U.S. Army War College, and National Bureau of Asian Research,

Pacifi c Northwest National Laboratory, Central Intelligence Agency,

Department of Energy, Nuclear Threat Initiative,

and the Ploughshares Fund

Key Points:

• Nuclear weapons are here to stay in China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

• The nuclear proliferation networks are in place. Shutting down A.Q. Khan’s network in Pakistan did 

not necessarily eliminate the networks.

• The nuclear proliferation networks intersect with other criminal networks—in drug traffi cking, 

human traffi cking, and other organized crime networks.

• The networks that support the terrorist groups in Asia are probably intersecting with the networks that 

facilitate trade between suppliers and consumers in nuclear proliferation trade.

• The terrorist networks may be comprised principally of nonstate actors, but they operate in 

environments where the state actors may condone or at least tolerate their presence, so any policies 

or security regimes directed at intercepting or disrupting the terrorist networks must manage the 

relationship with the state actors involved.

• Many of the Asian states are further developing their bilateral relations with their Asian neighbors 

to address their mutual security concerns--they are not waiting for a regional, multilateral solution. 

China, Japan, India and Pakistan are the most notable examples.

• All of the Asian states want to ensure that regional trade and economic development can 

proceed at a pace that allows them to meet their economic development goals. Export 

controls cannot be seen as “trade inhibitors.” But if adopting common standards allows 

export controls to become “trade enhancers”—where nations are viewed as reliable trade partners 

not engaged in dangerous behavior—then these countires have been open to adopting export control 

systems that advance their economic interests.

NUCLEAR ASIA

Compiled by

Joseph Ferguson, Director

Northeast Asia Studies

The National Bureau of Asian Research

and

Gael Tarleton, Consultant

Pacifi c Northwest National Laboratory
2

On March 18-19, 2004, in Seattle, Washington, 

the National Bureau of Asian Research, Pacifi c 

Northwest National Laboratory, U.S. Army War 

College, Central Intelligence Agency, Department 

of Energy, Nuclear Threat Initiative, and the 

Ploughshares Fund co-sponsored a conference 

to explore the complex topics of nuclear 

proliferation, regional and global terrorism, 

and the state of nonproliferation regimes in 

Asia. The conference drew representatives from 

government, academe, and nonprofi t research 

institutions from the United States and Asia. 

This event was an opportunity for policymakers, 

security analysts, nuclear scientists and engineers, 

regional experts, and military planners to share 

perspectives and identify those issues requiring 

new solutions as the international community 

prepares for the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) Review. 

Asia’s Nuclearization and Regional Instability.

As a region, Asia has the distinction of 

experiencing the world’s most rapid rates of 

economic and population growth, the fastest 

expansion of commercial nuclear power plant 

construction, the entrenchment of terror networks, 

and the fundamental failure of any state or group 

of states to emerge as a force to advocate regional 

solutions to nuclear security risks facing the AsiaPacifi c. 

Twenty-nine years after the NPT sought to 

“freeze” the Asian nuclear powers to a community 

of one, Asia is now a nuclearized region. 

Unquestionably, the nuclear nonproliferation 

regime has experienced failures in Asia--now 

India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, 

while North Korea either already possesses 

them or is close to developing them. Moreover, 

a number of other Asian states are participating 

in the Asian proliferators’ network, thus enabling 

other states to acquire nuclear technologies. 

Important components of the international 

community’s nonproliferation strategies--the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and other 

dual-use technology export control regimes--

have failed to stem the trade in nuclear materials 

and technologies in Asia. There, nuclear suppliers 

appear willing to satisfy the demands of persistent 

buyers. 

The “Nexus of Terrorism and Nuclear-Armed 

Adversaries.”

South Asia now constitutes the place where 

nuclear weapons, terrorist groups, state actors 

involved in proliferation trade, and nuclear 

adversaries in confrontational postures all 

intersect on the India-Pakistan border. The 

Korean Peninsula and the nations of Northeast 

Asia endure the most prolonged period of 

crisis since the Korean War, due to the nuclear 

machinations of North Korea.

Conference participants agreed that it is 

paramount that the international community 

make every effort to understand the reasons for 

the failure of the NPT and other nonproliferation 

regimes in Asia before new attempts are made to 

replace the NPT, modify the NPT, or impose new 

international security regimes on Asian nations. 

No common view exists on the nature of the 

threats that the region’s nations face from nuclear 

proliferation, or from terrorism internally within 

their own countries, and externally within the 

region. 

India and Pakistan openly reject the NPT as 

an attempt to undermine their sovereign rights 

to possess nuclear weapons. China has become 

a convert to multilateral regimes only in the 

past 3 years, and this remains a source of some 

confl ict internally. China pursues multilateral 

relationships cautiously and with deliberation. 

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan feel that regional, 

multilateral solutions will only weaken the special 

nature of their bilateral relationships with the 

United States. Therefore, they tread very lightly 

when it comes to multilateral commitments. 

Southeast Asia is engaged in Asian multilateral 

regimes, but avoids those institutions where the 

United States plays a dominant role. 

The ultimate test of a new security regime 

in Asia is whether those states that have gained 

entry into the nuclear club will choose to give 

up their nuclear status. Without exception, 

the conference experts assessed that India will 
3

not give up its nuclear weapons; that Pakistan 

believes its existence depends on its ability to 

threaten India with a nuclear strike; North Korea 

has proven to be intransigent and there seem 

to be few incentives--or even arguments--that 

China, Russia, or the United States can offer 

to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear 

capability. Furthermore, North Korea is likely 

prepared to sell nuclear technology for profi t to 

state or nonstate actors.

The nations of Asia have economic growth 

strategies that depend on access to nuclear power. 

A large number of nuclear power plants operate 

throughout Asia, and new construction is planned 

for the next 2 decades; therefore substantial trade 

will occur with nuclear technologies fl owing 

throughout the regional trade networks.

Proposing Regional Security Solutions.

At the conference a de facto acknowledgement of the following features of Asia’s security 

environment emerged:

• Nuclear weapons are here to stay in China, 

India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

• The nuclear proliferation networks are in 

place. Shutting down A. Q. Khan’s network 

in Pakistan did not necessarily eliminate the 

networks. 

• The nuclear proliferation networks intersect 

with other criminal networks--in drug 

traffi cking, human traffi cking, and other 

organized crime networks.

• The networks that support the terrorist 

groups in Asia are probably intersecting 

with the networks that facilitate trade 

between suppliers and consumers in nuclear 

proliferation trade.

• The terrorist networks may be comprised 

principally of nonstate actors, but they operate 

in environments where the state actors may 

condone or at least tolerate their presence, 

so any policies or security regimes directed 

at intercepting or disrupting the terrorist 

networks must manage the relationship with 

the state actors involved.

• Many of the Asian states are further 

developing their bilateral relations with their 

Asian neighbors to address their mutual 

security concerns--they are not waiting for a 

regional, multilateral solution. China, Japan, 

India, and Pakistan are the most notable 

examples.

• All of the Asian states want to ensure that 

regional trade and economic development can 

proceed at a pace that allows them to meet their 

economic development goals. Export controls 

cannot be seen as “trade inhibitors.” But if 

adopting common standards allows export 

controls to become “trade enhancers”—where 

nations are viewed as reliable trade partners 

not engaged in dangerous behavior—then 

these countries have been open to adopting 

export control systems that advance their 

economic interests.

The lesson from these examples of behavior 

may be that Asia is willing to tolerate the risks 

associated with nuclear-armed states, as long as 

the nuclear powers do not destabilize the bilateral 

relations among Asian states, and as long as 

behaviors do not jeopardize the overriding goals 

of economic growth and development. It is not 

clear what might happen should the nucleararmed states violate the states’ implicit agreement 

to tolerate the status quo.

This is a sobering view from the Asian 

perspective. If Asians do not share the sense 

of urgency or risk associated with limiting and 

ultimately ending access to nuclear technologies 

and capabilities, then nuclear security regimes 

for Asia must have a different set of goals. They 

must promote responsible behavior among 

all parties—the nuclear weapons owners, the 

suppliers, the trade facilitators, and the customers. 

And they must adopt regional mechanisms and 

enforcement policies that demonstrate their 

willingness to protect their regional security 

interests. The security regimes that Europe and 

America developed during the Cold War may 

not be suitable for Asia’s 21st century security 

environment. 
4

*****

The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors 

and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position 

of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, 

or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

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programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at 

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ or by calling (717) 245-4212.