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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

JANICE LIND, 

Appellee 

Appellant : No. 1825 EDA 2018 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2018 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006459-2017 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

JANICE LIND, 

Appellee 

Appellant : No. 1826 EDA 2018 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2018 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006458-2017 

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2019 

Janice Lind (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following her convictions for unlawful contact with a minor and two 

counts each of conspiracy to commit rape, endangering the welfare of a 

child, corruption of minors, conspiracy to commit involuntary deviate sexual 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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intercourse (IDSI) with a child, and conspiracy to commit incest. Upon 

review, we affirm. 

Appellant had been charged with the systematic sexual 

abuse of two of her minor biological children, her [son, AL.F,] 

and [the] eldest of [Appellant's] three daughters, [A.F. 

(collectively, Children),] committed in concert and independently 

with her husband[, C]hildren's biological father[, R.F.]. Charges 

had not [been] brought against Appellant for the sexual abuse of 

her two younger daughters who had also been reported as 

similarly abused per [Children. R.F.,] who had also participated 

in the sexual abuse, however, had died before the authorities 

learned of the [abuse]. The abuse of these [C]hildren had 

occurred between 2011 and 2013, inside the home where 

Appellant and [R.F.] had resided together with their minor 

children, who had ranged [in age from] under eight years to 

approximately eighteen months[. Children and their sisters] had 

been removed from this residence by the City of Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services [DHS] due to inhabitable [sic] 

conditions in the home and reported narcotics abuse of both 

parents before any information was related concerning sexual 

and physical abuse. 

[A.F.,] who was 12 years old when she testified at trial, 

had reported being repeatedly sexually abused by both 

[Appellant and R.F.], particularly when she was six or seven 

years old. She stated in summary that she and [AL.F] were 

often abused in Appellant's bedroom. Appellant had played 

pornographic movies on the television. Appellant directed 

[Children] to mimic the sexual acts portrayed on the television. 

[Appellant] had directed them to touch each other's private 

parts. [A.F.] recalled that Appellant had touched her front 

private parts and put "burning powder" on her front private 

parts. She testified that [R.F.] had touched her private parts in 

concert with Appellant. Appellant had put [R.F.'s] private part 

into [A.F.'s] private part. [A.F.] testified that Appellant had been 

laughing while the sexual activity was occurring. 

[AL.F.] was 10 years old when he testified. He recalled 

frequent instances when Appellant had ordered all four children 

to enter her bedroom when [R.F.] was in the bedroom only to be 

subjected to myriad forms of abuse. He reported that Appellant 

had touched his front and rear private parts. [R.F.] inserted his 

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front private part into [AL.F's] back private part. He said that 

Appellant had watched this activity. [AL.F.] said that Appellant 

had touched and performed sexual acts on all three of his sisters 

including a time when the youngest was just a baby. As to the 

second oldest sister, he said that Appellant had touched her back 

part while the father touched her front part. He recalled that his 

father had put his private part into [A.F.'s] private part. 

[AL.F.] testified that Appellant had given pills to [C]hildren 

to ingest while the sexual activity was occurring. He also 

remembered that [R.F.] had put a substance on his back private 

part and that Appellant had also put a substance on the 

youngest child's front private part. He had frequently observed 

Appellant give herself an injection with needles. [AL.F.] said 

that Appellant would "whoop" the children with wires, hangers 

and belts if they did not comply with all demands of Appellant 

and [R.F]. 

C.A. testified that she was the biological sister of [R.F.] 

and [C]hildren's aunt. After [R.F.] died in January 2016, she 

discovered that all four children had been removed from 

Appellant's home and placed in various foster care homes. She 

contacted [DHS] and arranged to have [C]hildren [and their 

sisters] placed to live with her and her children. 

After [C]hildren [and their siblings] began living with C.A. 

and her children, C.A. discovered that Appellant's youngest child 

had displayed sexual behavior to C.A.'s minor children. C.A. 

immediately questioned [AL.F. and A.F. separately. AL.F.] told 

her that Appellant and [R.F.] had hurt him in his private part and 

that Appellant had played pornographic movies on the television. 

He told her that [R.F.] had put his private part in his back area. 

[AL.F] also said that [R.F.] put a "powder on his private part 

which burned." [AL.F.] reported to her that Appellant had made 

his three sisters perform sexual acts. He said that Appellant told 

him and [A.F.] to perform sexual acts on each other. [AL.F.] said 

that Appellant told him to watch the television and perform the 

acts which he saw. He said Appellant laughed at the children 

during these horrific acts. 

[A.F.] independently corroborated [AL.F.'s] report of 

sexual abuse that had been mimicked. [A.F.] told C.A. that 

Appellant had played a movie on the television, and told her and 

[AL.F.] to do what was portrayed on the television. She 

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described sexual activity that had been demanded. [A.F.] said 

that the sexual activities hurt so much that she had bled. Upon 

hearing the individual accounts of [AL.F. and A.F.], C.A. 

immediately called [DHS. DHS] separated Appellant's children 

and all but one child had been permanently removed from C.A.'s 

home and placed in homes wherein other children did not reside. 

Christopher Li, social worker for [DHS], testified that as 

the initial intake responder, he had conducted minimal fact 

interviews with [AL.F. and A.F.]. The interviews were "minimal" 

so as not to re -traumatize [C]hildren. [AL.F.] reported to him [] 

that he remembered being brought into his parents' bedroom, 

forced to watch pornographic movies, forced to perform oral sex 

on [R.F.] and forced to engage in sexual activities with his 

parents and sisters who at that time ranged in ages from six or 

seven to less than two years old. [A.F.] also said that she had to 

do "stuff" with her parents and siblings. Mr. Li then referred the 

case to the Philadelphia Children's Alliance, an agency tasked 

with interviewing children who suffered sexual abuse. 

Michelle Kline, a forensic interview specialist with the 

Philadelphia Children's Alliance[,] testified that she interviewed 

the four children separately. Videotapes of the interviews were 

shown to the jury. The videotape recordings depicted [AL.F.'s 

and A.F.'s] credible separate reporting of long term penetrating 

sexual abuse committed by [Appellant and R.F.] in response to 

non -confrontational and non -suggestive questions posed by the 

Child Alliance forensic interview specialist. 

It was stipulated at trial that when the third oldest child[, 

0.F.,] had been interviewed by [DHS], she did not disclose 

sexual abuse. It was also stipulated that Appellant was born on 

December 13, 1975. The respective dates of birth of each of 

Appellant's four biological children including [AL.F. and A.F.] 

were entered by way of stipulation as well. Appellant's brother, 

John Lind, testified that Appellant had a reputation as being a 

peaceful and nonviolent citizen. 

Appellant testified, without any presented emotional affect, 

at trial that her four biological children had never even entered 

the bedroom[ with R.F.]. She calmly denied playing any 

pornographic videos. She denied sexually abusing [AL.F. and 

A.F.]. She denied witnessing any sexual abuse from [R.F.]. She 

claimed to have no idea why [C]hildren had accused her. She 

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had also claimed that her home had been quite suitable for 

habitation for her family that had also included her disabled 

mother. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/2019, at 2-6 (citations omitted). Following trial, on 

March 2, 2018, Appellant was convicted of the aforementioned crimes. 

On May 18, 2018, following full and fair sentencing hearing 

during which th[e trial c]ourt heard argument and victim impact 

testimony as well as testimony on behalf of Appellant and after 

review of all sentencing factors and incorporation of considered 

pre -sentence investigative [(PSI)] report[ and] mental health 

assessments[, at docket number] CP-51-CR-0006458-2017, 

Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of incarceration of 

10 to 20] years of incarceration for conspiracy [to commit rape 

of a child]; three and one-half [] to seven [] years of 

incarceration for endangering the welfare of child; and three and 

one-half [] to seven [] years for corruption of minors. The two 

remaining conspiracy counts merged into the sentence for 

conspiracy [to commit rape of a child]. 

Under CP 51-CR-0006459-2017, [] Appellant was 

sentenced to consecutive terms of incarceration of [10 to 20] 

years for unlawful contact with minor; [10 to 20] years for 

conspiracy [to commit rape of a child,] three and one-half [] to 

seven [] years for endangering welfare of [a] child; [and] three 

and one-half [] to seven [] years for corruption of minors. The 

two remaining conspiracy counts merged into the sentence for 

conspiracy [to commit rape of a child. The sentences at the 

abovementioned docket numbers were ordered to run 

consecutively to one another]. 

In each case Appellant had been deemed without objection 

as a Tier II Sexual Offender. Due notice of reporting and 

registration requirements were provided. Rehabilitative 

conditions were imposed which had included no contact [with] 

Appellant's children and prosecution witnesses. The 

Commonwealth's representative did not pursue designation of 

Appellant as a Sexual [Violent Predator (SVP)]. Post -sentence 

motions requesting reconsideration of sentence and a new trial 

were timely filed and denied without hearing on June 13, 2018. 

Id. at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalization and citations omitted). 

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This appeal followed.' On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency 

and weight of the evidence to sustain her convictions, as well as the 

discretionary aspects of her sentence. Appellant's Brief at 5. We review 

these claims sequentially. 

Regarding Appellant's sufficiency claim, before we address the merits 

of this issue, we consider whether she preserved it for appeal. 

An appellant's concise statement must properly specify the error 

to be addressed on appeal. In other words, the Rule 1925(b) 

statement must be specific enough for the trial court to identify 

and address the issue [an appellant] wishe[s] to raise on appeal. 

[A c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to 

identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent 

of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all. The court's review and legal 

analysis can be fatally impaired when the court has to guess at 

the issues raised. Thus, if a concise statement is too vague, the 

court may find waiver. 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). 

Appellant's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement does not specify precisely 

which elements of which crimes she contends the Commonwealth failed to 

prove. See Concise Statement, 6/14/2018 ("Counsel intends to raise a 

claim that the verdicts were against the sufficiency of the evidence."). This 

Court has repeatedly required an appellant to specify in the Rule 1925(b) 

statement the particular element or elements upon which the evidence was 

insufficient. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 

1 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

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(Pa. Super. 2017). "Such specificity is of particular importance in cases 

where, as here, the appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which 

contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 982 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339 (Pa. Super. 

2013)). Based upon this Court's desire to apply Rule 1925 in a "predictable, 

uniform fashion," this Court has determined that waiver applies even where, 

as here, the Commonwealth fails to object and the trial court addresses the 

issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Roche, 153 A.3d at 1072 (holding that 

where Roche was convicted of first -degree murder and criminal conspiracy, a 

concise statement asserting only that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain these convictions resulted in waiver); Commonwealth v. Tyack, 

128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that Tyack's "boilerplate" 

concise statement declaring "that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his conviction" was too vague even where Tyack was convicted only of one 

crime). In light of the foregoing, we find Appellant's sufficiency claim waived. 

Regardless, even if Appellant did not waive her sufficiency claim, she 

would still not be entitled to relief. Our standard of review in challenges to 

the sufficiency of the evidence is to determine 

whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact -finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying 

[the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact -finder. In addition, we note that the 

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facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need 

not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding 

a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact -finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). 

On appeal, Appellant argues "[t]he evidence was weak and 

inconclusive" based upon the inconsistencies in A.F.'s testimony. See 

Appellant's Brief at 10-11 ("[A.F.] stated at trial the events concerning the 

sexual abuse took place when she was seven or six. However, at a 

preliminary hearing [A.F.] stated she could not remember how old she was 

when the sexual assaults took place. Also, when being interviewed by the 

Philadelphia Children's Alliance, [A.F.] could not remember when the events 

took place. [A.F.] stated that the sexual assault happened in [Appellant's] 

room on multiple days. At a preliminary hearing [A.F.] testified that it 

happened on one day.") (citations omitted). Furthermore, Appellant noted 

that despite A.F. testifying about Appellant's abuse of Children's younger 

siblings, DHS took no further action regarding these allegations and "[i]n 

fact, it was stipulated at trial that when O.F. was interviewed[,] she did not 

disclose any abuse." Id. 

Here, while presented as a sufficiency claim, Appellant's argument on 

appeal is essentially challenging the weight of the evidence, asking this 

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Court to assess the credibility of testifying witnesses and reweigh the 

evidence presented at trial. This we will not do. Our case law is clear that 

the finder of fact is "in the best position to view the demeanor of the 

Commonwealth's witnesses and to assess each witness'[s] credibility." 

Commonwealth v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). Thus, it was within the province of the jury, as fact -finder, to 

believe A.F's testimony that Appellant engaged in physical and sexual abuse 

of Children and discredit the testimony of Appellant that she was innocent of 

the crimes charged. See Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 562 

(Pa. Super. 2006) (recognizing that "testimony of a sexual assault victim, if 

believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to convict a defendant, despite 

contrary evidence from defense witnesses. If the factfinder reasonably could 

have determined from the evidence adduced that all of the necessary 

elements of the crime were established, then that evidence will be deemed 

sufficient to support the verdict.") (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 642 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) ("Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility 

are matters for the finder of fact."). 

Moreover, even if we were to review this issue as a properly preserved 

sufficiency claim, we would conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden 

of proving each and every element of the crimes for which Appellant was 

convicted. As aptly set forth by the trial court: 

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Rape of a child involves sexual intercourse by forcible 

compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion where the victim is 

under the age of 13[.] 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 3121. [IDSI] with a child 

involves anal intercourse by forcible compulsion or threat of 

forcible compulsion where the victim is under the age of 13[.] 18 

Pa.C.S. [§] 3123, 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 3101. Incest involves sexual 

intercourse with a descendant[.] 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4302. 

Endangering the welfare of children involves violating a 

duty of care, protection or support[.] 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4304. 

Corruption of minors involves any act that tends to corrupt the 

morals of a minor[.] 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 6301. Unlawful contact with 

[a] minor involves being intentionally in contact with a minor for 

the purpose of committing a sexual offense enumerated in 

Chapter 31 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes[.] 18 Pa.C.S. 

[§] 6318. 

At trial it was overwhelmingly demonstrated that Appellant 

[and R.F.] had entered into a conspiracy to systematically 

sexually and physically abuse their four minor children over a 

period of years. Their abhorrent ongoing conduct included 

forcible anal and vaginal intercourse, the display of pornographic 

movies, the touching of private parts of their bodies, applying 

substances to their bodies, physical beatings and directing and 

ordering of the children to engage in sexual activities with each 

other. 

Rather than attempt to stop the abuse as a responsible 

parent, Appellant had pleasurably participated with [R.F.] as he 

and [Appellant] sexually violated every private orifice of each 

minor child, who ranged in ages from six years old to a toddler. 

Appellant cruelly laughed while the children engaged in these 

forced sexual activities. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/2019, at 8-9. In light of the foregoing, Appellant's 

sufficiency claim fails. 

We now turn to Appellant's weight -of -the -evidence issue. In support 

of her weight claim, Appellant cites the same inconsistencies in A.F.'s 

testimony as set forth supra. Appellant's Brief at 11-12. In sum, Appellant 

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claims "[t]he inconsistent testimony is a shock to one's sense of justice and 

a new trial should be granted." Id. at 12. 

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the 

trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence 

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when 

reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons 

for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction 

that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of 

justice. 

However, the exercise of discretion by the trial court in 

granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is not unfettered. The 

propriety of the exercise of discretion in such an instance may be 

assessed by the appellate process when it is apparent that there 

was an abuse of that discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (internal 

citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Britton, 134 A.3d 83, 86 

(Pa. Super. 2016) ("The trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, 

part or none of the evidence.") (citation omitted). 

The trial court found the testimony of Children to be "credible and 

compelling. The heartbreaking accounts of unspeakable horrors was 

corroborated by the testimony of" C.A., Mr. Li, Ms. Kline, "and the 

videotapes of [Children's] interviews. The cumulative evidence of guilt was 

overpowering." Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/2019, at 10. 
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In reviewing the issue before us, we reiterate that "[a]ppellate review 

of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence." Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753. 

The term 'discretion' imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom 

and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the 

framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of 

giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be 

exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, 

personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is 

abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error 

of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable 

or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that 

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. 

Id. (citation omitted). 

With this in mind, upon review of the record, we discern no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court's determination. Here, the jury had the 

opportunity to hear all evidence presented and assess the credibility of those 

who testified. This included listening to defense counsel speak at length 

during closing about the inconsistences in the testimony presented. Despite 

this, it is evident by the jury's verdict that they found that not only was A.F. 

credible, but that her testimony, in conjunction with the additional evidence 

and testimony, including corroborating testimony from her brother, AL.F., 

supported the finding that Appellant physically and sexually abused Children. 

Moreover, Appellant has not alleged, and we do not conclude, that the trial 

court acted unreasonably, or displayed prejudice, bias, or ill -will when 

denying Appellant's weight claim. No relief is due. 

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Lastly, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence. 

Appellant's Brief at 13-14. Accordingly, we bear in mind the following. 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his [or her] sentence 

must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part 

test: 

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether 

appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

citations omitted). Here, Appellant timely filed a post -sentence motion and 

notice of appeal, and included a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f) in her 

brief. We now turn to consider whether Appellant has presented a 

substantial question for our review. 

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case -by -case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 

825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). "A substantial question exists only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

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sentencing process." Griffin, 65 A.3d at 935 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). 

In her 2119(f) statement, Appellant's claims her sentence is 

"manifestly excessive and imposed in violation of the Sentencing Code[.]" 

Appellant's Brief at 13. Specifically, Appellant contends her aggregate 

sentence of 44 to 88 years' incarceration "is virtually a life sentence." 2 Id. 

Under 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721, the [trial] court has discretion to 

impose sentences consecutively or concurrently and, ordinarily, 

a challenge to this exercise of discretion does not raise a 

substantial question. The imposition of consecutive, rather than 

concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only 

the most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate 

sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes 

and the length of imprisonment. 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171-72 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citations omitted). 

[A] sentence can be so manifestly excessive in extreme 

circumstances that it may create a substantial question. When 

determining whether a substantial question has been raised, we 

have focused upon whether the decision to sentence 

consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears 

upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal 

conduct in this case. 

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133-34 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

2 Within the argument section of her brief, Appellant contends the "trial court 

failed to sufficiently take into consideration the rehabilitative needs of 

[Appellant], her lack of prior record and the sentencing guidelines when 

imposing sentence." Appellant's Brief at 14. 

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In this case, prior to sentencing, the trial court set forth the guideline 

ranges for each of the crimes Appellant was convicted. N.T., 5/18/2018, at 

6-9. Furthermore, the trial court noted that "in addition to presiding over 

the jury trial and listening to all the testimony, th[e trial court had] reviewed 

in depth the mental health assessment of [Appellant] as well as the [PSIS] 

report conducted pursuant to the [trial c]ourt's order." Id. at 5. Moreover, 

the trial court heard statements made by Appellant, her brother and cousin, 

as well as listened to victim impact statements. 

In addition, the trial court gave sufficient justification for any deviation 

from the guidelines. Specifically, at sentencing, the trial court set forth the 

following. 

[T]o the extent I deviate upward, it is for the following 

reasons, ma'am. The amount of damage that you have done to 

your children, to whom you have been entrusted their care, is 

immeasurable. The damage is permanent. The trauma that 

resulted had a rippling effect to traumatizing other children 

within their sphere. The genesis of all of that is you. And yet you 

sat here and you spoke. The only time I saw any, any ounce of 

emotion, whatsoever, was when I said you were supposed to be 

weaned off of the methadone that has been your crutch, and 

that [was it]. I took great care throughout this trial to listen very 

intensely to everything. I daresay that the rippling effect of the 

trauma that was in this case was felt by even folks in my 

courtroom, including the jury and our court officers. This case 

will haunt me. 

3 "[W]here the sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI] report, it will be 

presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding 

the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with 

mitigating statutory factors." Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 

1038 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

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I have evaluated and tried to understand what cannot be 

understood. I take into account your longstanding abuse of 

various narcotics that you give varying versions in reference. 

You stand before me at the age of forty-three years old with an 

alcohol and narcotics abuse history beginning at the age of 

fourteen. Your abuse of various narcotics to which [R.F.] also 

died in January 2016, your co -abuser, was extensive but by no 

means an excuse for your behavior. It was alcohol, progressed 

to marijuana, heroin, morphine, cocaine, methamphetamine, 

PCP. And it was remarked by the mental health assessment that 

methadone was your drug of abuse beginning at the age twentyfour along with heroin most particularly. 

* * * 

It did not go unnoticed by th[e trial c]ourt that in addition to the 

sexual abuse committed by you, the reason that these children 

were removed from your care in the first place was because of 

the horrendous, horrendous conditions that were very visible 

within their home to anybody that actually would go there. They 

were removed from a home that you wouldn't put dogs or cats 

in. The longstanding nature and methods of your abuse are part 

and parcel of my sentence. You used your children, your babies, 

as sexual playthings for your enjoyment and the enjoyment of 

[R.F.]. And you can shake your head all you want, but I believe 

them. It is beyond my comprehension as to why the need for 

self -gratification in that manner. 

N.T., 5/18/2018, at 29-31. 

It is clear to this Court that the trial court took into account all 

necessary considerations, including the mitigating factors presented by 

Appellant. Nonetheless, for the reasons cited supra, the trial court 

determined that a lengthy period of incarceration was appropriate in light of 

the heinous nature of the crimes Appellant was convicted of. We find no 

abuse of discretion in this determination. Nor has Appellant demonstrated 

to this Court that "the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

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exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision." Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013)). 

Accordingly, after a review of the briefs, record, and applicable case 

law, we are not persuaded that Appellant's issues warrant relief from this 

Court. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/1/19 

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