SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2194-18T3

ROSALYND SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PATERSON BOARD 

OF EDUCATION and

VIRGINIA GALIZIA,

Defendants-Respondents.

___________________________

Submitted May 26, 2020 – Decided July 22, 2020

Before Judges Sumners and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1742-15.

Rosalynd Smith, appellant pro se.

Schenck, Price, Smith & King, LLP, attorneys for 

respondent (John D. McCarthy, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Plaintiff Rosalynd Smith was employed as a non-tenured teacher with

defendant Paterson Board of Education (the Board) for the 2012-2013 school 

year. She was supervised by defendant Virginia Galizia, the Alexander 

Hamilton Academy Principal. Following the Board's decision not to renew her 

non-tenured teaching contract for the 2013-2014 school year, Smith filed a Law 

Division complaint alleging violation of the New Jersey Law Against 

Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, 

N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, and other causes of action.

As a result of settlement discussions on the cusp of trial, the trial judge 

was advised by the parties' counsel that a settlement agreement was reached. 

Smith, however, claimed she did not agree to the settlement. The judge 

subsequently granted the Board's motion to enforce the settlement. Eighteen 

months later, Smith moved to vacate the order enforcing the settlement. A 

different judge denied the motion. For the reasons that follow, we reject Smith's 

appeal of that order. 

I

The parties and their counsel reported for trial of Smith's claims on May 

15, 2017. In an effort to resolve the matter, the trial judge engaged the parties 

in settlement negotiations, which included the judge having separate in chamber
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conferences with Board counsel, and with Smith and her counsel, Gina Mendola 

Longarzo. After a few hours of negotiations, Board counsel advised the judge 

a settlement had been reached subject to the Board's approval at its meeting on 

May 17. According to the settlement terms, the Board could resolve the matter 

by paying Smith $45,000 without her return to employment, or in the alternative, 

pay her $10,000 and return her to employment. The settlement terms were not 

placed on the record. 

On the morning of May 18, Board counsel advised Mendola Longarzo the 

Board agreed to the settlement option of $45,000. Thus, as the judge had 

directed on May 15, Smith and Board counsel personally appeared before the 

judge that afternoon with Mendola Longarzo appearing by telephone because of 

a scheduling conflict. Board counsel informed the judge the Board agreed to 

settle the matter by paying Smith $45,000. Smith, however, stated she did not 

agree to settling her complaint. After the judge conferenced with Smith and 

Mendola Longarzo in chambers, the proceedings resumed on the record with the 

judge stating Mendola Longarzo was allowed to withdraw as counsel and the 

Board should file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement given Smith's 

position that an agreement was not reached.
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The Board promptly complied with the judge's directive by moving to 

enforce the settlement agreement, which Smith, representing herself, opposed. 

At the May 23 hearing on the Board's motion, Mendola Longarzo, who was 

subpoenaed by the Board, testified Smith agreed to the settlement terms on May 

15 subject to the Board's action at its meeting two nights later to accept one of 

the two settlement options. The judge was informed the Board agreed to the 

option to pay Smith $45,000 and not have her return to work. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the judge placed her decision on the record granting the Board's 

motion based on her determination the parties reached a binding settlement

agreement. The judge confirmed her decision in an order entered that day.

Smith did not appeal the order. 

A month later, Board counsel mailed Smith a written settlement agreement 

and release for her execution. Smith responded by email two weeks later stating 

she would not sign the documents. 

On August 10, to satisfy its payment obligation to Smith, the Board filed 

a motion to deposit the $45,000 settlement payment with the court. On 

September 1, the judge granted the motion.

1

 

 

1

 For reasons that are not revealed in the record, it took until January 26, 2018 

for the Board to deposit the settlement funds with the court. 
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On November 18, 2018, some eighteen months after the May 23, 2017 

order enforcing the settlement agreement, Smith filed a motion to vacate the 

order under Rule 4:21A, essentially attacking Mendola Longarzo's 

representation in claiming she did not agree to the alleged settlement terms. The 

Board opposed. Neither party requested oral argument.

On December 10, 2018, a different judge entered an order denying Smith's 

motion and directing her to sign a release so the $45,000 settlement funds could 

be turned over to her. In his statement of reasons accompanying the order, the 

judge noted the motion was denied because Smith failed to file a timely motion 

to reconsider the May 23, 2017 order under Rule 1:7-4(b) within twenty days of 

the order; failed to file with this court a timely appeal of the May 23, 2017 order

under Rule 2:4-1 within forty-five days; and failed to file with the trial court a 

timely motion to vacate an order under Rule 4:50-2 (mistakenly cited as Rule

4:5-2). Putting aside these procedural deficiencies, the judge addressed the 

merits of Smith's contentions. The judge determined "in reviewing the 

settlement conferences and agreement . . . occurring in May 2017," Smith "was 

fully and duly represented by" Mendola Longarzo, who was authorized to settle

her claims for $45,000, which the Board accepted.

Before us, Smith argues:
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POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, BECAUSE THE 

SETTLEMENT WAS ASCERTAINED THROUGH 

UNETHICAL PRACTICES AND BREACHING OF 

CLIENT ATTORNEY MORALS.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, BECAUSE 

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO FREELY 

EXPRESS ONE’S OWN WISHES AND DESIRE TO 

NOT ACCEPT PROPOSED SETTLEMENT. AN 

OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ALL

FACTS/ARGUMENTS BEFORE A JURY DURING A 

TRIAL PROCEEDING SHOULD BE ONE’S 

CHOICE.

POINT III

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS FALSLY 

SOLIC[I]TED AND ABOLISHED PLAINTIFF’S 

RIGHTS TO REFUSE ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF 

CLEARLY STATED THAT SHE WAS NOT 

WILLING TO ACCEPT SUCH A MINUSCULE 

AMOUNT.

POINT IV

EVEN IF PLAINTIFF’S DESIRE TO MOVE 

FORWARD WITH A TRIAL APPEARED TO BE A 

FLUKE, THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE 

"EQUAL AND FREE RIGHTS OPPORTUNITY" 

DOCTRINE SO PLAINTIFF CAN BE
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COMPENSATED FOR HER LOSSES ONCE TRIAL 

HAS BEEN CONDUCTED AND CONCLUDED.

(Not raised below)

II

We first address the procedural grounds upon which the judge denied 

Smith's motion to vacate the May 23, 2017 order. Given Smith's improper 

citation of the Rule 4:21A, which addresses settlements reached through courtmandated arbitration, the judge considered the motion under Rule 4:50-2 and 

found it untimely.

Rule 4:50-1(a)-(e) authorizes a court to relieve a party from a final 

judgment or order for reasons such as: mistake or inadvertence; certain newly 

discovered evidence; fraud; the judgment or order is void; or the judgment or 

order has been satisfied. Subsection (f) of Rule 4:50-1 provides a catch-all 

provision authorizing a court to relieve a party from a judgment or order for 

"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order." 

The essence of subsection (f) is to achieve equity and justice in exceptional 

situations that cannot be easily categorized. DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 

198 N.J. 242, 269-70 (2009) (citing Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 

(1966)). 
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Rule 4:50-2 requires a motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1 to be filed 

within a "reasonable time." However, where the relief sought is based on 

reasons set forth in Rule 4:50-1(a) ("mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 

excusable neglect"), (b) ("newly discovered evidence") or (c) ("fraud"), the 

motion must be filed within one year of entry of the judgment. Ibid.

We review a court's determination of a Rule 4:50-1 motion under an abuse 

of discretion standard. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 

(2012). There is "an abuse of discretion when a decision is 'made without a 

rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested 

on an impermissible basis.'" Ibid. (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 

N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).

Applying these principles, we conclude the judge did not abuse his 

discretion in denying Smith's motion. The judge properly ruled Smith's motion 

to vacate the May 23, 2017 order was untimely because it was made eighteen 

months after it was entered. Although it is not clear if Smith's motion fits the 

criteria under Rule 4:50-1(a), which must be filed within a one-year time limit, 

her motion is still untimely even under the reasonable time limits of Rule 4:50-

2. Smith has not presented any reason to conclude otherwise. In fact, neither 
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her motion to vacate nor her appellate brief explain why it took her so long to 

file the motion to vacate. 

Like the judge, we also address the merits of Smith's appeal. Our state 

has a strong public policy in favor of settlements. Brundage v. Estate of 

Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601, (2008). Essentially, a settlement agreement is a 

contract. See Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (citing Pascarella v. 

Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 (App. Div. 1983). "As a general rule, courts 

should enforce contracts as the parties intended." Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 

258, 266 (2007) (citations omitted). "[P]arties may orally, by informal 

memorandum, or by both agree upon all the essential terms of a contract and 

effectively bind themselves thereon, if that is their intention, even though they 

contemplate the execution later of a formal document to memorialize their 

undertaking." Comerata v. Chaumont, Inc., 52 N.J. Super. 299, 305 (App. Div. 

1958). It is well settled that "[a] contract arises from offer and acceptance, and 

must be sufficiently definite 'that the performance to be rendered by each party 

can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.'" Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 

128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992) (quoting Borough of W. Caldwell v. Borough of 

Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 24-25 (1958)). If the parties agree on the essential terms 

and agree to be bound by those terms, they have created an enforceable contract. 
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Ibid. Nevertheless, "a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling 

circumstances,'" can invalidate a settlement agreement. Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 

N.J. Super. 118, 125 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. 

Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1974)).

We find no fault with the December 10, 2018 order denying Smith's 

motion to vacate the May 23, 2017 order enforcing the settlement agreement 

between her and the Board. The first judge, faced with disputed material facts 

as to whether a settlement was reached, conducted a hearing. See Eaton v. Grau, 

368 N.J. Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 2004) (holding a plenary hearing should be 

held on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement "where the evidence shows 

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact") (citation omitted). She 

determined the parties – through their counsel – had agreed the Board could 

settle Smith's claims by deciding at its May 17 meeting to pay her $45,000 or to 

pay her $10,000 and reinstate her. Since the Board approved the $45,000

payment option, the agreement was held to be consummated. In reviewing the 

record, the second judge properly decided not to disturb the May 23 order

because there was credible evidence to support enforcement of the settlement

agreement. See Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) 

(recognizing appellate review "give[s] deference to the trial [judge] that heard 
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the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions")

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)). 

Having carefully considered Smith's arguments, we find they have no 

merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.