NATURAL ALLIES?

REGIONAL SECURITY IN ASIA AND PROSPECTS

FOR INDO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION

Stephen J. Blank

September 2005

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ISBN 1-58487-197-0
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

2. Bureaucratic Challenges to Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

3. The Challenges to Indian Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

4. India and the Persian Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

5. Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

6. India as Player in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

7. Practical Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

8. Toward Alliance?: Asian NATO, Bases, and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . .89

9. India and Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

10. Technology Transfer and Arms Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105

11. Technology Transfer and Arms Sales in Indo-American

 Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123

12. Toward the Future: Indo-Pakistani-American Ties

 and Future Defense Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135

13. Overcoming the Obstacles to a Strategic Partnership . . . . . . . .153

Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207

v

FOREWORD

 One of the hallmarks of the two Bush administrations’ foreign 

and defense policies has been a growing rapprochement with 

India. Indeed, in June 2005 the U.S. Government signed a defense 

agreement with that country. In part, this rapprochement is driven 

by and coincides with India’s increasingly visible role as a major 

Asian power. This book-length monograph seeks to illuminate 

India’s rising power and capabilities with regard to the key regions 

on its periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. 

The author, Dr. Stephen Blank, also considers the major issues 

pertaining to India’s bilateral defense agenda with the United States. 

By revealing the dimensions of India’s growing capabilities and 

interests, he also provides a strategic rationale for the development 

of the partnership to date and for its further evolution. 

 Numerous analyses of current global trends point to the rise of 

India as a major transformation in world politics. This work underscores India’s importance and provides a basis for understanding 

why its relationship to the United States is and will become ever 

more critical.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vii

SUMMARY

 Indo-American relations increasingly comprise expanded 

strategic and economic ties. India’s government, led by Prime 

Minister Mamonhan Singh, has stated its intention to intensify 

these ties with America. Clearly the Bush administration agrees. For 

example, President Bush has indicated his intention to sustain the 

gains achieved since 2001 as a priority. 

 Prime Minister Singh has invited the President to India. President 

Bush has indicated his intention to go there, leading Indian analysts 

to expect that, “What we are going to see is a consolidation of IndoU.S. ties on a range of strategic issues. We may see a greater emphasis 

on economic ones as well.” 

 The Bush administration is prepared to make a major offer of arms 

sales to India. This deal has many repercussions across the entire 

range of Indo-American relationships and of India’s relationships 

with a host of important foreign governments like Russia, China, 

Pakistan, and Israel. Undoubtedly, a reinforcement of the economic 

foundations of bilateral amity would be desirable for many reasons.

 This book-length monograph seeks to illuminate India’s rising 

power and capabilities with regard to the key regions on its 

periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and South East Asia. The 

author also considers the major issues pertaining to India’s bilateral 

defense agenda with the United States. By revealing the dimensions 

of India’s growing capabilities and interests, he provides a strategic 

rationale developing the U.S.-India partnership further.

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

 Since 1997, the Clinton and Bush administrations have searched 

for ways to initiate and sustain a lasting improvement in IndoAmerican relations.1

 India has reciprocated this search today, even 

though it changed governments in its 2004 elections—replacing 

the A.B. Vajpayee administration and the coalition led by the 

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with the Congress Party-led coalition, 

many of whose members are rather more opposed to U.S. policies. 

Both sides now proclaim that their relations are better than ever.2

Indeed, in 1998, soon after India’s nuclear tests forced the Clinton 

administration to impose congressionally-mandated sanctions upon 

India, Prime Minister Vajpayee proclaimed the two states to be 

natural allies.3

 Since then, their mutual rapprochement has led to the 

lifting of these sanctions and the start of meaningful economic and 

technological cooperation, with the distinct possibility of expanded 

bilateral military cooperation.4 These steps reflect America’s gradual 

reorientation of its policies towards India and show that IndoAmerican relations increasingly comprise expanded strategic and 

economic ties.

 India’s government, led by Prime Minister Mamonhan Singh, 

similarly has stated its intention to intensify both strategic and 

economic ties with America.5

 Therefore, today there are grounds for 

optimism concerning the future development of this relationship. 

Due to these trends, Indian elites believe and have told Americans 

that great possibilities are in store for a relationship that they now 

deem to be “irreversible.” Indeed, during 2003, if not since then, 

American and Indian officials discussed a possible “Asian NATO 

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization)” although the content of 

these discussions and of India’s significance for them has not been 

made public.6 Thus G. V. C. Naidu’s recent study of Indian policy 

in Southeast Asia, an important region for both Washington and 

New Delhi, states that, “Whether with regard to the U.S., Japan, 

or Southeast Asia, policymakers appear to be convinced that an 
2

enduring bilateral relationship cannot be built unless underpinned 

by strategic ties.”7

 Clearly the Bush administration agrees. For example, President 

Bush has indicated his intention to sustain the gains achieved since 

2001 as a priority of his next term.8

 Indian observers were also 

pleased by President Bush’s re-election since they expressed some 

concern about a possible Kerry presidency, given his comments 

about outsourcing jobs to India and the past record of some of Senator 

Kerry’s foreign policy advisors. Indeed, Prime Minister Singh lost no 

time in congratulating President Bush and inviting him to India as 

soon as he can come.9

 President Bush recently reiterated his intention 

to go to India, leading Indian analysts to expect that, “What we are 

going to see is a consolidation of Indo-U.S. ties on a range of strategic 

issues. We may see a greater emphasis on economic ones as well.”10

This emphasis on economic issues appears to be in tune with the 

administration’s thinking and, as we shall see below, with much 

expert opinion as well. More recently it has also become clear that the 

Bush administration is prepared to make a major offer of arms sales 

to India. This deal (the details and specific ramifications of which are 

discussed below) has many repercussions across the entire range of 

Indo-American relationships and of India’s relationships with a host 

of important foreign governments like Russia, China, Pakistan, and 

Israel.11 Undoubtedly, a reinforcement of the economic foundations 

of bilateral amity would be desirable for many reasons.
3

CHAPTER 2

BUREAUCRATIC CHALLENGES TO PARTNERSHIP

 One reason for reinforcing U.S.-Indian ties is the persisting and 

troubling reality that this strategic partnership remains a precarious 

one that has yet to reach its full strategic potential. Indeed, several 

observers fear that this relationship is presently treading water.12

Others point to continuing Indian suspicions that Washington places 

a higher priority upon working with Pakistan than it does with India. 

So, for example, distinguished Indian commentator C. Raja Mohan 

recently wrote that,

Washington’s decision, for whatever reason, to discreetly handle the 

Abdul Qadeer Khan affair—the so-called father of the Pakistani bomb 

whose extensive network of nuclear proliferation was unveiled earlier 

this year—confirms New Delhi’s assessment that Washington will allow 

Islamabad to get away with anything.13

Such suspicions unfortunately are congenital, given the zero-sum 

nature of Indo-Pakistani relations. Nor does the gap in perceptions 

among American officials, who see Pakistan’s support in the war 

on terrorism as being crucial, while India is an informal ally that 

provides important but indirect support to this war, make it easier to 

enhance the very real strategic partnership that exists between New 

Delhi and Washington.14

 Likewise, both India’s and Pakistan’s readiness to insist that 

Washington support one of them at the other’s expense inserts a 

“hyphen into the relationship” despite the professed statements of 

all three governments in this triangle that they want a relationship 

that is based on an independent calculation of interests, capabilities, 

etc. Thus Indo-Pakistani frictions dog many, if not all, of the issues 

on the Indo-American agenda and, when added to the perception 

of Pakistan’s criticality for the war on terrorism, the ensuing 

“hyphenization” of U.S. policy retards the full progress of partnership 

with India.15 Hence, one reason for the new offer on arms sales 

appears to be an attempt to remove India’s unhappiness about recent 
4

disclosures of impending arms sales to Pakistan of almost $1 Billion 

made up of tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) 

anti-tank missiles; Phalanx shipborne guns; and P-3C Orion longrange maritime patrol strike aircraft. F-16 planes that were ordered 

earlier and withheld due to sanctions evidently will also be released 

to Pakistan as well.16

 Nevertheless, U.S. concessions to Pakistan that are not balanced 

or appear not to be balanced by due regard for Indian interests, 

sensitivities, and perceptions inevitably will cause bitterness in New 

Delhi. Announcing Pakistan’s status as a non-NATO ally, making it 

eligible for weapons like the F-16 that India cannot get, and doing 

so immediately after Secretary Powell left India without telling it 

what was happening caused an explosion earlier in 2004. Indeed, it 

flew in the face of the recommendations of the Council on Foreign 

Relations’ Task Force on South Asia that recommended giving India 

the status of a friendly country for purposes of negotiating export 

licenses on defense technology.17 Moreover, this explosion was 

entirely foreseeable, and thus the failure to anticipate it suggested 

a neglect of, or lack of concern for, India or was seen as such. So, as 

long as Indian policymakers see the same facts we do, they will not 

accept that their interests are not to be taken into account. Indeed, 

taking India’s interests into account and not taking it for granted is 

what this partnership must be about on a day-to-day basis.

 Bureaucratic failures are also distressingly common. Pentagon 

officials involved with Indian affairs confess that they lack strategic 

guidance as to the long-range strategic purpose of this expanding 

relationship, and this hesitancy invariably translates into policy on 

the ground and allocation of resources for purposes of policymaking 

as conducted by Department of Defense (DoD) personnel.18 As 

a result, despite expanding bilateral military cooperation that 

includes a growing number of combined exercises involving all the 

services of both states’ armed forces and which are moving from 

tactical cooperation to operational cooperation entailing larger 

units and standardization of operational procedures among them, 

those involved in planning and coordinating them find it difficult to 

discern a strategic rationale for this relationship or those exercises 

besides the sheer fact of their existence.19 Consequently, bilateral 
5

military cooperation drives the bilateral relationship but does so 

in the absence of a sufficiently robust economic or political and 

strategic dimension. Not surprisingly, this perception confirms the 

notion that the bilateral relationship is treading water or stagnating 

at a plateau.20

 Fundamental differences of approach to India between and within 

the relevant cabinet departments of the U.S. Government: State, 

Energy, Commerce, and Defense, as well as within the Congress, 

clearly obstruct this relationship’s full development.21 The Democratic 

Party and the State Department tend to view India through the lens 

of nonproliferation priorities, whereas the administration and the 

Pentagon see India as part of the most dynamic strategic region in 

the world, i.e., Asia, and as an economic and strategic partner of 

the United States. Without determining whether either outlook is 

justified or correct, it is clear that State Department officials have 

obstructed arms sales to India because they still are aggrieved over 

its nuclearization in 1998 and cherish the idea that India can be kept 

from being formally declared a nuclear power state by punishing 

it through the withholding of conventional arms and military 

technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones. DoD, on the 

other hand, strongly favors moving to expanded defense relations 

with India which encompass not just the 17 combined exercises that 

occurred with the Indian armed forces in 2003 but also relief from 

existing sanctions, expanded technology and weapons sales, and 

discussions with India on missile defense.

 The State Department’s stress on nonproliferation and desire to 

arraign India for its nuclearization in 1998 is an immense source of 

frustration to Indians, especially as they view technology transfer 

and the ending of sanctions and other obstructions to military sales 

as touchstones of the seriousness and genuineness of the bilateral 

relationship. Furthermore, it aligns Washington with China’s 

opposition to according India formal status as a nuclear power, 

clearly a sign that Beijing still seeks to confine India to a lower, purely 

regional, status as an Asian player while it reaps the benefits and 

status of being a recognized nuclear power.22 From India’s standpoint, 

such a ranking is intolerable, both politically and psychologically. At 

the same time, neither does the State Department’s stance preclude 
6

India’s nuclearization or the development of its weapons arsenal, 

since there are others who will gladly produce whatever Washington 

denies. As C. Raja Mohan observes,

The administration must also consider that a technology-denial regime 

against India makes little sense because it ignores recent technological 

developments in India; disregards New Delhi’s emerging capability 

to export sensitive technologies, even while it remains outside the 

international architecture constructed to manage WMD [weapons of mass 

destruction] proliferation; and belies U.S. proclamations of a strategic 

partnership with New Delhi.23

 Ultimately, the withholding of recognition of India as a nuclear 

power also allows Pakistan to escape constraints on its nuclear 

programs. Thus it represents a policy of feeling virtuous rather than 

doing the right thing strategically, since there is no evidence that 

withholding that status has stopped other powers from proliferating; 

quite the opposite. Therefore, Indian elites, be they important 

correspondents and observers like C. Raja Mohan or former military 

personnel like an admiral whom Juli MacDonald interviewed in 

her published study of Indo-American strategic perceptions, all 

speak bluntly about the consequences of the State Department’s and 

general bureaucratic obstruction here.24 C. Raja Mohan writes that,

Where arms control is concerned, the nonproliferation establishment in 

Washington has not been willing to match the intellectual boldness of the 

Bush administration. Many officials at the political level in Washington 

recognize that India could be a partner in managing the new challenges 

that arise from the proliferation of WMD. Caught up in the old verities, 

by contrast, the American arms-control bureaucracy continues to see 

India as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. Unless 

there is some fresh thinking about India in the American arms-control 

community, talk of a new relationship between the two countries will 

likely remain on paper.25

Similarly, a retired brigadier told MacDonald that,

Until the United States changes its approach to nonproliferation, its 

policies will be seen as a threat to India’s security interests. Current U.S. 

policy is intended to deny India technologies. Moreover, not only does 

the U.S. Government deny India technologies, it actively blocks other 
7

countries from selling India technologies (e.g., Israel). For Indians, this is 

a direct affront to their security interests.26

While India’s actual nuclear capability has apparently been a key 

factor in influencing the Bush administration’s overall approach to 

it, the strong pockets of opposition to military sales to India within 

Congress and the Executive Branch bureaucracy clearly are regarded 

by Indians as a major obstacle to any genuine strategic cooperation.

 Another problem relates to India’s placement within the 

combatant commands of U.S. forces. Bureaucratic hurdles that place 

India in U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) Area of Responsibility 

(AOR) and the rest of South Asia and Central Asia in U.S. Central 

Command’s (CENTCOM) AOR appear to Indian leaders and elites 

to create their own sense of disjunction in American policy. Thus 

Arun Sahgal, the first director of India’s Office of Net Assessment 

in India’s Joint Staff, writes that Indian policymakers and elites are 

particularly dismayed by the strategic rationale of dealing with 

PACOM when India’s central concerns lie in CENTCOM.27

 Moreover, increasingly visible structural faults in the institutions 

responsible for planning U.S. strategy and policy, regardless of 

which party leads the government, impede the formulation and 

implementation of a coherent national security strategy (NSS) in 

general or toward any country in particular. The failure to impart 

strategic guidance concerning an increasingly critical relationship to 

key Pentagon offices in and of itself betrays a policy failure. Worse 

yet, some prominent past American policymakers disdain the very 

idea of a strategic approach to world affairs.

 Warren Christopher once declared that the United States did not 

have an overall strategy and, moreover, was not going to get one 

during his tenure as Secretary of State (1993-97). He had learned 

as a lawyer, he said proudly, that it was best to handle issues caseby-case as they arose. National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger 

(1997-2001) has said the same thing, doubting whether anything as 

grand as “grand strategy” ever really existed.28

 More recently, General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret), the 

Commander of CENTCOM in 1997-2000 wrote that,
8

The Washington bureaucracy was too disjointed to make the vision 

of all the strategies, from the President’s to the CINC’s [Combatant 

Commanders in Chief of major U.S. commands like CENTCOM] a 

reality. There was no single authority in the bureaucracy to coordinate 

the significant programs we CINCs designed. The uncoordinated 

funding, policy decisions, authority, assigned geography, and many 

other issues separated State, Defense, Congress, the National Security 

Council, and other government agencies, and made it difficult to pull 

complex engagement plans together. To further complicate matters, the 

CINCs don’t control their own resources. Their budgets come out of the 

service budgets, and these are controlled by the Service Chiefs (who are 

also double-hatted as the Joint Chiefs), who understandably don’t want 

to give up their resources to the CINCs. The Service Chiefs have minimal 

interest in, and little insight into, engagement programs. They’re trying 

to run their services, and that job’s hard enough without other burdens. 

Their purpose and function is to train, organize, and equip forces for the 

CINCS, but what they actually want to do is provide these forces where, 

when, and how they see best. In other words, CINCS are demanding 

forces and resources for purposes that the Service Chiefs may not support. 

Thus the CINC is an impediment—and even a threat—and the rising 

power of the CINCs reduces the powers of the Service Chiefs. It’s a zerosum game. Looking at the problem from the other side, the CINCs see the 

Service Chiefs as standing in the way of what they desperately need; and 

they are frustrated by the chiefs’ inability to fully cooperate with them or 

support their strategies. The CINCs want to see their money identified 

and set aside in a specific budget line, so they know what they have. For 

all kinds of reasons, the Department of Defense is reluctant to do this. 

The result is a constant friction between the CINCs and Washington.29

 It is unlikely that U.S. policy toward India has escaped these 

pervasive dysfunctionalities in policymaking.30 And these problems 

come with costs. For example, at least one assessment observes that 

due to the perception that Washington will not rein in Pakistan, 

“Indian leaders are skeptical about U.S. counterterrorism objectives 

and have dropped references to a ‘strategic’ relationship in which 

the United States and India would work together to keep peace 

in the Indian Ocean littoral area.”31 Although for every proposed 

alternative to the current system, there is a good counterargument, 

because whatever line of structural and policy reform we take imposes 

costs and forecloses other options, the current system imposes 

significant costs upon U.S. policy. It perplexes Indians who want this 

partnership to grow and expand, creating opportunities for friction 

and mistrust to erode it. The structural problems cited here (as well 
9

as their opposite numbers in India) also lead to a situation where 

policy emerges in an ad hoc, incremental, uncoordinated manner that 

appears to foreign observers as being essentially incoherent, if not 

inchoate. Meanwhile, our bureaucratic obstructions make it difficult 

for us to respond to India’s agenda. Similar problems may affect 

India’s ability to respond to our agenda, if it can discern that agenda. 

Thus both sides fail to harvest the maximum possible gains from a 

truly strategic partnership, leaving the door open to an erosion or 

reversal of recent trends, as there are many skeptics concerning this 

relationship in both countries.32

 Therefore, the question posed here is stark in its simplicity. On 

what basis can an enduring and solid strategic partnership with 

India be built and sustained, and what should be its parameters? 

In other words, this monograph strives to present a compelling 

strategic rationale for that partnership which is otherwise apparently 

still lacking, at least in Washington. While India and America are the 

two largest democracies in the world, that is not enough to justify or 

sustain a genuine strategic partnership. Neither does an expanding 

bilateral military relationship suffice to do so in the absence of a 

strong political and economic dimension to the relationship. For 

example, the two states’ past relations until the 1990s were not very 

friendly at all.33 Moreover, their foreign policy values and approaches 

are by no means identical. Therefore sharp disputes can still arise, 

even on important issues, e.g., Iraq.34 As Prime Minister Singh 

recently admitted, invocations of shared democracy or democratic 

values alone are not enough to provide a foundation for the bilateral 

relationship, let alone sustain it.35 While those expressions of shared 

values are necessary, always appear as reasons for close relations, and 

can buttress a partnership based on shared and common interests, 

they cannot substitute for them.36

 Accordingly, the argument presented here is that a basis for 

enduring security cooperation and partnership must be found, first, 

in the recognition of shared tangible interests, particularly shared 

regional interests in key areas of Asia: South Asia, Central Asia, 

Southeast Asia, and to some degree, even the Gulf. These are the key 

regions in which India sees itself as a power of rising influence and 

capability beyond South Asia. Such an argument must also take into 
10

account India’s rising value as a strategic partner to the United States 

in Asia. Its economy is expected to grow 6.5 percent in 2004 and has 

averaged 8 percent annual growth in recent years.37 It possesses the 

world’s third largest Air Force and fourth largest Army, both of which 

are of high quality as attested to by Americans who work with them. 

Their Navy is also an important player with growing capabilities and 

ambitions.38 Similarly, the Indian Army is moving toward network 

centric warfare as is the U.S. Army, and on several key points its new 

military doctrine appears to parallel American visions of the nature 

of future war.39 India also has convergent strategic interests with the 

United States. These go beyond defeating terrorism, which is a rising 

threat all along India’s peripheries, to encompass the safety of the 

Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and energy security throughout 

the Indian Ocean, opposition to nuclear proliferation, and a rising 

concern despite improving relations with China’s rising power. Both 

governments are also meeting to discuss threats to stability in South 

Asia: Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. They 

seek a freer world trading system and an equitable and permanent 

peace in the Middle East.40 As former Under Secretary of State 

Richard Armitage told the Indian newspaper, The Hindu,

India is soon to be the largest country in the world in terms of population, 

you have a key geo-strategic location; a large growing middle class; a 

multiethnic, multireligious society; and a democracy. These are the type 

of societies that should, we believe, stand as a beacon to the world. We 

are the same—just a several thousand miles away—a multireligious, 

multiethnic democracy. To the extent we can both be anchors of stability 

in our various regions, we raise the level of achievement of mankind and 

lower the possibilities of conflict.41

 Armitage similarly emphasized that for this partnership to 

flourish, it must be based on both sides’ common needs and interests, 

and not just be a partnership or kind of alliance against a third 

party. Consequently, the Bush administration understands that this 

partnership must have a positive agenda to move forward and pay 

dividends for both sides.42 At the same time, however, Armitage’s 

rationale for the new partnership heavily emphasizes the idealistic, 

even moralizing, tendency so visible in the Bush administration’s 

national security policies.43
11

 Given India’s rising capability in economics and military affairs 

that increasingly enables it to affect outcomes and influence trends in 

these three regions, virtually all of India’s foreign and defense policy 

elite demands recognition of India’s interests throughout Asia and 

a similar acknowledgement of its stature as a key player there. For 

example, India’s new Army doctrine states that,

The Indian Ocean region . . . assumes strategic significance due to the 

high volume of Indian international trade transiting through . . . By 

virtue of her size and strategic location in the Indian Ocean region, India 

is expected to play her rightful role to ensure peace and stability in it.44

 Equally important, India has reached a stage where it has strategic 

autonomy. It can make partnerships with whomever it pleases, as its 

recent agreement for strategic partnership with the European Union 

(EU) shows.45 Indeed, analysts have recently discerned a RussoAmerican rivalry for influence upon India over a host of issues: 

India’s application for a seat on the Security Council, weapons sales 

and technology transfer to India, and trade and investment issues.46

Similarly, India’s Ambassador to Moscow Kanwal Sibal has stated that 

India wants to invest in Russian oil fields and move beyond importing 

Russian military technology and equipment to participating in joint 

studies and development of new technologies. And India successfully 

gained much of what it wanted at the December 3-4, 2004, summit 

with Russian President Vladimir Putin.47 These rivalries, and India’s 

ability to exploit them, illustrate its growing clout and influence in 

both regional and global affairs. Major players are already making 

such deals with India, underscoring the fact that India is already, and 

will become even more, the predominant regional power throughout 

the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it will be able to conduct its security 

policy as it sees fit, with whomever it deems appropriate. There is 

nothing we can do to stop this from happening, though we could 

delay it if we chose and thus incur enormous Indian resentment. 

Nonetheless, that would be a fruitless policy as the whole effort to 

impose sanctions indicates. Indeed, that policy would be against our 

own best interests as it could lead India to form a bloc for global 

multipolarity with Russia and China, i.e., to realize former Russian 

Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov’s fundamentally anti-American 

vision of a strategic triangle.48 The same holds true for civilian and 
12

military technology transfer as well as arms sales.49 At the same 

time, because the regions of critical Indian interests are those where 

American power runs up against its limits, as we have learned from 

bitter experience in Vietnam and now again in Iraq, both states have 

vital interests in these areas that they cannot realize unilaterally. 

Therefore, they need help to realize those interests from like-minded 

governments who share those interests and who can do something 

positive towards those ends. From our standpoint, India certainly 

meets that requirement concerning the Gulf, Central, South, and 

Southeast Asia.

 American experts and officials acknowledge that,

India is in the middle of a lengthy process of moving from the status of a 

defensive sub-regional middle power, without a clear security strategy, 

to that of a more offensive-minded major power, with nuclear weapons, 

with interests to defend in Southeast Asia and the Middle East [we may 

also add Central Asia—author] and with China as a competitor.50

 Moreover, it is increasingly obvious to security professionals 

that our own and India’s positions in Central Asia, and in the South 

Asian subcontinent, are interconnected geographically. For example, 

Sir John Thomson, a former British High Commissioner to India, has 

written that,

The geographical definition of South Asia has expanded. If we had any 

doubt before, September 11 [2001] has made it clear that we have to take 

into account Afghanistan and its neighbors: Iran to the west; all the former 

Soviet republics to the north; and China to the east. The geographical 

context for South Asia may be even wider. We in the West say—sincerely, 

I believe—that we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe 

it. So, to a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can 

be connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential extension 

of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately, by the spiraling 

disaster in Israel-Palestine.51

Similarly, Celeste Wallander of Washington’s Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, observes that,

When terrorism vaulted to the top of the U.S. priority list, many very 

important issues seemed to disappear from view. They are coming back, 

and are likely to affect U.S. policy and options in the region. The IndiaPakistan relationship is one important issue that has not gone away, and 
13

which has the potential to significantly alter the working status quo of the 

U.S. Central Asian presence. If war between Pakistan and India makes 

South Asia a zone of conflict, a U.S. presence in Central Asia becomes 

all the more important. . . . A U.S. stake in India and South Asia is likely 

to reinforce the trend toward long-term importance of strategic and 

economic interests for the United States in Central Asia, by extending the 

reach and scope of interests beyond narrow counterterrorism and energy 

development.52

 These insights show how American and Indian interests are 

tied inextricably to both states’ pursuit of important and even vital 

interests in more distant theaters, and thus they also underscore the 

strategic rationale for Indo-American strategic partnership. Stated 

bluntly, we need Indian support throughout much of Asia, as much 

if not more than India needs our support. We need tangible Indian 

support because our strategic interests and objectives are global, 

while the military and other means at our disposal to pursue them 

are not keeping pace, creating a gap between ends and means in 

our overall NSS. Even the Pentagon’s new basing proposals, which 

envision differing kinds of “operating sites” primarily focusing on 

Asian issues do not go far enough to overcome this gap.

 Even more worrisome, American force posture remains 

dangerously thin in the arc—many thousands of miles long—

between Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Okinawa and Guam 

in the Pacific. Although there is hope of securing a basing agreement 

with Canberra for a site or sites in northern Australia, the multiple 

national security threats in the Asia-Pacific region–-from the 

potential destabilization of Pakistan or Indonesia by radical Islam 

to Chinese military aggression against Taiwan—argue for a more 

robust deployment of American land forces in the region.53

 Key policymakers and analysts, who were instrumental in forging 

the better ties with India after 2001, clearly think along the same lines. 

Even before September 11, they advanced these arguments in the 

expert literature and in policy circles. Before he came to India, former 

Ambassador Robert Blackwill argued that America and its Asian 

allies—Australia, South Korea, and Japan—should “collaborate to 

promote strategic stability in South Asia and to give greater weight 

to India’s role in Asia and in international institutions.”54

 Ashley Tellis, who served as Blackwill’s deputy in New Delhi in 

2001-03, argues that, not only is there a broad strategic convergence 
14

of Indo-American aims, there also is a clear hierarchy or division of 

labor between them concerning the regional priorities each one will 

face in Asia. Thus, India certainly will dominate South Asia by virtue 

of its economic and military superiority that translate into geopolitical 

primacy there. It will be able to dominate its immediate periphery, the 

smaller states of the region, and influence outcomes to some degree 

in more outlying, but still relatively near, areas like Southeast Asia, 

Central Asia, and perhaps even the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly it will 

have something like a veto power over South Asian developments. 

At the same time, in those Asian areas of critical significance to vital 

U.S. interests that would warrant the commitment of U.S. resources, 

including force on a unilateral basis if necessary, India will “remain a 

peripheral actor.” But as its capabilities grow, so will its influence even 

if it is limited. And that influence can help advance shared bilateral 

interests if relations with New Delhi are adroitly managed. These 

areas and issues include the security of the Persian Gulf; freedom 

of navigation in Southeast Asian waters; protection of Taiwan; and 

the global, i.e., non-Kashmiri, war on terrorism.55 In these areas, he 

writes, the enormous disparity in power capabilities and resources 

between Washington and New Delhi will be so stark as to render 

Indian preferences entirely irrelevant.56 Yet,

In such issue areas, however, Indian power could be dramatically 

magnified if it were to be applied in concert with that of the United 

States. In such circumstances, Indian resources could help to ease U.S. 

operational burdens, provide the United States with those benefits arising 

from more robust international solidarity, and, in the process, actually 

enhance Indian power in a multiplicity of ways.57

Cooperation in those regions would redound substantially to both 

states’ benefit as we are seeing in India’s significant assistance to the 

United States in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

 Finally, Tellis even more tellingly observed that,

Indian power will be most relevant in those geographic and issue-areas 

lying in the “interstices” of Asian geopolitics. The term interstice is loosely 

used here to denote those geographic, political, or ideational issues lying 

along the fracture lines separating the continent’s most powerful and 

significant geostrategic problems. In those areas, great power interests 

are neither obvious nor vital. Consequently, their incentives to enforce 
15

certain preferred outcomes unilaterally are poor. In such circumstances, 

rising powers like India can make a difference because their substantial 

though still not dominant, capabilities can swing the balance in favor 

of one coalition or another, depending on the actors, issues, and 

circumstances concerned. Thus, for example, in geographic areas like 

Central Asia, Afghanistan [after the end of hostilities—author—Tellis’ 

argument predated September 11], and the island states in the Indian 

Ocean, and in issue-areas like terrorism, narcotics, and the environment, 

Indian resources and commitments could make a significant difference to 

the final outcomes obtained.58

 Tellis postulates three reasons why this form of the relationship 

will not only benefit India but also the United States. First, Indian 

power will be felt most directly in areas where the United States 

has few vital interests and, consequently, the possibility of friction 

between the United States and India is minimized. Second, both in 

the interstices of and in the core of Asian and global geopolitics, U.S. 

and Indian interests have gradually converged and, with the ending 

of the Cold War, the structural distortions that bedeviled U.S.-Indian 

relations have almost entirely disappeared. Third, on many issues of 

great importance to the United States—the balance of power in Asia, 

the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, WMD proliferation, 

terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the rise of religious and secular 

extremism—Indian interests invariably dovetail with those of the 

United States and, as a result, are likely to evoke active Indian 

support.59

 Despite the compelling strategic arguments for Indo-American 

strategic partnership based on these hard strategic realities, too 

much of recent U.S.-India relations shows a focus instead on issues 

of nuclear testing, nonproliferation, arms control, and efforts to 

induce India to place its nuclear weapons program under some form 

of international and U.S. regulation, if not control.60 Despite the vital 

importance of preventing South Asian rivalries from “going critical,” 

that focus works against enduring partnership with India and 

concentrates relations and governmental attention on those issues 

which most divide Washington from New Delhi. As Polly Nayak of 

the Clinton administration observed, “In late 1997, the White House 

had decided to make India the lynchpin of its South Asia policy and 

to replace its nonproliferation focus which the Indians hated, with a 

multifaceted approach in which they were sure the Indians would 
16

welcome under any government.”61

 Therefore, even with the best will in the world, a focus on those 

issues impedes the formation of an enduring strategic partnership 

and multiplies opportunities for bilateral discord. Under those 

circumstances, success in building a lasting partnership then 

comes to depend on the good will, personal strength, and vision 

of politicians in both countries who must override key lobbies that 

oppose their vision to achieve any part of it. Partnership under those 

circumstances becomes inherently precarious and fragile, subject to 

revision, if not erosion, at the first sign of a domestic crisis in either 

capital or a dispute between the governments.62

 A focus on common interests and activities based on shared 

perceptions of regional interests and issues that arises out of a 

comprehensive and ongoing strategic dialogue would strengthen 

the domestic proponents and lobbies who support partnership 

and build good will based on common experiences when difficult 

issues arise. Given the GWOT’s long-term character, it might also 

be possible to broaden both Washington’s and Delhi’s engagement 

with Islamabad so that the really difficult issues in the Indo-Pakistani 

relationship might be dealt with after successful discussion of less 

neuralgic and therefore potentially commonly perceived questions. 

For these reasons, this monograph focuses on the key regions where 

India intends to display its capabilities, power, and defense of its 

interests beyond the South Asian subcontinent to include Central 

Asia, the Gulf, and Southeast Asia, and the issues of arms sales and 

defense technology transfer between the United States, its allies 

(particularly Israel), and India. While the author does not slight the 

importance of nuclear issues in this relationship, they have been 

covered exhaustively in the extensive literature on proliferation and 

nuclear issues in South Asia.

India’s Perspectives.

 Neither is this a purely American perspective. In 2001, as Indian 

officials began to respond to the Bush administration’s first initiatives 

on the way to partnership, they stated then that they had a definite 

agenda for bilateral cooperation. Already in April 2001, when the 
17

administration made its first overtures to New Delhi, highly-placed 

Indian sources told the Indian media what those principles and goals 

were and the premises of their talks with the U.S. Government. The 

four principles upon which these talks were premised were:

 • “India saw itself as a key player which had a rightful place in 

influencing the global system.”

 • Though it was keen on developing a positive and equal 

relationship with Washington, New Delhi would not 

compromise upon sovereignty. It was not seeking “alliance” 

but rather a durable “partnership where security cooperation 

played a prominent role.”

 • India wanted Washington to recognize that Indian strategic 

interests extended well beyond South Asia to encompass 

what it now calls an extended strategic neighborhood from 

the Suez Canal to the Strait of Malacca, an area encompassing 

the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South and Central Asia, 

and Southeast Asia. “In other words, the U.S., while fulfilling 

its global obligations, should factor in India’s aspirations and 

autonomy in this zone.”63

 • While desiring greater military-technological cooperation 

and transfers from Washington, India wanted Washington 

to understand that it would continue to procure most of its 

hardware from Russia (if for no other reason than that the 

Indian military depended and still depends overwhelmingly 

on such arms sales and technology transfer), supplemented 

by procurements from Eastern Europe. This pattern of 

procurements also was intended to diversify India’s options 

so that it did not become excessively vulnerable to any one 

power or to future U.S. sanctions. Indeed, past U.S. restrictions 

on transfers to India rankled greatly among India’s elite and 

fostered a perception of the United States as an unreliable 

supplier. However, India in 2001 was willing to assure the 

Bush administration that the weapons thus obtained would 

not be used in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Thus an implicit, 

if not explicit, point here was India’s strong desire for an end 

to sanctions and for regular technology transfer and weapons 
18

sales by America to India. Finally, another implicit principle in 

this outline is India’s preference for a multipolar world, rather 

than a bipolar or unipolar one.64 And India’s ambivalence 

about unipolarity evidently continues.65

 Indian officials also stated then that they had a definite agenda for 

bilateral cooperation. It included cooperation on counterterrorism, 

i.e., improved intelligence-sharing in Afghanistan, Tibet, and the 

South China Sea. India also hoped to benefit from advances in U.S. 

satellite technology and imagery. Both sides also wished to explore 

possibilities of expanded cooperation in military aviation. And India 

strove to adopt a fresh viewpoint on issues like Kashmir, Pakistan, 

and the nuclear question to dispel the impression that Kashmir could 

be a nuclear flashpoint. Indian officials argued that mere possession 

of nuclear weapons did not necessarily threaten nuclear war. Rather, 

poor domestic governance and political instability, as well as undue 

external dependence, could encourage the use of nuclear weapons. 

Therefore, the way to ensure that Kashmir or other issues do not 

provoke a nuclear clash is for Pakistan to become a well-governed, 

prospering, and democratic state. 66 Indian officials said that,

India and the U.S., in fact, had a common agenda in encouraging 

democracy and economic well-being in Pakistan. A moderate democratic 

Islamic state was necessary and could emerge in Pakistan, if Islamabad, 

in its self-interest, reined in terrorism. India was also not averse to 

Pakistan’s positive economic contribution to the South Asian Association 

of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Cooperation in the SAARC could also 

become a channel for reviving an economic relationship.67

Evidently this agenda was largely, if not wholly, acceptable to 

Washington, for the Bush administration has steadily expanded the 

sphere of cooperation with India since then. Indeed, in August 2001 

the administration announced that it was beginning to lift sanctions 

imposed in 1998 for India’s nuclear testing, thereby clearing the way 

for greater military planning, joint operations, and eventual sharing 

of weapons technology.68 It also indicated its decision to reinstate the 

Defense Planning Group (DPG) with India that would discuss issues 

of bilateral concern regarding Asian security and future bilateral 

military cooperation. By then the first bilateral military exercise, 
19

a table-top peacekeeping operation, had occurred and would be 

followed by a joint search and rescue operation. The Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton (USA) had already 

visited India in July 2001. The administration also revealed that it 

had been sending encouraging signals to India since the start of 

its term, including treating India as an ally for briefing purposes 

regarding President Bush’s May 1, 2001 speech on missile defense.69

And this perception clearly betokened further cooperation on that 

issue. What is particularly striking is that U.S. officials’ activities and 

statements by then revealed to Indian leaders that Washington was 

“acknowledging that India is a country poised to take its place on 

the world stage.”70 Since then, it has become clearer as well that a 

major Indian objective is to secure U.S. support for an Indian seat at 

the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Realization of this goal 

would certainly show U.S. support for India’s enhanced status and 

standing in world affairs.71

 At that time U.S. officials also were willing to share their 

perception of common interests, which almost certainly included 

countering China though they were, and are, scrupulous not to say 

so. Instead, as Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage said, “For 

us to have a sustainable relationship with India, it must be based 

in and on India and not be a relationship which we try to develop 

with India to face a third country.”72 Officials also revealed how they 

perceived common interests before September 11.

 American officials say Washington and New Delhi share a 

particular interest in ensuring free navigation through the Indian 

Ocean. An increasing proportion of Persian Gulf oil passes along 

those sea lanes, as does much of India’s trade, which has soared 

since it began to reform its socialist economy. Military cooperation 

with India could also help enhance U.S. military readiness by 

offering training in the Indian Ocean. American forces have no 

facilities for training between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, 

defense officials said. U.S. officials also are careful to say that their 

aspiration for closer ties with New Delhi does not represent a snub 

of Pakistan, an American ally during the Cold War and a longtime 

rival of India.73

 The idea that India should be both a force for democracy and 

possess an expanded strategic vision of its role in Asia fully com-
20

ported with eminent foreign observers like Australia’s Paul Dibb’s 

strongly worded recommendations to that effect and to the 

administration’s policymakers’ growing understanding of the 

importance of India in the overall Asian context. For example, former 

Secretary of State Colin Powell told Congress in January 2001 at his 

confirmation hearings that, “India has the potential to keep the peace 

in the vast Indian Ocean and its periphery.”74 Similarly, Armitage 

has stated subsequently that one reason for reorienting U.S. policy in 

2001, even before September 11, was the perceived necessity to have a 

relationship with India that was not a “hyphenated one” if a coherent 

policy against the looming terrorist threat was to take effect.75

 Since then this relationship has progressed to the point where the 

Pentagon is discussing or has discussed with India the possibility of 

what has popularly been called an Asian NATO that would include 

India, even though the formal membership and obligations of the 

parties have not been disclosed.76 Since it is not clear what the parties 

mean by the term an Asian NATO, even when they concede that such 

discussions have occurred, it is probably more precise to say that 

Washington and New Delhi are contemplating an ever expanding 

strategic partnership, not a formal alliance.

 Moreover, there is good reason to believe that, in its fundamentals, 

strategic partnership but not formal alliance remains the bedrock of 

India’s national security or grand strategy. Even when Vajpayee said 

that the two states are “natural allies,” he consistently still ruled out 

a formal military alliance and instead meant the term “allies” in a 

more figurative sense, i.e., something akin to a strategic partnership, 

a term whose definition is intrinsically malleable. But while the 

exact nature and dimensions of this relationship are flexible, its 

direction evidently is fixed. High-ranking Indian officials believe 

that continuing improvement in the relationship is “irreversible” 

and would have remained so even if Senator Kerry had been elected 

President.77 Leading Indian political figures, analysts, and foreign 

observers publicly claim a growing convergence of strategic interests 

and values with the United States and some Indian observers openly 

advocate an alliance or call for an Asian NATO, even though they 

do not define that term with any precision.78 Both sides also believe 

that strengthening that relationship would add substantially to 

stability throughout Asia, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. 
21

In particular, they believe that this relationship could provide major 

security benefits to both sides in the Persian Gulf, South, Central, 

and Southeast Asia, i.e., all the land masses adjacent to or relatively 

close to the Indian Ocean.

 More recently, Prime Minister Singh publicly outlined India’s 

interests in this partnership in a speech to the Council on Foreign 

Relations in New York. He stressed India’s economic development, 

enduring democracy, and the connection between the Indian 

diaspora in America as factors abetting bilateral ties and partnership 

as the basis for the two states’ engagement.79 But beyond that speech, 

Indian policymakers under both the Vajpayee and now the Singh 

governments share an expansive view of India’s interests and rising 

capabilities. And its interests and capabilities increasingly overlap 

with those of the United States in key areas like the Gulf and Central 

Asia, especially Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia.

India’s Regional and Naval Ambitions.

 As we have seen, the Bush administration’s initial overtures to 

India led to a recasting of the relationship, to include India’s regional 

agenda in Asia. By accepting that agenda, the administration 

admitted and accepted that India had significant and legitimate 

Asian interests that coincided with U.S. interests throughout Asia. 

This admission represented the achievement of one of the April 

2001 goals postulated by India, which has long craved recognition 

as much more than a major South Asian power and been greatly 

frustrated by its failure to achieve it. Major policy decisions like the 

decision to go nuclear in 1998 can be attributed to this consuming 

desire to be seen as a great power.80 The new Army doctrine cited 

above expresses the same outlook. But the most telling examples 

of Indian ambitions can be found in other recent policy statements. 

In late 2003, signifying its self-perception as a rising Asian power, 

Vajpayee’s government opted for a 20-year program to become a 

world power whose influence is felt across the Indian Ocean, the 

Arabian Gulf, and all of Asia.81

 Vajpayee directed planners to craft defense strategies that extend 

beyond South Asia and transcend past sub-regional mindsets. He 
22

claimed that India’s expanded security perspectives require fresh 

thinking about projecting power and influence, as well as security 

in all these directions. India will seek more defense cooperation 

with states in the Gulf, Southeast, and Central Asia, presumably 

going beyond intelligence-sharing about terrorist activities. This 

cooperation will proceed to more bilateral exchanges and exercises 

and greater sharing of defense advice with friendly nations. In this 

context, strategic partnership with Washington is essential because 

Russia’s ties with India are tempered by Moscow’s dependence on 

the West, particularly America. Absent partnership with America, 

this situation would severely constrain Indian options since it could 

no longer hide behind Russia if it clashed with America.82

 While India formally eschews offensive military projections to 

intervene unilaterally in other countries, it formally announced its 

air base in Tajikistan, and hopes to undertake the following military 

programs through 2013:

 • Improve military logistics in Iran, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and 

Uzbekistan.

 • Increase military interaction with Malaysia, Indonesia, 

Singapore, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.

 • Increase naval interaction with South Africa, other African 

states, Iran, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and 

other Gulf nations.

 • Extend infrastructure, logistic, and material support to 

Myanmar to contain Chinese activities there.83

 Beyond those policies, all the Indian military services are 

undertaking a major military buildup of conventional weapons, ways 

of delivering nuclear weapons, and defenses against nuclear missiles 

by improving communication and surveillance systems. Although all 

the services will be built up, India’s commitments to missile defenses 

and to constructing naval warships to make India’s presence in the 

Indian Ocean “a force to be reckoned with” and thus one capable of 

force and power projection if necessary are particularly noteworthy. 

Indeed, India’s naval plans bespeak a very expansive agenda that 

requires cooperation with Washington.84
23

 The pattern of Indian naval acquisitions reveals the expansive 

goals India has charted for itself, to include countering both Pakistan 

and China. Fulfilling this program would truly make India a naval 

force to be reckoned within the Indian Ocean. On October 14, 2003, 

Navy Chief Admiral Singh said that,

Fulfilling India’s dream to have a full-fledged blue-water Navy would 

need at least three aircraft carriers, 20 more frigates, 20 more destroyers 

with helicopters, and large numbers of missile corvettes and antisubmarine warfare corvettes.85

 India’s new naval acquisition program as of 2003 entails spending 

$20 billion to buy aircraft carriers, submarines, frigates, maritime 

surveillance aircraft, and other ships and gear. The 10 principal 

combatants of the Navy would be equipped with antimissile missiles; 

command, control, communications and intelligence systems (C3I); 

and cruise missile launchers. Officials also look to create and deploy 

“battalion sized forces at various strategic points . . . [on] short notice, 

and disperse them quickly from the landing or dropping zone before 

any adequate enemy response.”86 Officials also insist on the need 

for a submarine launched nuclear missile capability, presumably to 

establish a second strike capability and to counter the naval buildup 

by Pakistan’s Navy that they see as a “medium term” threat to India. 

Pakistan’s Agosta 90-B diesel submarines can, along with its three 

Orion P-3C maritime strike aircraft outfitted with missiles, conduct 

effective sea denial operations against India’s coast. However, it 

is just as likely, if not more likely, that the real threat Indian naval 

planners perceive is China, whose fleet they see, rightly or wrongly, 

as being increasingly able to project power into the Indian Ocean. 

One Indian study actually states that the power vacuum in that ocean 

in this century can only be filled by India, China, or Japan, either by 

“complete preeminence or by a mutual stand-off.”87 While this may 

seem a rather fanciful or extremely alarmist assessment, perceptions 

often drive policy. Consequently, India has searched for a submarine 

that could launch nuclear missiles, and aircraft carriers, as well as 

long-range missiles that could strike targets over 2,500 KM away, 

clearly a sign that China, too, is in its sights.88

 India’s maritime acquisitions clearly fit into this strategy that 

has both an expansive threat assessment and an equally expansive 
24

objective. As reported by the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies in London,

The Indian navy remains the most powerful in the Central and South Asian 

region. However, progress remains slow toward achieving the aims set 

out in the naval doctrine of 2000, mainly due to financial constraints. This 

new doctrine stressed the need to have a fleet capable of operating in both 

the eastern and western Indian Ocean by having two operational aircraft 

carriers and highly capable submarines. Negotiations about the transfer 

of the Russian (mod-Kiev class) aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, are still 

ongoing, though it is believed that India cannot afford to pay for the 3-year 

refit needed to attain operational capability. In February, 2002, [Defense 

Minister George] Fernandes announced that India would not lease, as 

was proposed in late 2001, two Russian nuclear-powered submarines, 

but would instead buy six French Scorpene diesel submarines, with a 

further six to be built in India. . . . In November 2001, India announced 

plans to equip some of its principal surface combatants with the BrahMos

supersonic antiship cruise missile with a range of 280Km. This was seen 

as a partial response to China’s acquisition of Russian Soveremnnyi-class 

destroyers, armed with Russian Sunburn anti-ship missiles.89

 And this program has now been adopted, and even extended, by 

the new Singh government. The May 2004 Indian Maritime Doctrine 

that reflected the Vajpayee government’s outlook won acceptance 

by the new regime, signaling the elite consensus about India’s 

national security objectives. Whereas earlier doctrine focused on 

inward-looking strategies, the new doctrine attempts to deal with 

“conflict with [an] extra-regional power and protecting persons 

of Indian origin and interest abroad,” points that clearly suggest 

action against China and in the Gulf where four million expatriates 

are living.90 Indian analysts attribute the need for these missions to 

the likely conflict for scarce energy supplies originating in or near 

the Persian Gulf. As those resources are depleted, new contenders 

(i.e., China in particular) will enter these waters, compelling the 

Indian Navy to “beef up its striking power and its command-andcontrol, surveillance, and intelligence abilities.”91 Not surprisingly, 

China’s naval relations with Myanmar, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, 

Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia received special scrutiny. 

The doctrine demands for India a submarine-based nuclear launch 

capability, as well as a fleet that could operate far from home well 
25

into the Arabian Gulf (or the Strait of Malacca for that matter). 

Even if this is a long-term rather than an immediate goal, given the 

costs involved it signifies a marker being laid down, a set of clear 

objectives, and a corresponding economic-political requirement 

that can only be met by significantly expanded ties to Washington 

and other major defense exporters.92 Not only does this doctrine 

lay down guidance for a robust program of naval construction and 

acquisition, especially for such potential submarines as Russia’s 

Amur and/or Akula subs, the French Scorpene-class and India’s 

own advanced technology vessel (ATV), it also calls for a marinebased rapid mobility force to conduct missions of landward power 

projection. The war on land and suppression of enemy power from 

the littoral mandates the enhancement of that capability, as well as 

of India’s ability to project airpower from the sea and defend its seabased and home land-based platforms. This justifies the acquisition 

of the Russian Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier and the construction 

of India’s own Air Defense Vessel or aircraft carrier.93 Finally, the 

Navy intends to increase spending by 40 percent through 2014, and 

its annual allocation rose from an annual $7.5 Billion during 1997-

2001 to $18.3 billion annually for 2002-07.94

 This program requires extensive foreign and American support 

building upon the cooperation hitherto achieved. It also serves as a 

challenge to China and to Pakistan while demonstrating the sweep 

of India’s ambitions and determination to realize the capabilities 

needed to sustain them. Since this program reflects and embodies 

an elite consensus, it is clear that Washington must deal with that 

consensus as it approaches India. Simply because many scholars and 

analysts dismiss India’s capabilities does not mean that policymakers 

can enjoy that luxury when dealing with what is clearly a rising, 

ambitious, and proud government that is the bearer of an ancient 

civilization. These goals and programs are known by now to the 

administration, and it has not offered any public criticism of them, 

suggesting its comfort with India’s growing capability.

 Since then, the Indian Navy has conducted exercises with both 

the Omani and Iranian navies, and conducted port calls to those 

countries, Bahrain, and the UAE. India is also upgrading Iran’s 

port of Chahbahar and has gained access to Iranian bases in case of 
26

war with Pakistan through its 2003 agreement or treaty with Iran.95

India’s ties to Iran may also be deepening as a result of the October 

2004 visit to Tehran of India’s National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit.96

India’s Maritime Doctrine clearly postulates the importance of a 

naval presence in the unsettled Gulf.

 At the same time, India’s requirements for realizing these goals as 

they pertain to both the Army and the Navy offer the United States 

significant opportunities regarding defense technology transfers 

and arms sales, as well as for strategic coordination with India 

throughout the Indian Ocean. In this sense, there is a genuine bilateral 

opportunity for both sides to realize the objectives suggested in 2001 

by Ashley Tellis regarding Indian strategic objectives and defense 

purchases. Tellis observed then that,

Thanks to its economic growth, India is about to embark on another cycle 

of major military modernization—one that had been postponed for the 

better part of the last 2 decades. Once this cycle is complete a decade 

or so from now, it is likely that India will possess: a modest nuclear 

capability intended to deter both China and Pakistan from mounting 

the most obvious forms of blackmail; a significant naval capability that 

allows it to dominate the northern Indian Ocean (and one that would be 

very interested in active cooperation with the U.S. Navy); a refurbished 

air force that will remain one of the most effective in Asia; and large land 

forces that will be able to defend successfully Indian interests against 

both Pakistan and China (along the Himalayan frontier). Even as this 

modernization program proceeds, however, India will seek to further 

accelerate the great improvement in U.S.-Indian relations that has occurred 

in recent years. Conditioned in part by fears of a rising China, India 

seeks to promote a relationship that emphasizes “strategic coordination” 

with the United States. While its traditional, and still strong, desire for 

political autonomy and its continuing search for greatness will prevent 

it from ever becoming a formal U.S. alliance partner, it nonetheless seeks 

to develop close relations with the United States both in order to resolve 

its own security dilemmas vis-à-vis Pakistan and China and to develop 

cooperative solutions to various emerging problems of global order. Even 

as it seeks to draw closer to the United States, India remains committed 

to developing those instruments it believes are necessary for its longterm security, like nuclear weapons.97

 Even if this program remains incomplete and is adopted, at least 

in part, for reasons more closely relating to India’s psychology of 
27

being a great power, it is solidly rooted in material capabilities. In 

fact, India’s growing economic-technological-military capabilities 

are very much at the root of this partnership. At least Indian and U.S. 

officials think so.98 For example, India’s new Agni II missile can reach 

targets throughout Central and East Asia, including China.99 And if 

India continues building nuclear weapons like an intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), 

it will truly have an intercontinental capability, not to mention an 

intertheater one. America’s quest for partnership with India duly 

represents an acknowledgment of those capabilities and of their 

significance for world affairs. And it should also represent a similar 

acknowledgement of India’s strategic autonomy; namely, that, while 

it might prefer partnership and even arms sales from America, it can 

do perfectly well without either that partnership or those arms sales 

and not suffer major or at least unacceptable lasting strategic losses 

thereby.

 Nevertheless India, despite its ambitions, faces serious obstacles 

to its quest for great or major power status in Asia. These obstacles 

include both domestic, largely economic, obstacles and various 

regional threats or challenges that would be difficult to meet under 

the best of circumstances. While India has to be the primary actor who 

meets and overcomes these diverse challenges, many of them also 

work against American interests or obstruct Indo-American efforts 

to maximize the benefits of any potential partnership. Therefore 

those challenges, too, must be factored into any analysis of prospects 

for Indo-American strategic partnership.

29

CHAPTER 3

THE CHALLENGES TO INDIAN SECURITY

 It may be a cliché to say so, but Indian security begins at home. 

The ruling coalition clearly came to power with a mandate to 

improve the economic life of the masses, many of whom did not feel 

they were partaking sufficiently in India’s growth. Thus the Singh 

government’s foreign policy agenda is very much tied to, or grows 

out of, its perception of economic issues. Moreover, Singh and his 

coalition partners are acutely aware that failure to deliver improved 

economic conditions to the masses will trigger a significant loss of 

popular support. And slowed growth certainly will not create a 

rising tide of improved economic conditions that could ease social 

tensions in Kashmir or in the troubled northeast which is already 

aflame with various low intensity conflicts. Thus the projected 

growth of 6.5 percent for 2004 actually represents a retreat from 

earlier projections of matching the 8 percent growth of 2003. In order 

for the economy to achieve its hoped for growth rate of 8 percent 

that will allow India to compete with China, improve its internal 

economic conditions, and play a major power projection role (not 

only militarily) in Asia, it must therefore attract investment from 

within and without. And this can only be done by major economic 

reforms.100 In this respect, the government’s understanding of these 

facts corresponds to the increased American understanding of the 

fact that economics must play a much greater role than previously in 

Indo-American relations.

 Indeed, both Indian and American analysts strongly stressed in 

reports to the American based Asia Foundation that an emphasis on 

promoting socio-economic development throughout South Asia, and 

not just in India or Pakistan, would facilitate the realization of major 

American and Indian interests and further the overall cause of peace 

and stability (not to mention development) across the subcontinent.101

The Singh government clearly understands as well that no foreign 

policy of any kind can command mass or coalition support or project 

power abroad unless it directly improves the material conditions of 
30

both the national economy and especially the poor and lower classes 

who claim to have been left out of preceding growth and who make 

up its electoral constituency.102 Indeed, the Navy, in fact, does not 

have enough funding to make good on the promises it is making 

or policy goals laid out in the new maritime doctrine. So even if its 

capability expands considerably, it will not reach its proclaimed 

goals absent major domestic economic transformation.103 Similarly, 

Prime Minister Singh believes that only by transforming the Indian 

economy can India achieve genuine international recognition and 

project real power abroad. Thus, given his government’s perspective 

and those articulated by external analysts and increasingly by U.S. 

officials, there is a growing consensus about the kinds of economic 

policies, both domestic and foreign, that both states must pursue 

jointly in order to strengthen the lagging framework of economic 

ties and buttress thereby their strategic partnership.

 While Singh is confident that his comprehensive program of 

reducing bureaucratic interference in the economy, liberalization, 

and decentralization will galvanize the economy, it is also clear that 

strong foreign investment and issues like energy security must be 

addressed within a strategic framework if India is to increase its 

growth rate and keep pace with China.104 But the attempt to ensure 

energy security, which is vital, while also attracting major foreign 

investment and accelerating technological growth, creates a foreign 

policy quandary for India. Singh told the Financial Times that “energy 

security is second only in our scheme of things to food security.”105

Thus India’s dependence upon secure oil and gas supplies from the 

Gulf and from Central Asia, as manifested in its energy firms’ quest 

for equity holdings in Russian, Angolan, Sudanese, Venezuelan, and, 

most of all, Iranian energy fields or for major deals with states like 

Iran, represents a vital national interest. Accordingly, in November 

2004 India’s state-run oil corporation announced a $3 billion deal with 

Iran’s Petropars.106 At the December 3-4, 2004, summit with Russia, 

India announced a $3billion Indian investment in the Sakhalin-3 

oil field and the joint Russian-Kazakh Kurmangazy oil field in the 

Caspian. India Energy Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar has stated that, 

“what I am talking about is the strategic alliance with Russia in 

energy security, which is becoming for India at least as important 
31

as our national security.”107 Indeed, India’s quest for energy is so 

driving a factor in its foreign policy that it agreed to have the Oil 

and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) enter what is a transparent 

dummy bid for the remnants of Yukos in Russia, the most efficient 

energy producer there that was destroyed by President Putin and his 

government for political reasons, in order to gain favor in Moscow’s 

eyes by legitimating this phony auction. Presumably, this favor 

will lead to enhanced access to Russian energy and heightened 

cooperation with Russian energy firms.108 Similarly, India still shows 

interest in participating in a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, even though it is understandably reluctant 

to allow Pakistan to have a hand on its gas or oil supply.109

 While such statements and policies highlight India’s capabilities 

and ambitions, they also clearly underscore its economic vulnerabilities and the inherent dilemmas of the economic dimension of 

its ties with the United States. India must balance its dependence 

upon external energy sources like Iran or Russia with its need for 

U.S. support. While India’s close ties with Iran have not inhibited the 

development of a flourishing commercial and military relationship 

with Israel, those ties could cause trouble with the United States, 

even if Indian officials like Hamid Ansari, a member of the Policy 

Advisory Group to Foreign Minister S. Natwar Singh, stated that, 

“What is going on with regard to Iran is a complex game—part 

chess, part poker. But we have done our sums with regard to Iran. 

It isn’t an area where we will be pushed to resolve our position.”110

On the other hand, if Iran’s nuclearization could be arrested, thanks 

to the recent Irano-EU agreement of November 2004, then perhaps it 

might be possible for some improvement of Iran’s ties with either, if 

not both, Jerusalem and Washington to occur. If that were to happen, 

some Indian analysts believe that India could then function as an 

interlocutor between Tehran and Washington.111

 The relationship with Iran is very important to India because of 

the need to ensure reliable energy access, the two states’ common 

opposition to what they perceived as Pakistani-sponsored terrorism 

in Afghanistan and Central Asia, India’s rising interest in the 

stability of the Persian Gulf, and the importance of the North-South 

trade corridor. This corridor, beginning in Northwest Russia, is the 
32

centerpiece of a grand Russian design to exploit Russia’s geography 

as a bridge between North and South and East and West, and 

make Russia the hub of a vast overland and maritime trading and 

transportation network that would embrace Europe to the West and 

Iran, Central Asia, and India in the South.112 Obviously, the corridor’s 

value for India grew when trade routes through Afghanistan and 

Pakistan were held hostage to Pakistan-backed terrorism before 

2002. The North-South corridor bypasses Afghanistan and Pakistan 

and is a strong symbol of India’s political closeness to Iran, Russia, 

and Central Asian regimes.

 While this relationship with Iran substantiates India’s own claims 

to be a rising power and reflects Iran’s awareness that cooperation 

with India benefits it in and around Central Asia, it also exemplifies 

the broader trend of Indian relations with key actors in Central 

Asia and the Middle East. Whereas Pakistan’s strident Islamism 

and support for terrorism and drug-running has strongly alienated 

Central Asian governments and even estranged Iran and its ally, 

China, India’s opposition to those policies and superior economic 

attainments enhances its political status and fosters an alignment 

with Iran against Pakistani-inspired terrorism.113 And the powerful 

linkages that India has created thereby enable it to project power and 

influence further afield, e.g., the North-South trade corridor with 

Russia and Iran which could only take shape on the basis of common 

political goals. The relationship with Iran is not based exclusively 

either on this fact or on the fact that India’s main supplier of oil will 

continue to be the Gulf states, Iran among them.114 But undoubtedly 

energy is a key factor, along with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and 

Indo-Pakistani relations and general trade, especially as Iran seeks 

to become a center of the international energy trade and sees Central 

Asia as the biggest market for its goods and capital investment.115 In 

fact, Indo-Iranian relations exemplify the pattern whereby economic 

and energy security become inextricable parts of a web of greater 

security and defense interests.116

 On the other hand, Iran cannot provide the foreign investment 

or the civilian technological transfers that India desperately needs 

and for which it looks to Washington. So, in order to preserve its 

partnership with Washington and obtain the resources that only such 

partnership makes available, it must indeed “do its sums.” From 
33

India’s perspective, that means debureaucratizing and liberalizing 

the economy and reducing the obstacles to foreign investment 

and imports of necessary technologies.117 It also means massive 

investments in infrastructure (which also entails obtaining sufficient 

energy from abroad while this is happening, and to facilitate the 

transition to a more efficient energy economy). Infrastructural 

investments will not only facilitate domestic growth but also the 

export of Indian goods and investments abroad, so that India can 

then compete with China—which is increasingly the overarching 

standard of comparison for India—as it occupies an ever larger role 

in Asian economies. In an age where the projection of economic 

power is on a par, if not superior, to the projection of military power 

as a factor making for a state’s global importance, and given India’s 

openly expressed ambitions for becoming a great power, there is no 

other strategic route to economic power. More importantly, it also 

is the case that Washington and its representatives, in their quest 

for strengthened partnership with India, have fastened upon a 

comparable agenda in order to buttress the economic dimension of 

this relationship.

 Washington’s main concerns about India relate to what it believes 

are obstacles to both domestic growth and foreign investment in 

India from the United States. The Bush administration wishes to 

see ongoing reforms of India’s statist and excessively dirigiste and 

quasi-socialist economy; reduction, if not termination, of India’s 

extensive trade and investment barriers; and greater protection of 

American intellectual property rights.118 Such moves should facilitate 

an expansion and freeing of trade that both sides claim to want, both 

for its own sake and as part of a global move toward freer trade. 

In particular, Ambassador David Mulford strongly emphasizes the 

pressing need for putting the transformation of India’s infrastructure 

on a wartime basis so that its quality will be able to support India’s 

ambitious economic and foreign policy programs.119 Mulford also 

advocates major reforms to eliminate the deficit financing at the 

federal and state levels in India, and for reforms that will allow 

capital to be more productive.120 Other officials from the U.S. Treasury 

Department emphasize the increased productivity that would result 

from a freer economy.121 All these statements of high-level official 
34

interest in Indian economic development signify Washington’s 

heightened overall interest in a stronger India that can participate 

with the United States on a broad range of foreign and defense policy 

issues.

 However, India’s challenges are not merely economic. In many 

cases, they are strategic because all around its periphery there are 

growing threats of terrorism, failing states, insurgency, drug running, 

and the like. Actually, at least 14 terrorist and separatist movements 

“of varying rigor and intensity,” other than the violence in Jammu 

and Kashmir, “are raging across India.”122 Recognizing this, the 

U.S. Government has discreetly, but clearly, acknowledged that the 

challenges to security in areas like Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar 

could open up a third front in the war on terrorism and prevent the 

full fruition of its growing ties to India. Only quite recently has the 

full magnitude of the threat posed by these phenomena become clear 

to or accepted by policymakers, but they are beginning to see them 

as linked to the long-standing and well-known struggles in Kashmir. 

Thus, for example, Indian officials tend to regard disturbances in 

Bangladesh as reflecting that it is “a playground for Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence agency (ISI).123 Excepting Kashmir, we and Indian 

officials can easily see an accelerating Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, 

much of which receives financial support from Tamils in Southern 

India; a floundering state in Bangladesh that is experiencing growing 

terrorism; a Maoist insurgency in Nepal that is gaining the upper 

hand over the state there and could either precipitate state failure 

or a successful violent insurgency that is now apparently spreading 

into Northeast India; insurgent and terrorist activity in Myanmar 

that threatens Indian interests and that has led to the participation of 

Indian military personnel in actions there and to the signing of a new 

agreement with the government of Myanmar, hitherto regarded as 

something of a pariah due to its repressive dictatorship.124

 The threats posed by the efflorescence of terrorism here combine 

the usual plagues of terrorist activity, insurgency, drug running, and 

strong evidence of the existence of nuclear smuggling rings, possibly 

tied to A. Q. Khan’s network that originated in Pakistan.125 Given 

the scope of the challenge and Indian officials’ belief that in many, if 

not all, cases, Pakistani intelligence or military officials are abetting 

these insurgencies, there is a discernible rise in both Indian military 
35

activity in and around its frontiers, from Sri Lanka to Nepal and 

Myanmar, even as it withdraws troops from Kashmir in response 

to lessened terrorist infiltration there.126 Moreover, Washington 

and New Delhi are sharing sensitive information about activities at 

terrorist bases throughout South Asia, particularly Bangladesh and 

Nepal, and Washington has pledged $1 million to Nepal as security 

assistance. 127

 U.S. officials agree with their Indian counterparts that terrorist 

camps in Bangladesh pose a terrorist threat to the stability of the 

region. The United States is also trying to ascertain the threat of 

terrorists to Bangladesh itself, as well as the “potential utilization of 

Bangladesh as a platform to project terror internationally, according 

to J. Cofer Black, coordinator for counterterrorism in the U.S. State 

Department.128

 Clearly the earlier neglect that apparently characterized India’s 

attitude toward the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is becoming a thing 

of the past. Indeed, Myanmar, Bhutan, and India are preparing for 

an armed crackdown against insurgents. But for Indo-American 

security partnership, these insurgencies and threats along India’s 

peripheries beyond the struggle in Kashmir point simultaneously 

in two directions. On the one hand, they highlight the obstacles to 

India’s grandiose vision of the future and give reasons for alarm 

about India’s own internal stability.129 If India cannot find the means 

to overcome these challenges, even if they are protracted operations, 

its stability, that of South Asia, and the heralded arrival of a great 

power will be set back considerably. On the other hand, the threat of 

spreading terrorism, insurgencies, and failing states has galvanized 

U.S. officials into taking broader action with India to confront 

those challenges. Ultimately, the cooperation that we now see 

along India’s peripheries could serve as a starting point for future 

highly beneficial security cooperation in the other key areas of IndoAmerican interests.

37

CHAPTER 4

INDIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

 One area where both the United States and India have vital 

strategic interests is the Persian Gulf. But while both sides have 

expansive strategic ambitions regarding the Gulf and share a hostility 

to Islamic terrorism and a vital interest in ensuring the security of 

reliable energy supplies from this region, the current situation in the 

Gulf makes cooperation between them difficult, albeit by no means 

impossible. Both necessity and ambition, fueled by opportunity, drive 

India’s efforts to cut a major figure in the Persian Gulf. Four million 

Indians reside in the Gulf and send valuable remittances home to 

their kinsmen, making them hostages of the local security situation, 

but also signifying India’s rising interest in the Gulf. This rising 

interest takes place in a context dominated by three interacting and 

profound strategic trends: India’s rise as a major Asian power with 

continental aspirations throughout all Asia, American dominance of 

the Gulf, and the visible Indo-American strategic partnership.

 Consequently, India is determined to prevent any maritime or 

landward threat to it from the Gulf. Indeed, following Ashley Tellis’ 

analysis in 2001-02, we can state that, for India, the Middle East and 

the Persian Gulf constitutes a vast strategic buffer, an outer ring, 

if you will, that cannot be allowed to become a base from which 

policies inimical to India’s interests and security can be pursued 

with impunity. Because India must engage local states to forestall 

such negative trends, India robustly counters the related threats of 

terrorism, proliferation, and the export of radicalized Islam.130 The 

threat of proliferation in the Gulf, for example, as abetted by China, 

obligates India’s policymakers to assert New Delhi’s presence there. 

As Tellis wrote,

The relationship between China and various key states in Southeast Asia, 

Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which have the effect of marginalizing 

India, reducing its access to the region, and creating pockets of Chinese 

influence in areas where natural resources, physical access, markets, and 

sources of influence are increasingly coveted, remain a good example of 

how the relationships among various states in the “outer ring” [of Indian 

security perspectives— author] could directly affect Indian interests.131
38

 India, in many ways, thinks as did its erstwhile British masters 

who also confronted the threats of advancing major powers and 

crumbling or failing states on the approach to India.132 Indeed, the 

Gulf figures prominently in India’s overall strategic horizons as one 

of the key areas where it must be able to project power in the future. 

Indian elites share a consensus that envisions an expanded concept 

of India’s national interests encompassing Asia from the Middle East 

to the Strait of Malacca. This expanded strategic concept comprises 

not only classic military and/or geostrategic perspectives, but also 

a broader definition of security and security interests. For example, 

Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh revealed that, for many years, 

India’s Middle Eastern policy was hostage to the “communal card” 

at home, i.e., Muslim sympathies. But now it is freed from that and 

can determine its policies on the basis of a pure national interest. 

This kind of reasoning certainly helps explain the vastly improved 

relationships with both Israel and Iran. However, it obviously is 

not completely true, as the refusal to send forces to Iraq shows. 

Nevertheless, this confidence underscored and still underlies India’s 

apparent willingness to play a partnership role in the Gulf despite 

differences over Iraq.

 Equally, if not more important is India’s acceptance of the logic 

of the Raj that no maritime threats must be tolerated, as that was the 

basis of the British threat to Mogul India and of subsequent threats 

to British interests. That threat was also perceived in the dispatch 

of the U.S. fleet to check Indian power during the Indo-Pakistani 

war of 1971. In 1979, former Admiral A. K. Chatterji wanted “a 

force equal in size and competence to the naval forces of any one 

of the superpowers now formally operating in the area.”133 Defense 

Minister George Fernandes said in 2000 that, since India has “high 

stakes in the uninterrupted flow of commercial shipping, the Indian 

Navy has an interest in the ocean space extending from the north of 

the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.”134 Others talk of denying 

outside forces an autonomous capacity to act in the Indian Ocean 

and thus proclaiming what amounts to a kind of Indian Monroe 

Doctrine throughout its expanse.135

 Scholars, too, now see a fundamental change in India’s geostrategic position. In a major study of South Asia’s geopolitics, 
39

Graham Chapman concluded that, “The major deductive viewpoint 

is that provided by [Halford] Mackinder and [Saul] Cohen, [namely] 

that South Asia is an independent geopolitical region, strategically 

placed as one of the rim-land regions flanking the central Eurasian 

heartland.”136 Consequently, India, as the dominant power of South 

Asia, has both the interest and capability to take an active, even 

forceful, interest in strategic events happening either in the central 

Eurasian heartland or in the two “shatterbelts” adjoining it, the 

Middle East and Southeast Asia. Hence, India’s active pursuit of 

national interests in those two regions and Central Asia.137 Chapman 

further illustrates how the intersection of geographic location and 

military capability create India’s expansive strategic vision, and he 

explicitly invokes the British and Mogul heritages in that context.

 India is committed to developing a “blue water” navy capable 

of strategic action within the Indian Ocean and not just coastal 

defense. There is some logic to this, in that many important cities 

and installations, including most of her atomic power stations, 

are within range of submarine-launched missiles, not necessarily 

intercontinental missiles like Polaris, but small cruise missiles 

launched from a submerged or surfaced submarine. These are now 

within Pakistan’s capability. In other words, India now recognizes 

that the defense of the sea is as important as the defense of the land 

borders. The heir to the Moguls and the British appreciates India’s 

position as a unique geopolitical region, which must face both the 

potential of land power and of sea power.138

 Obviously this concept of security reflects both rising Indian 

capabilities and a sense of pervasive threats on the peripheries, 

not least throughout the entire Indian Ocean. And the program 

advocated by Vajpayee, as well as the new maritime doctrine cited 

above, represents efforts to realize that concept in policy.139

 India’s determination to prevent hostile powers from controlling 

the northern approaches to India from both the East and West and 

to control the maritime approaches in the Indian Ocean clearly 

derive from both traditional Realist perspectives of strategy and 

international relations, as well as from British approaches to the 

defense of the Raj.140 This determination clearly is also tied to critical 

aspects of India’s current economic transformation like the need for 
40

secure access to energy. Indian interests in the Gulf, for example, are 

clearly also closely tied to the need to ensure reliable and regular 

access to supplies and to tie into the expanding network of the 

growing north-south corridor trade from Russia and Central Asia 

through Iran to India and beyond.141 Indeed, Indian analysts regard 

the Gulf as the priority source of its anticipated energy needs for the 

long term, hence its importance to India grows commensurately.142 In 

this respect, India, like so many other states, sees energy and overall 

economic security and defense as being inextricably connected to 

each other. And such interests also mandate a close relationship 

with Iran that is quite unlike the posture of frozen hostility that 

characterizes U.S. relations with Iran. Likewise, India maintains that 

the Gulf must remain a stable and unimpeded source of energy. India 

not only depends on a stable supply of oil and gas from the Gulf, it 

is also now seeking to gain equity investment, through the Oil and 

Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), in local energy projects.143 And 

India’s vital security interest in stable energy supplies, cited above, 

is not a function of recent developments in the Gulf but has been a 

major issue for several years.

 Similarly, India’s participation in the aforementioned North-South 

transport corridor that traverses the Gulf also represents a major 

trading and political interest insofar as it brings India closer to Russia, 

Central Asian states, and Iran. Finally, as specified in Vajpayee’s 

November 2003 program, India will both seek to develop its longrange capabilities of power projection to the Gulf and seek more 

defense cooperation with local states. This cooperation will proceed 

to more bilateral exchanges and exercises and greater sharing of 

defense advice with friendly nations. To realize those goals, he argued 

that strategic partnership with Washington is essential so that India 

always has the option of U.S. support for its objectives. Otherwise, 

India’s ability to project power and influence abroad anywhere would 

be greatly compromised.144 This overarching strategic fact clearly 

still applies to Indian policy, even if the government has changed. 

And since the Indian government has apparently done its sums, as 

it believes, it has been able to maintain and expand its ties to Iran, 

while simultaneously expanding its ties to both Israel and the United 

States. In so doing, it has furthered significantly its own interests 
41

and isolated Pakistan, probably contributing thereby to the latter’s 

willingness to enter into negotiations with India. Meanwhile, Iran 

benefits materially and politically from its ties to India that reduce 

its sense of isolation in the face of perceived American threats.

 Thus Iran has sought assistance in building an overland gas 

pipeline through Pakistan to India. Other options include a pipeline 

along Pakistan’s shallow water coastline, or on the seabed from 

the Persian Gulf to India’s west coast, or an already existing fourth 

option, liquefied natural gas, which is most expensive. India hitherto 

has rejected including Pakistan in the pipeline so the North-South 

corridor may come to include gas and/or oil.145 Iran also seeks Indian 

support for joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), G-17, and 

G-77 trading regimes and greater business and perhaps also defense 

ties with India.146 Finally, both states oppose Islamist takeovers in 

Central Asia where Iran has been a notably cautious actor.147 While 

Pakistan has guaranteed the safety and security of Indian gas or oil 

supply through an overland pipeline from Iran (and probably must 

do so since the project originates in Turkmenistan), India remains 

reluctant. Still, ties to Iran remain strong, given both states’ overall 

strategic harmony, shared interests, and Moscow’s support behind 

the scenes. So this pipeline probably will be built.148

 Iran and India have come even closer with regard to hard security 

and defense. In 2003 they forged what amounts to an old-fashioned 

alliance. India will provide repairs and maintenance for Iran’s 

Russian-built weapons and training for its officers in return for the 

use of Iranian bases in any future war against Pakistan. Undoubtedly 

any Indo-Iranian military cooperation will raise questions here and 

in Jerusalem about Indian policies, but so far that has not precluded 

India’s advancing ties with either Israel or America. Despite the 

prospect of a new government, Indian officials in the Ministry of 

Defense claim that India will still advance military help to Iran. 

Apparently a joint working group will be established, and Iran wants 

to go beyond troop training to have India take an advisory role in 

helping the Iranian Army develop a logistics strategy to manage its 

stores. The Indian Defense Ministry is also eager to establish regular 

naval exchanges between the two countries that would include 

annual joint naval exercises.149 Clearly Pakistan’s beliefs that it could 
42

destabilize its neighbors and rivals with impunity, using terrorists as 

its instrument, or that it could then switch sides to recoup a positive 

position in Central Asia, have been rudely shattered. In Central Asia, 

Pakistan is now isolated while a potent Indo-Iranian-Russian entente 

that disposes of formidable economic and military power is visibly 

taking shape.

 India could also bring several assets to the Gulf security equation. 

India already possesses considerable experience and capability to 

project power in the form of peacekeeping or peace enforcement 

forces abroad. Indeed, in anticipation of playing exactly this role in 

Iraq, the Army and some in the government began to plan for that 

mission in 2003.150 However major domestic political controversy 

and the failure of the UN to authorize foreign participation in an 

Iraqi peace operation prevented the government from authorizing 

the dispatch of troops there.151 Somewhat surprisingly, in the wake 

of Iraq’s successful January 30, 2005, elections, there are signs of 

a reviving Indian interest in according the new regime legitimacy 

and in getting into position for the competition for reconstruction 

contracts in Iraq.152 This could occur even though the strength of 

opposition among members of the current ruling coalition will, for 

now, preclude any Indian dispatch of troops to Iraq in the foreseeable 

future. Although the Pentagon clearly wanted such troops in 2003 

and an intense political debate about it occurred as shown by the 

military’s preparations for such an order, it should have been clear 

to Washington that the balance of factors in Indian domestic and 

foreign policy militated against such a dispatch of forces, especially 

during an election campaign.153 Nevertheless, the Indian government 

is already deeply engaged in the Gulf.

 For example, while it remains unclear who will join the projected 

Asian NATO that both India and America have discussed or what its 

missions, rules of engagement in peace operations, and purpose will 

be, India has already provided access to the United States in its quest 

for bases against terrorism in the Indian Ocean, bases which were 

and are being used to prosecute the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In the event of future contingencies, they could be used in the Gulf 

as well.154 Because of domestic terrorism, India also regards the Gulf 

as a potential breeding ground for anti-Indian terrorism, if not more 

generalized expressions of this threat. Thus it is determined to assert 
43

itself there to prevent that threat’s overt expression and mutation 

into a threat based on WMD proliferation and the acquisition of such 

a capability by terrorists.

 This opposition to terrorism and proliferation not only brings 

India and America closer, it also catalyzes India’s drive to outflank 

the territorial bases of these threats by finding points of influence 

in the Gulf and Central Asia and by developing a capability to 

assert and project its power in enduring fashion into these areas. 

But beyond rivalry with Pakistan, the great strategic objective of 

India’s rapprochement with Washington is to convince it that India 

truly merits being seen as an Asian power that can project influence 

and power on behalf of common interests against common threats 

throughout Asia. To the degree that the United States regards India 

as having legitimate security interests in the Gulf, Southeast Asia, 

and as far afield as the Strait of Malacca, India can then play a 

much greater role on its own and in support of Washington. Thus 

frustrating terrorist challenges in a post-Saddam Iraq is intrinsically 

an important Indian interest, even if it cannot yet commit forces 

there due to domestic considerations and a different valuation than 

America’s concerning the need for a UN authorization.

 The Indian government not only wants Washington to keep 

Pakistan “in the dock” and under constant pressure, it also wants 

Washington to stabilize the Gulf in order to stabilize the South Asian 

subcontinent and eliminate the territorial and political bases of the 

terrorism that threatens it. Indian diplomatic support will be discreet 

and measured, maybe even covert, but there is a visible basis for 

Indo-American collaboration here, even if it is somewhat limited 

by the asymmetric, though not opposed, interests of the two states. 

The architecture for regional security in the Gulf clearly is broader 

than merely establishing the basis for Iraq’s long-term stability and 

security. But the latter is the essential precondition for any successful 

security architecture or structure in the region. And without such an 

architecture, India’s and America’s interests, security, and standing 

will be severely compromised.

India’s ambitions, capabilities, experience, and interests all 

suggest that it is interested in playing a major role in helping to 

stabilize the Persian Gulf in a post-Saddam era. As C. Uday Bashkar 

of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses recently wrote,
44

In the immediate future, U.S. policy toward South Asia will, to a great 

extent, be determined by the way in which Iraq is stabilized, and the 

January (2005) elections will be a significant punctuation that will shape 

the degree of U.S. involvement in that country in the Bush second term. 

It is relevant that India also shares an interest in the swift return to 

normalcy to Iraq and its citizens, and it remains to be seen if the U.S. will 

be able to facilitate such joint effort under the appropriate multilateral 

banner. India’s abiding concern about radical Islamic militancy and its 

supra-national aspirations is the more complex element and this will 

be the common template for the long-term security relationship, not 

withstanding the immediate divergence over Pakistan and its military 

DNA.155

 The issue is how do we craft an invitation to India to do so that 

has a chance of succeeding. Obviously we must stop dismissing the 

UN, for no matter what we think, India, like many other states, sees 

its authorization as indispensable to any legitimization of the use of 

force or for deployment in post-conflict stability operations. Second, 

before India enters into any such operation, it will be necessary to 

conduct a candid discussion with it as to its strategic objectives, 

interests, and concerns in the new Gulf. And those objectives, interests, 

and concerns must be accommodated. During this dialogue, it will 

be necessary as well to elucidate its views as to how that structure or 

architecture should work, and not just what it hopes to gain from its 

participation in any such system.

 Here it should be noted that India appears to be shifting gears in 

its policy toward Iraq. For example, in December 2004 Iraq interim 

Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari came to New Delhi, signifying a 

resumption of formal contacts with Iraq and the change in Indian 

policy. Indian observers had noted several earlier signs of New 

Delhi’s interest in moving to adapt itself to the evolving Iraqi situation 

despite the intense public opposition, particularly strong among 

members of the ruling coalition, especially the Communist Party, to 

the U.S. campaign in Iraq. It had become clear to New Delhi that other 

states were moving to engage the new interim Iraqi government and 

that it was being excluded by its inflexibility. Thus, even if Indian 

engagement with the interim government and its successor that 

was elected in January 2005 remain low-key, India clearly intends to 

remain engaged with Iraq and help shape a future status quo there 
45

that is consonant with its interests. And those interests are broadly 

consonant with U.S. strategic interests regarding proliferation and 

terrorism.156

 Thus there are opportunities for enhanced Indo-American 

cooperation, even with regard to the evolving situation in Iraq. 

But for that cooperation to take root, India has to be able to look 

beyond the domestic opposition to American policy there, and that 

requires some American actions to facilitate such movement within 

Indian politics. For example, the perception in India that U.S. policy 

is characterized by excessive unilateralism must be shown to be 

groundless. And that altered perception must be based on what is 

actually transpiring among our allies and us. Allies like India must 

be consulted and accommodated, much more openly than was 

previously the case. This consultation must mean, and be seen to 

mean, more than that they were simply heard and that then we 

proceeded as we had intended to do anyway. Their interests in a 

stable Gulf, which, after all, are not far removed from our goals 

for the area, must be seen as legitimate, and it must be understood 

that no unilateral American system stands any chance of more than 

ephemeral success in constructing a post-Saddam order in the Gulf. 

The beginning of wisdom in constructing a sustainable and enduring 

Gulf security architecture entails genuine dialogue with allies and 

partners, and a genuine give and take among them and us. The gains 

in getting the participation of a rising power with a good reputation 

in the Gulf and a democratic tradition in this security architecture far 

outweigh any losses involved in accommodating their interests there 

and in taking their advice when it makes sense. Since partnership, 

if not alliance, with India is one of the fundamental points of the 

administration’s agenda and even preceded September 11, as India’s 

power and standing grow, it makes all the sense in the world to 

exploit that partnership on behalf of interests and values that are 

fundamentally shared and compatible and against common threats. 

Failure to devise a basis for a significant Indian presence in the new 

Gulf, on the other hand, all but ensures that the architecture we then 

build will be built on sand.

47

CHAPTER 5

CENTRAL ASIA

 If the Gulf is of rising importance to Indian security and stability 

and has been a vital interest of the United States since 1941 when 

it entered World War II and participated in the Grand Alliance’s 

occupation of Iran, Central Asia has been vital to India for millennia. 

Indians like to point out that India frequently has been invaded 

from Central Asia, and the essence of the Raj’s security policy was to 

prevent another such invasion. Moreover, geostrategic imperatives 

of today’s world have transformed the situation, making Central 

Asia not just vital to India, but also increasingly important to the 

United States, and not merely because of terrorism. Energy access to 

this region, in part to ensure a diversity of supplies to America and 

its allies that does not rely merely on the Persian Gulf, has grown in 

importance to America since 1992.157 The geostrategic implications 

of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also are clear. For the first time 

in history, externally based naval and air based military power has 

been projected successfully and sustained against Central Asian 

forces and targets. As Graham Chapman wrote recently, invoking 

Sir Halford Mackinder, “The Americans have also now built bases in 

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; and so the maritime powers 

have penetrated the heartland for the first time ever.” 158 Indeed, 

Norman Friedman calls the war in Afghanistan a littoral war, 

highlighting the sustained strategic projection of offshore or externally 

based power into this theater.159 Second, these capabilities can also 

be projected from there to all of Asia, or Europe (including the Middle 

East), and vice versa, making the Transcaspian literally a pivotal 

Eurasian theater. Therefore we can and must think seriously about 

the future projection of naval, land, and air power into or from the 

Transcaspian theater to or from adjacent theaters in Eastern Europe, 

the Middle East, South Asia, and/or East Asia. But this fact obligates 

the United States to engage this entire area with more strategic 

purposefulness in order to maintain permanent access to it and 

to help ensure its security and stability. Therefore, by using those 

forms of power projection—which can project ground forces into the 
48

theater and sustain them for a long time—India, America, and other 

similarly endowed states can now, or in the future, leverage military 

power in and throughout Central Asia, and from there throughout 

Eurasia in hitherto unforeseen ways. Not surprisingly, both halves 

of the Transcaspian, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, now enjoy 

heightened analytical and policy interest. Ever more security 

professionals here and abroad realize the importance of addressing 

the Black Sea and Transcaucasia as well as Central Asia in order to 

complete the stabilization of Europe or to help stabilize the “Broader 

(or greater) Middle East” or a reconceptualized Eurasia or consider 

Central Asia as an integral part of Asian security.160 Many Indian 

and American writers, as well as others with expertise in the region, 

emphasize the strategic importance of Central Asia and/or the 

Caucasus to the current geopolitical order. Frequently, they see new 

geographical and even strategic unities between the two halves of 

the Transcaspian and areas like South Asia or Europe. For example, 

Even before the war in Iraq, Sir John Thomson, a former British High 

Commissioner to India wrote that,

The geographical definition of South Asia has expanded. If we had any 

doubt before, September 11 has made it clear that we have to take into 

account Afghanistan and its neighbors: Iran to the west, all the former 

Soviet republics to the north, and China to the east. The geographical 

context for South Asia may be even wider. We in the West say—sincerely, 

I believe—that we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe 

it. So, to a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can 

be connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential extension 

of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately, by the spiraling 

disaster in Israel-Palestine.161

 Rajan Menon of Lehigh University also writes that:

A seamless web connects Central Asia proper, the South Caucasus, 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and China’s Xinjiang province. 

Thinking in terms of a “greater Central Asia” captures the bigger picture 

and reflects how forces from one part of this extended region radiate 

across borders to other parts. Thus, an axiom of both policymaking 

and analysis should be that the consequences of a major change in one 

part of greater Central Asia will affect its other parts, often quickly and 

dramatically and through multiple networks. 162
49

 In 2003 Indian Foreign Secretary Kinwal Sebal similarly told a 

U.S. audience that,

Asia has traditionally been seen in terms of its sub-regions, each with its 

own dynamics and its own problems. Traditionally, we deal with them 

as unconnected compartments. However, lines that insulate one region 

from the other increasingly are getting blurred by proliferation deals that 

link the east to the west, by the chain of terror network(s) across West, 

South, and Southeast Asia, by the concerns about the safety of commerce 

from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca, by the challenge of 

connecting major consumers of energy to its sources in West and Central 

Asia.163

 Most tellingly, Paul Bracken writes that,

The arc of terror cuts across the military and political theaters into 

which the West conveniently divided Asia, essentially for the purpose of 

fighting the Cold War: the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and 

Northeast Asia. The ballistic missile once launched, does not turn back 

at the line that separates the territory of one State Department desk from 

another. Thus the Gulf War (of 1991) brought the troubles of the Persian 

Gulf to Israel, linking theaters that had once been considered separate. 

Israel, for its part, sends up spy satellites to spy on Pakistan, 2000 miles 

away, spooking Islamabad into seeing an Indian-Israel squeeze play 

against it. Chinese and Indian military establishments plot against each 

other, making East and South Asia one military space.164

 Given the Transcaspian region’s proximity to the centers of 

contemporary terrorism, it is hardly surprising that both U.S. 

policymakers and foreign analysts see enhanced U.S. attention 

to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus as essential. Indeed, 

Blackwill wrote that “Asia is increasingly a geopolitical whole” and 

recommended that America and its Asian allies—Japan, South Korea, 

and Australia—consider Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia a 

geopolitical unit with which they should engage.165 And as we have 

seen, such geopolitical ruminations and policy recommendations are 

by no means alien to Indian policymakers and analysts. Therefore, it 

is not surprising that Vajpayee’s 2003 program emphasized Central 

Asia as a key theater where India must project its power and influence, 

or that India, since 2000 if not before, has been steadily expanding its 

presence using all the instruments of power at its disposal.166
50

 Recent Indian assessments of Central Asia thus correspond to 

emerging American strategic perspectives. Although some analysts 

believe that America’s supposed partiality to Pakistan leads to a 

U.S. disinclination to have India be a major presence and potential 

rival in Central Asia, in fact, India’s interests there derive from the 

same bases as do American strategy, namely geopolitical interests 

and energy security.167 Since Central Asia has long been a source of 

potential threat to India, its primary interest here was and is selfpreservation.

 The basic underlying aim was to ensure that the heart of Asia 

does not turn hostile to India. Indian policymakers knew it was in 

their interest to see that these countries also do not end up helping 

hostile forces or falling prey to the ravages of militant Islam.168

 Equally importantly, and like U.S. analysts and policymakers, 

Indian observers long have seen growing geopolitical rivalry in this 

area as well as a high degree of potential threat. They intend to take 

part in the geopolitical competition, not to seek a hegemonic position 

which they know is beyond them and in any case unattainable, but 

rather to prevent a hostile force from doing so whether it is Pakistan, 

China, or Islamic radicalism.169 Indian and Russian diplomats have 

also long shared similar apprehensions about Central Asian security. 

Already in 1997, Russia’s press reported that in private Indo-Russian 

diplomatic conversations, “Russian and Indian diplomats willingly 

open the cards: both Moscow and New Delhi see a threat in the 

excessive strengthening of China and the Islamic extremists.”170

Thus as both states become economic powerhouses regionally, if not 

globally, there exists genuine potential for rivalry between them. 

For example, Indian naval building in and around Pakistan’s port 

of Gwadar also certainly intends to counter Chinese interest in the 

Indian Ocean as China is investing heavily in Gwadar’s development.

India also hopes to wage economic war on Pakistan by restricting 

the development of trade from Central Asia through that port even 

as Pakistan seeks to open its ports to Central Asian states in the hope 

that it will become their entrepot.171 However, it is not only Pakistan’s 

presence in Central Asia that concerns India. The rising specter of 

China’s presence there is also a matter of considerable concern to 

Indian elites.
51

 Not surprisingly, many Indians now view China as India’s current 

and long-term main rival and threat and see Central Asia in terms 

of that strategic rivalry encompassing both economics and more 

traditional security relationships. U.S. analysts in touch with Indian 

elites before September 11, 2001, observed that Russia’s decline has 

galvanized Indian apprehensions about Central Asia.

 Russian weakness in Central Asia compounds India’s immediate 

and long-term problems there. In the short term, the chaos in 

Afghanistan and parts of Central Asia over which Russia might once 

have exerted a strong restraining influence is now free to spread, 

and most Indians believe—correctly it appears—that it will spread 

southward, infecting Pakistan and eventually possibly India’s large 

northern Islamic population. In the longer term, Russian weakness in 

the core of Central Asia creates a vacuum, especially in energy-rich 

Kazakhstan, into which China will expand. Among Indian strategists, 

one frequently hears the term “encirclement” by China, and they 

view Central Asia as a part of the top of a China-dominated circle of 

states that includes most of Southeast Asia, Burma, Bangladesh, and 

Pakistan. In this sense, Indian national security specialists believe 

that Russia’s weakness encourages India’s encirclement.172

 Central Asia’s rising strategic importance to India would be 

important to its foreign and defense policies even if it was bereft of 

energy deposits, but the fact that it is and will become an even more 

important source of oil and gas make it even more important to India 

which seeks, like China, to diversify its sources of energy supply 

and which cannot afford to be excessively dependent on the volatile 

Persian Gulf for its energy sources. And from these twin standpoints 

of geopolitics and energy, India and China’s rising interest and 

capacities for projecting power and influence in Central Asia must 

be mentioned in conjunction with Indo-American ties. According to 

analysts like James Clad, India, like China, appears to be moving 

from an approach that emphasized security of supply to one that 

spreads supply risks through greater reliance on market mechanisms 

and diversification of supplies. These two states also are moving 

towards greater reliance on liquid natural gas, two factors that will 

stimulate investment in capital intensive projects in Central Asia and 

elsewhere, greater interest in preventing interruptions of seaborne 
52

energy trade, and in the restructuring of their formerly state-owned 

oil and gas companies. Accordingly, both states now tend to focus 

on exploiting short-term advantages to lock in, if possible, overall 

lower cost delivery over the long-term.173 However, other analysts, 

like Ashley Tellis, discern a suspicion common to both states of 

the market mechanism’s effectiveness and viability with regard to 

securing reliable access to raw materials. Moreover, stability in the 

energy market assumes a stable Middle East, a highly questionable 

assumption. Therefore, if problems in the Middle East or in their 

bilateral relations with each other or with the United States, or 

crises in world politics on a larger scale preclude the Middle Eastern 

option, or if their politics veer toward greater reliance on non- and 

extra-market mechanisms, Indo-Chinese rivalry over Central Asia 

will grow.174 Thus it is still unclear whether or not this shared 

approach that seeks to balance mechanisms of cooperation abroad 

with maximization of indigenous capabilities will promote greater 

amity or greater rivalry among them generally, and in Central Asia 

in particular. To a significant degree, the outcome of their current 

policies in Central Asia depends on factors beyond either of these 

states’ control.

 Though the balance of the factors impelling each state to assume 

a larger profile in Central Asia differs, these factors are common to 

them both. Given the expected length and intensity of the global 

struggle against Islamic radicalism and terrorism and these two 

states’ exploding demand for energy and foreign markets, in the 

context of Asia’s unsettled security equations, we can expect them 

both to increase their capabilities and interest in Central Asia. 

Likewise, there already appears to be some ad hoc collaboration in 

intelligence against the common threats of terrorism and drugs in 

Central Asia.175 Finally, we can expect numerous efforts either by 

them to join forces with other powers against threats that either 

they or their prospective partners perceive to be in their interests. 

Consequently both governments’ policies in Central Asia reflect 

these similarities and differences in their situations.

 For example, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) is 

essentially a Chinese-inspired organization to counter terrorism and 

separatism in Xinjiang and Central Asia and preserve a mechanism 
53

for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia and Central 

Asian states with regard to threats to security there. Often those 

threats also are conjoined with China’s efforts to use the SCO against 

regional American influence of any kind.176 As such, it perfectly 

embodies the trend to form regional associations or security 

organizations in Central Asia that include China or India. Hence, it 

is not surprising that India has duly sought to join the SCO to make 

sure its voice is heard, although no final answer has yet been given. 

Likewise, Russia’s continuing and frequent attempts to create an 

Asian security triangle comprising India, China, and Russia against 

Islamic unrest and America’s local influence represent an effort to 

manage Indo-Chinese rivalry in Asia by bringing both states into 

a compatible relationship where Russia holds the balance between 

them and can avoid having to choose between them.177

 America’s efforts to build a broader connection of Central Asian 

militaries with its own forces and with NATO, and the talk of an 

Asian NATO comprising India, America, and other Asian powers 

also reflect this trend and grow out of India’s strategic partnership 

with America.178 Indeed, India has even supported Washington’s 

indefinite retention of its bases in Central Asia.179 Nor is India’s 

search for partners in Central Asia and across the continent limited 

to Washington, although it clearly is conditioned by Russia’s longterm weakness. India and Iran have even forged what amounts to 

a classic alliance against Pakistan and its support for terrorism in 

Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Indian Capabilities and Interests in Central Asia.

 Compared to the long-standing awareness of China’s rising 

economic power and its implications for Asia, India’s rising economic 

power is only beginning to register across Asia.180 Therefore, 

India’s ability to expand its capabilities in Central Asia depends on 

successfully continuing this record of growth and extending it to 

ever larger sectors of Indian society, much of which still suffers from 

terrible poverty and backwardness.181 Therefore, we cannot doubt 

India’s seriousness about playing a major role in Central Asia or its 

growing interests there, which comprise internal security against 
54

terrorists, largely sponsored by Pakistan, economic and energy 

activities, and the desire to play a major role in Central Asia to deny 

to both China and Pakistan opportunities to encircle India or keep 

it penned up in South Asia. In other words, beyond perceptions of 

security or of economic need and opportunity, a primary motive 

of India’s overall foreign policy and particularly in Central Asia, is 

India’s determination to play a great power role throughout Asia 

and belief that it now can begin to do so as Vajpayee’s 2003 directives 

indicate.

 Whereas other powers in and around Central Asia, especially 

Russia, previously had discerned Indian hesitancy regarding Central 

Asia, that is no longer the case.182 Central Asia has definitively entered 

into the “mental map” of India’s sphere of interests.183 During the 

1990s, India sought to reduce Pakistan’s ability to deflect it from 

playing the broader Asian role India craved by reaching out to all its 

interlocutors, including Central Asia.184 Retired Brigadier General V. 

K. Nair, a leading strategist, spoke for the entire Indian establishment 

when he told the U.S. National Defense University in 2001 that,

India needs to evolve a broad based strategy that would not only ensure the 

security of its vital interests but also provide policy options for effectively 

responding to developing situations in the area. India’s geostrategic 

location dictates that the primary focus of its security policies must be its 

relationship with the neighboring countries and the countries that form 

part of its “extended security horizon” which in one official publication 

is defined as “regions with economic, social, cultural, and environmental 

linkages [that] result in overlapping security interests.”185

Central Asia is explicitly and widely cited as part of this “horizon,” 

and this interpretation of that term was publicly conveyed to Central 

Asian audiences at a Tashkent conference in 2003 by Foreign Minister 

Yashwant Sinha.186 And the strategic goals of projecting economic 

and military influence and power abroad clearly are tied to this 

determination to cut a major figure in Asian politics.

 Indian interests in Central Asia do not only grow out of its 

rising capability. To sustain that capability and create new avenues 

of influence for itself, India must find markets abroad and Central 

Asia was historically a place to look, especially as the Soviet Union 

collapsed. This major policy innovation grew out of the vacuum 
55

created by that collapse, the pressure of globalization, and the socalled Washington consensus in liberalizing much of India’s quasisocialist economy, particularly as China’s rise became too palpable 

to ignore. As Kishore Dash recently wrote,

Such a paradigmatic shift in India’s regional policy can be explained by 

post-Cold War global political-economic developments. Indian leaders 

well know that the success of their country’s [concurrent] economic 

liberalization depends upon its ability to increase exports to new 

markets in developed and developing countries. Until recently, India has 

achieved only restricted access to the markets of Japan, North America, 

and Western Europe due to these countries’ projectionist policies and 

various kinds of nontariff barriers against Indian products. Additionally, 

with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gradual incorporation of 

Eastern Europe with the West European economy, India has lost two of 

its privileged market links.187

 India’s trade with Central Asia underwent a tremendous decline 

in 1991-94 that highlighted its faltering competitiveness with an 

already reformed China.188 Indeed, observers of Chinese policy 

quickly grasped China’s exploding economic and political ties 

with Central, South, and Southeast Asia.189 Thus the appearance of 

Islamic terrorism, abetted by the Taliban, and behind it, Pakistan, 

strengthened a rising disposition to see in Central Asia an area where 

important interests were already at stake. However, interest in trade 

and investment do not end there.

 India’s strategic capability also depends on a rapidly growing 

economy with a significant and well-known high-tech component 

that seeks markets and guaranteed energy supplies to sustain this 

growth. India’s energy deficit, rising domestic demand, and need to 

sustain high growth rates make securing reliable long-term sources 

of energy a vital strategic priority.190 The pursuit of energy sufficiency 

and markets in Asia impels Indian leaders to look seriously at Central 

Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East, and to attempt to influence 

trends there.191

 The quest for energy access and more open markets is part of India’s 

overall foreign economic strategy, and on a daily basis, economic 

power is perhaps the most important instrument in India’s arsenal 

because it is the indispensable prerequisite for advanced military 
56

capability and for offering other states inducements to cooperate 

with India. Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral noted in 1997 that much of 

India’s foreign policy revolves around economic and infrastructural 

needs.192 He outlined a vision of regional economic development, 

including Central Asia, which he called “our near abroad.” Gujral 

emphasized investment in infrastructure: railroads, roads, power 

generation, telecommunications, ports and airports, informatics, 

cross-border investments, energy exchanges, up to and including 

“Trans-Asian pipelines,” strengthened regional organizations, tariff 

reductions and freer trade, and meeting “an exponential surge in 

energy demand” through the cooperative development of all forms 

of energy.193

 Indian businessmen clearly also are eager to compete with China 

in the region and exploit opportunities for expanding overland 

commerce with Central Asia, provided that the trade routes go 

through pacified countries. As S. Frederick Starr, director of Johns 

Hopkins Central Asia Caucasus Institute, has observed,

The opening of transport corridors to Iran, Pakistan, and India will 

dramatically shift these dynamics [China’s rising share of Central Asian 

trade—author]. Indian and Pakistani businessmen and traders are quite 

blunt about their desire to supplant China as a source of goods for Central 

Asia. Both countries have assigned governmental commissions to explore 

the development of transport to bring this about.194

Obviously hopes for greater trade and Gujral’s vision would 

collapse if Central Asia, including Kashmir, were engulfed in antiIndian violence. Then sustaining India’s economic development 

and internal security would become much more problematic. Thus 

foreign trade factors are also a compelling motive for resolving the 

Kashmir issue.

 Indian energy companies, including the state-owned ONGC, 

take part in projects from Azerbaijan to Kazakstan and hope to get 

in on the ground floor with respect to both oil and gas pipelines 

becoming players in a network that supposedly will revive the 

old silk route to Asia and give it an Indian branch as well.195 India 

also evidently holds the deciding voice as to whether the projected 

Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistani pipeline will ever materialize. Although 
57

it would greatly benefit all those states, offering Turkmenistan 

an alternative to Russia’s pipeline system and offering Pakistan 

and Afghanistan energy and revenues from transit fees, there are 

considerable economic and political difficulties. Those difficulties are 

not connected solely to the many political imponderables in all three 

of those states and Pakistan’s rivalry with India. Financing remains 

unsettled because political instability precludes a stable climate for 

investment by the Asian Development Bank and other interested 

institutions.196 But while India would be the main consumer of gas 

flows from this pipeline, it was not invited to the 2002 meetings in 

Ashgabat that formulated the new proposal and has refused to tie its 

gas supply to a pipeline through Pakistan.197 Clearly India’s decision 

will materially affect economic and political outcomes in the other 

three states.198

Indian strategy also entails further exploration of India’s interior 

and off-shore regions for energy, investment of domestic resources 

in them, and welcoming foreign investors, e.g., Russia’s Gazprom.199

Thus India has developed a four-part foreign economic program to 

materialize this vision. First, its state-owned ONGC now invests in 

foreign oil and gas fields across Central and East Asia, even to include 

Sakhalin. Second, India also aims to assert itself as a major player 

throughout Asia and cement political ties with key states. Third, India 

seeks to increase exploration within its own confines. Indeed, with 

respect to Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran, these policy 

dimensions march together. Indian and Russian policymakers both 

accept that the strong bilateral political relationship is insufficient 

without deeper economic and trade ties.200

 The fourth aspect is stabilizing Afghanistan, a necessary 

condition of a revival of Central Asian trade with India that declined 

precipitously after the Soviet breakup. Instability in and around 

Afghanistan prevents India and Pakistan from fully realizing 

potential economic gains from trade with Central Asia.201 Indian 

businesses stand ready to expand their overland trade with Central 

Asia and Afghanistan once they can safely move cargoes through 

those areas, but violence in Afghanistan, and perhaps Pakistan 

too, inhibits them.202 Therefore, India has made a large effort to 

stabilize Afghanistan, providing financial assistance and aid in 
58

transport, education, and health care. India was also among the first 

governments to accept the Karzai government there and has steadily 

intensified its connections with Afghanistan. And by so doing, it has 

repeatedly aroused Pakistan’s long-standing suspicions about Indian 

activity there, indicating that their rivalry connected to influence in 

and over Afghanistan is by no means a thing of the past.203

Indian Regional Diplomacy.

 To realize these interests and goals, India recently has improved 

ties with China, Russia, Iran, Israel, and the United States and also 

is consolidating key military and trading partnerships with them. 

Similarly, the shared perspective on terrorism with Moscow and 

Washington has allowed India to form permanent relationships and 

working groups with those governments to combat terrorism. As the 

new exercises and potential arms purchases from Washington show, 

these groups enhance military-political-intelligence collaboration 

with both capitals and their discussions about Central Asia 

apparently now include India as a shared subject of discussion.204

India’s membership in the UN-sponsored 6+2 process to deal with 

Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and the favorable reaction to its interest 

in the SCO, also demonstrate its growing weight and repute in Asia 

generally, including Central Asia. Thus India has substantially 

improved relations with major players in and around Central Asia. 

Special emphasis here belongs to Indo-Uzbek and Indo-Kazak 

relations, which comprise heightened economic exchange and a 

growing security relationship.

The Military Instrument.

 India’s policies also reflect the rising importance of military 

factors and instruments in its overall national security policy. While 

its conventional power projection capabilities have always been 

intended for use primarily against Pakistan, they are fungible and 

usable wherever applicable, e.g., against terrorist activities on the 

high seas or for aerial reconnaissance over Central Asia or Pakistan’s 

interior through airborne warning and control system (AWACS) or 
59

satellite technology. These examples show what capabilities India is 

developing, improving, or seeking to acquire from its suppliers.205

Simultaneously, India also projects military power into Central Asia 

in other forms.

 First, responding to Pakistan’s closing of its air space, India 

negotiated base rights with Tajikistan in 2002. While little is known 

about this air base, it is reportedly at an operational level and could 

therefore be used for operations against either Central Asian insurgents 

in support of a friendly government or Pakistan.206 However, this 

base may not be India’s last one or remain small. Indeed, it could 

become the spearhead of a deepening Indian involvement in Central 

Asian defense. Thus the ties with Tajikistan have led to joint TajikIndian military exercises involving the air, airborne, and ground 

forces of both sides.207

 India’s increased ability and willingness to sell weapons to 

Central Asian and to buy from them earlier Soviet models parallels 

Pakistan’s similar capability, as both are entering the international 

arms market to find new export markets and keep defense plants 

open.208 Indian spokesmen frankly admit the drive to find export 

markets among former “pariah” states like Israel and South Africa 

to achieve economies of scale for their domestic defense industry. 

They hope that capturing those markets will then reduce Indian 

dependence upon foreign suppliers, especially as India increasingly 

can compel them to transfer technology and know-how as part of 

their sales.209 Probably India will provide training and assistance to 

Central Asian militaries, as do Turkey, Russia, China, and the United 

States, and also find in them willing buyers of its weapons, especially 

those made jointly with Russia.

 But India has even broader objectives. Because it competes with 

China in the small arms market and also seeks to penetrate into 

Southeast Asia and Central Asia where China seeks to expand its 

influence, India must compete with China on price and quality in 

the same categories of weapons. India sells small arms, ammunition, 

patrol ships, light field guns, trucks, and aircraft parts to Southeast 

Asia at reduced price and with better equipment.210 Furthermore,

Over the next decade, India intends to produce weapons systems China 

cannot, including an indigenously designed air defense ship—basically 
60

a small aircraft carrier. Through subsidies, loans, and higher technology, 

New Delhi hopes to supplant China as a major regional arms supplier. 

It also can take advantage of underlying concerns about China within 

Southeast Asia, touting Indian weapons systems as free from the risks of 

being swallowed by an aggressive China in the future.211

All this also applies to Central Asia, which is already the target of an 

Indian arms sales offensive. India has sold Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 

Ilyushin-76 transports and helicopters, respectively.212

 Finally, India has built a burgeoning security relationship with 

Uzbekistan based on a common antipathy to Islamic terrorism. Indian 

scholars believe these two states are natural allies who confront 

the same threats: terrorism, insurgency, separatism, drugs, etc. 

Uzbekistan steadily has widened its security discussions with India 

to include intelligence sharing, military and paramilitary training, 

and joint working groups against terrorism, as India has done 

with Washington and Moscow.213 Here again, New Delhi emulates 

Moscow, Washington, Ankara, and Beijing. More importantly, it 

has only begun to display its military instruments of power locally. 

As long as security threats remain and Pakistan seeks to obstruct 

India or to use this area as a “strategic hinterland” against it, India’s 

projection of all forms of military power will likely grow. Indeed, 

the threat of terrorism against India and its measures to fight that 

threat evidently have received sympathetic hearing in Kazakhstan 

and Kyrgyzstan and has allowed India to build enduring security 

and intelligence cooperation fora with those states.214

Conclusions.

 India’s display of its military instruments of power in and to 

Central Asia is ultimately a harbinger of future trends. As long as 

security threats remain and Pakistan seeks to obstruct India or to use 

this area as a “strategic hinterland” against it, the projection of all 

forms of military power will likely grow. But India will also increase 

its capabilities and influence in Central Asia for reasons having to 

do with internal economic needs like energy and trade, as well as 

for traditional geostrategic imperatives that will make themselves 

increasingly important as India’s economy and military capabilities 
61

grow, along with its aspirations to cut a meaningful figure in Asia. 

This means that Indo-Chinese interests in Central Asia will inevitably 

collide with each other, but not necessarily violently. Nonetheless, 

the relationship will contain considerable elements of competition, 

as is already seen from the history of Indo-Chinese relations.215

 While Sino-Indian tensions throughout Asia are likely, whatever 

stresses divide them in Central Asia will also be a function of 

American, and to a lesser degree Russian, relations with them. SinoIndian competition in Central Asia cannot be separated from the 

larger Asian and global context in which the two countries operate. 

Thus their rivalry over nuclear issues, South Asia, and Southeast 

Asia, as well as their current efforts to find a largely economic basis 

for a modus vivendi, will spill over into and influence their relations 

in Central Asia and vice versa. Indo-American cooperation in 

Central Asia cannot only help both sides prevent destabilization due 

to terrorist attacks or potential future Chinese efforts to establish 

a sphere of influence either unilaterally or with Moscow against 

Washington, their collaboration can also exercise a moderating or 

restraining influence on the tendency of Indo-Chinese competition 

in Asia.

 Moreover, India’s and China’s participation in Central Asia, 

and the degree to which they do so, will be a function of the success 

of their economic and military policies. If those policies continue 

to bring about substantial rises in both economic and military 

capability without endangering the domestic fabric of their societies 

and governments, that capability will find an outlet in Central Asia 

as well as elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, if they can continue growing 

at their current pace for another generation, they may well begin to 

eclipse other powers’ capability to project meaningful influence and 

power in to Central Asia, e.g., Russia and Iran. Likewise, if India can 

surmount the obstacles to a genuine rapprochement with Pakistan, 

not least among them being Chinese support for Islamabad’s efforts 

to block Indian hegemony in South Asia, it will become that much 

more formidable a challenger in Central Asia. After all, there is good 

reason for arguing that India’s grand strategy took a decisive turn in 

the 1990s to recover something of the heritage of the British Raj and its 

quest for enduring influence in Central Asia as expressed by leaders 
62

like Lord Curzon.216 Because the capabilities that India can bring to 

bear in Central Asia are growing and are perceived as legitimate and 

nonthreatening by local governments, the utility of cooperation with 

India in Central Asia grows along with its importance to both New 

Delhi and Washington.
63

CHAPTER 6

INDIA AS PLAYER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

 Southeast Asia is a region whose importance to both American 

and Indian interests has risen for the same reasons: the threat of 

terrorism and the enormous growth of Chinese economic power 

and influence throughout the region that could soon and relatively 

quickly translate, or so it is feared, into enduring political and military 

power and/or influence. Thus Washington’s and New Delhi’s 

appreciations of potential short-term and long-term threats that could 

put vital national interests of both states at some risk in this area are 

convergent, if not identical. If one includes Myanmar in Southeast 

Asia, for example, the threat posed by terrorists there to India’s 

Northeast provinces has already been cited.217 Indeed, the eruption 

of terrorist activity throughout Southeast Asia has only refocused 

the attention of both the United States and neighboring states, 

including India and Australia, on the area. Australia has proclaimed 

a preventive intervention doctrine, along with assigning forces to 

the Solomon Islands, precisely to forestall a rise in indigenous civic 

violence that could lead to further terrorism there, or else originating 

from there but conducted elsewhere. And it has created a 1,000 mile 

nautical maritime security zone around its coastline.218 Similarly, a 

recent American analysis states openly that,

Southeast Asia is a promising hub for not only al-Qaeda, but also other 

terrorist groups, and many within the U.S. military view Southeast 

Asia as the next front in the war on terror. Although there are terrorist 

networks throughout, there are no overt sponsors of that terrorism. This 

does make the problem harder to solve since there are no obvious targets, 

but it also creates greater possibilities for cooperation in the war on terror 

and opens the door to the expanded use of the U.S. military beyond the 

Philippines.219

 Such cooperation has begun with India’s Navy conducting joint 

patrols with the U.S. Navy in the Strait of Malacca in 2002. And 

there also appear to be possibilities for trilateral cooperation with 

Australia, if not other local powers, in prosecuting antiterrorist 
64

missions.220 Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that 

Indian analysts display greater interest in Southeast Asia. So while 

there may be increased scope for practical bilateral or even trilateral 

cooperation with Australia here, any serious upgrading of U.S. and 

Indian influence and capabilities in Southeast Asia, whether pursued 

singly or in tandem, will force policymakers in India, America, China, 

and local governments to interact in a highly complex manner.

 Moreover, Southeast Asian analysts and elites would welcome 

greater American and Indian involvement in the region provided 

that these two governments each adopt a comprehensive view of 

the Southeast Asian security agenda to comprise all the fields in 

economics and social issues where mutually beneficial cooperation 

could occur and where America and India take regional security 

institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seriously. These strictures, it 

should be noted, apply more to Washington than to New Delhi, for 

there is a widespread view throughout Southeast Asia that harbors 

some reservations and criticisms about America’s willingness to 

take the nonterrorist security agenda and organizations like ASEAN 

and the ARF fully into account.221 Thus Ambassador Tommy Koh of 

Singapore writes that,

Southeast Asians do not want the U.S. to see the region purely through 

the lens of terrorism. Engagement between Southeast Asia and [the] 

U.S. should be more comprehensive, covering the whole spectrum of 

social, economic, cultural, political, and security issues. The war against 

terrorism cannot be won by military means alone. A winning strategy 

should be multifaceted and include social, economic, political, and 

military components.222

 Due to this demand for a comprehensive security strategy, India, 

as an important neighboring partner of Southeast Asian security 

organizations, is in an excellent position to find ways of working with 

Washington to advance shared interests against commonly faced 

problems that threaten all local governments and other interested 

parties in Southeast Asia. Obviously, there is a wide field of activity 

for both the United States and India with regard to Southeast Asian 

security, especially if one takes the modern and not exclusively 

military definition of security into account as well as opportunities 
65

for beneficial cooperation between these two states and among them, 

Australia, and local governments. Indeed, ASEAN members openly 

state that they seek greater Indian, American, and Chinese economic 

involvement in Southeast Asia to ensure greater prosperity there. 

As Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi told ASEAN 

leaders, without greater integration with China and India, ASEAN 

cannot remain competitive merely by strenghtening intraregional 

cooperation.223 Following through on this, in late 2004, ASEAN set 

up a Regional Trade and Investment Area to enhance the flow of 

foreign direct investment into Southeast Asia, regional monetary 

cooperation, and promote an Asian bond market and set up a plan 

of action to implement the ASEAN-India partnership for Peace, 

Progress, and Shared Prosperity.224 And, at least with regard to 

American policy, there is a widespread feeling in the region that there 

is a much greater scope for action than what Washington currently 

perceives.225

 At the same time both Indian and American policy initiatives 

in Southeast Asia must confront the challenge that China’s rising 

power poses even if Chinese intentions are deemed to be peaceful 

and nonaggressive. Indeed, as Koh suggests, Southeast Asians, for all 

their wariness about China, perceive its rise not as a threat, but as an 

opportunity and a challenge.226 Whether or not that is the case, Indian 

defense planners are very wary of China, even though a substantial 

rapprochement is underway between Beijing and New Delhi and 

despite the fact that India, as its spokesmen regularly announce, will 

not take part in a policy of open containment of China.227

 Thus, while Indo-American strategic partnership—to whatever 

degree that it exists—checks China’s ability to dominate Southeast 

or Central Asia, that partnership cannot, for India at any rate, 

become a vehicle for containment of China. One reason for India’s 

calm vis-à-vis China is that, even as Chinese military and economic 

capabilities grow, causing no small amount of anxiety among Indian 

elites, so too do India’s similar capabilities. For example, India’s new 

Agni II missile can reach targets throughout Central and East Asia, 

including China. But it has refrained from testing the Agni III which 

could clearly target China and thus provoke it into a missile race 

with India.228 And if India continues building nuclear weapons like 

ICBMs or SLBMs, it will truly have an intercontinental capability, 
66

not to mention an inter-theater one. Similarly, insofar as American 

and Indian policymakers discuss a version of an “Asian NATO,” that 

immediately arouses Chinese suspicions. So it is hardly surprising 

that China immediately voiced concern about what this Asian NATO 

might mean, and that it equally has been motivated to prevent 

any kind of Indo-American alliance even if its analysts conform to 

China’s policy line of downgrading Indian claims to being a major 

power, even though Chinese analysts contend that such an alliance 

is unlikely to be a serious one.229

 Since the Indo-American partnership constitutes a major strategic 

reversal from the past history of a troubled bilateral relationship, 

this rapprochement made China’s government and armed forces 

sit up and take notice and therefore rethink their relationship with 

India.230 Indeed, China has gone so far as to publicly support Indian 

membership on the Security Council.231 Thus the talk of an Asian 

NATO, as well as the visible signs of partnership, has inclined 

Beijing to deal more seriously with New Delhi in a departure from 

its traditional policy of not wanting even to discuss the possibility of 

India’s being a major Asian power.232 Indeed, China is now calling 

for upgraded economic and military ties with India, a new departure 

in its policies as well.233

Similarly, Tellis cites Indian views that India’s perceptions 

of a threat from rising Chinese power do not mandate a direct 

confrontation with China, but rather merely a buildup of India’s 

own capabilities and resources for a subtle multidimensional policy. 

Partnership with Washington then becomes a major, but still only 

one, part of that multidimensional strategy that mixes regional 

competition with engagement on issues of less strategic centrality, 

suffices to check China’s ambitions, and makes India more worthy of 

being seen as a genuinely equal strategic partner of America in Asia.234

The many signs of an economic-political rapprochement with China 

also suggest that Beijing is coming to terms with Indian power, and 

that New Delhi believes that this recognition suffices to maintain 

a balance with China for the foreseeable future. Indeed, wherever 

possible, cooperation on a broader scale than ever before with China 

may well occur, even if many of the reasons for persisting suspicion 

remain.235 Thus there is no apparent need for a formal alliance with 

Washington as long as both partners understand and accept that 
67

the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic and 

military growth suffices to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast and 

South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the official 1998-99 Indian 

Defense Report, written soon after India’s nuclear tests displayed open 

tension with China, already stated that India “does not regard China 

as an adversary but as a great neighbor with which it would like to 

develop mutually beneficial and friendly relations.”236

 Furthermore, Indian officials from Prime Minister Singh on down, 

profess not to be worried by China’s economic growth, even though 

China clearly serves both as a rival and as a benchmark against 

which to measure Indian economic progress. They profess to believe 

that, because India is a democracy and China is not, India’s slower 

rate of growth is not a problem because China’s political system 

will enter into a crisis. Indeed, India’s rising profile easily could 

presage a fundamental and lasting strategic change throughout Asia, 

especially if India can maintain a high rate of economic growth into 

the future. Because India is a democracy, not only would economic 

growth strengthen its overall capabilities, it probably also would 

not unleash a major political crisis, something that many people 

expect or fear for China if growth there continues at a high rate.237

Indeed, some observers report the possibly counterintuitive finding 

that, “Indian policymakers are more confident than their Chinese 

counterparts regarding their ability to deal effectively with domestic 

ethnic and economic forces.”238

 In the 1990s the concern that a rising China might economically and 

politically isolate India from Southeast Asia led Indian policymakers, 

influenced by world trends and ideas like the Gujral doctrine, to “look 

East” even well before September 11.239 And ASEAN welcomed this 

policy both for its own sake and obviously to serve as a potential 

counterweight to China. Thus an Indonesian assessment of ASEAN 

and cooperation in East Asia states that,

At this point some ASEAN countries view the entry of India into the 

whole framework of cooperation as the strategic means to balance 

the influence of Northeast Asian countries, which are much superior, 

compared to those in Southeast Asia. This had been clearly reflected in an 

analogy made by the Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore that “if 

ASEAN is a fuselage of an aircraft, and Northeast Asian economies serve 

as one wing of the aircraft, then India’s engagement with Southeast Asia 
68

is—and should be viewed as—the other wing which made the aircraft 

operational and stable.”240

 Indeed, that Look East program, a clear response to the end 

of the Cold War, aimed to upgrade diplomatic and economic 

relations with the area and put them on a greater, expanded, and 

regular footing. Once those objectives were accomplished, the 

extension or projection of military capabilities was found to be less 

objectionable by Southeast Asian governments than was previously 

the case.241 However, Indian governments did so, not just to compete 

economically and politically but also in line with their aspirations 

to play a major role throughout Asia. This consensus concerning 

India’s expansive interests throughout the entire Indian Ocean and 

its littoral are rooted in India’s geography as it is refracted through 

the prism of contemporary strategic capabilities (which very much 

include economic, energy, and technological capabilities) and in 

domestic Indian political discourse.

 As virtually every analyst of Indian policy emphasizes, Indian 

elites carry within themselves a mental map that says India is a state 

that has a major power potential and future international importance 

which should become a major “pole” in an ideally multipolar or 

polycentric world. This polycentric or multipolar world where India 

is one of the centers or poles is the ideal Indian goal, hence it is clear 

that, despite partnership with Washington, there is considerable 

skepticism about Washington’s penchant for unilateralism. Therefore 

and despite the need for strategic partnership with America and other 

major players, India must retain its strategic autonomy to pursue 

its vital interests throughout its “extended strategic neighborhood,” 

i.e., Asia from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca.242 This 

expanded strategic concept comprises not only classic military and/

or geostrategic perspectives but also a broader definition of security 

and security interests.

 Moreover, India has been expanding its strategic profile steadily 

throughout the Indian Ocean in recent years. Beyond the joint patrols 

in the Strait of Malacca and the possible discussions with Australia 

regarding the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy is making port calls 

in Vietnam, the Philippines, and even South Korea and Japan. In 

July 2004, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia began coordinated 
69

antipiracy patrols there, too, and discussions between them and 

India are taking place to see if the Indian Navy will join ASEAN 

members in these patrols.243 In September, the Indian and Indonesian 

Navies began patrolling the area west of the Straits known as the 

Six-Degree Channel that separates the Indian island of Nicobar 

from Indonesia’s island of Sabang and the coast of Aceh and which 

is home to virtually all the commercial traffic entering or leaving 

the Straits. These activities, as well as Indian naval maneuvers and 

exercises with the U.S. Navy off of Goa and in the Arabian Sea region, 

underscore India’s arrival as a major player in Asia and reflect the 

implementation of Vajpayee’s directives even after his government’s 

defeat.

 The enhanced Indian naval profile in Southeast Asia serves several 

objectives. One is to strengthen India’s so-called “Look East” policy 

that is intended in part to balance China’s influence in the eastern 

Indian Ocean region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 

Myanmar, etc.) and in Southeast Asia. A second is to familiarize the 

navy with a potential theater of operations—the South China Sea—

that probably would be important in any contingency involving 

conflict with China. India’s naval presence in this region also is likely 

intended to help stymie the apparent flow of arms across the Bay of 

Bengal to insurgents in India’s northeast and to the Tamil Tigers in 

Sri Lanka. Finally, as stated by an Indian Navy spokesperson, the 

deployment would also demonstrate the navy’s ability to operate 

far from home. Taken together, these latest naval initiatives, in 

conjunction with an October air exercise with Singapore in Central 

India, ongoing Indian base-building efforts in Tajikistan and possibly 

elsewhere soon in Central Asia, the finalization of a defense pact 

with Sri Lanka and newly strengthened security ties with Myanmar 

all underscore India’s strategic emergence as a major player in the 

broad Asia-Pacific region.244

Clearly India’s and China’s rising capabilities in economics and 

defense already impel them to expand their interests even beyond 

South and East Asia. Both of them will also try to co-opt Washington 

to support them, if need be, against each other, or in their interactions 

with other Asian states. Washington, for its part, will also exploit 

latent Indo-Chinese rivalry for its interests which include, inter alia, 

holding the balance in South and East Asia.245 Since the United States 
70

will likely remain the strongest power in Asia for a generation, its 

role in conditioning Sino-Indian interactions in Asia absolutely is 

critical. As Mark Frazier writes of Indo-Chinese relations, “future 

relations between the two states will remain firmly embedded 

within a triangle formed with the United States.”246 At the same 

time, local actors in Southeast Asia will also be engaging China, 

India, and America, thereby multiplying the complexity of local and 

international interactions.

 While there is a current Indian rapprochment with Beijing and 

a search for common grounds and increased economic interaction, 

this does not mean that the two states’ rivalry is over—far from it. 

But for now and the immediate future, that rivalry will be limited 

by the interests and capabilities of India, China, and all the other 

states they engage in this region, including America. For now, the 

mainstream Indian view is that India must be wary of China, but 

that no serious threat presently exists. However, the future may 

bring undesirable changes in that regard unless Indian growth keeps 

pace with China’s growth. Therefore, even if we assume China to 

be a strategic competitor for both India and Washington, the major 

architect of a strategy to tie India down to being a contested power 

in South Asia and a state that cannot play a major role in Asia, e.g., 

by major proliferation to Pakistan, it is by no means foreordained, 

indeed it is unlikely, that Washington and New Delhi will reply to 

that strategy by implementing their own concerted version of the 

containment of China.247

U.S. leaders are on record as saying that current relations with 

China are at an all-time high and that a flourishing partnership with 

Beijing is now taking place.248 Thus current U.S. strategy to China 

is not exclusively a containment strategy and the future course of 

those relations depends upon events in Beijing and Washington, 

if not places which neither can control, like North Korea. None of 

this diminishes the element of competition in our ties to China or in 

India’s ties to it. But it does mean that Indo-American collaboration, 

strategic partnership, or even alliance need not inevitably replicate 

the Cold War containment of the Soviet Union. Indeed, as Arun 

Sahgal writes, despite both sides’ concern to understand and limit 

the possible negative consequences of China’s rising power, India 

“is clear that a long-term Indo-U.S. relationship cannot be based and 
71

sustained on the China containment theory.”249

Instead, strategic partnership with America, plus improving 

relations with other key states in Asia, enables India to have the best 

of both worlds, partnership with Washington and other key actors, 

and the strategic autonomy to engage with whomever it chooses 

whenever it wants to do so. As Mark Frazier writes,

Given the importance of retaining its foreign policy autonomy, India 

will be reluctant to stake its future on an exclusive alliance with the 

United States. Instead, India will develop multifaceted, flexible security 

relationships that also involve Japan, Russia, and ASEAN. The underlying 

purpose of Indian strategy is thus to signal to China that India can become 

part of an anti-China coalition, should China take stances that threaten 

the security of its neighbors.250

 This strategy grows out of the aforementioned assessment of 

India’s elite consensus on China and informs all of India’s regional 

policies in Asia. Direct confrontation with China is ruled out in 

favor of economic-political cooperation and muted strategic rivalry 

whenever possible. Thus there is no apparent need for a formal alliance 

with America, as long as both partners understand and accept that 

the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic and 

military growth and its strategic partnership with America suffices 

to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the 

Indian Ocean. Moreover, India’s own steady and impressive rising 

power potential demonstrates the power of the democratic option in 

Asia and stands in stark contrast to Chinese authoritarianism, which 

many fear will run inevitably into a major domestic crisis.In that case, 

an Indo-American partnership will be strengthened by its being “an 

axis of democracy,” not a purely military alliance whose purpose 

is containment of China.251 And this is true even if India is in favor 

or not averse to further U.S. deployments in the region or if some 

sort of alliance along the lines of the so-called Asian NATO comes 

into being.252 As that alliance has yet to take shape, it could become 

like today’s NATO, a crisis manager and provider of stability, rather 

than replicating the Cold War alliance.

 On the other hand, China and India currently are undergoing 

major military buildups, and there is a more honest awareness in 

both capitals of strategic rivalry and of the need to take each other 
72

into account as strategic factors than was previously the case. In large 

measure, this mutual realization is due to the fact that the 1998 nuclear 

tests awoke China to the reality that India would not be deterred 

from its aspirations to play a major role in Asia. Therefore, Beijing 

had to take the potential trajectory of rising Indian military and 

economic capabilities more seriously than it had ever been willing to 

do beforehand or than it is willing to admit.253 Indeed, many Chinese 

analysts perceive the burgeoning partnership with the United States 

as more than an expression of India’s efforts to carve out a greater 

role in Asia. They see this partnership as part of a joint, if generally 

American-led, effort to encircle China, or at least to contain it. While 

official China does not mention the possibility of encirclement or 

of a formal Indo-U.S. alliance in keeping with China’s policy to say 

nothing that might give rise to the idea that India is a legitimate 

major player in Asia, undoubtedly this perception does color some 

of China’s views and may actually be a major feature in its post-1998 

efforts to improve diplomatic relations with India.254

 Both China’s concerns about this partnership and its efforts to 

improve ties with New Delhi work to the advantage of both partners 

here because these factors reduce China’s margin for threatening 

behavior, create a broader Asiatic balance than would otherwise be 

the case, and enhance the U.S. position vis-à-vis those two states, 

and in Asia more generally, making it the focus of each side’s effort 

to gain greater leverage and traction in Asia.255 Consequently, 

enhanced bilateral military partnership and arms sales to India 

offers Washington another card to play when needed and provides 

both states with an ever-present factor of restraint that acts upon 

Chinese policy. It also is clear that India’s military buildup, while 

parallel to China’s, does not have to be as comprehensive as China’s 

to counter Chinese expansionist ambitions. As long as that Indian 

buildup suffices to check or to constrain Chinese strategic options, 

helping it represents a sound investment for the United States. In 

this respect, the overall picture bears out the Indian argument 

presented here concerning India’s ability to check excessive Chinese 

ambitions. Even Chinese sources hint (because they do not wish to 

discuss this openly) that this is what is transpiring under cover of 

Washington’s rapprochements with India and other key countries 
73

like Indonesia.256

 To the extent that Indian power, backed up and promoted 

by Washington, contributes to an overall Asian framework that 

restrains the projection of Chinese power, it will foster a broader, 

more comprehensive Asiatic equilibrium that keeps all powers in 

play and prevents any one power from making a bid for regional 

or continental hegemony. Indeed, Indian analysts are confident of 

such an outcome.257 It should be noted that precisely such a balance 

of power is postulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 as 

being a desirable outcome of U.S. policy in Asia.258 So this concept of 

Indo-Chinese relations ultimately closely correlates with U.S. goals 

as well.259 Certainly Chinese observers have assimilated fully the 

notion, reiterated by the Pentagon and the Indian government, that 

India and America “have common strategic interests in Asia and 

even farther regions.”260

Obviously Southeast Asia is one of those regions. And here, as 

elsewhere,

Beijing cannot afford to place much faith in the common Sino-Indian 

desire for “multipolarity” because American unipolarity offers India 

geopolitical advantages that are far more attractive to New Delhi than 

any prospective multipolarity that brings with it grave imbalances in 

future Sino-Indian power.261

In Southeast Asia, this observation is relevant particularly since 

China has so many historic, vital, and now growing strategic and 

economic interests in the area that its rising capabilities are perceived 

immediately as somehow opening the way to a sphere of influence. 

While India will not represent or present an overt challenge to China, 

Beijing’s growing regional power stimulates its counterefforts and 

lends credence to the elite consensus that rising Chinese power here 

signifies Beijing’s attempt to move into Southeast Asia to encircle 

India.262 This rivalry is particularly visible as regards Myanmar and 

its neighborhood.263

 Thus, observers like Tellis perceive three overarching Indian 

strategic objectives here, many of which can be seen to harmonize 

with U.S. interests as well. The first objective is to prevent China 

from acquiring foreign basing and presence that could threaten the 
74

Indian homeland and its freedom of action in South Asia. The second 

objective is to prevent China from acquiring sufficient regional 

influence so as to be able to coerce the local states into supporting 

Chinese policies aimed at undercutting Indian security. The third 

objective is to develop strategic relationships with the key states that 

enable India to operate within the region as required, and to extend 

support that may be requested by its regional partners.264

 These objectives mandate for India a strategy that unites the use 

of defense and economic instruments of power in Southeast Asia. At 

the same time, America’s recent success in projecting naval based 

air power from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan also is not lost on 

Indian planners who also know that much of Pakistan’s and India’s 

trade is seaborne and therefore particularly vulnerable to maritime or 

maritime-based air threats. That consideration is especially pertinent 

to energy supplies, given instability in Central Asia and the Gulf and 

adds another reason for a combined military-economic approach to 

regional security issues in Southeast Asia.

 These strategic considerations, in an environment where India’s 

increasing ability to project power beyond its borders has also long 

been recognized, bring together economic needs and the impetus for 

a big navy and an expansive naval policy as detailed above.265 For 

example, India has not only used its naval deployments to show its 

interest in restraining Chinese penetration of Myanmar, it has also 

offered economic assistance and help in the government’s campaign 

against terorists to enhance its security. And as a result, the Burmese 

Foreign Ministry has assured India that any Chinese military activity 

on the Coco Islands off the Burma coast in the Bay of Bengal “will not 

be used as a military base by any power against India.”266 Although 

Indian interests in Southeast Asia are not quite as sharply focused as 

they are in Central Asia, they are no less real for Indian strategists. 

Not surprisingly, Indian analysts frequently invoke old strategic 

and Realpolitik perspectives in India’s quest for regional hegemony 

in the Indian Ocean, including the waters off Southeast Asia. And 

they are hardly alone in their approach. Here the clear and specific 

threat that both precedes and will follow the current terrorist threat 

is Chinese commercial and maritime penetration (which in Indian 

threat assessments are one and the same with the ships following 

the trade) into the Indian Ocean, particularly Myanmar and more 
75

recently Pakistan’s port of Gwadar.267 If China were to achieve the 

goals imputed to it by Indian elites, it could then actualize the three 

potential threats to India from Southeast Asia that Tellis cited.268

 Therefore the Indian policy response, most notably in its “Look 

East” policy of the past decade, has combined military and economic 

programs and both bilateral and multilateral fora, though until 

recently it has been primarily commercial and diplomatic. India 

participates in ASEAN’s talks to create a free trade area (FTA).269 It 

appears that the major thrust of India’s foreign economic diplomacy 

here is to push for agreements that incorporate it and Southeast Asia 

in a formalized free trade regime. Thus India has supported a variety 

of initiatives spanning both South Asian and Southeast Asian states 

that would move in this direction.270 India also participates in the 

ARF and was clearly invited into it as a hedge against China.

 India is also steadily upgrading its commercial and arms sales 

relationship with Vietnam, which it clearly regards as a principal 

check upon China’s aggrandizement in the vicinity of the South 

China Sea and Southeast Asia. Apparently ASEAN also increasingly 

is persuaded that a closer association with India is useful to it for 

this same purpose of balancing China in the South China Sea and 

Southeast Asia.271 Therefore, as long as India employs a diversified 

strategy using both economic and military instruments of power and 

avoids perceptions that it seeks to export South Asia’s dilemmas, 

including its rivalry with Pakistan, to the area, it should be able to 

support its and ASEAN’s goal of helping ASEAN become strong 

enough to ward off either Chinese blandishments or coercion.272

 For India, Southeast Asia is not just important as a place for 

trade rivalry with the dynamic Chinese economy and as a strategic 

or potentially strategic theater for Indian influence, it also has an 

important bearing on energy security. Based on extensive interviews 

with Indian military and political figures, Juli MacDonald reports 

that,

Indians look to Southeast Asia to diversify their energy imports away 

from West Asia. Indians anticipate that India will rely increasingly on 

Southeast Asia’s abundant natural gas to meet its growing demand 

for that fuel. [In addition] several retired Indian military officers spoke 

of rising Islamic fundamentalism and instability in Indonesia as a 
76

combination that at best provides safe havens for terrorists and at worst 

could destabilize the entire region. Indians see Indonesia as a key, and 

increasingly fragile, part of India’s strategic periphery.273

 Clearly India and Indian spokesmen also are not afraid to advertise 

that all of Southeast Asia, including the Eastern reaches of the 

Indian Ocean and at least some of the land mass adjoining the South 

China Sea, also constitutes either part of India’s “extended strategic 

neighborhood” or part of a single strategic unit. Consequently, they 

readily proclaim that Indian security interests span “the region 

from the Gulf to Southeast Asia.”274 They do so even though some 

American military perspectives do not envision India as more than a 

secondary player in the Eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean whose 

interests might one day come into conflict with the vital U.S. interest 

of controlling and/or denying access into the Indian Ocean.275

Indeed, MacDonald found that Indian officers and policymakers 

claim that India needs no U.S. “blessing” to confer “legitimacy” 

upon its presence there, as local governments have already done so 

after substantive consultation.276

She also found that, while India and America concur concerning 

a harmony of shared interests against common threats—terrorism, 

piracy, concern for the safety of SLOCs, counterdrug, environmental 

pollution, counterproliferation, and search and rescue operations—

Indians have an expansive view of their responsibilities there that is 

much grander than what the Americans she interviewed are ready 

to concede. Thus a retired Indian lieutenant general opined to her 

that Indo-American collaboration in the Indian Ocean basin helps 

expand the relationship and perception of India from the IndoPakistani conflict, restricts the rise of Chinese power, and protects 

sea lanes.277 He further elaborated that,

The Indian Ocean basin is extremely important to India. India seeks to 

prevent this region from becoming an area of turbulence and competition 

among the navies of this region. India wants to keep China out of the 

Indian Ocean. This means that the Indian Navy must be strengthened. 

It must bolster its bases in the region, including the Eastern Command 

on the Nicobar Islands. It must work with other navies to protect the 

sea lanes and enhance all maritime security in India’s EEZ (Economic 

Exclusion Zone).278
77

 Not surprisingly, India has followed his recommendations, even 

without waiting for the United States to “bless” its policies. India 

reorganized its naval command to create an Andaman and Nicobar 

Island command for the Fleet at Port Blair in the Bay of Bengal in 

2001 to monitor China’s presence in Myanmar and the Indian Ocean 

more broadly. In December 2003, India also announced that it would 

reinforce those bases by basing strike jets, aerial refuelers, and about 

100 long, short, and middle range unmanned aerial vehicles there to 

monitor developments at China’s Coco Island base.279 The AndamanNicobar command at Port Blair,

Is tasked with exerting influence over Indian Ocean sea-lanes, combating 

piracy, and guaranteeing the smooth entry of ships heading toward the 

Malacca Straits. It also includes surveillance and monitoring stations 

across the 750 Km long Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago. The islands 

are 1,200 km from India, but just 90 Km from Indonesia and 50 Km from 

Myanmar. The Indian Air Force plans on establishing a fighter air base 

at southern Nicobar, giving its newly acquired Russian Su-30MKI (sea 

based fighters)—likely to be based there from time to time—an extended 

regional role.280

 India is increasing military sales to Vietnam, providing spares for 

overhauling its aged MiG-21 series fighter aircraft with new avionics 

and radars to support Russia’s latest missiles, including the R-77 

AMRAAMSKI and R-27 DOGFIGHT, sending its officers to Vietnam 

for training in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare operations, 

while India’s coast guard and Vietnam’s sea police would cooperate 

to fight piracy. India also is providing help to build up the Vietnamese 

Navy, including repairs, upgrading, and construction of warships 

and patrol craft. Reciprocal visits by senior military officers and 

regular intelligence exchanges are also part of the agreement with 

Hanoi, and India has also agreed “in principle” to sell Vietnam the 

locally developed surface-to-surface Prithvi missile, train Vietnamese 

scientists in India’s nuclear establishments, and help Vietnam 

establish its own arms industry for small arms and other kinds of 

ordnance.281 The Indian Navy also conducted combined exercises 

with the Vietnamese Navy.282 As one writer observed, “India needs 

Vietnam in strategic terms as a spear in the Chinese underbelly to 

counter the threatening Beijing-Islamabad-Rangoon entente now 
78

taking shape against New Delhi.”283 The BJP government has also 

sent some ships to Southeast Asia on goodwill missions, during 

which they took part in naval maneuvers with Japan and Vietnam.

 The exercises and policy actions cited above are also evidence of 

this growing naval capability and interest in power projection. The 

Navy is also proposing an amphibious force towards achieving this 

capability.284 Clearly the Navy, if not the government, regards itself 

as a force for stability and a security manager in the Indian Ocean and 

its littoral against a range of threats that encompasses much, if not 

all, of the spectrum of conflict, including humanitarian operations, 

guaranteeing energy supplies, and controlling the strategic choke 

points of the Indian Ocean.285

 The Indian government and Navy also are implementing 

Fernandes’ 2000 statement that Vietnam and Japan are emerging 

as strategic partners for countering piracy from the Indian Ocean 

east to the South China Sea. By doing so, they also serve notice on 

China that they will contest its efforts to dominate that Sea.286 India’s 

increasing defense ties to Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore 

(agreeing in principle to letting Singapore train its forces on Indian 

territory) must also be seen in this light of a common concern about 

Chinese power in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, a vital lifeline 

for both states.287

 Signifying its desire for a visible and favorable strategic profile, 

India also committed itself to respecting the agreement on a nuclearfree Southeast Asia even though it refuses to sign the Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As one commentator indicates, this shows 

India’s willingness to compromise on strategic issues for the sake of 

improved relations with Southeast Asia despite Pakistan and China’s 

nuclear arsenals.288 Given the linked energy, trade, and strategic 

issues tying this region to India and due to the presence of Islamic 

terrorism and a sharp rise in piracy here (perhaps not unconnected 

with that terrorism), it is clear that this region enjoys a rising profile 

in Indian and American security calculations, and that it, like Central 

Asia and the Gulf, reinforces the intertwined nature of energy, 

economic, and strategic factors in India’s security calculations.289

Therefore, it is not unlikely that further progress towards a bilateral 

military and strategic partnership with the United States will include 

serious discussions about security trends and both sides’ interests 
79

throughout Southeast Asia and its adjoining maritime reaches. But 

beyond that, at least some Indian analysts think that it is very much 

in Washington’s interest that India play a substantially larger role 

here.

 What’s in it for the United States? For one, the proposed security 

system is principally an in-region solution for dealing with two of the 

biggest international security threats—an over-ambitious China and 

the spread of Talibanised Islam. Second, this scheme being entirely 

indigenous, there is none of the odium that attends on U.S. troops 

deployed locally as in South Korea and Japan. Third, it can eventuate 

in more economical and even effective policing of the proximal Asian 

waters against piracy, drug-trafficking, and gun running. It could also 

protect the sea lines of communications and the oil-bearing oceanic 

traffic more effectively than the U.S. naval fleets and air flights out 

of Sasebo Bay and Guam may be able to manage. And, finally, it in 

no way precludes the presence in the extended region of the U.S. 

armed forces or limits U.S. military initiatives. But crucial to making 

this system work is India’s being convinced of its “manifest destiny” 

and for it to act forcefully. It will require in the main that New Delhi 

think geostrategically and give up its diffidence when it comes to 

advancing the country’s vital national interests and its almost kneejerk bias to appease friends and foes alike. The corrective lies in the 

Indian government expressly defining its strategic interests and focus 

and, at a minimum, proceeding expeditiously towards obtaining a 

nuclear force with a proven and tested thermonuclear and an ICBM 

reach. Nothing less will persuade the putative Asian allies that India 

can be an effective counterpoise to China in the region, or compel 

respect for India in Washington.290

 Two conclusions emerge from this discussion of Indian activities 

and interests in Southeast Asia. First, India’s own actions and 

outlooks, combined with growing U.S. interests and the stress on 

U.S. military capabilities, should impel both governments to initiate 

a sustained bilateral discussion on roles, interests, threat perceptions, 

and responsibilities throughout that area. Second, we should not 

underestimate the importance attached by India to all of Southeast 

Asia. Beyond Vietnam, India might find possibilities for enhanced 

defense cooperation with Thailand, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, 

and the United States, either bilaterally or in a multilateral forum 
80

with some or all of these states. There are many dimensions for this 

kind of cooperation to take shape, e.g., provision of intelligence 

support and training in the war against terror, patrolling the Strait 

of Malacca, or as a supplier of military technology and parts to local 

militaries.291 Indeed, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), one of 

India’s leading defense firms, seeks to become an aviation industry 

hub for Southeast Asia, and India seeks to become, in general, a hub 

for missile building programs throughout Asia, and even Africa.292
81

CHAPTER 7

PRACTICAL MILITARY COOPERATION

 As India’s April 2001 agenda indicates, it is critically important 

to India that America treat it as an equal and that this relationship 

lead to “partnership where security cooperation played a prominent 

role.” India wants both the respect it feels has not been forthcoming in 

the past and sustained security cooperation with the United States.293

Therefore, its practical military actions in cooperation with the U.S. 

military or in support of American interests have a dual goal, not 

just to improve the relationship but also to show Washington how 

important and useful an ally India can be. Certainly many officers 

in the U.S. armed forces have come to know the high quality of 

India’s Navy, Air Force, and Army and on these grounds alone 

recommend greater military cooperation with India in general and 

with these services in particular.294 At the same time, these actions 

are or at least should be clearly undertaken as well out of hardheaded calculations of national interest on both sides because they 

add substantially to both sides’ capabilities to realize their vital and 

important Asian security interests. For example, General William J. 

Begert, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), stated 

that, “The increased interaction between U.S. and Indian military 

services helps U.S. efforts to reduce tensions between India and its 

neighbor, Pakistan.”295 Yet, a full strategic appreciation of the benefits 

of bilateral military collaboration was absent from the Pentagon, at 

least as of September 2004.296

 By practical defense cooperation, we mean not only joint 

and/or combined exercises among and between the forces of the 

two governments but also a regular cycle of mutual high-level 

interchanges among both political and military leaders, intelligence 

sharing and cooperation, and the forging of practical cooperation on 

security issues like missile defense, weapons sales, and technology 

transfer. From everything that has been written, it is clear that these 

manifestations of cooperation are important, if not critical, to both 

India and the United States in their relations with key allies and 
82

partners. Therefore, the indices and trend lines of such occurrences 

represent a telling sign of the health and direction of the relationship 

over time. Moreover, they also represent substantive progress to the 

establishment of viable and credible mechanisms for continuous 

strategic dialogue and interaction and provide this relationship with 

a basis for further advances.

 For example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 

Richard Myers (USAF) traveled to India in July 2003 for talks with 

his Indian counterpart and discussed ongoing bilateral military ties. 

In his own words, he did so because “Not only is India’s cooperation 

in the global war on terrorism significant, but the U.S.-India military 

cooperation continues to increase, an important fact, given that India 

will soon have the largest population in the world.”297 In this respect, 

General Myers’ visit is only the most recent of what Blackwill called 

“a continual parade” of high-ranking U.S. officials’ visits to India 

and six major joint exercises as of December 2002.298 These visits 

also comprise a similar “parade” of high-ranking Indian officials, 

including Prime Minister Vajpayee, to Washington.299Moreover, the 

interaction among officials at the highest ranks of government and 

of high-ranking military officers provides a valuable mechanism 

for continuous interaction and cooperation beyond exercises. 

Thus, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former Secretary 

of State Colin Powell have traveled there frequently, and former 

National Security Advisor, now Secretary of State Condoleeza 

Rice was in frequent contact with her opposite number, Brajesh 

Mishra, who traveled frequently to Washington. Likewise, over 100 

senior policymakers traveled to India from late 2001 to December 

2002.300 The practical materialization of this kind of regular contact 

expresses itself in the joint DPG that was reestablished in 2001 with 

Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith in the lead for the U.S. 

side. The invigoration of the DPG paralleled the equal strengthening 

of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter-Terrorism 

and the ongoing bilateral economic dialogue.301 At its initial meeting 

on December 4, 2001, the DPG went beyond exchanging views 

on the progress of the campaign against terrorism to that point in 

Afghanistan and elsewhere.

 Noting that both India and the United States have been targets 

of terrorism, the two sides agreed to add a new emphasis in their 
83

defense cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives, including 

expanding mutual support in this area. The two sides also recognized 

the importance of joint counterproliferation efforts to achieve the 

goals of their defense cooperation.302

 At these meetings the DPG also committed its members to an 

increased pace of high-level dialogues, bilateral military exchanges 

and other combined activities, including programs for combined 

humanitarian airlift, special operations training, small unit air/

ground exercises, naval combined personnel exchange and 

familiarization, and combined training between the U.S. Marines and 

corresponding Indian forces. The DPG also established an ongoing 

security cooperation group to manage the defense supply relationship 

which is a critical part from India’s standpoint, if not America’s, of 

this relationship and agreed to discuss “bilateral ties in the field 

of defense production and research, military planning, India’s triservice doctrine and tri-service institutions.”303 As President Bush 

had already waived sanctions imposed on India for its nuclear tests, 

the DPG also took up the critical issue of arms sales and announced 

that,

The two sides underscored the importance of a stable, long-term defense 

supply relationship as part of the overall strategic cooperation between 

India and the United States. Since the waiver of sanctions, a number 

of applications for export licenses have been approved by the U.S. 

Departments of State and Defense and are in the process of notification to 

Congress. These include licenses such as that related to weapon locating 

radars. The U.S. also agreed to expeditious review of India’s acquisition 

priorities, including Engines and Systems for Light Combat Aircraft, 

radars, multi-mission maritime aircraft, and components for jet trainers 

and high performance jet engines. To assist this licensing and sales 

process in the future, the two sides have resolved to establish a separate 

Security Cooperation Group to manage the defense supply relationship 

between India and the United States.

304

 In January 2002, the JWG on Counter-Terrorism met in New 

Delhi and was led by Mishra and Ambassador Francis Taylor, the 

State Department’s “point man” on terrorism. It discussed finalizing 

the project of creating the sale of U.S. electronic sensors to be used 

on the international border with Pakistan and which could be placed 

on the disputed Line of Control (LOC) dividing Indian and Pakistani 
84

controlled Kashmir. India then claimed that this outcome constituted 

an official American recognition of Pakistan’s support for “terrorist” 

infiltration across the border.305 Since then the DPG has further 

expanded its remit so that its discussions now include virtually all 

aspects of the bilateral agenda. For example, at its meetings on June 

1-3, 2004, the DPG’s agenda was expected to include,

The entire gamut of Indo-U.S. defense relations including strategic 

issues, joint exercises, training and acquisition. . . . The talks will also 

review counterterrorism requirements of India, terrorism, proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction, security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, 

and peace and stability in Asia.306

Subsequent reports indicated the growing convergence of views on 

these issues.307

 Finally, another bilateral working group on cyber-terrorism was 

also set up in 2001-02. This “Cyber Security Forum” has an extensive 

program of action to address cyberterrorism and information 

security.308 Thus this forum connects as well to the broader agencies 

that are cooperating on Counter-Terrorism and intelligence sharing. 

This sharing became possible in January 2002 when Fernandes signed 

a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 

with Washington and has particular relevance as both sides try 

to determine the extent to which Pakistan may or may not have 

reduced, if not terminated, terrorist infiltration into Kashmir.309

Judging from remarks by Blackwill and Ambassador to Pakistan 

Nancy Powell, as well as Indian intelligence findings through 2003, 

not enough had happened in that regard to justify optimism.310

However, it does appear that in 2004, in no small measure thanks to 

U.S. pressure, the flow of terrorists to Jammu and Kashmir and the 

incidence of terrorist operations there had abated noticeably already 

after 2002. 311

 The establishment of new agencies and invigoration of existing 

fora for cooperation shows that despite obstacles, a real structure 

for enhanced and routine cooperation that both sides can use if they 

wish to is taking root. Cooperation through these working groups 

and other bodies encompasses exercises, intelligence sharing, trade 

and economic relations, defense and technology transfers and joint 
85

Counter-Terrorist activities. Thus the framework for expanded 

cooperation, particularly as seen in continuing visits, working group, 

and other agency meetings and exercises is vibrant and expanding.

Combined Exercises.

 Six major combined exercises were carried out in 2002, and 

Myers’ remarks cited above, as well as the author’s conversations 

with members of the various services of PACOM, indicate that 

more and perhaps bigger ones, either in number or in scope, will 

take place. These exercises will also move from being tactical ones to 

encompassing larger units. Thus they will have a more operational 

nature.312 At the DPG meeting in August 2003, the participants 

registered their satisfaction at the expansion of these forms of 

cooperation since 2002. Those exercises include:

Combined special forces counterinsurgency exercise in Northeast India: 

Combined Air Force exercise in Alaska; Complex naval exercises on the 

East Coast of India; Delivery of “Firefinder” radars to India; Senior-level 

missile defense talks; and conclusion of a master information exchange 

agreement to facilitate cooperation in research and development of 

defense technologies.313

 However, there were more exercises than those described here. 

For instance, there was a bilateral airlift and supply exercise in India 

from October 20-26, 2002.314 Nor does the DPG’s concise description 

of exercises capture their full range. A report of the official visit of 

Chief of India’s Naval Staff Admiral Madhvendra Singh in September 

2002 observed that,

As part of the growing Indo-U.S. Defense cooperation, naval interaction 

between the two countries has intensified this year with the commencement 

of the Straits of Malacca joint escort mission in April; several port visits 

by U.S. naval ships to India followed by passing exercises; and a big 

increase in the number of Indian naval officers training in the U.S., the 

revival of the “Malabar” series of annual joint exercises (Malabar 2002) 

scheduled in the Indian Ocean next month; and the Search and Rescue 

exercises scheduled later this year; are further significant milestones in 

this cooperation.315
86

The Malabar exercise (Malabar IV) involved surface, subsurface, and 

air operations, and an exchange of both sides’ aural and electronic 

signatures, giving some idea of its scope. And as they are scheduled 

to expand in size and sophistication in 2005, they exemplify the 

progressive trends in bilateral military relationships.316

 The U.S. Army also plays a key role in these exercises. In 

October 2002, Indian and U.S. Army and Air Force personnel from 

the PACOM carried out an exercise in Alaska. This exercise, the 

second of two such airborne joint exercises during 2002, aimed to 

have each side learn from the other’s experience and procedures 

towards achieving “interoperability.” Both countries’ forces carried 

out parachute drops, scouting/airborne assault missions, and 

various levels of joint firing exercises in conditions of cold and 

wet weather. Such exercises in these climates are very relevant to 

potential scenarios in Kashmir, the Himalayas, and potential winter 

operations in the Afghan mountains. The earlier exercise at Agra in 

May 2002 rehearsed such operations in vastly different but equally 

relevant climactic conditions, i.e., desert-like conditions which were 

particularly relevant in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, respectively.317 Finally, in September 

2003 U.S. Special Forces conducted a combined exercise with 

Indian commandos based in Jammu and Kashmir. These exercises, 

conducted in high altitude, dry, and rocky terrain similar to that in 

which Osama Bin Laden is reported to be hiding, fostered greater 

interoperability among the forces involved and helped train U.S. 

forces in terrain that would otherwise not be available to them in 

the United States. The forces involved conducted rock-climbing, 

surveillance, and a cliff assault using the latest infantry weapons 

needed for operations behind enemy lines.318

 Beyond these exercises, other forms of cooperation to upgrade 

interoperability, intelligence sharing, and planning are taking place. 

The U.S. Joint Staff and India’s IDS have established a normal 

relationship to discuss planning and triservice doctrine as envisioned 

by the DPG. Likewise, the U.S. and Indian Defense Intelligence 

Agencies have instituted a formal relationship and both militaries 

are discussing doctrinal issues. Washington has requested that U.S. 

troops be allowed to attend training courses at India’s prestigious 

Jungle Warfare School at Vairangte, Mizoram, and the High Altitude 
87

Warfare School at Gulmarg in Kashmir. The former request has been 

accepted, while the second request is pending as of this writing.319 In 

return, Indian defense officials are seeking to increase Indian forces’ 

participation in American institutions of military education and 

training and increased use of the International Military Education 

and Training (IMET) program.320 Finally, according to Australian 

analyst Ian Storey,

Future exercises are likely to include larger-scale Malabar exercises, while 

the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) are planning 

joint combat exercises involving fighter aircraft including IAF MiG-29s 

and Sukhoi-30 “Flankers” and USAF F-15C “Eagles” and F-16 “Fighting 

Falcons.” The USA specifically requested joint air exercises with the IAF’s 

SU-30s [the best Russia makes—author] as the USAF wants to familiarize 

itself with this kind of fighter [Su-30s also are operated by the Chinese 

Air Force—original]. 321

 Thus these exercises are comprehensive and growing in scope, 

provide numerous benefits to all the services involved, and have 

immediate operational and tactical relevance beyond the strategic 

point of instituting and establishing durable working relationships 

among both sides’ forces and officers. Jane’s Defence Weekly published 

a list of combined exercises in 2004. The Air Forces conducted 

Operation “COPE INDIA 04” in February and COOPERATIVE 

COPE THUNDER in June. In November 2003 the two Navies 

conducted Malabar 04 exercises that were followed by Search and 

Rescue exercises through 2003-04 and an anti-submarine warfare 

(ASW) exercise in April 2004. In 2004, the Indian and U.S. Armies 

conducted Army Aviation exchanges, a peacekeeping operations 

workshop, the continuing special forces ‘Iroquois’ series of exercises, 

and Operation YUDH AABHYAS 04. And the Marines conducted a 

High Altitude Artillery exercise in November 2003.322 But beyond 

these signs of a deepening and expanding relationship, these 

exercises provide the immensely important foundation of shared 

experiences, understanding, and training that make it possible to go 

beyond exercises and even smaller, though important, operations 

like Search and Rescue to talk seriously about combined operational 

planning. Indeed, the evidence of recent exercises with India’s Air 

Forces in Operation COOPERATIVE COPE THUNDER has forced 
88

us to rethink the issue of whether the F-15 is, in fact, superior to 

Russian made Su-27, Su-30, and even older MiG-21 Fighters armed 

with Russia’s AA-10 Air-to-Air missiles.323 So there is no doubt of the 

importance and benefits of these exercises to both sides.
89

CHAPTER 8

TOWARD ALLIANCE?: 

ASIAN NATO, BASES, AND IRAQ

 These combined Indo-American exercises and the high level of 

intergovernmental and intermilitary dialogues are all essential to 

the creation of a durable partnership, if not alliance. They establish 

trust; a sound knowledge base of both sides’ interests, capabilities, 

and objectives; predictability; and mutual confidence among the 

players. They also create overlapping and routinely functioning 

mechanisms of communication and dialogue between the two sides. 

All those attributes are essential ingredients of a successful alliance. 

If there really will be an Asian NATO or some other kind of as yet 

undefined alliance, those exercises and dialogues would constitute 

the foundation of that alliance. But for an alliance to materialize, 

there has to be resolution and concord concerning its purpose and 

both sides’ contribution to the realization of each other’s interests 

and objectives, especially mutual defense. Otherwise partnership 

on an ad hoc basis and warm, but noncommittal, relations will be 

the best we could hope for. We see these points or considerations 

emerging with special clarity as regards the discussions concerning 

an Asian NATO.

 At present it is unclear exactly what that entails, although some 

aspects appear to have been hinted at in the press. In his campaign 

to expand the scope of the bilateral partnership with New Delhi, 

Blackwill also strongly urged the administration to invigorate 

“military-to-military relationships with those Asian states that share 

our democratic values and national interests,” i.e., India.324 America 

thereby would not only strengthen its position in the GWOT, but 

also more generally in the Indian Ocean and largely at Russia and 

China’s expense. Thus some see in this Asian NATO an updated 

version of the old Cold War Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO) alliance or containment of China during the Cold War.325

Others like Professor Madhav Nalapat, an advisor to India’s National 

Security Council, who is close to Dr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the 
90

Office of Net Assessment, argue for such an alliance to “defend 

democratic values and exclude countries with authoritarian 

structures or religious states. The test [for membership of such an 

alliance] is whether people enjoy equal rights under the law and the 

democratic freedoms that this alliance would defend.”326

 Such statements suggest that there is, or at least was during 

Vajpayee’s tenure, considerable interest in official and semi-official 

circles about the possibility of such an alliance.327 The fact that this 

definition also excludes Pakistan and China is not lost on either 

side. But it also suggests what at least some Indians want out of it. 

However, beyond an alliance against or to contain China and/or 

Pakistan that would overtly restore bipolarity in Asia—something 

that nobody in either government has espoused—there are clearly 

some Indian elites who view any alliance with America as allowing 

for a substantial expansion of India’s political-military reach to the 

areas outlined above. In other words, partnership with America will 

not only realize Washington’s but also New Delhi’s agenda, which 

are both expansive ones. If we are to proceed towards some form 

of an Asian NATO, these strategic interests of India, as seen by at 

least some members of its military-political community of elites, 

must duly be taken into account. Since any serious contradictions in 

these two expansive agendas would preclude any effective strategic 

coordination, the need for ongoing high-level strategic dialogue on a 

host of issues like those discussed above, is imperative.

 The expansiveness of India’s agenda emerges from many sources, 

e.g., Vajpayee’s program cited above, the new naval doctrine, India’s 

continuing foreign policy and India’s own ingrained self-perception 

as a major global or at least Asiatic power.328 Vajpayee’s directive 

lays out the sphere of strategic interests that such an alliance would 

embrace, i.e., from the Middle East and former Soviet South to the 

Strait of Malacca, and at least some of the issues that must be dealt 

with—Pakistan, arms control, missile defense, Iran, terrorism in 

general and Indo-Pakistani relations, and of course, China’s rising 

power. But it is not clear how this expansive version of Indian aims 

might comport with those of the other listed potential members of 

this alliance, Japan, Australia, and Singapore.329 Neither is it at all 

certain that the new Indian Government led by Prime Minister Singh 
91

subscribes to the idea of an Asian NATO. Finally, it also is unclear 

whether any Asian NATO seen from Washington encompasses the 

same strategic outlook as does India’s outlook.

 These difficulties in the way of deeper and more sustained 

practical coordination do not, however, preclude the achievement 

of that coordination provided that both sides are willing to meet the 

other’s interests and perceptions. This is the reason why sustained 

high-level official and unofficial dialogue is so necessary, because 

that is a proven method by which differences in understanding can 

be bridged. Interestingly enough, although India has long publicly 

harbored expansive ambitions in the Indian Ocean, its practical 

cooperation with the United States and desire to be seen as a reliable 

partner have led it to take steps that were hitherto believed to be 

impossible. For example, in June 2001, i.e., before the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, Defense and External Affairs Minister Jaswant 

Singh indicated that he did not exclude the possibility of U.S. access 

to military bases in India because both Australia and America now 

recognized India’s regional role, and this changed situation made 

military-to-military cooperation a major aspect of overall bilateral 

cooperation with the United States.330 Since then, Indo-American 

cooperation in the Indian Ocean has grown. Despite years of trying 

to prevent any foreign state from getting near Diego Garcia and 

Eastern Sri Lanka’s base and port of Trincomalee, India has acted 

on behalf of the U.S. Navy to secure its access to these ports and 

offered Washington access to its own ports for the GWOT. In return, 

Washington successfully pressured the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to 

persevere in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government.331 The Bush 

administration has recognized that access to these bases in the Indian 

Ocean not only allows it to exercise considerable command and 

control of the seas through that ocean, but also is extremely valuable 

for operations and missions from the Middle East to Southeast Asia 

and could thus also serve as a check upon Chinese naval ambitions 

in the Indian Ocean.332 This fact alone illustrates India’s enduring 

relevance to any U.S. strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and in 

projecting power to Afghanistan, Central and South Asia, and the 

Gulf. Moreover, at the moment, U.S. ships and planes now enjoy a 

case-by-case access to Indian bases. Conceivably, this access could 
92

become part of this Asian NATO and ultimately lead to a more 

regularized right of access that would be in tune with the broader 

transformation of U.S. strategy because, since 2001 the United States 

has been seeking broader access to bases throughout Asia.333

 Administration officials have spelled out openly the rationales 

for obtaining new bases throughout Asia. The Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR) of 2001 openly asserted the need for more forces and 

bases in Asia due to the expansion of threats there across the spectrum 

of conflict.334 Subsequent statements and testimony by Pentagon 

officials reinforces and expands upon the strategic rationale for this. 

Basing himself upon that QDR, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense Peter Brookes told Congress in 2002 that,

Distances in the Asian theater [note the singular—author] are vast, and 

the density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower than in other 

critical regions. Moreover, the U.S. has less assurance of access to facilities 

in the Asia-Pacific region than in other regions. The QDR, therefore 

identifies the necessity of securing additional access and infrastructure 

agreements and developing military systems capable of sustained 

operations at great distances with minimal theater-based support. The 

QDR also calls for a reorientation of the U.S. military posture in Asia. The 

U.S. will continue to meet its defense and security commitments around 

the world by maintaining the ability to defeat aggression in two critical 

areas in overlapping time frames. As this strategy and force planning 

approach is implemented, the U.S. will strengthen its forward deterrent 

posture. Over time, U.S. forces will be tailored to maintain favorable 

regional balances in concert with U.S. allies and friends with the aim of 

swiftly defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement.335

 In subsequent testimony to the House, Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman fully 

explicated the administration’s thinking regarding overseas basing 

in Asia. Rodman stated that the administration’s goals entail tailoring 

our forces abroad to the particular conditions of those regions 

and strengthening U.S. capabilities for prompt global response 

anywhere. He observed that since threats are not confined to a single 

area and because we cannot anticipate where the next one will be 

even though an immediate response is often warranted, we need 

a capabilities based strategy, not one based on force levels. Forces 

are not expected to fight where they are based, and mobility and 
93

speed of deployment are the critical factors.336 Rodman then laid out 

the working assumptions behind the transformation of our basing 

structure. And a consideration of administration objectives, taken 

in conjunction with these assumptions, immediately tells the reader 

why an Asian NATO with India is now a priority.

 India as an ally or area where bases may be located meets virtually 

every criterion laid out in Rodman’s testimony. These working 

assumptions for the transformation of our basing structure are as 

follows:

 • U.S. regional defense postures must be based on global 

considerations, not regional ones.

 • Existing and new overseas bases will be evaluated as combined 

and/or joint facilities as befits the new emphasis on combined 

and joint operations.

 • Overseas stationed forces should be located on reliable, wellprotected territory.

 • Forces without inherent mobility must be stationed along 

major transportation routes, especially sea routes.

 • Long-range attack capabilities require forward infrastructure 

to sustain operations.

 • Forward presence need not be equally divided among all the 

U.S.’ regional commands in order to reduce the “seams” that 

separate them from each other.

 • Expeditionary forces and operations require a network of 

forward facilities with munitions, command and control, and 

logistics in dispersed locations.

 All these requirements would increase U.S. forward forces’ 

capability for deterrence and operations and allow for reinforcement 

of other missions by reallocating forces. Rodman observed that 

we intend to accomplish these objectives by increasing precision 

intelligence and strike capabilities on a global basis and exploiting 

our forces’ capability for superior strategic mobility.337 Therefore, 

changes in U.S. basing policies aim to strengthen defense relations 

with key allies and partners and respond more effectively to 

unforeseen contingencies. These changes entail:
94

 • Diversifying the means of U.S. access to overseas bases and 

facilities to obtain military presence closer to combat regions 

and offer our forces a broader array of options;

 • Posturing the most flexible forces possible for overseas 

missions so that they will be capable of conducting a wide 

range of expeditionary operations; and,

 • Promoting greater allied contributions and establishing 

more durable defense relationships with those allies and 

partners.338

 India, due to its location, excellent ports, many air bases and 

developed infrastructure, democratic values, and the harmony of 

interests with the United States, would exemplify such an alliance 

if it came about. But it is by no means clear that an alliance will 

emerge from those discussions on an Asian NATO or that we will 

obtain permanent peacetime access or lodgment and deployments 

in Indian bases. Nor is it clear how the requirements of an alliance 

with Washington would square with what appears to be an alliance 

with Iran and rapprochement with China. A formal alliance would 

require a sovereign political decision by India’s government, a 

treaty, and probably Parliamentary ratification, which cannot simply 

be counted on in advance—especially with the new government in 

power since it will be a left-wing coalition. Therefore, to obtain these 

capabilities and this access, Washington also must respond to Indian 

needs and interests. And even if it does so, in some cases that might 

not be enough to achieve what we want.

 The effort to obtain Indian participation in Iraq cited above 

exemplified this possible dilemma.339 It showed that obtaining 

Indian support in Iraq and for a binding alliance would require 

considerable “side payments” by the U.S. Government, and even 

then that might not be enough. Similarly, it would be extremely 

naïve to hope that India will give America bases and opportunities 

for permanent lodgments and deployments on its territory or in its 

sphere of interests without demanding ultimate discretion over how 

those bases and forces are used. In other words, we will have to be 

forthcoming to some discernible and presumably considerable extent 

on India’s regional and defense agendas if we are to elicit support for 
95

anything resembling an Asian NATO. For example, a recent article 

about the negotiations over an Asian NATO observed that,

The aggressive U.S. push is tempered by India’s own reluctance to rush 

into any such arrangement without securing its immediate objective of 

dousing terrorism on its borders inflamed by the policies of Pakistan’s 

military establishment. In fact, what could have been a straightforward 

defense relationship with Washington has been complicated by the U.S. 

State Department’s relentless patronage of Pakistan’s military dictatorship 

at a bruising cost to India.340

Whether or not this perception of U.S. policies is accurate or 

not is irrelevant because it is shared by much of India’s militarypolitical elite and constantly reiterated in the press. Therefore, it is 

a constant factor in Indian media and politics that any Indian and 

U.S. Government must take into account. But what is important 

here is that the United States cannot secure or even begin to pursue 

its broader agenda in Asia through the mechanism of an Asian 

NATO or some other alliance system without substantive actions to 

address India’s own security agenda and priorities, which are rather 

different than America’s, for all the harmony of interests between 

them. That agenda involves India’s ability to influence trends in the 

geographic areas listed above, and in particular three other issues 

of major concern: missile defense, general technology transfer, and 

Pakistan. In other words, no policy of unilateralism, however it may 

be clothed, has a chance of success in enlisting Indian support, which 

is increasingly necessary for the advancement of U.S. interests in 

the Gulf, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, or with regard to missile 

defense and proliferation.

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CHAPTER 9

INDIA AND MISSILE DEFENSE

 Missile defense is an issue that cuts in several directions 

for India. On the one hand, many commentators both here and 

abroad, mainly those opposed to the Bush administration’s missile 

defense programs, contend that America’s construction of missile 

defenses will lead China to build more missiles to retaliate against 

or overcome our system. This in turn would then threaten India 

further, causing it to feel impelled to build defenses and add to its 

offensive capabilities, leading Pakistan to follow suit in turn, and 

thereby creating a kind of Asian chain reaction. A Chinese reaction 

to build more offensive missiles to defeat an American system would 

also probably force India to build more of its own offensive medium 

range ballistic missiles (MRBM) to deter China and retain a secondstrike capability as prescribed by the classical theory of deterrence.341

Since India faces two adverse nuclear powers, China and Pakistan, 

U.S. missile defenses could entail further complications in India’s 

security environment that are decidedly negative. Another negative 

possibility is that the U.S. system might not work, while other nations 

further arm themselves with increased offensive capabilities or else 

they may acquire still newer technological and military capabilities 

that would force India into an exhausting competition with them.342

 On the other hand, it equally is arguable that China’s buildup is 

continuing anyway, regardless of what America does. Since advocates 

of this view contend that America’s commitment to missile defense is 

not the real factor driving China’s nuclear and missile buildup, India 

might as well take effective steps now to ensure its own security. 

India, this side argues, has no credible ally in Asia, and indeed faces 

an array of political and military threats, including nuclear ones 

from Pakistan and China. Consequently, a Chinese buildup, coupled 

with India’s commitment to no first use, may render any hope of 

possessing a survivable second strike capability illusory. Hence 

defenses are needed, and sooner rather than later.343 By the same 

token, an effective U.S. missile defense would provide possibilities 
98

for extension of that “missile umbrella” to allies. As the U.S. Ballistic 

Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) stated during the Clinton 

administration, “such a globally expansive missile defense system 

would help safeguard unipolarity, providing the impetus to other 

nations to enhance their military arrangements with the United States 

and come under its missile-defense umbrella.”344 Thus there were and 

are positive and negative features in the U.S. program as India might 

have seen it. A third argument in favor of missile defenses takes an 

anti-American twist, namely, that by building them, India somehow 

would render itself more capable of resisting American bullying 

and unilateral or neo-imperial tendencies. Or, equally importantly, 

these factions hope to escape the irksome situation where India still 

depends on foreign military suppliers for advanced technologies As 

one recent study observes,

While much has changed in India’s relations with the West, and with 

the United States in particular, the West’s continued support to Pakistan 

and its ambivalence towards China is the cause of lingering suspicion 

that India stands without allies in its disputes against its two adversaries. 

Russia, too, is of little help, especially with regard to China. This sense of 

isolation has persisted, and continues to suggest that the country needs 

some level of deterrence against even the big powers. The events in Iraq 

have only reinforced such thinking.345

Obviously this argument plays well among those sectors of Indian 

opinion that harbor decidedly negative views of U.S. policy. But it, 

too, leads to policy conclusions that no less decidedly concur with 

current administration preferences.

 What this discussion of alternatives, however rudimentary, 

shows is that,

Critical decisions relating to further “horizontal proliferation” in South 

Asia-–that is to say, decisions bearing on both the number and kind 

of strategic technologies acquired-–will ultimately be linked to larger 

Indian perceptions about issues relating to “vertical proliferation” and 

by extension, the structure of the global nuclear regime in general. This 

in turn implies that as long as Indian decisionmakers perceive that the 

existing nuclear weapons states either will not or cannot move toward 

deeper stockpile reductions that will ultimately lead to nuclear abolition, 

India (and by implication, Pakistan) will not countenance the prospect of 

rolling back its own programs. This obduracy is linked both to strategic 
99

concerns about perceived threats emerging from some of the nuclear 

weapons states—China in particular in the case of India—and to ideational 

fears about enshrining “discriminatory” organizational regimes such as 

the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) in international politics.346

 A second consequence of this way of thinking about nuclear 

weapons is that India will not yield unilaterally its nuclear assets or 

roll back programs without constraints on other potential threats. 

Therefore, American approaches to nuclear weapons issues will 

exercise the greatest influence on India of all players. This is not only 

because Washington can extend or withhold strategic technologies 

and weapons, but also because its own strategy will influence all the 

other nuclear players.347 Third, this line of reasoning implies strongly 

that one way to slow down India’s nuclear program is for America 

and the other nuclear powers’ partners—primarily Russia—to reduce 

their dependence upon nuclear weapons and their stockpiles.348

 Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that in May 2001 

India applauded President Bush’s National Defense University 

speech outlining his view of missile defense, citing, in particular, his 

assertion that the classical canons of deterrence no longer sufficed 

and that we were now living in a transformed strategic environment. 

Certainly one facet of Bush’s speech and of subsequent American 

strategy was the commitment to reduce substantially the number 

of strategic offensive missiles and warheads in the American and 

Russian arsenals. This policy accorded with a longstanding Indian 

demand and had been one of the major reasons why India had 

consistently stood apart from the NPT, which had required progress 

towards such reductions. As long as such reductions did not occur, 

protestations of the need for nonproliferation seemed to New Delhi 

like a hypocritical attempt to keep India in what its leaders called 

nuclear apartheid, while reserving the benefits of possession of 

nuclear weapons to the existing members of the club. Bush’s new 

formulations and the subsequent treaty of Moscow in 2002 (the 

Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty [SORT]) clearly shattered 

what India saw as the preexisting paradigm here.349

 While this positive response was not quite an endorsement of 

national missile defense (NMD), it certainly was a strong signal 

of interest in the idea. Some commentators explained that India’s 
100

reaction was that it saw from Bush’s and his administration’s 

statements that NMD was inevitable; therefore, India might as well 

accept reality and position itself to benefit from technology transfer 

relevant to it and from the opportunity as a nuclear power to shape 

the future rules of the international nuclear game.350 But it is also 

the case that the decision to support Bush’s speech and subsequent 

initiative flowed logically from the principles of nuclear policy stated 

above. Indian analysts like C. Raja Mohan duly contended that by 

mid-2001, India adroitly had positioned itself vis-à-vis Washington 

on the issue of missile defense. As he wrote then,

Mr. Vajpayee will be right in claiming that India is now in tune with 

all the four aspects of the [Bush administration’s] strategic framework: 

radical nuclear force reductions, strengthening the nonproliferation 

regime, counter-proliferation, and missile defenses. In endorsing missile 

defenses and nuclear cuts envisaged by the two great powers, Mr. 

Vajpayee can also demand a larger Indian role in managing the global 

nuclear nonproliferation regime by becoming a member of the various 

export control mechanisms such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. He 

can also proclaim Indian interest in a cooperative counter-proliferation 

strategy that hopes to deal with the emerging threat of weapons of mass 

destruction in the hands of terrorists and other non-state actors.351

More recently he analyzed the problem from the standpoint of India’s 

own declared nuclear doctrine.

 India believes that missile defenses are an all important 

supplement to its strategy of nuclear no-first use. Having deliberately 

accepted the risk of absorbing a potential nuclear first strike by its 

adversaries, India hopes the deployment of missile defenses will 

help curb the temptations of a first strike against it. India may have 

two other reasons behind its quest for missile defense. One is the 

presumed need to cope with the growing spread of nuclear weapons 

and missiles capable of delivering them around its neighborhood. 

The other is the recognition that the development of missile defense 

appears an inevitable technological trend, and a country like India 

has no choice but to invest in it.352

 Therefore, it is clear that India’s interest in missile defenses in 

some form of association with the United States, either directly or 

through a third party like Israel, has grown. In November 2001 
101

India Ambassador for Disarmament to the Permanent UN Mission 

in Geneva Rakesh Sood publicly speculated about India building 

missile defenses if the preliminary research and development (R&D) 

turned out to be fruitful. This missile defense would be a limited one, 

unlike the projected U.S. national missile defense.353 In September 

2002, it was revealed that bilateral military and intergovernmental 

consultations on missile defense were taking place.354 Since then, it 

has also become clear that if legislation is passed in the United States 

permitting either research into nuclear weapons or even testing, that 

India, and probably Pakistan, would follow suit. Again, this would 

follow the logic of America being the main, though not only external 

influence upon Indian strategic policy. The conclusion that India 

would then test nuclear weapons is not necessarily at odds with the 

Pentagon’s preference. For in July 2002, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense Marshall Billingslea testified to the Senate Governmental 

Affairs Committee that,

We believe that missile defenses, generally speaking, are part of an 

inherently stabilizing concept. The right to defend yourself against these 

missiles is something we feel is a matter to explore with the Indians [and] 

with the Pakistanis if they’re interested.355

 Meanwhile India is stepping up production of its Prithvi and Agni

missiles to counter Pakistan’s Hatf, Shaheen, and Ghauri missiles, along 

with its successful quest for the U.S.-Israeli Arrow-2 missile defense 

system, the accompanying Green Pine radar system, and Russia’s 

S-300 V theater missile defense system.356 India has also asked the 

administration for the Patriot missile defense system (PAC-3). These 

examples of transfer of advanced technology serve for Indian elites as 

a test of how serious the administration is about technology transfer 

and arms sales, a critical issue for New Delhi.357 India clearly is trying 

to develop both an indigenous and reliable missile defense system, 

at least for its Western border with Pakistan. India also reaffirmed 

the view it shares with Washington that missile defenses enhance 

cooperative security and held a missile defense workshop in India in 

2004. India also agreed to participate in the 2005 Roving Sands missile 

defense exercise with the United States.358 Finally, in September 2003, 

as a result of previous bilateral meetings where the issue of missile 
102

defense was discussed, President Vajpayee submitted a proposal to 

President Bush, laying out the conditions under which “Vajpayee 

accepts a U.S. condition that India establish a strict nonproliferation 

regime, and assents to U.S. monitoring of the deployment of missile 

defenses—and possibly even overall U.S. control of deployed 

systems in India.”359 In return, the United States would help create 

a missile defense shield for India against both Pakistan and China’s 

perceived increasing nuclear threats, or possibly in some sense to 

control missiles deployed in India.360 While some officials profess 

concern that India might export U.S. technologies to Iran (a fear that 

India alleviated with Israel by agreeing not to transfer Israeli defense 

technology to Iran361), India also received a green light to buy the 

joint U.S.-Israeli Arrow missile defense system.362

 Vajpayee’s September 2003 proposal triggered a major debate 

within the U.S. national security bureaucracy on the advisability of 

lifting sanctions and of sharing data with India on missile defense. The 

State Department, and particularly the U.S. arms control community, 

much of which is lodged there, tends to look at India through the 

lens of proliferation and to prioritize that issue above all others in 

the relationship. Without entering into an assessment of whether this 

outlook is justified, correct, or not, it is clear that these officials have 

obstructed arms sales to India because they still are aggrieved over 

its nuclearization in 1998 and cherish the idea that India can be kept 

from being formally declared a nuclear power state by punishing 

it through the withholding of conventional arms and military 

technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones. DoD, on the 

other hand, strongly favors moving to expanded defense relations 

with India, which encompass not just the 17 combined exercises that 

occurred with the Indian armed forces in 2003, but also relief from 

existing sanctions, expanded technology and weapons sales, and 

discussions with India on missile defense. Indeed, as we saw above, 

the Pentagon has stated publicly its support for India’s having its 

own missile defense system.363 Naturally this divergence in outlook 

has created major policy debates within the administration, slowed 

the momentum in the development of the partnership (at least from 

the Pentagon’s standpoint), and caused enormous resentment in 

India.364
103

 It appears that the Pentagon’s viewpoint prevailed to some degree 

during the winter of 2003-04. In December 2003, it was reported that 

an agreement would be signed in January 2004, ending most U.S. 

sanctions on advanced technology transfer to India, in return for 

India’s tightening up of its regulations and laws relating to export 

controls over materials usable for proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD).365 On January 12, 2004, both governments 

released an announcement stating that they had agreed that the U.S 

Government will expand cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, 

civilian space programs, and high-technology trade. There will also 

be an expanded engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues 

(i.e., tightening up of Indian export control laws and regulations) 

and an enhanced dialogue on missile defense.366 By all accounts, this 

outcome greatly satisfies Indian elites who viewed access to these 

technologies as the litmus test of America’s seriousness in building 

close ties to India. Indeed, Vajpayee and President Bush both stated 

that the vision of the bilateral strategic partnership that they share 

“is now becoming a reality.” Although it is also abundantly clear 

that the State Department is going to drag its feet on approving 

these technology transfers where they could relate to proliferation 

of WMD, this outcome seems to have satisfied everyone at least for 

now.367

 Thus it appears that India, under Vajpayee, was ready to move 

both toward a genuine alliance involving missile defense that entails 

a commitment to missile defense or to protection under the U.S. 

program that is coming into being. Whether the new government 

will continue along that line remains to be seen. But Vajpayee’s 2003 

initiative and Bush’s response in January 2004 signify an increasingly 

solid basis for strategic cooperation on the basis of expanded dialogue 

and R&D between both countries. To the extent that strategic dialogue 

continues here and is successful, it could also spill over into other 

areas with no less productive results. This is especially true for the 

linked issues of technology transfer and arms sales, issues that are far 

more problematic insofar as a strategic partnership is concerned.

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CHAPTER 10

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ARMS SALES

 The part of the April, 2001 agenda pertaining to arms sales and 

technology transfer may arguably be the most critical part of the 

agenda as far as Indian elites are concerned. MacDonald reached the 

conclusion, based on many interviews, that “For Indians, technology 

transfer from the United States is military cooperation’s touchstone.”368

Other Indian assessments confirm the great importance that India 

attaches to transfer of civil and defense technology, including 

technologies for missile defenses, as a critical and essential element 

in any partnership with America.369 For Indian officials and observers 

America’s willingness to enter into serious technology transfer and 

arms sales is a fundamental barometer of the seriousness with which 

it views this relationship. Certainly many observers believe that 

requests like those for the PAC-3 also are intended to gain access 

to such technology as well as to fill up gaps in Indian security.370

Undoubtedly this issue will come up, if it has not already done so, in 

discussions about an Asian NATO, for transatlantic arms sales and 

technology transfer are very important issues within NATO as well. 

But the issue of technology transfer and arms sales to India will not 

only directly affect the bilateral relationship with America, it will 

also affect American allies, particularly Israel, who is emerging as a 

major supplier to India. And it also is an issue where India’s rising 

economic and technological capabilities as well as its ambitions 

could allow it to play off other potential suppliers against America, 

for it is obvious that major players in the transfer of both civil and 

defense technologies, not to mention weapons systems, increasingly 

believe that India, whose demand is huge, is a market from which 

they cannot afford to be excluded. In this regard India exemplifies 

some of the major contemporary trends in the global arms market, 

which in many respects is now a buyer’s market where sellers must 

increasingly compete against each other to meet clients’ demands.371

 Indian elites attach so great an importance to technology transfer 

and arms sales for the following reasons: first it will confirm the 

U.S. understanding of India’s rising importance as both a regional 
106

and global power with whom it shares a serious partnership and 

converging strategic interests on a wide range of issues.372 Second, 

Indians want the technological transfer and arms sales up front as a 

sign that the U.S. Government is willing and able to share its weapons 

with India and that America will then be seen as a reliable partner 

that is committed, by virtue of the previous arms deals, to long-term 

partnership with India.373 This appears to resemble the pattern with 

Indo-Russian relationships going back to 1955. Indian interviewees, 

all of whom concurred on this point, told MacDonald that such 

transfers would signify U.S. acceptance of India’s strategic role in 

the regions of India’s interests as a source of stability in support 

of American interests, that Washington regards India as a serious 

partner with similar strategic concerns, but which can be trusted to 

use the technology. Withholding of technology indicates a belief that 

India cannot be trusted. A third perception is that technology transfer 

and arms sales show India that it is regarded as a preferred friend, not 

as a former Soviet ally or rogue state that deserved to be sanctioned 

because it looked after its own interests exactly as America does.374

Indians also see technology transfer as enabling them to perform the 

expansive role they wish to play in world politics.

So while Russian weapons remain the bedrock of the Indian 

defense arsenal and may conceivably dominate that market for 

the foreseeable future; major changes are afoot in India’s weapons 

programs, particularly as India’s comprehensive rearmamment 

during this decade promises to be one of the most lucrative sources of 

funding for global arms companies. American officials and analysts 

already talk about the extensive modernization of the Indian Air 

Force that will have to take place soon and the need for America 

rather than other sellers to win the contract to replace the IAF’s 

fighters.375 Moreover, as the gap between American and Russian 

military technology widens and as the gap also widens between 

European and Russian technology on the one hand and between U.S. 

and European technology on the other, some Indian experts argue 

that we can expect increasing Indian purchases from the Europeans 

(including the Israelis) and even more from the United States.376

Thus for India technology transfer comes in several different forms. 

First, there is the hope for increased American trade and investment 
107

in general, not least in the technology sector. In that context there is 

particularly strong interest in receiving greater access to U.S. civilian 

high technology that also possesses military applications, i.e., so 

called dual use technology.377

 There is increasing hope in Indian circles that India’s ability to 

gain access to this kind of technology will grow steadily as a result 

of the Bush administration’s Next Steps in Security Policy (NSSP) 

program of which the January 12, 2004 announcement was the 

first step. The NSSP, according to Administration officials, fully 

represents its name, i.e., it is an attempt to tie together existing 

and new programs and Indo-American desires for mechanisms to 

strengthen the idea and reality of a bilateral strategic partnership that 

meets India’s craving for technology transfer and arms sales while 

also satisfying the administration’s perception that such transfers 

should also embrace civilian technology and the private sector. It 

duly grows out of India’s long-expressed desire for unimpeded 

technology transfer, especially dual-use technology, arms sales, 

and space and nuclear technology transfer while respecting antiproliferation concerns and the Bush administration’s broad-gauged 

effort to reinforce private and public sector cooperation with India. 

From 2001-2003 Indian officials described these three issues as the 

trinity and, pace MacDonald, presented it as a touchstone of the 

sincerity of U.S. interests in a partnership. In 2003 missile defense 

was added to this trinity, making it a quartet and President Bush’s 

January, 2004 statement, cited above, represented the first step in the 

multi-phase NSSP.378 Even though several non-governmental experts 

still maintain that while India is not regarded as a proliferator, 

existing legal obligations might lead to bureaucratic obstacles that 

degrade the value of the program. Some Indian analysts, too, hold 

this view.379

 Nevertheless Under-Secretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster and 

his Deputy, Matthew Borman, have both emphasized that this is a 

serious and genuine program even if it is a multi-phase one. Phase 

one, or the first step, was the January 2004 announcement that Juster 

presented as providing a “framework for takeoff” for the overall 

NSSP.380 He emphasized that the Bush administration desires to use 

the program to strengthen a bilateral strategic partnership and also to 
108

deepen bilateral ties among both states’ private sectors. That would 

give everyone a much greater stake in the bilateral relationship, 

thereby preventing political disputes from derailing it. Second, the 

NSSP, as embodied in the January 2004 bilateral statement, outlines 

several phases of reciprocal steps that can be taken that would really 

enable the United States to ease its licensing requirements and other 

technology transfer restrictions, while at the same time insuring 

that our nonproliferation commitments and policies are intact and 

that both of our countries jointly work together to ensure that the 

nonproliferation goals we share are met.381

 As Borman also notes, the NSSP binds the two countries together 

and adds a nonproliferation and high-tech trade relationship to their 

common interests while leading to the removal of India’s Indian 

Space Research Organization from the Commerce Department’s 

list of entities to be sanctioned. It has also applied a presumption 

of approval for all dual use items excepting the troubled reactors 

at Tarapur, which come under the aegis of the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group, and agreed to eliminate the need for export licenses for 25% 

of all U.S. items that India seeks to import.382

 Ultimately, fulfillment of this multi-phase program will allow 

India to move from being a country that was on various U.S. export 

lists to one that can obtain civilian nuclear, space, dual–use, and 

eventually, should it so desire, ballistic missile defense technology, 

though this last one depends on India’s decision whether to pursue 

BMD or not.383 In September-October 2004, both sides announced the 

completion of phase 1 and commenced movement to phase two of 

the NSSP.384 As Tellis noted, the NSSP should, for several reasons, be 

regarded as a revolutionary point of departure in bilateral relations, 

despite the criticisms of some Indians that it did not change the laws 

that India earlier found to be so irksome. First, the NSSP sees India not 

as proliferator, but rather as part of the solution to the proliferation 

issue. Thus India gains access to world class technologies while 

formally remaining outside the global nonproliferation regime. In 

return India will institutionalize its world class export controls.385

 This is the true revolutionary import of the NSSP: a change in the 

U.S. strategic orientation towards India that in time will be far more 

consequential than the minutiae encoded in the current agreement. 
109

In effect, the NSSP implies the administration would seek to build 

a transforming partnership with India that includes satisfying its 

longstanding desire for greater access to restricted commodities so 

long as it does not utilize these artifacts to advance its own strategic 

programmes or for unlawful export. Some might argue that if the 

Bush administration wanted to be truly revolutionary, it would 

not only increase New Delhi’s access to controlled technologies 

but would also permit their utilization in India’s strategic weapon 

programmes. While this policy may be desirable in the long run, no 

U.S. administration today can permit such an arrangement without 

completely undermining the global nonproliferation regime at a 

time when it is more fragile than ever before. It is to Bush’s credit 

that he has actually reached out to India in such unsettled times. 

True, the administration is not yet prepared to support India in 

enlarging its strategic capabilities. However, it has expressed its 

willingness—through the NSSP—to at least look the other way. As 

U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford recently noted, the United 

States does not have any agreement comparable to the NSSP with 

two other states –Israel and Pakistan –that share India’s anomalous 

status in the nonproliferation order. That the administration has 

consented to such a unique covenant speaks volumes for New Delhi’s 

importance in the president’s geopolitical calculations.386

 Third, the NSSP not only shifts U.S. perspectives, it also opens 

the way to further, even more consequential changes in policy than 

have hitherto been the case. It creates a mechanism for reciprocal 

and mutually beneficial actions as well as a structured process 

for discussing issues of concern without jeopardizing the overall 

strategic relationship.387 At the same time, the NSSP bypasses many 

of the obstacles to one of India’s most compelling interests, namely 

the termination of all restrictions upon direct access to purchases 

of U.S. weapons systems and defense technologies. Although the 

Bush administration has lifted many earlier sanctions, this access is 

not yet as open as India would like, and, in any case, negotiations 

over the sale and acquisition of major defense systems generally are 

protracted affairs everywhere. While we will only be able to see the 

extent to which India has successfully achieved its goals regarding 

the acquisition of U.S. defense systems over the medium to long-
110

term, the administration is moving rapidly, as noted above, to 

overcome even that barrier to partnership.388 In offering a program 

of conventional weapons sales to India, the administration confirms 

what the DPG recognized already in August 2003, i.e., there is reason 

to believe that the earlier obstacles to defense sales and technology 

transfer are being overcome.389 For example, at the May 2004 DPG 

meetings the issue of selling the Orion P-3C reconnaissance plane to 

India was discussed, apparently favorably as it is now going to be 

sold to India.390

 More recently, in the fall of 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld visited 

India. While he was greeted with a storm of protests from the media, 

evidently to some degree orchestrated by the Ministries of Defense 

and Foreign Affairs, over proposed U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, 

national security advisor J. N. Dixit, who died suddenly on January 

3, 2005, reportedly told him that, “I am not going to whine at you—I 

am going to only tell you that you can go ahead and do what you 

like with the Pakistanis. But if U.S. aid to Pakistan upsets stability in 

this region, then India reserves the right to address this instability in 

any way it chooses.”391

 Not only did Rumsfeld get this message, he said Washington 

would build a stronger relationship, including defense ties, with 

India and also brought forward the discussions on a U.S. package 

of arms sales that would be offered to India and that was revealed a 

week before he came to New Delhi.392 The arms sales package offered 

by the Bush administration also eclipses what it proposes to offer 

Pakistan.

 The offer includes the much-touted Patriot anti-missile defense 

system that tackles aircraft and also tactical and cruise missiles, C130 stretched medium-lift transport aircraft, P-3C Orion maritime 

surveillance planes, and even F-16 fighters. The United States has 

also offered Perry-class frigates and Sea Hawk helicopters, while 

special operations forces will be looking at chemical and biological 

protection equipment.393

 Although India may not accept the F-16s because it already 

possesses Su-30MKI’s and French Mirage 2000s, it is likely to pick 

up the P-3C to obtain the long-range maritime surveillance and antisubmarine capabilities it possesses. Moreover, this deal provides 
111

the necessary strategic depth to India’s arsenal to distinguish it 

from either Pakistan or China. For example, the P-3C that India is 

being offered is an upgraded version with the latest avionics and 

equipment as well as offensive capabilities that eclipse what Pakistan 

is being offered.394 This offer confirms the trend cited in the 2003 DPG 

meetings of an increasingly favorable environment for weapons sales. 

And it also underscores the fundamentally strategic and qualitative 

transformation of past policy that, as Tellis observed, is embedded 

within the NSSP. But this is by no means the only way in which India 

can assure itself of a regular access to quality weaponry and hightech transfers that links it up to the United States.

 The third way in which India can enhance its access to U.S. 

technologies and weapons is through purchase of systems that are 

jointly made by the U.S. and other third parties, e.g., Israel. This is 

one reason for the interest in Israeli missile defense and AWACSlike systems such as the Phalcon. But negotiations for these systems 

also are inherently protracted affairs because of the legal restrictions 

incumbent upon U.S. partners regarding the subsequent sale of 

these systems to other governments and to political considerations 

that may be brought to bear inside the United States. Thus earlier 

Washington forced Israel to scuttle its deal to sell the Phalcon to 

China. And since Israel coordinates its arms sales with Washington 

due to the close technological and defense links between them, 

Indian purchases from Israel can open another or broader pipeline 

to U.S. defense sales.395

 Furthermore, India is a notoriously slow negotiator in arms deals. 

Consequently, going the route of third party sales and technology 

transfer with states other than Russia or the United States is a very 

time-consuming process. As a result, it is possible that by the time 

the deals are finalized the weapon or technology in question may no 

longer be state of the art and the costs attached to the goods under 

discussion will probably have risen as well. Therefore this method of 

obtaining arms is not cost-free.

 The high priority of such defense sales, and not only from the 

United States and its allies, is a constant reminder that India’s 

indigenous defense industry still cannot produce sufficient high 

quality, reliable, state of the art, and competitive weapons systems 
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for domestic use and for export abroad.396 Although several highranking military figures—e.g., the new chief of the Air Force, Air 

Chief Marshal Shashindra Pal Tyagi—espouse greater indigenization 

and point to India’s rising economic capabilities, this is only 

beginning to bear fruit. In the meantime, imports in many sectors 

will be necessary for quite some time. For example, the Air Force 

must replace half of its 350 planes and is seriously short of spare 

parts for half of them.397 Therefore India, like many other aspiring 

arms producers, must still rely on foreign providers and seek offsets, 

technology, and knowhow transfer, as well as direct product sales 

in order to maintain its forces at a competitive level and to find a 

way to bring its defense industry up to global standards.398 This 

consideration places India in several quandaries, particularly, if 

as seems to be the case, its problems remain intractable and it still 

must rely excessively upon Russian weapons, which appear to be 

manifesting ever more problems to judge from the Indian press. For 

instance, this dependence upon Russian tanks obviously irks those 

who are pushing for the completion of the indigenous Arjun tank 

project despite the many problems that have dogged this project 

since its inception.399 Throughout its history India has sought to 

eschew excessive dependence upon any one source for the provision 

of arms and to obtain as much self-sufficiency as possible in its 

defense sector. Given the socialistic and dirigiste origins of Indian 

defense industrial policy, the ensuing rigidities and failures of that 

sector as characterized in numerous studies are well known.400 But 

these failures to attain the objective of self-sufficiency, a goal that is 

particularly chimerical and difficult under globalization, have left 

their mark on Indian defense policy writ large and forced that policy 

and policymakers to accommodate themselves to reality.

 As a result, India actually pursues three simultaneous avenues to 

modernization of its defense arsenal: importing weapons, importing 

foreign production technology for licensed production, and indigenous production.401 We can see aspects of each of these pathways to 

building a robust defense capability and some of the consequences 

thereof in Indian defense policy and the bilateral ties with America. 

First, India still tries to upgrade its indigenous capabilities. Indeed 

it seeks to become a major arms exporter consonant with Vajpayee’s 
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November 2003 directives cited above.402 For example, Vijay Kumer 

Saraswat, program director for development of ballistic missile 

defense systems, recently said that India might soon begin exporting 

ballistic missile systems that could be used in local warfare, a term he 

did not define.403 India seeks to become a major exporter of weapons 

not just because that would give it the semblance, if not the reality 

of self-sufficient arms production, but because many still hanker 

after the status accruing to such states or fear too much dependence 

upon outsiders. Probably no less important is the fact that Indian 

elites now see arms sales as a way to gain influence in key zones, 

as Vajpayee’s 2003 directives suggest. We see this approach with 

particular clarity as regards Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Here 

economic motives, the quest for status, and classical great power 

politics come together.

 India’s increased ability and willingness to sell weapons to 

Central Asian governments parallels Pakistan’s similar capability as 

both are entering the international arms market to find new export 

markets and keep defense plants open.404 Indian spokesmen frankly 

admit that they seek export markets to achieve economies of scale 

for their domestic defense industry. Capturing those markets will, in 

turn, reduce Indian dependence upon foreign suppliers, especially 

as India can increasingly compel them to transfer technology and 

knowhow as part of their sales.405 Probably India will provide 

training and assistance to Central Asian militaries as do Turkey, 

Russia, China, and the United States, and also find in them willing 

buyers of its weapons, especially those made jointly with Russia.

 But India has even broader objectives. Because it competes with 

China in the small arms market and also seeks to penetrate into 

Southeast and Central Asia’s markets where China seeks to expand 

its influence, India must compete with China on price and quality in 

the same categories of weapons. India sells small arms, ammunition, 

patrol ships, light field guns, trucks, and aircraft parts to Southeast 

Asia at reduced price and with better equipment.406 Furthermore, 

as India intends to supplant China as regional supplier of arms, it 

will aggressively seek markets in Central and Southeast Asia.407 For 

example, India has already sold Kazakstan and Tajikistan Ilyushin76 transports and helicopters, respectively.408 In order to realize these 
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goals, India must also undergo a simultaneous modernization of 

its existing indigenous defense industries. Thus India is now also 

trying to stimulate its naval defense industry as well to build up 

capabilities for a robust and competitive indigenous naval defense 

industrial sector.409 As noted above, HAL also seeks to become an 

aviation industry hub for Southeast Asia, and India seeks to become 

a hub for missile building programs across Asia and Africa.410

 However, many obstacles stand in the way of achieving this 

objective of becoming a major indigenous producer of weapons 

for export. Indigenous industries are heavily subsidized and have 

a poor track record replete with long delays, cost overruns, and 

inferior quality. Moreover, there is a very serious problem with the 

transfer of technology from civilian discovery and use to military 

production and use.411 As a result of these outcomes, India has 

had to resort to the other alternatives listed above. But, given the 

institutional and political inflexibilities and rigidities that pervade 

India’s defense industrial system, it is unlikely that it will give up 

that dream unless it bites the bullet, so to speak, and abandons it by 

giving more scope than it has done until now to private and foreign 

investors and producers.412 Paradoxically, to have any chance of 

realizing indigenization to any significant degree, India must, for 

now, increasingly import technology and open up Indian production 

facilities to foreign ownership and participation.

 Indeed, that has begun to happen because India found it had 

no choice if it wished to remain competitive in a globalized world, 

and if it wanted to acquire the best technologies on the market. As 

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute stated in its 

annual report for 2004, arms imports by India increased by more 

than 100 percent in 2003 over 2002 to the highest level for the present 

5-year period, maintaining a constant increase since 2000. While 

Indian imports accounted for only about 9 percent of major arms 

imports in 1999-2003, giving India second place for the period, India 

accounted for 19 percent of global transfers in 2003, making it the 

largest recipient that year. Russia provided 79 percent of all Indian 

arms imports in 1999-2003 and 75 percent in 2003.413

 Since these figures show also that Russian arms exports to India 

decreased in 2003 and were a somewhat smaller percentage of a 

much larger market, this trend in Indian defense policy also creates 
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expanded opportunities for the United States and its allies, like 

Israel, to gain greater entrée into the Indian defense market. And 

there are many signs that these exporters to India would be welcome 

because imports are essential for India to meet its defense industrial 

and strategic objectives. For example, HAL is also pressing an 

outsourcing program whereby it will help private Indian companies 

find and choose foreign partners to undertake high-tech projects like 

avionics integration, weapons system integration, and other related 

efforts. This program is intended to “lay the foundation for a credible 

domestic aerospace industry base that could meet the majority 

of India’s military aerospace requirements in the next 10 years.” 

Thus it is clear that a major part of the growing diversification of 

India’s defense industrial program is intended to stimulate domestic 

production by opening up that sector of industry to outside foreign 

private investment.414 Jasjit Singh, Director of the prestigious Institute 

of Defense Studies and Analysis, suggested that in the future, 

“Collaboration [with Russia and other powers—author] must extend 

to components and sub-systems which could be handled through 

the private sector. We need to link up with industrial countries for 

joint development, production, and sales.”415 Many states, Israel and 

the United States among them, can be expected to take advantage of 

this opportunity and to do so with India’s blessings.

Indeed, such programs are necessary if India is to realize its goal 

of being a competitive military player, not to mention becoming 

a major defense exporter. For instance, it is clear that India faces 

several continuing problems if it continues to rely so much on 

Russian defense systems. Engine trouble forced it to ground all 18 of 

its fleet of Sukhoi-30MKI Fighters in August 2003. The AL-31 engine 

developed trouble after only 1,000 hours of flight time. As these 

fighters lie at the heart of India’s future Air Force strategy, due to 

their long range and midair refueling capacity, these flaws are telling 

indicators of the risk associated with an almost exclusive reliance upon 

Russian systems.416 And they are hardly the only instances of Indian 

unhappiness with Russian performance. Three areas in particular 

seem to have caused some anxiety in New Delhi. In March 2002, The 

Times of India reported that the Parliamentary Standing Committee 

had issued recommendations last week urging the government to 
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avoid overdependence on Russia for armaments and spare parts. The 

committee report reportedly did acknowledge that Russia has been 

and will remain a steadfast source of defense equipment for India, 

but cautioned that New Delhi’s current dependence on Moscow for 

as much as 80 percent of its arms imports is not a healthy situation. It 

likewise observed that Russia was not providing military hardware 

on the same beneficial financial terms that it had during the Soviet 

era, and urged both that New Delhi cease making advance payments 

for future weapons acquisitions from Russia, and that it seek in the 

future to put more defense contracts up for competitive tender.417

 There also are numerous complaints about the failure of the 

Russian contractors to deliver systems and parts rapidly—a longstanding defect of the Russian defense industry. In fact, India has 

warned Russian industry that if their products are not reliable and 

of the highest quality, India will shop elsewhere.418 This failure to 

obtain timely delivery is becoming a major impediment to realization 

of Indian defense programs. For example, in 2002 it became clear 

that, given the worsening relations with Pakistan, India was seeking 

to diversify its foreign purchases and also use foreign partners to 

develop its own defense industrial capability, e.g., by conditioning 

purchases on obtaining offsets from the sellers to develop that 

indigenous capability. This search for offsets continues a longstanding Indian policy.419 Thus one major solution to the problem 

inherent in excessive reliance upon Russian production is the 

acquisition of foreign licensing in the form of transfer of technology 

from Russia to build weapons inside India, i.e., offsets, a process 

whereby the seller transfers know-how and production capability, 

as well as weapons, to the buyer. However, it is also clear that the 

prospects of major American arms sales to India alarms Moscow 

for it threatened India that it could not merge Russian systems with 

forthcoming American ones without running the risk of litigation 

and charges over abuse of intellectual property. India saw this as 

a naked attempt to force it to buy Russian spare parts at exorbitant 

prices instead of shopping around or making them locally.420 While 

the problem was resolved in negotiations during Russian President 

Putin’s visit to India in December 2004, it still underscores the 

decreasing attractiveness to India of dependence on Russia. But at the 
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same time, India’s dependence on Russian defense production has 

greatly diminished, and it is Russia, whose defense industry remains 

in a precarious condition, that depends on the Indian market for its 

survival.421

 Offsets to India from Russia have become a critical factor in 

maintaining the long-standing ties to Moscow and its defense 

industry, while for Russia it is a vital interest to retain a customer 

who buys about 40 percent of Russia’s annual exported defense 

production, the only production it can sell anywhere since its own 

army cannot buy the weapons. For example, beyond the existing 

$10 billion program of weapons sales from Russia to India, India 

collaborates with Russia on joint production of a fifth-generation 

fighter. More broadly, India is the only country with whom Russia 

is collaborating on joint production of sophisticated and futuristic 

weapons systems.422 Likewise India, not China, gets Russia’s best 

weapons that currently are being produced, systems that not even 

Russia’s armed forces can obtain. And Russia is building a missile 

defense system based on its S-300 missiles, a move that certainly 

raised eyebrows in Beijing.423 Moscow offers offsets in the form of 

technology transfer of production skills and know-how to India, one 

of its largest customers. And while India obviously seeks to diversify 

its sources of foreign procurement, even so Russian officials and 

exporters continuously have voiced optimism dating back to 2000 

when the press reported that,

Russian exporters are still optimistic that they will be able to retain their 

positions in the Indian market. To do so, they have had to develop a 

fundamentally new approach to cooperation with India. While Russia 

used to offer ready-made weapons systems, now the emphasis is on 

joint design and production. This new approach was reinforced during 

Vladimir Putin’s [October 2000—author] visit to India, during which the 

two countries signed an agreement in which they pledged to protect the 

confidentiality of classified information transferred to or developed in the 

course of their joint activity. As a result, Russian and Indian researchers 

can now conduct joint R&D. Moreover, the leading participants on the 

Russian side will no longer be the Rosoboronexport (Russian Defense 

Export) State Company, but our actual R&D organizations. The work 

will focus primarily on the development of reconnaissance satellites and 

surface-sea-and-air launched cruise missiles, as well as nuclear submarine 

design.424
118

 However, it is not clear that this Russian optimism is wellfounded or reciprocated by India, even though it still exists among 

most, but by no means all, Russian producers and officials.425 For 

example, the Defense Ministry in July 2004 announced that it is 

phasing out MiG series jets, which the Indian press derisively refers 

to as flying coffins, over the next decade.426 India’s behavior vis-à-vis 

foreign arms and technology sellers also indicates that New Delhi is 

reorienting its overall defense technology relationship with Western 

countries. Apart from the well-known economic advantages of 

greater access to an interaction with large markets and investors in 

purely civilian fields of high technology and information technology 

(IT), one of India’s strongest economic calling cards, greater 

access to the U.S. technology market and greater U.S. interest in 

India under benevolent government sponsorship offer New Delhi 

several tangible strategic rewards. First, since civilian technologies 

are today’s cutting edge systems as opposed to military ones that 

played that role a generation or so ago, greater closeness to the U.S. 

market stimulates and provides a greater guarantee of India’s ability 

to maintain a competitive profile, even possibly reach a breakout 

stage, or make equivalent technological discoveries. In turn, that 

capability or those possible discoveries make it possible to overcome 

the barriers in India between civilian and defense technologies that 

have impeded defense production. That outcome would generate 

real prospects for ensuring that the defense industrial base remains 

a competitive one and also permits greater indigenization of India’s 

capability to produce its own dual-use technologies or to re-export 

American systems to other buyers. A second indirect benefit of such 

trade is that the foreign pressure generated by such trade might also 

push India’s lagging defense industries to become more robust and 

competitive.

 A third benefit that would accrue to India from greater exposure 

of American firms to it and vice versa is already discernible in the 

rival Chinese case. Substantially expanded U.S.-Indian trade and 

investment ties would promote creation within the U.S. political 

system of an Indian lobby that could influence American foreign and 

defense policy constantly just as the expansion of such ties to China 

has produced an influential lobby that clearly restrains expressions 
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of hostility to China in our policy when the pressure builds to take 

such actions. An equivalent Indian lobby would promote favorable 

strategic ties to India and win friends and influence for New Delhi 

on Capitol Hill and elsewhere throughout our political system. 

New Delhi clearly understands the potential significance of a lobby 

of Indian-Americans and of high placed friends in the business 

community for its broader strategic objectives.427

 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Indian commentators 

regarded access to nuclear, high-tech, and space cooperation with 

the United States as the “trinity” issues, and hope for a more 

accommodating U.S. position on transfer of critical technologies 

when issues come before the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).428

Neither is it surprising, under the circumstances, that the turn to 

Israel has taken place. Indeed, the Vajpayee government, building 

upon past precedents, effected an amazing transformation of India’s 

defense relationship to Israel, and it appears that the present regime 

is building effectively on it.429 In 2003, Defense News reported that 

the Indian government is working on a program whereby Israel 

would replace Russia as India’s largest supplier of weapons and 

defense equipment by 2008. Under the terms of this program, India 

will identify the products it wants and ask the Israeli government to 

negotiate with Israeli firms on its behalf, just as Jerusalem does with 

regard to its own weapons. Israel is already India’s second largest 

supplier of military systems, if not, as some think, India’s largest 

supplier. Therefore, this program could effect a major transformation 

in India’s security relationships.430 Israel evidently is willing to sell 

India some of its latest and most sophisticated weapons systems, 

e.g., the Advanced Naval Attack Missile and the Next Generation 

Defense Missile, provided India also invests in their development.431

Similarly, India seeks Israeli investment in Indian defense industry 

to modernize it and make it more competitive.432

 India’s wish list from Israel reveals the scope of its strategic 

interests. India seeks super-high satellite imagery resolution 

technology from Israel to gain critical real-time targeting capability 

to improve the accuracy of India’s ballistic missiles and gather 

intelligence concerning terrorist and Pakistani activities in Jammu 

and Kashmir.433 Indian army planners, frustrated by the slow pace 
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of India’s indigenous ballistic missile programs and alarmed by 

Pakistan’s progress in that area, also advocate an emergency purchase 

of either Russian or Israeli missiles, even though Israel’s Long Range 

Artillery (LORA), if sold, would, with minor adaptations, trample 

on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). That sale might 

be a bridge too far for U.S. authorities to accept.434 India also seeks 

Israeli help regarding a new inertial navigation system for longrange missiles like the Agni III, the multi-target surface-to-air missile, 

and for short-range missiles like the sea-skimming Dhanush.

435Other 

issues under consideration are Israeli avionics for India’s Russianbuilt fleet of aircraft, tanks, improved artillery systems, fire control 

and thermal imaging systems for tanks, maritime patrol aircraft, 

submarines, and “platforms with longer reach and sustainability at 

sea.” These include the Barak ship-defense missile and UAVs.436 These 

requests come on top of existing purchases of UAVs for all of India’s 

services, avionics, night vision devices, artillery, artillery radars, fast 

attack naval craft, an electronic warfare system for the INS Virat, and 

ammunition.437 Israel is also training up to 3,000 Indian commandos 

in urban warfare and counterinsurgency operations.438 Moreover, 

this cooperation is poised to grow. There are fresh reports that the 

Mossad will train Indian intelligence personnel. Apparently India’s 

Cabinet Committee on Security has decided to solicit Israeli training 

for four new Special Forces battalions which will be stood up to fight 

the insurgency in Kashmir. Likewise, India has already purchased 

several Barak missile systems for its Delhi class destroyers, and 

Israel’s evident willingness to sell the ANAM and the NGD missile 

has been cited above.439

Other projects under consideration clearly suggest Indian interest 

in responding to Pakistan’s acquisition of North Korean SRBMs and 

MRBMs that can strike deep into India, and to China’s development 

of similar conventional and nuclear missiles. Thus India is discussing 

acquisition of an aerial attack vehicle configured for striking ballistic 

missiles during their boost phase. India has also asked Israel for 

advanced surveillance equipment and an ABM defense system 

and received two Israeli Green Pine radars and aerostat balloons 

and UAVs for use both by the Army in Kashmir and by the Navy 

for monitoring and surveillance in the Arabian Sea and around the 

Andaman and Nicobar islands.440
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India’s opening up of its defense sector to foreign investment 

creates opportunities not only for Israeli investors and for the 

acquisition of licenses for domestic production from Israel, France, 

Russia, etc., but it also creates greatly expanded opportunities for 

America both directly and through the provision of Israeli assistance, 

much of which is contractually tied to American assistance. Indian 

elites know this and value the Israeli tie in part because it opens 

doors in Washington which were hitherto blocked and which might 

be blocked again.441 As Tellis wrote in 2001,

It is worth noting that India’s interest in Russian strategic technology 

is accompanied by a growing interest in French and Israeli technology. 

The parallelism in these cases is fascinating: all three states are seen as 

repositories of critical strategic technologies of interest to India; all three 

states are seen to be sufficiently independent of U.S. political pressure as 

far as transferring many technologies to India is concerned; and all three 

states are perceived to be driven more by commercial considerations 

than by ideological interests, and even these, to the degree that they exist, 

are viewed as aligned with rather than oppposed to Indian perceptions. 

Consequently, it is not unreasonable to expect that India’s strategic 

ties with each of these countries will grow, both in connection with its 

strategic programs and otherwise.442

 However, the opportunities now being generated to acquire freer 

access to American civilian and defense technologies, as well as to 

weapons systems, open up opportunities for both parties to strengthen 

their ties and to enhance India’s own defense capabilities through 

the invigoration of cooperation. That cooperation would facilitate 

not just licensing or direct sales, but would also help India overcome 

the problems that have hampered its quest for indigenization. This 

hardly means the millennium is at hand for Indian defense. But it 

does offer it new posibilities that should be seized if India truly wants 

to materialize the expansive security agenda that its elites share.

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CHAPTER 11

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ARMS SALES 

IN INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

 While India’s wish list to Jerusalem is expansive, it pales in 

comparison to what India wants from Washington. That “wish list” 

is still more expansive and revealing of the scope of Indian policy 

ambitions, as shown in Defense Minister George Fernandes’ visit to 

Washington in 2001. India then requested:

 • Land, sea, and air-based communication and surveillance 

platforms and systems;

 • Testing facilities for land, sea, and air-based weapons, avionics, 

electronic warfare equipment, and radar;

 • Small arms and other infantry gear;

 • Testing equipment for defense research programs, including 

command and control weapons and laser weapons;

 • Air defense network management; and,

 • Current and future training concepts.443

 India’s wish list from the United States regarding civilian and dualuse technology transfer is equally expansive. At a July 2003 meeting 

of the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), 

a group that brings together private business and governmental 

officials, a discussion of specific proposals for joint development in 

defense technology included the following items: Communications 

systems, including multiplexer and frequency hopping systems, 

satellite networks, information security, encryption technologies and 

solutions; minesweeper technology; shipbuilding; combat aircraft; 

development of precision guided munitions, including laser guided 

munitions; nanotechnology; UAV technology and associated sensors; 

data links for airborne and vehicular surveillance platforms; software 

development; manufacture of electronic components; test equipment; 

tanks and armored vehicles, missiles, rockets, and launchers; radar 

and sonar systems; air defense systems; torpedoes and mines; and 
124

small arms and guns.444 India’s abiding fears that America is not 

a reliable supplier and confusion about export controls, plus the 

fact that actual release of exports is much slower than the declared 

policy, India’s own cumbersome bureaucratic deformities regarding 

a lengthy acquisition process, and a lack of interoperability between 

both forces also figured prominently in the discussion.445

 In practice, of course, the Indian government cannot address so 

extensive a list of desired technologies and/or weapons systems to 

Washington. Nevertheless, this list shows the desire for partnership 

even under the existing obstacles and the expansiveness of Indian 

objectives. The government’s official requests to Washington also 

show this expansive Indian perspective. For example, in April 

2003, the plan prepared for the Indian military developed by the 

Directorate of Defense Policy and Planning for the Army, Air Force, 

and Navy advocated a rapid reaction capability for real-time troop 

deployment to countries along the rim of the Indian Ocean to create 

a defense umbrella for them. This plan, “India’s Strategic Vision,” 

envisions cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, 

and Vietnam. And it comports with Vajpayee’s directives above. 

However, it cannot be carried out, given India’s lack of fast long-range 

aircraft with aerial refueling capabilities, Airborne Early Warning 

and Command (AEW&C) aircraft, attack helicopters, and a carrier in 

addition to the existing INS Virat carrier. These deficiencies, which 

the report insists cannot be made up by India’s defense industry, put 

it at a disadvantage relative to China, which allegedly can project 

major power into the Indian Ocean area. Therefore, the only way to 

acquire these capabilities is through foreign suppliers.446

 More recent reports suggest that planning for anti-Chinese 

contingencies is still driving much of India’s defense acquisitions 

policy, particularly with regard to naval and air forces, while the 

Army is still tasked with contingencies closer to home that primarily 

target Pakistan and the terrorists it has supported. The Indian Defense 

Forces’ new strategic plan mandates the purchase of submarines and 

maritime patrol aircraft like the P-3C and the development of littoral 

warfare capabilities. The Army must prepare to fight intense, short 

wars against the backdrop of terrorism and possible nuclear threats. 

Meanwhile, the Air Force is to buy up to 125 multirole aircraft and 
125

upgrade aging air defense systems.447 And despite the improved 

Sino-Indian dialogue,

India plans future acquisitions based on a scenario involving conflict 

with China, a Defense Ministry official said. The Agni-3 nuclear-capable 

missile, with a range of 3,000 kilometers, is ready for testing, and the IndoRussian BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile, with a range of 290 kilometers, 

will enter Indian Navy service in 2005, the official said. The Air Force also 

received its fifth Il-78 serial tanker from Uzbekistan, which will enable 

the service’s SU-30MKI and Mirage 2000-H combat aircraft to fly deep 

inside China.448

 All these requests, as well as existing programs that are bringing 

new weapons into active service, suggest the breadth and scope of 

Indian goals and the capabilities that India seeks to acquire in order 

to play the great role it envisions for itself in Asia. And the large 

scope of India’s requests might also explain at least some of the U.S. 

bureaucracy’s earlier hesitancy in giving these systems and platforms 

to India, even though arms manufacturers now see great potential in 

the Indian market, thanks to the Pentagon’s intervention. Indeed, in 

August 2003, the Pentagon showed its approval for sale of the Orion

and for a “deep submarine rescue vehicle,” and for intelligence 

equipment and sensors that would allow India to monitor passage 

through Kashmir by terrorists and other infiltrators. Indian reports 

also said that the Pentagon cleared numerous other export licenses 

that were being held up in the bureaucracy even as late as November 

2004, i.e., up until just before public word of the projected U.S. arms 

sales to India were announced.449 However, the combined force of 

India’s needs and capabilities, coupled with the transformation of 

U.S. policy regarding arms sales and technology transfer discussed 

above suggest that we may now be crossing a threshold in the bilateral 

relationship with regard to arms sales and technology transfer.

 Still, there are obstacles to the realization of such transfer, e.g., the 

rivalry between the State and Defense Departments that pertains to 

India. As noted above, the State Department and particularly the U.S. 

arms control community, much of which is lodged there, emphasizes 

the proliferation perspective when it looks at India. That perspective, 

regardless of whether it is justified or not, is clearly conducive to the 

obstruction of arms sales to India because of continuing unhappiness 
126

over its nuclearization. Evidently some officials there still believe 

that India can be kept from being formally declared a nuclear power 

state by punishing it through the withholding of conventional arms 

and military technologies, including perhaps nuclear related ones. 

Thus Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John S. Wolf 

told the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 

Review Conference on the Nonproliferation treaty that,

Turning to South Asia, our focus there is not on compliance, as neither 

India nor Pakistan is a party to the NPT. While we remain committed to 

universal NPT adherence, our focus in South Asia has been and remains 

on preventing actions that would undermine the global nonproliferation 

regime and regional stability—be it through nuclear testing, deployment, 

nuclear use, or proliferation to other countries. The United States has an 

active dialogue with both countries on these issues. We have taken steps 

recently with both countries to strengthen relations in order to advance 

our regional goals, enhance the fight against terrorism, and to secure 

cooperation from both countries on export controls. These steps should 

not, however, be taken to suggest that we have “accepted” the status of 

either country as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. We have not. 

Moreover, we will not reward either country for their decisions to acquire 

nuclear weapons or for the 1998 tests that made the world and the region 

a more dangerous place. We have steadfastly avoided taking any actions 

that would be contrary to our long-established nuclear export control 

policy. India and Pakistan remain ineligible under U.S. law and policy for 

any significant assistance to their nuclear programs. We continue to call 

on India and Pakistan not to conduct nuclear tests, to end the production 

of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to take steps to reduce regional 

tensions and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.450

Obviously such a position flatly contradicts the logic embodied in 

the NSSP and the President’s offer of weapons to India.

 State Department officials also are extremely alarmed (and 

with good reason) about the possibility of Indo-Pakistani conflicts 

breaking out over Kashmir or other issues, even though that has not 

stopped either side from developing nuclear weapons indigenously. 

State Department officials publicly cite both India’s and Pakistan’s 

possession of nuclear weapons as a threat to American interests and 

troops because they are a factor that can ratchet up regional instability. While formally this may be true, this assessment, Indians 

reply, omits to mention that Pakistan has used terrorism as a weapon, 
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secure in the knowledge that it can match escalation. Thus each side’s 

nuclear weapons serve rather different purposes and have rather 

different consequences, which are not equal either for the region or 

for the United States.451

 The State Department’s emphasis on nonproliferation emerged 

clearly in a speech by then Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass 

who stated on January 7, 2003:

Despite this impressive list of areas of joint cooperation, there is more 

we can work on together. Security cooperation tops the list. A key 

component of our growing security collaboration must be geared toward 

stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The United States 

and India share a common interest in bringing about a world where 

materials and technologies for the production of chemical, biological, and 

nuclear weapons are difficult to acquire. India has shown its willingness 

to identify proliferators; we do, however, look for even more aggressive 

Indian action on this front, and are prepared to work together and share 

experiences to help India achieve our common goal of stopping onward 

proliferation.452

 In fact, it is rather doubtful if India shares this aim, at least so 

far as its ability to acquire new nuclear technologies and capabilities 

is concerned, given its nuclear weapons development programs. 

While India certainly opposes other states’ nuclearization and does 

not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it is unclear 

if it really holds the State Department’s view, or does so as intensely 

as does the State Department. As Tellis points out, based upon 

the Indian policy framework cited above, which is taken from his 

magisterial study of Indian nuclear policy,

The current global nuclear regime therefore influences the future direction 

of India’s nuclear regime in at least one straightforward manner: it makes 

denuclearization impossible, and to the extent that it allows the nuclear 

weapon states to continually maintain and perhaps improve their arsenals 

even if only in qualitative terms, makes further Indian movement in the 

direction of denuclearization all the more likely. 453

 Moreover, India shares the principles of U.S. nonproliferation 

policy but dissents from their application to the region because of 

India’s proximity to China and Pakistan and its commitment to 
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democratic and restrained defense policies.454 In addition, India 

fears that the application of this nonproliferation policy is inherently 

discriminatory, since Washington will not abide by the strictures 

it preaches to others and that India would then be locked out of 

key avenues for enhancing its security. Furthermore, this logic 

leads Indian policymakers into an acceptance of Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons. Indeed, they apparently argue that Pakistan should now 

feel more secure by virtue of having them and thus be able to curtail 

such manifestations of its abiding insecurity like the support for 

terrorism.455

 Nevertheless, the State Department and its spokesmen, including 

Blackwill when he was ambassador, regularly emphasize that one 

of the main common interests of the two states is stopping nuclear 

proliferation, even though he was also at pains to insist that America 

was a reliable friend and supplier of technology.456 This State 

Department’s stress on nonproliferation and desire to arraign India 

for its nuclearization in 1998 is an immense source of frustration to 

Indians, especially as they view technology transfer and the ending 

of sanctions and other obstructions to military sales as touchstones 

of the seriousness and genuineness of the bilateral relationship. 

Furthermore, it aligns Washington with China’s opposition to 

according India formal status as a nuclear power, clearly a sign that 

Beijing still seeks to confine India to a lower, purely regional status 

as an Asian player, while it reaps the benefits and status of being a 

recognized nuclear power.457 From India’s standpoint, that ranking 

is intolerable both politically and psychologically. Neither does the 

State Department’s stance preclude India’s nuclearization or the 

development of its weapons arsenal, since there are others who will 

gladly sell whatever Washington denies. As C. Raja Mohan writes,

The administration must also consider that a technology-denial regime 

against India makes little sense because it ignores recent technological 

developments in India; disregards New Delhi’s emerging capability 

to export sensitive technologies, even while it remains outside the 

international architecture constructed to manage WMD proliferation; and 

belies U.S. proclamations of a strategic partnership with New Delhi.458

 Ultimately the withholding of recognition of India as a nuclear 

power also allows Pakistan to escape constraints and represents 
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a policy of feeling virtuous rather than doing the right thing 

strategically, since there is no evidence that withholding that status 

has stopped other powers from proliferating; quite the opposite. 

Therefore, Indian elites, be they important correspondents and 

observers like C. Raja Mohan or former military personnel like an 

admiral that MacDonald interviewed, all speak bluntly about the 

consequences of the State Department’s and general bureaucratic 

obstruction here.459 C. Raja Mohan writes that,

Where arms control is concerned, the nonproliferation establishment in 

Washington has not been willing to match the intellectual boldness of the 

Bush administration. Many officials at the political level in Washington 

recognize that India could be a partner in managing the new challenges 

that arise from the proliferation of WMD. Caught up in the old verities, 

by contrast, the American arms-control bureaucracy continues to see 

India as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. Unless 

there is some fresh thinking about India in the American arms-control 

community, talk of a new relationship between the two countries will 

likely remain on paper.460

 Similarly, a retired brigadier told MacDonald that,

Until the United States changes its approach to nonproliferation, its 

policies will be seen as a threat to India’s security interests. Current U.S. 

policy is intended to deny India technologies. Moreover, not only does 

the U.S. Government deny India technologies, it actively blocks other 

countries from selling India technologies (e.g., Israel). For Indians, this is 

a direct affront to their security interests.461

 While India’s actual nuclear capability has apparently been a key 

factor in influencing the Bush administration’s overall approach to 

it, the strong pockets of opposition to military sales to India within 

Congress and the Executive Branch bureaucracy are clearly regarded 

by Indians as a major obstacle to any genuine strategic cooperation. 

This makes Vajpayee’s willingness to accept U.S. supervision over 

the missile defense program in 2003 all the more bold a proposal 

in the context of Indian perceptions. For example, Sahgal criticized 

the U.S. dilatory attitude toward technology transfers as well as the 

bureaucratic structure for policymaking toward India and writes 

that,
130

The centrality of technology transfers in building a strong and enduring 

relationship is underestimated. From the Indian perspective, technology 

transfers are the touchstone for forging a long and stable strategic 

relationship, in particular dual use technologies, space technologies, and 

those related to nuclear risk reduction. U.S. righteousness in this regard 

is distressing particularly when much more advanced technologies have 

been sold to its strategic competitor, China. Long bureaucratic delays on 

account of differences between the departments of State and Defense, 

particularly when attempts are made to hyphenate India and Pakistan 

under the maxim of regional stability. Another area of differences relates to 

structural concerns. What is particularly irksome is the strategic rationale 

of dealing with the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) when 

India’s central concerns lie in [the] Central Command (CENTCOM).462

 Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal similarly told an audience 

at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in February 2003 

that, while there has been much progress in deepening cooperation 

in science and technology to overcome past constraints, there is still 

much work to do. Accordingly,

A broad cooperation in science and technology and a more robust trade in 

high technology areas should be an important element of our strategy to 

stimulate our overall economic relations, because in so many ways India 

and the United States are already pioneering international partnerships 

in knowledge-intensive industries.463

This cooperation already began to appear in the February 2003 

technology agreement between the United States and India. A bilateral 

technology cooperation group has been formed to promote high-tech 

trade and thus remove many of the barriers that have impeded such 

trade in the past. At the same time, the agreement recognizes the need 

to prevent dual-use exports of sensitive technology as prohibited 

by U.S. export control laws.464 While there are high hopes in India’s 

high-tech sector due to this agreement, in a sense it exemplifies some 

of the problems involved in bilateral technology transfer. Despite the 

promised reduction of barriers to trade in supposedly purely civilian 

and commercial high technology, it also is clear that the efforts to 

overcome obstacles to expanded technology transfer and investment 

that currently exist in both countries and which impede the kinds 

of relationships called for by Sahgal and Sibal, among others, very 
131

much apply to defense technology that is directly obtainable from the 

United States. This pertains both to entire weapons systems and to 

enabling technologies. Some of these impediments apply, for instance 

to dual-use technologies like nuclear reactors. As a recent paper by 

two members of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

that was written for the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in 

Russia (PIR) observed,

India pressures nuclear reactor suppliers to adapt the nonproliferation 

regime to India’s benefit. India wants access to nuclear reactors and 

other sensitive technologies that have been denied on nonproliferation 

grounds. New Delhi makes such cooperation a test of U.S. willingness to 

elevate Indo-American relations.465

 Unfortunately other states, like Russia and France, supplied 

India with such reactors and might be interested in doing so again if 

nonproliferation strictures could be revised. Indeed, Russia is now 

promoting the idea of floating nuclear reactors and/or plants off 

India’s shore.466 Thus, as in so many other cases, the U.S. Government 

must acknowledge that blocking the transfer of sensitive technologies 

may allow other states to capture that market and for political relations 

with a key state to suffer. It is an abiding dilemma for policymakers 

and for which there are no easy or uniformly correct answers. But 

this consideration raises another reason why it would be quixotic 

to expect that State Department disapproval for the nuclear tests 

of 1998 could effectively translate into India’s denuclearization, or 

that we can punish India for those tests without severe costs in both 

economic and political, not to mention strategic influence over India’s 

government. Like it or not, India has alternatives to U.S. displeasure 

and, while we can impose costs upon New Delhi, they will rebound 

upon us and ultimately not prove decisive because others will be 

only too happy to enter into the breach.

 And the issues involved with the sale of dual-use or more 

specifically military systems to India push these dilemmas to the 

fore. The question of arms sales to India sufaces many of the factors 

or asymmetries in the bilateral relationship with Washington that 

obstruct deepening of this relationship, as well as the immense 

potential benefits for both sides that are now clearly visible to 
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proponents of a deeper and more intimate bilateral strategic 

relationship. India’s military requests, as stated to Washington and 

as seen by its other ongoing acquisitions, also reveal the extent of 

its strategic ambitions and perceptions, which some officials here 

might find objectionable. Despite the lifting of sanctions, only the 

Firefinder radar system has so far been sold to India. Much of the 

reason for the obstacles to completing these deals clearly has been 

the State Department’s obstruction. These sales and discussions 

also highlight the threats India faces, missiles, theater conventional 

war, and terrorism, if not some combination of the three or of any 

two of these contingencies. But they also show us that India’s full 

commitment to being the dominant military player in South Asia 

and its determination to acquire the needed military capabilities to 

realize that ambition.

 However, it is not clear that by doing so, it will achieve peace, 

security, or a lasting partnership with America beyond the Bush 

administration’s current term. If there is to be a lasting partnership, 

the remaining obstacles to it must be cleared away. We have cited 

the bureaucratic rivalry between the DoD and State Department, but 

those rivalries do not, by any means, exhaust the defects cited in 

our bureaucratic structure with regard to Indian policy, as analyzed 

by MacDonald.467 India’s anomalous position between USPACOM, 

which includes India in its AOR, and USCENTCOM, where it is 

absent but Pakistan and Afghanistan are in that command’s AOR, 

causes it to be lost in “a kind of ‘strategic ether’ between two 

powerful unified commands.”468 Indians interviewed by MacDonald 

criticized this bifurcation in policymaking because India’s interests 

regarding Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Gulf cannot 

be discussed in PACOM since those areas are outside of its AOR, yet 

India cannot come to CENTCOM because it is not in CENTCOM’s 

AOR. They also uniformly felt that, because PACOM encompasses 

so many important Asian governments, India’s interests do not 

receive the priority level of attention that they warrant. One highlevel Indian policymaker told MacDonald that,

To understand Indian national interests and India’s potential role in the 

region, the United States must view the Indian Ocean as a region, not a 

bunch of segments. An institutionalized link between CENTCOM and 
133

PACOM that allows the United States to understand India’s role across 

the region is required. Absent an integrated view of the region, the 

relationship will continue to face the communications breakdowns that 

occurred after 9/11. Areas of shared concerns, such as terrorism, Islamic 

fundamentalism, narco-trafficking, and sea lane protection cascade across 

the PACOM and CENTCOM.469

 Yet American officers argue that it is beneficial that these countries 

are separated in the two commands since, otherwise, combatant 

commanders could not achieve relationships of trust and confidence 

with Indian and Pakistani officials. Therefore, they believe the current 

structure allows the U.S. military to build cooperative relationships 

with both those states irrespective of the current state of relations 

between India and Pakistan.470 They also claim that there is sufficient 

interaction between the two commands to allow for the creation of 

good policy relationships with each state and that Indian complaints 

about this division of commands stems from a fundamental 

misapprehension of the role of the combatant and unified commands 

in American defense policy.471 Unfortunately, MacDonald’s evidence 

of a lack of interaction between these commands, and of Indians’ 

clear understanding of the nature of U.S. defense policy organization, 

and the clear demonstration of the astonishing incoherence in our 

national security bureaucracies where India is concerned shows 

these claims to be misconceived and not grounded in reality.472

 In fact, these disjunctions and gaps in mutual perceptions 

that clearly impede effective cooperation testify to the need for 

bureaucratic reform with regard to Indian and U.S. policy. That is 

to say, both Indian and U.S. leaders need to overcome bureaucratic 

impediments to the bilateral relationship. MacDonald’s evidence and 

the strategic realities of an increasingly integrated Asiatic strategic 

space that are now clear to analysts and officials (and not only in the 

United States or India) demonstrate how unwarranted, unjustified, 

and counterproductive complacency is about existing structural 

relationships. From the U.S. viewpoint, India should already be 

regarded, in fact and not just in rhetoric, as a major Asian power 

whose vital interests and points of contact with American policy 

encompass the entire area from the Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, as 

well as global issues like terrorism and nonproliferation.

135

CHAPTER 12

TOWARD THE FUTURE: 

INDO-PAKISTANI-AMERICAN TIES 

AND FUTURE DEFENSE COOPERATION

 A successful U.S. policy towards India will find a way to balance 

our interests and values with India’s interests and values. It also will 

maximize the areas of agreement and consonance, while not allowing 

disagreements to go beyond that phase and corrode the relationship 

as a whole. Given the history of Indo-American relations and the 

current gaps between both states, e.g., on Iraq, the two governments’ 

disparate foreign policy traditions, contemporary political realities in 

both countries, and the problems of making coherent policy toward 

the other state that exist within both bureaucracies, sustaining 

and advancing this partnership will inevitably be a difficult and 

persisting challenge to both governments. However, it is well worth 

it to us not to become disappointed by the size of the challenge or the 

disparities between American and Indian policies and perspectives. 

This is because the potential payoffs to us in Asia and beyond from 

an enduring partnership are enormous and long-lasting.

 A clear-eyed assessment of existing possibilities should be based 

on U.S. interests and values. Those interests dictate, first of all that 

policy work towards the following objectives:

 • Winning the war on terrorism: preventing the al-Qaeda 

and Taliban networks from operating freely and ultimately 

destroying them requires long-term systematic cooperation 

with Pakistan’s armed forces, since they alone can conduct 

sustained operations in that “theater” and their support is 

essential for any operations we might wish to undertake there 

as well.

 • At the same time, it is also essential to help stabilize the overall 

South Asian balance to prevent Pakistan from becoming a 

failed or radical Islamic state. That broad aim is essential to 

preventing the recurrence of Kashmiri and other terrorist 
136

activities and the further inflammation of Indo-Pakistani 

relations. It also is essential to making progress, not just on 

reducing tensions that could ultimately trigger a nuclear 

exchange in South Asia but on helping Pakistan move towards 

greater liberalization and democratization. This requires not 

just military assistance but continuing and even increasing 

the economic dimension of U.S. foreign policy programs in 

South Asia. Moreover, they should include not just India and 

Pakistan, but also the neighboring states of Bangladesh, Nepal, 

and Sri Lanka, since all of them are menaced by conditions that 

could lead to state failure or civil war, and the recruitment of 

many more cadres for terrorism and insurgency against their 

own governments, India, and the United States.473

 • Third, it is essential to act to facilitate the moderation of IndoPakistani tensions so that Pakistan will not feel obliged to 

resort to terrorism, or to support violent Islamic extremism. 

Doing so also lowers the likelihood for either conventional 

or nuclear conflict in the region especially as the latter may 

grow out of the former. Another factor here is that, since 1999 

when both sides became nuclear weapon possessors, there 

have been two crises, Kargil and the crisis of 2001-02, that led 

to low-level conventional conflict between the two armies in 

1999 and then to mobilization of the Indian army in 2002. A 

third such crisis could easily go beyond those levels, especially 

as many in India now profess to hold a doctrine saying that 

India’s conventional superiority now allows it to wage a 

“limited conventional war,” i.e., a war against Pakistan for 

limited objectives using purely conventional means. Whether 

or not they are right, Pakistan holds to a doctrine of nuclear 

first use and the threat of defeat in a conventional war could 

tempt its leaders to throw the nuclear dice to forestall such 

an outcome. Preventing such conflicts is therefore a matter of 

the highest urgency. Since neither side now accepts that we 

should be actual mediators, we need to adopt instead a role as 

facilitator of conflict resolution, but do so with clear objectives 

and policies in mind as discussed below.474 And, in fact, it is 

mainly U.S. pressure on both New Delhi and Islamabad that 
137

has been the catalyst for both sides to begin what amounts 

to a peace process, however fragile, and insecure. While we 

should not be negotiators for either or both sides, we must be 

facilitators and encouragers of this process.

 • Fourth: As the NSS and QDR both proclaim, the administration 

has postulated the long-term goal of forging a new balance 

of power in Asia on behalf of democratic change and against 

any one power’s excessive aggrandizement.475 This obviously 

means China, but it does not have to be containment in its 

classical sense. A robust partnership with a flourishing and 

democratic India whose power is growing will of its own 

accord limit China’s ability to alter that balance in Southeast 

Asia in ways contrary to our own and India’s interests. 

Creation of a pro-democratic balance, as called for in U.S. 

policy documents like the NSS and QDR of 2001 is a vital 

and shared strategic objective for both states whose relevance 

must be kept in view.

 Those objectives are clearly consonant with India’s interests, e.g., 

as expressed in the April 2001 agenda stated above. But achieving 

them together requires special care and sensitivity since India cannot 

be dictated to and will bridle at any such effort. Moreover, it is not an 

ally like other NATO members and seeks partnership, not alliance, 

with America. Therefore exchanges must take place on the basis of 

mutual equality and mutual understanding. So, work in all these 

areas to sustain and advance the partnership must take those factors 

into account. For instance, any cooperation with Pakistan that is 

not explained in advance to India and that is not taken as part of 

a broader strategic approach to keep both those states as partners 

with us is bound to undermine our relationships with either one or 

both of those states. Therefore, as policy moves forward, we must 

maintain constant coordination with both governments concerning 

our initiatives there, not in order to give one or the other a veto or 

blank check, but in order to keep them both within a framework 

where common or at least harmonious interests can be advanced 

together and by joint action.

 The United States needs a strategic perspective on South Asia 

that transcends but includes the current war on terrorism where 
138

Pakistan is the second front. While the foregoing analysis challenges 

the standpoint taken by analysts like Norman Friedman, that India 

is or was “irrelevant” to the war on terrorism, there is no question 

that Pakistan’s support is vital and urgent, even if its considerable 

support also is laced with a good deal of backsliding and temporizing 

due to the strong position of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistani 

politics and the resonance of the Kashmir issue there.

 Today the distinctions between U.S. and Indian perceptions 

pertain with particular force to South Asian issues and relationships, 

especially Pakistan and the issues involved in the Indo-Pakistani 

relationship. Assuming that genuine strategic partnership among 

India, Pakistan, and the United States against terrorism and other 

future threats is desirable is not necessarily an Indian view. But it 

certainly should represent the objective toward which Washington 

should strive, since such a partnership also reduces the likelihood 

of other potential threats in Asia. Specifically, such a partnership 

reduces China’s incentives and ability to meddle in South Asia’s 

troubled waters and opportunities for both Beijing and Islamabad to 

continue the reckless policies of proliferation that are now causing 

international insecurity across much of Asia, even to the point of 

becoming a major problem for China.476 At the same time, progress 

towards Indo-Pakistani conflict resolution now accords with the 

interests of both Russia and China because of the threat they both 

perceive from the terrorist virus that has been let loose in South and 

Central Asia.477 This partnership also imposes a severe penalty upon 

Pakistan for continuing to support terrorism and pressures it to both 

combat terrorism actively, as it has done, and to move, however 

cautiously and reluctantly, towards a genuine dialogue with India. 

However, for America to move steadily and successfully towards 

this outcome, it needs to begin with a realistic assessment of the 

current situation.

 Many Indian analysts now argue that China is the principal rival of 

both India and Washington and that Washington needs India to meet 

the Chinese and/or Muslim challenges successfully. Consequently, 

the United States has a fundamental stake in the growing capability 

of India to provide a major counterweight to forces in Asia that are 

clearly antagonistic towards American interests. “Washington has 
139

yet to realize that India can play the role of a major friendly power 

only if it is able to secure and preside over a stable and legitimate 

order in South Asia.”478

 However, the legitimacy of the regional order must precede any 

recognition of India’s presiding over it, which would be the natural 

outcome, given its power and a three-way partnership with Pakistan 

and the United States. That means Pakistan must also agree to a 

new regional order and to some sense of the legitimacy of India’s 

leading position there. This requires that Pakistan not feel its security 

threatened if it is to live in peace with India and acknowledge its 

superior regional and continental position. Only the United States 

can provide that reassurance and deterrence of both sides needed to 

sustain such a regional order.479 Indeed, there is no way for Indian 

power to be regionally secure without a prior establishment of both 

its legitimacy and a consensus with Pakistan on that basis. Thus 

the partnership which we must now build with India and Pakistan 

must create its own legitimacy to be recognized by both sides and 

be truly effective. At the same time, America’s growing intimacy 

with India and Pakistan already has sparked a frank dialogue that 

forges consensus rather than simply assumes either that consensus’s 

prior existence or that India (or Pakistan) will act according to 

our perception of its interests and conform to our interests and 

objectives.480

 Beginning with this recognition of reality, we can undertake 

to forge a real and lasting partnership that will outlast the present 

governments in both countries and conform to both states’ deepest 

values and strategic interests. For this purpose, both political and 

institutional steps are needed here. The political steps comprise both 

the vision upon which an enduring and genuine partnership must be 

based and the diplomatic precepts that should govern U.S. strategy 

and conduct toward India and the agenda of regional security where 

India is a player. The institutional steps are concrete actions that the 

U.S. Government and its departments should carry out, not just 

including specific policies, e.g., concerning technology transfer, but 

also in adapting the institutional structure of government so that it 

can maximize the gains that we hope to obtain from cementing a 

long-term partnership.
140

 First, the administration needs to devise a more unified approach 

to India and to the subcontinent as a whole. It is clear that the State 

Department and Congress are inclined to worry more about India 

as a nuclear state and proliferator than to see it in the regional 

context as a strategic partner of the United States. The Pentagon, 

on the other hand, sees India mainly through the lens of strategic 

partnership and regional security, rather than as a potential threat 

by virtue of the nuclear issue and Pakistani provocations. Thus, 

there is an organizational and conceptual disjunction affecting policy 

toward South Asia throughout the administration, with the State 

Department emphasizing the threat from proliferation by both sides 

in South Asia and responses drawn from the traditional repertoire 

of arms control. DoD, for its part, manifests a skeptical attitude 

toward those traditional precepts of arms control and deterrence. 

Hence it promotes the transfer of missile defenses to India.481 As long 

as the struggle between these two departmental views continues 

unabated or unless it is superseded by new paradigms through 

which to view the subcontinent, U.S. policy there will fail to achieve 

a lasting strategic partnership with either India or Pakistan. That is 

because the basis upon which Washington then will approach this 

region will be an internally unstable one, and rival bureaucracies 

will sabotage each other’s initiatives. To make this argument does 

not mean to minimize either the dangers from the situation in South 

Asia, or to overlook the real gains that could accrue to both India 

and the United States from a partnership seen primarily through the 

perspective of common threats facing both states in Asia. Rather, 

it is a call for the administration to establish a consensus within 

itself and for subsequent administrations to do likewise concerning 

what is most important and enduring in this relationship and to 

proceed on a bilateral basis from there. Likewise, recent research 

has found that the structure that ties together civilian agencies and 

regional combatant commanders is seriously defective and in need 

of substantial reform.482 These findings apply across the globe, not 

just to India and Pakistan. But they clearly inhibit the formulation 

and implementation of truly strategic and well-conceived policies. A 

more auspicious basis for addressing the American relationship with 

India actually would be to focus upon or emphasize those features 

of both states that are held in common, beginning with the fact that 
141

they are both multi-confessional and ethnic secular democracies.

 Second, their vital interests are threatened by Islamic terrorism, 

which deliberately has targeted them. These two points, it should 

be noted, also may be applied to Israel, which is why some groups 

in both countries talk of a kind of triple alliance among those three 

states.483 

 Third, both states share a common interest in constraining the 

growth of Chinese power and influence in Asia, and are opposed to 

one of the main instruments of China’s counterpolicy for restraining 

their capabilities in Asia; namely, China’s creation of a ring of 

proxies to whom it is proliferating technology and systems both of a 

conventional and nuclear nature.484

 Fourth, they increasingly have compatible, if not convergent, 

economic interests, and South Asia is a great field for both to 

develop. 

 Fifth, their common interest in democracy, opposition to terrorism, 

attempts to forestall and oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

and concern about China’s intentions suffices to create a strong 

basis for partnership, even if the economic link between them was 

tenuous and would do so even under the present conditions of IndoChinese rapprochement. However, both the Indian and American 

governments also need to eliminate barriers to each other’s trade 

and investment in their respective countries and create a viable 

basis for future transactions involving military weapons systems, 

technologies, and dual-use systems.

 On the basis of a common opposition to terrorism and emphasis 

on democracy, they also can approach Pakistan individually, or 

together as the case may be, to induce it to take steps to democratize 

its polity; liberalize its social, economic, and religious institutions; 

and, in general, ameliorate conditions along the Line of Control. 

Therefore, it is urgent that we craft a better and more workable 

approach to the question of Pakistan’s role in the anti-terrorist alliance 

and in regional security in South Asia. The urgency of preventing a 

return to power by terrorists in Afghanistan or the failure of the state 

in Pakistan—unquestionably a strategic nightmare for India and not 

its desired outcome—impels the administration to see South Asia in 

a broader strategic perspective than the war on terrorism. It may not 
142

be satisfactory to us, but it could well be the case for both India and 

the United States that the Musharraf regime is the best one available, 

given what Pakistan’s internal political landscape has come to look 

like. It already is clear that stability in Central Asia, now a much more 

important theater of operations than previously was the case, also is 

imperiled by the prospect of destabilization in either Afghanistan 

or Pakistan. Those outcomes would enhance terrorist and Jihadi 

capabilities in Southeast Asia tremendously as well as in the Middle 

East, making the stabilization of South Asia probably just as urgent 

a matter of security for those two regions as well. And, of course, as 

many have pointed out, a collapse of the regime in Pakistan could 

lead to the following “nightmare outcomes”: transfer of nuclear 

weapons to Jihadi control or to elements that would allow those 

elements to conduct more terrorist actions abroad under protection 

of the “extended deterrence” offered by those weapons. Then those 

Jihadi elements could resort to nuclear blackmail, if not actual use 

of those weapons, and/or to carry out more operations like the 1999 

Kargil attacks. All of those possibilities represent nightmare scenarios 

for all concerned.

 The quest for equilibrium and balance over and above the need to 

defeat terrorism, and to realize common interests across Asia, makes 

it equally important to overcome, or reverse, or alleviate Indian 

perceptions that Pakistan is not much more than China’s instrument 

for containing the rise of Indian power, harassing Indian efforts to 

break out of the South Asian “ghetto,” and a legitimate outlet for 

Chinese proliferation, which can then go on to other, even more 

dangerous destinations like Iran and North Korea.485 Washington 

must be able to exercise not just a restraining influence upon Pakistan, 

but also become a decisive, if not the decisive, interlocutor for it to 

subsume Indo-Chinese and South Asian rivalries in this framework of 

equilibrium. There are signs that such an exercise might be possible, 

but we cannot underestimate the difficulties along the way to such 

an amelioration, not to mention a resolution, of existing tensions.

 The difficulties are clear to observers. As reported by the Far 

Eastern Economic Review, Islamic fundamentalism in the Pakistani 

army is growing, officers have recently been arrested for aiding 

al-Qaeda, which operates increasingly with the toleration of the 

Army in Pakistan, and the Army until recently has “turned a blind 
143

eye” to terrorists crossing into Kashmir. This is in addition to two 

assassination attempts against Musharraf on December 14 and 25, 

2003, which indicated, as he admitted, penetration of the army and 

of his inner circle as well.486 This “unreliability” of the Pakistani 

armed forces is, or should be, unacceptable for Washington, since 

numerous reports testify to the continuing help rendered by these 

fundamentalist parties to the Taliban and other terrorist groups 

inside Pakistan as they continue to fight the United States. Nor is 

it acceptable to New Delhi for obvious reasons. Consequently, it is 

not surprising that under U.S. prodding, there have been several 

Pakistani offensives into its tribal area to uproot the Taliban, alQaeda, and other terrorists.

 These considerations demonstrate a community of interests 

between New Delhi and Washington that terrorism in or potentially 

supported by Pakistan must be fought resolutely. Yet while American 

officials publicly extol the support given by Pakistan to us in the war 

on terrorism, this only frustrates India more since Indian analysts 

believe that this terrorism is orchestrated, or at least tolerated, from 

the top of Pakistan’s government and military, and that we are 

inclined to play it down in the interests of having Musharraf take on 

the Taliban or al-Qaeda.487 Likewise, any hint of arms sales to Pakistan 

generates what Dixit called whining, as noted above.488 While Indian 

analysts apparently display little hope that Pakistan will desist from 

terrorism, Pakistan’s government had maintained well into 2004 the 

argument that it proclaimed in 2002 that it has gone as far as it can 

and that it is up to India to launch initiatives to resolve outstanding 

issues, among them Kashmir.489 However, until now, India clearly 

has wanted Pakistan to be put into the dock, arraigned, tried, and 

convicted, even though doing so is beyond anyone’s capability. It 

is possible that gestures such as the announcement of a nuclear hot 

line between India and Pakistan in June 2004 might lead to further 

agreements that actually do something about the sponsorship of 

anti-Indian terrorism.490 But until now, naturally the result has been 

considerable disappointment in America’s failure to break this 

modus vivendi and the support of many politically active Pakistanis 

for the Jihadi groups operating against both Washington and India’s 

interests. As a result, there have been many Indian expressions, even 
144

from high-ranking officials, of frustration with Washington and 

anger at its double standards and unwillingness to, as they see it, 

fully take Indian interests and desires into account.491

 In order for a consensus among India, Pakistan, and the United 

States to grow, Pakistan must fully understand that, having called 

terrorists into being to serve its own anti-Indian policies, it now finds 

itself threatened by its own creation. Yet it will take years to uproot 

the terrorist virus and its deep-rooted causes inside Pakistan, a task 

that entails reversing the whole recent trajectory of Pakistani policies, 

moving over time towards a solution with India on outstanding 

issues; reversing Pakistan’s domestic political course; and moving 

towards democratization and economic development, rather than 

toward military posturing and incitement of violence in Afghanistan, 

Central Asia, and Kashmir.492 Overcoming the myriad threats to 

Pakistan must take time and must involve a positive dialogue with 

India that may in many respects be unpleasant for India, given its 

heavy-handed response to the violence in Kashmir.

 Practical steps are needed here urgently, given the stakes 

involved. Since it will not be accepted as a mediator and has therefore 

shunned this role, Washington ought to facilitate this dialogue and 

repeat its activities in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs. 

This kind of dialogue is essential if Pakistan is to stop being a threat 

to the regions it inhabits and instead become a factor for stability, 

an outcome that is manifestly in India’s interests, as that alone will 

allow it to play the broader Asian role it clearly craves. Therefore, 

support for such a dialogue and for its positive reinforcement by 

mutually satisfactory agreements over time on outstanding issues 

large and small is equally manifestly in Washington’s interests. The 

question is how to facilitate this process and enhance America’s now 

unique interlocutor status with the two South Asian governments 

without being trapped in the struggles between them.

 Several recent writings by both Indian and American authors 

suggest practical steps that can be undertaken to facilitate this 

dialogue. First we must continue to realize that the intense U.S. 

effort to defuse Indo-Pakistani tensions since 2002 has opened up 

space for India and Pakistan to begin to discuss outstanding issues, 

including Kashmir, and for Washington to assist them in doing so. 
145

Now both states have several commercial and security incentives 

to enlist Washington on their side as they have done in nuclear 

crises. This facilitates Washington’s ability to engage in a process 

of helping them to negotiate solutions to outstanding issues over 

time.493 Washington enjoys that status as a privileged interlocutor, 

especially as both sides have tried repeatedly to entice it to join their 

side or accept their view of the numerous recent crises in South Asia. 

This pattern of behavior whereby both sides resort to provocative 

actions intended to elicit an equally, if not more provocative response 

which can then be used to arraign the other side in Washington is all 

too frequent an occurrence.494 Indeed, an examination of the recent 

crises involving India and Pakistan that revealed the possibility of 

escalation, even to the nuclear level, indicates that strong diplomatic 

action by Washington was essential to prevent these crises from 

escaping control and becoming hot wars.495 As this study also 

indicated that both sides “had learned nothing and forgotten nothing” 

and were therefore predisposed to play games of chicken with each 

other and launch provocative crises, Washington’s role is therefore 

vital.496 Given both sides’ nuclear capabilities, such “games” as the 

Kargil offensive in 1999 or the use of terrorism and India’s coercive 

diplomacy in reply during 2001-02 can bring about precisely the crisis 

that nobody professes to want. Thus, in fact, although administration 

spokesmen claim that “in every instance, Indian and American 

objectives, far from being antithetical are complementary,” this 

assertion is not quite true.497 But they can become more convergent 

than was previously the case. Even if many Indians, as these officials 

profess, want Pakistan to achieve a “soft landing,” it is not clear that 

Pakistan does or can do so or that this will remain the policy of the 

Indian government if Pakistan refuses to meet its initiatives or stop 

supporting terrorism against it.498 Therefore a well-organized political 

strategy on the administration’s part is needed to bridge the gaps 

between both India and Pakistan so that they can reduce tensions 

between them, devise an enduring and viable mechanism by which 

they can continue to seek to reduce conflicts, and both work together 

with America in a redefined political environment where all sides 

can realize important and possibly even vital interests.

 Second, Washington should avoid taking a position on the final 

outlines of an accord concerning Kashmir or other issues. Rather, 
146

it should support activities like Track Two and regional dialogues, 

encourage foreign investment in both states and Kashmir, tailor its 

assistance to democratizing projects, and emphasize that the issue 

in Kashmir is primarily a human rights, or democratic, issue. This 

avoids getting entangled in each side’s claims, actually maximizes 

the interests of all concerned, and facilitates a final settlement.499

 Third, the framework for a resolution must include the cessation 

of Pakistani support for cross-border terrorism and violation of 

the current cease-fire; efforts to facilitate conflict resolution and 

confidence-building between India and Pakistan; and free, fair, and 

nonviolent elections to the state assembly on India’s side of Kashmir. 

Likewise, as cross-border terrorism diminishes, India can begin to 

thin out its deployments at the border.500

 Given the intensity and obduracy with which both sides now hold 

to their positions, Washington always will come under pressure from 

both sides to lean towards one or the other. While it may be true that, 

as former Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated, “we probably 

have the best relations we have had with India and Pakistan now than 

in many, many years,” it is by no means assured that we can maintain 

that situation and keep both states in an alliance against Islamic 

terrorism without a well-conceived and active policy. Nevertheless, 

the return of both parties to composite negotiations (their phrase) 

over all the issues that divide them that was announced in January 

2004 and the progress, albeit limited, since then, are very much due 

to American diplomacy. And this effort must be continued and 

reinforced.501 Policy toward India or Pakistan also always will have 

to take account of the regional dimension of this relationship and the 

impact of our decisions upon the third member of this “triangle.” 

Making the need for a more important clear-sighted, yet adroit policy 

is the absence of factors of a political or structural nature that could 

serve, absent U.S. diplomacy, as mediating forces in Indo-Pakistani 

crises. The absence of such forces both reinforces and stems from 

both sides’ tendencies to launch and escalate crises suddenly and 

heightens the urgency of action to contain those crises, all the while 

validating President Clinton’s observation that South Asia, and 

especially Kashmir, are the most dangerous places on earth.502

 To these considerations, we must add the fact that U.S. concessions 

to Pakistan that are not balanced or appear not to be balanced by 
147

due regard for Indian interests, sensitivities, and perceptions will 

cause bitterness in New Delhi, as noted above. So, as long as Indian 

policymakers see the same facts we do, they will not accept that 

their interests are not to be taken into account. Indeed, from our 

standpoint, taking India’s interests into account and not taking it 

for granted is what this partnership must be about on a day-to day 

basis. Thus Washington must not relax the pressure on Islamabad to 

stop supporting terrorism, either in Kashmir or in Afghanistan; to 

stop proliferating to other countries, either through governmental 

or quasi-private channels; and to ensure the safety of its nuclear 

weapons and materials. In return, Washington should do its utmost 

to ensure that the negotiations now beginning over Kashmir and 

other issues with India move forward.

 While ensuring that neither country is blindsided by our moves 

toward the other is essential, constructing mechanisms where both 

countries and the United States can interact together regularly on 

issues of common concern would also be desirable. Such working 

groups or Track Two programs can provide much useful basis for 

stimulating a mutually beneficial dialogue and for floating new 

initiatives that could ameliorate tensions.503 For example, there is an 

urgent need for large-scale infrastructural and environmental projects 

in Central Asia, in energy and water conservation to be sure, but not 

only there. These projects, which should also include Afghanistan, 

would benefit all sides, and certainly Indian and Pakistani business 

interests would benefit greatly from them. Joint military training 

for local armed forces also could become a possibility if all three 

states and the host governments could agree. A U.S. proposal to 

guarantee the safety of projects like oil and gas pipelines would 

also be beneficial. It would build confidence and shared interests, 

reduce Iran’s ability to make trouble in Central Asia, provide those 

states with needed outlets to the Indian Ocean, and reduce their 

dependence upon Russia’s infrastructure. Track Two dialogues or 

working groups could formulate such proposals while ensuring that 

the trilateral dialogue goes forward.

 This sensitivity needs to be established as well for the bilateral 

defense relationship and security cooperation with India. Policy 

adjustments within a relatively stable framework are the stuff 

of politics, and this is especially to be expected at a time when 
148

governments change or could change, as is the situation in this bilateral 

relationship. Both the Indian and American governments will be 

adjusting their relations to each other based on the balance of factors 

in the relationship so it is obvious that there will be changes from 

the Vajpayee to the Manmohan Singh governments. Nevertheless, 

the new government has made clear that it wants to continue the 

strategic partnership with Washington. That is clear from the recent 

DPG meetings and the result of Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh’s 

visit to Washington in June 2004. Indeed, that was his first foreign 

visit, symbolizing the priority he and the government attach to the 

American connection. Certainly the Bush administration appreciates 

this, for key officials like Secretary Powell have expressed their 

confidence that this relationship will continue largely along previous 

lines.504

 We can see how this newly modulated relationship is taking 

shape from the new government’s initial moves and statements and 

Washington’s corresponding actions. Even though the new Indian 

government has stated that it will (not surprisingly) pursue an 

independent policy in favor of multipolarity in world politics and 

against unilateralism, Natwar Singh also stated that relations with 

Washington are of “exceptional importance” and should not be 

“episodic.” Indeed, India aims to strengthen and deepen those ties.505

As did the previous regime, the new government will seek to deepen 

relations with China. But it is unlikely that it will spurn Japan’s recent 

public offer to establish a “global partnership” with India to balance 

China’s rising power. Indeed, it is already discussing collaboration 

on terrorism and defense cooperation with Japan, evidently in the 

Indian Ocean’s sea lines of communication.506 Similarly, even though 

the regime claims to greatly value its relations with the Islamic world 

and is well aware that some 4 million Indians live in the Middle 

East and are thus hostage to developments there, it will, we are 

told, probably not go further than to condemn certain Israeli actions 

rhetorically, e.g., its operations in Gaza in May-June, 2004. So while 

there will be a new thrust toward perhaps greater balance between 

Israel and the Palestinians and reiteration of support for a Palestinian 

state (hardly a novel approach since both Washington and Jerusalem 

publicly support such an eventual outcome), the new government “is 
149

unlikely to do anything that may jeopardize Delhi’s second-largest 

arms supplier.”507 Instead, as a former diplomat claims,

The India-Israel relationship has acquired substantive content in the past 

which serves the mutual need of both countries. . . . India will carefully 

balance its national interest with other considerations before making any 

policy changes which I don’t think will happen.508

Plans for intensifying infrastructural linkages connecting India to 

Central Asia, especially Afghanistan, and Iran also are going forward 

in line with earlier plans.509

 Military modernization remains the watchword of the 

government, and this will clearly lead it to continue seeking the 

most effective ways to upgrade India’s defense industries and 

defense capabilities. Therefore, the government is apparently going 

to continue mainly along previous lines of foreign acquisitions.510

The package announced in late 2004 and discussed above is further 

evidence of movement towards regularizing arms sales to India. 

Evidently the BJP government’s support for missile defense in 2002 

also helped persuade the administration to support the sale of the 

Phalcon to India. And while Washington is ready to increase military 

ties, including combined military exercises, the domestic cost of 

formally supporting the missile defense program might prove to be 

too much of a burden for the Indian government to bear, even though 

it has said it will debate it fairly.511 Given the Indian government’s 

clear desire to develop this partnership, such tactics might not be the 

most productive way to achieve our broad strategic goals, since they 

immediately thrust controversial issues that not even all of our allies 

accept into the foreground of the agenda.

 At the same time, perhaps the most significant statement of India’s 

defense plans is the release of the semi-classified Indian Maritime 

Doctrine. This doctrine offers real possibilities for enhancing 

cooperation with the U.S. Navy against terrorists; forging broader 

ties based on sales of naval technologies, weapons, and platforms; 

and restraining the growth of Chinese power in the Indian Ocean, 

three shared and key strategic goals. The Indian Navy will implement 

minimum nuclear deterrence by achieving a real SLBM, probably 

from Russia, generate a littoral warfare capability that entails power 
150

projection ashore, and seek to dominate the Indian Ocean Region 

(IOR). The latter objective in particular almost inevitably entails 

closer cooperation with the United States, and especially the U.S. 

Navy, because India and the Pentagon are clearly animated by a 

genuine alarm about the growing capabilities of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).512

 Through force enhancements and acquisitions like the P-3C 

Orions and surface vessels bought from Russia, France, etc., the 

Indian Navy (IN) will extend its capabilities and reach, enabling it 

to undertake new and more distant missions. It will aim to counter 

distant and emerging threats; protect Sea Lines of Communications 

(SLOC); combat piracy; and, most importantly, dominate the IOR 

“choke points, important islands, and vital trade routes.”513 Thus 

later in 2004, the IN will start policing the IOR together with the 

Singaporean, Thai, and Philippine Navies to check piracy, weapons 

smuggling, drug running, and all potential threats to commercial sea 

traffic. According to Commander Uday Bashkar, these actions signify 

India’s reliability and credibility as an ally to ASEAN members and 

to China. To add to its profile, the IN has also stepped up maneuvers 

with the U.S., Russian, French, ASEAN members, Iranian, UAE, and 

Kuwaiti navies.514 So enhanced naval cooperation with America, 

either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis with Southeast Asian 

states and foreign governments’ naval forces, is a real possibility that 

is likely to continue if not increase.

 Even in Iraq, there is an attempt to build bridges despite the strong 

public and parliamentary opposition to the war there. When the UN 

passed Resolution 1546 in June 2004, setting the parameters under 

UN auspices for the transition to a new government until elections 

by January 2005, Natwar Singh indicated that the government would 

have to look carefully at the “changed situation.”515 However, this 

triggered an explosion at home and indicates the limits that still exist 

to this relationship. Although Washington has launched a major 

lobbying campaign to get the new government to support its position 

in Iraq and the presence of Iraqi troops under the terms of Resolution 

1546 and then up to 20,000 troops there, the government’s coalition 

partners, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Left Front, 

have made it clear that any such approval of Washington’s policies 
151

in Iraq, not to mention dispatch of troops, will lead them to call out 

protest marches and demonstrations. Thus the government has had 

to temporize and tell Washington that it cannot yet send troops to 

Iraq, lest the domestic scene unravel.516

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CHAPTER 13

OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES 

TO A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

 This episode, like earlier struggles over Iraq, suggests the obstacles 

to deeper partnership and the problems that must be overcome for 

it to flourish. As long as the government depends on a coalition 

comprising the substantial anti-American left–wing parliamentary 

parties in India, it will be constrained in its approach to America 

and Washington’s agenda. Nevertheless, it is clearly following in 

its predecessor’s footsteps as regards the United States and even 

to a significant degree, Israel. Still, attempts by Washington to 

pressure the government to submit to U.S. policies that are beyond 

the coalition’s or the government’s capability to sustain will unduly 

burden the relationship and could ultimately drag it down. India’s 

domestic politics compel us to tread warily and emphasize those 

areas of the bilateral agenda where joint cooperation can take place 

smoothly and quickly so that we can then build capital to do the 

harder issues together.

 Domestic politics will influence Indian policies of interest to us 

in several directions. Foreign and defense policy may have to take 

more account of coalition partners and necessarily will become 

more consultative and less subject to the governmental ministries’ 

and the Prime Minister’s exclusive discretion. This could also 

entail a probable weakening of the National Security Advisor’s and 

the National Security Council’s power. There will be more of the 

moralism that is bred in the bone of the Congress Party and possibly 

more rhetoric about multipolarity. But it will also be coupled with 

Realpolitik when concrete needs are at stake, a combination that 

tends to alienate many Americans if not handled carefully.517 On the 

other hand, there probably will be continuing pressure from India 

to induce us to compel Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism and 

negotiate in good faith with New Delhi. So, with proper care, the 

relationship can still go forward. Ashwani Kumar, a Congress Party 

member of the upper house of the Parliament, displayed this blend 
154

of moralism and Realpolitik when he told an American audience in 

2003 that,

The inescapable logic of the situation supports a purposive engagement 

between India and the U.S., consistent with a theory of power that allows 

for differences in perspective on some issues. We need to deal candidly 

with differences about both means and ends. There is no escape from a 

brooding moral dimension to a philosophy of power tailored to foster 

international conciliation and peace. Indeed, “without a moral yardstick 

constantly applied to action, the possession of power, large or tiny, is 

always subject to misuse.” Iraq has shown that present ills triumph over 

philosophy. We need to accept that there cannot be a selective war against 

terror and that the processes of armed engagement are as important as 

the ideals that it is intended to support.518

 But candid discussion is not enough, given the constraints 

that exist on policymaking now in both capitals; we also need to 

do more than just not being disagreeable about differences, while 

speaking candidly. We must also constantly and simultaneously 

stress commonalities. We must also avoid needless or thoughtless 

mistakes that compound an already difficult strategic position 

and overcome the obstacles cited above. As we have suggested, 

DoD apparently is gradually wresting control of the issue of arms 

sales away from the State Department, which still seems intent on 

denying India formal recognition or acknowledgment as a nuclear 

power. The administration still has not recognized India as such, 

possibly fearing that other potential proliferators might be further 

emboldened to carry out a nuclear weapons program and thereby 

obtain the benefits that would accrue to India from being recognized 

as a nuclear power. On the other hand, good policy is rarely one that 

is maintained in the face of overwhelming and contradictory facts. 

Regardless of the potential deterrent to other proliferators, there 

does seem to be something of tilting at windmills in maintaining this 

stance rather than at making policy on the basis of existing realities. 

Defending an untenable position regarding India and Pakistan in 

order allegedly to deter proliferation makes little sense.519 It seems 

unlikely that we can achieve our nonproliferation goals by denying 

plain facts that State Department officials clearly acknowledge, 

especially as virtually every bilateral statement raises the point 
155

that both states oppose nuclear proliferation and that this common 

orientation is a factor making for a strategic partnership.520

 While going to the extreme of maintaining for New Delhi 

essentially an open account at the Pentagon is not desirable, a more 

reasonable procedure for screening and evaluating its requests for 

weapons systems and technologies also needs to be in place. This 

is particularly the case now that Pakistan has been declared a nonNATO ally, placing it symbolically on a par with Israel and South 

Korea, and giving it opportunities to receive weapons like the F-16. 

This procedure for handling Indian arms sales requests also must be 

integrated not only with the commitment to global nonproliferation, 

but also to the regional context within which we and New Delhi seek 

to operate either jointly or in parallel. This consideration is one more 

reason why it is eminently desirable that Washington, New Delhi, and 

Islamabad forge a clearer and more permanent working relationship 

among themselves. It also suggests a more active dialogue with India 

concerning Iran.

 Finally, a solid partnership with India helps stabilize Asia beyond 

the subcontinent and enlarges the balance within which a rising China 

will soon appear. Reports indicate that what one journalist calls “the 

outsourcing of global security, with India once again getting the job” 

is accelerating under the Bush administration’s leadership. Even 

though India is determined to retain its strategic autonomy and not 

be excessively dependent on anyone for major political or defense 

goods, there is a clear convergence of aims with the United States on 

many issues affecting Asian security. K. Santhanam, Director of the 

prestigious Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), cites 

security of the oil lanes, the sea lanes of Southeast Asia, and relations 

with China as areas where a “natural convergence” of interests is 

occurring. 521 Other analysts go farther in their assessments of what 

this relationship now means and could mean in the future. For 

example, C. Raja Mohan writes that,

For skeptics, the suggestion of an area of peace in Asia remains wishful 

thinking. It is in fact rooted in the fact that the much feared cold war 

between the United States and China has now been postponed, probably 

indefinitely. It is built on the real potential to deepen the economic 

integration of Asia. It is founded on the recognition that all the major 
156

powers in the region face threats—not from the unrealized geopolitical 

ambitions of the other but from religious extremism and terrorism 

flourishing from many failed and failing states in Asia. The importance 

of the changing nature of great power relations in Asia is not abstract. It 

offers India a rare opportunity to transform the international relations 

of the subcontinent. . . . As the weakest of the great powers, India has 

no reason to choose options of aligning with one great power against 

another. India must instead focus on intensifying its current multidirectional engagement of all the major powers in the region and become 

an indispensable element of the Asian balance of power. A creative Indian 

policy must aim at leveraging the rise of China and Japan and the SinoU.S. entente to transform its own security situation in the subcontinent. 

India is now in a position to mobilize American, Chinese, and Japanese 

power to engineer internal change in Pakistan and nudge it in a direction 

of political moderation and regional economic integration.522

 It is clear that, while he eschews an alliance with Washington, 

he is recommending a strategic partnership to induce Pakistan to 

move toward democracy and away from support for terrorism and 

insurgency in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Tellis similarly observes 

that, not only is there a broad strategic convergence of Indo-American 

aims, there also is a clear hierarchy or division of labor between them 

concerning the regional priorities each one will face in Asia. Thus, 

India certainly will dominate South Asia by virtue of its economic 

and military superiority that translates into geopolitical primacy 

there. It will be able to dominate its immediate periphery, the smaller 

states of the region, and influence outcomes to some degree in more 

outlying but still relatively near areas like Southeast Asia, Central 

Asia, and perhaps even the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly, it will have 

something like a veto power over South Asian developments. At 

the same time, in those Asian areas of critical significance to vital 

U.S. interests that would warrant the commitment of U.S. resources, 

including force on a unilateral basis if necessary, India will “remain 

a peripheral actor.” But as its capabilities grow, so will its influence, 

even if it is limited. And that influence can add to the advancement 

of U.S. and shared interests if relations with New Delhi are managed 

adroitly. These areas and issues include: the security of the Persian 

Gulf, freedom of navigation in Southeast Asian waters, protection 

of Taiwan, and the global, i.e., non-Kashmiri war on terrorism.523 In 

these areas, he writes, the enormous disparity in power capabilities 
157

and resources between Washington and New Delhi will be so stark 

as to render Indian preferences entirely irrelevant.524 Yet,

In such issue areas, however, Indian power could be dramatically 

magnified if it were to be applied in concert with that of the United 

States. In such circumstances, Indian resources could help to ease U.S. 

operational burdens, provide the United States with those benefits arising 

from more robust international solidarity and, in the process, actually 

enhance Indian power in a multiplicity of ways.525

Thus cooperation in those regions would redound substantially to 

both states’ benefit. Certainly, we are seeing precisely this kind of 

outcome in India’s significant assistance to the United States in the 

global war on terrorism.

 Finally, as Tellis even more tellingly observed above, Indian 

power can be most relevant to U.S. policies in the so-called interstices 

of Asian geopolitics where India’s capabilities are strongest and ours 

are most limited, e.g., in Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, 

and in issue-areas like terrorism, narcotics, and the environment.526

As he did above, Tellis postulates three reasons why this form of the 

relationship will not only benefit India but also the United States. This 

Indo-American interaction will take place and be felt most directly 

where Washington has few vital interests. That should minimize 

possible frictions between Washington and New Delhi. Second, as 

regards both Asian and global geopolitics, Indo-American interests 

are convergent. Third, on many issues of great importance to the 

United States—the balance of power in Asia, the security of sea 

lanes in the Indian Ocean, WMD proliferation, terrorism, narcotics 

trafficking, and the rise of religious and secular extremism—Indian 

interests invariably dovetail with those of the United States and as a 

result are likely to evoke active Indian support.527

 At present, some scholars question if there really are deep-going 

and fully shared interests leading to common actions regarding 

the policies of India and America in South Asia. Specifically, it is 

by no means certain to all observers that both these governments 

have fully congruent or at least parallel interests and perceptions 

regarding Indo-Pakistani relations and the local dimensions of the 

war on terrorism that would allow them to make the most of their 
158

relationship with each other. As one assessment of the bilateral 

relationship observes,

But unrestrained giddiness about “paradigm shifts” or a strategic 

rapprochement between India and the United States is premature. To 

the contrary, substantive differences over the nature and goals of IndoAmerican partnership are likely to complicate future relations between the 

world’s two largest democracies. A short list of issues where Washington 

and New Delhi will find it difficult to collaborate would include, Pakistan, 

China, Iran, Iraq, the World Trade Organization, and the future of the 

global nonproliferation regime. India will continue to prefer a multipolar 

world order, whereas the Bush administration, even more than Clinton’s, 

is likely to assert U.S. dominance and insist on Washington’s right to act 

unilaterally.528

 We have already seen this gap between Indo-American 

perceptions happening with regard to Iraq and India’s excellent 

ties to Iran and its stance on global trade further confirms that there 

are real differences with Washington on certain important issues 

in world politics. However, it is by no means correct that previous 

differences of opinion must be decisive or cannot yield to new 

perceptions and policies. The current case of China is an example. 

Even if we assume China to be a strategic competitor for both India 

and Washington and a major architect of a strategy to tie India down 

to being a contested power in South Asia without a more continental 

focus in Asia, e.g., by major proliferation to Pakistan, it is by no means 

foreordained that containment is or will be the necessary response 

of both capitals to China.529 Even as other Asian states, e.g., Japan, 

approach India with calls for partnership that are clearly intended to 

counter China, India, as we saw above, opposes any idea of a policy 

based on containment of China.”530

 This point of view coincides with Tellis’ assessment of India’s 

elite consensus on China cited above, that India’s sense of possible 

threat due to China’s rising power did not mandate a direct 

confrontation with China, but rather merely a steady buildup of 

its own multidimensional capabilities and resources for regional 

competition, which suffices to check China’s ambitions and make 

India more worthy of being seen as a genuinely equal strategic 

partner of America in Asia.531 Direct confrontation with China is 
159

thus ruled out in favor of economic-political cooperation and muted 

strategic rivalry whenever possible. Thus there is no apparent need 

for a formal alliance as long as both partners understand and accept 

that the steady rise of India’s power at the current rate of economic 

and military growth suffices to check Chinese ambitions in Southeast 

and South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India’s own steady 

and impressive rising power potential demonstrates the power of 

the democratic option in Asia and stands in stark contrast to Chinese 

authoritarianism, which many fear will inevitably run into a major 

domestic crisis.532 In that case, an Indo-American partnership will 

be strengthened by the fact of being “an axis of democracy,” not a 

purely military alliance whose purpose is containment of China.533

And this is true even if India is in favor or not averse to further U.S. 

deployments in the region, or some sort of alliance along the lines of 

the so-called Asian NATO comes into being.534 As that alliance has yet 

to take shape, it could become like today’s NATO, a crisis manager, 

and provider of stability, rather than the Cold War alliance.

 Both China’s concerns about this partnership and its efforts to 

improve ties with New Delhi work to the advantage of both partners 

here because these factors reduce China’s margin for threatening 

behavior, create a broader Asiatic balance than would otherwise be 

the case, and enhance the U.S. position vis-à-vis those two states, 

making it the focus of each side’s effort to gain greater leverage 

and traction in Asia.535 Consequently, enhanced bilateral military 

partnership and arms sales to India offer Washington another card 

to play when needed and provide both states with an ever-present 

factor of restraint that acts upon Chinese policy. As long as that 

Indian buildup suffices to check or to constrain Chinese strategic 

options, helping it constitutes a sound investment for the United 

States. In this respect, the overall picture bears out Tellis’ argument 

that, as long as India’s buildup of economic and military power 

takes place at a moderate but visible and sustainable rate, it will 

suffice to restrain Chinese ambitions and serve both Washington 

and New Delhi’s interests. At the same time, a discernible rise in 

both Indian and American economic and defense presence, as well 

as capability, in and around Southeast Asia will also help establish 

a continuing balance there and prevent China from deploying its 
160

rising economic and military power and becoming too great a threat 

to the region’s independence. Undoubtedly Chinese analysts and 

officialdom recognize this possibility and signs of its appearance in 

Southeast Asia.536 In other words, to the extent that Indian power 

contributes to an overall Asian framework backed up and promoted 

by Washington that restrains the projection of Chinese power, it will 

contribute to a broader, more comprehensive Asiatic equilibrium that 

keeps all powers in play and prevents any one power from making 

a bid for regional or continental hegemony. Indeed, Indian analysts 

are confident of such an outcome.537 It should be noted that precisely 

such a balance of power is postulated in the U.S. NSS of 2002 as 

being a desirable outcome of U.S. policy in Asia. So this concept of 

Indo-Chinese relations is in close harmony with American goals 

as well.538 Moreover, at least some Indian analysts believe that U.S. 

forces in and around Central Asia will not soon be withdrawn, and 

that Washington will continue to play the leading role in trying to 

moderate India’s troubled relations with Pakistan. Therefore, these 

two policies will constrain Chinese options in the area and stabilize 

the regional and overall Asian balance by doing so.539 Certainly 

Chinese observers have assimilated fully the notion, reiterated by the 

Pentagon and the Indian government, that India and America “have 

common strategic interests in Asia and even farther regions.”540

 Despite the growing amity of bilateral relations with India 

and the rhetoric of a complete identity of interests, that is not yet 

the case. While we already have made suggestions as to ways to 

forge this strategic consensus, it is no less important to “encase” 

those proposals within a viable strategic framework. Apart from 

bureaucratic obstructions either in Washington or in New Delhi, it 

is clear that for an alliance to flourish it has to go beyond shared 

enemies and the rhetoric of common values. In other words, if there 

truly are shared interests, they must be made real and activating 

principles of common policies and actions and embedded in viable 

mechanisms for undertaking those actions and shared values that 

animate them.

 The basis for the continuing vitalization of this partnership would 

be to move together toward the creation of a democratic security 

community, e.g., as suggested by Henry Nau. Indeed, using this 
161

aspiration and foundation to continue the building of partnership 

with India flows naturally from the administration’s most basic 

foreign policy precepts. As President Bush recently stated, “The 

work of building democracies in nations that have endured decades 

of tyranny is hard. It’s hard work. It will require the kind of sustained 

commitment that won the Cold War. We accept that duty. We accept 

that duty in our time because our cause is right.”541 The 2002 NSS and 

President Bush’s second inaugural speech also make clear that this 

is the foundation principle for the administration’s overall national 

security policy.542 Furthermore, strengthening of our alliances and 

security communities with like-minded democratic states in both 

Europe and Asia, even when they disagree with us, invigorates our 

overall mutual ties. Thus India has been perturbed by the disunity 

of the members of the Atlantic Alliance over Iraq, even if it has not 

publicly voiced its apprehensions on this point.543

 As Nau describes this security community, its attributes and 

advantages are as follows. First of all,

The administration needs a new conceptual framework to integrate 

the various elements of its Asian policy. Traditional frameworks pose 

policies as alternatives—for example, containment or engagement. The 

framework of a democratic security community integrates alternatives. 

Unlike traditional concepts, a democratic security community operates 

on the basis of common democratic values, not just common foreign 

policy interests (alliances) or common international institutions 

(collective security arrangements). The community distinguishes clearly 

between America’s democratic allies in Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, 

Australia, New Zealand, and India (and indirectly Taiwan), and its more 

conventional, perhaps temporary, allies or collective security partners in 

the war against terror, such as China and Russia.544

 Thus, second, our existing anchors to Japan, South Korea, and 

Australia remain in place for our overall Asian policy, along with 

the ability to avoid the drift of policy either toward a premature 

collective security arrangement with China or to classic balance of 

power politics. While constructing a framework that can restrain 

Chinese power, we at the same time, hopefully along with India, 

act to channel that rising power’s growth in constructive directions. 

This is because a security community, unlike an alliance, does not 
162

need an external adversary upon whom to focus. Consequently, both 

Washington and New Delhi can then conduct extensive economic and 

political relationships with difficult states like China and Pakistan, 

and even engage in genuine strategic cooperation with them when 

necessary, yet also pressure them to move in directions that are more 

congenial to the members of the security community’s interests.545

Yet even if any of the members of this community conducts its own 

policy that diverges from that of another or all the other members, 

that need not create a rupture or even a crisis within the community. 

Meanwhile, the possibility of closer bonds, e.g., an alliance, remains 

intact and vital, given the preexisting foundation of shared values, 

not just interests.546 In this way, Washington can also place pressure 

upon Pakistan, either overtly or discreetly as the case may be, to 

move away from support for terrorism. The option of joining this 

security community, as happened in Europe, then becomes too 

positive a benefit to be traded away lightly. As Washington is already 

placing such pressure upon Pakistan, this approach would then 

become even more compelling and might create sufficient political 

space over time for, first, a diminution of the crisis atmosphere in 

and around Kashmir and the borders with India and, second, for a 

gradual resumption of the dialogue between India and Pakistan that 

might then flower into a productive process.

 As former Ambassador to Sri Lanka Teresita C. Schaffer writes,

To avoid repeating history, U.S. policymakers must depersonalize policy 

toward Pakistan and establish two fundamental bases for engagement: 

a long-term democracy agenda designed to strengthen and legitimize 

Pakistan’s institutions; and a sustained and realistic approach to working 

with both Pakistan and India to deal with and ideally resolve their 

enduring, dangerous dispute.547

 Nau’s approach also creates a means by which the bureaucratic 

rivalry in Washington over how to deal with India might be 

overcome. The emphasis on a democratic security community 

changes the framework by which we address issues of proliferation 

and conflict resolution in South Asia. First of all, it places the center of 

gravity of U.S. policy in South Asia, and even Central Asia, precisely 

where it ought to be, namely, the promotion of pluralistic and more 
163

developed societies, not because we like them but because states 

that move successfully in this direction over time find themselves 

less encumbered by threats to their internal security that drive both 

state failure or belligerent foreign policies. Pakistan is a case in point, 

but it is an axiom of security in the Third World that the perception 

of the state’s being in danger primarily from internal causes is 

a major driver of foreign and defense policies.548 Second, Nau’s 

formula creates a policy environment that offers numerous positive 

inducements for states to liberalize, if not democratize, because such 

policies ease their external (as well as domestic) security challenges. 

This is precisely why a new emphasis on socio-economic dimensions 

of our overall South Asian policy should be considered strongly by 

the administration and Congress.549

Nau’s formulation also thereby places pressure upon Pakistan 

to cease and desist from its previous proliferation to North Korea 

and Iran by threatening it with meaningful isolation if it continues to 

undermine this Asian security community. Likewise, it also allows 

us to approach India in terms that are different from the ongoing 

bureaucratic debate. We need to accept that India will not renounce 

nuclear weapons to suit our moralistic tendencies in foreign policy. 

But we can craft an approach to India that subsumes all discussion 

of military assistance in any field under an approach that is based 

upon what we share rather than what divides us. At the same 

time, Nau’s approach also moderates fears that Indo-American 

partnership or alliance will be explicitly or implicitly nothing more 

than a containment scheme directed against China. While these 

two states and others might unite to counter excessive or negative 

aggrandizement of Chinese power, they also will be creating both 

negative and positive incentives for China to act in concert with 

their purposes based on concrete shared interests that can then bring 

about a change in values over time in Chinese thinking. Chinese 

power, though growing, will then be growing in directions that are 

nonthreatening to the partners and other Asian states.550

 In the context of Nau’s proposed formula, we can also recommend 

specific policies that would strengthen the bonds of partnership 

with India, while avoiding the trap of overcommitment and of a too 

hastily formed alliance, which would then rest on an incomplete and 
164

therefore wobbly foundation. As suggested in a 2003 report by the 

Council on Foreign Relations but also in some cases going beyond 

it, a sound approach to strengthening ties with New Delhi would 

require the following specific policies in the defense and foreign 

policy sector (I omit the specifically economic aspects here that do 

not relate to those issues, but they are all worthy of consideration):

 • Continuing strong and public support at the highest levels of 

government of enhanced bilateral cooperation to emphasize 

to bureaucracies and publics in both countries the need for 

effective and unified policymaking by those bureaucracies;

 • Maintenance and, as possible, enhancement of official 

cooperation and dialogue on political, security, and intelligence 

areas;

 • Reinstitution of an official dialogue on bilateral and 

international economic policy issues; and,

 • Negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement to spur expanded 

economic ties and thus provide a solid floor beneath which 

the security relationship can never fall.

On its own, the United States should also undertake the following 

actions:

 • Ease restrictions on cooperation in the civilian satellite sector; 

and,

 • Treat India as a “friendly” country with regard to the 

granting of export licenses of defense equipment and dualuse technologies.

 Adopting these two measures as policy has just become more 

likely as both sides have agreed to formalize a framework of action 

that would enable India to obtain dual-use technologies from the 

United States. This agreement would allow India to receive civilian 

nuclear, space, and other technologies. This process could also allow 

HAL to form agreements with other major defense producers as it 

has long wanted to do. India now will also obtain greater access to 

Western and American firms that can provide it with the technologies 

for information warfare and C3

I systems that it desires. Likewise, 
165

real possibilities for bilateral cooperation in space also can now be 

envisaged. Most of all, this decision goes a considerable distance in 

demonstrating to India the seriousness with which the United States 

now approaches its ties to New Delhi.551 Other policy steps would also 

be of major importance in cementing this relationship and making it 

both a productive and enduring one. Again, in following the CFR’s 

suggestions but also expanding on them, this study recommends 

that the U.S. Government study ways to fit India and Pakistan into 

the global nuclear nonproliferation regime without upsetting it and 

to make maximum effort to prevent either or both of them from any 

further proliferation of WMD technologies or systems. This would 

require both India and Pakistan to adopt and enforce more effective 

export control regulations and laws.552

 These policy recommendations are essential because it is vital 

to the success of building a partnership, if not a more intimate 

relationship, that both sides treat each other’s interests seriously. As 

a retired Indian general told MacDonald,

Indians understand that the United States has sustained interests in the 

regions that are part of India’s extended security horizon and that it 

will act to protect them. But as an equal partner, we expect increased 

consultation about U.S. objectives and intentions in these areas. Without 

consultation, we cannot identify areas of convergence and work jointly 

with the United States to maintain peace and security in the region.553

In other words, absent a robust, frank, intimate, and enduring 

dialogue among equals, no genuine and lasting partnership is 

possible. This would not only hurt India; it would hurt America as 

well, and make the achievement of many of our vital interests much 

more difficult. This emerges clearly from MacDonald’s interviews 

with American military personnel.

 Generals have observed to her that “Access to India would enable 

the U.S. military “to be able to touch the rest of the world” and to 

respond rapidly to regional crises.” Likewise, the Air Force would 

gain by access to India because that would bring it closer to the 

entire area of instability from the Gulf to Southeast Asia including 

Central Asia. Moreover, India’s well-developed infrastructure could 

assist U.S. power projection forces in many ways.554 A strong and 
166

viable partnership with India would constitute recognition of the 

security situation throughout Asia that is increasingly a seamless 

web that embraces all the areas where India is displaying keen, if not 

vital, interests and where the United States as well is now militarily 

engaged. This notion of increased security interdependence among 

all the different regions of Asia, including the Gulf and Central, 

South, and Southeast Asia, is now becoming as well a commonplace 

of international—not just American—scholarship and analysis.555

Therefore effective policy in support of vital U.S. interests must 

acknowledge the transformations taking place on the ground and 

respond accordingly.

 That response appropriately entails significant bureaucratic and 

institutional restructuring in order to conduct our overall security 

policies in Asia more effectively and, in particular, strengthen the 

relationship with India. Indeed, MacDonald’s report found that, “both 

the U.S. and Indian systems are poorly organized to build a robust 

military relationship that maximizes the strategic benefits for both 

sides.”556 In order to overcome both the negative perceptions on both 

sides that cloud effective partnership and the resulting suboptimal 

policy outcomes, she and this author find substantial reasons for 

reshaping the institutional framework within which U.S. policy is 

conducted. Reorganization or bureaucratic restructuring serves many 

purposes besides aiming to effectuate a more unified and coherent 

policy process in regard to India throughout the U.S. Government. 

The positive benefits of an intelligent and successful reorganization 

go beyond merely eliminating contradictions among departments 

and agencies or bureaucratic bottlenecks. Effective reorganization 

that creates this unified approach enhances mutual predictability 

for both governments and thus enhances mutual confidence and 

trust. Second, changing the bureaucratic mechanisms through which 

policy is implemented also changes behavior of those entrusted with 

its implementation, and thus their perceptions as well. All these 

changes, if accomplished, will produce better policymaking and 

implementation and improve the overall quality of the relationship 

thanks to the increase in mutual confidence and predictability. The 

same conclusion would hold true as well for successful institutional 

reorganization on the Indian side.
167

 But beyond these positive outcomes, such reorganization also 

would go far to overcoming the main obstacles to an enhanced 

and enduring strategic partnership. We have identified four major 

obstacles that either impede or have impeded the realization of this 

partnership. They are the issue of technology transfer, the gap between 

the State Department and DoD approaches to India, an incomplete 

convergence of strategic interests within a larger context of general 

convergence of interests, and last, the fact that India’s anomalous 

position between USPACOM, which includes India in its AOR, and 

USCENTCOM, where it is absent but Pakistan and Afghanistan are 

in that command’s AOR, causes it to be lost between two powerful 

unified commands.”557

 In fact, these disjunctions and gaps in mutual perceptions 

that clearly impede effective cooperation testify to the need for 

bureaucratic reform with regard to Indian and U.S. policy. That is 

to say, both Indian and U.S. leaders need to overcome bureaucratic 

impediments to the bilateral relationship. MacDonald’s evidence and 

the strategic realities of an increasingly integrated Asiatic strategic 

space that are now clear to analysts and officials (and not only in the 

United States or India) demonstrate how unwarranted, unjustified, 

and counterproductive complacency about existing structural 

relationships are. From the U.S. viewpoint, India should already be 

regarded, in fact and not just in rhetoric, as a major Asian power 

whose vital interests and points of contact with American policy 

encompass the entire area from the Gulf to the Strait of Malacca as 

well as global issues like terrorism and nonproliferation.

 Therefore, the most effective way to sustain what has already 

been achieved in the bilateral relationship is for the President to order 

a review of the way in which our national security structures (and 

not just the State and Defense Departments and NSC, but also their 

respective subcomponents) are organized to deal with India and Asia 

generally. This review should aim to overcome the tensions between 

the Pentagon and State Department that are universally recognized 

as an impediment to improved ties as well as the inability to see 

India and its interests as a whole that plagues the components of 

both our military commands in Asia and the Departments of State, 

the Pentagon, and the NSC.558 Given the gravity of the consequences 
168

of this reorganization for all our Asian relationships, this highlevel review should be comprehensive and carefully organized. But 

the need for this review is obvious. In order for the United States 

to take most effective advantage of the transformation of Asia as a 

strategic entity or entities where India plays a large and growing 

part, it must reorganize the way it does business with India and Asia 

in general. As the world and its strategic realities change, so must 

our institutions adapt and change lest they become ineffectual and 

obstacles to the realization of our strategic interests. The issue here is 

not any one particular reorganization scheme for all those institutions 

within and among the U.S. Government’s departments. We are not 

advocating any particular line of approach here, and it would be 

presumptuous to do so in view of the immense task of such a review. 

Rather, we are calling for a fuller understanding of and response to 

the strategic transformation that is engulfing Asia, India, and our 

relations with Asia and India in particular. Once that realization 

of the growing strategic importance of India and Asia materializes 

and is fully internalized across the national security sector of the 

government, the opportunities for cooperation and for an ongoing, 

frank, yet respectful, and intimate discussion of strategic issues with 

India truly can get off the ground. Absent such a strategic review 

and reorganization in both countries, the relationship between 

Washington and New Delhi will resemble a spavined horse: it walks, 

but it cannot run, and it cannot even walk as quickly as possible.

 In order to underscore the breadth of India’s role in the 

emerging new Asian strategic order, this monograph has looked 

comprehensively at India’s policies and interests across the breadth 

of Asia from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca, and at the 

points of contact with the United States in the war on terrorism, 

missile defense, and technology transfer (both civil and military). By 

doing so, this monograph has aimed to alter perceptions by giving a 

deeper sense of the scope of India’s role in Asian and world affairs 

and of its genuine and emerging importance to the United States. 

The changed realities to which India both responds and contributes 

must also evoke in both New Delhi and Washington a series of 

ongoing institutional responses to those new realities, so that both 

sides can most effectively cooperate with each other. A recent UN 
169

report on the war on terrorism shows that few states are cooperating 

to the fullest degree possible in this war, a finding that helps explain 

why it could well be more protracted and difficult a war than was 

even imagined earlier when everyone knew it would be a long and 

arduous struggle.559 The Indo-American relationship for a long time 

has been plagued by mutual suspicions and misperceptions that 

have impeded collaboration between the two largest democracies 

in the world, a cooperation that could be decisive in the war on 

terrorism and in helping large parts of Asia to achieve more security, 

prosperity, and democracy.

 The intensity of the threat of terrorism faced by both India and 

the United States underscores the stakes involved in this war and 

in mastering the general strategic transformations of our time. 

Continuation of that history of failed relationships when genuine 

partnership is within our grasp and requires the sustained attention 

of both the topmost ranks of government in both countries and of 

their respective national security bureaucracies to achieve it, would, 

given those stakes, be worse than a crime. Indeed, it would be a 

profound mistake at the highest level of grand strategy.

171

ENDNOTES

1. See the remarks by Polly Nayak to the Dwight D. Eisenhower National 

Security Conference, September 25-26, 2003, Washington, DC, pp. 188, 203.

 2. For an assessment of the current state of Indo-American relations, see K. 

Alan Kronstadt, India-U.S. Relations, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Washington, 

DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, November 4, 2004. 

 3. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy, 

New York: Palgrave, 2004, p. 49.

 4. This is based upon the author’s conversations with representatives of the 

different U.S. military services that comprise the U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, 

November 7-10, 2004 (henceforth Conversations, USPACOM); and with officials 

of the Department of Defense in Washington, September 28, 2004 (henceforth 

Conversations, Pentagon). See also Ashley J. Tellis, “Lost Tango in Washington,” 

Indian Express, November 17, 2004, also available from the Carnegie Endowment 

at www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.

 5. Russell C. Leffingwell Lecture with Manmohan Singh, Council on Foreign 

Relations, New York, September 24, 2004, www.cfr.org. (henceforth Singh Speech); 

Seema Sirohi, “Manmohan’s New York Report Card,” Asia Times Online, October 

5, 2004, www.atimes.com.

 6. Cited in John C. Holzman, “A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps in U.S.-

Indian Relations,” Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Washington, 

DC, No. 182, July, 2001, p. 1; Ian Storey, “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2003, p. 42; “India To Play Prominent Role in USled ‘Asian NATO’,” Press Trust of India, July 18, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; 

Nilofar Suhrawardy, “India Reacts Favorably to Bush’s Victory,” www.aljazeerah.

info/News%20archives/2004%29archives/November/4%, November 4, 2004.

 7. G. V. C. Naidu, “Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia,” 

Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, April-June, 2004, p. 343.

 8. T. V. Parasuram, “Indian Envoy Confident Strategic Relations Will 

Strengthen,” ww.outlookindia.com, November 4, 2004.

 9. Suhrawardy, “India Reacts Favorably to Bush’s Victory.” 

 10. K. P. Vijayalakshmi, quoted in Raj Changappa and Anil Padmamabhan, 

“Roll Out the Red Carpet,” India Today, November 15, 2004, p. 59, retrieved from 

Lexis-Nexis.

 11. Siddarth Srivastava, “A US Offer Delhi Can’t Refuse,” Asia Times Online, 

December 2, 2004, www.atimes.com.

 12. Conversations, USPACOM; Ashley Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs,” Force, 

October, 2004, pp. 8-9.

 13. C. Raja Mohan, “What If Pakistan Fails? India Isn’t Worried . . . yet,” 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Winter 2004-05, p. 117.
172

 14. C. Chirstine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and 

India, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004, pp. 1-2.

 15. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

 16. Srivastava, “A US Offer Delhi Can’t Refuse.”

 17. Ehsan Ahrari, “Pakistan as a ‘Key Non-NATO-Ally,’” Asia Times Online, 

March 20, 2004, www.atimes.com; Sultan Shahin, “India Doubting its US ‘Strategic 

Partnership,’” Asia Times Online, March 26, 2004, www.atimes.com; Gopal Rathnam 

and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Subcontinental Tightrope: U.S. Nod to Pakistan Angers 

India,” Defense News, March 29, 2004, pp. 1, 8; Council on Foreign Relations, “New 

Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan,” 

(Henceforth CFR Report), New York: 2003, accessed on November 18, 2003, pp. 4, 

38.

 18. Conversations, Pentagon.

 19. Ibid.; Conversations, USPACOM.

 20. Ibid.

 21. Anupam Srivastava, “The Strategic Context of Evolving Indo-US Ties,” 

Satish Kumar, ed., India’s National Security: Annual Review 2002, New Delhi: India 

Research Press, 2003, pp. 88-114. The manuscript copy of the article was made 

available to me by Dr. Srivastava.

 22. “China Not in Favor of According Nuclear Status to India, Pak,” Press Trust 

of India, June 29, 2004, Retreieved from Lexis-Nexis; Juli A. MacDonald, Indo-U.S. 

Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions,” Released from the Director, 

Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC: Booz Allen 

Hamilton, 2002, pp. 57-59; Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: 

Prospects for Resolution,” India Review, Vol. II, No. 3, July, 2003, p. 112.

 23. C. Raja Mohan, “C. Raja Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift Towards South Asia,” 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Winter 2002-03, p. 149.

 24. MacDonald, pp. 57-59; Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” The Monitor, 

Vol. IX, No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 5.

 25. Ibid.

 26. MacDonald, p. 59.

 27. Arun Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet,” Asia Times Online, August 

21, 2003, www.atimes.com.

 28. Peter W. Rodman, Uneasy Giant: The Challenges to American Predominance, 

Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2001, p. 2.

 29. Tom Clancy, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Klotz, Battle Ready, 

New York: G. P. Putnam’s & Sons, 2004, pp. 323-324.

 30. Glenn Kessler and Thomas E. Ricks, “Rice’s NSC Tenure Complicates New 

Post,” Washington Post, November 16, 2004, p. 7.
173

 31. Walter K. Andersen, “South Asia: A Selective War on Terrorism?” Ashley 

J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the 

Pursuit of Power, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004, p. 228.

 32. Robert M. Hathaway, “The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 4, December, 2002, pp. 21-29; Zbigniew 

Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, New York: Basic 

Books, 2004, pp. 64-65.

 33. Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies: 1941-1991, 

Washington, DC: Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Defense University Press, 1992.

 34. “Does the US Want to Repeat the Mistake in Iraq That It Committed in 

the Case of the Taliban?” Ahmedabad Sandesh, in Gujarati, Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service, Near East and South Asia (henceforth FBIS NES), June 14, 2003.

 35. Singh, CFR Speech.

 36. Ibid.; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September, 

2002 (Henceforth NSS), www.whitehouse.gov.

 37. Conversations, USPACOM; Edward Luce and Quentin Peel; “FT Interview 

Manmohan Singh,” Financial Times, November 8, 2004, p. 5.

 38. Conversations, USPACOM.

 39. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Embraces New War Doctrine,” Defense News, 

November 8, 2004, p. 14.

 40. Robert O. Blake Jr., Charge d’affaires, “U.S. India-Relations: The Making of 

a Comprehensive Relationship,” Speech to the Army War College, Indore, India, 

August 23, 2004. www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm35686 (henceforth Blake Speech).

 41. “We Won’t Play the Triangular Game: U.S.” The Hindu, October 22, 2001, 

retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 42. Ibid.; Ian Storey, “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing,” Jane’s Intelligence 

Review, March 2003, p. 40; Alan Sipress, “U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India: Aim 

Is To Bolster Military Relations,” Washington Post, August 12, 2001, p. A1.

 43. Francine R. Frankel, “Introduction,” Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, 

eds., The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 9.; Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on 

Terrorism, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA, 2003.

 44. Raghuvanshi, “India Embraces New War Doctrine,” p. 14.

 45. October 11, 2004: EU-India Strategic Partnership—Council Conclusions, 

www.eu.int/comm/external_relaitons/india/intro/gac.htm.

 46. “Russia, USA Compete in India,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, December 10, 

2004, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jid/doc.

 47. Ibid.; Moscow, RIA Novosti, November 5, 2004, FBIS SOV November 5, 

2004. 
174

 48. Conversations, USPACOM.

 49. Jyoti Malhotra, “Putin, Chirac Favor Changes in NSG Rules,” The Indian 

Express Internet Version, FBIS NES June 7, 2003.

 50. Stephen F. Burgess, India’s Emerging Security Strategy, Missile Defense and 

Arms Control, Colorado Springs: US Air Force Academy Institute for National 

Security Studies, Occasional Paper, No. 54, 2004, p. 1.

 51. Sir John Thomson, “Policy Paths in South Asia: Intersections Between 

Global and Local,” Michael R. Chambers, ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic 

Balances and Alliances, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2002, p. 17.

 52. Celeste A. Wallander, “Silk Road, Great Game or Soft Underbelly?: The 

New US-Russia Relationship and Implications for Eurasia,” Shireen Hunter, ed., 

Strategic Developments in Eurasia After 11 September, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 

2004, pp. 97-98.

 53. Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, “A Bigger, Badder Better Army,” The 

Weekly Standard, November 22, 2004, reprinted from the website of the American 

Enterprise Institute, www.aei.org/news/news/ID.21591/news_detrail.asp.

 54. Robert D. Blackwill, “An Action Agenda to Strengthen America’s Alliances 

in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., America’s 

Asian Alliances, Cambridge, MA; The MIT Press, 2000, p. 129.

 55. Ashley J. Tellis, “South Asia,” Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, 

eds., Strategic Asia 2001-02 Power and Purpose, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian 

Research, 2002, pp. 262-263.

 56. Ibid.

 57. Ibid.

 58. Ibid.

 59. Ibid.

 60. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, 

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

 61. Nayak, Remarks, p. 203.

 62. Talbott.

 63. Chennai, The Hindu, in English, FBIS NES, April 11, 2001; Mandavi Mehta 

and Teresita Schaeffer, “India and the United States: Security Interests.” 

 64. Ibid.; South Asia Monitor, NO. 34, June 1, 2001.

 65. Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary 

Interest, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2005.

 66. Ibid.

 67. Ibid.
175

 68. Alan Sipress, “U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India,” Washington Post, 

August 12, 2001, p. 1.

 69. Ibid.

 70. Ibid.

 71. Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary 

Interest.

 72. Sipress, “U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India.”

 73. Ibid.

 74. Samina Ahmed, “The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia,” 

International Security, Winter 2001-2002, pp. 80-81; Paul Dibb, “The Strategic 

Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Blackwill and Dibb, eds., pp. 4, 10.

 75. C. Raja Mohan, “We Won’t Play the Triangular Game: U.S.,” The Hindu, 

October 22, 2001, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Testimony of Under-Secretary of 

State Richard Armitage to the Commission to Investigate the Attacks of 9-11, 

March 24, 2004, www.nytimes.com/2004/03/24/politics/24CND-PTEX.html.

 76. “India To Play Prominent Role in US-led ‘Asian NATO’” Press Trust of India, 

July 18, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Stephen Blank,” Inherent Dangers in an 

‘Asian NATO,’ Asia Times Online, September 19, 2003, www.atimes.com; “Pentagon 

Keen To Make India A Strategic Partner,” SAPRA India Bulletin, June 2003, pp. 27-

28.

 77. Cited in John C. Holzman, “A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps in U.S.-

Indian Relations,” Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Washington, 

DC, No. 182, July, 2001, p. 1; Ian Storey, “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2003, p. 42; “India To Play Prominent Role in USled ‘Asian NATO’.”

 78. Ibid., p. 40; Jayanthi Iyengar, “NATO: Blueprint for Asian Security,” Asia 

Times Online, March 21, 2004; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “U.S., India Discuss Tech 

Partnership,” Defense News, March 22, 2004, p. 34; Arun Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite 

in Step Yet,” Asia Times Online, August 21, 2003, www.atimes.com; Venu Rajamony, 

“Within the Arc of Crisis: India-U.S. Relations Moving From Estrangement to 

Convergence,” Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 3, 2003, pp. 71-84; C. 

Raja Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” The Monitor, Vol. IX, No. 2, Summer 

2003, p. 3, Idem., “India, U.S. and Gulf Security,” The Hindu, March 29, 2001, www.

indiaserver.com/thehindu/2001/03/29/stories/05292523.

 79. Singh, CFR Speech.

 80. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia,” Defense 

News, November 10, 2003, p. 10; Speech by Shri Brajesh Mishra, National Security 

Advisor of India at the Council of Foreign Relations, “India, United States, and 

the New World Order: Prospects for Cooperation,” New York, May 7, 2003, p. 

23; George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, 

Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Updated Edition, 2001, 
176

particularly pp. 438-443; more generally, see Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, India 

in the World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

 81. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia.”

 82. Ibid.

 83. Ibid.

 84. Ibid.; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s Navy Reaches for Blue Water Goals,” 

Defense News, October 27, 2003, p. 19.

 85. Ibid.

 86. Jammu, The Kashmir Times, in English, July 31, 2001, FBIS NES, August 

1, 2001; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Threats Prompt Indian Navy to Push Upgrades,” 

Defense News, January 6, 2003.

 87. Ibid.; K. Alan Kronstadt, The Asian Way to Insecurity: India’s Rise and the 

Meaning of Increased Power Projection Capabilities in South Asia, Paper Presented to 

the 42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 

Illinois, February 21, 2001, p. 19; Huma Siddiqui, “Naval Cause: Amphibious Force 

Along With Marines Proposed,” New Delhi, Financial Express, Internet Version, in 

English, June 11, 2003, FBIS NES, June 11, 2003. 

 88. Ibid.

 89. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002-2003, 

London: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 125.

 90. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s New Naval Ambition,” Defense News, June 7, 

2004, pp. 1, 8; Rahul Bedi, “India Outlines Vision of Future Nuclear Navy,” Jane’s 

Defence Weekly, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view.jsp?.

 91. Ibid.

 92. Ibid.

 93. Ibid.

 94. Ibid.

 95. Donald L. Berlin, “Navy Reflects India’s Strategic Ambitions,” Asia Times 

Online, November 5, 2004, www.atimes.com.

 96. Ibid.

 97. Ashley J. Tellis, “South Asia,” Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, 

eds., Strategic Asia 2001-02 Power and Purpose, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian 

Research, 2002, p. 237.

 98. Conversations PACOM; Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military 

Environment: South Asia,” pp. 210-216.

 99. Ibid., the Indian Defense Report is quoted in John W. Garver, “Asymmetrical 

Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 

4, December, 2002, p. 112; more recently “Indian Defence Minister Says China, 
177

New Delhi Share Common Strategic Interests,” BBC Monitoring, January 30, 2003, 

retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 100. “India’s Economy: Back to Earth,” The Economist, September 18, 2004, p. 

49.

 101. Ambassador Farooq Sobhan, “South Asia,” America’s Role in Asia: Asian 

Views, San Francisco, CA: Asia Foundation, 2004, pp. 55-83; Stephen Phillip 

Cohen, “South Asia,” America’s Role in Asia: American Views, San Francisco, CA: 

Asia Foundation, 2004, pp. 77-104.

 102. Conversations, USPACOM.

 103. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s Budget Falls Short of Navy Doctrine,”

Defense News, November 15, 2004, p. 19.

 104. Luce and Peel, p. 5; Quentin Peel, “India’s Terms of Engagement,” 

Financial Times, November 11, 2004, p. 15.

 105 Ibid.

 106. Peel, p. 15

 107. New, Delhi, The Hindu, November 14, 2004, FBIS NES, November 14, 

2004. 

 108. “Focus; Geopolitics; India and Russia Deepen Energy Cooperation,” 

Petroleum Economist, December 3, 2004; “President Putin Approved Participation 

of Indian Companies in the Auction for Sale of Yuganskneftgaz,” Vedomosti, 

December 8, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Valeria Korchagina, “Indian Oil 

Company to Bid for Yugansk,” Moscow Times, December 6, 2004.

 109. “Pipelines Pondered,” www.asiant.com, November 26, 2003; Prem Shankar 

Jha, “The Pipeline to Peace,” www.outlookindia.com, November 30, 2004.

 110. V. Sudarshan, “The Next Step on Tiptoes,” Outlook India.com, November 

15, 2004.

 111. Mohammed Ayoob, “Southwest Asia After the Taliban,” Survival, Vol. 

XLIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 60-65.

 112. Moscow, ITAR-TASS ̧ in English, January 3, 2001, FBIS SOV, January 3, 

2001; Ramtanu Maitra, “India and Russia Have Much to Lose,” Asia Times Online, 

November 26, 2003, www.atimes.com; Idem., “Why Courting Russia and Iran Makes 

Sense,” Asia Times Online, October 1, 2003, www.atimes.com.

 113. John Calabrese, “Indo-Iranian Relations in Transition,” Journal of South 

Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 5, Summer 2002, pp. 60-82; Smita 

Gupta, “Threats of Terrorism Bring India, Iran Closer,” The Times of India, April 15, 

2001.

 114. Calabrese, “Indo-Iranian Relations in Transition,” pp. 60-82; Satyanarayan 

Pattanayak, “Oil as a Factor in Indo-Gulf Relations,” Strategic Analysis, June, 2001, 

www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_june01pas02.html.
178

 115. “Iran Tries to Become Centre of Distribution of Energy to International 

Market,” www.TehranTimes.com, June 9, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Tehran, 

IRNA, in English, January 16, 2003, FBIS NES, January 16, 2003.

 116. Jasjit Singh, “Enhancing Peace and Cooperation in West Asia: An Indian 

Perspective,” The Emirates Occasional Papers No. 27, Abu Dhabi: The Emirates 

Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1998, p. 7.

 117. Luce and Peel, p. 5; Peel, “India’s Terms of Engagement,” p. 15.

 118. Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” pp. 12-14; Alan Larson, Under Secretary 

of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, “The American Vision 

of U.S.-India Economic Cooperation,” Remarks to the Delegates of the IndoAmerican Chamber of Commerce Economic Summit, Mumbai, September 16, 

2004, www.state.gov/e/rls/rm/2004/36345; Ambassador David C. Mulford, “U.S.-

India Economic Relations,” Remarks to the International Institute of Finance 

Program, Mumbai India, November 4, 2004, www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/37789.htm;

Idem., “World-Class Infrastructure: need for a War-Footing in India,” Remarks at 

GAIL (India) Limited’s Looking Beyond Lecture Series, New Delhi, November 9, 

2004, http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/wwwhipr1109084.html.

 119. Ibid.

 120. Ibid.

 121. Remarks by John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for 

International Affairs, World Economic Forum’s India Economic Summit, New 

Delhi, India, December 6, 2004, www.usinfo.state.gov.

 122. “India’s Many Wars,” Jane’s Foreign Report, December 16, 2004, www4.

janes.com/subscribefrp/doc.

 123. Conversations, USPACOM.

 124. Ibid.; Rahul Bedi, “Cross-Border Links Strengthen India’s Insurgent 

Groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1, 2004, ww4.janes.com/subscribe/

jir/doc; “Rebel Strongholds Fall With Burmese Help,” www.asiant.com, November 

11, 2004; B. Raman, “Greater Indian Visibility in Its Neighborhood,” South Asia 

Analysis Group, No. 1159, November 8, 2004; Indo-Myanmar Security Accord 

Targets Militants in India’s Northeast,” SAPRA India Bulletin November, 2004, pp. 

15-17.

 125. Ibid; John Hill, “Illegal Drugs Trade Thrives in Nepal’s Security Vacuum,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, August, 2004, www.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc; Ramtanu 

Maitra, “India Takes the Fight to Guerrillas,” Asia Times Online, www.atimes.com, 

November 19, 2004; Andrew Prosser, Nuclear Trafficking Routes: Dangerous Trends 

in Southern Asia, Center for Defense Information, www.cdi.org, November 22, 

2004; “India’s Military Becoming More Active in Sri Lanka,” www.Courcyint.com, 

November 15, 2004.

 126. Ibid.
179

 127. B. P. Khanna and Lalit Sethi,” Different Hemispheres, Common Foe,” 

Armed Forces Journal, December, 2004, p. 37.

 128. Ibid.

 129. Christian Le Miere, “Indian Separatist Groups Face Crackdown,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, January 1, 2005, www4janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc.

 130. Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 247-250.

 131. Ibid., p. 250.

 132. Ibid., pp. 247-248; Jennifer Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final 

Struggle for Central Asia, Foreword by Paul Kennedy, London and New York: I. B. 

Tauris, 2002.

 133. Quoted from Walter K. Andersen, “India in Asia: Walking on a Tightrope,” 

Asian Survey, December 1979, in S. Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear: A Study of 

Indo-Soviet Relations, Riverdale, MD: The Riverdale Company, Inc., 1986, p. 147.

 134. Quoted in Ji Guoxing, Asian Pacific SLOC Security: The China Factor, 

Canberra: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, Working Paper No. 10, April, 

2002, p. 36.

 135. Mushahid Hussain, “Indian Power Projection in South Asia and the 

Regional States’ Reaction,” Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Security and 

Cooperation in India and Pakistan, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 155; C. Raja 

Mohan, “Beyond India’s Monroe Doctrine,” The Hindu, January 2, 2003, retrieved 

from Lexis-Nexis. 

 136. Graham P. Chapman, The Geopolitics of South Asia From Early Empires to the 

Nuclear Age, 2nd Edition, London, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003, p. 281.

 137. Ibid.

 138. Ibid, pp. 130-131.

 139. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia,” p. 10.

 140. Siegel; Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 248-253; Jaswant Singh, Defending India, 

New Delhi: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 146-147; Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: pp. 204-

210, 224-236.

 141. Ibid., pp. 222-223; Stephen Blank, “India and the Gulf States After Saddam,” 

Strategic Insights, Vol. III, No. 4, April, 2004.

 142. Holzman, p. 3; Satyanarayan Pattanayak, “Oil As a Factor in Indo-Gulf 

Relations,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXV, No. 3, June, 2001, ww.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_

june01pas02.

 143. Calabrese, pp. 60-82; Smita Gupta, “Threats of Terrorism Bring India, Iran 

Closer,” The Times of India, April 15, 2001; Pattanayak. 

 144. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia.” 

 145. S. M. Pourriahi, “Politics and the ‘Pipeline of Peace,” Asia Times Online, 

January 21, 2003, www.atimes.com; TS Gopi Rethinaraj, “South Asian Rivalries 
180

Obstruct Energy Co-Operation,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December, 2001, pp. 

38-40; Calabrese, “Indo-Iranian Relations in Transition,” pp. 60-82; Maitra, “Why 

Courting Russia and Iran Makes Sense,” Asia Times Online, October 1, 2003, www.

atimes.com; “National Security Has Upper Hand in Pipeline Decision,” SAPRA 

India Bulletin, July, 2003, p. 21.

 146. Rethinaraj; Farah Naaz, “Indo-Iranian Relations 1947-2000, Strategic 

Analysis, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_jan01naf01.html; Naseem Khan, “Vajpayee’s Visit 

to Iran: Indo-Iranian Relations and Prospects of Bilateral Cooperation,” Strategic 

Analysis, September, 2001, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_sep01khm01.html.

 147. Ibid.; Rethinaraj, pp. 38-40; Calabrese, pp. 60-82. 

 148. Ibid.; Naseem Khan, “Vajpayee’s Visit to Iran.”

 149. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Two Allies Negotiate Defense Aid Deals,” Defense 

News, May 24, 2004, p. 10.

 150. Deba Mohanty, “‘No’ To Troops for Iraq: An Indian Story,” Military 

Technology, Nos. 8-9, 2003, p. 4.

 151. Siddarth Srivastava, “Indian Firms Fight Back for $10BN Iraq ‘Prize,’” 

Asia Times Online, December 13, 2003, www.atimes.com.

 152. Siddarth Srivastava, “India Queues Up for Iraqi Spoils,” Asia Times Online, 

February 3, 2005, www.atimes.com.

 153. Ibid.; Mohanty.

 154. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War, 

Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, p. 142; Rahul Bedi, “US Closes In On South 

Asia’s Strategic Jewel,” Asia Times Online, January 6, 2003, www.atimes.com; Idem., 

“U.S. Tightens Security Presence in Indian Ocean,” InterPress Service, January 5, 

2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 155. C. Uday Bhaskar, “Bush Victory Ensures Continuity in U.S.-India Strategic 

Relations, http://www.idsa-india.org?CUBArticle 3.htm, accessed from the Institute 

for Strategic and Defence Analysis, December 15, 2004.

 156. M. K. Bhadrakumar, “India Shifts Gear on Iraq Policy,” Asia Times 

Online, www.atimes.com, December 7, 2004; Srivastava, “India Queues UP for Iraqi 

Spoils.”

 157. Michael T. Klare, “Essay: The Bush-Cheney Strategy: Implications for U.S. 

Foreign and Military Policy,” New York University Journal of International Law and 

Politics, Vol. IIIVI, Nos. 2/3, Winter/Spring 2004, pp. 395-423.

 158. Chapman, p. 267.

 159. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War, 

Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2003, pp. 157-250.

 160. Istanbul Summit Communiqué: Issued by the Heads of State and 

Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, 
181

June 28-29, 2004, www.Nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm (henceforth Istanbul 

Initiative); Muthiah Alagappa, “Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite 

Challenges,” Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and 

Normative Features, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 26; Radu Tudor, 

“Black Sea Emerges as Strategic Hub Following NATO Expansion,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, August, 2004, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2Doc; 

Recep Tayip Erdogan, “A Broad View of the ‘Broader Middle East’,” Russia in 

Global Affairs, Vol. II, No. 3, July-September, 2004, pp. 130-133, Erdogan is the 

Prime Minister of Turkey.

 161. Sir John Thomson, “Policy Paths in South Asia: Intersections Between 

Global and Local,” Michael R. Chambers, ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic 

Balances and Alliances, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2002, pp. 17-18.

 162. Rajan Menon, “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” Survival, Vol. XLV, 

No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 201. 

 163. Kanwal Sibal, “Meeting Emerging Security Challenges,” Indian Foreign 

Secretary Kanwal Sibal’s Address at the Carnegie Endowment, February 4, 2003, 

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 164. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power And the 

Second Nuclear Age, New York: Perennial Publishers, 2000, pp. 2-3.

 165. Robert D. Blackwill, “An Action Agenda to Strengthen America’s Alliances 

in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., America’s 

Asian Alliances, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 125-127.

 166. Stephen Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia,” Comparative 

Strategy, Vol. XXII, No. 2, April-June, 2003, pp. 139-157.

 167. Indranil Bannerjie, “Introduction,” Indranil Bannerjie, ed., India and 

Central Asia, Northolt, Middlesex, UK: Brunel Academic Publishers, Ltd., 2004, 

pp.xi-xii.

 168. Ibid.

 169. Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.

 170. Jyotsna Bakshi, “Russia’s Post-Pokhran Dilemma,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 

XXII, No. 5, August 1998, p. 721, quoted in Jerome M. Conley, Indo-Russian Military 

and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for the United States, INSS Occasional Paper 

No. 31, Proliferation Series, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF 

Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 2000, pp. 24-25.

 171. John Garver, “The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations,” India 

Review, Vol. I, No. 4, October, 2002, pp. 17-21; Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the 

National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia, Burlington, VT: Ashgate 

Publishing Company, 2003; T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “China’s Energy and Regional 

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Lahore Daily Times, Internet Version, August 2, 2003, FBIS SOV, August 2, 2003.
182

 172. Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Alliances 2020,” Michael R. Chambers, ed., South 

Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002, pp. 370-376; S. Enders Wimbush, 

“India’s Perspective,” Central Intelligence Agency, Russia in the International 

System: A Conference Report, June 1, 2001, www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference_reports/

russia_conf.html, p. 31.

 173. James Clad, “Convergent Chinese and Indian Perceptions on the Global 

Order,” Frankel and Harding, eds., pp. 271-276.

 174. Ashley Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” Ibid., pp. 134-177.

 175. “China for Anti-Terror Front with India, Pak,” News Insight, July 12, 

2004, www.indiarects.com/nati2.asp?recno=2718; Atul Aneja, “China May Share 

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 176. Bates Gill and Matthew Oresman, China’s New Journey to the West: China’s 

Emergence in Central Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests, Washington: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 2003, pp. 8-14.

 177. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” pp. 153, 155; Francine R. Frankel, 

“Introduction,” Frankel and Harding, p. 7.

 178. Martin Walker, “U.S., India Discuss ‘Asian NATO’,” UPI, May 29, 2003;

“India To Play Prominent Role in U.S.-led ‘Asian NATO,’” Press Trust of India, July 

18, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis. 

 179. Jim Hoagland, “Staying On in Central Asia,” Washington Post, January 

20, 2002, p. B7; New Delhi, The Indian Express Internet Version, in English, July 8, 

2002, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Near East and South Asia (henceforth FBIS 

NES), July 8, 2002.

 180. Juli A. MacDonald, “Rethinking India and Pakistan’s Regional Intent,” 

NBR Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 4, November, 2003, pp. 7-8.

 181. Ibid.

 182. New Delhi, Hindustan Times Internet Version, in English, September 13, 

2000, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia, (Henceforth FBIS SOV), 

September 13, 2000; Igor Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, “Contending with 

the “Bear-ish” Arms Market: U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation and Russia, Gary 

K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, eds., Engaging India: U.S. 

Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy, London and New York: 

Routledge, 1999, pp. 245-246; Ross Munro, “China, India, and Central Asia,” Jed 

C. Snyder, ed., After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia, Fort Leslie 

McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995, pp. 132-133.

 183. Bagila Bukharbayeva, “India seeks Increased Engagement in Central 

Asia,” Associated Press, November 6, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
183

 184. Kishore C. Dash, “The Challenge of Regionalism in South Asia,” 

International Politics, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, June 2001, pp. 216-217; Mohan, Crossing 

the Rubicon, pp. 217-224.

 185. Brigadier Vijai K. Nair, VSM, Ph.D., “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An 

Indian Perspective,” Paper Presented to the Annual National Defense University 

Asian-Pacific Symposium, Honolulu, March, 2001, www.ndu.edu/iNSS/symposia/

pacific2001/nairpaper.htm.

 186. Bukharbayeva, “India seeks Increased Engagement in Central Asia.” 

 187. Dash, pp. 216-217.

 188. Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central Asia, Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1995, p. 155; Munro, pp. 132-133.

 189. Ibid.

 190. Shankkar and Shishir Gupta, “Energy: Striking it Rich,” India Today, 

November 18, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Meena Singh Roy, “India’s 

Interests in Central Asia,” Strategic Analysis, March, 2001, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/

sa_mar01rom01.html, Cited in Holzman, p. 3; Satyanarayan Pattanayak, “Oil As a 

Factor in Indo-Gulf Relations.”

 191. Ibid.

 192. I. K. Gujral, A Foreign Policy for India, New Delhi: External Publicity 

Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1998, p. 135; Maya 

Chadda, “Indo-Russian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” Hafeez Malik, ed., 

The Roles of the United States, Russia, and China in the New World Order, New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 119; S. P. Gupta, “India’s Increasing Eastern Orientation 

in Trade and Investment: Context and Challenges,” in Sandy Gordon and Stephen 

Henningham, eds., India Looks East: An Emerging Power and its Asia-Pacific Neighbors, 

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 111, Canberra: Strategic and Defence 

Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian 

National University, 1995, pp. 83-87; Teresita C. Schaffer, “A Changing India,” 

Chambers, ed., p. 50; Vijay L. Kelkar, “South Asia in 2020: Economic Outlook,” 

Chambers, ed., p. 87.

 193. Gujral, pp. 181-191; Kelkar, p. 87.

 194. Starr is cited in National Intelligence Council, Central Asia and the South 

Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, Strategic Dynamics, Washington, DC, 

2000, p. 41. 

 195. “ONGC Arm Seeks Nod for Stake in Overseas Fields,” Financial Times 

Information, February 20, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 196. Harsh V. Pant, “India and Iran: An ‘Axis in the Making’,” Asian Survey, 

Vol. XLIV, No. 3, May-June 2004, p. 375; Roy, (2001); Shankkar and Shishir Gupta, 

M. Ashraf Haidari, “No Security, No Trans-Afghan Pipeline,” www.afghanmafazine.

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 197. Ibid, Mark Berniker, “Trans-Afghan Pipeline Project Moving Forward, 

Faces Risks,” www.eurasianet.org, December 19, 2002; Brigadier General (Ret.) M. 

Sakhawat Hussain, “Behind the U.S. Diplomatic initiative in South Asia,” The 

Independent, June 19, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 198. Ibid.

 199. “Gazprom Capitalizes on Insecurity,” Indigo Publications Intelligence 

Online, December 5, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Vladimir Radyuhin, 

“Russia Revives Gas Proposal,” The Hindu, August 7, 2002, www.hnduonnet.com/

stories/200280703531200.htm; Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy, Foreword 

by Henry A. Kissinger, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002, p. 123; 

Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, FBIS SOV, October 4, 2000; Elizabeth 

Roche, “Indo-Russian Trade Vital for Momentum in Relations: Analysis,” Agence 

France Presse, December 1, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 200. Ibid.

 201. Poonam Mann, “Fighting Terrorism: India and Central Asia,” Strategic 

Analysis, February, 2001, www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_feb01map01.html; Roy.

 202. This is based on conversations with S. Frederick Starr, Director of the 

Central Asia Caucasus, Institute of Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; 

Starr.

 203. See, for example, Islamabad, The News Internet Version, in English, July 13, 

2003, FBIS SOV, July 13, 2003.

 204. “Russian Paper Says Minister Trubnikov’s Talks Mark ‘New Shift’ in 

Russia-U.S. Ties,” Kommersant, July 29, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 205. Stephen Blank, “Central Asia, South Asia, and Asian Security,” Eurasian 

Studies, Vol. II, No. 3, 1995, pp. 19-22; John W. Garver, “The Future of the SinoPakistani Entente Cordiale,” Chambers, ed., pp. 397-401, 429-436.

 206. Rahul Bedi, “Indian Base in Tajikistan ‘Quietly Operational’,” Irish Times, 

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 207. Dushanbe, Tajik Television First Channel in Russian, August 5, 2003, FBIS 

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185

208. Jane’s Intelligence Digest, December 13, 2002, www4.janes.com/search97cgi/

s97_cgi; Douglas Frantz, “Around the World, Hints of Afghanistans to Come,” 

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 209. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Eyes Markets Abroad,” Defense News, May 

20-26, 2002, p. 36; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Munitions Plants Fear Sales Losses, 

Seek Exports,” Defense News, January 14-20, 2002, p. 10; Nadeem Iqbal, “Pakistan’s 

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 210. Ibid.; Defense Industry Globalization: A Compendium of Papers Presented 

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 211. Ibid.

 212. Ibid.

 213. Ibid.

 214. MacDonald, “Rethinking India and Pakistan’s Regional Intent,” p. 20.

 215. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth 

Century, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001; John W. Garver, The ChinaIndia-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post Cold War Era, Seattle; NBR Asia, 

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 216. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: pp. 204-210, 224-236.

 217. Indo-Myanmar Security Accord Targets Militants in India’s Northeast,” 

pp. 15-17; John Hill, “Illegal Drugs Trade Thrives in Nepal’s Security Vacuum”; 

Ramtanu Maitra, “India Takes the Fight to Guerrillas.” 

 218. Stephen Blank, “Australia Joins U.S. Strategic Revolution,” Asia Times 

Online, August 2, 2003, www.atimes.com; Gregor Ferguson, “Australia Extends Its 

Maritime Security Zone,” Defense News, January 3, 2005, p. 14.

 219. Justine A. Rosenthal, “Southeast Asia: Archipelago of Afghanistans,” 

Orbis, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Summer 2003, p. 493. 

 220. R. K. Radhakrishnan, “Australian Navy Looking for Ties With India,” 

Global News Wire, World News Connection, June 11, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; 

“India, Indonesia Begin Joint Naval Patrols,” Agence France Presse, September 4, 

2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 221. Catharin Dalpino, “Southeast Asia,” Michael Armacost and J. Stapleton 

Roy, eds., America’s Role in Asia: American Views, San Francisco: The Asia foundation, 

2004, pp. 53-75.

 222. Ambassador Tommy Koh, “Southeast Asia,” America’s Role in Asia: Asian 

Views, San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2004, p. 36.
186

 223. “SE Asian Leaders Want More Tie-Ups With China, India,” The Straits 

Times Interactive, November 29, 2004, http: straitstimes.asia1.com.sg.sub/topstories/

story 0,5562, 287653,00html?; “Asian Leaders Urge Region to Look Towards China, 

India,” The Statesman, November 28, 2004, www.thestatesman.net/page.news.php?clid

=12&theme=usress=1&id=61403.

 224. Devidas Gupta, “India, ASEAN to Enhance Economic Cooperation,” Outlook 

India.com, November 30, 2004, www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=264526.

 225. Koh, pp. 36-53; Dalpino, pp. 53-75.

 226. Koh, p. 43.

 227. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia,” pp. 

210-216; Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”

 228. Ibid.; Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions,” 

p. 112; more recently, “Indian Defence Minister Says China, New Delhi Share 

Common Strategic Interests”; “China Willing to Strengthen Military Ties With 

India,” Outlook India.com, December 27, 2004.

 229. “India To Play Prominent Role in US-led ‘Asian NATO’.” Indeed, the 

Chinese media, and particularly the military media, have expressed concern about 

this cooperation almost since its inception. See Beijing, Jiefangun BAO Internet 

Version, in Chinese, February 24, 2002, Foreign Broadcast Information Service China

(henceforth FBIS CHI), February 24, 2002; Zhang Guihong, “US Security Policy 

Towards South Asia After September 11 and its Implications for China: A Chinese 

Perspective,” Strategic Analysis, April-June, 2003, www.idsa-india.org/SA200302/

APR-JUN01; “The Hindu-Editorial: Ties With Big Powers,” The Hindu, February 26, 

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13, 2002.

 230. Ibid.; Jing-Dong Yuan, “India’s Rise After Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses 

and Assessments,” Asian Survey, Vol. XLI, No. 6, 2001, pp. 978-1001.

 231. Pranay Sharma, “Beijing Boost to Delhi UN Role,” The Telegraph, Calcutta, 

October 21, 2004.www.telegraphindia.com/104102/asp/nation/story; Siddarth 

Srivastava, “Beijing Boosts Delhi’s Bid for UN Council,” Asia Times Online, www.

atimes.com, November 1, 2004.

 232. John W. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the 

Post-Cold War Era, National Bureau of Research Asia, Vol. XIII, No. 5, 2002; JingDong Yuan, “India’s Rise After Pokhran II,” pp. 978-1001; Tellis, “China and India 

in Asia,” pp. 139-142; Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s Perceptions and 

Policies Toward India,” Frankel and Harding, eds., pp. 75-96.

 233. “China Willing to Strengthen Military Ties With India”; Anna Greenspan, 

“The Great Reverse—Part III, Yale Global Online, wwww.yaleglobal.yale.edu, 

September 8, 2004; “China Welcomes Prospect of ‘Long-Term’ Partnership 

With India,” Radio Australia, May 24, 2004, http: www.abc.net.au/ra/newstories/

RANewsStories_11114005.htm; Urvashi Dev Rawal, “The India-Russia-China Axis: 

An Uncertain Future,” SAPRA India Bulletin, May 2004, pp. 4-6.
187

 234. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia,” pp. 

203-210; Mohammed Ayoob, “South Asia’s Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 

Orbis, Vol. XLV, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 128-133.

 235. “China Welcomes Prospect of ‘Long-Term’ Partnership With India,” 

May 24, 2004; Urvashi Dev Rawal, “The India-Russia-China Axis: An Uncertain 

Future,” pp. 4-6.

 236. Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions,” p. 112.

 237. “India Has a Comparative Advantage Over China,” Financial Express, 

September 30, 2004, www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=70134; 

Yoichi Funabashi, “India and Japan: A New Strategic Affinity,” USI Journal, AprilJune, 2004, www.usiofindia.org/article_apr_jun04_3.htm.

 238. Testimony of Rollie Lal to the Commission on U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review, December 4, 2003, www.rand.org; George Perkovich, “Is India a Major 

Power?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, Winter 2004, p. 133; Zalmay 

Khalizad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel M. 

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 239. Nair, “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An Indian Perspective”; Mohan, 

Crosing the Rubicon, pp. 204-236; Jajsit Singh, “Peace and Cooperation in West Asia: 

An Indian Perspective,” Sandy Gordon and Stephen Henningham, eds., India Looks 

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and Defence, No. 111, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research 

School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian National University, 1995, p. 

57.

240. Landry Haryo Subianto, “ASEAN and the East Asian Cooperation: 

Searching for a Balanced Relationship,” The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, 

First Quarter, 2003, p. 9.

241. Prasun K. Sengupta, “Globalization of Security and Its Regional 

Implications,” Asian Defence Yearbook, Kuala Lumpur: Asian Defence Journal, 2001, 

p. 8; “India’s ASEAN Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, October 17, 2003, www4.

janes.com/subscribe/jic/doc.

242. Nair, “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An Indian Perspective.” 

 243. Donald Berlin, “Navy Reflects India’s Strategic Ambitions,” Asia Times 

Online, November 6, 2004, www.atimes.com.

 244. Ibid.

 245. Steven J. Forsberg, “Is a China-India Naval Alliance Posible?” Proceedings

of the U.S. Naval Institute, March, 2002, pp. 71-72; “China’s Brazen Myanmar 

Move,” Asia Times Online, August 21, 2003, www.atimes.com; John W. Garver, “The 

Gestalt of the Sino-Indian Relationship,” Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of 

China in Asia: Security Implications, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
188

U.S. Army War College, 2002, pp. 279-281; Donald L. Berlin, “The Indian Ocean 

and the Second Nuclear Age,” Orbis, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 59-61; 

Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” pp. 134-177.

 246. Mark W. Frazier, “Quiet Competition and the Future of Sino-Indian 

Relations,” Frankel and Harding, ed., p. 300. 

 247. Robert M. Hathaway, “The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 4, December, 2002, pp. 21-29.

 248. Federal News Service, Remarks by Secretary of State Colin Powell, Topic: 

U.S.-China Relations, College Station: Texas A&M University, November 5, 2003.

 249. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”

 250. Frazier, p. 316.

 251. Parag Khanna, “The Axis of Democracy Revisited,” In the National Interest, 

September 12, 2003.

 252. “India To Play Prominent Role in US-led ‘Asian NATO’”; “Pentagon Keen 

To Make India A Strategic Partner,” pp. 27-28.

 253. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold 

War Era; Jing-Dong Yuan, “India’s Rise After Pokhran II,” pp. 978-1001; Tellis, 

“China and India in Asia,” pp. 139-142; Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: 

China’s Perceptions and Policies Toward India,” pp. 75-96.

 254. Ibid.; Garver, “The Future of the Sino-Pakistani Entente Cordiale,” pp. 

397-401, 429-436.

 255. Ibid.

 256. Beijing, Renmin Ribao Internet Version, in Chinese, August 17, 2001, FBIS 

NES, August 17, 2001

 257. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.

 258. NSS.

 259. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.

 260. Beijing, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, in Chinese, March 20, 2002, FBIS CHI, March 

20, 2002.

 261. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” p. 141.

 262. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle; Jing-Dong Yuan, pp. 978-1001; Tellis, 

“China and India in Asia,” pp. 139-142, 174; Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s 

Perceptions and Policies Toward India,” pp. 75-96.

 263. Ibid.; Garver, “The Future of the Sino-Pakistani Entente Cordiale,” pp. 

397-401, 429-436.

 264. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” p. 163.

 265. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle; Garver, “The Future of the SinoPakistani Entente Cordiale,” pp. 397-401, 429-436; Jing-Dong Yuan, pp. 978-1001; 
189

Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” pp. 139-142; Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s 

Perceptions and Policies Toward India,” pp. 75-96.

 266. Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia: Back to the Future,” Tellis and Wills, 

eds., p. 286.

 267. Forsberg, pp. 71-72; Garver, “The Gestalt of the Sino-Indian Relationship,” 

pp. 279-281; Ehsan Ahrari, “Strategic Moves in Southern Asia,” Far Eastern 

Economic Review, June 28, 2001, Ahamd Farroqui, “China Card Could Yet Trump 

Musharraf,” Asia Times Online, May 25, 2002, www.atimes.com.

 268. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” p. 141.

 269. Sahgal, “India: The World’s Parade Ground”; “India’s ASEAN 

Strategy.”

 270. Subianto, p. 9.

 271. Tellis, “China and India in Asia,” p. 166.

 272. MacDonald, p. 10; Nair., “Challenges for the Years Ahead: An Indian 

Perspective,” Jasjit Singh, ““Peace and Cooperation in West Asia: An Indian 

Perspective,” p. 57.

 273. MacDonald, pp. 41, 51.

 274. Ibid.

 275. Douglas Streusand, “Geopolitics Versus Globalization,” Captain Sam J. 

Tangredi (USN), ed., Globalization and Maritime Power, Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 2003, p. 52.

 276. MacDonald, p. 51.

 277. Ibid., p. 41.

 278. Ibid.

 279. Berlin, pp. 59-61; Vivek Raghunvanshi, “India Bulks Up Eastern Island 

Military Bases,” Defense News, December 15, 2003, p. 12.

 280. Ibid.

 281. Faizal Yahya, “India and Southeast Asia: Revisited,” Contemporary 

Southeast Asia, Vol. XXV, No. 1, April, 2003, p. 91; Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer, 

“Cam Ranh Bay: Past Imperfect: Future Conditional,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 

Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 2001. pp. 467-469.

 282. Ibid.

 283. Quoted in Ibid., from Micol Brooke, “India Courts Vietnam With Arms 

and Nuclear Technology,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, August-September 2000, 

p. 20.

 284. New Delhi, Financial Express Internet Version, in English, June 11, 2003, 

FBIS NES, June 11, 2003; C. Raja Mohan, “India’s New Naval Doctrine,” The Hindu, 

April 29, 2004, www.thehindu.com/2004/04/29/stories/2004042904801100.htm.
190

 285. “Admiral Sushil Kumar, “The Indian Navy is a Stabilizing Force in the 

Region,” www.Rediff.com, February 16, 2001; Commodore R. S. Vasan, “Indian 

Maritime Doctrine,” Observer Research Foundation, July 17, 2004, www.observerindia.

comchapters/discussion/ds040717.htm; Rahul Bedi, “A New Doctrine for the Navy,” 

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 286. Funabashi; “Ambitious Plans of India Navy,” Hindustan Times, April 

24, 2000, quoted in Victor M. Gobarev, “India as a World Power: Changing 

Washington’s Myopic Policy,” Policy Analysis, No. 381, Heritage Foundation, 

September 11, 2000, p. 7; R. S. Yadav, “Changing India-Japan Relations in the PostCold War Era,” India Quarterly, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, April-June, 2002, pp. 191-207; 

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 287. Ibid.; Yann-Huei Song, “Actions Taken by the Three Main “Outsiders” 

in the South China Sea Region in the Year 2000,” Peace Forum Papers, www.dsis.

org.tw/peaceforum/papers/2001-02APS0102001e.htm; Rahul Bedi, “India Opens Up 

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 288. Yahya, p. 84.

 289. Ibid., pp. 79-103.

 290. Sengupta, p. 12.

 291. Anthony Davis, “Thailand Strengthens Security Ties with Israel,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2005, www.4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.

jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags; Vladimir Radyuhin, “India To Gain From 

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stories/2003052205701200.htm.

 292. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures,” Defense 

News, November 17, 2003, p. 3; Idem., “India Strives for Missile-Building Hub,” 

Defense News, February 24, 2003, p. 34.

 293. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 438-443.

 294. Conversations at USPACOM, November, 2004.

 295. Harold Kennedy, “Air Force Forging Alliances in Pacific Region,” National 

Defense, March, 2004, p. 31.

 296. Conversations with DoD officials, September, 2004.

 297. Federal Document Clearing House, “Donald H. Rumsfeld Holds Defense 

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 298 Rajamony, p. 75; Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” The Monitor, Vol. 

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 299. Ibid.

 300. Morrison, p. 15.

 301. Rahul Bedi, “U.S., India Building Bridges,” Jane’s Defnce Weekly, November 

28, 2001, p. 23.
191

 302. “Joint Statement of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group,” December 4, 

2001, India News, No. 1, 2002, pp. 7-8.

 303. Ibid.; Rajamony, pp. 75-76.

 304. “Joint Statement of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group,” December 4, 

2001.

 305. “India, U.S. Hold Anti-Terrorism Talks With Focus on South Asia,” Agence 

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 306. “India, U.S. To Hold High-Level Defense Talks,” South Asia Monitor, May 

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 307. “India, U.S. Increase Defense, Anti-Terror Links,” Washington Times June 

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 308. “Press Release Issued by the Ministry of External Affairs on the India-U.S. 

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 309. Storey, p. 195.

 310. Rahul Bedi, “India Uncovers Militant Bases in Kashmir,” Jane’s 

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 311. New Delhi, The Indian Express Internet Version, in English, January 13, 2003,

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 312. Conversations, USPACOM, November 7-10, 2004.

 313. “Meeting of the India-US Defense Policy Group, August 7, 2003,” India 

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 314. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Militaries Meet As Indian-U.S. Relations Warm,” 

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 315. “Visit of Chief of India’s Naval Staff Admiral Madhvendra Singh to the 

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 316. Ibid.; Vivek Raghuvanshi,” U.S., Indian Navies Finish Major Exercises in 

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 317. Raghuvanshi, “Militaries Meet As Indian-U.S. Relations Warm,” p. 21.

 318. “Indian, U.S. Forces Hold Joint Exercises, The Associated Press, July 7, 

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 319. Storey, p. 42.
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 320. “Meeting of the India-US Defense Policy Group, August 7, 2003,” pp. 

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321. Storey, p. 42.

 322. Andrew Koch and Alon Ben-David, “US, India Agree Future Defence 

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s20030820209953.html; Major James Law, USAF, and Master Sergeant Michael 

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 323. “U.S. Warned It Could Lose Air Supremacy,” www.cnn.com, June 23, 

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 324. C. R. Jayachandran, “India May Lead Asian Version of NATO,” The Times 

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 325. P. S. Suryanarayana, “U.S. Move to Co-Opt India Attacked in China,” The 

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 326. Conversations with Indian experts, Tel-Aviv, February 2004, and with Dr. 

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 327. Walker, “U.S., India Discuss ‘Asian NATO’,” UPI, May 29, 2003.

 328. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia.”

 329. Walker.

 330. “India May Allow U.S. Access to Military Bases: Jaswant,” The News, June 

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 331. Rahul Bedi, “US Closes In On South Asia’s Strategic Jewel,” Asia Times 

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 332. Ibid.

 333. Ibid.

 334. QDR.

 335. Federal Document Clearing House, “Testimony by Peter T. R. Brookes, 

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 336. Statement to the House Committee on International Relations by Peter 

Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, June 26, 

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193

 337. Ibid.

 338. Ibid.

 339. Shahin, “US Won’t Take India’s ‘NO’ for an Answer.”

 340. Chindand Rajghatta, “US Presses India on Iraq, Seeks Military Bases,” The 

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 341. Joseph Cirincione, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” Foreign Policy, 

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 342. Ibid.

 343. Chellaney, “New Delhi’s Dilemma,” p. 150.

 344. Space-Based Laser Programme, www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/sbl, cited 

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 345. Scott Baldauf, “India Rises as Strategic U.S. Ally,” Christian Science Monitor, 

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 346. Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent 

and Ready Arsenal, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 21.

 347. Ibid., pp. 24-39.

 348. Ibid, p. 24.

 349. Celia W. Dugger, “Rare Praise From India on U.S. Defense,” New York 

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 350. Chennai, The Hindu, in English, May 9, 2001, FBIS NES, May 9, 2001; 

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 351. C. Raja Mohan, “India and the U.S.-Russian Alliance,” The Hindu, 

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 352. C. Raja Mohan, “Vajpayee, Bush May Explore Tie-Up in Missile Defense,” 

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 353. Ibid.

 354. “US Keen to Involve India in Missile Shield Programme: Experts,” Press 

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 355. David Ruppe, “India: Washington Considers Allowing Transfer of the 

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194

 356. Ibid., pp. 25-29; Richard Speier, “Arrows for India?” Washington Institute 

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winep/policy_2003/2003_785.

 357. Ibid; Gopal Ratnam and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Patriot Threatens Indo-Pak 

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 358. Sridhar Krishnaswami, “India, U.S. To Step Up Defence Cooperation,” The 

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Talks, Rumsfeld Makes Unscheduled Appearance,” BBC Monitoring, August 8, 

2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

359. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Offers Compromises To Join U.S. Missile 

Defense,” Defense News, September 29, 2003, p. 2.

 360. Ibid.

 361. Sultan Shahin, “India Sticks With Iran, For Now,” Asia Times Online, 

September 19, 2003, www.atimes.com; “Watershed in India-Israel Relations,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Digest, September 17, 2003, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jic/doc.

 362. Ratnam and Raghuvanshi, pp. 1, 8.

 363. Ruppe, “India: Washington Considers Allowing Transfer of the Arrow 

Interceptor.”

 364. C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” p. 5.

 365. Amrit Dhillon, “US Ban on Technology Sales to India Lifted; ‘Milestone’ 

Agreement Covers Nuclear Cooperation, Space, and Missile Defense,” South China 

Morning Post, December 19, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 366. Federal Document Clearing House, “Statement by the President,” January 

12, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 367. Baldauf, “India Rises as Strategic U.S. Ally”; Ashish Kumar Sen; Seema 

Sirohi, “India Takes What It Can,” Asia Times Online, Janaury 21, 2004, www.

atimes.com; Edward Luce, “Premier of India Hails ‘Strategic’ U.S. Alliance,” 

Financial Times, London Edition, January 14, 2004, p. 1, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; 

Christopher Marquis, “U.S. May Widen Technology Contacts With India,” New 

York Times, Janaury 13, 2004, p. A12; Peter Slevin, “U.S. to Send India Nuclear, 

Space Technology: New Delhi Pledges to Pursue Peaceful Purposes and Help 

Block Spread of Weapons,” Washington Post, January 13, 2004. 

 368. MacDonald, pp. 94-95.

 369. Gopal Ratnam and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Patriot Threatens Indo-Pak 

Balance,” Defense News, October 13, 2003, pp. 1, 8.

 370. “Present Indo-US Military Cooperation Level is Unprecedented: Myers,” 

Press Trust of India, February 17, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
195

 371. For example, Neelam Matthews, “Courting India: French and Israeli 

Teams Follow Up on Variety of Military, Civil Programs,” Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, January 10, 2005, p. 61; Richard A. Bitzinger, “Globalization in the PostCold War Defense Industry: Challenges and Opportunities,” Ann R. Markusen 

and Sean S. Costigan, eds., Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century, 

New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999, pp. 305-333.

 372. MacDonald, pp. 93-104.

 373. Ibid.

 374. Ibid.

 375. Conversations, USPACOM.

 376. Conversations with Indian experts, Tel-Aviv, February, 2004.

 377. MacDonald, pp. 93-98.

 378. Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations, pp. 14-15.

 379. Ibid.; Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or 

Complementary Interest, Forthcoming.

 380. “Commerce’s Juster Outlines Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with 

India,” U.S. Consulate Mumbai, Press Releases, April 5, 2004, http://Mumbai.

usconsulate.gov/wwwwashnews1565.html.

 381. Ibid.

 382. Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary 

Interest, Forthcoming; Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” p. 15.

 383. Ibid.

 384. Harbakash Singh Nanda, “India, U.S. Further Strategic Ties,” UPI, 

October 23, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Kenneth I. Juster, “A New Strategic 

Partnership for the U.S. and India,” Asian Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2004.

 385. Tellis, “Lost Tango in Washington.”

 386. Ibid.

 387. Ibid.

 388. MacDonald, pp. 93-98.

 389. “Meeting of the India-US Defense Policy Group,” p. 34; Joint Statement 

on U.S.-India Defense Policy Group.

 390. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, U.S. Find Middle Ground for P-3C Orions,” 

Defense News, May 31, 2004, p. 28.

 391. Jyoti Malhotra, “India After JN Dixit,” Asia Times Online, www.atimes.com, 

January 11, 2005.

 392. “US Seeks ‘Stronger’ Ties with India,” www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_

asia/4079455.stnm, December 9, 2004.
196

 393. Siddarth Srivastava, “AA U.S. Offer Delhi Can’t Refuse,” Asia Times 

Online, www.atimes.com, December 2, 2004.

 394. Ibid.

 395. “Israel Fine-Tuning Phalcon Radar for India: Air Force,” Agence France 

Presse, October 1, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 396. Timothy D. Hoyt, “India: The Regional Hegemon,” Timothy D. Hoyt, 

Military Industry and Regional Power: India, Iraq, and Israel Taylor & Francis, 

Forthcoming 2004 or 2005, pp. 123-155, cited by kind acknowledgement of the 

author; Damon Bristow, “‘Globalisation’ Versus ‘Self Reliance’ in India’s Defence 

Industry: Can the Conflict Be Resolved?” The Atlantic Council of the United 

States: Defense Industry Globalization, A Compendium of Papers Presented at a 

Conference on “Defense Industry Globalization, Washington, DC: November 16, 

2001, pp. 103-120. 

 397. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s New Air chief Pushes Indigeneous Materiel 

Purchases,” Defense News, January 17, 2005, p. 18.

 398. Ibid.; Bedi, “U.S. India Building Bridges,” p. 23.

 399. Kaushik Kapisthalam, “India’s Arjun Shows Value of Indigenous 

Industry,” Defense News, January 10, 2005, p. 29.

 400. Ibid.

 401. Hoyt, India: “The Regional Hegemon,” pp. 123-155.

 402. Raghuvanshi, “India Aims To Project Power Across Asia,” p. 10.

 403. “India May Export Missile, Official Says, Global Security Network, January 

18, 2005, www.nti.org/d_newsire/issues/2005_1_18.htm#A94AFA73.

 404. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Eyes markets Abroad,” Defense News, May 

20-26, 2002, p. 36; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Munitions Plants Fear Sales Losses, 

Seek Exports,” Defense News, January 14-20, 2002, p. 10; Nadeem Iqbal, Anil 

Sharma. 

 405. Ibid., Defense Industry Globalization, “India Furthers Strategic Goals By 

Reaching Out to Arms Markets,” www.stratfor.com, October 29, 2002.

 406. Ibid.

 407. Ibid.

 408. Blank, “The Arming of Central Asia,” Asia Times Online, August 24, 2002, 

www.atimes.com.

 409. Raghuvanshi, “Indian Navy Drafts Plan for Industry-Military 

Relationship,” p. 12; Muscal, “Indian Defense Industry Delegation Promotes 

Cooperation”; Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures,” p. 3.

 410. Ibid. Raghuvanshi, “India Strives for Missile-Building Hub,” Defense News, 

February 24, 2003, p. 34.
197

 411. Hoyt, “India: The Regional Hegemon,” pp. 123-155; Bristow, 

“‘Globalisation’ Versus ‘Self Reliance’ in India’s Defence Industry: Can the Conflict 

Be Resolved?” pp. 103-120.

 412. Ibid.

 413. Bjorn Hagelin, Mark Bromley, and Simon T. Wezeman, “International 

Arms Transfers,” SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament, and International 

Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 459.

 414. Raghuvanshi, “Indian Navy Drafts Plan for Industry-Military 

Relationship,” p. 12; Muscal, “Indian Defense Industry Delegation Promotes 

Cooperation”; Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures,” p. 3.

 415. New Delhi, The Indian Express, Internet Version, in English, April 24, 2002, 

FBIS SOV, April 24, 2002.

 416. “Sukhoi-30s Develop Technical Snags,” SAPRA India Bulletin, September, 

2003, p. 28; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Grounds Fleet of Sukhoi Fighters,” Defense 

News, September 15, 2003, p. 66.

 417. Ibid.

 418. Ibid., “New Challenges to Indian-Russian Defense Ties,” Jamestown 

Monitor, March 25, 2002; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “No Arms Sales in Russian-Indian 

Accord,” Defense News, December 9-15, 2002, p. 12; New Delhi, The Asian Age, in 

English, April 5, 2001, FBIS NES, April 5, 2001; Subhash Kapila, “India-Russia 

Strategic Cooperation: Time to Move Away,” South Asia Analysis Group Papers 

No, 144, 2002, www.saag.org/paper2_paper144.html; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian 

Ministry Puts Russian Arms Manufacturers on Notice,” Defense News, November 

24, 2003, p. 11.

 419. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Navy Drafts Plan for Industry-Military 

Relationship,” Defense News, December 15, 2003, p. 12; Tal Muscal, “Indian Defense 

Industry Delegation Promotes Cooperation,” Jerusalem Post, November, 25, 2003; 

Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures,” Defense News, 

November 17, 2003, p. 3; Sanu Kainikara, “Changing the Balance of Power,” AsiaPacific Defense Reporter, February, 2004, p. 52; Timothy D. Hoyt, “Israeli Defense 

Industry: The Other Side of Globalization,” The Atlantic Council of the United 

States: Defense Industry Globalization, A Compendium of Papers Presented at a 

Conference on “Defense Industry Globalization,” Washington, DC, November 16, 

2001, pp. 193-207. 

 420. Kapisthalam, p. 29.

 421. For information on the Russian defense industry, see Julian Cooper, “The 

Arms Industries of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus,” SIPRI Yearbook, 

2004, pp. 438-439.

 422. Stephen Blank, “Russian Defense Industry in an Age of Globalization,” 

Defense Industry Globalization : A Compendium of Papers Presented at a 

Conference on: “Defense Industry Globalization,” Washington, DC, November 16, 
198

2001, Atlantic Council of the United States, pp. 60-65; New Delhi, The Asian Age, 

in English, May 4, 2002, FBIS SOV, May 4, 2002; New Delhi, The Indian Express, 

Internet Version, in English, April 24, 2002, FBIS SOV, April 24, 2002; Mumbai, The 

Times of India Internet Version, February 6, 2002, FBIS SOV, February 6, 2002.

 423. Ibid.; “New Air Defense for India Will Unnerve Beijing,” www.stratfor.com, 

June 21. 2001.

 424. “Potential for Cooperation with India is Nearly Exhausted,” Current Digest 

of the Post-Soviet Press (henceforth CDPP), Vol. LIII, No. 35, September 26, 2001, p. 

17; B. M. Jain, “India and Russia: Reassessing the Time-Tested Ties,” Pacific Affairs, 

Vol. LXXVI, No. 3, Fall 2003, pp. 382-386.

 425. Hagelin, Bromley, and Wezeman, pp. 453-455.

 426. Harbaksh Singh Nanda, “India to Say Goodbye to Russian MiGs,” UPI, 

July 17, 2004.

 427. Sibal.

 428. Mishra, Speech by Shri Brajesh Mishra, National Security Advisor of India 

at the Council of Foreign Relations, “India, United States, and the New World 

Order: Prospects for Cooperation,” New York, May 7, 2003, p. 23.

 429. Harsh V. Pant, “India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints,” 

Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. VIII, No. 6, December, 

2004, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8no4a6.html.

 430. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Israel May Become India’s Top Source,” Defense 

News, March 10, 2003; p. 34. Indeed, some think Israel may already be the leading 

exporter to India, Amy Waldman, “The Bond Between India and Israel Grows, New 

York Times, September 7, 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/09/07/internatinl/asia/07INDI.

htm; Edward Luce and Harvey Morris, “India and Israel Ready to Consummate 

Secret Affair,” Financial Times, September 4, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; 

Amnon Barzilai, “Looking Out for Number One,” Ha’Aretz, July 12, 2004, www.

haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml.

 431. Ramtanu Maitra, “India’s Phalcon: Long-Range Problems,” Asia Times 

Online, www.atimes.com March 20, 2004.

 432. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Navy Drafts Plan for Industry-Military 

Relationship”; Muscal, “Indian Defense Industry Delegation Promotes 

Cooperation”; Raghuvanshi, “India’s HAL Eager for Aviation Ventures.”

 433. Barbara Opall-Rome and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Seeks Israeli Spy 

Staellite Imagery,” Defense News, September 22, 2003, p. 6.

 434. Barbara Opall-Rome and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Eyes Foreign 

Missiles,” Defense News, September 22, 2003, pp. 1, 8.

 435. Rahul Bedi, “India Courts Missile Help from Israel,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

October 1, 2003.
199

 436. Ibid.; Rahul Bedi, “India Negotiates Defence Packages with Israel,” Jane’s 

Defence Weekly, October 2, 2002, p. 12; Rahul Bedi, “New Delhi Near to Closing 

Barak Deal,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 3, 2003, www4.janes.com/subscribe/

jdw/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/jamesdata/mags.

 437. Ibid.

 438. Ashok K. Mehta, “Indo-Israeli Give and Take,” Global New Wire, World 

News Connection, September 10, 2003; “Rana Latif “Indo-Israel Nexus to Harm 

Pakistan, Says Gul,” Global News Wire, World News Connection, September 23, 2003; 

Rahul Datta, “Indo-Israeli Military Exercise Coming Up,” Global News Wire, World 

News Connection, September 23, 2003, all retreived from Lexis-Nexis.

 439. Ramtanu Maitra, “India’s Phalcon: Long-Range Problems,” Asia Times 

Online, www.atimes.com, March 20, 2004.

 440. Ibid.

 441. MacDonald.

 442. Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent 

and Ready Arsenal, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 86n.

 443. Vivek Raghunvahi, “India Outlines Defense Needs as U.S. Sanctions 

End,” Defense News, November 12-18, 2001, p. 34.

 444. USINFO.State.Gov, “U.S., Indian High Technology Will Benefit Through 

Cooperation,” Augst 8, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html; Gopal 

Ratnam, “India, U.S. Work To Restore Trust, Ties,” Defense News, November 3, 

2003, pp. 1, 8.

 445. Ibid.

 446. Raghuvanshi, “India’s Navy Reaches for Blue Water Goals, p. 19.

 447. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “ India’s New Government Rethinks Acquisitions,” 

Defense News, December 13, 2004, p. 22.

 448. Ibid.

 449. “India, U.S. Likely To Clear Sale of P-3 Orions,” Aerospace Daily, June 

12, 2003; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Awaits U.S. Commitments,” Defense News, 

November 22, 2004, p. 14.

 450. John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, Alternate 

Representative of the United States of America, Third Session of the Preparatory 

Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons, New York, New York, May 4, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/np/

rls/rm/32293.htm. 

 451. Stephen F. Burgess, Is Arms Control Really Dead?: The United States, India, 

and Pakistan, Paper Presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political 

Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 30, 2003, pp. 25-26, and the sources 

cited therein.
200

 452. Richard Haass, “The United States and India: A Transfomred Relationship,” 

Remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry, January 7, 2003, www.state.gov.

 453. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, p. 22.

 454. Ibid., pp. 26-29.

 455. Ibid.

 456. B. Muralidhar Reddy, “U.S. Envoy’s Remarks Raise Eyebrows in 

Pak.,” The Hindu, January 25, 2003, www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/01/25/

stories/2003012507951200.htm.

 457. “China Not in Favor of According Nuclear Status to India, Pak,” Press 

Trust of India, June 29, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; MacDonald, pp. 57-59; 

Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Propsects for Resoltuion,” 

India Review, Vol. II, No. 3, July, 2003, p. 112.

458. “A Paradigm Shift Towards South Asia,” p. 149.

 459. MacDonald, pp. 57-59; Mohan, “India and the Bush Doctrine,” p. 5.

 460. Ibid.

 461. MacDonald, p. 59.

 462. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”

 463. Sibal.

 464. A. Ganguly, “India Hails Technology Pact with US,” Asia Times Online, 

March 7, 2003, www.atimes.com.

 465. Jon B. Wolfsthal and Rose Gottemoeller, “Israel, India, and Pakistan: 

Regional Security and Politics are the Solution, Not the NPT,” www.pircenter.org/

conf2003/data.

 466. Ramtanu Maitra, “Russia Floats Novel Nuclear Idea for India,” Asia Times 

Online, www.atimes.com, December 3, 2003; Anwar Iqbal, “U.S.: India, Pakistan Will 

Retain Nukes,” UPI, June 17, 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 467. MacDonald, pp. 119-132.

 468. Ibid.

 469. Ibid.

 470. Burgess, pp. 25-26.

 471. MacDonald.

 472. Ibid.

 473. Stephen Phillip Cohen, “South Asia,” pp. 77-104.

 474. Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospects for 

Resolution,” India Review, Vol. II, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 89-116; “Army Chief Warns 

Pak Against N-strike: ‘We are Ready for Full-Scale War’,” The Tribune, January 12, 

2002.
201

 475. NSS; QDR.

 476. “Testimony of Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Verification and Compliance to the U.S.-China Commission, July 24, 2003, www.

uscc.gove/tesut.htm; Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-IslamabadPyongyang,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 

57-100.

 477. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War, 

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, p. 142; Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, 

June 25, 2003, FBIS SOV, June 25, 2003, Beijing Review Internet Version, FBIS SOV

February 7, 2002.

 478. Ayoob, “South Asia’s Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy,” p. 133.

 479. Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 

1980s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. LXI, No. 2, Winter 1982-83, pp. 309-324, employed this 

analytical point with regard to Europe, but it also holds for South Asia.

 480. Amy Waldman, “Indians in Deal with Pakistanis for Peace Talks,” New 

York Times, January 7, 2004, p. A1.

 481. Burgess, pp. 25-26; “Missile Defense Briefing Report, No. 124, American 

Foreign Policy Council, November 3, 2003, www.afpc.org; “India: Washington 

Considers Allowing Transfer of Arrow Interceptor,” www.nti.org/dnewswire/

issues/2002/730, July 30, 2002.

 482. Colonel Howard D. Belote, USAF, “Proconsuls, Pretenders, or 

Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders,” Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition, Washington, DC: Fort Lesley 

J. McNair, National Defense University Press, 2004, pp. 1-19, and the sources cited 

therein.

 483. Ilan Berman, “Israel, India, and Turkey: Triple Entente?” Middle East 

Quarterly, Fall 2002, pp. 33-40; K. Gajendra Singh, “India Wooing Turkey and Israel 

Adds Up,” Asia Times Online, October 1, 2003, www.atimes.com; Huma Siddqui, 

“US-Israel-India Meet on Terroism Being Planned,” Financial Express, June 16, 

2003, www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=36310.

 484. Mohan Malik, pp. 57-100; Justin Bernier, “China’s Strategic Proxies,” 

Orbis, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 629-643; T. V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani 

Nuclear/Missile Ties and Balance of Power Politics,” The Nonproliferation Review, 

Vol. X, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 21-29.

 485. Ibid.

 486. Ahmed Rashid, “Danger Mounts for Embattled General,” Far Eastern 

Economic Review, January 8, 2004, pp. 12-16; Seema Sirohi, “Pakistan Squarely 

Behind U.S. Shield,” Asia Times Online, November 11, 2003, www.atimes.com.

 487. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “India’s Response to Terorrism After 13 December 

2001,” Conflict, Security, and Development, Vol. III, No. 2, August, 2003, pp. 278-

280.
202

 488. Malhotra, “India After JN Dixit.”

 489. Steve Coll, “Between India and Pakistan, A Changing Role for the U.S.,” 

The Washington Post, May 26, 2002, p. B01.

 490. Neelesh Misra, “India, Pakistan to Establish Nuclear Hot Line to Lower 

Risk of Nuclear Flare-up,” Associated Press Worldstream, June 20, 2004, retrieved 

from Lexis-Nexis.

 491. Sultan Shahin, “India Doubting its U.S. ‘Strategic Partnership’,” however, 

this sentiment developed quite soon after September 11. For example, see “India 

Fumes as West Urges Kashmir Restraint,” Reuters, Hindustan Times, October 10, 

2001. For more recent assessments, see Zhang Guihong, “US Security Policy 

Towards South Asia”; C. Raja Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift Towards South Asia,” 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Winter 2002-03, pp. 145-46; New Delhi, 

Outlook, in English, FBIS NES, December 23, 2002; “US Is Weak If It Cannot Rein 

In Pakistan Terror: Indian PM,” Agence France Presse, March 3, 2003; Lancaster; 

Perkovich, “Is India a Major Power,” pp. 140-142.

 492. CFR Report, pp. 7-11; C. Raja Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift,” p. 148; 

“Testimony of Stephen P. Cohen, Frank Wisner, and Michael Krepon,” Hearing 

of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Pakistan and India, January 28, 2004, 

retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 493. Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift,” p. 150; Hagerty, pp. 89-91, 112.

 494. Feroz Hassan Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability 

Dilemmas in South Asia,” Arms Control Today, October, 2003, www.armscontrol.

org/act/2003_10Khan_10; Rajesh M. Basrur, “Are South Asian Nuclear Politics 

Different?” Discussion Paper, The Stimson Center, May 5, 2003, pp. 11-17, www.

stimsoncenter.org.

 495. Ibid.

 496. Ibid.; P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in 

South Asia,” Working Paper, Version 1.0, Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 

2003, pp. 22-28.

 497. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”

 498. Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan-India: Same Game, New Rules,” Asia 

Times Online, www.atimes.com, November 26, 2003; Nayar and Paul, p. 85; Jonah 

Blank, “Kashmir: All Tactics and No Strategy,” Sumit Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir 

Question: Retrospect and Prospect, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 2003, pp.199-201; 

“Banned Pakistani Ultra Outfits Back in Business,” Business Standard, September 

11, 2003.

 499. Hagerty, pp. 89-116; Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift,” pp. 149-151; Cohen, 

Wisner, Krepon, “Testimony”; Irm Haleem, “Micro Target, Micro Impact: The 

Resolution of the Kashmir conflict as a Key to Shrinking Al-Qaeda’s International 

Terrorist Network,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Spring 2004, 

pp. 37-41.
203

 500. Ibid.

 501. Waldman, “Indians in Deal with Pakistanis for Peace Talks,” p. A1.

 502. Timothy D. Hoyt, “Politics, Proximity, and Paranoia: The Evolution of 

Kashmir as a Nuclear Flashpoint,” Sumit Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question: 

Retrospect and Prospect, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 2003, pp. 117-144; Jonah 

Blank, pp. 199-201.

 503. Such conferences of academics and experts discussing issues of mutual 

concern in an unofficial capacity in a series of non-binding and unofficial fora has 

been very productive in stimulating international dialogue on East Asian security 

issues. And while they have not worked so well on the Middle East, that is not 

due to any inherent defect in the concept as such. Moreover, such conferences, 

albeit not under any formal track two auspices, already are taking place here and 

abroad.

 504. “Powell Confident of Close Ties With New Indian Government,” South 

Asia Monitor, June 2, 2004.

 505. “India Will Deepen Ties with US, Talks With China To Continue: Natwar 

Singh,” South Asia Monitor, May 22, 2004; “Relations with U.S. Should Not Be 

‘Episodic’: Natwar Singh,” South Asian Monitor, May 24, 2004; “India to Carry 

Forward Ties With US: Natwar Singh,” South Asian Monitor, May 25, 2004.

 506. “Japan To Establish Global Partnership with India,” South Asia Monitor, 

May 26, 2004; “India, Japan Discuss Terrorism, Defense Cooperation,” South Asia 

Monitor, May 26, 2004; “India, Japan Should keep Watch Over China,” www.

webindia123.com/news/showdetails.asp?id=63330&cat=Asia.

 507. Raman, “New Indian Govt. & National Security: Likely Policies—Part IV; 

Barzilai, “Looking Out for Number One”; “India Values Ties With Islamic World,” 

South Asia Monitor, May 24, 2004; Y.P. Rajesh, “India to Balance Ties with Israel, 

Palestinians,” South Asia Monitor, May 27, 2004; Elizabeth Roche, “New Indian 

government Will Avoid Upsetting Ties With Israel,” Agence France Presse, May 30, 

2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 508. Roche.

 509. “Indian Military Unveils Planned Road Linking Afghanistan and Iran,” 

South Asia Monitor, May 6, 2004.

 510. Neelam Mathews, “New Lyrics, Same Tune,” Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, May 31, 2004, p. 36; “India: Defense Spending and Normalization,” 

www.stratfor.com, July 10, 2004; “India’s New Government Pledges to Modernize 

Armed Forces,” South Asia Monitor, May 26, 2004; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “New 

Indian Boss Vows Scrutiny,” Defense News, May 31, 2004, p. 28.

 511. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indo-U.S. Defense Relations May Hinge on Missile 

Defense,” Defense News, June 21, 2004, p. 26; Sultan Shahin, “India and the Interim 

Mess in Iraq,” Asia Times Online, June 8, 2004, www.atimes.com.
204

 512. FY 2004 Report to Congress on Chinese Military Power, Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, May, 28, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/

d20040528PRC.pdf; Raghuvanshi, “India’s New Naval Ambition,” pp. 1, 8; Bedi, 

“India Outlines Vision of Future Nuclear Navy.”

 513. Ibid.; Raghuvanshi, “India’s New Naval Ambition,” pp. 1, 8.

 514. Ibid.

 515. “Powell-Natwar Talks: India to Look Again on Sending Troops to 

Iraq,” deepikaglobal.com, June 12, 2004, www.deepikaglobal.conm/archives/ENG4_sib.

asp?newsdate=06/12/2004&ccode=E.

 516. Srivastava, “India’s Top Guns Head for the US”; Shahin, “India and the 

Interim Mess in Iraq.”

 517. That is because our own muscular combination of Realpolitik and 

moralism can be and often is no less irksome to other governments.

 518. Ashwani Kumar, “Indo-U.S. Relations: The Logic and Philosophy of a 

Purposive Engagement,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 2003, p. 13.

 519. Ryu Jin, “US Offers 5-Point Proposal To N. Korea,” Korea Times, July 13, 

2004; “India-US Strategy Needed on WMD: Blackwill,” The Press Trust of India, 

November 27, 2002, retreived from Lexis-Nexis; Blackwill, Kolkata Speech; Sultan 

Shahin, “US, India Talk Nuclear Technology Transfer,” Asia Times Online, October 

8, 2003, www.atimes.com.

 520. Ibid.

 521. Baldauf, “India Rises as Strategic U.S. Ally.”

 522. C. Raja Mohan, “Asian Balance and the Subcontinent,” The Hindu, 

December 18, 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

 523. Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 262-263.

 524. Ibid.

 525. Ibid., p. 263.

 526. Ibid.

 527. Ibid.

 528. Hathaway, “The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,” p. 29.

 529. Ibid., pp. 21-25.

 530. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”

 531. Scott Baldauf, “US and China Dance With India,” Christian Science Monitor, 

April 19, 2001; Nirmal Ghosh, “India Seeks Balance In Ties With China,” The Straits 

Times, Singapore, April 14, 2001, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Tellis, “The Changing 

Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.
205

 532. Perkovich, “Is India a Major Power?” p. 133; Tellis, “South Asia,” pp. 244, 

261.

 533. Parag Khanna, “The Axis of Democracy Revisited,” In the National Interest, 

September 12, 2003.

 534. “India To Play Prominent Role in US-led ‘Asian NATO’”; “Pentagon Keen 

to make India a Strategic Partner” pp. 27-28.

 535. Garver, The China-India-U.S. Triangle; Garver, “The Future of the SinoPakistani Entente Cordiale,” pp. 397-401, 429-436; Jing-Dong Yuan, pp. 978-1001.

 536. Beijing, Renmin Ribao Internet Version, in Chinese, FBIS NES, August 17, 

2001.

 537 Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.

 538. NSS.

 539. Tellis, ”The Changing Political-Military Environment,” pp. 210-216.

 540. Beijing, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, in Chinese, FBIS CHI, March 20, 2002.

 541. “President Meets with U.S. Military Personnel at Fort Polk, Louisiana,”

February 17, 2004, www.whitehouse.gov; Henry R. Nau, “Alliances or Security 

Community in Asia: Which Way Is Bush Heading?” Hathaway and Lee, eds., pp. 

131-142.

 542. NSS; http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html.

 543. Therese Delpech, “Transatlantic Relations After the War in Iraq,” 

Connections, Vol. V, November, 2003.

 544. Nau, pp. 137-138.

 545. Ibid., pp. 138-150.

 546. Ibid.

 547. Teresita C. Shaffer, “U.S. Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have 

Divergent Priorities?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Winter 2002-03, p. 

170, 181-183.

 548. Mohammad Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society: 

Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order,” Australian Journal 

of International Affairs, Vol. LIII, No. 3, 1999, pp. 247-260; “Inequality and Theorizing 

in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism,” International Studies 

Review, Vol. IV, No. 3, 2002, pp. 127-148, and the works cited therein.

 549. Cohen, pp. 53-74; Sobhan, pp. 55-83.

 550. This, of course, is a peaceful method (though with force not invisible) of 

achieving the favorable balance of power that the NSS and the QDR both discuss.

 551. CFR Report, pp. 1-35; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, U.S. Boost Technology 

Ties,” Defense News, December 1, 2003, p. 29.
206

 552. Thomson, p. 17; Hoagland, p. B19.

 553. MacDonald, p. xxvii.

 554. Sahgal, “India-US Not Quite in Step Yet.”

 555. Thomson, p. 17. For other sources stating this point, see Stephen Blank, 

After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, forthcoming 

2005.

 556. MacDonald, pp. 119-120.

 557. Ibid.

 558. Ibid.

 559. For example, “Al-Qaeda Influence Spreads,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 

December 5, 2003, www4.janes.com/subscribe/jic/doc.
207

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s 

expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior 

to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for 

Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force 

Base, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the 

University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial 

Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military 

and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s 

Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many 

articles and conference papers on Russian, the Commonwealth 

of Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr. 

Blank’s current research deals with weapons proliferation and the 

revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. His 

most recent SSI publications include “The Foundations of Russian 

Strategic Power and Capabilities,” in Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the 

Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia, edited by Henry 

D. Sokolski and Thomas Riisager, April 2002, and The Transatlantic 

Security Agenda: A Conference Report and Analysis, December 2001. Dr. 

Blank holds a B.A. in History from the University of Pennsylvania, 

and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago.