apparent opposition and laying the foundation 

for the upcoming dynastic succession. As a result, the new Great 

Leader has been able to exert control over Pyongyang politics, while 

enjoying a high degree of political control.

Kim Jong Il’s “military-based” rule, however, does not come 

without potential consequences. While the KPA currently appears 

to be unquestionably loyal to Kim Jong Il, considering him to be the 

only leader capable of governing the nation in these difficult times, 

it is not inconceivable that it could turn against him, depending on 

circumstances. Owing to Kim’s divide-and-rule tactics, the ArmyParty rivalry is likely to be intensified, and bitter competition among 

the military leaders already is apparent. If the delicate balance begins 
48

to erode, regime stability could be threatened. The KPA’s preference 

for status quo over reform limits the regime’s ability to deal with the 

economic crisis. If allowed to continue, the depletion of the national 

treasury could throw North Korea into a political-security dilemma, 

depriving Kim Jong Il of political leverage over the ruling circle. 

The intensification of any rivalries in KWP-KPA relations will not 

be institutional, but personal in nature. Many of the vulnerabilities of 

the North Korean system reside with the elite. As the North Korean 

economy has deteriorated under Kim Jong Il, many elites have been 

forced to compete for privileges and access like never before. Under 

the military-first policy, KPA-affiliated companies have made rapid 

inroads into arenas for securing hard currency that were once reserved 

for the party. This, in turn, has led to increasing weakening of the 

cohesion of the privileged class. Since the North Korean system is 

based on “feudal service nobility,” where loyalty is ensured through 

privilege, if the regime loses its ability to placate the elite through 

goods and services, there is a real chance for the creation of factions.116

At first these factions, which are really personality-based but will 

likely reveal themselves as institutionally-based, will compete with 

each other for the ever-declining privileges. If the situation persists, 

this factionalism could transform itself into centers of opposition to 

the regime.

For his own long-term survival, Kim will, if he is able, eventually 

have to reduce his reliance on the military. How the military reacts will 

determine not only the character of the future leadership, but also the 

nature of North Korean security policy. While the evidence of existing 

warlords within the North Korean system is speculative at best, the 

possibility for their creation is real.117 Most likely, they will emerge 

within Kim Jong Il’s inner core of supporters. As Kim Jong Il continues 

to isolate his power by narrowing the channels of communication and 

transferring lines of authority between bureaucracies, he is not only 

causing deep fractures within the leadership, but also bringing the 

security forces into conflict with each other. These two outcomes have 

direct consequences for the elite, who see their access to the Suryong, 

and the perks associated with that access, threatened. While Kim Jong 

Il prefers bureaucratic rivalry as the chief operating principle of his 

regime over the long term, the conflicts that it engenders could result 
49

in potentially destabilizing antiregime outbursts by demoralized 

and disenfranchised organizations. This, in turn, could lead to the 

creation of warlords,118 who are able to serve as rallying points for 

the frustrated elements within the elite.

ENDNOTES

1. See author’s paper, North Korean Leadership: Evolving Regime Dynamics in the 

Kim Jong Il Era, Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2003.

2. Kang Sang Chun (66), who oversees Kim Jong Il’s protocol and security, 

was arrested by Chinese police in January 2006 for illegally transferring real estate 

ownership in Macau. The timing of the arrest was interesting since it occurred 

close to the time of Kim Jong Il’s trip to China. Kang was later released.

3. The term son’gun chongch’i first appeared in Rodong Sinmun editorials in JuneAugust 1998, preceding the launch of a Taepodong missile across Japan and Kim 

Jong Il’s official succession to power later the same year.

4. One explanation is Kim’s suspicions of senior KWP cadres of his father’s 

generation, who are less responsive to his command than younger KPA officers. He 

knows from history that Kim Il Sung took one decade of KWP factional struggles 

to reach the summit. The unified and loyal military is seen by the suryong as a 

quicker conduit to power and as a fixer of the moribund economy.

5. By the late 1990s, Kim Jong Il’s reliance on the military as a key pillar in 

the maintenance of his regime was unquestionable, made clear by the military’s 

significant rise in status vis-à-vis the Party. Military leaders, who in the past had 

been overshadowed by the party cadres, began to rise within the Pyongyang 

power structure. For example, vice marshals, who used to be ranked on VIP 

lists beginning around 30 (or even 50), by the late 1990s were placed just below 

Politburo members but above Party Central Committee secretaries and cabinet 

ministers.

6. The information used to construct Figure 2 is provided by the Ministry of 

National Unification, which tracks Kim Jong Il’s movements.

7. “DPRK: Kim Jong Il Appearances,” compiled by the Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service (FBIS).

8. The names in bold denote those members of the leadership who are either 

uniformed military or are members of the NDC. The judgments about political 

orientation are based on the author’s discussions with Lim Chae Hyoung, a 

research fellow at the Dankook Center for Dispute Resolution and the secretary 

general of the Korean Political Science Association. He writes widely on North 

Korean foreign policy issues and is one of the few scholars to attempt to ascribe 

political leanings to members of the North Korean leadership.

9. Figure 3 comes from the ROK Unification Ministry analysis of DPRK Leader’s 

Activities in 2005, January 23, 2006.
50

10. Yoel Sano, “Military Holds the Key,” Asia Times Online, February 18, 2005.

11. Ken Gause, “Leadership Politics in North Korea,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 

November 1994.

12. These carrots and sticks were first outlined in Jei Guk Jeon, “Kim Jong Il’s 

Ride on the Tiger KPA: A Two Pronged Strategy Toward the Military,” Korean 

Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XI, No. 1, Summer 1999.

13. EIU, Country Report: North Korea 4th Quarter 1997, p. 37; Lee Ki Taek, “The 

Army and Authoritative Rule in North Korea,” Vantage Point, Vol. 21, February 

1998.

14. Rodong Shinmun, April 10, 1997.

15. Russia DPRK Report, May/June 1996; Vantage Point, Vol. 21, August 1998. 

Consistent with the strong influence of the military in the North Korean leadership, 

the list of the representatives to the 10th term of the SPA includes 75 higher military 

leaders with ranks at or above lieutenant general (two-star).

16. According to many observers, the KWP increasingly has been marginalized 

in court politics. 

17. Jei Guk Jeon, a freelance scholar in Seoul, has written the most insightful 

studies of the generational challenge Kim Jong Il faces and how he has tried to 

deal with it. His two major works are “The Politics of Mourning Ritual in North 

Korea, 1994-1997,” World Affairs, Winter 2000; and “North Korean Leadership: Kim 

Jong Il’s Intergenerational Balancing Act,” The Strategic Forum, No. 152, December 

1998. 

18. In the KPA, all decisions regarding vice marshal and marshal are the 

responsibility of the NDC and (most likely) the CMC. Appointments to these 

bodies, of course, also would fall under their control. Kim Jong Il makes all other 

general grade appointments in his capacity as the Supreme Commander.

19. Sin Tong a, June 1993, pp. 452-461.

20. In his speech marking the 60th anniversary of the KPA, Choe did not 

highlight Kim Jong Il and, as a result, was regarded by the leader as a member 

of the anti-Kim Jong Il faction within the military. But in his April 1993 speech 

commemorating the 61st anniversary, he pledged his loyalty to the Dear Leader. 

Two months earlier, Kim Kwang-chin had delivered a speech marking the 30th 

anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s military slogan “One-a-match-for-100” in which he 

stated that the “leadership system of the respected Supreme Commander Comrade 

Kim Jong Il has been firmly established within our People’s Army, and the entire 

Army is firmly and single-heartedly rallied behind him.”

21. Jei Guk Jeon, “North Korean Leadership.” 

22. Ken Gause, “Leadership Politics in North Korea,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 

November 1994.

23. Ken Gause, The North Korean Leadership: Evolving Regime Dynamics in the Kim 

Jong Il Era, Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2003.
51

24. Pak’s communication channel to Kim Jong Il goes around his immediate 

superior in the GPB, Yi Pong Won.

25. Joseph Bermudez, The Armed Forces of North Korea, London: I. B. Tauris & 

Co., Ltd., 2001, p. 40. It also is rumored that the Operations Bureau may serve as an 

information facilitating body for NDC directives to the KPA, a relationship similar 

to the one that existed between the Soviet General Staff’s Operation Directorate 

and the Defense Council. 

26. Chang Song U is the older brother of Chang Song-taek, Kim Chong-il’s 

brother-in-law.

27. Yi’s relationship with Chang dates back to at least the early 1990s when Yi 

was commander of the 5th Corps.

28. Hyon’s post was taken by another Kim protégé, General Kim Ki-son.

29. He was named a member of the Central Committee in 1993 and promoted 

to the rank of General in 1995. Apparently, the defection of his nephew, Hyon 

Sung Il, in 1996 did not do much damage to his influence. 

30. Hyon Chul Hae apparently works closely with General Pak Chae Kyong in 

this role. Both were instrumental in assisting Kim Jong Il in the consolidation of 

his control over the military. 

31. Chung Chang-hyun, Kim Jong Il Up Close and Personal, Seoul: Toji Publications, 

1999, p. 224.

32. For a detailed examination of the North Korean high command, see author’s 

article “North Korean Military: Status Over Substance,” SP Military Yearbook, 2002, 

pp. 19-35.

33. “Activities of DPRK VMAR Cho Myong Nok Assessed,” Seoul Yonhap, 

Internet Version, September 29, 2000.

34. For an assessment of the North Korean Navy’s standing within the political 

apparatus, see author’s article, “North Korean Navy Grows in Influence,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, September 2002, pp. 41-43.

35. Kim Chong-min, “Kim Jong Il’s New Ruling Structure and Its Real Power 

Holders,” Seoul Pukhan, October 1998, pp. 60-77.

36. In 1995 there was an attempted coup by elements of the Sixth Army Corps 

in North Hamgyong province province bordering China, the area worst hit by the 

famine. Along with elements in the neighboring 7th Army Corps, they allegedly 

planned to march on Pyongyang.

37. In the past, the Chief of General Staff position has been a final steppingstone before appointment as MPAF, but this latter position seems to have been 

diminished somewhat under Kim Jong Il.

38. This disappearance suggests Yi was “revolutionized,” but the reason for his 

banishment from the leadership remains unknown. 
52

39. Yi served as chairman of the State Inspection Commission and Transportation 

Commission in the late 1980s. Unlike many Asian bureaucracies, including South 

Korea, where military officers being appointed to key government posts are 

discharged from military service, in North Korea, there are many cases of free 

movement between military and non-military posts. 

40. It is rumored that Chon Pyong Ho is the head of the Second Economic 

Committee (SEC), having taken over from Kim Chol Man.

41. Some have suggested that Choe’s removal as Minister of Public Security was 

tied to a purge by Kim Jong Il designed to rid Chang Song-taek’s protégés from 

critical, security-related positions. While this may be the case, Choe apparently 

remained on the NDC. “New Trends of Political Situation in North Korea,” Hong 

Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, January 16, 2005. 

42. “DPRK Coverage of State Funeral Suggests Demotion of NDC Member,” 

FBIS Feature, December 9, 2005.

43. “North Korea Starts Official Procedures for Third Generation Power 

Succession,” Seoul Shindong-A, September 1, 2005.

44. When a man by the somewhat unusual name of Paek Se Pong was listed as 

a member of the powerful NDC at the SPA meeting in 2003, North Korea watchers 

were unable to identify him. A complete unknown, his name did not appear in 

any database of North Korean officials, sparking speculation that the name was a 

pseudonym, and that the individual was actually one of Kim Jong Il’s sons, who 

was being groomed to succeed him. The interpretation of the name was that Paek 

stood for Mt. Paektu; Se was a Korean word for “three;” and Bong was “peak.” 

Thus, the name was believed to mean “The three peaks of Mt. Paektu—Kim Il 

Song; Kim Jong Il; and his mother, Kim Chong Suk.”

45. Pyongyang radio, October 22, 2005; Rodong Sinmun, October 23, 2005.

46. Paek is listed below these 16 high-level officials and even after the chairmen 

of North Korea’s two front parties—the Korea Social Democratic Party and the 

Korea Chondoist Cho’ngu Party—who are never referred to as “comrade.” In 

virtually all media reporting of attendance at official functions, the chairmen of 

these minor parties seem to mark the cutoff point for the “comrade” grouping. 

He is listed before the chairman of the Central Control Committee and nine 

Central Committee department directors or deputy directors—none of whom are 

consistently referred to as “comrade” in media reporting. His position in the list—

grouped together with party Central Committee non-secretary level officials—

suggests, however, that he could be a senior official under the Central Committee, 

possibly the CMC, given his previous identification as a member of the NDC. It 

should be noted, however, that in the past, there have been officials who have 

appeared out of sequence in funeral lists only to appear later in their assumed 

post.

47. “Pyongyang Leadership Resembles General Hospital Ward,” Seoul JeongAng

Ilbo, June 29, 2005.
53

48. Other major figures not on the NDC, such as Kim Yong Nam (age 77, 

commissioner of SPA standing committee), Choe Tae Pok (age 75, chairman of the 

SPA), Yang Hyong Sop (age 80, vice commissioner of the SPA standing committee), 

Kim Ki Nam (age 79, KWP Secretary and vice commissioner of DPRK’s Committee 

for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland), Kim Chung Lin (age 81, KWP 

Secretary), are within the aging elite.

49. In addition to its functional role, the CMC has a ceremonial role. It 

sponsors the armed forces day celebrations. Since 1995, the CMC has issued all 

congratulatory messages to all military events, something the KWP used to do 

prior to 1995. See Hyeong Jung Park and Kyo Duk Lee, Continuities and Changes 

in the Power Structure and the Role of Party Organizations Under Kim Jong Il’s Reign, 

Studies Series 05-05, Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, May 2005.

50. Some North Korea watchers, however, argue that Kim’s weakening of the 

KWP’s functions did not seriously undermine its preponderant position within 

the regime. They contend that it remains the supreme organization that controls, 

organizes, and directs various projects in the political, economic, cultural, and 

military fields. The military-first policy, they argue, “fundamentally aims to 

ensure the unlimited loyalty of the military to the great tasks of the party.” Ko 

Sang Jin, “Fundamental Characteristics of Great Leader Kim Jong Il’s Military-first 

Politics,” The Philosophical Studies, Vol. 1, 1999, p. 18. See also Hyeong Jung Park 

and Kyo Duk Lee.

51. Discussion with U.S. and South Korean sources.

52. This list is based on a reference pamphlet published by the South Korean 

Ministry of Unification in February 2005. As noted, several of the members have 

retired from their institutional portfolios, thus making it unclear whether they still 

hold positions on the CMC.

53. The veracity of these documents is highly suspect. There is a cottage industry 

that exists along the Chinese-North Korean border that traffics in forged DPRK 

documents. Whether this industry is tied to a larger North Korean disinformation 

campaign is not clear. Discussion with ROK and Chinese journalists and former 

intelligence sources.

54. “Workers Party of Korea [KWP] Central Military Committee Order No. 

2—On the Issuance of Regulations for Wartime Operations” (2 pages), with a copy 

of the “Regulations for Wartime Operations” (31 pages) appended.

55. The CMC forwards military requirements to the KWP Munitions Industry 

Department, which, in turn, passes them to the Second Economic Committee. At 

this level, requirements are reviewed and compared with the relevant defense 

industry’s resources and finances. See Kyoung-Soo Kim, North Korea’s CB 

Weapons: Threat and Capability. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, 

No. 1, Spring 2002.

56. In terms of composition, the CMC is better suited to exercise control over 

the military than the NDC. Traditionally, its membership has includes active duty 

and retired officers, many of whom are considered the “top brains” of the armed 

forces.
54

57. The North Korean ship sunk by the Japanese Coast Guard in December 

2001 is believed to have belonged to the Operations Department. All personnel 

aboard the vessel committed suicide instead of surrendering.

58. O Kuk Yol is the son of O Chung Hup, who died in action while fighting 

the Japanese with Kim Il Sung in the 1930s. It is reported that he lived with Kim Il 

Sung’s family before entering the Mangyongdae Revolution Institute. He entered 

the Air Force and was promoted rapidly, becoming commander in 1971, deputy 

chief of the General Staff in 1977, and chief of the General Staff in 1979. In 1980, 

his career reached a pinnacle with his election to the Politburo and CMC. In 1988, 

however, he was dismissed as chief of the General Staff following a power struggle 

with O Chin U. In 1992, he was identified as director of the KWP Civil Defense 

Department. A year later, he was identified in his current post.

59. Many speculated that the NDC’s administrative affairs were either the 

responsibility of Kim Jong Il’s personal secretariat (as with the Supreme Defense 

Council under Stalin) or had a dedicated apparatus (as exists in China).

60. According to some South Korean sources, the Military Affairs Department 

was eliminated as part of a shakeup of the KWP in 2004 to streamline Kim Jong 

Il’s control over the military and reduce the party’s interference in military affairs. 

Kim, they contend, now directs the armed forces through the GPB’s chain of 

command. The shifts in the GPB would seem to support the argument that the 

KWP’s role in military affairs has been reduced. However, in 2005, Hwang Pyong 

Il, identified as a deputy director of the KWP Military Department, has been a 

frequent accompanying cadre on Kim’s guidance inspections, suggesting that the 

department still exists. See “New Confidants of Chairman Kim Jong Il Emerge,” 

Seoul Yonhap, June 9, 2005.

61. “North Appoints New Reserve Chief,” Seoul JoongAng Ilbo, February 24, 

2005. Chang Song U is a second-generation military leader whose contact with 

Kim Jong Il dates back to the early 1980s. Chang is the older brother of Chang Song 

Taek, Kim’s brother-in-law. Until Chang Song Taek’s fall from power in 2004, 

Chang Song U enjoyed the trust of the Great Leader. A member of the Central 

Committee since 1982, Chang was promoted to lieutenant general in 1984. He rose 

through the security apparatus, first in the Ministry of Public Security and then 

the General Guards Bureau. He became commander of the 3rd Army Corps in 

1994. This corps, which is deployed in Pyongyang, is considered vital for regime 

security. Chang at times also was identified as director of the Guard Command’s 

Political Bureau, which would involve him in Kim Jong Il’s personal security. 

Chang’s transfer from the 3rd Corps to the KWP Civil Defense Department is 

considered a demotion.

62. The Chinese press in September 2005 reported on President Hu Jintao’s 

meeting with Kim Ik Hyon, who was leading a delegation of Korean anti-Japanese 

revolutionary fighters participating in the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of 

the victory in the world anti-fascist war, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. 

The report did not mention his status on the CMC.
55

63. He took care of Kim Il Song’s grandparents, Kim Po Hyon and Yi Po Ik.

64. The Guard Command is subordinate organizationally to the MPAF.

65. Yi’s influence has been obvious since 1996, when his name (together with 

vice marshals Cho Myong Nok and Kim Yong Chun) began to appear right below 

full Politburo members and above associate members in lists of attendees at 

important functions.

66. “Biographical and Career Data on North Korean VMAR Pak Ki-so,” Seoul 

National Intelligence Service, November 1, 1999.

67. “Pyongyang has Dozens of Nukes, Top Defector Says,” AFP, May 14, 

2003. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Kim Jong Il allegedly established 

an underground command post, which was called about the KPA Supreme 

Command’s Field Command Post. There, he conducted analysis of the war 

situation together with members of the office of Kim Jong Il’s military strategy 

assistants formally known as the “Operation Team [chakchonjo].” Besides Kim 

Tu-nam, the Operation Team includes Cho Myong Nok; Kim Yong Chun; and Yi 

Myong Su, director of the General Staff’s Operations Department. Another feature 

of the Operation Team is that it reportedly has on staff specialists with high levels 

of knowledge on such things as missiles and radars.

68. Kim Il Song initially employed Kim Tu Nam up as his aide-de-camp. “DPRK 

Defector on Kim Jong Il’s Family, Close Aides,” Tokyo Gendai, August 2, 2003.

69. Other professors who taught military science to Kim Jong Il include VMAR 

Choe In Tok, President of the Kim Il Song University; Lieutenant General Kim Sun 

Il, Vice President of the university; and Major General Kim Sang Ho.

70. In 1976, Kim published an article entitled “Scientific Features of Modern 

War and Factors of Victory,” which reexamined and reinterpreted North 

Korean military doctrine. He focused at length on the importance of economic 

development and the impact of new weapons on military strategy. He argued that 

the quality of arms and the level of military technology define the characteristics 

of war. Kim’s article contains several concepts that continue to influence North 

Korean operational art; particularly influential are the concepts that emphasize 

the importance of operational and tactical mobility through the employment 

of mechanized forces, the importance of firepower throughout the depth of the 

battlefield, the importance of deep strikes, and the importance of command and 

control. Kim also stresses that each operational plan and campaign should aim at 

a lightning war for a quick decision. See globalsecurity.org for more information on 

North Korean military doctrine.

71. The SEC is responsible for the defense industry. It is commanded and 

controlled by the KWP CMC and the Central Committee’s Munitions Industry 

Department. Originally placed under the party Central Committee, the SEC was 

placed under the NDC in 1993, when Kim Jong Il was appointed its chairman and 

the commission’s status and role were elevated. Although the South Korean media 

have long referred to North Korea’s “Second Economic Committee,” the term has 
56

not been observed in DPRK media, Joongang Ilbo, May 22, 1995. Nor are any of the 

subordinate units of the SEC mentioned in the North Korean media.

72. Kim Chol Man may have taken over the Agriculture portfolio from So Kwan 

Hui, who died.

73. Because his father was a close subordinate of Kim Il Song during the days 

of anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle, he enjoyed Kim Il Song’s confidence and also 

was highly trusted by O Chin U.

74. Based on a discussion with North Korean defector. When O Kuk Yol, 

a confidant of Kim Jong Il who was then serving as chief of the General Staff, 

attempted to wipe out political officers within the military circles in the late 1980s, 

Yi Pong Won reported the irregularities of approximately 10 generals, including 

O, to Kim Il Song and set off a purge of the high command. This apparently caused 

resentment on the part of Kim Jong Il and O Kuk Yol toward Yi, which may have 

contributed to the rumors of his demise.

75. “15 Powerful Figures in the Kim Jong Il Regime,” Seoul Sindong-A, September 

1998. Yi Pong Won remains on the FBIS CMC list, but has been taken off of the 

latest list provided by the ROK National Intelligence Service.

76. Before he was appointed as director of the Artillery Guidance Bureau in 1988, 

Choe Sang-Uk held the position of commander of the KPA Artillery Command, 

1985-88.

77. At the time of the regime’s founding in September 1948, North Korea called 

the Office of Military Forces the “People’s Defense Ministry.” It was renamed the 

Ministry of People’s Armed Forces in a sweeping power structure reorganization, 

featuring the creation of the state presidency made at the first meeting of the Fifth 

SPA in December 1972. The MPAF was separated from the Administration Council 

and put under the CPC in April 1982. The Ministry was again placed under the 

NDC in May 1990 when the Commission was expanded.

78. In order that no high-ranking military officer can conspire with another to 

topple Kim Jong Il, the present structure forces each one to stand-alone and each 

be ultimately responsible to the supreme commander.

79. There are reports that this post is now vacant and essentially is overseen 

by Kim Jong Il himself. This is similar to the situation that exists with the KWP’s 

Organization and Guidance Department.

80. Kim has been referred to in the North Korean press as a vice minister of 

the MPAF and chief of the Engineering Bureau of the General Staff. See “ROK’s 

Yonhap Analyzes DPRK’s Recent Promotion of Military Officials,” Seoul Yonhap, 

July 27, 2003; “DPRK Learning From Vietnam’s Reform, Opening Up Through 

Expanding Ties,” Seoul Yonhap, December 3, 2003. 

81. It is not clear whether Pak Yun Hwal still holds this portfolio. The most 

recent references to him in the North Korean press are to the unit named after 

him, which is involved in construction projects. This could suggest that he has 
57

retired. See “DPRK, PRC Units Involved in Construction of Taean Friendship 

Glass Factory,” North Korea and China, FBIS Report in English, October 7, 2005. 

82. This listing is based on discussions with various North Korea watchers and 

the North Korea Directory, Radiopress, Inc, Kanagawa, Japan, 2004.

83. See “DPRK Media Coverage of State Funeral Suggests Demotion of NDC 

Member,” North Korea, OSC Analysis in English, December 8, 2005. See also North 

Korea Directory, Japan: Radio Press, 2004.

84. Joseph Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, p. 59.

85. This map is adapted from one that appeared in Seoul Wolgan Chungang, 

November 1, 2000. All boundaries and corps locations are approximate.

86. Seven of nine infantry corps commanders, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 

Wonson Corps, as well as some mechanized and artillery corps, were changed. 

Almost all of the brigade-level commanders were replaced by people in their 30s. 

This reshuffle has received little attention in the press. I have received the names of 

most of the new appointees, but have not been able to corroborate the information. 

For that reason, I have chosen not to publish the names.

87. Occasionally, a corps commander rises to vice marshal rank, as in the cases 

of Chon Chae Son (First Corps) and Chang Song U (Third Corps).

88. Often corps commanders are not identified until Kim Jong Il visits their 

unit, and in many cases, not even then.

89. In the Military Balance 2006, the International Institute for Strategic Studies 

reported that the DPRK’s submarine warfare capacity has increased dramatically, 

and the number of its troops under arms has been reduced. The institute said the 

changes in the DPRK’s military machine suggested that Pyongyang was focusing 

on doing the maximum possible damage to the infrastructure of the ROK in case of 

war, rather than maintaining a large coterie of under-equipped ground troops. 

90. For an examination of this purge, see author’s chapter in North Korean Policy 

Elites, Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004.

91. There are rumors that the Guard Command recently may have been 

restructured and designated the Guard Bureau or the General Guard Bureau. One 

source states that this occurred in 2000. “Implicit Conflict,” Seoul Pukhan Yojigyong, 

June 1, 2006, pp. 214-218.

92. According to some sources, Kim Jong Il began to place more emphasis on 

the Guard Command following the execution of Romanian President Ceausescu 

in 1990.

93. Security for Kim Jong Il originally was handled by the State Defense 

Department. However, beginning in 1976, this activity was taken over by the 

Guard General Bureau. After Kim Il Song’s death, the Guard General Bureau was 

reorganized into the Guard Command.

94. The only other name mentioned as a possible successor to Yi Ul Sol is his 

long-time chief of staff, Colonel General Yun Chong In.
58

95. Kim Sung Bom’s time in grade as a lieutenant general is considered by 

many experts on North Korean military promotional patterns to be shorter than 

normal.

96. The extent of the relationship of these two security forces was highlighted 

in reporting in 2005. South Korea’s JoongAng Ilbo reported that “thousands of 

soldiers” from the “Pyongyang Defense Command and Third Army Corps” had 

been mobilized to kill and bury infected chickens around Pyongyang, March 31, 

2005.

97. It should be noted that Pak Ki So has not disappeared from public view. 

In April 2005, he sat in the front row of the 73rd KPA Founding Anniversary 

Report Meeting. See “Panoramic View of DPRK Leaders at 73rd KPA Founding 

Anniversary Report Meeting,” Pyongyang Korean Central Television via Satellite 

in Korean 0602 GMT, April 24, 2005, cited in FBIS.

98. The Security Command technically holds equal organizational status with 

the General Staff and the GPB. However, the command’s status and the close 

relationship between its commander, General Won Ung Hui, and Kim Jong Il 

apparently allows it to operate autonomously from the MPAF.

99. Kim Jong Il allegedly entrusted the KPA with both the investigation and 

purge because, in his words, “the State Security Department and the Ministry of 

Public Security are in collusion with the corrupted forces.” Defense and Foreign 

Affairs Strategic Policy, January 1999.

100. In 2005, North Korea placed a block on foreign trade organizations and 

companies operating there from making international phone calls after news of a 

bird flu outbreak spread rapidly to the outside world, presumably through phone 

lines. “North Korea Limits International Phone Services After Bird Flu Outbreak,” 

Seoul Yonhap, May 13, 2005.

101.According to some sources, the former commander of the General Guards 

Bureau, Yi Ul Sol, is close to Kim Chong Nam and “treats him like a grandson.” 

102. According to recent reports, Kim Jong Il has since remarried Kim Ok Hui, 

one of his secretaries. 

103. In a recent article, Brent Choi of Joongang Ilbo makes a wise argument 

that speculation on the succession struggle often has proved wrong, based on 

less than reputable documents and spurious logic. There is an almost unanimous 

assumption in the media, and among many Pyongyang watchers, that Kim’s 

successor will be one of his sons. While this is a strong possibility, it is not beyond 

reason that another powerful figure could emerge to take the reins of power, 

especially if something were to happen to Kim in the near term or if the succession 

does not occur for years, giving time for major shifts in the structural dynamics 

within the regime. See “Looking for Mr. X: North Korea’s Successor,” presented 

on the Nautilus website, January 10, 2006.

104. Until Chang’s purge, Hwang Chang Yop believed Chang Song Taek was 

the most likely successor if Kim Jong Il were to become ill or step down in the 
59

near term. Chang also could serve as the power behind the throne if one of Ko 

Yong Hui’s young sons (approximately 22 and 20) was chosen. A rumor in early 

2004 posited the possibility of a nephew, the son of Kim Kyong Hui and Chang 

Song Taek, succeeding Kim. An excellent examination of the various contenders 

is provided by Yoel Sano, “Happy Birthday, Dear Leader—Who’s Next in Line?” 

Asia Times, February 14, 2004.

105. As noted earlier, VMAR Chang Song U has been identified as the 

commander of the Civil Defense Command, a key post within the regime, but not 

as critical as the Third Corps, which serves a Praetorian Guard function. Lieutenant 

General Chang Song Kil has not been mentioned in the press since 1988, when he 

accompanied Kim Jong Il to a performance of the 488th Great Command Unit’s art 

propaganda troupe. His death was announced in July 2006. At that time, it was 

revealed he most recently had occupied the post of curator of the Revolutionary 

Museum of the Armed Forces. This post traditionally has been reserved for senior 

military officers who are no longer able to perform their duties for health reasons. 

“Chang Song Kil Dies. Death Likely Due to Illness,” The Daily NK, July 12, 2006.

106. Other calculations of how much North Korea spends on its military varies 

from these figures based on different calculations. For example, Military Balance 

2004-2005 by the UK’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated 

that North Korea’s military expenditure in 2004 was approximately $5.5 billion, or 

25 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). To put this in perspective, the 

ROK’s defense budget was $14.6 billion in 2004. Taking into consideration that the 

size of North Korea’s economy is less than 1/30th of the ROK’s economy, it can be 

seen how important military power is to North Korea.

107. “Gradual Increase in DPRK’s Defense Budget,” Seoul Yonhap, March 

25, 2004. Figure 18 is based on North Korean figures. However, taking into 

consideration the characteristics of the North Korean system and its budgetary 

system, ROK budget analysts believe that North Korea’s actual military spending 

is over 30 percent of its GNP. In other words, in addition to state budget, North 

Korea’s defense budget is augmented by the independent military budget system 

through the military supply economic operation system, the second economy, the 

export of weapons, and the military units that earn foreign currencies; and it is 

believed that North Korea has an extremely low-cost military spending structure 

with the defense industrial plants that are owned by the state. See ROK Defense 

Whitepaper 2004.

108. Dick Nanto provides some sobering figures. About 40 percent of the 

population still suffers from malnutrition, including 30 percent of the children. 

See his chapter in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The 

Politics of Regime Survival, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2006.

109. North Korea’s current economic policy can be traced back to 2001, with the 

announcement of “new thinking,” which was followed by the “1 July economic 

management improvement measures” in 2002. Following the guidance laid down 

in these measures, North Korea embarked on enacting new laws or revising the 
60

existing laws for economic reform and put forth the “military-first era’s economic 

construction line” (a line of simultaneously developing light industry and 

agriculture with priority given to defense industry) in September 2002 as a new 

economic operation policy. So, while Kim has tried to readjust priorities, he has 

done it within the Military-first Policy. 

110. According to one theory, Kim decided to declare the existence of North 

Korea’s nuclear weapons to counter the military’s security arguments. The military 

had been arguing: “Why does North Korea have to take a conciliatory stance by 

suggesting the possibility of abandoning nuclear weapons when the United States 

keeps its hostile policy toward North Korea unchanged? The regime is still beset 

with instability because of that, which makes it all the more necessary for the 

military to take action.” Therefore, North Korea needed to declare its possession of 

nuclear weapons in terms of saying that it could handle its own security without 

having to make a compromise to the United States to pacify the military before 

instituting a shift away from the military-first policy. No matter what the reason, 

the declaration on nuclear weapons has inhibited the reform effort, if for no other 

reason than it makes it harder to establish market systems with ties to the outside 

world.

111. It is important to note that many analysts, especially North Korean 

defectors, point to Kim Jong Il as the largest impediment to reform. They note that 

he has become disengaged and unable to make clear policy choices. Reformers 

within the system, they contend, often have “disappeared” after pushing policy 

changes.

112. These reasons for Kim Jong Il’s new thinking were first posited by Yu Ho 

Yol, “Change in N. Korea needs scrutiny,” The Dong-a Ilbo, January 17, 2001.

113. Unlike in previous visits to China, Kim’s entourage was composed almost 

entirely of economic officials, such as DPRK Cabinet Premier Pak Pong Chu; Pak 

Nam Ki, Chairman of SPA Budget Committee; Yi Kwang Ho, director of KWP 

S&T Department; and DPRK Vice Cabinet Premier Ro Tu Chol. If there were any 

military officials as part of the entourage, they were not identified publicly.

114. Quote from “North Korea: Will Economic Reform Defuse the Nuclear 

Crisis?” Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan, January 30, 2005.

115. The UNICEF Humanitarian Action Report 2006.

116. Cracks have at time been rumored to exist within Kim Jong Il’s core 

constituency. In the late 1990s, such stalwart supporters as Kim Kuk Tae, Kim 

Ki Nam, and Kim Yong Sun were rumored to be frustrated by lack of influence 

and access, when Kim Jong Il tended not to accept policy proposals they made. 

Nothing much seemed to materialize from this discontent. However, it did reveal 

that as the system came under increasing economic and political pressure, cracks 

could even appear within Kim Jong Il’s inner sanctum.

117. Kim Il Song carried out five purges of the North Korean military. While 

he was able to rid the system of warlords, he did not cut deep to eradicate their 

patronage systems. In fact, today colleagues or descendants of these vanished 
61

warlords exist within the high command. Cho Myong Nok, Yi Tu Ik, Choe In Tok, 

Kim Ik Hyon, Chon Chin Su, Yi Pyong Uk, Kim Yong Yon, and Chon Chae Son 

were protégés of one or another warlords; while Kim Il Chol, Kim Yong Chun, 

Yi Yong Mu, Pak Chae Kyong, Hyon Chol Hae, Won Ung Hui, Kim Myong Kuk, 

Yi Myong Su, O Kuk Yol, Kim Tae Sik, O Yong Pang, Kim Ha Kyu, Chang Pong 

Chun, Yi Chong San, Pak Ki So, Kim Kyok Sik, Yi Yong Hwan, and Chu Sang Song 

are their descendants. Kim Chong Min, “Kim Chong-il’s New Ruling Structure 

and Its Real Power Holders,” Seoul Pukhan, October 1998, pp. 60-77.

118.Warlords, in this context, refers to individual leaders, who have sources of 

power, independent of Kim Jong Il’s largess or manipulation, including alliances 

within the security and military apparatuses.