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STATE v. WILLIAMS-BEY—DISSENT

ECKER, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I would

hold that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed

on the defendant, Tauren Williams-Bey, in accordance

with General Statutes § 53a-54a is unconstitutional as

applied to a juvenile offender.1 My reasons are substantially the same as those set forth at length in Justice

Eveleigh’s dissenting opinion in State v. Taylor G., 315

Conn. 734, 796–97, 110 A.3d 338 (2015)2

(expressing

view that mandatory minimum sentences cannot be

applied to juvenile offenders under reasoning of Miller

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d

407 [2012]), and the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court

in State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 2014) (relying

on state constitution to hold that mandatory minimum sentences cannot be applied to juvenile offenders).3 Therefore, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand this case to the Appellate Court.4

No useful purpose is served by restating at length

what already has been said in Justice Eveleigh’s dissenting opinion in Taylor G. In light of the fundamental

principles animating Miller and our own decisions in

State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert.

denied, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376

(2016), and Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction,

317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub

nom. Semple v. Casiano, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 1364,

194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016), I am of the view that mandatory

minimum sentences designed for adult offenders cannot constitutionally be applied to juvenile offenders

tried as adults without providing an individualized sentencing proceeding in which the sentencing judge must

consider the mitigating effects of youth and its associated features. ‘‘[C]hildren are constitutionally different

from adults for sentencing purposes,’’ and these biological and psychological differences strike at ‘‘[t]he heart’’

of the rationale underlying the ‘‘penological justifications’’ for sentencing. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 471–72. These

differences do not change depending on the length of

the sentence imposed, and, accordingly, the attendant

constitutional safeguards should not change either. We

have deemed the ‘‘individualized sentencing prescribed

by Miller’’ to be ‘‘central to an accurate determination

that the sentence imposed is a proportionate one’’ and

‘‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 69–70. Rightfully so.

For the reasons explained in my dissenting opinion

in State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378, 429, A.3d

(2019), I also believe that the availability of parole eligibility under § 1 of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts,
codified at General Statutes § 54-125a, is not a substitute

for a Miller-compliant sentencing hearing and that the

defendant is entitled to retroactive relief in the form of

a Miller-compliant resentencing hearing under these

circumstances.

I therefore dissent.

1 The defendant was sixteen years old when he committed the crimes

that serve as the basis for his conviction.

2

I disagree with the majority opinion that the applicability of the Miller

rule to mandatory minimum sentences was not briefed by the defendant in

a manner sufficient to allow us to reach the issue. In his principal brief, the

defendant claimed that his sentence ‘‘violated the prohibition on cruel and

unusual punishment’’ because the Miller rule applies to all juvenile offenders,

regardless of the length of the sentence imposed. In support of his argument,

the defendant quotes Justice Eveleigh’s dissenting opinion at length, devoting

two pages to a thorough discussion of the dissent and Justice Eveleigh’s

conclusion that ‘‘neither the crime nor its mandatory minimum punishment

should be a factor in a sentencing court’s ability to comply with the eighth

amendment . . . and, therefore, a sentencing court possesses discretion to

fashion a constitutionally permissible sentence, even if that sentence departs

downward from a mandatory minimum sentence.’’ State v. Taylor G., supra,

315 Conn. 776. The constitutionality under federal law of mandatory minimum sentences as applied to juvenile offenders is intertwined with the legal

arguments at issue in the present appeal and, in my view, is appropriate

for appellate review. Cf. Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction, 319

Conn. 623, 635 n.7, 126 A.3d 558 (2015) (distinguishing between ‘‘claim[s]’’

and ‘‘argument[s]’’ and noting that appellate courts may review ‘‘legal arguments that . . . are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related

to the legal claim’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

3

I recognize that the cited cases all involve direct appeals from judgments

of conviction, whereas the present appeal is taken from the trial court’s

denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. I rely on the reasoning

contained in these cases relating to the merits of the constitutional claim,

i.e., whether the constitution is violated by the application of mandatory

minimum sentences without any ability for the sentencing court to consider

the hallmarks of youth in mitigation under Miller. That substantive analysis

applies in the context of a postconviction appeal, in my view, for the reasons

explained in my dissenting opinion in State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378, 429,

A.3d (2019).

4

I would remand this case to the Appellate Court with instruction to

address the state’s remaining claim that the defendant waived his right to

the relief being sought because his sentence was imposed pursuant to a

plea agreement. See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 241 Conn. 784, 792, 699 A.2d

91 (1997) (reversing judgment of Appellate Court and remanding for consideration of remaining claims). The waiver issue was fully briefed in the

Appellate Court but was not decided due to that court’s disposition of the

appeal in favor of the state on the merits.