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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

PARSING CHINESE-RUSSIAN 

MILITARY EXERCISES

Richard Weitz

April 2015

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iv

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ISBN 1-58487-680-8

vii

FOREWORD

China and Russia have two of the world’s most 

powerful militaries, and their growing defense cooperation has long been a subject of interest to the 

United States. Studying their military exercises provides insights for several questions of critical importance for the U.S. Army: What are the evolving power-projection capabilities of the Chinese and Russian 

armed forces? How have their tactics, techniques, and 

procedures evolved over time? How do the Chinese 

and Russian militaries conduct joint operations, from 

planning to execution? What is their level of operational interoperability—physical and otherwise? How 

might they conduct a future counterterrorist or counterinsurgency campaign in Central Asia, or maintain 

regional security in the region following the withdrawal of most North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

combat forces from Afghanistan? 

This monograph helps us to answer these questions, as well as consider the broader nature of the 

trilateral relationship between China, Russia, and the 

United States.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD WEITZ is Senior Fellow and Director of 

the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional 

security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, 

and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign and defense 

policies. Dr. Weitz is also an expert at Wikistrat and 

an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New 

American Security. Before joining Hudson in 2005, he 

worked for shorter terms at the Institute for Foreign 

Policy Analysis, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Defense Science Board, Harvard University, 

and other research institutions, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Dr. Weitz has authored or edited 

several books and monographs, including Turkey’s 

New Regional Security Role: Implications For The United 

States (2014); Rebuilding American Military Power in the 

Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy (2013); Global Security 

Watch-China (2013); two volumes of National Security 

Case Studies (2012 and 2008); War and Governance: International Security in a Changing World Order (2011); 

The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow (2010); Global 

Security Watch-Russia (2009); China-Russia Security Relations (2008); Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington 

Responds to Crisis (2008); The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis (2007); and Revitalising 

U.S.–Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures

(2005). Dr. Weitz holds a B.A. with Highest Honors in 

government from Harvard College, a M.Sc. in international relations from the London School of Economics, 

an M.Phil. in politics from the Oxford University, and 

a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University.

xi

SUMMARY

China and Russia have engaged in an increasing 

number of joint exercises in recent years. These drills 

aim to help the two countries deter, and if necessary 

defeat, potential threats—such as Islamist terrorists 

trying to destabilize Central Asian governments—

while also reassuring their allies that China and Russia will protect them from such threats. Furthermore, 

the recurring exercises, and other joint Russia-China 

military activities, have a mutual reassurance function insofar as they inform Moscow and Beijing about 

the other’s military potential and thereby build mutual confidence. Finally, the joint exercises attempt to 

communicate the message to third parties, especially 

the United States, that China and Russia have a genuine security partnership that extends to cover Central 

Asia (a region of great importance for Moscow and 

Beijing) and possibly other areas such as Northeast 

Asia. Although still limited in key aspects, the SinoRussian defense relationship deserves to be monitored 

by the United States as potentially one of the most 

significant international security developments of 

recent years.

1

PARSING CHINESE-RUSSIAN 

MILITARY EXERCISES

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 

Russian Federation continue to develop their defense 

partnership to encompass a wide range of activities, 

including arms sales and joint military exercises. 

Their governments share important security concerns 

and do not perceive each other as near-term military 

threats. Russia has been unable to develop a robust relationship with Western countries or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) collectively, leaving 

the PRC as its most important defense partner outside 

the former Soviet Union. In recent years, China has 

become more eager to pursue defense diplomacy with 

the United States and other countries, but Russia remains its primary foreign arms supplier and military 

exercise partner. 

BACKGROUND

From its origins as primarily a Russia-to-China 

arms transfer in the 1990s, the security relationship between China and Russia has evolved into something 

more closely resembling a balanced, though limited, 

defense partnership between two unallied but nonadversarial countries. During the Cold War, Chinese and 

Soviet armed forces stared each other down across 

the world’s longest border. They even engaged in a 

small-scale shooting war in the late-1960s over contested islands lying along a shared river. During the 

1990s, the two defense establishments largely ignored 

each other. The Russian high command was seeking 

to recover from the collapse of the integrated military 
2

structures of the Soviet armed forces and the Moscowled Warsaw Pact. It was also striving to manage the 

conflicts that had arisen along Russia’s periphery following the messy disintegration of the Soviet Union. 

Meanwhile, Russian commanders were trying to suppress an unexpectedly vicious and robust insurgency 

in Chechnya. In China, the military was seeking to 

come to terms with its June 1989 crackdown on mass 

anti-regime protests centered in Tiananmen Square. 

The brutality of the repression led Western governments to sever defense ties with Beijing and impose 

arms embargoes and other sanctions. In this context, 

Chinese-Russian defense relations consisted mostly of 

haggling over how much the PRC would pay to purchase Russia’s excess holdings of Soviet-era weapons. 

Though by no means a traditional defense alliance, 

the Sino-Russian military relationship has become a 

more balanced (though limited) security partnership 

between two countries that are neither adversaries 

nor allies, but share certain security concerns such as 

avoiding direct military conflicts, managing security 

along their border and nearby regions like Central 

Asia, maintaining Eurasian stability, and balancing 

the United States and its allies. Neither perceives the 

other as a near-term military threat; indeed, many 

Russian and Chinese leaders view reconciliation after 

decades of wars and armed confrontations as a major 

achievement and strive to maintain cordial ties, even 

as they recognize the possibility of renewed tensions 

in coming years. Although China has become more 

open to engaging in defense diplomacy with the United States and other countries, Russia remains Beijing’s 

defense exercise partner of choice and main foreign 

arms supplier. Meanwhile, Russia has been unable 

to develop robust defense relationships with NATO 
3

or other potential partners outside of some of the former Soviet Republics, which leaves China as its most 

important defense partner outside of Eastern Europe. 

While Russian and Chinese officials, including their 

presidents, have advocated strengthening the defense 

partnership further, both governments credibly deny 

any intent to establish a genuine mutual defense alliance such as the United States has with Japan, South 

Korea, and its NATO allies. 

Over time, this bilateral defense relationship has 

become more institutionalized and better integrated. 

As befits the governments of two large and powerful 

neighbors, the senior military leaders of China and 

Russia now meet frequently in various formats. Since 

1997, they have held yearly “strategic consultations” 

between their deputy chiefs of the general staff, and 

their direct encounters now include annual meetings 

of their defense ministers and their armed chiefs of 

staff, with other Chinese and Russian foreign, defense, 

and internal security officials often joining these bilateral summits.1

 All of these national security officials 

also interact frequently at various multilateral gatherings, especially within the framework of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO, Eurasia’s 

most important regional security institution, is comprised of China and Russia, along with four of the five 

Central Asian countries (excluding only Turkmenistan). In March 2008, the Chinese and Russian defense 

ministers established a direct telephone line—the first 

such ministerial hotline ever created between China 

and another country.2 In December 2008, the chiefs of 

the Chinese and Russian general staffs created their 

own similar such link.3 Contacts between mid-level 

military officers are even more common, especially between commanders of border security units and units 
4

in neighboring Chinese and Russian territories. Russian and Chinese military experts also engage in regular direct discussions related to their functional expertise in such areas as communications, engineering, and 

mapping.4 Academic exchanges also occur frequently; 

more than 1,000 Chinese students have studied at over 

20 Russian military academies since 1996.5 The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, signed 

in 2001, does not include a mutual defense clause, 

but does stipulate both nonaggression and mutual 

consultations clauses. 

Since 2003, the SCO members have organized a 

number of “anti-terrorist exercises” involving their 

armed forces and law enforcement personnel. On October 10-11, 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan conducted 

Exercise-01, which was the first bilateral anti-terror exercise within the SCO framework. Hundreds of their 

troops participated in joint border operations in this 

drill, which Xinhua says represented “the first time for 

PLA [People’s Liberation Army] to hold a joint military maneuver with a foreign army (sic).”6

 (Like the organization’s other projects, most SCO exercises, even 

those described as occurring within the SCO, typically 

involve only two or three member countries.) This was 

the case in August 2010, when the law enforcement 

and internal security forces of Russia, Kazakhstan, 

and Kyrgyzstan spent a week participating in what 

the Russian authorities called an “international operational and strategic exercise of SCO member states” 

against a hypothesized terrorist threat.7 However, 

some SCO exercises do involve additional members. 

From August 6-12, 2003, some 1,300 troops from five 

SCO countries joined Coalition-2003, a series of antiterrorism exercises held in the border city of Ucharal 

in eastern Kazakhstan and in Ili, located in China’s 
5

Xinjiang region. Out of the SCO members, only Uzbekistan failed to participate. The operation marked 

“the first time China participated in multilateral joint 

military maneuver.”8 Three years later, Uzbekistan, 

having broken with the West in 2005 and oriented towards Moscow, not only participated in, but hosted 

the SCO multilateral exercise, East-Anti-terror-2006. 

In this drill, representatives from the member governments’ special forces and law enforcement personnel 

rehearsed defending public facilities from terrorists.9

MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES

In addition to humanitarian relief, military exchanges, and numerous small-scale border drills, 

China and Russia have conducted a major bilateral or 

multilateral joint exercise on an almost yearly basis. 

The bilateral war games are unprecedented in the history of relations between Beijing and Moscow.

Peace Mission 2005.

The first of these Peace Mission exercises occurred 

from August 18-25, 2005. The Chinese and Russian 

militaries conducted a three-phased operation that 

began in Russia's far eastern city of Vladivostok and 

then moved to China’s Shandong Peninsula, where 

the participants conducted land and then amphibious 

maneuvers.10 Whereas the PLA supplied most of the 

troops (8,000 versus 2,000), the Russians provided the 

most sophisticated equipment, such as Russian Tu-160 

and Tu-95 strategic bombers, as well as some 140 warships.11 The maneuvers practiced during Peace Mission 2005 included neutralizing anti-aircraft defenses, 

enforcing a maritime blockade, and conducting an am-
6

phibious assault and other joint naval operations. One 

Russian analyst described the exercise as rehearsing 

“a conventional all-out assault using the Russian and 

Chinese tactics developed in the 1970s and 1980s.”12

Not even during the 1950s—when China belonged 

to the Soviet bloc and had a formal mutual defense 

treaty with Moscow—did the two countries carry out 

such a large joint exercise. Although their stated purpose was to fight terrorists and restore peace among 

hypothetical local combatants, the large scale of the 

air, sea, and ground drills made it appear to both Russian and foreign observers like a rehearsal for a joint 

amphibious invasion of Taiwan, with tactics designed 

to deter or defeat U.S. military intervention on the island’s behalf.13 The U.S. Defense Department (DoD) 

also interpreted the exercise as an attempt by China, 

at least in part, to strengthen its power projection capabilities with respect to Taiwan.14 The Russian government, at least, did not seek to impart such an impression. Moscow had reportedly rejected an earlier 

PRC proposal to conduct the exercise in Zhejiang, a 

Chinese coastal province near Taiwan.15

Another possible scenario could have been a joint 

Chinese-Russian military occupation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), undertaken if 

the regime in Pyongyang were to collapse. In addition 

to the risk of a massive flight of DPRK refugees fleeing into neighboring Chinese and Russian territory, 

Beijing and Moscow might worry that South Korean 

and U.S. military forces might move into North Korea 

to avert the humanitarian disaster; secure the DPRK’s 

nuclear explosive devices and other weapons of mass 

destruction before they could fall into the hands of terrorists, criminals, or other rogue regimes; and further 

the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. goal of reunifying 
7

the Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s leadership. Beijing and Moscow might therefore want to occupy the 

territory first to prevent U.S. forces from moving close 

to their borders.16

Peace Mission 2007.

Peace Mission 2007 began on August 9 in Urumqi, 

the capital of China’s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous 

Area, and ended on August 17, with a live-fire exercise at the Russian military training range near Chelyabinsk, in Russia’s Volga-Urals Military District. 

Unlike Peace Mission 2005, this exercise, which did 

not involve military ships, was better oriented toward suppressing a major Islamist insurgency (such 

as occurred in Chechnya) or popular rebellion (such 

as occurred at Tiananmen Square in 1989 or Andijan 

in 2005), presumably in one of the landlocked Central 

Asian countries. Perhaps due to the fears prevailing at 

the time that the SCO was trying to drive NATO out 

of Central Asia, several scholars have already written 

detailed studies of this exercise.17

Unlike in Peace Mission 2005, the armed forces of 

all six full SCO members participated in the 2007 war 

games, contributing a combined 7,000 troops, 1,270 

weapons systems, and 86 combat aircraft. Russia provided 2,000 personnel, 122 millimeter (mm) and 100-

mm artillery systems, and 40 aircraft. China supplied 

1,300 soldiers, 40 Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) and 

14 bronyetransportyer (BTR) armored infantry vehicles, 

18 pieces of 122-mm and 100-mm artillery systems, 

340 air force personnel, and 46 aircraft. Except for the 

PLA, all the countries used Russian-made ammunition, arms, and equipment. Even during the exercise, 

the Chinese forces would engage in solo military actions and displayed a higher level of secrecy.18
8

The declared purpose of the war games was to 

show the determination of the SCO member states to 

combat the three evils of terrorism, separatism, and 

extremism.19 Lieutenant General Vladimir Moltenskoy, deputy commander of Russia’s Ground Forces, 

said that the exercise could also be used as training 

and educational material for SCO militaries for antiterrorism operations.20 Other goals enunciated by the 

participants included ensuring regional security, stability, and prosperity.21 Observers ascribed additional 

motives to the participating governments. According 

to Roger N. McDermott, Chinese military analysts 

used this exercise to assess their “strategic insertion 

capabilities, cooperative operational capabilities, ability to carry out precision operations and long-range 

integrated support capabilities”; and some Chinese 

military officers believed that this exercise could help 

to reform and modernize the PLA.22 Russia used the 

opportunity to put forward anti-Western views. For 

example, Russian Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy 

claimed that promoting Western-style democracy in 

Central Asia would contribute to regional instability.23

Putin exploited the occasion to announce the resumption of long-distance patrol flights by Russian strategic 

nuclear bombers, which had been suspended in 1992 

with the end of the Cold War.

Peace Mission 2009.

Unlike in 2007, only Chinese and Russian troops 

participated in Peace Mission 2009, which took place 

from July 22-27 of that year. Chinese and Russian representatives sought to place the exercise within the 

SCO framework, but the only concrete involvement 

of that organization came from its secretariat and the 
9

four other SCO members—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—that sent observers to the 

drill.24 In this respect, the 2009 exercise more closely 

resembled Peace Mission 2005, which formally occurred under the rubric of their bilateral friendship 

treaty, than Peace Mission 2007, which involved combat troops from other SCO members. Peace Mission 

2009 differed from the previous two exercises in the 

series in other respects. For example, the operational 

phase took place only on Chinese territory, with a 

single day of staff discussions in Russia looking like 

a simple attempt to involve some Russian territory in 

the drill. In addition, the number of troops participating was considerably lower than in previous years, 

though both Chinese and Russian forces deployed 

surface-to-air missiles (somewhat out of place in a 

nominal anti-terrorist drill) for the first time in one of 

their joint exercises.25

Peace Mission 2009 began with a day of politicalmilitary consultations among senior Chinese and Russian defense personnel in Khabarovsk, the largest city 

in the Russian Far East and the headquarters of the 

Far East Military Command.26 The opening ceremony 

also took place there, with dozens of senior officials 

in attendance, including Chen Bingde, the Chief of 

the PLA General Staff, and Nikolai Makarov, his Russian counterpart.27 The officials reportedly discussed 

“the overall anti-terror situation” and “the terrorism 

trends in member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” as well as Afghanistan.28 The 

operational phases of the exercise occurred at the Taonan training base in China’s Shenyang Military Area 

Command, which borders the Russian Far East. Both 

parties established a theater-level command headquarters there. They then spent 3 days jointly plan-
10

ning and organizing for a combined anti-terrorist 

campaign. The most important exercise segment was 

the 90-minute live-fire drill held on the last day at the 

base.29 All told, about 1,300 military personnel from 

each country participated in some phase of Peace Mission 2009. The Russian air force contributed about 20 

military aircraft to the maneuvers in China, including 

Su-25 and Su-27 combat jets, Il-76 transport planes, 

Su-24 bombers, and Mi-8 helicopters.30 The Russians 

had considered sending strategic bombers to the exercise, but ultimately declined, following the practice of 

2007 rather than 2005.31 The Russian ground forces involved included BMP-1 and BTR-70 armored vehicles, 

as well as T-80 tanks.32 A Russian airborne assault unit 

also practiced parachuting from Il-76s.33 The Chinese 

armed forces contributed combat aircraft, artillery, air 

defense, army aviation, and special forces contingents 

as well as logistical support to both sides.34

This Chinese-Russian drill differed from the previous two Peace Mission exercises in certain respects. 

First, the operational phase occurred only on Chinese territory, with the single day of discussions at 

Khabarovsk looking like an attempt to involve Russian territory in some capacity. Second, the troop 

numbers were considerably lower. Several factors 

might explain the smaller size of Peace Mission 2009. 

Lieutenant General Sergei Antonov, the first deputy 

chief of staff of the Russian ground forces, argued that 

the two armed forces wanted the drills to correspond 

to their actual experience fighting small groups of 

mobile terrorists.35 Russian analysts interpreted this 

as applying lessons learned by Russian forces in the 

northern Caucasus and the Chinese military in Xinjiang.36 Other reasons for the smaller scale might have 

included operational considerations (the shorter time 
11

for preparation and the more genuine focus on countering terrorism), the costs constraints on the two governments due to the global economic recession, their 

desire not to alarm foreign observers, and China’s declining purchases of Russian weapons systems, which 

reduced Moscow’s incentive to use the drill as a sales 

opportunity. 

In any case, both countries conducted much larger 

national exercises around this time. Russia’s Kavkaz 

2009, which ran from June 29 to July 6, involved 

more than 8,500 military personnel, as well as more 

tanks, fighters, helicopters, and warships than had 

ever participated in a bilateral exercise with China.37

A month following Peace Mission 2009, China conducted Stride 2009, a 2-month-long PLA exercise involving some 50,000 military personnel—including 

divisions from the Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, and 

Guangzhou regional military commands—at the 

same base that Peace Mission 2009 occurred. At the 

time, the August-September Stride-2009 drill represented the largest tactical training exercise ever 

conducted by the PLA.38

Peace Mission 2010.

From September 9-25, 2010, the SCO rehearsed 

joint operations against a terrorist group in an urban 

setting as part of Peace Mission 2010, which took place 

in southern Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl region. This exercise more closely resembled the multinational Peace 

Mission 2007 than the 2005 and 2009 war games, 

which were exclusively Sino-Russian drills, though 

other SCO members received invitations to send observers to the latter exercises. However, Peace Mission 2010 ran 1 week longer than Peace Mission 2007. 
12

With 5,000 troops and considerable advanced military 

equipment, Peace Mission 2010 remains the largest 

SCO military exercise ever held outside of Russian 

and Chinese territory. The 2010 exercise occurred 

against a backdrop of continuing ethnic-religious minority unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet, newly resurgent 

terrorist activity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the 

deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the 

Russian-controlled territories of the North Caucasus. 

Hundreds of people died the previous year in vicious 

street fighting between Uighurs and Han Chinese in 

Xinjiang and other parts of China. The PLA authorities, who used the military to suppress the disorders 

after the police and other internal security forces lost 

control of the situation, blamed the ethnic rioting on 

foreign-backed terrorists seeking to create a separate 

state of East Turkmenistan. 

The exercise consisted of three phases. The first 

stage involved consultations among senior political 

officials and military officers in Almaty, Kazakhstan. 

The defense ministers, general staff chiefs, and others 

involved discussed how to employ SCO troops to resolve emergencies as well as the global and regional 

security environment, defense cooperation within the 

SCO, and other shared interests among the member 

states. The Chiefs of the General Staffs then issued 

instructions to start the drills.39 The next two phases 

involved combat exercises among the forces that had 

deployed to the Matybulak Air Base near Gvardeisky 

in Kazakhstan. Stage two, which began on September 

13, focused on joint maneuvers and drills in which 

the SCO contingents practiced making preparatory 

fire, mobilizing reserves, besieging residential areas, 

conducting breakouts, and using suppressing fire at 

night. During the main hour-long drill on Septem-
13

ber 15, the forces employed more than 1,000 armed 

vehicles, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and other 

ground equipment, as well as more than 50 military 

aircraft.40 Phase 3, which started on September 24, saw 

some live-fire drills, and then ended with a display 

of combat equipment from the member states.41 Peace 

Mission 2010 also involved more demanding live-fire 

drills than previous SCO exercises. In those cases, the 

simulated combat operations often appeared as media 

shows, timed to coincide with the annual SCO headsof-state summits. In 2010, the live drills occurred 

over several days, and about 50 percent took place 

at night.42

Peace Mission 2010 included some 5,000 troops, 

300 major combat pieces such as tanks, sophisticated 

defense equipment for engineering and communications, and more than 50 combat planes and helicopters.43 Russia, China, and Kazakhstan each sent at least 

1,000 troops to the war games, whereas Kyrgyzstan 

and Tajikistan contributed smaller numbers, though 

even these represented at least one self-standing operational-tactical group.44 Russia sent the largest amount 

of military equipment—some 130 tanks, self-propelled 

artillery systems, and infantry fighting vehicles, as 

well as over 100 trucks and about a dozen aircraft 

from its nearby base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, including 

Su-24 Fencer tactical bombers, Su-25 Frogfoot closesupport aircraft, and Mi-8 transport helicopters.45 In 

the end, Uzbekistan, which traditionally has been 

uneasy about Russia’s military presence in Central 

Asia, declined to send troops. At the time, Uzbek officials had been leading the effort to resist expanding 

the SCO’s military functions. They had criticized SCO 

exercises for resembling a Soviet-era military drill that 

did not meet the contemporary security needs of the 

organization’s Central Asian members.46
14

The PLA sent a major contingent that consisted of 

a ground force of approximately 1,000 soldiers, an air 

force combat group, and a logistics group under the 

command of Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the PLA 

General Staff.47 The Chinese contingent included some 

of the PLA’s most sophisticated indigenous weapons 

systems, including T-99 tanks, H-6 strategic bombers, 

J-10 fighters, as well as aerial tanker and early warning aircraft.48 The H-6 and the J-10 warplanes were 

participating in their first foreign exercise.49 Western 

observers noted that, uniquely among the participating militaries, the Chinese forces possessed and employed sophisticated “network-centric capabilities” 

that allowed them to display impressive combined 

armed tasks.50 In Peace Mission 2010, the PLA demonstrated improved logistics, command and control, 

and more sophisticated weapons and tactics. Before 

the exercise began, the PLA forces undertook extensive pre-deployment theoretical, basic, and combined 

combat training, optimized for joint counterterrorist 

training.51 In early September, hundreds of PLA soldiers traveled by train from a PLA training military 

base at Zhurihe, located in North China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, to Matybulak air base in 

Kazakhstan. The total distance covered during the 

week-long trip was 5,000 kilometers (km), after which 

the PLA soldiers immediately began preparing for 

their drills.52 One Chinese writer boasted that this represented “a big test for PLA’s comprehensive transportation capability.”53 According to Li Zhujun, deputy chief of the Chinese military’s exterior liaison for 

the exercises, the PLA moved a total of six contingents 

of almost 1,000 troops, 1,000 tons of materials, and additional quantities of military equipment. PLA logisticians also had the opportunity of loading and unload-
15

ing carriages as they passed from the 2.98-meter gauge 

used in China to the 2.87-meter gauge employed in 

Kazakhstan. “By improving the quality of service and 

logistics in various links,” Li declared, “we have created conditions for the soldiers and officers to devote 

themselves to the exercises in high spirits and full of 

vitality.”54 In addition, the Chinese Army’s helicopters rehearsed their first nighttime shooting exercise 

at the war games.55 Perhaps the most interesting skill 

demonstrated by the PLA was how the air force conducted its first simulated long-range air strike. Four 

H-6 bombers and two J-10 fighter jets took off from 

air bases in Urumqi, China. They then divided into 

two groups that, following mid-air refueling, each rehearsed bombing ground targets in Kazakhstan, 2,000 

km away from their departure base. According to the 

PLA, these planes could have conducted their bombing runs even without refueling.56 Having the capacity 

to conduct long-range air strikes and coordinate airground battle maneuvers could prove useful for attacking insurgents in Central Asia as well as combating Indian ground forces. A PRC analyst claimed that 

the H-6 bombers hit their target every time, and that 

the helicopters were able to fly only 40 meters above 

the ground in a valley.57 A Western analyst termed the 

strikes a “milestone” in the PLA’s ability to intervene 

rapidly in Central Asia.58

Naval Interaction 2012.

From April 22-27, 2012, China and Russia held their 

first official bilateral naval exercise (variously referred 

to as Naval Interaction 2012, or Maritime Cooperation 

2012) around China’s Yellow Sea port of Qingdao, the 

base of the PLA Navy’s Northern Fleet. Peace Mission 

2005 featured a much larger maritime component, 
16

but the 2012 maneuvers were bilateral exercises held 

outside the SCO. On this occasion, the combined fleet 

simulated the rescue of a hijacked ship, escorting commercial vessels in pirate-infested waters, joint air defense, maritime search and rescue, and anti-submarine 

tactics.59 The aircraft and special forces in Naval Interaction 2012 did conduct a joint maritime anti-terror 

task.60 Nevertheless, the two governments declined 

to characterize the war games as formally having a 

primarily anti-terrorist purpose. Instead, they referenced a more diverse set of goals such as improving 

interoperability, sharing techniques, rehearsing skills, 

and enhancing regional stability. These are the same 

declared purposes of many of the multinational naval 

exercises conducted in the Asia-Pacific region by the 

United States and other countries. 

Both China and Russia made major contributions 

to Naval Interaction 2010. Although the Chinese supplied more ships than their partner, some of the Russian 

vessels were very advanced. The Chinese and Russian 

navies shared important command, control, and communications functions during the drills, which helped 

them practice their combat interoperability and the 

effectiveness of their control, electronics, and information systems.61 The PLA Navy (PLAN) contributed 

4,000 service members, 16 ships (five missile destroyers, five missile frigates, four missile boats, a support 

vessel, and a hospital ship), two submarines, and 13 

aircraft (along with five shipboard helicopters).62 The 

PLAN Type 052 Luhu-class multirole destroyer Harbin (a domestically-produced, second-generation ship 

that is the Northern Fleet’s flagship) acted as the command vessel—responsible for directing both sides’ 

ships, submarines, and fighters.63 The rest of the Chinese contingent consisted of four guided missile de-
17

stroyers—including the Shenyang (Type 051C Luzhouclass), the Fuzhou (of the Russian Sovremenny-class), 

and the Taizhou (an improved Project 956EM Sovremenny)—the guided missile frigates Luoyang and Mianyang (both Type 053H3 Jiangwei-II-class), and the 

Type 054A Jiangkai-II-class frigates Yiyang, Zhaoshan, 

and Xuzhao; the Fuqing-class fleet oiler Hongzhu was 

tasked with replenishment duties.64 The Chinese fleet 

also included four missile boats, two submarines (at 

least one of which was a Type 039G1 Song-class), and 

a hospital ship.65 Meanwhile, Russia deployed four 

combat ships and three supply vessels from its Pacific 

Fleet, which is headquartered in Vladivostok: the Slava-class cruiser Varyag, the flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, was present, along with three Udaloy-class 

anti-submarine destroyers (the Admiral Vinogradov, 

Marshal Shaposhnikov, and Admiral Tributs—the last of 

the three being from the Northern Fleet), the tugboat 

MB-37, the fleet tanker Pechenga, and the supply ship, 

SB-22.66 Throughout the live-fire drills, ship-to-ship 

communications were conducted in Russian.67 This 

was also not the first time that the Varyag had taken 

part in one of these joint naval exercises; in April 2009, 

the 11,500-ton Varyag had led the formation of foreign 

ships on review at the celebrations marking the 60th 

anniversary of the PLAN’s founding.68

Naval Interaction 2012 involved two phases. The 

first phase consisted of preparation of headquarters 

and naval units and the deployment of ships.69 The 

Russian ships arrived at Qingdao on April 21, and the 

exercises themselves began the next day.70 The two 

sides also practiced relaying information between 

Chinese and Russian naval command stations and 

the joint headquarters of the exercises.71 The second 

“active” phase included live-fire exercises and ship 
18

maneuvers. (The naval component of Peace Mission 

2005 included these two phases but also had a third 

phase consisting of amphibious operations.72) Starting on April 25, the active phase of the exercises began, with sailors engaging in tactical drills with small 

arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) aimed 

at defending their ships from posited hijackers. The 

PLAN and Russian ships then practiced fending off 

simulated air attacks, resupplying at sea, and moving 

into an area containing enemy submarines.73 On the 

morning of April 26, the two sides engaged in a joint 

counterhijacking and naval escort drill using 13 naval 

vessels, four helicopters, and two special operations 

teams. Five of the warships conducted a naval escort 

for four merchant ships, which, minutes later, were 

attacked by four designated pirate boats. The naval 

escorts and their shipboard helicopters rapidly drove 

the pirates away. The two sides then simulated a raid 

on a hijacked Chinese merchant ship, with 20 Chinese and Russian special force operators successfully 

boarding the ship and rescuing the hostages. Both 

sides also conducted live-fire exercises that involved 

shelling ships some 30 km away, as well as joint antiaircraft and anti-submarine drills. The anti-submarine 

exercise employed a sonar target that was used to test 

submarine detection capabilities, as well as rocketpropelled depth charges. The drill was conducted 

with the Admiral Tributs’ shipboard Ka-27 helicopters 

searching for the sonar target, and then reporting 

their coordinates to the anti-submarine ships, which 

deployed countermeasures.74 Following these livefire drills, a fleet review was held later that day (still 

April 26), marking the end of the active phase of the 

exercise.75 The exercises officially ended on April 27 

with a closing ceremony.76
19

Peace Mission 2012.

From June 8-14, Peace Mission 2012 was held at the 

Chorukh-Dayron training range in northern Tajikistan’s Sughd Province. More than 2,000 soldiers and 

500 vehicles from SCO members China, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan participated.77 The 

host government said that the drills simulated fighting terrorists operating in Central Asia’s mountainous 

terrain.78 The exercise included “military maneuvers, 

including air and ground strikes, encirclement, and 

suppression, as well as pursuit and vertical interception.”79 China contributed 369 army soldiers. The PLA 

ground troops travelled by vehicle via Kazakhstan 

from Xinjiang, while the PLA army aviation flew over 

Kyrgyzstan after departing from Kashi Airport.80 Russia used some troops already in the region that were 

supporting the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty 

Organization (CSTO): a reinforced motorized rifle 

company from one of the battalions at its 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, which forced marched to the 

exercise site through mountainous terrain, and some 

attack planes stationed at the CSTO base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.81 Kazakhstan sent an air assault battalion and 

air defense forces as well as armored personnel carriers, combat helicopters, and fixed-wing warplanes; 

Kyrgyzstan dispatched a mountain warfare company 

and a special forces unit; and host Tajikistan contributed a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with 

tanks, an air assault unit, military transport helicopters, and emergency response units.82 The Uzbekistani 

government sent only some observers while denying 

the government of Kazakhstan’s request to allow its 

troops to traverse Uzbekistan’s territory to reach Ta-
20

jikistan, with which Uzbekistan has poor relations; 

the Kazakhstan units ended up having to go through 

Kyrgyzstan to reach northern Tajikistan.83 With only 

some 350 soldiers coming from China and from Russia, this combined figure of 700 military personnel 

represented the smallest number of forces ever participating in a Peace Mission exercise from these two 

great military powers. A description of the counterterrorism drill itself also suggests a relatively limited operation: soldiers battled terrorists at a roadblock and 

at a residence where they held hostages. They were 

supported by armored vehicles, helicopters, and a few 

combat aircraft.84

Naval Interaction 2013.

From July 5-13, China and Russia conducted an 

8-day naval drill in the Sea of Japan. These war games 

(which the Russians termed Naval Interaction 2013 

and the Chinese Joint Sea-2013), were larger and more 

sophisticated than the first exclusively Sino-Russian 

naval exercise held the previous year. During the livefire drills, which ran from July 8 to July 10, the Chinese and Russian ships simulated escorting commercial vessels, rescuing a hijacked ship, and defending 

a convoy of ships from sea and air attacks.85 The 2013 

exercise was comprised of 18 surface vessels, including four guided-missile destroyers, two missile frigates, and a supply vessel, as well as a submarine and 

three helicopters. The drills involved a total of 4,000 

military personnel, including special forces units from 

both countries. China sent fewer ships than in 2012—a 

total of seven vessels, which included four guidedmissile destroyers, two guided-missile frigates, and 

a supply ship, as well as three shipborne helicopters 
21

and a special operations detachment.86 Nevertheless, 

these vessels, which came from the PLAN’s North 

Sea and South Sea fleets, included some of the PLA 

Navy’s most advanced warships such as a guidedmissile destroyer that had an Aegis-type radar and an 

anti-submarine warfare missile frigate.87

Peace Mission 2013.

Two weeks later, Peace Mission 2013 took place 

from July 27 to August 15 at the Chebarkul military 

range in Russia’s Chelyabinsk Region in the Urals. 

Some 600 Chinese troops and 900 Russian troops participated, but no other SCO country sent troops in 

this exclusively Sino-Russian exercise.88 This exercise 

marked the first occasion when both countries’ regional military area commands, rather than their national military headquarters, planned a joint exercise 

together.89 In this case, the United Strategic Command 

of the Russian Central Military District, led by the 

deputy chief of staff of the District, Major-General 

Sergey Chuvakin, and the PLA’s Shenyang Military 

Region, led by its deputy chief of staff, Zhang Yan, 

organized the drills with a joint command of 60 Chinese and Russian staff officers. Both sides no longer 

followed their former tradition of depending solely 

on their respective national command systems and executing the planned flow of events with little bilateral 

interactions. Instead, they now worked side by side 

with each other, coordinating activities in a real-time 

manner, thereby transforming their previous parallel 

planning into a joint planning process. The two regional commands also contributed the troops to the 

exercise, as well as more than 250 pieces of military 

hardware.90 PLA spokesperson Geng Yansheng said 
22

that the Chinese contributions to the joint drill included a planning cell, a command element, and infantry, 

air force, and logistics groups. Their weapons systems 

included armored vehicles, self-propelled guns, and 

fixed- and rotating-wing aircraft, including Z-9 and 

M-171 helicopters.91 The Russian media related that: 

Chinese troops brought along their own tanks, light 

reconnaissance vehicles, 120-mm self-propelled howitzers, 152-mm self-propelled guns, JH-7A ‘Flying 

leopard’ fighter-bombers and Harbin Z-9 gunships 

and Mi-171 transport helicopters.92

Peace Mission 2013 simulated a campaign-level 

operation with more than 25,000 soldiers (rather a 

large size for a mere “counterterrorism” exercise). 

As only 1,500 soldiers were physically present, the 

remaining personnel were “virtual soldiers,” which 

worked fine for the deployment and planning phases, 

which involved computer simulations as well as joint 

staff meetings.93 According to the Chinese Ministry 

of Defense, the three components of the war games 

were “troop deployment, battle planning, and simulated combat.”94 Getting to the Chebarkul military 

range was a challenge for the PLA units departing 

from Shenyang. Since the training range was more 

than 4,000 km away, they required a week of travel, 

and the exercises stipulated that this had to occur under simulated combat conditions.95 The ground forces 

could travel by rail, but the helicopters had to land 

eight times and be escorted through Russian air space 

by Russian Mi-8 combat helicopters.96 In the live-fire 

drills on August 15, Chinese and Russian elite troops 

operated in mixed ground formations consisting of 

tanks, artillery, and special forces; for the first time, 

the Chinese and Russian special forces used the same 
23

helicopters in the simulated combat phase, which in 

this case lasted only an hour.97 Russian and Chinese 

planes and helicopters formed a united air group to 

provide support for the ground operations.98 These 

units coordinated operations, shared intelligence, operated helicopters, and gave orders bilingually. Colonel General Nikolai Bordanovskiy, chief commander 

of Russia’s Central Military District, explained that, 

“Although they speak different languages, the two 

militaries have worked out a set of rules to facilitate communication by using gestures with military 

signals.”99

Naval Interaction 2014.

Russians called the maritime drills Naval Interaction 2014, whereas the Chinese referred to the exercise as Joint Sea-2014.100 Sources offer varying dates 

when the maneuvers formally began and ended, with 

the earliest start date being May 20 and the latest end 

date being May 26.101 The location of the exercise was 

vaguely described as taking place in the “northern waters and aerial space of the East China Sea.”102 Before 

sailing there, the Russian ships participating in Naval 

Interaction 2014 engaged in joint maneuvers with the 

PLA at Usun naval base in Shanghai.103 The two commands finalized the subsequent drills there, and then 

their fleets departed together for the exercise’s staging grounds in the East China Sea.104 On May 19, 2014, 

Chinese and Russian sailors toured each other’s ships 

in port. 
24

On this occasion, the joint maritime exercise coincided with a state visit of Russian President Vladimir 

Putin to China, which lasted May 20-21. Putin and 

PRC President Xi Jinping were both in the city attending the summit of the Conference on Interaction and 

Confidence-Building in Asia (CICA), an emerging 

Eurasian security institution that China had begun 

chairing in May 2014.105 Both presidents attended the 

exercise’s official opening and praised Naval Interaction 2014 for enhancing mutual cooperation and security. Putin argued that, “the military ties are an important part of the Russia-China comprehensive strategic 

partnership of coordination.” He “called for enhanced 

cooperation to tackle various threats and challenges to 

safeguard regional and world peace and stability.”106

Xi said that the exercises “would showcase the two 

sides’ resolve in responding to threats and challenges 

as well as safeguarding regional security and stability.” Xi further stated that the 2014 drills “display the 

new level of strategic mutual trust and coordination 

between the two countries.”107

During the second day of Putin’s visit, China and 

Russia announced the signing of a major gas deal. 

There was also media speculation of further Russian 

arms sales to China: to include advanced air and missile defense systems such as the S-400, the Lada class 

air-independent propulsion submarines, and Su-35 

multirole fighter jets—all assets that would enhance 

China’s ability to project power over disputed maritime territories.108 These developments confirmed for 

many the impression of a further strengthening of the 

China-Russia partnership since the Ukrainian crisis 

led to a sharp downturn in Russia’s relations with 

the West.
25

According to Russian and Chinese sources, Naval 

Interaction 2014 consisted of 12 ships109 (six Chinese, 

six Russian); two submarines (both Chinese); nine 

fixed-wing aircraft (seven Chinese, two Russian); six 

helicopters (two to four each); and two marine commando units (one Chinese, one Russian).110 Interestingly, until just a few days before the exercise began, 14 ships were originally reported as planning to 

participate.111 The reductions in the number of ships 

involved, along with the confusion over when the 

drills started, suggest the exercise underwent some 

last-minute changes. The six Russian ships came from 

Russia’s Pacific Fleet; it was led by the guided-missile 

cruiser Varyag, capable of carrying 16 advanced SS-N12 anti-ship missiles armed with nuclear warheads in 

a configuration designed primarily to destroy U.S. aircraft carriers.112 The Russian contingent also included 

the fleet destroyer Bystry, the submarine warfare ship 

Admiral Panteleyev, the amphibious warship Admiral 

Nevelskoy, and two service vessels, the tanker Ilim and 

the tug boat Kalar.

113

Overall, the Russian Order of Battle consisted 

of the following ships: Slava Class Guided Missile 

Cruiser Varyag, Sovremenny Class Destroyer Bystry, 

Udaloy Class Anti-Submarine Destroyer Admiral Panteleyev, Large Landing Ship Project 775 Admiral Nevelskoy, Tanker Ilim, and Tugboat Kalar.

114

Host-country China made a somewhat larger contribution to the drills. The participating PLAN vessels 

included the latest-generation Russian-built destroyer 

Ningbo and the Chinese-built Type-052C Luyang II destroyer.115 The Zhengzhou is one of the most advanced 

combat vessels in the PLA’s East Sea Fleet. It can carry 

48 HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles, based on 

the Russian-built S-300, to intercept enemy aircraft, as 
26

well as C-805 and YJ-62 missiles, capable of attacking 

enemy ships and land targets. China’s Su-30 fighters 

and JH-7 bombers provided air support for both fleets. 

In addition, J-10 fighters took part in the Russia-China 

exercises for the first time.116

The Chinese Order of Battle consisted of the following ships: Type 052 Guided-Missile Destroyer Harbin, 

Type 052C Guided-Missile Destroyer Zhengzhou, Type 

956 Destroyer Ningbo, Type 054 Guided-Missile Frigate Yantai, Type 054 Guided-Missile Frigate Liuzhou, 

Type 903 Replenishment Ship Qiandaohu, Type 022 

Houbei-class missile boats, attack submarines Kamov

Ka-28; and/or Harbin Z-9 helicopters, and seven warplanes of multiple classes.

Although China and Russia each contributed six 

major ships to Naval Interaction 2014, the overall Russian contingent was smaller this time and played more 

of a support role. Russia provided only three of the 

eight surface combatants and none of the submarines, 

but did supply two of the exercise’s three support 

ships. Furthermore, only two of the nine fixed-wing 

aircraft were Russian. The larger contribution of the 

PLA Navy was most likely due to the exercises taking place off China’s coast. When China and Russia 

conducted their first joint naval exercises in 2012, the 

drills took place off China’s coast, and PLA Navy ships 

predominated. When the 2013 exercises took place 

near Vladivostok, the Russian Navy contribution was 

larger than that of China. It would thus appear that 

whichever country is hosting the exercises provides 

the bulk of their participants. If anything, Russia’s 

contribution in 2014 was somewhat robust, compared 

to the last time the PRC hosted the exercises in 2012, 

when the Chinese contingent was considerably larger 

than the Russian one.
27

The 2014 exercises consisted of a wide range of missions, including jointly identifying potentially hostile 

aircraft, combating submarines, providing joint air 

defense, escorting vessels, engaging in search-andrescue missions, recapturing a seized ship, and intercepting missiles.117 For example, Chinese and Russian 

ships conducted a drill to fight underwater “frogmen,” and stop terrorists on speedboats. In addition, 

they rehearsed defending ships at anchorage by providing early warning against possible enemy attacks, 

evacuating the warships under attack, and countering 

the attack with kinetic actions and through electronic 

systems.118 On May 24, 2014, the militaries conducted 

joint anti-submarine exercises. Both navies used live 

weapons in the drill, with eight ships firing main guns, 

high-speed guns, and rocket depth charges.119

Some of these missions appear geared towards anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations of the type that 

the Chinese and Russian navies have been engaged in 

for years, primarily in the Gulf of Aden—though the 

two fleets do not cooperate closely with each other or 

the other navies on patrol there. Chinese researchers 

note that protecting sea lanes is important for China, 

which relies heavily on maritime trade.120 Their May 23 

anti-piracy drill occurred under the command of the 

Varyag, which ordered special forces to eliminate “pirates” on a “hijacked” ship.121 The simulated defense 

of ships at anchorage is a skill that is needed to counter pirate attacks, though the Chinese may also have 

wanted to remind observers that Imperial Japan had 

also conducted such attacks.122 Naval Interaction 2014 

also saw much simulated ship-to-ship combat. The 

Chinese and Russian fleets split into two teams that 

simulated combat against one another (as they have 

in previous years), but they also formed three mixed 
28

groups, commanded by both Russian and Chinese officers in both languages, that engaged one another.123

Wang Chao, head of a PLAN coordinating team, said 

that the mixed grouping would enhance naval coordination between the two countries.124 Furthermore, by 

assuming responsibility for providing air cover to both 

fleets during the drills, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 

gained experience in controlling airspace through coordination of fighter and surface vessels.125 According 

to Li Jie, an expert at the PLA’s Naval Military Studies 

Research Institute, “the exercises operate more like a 

real battle.”126

Peace Mission 2014.

From August 24-29, the SCO held its largest multinational exercise in history, Peace Mission 2014. The 

drills took place at Zhurihe Training Base, located in 

Inner Mongolia in North China. Zhurihe has become 

China’s main base for engaging in large-scale exercises with foreign armies on its soil.127 Five of the six SCO 

members sent troops (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, but not Uzbekistan). The war 

games saw a panoply of weapons in use, including 

unmanned aerial vehicles, air-defense missiles, tanks, 

armored vehicles, other ground vehicles, and special 

operations units. A total of about 70 aircraft flew roles 

in the exercise, including fighter planes, airborne early 

warning aircraft, armed helicopters, and surveillance 

and combat drones.128 The combined forces practiced 

ground and aerial reconnaissance, joint precision 

strikes, integrated air-ground assaults on fortified 

positions, joint hostage rescue and urban assault missions, and extensive information sharing.129 According 

to Liu Zhenli, Commander of China’s 38th Army: 
29

The level of collaboration this time is much higher 

than in previous joint military exercises. We have 

established a joint commanding center, and another 

affiliated commanding center for five armies and air 

forces. An information sharing mechanism has also 

been set up among five parties for reconnaissance. 

Joint actions have also been carried out, especially in 

terms of hostage rescue.130

The exercise scenario involved an international 

terrorist organization supporting a separatist movement in a country, plotting coups, and aiming for 

violent regime change. More specifically, the scenario hypothesized that a city in an unnamed Eurasian 

country (implicitly a SCO member) had become a hub 

of political instability and terrorist activity, and its 

government called on the SCO to intervene to resolve 

the issues.131 The fictitious separatist organization has 

more than 2,000 fighters armed with tanks, missiles, 

and even light aircraft—something on the scale of the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) rather than 

al-Qaeda.132 The exercise’s three phases included troop 

deployments, battle planning, and simulated combat. 

Before the live drills, the multinational forces moved 

to the Zhurihe base, conducted some planning meetings, and held an opening ceremony in which the deputy chiefs of the general staff from China, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and deputy commander 

of Russia’s Eastern military command participated.133

The first stage of the third live-fire phase involved the 

SCO forces using electronic warfare measures against 

their adversary’s communication systems. Chinese 

and Russian planes, helicopters, and drones then conducted air strikes against the “terrorists.” The SCO 

forces subsequently employed high-precision artil-
30

lery attacks that destroyed the terrorists’ command 

centers. Finally, SCO ground forces with combined 

air support liberated the terrorist-occupied zones and 

freed their hostages.134

China provided the most troops by far. In addition 

to some 5,000 personnel and more than 400 combat 

systems from the 38th Combined Corps and the air 

force under the PLA’s Beijing Military Area Command (MAC), China assigned some forces directly 

under the PLA general headquarters/departments, 

including aerospace reconnaissance, mapping, hydrometeorological, and mobile logistics support detachments providing “strategic and operational support.”135 The PLAAF CH-4 unmanned combat aerial 

vehicle (UCAV) made its first appearance at an SCO 

exercise. The CH-4 (Cai Hong 4 or Rainbow 4), which 

resembles the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper, shot 

several targets during the live-fire drills.136 One PLA 

official said that the drones’ ability to monitor, identify, and destroy ground targets in real time made it 

an important counterterrorist tool.137 PRC authorities 

claim that Uighur insurgents fighting Beijing’s rule in 

Xinjiang’s vast northwestern region have used illicit 

border crossings and desert encampments that can 

be monitored by air.138 Chinese aerospace firms have 

developed dozens of drones, and the PLA is eager to 

take advantage of these unmanned systems. The Chinese also contributed some of their most sophisticated 

manned aircraft such as its J-10 and J-11 fighter jets, its 

JH-7 fighter bombers, and its KJ-2000 airborne early 

warning and control aircraft.139 Also debuting in the 

SCO exercises were the WZ-10 and WZ-19 attack helicopters used by the PLAAF and the Ground Force. 

The larger Z-10, Fierce Thunderbolt, is designed primarily for anti-tank missions, but has some air-to-air 
31

capability; the smaller Z-19 Black Whirlwind is an 

upgraded version of the Z-9 attack helicopter, which 

is also manufactured by the Harbin Aircraft Industry 

Group.140 During the war games, the helicopters practiced reconnaissance and rocket barrages.141 Meanwhile, three IL-76 transport aircraft from an aviation 

regiment of the Guangzhou MAC air-dropped people 

and equipment during the drills.142 The PLA Army’s 

most modern Main Battle Tank, the Type 99—a variant of the former Soviet T-72—also took part in the 

exercises.143

Almost 1,000 Russian troops participated in Peace 

Mission 2014, travelling by rail from Russia’s Eastern 

Military District.144 The main units assigned to the 

drills were the 36th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade and an aviation group from the 3rd Air Force and 

Air Defense Command.145 Russia also contributed 60 

armored vehicles (including 40 BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles and 13 T-72 main battle tanks); more than 

20 missile and artillery systems (including the SAU 

2S3M self-propelled guns and BM-21multiple-launch 

rocket systems); more than 60 other military vehicles; 

eight Mi-8 AMTSh helicopter gunships; four Sukhoi 

Su-25 attack planes; and two IL-76 military transport 

planes.146 The Russian media reported that the artillery 

systems used Krasnopol semi-automatic laser-guided 

explosive projectiles during their drills.147 Unlike in 

Peace Mission 2013, the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan each sent hundreds of elite soldiers: Kyrgyzstan deployed about 500 

members of its special forces units, along with a few 

dozen combat vehicles (including eight tanks); 148 Kazakhstan, which often sends the largest Central Asian 

contingent, provided only about 300 elite airborne 

troops.149 Finally, some 200 rapid reaction troops came 
32

from Tajikistan.150 As usual, Uzbekistan, though a SCO 

member, again did not send troops to participate in 

the exercises.151 The observers at the exercise included 

representatives from the SCO Secretariat, the SCO regional anti-terrorism organizations, the five SCO observer states, the three dialogue partners, and military 

attachés from more than 60 countries.152

The day before the exercise ended, President Xi met 

with the SCO chiefs of staff, who were then meeting in 

Beijing, and praised the drills for “having made positive contributions to regional security and stability.”153

In addition to China’s large troop contribution, Wang 

Ning, chief director of the Joint Directing Department 

of the exercise and deputy chief of the PLA general 

staff, boasted at the start of the war games that the 

SCO “exercise will be conducted in China throughout 

the process for the first time” and, also for the first 

time, would occur simultaneously with a meeting of 

the chiefs of the SCO members’ general staffs and with 

a military music festival.154

ASSESSMENT

These joint Russian-Chinese military exercises 

serve several important national security purposes for 

both governments. One of their original aims was to 

facilitate Russian weapons sales to China. Russia has 

used the drills as an opportunity to showcase to the 

Chinese defense community certain weapons systems 

that they want to sell to the PLA. The Chinese presumably welcome the chance to examine the capabilities of 

Russian systems through these exercises. Peace Mission 2005 in particular could be seen, in part, as an 

elaborate staging ground for demonstrating Russian 

military technologies to potential Chinese buyers. At 
33

the time, China, along with India, was the leading buyer of Russian weapons. During the exercises, Russia 

showed off the Tu-95 strategic bombers and Tu-22M 

long-range bombers that Moscow was then trying to 

sell to Beijing. Although these strategic bombers are 

older platforms (the Tu-160 is Russia’s most advanced 

strategic bomber), they can launch long-range cruise 

missiles against air and ground targets, including U.S. 

aircraft carriers.155 The sales motive was also evident in 

the Russian decision to leave the bombers that participated in the exercise, as well as other types of military 

aircraft, on display in China for several days following 

the maneuvers. The policy of exploiting the opportunity to highlight a few advanced weapons systems to 

the Chinese during the exercise may have worked. A 

few weeks after the drills, China placed a large order 

for one of the participating warplanes, the Il-78 tanker.156 In recent years, this function has declined in importance, since the Chinese armed forces, benefiting 

from growing indigenous capabilities of the Chinese 

defense industry, have been buying fewer Russian 

weapons. However, the resumption in recent years of 

large-scale Chinese purchasing of Russian arms might 

revive the use of this exhibit function. China may also 

start using these exercises for this purpose, especially 

if the SCO expands in size. Beijing has until now declined to sell weapons to Russia’s Central Asian allies 

out of deference to Moscow, but has practiced no such 

constraint regarding Pakistan, Iran, or Turkey.

A more enduring goal of the exercises is to improve the operational and tactical proficiency of both 

militaries and increase their interoperability. Chinese 

defense representatives have traditionally cited the 

advantage of using exercises with foreign countries 

as opportunities to learn new tactics, techniques, and 
34

procedures. For example, the 2007 live-fire drills in 

Chelyabinsk allowed the PLA to practice deploying 

and supporting a large military force at a considerable distance from mainland China.157 The same challenge was overcome with Peace Mission 2013, when 

the PLA forces had to travel more than 4,000 km from 

the PLA’s Shenyang Military Region to the Chebarkul 

training field in the Urals. At the time, deputy chief 

of staff for the Shenyang region Shi Xiangyuan told 

the media that “exercises like Peace Mission 2013 are 

called with an eye to helping both armies to strive as 

close to perfection as possible.”158 The PRC can use the 

maneuvers with Russia to practice coordinating large 

and varied forces with one of the world’s leading 

military powers. At the time of Peace Mission 2013, 

Wang Haiyun, vice president of the Chinese Society 

for the Study of the History of Sino-Russian Relations, 

explained that, “Holding joint drills will enable China 

and Russia to learn from each other, deepen mutual 

trust and boost each other’s combat power.”159

China seeks the same goals in the maritime domain. Yin Zhuo, an adviser to the PLAN, said the 

Chinese Navy was eager to interact with the more 

modern Russian Navy, telling Chinese TV that, “Both 

sides will have deep exchanges in terms of tactics and 

technology.”160 For example, the Russian and Chinese warships that participated in Naval Interaction 

2012 simulated rescuing a hijacked vessel, protecting 

commercial ships from pirates, anti-submarine warfare, and joint maritime air defense and search and 

rescue.161 Then Naval Interaction 2013 practiced a 

wider range of skills, including at-sea replenishment, 

anti-piracy convoying, surface warfare, and fleet air 

defense.162 Zhang Junshe, deputy director of the Naval Military Studies Research Institute, acknowledged 
35

that the PLAN had achieved significant technological 

advances in recent years, but he argued that Russia’s 

military technology was still more advanced.163 At 

the time of the 2014 naval exercises, the PRC Defense 

Ministry described their purpose as, “to deepen practical cooperation between the [Chinese and Russian] 

militaries, [and] to raise the[ir] ability to jointly deal 

with maritime security threats.”164 PRC experts also 

state that joint defenses can allow navies to cooperate more efficiently in coping with maritime security 

threats than if they acted unilaterally.165 As for Peace 

Mission 2014, these land exercises rehearsed combating international terrorist organizations supporting a 

separatist movement and boosting intelligence sharing in response to such events.166 In recent years, the 

PLA has developed a cadre of Russian-speaking officers to coordinate with the Russian and other SCO 

militaries, thereby promoting interoperability.167

The Russian armed forces also aim to improve their 

performance through these exercises. The movement 

of Russian troops and equipment to China in preparation for Peace Mission 2009 represented the largest 

foreign deployment by the forces of Russia’s Far Eastern Military District since Soviet forces invaded northeastern China to attack the Japanese occupation troops 

at the end of World War II.168 Furthermore, whereas 

previous Sino-Russian exercises focused on suppressing terrorists, guerrillas, and possibly rebellious cities 

or provinces, the latest naval drills explicitly have as 

one of their goals the enhancing of their ability to cooperate against maritime piracy. The two navies have 

been operating together (though mostly in parallel) 

in the Gulf of Aden, fighting Somali-based pirates, 

and some experts said they wanted to improve their 

interoperability in such operations.
36

The Russian and Chinese forces involved in these 

war games have demonstrated increased proficiency 

over time, though it is unclear whether this improvement results from the exercises themselves or the 

strengthening capabilities of both sides’ conventional 

forces in recent years due to other initiatives. The 2005 

series saw only a limited degree of operational interoperability. That year’s drills involved mostly parallel 

Chinese and Russian military maneuvers in the same 

area of operations.169 The subsequent exercise rounds 

have demonstrated greater integration, though it is 

still dubious if both militaries could conduct a joint 

battle, with integrated tactical operations, rather than 

a joint campaign in which they operated independently in parallel sectors (e.g., with Russian troops 

moving into Kyrgyzstan from the north while Chinese 

forces enter from the east). Their ability to organize 

a rapid joint military response even in a neighboring 

state is also questionable. The Chinese media cited a 

PLA general who boasted that, after deciding to hold 

Peace Mission 2009, they spent “only 6 months” getting ready for the drill to better “demonstrate Chinese 

forces’ quick [sic] response capabilities.”170 The SCO 

lacks the integrated command and control mechanism 

to organize a more rapid collective military intervention, even in one of its member countries. Perhaps for 

this reason, the Russian government has been trying 

to develop a rapid response force within the Moscowcontrolled CSTO that Russia and its allies can employ 

for urgent scenarios. 

These exercises could enhance the ability of the 

Russian, Chinese, and perhaps other SCO armed 

forces to deter—and if necessary suppress—another 

popular rebellion or large–scale terrorist movement, 

such as the ones that occurred in Tiananmen Square in 
37

spring 1989 and Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May 2005.171

At the time, the 2007 drills in Xinjiang led some observers to speculate that exercise aimed “to intimidate 

the Uighur population in East Turkestan and to warn 

the democratic forces in Central Asia not to challenge 

the authoritarian regimes.”172 The 2009 maneuvers 

between the Russian and Chinese militaries occurred 

against the backdrop of mass unrest in Xinjiang and a 

deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the 

Russian-controlled territories of the North Caucasus. 

Hundreds of people had died the previous month in 

vicious street fighting between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang and other parts of China. The authorities, who used the military to suppress the disorders 

after the police and other internal security forces lost 

control of the situation, blamed the ethnic rioting on 

foreign-backed terrorists seeking to create a separate 

state of East Turkmenistan. During the weeks preceding the exercises, the governments in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan reported that Taliban-linked 

insurgents were infiltrating their countries from Afghanistan.173 Wang Xinjun, researcher with the PLA 

Academy of Military Sciences, wrote at the time of 

Peace Mission 2013 that, “The foreign media tend 

to focus on military cooperation between China and 

Russia in the context of geopolitical strategy, while ignoring the fact that the two countries face a common 

threat from terrorism.” He added that Peace Mission 

2013 communicated to the world that: 

China and Russia will work together to firmly crack 

down on terrorism, which causes significant harm to 

a world that is trying to achieve peace and development. The resurgence of terrorist forces in China and 

Russia in recent years demonstrates the need for cooperation between the two countries.174
38

The Chinese representatives especially emphasized the counterterrorist dimensions of the 2009 

exercise. A series of PLA military experts called the 

drills a “warning” meant to deter terrorists.175 Major 

General Wang Haiyun, a former military attaché to 

Russia, observed that, “To some extent, the July 5 Xinjiang riot pushed forward anti-terrorism cooperation 

between China and Russia.”176 According to General 

Chen Bingde, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, 

“China and Russia have a very clear objective to jointly eliminate terrorism, separatism, and extremism.” 

Chen added: “We fight for peace.”177 In describing the 

tactics involved, Chinese Major General Luo Yuan, a 

researcher with the PLA’s Military Sciences Academy, 

stressed that, “The major subjects of the exercise are 

not designed to train positional attack-and-defense or 

mobile warfare, but to encircle and suppress unprepared terrorists.”178 At the opening ceremony, General 

Makarov also emphasized the counterterrorist purpose of the drills, arguing that the Urumqi riots “show 

that more and more terrorist, separatist, and extremist 

forces are emerging, and, recently, to that we have to 

add pirates” that were operating off Somalia and attacking foreign vessels defended by Russian, Chinese, 

and other international warships. “I believe the joint 

task of our two armed forces is to fight such illegal 

forces,” Makarov insisted.179 Despite the lack of a clear 

counter-terrorist purpose for the surface-to-air missiles, the rest of the order of battle for Peace Mission 

2009 seems well-suited for fighting terrorist groups 

such as the Taliban and Chechen insurgents.

In contrast, the massive 2014 war games saw tanks, 

warplanes, and precision missions being used against 

a terrorist group that had thousands of fighters as 

well as its own light aircraft and ground equipment. 
39

In justifying the exercises, Chinese writers pointed to 

the growing threat that terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, 

and other countries could spillover into Central Asia 

and argued that “joint military drills and other moves 

taken by SCO members for defense and security cooperation will send a strong deterrent signal to the ‘three 

forces’ of terrorism, extremism, and separatism in the 

region.”180 The exercise occurred after Chinese authorities had become alarmed by the surge in Uighur 

domestic terrorism during the past year in China’s 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. PRC Defense 

ministry representatives declared that the exercise 

would help deter the “three evil forces” of terrorism, 

separatism, and extremism by strengthening the militaries’ ability to coordinate counter-terrorism operations.181 Fang Fenghui, Chief of the PLA General Staff, 

said that, “The success of the joint drill demonstrated . . .

their resolution to fight against the three evil 

forces. . . .”182 He maintained that the situation around 

Afghanistan was becoming more complicated and 

“terrorists are rapidly infiltrating into Central Asia.”183

Even if they do not establish a military presence in Afghanistan, which became a formal SCO observer in 

2012, China and Russia might work with their Central Asian partners to establish some kind of barrier 

to try to limit the flow of Afghan-based terrorists and 

narcotraffickers into their countries. China is aiming 

to construct a New Silk Road through Central Asia as 

well as deepen transportation links with Pakistan and 

Iran, while Russia is trying to establish an integrated 

economic and security bloc among the former Soviet 

states, some of which border Afghanistan.

Another goal is to underscore the high level of defense cooperation between China and Russia. The exercises are not explicitly intended for the classic pur-
40

pose of collective defense. The bilateral Sino-Russian 

friendship treaty, signed in July 2001, lacks a mutual 

defense clause, instead obliging both sides to refrain 

from aggressive acts toward one another and to consult in the case of mutual threats and international 

crises. Furthermore, Chinese government representatives have stated repeatedly for years that they will not 

join foreign military alliances. At the May 2014 CICA 

summit in Shanghai, President Xi, while joining Putin 

at the concurrent China-Russia naval drills, attacked 

the concept of Cold War alliances that exist at “the 

expense of others . . . and leave the rest insecure.”184

Nonetheless, the combined maneuvers do affirm the 

two countries’ commitment to defense cooperation 

as one dimension of their evolving relationship. Major General Wang Haiyun, a former military attaché 

to Russia, observed that, “Military cooperation is the 

highest level and most sensitive exchange between 

two countries and China and Russia’s joint military 

drill has demonstrated the solid bond between the 

neighbors.”185 Major General Qian Lihua, director of 

the Ministry of National Defense’s Foreign Affairs 

Office, specifically described Peace Mission 2009 as 

contributing to the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations 

between Beijing and Moscow: 

This drill is a specific move to consolidate and deepen 

the two nations’ strategic cooperation partnerships, 

an important practice to implement the consensus 

reached at the [June 2009] SCO summit and a key 

program for celebrating the two nations’ diplomatic 

relations.186

Nikolai Markov, the chief of the Russian General 

Staff, said that “Russia sees great importance in pro-
41

moting cooperation between the two militaries and 

the naval exercise shows that bilateral strategic coordination is at a high level.”187 According to Viktor 

Litovkin, the chief editor of the Independent Military 

Review, the exercises help “confirm” to both sides as 

well as external audiences “that Russia and China are 

committed to military cooperation in the region.”188

Collaborating through joint exercises could also be 

seen as a form of mutual confidence building aimed 

at reassurance and mutual trust. Since the end of their 

Cold-War antagonisms, Russia and China have adopted a series of arms control measures along their joint 

border, including advanced notification of large military exercises in the vicinity. The Russia-China border 

demilitarization talks began in November 1989. They 

soon split into parallel negotiations: one on reducing 

military forces along the Russian-Chinese frontier, the 

other on establishing confidence and security building measures in the border region. The other newly 

independent former Soviet republics bordering China—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—also 

participated in demilitarization and confidencebuilding measures involving China. In July 1994, the 

Russian and Chinese defense ministers agreed to a set 

of procedures to avert future incidents, including arrangements to prevent unauthorized ballistic missile 

launches, prevent the jamming of communications 

equipment, and warn ships and aircraft that might 

inadvertently violate national borders. In September 

1994, Chinese and Russian authorities pledged not 

to target strategic nuclear missiles at each other. On 

April 26, 1996, the governments of China and the four 

former Soviet republics signed a Treaty on Deepening 

Military Trust in Border Regions, which established 

a set of military confidence-building measures along 
42

their shared borders. At their second meeting, which 

occurred in Moscow on April 25, 1997, the “Shanghai 

Five,” as these countries were known before they added Uzbekistan and created the SCO, signed a Treaty 

on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border 

Regions. This accord has restricted conventional military deployments and activities within a 100 km-wide 

demilitarized zone along their shared frontiers. The 

Shanghai Five also established a Joint Control Group, 

which still holds sessions, to monitor implementation of these confidence-building measures.189 In April 

1998, China and Russia established a direct presidential hot line—China’s first with another government. 

Some of these agreements are largely symbolic in that 

they are not accompanied by any verification or enforcement procedures. For example, either country 

can rapidly retarget its strategic missiles. Leaders can 

choose to use the hot line, or not pick up the receiver. 

Yet, most of the accords are self-enforcing. China and 

the former Soviet republics were eager to demilitarize 

following the end of the Cold War. 

Chinese authors commonly refer to the value of 

these exercises for promoting, or at least confirming, 

a high level of mutual trust among the participants. 

Wang Ning sees them having an “important and 

far-reaching political significance on strengthening 

mutual trust among the SCO member states.”190 The 

Russian-Chinese exercises, whether they occur bilaterally or occur within the multilateral SCO framework, help supplement the formal arms control agreements by providing additional information regarding 

the tactics, techniques, and procedures practiced by 

the other military as well as its capabilities and intentions. Recurring exercises and other forms of cooperation also increase both states’ confidence that the 
43

other will stand with them, or at least stand aside, if 

they enter into a conflict with another party. Chen 

Bingde, Chief of the PLA General Staff, said that the 

exercises promote “strategic coordination and mutual 

trust” between the Chinese and Russian military establishments.191 Luo Yuan, a researcher with the PLA 

Academy of Military Sciences, also said that the: 

Joint drills have become the regular means of military 

cooperation between China and Russia, helping to improve both armies’ structures, mutual trust, and military transparency.192

Ren Yuanzhe, a researcher at China Foreign Affairs University, said that the two navies “took concrete steps to increase military transparency through 

the exercise.”193 Li Shuyin, a research fellow with the 

Academy of Military Sciences, called the 2014 naval 

exercise “a clear show of enhanced mutual trust between the two militaries, and of increased transparency.” Noting that the Sino-Russian maritime drills 

had occurred 3 years in a row, Li said that they had 

become a “routine and institutionalized cooperation 

mechanism between the two sides.”194 According to 

Chinese sources, during these exercises, tactics, technical performances, and data were shared between 

the two navies, and each showed its respective tactical concepts and weapons employment practices.195

The Chinese and Russian fleets also allowed the other 

country’s sailors to board their ships, both during 

combat and when they were docked in port before the 

exercise.196 Perhaps most importantly, not only did 

the two navies simulate combat against one another, but they also split into mixed groups under joint 

command. Although NATO and other navies have 
44

engaged in joint drills with their alliance partners, 

Naval Interaction 2014 marked the first time that the 

PLAN has engaged in this kind of joint drill with a 

foreign country.197

Shi Xiangyuan, deputy chief of staff of the PLA 

Shenyang Military Region, which organized China’s 

participation in Peace Mission 2013, told the Russian 

ITAR-TASS news agency that, “We’re not competitors, 

but we’re partners. Trust between the two countries 

became the unique feature of the Peace Mission.”198

Commenting on the most recent Peace Mission 2014, 

Meng Xiangqing of the PLA National Defense University argued that China had displayed a high level of 

trust in allowing the other SCO members to send their 

armed forces into its interior.199 A deputy commander 

of Russia’s Eastern military command described these 

countries military ties as “unbreakable,” emphasizing 

Russia’s commitment to its role in the SCO.200 Shao 

Yuqun, at the Shanghai Institute for International 

Studies, argued that the SCO exercises “can help build 

up mutual trust between the member states and thus 

enable the SCO to play a greater role in stabilizing the 

region” including by nonmilitary means.201

In this regard, the two militaries are presumably 

also interested in learning more about the evolving 

capabilities of a possible future adversary (e.g., each 

other). Alexander Khramchikhin, the Director of Russia’s Institute for Political and Military Analysis, argues that the joint military operations provide an occasion for both militaries to check each other: “China 

intends to study Russia’s strong and weak points 

during the drills in case Russia becomes its adversary 

in the future.”202 Unlike during the Cold War, China 

and Russia no longer fear engaging in a shooting war. 

The two countries have largely accepted their com-
45

mon border, which at almost 2,700 miles (consisting 

of a small segment in China’s northwest and a much 

larger frontier along China’s northeast) is one of the 

longest borders between two neighboring countries in 

the world. Yet, Russians worry about the long-term 

implications of China’s exploding population for 

Russia’s demographically and economically stagnant 

eastern regions. In addition, militaries like to develop 

contingency plans for a range of possible scenarios.

Furthermore, the exercises provide an opportunity 

for China and Russia to demonstrate their capabilities to external audiences. The Chinese and Russian 

denials that they intended to send messages to others 

with their joint exercises appear pro forma. Using military exercises to communicate signals to third parties 

is a common objective of these drills. These activities 

typically attract greater attention than simple political declarations or other routine civilian government 

activities. For example, Director Wang Ning described 

Peace Mission 2014 as “pushing forward establishment of a fair and reasonable new international political order.”203 Demonstrating military prowess is a 

time-honored tactic for reassuring friends and deterring adversaries. Through such operations, the Russian armed forces can counter doubts that they have 

not yet fully recovered from their post-Soviet meltdown, while the Chinese can show off their growing 

sophistication of their own military.

One target audience might be Central Asia. 

Through their exercises, which typically involve observers if not always combat troops from Central 

Asian states, China and Russia underscore their ability to defend Central Asian governments from foreign 

or internal threats. Eurasia’s precarious regional security situation, combined with the SCO’s failure to in-
46

tervene in Kyrgyzstan to suppress the June 2010 riots, 

alarmed many Central Asians about whether they can 

confidently rely on the SCO to protect them against 

external and domestic security threats. By reassuring 

Central Asian governments that they can depend on 

Beijing and Moscow, the drills also weaken Western 

influence in the region by helping persuade their SCO 

allies that they need not rely on NATO and the United 

States for their defense.204 Russia in particular has benefited from highlighting its commitment to combating threats to regional stability to justify its military 

presence in Central Asia. Unlike the United States 

and other NATO countries, Russia has not experienced problems obtaining military bases on the territory of its SCO allies. Central Asian governments also 

generally appear to prefer working within the SCO, 

which is not dominated by a single country. China’s 

balancing presence presumably reduces fears of external subordination and gives them more room to maneuver. For example, with low-key Chinese support, 

Uzbek officials have been leading the effort to resist 

expanding the SCO’s military functions. Conversely, 

it is easier for the Central Asian governments to deal 

with the Chinese colossus through the SCO rather 

than directly. In terms of political signaling to third 

parties, moreover, the maneuvers affirm to the United 

States and other extra-regional countries that Russia 

and China consider Central Asia as lying within their 

overlapping zones of security responsibility. Chief of 

Russia’s general staff General Nikolai Makarov said at 

the opening ceremony of the Peace Mission 2009 exercises that they “must show the international community that Russia and China have the necessary resources 

to ensure stability and security in the region.”205
47

The Chinese and Russian governments and media 

regularly affirm that their military exercises are not 

aimed at any third party. For example, trying to reassure Westerners that they need not worry about the 

recent holding of back-to-back ground and maritime 

Sino-Russian exercises, one Chinese commentator 

wrote that: 

The simulated enemies of the joint forces in the Joint 

Sea 2013 and Peace Mission 2013 drills are obvious: 

pirates and terrorists. So people who allege that China 

and Russia are targeting a third country or that they 

are trying to establish a ‘military alliance’ are only 

betraying their Cold War mentality.206

One year later, both countries dismissed notions 

that Peace Mission 2014 represents a joint Sino-Russian response to the recent Western sanctions on Russia and U.S. pressure on China. In July 2014, Chief of 

Russian presidential staff Sergei Ivanov insisted that 

Russia and China would not “create a new military 

alliance, union or something like that,” and that SinoRussia co-operation “was not targeted at anyone.”207

In August 2014, The People’s Daily published a commentary by Zhang Junshe, a researcher at the China 

Naval Research Institute, which read: 

Some Western media have described this drill as ‘a 

Central Asian grouping that is dominated by China 

and Russia, aiming to challenge U.S. influence in Asia 

as well as the international order ruled by U.S. and its 

European allies’. Any reasonable analysis of this drill 

will expose the fact that these doubts and criticisms 

stand on shaky foundations.208

Junshe further stated that the drills’ dates and 

plans were determined well before the Ukraine crisis, 
48

that the exercise focused on helping members deal 

with “the threat of increasingly severe territorial attacks,” that the exercises were very transparent to outside observers, and insisted that the tasks had nothing to do with capturing “disputed islands.”209 The 

Chinese government has generally pursued a low-key 

approach toward the Ukraine crisis, while Russia has 

relied mostly on its independent military exercises as 

well as those conducted in partnership with the CSTO, 

Moscow’s main military alliance, which includes all 

SCO members except China. However, Fyodor Lukyanov, an independent Russian foreign affairs specialist influential in Russia’s foreign policy community, 

acknowledged that any major Russian-Chinese military exercise would appear as a signal to the West that 

China and Russia are developing closer political and 

military ties.210

That Naval Interaction 2014 coincided with a period when both countries had tense relations with the 

West naturally led to speculation that the drills were 

intended to send a message to Western countries, especially the United States, that Beijing and Moscow 

had other security options than siding with the Western powers. However, while the 2014 Sino-Russian 

maritime exercise might seem a joint reaction to the 

countries’ mutual troubles with the West, its timing is 

likely coincidental. Since 2012, China and Russia have 

held annual naval exercises, with the Chinese defense ministry reporting in 2013 that they were “to be 

normalized and institutionalized.”211 Given this, and 

the fact that the 2012 exercise occurred in late April 

and the 2013 drill in early July, a Sino-Russian naval 

exercise was likely to occur sometime in spring or 

summer 2014. 
49

The naval exercises show that China and Russia 

are willing and able to cooperate to advance their 

joint interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Chen said 

that, through the joint naval drills, China and Russia 

“demonstrate their confidence to maintain peace and 

stability in the region and world.”212 These exercises 

have occurred amidst growing tensions in the western Pacific over territorial disputes. China has overlapping maritime claims with several of its neighbors, 

with the disputes centered on islands located within 

overlapping exclusive economic zones, including with 

Japan over islands in the East China Sea. Meanwhile, 

China’s and Russia’s territorial disputes with Japan 

have become newly acute in recent years. Rear Admiral Leonid Sukhanov, Deputy Chief of the Main Staff 

of the Russian Navy and the commander of the Russian contingent to the 2012 maritime maneuvers, said 

that the “[p]articipating naval forces will train in the 

prevention of armed conflicts in exclusive economic 

zones,”213 implying a desire to affirm these disputed 

territorial claims. Naval Interaction 2012 took place at 

the same time as a large U.S.-Philippines amphibious 

drill and followed a series of U.S.-South Korean military exercises that some Chinese and Russian commentators had denounced as exacerbating tensions 

on the Korean Peninsula. PRC officials have been 

especially incensed that some of these exercises have 

occurred in the Yellow Sea, near China’s industrial 

heartland and along routes where imports reach key 

Chinese coastal cities.214 Yana Leksyutina, associate 

professor of international relations at St. Petersburg 

State University, said that the China-Russia naval exercise served as a warning to Washington to respect 

both countries’ interests and that “the joint drill is a 

response to recently intensified military drills in the 
50

Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea by 

the U.S. and its allies.”215

Chinese and Russian analysts also attribute the 

exercises to a general Sino-Russian desire to counter 

the U.S. rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region. 

Russian sources cited retired PLA generals as describing Naval Interaction 2012 as a response to the Pentagon’s increased activities in the Asia-Pacific region.216

Igor Korotchenko, chief editor of the National Defense

magazine, added that while “China is not Russia’s 

military ally . . . as strategic partners, we want peace 

and stability on our borders.”217 Rear Admiral Duan 

Zhangxian, PLA Navy deputy chief of staff and the 

executive director of the Chinese navy for the drill, 

warned that, “The Chinese navy strives for peace. 

However, if anyone infringes on the country’s peace, 

we will not be afraid to fight for it.”218 Chinese sources 

listed a desire to counter U.S. influence in Asia as one 

of Russia’s goals in Naval Interaction 2013. A Russianlanguage web site controlled by the Chinese government described Naval Interaction 2013 as “‘an attempt 

to resist the ongoing U.S.-Japan alliance’.”219 Perhaps 

the clearest sign of China’s anti-Japan intent was 

how, following the end of Naval Interaction 2013, five 

PLAN vessels conducted their first known passage of 

the Soya Strait located between Hokkaido in northern 

Japan and Russia’s Sakhalin Island. Xinhua, China’s 

official news agency, described the drills as providing China and Russia with “the experience to compete 

against the United States Navy and Japan Maritime 

Self-Defense Force in a real combat environment.”220

Although the specific timing of the exercises seem unrelated to any specific Japanese or U.S. statement of 

action, a general Chinese desire to show displeasure 

and capabilities in response to the heightened tensions 
51

with Japan, supported by the United States, is probable. PRC analysts have been complaining throughout 

the Barack Obama administration that the Asia Pivot 

has been encouraging Japan, the Philippines, and other Asian countries to challenge more assertively Beijing’s territorial claims. The military exercises would 

underline China’s assertion of sovereignty and serve 

as a warning and deter the United States.221

China also tried to use the exercise to legitimize 

the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that Beijing declared in November 2013 but which Japan, the 

United States, and other countries have been contesting. Naval Interaction 2014 included air identification

drills. Although they are routine in naval exercises to 

ensure that civilian planes are not targeted, Li Jie, an 

expert at the PLA’s Naval Military Studies Research 

Institute, explicitly claimed that Moscow’s participation in the air identification drills “showed [that it] 

supported China’s move to set up the zone.”222 Although no Russian official or expert confirmed this interpretation, the PRC government naturally wants the 

world to think this is the case. In addition to attempts 

to make it appear as if Russia supported its ADIZ, 

China also used the joint exercises as an opportunity 

to implement the zone. Before then, China had done 

little to actually interfere with U.S. or Japanese violations of the ADIZ that it had declared in November 

2013. However, on May 24, at the height of Naval Interaction 2014, two Chinese fighters flew threateningly close to Japanese planes that, according to Beijing, 

had violated the ADIZ by coming so close to watch 

the China-Russia war games.223 The PRC explanation 

for the buzzing is odd. An ADIZ would only require 

the planes to identify themselves to China, not avoid 

flying in international waters, where the drills were 

then occurring. 
52

In addition, Russia’s participation reflects Moscow’s recent efforts to raise its global naval profile. 

Russian fleets are increasing their presence on the high 

seas and, after years of falling budgets, finally acquiring newly built warships. More recently, the Russian 

media used the Peace Mission 2014 exercise to highlight that, despite Moscow’s alienation from the West 

and the many sanctions imposed on Russia due to the 

Ukraine conflict, Moscow still had important foreign 

partners. Nevertheless, the increased size of the latest exercise may not be related to the most recent international tensions since Russia’s contribution was 

comparable in size and status to what Moscow sent to 

earlier SCO exercises.224 Some analysts do depict Russia as trying to enhance the SCO to counter NATO and 

advance a more multipolar world.225 But it was China, 

not Russia, that greatly increased its contribution to 

the latest drill. The growth of terrorist attacks in China 

during the preceding year and the exercise’s location 

in China might explain the PLA increase.

CONCLUSIONS

The joint China-Russia military exercises provide 

several benefits to both countries that contribute to 

their security partnership. The drills help the Chinese 

and Russian armed forces to improve their tactical and 

operational capabilities, thereby enhancing their ability to pursue unilateral and joint operations. The PLA, 

which has not fought a major war in decades, particularly strives to learn lessons from other militaries. 

At times, the Russian government has used the drills 

as a way of showcasing military technologies that it 

wanted to sell to China. The joint shows of force also 

aim to deter and, if necessary, defeat potential threats, 
53

such as Islamist terrorists trying to undermine Central 

Asian states, while at the same time reassuring SCO 

member states that China and Russia can protect them 

from such threats. Furthermore, the recurring exercises and other joint China-Russia military activities 

have a mutual reassurance function, as they inform 

Beijing and Moscow about the other’s military potential and thus build mutual confidence about their 

friendly intentions toward one another. Finally, the 

joint exercises attempt to communicate the message to 

third parties, especially the United States, that China 

and Russia have a genuine security partnership and 

that it extends to cover Central Asia, a region of high 

priority concern for Moscow and Beijing, and possibly 

other areas, such as northeast Asia.

The China-Russia defense partnership looks likely 

to continue for at least the next few years. The new 

Chinese leadership seems eager to cultivate defense 

ties with Russia. During Xi’s March 2013 Moscow visit, when he became the first Chinese president to visit 

the Russian Armed Forces Operational Command 

Center, Xi said that: 

My visit to the Russian Defense Ministry is intended 

to confirm that military, political and strategic relations between the two countries will strengthen as will 

cooperation between the Armed Forces of China and 

Russia.226

At the time, PRC Defense Minister General Chang 

Wanquan told his Russian counterpart, General Sergei 

Shoigu, that “China is ready to work with Russia to 

tap that potential and expand the scope of bilateral defense co-operation, so as to lift it to a new level.”227 At 

the beginning of Peace Mission 2014, General Valery 

Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the armed 
54

forces of Russia, said that, “Russia is ready to make 

joint efforts with China to lift the relationship to a new 

high.”228 After the drills, Liu Zhenli, Commander of 

China’s 38th Army, said that further SCO military 

cooperation should seek an expanded “exchange of 

ideas on tactical thoughts, joint command, and fighting methods of anti-terror operations.”229 NATO’s decision to suspend military cooperation and contacts 

with Russia following Moscow’s annexation of the 

Crimea is leading Moscow to place more emphasis on 

strengthening security cooperation with Beijing.

One should not exaggerate the significance of these 

Sino-Russian military exercises. Russia and China do 

not have a formal defense alliance, and there is no 

pledge or expectation that they would conduct joint 

combat operations anytime soon. In principle, SCO 

members might come to one another’s defense in case 

of an external invasion, but the organization’s charter does not formally authorize collective defense operations. In practice, China would prove reluctant to 

make such a defensive commitment since Beijing has 

shunned formal military alliances, while the other five 

governments belong to the Moscow-led CSTO, whose 

explicit function is to provide for the mutual defense 

of its members from external attack.

The exercises that the Chinese and Russian armed 

forces undertake without foreign participation are 

considerably larger than their joint drills with one another. Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, deputy 

chief of the PLA general staff, clearly exaggerated last 

year when he said that, “After a decade of cooperation, 

I am confident that the two militaries are absolutely 

able to conduct joint combat under any conditions.”230

Despite their many contributions, these exercises have 

not established a solid basis for a sustained major joint 
55

Russia-Chinese military operation. Even in the SCO 

context, Russia and China lack the interoperability 

or integrated command, control, and support mechanisms required to conduct an effective combined military campaign. The Chinese and Russian armed forces 

do not rehearse integrated military operations to the 

same degree as, for example, do the U.S. military drills 

with its NATO allies or South Korea and Japan. The 

United States and other countries regularly engage 

in many comparably large and often more challenging exercises with foreign partners, including China 

and Russia. At best, the Chinese and Russian armed 

forces could probably conduct a joint counterterrorist 

or peacekeeping mission in a nearby country, but only 

if the environment was not too challenging—like Kyrgyzstan in 2010, but not Chechnya in 1999 or Afghanistan today. In those more demanding cases, Russia 

and China could at best employ a sectoral approach in 

which they would conduct parallel but geographically 

separate operations in a common military campaign, 

such as might occur in a joint effort to suppress a major Islamist insurgency in a Central Asian country. 

Regarding their joint naval exercises, the prospects 

of the two countries fighting foreign navies together 

seems remote. Even in the case of Japan, with which 

Russia and China each have bilateral territorial conflicts, neither Moscow nor Beijing have strongly sided 

with the other against Tokyo. In particular, the Russian government has been seeking to regularize its 

territorial dispute with Japan rather than establish a 

common anti-Tokyo front with Beijing. When Chinese 

warships sailed off toward Japan following the 2013 

Russia-China naval exercise, Russia’s vessels declined 

to follow them in what could have been a joint show 

of force designed to intimidate Tokyo. In addition, 
56

while the general number of Chinese and Russian capital warships has been increasing, the size of their annual naval exercises has remained modest. The small 

prospect of a joint Chinese-Russian naval operation 

combined with their governments’ limited commitment to the joint maritime drills suggests that other 

considerations are driving their naval exercise program, such as building trust and sending messages to 

third parties.

Thus far, the U.S. defense community has reacted 

with appropriate watchful calm to the Chinese-Russian defense engagements. If anything, these exercises present less of a threat to U.S. regional security 

interests than the Sino-Russian arms trade relationship, which at times seems as if it could allow Beijing 

to contemplate using its Russian-supplied capabilities to pursue military options against Taiwan or in 

other Asia-Pacific scenarios. The U.S. military should 

continue to monitor the Chinese-Russian defense cooperation as it sustains its own robust exercise and 

exchange series with the far larger number of international partners available to the United States. As 

we are daily reminded, unlike Beijing or Moscow, 

Washington has many genuine military allies.

ENDNOTES 

1. “Joint Military Drill to Boost Peace and Stability,” 

People’s Daily Online, July 21, 2009, available from en.people.

cn/90001/90780/91345/6705902.html.

2. China’s National Defence in 2008, January 20, 2009, chapter 13, Beijing, China: Information Office of China’s State 

Council, available from www.china.org.cn/government/central_

government/2009-01/20/content_17155577_15.htm. 
57

3. Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Embracing a Storm and 

Each Other?” Comparative Connections, Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, January 2009, available 

from www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0804qchina_russia.pdf. 

4. “Joint Military Drill to Boost Peace and Stability.”

5. Ibid.

6. “Backgrounder: Major PLA-related joint anti-terror military trainings,” Xinhua, December 21, 2007, available from news.

Xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/21/content_7290327.htm.

7. “Regional Security Organization to Start Antiterrorism 

Drills in South Russia,” RIA Novosti, August 16, 2010, available 

from en.ria.ru/military_news/20100816/160216342.html.

8. “Backgrounder: Major PLA-Related Joint Anti-Terror 

Military Trainings.”

9. “Uzbekistan Hosts SCO Drill,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty Newsline, March 10, 2006, available from www.rferl.org/

content/article/1143591.html.

10. “Sino-Russian Military Drills Demonstrate Commitment to World Peace,” People’s Daily Online, August 19, 2005, 

available from www.politicalaffairs.net/sino-russian-military-drillsdemonstrate-commitment-to-world-peace/.

11. Vladimir Mukhin, “Po uyguro-chechenskomu stsenariyu” (“On the Uyghur-Chechen Scenario”), Nezavisimyay Gazeta, 

July 21, 2009, available from www.ng.ru/politics/2009-07-21/2_

uchenia.html. 

12. Roger N. McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, October 

2007, available from www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/JamestownMcDermottRisingDragon.pdf. 

13. Mukhin, “Po uyguro-chechenskomu stsenariyu”; and 

“Russia and China: Joint Military Exercises: Comment and Analysis from Taipei, London, Singapore and Tokyo,” WorldPress.org, 

August 26, 2005, available from www.worldpress.org/Asia/2138.cfm.
58

14. “U.S. is Watching Russia-China Drill,” The New York Times, 

August 19, 2005, available from www.nytimes.com/2005/08/18/

world/asia/18iht-exercise.html?_r=1. 

15. Sergei Blagov, “Russian-Chinese War Game Meant to 

Boost Bilateral Partnership,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 18, 

2005, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews[tt_news]=30804. 

16. Bruce W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013, available from www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR331.html.

17. See for example McDermott, “Rising Dragon”; and Marcel 

de Haas, “The ‘Peace Mission 2007’ Exercises: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Advances,” Shrivenham, UK: Advanced 

Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, September 2007, available from www.clingendael.nl/

sites/default/files/20070900_cscp_paper_haas.pdf.

18. De Haas, “Peace Mission 2007,” p. 3.

19. McDermott, “Rising Dragon,” p. 5.

20. Ibid., p. 10.

21. De Haas, “Peace Mission 2007.”

22. McDermott, “Rising Dragon,” p. 12.

23. McDermott, “Rising Dragon,” p. 18.

24. “’Peace Mission-2009’ Improves Anti-Terror Response: 

Chinese Military Officer,” Xinhua, July 24, 2009, available from 

www.gov.cn/misc/2009-07/24/content_1374227.htm.

25. Ibid.

26. “Mission for Peace Targets Terrorists,” CCTV, July 23, 

2009, available from english.cctv.com/20090723/106704.shtml.
59

27. Peng Kuang and Li Xiaokun, “Sino-Russian Drill to Begin 

Despite Crash,” China Daily, July 22, 2009, available from www.

chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-07/22/content_8456192.htm.

28. Ibid.

29. “Day 2 of China-Russia Anti-Terror Drill,” CCTV, 

July 24, 2009, available from www.cctv.com/program/newshour/20090724/104689.shtml. 

30. “Russian Troops Go Aboard Train to Take Part in Chinese 

Exercises,” ITAR-TASS, July 8, 2009, available from www.ITARTASS.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=14127785&PageNum=23. 

31. Roger McDermott, “Sino-Russian Military Exercises 

Conceived as a Show of Unity,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 5, 

2009, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34949. 

32. “Russia and China Hold Peace Mission Drills to Show 

USA Its Place,” Pravda, June 20, 2009, available from english.

pravda.ru/russia/politics/20-07-2009/108250-russia_china-0.

33. “Chiefs of the General Staff from both China and Russia 

Watch Military Drill,” People’s Daily Online, July 24, 2009, available from english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6709677.html; 

and “Russia, China to Hold 2nd Joint Training at Peace Mission 

Exercise,” ITAR-TASS, July 19, 2009, available from www.ITARTASS.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=14159658&PageNum=0. 

34. Zhang Ning, “Chinese Army Battle Group Ready for Russia-China Joint Military Exercise,” CCTV, July 20, 2009, available 

from www.cctv.com/program/newshour/20090720/104771.shtml. 

35. “Vo vremya rossiysko-kitayskix voennyx ucheniy budut 

otrapbotany I deystviya protiv terroristov” (“Actions Against 

Terrorists Will Be Practiced During the Russian-Chinese Military 

Exercises”), Interfax, July 11, 2009, available from www.interfax.

ru/news.asp?id=89731. 

36. Mukhin, “Po uyguro-chechenskomu tsenariyu.” 
60

37. Roger McDermott, “Russia Quietly Introduces ‘New 

Look’ Army,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 14, 2009, available from 

www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5

D=35258&cHash=6bb639c453. 

38. “China Launches Massive Military Exercise: Report,” 

AFP, Aug 11, 2009, available from www.spacewar.com/reports/

China_launches_massive_military_exercise_report_999.html; and Yan 

Hao, “‘Stride-2009’: PLA 50,000 Troops Kick off Largest Military 

Exercise,” Xinhua, August 12, 2009, available from www.chinadefense-mashup.com/?p=3779. 

39. “SCO Anti-Terrorist Drills to Show SCO Potential in Security Area,” ITAR-TASS, September 10, 2010, available from www.

ITAR-TASS.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=15480561&PageNum=0.

40. “SCO Troops Stage Second Joint Training,” Xinhua, September 16, 2010, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english2010/

world/2010-09/16/c_13514780.htm.

41. Liang Jun, “Three Highlights of ‘Peace Mission 2010’ 

Worth Expecting,” People’s Daily Online, September 13, 2010, 

available from english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7138773.

html.

42.“На учениях ‘Мирная миссия 2010’ Сухопутные войска сосредоточатся на ночных стрельбах” (“At the ‘Peace Mission-2010’ Military Exercises the Ground Forces Will Focus on 

the Nighttime Shootings”), GZT.RU, September 8, 2010, available 

from www.gzt.ru/topnews/politics/-na-ucheniyah-mirnaya-missiya2010-suhoputnye-/323965.html.

43. “Kazakh Official Calls for United Efforts,” 

China Daily, September 11, 2010, available from english.cri.cn/

6966/2010/09/11/2481s594022.htm.

44. “SCO to Begin Large-Scale Anti-Terror Drills in Kazakhstan,” RIA Novosti, September 9, 2010, available from www.global

security.org/military//library/news/2010/09/mil-100909-rianovosti01.

htm; and “SCO Anti-Terrorist Drills to Show SCO Potential in Security Area,” ITAR-TASS, September 10, 2010, available from www.

ITAR-TASS.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=15480561&PageNum=0.
61

45. “SCO to Begin Large-Scale Anti-Terror Drills in 

Kazakhstan.”

46. Roger McDermott, “Sino-Russian Military Exercises 

Conceived as a Show of Unity,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 5, 

2009, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34949.

47. “First Contingent of Chinese Soldiers Arrive in Kazakhstan for SCO Drills,” Xinhua, September 7, 2010, available from 

news.Xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-09/07/c_13483072.htm.

48. “Chinese Troops Pay Attention to Coordination with 

Friendly Forces,” Xinhua, September 19, 2010, available from 

english.cri.cn/6909/2010/09/19/1461s595271.htm.

49. Ding Ying, “Practicing for Peace,” Beijing Review, September 21, 2010, available from www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2010-

09/21/content_299532.htm.

50. Roger McDermott, “PLA Displays Network-Centric Capabilities in Peace Mission 2010,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 6, 

2010, available from www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37001&cHash=ff5fd5240d.

51. “Chinese Troops Pay Attention to Coordination with 

Friendly Forces,” Xinhua, September 19, 2010, available from english.cri.cn/6909/2010/09/19/1461s595271.htm.

52. “First contingent of Chinese Soldiers Arrive in Kazakhstan for SCO Drills.” 

53. Ying, “Practicing for Peace.” 

54. “Chinese Army Hones Transportation Skills at SCO War 

Games,” Xinhua, September 22, 2010, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-09/22/c_13525299.htm.

55. Liang Jun, “Three Highlights of ‘Peace Mission 2010’ 

Worth Expecting,” People’s Daily Online, September 13, 2010, 

available from english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7138773.

html.
62

56. McDermott, “PLA Displays Network-Centric Capabilities.”

57. Ying, “Practicing for Peace.”

58. Gabe Collins, “China’s Military Gets Expeditionary,” The 

Diplomat, April 15, 2011, available from the-diplomat.com/2011/04/15/

china%E2%80%99s-military-gets-expeditionary/?all=true.

59. J. Michael Cole, “China Joins Russia in Naval Exercise,” 

Taipei Times, April 2, 2012, available from www.taipeitimes.com/

News/taiwan/archives/2012/04/02/2003529315. 

60. Ibid. 

61. Zhao Shengnan, “Russia-China Joint Naval Drill Starts,” 

China Daily, April 22, 2012, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2012-04/22/content_15108571.htm. 

62. Ibid. 

63. Denis Bolotsky, “Russia, China To Trade Naval KnowHow In Drills,” RT, April 23, 2012, available from rt.com/news/

russia-china-drills-warships-679/. 

64. “Latest Russian and Chinese Naval Exercise,” Liveleak.

com, April 23, 2012, available from www.liveleak.com/view?i=09e_

1335567430&comments=1. 

65. Dean Cheng, “Sino-Russian Naval Exercises: Shape 

of Things to Come?” Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, April 25, 2012, available from blog.heritage.org/2012/04/25/

sino-russian-naval-exercises-shape-of-things-to-come/.

66. “China, Russia End First Naval Exercises: State Media,” 

Agence France Presse, April 27, 2012, available from www.asiaone.

com/News/Latest%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20120427-342570.

html; Vladimir Skosyrev, “Очень своевременные маневры” 

(“Very Timely Maneuvers”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 23, 2012, 

available from www.ng.ru/world/2012-04-23/1_manevry.html; 

“China, Russia End First Naval Exercises: State Media,” Agence 
63

France Presse, April 27, 2012, available from www.asiaone.com/

News/Latest%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20120427-342570.html; 

and “Russia, China Complete Naval Drills,” RIA Novosti, April 

26, 2012, available from en.rian.ru/world/20120426/173069251.html. 

67. “Russian, Chinese Warships Start Joint Exercise in Yellow 

Sea,” ITAR-TASS, April 22, 2012, available from www.ITAR-TASS.

com/en/c154/399414.html/. 

68. “Cruiser to Lead Foreign Ships in China Naval Parade,” RIA Novosti, April 22, 2009, available from en.rian.ru/

russia/20090422/121247162.html. 

69. “China-Russian Joint Naval Exercises Will Be Divided 

into Two Stages of Locations in the Yellow Sea,” HYCFW, April 5, 

2012, available from www.ocean-fortune.com/Item/225.aspx. 

70. “Chinese Commander Commends Naval Exercises with 

Russia,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, April 27, 2012.

71. “Russia, China Ships Enter Area of Joint Naval Drills in 

Yellow Sea,” ITAR-TASS, April 24, 2012.

72. Martin Andrew, “Power Politics: China, Russia and Peace 

Mission 2005,” China Brief, Vol. 5, Issue 20, October 27, 2005, 

available from www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_

ttnews[tt_news]=3897&tx_ttnews[backPid]=195&no_cache=1. 

73. “Russian, Chinese Warships Start ‘Active Phase’ of Joint 

Maneuvers,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, April 25, 2012.

74. Ibid.

75. “Fleet Review Held at Russia-China Joint Naval Exercise,” China Military Online, April 27, 2012, available from eng.

chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2012-04/27/content_

4845630.htm. 

76. “Russian-Chinese Naval Drills Not a Demonstration of 

Force—Ministry,” Interfax, April 26, 2012.
64

77. Joshua Kucera, “Uzbekistan Blocks Kazakhstan’s Military from SCO Exercises,” EurasiaNet, June 14, 2012, available 

from www.eurasianet.org/node/65552; and “Sovmestnoye ucheniye 

vooruzhennykh sil gosudarstv-chlenov SHOS ‘Mirnaya missiya-2012’” (“The Members of SCO ‘Peace Mission-2012 Exercise’”), Moscow, Russia: Russian Ministry of Defense, June 

4, 2012, available from function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.

htm?id=11165517@egNews.

78. Alexander Sodiqov, “SCO Peace Mission 2012: Lessons 

for Tajikistan,” CACI Analyst, June 27, 2012, available from www.

cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12537-field-reportscaci-analyst-2012-6-27-art-12537.html.

79. “Joint SCO Military Drill a Success,” China Daily, June 

12, 2012, available from usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-06/15/

content_15503703.htm. 

80. “Chinese Troops Participating in ‘Peace Mission 2012’ 

Exercise Arrive in Tajikistan,” PLA Daily, June 7, 2012, available 

from english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7838414.html.

81. Roger McDermott, “China Leads SCO Peace Mission 2012 

in Central Asia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 26, 2012, available from 

www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39538&no_

cache=1#.VCKbl-l0y20.

82. Sodiqov, “SCO Peace Mission 2012: Lessons for 

Tajikistan.”

83. Roger McDermott, “Uzbekistan Snubs SCO Peace Mission 2012,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 19, 2012, available from 

www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39512&no_

cache=1#.VCKcMOl0y20.

84. Saida Badenova, “V Kazakhstane zavershilis’ ucheniya 

SHOS ‘Kazygurt-Antiterror-2013’” (“The SCO ‘Kazygurt-Antiterror-2013’ Exercises in Kazakhstan Have Ended”), Voice of Russia, 

June 14, 2013, available from rus.ruvr.ru/2013_06_14/V-Kazahstanezavershilis-uchenija-SHOS-Kazigurt-Antiterror-2013-9841/.
65

85. “China, Russia Complete Extensive Naval Exercise” RIA Novosti, July 10, 2013, available from en.rian.ru/

world/20130710/182171807/China-Russia-Complete-Extensive-NavalExercise.html.

86. “China, Russia Complete Extensive Naval Exercise.”

87. Jane Perlez, “China and Russia, in a Display of Unity, 

Hold Naval Exercises,” The New York Times, July 10, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/asia/china-and-russiain-a-display-of-unity-hold-naval-exercises.html?_r=0; and “China, 

Russia Complete 3-Day Joint Naval Drill,” China Daily, July 11, 

2013, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-07/11/

content_16761518.htm.

88. Joshua Kucera, “Chinese Troops Exercise in Russia, But 

Where’s Rest of the SCO?” Eurasianet, August 6, 2013, available 

from www.eurasianet.org/node/67350.

89. “Beijing, Moscow Hail Military Ties,” China Daily, August 

16, 2013, available from gbtimes.com/world/beijing-moscow-hailmilitary-ties.

90. “Chinese Military Hardware Hits Russia for Joint AntiTerror Drills,” RT, August 4, 2013, available fromrt.com/news/

russia-china-drills-urals-016.

91. “1,500 Troops to Attend China-Russia Joint Drills,” Xinhua, July 25, 2013, available from english.cntv.cn/20130725/105006.

shtml.

92. “Chinese Military Hardware Hits Russia.”

93. Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Summer Heat and 

Sino-Russian Strategizing,” Comparative Connections, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2013, p. 138, available from csis.org/publication/comparativeconnections-v15-n2.

94. “Peace Mission-2013 China-Russia Joint Drill Ends,” Xinhua, August 16, 2013, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/

video/2013-08/16/c_132635278.htm.
66

95. “Beijing, Moscow Hail Military Ties.”

96. “Chinese Military Hardware Hits Russia.”

97. “Beijing, Moscow Hail Military Ties.”

98. “Chinese Military Hardware Hits Russia.”

99. “Beijing, Moscow Hail Military Ties.”

100. “Start of Naval Interaction 2014 Exercises,” President 

of Russia website, May 20, 2014, available from eng.kremlin.ru/

news/7201. 

101. See for example “Crossover: 14 Chinese and Russian 

Vessels Taking Part in Defense Exercise,” CCTV, May 23, 2014, 

available from english.cntv.cn/2014/05/23/VIDE1400824201466167.

shtml; “Chinese, Russian Naval Forces Gather for ‘Joint Sea-2014’ 

Drills,” People’s Daily Online, May 21, 2014, available from english.people.com.cn/n/2014/0521/c98649-8730524.html; “China-Russia 

Joint Naval Drill Ends Successfully,” Global Times, May 25, 2014, 

available from www.globaltimes.cn/content/861975.shtml; and “Russian Battleships in Shanghai for Joint Naval Drills,” RT, May 19, 

2014, available from rt.com/news/159912-russia-china-naval-drills. 

102. “Chinese, Russian Naval Forces Gather for ‘Joint Sea2014’ Drills.” 

103. “Russian Battleships in Shanghai for Joint Naval Drills.” 

104. “China, Russia Begin Joint Naval Drills in Shanghai,” 

Global Times, May 21, 2014, available from www.globaltimes.cn/

content/861439.shtml.

105. “Russia Signs 30-Year Gas Deal with China,” BBC, May 

21, 2014, available from www.bbc.com/news/business-27503017.

106. “China, Russia Begin Joint Naval Drills.” 

107. Ibid. 
67

108. Zachary Keck, “China, Russia Military Ties Deepen with 

Naval Drill in East China Sea,” The Diplomat, May 2, 2014, available from thediplomat.com/2014/05/china-russia-military-ties-deepenwith-naval-drill-in-east-china-sea/. 

109. “Start of Naval Interaction 2014 Exercises,” President of 

Russia, May 20, 2014, available from eng.kremlin.ru/news/7201.

110. “Russian Battleships in Shanghai for Joint Naval Drills.” 

111. Ibid. 

112. “Reasons Behind the Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercise,” Want China Times, May 21 2014, available from www.

wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=

11&id=20140521000032. 

113. “Russian Battleships in Shanghai for Joint Naval Drills.” 

114. “Russian, Chinese Leaders to Open Joint Naval Drills Off 

China’s Coast,” The Voice of Russia, May 20, 2014, available from 

voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_20/Russian-Chinese-leaders-to-openjoint-naval-drills-off-China-s-coast-4958.

115. “Chinese, Russian Naval Forces Gather for ‘Joint Sea2014’ Drills.” 

116. “Reasons Behind the Sino-Russian Joint Military 

Exercise.” 

117. “Russian-Chinese Military Exercises Joint Sea 2014 End 

in China”; Vitaliy Ankov, “Russian Ships Sail to East China Sea to 

Participate in Russia-China Exercises,” RIA Novosti, May 22 2014, 

available from en.ria.ru/military_news/20140522/190038040/Russian-Ships-Sail-to-East-China-Sea-to-Participate-in.html; and “China, 

Russia Begin Joint Naval Drills.” 

118. “Joint Sea-2014 China-Russia Joint Military Exercise 

Kicks Off,” China Military Online, available from english.chinamil.

com.cn/.
68

119. “China-Russia Navies Conduct Real Combat Drill,” Xinhua, May 24, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2014-05/24/c_133358519.htm. 

120. “Naval Drill Showcases Partnership in Upholding World 

Peace,” Xinhua, May 21, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/

english/indepth/2014-05/21/c_133351273.htm.

121. “China-Russia Navies Conduct Anti-Piracy Exercises,” 

Xinhua, May 23, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2014-05/23/c_133356500.htm.

122. Bin, “Summer Heat and Sino-Russian Strategizing.”

123. “PLA and Russian Navy Learn from Joint Sea 2014 

Drills,” Want China Times, May 25, 2014, available from www.

wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=

11&id=20140525000071. 

124. “China, Russia Begin Joint Naval Drills.” 

125. “Reasons Behind the Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercise,” Want China Times, May 21 2014, available from www.

wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=

11&id=20140521000032.

126. Minnie Chan, “China, Russia Start Joint Naval Exercise,” 

South China Morning Post, May 20, 2014, available from www.

scmp.com/news/china/article/1516768/china-russia-start-joint-navalexercise. 

127. “Shanghai Cooperation Organization to Hold LargestEver Military Drills in August,” RIA Novosti, August 22, 2014, 

available from en.ria.ru/military_news/20140822/192236652/Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization-to-Hold-Largest-Ever-Military.html.

128. “China’s Drone Blasts Off Missile in SCO Anti-Terror 

Drill,” Xinhua, August 26 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.

com/english/china/2014-08/26/c_126921067.htm.

129. “Chinese Forces for ‘Peace Mission-2014’ Exercise in 

Position,” China Military Online, August 21, 2014, available from 

www.ecns.cn/military/2014/08-21/130781.shtml. 
69

130. “Five SCO Participating Troops Carry Out Anti-Terror 

Exercise,” Xinhua, August 31, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/video/2014-08/31/c_133608499.htm.

131. “SCO Troops in Final Stage of Peace Mission 2014 Exercise,” RIA Novosti, August 29, 2014, available from en.ria.ru/

world/20140829/192444964/SCO-Troops-in-Final-Stage-of-PeaceMission-2014-Exercise.html.

132. Xiang Bo, “China Hosts SCO Live Fire Drill,” Xinhua, 

August 29, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2014-08/29/c_133606645.htm. 

133. “SCO Anti-Terror Drill Kicks Off in China,” Xinhua, 

August 24, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2014-08/24/c_133580322.htm.

134. “SCO Troops in Final Stage of Peace Mission 2014 Exercise,” RIA Novosti, August 29, 2014, available from en.ria.ru/

world/20140829/192444964/SCO-Troops-in-Final-Stage-of-PeaceMission-2014-Exercise.html.

135. “Chinese Forces for ‘Peace Mission-2014’ Exercise in 

Position,” China Military Online, August 21, 2014, available from 

www.ecns.cn/military/2014/08-21/130781.shtml. 

136. Gordon Arthur, “China Confirms CH-4 UCAV in PLA 

Service at ‘Peace Mission 2014’ Drill,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

September 1, 2014, available from www.janes.com/article/42619/

china-confirms-ch-4-ucav-in-pla-service-at-peace-mission-2014-drill. 

137. “China Deploys Armed Drone to Multinational 

Drills,” Associated Press, August 26, 2014, available from www.

military.com/daily-news/2014/08/26/china-deploys-armed-drone-tomultinational-drills.html.

138. Ibid.

139. Miles Yu, “Inside China: A Shanghaied Exercise,” Washington Times, September 4, 2014, available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/4/inside-china-a-shanghaied-exercise/?utm_

source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS.
70

140. “Armed Helicopters Debut in Joint Exercise (1/4),” People’s Daily Online, August 22, 2014, available from www.ecns.cn/

visual/hd/2014/08-22/46980.shtml. 

141. “China Hosts SCO Live Fire Drill,” Xinhua, August 

29, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-

08/29/c_133606645.htm. 

142. “Chinese IL-76 Aircraft to Conduct Heavy-Equipment 

Air Dropping,” China Military Online, August 25, 2014, available 

from www.ecns.cn/military/2014/08-25/131308.shtml. 

143. “China’s Military Shows Off Its Newest Helicopters, 

Tanks in SCO Exercises,” Real Clear Defense, August 29, 2014, 

available from www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/08/29/chinas_military_shows_off_its_newest_helicopters_tanks_in_sco_exercises_107403.html; and “SCO Troops in Final Stage of Peace Mission 2014,” RIA Novosti, August 29, 2014, available from en.ria.

ru/world/20140829/192444964/SCO-Troops-in-Final-Stage-of-PeaceMission-2014-Exercise.html.

144. “Nearly 900 Russian Servicemen to Participate in Military Drills in China,” RIA Novosti, August 11, 2014, available from 

en.ria.ru/military_news/20140811/191898923/Nearly-900-RussianServicemen-to-Participate-in-Military-Drills.html. 

145. “Russian Troops Hit Targets with Precision Missiles 

during Peace Mission-2014 in China,” RIA Novosti, August 25, 

2014, available from en.ria.ru/military_news/20140825/192309385/

Russian-Troops-Hit-Targets-with-Precision-Missiles-DuringPeace.html. 

146. “SCO Anti-Terrorist War Games Begin in China,” 

ITAR-TASS, August 24, 2014, available from en.ITAR-TASS.com/

russia/746411. 

147. “Russian Troops Hit Targets With Precision Missiles 

During Peace Mission-2014 in China.” 

148. Ivan Marchenko, “Kyrgyzstanis Participate in Peace 

Mission-2014 Antiterrorist Exercise,” 24.kg news agency, August 25, 2014, available from www.eng.24.kg/community/171929-

news24.html.
71

149. Aynur Jafarova, “Central Asian Countries to Join Military Exercises in China,” Azernews, August 20, 2014, available 

from www.azernews.az/region/69829.html.

150. “Over 200 Tajik Troops to Participate in SCO Military 

Exercises,” Xinhua, July 22, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.

com/english/china/2014-07/22/c_133502875.htm.

151. Joshua Kucera, “SCO Exercises to Be Biggest in Ten 

Years,” EurasiaNet, August 11, 2014, available from www.eurasianet.org/node/69486.

152. “‘Peace Mission-2014’ to Highlight Five Features,” China Military Online, August 20, 2014, available from www.ecns.cn/

military/2014/08-20/130545.shtml.

153. Shao Yuqun, “Intra-SCO Security Cooperation Helps 

Regional Stability,” China-US Focus, September 17, 2014, available from www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/intra-sco-securitycooperation-helps-regional-stability/.

154. “‘Peace Mission-2014’ to Highlight Five Features.”

155. The U.S. Department of Defense also concluded that the 

Russians might have been exploiting the exercise to show off advanced weapons systems to potential Chinese buyers, see Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 

2006, p. 2.

156. Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: The New World Order 

According to Moscow and Beijing,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 

7, No. 3, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, October 2005, p. 148, available from csis.org/publication/

comparative-connections-v7-n3-china-russia-relations-new-world-order-according-moscow-an.

157. McDermott, Rising Dragon.

158. “Chinese Military Hardware Hits Russia.”
72

159. Wang Haiyun, “Joint Drills Vital for Security,” China Daily, August 1, 2013, available from usa.chinadaily.com.cn/

opinion/2013-08/01/content_16860197.htm.

160. “China, Russia Launch First Joint Naval Exercises,” 

Agence France Presse, April 22, 2012, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20120422/DEFREG03/304220010/China-RussiaLaunch-First-Joint-Naval-Exercises. 

161. J. Michael Cole, “China Joins Russia in Naval Exercise,” 

Taipei Times, April 2, 2012, available from www.taipeitimes.com/

News/taiwan/archives/2012/04/02/2003529315.

162. “Na voennykh manevrakh ‘Morskoye vzaimodeystviye-2013’ korabli Rossii i Kitaya ‘osvobodili zakhvachennoye piratami sudno’” (“At the ‘Naval Cooperation 2013’ Maneuvers, 

Russian and Chinese Vessels ‘liberated a Ship that Had Been 

Captured by the Pirates’”), ITAR-TASS, July 9, 2013, available 

from www.ITAR-TASS.com/c11/801028_print.html; “Po itogam 

ucheniy ‘Morskoye vzaimodeystviye-2013’” (“On the Results 

of the ‘Naval Cooperation-2013’ Exercise”), Voennoye obozreniye, 

July 12, 2013, available from topwar.ru/30718-po-itogam-ucheniymorskoe-vzaimodeystvie-2013.html; and Zhao Shengnan, “China, 

Russia Consider Increasing Naval Drills,” China Daily, July 12, 

2013, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-07/12/

content_16765666.htm.

163. Zhao Shengnan and Cui Haipei, “Joint Naval Drill ‘Complete Success’,” China Daily, April 28, 2012, available from www.

chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-04/28/content_15166266.htm.

164. “China to Conduct Naval Drills with Russia in East China Sea,” Reuters, April 30, 2014, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2014/04/30/us-china-russia-idUSBREA3T0WK20140430. 

165. “China-Russia Navies Conduct Real Combat Drill.” 

166. “SCO Exercise Peace Mission 2014 to Involve 7000 

Troops,” ITAR-TASS, August 19, 2014, available from en.ITARTASS.com/world/745617.
73

167. William Ide, “Anti-Terror Drills Highlight China’s 

Push into Central Asia,” Voice of America, August 29, 2014, available from www.voanews.com/content/anti-terror-drills-higlight-chinapush-into-central-asia/2432330.html.

168. James Pomfret and Dmitry Solovyov, “China, Russia 

Kick Off War Games,” Reuters, July 23, 2009, available from www.

themoscowtimes.com/news/article/379755.html.

169. For additional information on the exercise, see Annual 

Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 

2006, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 

2; Mikhail Lukin, “Peace Mission 2005: A 1970s Template for SinoRussian ‘Peacekeeping’,” Moscow Defense Brief, No. 2, 2005, p. 15-

18; and “Russia China Security Cooperation,” PINR, November 

27, 2006, available from https://archive.today/zCALw.

170. “Joint Military Drill to Boost Peace and Stability.”

171. Patrick Moore and Daniel Kimmage, “Uzbekistan: Was 

Andijon Uzbekistan’s Tiananmen Square?” Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty, June 9, 2005, available from www.rferl.org/content/

article/1059188.html.

172. Alim Seytoff, “SCO Exercise ‘Aimed at Suppressing Uighurs’,” Washington, DC: The Uyghur American Association, 

August 15, 2007, available from www.atimes.com/atimes/China/

IH16Ad06.html. 

173. Fred Weir, “Russia-China War Games Battle Extremists, Separatists,” Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 2009, available from features.csmonitor.com/globalnews/2009/07/22/russia-chinawar-games-battle-extremists-separatists/.

174. Wang Xinjun, “China-Russia Military Drill Sends Out 

Five Signals,” People’s Daily Online, August 16, 2013, available 

from english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8366820.html.

175. “Researchers: Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercise a 

Warning to Terrorists,” People’s Daily Online, July 22, 2009, available from english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6707055.

html.
74

176. “Joint Military Exercise Targets Spread of Terrorism,” 

China Daily, July 20, 2009, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2009-07/20/content_8446817.htm.

177. “‘Peace Mission-2009’ Improves Anti-Terror Response, 

Chinese Military Officer,” People’s Daily Online, July 24, 2009, 

available from english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/

6709137.html.

178. “Researchers: Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercise a 

Warning to Terrorists.”

179. “Mission for Peace Targets Terrorists,” China Daily, 

July 23, 2009, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/

peacemission2009/index.html.

180. Shao Yuqun, “Intra-SCO Security Cooperation Helps Regional Stability,” China US Focus, September 17, 2014, available 

from www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/intra-sco-security-cooperation-helps-regional-stability/.

181. “Military to Minimize Flight Delays during Drill,” Xinhua, August 18, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2014-08/18/c_133566325.htm; and “‘Peace Mission-2014’ 

Scale: More than Ever,” Xinhua, August 28, 2014, available from 

news.Xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/28/c_133603431.htm.

182. “China Hosts SCO Live Fire Drill,” Xinhua, August 

29, 2014, available from news.Xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-

08/29/c_133606645.htm.

183. “SCO Military Exercises Due To Enter Final Stage,” Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 29, 2014, available from www.

rferl.org/content/sco-military-exercises-china/26556342.html.

184. “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” Beijing, China: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

of the People’s Republic of China, May 21, 2014, available from 

www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml.

185. “Joint Military Drill to Boost Peace and Stability.” 
75

186. Ibid.

187. “Joint Navy Drill to Boost China-Russia Military Ties: Senior Chinese Officer,” People’s Daily Online, April 18, 2012, available from english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7790327.html.

188. Ilyashenko Andrei, “Russia and China Are Intensifying Cooperation in the Military Sphere,” Space War, May 7, 2012, 

available from www.spacewar.com/reports/Russia_and_China_are_

intensifying_cooperation_in_the_military_sphere_999.html.

189. Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Embracing a Storm and 

Each Other?” Comparative Connections, Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, January 2009, csis.org/

publication/comparative-connections-v10-n4-china-russia-relationsembracing-storm-and-each-other.

190. “‘Peace Mission-2014’ to Highlight Five Features.” 

191. “Joint Navy Drill to Boost China-Russia Military Ties: 

Senior Chinese Officer.”

192. Zhao Shengnan, “Exercises ‘Intended to Ensure Peace’,” 

China Daily, April 24, 2012, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2012-04/24/content_15120545.htm.

193. Zhao Shengnan and Cui Haipei.

194. “China, Russia Begin Joint Naval Drills.” 

195. “China-Russia Navies Conduct Real Combat Drill.”

196. “Russian Battleships in Shanghai for Joint Naval Drills,” 

RT, May 19, 2014, available from rt.com/news/159912-russia-chinanaval-drills.

197. Chan.

198. “Chinese Military Hardware Hits Russia for Joint AntiTerror Drills.” 
76

199. “SCO anti-terror drill kicks off in China.”

200. Ibid.

201. Shao Yuqun, “Intra-SCO Security Cooperation Helps Regional Stability,” China-US Focus, September 17, 2014, available 

from www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/intra-sco-security-cooperation-helps-regional-stability/.

202. Sergey Balmasov, “Russia and China Hold Peace Mission 

Drills to Show USA Its Place,” Pravda, June 20, 2009, available from 

english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/20-07-2009/108250-russia_china-0.

203. “‘Peace Mission-2014’ to Highlight Five Features.” 

204. McDermott, Rising Dragon, pp. 3-25.

205. “Russia, China Kick Off Military Exercises.” 

206. Wang Haiyun.

207. “Russia, China Do Not Plan to Create Any Military 

Union - Russian Presidential Staff Chief,” ITAR-TASS, July 10, 

2014, available from en.ITAR-TASS.com/russia/739875.

208. Zhang Junshe, “Anti-Terrorism Exercise Has Nothing to Do with America,” People’s Daily Online, August 21, 2014, 

available from english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0821/c98649-

8772635.html.

209. Ibid.

210. Kucera, “Russia and the SCO Military Exercises.” 

211. “China-Russia Naval Joint Exercise to Be Normalized 

and Institutionalized,” Beijing, China: Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, July 11, 2013, available 

from eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2013-07/11/content_4458244.htm.

212. “Joint Navy Drill to Boost China-Russia Military Ties: 

Senior Chinese Officer.” 
77

213. Zhao Shengnan, “Russia-China Joint Naval Drill Starts,” 

China Daily, April 22, 2012, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2012-04/22/content_15108571.htm. 

214. Noah Shachtman, “China, Russia Team Up at Sea,” Wired, 

April 27, 2012, available from www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/

chinas-navy/.

215. “Chinese, Russian Navies Hold High-Profile Drills,” 

Samay Live, April 24, 2012, available from english.samaylive.com/

world-news/676503170/chinese-russian-navies-hold-high-profiledrills.html. 

216. Skosyrev. 

217. Mikhail Aristov, “Russia, China Start Joint Naval Drills 

in Yellow Sea,” The Voice of Russia, April 22, 2012, available from 

english.ruvr.ru/2012_04_22/72547226/.

218. Zhao Shengnan and Cui Haipei.

219. Jane Perlez, “China and Russia, in a Display of Unity, 

Hold Naval Exercises,” The New York Times, July 10, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/asia/china-and-russiain-a-display-of-unity-hold-naval-exercises.html?_r=0.

220. “PLA and Russian Navy Learn from Joint Sea 2014 

Drills,” Want China Times, May 25, 2014, available from www.

wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=

11&id=20140525000071.

221. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “After Obama Visit, Planned Naval Drills With Russia Reported,” The New York Times, May 1, 

2014, available from sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/afterobama-visit-planned-naval-drills-with-russia-reported/?_php=true&_

type=blogs&_r=0.

222. Chan.

223. Martin Fackler, “Chinese Flybys Alarm Japan as Tensions Escalate,” The New York Times, May 25, 2014, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2014/05/26/world/asia/japan-east-china-sea.html.
78

224. Kucera, “SCO Exercises To Be Biggest In Ten Years.”

225. Vaughan Winterbottom, “Chinese, Russian Troops 

Gather for Military Exercises,” Lowy Interpreter, August 19, 2014, 

available from www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/08/19/ChineseRussian-troops-gather-military-exercises.aspx.

226. “Chinese Leader Vows Stronger Military Ties With Russia,” RIA Novosti, March 24, 2013, available from en.rian.ru/military_news/20130324/180213648/Chinese-Leader-Vows-Stronger-Military-Ties-With-Russia.html.

227. Choi Chi-yuk, “China To buy Lada-Class Subs, Su35 Fighters from Russia,” South China Morning Post, March 25, 

2013, available from www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1199448/

china-buy-russian-fighters-submarines?utm_source=Sinocism%20

Newsletter.

228. Wang Xu, “China Military Chiefs Vow to Build Up Military Ties,” China Daily, August 30, 2014, available from news.asiaone.com/news/asia/china-military-chiefs-vow-build-military-ties.

229. “Five SCO Participating Troops Carry Out Anti-Terror 

Exercise.” 

230. “Beijing, Moscow Hail Military Ties,” China Daily, August 16, 2013, available from gbtimes.com/world/beijing-moscowhail-military-ties.
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