Reserve Component Soldiers

as

Peacekeepers

/ä^Ü

Edited by

Dr. Ruth H. Phelps

and

Dr. Beatrice J. Farr
REPORJ DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy)

1996, October

2. REPORT TYPE

Final

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers

6. AUTHOR(S)

Ruth H. Phelps

Beatrice J. Fair

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

ATTN: PERI-ID

5001 Eisenhower Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

3. DATES COVERED (from... to)

February 1994 - October 1996

5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER

N/A

5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

0603007A

5c. PROJECT NUMBER

A792

5d. TASK NUMBER

6952

5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER

H01

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

Book 96-07

10. MONITOR ACRONYM

ARI

11. MONITOR REPORT NUMBER

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words): In the continuing effort to maintain a ready force and honor the United States commitments

throughout the world, in 1993 the Chief of Staff ofthe Army directed a test ofthe use ofReserve Component forces for the Multinational

Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. A battalion composed of 80% RC individual volunteers and 20% Active

Component soldiers was activated, trained and deployed as the 28th MFO rotation to the Sinai (Jan-Jul 95). ARI conducted an assessment of

personnel and training issues using performance, interview and survey data collected longitudinally.

The four research questions and their findings are as follows. (1) Personnel: Who volunteered and why? What, ifany changes should be

made to the volunteer screening process? Most soldiers said they volunteered for a challenging and adventurous way to serve their country

and/or to enhance their military careers. Fifty-eight percent ofthe RC volunteers were employed part/full time; 22% were in school; 20%

were unemployed. Inefficiencies and delays in feedback during the screening process resulted in 39% no-shows 3 weeks prior to report date;

an intensive recruiting effort resulted in 100% ofrequired fill on report date. Inadequate information during the screening process also

resulted in soldier morale problems during the deployment; long term impact on future volunteerism is being researched. (2) Family Support:

How well did the family support system work? What was the impact ofSinai service on the family and civilian lives ofvolunteers? The

family support system functioned very well, despite families being distributed (Continued)

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Reserve Component

..jjjjnaj

Peacekeeping Multinational Force and Observers

Voluntflsriam

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF

16. REPORT

Unclassified

17. ABSTRACT

Unclassified

18. THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. LIMITATION OF

ABSTRACT

Unclassified

20. NUMBER

OF PAGES

449

21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON

(Name and Telephone Number)

Ruth Phelps

208/334-9390
UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWhen Date Entered)

over 31 states with 44% more than 50 miles from a military installation. There was high spouse support for the mission;

spouses living in MD/VA/NC received more support services than spouses in distant states. Command emphasis and

resourcing for family support was critical to its success. (3) Training/Performance: What are the unique and minimal

training requirements? Did the trainingprocess produce a cohesive unit that couldperform the mission? Bonding among

leaders during the Infantry Leaders Course was high. Leaders felt training should have more MFO specific tasks and

fewer infantry tasks; train-the-trainer needed more early emphasis. The Bn was well prepared for the mission as indicated

on independentjob knowledge tests. Mission motivation, leadership and squad cohesion ratings were similar to those of

other rotations. (4) Impact on the 29th ID(L): What is the impact on the ARNG units thatsent volunteers, both during the

deployment andpost-deployment? Results showed positive effects on unit morale and slightly negative effects on

training and perceived unit readiness in the home units early in the deployment but not late in the deployment.

Recommendations for future deployments are discussed in the text.

ARI will continue to assess the impact ofthe deployment and postredeployment re-entry on National Guard soldier

commitment/retention, marital stability and financial well-being through October 1997. Cost analyses are not included in

the ARI portion ofthe MFO assessment.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfVWien Date Entered)
RESERVE COMPONENT

SOLDIERS AS PEACEKEEPERS

m^msAmzxf &TKTmsm~T~~

«ArTMTMTM^^^

Ruth H. Phelps

Beatrice J. Farr

Multinational Force and Observers Task Force Leaders

U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences

September 1996

19970226 012

DTIC QUALITY IN8PEGTED 1
CONTENTS

FOREWORD vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix

PREFACE Xi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xv

ASSESSMENT AREAS AND METHOD xvi

FINDINGS xvi

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS xx

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS xxiii

SECTION 1, INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION 3

THE MISSION 5

THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 9

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK 10

REFERENCES 13

CHAPTER 2, RESEARCH APPROACH 15

INTRODUCTION 15

THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 16

DATA COLLECTION TIME LINES 18

RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION.21

SUMMARY 23

REFERENCES 25
ii RC Peacekeepers

SECTION 2, PERSONNEL 27

CHAPTER 3, SOLDIER ATTRIBUTES FOR PEACEKEEPING

AND PEACEMAKING 29

INTRODUCTION 29

JOB ANALYSIS EVIDENCE 46

CONCLUSION 49

REFERENCES 50

CHAPTER 4, FILLING THE MFO's PERSONNEL NEEDS WITH

VOLUNTEERS: PROCEDURES TRIED AND LESSONS

LEARNED 59

INTRODUCTION 59

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD PROCEDURES 61

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE (USAR) PROCESSES . . 80

CONCLUSION 83

REFERENCES 85

CHAPTER 5, PERSONNEL PROFILE: SOLDIERS OF THE

28TH ROTATION 87

INTRODUCTION 87

METHOD 87

RESULTS 88

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 95

CHAPTER 6, REASONS FOR VOLUNTEERING AND

ANTICIPATED DEPLOYMENT EFFECTS 97

INTRODUCTION 97

METHOD 98

FINDINGS 100

DISCUSSION Ill
Contents jji

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 115

REFERENCES 116

SECTION 3, TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE 117

CHAPTER 7, DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF MEASURES: SINAI PEACEKEEPING PERFORMANCE .119

INTRODUCTION 119

ENLISTED SOLDIER PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

DEVELOPMENT 121

KNOWLEDGE AND TASK DIMENSIONS 131

ENLISTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES: RESULTS .... 137

NCO PERFORMANCE MEASURES: DEVELOPMENT ... 142

NCO PERFORMANCE MEASURES: RESULTS 151

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 156

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 160

REFERENCES 161

CHAPTER 8, TRAINING AND TASK PERFORMANCE .... 163

INTRODUCTION 163

PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING PHASES 170

COMPARISON TO ACTIVE COMPONENT UNIT 180

TRAINING WHILE DEPLOYED 186

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 195

RECOMMENDATIONS 198

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 199

REFERENCES 200

CHAPTER 9, PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING AT THE

INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE 203

INTRODUCTION 203
iv RC Peacekeepers

METHOD 205

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 209

CONCLUSIONS 229

RECOMMENDATIONS 232

REFERENCES 234

SECTION 4, SOLDIER ATTITUDES AND

PERCEPTIONS 235

CHAPTER 10, SMALL UNIT DYNAMICS: LEADERSHIP,

COHESION, MOTIVATION, AND MORALE 237

INTRODUCTION 237

RESEARCH ORIENTATION 238

METHODS AND MEASURES 241

RESULTS 243

DISCUSSION 280

REFERENCES 285

CHAPTER 11, MFO LEADERS: OPPORTUNITIES,

CHALLENGES, AND EXPERIENCES 287

INTRODUCTION 287

THE DATA COLLECTIONS 288

THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN LEADER

PERCEPTIONS 290

THE IMPACT OF MFO SERVICE ON LEADERSHIP SKILLS

AND CAREERS 291

LEADER CONCERNS ABOUT MFO SERVICE 293

AC/RC COORDINATION 301

INTERACTION WITH OTHER NATIONALITIES 304

FAMILY ISSUES AS LEADERSHIP CONCERNS 306
Contents

CONCLUSION 307

REFERENCES 310

CHAPTER 12, SOLDIERS' PERCEPTIONS OF DEPLOYMENT

EFFECTS 315

INTRODUCTION 315

METHOD 316

FINDINGS 319

DISCUSSION 327

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 331

REFERENCES 332

CHAPTER 13, FINANCIAL IMPACT OF PEACEKEEPING IN

THE SINAI 333

INTRODUCTION 333

LITERATURE REVIEW 335

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 338

METHOD 338

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 342

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ON CAREER

COMMITMENT AND EARNINGS 350

REFERENCES 351

SECTION 5, THE MFO FAMILY 353

CHAPTER 14, THE FAMILY SUPPORT SYSTEM

FOR THE MFO 355

INTRODUCTION 355

METHOD 356

FINDINGS 361
vj RC Peacekeepers

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 391

REFERENCES 393

CHAPTER 15, CHANGES IN MARITAL QUALITY AMONG

MFO COUPLES 395

INTRODUCTION 395

METHOD 396

FINDINGS 402

DISCUSSION 404

REFERENCES 407

SECTION 6, IMPACT ON HOME UNIT 409

CHAPTER 16, IMPACT OF MFO MISSION ON ARMY

NATIONAL GUARD HOME UNIT 411

INTRODUCTION 411

METHOD 412

RESULTS 414

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 431

RECOMMENDATIONS 433

REFERENCES 435

SECTION 7, CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS 437

CHAPTER 17, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 439

APPLICABILITY TO OTHER MISSIONS 440

RECOMMENDATIONS 440

REFERENCES 444

APPENDIX 445

SUMMARY OF SOLDIER COMMENTS 445
FOREWORD

Research and development to increase the readiness and

deployability of Reserve Component (RC) soldiers has been a

long-standing program area of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). There is currently increased

interest in utilizing RC forces to support the increased operational tempo

of U.S. forces as the size of Active Component (AC) forces and defense

budgets have declined. One of the new strategies being developed is to

use RC soldiers to augment or replace AC soldiers. ARI assisted the

Chief of Staff of the Army to test this concept using one of America's

oldest peacekeeping commitments: the Egyptian-Israeli border in the

Sinai.

The Chief of Staff's concept was modeled after the World War I

"Rainbow Division" in which National Guard soldiers from across the

country were formed into a single division under AC leadership. The

research described in this book provides the results of an intensive 2-year

assessment of a mixed AC/RC battalion used to fulfill the U.S.

peacekeeping commitment in the Sinai. In addition to its expertise in the

RC, ARI drew on its institutional capabilities in recruiting and selection,

training, economic/life course impacts, family support, leadership, and

cohesion. Our experience in personnel performance and training research

with previous and ongoing peace missions provided an invaluable

context for understanding the degree to which our findings will validly

apply to other missions.

Our findings support the use of RC volunteers for the peacekeeping

mission in the Sinai. Qualified RC soldiers volunteered, the unit

successfully performed the mission, the families throughout the country

were supported, and the RC unit from which most of the volunteers were

drawn experienced only temporary decreases in readiness but a consistent

increase in morale. Within their respective chapters the generalizability

of these findings to other missions is discussed.

Our purpose for organizing this research into a book is to make it

accessible to military and academic audiences. We hope the military will

continue to use these findings to inform decisions and policies about new

Vll
roles and missions for the RC. We hope academia will benefit from the

theoretical interpretation as well as theoretical expansion.

ZITA M. SIMUTIS EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Deputy Director Director

(Science and Technology)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research described in this book was accomplished with the

assistance and cooperation of many individuals and organizations

throughout the U.S. Army and the Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO). Some helped us understand the mission, the environment, the

politics, the history, and others provided access to troops, facilities and

made our trips to Egypt successful.

Foremost, we acknowledge General Gordon Sullivan (Ret.) for his

vision of an expanded use of the Reserve Component and his support of

empirical research in peacekeeping. He provided clear research

questions, access to troops and their leaders, as well as his time and

attention. His concept of a 1990's "Rainbow Division" will likely

change how the Army fulfills its international commitments into the 21st

century.

The products of research are only as valid as the data collected. We

are indebted to the soldiers and officers who served in the 4-505

Parachute Infantry Regiment as the 28th Rotation to the Sinai. They

answered our questions, filled out what must have seemed to them as

endless surveys and tests, provided us their own unit data, and let us

watch them at work and play. We also acknowledge the soldiers and

officers of the 29th Infantry Division (Light) who so graciously answered

our questions and surveys. We thank the soldiers and officers from the

101st Air Assault Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 24th

Infantry Division (Light) who served in prior MFO rotations for their

cooperation and contributions to our understanding of the

similarities/differences of the 28th Rotation. A special recognition is due

to CPT Scott Hillmer for his coordination in collecting our background

data. Without the assistance of the leadership and the patience of these

units and their soldiers, military empirical research was just not possible.

Special thanks go to LTC Robert Brumley (Ret.), LTC Robert

Martinez, and MAJ(P) Angela Manos who served as project officers and

our liaisons with Forces Command, the Army National Guard, and the

Chief of Staff, Army, respectively. They provided substantive

contributions to the quality of our data collection as well as access to

IX
x RC Peacekeepers

soldiers and decisionmakers. CPT Michael Boston generously shared his

experiences as a member of the 28th Rotation and reviewed many of our

manuscripts. And finally the assistance of Bob Krantz at the U.S.

Department of State, Gus Riolo at MFO Headquarters in Rome, and MG

David Ferguson, Force Commander of the MFO in the Sinai, is gratefully

acknowledged.

Dr. Mady Segal and Dr. David Segal, separately and together, helped

us define the research program, put our research in the context of their

earlier MFO work, and provided many stimulating discussions on

peacekeeping roles and missions. Their seminal book, Peacekeepers and

Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and

Observers, introduced many of the soldiers to military social science

research, paving the way for our tests, surveys, and interviews. Thank

you.

A very special acknowledgment is due to Ramona Cox, who

patiently and carefully prepared all the chapters for publication, including

the creation of the computer graphics. Dr. Ronald Tiggle created the

database for consolidating our data, conducted many of our analyses, and

provided expertise in using new statistical packages. Kathryn Fowler

assisted in converting our manuscripts into this book, and the cover was

designed by Dr. Dale Palmer.

Thank you all for your dedication and perseverance.

RUTH H. PHELPS

Multinational Force and Observers

Task Force Leader

U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
PREFACE

For over a decade and a half, the Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) in the Sinai, in support of the Camp David Accords, has been a

major testbed for the participation of U.S. Army units in multinational

peacekeeping operations. During the 1980s, as the Cold War waxed and

waned in Europe, the two American light infantry battalion task forces

that were sent to the Sinai every year for 6 months each were the Army's

major opportunities to have regular maneuver formations participate in

peacekeeping. Over 30 such battalion task forces—the equivalent of

more than 10 infantry brigades—have participated in this operation.

When an international workshop on peace operations was held at the

University of Maryland in 1993 under the auspices of the U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) and the

Chief of Staff of the Army, virtually all of the U.S. participants—civilian

as well as military—who had any first-hand experience with

peacekeeping, as participants, policymakers, or researchers, had gained it

through association with the MFO.

The number of multinational peacekeeping operations has increased

in the 1990s, and demand for U.S. participation in these operations has

been increasing as well. However, the size of the U.S. Army has been

decreasing. The experimental use of a composite task force from both

the active and reserve components of the Army to serve as the 28th

Rotation of U.S. combat troops to the Sinai MFO, which is reported in

this book, represents the first attempt to use large numbers of Reserve

Component personnel to help meet the United States' growing

peacekeeping obligations with a smaller force.

The United States had participated in a few early United Nations

(UN) peacekeeping operations. This has included, for example, the

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle

East. However, these were relatively small and generally short-lived

missions. UNTSO is an exception to the principle of brief half-life: it

has existed since 1948. However, it is a mission of only 220 personnel,

including 17 Americans.

XI
xii RC Peacekeepers

Peacekeeping by multinational military forces under the auspices of

international organizations was a relatively new and rare process after the

birth of the UN, and as Cold War norms of international peacekeeping

evolved, direct U.S. participation was increasingly restricted.

One of the emergent norms of peacekeeping was impartiality.

Peacekeeping forces were to serve as disinterested third-party "honest

brokers." But in the context of a bipolar Cold War world in which

international relations were defined largely by antagonistic superpower

relations, it was difficult to imagine either the United States or the Soviet

Union as disinterested parties. Anywhere in the globe where there was a

conflict, the superpowers were likely to be perceived as being interested

parties.

Another emergent Cold War norm was host-nation consent to the

presence of peacekeeping forces. Unlike some of the peace operations of

the 1990s, the UN was committed to not being a peacekeeping presence

where it was not wanted. Indeed, the June 1967 war between Israel and

its Arab neighbors was presaged by a withdrawal of interposed troops of

the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) at the request of the

Egyptian government the previous month. UN Secretary General U.

Thant defended the withdrawal on the basis of the terms of the original

host-nation agreement with Egypt.

In the postcolonial years after World War II, nations in unstable

areas of the world were likely to be relatively recently independent and

more comfortable with having military forces who were from small- or

middle-sized nations that did not have colonial histories than from major

powers or superpowers that had colonial histories or were perceived to

have imperial objectives on their soil. Indeed, New Zealand was initially

rejected from participation in UNEF because of its association with Great

Britain in earlier operations in the Middle East, and when Canada

volunteered to send a battalion from the Queen's Own Rifles, it was

asked to substitute an air force transport squadron and staff and support

elements from its ground forces because the similarity between the

Canadian and British combat uniform would have set the wrong image.

Canada has become a regular participant in UN peacekeeping operations.

If the presence of Canadian combat troops was felt to be problematic,

imagine how the presence of U.S. or Soviet combat troops on the soil of a

less-developed nation would be seen. A Swedish soldier, when he puts
Preface xiii

on a blue helmet, becomes a UN soldier. A U.S. soldier, when he puts on

a blue helmet, is a U.S. soldier in a blue helmet.

The third important emergent norm of international peacekeeping

was minimum use of force. This norm has been reflected in the rules of

engagement of multinational peacekeeping forces and is compatible with

the military doctrines of many middle powers, who view their military

forces more as symbols of sovereignty than as agents of force projection.

The United States and the Soviet Union, by contrast, moved increasingly

to doctrinal positions calling for the use of decisive or overwhelming

force during the Cold War. If there is an incompatibility between the role

of soldier and that of peacekeeper, it may be doctrinally greater in the

U.S. case than in the cases of nations more traditionally involved in

peacekeeping. At the same time, it may be less problematic for reserve

personnel than for active Army combat soldiers.

These peacekeeping norms contributed to the development of an

international peacekeeping doctrine during the Cold War that excluded

superpower participation. Indeed, when the Camp David Accords were

drafted, under the assumption that the MFO would be a UN mission, they

explicitly precluded major power military participation in the MFO.

Under the terms of the original treaty, the United States was not to be in

the Sinai.

Tensions among the major powers precluded UN sponsorship of the

MFO, and other auspices were sought. It became clear that in the

absence of the moral force of the UN, a U.S. military presence was

required to guarantee the credibility of the force. The treaty was

modified, and the United States committed itself to contributing an

infantry battalion and a logistical support unit to the MFO. This reflected

a change in peacekeeping norms—a process that has become increasingly

obvious with the passage of time.

Most traditional peacekeeping operations, involving observers or

military forces interposed between belligerents who are trying to

disengage from a conflict, are seen as transitional missions. One of the

unique elements of the MFO is that it is not transitional. It is not in place

while awaiting a peace; it is a negotiated part of the peace. Its presence is

stipulated in the Camp David treaty. Thus, while the U.S. Army grows

smaller through the process of the downsizing of the 1990s, as the norms
xiv RC Peacekeepers

of international peace operations have changed to allow, and in fact seem

to require, U.S. military participation and the new world disorder has

required a record number of deployments of U.S. military personnel, the

United States' obligation to contribute troops to the MFO will not go

away.

It was in this context that General Gordon Sullivan, former Chief of

Staff of the Army, asked researchers from the University of Maryland to

collaborate with behavioral scientists from ARI to study the composite

active and reserve unit he was sending to the Sinai as the 28th U.S.

Rotation to the MFO. The MFO had moved from a generic testbed for

U.S. participation in peacekeeping to a testbed specifically to evaluate the

use of reserve personnel to help fulfill peacekeeping obligations as part of

the United States' Army. The establishment of this task force itself

required a modification of the Camp David protocols, which specified

that the American battalion serving in the Sinai would be a regular army

unit and not one specially developed for this mission.

This has been a fortuitous experiment and an exciting collaboration.

Those of us from the University of Maryland who participated in this

project feel that we have been a part of history, helping to clarify the

roles that the reserve components might play in the Army of the 21st

century. We feel that the soldiers of the 4-505 Parachute Infantry

Regiment, which was activated as the composite battalion task force for

the 28th Rotation of the MFO, demonstrated that, at least for a mature

peace-interposition mission, evaluated against a criterion of military

effectiveness, reserve component personnel can make a significant

contribution to the United States' peacekeeping obligations. At the same

time, we were impressed at the ability of ARI to put together its own task

force of behavioral scientists from diverse parts of its organization, and

indeed from diverse geographical locations, to execute the large,

carefully designed research program that is described in this book. We

anticipate that this volume will become an important part of the growing

body of scientific literature on peacekeeping.

DAVID R. SEGAL, Director

Center for Research on Military Organization

The University of Maryland at College Park
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ruth H. Phelps

Recent cuts in strength, coupled with increased demands for

participation in peace missions, have caused the Army to consider new

options for meeting its international commitments. One option is to use

the Reserve Component (RC) for missions currently performed by the

Active Component (AC). In 1993, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA)

directed the Army to test the feasibility of recruiting qualified RC

volunteers, forming them into a battalion, and deploying them on the

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission in the

Sinai Peninsula. The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences (ARI) and the University of Maryland were called

upon to conduct an assessment of this test.

The MFO was created as a neutral organization to observe and report

violations to the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace (1979) resulting from

the Camp David Accords. As part of its contribution to the MFO, the

United States has deployed an infantry battalion for 6-month rotations to

the Sinai continuously since 1982. This battalion has the peacekeeping

responsibility for the area of operation in the southern third of the Sinai

bordering the strategic Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. Squads

typically spend 3 weeks at a remote observation/control site, 3 weeks at

base camp, then rotate back to the same remote site.

The test battalion (the 28th Rotation) was activated on 4 November

1994 and deactivated on 28 July 1995 as the 4-505 Parachute Infantry

Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division. It consisted of 80% RC and

20% AC. Officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) positions were

divided equally between the two components, leaving nearly all junior

enlisted positions to be filled by RC soldiers. Although this test unit was

to perform the same mission to the same standards as those of previous

all-AC units, it needed a different approach to team building, training,

and family support. In addition, because this was the first test of a

xv
xvi RC Peacekeepers

composite AC/RC unit performing such an important international

mission, this unit had to cope with considerable media coverage and a

large number of visiting dignitaries.

ASSESSMENT AREAS AND METHOD

ARI's research involved the assessment of five areas: (a) Personnel,

which examined the recruiting and screening process of volunteers, their

demographics, reasons why they volunteered, and their expectations of

the peacekeeping experience; (b) Training, which examined the types of

tasks trained, the length and sequence of training, and soldiers' job

knowledge following training; (c) Attitudes and Perceptions, which

examined unit cohesion, morale, and impact of volunteering for the

deployment on soldiers' civilian and military lives; (d) Family Support,,

which examined the system put in place to support families located

across the country and how serving in the Sinai affected the quality of

soldiers' marriages; and (e) Home Unit Impact, which examined the

personnel, training, and readiness changes that occurred in the 29th

Infantry Division (Light) (29th ID[L]) as a result of losing soldiers to the

MFO mission.

These five areas were examined using a longitudinal case study

method in which soldiers in the test battalion were tracked throughout the

activation period. During this time, we surveyed and/or interviewed

soldiers, leaders, trainers, and spouses. We measured job proficiency

using supervisor ratings and soldier's scores on job knowledge tests. We

visited the test unit to collect these data three times during

predeployment and twice during Sinai deployment. In addition, we

gathered comparable data from prior all-AC rotations where possible.

FINDINGS

Personnel

All required 446 RC slots were filled with volunteer soldiers meeting

the physical and performance standards set by the Army. These soldiers

came from 35 states, with the majority (53%) coming from the Maryland
Executive Summary xvii

and Virginia Army National Guard (ARNG) [(i.e., 29th ID[L]) where

recruiting was initially focused. Forty-five percent were employed full

time, 25% were either employed part-time or in school, and 20% were

unemployed. Only 35% of the RC volunteers were married. Most RC

soldiers said they volunteered for a challenging and adventurous way to

serve their country and/or to enhance their military careers. Eighty-one

percent of RC soldiers intended to take educational courses while in the

Sinai, and 97% planned to travel for recreation.

Despite the overall success in acquiring qualified volunteers, we

found that 3 weeks prior to the report-for-duty date, 39% of the RC

soldiers who had volunteered initially were subsequently unable to

report, primarily because they were not informed of their mission

acceptance early on in the recruitment process. Citizen soldiers must take

the needs of their employers, military units, and families into account

when deciding to volunteer for extended overseas missions. As a result,

we found that it is likely that a significant number of soldiers who

volunteer several months before a mission may not be available at the

reporting date if such information is not available early in the process.

The "good news" is that the 39% shortfall was filled within the remaining

3 weeks by soldiers from around the country who were able to volunteer

on short notice.

Training Procedures, Tasks, and Performance

We tracked which tasks were trained, how well they were performed,

and the soldiers' and trainers' evaluation of the training that was

conducted during predeployment and overseas deployment. The 3

months of training received by the test battalion during predeployment

was comparable to that received by a recent all-AC battalion before its

arrival in the Sinai. However, an additional 2 months were spent training

the test battalion's leaders both in garrison and at the Infantry Leaders

Course (ILC) at Fort Benning.

Tests were specially developed to measure each soldier's knowledge

of common soldiering tasks and MFO peacekeeping-specific tasks. Test

battalion scores collected just prior to deployment were comparable to

those obtained from an all-AC prior rotation. However, during the

deployment itself, the test battalion concentrated on
xviii RC Peacekeepers

peacekeeping-specific tasks, whereas the prior all-AC rotation decreased

its training on these tasks and increased its emphasis on warfighting

tasks. Because the test battalion was to be deactivated following the

MFO mission, there was no need to prepare for a follow-on assignment

as a unit, and thus, their training was focused largely on peacekeeping

tasks. Content analyses of the predeployment training showed that the

ILC could be shortened or replaced by training that emphasized more

peacekeeping tasks and fewer infantry tasks.

Perceptions and Attitudes

The attitudes and perceptions soldiers hold about each other, their

leadership, other components, the mission itself, and the Army in general

can affect mission performance, soldier willingness to volunteer for other

missions, and commitment to remain in the Army. We therefore

examined soldier morale, unit cohesion, fulfillment of expectations, and

the impact of the deployment on their civilian and military lives.

Even though this unit had not previously served together, their unit

cohesion was comparable to that of a prior all-AC rotation. High unit

cohesion was built early in the predeployment training and remained high

throughout deployment in the Sinai. There was a drop in soldier morale,

however, and a significant decline over the predeployment and

deployment period in the number of RC soldiers who reported that they

would volunteer again (36% decrease) or would remain in the military

(26% decrease). This drop was the result of discrepancies in soldier

expectations that were formed during the recruiting/assignment process

and what was actually experienced once on duty. Educational

opportunities, for instance, were fewer and costs were higher than the RC

soldiers anticipated. In addition, some AC soldiers believed that this

assignment would count as an overseas unaccompanied short tour.

We did find that soldiers who volunteered for patriotic reasons

tended to have higher mission motivation, morale, and squad cohesion

than soldiers who volunteered for monetary reasons. However, morale

differences were not related to the soldier's component, demographic

background, previous experience overseas, or how long before reporting

for duty the soldier had volunteered.
Executive Summary xix

Family Support

Although only 30% of the test battalion's RC soldiers were married

(compared to 59% of the AC soldiers), their families were scattered

across 26 states. Supporting these families would be difficult for the

standard AC system because 44% of RC families lived more than 50

miles from any AC military installation. The solution implemented by

this test battalion was a system that energized existing combined AC and

RC assets to support the volunteer families. For example, ARNG family

coordinators were notified of any families in their states and then

provided with special MFO information to assist these families. In

addition, the Battalion Commander made family support a high priority

and assigned an ARNG family support NCO to the rear detachment as a

full-time family assistance officer.

Interviews and survey responses from soldiers and spouses showed

that they used family and non-Army friends as their primary means of

support and problem solving. Most of the spouses who did use the

Army's family support system found problems resolved to their

satisfaction. However, soldiers seemed more concerned about marital

quality than spouses and even reported that this worry affected their

morale and job performance in the Sinai.

Home Unit Impact

Unlike the research areas that focused on soldiers who deployed to

the Sinai and their spouses, this last area assessed the impact of the

peacekeeping mission on the 29th ID(L). This division was responsible

for the RC portion of the mission and contributed most of the test

battalion's volunteers. We surveyed (twice) and interviewed (once) 71

senior leaders from the nine contributing infantry battalions within the

division. We also surveyed 875 junior leaders and soldiers from these

same battalions.

Senior leaders initially reported a negative impact on their combat

readiness and training, with those leaders who lost more troops reporting

greater impacts. By the time volunteers had returned to their units after

deactivation, however, these same senior leaders reported the impact on

their combat readiness and training to be actually positive. In addition,
xx RC Peacekeepers

73% of the senior leaders reported that the volunteers returned better

trained than before they had left.

In contrast, sponsorship of the peacekeeping mission had a

consistently positive effect on the division's morale. Both senior and

junior leaders reported there was an increase in morale in the unit and

that the volunteers themselves returned with enhanced morale. It appears

that the unit was proud to be selected as the peacekeeping mission's

sponsor and 90% ofjunior and senior leaders endorsed future

participation in similar missions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We conclude that the use of RC soldiers for the MFO mission can be

a successful strategy for meeting U.S. overseas military peacekeeping

commitments. Although the conclusions and recommendations listed

below were derived from the MFO mission, we believe they will

generalize to other missions, but only to the extent that such missions are

similar to that conducted in the Sinai in terms of their situation stability,

force complexity, and degree of threat.

1. Personnel: Enough qualified RC soldiers volunteered.

• Maintain more frequent communication with volunteers about their

status in the selection process.

Identify in advance the conditions, opportunities, and benefits of

volunteering, and present them in writing to all volunteers,

regardless of component, unit, or location.

2. Training Procedures and Tasks: Soldiers were well trained and

conducted a successful mission.

Shorten the predeployment training time by focusing soldier and

leader training on peacekeeping tasks only.
Executive Summary xxi

• Delete the ILC and build cohesion using peacekeeping training.

• Use job knowledge tests and supervisor rating scales for diagnostic

and competency testing.

• Develop unit measures of peacekeeping performance to

complement the existing soldier measures.

• Add or reorient training to include command and control

synchronization. Consider using simulations and simulators.

3. Attitudes and Perceptions: Cohesion was high, but morale

declined.

• Train leaders to recognize conditions of peacekeeping that lead to

morale problems; e.g. boredom and isolation.

• Make leaders aware of negative morale effects caused by

micromanagement.

• Set more realistic soldier expectations by increasing the frequency

and accuracy of information during recruiting and reinforce during

training.

4. Family Support System: Combined AC/RC system was successful.

• Keep family support a high priority.

• Keep family support providers as geographically close to families

as possible and maximize use of existing state family assistance

programs.

• Improve accuracy of information on family addresses and telephone

numbers.
xxii RC Peacekeepers

• Budget for morale telephone calls (at least one call home per month

without charge to the soldier).

5. Impact on RC Home Unit: Unit morale increases; unit can

compensate for small temporary losses in personnel.

• Limit the number of soldiers taken from individual battalions by

drawing from the largest volunteer pool practicable.

• Capitalize on the morale benefits of sponsoring a special mission

such as the MFO.
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

Elissa T. Abod, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and

Social Sciences, Consortium Research Fellow, Organization and

Personnel Resources Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

D. Bruce Bell, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, Organization and Personnel Resources

Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Roy C. Campbell, Human Resources Research Organization, Ft. Knox,

KY

Beatrice J. Farr, Ed.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, Advanced Training Methods Research Unit,

Alexandria, VA

Gene W. Fober, Ed.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences Infantry Forces Research Unit, Ft. Benning,

GA

Joseph D. Hagman, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Reserve Component Training

Research Unit, Boise, ID

Stephanie M. Hayes, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, Consortium Research Fellow, Organization

and Personnel Resources Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Robert N. Kilcullen, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Selection and Assignment

Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Hyder-Ali G. Lakhani, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Organization and Personnel

Resources Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

xxni
xxiv RC Peacekeepers

Fred A. Mael, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, Selection and Assignment Research Unit,

Alexandria, VA

Laurel W. Oliver, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Organization and Personnel

Resources Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Dale R. Palmer, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, Selection and Assignment Research Unit,

Alexandria, VA

Ruth H. Phelps, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, Reserve Component Training Research Unit,

Boise, ID

Robert J. Pleban, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Infantry Forces Research Unit,

Ft. Benning, GA

Douglas B. Reynolds, Ph.D., Human Resources Research Organization,

Alexandria, VA

Rose E. Rice, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and

Social Sciences, Consortium Research Fellow, Organization and

Personnel Resources Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Michael G. Rumsey, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Selection and Assignment

Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Margaret S. Salter, M.A, U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Infantry Forces Research Unit,

Ft. Benning, GA

Walter R. Schumm, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Senior Consortium Research

Fellow, Alexandria, VA (Kansas State University)
Contributing Authors ; xxv

David R. Segal, Ph.D., University of Maryland, Director, Center for

Research on Military Organization, College Park, MD

Mady W. Segal, Ph.D., University of Maryland, Center for Research on

Military Organization, College Park, MD

Guy L. Siebold, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, Organization and Personnel Resources

Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Monte D. Smith, Ph.D., Hughes Training Inc. - Link Operations, Boise,

ID

Ronald B. Tiggle, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Organization and Personnel

Resources Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Patrick J. Valentine, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Infantry Forces Research Unit,

Ft. Benning, GA

Leonard A. White, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Selection and Assignment

Research Unit, Alexandria, VA

Robert A. Wisher, Ph.D., U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Advanced Training Methods

Research Unit, Alexandria, VA
SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

In 1993, the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked the Active

Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) to design a test for

using RC volunteers to augment or replace AC soldiers in at least some

peace missions. He selected the Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) mission in the Sinai as the testbed, and the U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences assessed its feasibility,

concentrating on personnel and training issues.

When designing our research, we focused on obtaining practical

empirical answers to the Chief of Staff's questions. However, whenever

possible we also used these same data to further military social and

behavioral sciences theories. Thus, the reader will find some chapters

technical, some descriptive, and yet others descriptive with theoretical

interpretations.

The opening section to Reserve Component Soldiers as

Peacekeepers summarizes the background, the research questions, and

the general research approach used in the following six Sections.

Chapter 1 (Phelps) describes the five personnel and training research

areas investigated, the reasons for selecting the MFO mission, and how

the mission is executed. Chapter 2 (Phelps) covers the general research

approach, how and when data were collected during predeployment

training and the deployment itself, and the research instruments. Details

unique to individual research questions are covered in their respective

chapters.
INTRODUCTION

Ruth H. Phelps

During 1993-1995, the U.S. Army tested the concept of using

Reserve Component (RC) volunteers to fulfill America's commitment to

the Multinational Force and Observers' (MFO) peacekeeping mission in

the Sinai Peninsula. The purpose of this test, as envisioned by the Chief

of Staff, Army, was to examine the feasibility of recruiting qualified RC

volunteers, forming them into a battalion-sized unit, and deploying them

overseas for a 6-month peacekeeping assignment in the Sinai near the

Egyptian-Israeli border. At the Army's direction, the U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) designed

and conducted an empirical assessment of the test. This book documents

our findings.

The Army is interested in expanding the RC's role in peace missions

because of escalating worldwide demands for U.S. military assistance

and current reductions in military strength. Today's Army is 25%

smaller than that of 1990, with the combined strength of the Active

Component (AC) and the RC (Selected Reserve only)1decreasing from

1,520,108 soldiers in 1990 to 1,140,912 soldiers in 1995 (Defense, 1990;

1995). Although both components have decreased in size, the AC

decreases have been larger (31%) than RC decreases (19%).

1 The Army Reserve Component includes the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, both of

which have troop units (the Selected Reserve) and soldiers as individuals (Individual Ready Reserve and the

Inactive National Guard). Soldiers who leave active duty, but still have an obligation to the Army, are placed

in the Individual Ready Reserve. Thus, whenever there is a reduction in the size of the active Army, there is a

temporary increase in the Individual Ready Reserve. Therefore, it is most accurate during a draw down to use

only the Selected Reserve strength figures.
RC Peacekeepers

Historically, when reductions in AC strength are required, the Army

has changed force structure by moving units from the AC to the RC

(Binkin & Kaufmann, 1989), so that now 55% of total Army strength lies

in the RC (Selected Reserve).2 Given the AC's smaller size, its capability

to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts could be

questioned.3 One strategy to compensate for the smaller AC force would

be to commit RC forces to more missions, thereby freeing the AC for

other contingencies (Vaccaro, 1995).

The Chief of Staffs vision was to create a test battalion composed of

RC volunteers from all over the country, then train, deploy, and return

the volunteers to their civilian lives. This concept was modeled after the

World War I "Rainbow Division" in which National Guard soldiers were

brought together from 26 states to form the 42nd Division (Dupuy,

1971). It was his intention to create this test so the Army could learn

about questions such as: will enough qualified soldiers volunteer, what

training is needed, and did the Army have a system to support families

distributed throughout the country? The Chief was not questioning the

capability of RC soldiers to perform the mission, rather he wanted to

identify the logistics, recruiting, training, and family support

requirements of the concept. He selected the Sinai mission as his testbed

because it offered the opportunity to experiment in a predictable,

low-conflict environment, with minimal risk to both U.S. soldiers and the

diplomatic relationships of the United States, Egypt, and Israel. At the

same time, the ARI research could be conducted under stable test

conditions using an internationally important mission in an extremely

volatile area of the world.

The decision to use the RC in the Sinai required the Army to

consider the terms of the Treaty of Peace that was signed between Egypt

and Israel and the associated diplomatic impacts. Because the United

States had set a 14-year precedent of sending a battalion of AC

peacekeepers to the Sinai, Egypt and Israel had to concur on the proposed

change to include RC soldiers. Thus, analyses of each personnel position

in the battalion were made to balance Egyptian and Israeli concerns with

2 If the IRR is included, 68% of the Army is in the RC.

3 This is the national security goal of President Clinton's "Bottom-up Review" (State Department, 1994).
Introduction

the goals of the test without compromising mission performance. It was

ultimately decided that the final composition of the battalion was to be

80% RC and 20% AC, with leadership positions equally divided between

the two components. This resulted in a composite battalion in which half

of the squad leader and above positions and nearly all junior enlisted

positions were filled by RC soldiers. They would serve as the 28th

Rotation of U.S. soldiers fulfilling our commitment to the Treaty.

THE MISSION

In accordance with the MFO charter, the mission was to observe and

report violations to the 1979 Treaty of Peace signed by Egypt and Israel

as a result of the Camp David Accords. This Treaty stipulated the

phased withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai, which Israel had occupied

since the 1967 Yom Kippur War, and reestablished the prewar

boundaries set in 1948 by the United Nations. Recognizing the potential

for violence, Egypt and Israel agreed in the Treaty to have a multinational

force monitor their compliance with the terms of the Treaty. In 1979,

both countries had expected the United Nations to provide the required

multinational force. The United Nations, however, was unable to agree

to the commitment, and in 1981 a new organization outside of United

Nation's purview was established to provide it. The resulting MFO

organization is funded by equal contributions from Egypt, Israel, and the

United States and is headed by the Director General located in Rome.

(For a more complete historical account see Quandt, 1988; Rabinovich,

1980; Segal & Segal, 1993; Tabory, 1986.)

As stipulated in the Treaty, the Sinai was divided into four zones.

Progressively tighter restrictions on the amount and type of weaponry

permitted were established for each zone, with the most restrictions

applying to Zone C which encompasses the boundary line between the

countries, as shown in Figure 1-1. The MFO monitors Zone C, whereas a

Civilian Observer Force monitors Zones A, B, and D.

4 The Treaty of Peace, and its 1979 and 1981 Protocols, are printed in their entirety in MFO (1993).
RC Peacekeepers

wmmsm.^ *'"* ' ' "' Red Sea

'\V>Sharm

"'Sheikh •

Figure 1-1. According to the protocol only limited military presence is

permitted in Zones A, B, and D. The MFO covers the entire Zone C stretching

from the Mediterranean in the north to the Red Sea in the south.

The Commander of the MFO forces in the Sinai is headquartered at

North Camp, which is located near El Gorah. Because Zone C stretches

the entire north-south length of the Sinai, the Commander of the southern

most of the three battalions within Zone C is headquartered at South
Introduction

countries participating in the MFO: Australia, New Zealand, France,

Norway, Columbia, Fiji, Italy, Hungary, Canada, Uruguay, and the

United States.

The United States contributes an infantry battalion task force that is

based at South Camp and is responsible for the entire southern portion of

Zone C.5The first U.S. troops arrived in the Sinai on 20 March 1982,

and the mission officially began on 25 April 1982 (MFO, 1993). Since

then, the United States has deployed an AC infantry battalion, typically

from the XVIII Airborne Corps, for 30 6-month rotations. The

battalion's mission is to observe the area immediately surrounding each

of 13 observations posts, check points, and sector control centers from an

observation tower and to provide routine vehicular patrolling of the area.

All activities, vehicles, aircraft, and seacraft observed in the designated

area are identified and reported to the battalion headquarters at South

Camp. Reports that warrant follow up as possible treaty violations are

further reported to MFO headquarters at North Camp.

Mission execution requires deployment of a squad to each

observation post, check point, and sector control center for 3 weeks and

then return to South Camp for 3 weeks. This cycle is repeated four to

five times during the 6-month rotation. Each squad lives 24 hours a day

at its remote site. Platoon leaders and company commanders live at the

sector control centers, which vary in distance from their associated

observations posts and check points. Some are located within 15 minutes

by ground of South Camp, whereas others are only accessible by airlift.

Some are located in the sparsely populated desert, some in the mountains,

some along the Red Sea, and some inland.

As shown in Figure 1 -2, each remote site has two air conditioned

modular shelters, one for housing and the other for operations, mess, and

day room activities, as well as utility buildings, a weight lifting area,

outhouse facilities, underground camouflage bunkers, and an observation

tower. Chain-link fence with concertina wire surrounds each site.

Soldiers at some sites are not permitted to leave the compound because

5 In addition, the United States contributes a logistical support battalion, headquartered at North Camp, that

serves both North Camp and South Camp. A small element is also provided to support the MFO Force

Commander's staff. No data from these soldiers are included in this book.
RC Peacekeepers

Figure 1-2. Remote observation post overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba and the

Sinai desert.

Soldiers at some sites are not permitted to leave the compound because

there are live land mines scattered throughout the Sinai. These mines

migrate unpredictably with the shifting sands and occasional winter

floods.

The primary duties of the squad at each remote site are to observe

civilian and military activities in the surrounding area, file routine

reports, and notify South Camp of potential treaty violations. Typically,

a soldier performs observation duty from the tower for 2-3 hours before

being relieved. Squad members must also provide for their own needs

(e.g., meals, physical fitness and mission training, and recreation) as well

as conduct site maintenance. After 3 weeks, the squad returns to South

Camp. Here it takes rest and recreation (R&R), receives additional

training, and serves on the 24-hour emergency Quick Reaction Force.

Most services and facilities, although on a small scale, are available

at South Camp. These include limited university courses, a library,

baseball diamond, soccer field, tennis and basketball courts, weight

training facilities, force exchange, laundry, barbershop, and travel

agency. Mail is usually delivered three times each week. Commercial
Introduction

personal calls. The area around South Camp has been commercially

developed into a small resort, largely frequented by Europeans, with

night clubs, water sports, and shops. The availability of the resort

facilities to U.S. soldiers varies depending on the policies and training

schedules set by the battalion and company commanders.

Because both Israel and Egypt have honored the terms of the Treaty

with no violent incidents, the physical threat in the Sinai is relatively low.

Terrorism is always a potential, but to date there have been no attacks

targeted against MFO soldiers in the Sinai. Most injuries and illnesses

are due to reactions to local food and water, dehydration from extreme

heat, and diving accidents in the Red Sea (Rothberg, Harris, Jellen, &

Pickle, 1985; Gambel, 1995). Because ground traffic is hazardous as a

result of poor road conditions and unpredictable driving habits of the

local population, soldiers are not permitted to drive after dark without

special command approval. Perhaps the biggest challenge is the

psychological effects of boredom and confinement that may lead to low

morale, micromanagement and interpersonal conflicts (Harris & Segal,

1985; Segal & Segal, 1993; Litz, 1996).

THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Because the strategy of deploying a composite battalion of primarily

RC volunteers for peacekeeping operations is unique, the results of the

present test could not be predicted from past research conducted with

AC-only battalions (e.g., Segal & Segal, 1993). There are three

conditions which make this deployment unique: (a) the AC and RC were

combined in the same unit, (b) the unit was assembled from individual

soldiers who had not served together, and (c) the volunteers came from

states across the country. The first condition is potentially problematic

because there is an historical undercurrent of doubt about RC capabilities,

especially regarding successful conduct of overseas missions (Binkin &

Kaufmann, 1989; Boland, 1970; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991;

1995; Mahon, 1983). This doubt, coupled with the fact that these

soldiers had not served together before, may have negative effects on

morale, unit cohesion, and squad performance. The third condition, the

widely distributed home states, could make the coordination for

recruiting, screening, and selection of volunteers as well as the support of
10 RC Peacekeepers

their families more difficult than for an intact unit stationed at a single

installation.

Our research focused on the impact of these three conditions on

personnel, training, and family support requirements for the deployed

unit, the soldiers' spouses, and the RC unit that sponsored the volunteers.

The specific questions we asked are organized under the five areas listed

below.

1. Personnel: Questions related to personnel asked how was the

recruiting and screening process conducted, did it produce enough

qualified volunteer RC soldiers, could it have been improved (and how),

who volunteered and why, and what did volunteers expect to gain from

their peacekeeping experience.

2. Training: Questions related to training asked how was training

conducted in preparation for and during the mission, did this process

produce proficient soldiers able to accomplish the mission, could training

have been done better, and if so, how.

3. General Attitudes and Perceptions: Questions in this area asked

what soldiers thought about participation in the test battalion, whether

their expectations were met, what the mission's effects were on soldiers'

civilian and military careers and families, and how did these effects

impact soldier willingness to volunteer for other missions in the future.

4. Family Support: Questions related to family support asked what

was the family support system, did it serve the soldiers' and spouses'

needs, how could it be improved, and how serving in the Sinai affected

quality of marriages.

5. RC Home Unit Impact: Questions related to home unit impact

asked what effect the loss of volunteers to the Sinai mission had on the

sponsoring ARNG division in terms of personnel, training, and readiness.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The book is organized into seven sections, corresponding to the five

general areas listed above, plus an initial section that provides

background, defines the research questions (Chapter 1) and describes the
Introduction 11

methods, procedures, and data collection instruments used in the overall

conduct of the research (Chapter 2) and a final section that provides

conclusions and recommendations for future use of the RC in other

peacekeeping missions (Chapter 17).

In Section Two (Personnel), Chapter 3 describes the psychological

characteristics of soldiers who have participated in peace missions, based

on the findings of past research on previous Sinai rotations as well as

other peace missions. Chapter 4 describes the procedures used by the RC

to acquire qualified volunteers for the Sinai mission and provides

recommendations for improvements that could be made to these

procedures in the future. Chapter 5 presents a demographic description

and personnel profile of the soldiers. Chapter 6 discusses soldiers'

reasons for volunteering, their expectations about the experience, and

their personal goals during the deployment.

In Section Three (Training), Chapter 7 describes the research

conducted to measure soldier performance during the Sinai mission.

Results based on the performance measures that were developed appear

in both this chapter and the next. Chapter 8 describes the background of

the soldiers, the training they received, and a longitudinal analysis of

their demonstrated skill proficiency as measured from the start of

predeployment training through deployment in the Sinai. This chapter

also contains soldier reactions to the classes that they were offered for the

first time via satellite from the United States. Chapter 9 describes and

evaluates the Infantry Leaders Course that was specially designed for this

mission and attended by most of the leaders prior to deployment.

In Section Four (Attitudes and Perceptions), Chapter 10 describes the

level of unit cohesiveness perceived by squad level soldiers, whereas

Chapter 11 focuses on the attitudes and perceptions of the soldiers who

held leadership positions. Both Chapters 12 and 13 describe the

perceived impact of volunteering for, or being assigned to, this mission

on soldiers' personal lives. Chapter 12 also discusses how well soldier

expectations were met and the how their peacekeeping experience

affected their career commitment. Chapter 13 describes the financial

impact of the mission and its relation to soldier intentions to remain in the

Army.
12 RC Peacekeepers

In Section Five (Family Support), Chapter 14 describes the support

system that was put in place to assist the families left behind in

communities across the country as well as at major military installations.

In addition, this system is evaluated with recommendations for future

deployments. Chapter 15 discusses the impact on the quality of

marriages.

In Section Six (Home Unit), Chapter 16 describes the personnel,

training, and readiness impacts experienced by soldiers in the sponsoring

ARNG division that provided the majority of the volunteers for the Sinai

mission.

In Section Seven, conclusions and recommendations for future use

of the RC in other peacekeeping missions concludes the main body of the

book (Chapter 17). We also include an appendix for those readers who

might be interested in specific soldier comments.
Introduction 13

REFERENCES

Binkin, M., & Kaufmann, W. W. (1989). U.S. Army Guard & Reserve:

Rhetoric, realities, risks. Washington, DC: The Brookings

Institute.

Boland, H. (1970). The Reserves. In Studies preparedfor the

president's commission on an all-volunteer armedforce: Vol. 2

(pp. iv-2-12). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office.

Department of Defense. (1990, November/December). Defense 90

Almanac, 19, 24, 32.

Department of Defense. (1995). Defense 95 Almanac, 5, 11, 17, 22.

Dupuy, R. E. (1971). The National Guard: A compact history. New

York: Hawthorn Books.

Gambel, J. M. (1995, September-October). Health threats to soldiers

serving in the Sinai. Military Review, 75, 28-32.

Harris, J. J., & Segal, D. R. (1985). Observations from the Sinai: The

boredom factor. Armed Forces & Society, 11, 235-248.

Litz, B. T. (1996, Winter). The psychological demands of peacekeeping

for military personnel. Clinical Quarterly, 6, 1-8.

Mahon, J. K. (1983). History ofthe Militia and the National Guard.

New York: Macmillan Publishing.

Multinational Force and Observers. (1993, June). The Multinational

Force and Observers: Servants ofpeace. Rome: Office of

Personnel and Publications.

Quandt, W. B. (1988). The Middle East: Ten years after Camp David.

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.
14 RC Peacekeepers

Rabinovich, I. (1980, January). Israel: The impact of the peace treaty.

Current History, 78, 9-11, 37-38.

Rothberg, J. M, Harris, J. J., Jellen, L. K., & Pickle, R. (1985). Illness

and health of the U.S. battalion in the Sinai MFO deployment.

Armed Forces & Society, 11, 413-426.

Segal, D. R., & Segal, M. W. (1993). Peacekeepers and their wives:

American participation in the Multinational Force and

Observers. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Tabory, M. (1986). The Multinational Force and Observers in the

Sinai: Organization, structure, andfunction. Boulder, CO:

Westview Press.

U.S. General Accounting Office. (1991, September). National Guard:

Peacetime training did not adequately prepare combat brigades

for Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-91-263). Washington, DC: Author.

U.S. General Accounting Office. (1995, June). Army National Guard:

Combat brigades' ability to be ready for war in 90 days is

uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-95-91). Washington, DC: Author.

Vaccaro, J. M. (1995). Peace operations and combat readiness. In A. H.

Chayes & G. T. Raach (Eds.), Peace operations: Developing an

American strategy (pp. 67-82). Washington, DC: National

Defense University Press.
RESEARCH APPROACH

Ruth H. Phelps

INTRODUCTION

From its inception, the use of the Reserve Component (RC) to fulfill

the U.S. Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping

commitment in the Sinai was meant to be a test. The Chief of Staff

guidance was specifically to study the Army's ability to obtain RC

volunteers, train them, execute the mission, and determine the impact of

removing citizen soldiers from their units, civilian jobs, and families. In

short, it was to be a testbed. This direction gave the Army the rare

opportunity to actually design a research program before the execution of

the mission instead of taking advantage of targets of opportunity or

gathering lessons learned after the mission.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the

approach used for the assessment of the composite unit serving as the

28th U.S. Rotation to the Sinai. Emphasis in this chapter is on the big

picture: the general design and time line, the different populations of

participants, and the various types of data collected and their supporting

instruments. Most of the subsequent chapters focus on the soldiers of the

28th Rotation. However, in some chapters, the focus is on the spouses of

the soldiers, the military and civilians who supported or trained the

soldiers, and also the RC units from which these soldiers were drawn.

Details on subpopulations will be presented within the appropriate

chapters themselves.

15
JÜ RC Peacekeepers

THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

As discussed in Chapter 1, the empirical assessment of using an

Active Component (AC)/RC composite unit for the MFO mission

covered a series of research questions concerning the predeployment

recruiting and training process; training, performance, morale, unit

cohesion, and family support during the deployment; and

postredeployment impacts on the soldiers and families, including civilian

and military careers and attitudes toward future volunteerism. In

addition, the positive and negative impacts of losing soldiers from their

home RC units and their subsequent return to those units were assessed to

determine the effects on unit readiness, training, and morale.

To answer these questions, the entire 28th Rotation was tracked

longitudinally from the time the soldiers were recruited until they were

released from active duty and returned to their homes. The number and

type of positions (with minor deviations such as a larger rear detachment

to handle family support) were similar to all the other MFO rotations.

However, as shown in Figure 2-1, the 28th Rotation was composed of

80% RC and 20% AC members; half of the noncommissioned officer

(NCO) and officer positions were assigned to AC and half were assigned

to RC soldiers. These constraints, imposed by the Army specifically for

this test, resulted in squads of nearly 100% RC soldiers, half with AC

leaders and half with RC leaders. Although the Battalion Headquarters

was also half AC and half RC, the key positions of Battalion

556 Soldiers in Rotation #28

AC/RC Composite Personnel Distribution

lAC RC

Officer' ir%r\f r ^*

NC0

Figure 2-1. Rotation 28 was composed of 80% RC and 20% AC; half of the NCO and

officer positions were AC, leaving nearly all junior enlisted slots to be filled by RC soldiers.
Research Approach 17

Commander, Command Sergeant Major, and Operations Staff Officer

(S3) were AC. Nearly every soldier, regardless of rank, position, or

component, deployed to the Sinai or in the rear detachment, was tracked

throughout the entire assessment.

To get a total perspective, data were also collected from spouses of

soldiers in the 28th Rotation, soldiers who functioned as trainers, and

soldiers and civilians who provided support for families or performed in

key roles within the family support system (e.g., the American Red

Cross, Army National Guard [ARNG] state family coordinators). As

shown in Figure 2-2, the sponsoring RC unit, from which the majority of

the volunteer soldiers were drawn, was simultaneously tracked from

predeployment through redeployment to determine the effects on the

home unit of losing the volunteers. Only data collected before

redeployment are reported in this book.

APPROACH

FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97

29th ID (L) not deployed Personnel

Training

Family

RC Readiness

Rotation #28

Soldiers Deployed

• Families

f

Figure 2-2. Rotation 28 RC soldiers and families were studied prior to reporting for duty in 1994,

during deployment and post-redeployment through 1997. Note that the 29th ID(L) soldiers who

did not deploy were studied over the same timeframe.

Reference and baseline data were gathered from a recent all-AC

rotation using data collection instruments similar to those used for the

28th Rotation. In addition, the data were collected for both rotations at

approximately the same time during the predeployment preparation as
18 RC Peacekeepers

well as during the deployment itself. This allowed both a comparison of

attitudes and performance at similar times during the rotations and the

identification of characteristics of all MFO rotations not unique to the

composite unit. Informal data were also collected from the 24th, 25th,

and 26th Rotations to support the design and pilot test the data collection

instruments.

Thus, the research design was a longitudinal case study of personnel

and training issues affecting five different populations of participants: (1)

RC and AC soldiers in the 28th Rotation, (2) spouses of the 28th Rotation

soldiers, (3) soldiers and civilians who provided training and support, (4)

soldiers in a recent all-AC rotation, and (5) RC soldiers and leaders from

the sponsoring ARNG unit. In the following chapters, depending on the

subject matter, findings for various combinations of these populations are

reported; e.g., some focus exclusively on the 28th Rotation soldiers,

while others combine findings from spouses, the recent all-AC rotation,

and/or the RC sponsoring unit. Identification of the specific populations

being reported will be made in the individual chapters.

DATA COLLECTION TIME LINES

The entire research program was designed to parallel the

predeployment, during deployment, and postredeployment flow of events

of the 28th Rotation. This section describes the time line of the unit's

events and the corresponding data collection dates. Because both the

time line and the process used to recruit RC volunteers were different for

soldiers from the ARNG and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), the data

collection dates and the types of data collected were different. However,

once the composite unit was formed, all soldiers followed the same time

line and responded to the same research instruments under the same

conditions regardless of component.

In keeping with the tradition of deploying light infantry or

paratroopers for the Sinai mission (Segal & Segal, 1993), the ARNG

initially recruited soldiers from its only light infantry division, the 29th

Infantry Division (Light) (29th ID[L]). Recruiting began unofficially in

the fall of 1993 and officially during the winter of 1994. Primarily

located in Maryland and Virginia, the 29th ID(L) held an all-day
Research Approach 19.

orientation session in each state for volunteer soldiers and their families.

These sessions gave the soldiers and their families the opportunity to

meet the Battalion Commander, his wife, and the primary battalion staff,

and receive personnel and family support information and counseling on

soldier preparations, such as designation of powers of attorney.

The USAR began recruiting in March 1994 from the pool of

Individual Ready Reserve soldiers. A 2-week screening and training

session was held in June 1994 at Fort McCoy, WI, with follow-up

recruiting from the USAR Troop Program Units, as needed, through

October 1994. We observed and documented both the ARNG and USAR

processes, collecting data as opportunities permitted from soldiers,

families, and trainers.

The primary data collection times, relative to the deployment date

(D) for the 28th Rotation and a recent all-AC rotation, are shown in

Figure 2-3. Note that for the different waves of data collection, the

location and types of data varied along the total time line.

The Battalion Commander and the Company Commanders and their

staffs reported for duty between February 7 and May 2 at Fort Bragg,

NC. The remaining NCOs and officers (both AC and RC) reported for

duty on August 8, 1994, whereas the junior enlisted (E-4 and below)

soldiers reported at Fort Bragg on October 2, 1994. Most NCOs and

officers attended the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC) at Fort Benning, GA,

from August 27 to September 24, 1994. Once the junior enlisted soldiers

reported for duty in October, there was intensive predeployment training

culminating in an evaluation by personnel outside the battalion in

December 1994. The battalion was deployed from January 7 to July 23,

1995. The unit was formally activated on November 4, 1994 and

deactivated on July 28, 1995.

Data were also collected from the other three populations (spouses,

trainers/support personnel, and the sponsoring RC unit) at strategic times

throughout the predeployment, deployment, and postredeployment of the

28th Rotation. We collected data from the spouses during the recruiting

process as well as both early and late in the deployrhent itself. Trainers

from the ILC were interviewed/surveyed both during the course and 2

months later. We collected data from family support providers

throughout the entire time line. The sponsoring RC unit responded to
20 RC Peacekeepers

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Research Approach 21

surveys and interviews during the deployment and postredeployment.

Details on these three populations will be presented in their respective

chapters.

RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION

Data were collected from all five populations using both informal

methods (discussion, observation, and unit records) and formal methods

(surveys, interviews, job knowledge tests, and supervisor ratings). An

overview of the instruments and their administration is presented in this

section whereas the details for instruments used for the four other

populations are described separately in the appropriate chapters.

The Soldier Surveys

The entire battalion (both AC and RC) was surveyed four times: (1)

upon arrival at Fort Bragg (August 1994 for E-5 and above and October

1994 for E-4 and below) («=522); (2) at the end of predeployment

training (December 1994) (n=340); (3) 1 month into the deployment

(February 1995) (n=305); and (4) 4 months into the deployment (May

1995) (n=443). For each wave, soldiers were brought to a large room

(e.g., gymnasium, classroom) and given background on the purpose of

the survey; instructions for completing the survey; and pencils, survey

booklets, and answer sheets. Soldiers spent approximately an hour

responding to the survey; they brought their materials to a researcher who

checked each survey for completeness. The soldiers were then released

to their Officer In Charge. The number of survey questions varied

between 198 and 226 for the different waves; questions were organized

into four topic categories: civilian/military and family background and

experiences; training; cohesion/climate; and attitudes about the Army.

Because not all items applied to every soldier, some analyses are based

on fewer cases than the maximum sample sizes reported above.

The Background and Experiences Survey. These questions focused

on demographic and financial information, reasons for volunteering,

civilian and military career intentions, expectations of the impact of

volunteering on their civilian/military careers and their families, as well

as what their actual experiences were. These items were used to
22 RC Peacekeepers

determine the characteristics of volunteers and how their expectations of

the experience were met or not met, and to what degree their expectations

and experiences changed over the course of predeployment and during

deployment for both the soldiers themselves and their families.

The Training Survey. Training questions were designed to determine

each soldier's civilian and military background as well as document their

training experiences during predeployment and deployment phases.

Because many soldiers move among Regular Army, ARNG, and USAR

status, soldiers were asked to indicate their military histories in each

component. Other training questions were on Military Occupational

Specialty qualification, experience at Combat Training Centers, and prior

deployments; they were also asked their opinions on the physical

difficulty/demands of the MFO mission and the efficacy of the training

they received. The surveys that were administered to soldiers

participating in the ILC focused on quality, content, and execution of the

training.

The Cohesion and Climate Survey. Additional soldier questions

were asked to determine the level/stability of unit cohesion and climate.

Items concerned the soldier's family, satisfaction with the unit's

performance, personal performance, leadership performance, and

treatment of the soldiers. These questions were modifications of

previously used ARI surveys (Siebold, 1994; Siebold & Lindsay, 1994).

The Soldier Interviews

Soldiers were interviewed to obtain more detailed information in

areas such as leadership, morale, and family support. They were

interviewed on five separate occasions, as shown in Figure 2-3. We

interviewed a total of 71 soldiers in squad leader positions and higher in

all companies 1 month prior to deployment, then 1 month (n=52) and 4

months (n=75) into the deployment. Interviews were always conducted

privately with an individual or a small group of same-grade soldiers;

supervisors were never present for subordinate interviews. Questions

focused on perceived impact of MFO experience on military career, job

duties, treatment by the leadership, AC/RC differences, expectations

about recreational and educational opportunities, and attitudes about the

MFO mission.
Research Approach 23

Job Knowledge Tests

Individual soldier paper-and-pencil tests used to assess the amount

and type of knowledge of both common tasks and MFO-specific tasks

were either newly developed or drawn from previously developed U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

knowledge tests (Campbell & Zook, 1991). Job knowledge tests were

administered three times to soldiers in squad leader and below positions:

1 month prior to deployment (n=448) and then 1 month (n=309) and 4

months («=308) into the deployment. Administration conditions were the

same as for the surveys. Examples of the 42 common soldier tasks are:

estimate range, maintain M16A2 rifle, send radio message, administer

first aid, and perform self-extraction from a minefield. Examples of the

57 MFO tasks are: describe zonal structure of the Sinai, identify Arab

Republic of Egypt forces, and follow rules for use of force and

employment of firearms.

Supervisor Ratings

MFO-specific performance rating scales were developed to assess

supervisor perceptions of soldier performance in executing the mission.

Fifty-seven supervisors rated 228 soldiers 4 months into the deployment

on 10 dimensions clustered into three factors: "Job Relevant Skills and

Motivation," "Personal Discipline," and "Physical Fitness and Military

Bearing." These scales were based on an identification of the dimensions

that make up successful and unsuccessful performance in the Sinai. The

dimensions, however, were defined by an analysis of MFO background

information and critical incident interviews with NCOs who served in

prior MFO rotations.

SUMMARY

The overriding theme for the research approach was to capture how

soldiers and their spouses reacted to the Army's attempt to use volunteer

soldiers from the RC in a peacekeeping mission. We were both the "fly

on the wall" as well as the formal surveyor, interviewer, and tester. We

either modified existing research instruments or developed new ones
24 RC Peacekeepers

better suited to this mission and its unique AC/RC composition.

Instruments were administered throughout the recruiting, predeployment

training, and the deployment in the Sinai. The Army's explicit intention

to use this rotation as an experiment allowed us greater access over a

longer time period than is typical of behavioral research, providing more

in-depth data as well as extensive on-the-ground experience for the

research team.
Research Approach 25

REFERENCES

Campbell, J. P., & Zook, L. (1991). Improving the selection,

classification, and utilization ofArmy enlisted personnel: Final

report on Project A (ARI Research Report No. 1597).

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences.

Segal, D. R., & Segal, M. W. (1993). Peacekeepers and their wives:

American participation in the Multinational Force and

Observers. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Siebold, G. L. (1994). The relation between soldier motivation,

leadership, and small unit performance. In H. F. ONeill, Jr., and

M. Drillings (Eds.), Motivation: Theory and research (pp.

171-190). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Siebold, G. L., & Lindsay, T. J. (1994, August). The relation between

soldier racial/ethnic group and perceived cohesion and

motivation. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the

American Sociological Association, Los Angeles, CA.
SECTION 2

PERSONNEL

Because this unit was composed largely of Reserve Component (RC)

volunteers, there were special personnel concerns that would not have

normally been an issue with an all-Active Component (AC) unit. The

personnel goal was to fill all the RC slots in the 28th Multinational Force

and Observers (MFO) Rotation with qualified volunteers. The challenge

was to recruit and screen 446 junior enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned

officers, and officers from the Army National Guard, and both the

Individual Ready Reserve and Troop Program Units of the U.S. Army

Reserve.

Chapter 3 opens the section with the identification of the individual

personnel attributes important for peacekeepers. Mael, Kilcullen, and

White define 22 attributes derived from previous literature and new data

collected specifically on the MFO mission. They also hypothesize about

how these attributes may be more and less fostered by the RC

environment.

In Chapter 4, Palmer, Rumsey, Smith, and Wisher describe the

process used by the RC to recruit and screen the volunteers from across

the country. Their assessment of the success of that process highlights

lessons that can be applied to future use of RC volunteers for either the

MFO or other peace missions.

Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on the MFO soldiers' individual

background and motivations. Farr (Chapter 5) describes personnel

profiles of soldiers, including their demographic background, civilian

employment experience, and military experience. In Chapter 6, Oliver,

Tiggle, and Hayes conclude Section Two with a description of why

soldiers volunteered and their expectations of the upcoming MFO

experience when they first reported for duty.

27
SOLDIER ATTRIBUTES FOR

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

Fred A. Mael

Robert N. Kilcullen

Leonard A. White

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the U.S. has committed increasing resources and

attention to nonwar involvements overseas, including peacekeeping and

peacemaking operations. These missions represent a departure from

traditional U.S. warfighting doctrine (Eikenberry, 1993; füllen, 1993;

Janowitz, 1960; Van Creveld, 1991). Peacekeeping may also require a

different mixture of skills or techniques by U.S. soldiers (Segal & Segal,

1993). In turn, the requisite attributes that would be optimal for

peacekeeping may be different than those typically sought in either the

combat or combat support branches of the military. Thus, information

about desired attributes would be useful, whether it was to be used for

initial or secondary selection, or used to shape training goals.

However, in spite of this U.S. move toward more peacekeeping-type

engagements and the longstanding involvement of other nations in

peacekeeping missions, little is being done to determine the attributes

needed for peacekeepers. In a review of other countries' programs,

Grandmaison and Cotton (1993) noted that only Austria had a program

designed specifically to screen candidates for peacekeeping (Lohwasser,

1993). Moreover, Eikenberry states that "reliable reports of gross

corruption and incompetence continue to emanate from Bosnia and

Cambodia" (1993, p. 17). In recent years, allegations of the torture and

murder of a Somali national by Canadian peacekeepers has increased

29
2Q RC Peacekeepers

Canadian concern for psychological screening of peacekeepers

(Grandmaison & Cotton, 1993). Interest in individual differences and

desired attributes may take the form of either screening out undesirable

characteristics or highlighting needed qualities, either through selection

or training.

In this paper, we describe the development of a model of individual

characteristics thought to be relevant to performance in peacekeeping

missions. These attributes were identified based on a search of the

literature and discussions with subject matter experts from the United

States and other countries. In conjunction with this broader model, we

describe a small job analysis demonstrating the likely relationship of

these attributes to performance in the Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) Sinai and other peacekeeping missions.

Of course, no two peacekeeping missions are exactly alike.

Peacekeeping in countries such as Somalia and Bosnia is far different

from peacekeeping in MFO Sinai, where very little activity takes place

and contact with possible belligerents is virtually nonexistent. It is also

true that the scenarios encountered by peacekeepers within a particular

mission are not always foreseeable. The U.S. experience in Somalia

began as a humanitarian effort to end hunger and evolved into combat

operations involving both defensive and offensive maneuvers. A key

distinction is whether the involvement of troops is in peacekeeping or

peacemaking. Peacekeeping involves maintenance of a situation in

which two former combatants have already agreed to peace.

Peacekeepers will typically serve as observers or at most as enforcers of

an in-place ceasefire. By contrast, peacemakers may be involved in

brokering peace, both as adjuncts to diplomatic efforts and through

policing of areas in which combatants are still at odds with each other or

with the peacemakers themselves. Most missions fall on a continuum

between these two types of operations (R.J. Fisher, 1993).

Given the unpredictable nature of these assignments, peacekeeping

forces need to be competent in, and prepared for, both types of situations.

Therefore, the model described herein lists attributes relevant to

performance in both low- and high-intensity peacekeeping environments.

Some attributes are likely to be applicable in both scenarios, while others

seem relevant to only one situation. Subsequent administrations of the

biodata instrument described in this paper should permit an empirical
Peacekeeping Attributes 3_1

confirmation of the constructs important within each environment. Of

course, it is also possible that both types of constructs could be relevant

in peacekeeping missions of an intermediate nature (e.g., Haiti), in which

there exists a moderate possibility of combat operations.

Another level of inquiry involves the relative appropriateness of

using either Active Component (AC) soldiers, Reserve Component (RC)

soldiers, or either in a peacekeeping or peacemaking environment. Stated

differently, the question is whether the desired attributes will likely be

better represented among AC or RC soldiers, and whether some attributes

have different meanings for the two groups. This issue will be discussed

in the course of describing the theorized relevant constructs.

We turn now to a description of the peacekeeping constructs

described in the model and measured by the biodata instrument. These

attributes are grouped according to their anticipated situational relevance.

Tolerance for Boredom

Some aspects of the peacekeeping job, especially monitoring a

ceasefire, involve extreme tedium, punctuated by rare moments requiring

peak alertness. The peacekeeping role in the MFO Sinai, where there has

been a longstanding lack of overt hostilities; where the two sides are

geographically separated by a rarely entered buffer area; and where

peacekeepers rarely interact with indigenous persons, much less with

armed combatants, has been identified as an environment in which

soldiers are particularly vulnerable to boredom (Segal & Segal, 1993). In

this respect, peacekeeping is not unique. Work environments in which

there is quantitative underload, lack of variety, and lack of challenge tend

to be perceived as very boring (Caplan, Cobb, French, Harrison, &

Pinneau, 1975). Those who successfully perform similarjobs (jail

guards, security officers/night watchman, lifeguards) also need to have

some level of tolerance for boredom.

However, in addition to task effects, there are individual differences

in tolerance for boredom, as well as differences in the tendency to

become bored. There is some indication that males, younger persons,

and those of higher intelligence and educational attainment are more

likely to be bored in monotonous jobs (Drory, 1982). There is
22 RC Peacekeepers

contradictory evidence on the relationship of extroversion to boredom.

Some research has shown that extroverts need more stimulation and are

thus bored more easily on monotonous tasks than introverts (Gardner &

Cummings, 1988). Conversely, boredom has been identified as a

symptom of loneliness and depression, both of which are correlated to

some degree with introversion (Rubenstein & Shaver, 1982). In addition,

introverts are more distractible, leaving them more prone to boredom in

some situations (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989).

Although there are empirical measures of proneness to boredom

(Farmer & Sundberg, 1986), the greater concern for peacekeepers is the

tolerance for boredom, the ability to cope with the effects of an

objectively unstimulating task or environment without feeling agitated.

Finally, being bored should not be confused with being a boring person,

as judged by others in interpersonal contact (Leary, Rogers, Canfield, &

Coe, 1986).

Boredom which is not dealt with constructively could have a number

of negative effects in the peacekeeping environment. For the junior

soldier, a response to boredom could be a lack of attention to one's work,

as expressed in daydreaming or writing letters (CD. Fisher, 1993;

Kishida, 1977) that would defeat the whole purpose of manning an

observation post. On the other hand, boredom among officers could lead

to micromanagement of subordinates (Kiechell, 1984), a problem that has

been mentioned in interviews with previous members of MFO Sinai

missions. Finally, other negative consequences of prolonged, poorly

tolerated boredom include job dissatisfaction, absenteeism, increased risk

of accidents, health problems, stress, and increased drug and alcohol

abuse (Caplan et al., 1975; Drory, 1982; CD. Fisher, 1993; Hamilton,

1983; Orcutt, 1984). Thus, tolerance for boredom would be an important

coping mechanism in the MFO Sinai mission, although the soldiers

specific role would be relevant as well.

In the current research, tolerance for boredom as well as the ability to

cope with various situational components that Harris, Rothberg, Segal,

and Segal (1993) viewed as aggravating or compounding boredom

problems were investigated. The first is the persons' tolerance for

extended periods of isolation, when one is expected to spend long hours

in an observation post virtually alone, as well as isolation from one's

family. Harris et al. also viewed sensory deprivation and occasional
Peacekeeping Attributes 22.

concomitant time and space disorientation in the unchanging desert as

another, unspoken factor in the sense of isolation. The second

component is ones tendency to get frustrated from the sense of

underutilization of one's skills or cultural deprivation. These feelings

tend to vary, depending upon whether ones role in the mission was

primarily observation or whether it was more typical of other

assignments, such as cooks and those involved in supply and

transportation. The third is one's need for privacy. Because the MFO is

located in a remote desert, the ability to "go into town" or find another

way to simply leave the company of others may be limited. The sense of

constantly being among others may grate on some individuals, especially

introverts or loners who are uncomfortable with steady camaraderie.

Another possibility is that the soldier's unit may resent loners more in

this environment that they would otherwise, making the loner a liability

to others.

Organizational Identification

Identification is defined as a cognitive perception of oneness with the

defined aggregate of persons, involving the perceived experience of the

group's successes and failures (Kelman, 1961; Mael & Tetrick, 1992;

Tolman, 1943). Identification with one's work organization and its

mission has long been recognized as an important component in one's

sense of satisfaction and belonging, in one's propensity to attrit, and in

the quality of one's interactions with other organizational members

(Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Brown, 1969; Mael & Ashforth, 1992, 1995;

Patchen, 1970). In military settings, identification with one's unit and

mission has been shown to be related to job involvement, intent to remain

in the Army, motivation to succeed in one's current mission, and

cohesion with the members of one's unit (Mael & Alderks, 1993). There

is some evidence that there are individual differences in the propensity to

identify with one's group or organization across different situations (Cox,

1985; Mael & Ashforth, 1992, 1995; Rotondi, 1975). For the current

research, it was hypothesized that given the various stresses involved in

the MFO mission and in peacekeeping in general, it would be useful for a

soldier to have a strong identification with the MFO, with the mission,

and with the U.S. Army as a whole.
34 RC Peacekeepers

In the current context, it would be of interest to determine if the

organizational identification of RC members differs from that of AC

members. It is conceivable that the loyalties of the Army National Guard

(ARNG) personnel would be somewhat conflicted between allegiance to

the state guard and the U.S. Army as a totality. In turn, the differing

allegiances of the members of a mixed RC/AC unit could make for lack

of shared identity, if not friction (Mael & Palmer, Chapter 11). Thus,

clarifying the joint identities and identification of such a unit embarking

on peacekeeping could be an important goal of the predeployment

training period.

Team Commitment

In addition to commitment to the Army and its mission as a whole, a

separate importance is associated with one's commitment to work for the

good of one's immediate team. Team commitment reflects the degree to

which the individual is concerned with the unit's welfare and his/her

willingness to help other soldiers. Individuals scoring high on this scale

express and act upon concerns for the personal well-being of other

soldiers in their unit. Their help is valued and relied upon by other

soldiers in time of need.

The team commitment expressed by individual members of a team or

unit must lead inexorably to increased unit cohesion, which is in turn

associated with increased soldier morale (Manning, 1991; Manning &

Ingraham, 1987; Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfoll, 1986). In the MFO

Sinai, where most actual observation work is performed at the team level,

as opposed to the squad or platoon level, the commitment of individuals

to the literal team is important. In more active peacemaking operations

team commitment becomes critical because of the need for coordinated

action. Moreover, veterans report that acts of bravery and self-sacrifice

in combat stem largely from the individual's concern for the welfare of

his comrades.

As mentioned above, RC and AC members of a mixed unit may

differ in how they conceive of their personal identities as Army soldiers

and as members of a peacekeeping unit. Moreover, individuals from the

two groups may differ in their personal career identities: AC soldiers are

likely to see themselves professionally as "soldiers," with their financial,
Peacekeeping Attributes 25

geographical, social, and familial decisions heavily influenced by the

demands of career progression within the AC. By contrast, the RC

member may see himself or herself primarily as a lawyer, policeman, or

security guard, and as a member of a local community who is merely

taking a career and communal "sabbatical" by joining a peacekeeping

mission. This lack of shared concerns and shared identity could limit

interpersonal empathy and identification, and in turn hamper the ability

of such a mixed group to form a cohesive bond (Mael & Palmer, Chapter

11). If this concern is valid, it would suggest the need to build personal

bridges of commonality between the members of the two groups. In

addition, the severity of these concerns would differ depending on

whether the RC component were from an intact or "pickup"

group—members of an intact group would be more internally cohesive,

but could be more prone to subgroup distancing from the AC members of

a mixed unit.

Object Belief

Object belief refers to the propensity to use others as tools for

personal gain. Individuals scoring high on this scale are not remorseful

about achieving their goals through callous manipulation of others and

may be described as ruthless or Machiavellian. It is anticipated that

soldiers scoring low on this scale will perform better in peacekeeping and

peacemaking roles. In peacekeeping missions soldiers with excessive

object belief would behave in a self-centered manner, possibly harming

morale and unit cohesion. In peacemaking operations this characteristic

would have more alarming consequences, particularly among leaders.

These individuals may expose soldiers to unnecessary risks solely for

their own personal glory. The deleterious effects of such actions can

include, at worst, excessively high casualty rates, plus a substantial loss

of materiel. The unit's ability to continue as an effective fighting force

may be impaired if these losses are severe enough.

Cultural Openness and Cultural Awareness

The advent of the multinational corporation and the increasing

tendency of American businesses to set up offices and subsidiaries in

foreign countries has led to greater interest in the qualities that predispose

a person to show awareness of and sensitivity to members of other
3J> RC Peacekeepers

cultures (Evans, Sculli, & Yau, 1987; Mendenhall, Dunbar, & Oddou,

1987). People who violate local conventions or interpret the behavior of

indigenous persons from the perspective of their own culture could be

serious liabilities to their organizations' goals; however, capabilities in

these areas are seldom considered during selection decisions (Harvey,

1983; Tung, 1981, 1987). Moreover, European and Asian multinationals,

who spend more time on cross-cultural training, have lower failure rates

on expatriate assignments (Tung, 1987).

These concerns are equally true for military operations that involve

extensive involvement with indigenous populations or intervention in the

lives of indigenous civilians. As such, these concerns would be greatest

for such superficially different entities as the Special Forces,

peacemakers, and peacekeepers. Specifically, an ability to empathize

with indigenous persons that one is bound to protect, without being

disturbed by local mores, business practices, or hygiene, would seem to

be essential for successful peace operations.

Nevertheless, development of measures that capture cross-cultural

awareness and sensitivity has only recently begun. A measure developed

by Pruegger and Rogers (1993) is specific to a Canadian context and

current Canadian social concerns. Additional work has been done by

Caligiuri (1992, 1994). More needs to be done with a referent to

openness to, if not tolerance for, living conditions and lifestyles unlike

one's own.

During interviews with soldiers who returned from previous MFO

Sinai assignments, a distinction was made between cultural openness and

cultural awareness. The former was seen as a tolerance for and

willingness to accept the very different behavioral patterns and values of

a host country's inhabitants. The latter was seen as simple awareness of

those behaviors that would be deemed unacceptable in the host country.

An example given was the unacceptability of touching the Muslim

women in the adjoining villages, even in the course of offering them

medical assistance.

A few notes of caution must be added about the culture-related

constructs. Because of the limited previous effort devoted to this topic,

optimal paradigms for the study of cross-cultural differences have not yet

been formalized. In addition, much of the research into the difficulties of
Peacekeeping Attributes 3_7_

bridging cultural gaps has been criticized for its presumptuousness and

artificiality (Tayeb, 1994). Also, most research has focused on

generalized cross-cultural orientations rather than on specific distances

between the worldviews of any given cultures or individual differences

within a culture in terms of a person's cognitive proximity or sensitivity

to a focal culture. Thus, another layer of global superficiality permeates

the current research on this topic (Smith, 1992).

The current approach is essentially a search for an interpersonal

skill embedded in the person, usable across all cultures, rather than a

determination of the likelihood of a successful person-culture interaction.

While this approach may indeed be problematic because of the need to

deploy soldiers en masse in remote locations, choosing persons on the

basis of their location-specific sensitivity would be unrealistic. Thus, the

current research focuses on generalized sensitivity to and awareness of

cultural differences of one's own American military contingent compared

to both indigenous peoples and other nationalities involved in a

multinational peacekeeping mission. When a soldier's assignment to a

region will be for longer periods, such as the assignment of a Special

Forces soldier to a geographically based group, a different approach that

uses profile matching might be preferred.

Boundary Spanning Skills and Tolerance for Ambiguity

Boundary role persons (Keller & Holland, 1975; Miles, 1980) have

to deal with large amounts of role-conflict and role-ambiguity, as well as

distrust by all parties who the person represents or services. In some

peacekeeping, boundary spanning could involve serving as an active

buffer between the opposing nations or factions in a civil dispute. In

some multinational efforts, this could be a problem if the role includes

integration with foreign (i.e., UN) commanders or if lines of command

between soldiers and U.S. civilians (such as State Department) are

blurred. Thus, a specific type of stress tolerance may be required, such as

would be measured by tolerance for ambiguity (Budner, 1962; McLain,

1993) and adaptability (Gould, 1979). However, in the MFO Sinai

environment, where interactions with others are minimal, tolerance for

ambiguity may not be as necessary.
3_8 RC Peacekeepers

The question of AC/RC differences in cultural openness and

awareness, as well as the ability to engage in boundary spanning, is also

relevant. Although generalizations are difficult, some RC soldiers have

never strayed far from their home states and have certainly been less

exposed to persons of different nationalities than would most AC

soldiers. Thus, Mael and Palmer (Chapter 11) found that RC soldiers

were expected to experience more "culture shock" in the Sinai.

However, depending on the homogeneity of their home states'

populations and their own lack of contact with different groups, some RC

soldiers may have been less exposed to other American soldiers of

different races and creeds. This could in turn affect their ability to bond

cohesively with different unit members of either a "pickup" unit or a

mixed AC/RC unit if those units were more culturally diverse than their

own RC units.

Rugged Orientation

A basic tenet of biographical data is that past behavior predicts

future behavior. The military lifestyle often requires that soldiers spend

extended periods outdoors in environments that lack the climate control

and amenities of typical dwellings. For this reason, it could be expected

that those who have spent time involved in outdoor or rugged activities,

such as camping, hiking, hunting and fishing, and wilderness exploration,

would be more successful in their adaptation to the military lifestyle.

There is evidence for this position as well (Grey, Mael, & Morath, 1995;

Mael & Hirsch, 1993; Mael & White, 1994). Cadets at the United States

Military Academy (USMA) who had been more involved in rugged and

outdoor activities during high school were rated as better leaders during

basic training and during the field training that took place at the

beginning of their second year at USMA. This finding was confirmed

with two successive classes at USMA and with a class of cadets at the

Virginia Military Institute. Similarly, Mael and Ashforth (1995) found

that participation in rugged and outdoor activities was significantly

related to identification with the Army and a lesser probability of

6-month attrition. Moreover, because a rugged/outdoors orientation is

unrelated to cognitive aptitude or educational attainment, it provides

useful incremental validity over the more common indices of military

adaptability. It should be pointed out that in addition to an experiential,
Peacekeeping Attributes 22

biodata approach, there have been other approaches to outdoors

orientation which stress dispositional or vocational/preference-type

differences instead (Craik, 1975; McKechnie, 1977). From their

perspective, previous involvement in these types of activities would be

manifestations of longstanding tendencies, rather than the results of

previous acculturation.

As with other constructs considered in this research, the degree of

time spent outdoors will vary, depending on the type of peacekeeping

mission. Nevertheless, across all soldiers an outdoor orientation was

viewed as a useful predictor of the ability to deal with extensive periods

spent in the elements.

Physical Endurance and Strength

The measurement of physical abilities needed for job performance

has been given relatively little attention in comparison to cognitive and

dispositional qualities. Standardized taxonomies of these abilities have

only recently been produced (Fleishman & Mumford, 1988; Lopez,

1988). Moreover, physical capabilities which could often be observed, or

would be amenable to work samples and tryouts, are often assessed

through self-report questionnaires, as was done in the current research

(Hogan, 1994). One reason for this may be that the relative ease of

paper-and-pencil tests is seen as outweighing the benefits of more

realistic testing. However, this state of affairs may also bespeak the

relative lack of importance accorded physical ability testing. While

physical fitness testing (PT tests) in general are common throughout the

military, linking specific types of fitness or physical ability to specific

jobs may be less common.

When approaching the role of the peacekeeper, two broad areas of

physical capability were investigated. The first is referred to as physical

endurance, and has also been described as stamina. The concept of

endurance or stamina refers to the ability of the lungs and circulatory

system to perform efficiently for extended periods, without having to stop

because of lack of breath or muscular fatigue (Fleishman & Mumford,

1988; Hogan, 1991; Lopez, 1988). The second is physical strength,

which can be broken into various components, such as static strength

(ability to use muscle force for a short period to lift or push objects) or
40 RC Peacekeepers

explosive strength (strength of one's ability to provide short bursts of

strength to propel oneself or objects). The concepts of dynamic strength

and trunk strength, used by Fleishman and Mumford (1988) to refer to

continuous exertion of force without "giving out," seem to combine

needs for strength and endurance. Both of these areas— endurance and

strength—were examined in regard to peacekeepers. The role of the

observer would not appear to require great bursts of strength, either

short-term or continuously, unless a soldier were involved in supply jobs.

A third category of physical ability, flexibility, was not included in this

research.

The relative inferiority of RC soldiers' physical fitness is an

empirical question. However, it has historically been assumed to be true

by many in the AC community over many years (Binkin & Kaufmann,

1989). However, the idea that "weekend warriors" could be as fit as

full-time soldiers may also be problematic for the shared identities of AC

soldiers. To the extent that the problem is real, additional fitness

pretraining time for RC soldiers may be needed; to the extent that it is a

self-serving perception, RC members of a mixed unit would need to

prove themselves to their skeptical AC peers. Thus, the possibility of

carrying unfit RC soldiers or the threat to the identities of AC soldiers are

yet additional potential obstacles to mixed unit cohesion.

Dependability

Dependability in the current context refers to being reliable and

following through on commitments. Individuals high in dependability

take their duties and obligations seriously. This characteristic may be

seen as the opposite end of a continuum from deviant and impulsive

behavior, as well as egocentric behavior without concern for

consequences or for the perspective of others.

An integral part of military life (and work life in general) is the

partitioning of tasks to individuals. For example, the sentry's role is to

alert the unit to approaching threats. In peacekeeping operations soldiers

who do not take their duties seriously can harm the performance of the

entire unit. In such missions, where soldiers place their lives in the hands

of comrades, it is imperative that soldiers take their duties seriously.

America's elite fighting units have long recognized the importance of this
Peacekeeping Attributes 41

characteristic: "... the hot dogs and daredevils rarely make it past the

special ops screening boards. Today's secret warriors are obsessive

about being team players. Freelancers get their mates killed" (Waller,

1994).

Cognition Under Stress

Stressors can be defined as "environmental events or forces [that]

threaten an organism's existence and well-being" (Baum, Singer, &

Baum, 1982, p. 15). Most would agree that there are few environments

as stressful as combat. Severe injury or death to oneself or to comrades

can occur at any instant. No wonder, then, that fear has been described as

"the most fundamental and pervasive aspect of war" (Dupuy, 1987, p.

200). Moreover, soldiers often must endure substantial physical

discomfort from fatigue, thirst, and hunger while performing in this

environment. Particularly stressful are peacemaking operations against

guerrilla forces. Identification of friend and foe is problematic, and

ambushes can occur at anytime or anyplace.

Research in other work settings confirms that exposure to highly

stressful environments produces a variety of negative consequences

(Matteson & Ivancevich, 1982; Motowidlo, Packard, & Manning, 1986),

both for the individual (e.g., physical ailments and emotional problems)

and the organization (e.g., impaired quality and quantity of work,

accidents, absenteeism). This suggests that individuals who are better at

withstanding stress should perform better in combat operations. The

importance of this characteristic for combat performance has long been

recognized:

If your officer's dead and the sergeants look white;

Remember it's ruin to run from a fight;

So take open order, lie down, and sit tight,

An' wait for supports like a soldier.

-Rudyard Kipling, "The Young British Soldier"

Cognition Under Stress is closely related to Stress Tolerance

(positively) and Anxiety (negatively). It refers to the ability to think

clearly and logically while under physical or emotional stress. High
42 RC Peacekeepers

scorers are not easily rattled and are more likely to remain calm under

pressure.

Additional Empirical Support for Peacekeeping Attributes

A number of the attributes that we have associated with

peacekeeping and peacemaking capability have been investigated with

select segments of the U.S. Army who have been involved in similar

operations. It is interesting to note that elite U.S Army units have been

continually involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The

first U.S. Army deployment to the Sinai consisted of troops from the

82nd Airborne Division. In 1991, Special Operations Forces (SOF)

personnel came to the assistance of Kurdish refugees who were dying in

large numbers in northern Iraq. In one case, SOF medics saved over 200

children given up for dead by local doctors (Collins, 1994). In recent

years SOF teams inoculated 60,000 civilians in Cameroon to control a

meningitis epidemic, taught African game wardens how to stop poachers,

helped to deliver food and medicine to republics within the former Soviet

Union, and assisted relief efforts in Bangladesh after Cyclone Marian

(Collins, 1994). By all accounts, elite U.S. Army units have performed

admirably in these and other humanitarian roles.

Evidence of the relevance of some of these constructs for SOF units

was obtained in a recently completed job analysis of Special Forces

positions (Russell, Crafts, Tagliareni, McCloy, & Barkley, in press). A

sample of 176 Special Forces soldiers rated the job importance of 30

motivational, cognitive, psychomotor, and physical characteristics using

a 5-point rating scale (1 signified unimportance and 5 signified extreme

importance). "Team Playership" was viewed as the single most

important characteristic, with a mean rating of 4.54. Cultural/

Interpersonal Adaptability, which is akin to Cross-Cultural Awareness

and Sensitivity, had a rating of 4.17, and the related constructs of

Communication and Language Ability were also highly rated. Constructs

such as Dependability, Maturity (similar to Cognition Under Stress), and

Physical Endurance were listed among the top seven attributes, with

mean ratings above 4.00 (i.e., "very important"). Physical Strength was

rated less than very important, although it was still seen as "important."
Peacekeeping Attributes 43

Combat Motivation/Socialized Aggression

A final type of construct that has proven somewhat useful in SOF

research may at first glance seem irrelevant or even counterproductive for

peacekeepers. This would include attributes that reflect physical

aggressiveness, eagerness for combat, and similar characteristics

seemingly incompatible with the basic role of peacekeepers. However,

one may argue that while it would be undesirable to have peacekeepers

and peacemakers who long to initiate combat, it would be important to

know that peacekeepers are willing to assert themselves, either when

coming under fire from belligerent combatants or when they must

forcibly convince combatants to desist from harming others, to evacuate

an area, or to allow a convoy safe passage. Thus the attribute combat

motivation was investigated in a wider connotation than applicability to

SOF. Below, we discuss this construct in greater depth.

According to Buss (1961), aggression is the deliberate attempt to

deliver noxious stimuli to another person. Note that this behaviorally

oriented definition distinguishes aggression from anger, which is an

emotion, and from hostility, which is characterized by negative attitudes.

Aggression is, of course, precisely what is required of soldiers in warfare,

conceptualized as "a violent, planned form of physical interaction

(fighting) between two hostile opponents" (Dupuy, 1987), the goal of

which is "the violent resolution of the crisis, the wish to annihilate the

enemys forces" (Clausewitz, 1984).

Although environmental events can facilitate aggression (Baron,

1979; Berkowitz, 1978; Carlson, Marcus-Newhall, & Miller, 1990), there

are clearly individual differences in terms of the frequency and intensity

of aggressive responses (Berkowitz, 1978; Carver & Glass, 1978;

McCord, 1979; Toch, 1969). This suggests that some individuals may

perform better in combat compared to others. In addition, there are

conceptual distinctions regarding the motivation to aggress and the

methods for aggressing which also may be related to combat performance.

Buss (1961) distinguishes between two broad types of aggression

reinforcers: intrinsic reward from bringing pain or injury to the victim,

and extrinsic rewards (e.g., approval, money, status, escape from noxious

stimuli). It should be noted, however, that some extrinsic rewards (e.g.,

approval) are likely to become more intrinsic as the individual matures
44 RC Peacekeepers

and the approving authority generalizes from others to the self (Kegan,

1982). Therefore, the central motivational distinction appears to be

between causing pain/injury to victims versus attaining other intrinsic or

extrinsic rewards.

Clearly, peacemaking soldiers should be primarily motivated by

rewards other than inflicting pain. Those who are motivated to inflict

pain may or may not perform well in combat. However, these

individuals may be more likely to aggress against fellow soldiers as well

as noncombatants, which may result in collateral damage and/or killing

of innocent civilians. What is required are peacemakers who have a

well-integrated and internalized system of norms and values that control

the manifestation of physical aggression. A quote from Waller's (1994)

book on elite SOF units makes this point clearly:

"All of us are behavioral chameleons," a combat-hardened Navy

SEAL once told me. "Just as you compartmentalize intelligence

programs, we learn to do that with our personalities. When

you're on an operation, that's the violent mission side of you. It's

totally different from the loving father side of you, who takes his

kids to church and says hi to his neighbors." (p. 36)

Buss (1961) classifies aggressive behavior into three dimensions:

physical-verbal, active-passive, and direct-indirect. The first distinction

is self-explanatory, with kicking and cursing examples of physical and

verbal aggression. The second dimension distinguishes between

presenting noxious stimuli through active behavior or through inactivity.

Deliberately driving slowly to block traffic is an example of passiveaggressive behavior. The third dimension distinguishes between

aggressive responses where the victim either can or cannot identify the

aggressor. An example of indirect aggression is slashing a car's tires

when the owner is absent.

All aggressive behaviors can be classified using one or more of these

dimensions. For example, kicking is physical-active-direct, blocking

others is physical-passive-direct, and tire slashing is physical-activeindirect. While most individuals make use of each type of behavior at

various times, individuals may show consistent preferences in the

methods they use to aggress. Thus, when some form of aggressive
Peacekeeping Attributes 45

behavior is appropriate, it is probably desirable for peacemaking soldiers

to manifest physical-active forms of aggression rather than

physical-passive, verbal-active, or verbal-passive forms of aggression.

It is important to recognize that the Combat Motivation scale was

designed to measure the willingness to engage in socialized,

context-appropriate forms of physical aggression. However, the

relationship between this construct and other, more unacceptable forms

of aggression is, as yet, unknown. Research with the scale continues, and

revisions to selected items have been made. At this stage the scale is best

characterized as an early, experimental measure.

How might AC/RC differences in combat motivation affect

performance in peacekeeping efforts? One may speculate that RC

members would generally be lower in combat motivation, as they are not

as regularly immersed in mission preparation, aggressive training, and

Army doctrine and lore. In addition, their choice of RC versus AC

membership may also bespeak less interest in full-time combat-oriented

activity than AC soldiers, at least those in combat MOS. In a

peacemaking situation, in which the threat of hostilities is high, this may

be seen as a deficiency. However, in a peacekeeping environment, when

self-restraint is a greater priority than combat motivation (as defined

above), this may be advantageous. Moreover, the missions for which

some members of the ARNG are used (such as riot control or maintaining

order) may be more relevant than those for which AC soldiers have

trained.

Summary

The constructs described above were those considered most

applicable to the peacekeeping domain. In the next section, we describe

a job analysis that investigated the relative importance of these attributes

in the MFO Sinai peacekeeping mission, as well as some estimates of

their importance in more high-intensity missions, such as Somalia and

Bosnia. Then, we describe our efforts to develop a selection instrument

to measure these attributes. Though this effort was tailored to MFO

Sinai, the basic model allows for a measure tailored either to

peacemaking or for a more all-encompassing one.
46 RC Peacekeepers

JOB ANALYSIS EVIDENCE

A small-scale job analysis was undertaken in a series of interviews

during 1994 with previous peacekeeping participants who had returned to

Fort Campbell, KY. The purpose of this effort was to determine whether

our a priori classification of attributes in terms of their relevance for lowand high-intensity peacekeeping was reasonably accurate.

Successive interviews were undertaken with 8 junior officers and

noncommissioned officers (NCO) and with 10 junior enlisted soldiers.

Each of the attributes aforementioned (and additional characteristics used

in other research settings) was discussed with the participants to clarify

the meaning of each attribute and to elicit general comments about the

deployment. After all attributes were discussed, the participants were

asked to rate each of the attributes on a 5-point Likert scale. Based on

the ratings, rankings of each attribute were computed. Table 3-1 shows

the ratings and rankings for both the officers/NCO and enlisted soldiers.

Generally, there was a substantial amount of agreement between the

officers/NCO and soldiers about the relative importance of the attributes,

with a correlation of .64 between their ratings. However, in terms of

absolute agreement, the soldiers consistently used a lower portion of the

scale. The biggest difference was in the rating of the importance of

leadership ability and motivation to the mission. The officers/NCO rated

this attribute as of the greatest importance, according it an average rating

of 4.9 out of 5, which ranked it first among 22 attributes. The soldiers

disagreed, rating it at 3.4, which was consistent with their view that

officers and NCOs were underutilized and often irrelevant in the

low-intensity MFO Sinai mission. Moreover, complaints about

officer/NCO micromanagement because of lack of work were not

uncommon, either with this group or on subsequent interviews with the

28th Rotation. The soldiers also downplayed the importance of outdoor

orientation, team orientation, identification with the Army, interpersonal

and boundary skills, cognitive ability, self-motivation, maturity, and

cultural awareness, compared to the officers/NCO. One interpretation is

that the soldiers viewed and portrayed the mission as a whole as less

stimulating, challenging, and career-enhancing than did the

officers/NCO. The main attributes that soldiers viewed as more

important than did the officers were tolerance for boredom and stress
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48 RC Peacekeepers

tolerance, perhaps reflecting the greater stretches of time spent by

soldiers in observation posts. One implication is that the attributes

needed by soldiers and officers/NCO are in fact different, but this will

require a wider collection of data in the future. Only one attribute was

evaluated uniformly as being unnecessary for low-intensity peacekeeping

environments like MFO Sinai: combat motivation. As shown, this is

clearly a reflection of a low-intensity mission and is not necessarily

indicative of attributes needed for high-intensity peacekeeping missions.

Also illustrated in Table 3-1 is the degree to which attribute

relevance changes from low-intensity missions like MFO Sinai to

high-intensity environments such as Somalia/Bosnia. Steinberg (1994)

has indicated a number of dimensions upon which various missions may

differ. She lists (a) situation stability, (b) complexity of the military force,

(c) complexity of the organizational environment, (d) amount of

threat/lethality, (e) duration, (f) media interest/presence, and (g) public

acceptance of the mission. However, no work has been done on whether

and which of these dimensions would affect the mix of required attributes

for successful accomplishment of the mission, whether for selection or

for training emphasis. In the context of the current study, we attempted

to get some estimate of the relative importance of these dimensions

across the two different peacekeeping environments. Thus, the soldiers

and officers were asked to assess the importance of the attributes for a

unit sent to either Somalia or Bosnia. The soldiers had not served in

either Somalia or Bosnia, and thus their views were speculative.

Nevertheless, the respondents were able to identify clear differences in

what might be needed for accomplishment of those missions.

One obvious example would be combat motivation, which was

rated relatively important for Somalia/Bosnia, and virtually irrelevant for

the Sinai. Conversely, tolerance for boredom, which was rated as

important in the Sinai, was rated very low in Somalia/Bosnia.

Surprisingly, cultural openness, which was rated as important in the

Sinai, was rated low in Somalia/Bosnia, although cultural awareness was

rated almost equally important for both types of missions. Clearly, this

work needs to be done with soldiers who have actually been on the

missions that they are rating and with a wider range of actual missions.

As a group, the correlation between the ratings of attribute importance in

Sinai compared to Somalia/Bosnia was -.13 for the enlisted soldiers and
Peacekeeping Attributes 42

.21 for officers/NCO. On the other hand, the soldiers and officers had

strong agreement about the relative importance of attributes in a

Somalia/Bosnia type of mission, with a correlation of .90 between their

ratings.

CONCLUSION

A model of peacekeeping attributes, one which encompasses both

peacekeeping and peacemaking, has been postulated. Evidence from a

small job analysis indicates that a range of attributes would be especially

useful for participation in peacekeeping such as the MFO Sinai, and a

different subset of attributes may be more crucial for more intense

peacemaking situations such as Somalia or Bosnia. Other missions, such

as the recent U.S. deployment in Haiti, may fall somewhere in between.

Initial evidence from a study of recent MFO peacekeepers indicates that

the attributes applicable to the MFO can generally be measured with

some degree of reliability (Mael, Kilcullen, Olszewski, & White, 1995).

Future work will involve actual validation of these measures.

Further, as discussed above, it would be a mistake to treat the MFO Sinai

as an exemplar of all peacekeeping, as it is actually relatively anomalous.

Thus, additional job analysis-type interviews and surveys with other

soldiers who have participated in other missions would help establish the

whole range of needed attributes for a peacemaker, and would better

delineate the mission characteristics that would determine the proper mix

of attributes to be stressed. In order to accomplish this goal, ongoing

efforts are being made to ensure participation of soldiers from other

nationalities in this research, especially soldiers from those nations whose

armed services specialize in peacekeeping.
50 RC Peacekeepers

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FILLING THE MFO's PERSONNEL

NEEDS WITH VOLUNTEERS:

PROCEDURES TRIED AND LESSONS

LEARNED

Dale R. Palmer

Michael G. Rumsey

Monte D. Smith

Robert A. Wisher

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the process of staffing those positions in the

composite unit that were designated for the Reserve Component (RC).

Since the use of a composite unit for this mission was unprecedented, the

process was not easy. Staffing with Active Component (AC) soldiers

was not new, but the use of volunteers from the RC was. As with other

aspects of the experimental unit, an investigation of how this was done

can provide valuable lessons, both as a foundation for future efforts and

as a source of lessons learned concerning what problems can arise and

how to deal with them.

The staffing of the volunteer positions can be analyzed in terms of

three major, somewhat interrelated processes which need to be conducted

effectively: recruiting, screening, and retention. While the use of each of

these terms is familiar in other contexts, the meaning of each is somewhat

different here. Recruiting and screening are terms commonly applied

when the problem is to persuade individuals to apply for entry into an

organization, then to determine whether those individuals who are willing

to apply meet the requirements for entry. These requirements involve

cognitive, physical, moral, or other characteristics.

59
6_Q RC Peacekeepers

In this case, the individuals had already applied for entrance into the

Army National Guard (ARNG) or the United States Army Reserve

(USAR) or had voluntarily followed a path that led to their membership

in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). They met that organization's

entry requirements; the recruiting problem was to persuade them to apply

for a particular mission. The screening problem was to determine

whether they were qualified to perform this mission.

Retention is also typically associated with organizational

membership. The problem is generally one of convincing those who

have already joined an organization to continue membership in that

organization. In this case, the problem was ensuring that those who

volunteered for a particular mission did not change their decision before

the beginning of that mission.

A total of 446 individuals were recruited by the RC for this mission.

Of these, 401 were provided by the ARNG and 45 by the USAR. The

recruiting processes for the ARNG and the USAR are summarized

graphically in Figure 4-1. As this figure shows, the ARNG recruiting

process began in January of 1994 and the USAR process began in March

of that year. Recruiting, selection, and retention activities all culminated

in the arrival of selected junior enlisted volunteers for unit training at Fort

Bragg on 1 October 1994. One unexpected occurrence prior to this date

was the temporary shortfall of ARNG and USAR members. The factors

leading to this shortfall, and the manner in which the shortfall was

eliminated, are topics which will be addressed in this chapter.

Since the bulk of the RC members of this unit were drawn from the

ARNG, the processes used by the ARNG are the ones that will be

examined here in greatest detail, but some attention will also be given to

the USAR. The first section to follow deals with the ARNG, followed by

a short section on the USAR. The focus is organized around these three

major personnel activities: recruiting, screening, and predeployment

retention. However, since both the data collection and activities were

different for the separate organizations, the findings will be presented

somewhat differently for the ARNG and the USAR. In the ARNG

section, recruiting and retention are dealt with jointly, following a

discussion of screening. In the USAR section, a separate recruiting

section is followed by one which combines screening and retention.
Personnel Needs M

RC Recruiting & Selection Process

29th ID (L)

USAR ARNG Begins

Begins recruiting Recruiting

Mar 94 Jan 94 Jun Aug Sep11

E5 & above

report for

in-processing E4 & below

100% report for

a in-processing

1 61%

report for duty

Ft. Bragg

ARNG

Nationwide

Recruiting

Oct 1 '94

Figure 4-1. Time line for recruiting process.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD PROCEDURES

Screening

As noted earlier, screening for a specific mission is a different

problem from that of screening to determine qualifications to join a

particular organization. In the case of this Multinational Force and

Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission, the pool of applicants had

already been screened to determine their eligibility to join the ARNG,

and all had been deemed fit to join that organization.

Thus, there was no need to address the question, do these applicants

have the qualifications to be good soldiers? This question had already

been posed and answered affirmatively. However, having determined

this, could it automatically be assumed they would successfully perform

the duties of a soldier serving in the MFO Sinai mission?

As noted in Chapter 1 of this book, the U.S. Army had, in the past,

always deployed an intact AC unit to the Sinai. When an AC unit is
62 RC Peacekeepers

deployed, the issue of individual screening tends to receive minimal

attention. The unit is assumed to be capable of performing the mission;

accordingly, virtually all individuals within that unit are assumed to be

capable of performing their parts in that mission. Informal screening may

occur in the case of a few known problematic individuals, but no formal

screening process, beyond perhaps meeting certain administrative

requirements associated with overseas deployment, is deemed to be

necessary.

For the ARNG soldiers in the MFO composite unit, conditions were

somewhat different. They were not drawn from a single intact unit, so

the process did not begin with an automatic assumption that no individual

mission-related screening was necessary. Also, given the potential

eventuality that the number of volunteers would exceed the number of

positions available, some mechanism for evaluating the relative

qualifications of the individual candidates could be viewed as not only

having value, but even as being a necessity.

If, for these reasons, a formal screening process were to take place, it

could proceed in one of two ways. These will be described here as

administrative and supplemental. An administrative process would be

one which relies entirely on information already available on an

individual. If the individuals records show that he or she meets the

selection criteria, then that individual is judged to be qualified for the

position; otherwise, he or she is not qualified. A supplemental screening

process would be one which uses tests or other measures, whether written

or situational, to obtain additional information about the individual's

suitability for the position.

Pinch (1994) has described a process for selecting Canadian

peacekeepers from a formed unit that is fundamentally administrative in

nature. Personnel are screened in such areas as "training and coursing

requirements, security, medical, dental...and the like." Pinch believes

that, within such an administrative framework, "the psychological fitness

of the individual member" can be evaluated. "The areas to be considered

would include those already considered by the more conscientious units:

service record and experience, social conduct, in and out of the military;

history and incidence of alcohol and other substance abuse; social and

family stability and interpersonal skills; attitudes and behavior toward

other cultures and social groups, etc."
Personnel Needs §3

Pinch (1994) also notes some factors that can inhibit the

effectiveness of such screening. These include a "lack of routinization of

procedures," which means the individual member "may have to show

considerable initiative to be completely processed;" reliance on

replacements, who in terms of screening, are "most disadvantaged;" and

failure to record screening decisions and their justifications.

The need for a minimal administrative screen which ensures that

soldiers are qualified with respect to relevant military skills and have

sufficient medical and dental fitness to qualify for an overseas assignment

in a relatively remote location seems reasonably self-evident. The

incorporation of other elements pertaining to "social conduct, in and out

of the military; history and incidence of alcohol and other substance

abuse; social and family stability and interpersonal skills; attitudes and

behavior toward other cultures and social groups, etc.," is less

self-explanatory, and to understand Pinch's reasoning in considering

these elements, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of a

peacekeeping mission which might differentiate it from a conventional,

war-fighting mission.

According to Pinch (1994) and Last (1992), a peacekeeping mission

focuses on impartiality and restraint on the use of force so as not to

escalate the conflict further. In this sense, the goal of peacekeeping is to

stabilize and/or eliminate a conflict. Contrary to this, a war-fighting

mission would concentrate on victory. Due to the divergent mandates,

modes of operation, and rules of engagement that each would represent, it

is questionable whether all of the abilities needed for combat in a

conventional war-fighting stance are compatible with extensive

peacekeeping duties. Thus, even though one has been found to meet

those requirements associated with being a soldier, further psychological

screening to ensure that one can behave appropriately in a peacekeeping

environment has potential value.

The purpose of this section is to examine the basic components of

the process of screening ARNG personnel for the 28th Rotation as a

foundation upon which any revised set of procedures can be built.

Questions of interest include: What kinds of information are being

collected now? and What might this information tell us about the

qualifications of those being evaluated? We are interested in

characterizing this process as administrative or supplemental not as a
£4 RC Peacekeepers

means of evaluating it, but as a means of better understanding it. We will

not directly address how well the procedures were executed—rather, the

current focus is on the procedures themselves.

Data Collection

Information on the screening process was obtained by the first author

from three personal interviews with the Personnel Officer (S-l) at the

29th ID(L) Headquarters (HQ) in Fort Belvoir, VA. The meetings took

place at various times from August 1994 through January 1995.

Following the interviews, a summary of the information obtained was

prepared and reviewed by the 29th ID(L)'s S-l and the S-l at the 28th

Rotation to ensure the validity of the facts.

Description of Screening Processes at Each Level

Overall, the procedures followed can be described as principally

administrative and iterative. Screening occurred at three different levels:

brigade, battalion, and division. Although there was some redundancy

across the levels, different types of qualifications tended to be

emphasized at different stages. The process encompassed both objective

and subjective, and formal and informal elements. Objective elements

tended to be assessed in a formal manner; subjective elements more

informally.

The Brigade Level - "Setting Standards and Gathering Volunteers"

The process of screening ARNG volunteers began at the brigade

level. After the 29th ID(L) was chosen for the task, the first step was to

obtain a list of volunteers from each brigade in the states of Virginia and

Maryland. Records of volunteers were reviewed against standard U.S.

Army requirements which fell generally into four different categories.

One category focused on individual performance and required a volunteer

to be qualified in his or her military occupational specialty (MOS) and on

weapons. They could have no pending adverse personnel actions which,

for officers, included being passed over for promotion. Another category

concerned family support, including the requirement that volunteers have

a current family care plan and not be single parents or members of a

dual-parent military family. A third category (medical) excluded soldiers
Personnel Needs (£5

with dental braces. A fourth category, military status, included the

requirement that the volunteer be able to complete the tour of active duty

at least 30 days prior to the mandatory removal date.

At this point, virtually no evidence is available to determine how

units balanced their own needs against the needs of the MFO mission in

making their selection decisions. Based on discussions with individual

ARNG personnel, we must consider the possibility that some units did

not always recommend their best full-time personnel for volunteer status.

Specifically, individuals with exceptional or unique job skills and/or

those occupying "hard-to-fill" MOS positions were seen by their chain of

command as too valuable to the operations of their ARNG unit to be

allowed further consideration as MFO volunteers.

The Battalion Level - "Identifying Candidates to Go Forward"

Once a list of volunteers was established, the next step in the

selection process was at battalion level. In this step, each volunteer was

screened by the First Sergeants (lSGs) in coordination with their

respective company and battalion commanders. Not unlike the reported

Canadian system for selecting peacekeepers (Pinch, 1994), the United

States ARNG lSGs conducted a review of the volunteers' service files

for evidence or indicators of problems that could be exacerbated or create

dysfunction in the operational environment. Examples of such criteria

included: work performance, social and military conduct, misuse of

alcohol and other drugs, and attitudinal and behavioral problems. For the

most part, the criteria during this stage were of a GO/NO GO nature. In

this light, the criteria were used for the purpose of weeding out rather

than selecting in individuals for peacekeeping duties.

At this level, the screening process was both objective and

subjective, formal and informal. For example, while specific objective

requirements for eligibility were sent down to each brigade, it was up to

the subjective decision making ability of the lSGs and brigade

commanders to determine the (work-related and personal) social and

behavioral suitability of each volunteer for deployment. To do this,

additional criteria were often used that dealt with the volunteers

background and day-to-day, work-related interactions between the

volunteers and their superiors (usually the lSGs). The additional,
66 RC Peacekeepers

work-related criteria were objective (e.g., attendance and punctuality) as

well as subjective in nature (e.g., motivation, reliability, character,

emotional stability, poise, personality, energy level, work ethic, military

appearance). In some cases, when the individual on the list was not well

known to the 1SG, and work-related criteria were not well established, an

informal interview was scheduled to help the 1SG make a GO/NO GO

decision about the person.

On the basis of the decisions made at this level, a new list of

prospective volunteers, known as the MFO Volunteer By Name Roster,

was sent from each ARNG battalion/brigade in Virginia and Maryland to

the S-l in charge at the 29th ID(L) HQ.

The subjectivity of the lSG's decisionmaking process could be

viewed as a source of potential variability and uncertainty in the

screening of volunteers. At this time, no data are available on how much

the lSGs varied from one another on the percentage of those screened

and to what degree any of the criteria were used. No set standards were

developed for the lSGs to base their decisions on, and therefore, the

reliability of the decision making process at this stage becomes an issue.

Division Level - "Eliminating Those Not Qualified"

At division headquarters, projections were made on a unit roster

which listed the number of slots to be filled by various MOS. Based on a

number of criteria taken from the Volunteer Criteria Questionnaire,

volunteers were slotted, by MOS, in the 28th Rotation unit roster. Once

all positions were filled, each individual chosen was then notified of

his/her status as a volunteer. The criteria used for slotting volunteers,

once again, fell into several categories. One category concentrated on

physical fitness standards and included height/weight certification, tape

measure test, and the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). A second job

performance category included an additional check for MOS, grade, and

weapon qualification and ensured satisfactory completion of common

task training (CTT) within 6 months of reporting for duty. A third

category dealt with medical eligibility and required that all volunteers

have a negative HIV test 24 months prior to reporting; no history of

mental illness or mental disability; no history of chronic orthopedic,
Personnel Needs g2

gastrointestinal, neurologic, or dermatologic illness; and no history of

anaphylaxis or anaphylactoid reaction.

The 29th ID(L) included a screen of those volunteers with any past

signs (e.g., clinical and medical diagnosis including prescribed

medications) of depression on their personal medical files. This

additional medical requirement is over and above the volunteer screening

requirements handed down to the ARNG units by the Department of

Army.

As a general rule, eligible volunteers equal in all other areas but with

higher scores on the APFT and CTT were slotted before those with lower

scores. Alternatives or "backups" at each position were usually

individuals with lower scores on these tests than someone else with the

same rank and MOS qualification.

Final processing at division level included a final check of all listed

standards, with particular attention to the accuracy of the height/weight

and APFT scores listed in each volunteer's personnel files. Once the

volunteer reported for training, a final height/weight and APFT check

was conducted. If it was determined necessary to send an individual

home at this point, the next individual slotted as a "backup" for that

particular position was used.

While height/weight measurement is presumably a relatively

objective procedure, there is perhaps some opportunity for error in

conducting the measurement and for judgment in how strictly the

standards are applied. There are no data which would directly show how

the application of standards to the ARNG volunteers compared to their

application to AC soldiers, but some MFO leaders expressed the

judgment that Regular Army personnel follow the standards more exactly

and are more rigid in their measurement than ARNG personnel.

Screening Results

Approximately 763 individuals volunteered for 399 positions, of

which 390 were accepted. The staffing requirements of the MFO

peacekeeping mission made heavy demands (at every level of enlisted

and noncommissioned officer [NCO] rank) on soldiers with the 1 IB

(Infantryman) MOS, who were concentrated in the nine maneuver
58 RC Peacekeepers

battalions of the division's three maneuver brigades. Accordingly,

although volunteers were attached to 37 different units of the 29th ID(L),

81% of all volunteers and 92% of accepted volunteers came from the

nine battalions of the division's three maneuver brigades. Only five units

outside the maneuver battalions produced more than 1 % of total

volunteers, and volunteers from those five units were not accepted at a

high rate (only 8 out of 98).

Summary

The screening process of ARNG volunteers can best be described as

administrative and occurred at three different levels: brigade, battalion,

and division. At the brigade level, names were collected and records

were reviewed against Army requirements to determine if each individual

met the standards set for volunteer status. At this level, primary concerns

were on performance and medical criteria and determining if the

volunteer had a current family care plan. If a volunteer met all current

requirements, he/she was included for further consideration at the next

(battalion) level.

At the battalion level, screening involved identifying individual

candidates for further consideration. At this stage, less objective criteria

such as motivation, reliability, energy level, and emotional stability were

sometimes used, primarily by the 1 SGs, to determine the social and

behavioral suitability of each volunteer. From this, a list of prospective

volunteers was then forwarded to the division level.

At division level, decisions were made based primarily on the

volunteers' levels of physical fitness. The last stage of screening, at the

training site, once again involved physical fitness reviews on each

volunteer.

The screening process concentrated on making sure that each

candidate passed all requirements before being considered for volunteer

status. As such, it can be seen as a foundation upon which any revised

process can build.

Several problems did arise, the most problematic being the loss of a

large number of volunteers. However, a review of the current process,

with a lessons learned approach in mind, should help to develop and
Personnel Needs 62

conduct improved screening procedures for possible future composite

peacekeeping battalions.

Recruiting and Retention

Recruitment and predeployment retention of volunteers were not

originally focal issues of this project. Had they been so, a more

comprehensive and balanced data collection than the one adopted would

have been appropriate. For example, it would have been logical to

attempt to question a large proportion of those who participated in the

deployment about the recruitment process. However, questions regarding

this process emerged ultimately as a function of two factors: (1) the

unexpected failure of many presumed volunteers to report for duty in the

peacekeeping unit on the date scheduled, and (2) an interest in the impact

of the peacekeeping mission on the supplying unit, the 29th ID(L). As a

result of the first factor, an intensive data collection focusing on the

"no-shows" was initiated. Because of the second factor, a comprehensive

questionnaire, which included questions on the recruiting process, was

administered to soldiers of the 29th ID(L). Both of these efforts

generated information about the recruiting process, and in many cases the

conclusions from both data collections tended to converge.

Two cautions should be raised, however. Neither effort was

optimally designed to generate a comprehensive picture of the

recruitment and retention processes, and neither can be assumed to have

done so with complete success. Second, both of the efforts could be

viewed as having a "problem-oriented" bias. They were more focused on

identifying elements of the recruiting process that were problematic than

on those that were successful. Thus, any conclusions from these efforts

should be qualified accordingly.

Data Collection Strategy: Interviews With "No-Show" Volunteers

Background

Several months elapsed between the time when soldiers initially

volunteered for the peacekeeping mission and when they eventually were

notified of their acceptance. During this time, many volunteers changed

their minds about serving in the Sinai. Although 390 eligible individuals

originally volunteered for this mission, the 29th ID(L) ultimately
20 RC Peacekeepers

contributed 294 soldiers. A large number of "no-shows" were suffered

by the 29th ID(L) during August/September 1994. This development

raised problems for the ARNG which then had to put out a national call

for volunteers to get the necessary number of volunteers for the MFO

mission. The national call was issued at the last minute, and another 107

ARNG volunteers were subsequently selected from 22 other states.

Data Collection Methodology

The unexpected shortfall was an issue of intensive research interest.

A list was obtained from the 29th ID(L) of the names of 57 soldiers who

had initially volunteered for the Sinai Peacekeeping mission but who,

according to available records, withdrew prior to commencing training.

Thirty-seven were interviewed by telephone in January 1995 in an effort

to determine why they had changed their minds. Over 70% were grades

E3 or E4. Twenty soldiers could not be interviewed for a variety of

reasons, including completing their term of service, failure to complete a

APFT, and, in four cases, because the presumably missing soldiers

actually were serving in the Sinai.

Data Collection Strategy: Data From 29th ID(L)

Questionnaires designed for the specific purpose of measuring the

impacts of the peacekeeping mission were administered to both senior

leaders and junior leaders/soldiers of the 29th ID(L). For more details on

these questionnaires, see Smith and Hagman, Chapter 16.

Participants

Senior leadership sample. On the basis of their duty assignments,

112 senior leaders in the 29th ID(L) were identified as qualified to

observe and evaluate impacts that resulted from the unit's participation in

the peacekeeping mission. Questionnaires were directed to the company

commanders and lSGs of all 36 companies of the nine maneuver

battalions (combined n = 72), as well as battalion commanders, S-3s,

and sergeants major (combined n = 27), and brigade commanders, S-3s,

and sergeants major (combined n = 9). At the division level,

questionnaires were directed to the Chief of Staff, G-l, G-3, and Sergeant
Personnel Needs 71

Major (combined n = 4). A total of 112 senior leaders constituted the

data collection population.

Junior leader/soldier sample. A database known as SIDPERS was

used to identify the potential population from which a stratified sample of

junior leaders/soldiers was structured. Eligible sampling units consisted

of all soldiers in the nine maneuver battalions of the 29th ID(L),

excluding soldiers serving in an Army mission, as well as senior leaders

who were included in the senior leadership survey.

Using this database, soldiers were stratified by rank and grouped

with those who were considered likely to be platoon leaders (officers),

platoon sergeants (E7-E8), squad leaders (E5-E6), and other squad

members (E1-E4). Surveys were mailed to all platoon leaders (168 in the

population) and all high-level NCOs (107 E7-E8s in the population).

Random samples of 400 junior NCOs at the sergeant (E5) and staff

sergeant (E6) level (from among 992 available) and 200 junior enlisted

soldiers at levels ranging from El to E4 (from among 1,982 available)

were constructed. The final sample consisted of 875 individuals.

Senior Leadership Questionnaires

Senior leadership questionnaires were administered on two

occasions, but only on the first occasion was a question involving

recruiting included. This first administration occurred approximately 60

days after troops departed for the peacekeeping mission. Questionnaires

were delivered via mail and were designed to require no more than 1 hour

to complete. Telephone calls were used extensively in cases of

nonresponse to encourage participation. Ultimately, however,

participation was voluntary. Because a key concern was to determine if

reactions to the mission changed over time, it was decided, at the outset

of the investigation, to base statistical analyses only on senior leaders

who completed both questionnaires.

Senior leadership questionnaires probed both personnel and training

impacts of the mission, with recruiting being just one of several topics

covered.
12 RC Peacekeepers

Additional information about the recruitment process and factors that

impacted on the retention of those initially recruited came from written

comments from junior leaders and soldiers.

Junior Leader/Soldier Questionnaires

To the extent possible, junior leader/soldier questionnaires covered

the same questions that were asked of senior leaders. Since many

questions for senior leaders were inappropriate forjunior leaders/soldiers,

the junior leader/soldier questionnaire was abbreviated in some areas.

Additional information about the recruitment process, as well as factors

which impacted on the retention of those initially recruited, came from

written comments. Junior leader/soldier questionnaires were

administered 4 months after volunteers departed for training.

A number of questions are of interest to the areas of recruiting and

retention. Although these processes were not intensively studied, several

sources of information provide some insight into how these functions

were executed, how successful they were, and how improvements could

be made. We will first focus on two relatively specific questions: what

types of recruiting activities took place and what factors, occurring

between the time soldiers volunteered and the time they were to report to

duty, led to attrition. Later sections will address aspects of recruiting

and retention from the perspective of a sample of soldiers and leaders

from the 29th ID(L). The purpose is to attempt to gain further

perspectives on how these processes took place and how they might be

improved.

Results: Interviews With "No-Show" Volunteers

Interviews with "no-shows" provided four types of information: (1)

how this group was initially contacted, (2) recommendations for

improving the recruiting process, (3) reasons for not reporting, and (4)

recommendations for improving the predeployment retention process.

Initial Contacts

The "no-show" volunteers cannot be presumed to be representative

of the full set of those who were recruited. However, their responses
Personnel Needs 22

concerning the manner in which they were initially contacted, which may

not dramatically differ from the typical recruiting pattern, were

informative. Over 90% had been contacted about volunteering for the

mission at the armory. Contacts were made by a wide variety of

individuals. Company commanders, company 1 SGs, and battalion

commanders accounted for less than half of initial contacts. Other

sources of initial contact included platoon sergeants, readiness NCOs,

and "some General from division." One soldier said he first learned of

the peacekeeping mission by reading about it in the Army Times. If these

reports can be accepted at face value, they indicate no systematic method

of disseminating information about the forthcoming mission. It should

be noted, however, that these reports are retrospective (up to 1 year), and

the multiplicity of reported contact sources may reflect the normal

distortion that often occurs with the passage of time.

Over 80% of the soldiers reported that they had been contacted

initially in January, February, or March of 1994, predominantly in group

settings (81%). No soldiers reported feeling pressured to volunteer, and

nearly 84% said the mission was adequately explained. One soldier

reported that he was told to sign up at the time of the initial briefing and

was promised that more information would be forthcoming later.

Another soldier said the briefing was adequate, but that "...after the initial

briefing ... they wanted a 'yes' or 'no' at that time without [the

opportunity to talk] it over with others. They expected an on-the-spot

decision."

Interviewee Recommendations for Improved Recruiting

Timing and information adequacy were the dominant themes of

those who were asked for suggestions on how to improve the call-up

process. Soldiers said the mission had come out of the blue, with no

advance notice. They needed time to think about the implications of

volunteering and wanted details on mission requirements and the

opportunity to talk it over with family, friends, and other community

members before making a decision.
24 RC Peacekeepers

Reasons for Not Reporting

Although soldiers often cited multiple reasons for not reporting,

when asked their primary reason, the most frequently cited reason was

Family (cited by 41% of soldiers), followed by Job (14%), and School

(14%). When allowed to cite multiple reasons, 16% mentioned Money,

but when asked to cite the primary reason, only 3% chose Money.

Interviewee Recommendations for Improved Retention

Suggestions for improving the process that followed the initial call

for volunteers focused on the need for timely feedback. Soldiers reported

that once they had volunteered, they were given no specific dates for

training and heard nothing about the mission except rumors. One rumor

they heard repeatedly was that the mission had been scrubbed. In the

absence of specific information, volunteers went about their lives,

starting new jobs, resuming or beginning their education, becoming

engaged, and making other personal and community commitments. By

the time they received word that the mission was imminent and that they

had been selected for participation, many of them had to withdraw due to

conflicting obligations.

Results: 29th ID(L) Questionnaire Data

Both the soldier/junior leader and senior leader questionnaires

provided respondents with an opportunity to respond to the question: "In

what ways could recruitment for the PK mission have been improved?"

The responses received to this question have implications for both initial

recruiting and follow-up retention activities.

A high proportion of members of the senior (92%) and junior (69%)

groups said the peacekeeping recruitment process could be improved.

Among the dozens of suggestions from the two groups, two recurrent

themes emerged: information and timing. Members of both groups

repeatedly stated that sufficient prior notice was not given. This was

accompanied by pressure to volunteer without adequate information,

particularly concerning the anticipated timetable of events, and precise

details of what would be expected of volunteers during all phases of the

mission. The junior respondents noted that they were not given sufficient
Personnel Needs Z5.

time to adequately confer with family, employers, and community

contacts before making a decision about volunteering.

Many of the comments from both groups suggested that the initial

push to volunteer was followed by months without feedback, during

which time at least some, if not all, of the volunteers had no idea if they

had been accepted or rejected for the mission, or if the mission had

indeed been canceled. The long lag between the solicitation of

volunteers and subsequent notification of selection was cited by several

in the junior group as a major reason for not following through with their

initial intentions. For senior leaders, the period of silence ended abruptly

with the application of new pressure to recruit more soldiers for the

mission. By this time, as noted earlier, many of the volunteers had

changed their minds, or made other arrangements.

To avoid these problems in the future, many senior leaders

recommended briefings by peacekeeping mission veterans and

dissemination of unambiguous eligibility requirements, selection criteria,

timetables of events, and (written) expectations. Several senior leaders

mentioned that superior performance would result from activation of

intact units, as an alternative to reliance on individual volunteers.

Several junior leaders/soldiers emphasized the need for the Army to

conduct public relations efforts with employers to impress upon them the

importance of the mission and the requirement for having jobs available

upon the volunteers return from the mission. Some members from this

group also concurred with the senior leaders' recommendations regarding

briefings by Sinai veterans and also favored the use of in-depth

informational videos. Several also favored using an intact unit rather

than relying on individual volunteers.

Table 4-1 lists recommendations for improving the recruitment and

retention process that emerged from these questionnaires, in order of their

frequency of mention. Recommendations are listed separately for the

senior and junior groups and are listed only if they were given by at least

two members of the group in question.
76 RC Peacekeepers

Table 4-1

Suggestions on How to Improve the Peacekeeping Mission Recruitment Process

SENIOR LEADERS

# Times

Mentioned Suggestion

19 • Timing issues: Earlier information/faster notification/more advance

notice/reduced lag time between volunteering and serving

14 • Briefings by Sinai veterans/Active Component (AC) representatives

13 • More/better/detailed information/clear expectations/timetables/clear

eligibility requirements and selection criteria

6 • Guaranteed return employment/public relations (PR) with empbyers

2 • Mobilize entire unit/battalion

6 • Maintain promotion eligibility during peacekeeping tour

2 • Widen the volunteer pool: entire National Guard

2 • Provide incentives: money/tax breaks/tuition

JUNIOR LEADERS/SOLDIERS

# Times

Mentioned Suggestion

33 • More and/or better and/or more detailed information and clarified

expectations

32 • Timing issues: Earlier information, faster notification, more advance

notice, reduced lag time between volunteering and being notified of

selection

10 • Guaranteed return employment

9 • Briefings by Sinai veterans

7 • Mobilize an entire battalion

4 • Remove politics from selection process

3 • Widen the volunteer pool: entire National Guard

3 • Avoid overpromising

2 • Do not solicit volunteers and then tell them they are ineligible

2 • More division support for the mission

2 • Send Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers

2 • Recruit new National Guard soldiers for the mission

2 • Open the recruitment to all ranks
Personnel Needs ZZ

Discussion of Army National Guard Recruiting and Retention

Procedures

The different sources provide remarkably consistent results

concerning what aspects of the recruiting and follow-up process could be

improved. These can be summarized in terms of the following lessons

learned:

(1) Provide advance notice. Let potential volunteers know in

advance that a mission is forthcoming.

(2) Provide complete details in advance, in writing, especially

regarding dates, mission requirements, training, and availability of family

support. Ensure that the same information is provided to everybody.

Standardize the information dissemination process.

(3) As part of information dissemination, have previous mission

volunteers conduct briefings. If possible, these briefings should be

conducted by soldiers of the same rank and educational levels as those

being recruited to enhance rapport and optimize credibility and

communication effectiveness.

(4) Give soldiers the opportunity to talk it over with family and

significant others. It is imperative that family and significant others be

part of the decision process. A substantial number of soldiers cited either

"Family" or "Significant Others" as reasons for changing their minds

about the mission.

(5) Develop a schedule and stick to it. If schedule changes cannot be

avoided, immediately communicate the details to volunteers.

(6) Make the selection criteria clear to all potential volunteers.

(7) Provide timely feedback on the results of the selection process,

well in advance of the date for commencement of train up. In the present

instance, soldiers were left in limbo for months, with no reliable

information whatsoever and uncertainty as to whether the mission was

still planned.

(8) Strive for consistency in administration of the call-up process.

Research on the present call-up (including not only the present sample of

37 volunteers but also interviews with 29th ID(L) leaders and a random

sample of other soldiers) indicated that some soldiers claimed they had
28 RC Peacekeepers

never volunteered in the first place, although they were placed on

volunteer rosters. Others claimed they had indeed volunteered and in fact

had never changed their minds about going, were eager to go, and had

never been told why they had not been selected. Others thought they had

been unfairly rejected for the mission, and some of them were clearly

embittered. In the present survey, four soldiers who had been listed as

volunteers who had changed their minds were actually in the Sinai.

The single most striking theme which emerges from all of this is the

importance of communication in the recruiting and follow-up process and

the relationship between communication problems and problems which

emerged in the recruiting and retention arenas. Lack of timeliness and

completeness of information hindered the recruiting process. Lack of

follow-up and feedback hindered the retention process.

Identifying the problem is of course much easier than fixing it.

Enhanced communication in an organization as large and complex as the

ARNG requires not only the will to make effective communication a

reality, but the means. Where mechanisms are already in place for

enhanced communication, an awareness of the problem should set in

motion actions for alleviating it. To the extent such mechanisms are not

available, solutions may require creativity, special effort, and successful

time management.

Recommendations

As noted earlier, the primary purpose of this chapter section on

ARNG screening is to provide descriptive information of how the

function was performed, not to evaluate its effectiveness. Further

research is needed to examine the components of peacekeeping

performance and the extent to which different types of personal

information predicts individual success on missions of this type. It will

give us a better basis for determining whether enhancements to current

procedures, such as more systematic and comprehensive measurement of

an individual's past history, behavior, and aptitudes, would be advisable.

However, sometimes even a descriptive analysis of a process can identify

possible problem areas and generate recommendations for change.

Accordingly, we will cautiously explore what "lessons learned" can be

drawn from the screening processes used for this experimental unit.
Personnel Needs 79

The principal problem that emerged during the process of staffing

this unit was the shortfall that occurred when volunteers were to report

for duty. We have already examined this problem from a recruiting and

staffing perspective. From a screening perspective, some safeguards

could be taken to avoid this problem. If the pool of volunteers were large

enough to support it, a "double-staffing" screening approach, which lists

two potential individuals for every available position, could be adopted

with the best of the two scheduled to go. Screening to identify a greater

number of qualified individuals than needed would cost more; however,

the payoff of gaining better soldiers and greater preparedness may

outweigh the extra costs involved.

A second issue that emerged involves the standardization of

procedures. The three-level process of screening, which involves

brigade, battalion, and division, has advantages in terms of a logical

organizational progression and in terms of multiple screening checks, but

it does make standardization difficult. Standardization at brigade and

battalion levels present particular challenges. To the extent that objective

standards could be substituted for the subjective judgments currently

being made at these levels, standardization would be enhanced.

However, the goal of removing subjectivity entirely is probably both

unrealistic and undesirable.

As information accumulates about what individual characteristics are

associated with peacekeeping success, decisionmakers at every level will

have a better basis for evaluating candidates. In some cases, it may be

possible to translate this information into routinized procedures.

However, this information will have limited value if it is not shared

with all those at brigade and battalion level who participate in the

decisionmaking process. This could be accomplished through a number

of means. One would be the distribution of a comprehensive written

packet which provides information about how the standards are to be

applied and on what rationale or research they are based. This could be

an expansion on or replacement for the instructions that specified

qualifications for the experimental unit. Also, communication among the

decisionmakers at brigade and battalion level about their interpretation of

the standards and how they are to be applied could enhance

standardization.
8jQ RC Peacekeepers

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE (USAR) PROCESSES

Recruiting

The information available on USAR recruiting is basically

descriptive, not evaluative. It provides little basis for recommendations,

but does provide a sense of the difficulty of the recruiting process.

The USAR was given the mission to fill 45 of the slots for the MFO

unit. The intent was to fill this mission through recruitment of members

of the IRR. IRR volunteers were solicited by the Army Reserve

Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). An operations order was issued on 20

March 1994, after which recruitment was initiated. The considerations

were that the volunteer be a member of a particular MOS (mostly combat

support or service support functions such as military police, personnel,

finance, linguist) and that the volunteer had been separated either from

active duty or a reserve unit for no more than 12 months (RT12

category). ARPERCEN reported making about 150 telephone calls per

volunteer. Of the 39 soldiers identified to attend refresher training at Fort

McCoy, there were 36 "shows" and 3 "no-shows" (due to orders not

being sent, lost contact, and an arrest). Orders to report to Fort McCoy

were cut by 18 May 1994.

Screening and Retention

The process. The USAR screening process was different from the

ARNG process in a number of respects. Although ARPERCEN

recruiters may have done some preliminary informal screening in

determining who should attend training, in effect performance of IRR

volunteers during the course of their Fort McCoy training served as the

principal screening measure. This measure had relatively objective

components, and the process was relatively compact and simplified.

Also, it tended to be supplemental rather than administrative:

decisionmakers could observe actual performance rather than merely

relying on records.

Soldiers (n = 36) were in-processed on 12-13 June, given a

diagnostic APFT, provided with refresher training, given a record APFT,

and out-processed on 23 June. The battalion commander and command
Personnel Needs 81

sergeant major for Rotation 28 visited on 22 June and provided a

background briefing on the Sinai mission. A U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Science (ARI) survey of these

IRR soldiers found that 58% had a previous full tour of active duty, 29%

had served in a direct combat zone, and 64% had previous overseas

military assignments.

The operation order for the 84th Division (Training) specified that

they would provide refresher training for up to 50 IRR members who

volunteered for the composite battalion (Rotation 28). The critical

training areas were basic rifle marksmanship (day/night fire), the APFT,

vehicle operations and maintenance, and common task training.

Successful completion of the refresher training would ensure that the IRR

have the requisite military skills needed for active duty. However, the

training did not allow the IRR soldiers to demonstrate their ability to

perform in their primary MOS. Thus, no MOS certification or

requalification was required or expected during this refresher training.

A diagnostic APFT was given on 13 June. The importance of this

test was not made clear to the soldiers prior to their arrival at Fort

McCoy. Soldiers complained of insufficient lead time to prepare

themselves physically. For the three events in the diagnostic APFT of 36

soldiers, 20 passed the push-up event, 17 passed the sit-up event, and 12

passed the run event.

On an overall basis, only 6 soldiers out of 36 tested passed this

three-part test (the scoring convention requires a pass on each event).

Master Physical Fitness trainers from the 84th Division (Training)

developed individualized fitness programs designed to ensure the soldiers

physical readiness prior to reporting to Fort Bragg months later. A record

APFT was conducted on 23 June. For this test, 19 passed, 9 did not pass,

and 9 were on profile.

One soldier on profile was sent home after the diagnostic test as a

result of not meeting AR 600-9 standards (body fat). This left 35 soldiers

to participate in the IRR refresher training.

For weapons qualification, 32 soldiers successfully qualified on the

M16A/2 rifle: 3 as expert, 8 as sharpshooter, and 19 as marksman. The

remaining two were on profile for injuries. Of the 30 soldiers tested for

the land navigation class, 27 received a "GO" score and 3 a "NO GO;"
82 RC Peacekeepers

the remaining 5 were on profile for injuries. For the common tasks, a

preassessment on the 13 common tasks selected for training demonstrated

an overall 72% "GO" rate before any training was provided. Upon

completion of the refresher training, all soldiers tested received a "GO"

on each task.

Generally speaking, the IRR volunteers were highly motivated and

seriously interested in the Sinai assignment. The limited information on

the Sinai was insufficient, given the level of interest. The 3-month break

prior to reporting to Fort Bragg for further predeployment activities was

unfortunate, as the IRR volunteers had to take 2 weeks off from work,

return for 3 months, and then depart again.

Upon completion of the refresher training, 23 IRR soldiers were

recommended for continuation at Fort Bragg; 1 soldier was

recommended as an alternate and 5 soldiers were not recommended for

immediate participation in the mission but were identified as candidates

with a successful APFT score. Finally, six soldiers were not

recommended at all due mostly to poor scores on the APFT, lack of

leadership skills, and failure to complete rifle marksmanship because of a

profile condition. Tracking those who actually reported to Fort Bragg for

the remainder of the predeployment training indicated that 10 soldiers

joined the unit. Thus, of the original 36 soldiers reporting to Fort McCoy

for IRR refresher training, only 28% ultimately became members of

Rotation 28. The USAR made up the shortfall of 35 from the original

target of 45 soldiers by recruiting from its troop program units.

Comments

The USAR process, perhaps even more dramatically than the ARNG

experience, shows the immense effort required to produce even a small

number of volunteers for this mission. Over 500 ARPERCEN contacts

were required for every IRR volunteer who eventually became a member

of Rotation 28. Considerable resources were expended on the training of

36 volunteers, only 10 of whom eventually joined the peacekeeping unit.

The Fort McCoy training experience provided a good opportunity to

screen based on direct observation of performance, but it also

demonstrated that a substantial number of volunteers identified by the

ARPERCEN recruiters were not prepared for the MFO experience. A
Personnel Needs SI

cost-effective prescreening measure administered prior to deploying

volunteers to Fort McCoy, such as a short questionnaire addressing the

volunteers' recent physical training and level of physical activity,

combined with a realistic preview of the level of physical proficiency

they would need to attain during the training experience, might have

resulted in fewer APFT failures at Fort McCoy. Such prescreening

would have placed even greater requirements on the recruiter in terms of

the number of contacts required, but would have avoided the unpleasant

surprise of finding that only 17% could pass the APFT upon arrival and

that a significant number still had poor scores after training.

CONCLUSION

The staffing of the experimental unit created special challenges.

New mechanisms had to be set in place, or old ones adapted, to

accomplish a feat that was in many respects unique. In the most basic

way that such a staffing effort can be evaluated, it was a success. The

unit was eventually completely staffed. A sufficient number of

volunteers were recruited to both make screening possible and to

ultimately ensure that complete staffing was achieved. A reasonable

screening process was developed and implemented.

But, as in any innovative effort, all of the potential problems could

not be anticipated in advance. The process of filling such a unit with

volunteers was not a familiar one to the organization. The amount of

necessary communication and follow-up with volunteers was more

apparent retrospectively than it could have been prospectively. Having

had this experience, the ARNG has now learned a number of lessons

concerning the importance of providing feedback to volunteers and their

units concerning the results of the selection process, the details of the

mission, and the projected schedule. Although the applicability of these

lessons to the IRR situation is a little less clear, the IRR volunteers

probably could also have benefited from more information about the

details of the mission and more feedback and contact following their Fort

McCoy training. It is difficult to know how much impact such

communication would have had on their retention but, if nothing else,

posttraining contact could have provided the unit an opportunity to obtain
£4 RC Peacekeepers

a clearer indication of how many volunteers were actually intending to

report to duty.

We now have adequate information about the need to allow

prospective volunteers sufficient time to consider their decision. Lessons

have also been learned about how to better integrate different elements of

the staffing process—recruiting, screening, and predeployment retention,

and the need for better standardization of the screening process. The

degree to which these lessons result in improved staffing processes in the

future depends on a number of factors, including the following: (a)

communicating the lessons learned to those involved in future missions

of this kind, (b) developing procedures which can enhance

communication, coordination, and standardization in recruiting,

screening, and retaining volunteers, and (c) finding the means to

implement these procedures.
Personnel Needs 85

REFERENCES

Last, D. (1992, July/August). Negotiating skills for peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping and International Relations, 8-9.

Pinch, F.C. (1994). Screening and selection of personnel for peace

operations: A Canadian perspective. In D.R. Segal, Peace

Operations: Workshop Proceedings (pp. 57-59). (ARI Research

Report No. 1670). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A292 116)
PERSONNEL PROFILE:

SOLDIERS OF THE 28TH ROTATION

Beatrice J. Farr

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the demographic and

personnel characteristics of the volunteers.

Research Question

The personnel profile of the 28th Rotation provides a snapshot of

Reserve Component (RC) volunteers and Active Component (AC)

soldiers just prior to the beginning of their Sinai mission. We collected

data on variables that could have an impact on mission performance.

Specifically, we wished to determine how these two groups looked in

terms of age, years of military service, marriage and family, education,

training background, previous employment, and their plans for returning

to their former jobs.

METHOD

Sample

The data presented here are based on responses from 407 RC

soldiers and 98 AC soldiers during the predeployment phase of the

mission (See Chapter 2 for more details).

87
88 RC Peacekeepers

Analysis

Each item was analyzed separately and is so reported in the results

section of this chapter. The overall percentages are given in the text, and

the differences between RC and AC soldiers are presented in

accompanying figures and tables.

RESULTS

Demographics

Age. As shown in Figure 5-1, soldiers participating in the 28th

Rotation ranged in age from 18-55. The RC were 20-48, with 80%

falling between 20-34. The most frequently occurring age was 23. The

AC had a somewhat wider age range—from 18-55—with 80% falling

between 18-30, and 25 the most common age.

70 "

60

50

3

Component

HRC

18-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years

Figure 5-1. Age.

Sex. Ninety-nine percent of the 28th Rotation were male. There

were only five female soldiers, three RC and two AC. This represents a

substantially lower proportion than is true, overall, for women in the

Army.
Personnel Profile _S2

Race and Hispanic origin. The overall racial composition of

Rotation 28 consists of 77% White, 13% Black, 1% Asian of Pacific

Islander, 2% Native American, and 5% other. Of those who reported

themselves to be Hispanic, 3% were Puerto Rican, and less than 1% each

were Mexican American, Cuban, or other Hispanic. The percentage of

Blacks was somewhat higher (18%) in the RC than in the AC (12%).

Highest grade level completed. Virtually all members of the 28th

Rotation had at least a high school, GED, or other equivalent diploma.

Ninety-eight percent of the RC and 100% of the AC had at least a high

school level education. Eleven percent of the RC and 23% of the AC had

a bachelor's degree or higher.

RC volunteer states. The RC soldiers from the 28th Rotation came

from a very wide geographical distribution, originating from 35 states

and the District of Columbia, as shown in Figure 5-2.

Location when growing up. The RC and AC grew up in virtually

identical surroundings—30% in rural or farming communities, 34% in

the suburbs, and roughly 25% in cities.

Enlisted ranks. The 28th Rotation was intentionally constituted so

that less than 1% were PVls, 2% were PV2s, 12% were PFCs, 46% were
20. RC Peacekeepers

SPCs, 6% were CPLs, 18% were SGTs, 11% were SSGs, and 4% were

SFCs. Among the RC enlisted ranks, 14% were PFCs, 54% were SPCs

6% were CPLs, 14% were SGTs, 6% were SSGs, and 2% were SFCs.

The comparable percentages for the AC were 3, 8, 5, 38, 31, and 14,

respectively.

Officer ranks. The distribution of officers was also intentionally

constituted to consist of: 11% 2LTs, 47% lLTs, 34% CPTs, and 5%

MAJs. The RC officers included three 2LTs, eight lLTs, nine CPTs, and

one MAJ. The AC officers included 1 2LTs, 10 lLTs, 4 CPTs, 1 MAJ,

and 1 LTC.

Family

Marital/engagement status. As shown in Figure 5-3, 56% of the

sample reported that they were single and had never been married; 26%

were married for the first time; 6% were divorced and remarried, and

10% were separated or divorced. AC soldiers were twice as likely to be

married (56% vs. 28% for the RC). Similarly, 62% of the RC are single,

compared to only 32% of the AC. The divorce rate among the AC is also

somewhat higher than that of the RC (8% vs. 6%). Nearly half (47%) of

the soldiers were engaged or had an important boyfriend or girlfriend.

Seventy percent of the single AC soldiers reported that they were

engaged, versus 45% of the RC soldiers.

70

60 62

4 <

X

Component

E3RC

\

Figure 5-3. Martial status.
Personnel Profile 9J_

Spouse/important girlfriend/boyfriend employment status. Overall,

38% of spouses or significant others were employed as civilians, 19%

were in school, and 4% were Active Duty military. RC wives and

significant others were more likely to be employed as civilians (41% RC

vs. 32% AC). Only 2% of the RC spouses/important boyfriend or

girlfriend were active duty military, compared to 15% for the AC.

Number ofdependent children. Overall, a substantial majority of the

soldiers (65%) had no dependent children at all. RC soldiers were

younger than AC soldiers and fewer of them were married. Those who

were married also had fewer children. Seventy percent of the RC and

41 % of the AC had none. Twenty-nine percent of the RC and 54% of the

AC had between one and three children.

Number ofdependent children/others in residence. Most (71%) of

the participants did not reside with any dependent children. The AC had

considerably more dependent children living with them than did the RC

(48% vs. 25%), but there was no real difference in the number of other

dependents living with them. About 20% had one or two such

dependents.

Military Experience

Primary/secondary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Many

different MOSs are represented within the ranks of the RC and AC (RC

had 22 Primary and 42 Secondary MOSs and the AC had 7 and 6,

respectively).

Full tour ofactive duty in the Regular Army. Overall, 39% of the

soldiers had previously completed a full tour in the Active Army, as

shown in Figure 5-4. However, the difference between the AC and the

RC was very substantial. Whereas the majority (74%) of the RC had

never completed a full tour of active duty, nearly all (96%) of the AC had.

Prior Sinai rotation. The 28th Rotation had not had a great deal of

prior Sinai experience; overall, only 5% had served on an earlier mission

(22% of the AC and 1 % of the RC).

Direct combat experience. The Army defines direct combat as

engaging the enemy on the ground with individual- or crew-served

weapons while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of
22_ RC Peacekeepers

120 '

100

80

a

a

u

60"

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a

CM

40

20 .

Component

74

AC

0

^^^^^^^^^^^^ 1 1 1 RC

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Figure 5-4. Tour of active duty.

direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel and/or

substantial risk of capture. Using that definition, 26% of the soldiers

served, at some time or other, in a direct combat zone (15% of the RC

and 49% of the AC).

Prior overseas assignment. Somewhat less than half (45%) were

previously deployed on overseas assignments, but a majority of the RC

(63%) had never served overseas. The reverse is true for the AC; i.e.,

78% had overseas assignments before their Sinai mission, as shown in

Figure 5-5.

Attitude toward overseas assignments. Both groups were quite

enthusiastic about overseas tours in general. Overall, 91% felt either very

or somewhat positive (94% of the RC and 78% of the AC).

Combat training site. Soldiers of Rotation 28 received their combat

training at three major training sites (i.e., The National Training Center,

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and The Combat Maneuver

Training Center). The majority of the AC (60%) trained at the JRTC, but

most (44%) of the RC got their combat training at locations other than the

three major centers, as shown in Figure 5-6.
Personnel Profile M

100

80'

Percent

o

o

63

37

20- Component

^^^H AC

0 ^^^^^H n RC

No Yes

Figure 5-5. Prior overseas assignment.

Employment

Employment status prior to mission. Prior to reporting for their Sinai

mission, 45% of the RC soldiers were employed full-time (i.e. more than

35 hours per week), 13% were employed part-time (less than 35 hours

per week), 20% were unemployed, and 22% were attending school.

Full-time jobs since 18th birthday. The figures for the AC and RC

were quite similar. Overall, since their 18th birthday, 17% of the soldiers

had never held a full-time job, 35% had held one or two, 28% had held

three or four, 11 % had held five or six, and 9% had held more than six.

Number of unemployed periods since 18th birthday. The periods of

unemployment were also similar for AC and RC soldiers. Overall, since

their 18th birthday, 48% of the soldiers had never been unemployed for

more than 3 months, 23% had been unemployed once for that length of

time, 10% twice, 7% three times, 5% four times, 1% five times, and 6%

six or more times.

Plans to return to formerjob. Of those who responded to the

question on whether they planned to return to their former civilian job

after completing their Sinai mission, 36% indicated that they would, 20%

would not, and 25% were not sure.

Ease ofreturning to formerjob. In response to the question about

how easy they thought it would be to return to their former job, 26%
24. RC Peacekeepers

S

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u

i.

*2T'

-£

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Figure 5-6. Army combat training centers.

44

Component

AC

m Re

-&

indicated that they were not employed or did not intend to return, 40%

thought it would be very easy, 13% thought it would be easy, 9% felt it

would be neither easy nor difficult, 3% thought it would be difficult, 2%

thought it would be very difficult, and 7% were not sure, as shown in

Figure 5-7.

70

•> 30

jfill

<a i

Figure 5-7. Ease of returning to former job.

4 \

Component

RC
Personnel Profile 9_5_

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Virtually all soldiers were male and at least a high school graduate;

more were single than were married; and most did not have dependent

children. There were no substantial differences between RC and AC

soldiers in age, education, and spouse employment. Although the

majority of the AC had served on an overseas tour, the majority of the

RC had not; all of the soldiers were positive about overseas tours,

especially in the Sinai. Nearly half (49%) of the AC had direct combat

experience, as opposed to 15% for the RC.
REASONS FOR VOLUNTEERING AND

ANTICIPATED DEPLOYMENT EFFECTS

Laurel W. Oliver

Ronald B. Tiggle

Stephanie M. Hayes

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to document deployees'

predeployment status. We present the reasons soldiers gave for

volunteering for the deployment and also summarize their expectations

for deployment effects on various aspects of their lives at this

predeployment point.

Research Questions

The major research questions explored in this chapter are described

below.

1. Reasons. What are the reasons Reserve Component (RC) soldiers

give for volunteering for this peacekeeping deployment?

2. Anticipated effects. What effects do soldiers, both RC and Active

Component (AC), expect the deployment to have on various aspects of

their lives? Before they deploy, how do soldiers expect the deployment

to affect the following:

• physical health

• emotional well-being

• civilian job/career

97
28 RC Peacekeepers

military career

marriage

adjustment to spouse upon return

children

likelihood of volunteering for future operations

likelihood of remaining in the military

3. F'redeployment status. At this predeployment point, what are

soldiers' career intentions, educational aspirations, organizational

commitment, and marital/family status?

METHOD

In this section, we describe the variables we analyzed. See Oliver,

Tiggle, and Hayes (in press) for a copy of the survey (Background and

Training Questionnaire) containing these items. Unless otherwise noted,

all variables are from this survey.

Reasons for Volunteering

A checklist of reasons for volunteering contained 15 items: 14

specific categories (e.g., medical benefits, challenging work,

adventure/travel) plus an "other" category. Respondents rated each

reason on a 5-point Likert scale from Very Unimportant to Very

Important. There was also a Not Applicable option.

Life Course Variables

Expected effects ofSinai deployment. Previous research (e.g., Card,

1983; Ivie, Gimbel, & Elder, 1991) has shown that life course events

such as military service have long-term as well as short-term effects on

people's lives. To tap into some of these changes, survey respondents

were asked to rate the anticipated effects of the deployment on the

various aspects of life enumerated in the first research question. The
Volunteer Expectations 22

ratings were on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Very Unimportant to

Very Important plus a Not Applicable option. The survey also included a

general item asking soldiers how they felt about going to the Sinai, also

on a 5-point scale from Very Negative to Very Positive.

Organizational commitment. The commitment variable was

operationalized in a 15-item scale based on the (Meyer and Allen, 1984;

Allen & Meyer, 1990) measure of organizational commitment. The

Meyer and Allen instrument was modified by substituting "the military"

for "my organization" and deleting one item which did not apply to

military careers. We also reworded reverse-coded items so that all items

read in a positive direction. We used two of the three subscales that

Meyer and Allen identified in their instrument.1 These two scales were:

affective commitment, which is the emotional attachment the respondent

feels for the organization, and continuance commitment, which assesses

the costs to the person of leaving the organization.3The respondent rates

each item on a 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly

Agree. The set of items constituting the organizational commitment

variable is entitled "Army Organization" in the "Background and

Training Questionnaire." (Oliver et al., in press).

Career intentions. Intentions concerning making a career in the

military were measured on a 6-point scale representing the length of time

the respondent expected to remain in the military. This item was based on

the Propensity to Stay measure of Teplitzky (1991) but was adapted to be

appropriate for RC personnel as well as AC soldiers.

Educational and travel aspirations. Three items related to the

respondent's educational aspirations. One asked for the highest

educational level the respondent had attained to date, another asked about

expectations for acquiring additional education, and a third asked about

plans for taking courses while in the Sinai. Another item asked

1 We did not use a third subscale of this instrument, normative commitment, as it was not relevant for our purposes.

2 Teplitzky (1991) used the Meyer and Allen (1984) affective dimension in her measure of organizational

identification, substituting the Army for my organization. Teplitzky also used reverse coding for four of the seven

items in her scale.

3 The costs of leaving the organization involve considerations such as the disruption to ones life and the difficulty of

obtaining another job.
100 RC Peacekeepers

respondents whether or not they planned to travel outside the Sinai

during their deployment.

Marital/family status. An item concerning marital status ascertained

whether or not the respondent had a spouse. Another item asked the

respondent how many dependent children he/she had. A third item in

another survey ("Family and Finance Questionnaire") administered at the

same time asked for an assessment of the quality of the relationship.

Analyses

The analyses for the research reported here involved predeployment

data. Results are generally reported for the entire sample. Where

appropriate and of interest, results are broken out by employment status,

by component (RC and AC), or by rank (junior enlisted,

noncommissioned officers [NCOs], and officers).

We investigated subgroup differences (component, rank,

employment status) using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure.

For rank comparisons, which involved three groups, Tukey's Honestly

Significant Difference technique was used to test for significance. We

present these comparison data, however, with two cautions: (1)

Substantive, not necessarily statistically significant, differences are the

important ones (Cohen, 1994); (2) These results involve a considerable

number of tests based on a limited number of people.

FINDINGS

Reasons for Volunteering

Overall results. Table 6-1 contains means and standard deviations of

importance ratings by the RC soldiers on their reasons for volunteering.

Because most of the AC soldiers did not truly volunteer for the

deployment, AC comparisons with the RC do not seem meaningful for

this variable.4 As can be seen in the table, the most highly rated reasons

4 The AC respondents, however, were very positive about going to the Sinai, even though most of them were not volunteers in

the usual sense. About 86% of the AC soldiers responded that they were very or somewhat positive about deploying,

compared to 96% of the RC soldiers. A larger proportion of the AC (10%) than the RC (3%) were neutral about deploying.
Volunteer Expectations 101

(over 4.0 on a 5-point scale) were adventure, challenging work, serving

one's country, and career advancement. The lowest rated reasons were

being unemployed, family pressures/problems, and getting away from a

bad neighborhood. In-between ratings were generally associated with

various benefits and the need for more money.

Table 6-1

Reserve Component (RC) Reasons for Volunteering for Deployment

Reason3

N Mean (SD)b

Adventure/travel 401 4.42 (.93)

Challenging work/learn new skills 402 4.25 (.97)

Serve country/serve Army 400 4.15 (1.01)

Military career advancement/promotion 401 4.07 (1.06)

Educational course credit 396 3.70 (1.18)

Needed more money 401 3.66 (1.24)

Earn points toward retirement 402 3.50 (1.27)

Dental benefits 401 3.39 (1.22)

Medical benefits 402 3.38 (1.20)

Montgomery G.I. Bill benefits 399 3.24 (1.33)

Take time out from school/job 402 3.02 (1.37)

Was unemployed 393 2.23 (1.40)

Family pressures/problems 399 2.17 (1.27)

Get away from bad neighborhood 396 1.87 (1.20)

a

In descending order of importance.

Rated on 5-point scale (1 = very unimportant to 5 == very important).

Some of the reasons written in under the "other" category included:

"get into good shape for college athletics," "take time off from

girlfriend," and "missed the Army."

Comparisons by rank. In Table 6-2, we present reasons for

volunteering broken out by rank (junior enlisted personnel, NCOs, and

officers). In general, differences were not great even if they were

statistically significant. Junior enlisted and NCOs rated benefits and

"educational course credit" more highly than did officers. Junior enlisted
102 RC Peacekeepers

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also ranked "needed more money" and "get away from a bad

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reasons, the three groups did not differ significantly from each other.

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relatively few differences between soldiers who had been employed and

those who had not been employed before volunteering. As can be seen in

Table 6-3, employed soldiers ranked "adventure/travel" significantly

lower than did soldiers who had not been employed. Greater differences

occurred on "needed more money" and "was unemployed," both of

which employed soldiers ranked significantly lower than did unemployed

soldiers.

Anticipated Effects of Deployment

Before they deployed, soldiers were asked to indicate how they

expected various aspects of their lives to change as a result of the

deployment to the Sinai. Tables 6-4 and 6-5 contain the means and

standard deviations for soldier expectations for various life aspects. The

5-point scale ranged from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree."

Table 6-4 shows findings for the entire sample and for the two

components. Soldiers' expectations for deployment effects were

positive, averaging 3.74 over all effects on the 5-point scale.

Expectations for effects on marriages and families were somewhat less

positive (3.27), with other effects perceived more favorably (3.94).

As can be seen in Table 6-4, physical health and military career were

the aspects of their lives that soldiers in the entire sample and in both

components expected to be most positively affected. In general, the RC

soldiers expected more positive outcomes than did AC soldiers.

Significant differences between components (RC>AC) occurred on

expectations for physical health, emotional well-being, and several

outcomes related to military careers and military service.

Table 6-5 contains data on the deployment effects expected by the

various rank groups. There were some significant differences between

expectations of the junior enlisted personnel and those of NCOs and

officers. For example, junior enlisted anticipated more positive outcomes

for physical health and emotional well-being as well as for benefits to
104 RC Peacekeepers

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Volunteer Expectations 107

their military careers and willingness to volunteer in the future. Junior

enlisted and officers expected to be more willing to stay in the Army than

did the NCOs.

Another item, not shown in the tables, is the general item relating to

how positively the soldier felt about going to the Sinai. The overall mean

was 4.69 on a 1-5 scale, with means for all component and rank groups

uniformly high.

Organizational Commitment

Predeployment scores for the two scales of the organizational

commitment measure can be found in Table 6-6. The overall mean for

affective commitment (emotional attachment to the organization) was

3.48 on a 5-point scale, and the overall mean for continuance

commitment (perceived costs of leaving the military) was 2.76. The RC

and AC soldiers did not differ on either type of commitment. The only

significant commitment difference we found between groups occurred in

Table 6-6

Predeployment Organizational Commitment

Commitment

Affective Continuance

Group ä Mean £SD) ä Mean rsD^

All soldiers 506 3.48 (.58)

Component

499 2.76 (.90)

Reserve 398 3.49 (.58) 392 2.73 (.89)

Active 93 3.44 (.60)

Rank

92 2.87 (.88)

Junior enlisted 307 3.46 (.55) 300 2.81 (.88)

NCOs 157 3.46 (.64) 156 2.73 (.91)

Officers 38 3.77* (.44)

antly (p <.05) from other ranks on this variable.

39 2.47 (.89)

*Officers differ signific
108 RC Peacekeepers

the comparisons by rank for affective commitment: officers scored

significantly higher on affective commitment than did either junior

enlisted soldiers or NCOs. We did not find any significant differences

among the three rank groups on continuance commitment.

Career Intentions

Table 6-7 contains predeployment career intentions for the soldiers

who deployed to the Sinai. Note that the original response options to the

career plans items were collapsed into three categories: (1) those who

had already been in for 20 years or planned to stay in until or beyond 20

years, (2) those who were undecided about their career plans, and (3)

those who planned to leave before 20 years.

Component differences on career intentions were small. A slightly

larger percentage of RC than AC were undecided about their career plans

(33% vs. 26%), and a smaller percentage of RC than AC were planning

to stay in the military until or beyond a 20-year retirement (55% vs.

Table 6-7

Predeployment Career Intentions

Stay unti /beyond Retire before

20 vears Undecided 20_vears

Croup ä m ä m. ä m

All soldiers 284 (56) 161 (32) 60 (12)

Component

Reserve 216 (55) 131 (33) 49 (12)

Active 59 (62) 25 (26)

Rank

11 (12)

Junior enlisted 143 (47) 118 (38) 46 (15)

NCOs 115 (74) 29 (19) 11 (7)

Officers 25 (64) 11

not total to 100% because of rounding error

(28) 3 (8)

Note. Percentages may
Volunteer Expectations 109

62%). There was no difference between components in the percentage of

soldiers planning to retire before 20 years (each 12%).

Because the number of officers was so small when distributed across

the three career intentions categories, comparisons by rank for this group

are inconclusive. The youngest group, junior enlisted soldiers, were least

likely to stay until or beyond 20 years, were most undecided about

staying, and were most likely to plan to retire before 20 years.

Educational Status and Aspirations

Tables 6-8 and 6-9 relate to deployees' predeployment educational

status and educational aspirations. Table 6-8 contains data for the entire

sample and for the two components. Differences between components

were generally minimal. A larger proportion of AC soldiers (24%) held a

Table 6-8

Predeployment Educational Status and Educational

Aspirations for all Soldiers by Component

Component

Educational variables All soldiers Reserve Active

] 'resent educational status

Less than bachelor's 86% 89% 76%

degree

Bachelor's degree 10% 7% 20%

Higher than bachelor's 4% 4% 4%

degree

Future educational plans

Less than bachelor's 47% 48% 43%

degree

Bachelor's degree 27% 26% 27%

Higher than bachelor's 26% 26% 30%

degree

Deployment plans

Take educational courses 82% 81% 88%

Plan to travel 95%

% because of

97%

rounding error.

86%

Note. Percentages may not total to 100
im. RC Peacekeepers

bachelor's degree or higher than did the RC soldiers (11 %), and a

somewhat larger proportion of RC soldiers planned to travel during

deployment than did AC soldiers (97% vs. 86%).

Larger differences are found in Table 6-9, which contains data for

the three rank groups. As the table shows, 93% of the officers held a

bachelor's degree or higher, while fewer than 6% of the junior enlisted

and 11% of the NCOs were at this educational level. With respect to

future educational plans, 89% of the officers anticipated eventually

obtaining an advanced or professional degree compared to the 24% of

junior enlisted and the 16% of NCOs who aspired to this educational

level. Fewer officers planned to take educational courses for credit

(61%) in the Sinai than did eitherjunior enlisted soldiers (82%) or

NCO's (87%). Very large proportions of all groups planned to travel

while on the Sinai deployment (100% of officers, 90% of NCOs, and

96% ofjunior enlisted).

Table 6-9

Predeployment Educational Status and Educational

Aspirations by Rank

Rank

Educational variables Junior enlisted NCOs Officers

Present educational status

Less than bachelor's degree

Bachelor's degree

Higher than bachelor's

degree

95%

5%

<1%

89% 8%

7% 62%

4% 31%

Future educational plans

Less than bachelor's degree

Bachelor's degree

Higher than bachelor's

degree

50%

26%

24%

52% 5%

32% 5%

16% 89%

Deployment plans

Take educational courses

Plan to travel

82%

96%

100% because of

87% 61%

90% 100%

Note. Percentages may not total to rounding error.
Volunteer Expectations Hi

Marital and Family Status

Marital status. Table 6-10 shows that 36% of all the deployed

soldiers were married at the time of the predeployment data collection.

About twice as many AC were married as RC, with the lowest proportion

of marriages found among junior enlisted (22%) and larger proportions

found in the officer (44%) and NCO (62%) groups. However, age is

confounded with marital status since junior enlisted were younger (mean

= 24) than either officers (mean = 30) or NCOs (mean = 32).

Dependent children. The same pattern found for marital status was

duplicated in the results for number of dependent children. As can be

seen in Table 6-10, AC soldiers reported more dependent children than

did RC soldiers, while junior enlisted personnel had fewer dependent

children than either officers or NCOs. Again, this variable is confounded

with age and marital status.

Spouse support. In general, the various subgroups reported

relatively high levels of spouse support for the soldier's going on the

MFO deployment. Table 6-10 shows that 80% of the entire married

sample reported positive ("supportive" or "very supportive") support.

About 82% of RC soldiers and 75% of AC soldiers reported positive

support, while 83% ofjunior enlisted, 76% of NCOs, and 88% of officers

reported this level of support.

Quality ofrelationship. All groups reported moderately high levels

of marital happiness. Table 6-10 shows that the overall mean was 5.29

(on a 7-point scale). Component means were 5.14 for the RC and 5.56

for the AC. Rank means were 5.29 (junior enlisted), 5.20 (NCOs), and

5.75 (officers).

DISCUSSION

Reasons

The most popular reasons for volunteering by the RC soldiers were

service, adventure, and work/career challenge and advancement. Various

benefits (medical, dental, retirement) and the need for more money

received modest ratings of importance. Respondents rated as lowest in

importance reasons such as time out from school/job, family problems,

and unemployment.
112 RC Peacekeepers

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Volunteer Expectations LU.

Differences among the various RC groups seemed more related to

age or educational level than to component or rank. Junior enlisted

personnel, for example, rated the importance of "take time out from

school/job" higher than NCOs and officers. The more highly educated

officers, on the other hand, rated educational course credit lower than the

other two rank groups.

Employment status of the RC soldiers prior to volunteering seemed

related to some reasons. Soldiers who had been unemployed before

volunteering for the deployment rated "needed more money" and "was

unemployed" significantly higher than soldiers who had been previously

employed.

Effects on Various Aspects of Soldiers' Lives

Anticipated effects. In general, all soldiers expected the effects of the

deployment on various aspects of their lives to be neutral (no change) to

highly positive. Although the RC soldiers tended to be more positive

than AC soldiers about anticipated effects, the pattern for both groups

was similar. That is, the most positive effects were expected for the same

variables by both components. Because the RC soldiers were volunteers,

it seems reasonable that they would anticipate positive effects—or they

would not have volunteered. And because most of the AC soldiers were

not truly volunteers, it is not surprising that they rated the various

outcomes somewhat less positively.

The significant rank differences on anticipated effects consisted

primarily of more positive expectations by junior enlisted personnel. The

pattern of RC/AC differences holds for the comparisons ofjunior enlisted

personnel with the other rank groups. Because half the leadership of the

battalion was from the AC, this finding does not surprise us. We would

expect the RC volunteers, who constituted the bulk ofjunior enlisted

personnel, to have the most positive expectations.

Although there were some group differences in anticipated effects,

all soldiers—regardless of rank or component—had highly positive

feelings about going to the Sinai.

Organizational commitment. Affective organizational commitment

(emotional attachment to the organization) was strong for both
114 RC Peacekeepers

components, and officers were higher on this type of commitment than

were NCOs and enlisted personnel. This result is often found in Army

organizational research—officers tend to be more positive, more

favorable, and/or more optimistic about the Army and their future than

are other soldiers. There were no differences in continuance commitment

between components or across ranks. Most soldiers seemed to feel that

the costs of leaving the organization would not be excessively high.

Career intentions. In spite of the fact that the respondents seemed to

believe that leaving the military would not entail excessive costs, sizable

proportions of all groups expressed interest in continuing with the Army

for a 20-year career or longer. A larger percentage of RC soldiers were

undecided about their military career plans than were AC soldiers, a

result which may be due to the fact that RC jobs are typically part-time

and not full-time. Many of the RC have full-time civilian jobs and thus

may be more ambivalent about whether or not they wish to seek a full

career as a part-time military member.

Educational aspirations. As a whole, this sample had high

educational goals for themselves, with many nondegreed soldiers aspiring

to college degrees and those already holding bachelor's degrees aspiring

to advanced or professional degrees. Sizable proportions of all soldier

groups planned to take educational courses for credit while in the Sinai,

although the proportion for the better educated officers was somewhat

less than for the other rank groups. Very large proportions of all groups

(100% of the officers, for example) planned to travel to other countries

during their deployment.

Marital/family status. Generally speaking, the marital and family

status of a soldier seemed more related to his or her age than to factors

such as component or rank. Higher rank (older) soldiers tended more

often to be married and to have children. Those who were married

reported high levels of spouse support for the deployment and high levels

of satisfaction with the marriage.
Volunteer Expectations 115

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

What we consider remarkable about these findings is that we found

so few real differences among groups. Among reasons for volunteering,

differences seemed more related to age or educational level rather than

component or rank, although previously unemployed RC personnel did

rank economic reasons higher than their employed counterparts.

Junior enlisted personnel tended to be more positive than the other

rank groups were about the life effects they expected as a result of the

deployment, while officers had more positive attitudes in other cases. On

some variables, RC soldiers responded somewhat more positively than

AC soldiers. But considering the fact that the majority of the soldiers

were not only volunteers but also from the RC, we would have expected

to find more and larger differences than we did.

In this chapter, we have reported on the deployees' predeployment

status and expectations. In Chapter 12, we shall present findings on these

same life course effects based on data collected during the deployment.
116 RC Peacekeepers

REFERENCES

Allen, N. J., & Meyer, J. P. (1990). The measurement and antecedents

of affective, continuance and normative commitment to the

organization. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 63, 1-18.

Card, J. J. (1983). Lives after Vietnam: The personal impact ofmilitary

service. Toronto: Lexington.

Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round. American Psychologist, 49,

997-1003.

Ivie, R. L., Gimbel, C, & Elder, Jr. (1991). Military experience and

attitudes in later life: Contextual influence across forty years.

Journal ofPolitical and Military Sociology, 19, 101-117.

Meyer, J. P., & Allen, N. J. (1984). Testing the side bet theory of

organizational commitment: Some methodological

considerations. Journal ofApplied Social Psychology, 69,

372-378.

Oliver, L. W., Tiggle, R. B., & Hayes, S. M. (in press). Preliminary

report on selected life course variables and reasonsfor

volunteeringfor the 28th Sinai deployment (ARI Technical

Report No. 1046). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Teplitzky, M. L. (1991). Junior Army officer retention intentions: A

path analytic model (ARI Technical Report No. 934).

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences. (AD A242 094)
SECTION 3

TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE

The training challenge for the 28th Rotation was to build a unit

prepared to perform the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

mission to the same standards as all prior units. However, because the

unit was newly assembled from both Active Component (AC) and

Reserve Component soldiers who had not worked together previously,

the predeployment training was not like other units. Leaders received

nearly 2 months of extra training and preparation time. Section Three

focuses on the assessment of this training process by tracking the

sequence of tasks, analyzing training content, and measuring the soldiers'

job knowledge following training and during the deployment itself.

Chapter 7, by Reynolds and Campbell, opens the section by

describing the development of measures ofjob performance for basic

soldier as well as MFO-specific tasks. Based on these measures, job

knowledge of Rotation 28 and a previous all-AC rotation was assessed.

Wisher and Farr (Chapter 8) then report on the specific tasks trained

throughout the predeployment and deployment in the Sinai. Using the

measures developed by Reynolds and Campbell, Chapter 8 describes the

success of the training process to prepare for the MFO mission. Going

into even further detail, Chapter 9 (Salter, Fober, Pleban, and Valentine)

presents an assessment of the Infantry Leaders Course portion of the

predeployment training.

17
DEVELOPMENT AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF MEASURES: SINAI PEACEKEEPING

PERFORMANCE

Douglas H. Reynolds

Roy C. Campbell

INTRODUCTION

The research described here was undertaken to define the dimensions

of peacekeeper performance in the Sinai and to develop measures of

these dimensions to be used for two purposes. First, one focus of the

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences'

(ARI) research on the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

peacekeepers has been on the improvement of the methods used to select

soldiers who are to serve in the Sinai. Accordingly, an experimental

measure has been developed to assess a number of dimensions purported

to be predictive of performance on the mission (Mael, Kilcullen,

Olszewski, & White, 1995). In order to validate this new measure, it was

necessary to develop measures of peacekeeper performance to use as

criteria. Thus, one purpose of the effort described here was the

development of measures that could be used as criteria to validate

predictors of peacekeeper performance. Second, this effort provided an

opportunity to examine the performance requirements for soldiers on the

MFO peacekeeping mission and, in particular, to document the

performance levels of those who participated in the 28th Rotation. This

report describes the steps taken to define and assess soldier performance

119
120 RC Peacekeepers

in the Sinai and the results of administering a set of MFO-specific

performance measures.

Performance Measurement Approach

Recent research on performance modeling has underscored the need

to consider the performance domain for a given job as multifaceted (cf.

Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993). This is especially important

when conducting validation research. For example, in the Army's longterm research effort known collectively as Project A/Building the Career

Force, a variety of predictor measures was validated against a five-factor

model of performance; the results indicated that the predictors

differentially related to the various criterion factors (McHenry, Hough,

Toquam, Hanson, & Ashworth, 1990). Specifically, cognitive measures

tended to better predict "can-do" performance factors (i.e.,

proficiency-oriented factors involving technical knowledge and skills),

while noncognitive measures such as personality and temperament were

better predictors of "will-do" performance factors (i.e., motivationally

based factors dealing with typical performance).

The importance of noncognitive measures for predicting will-do

performance factors is critical in this research because, as Rumsey (1995)

has noted, selection into the Sinai mission is secondary to selection into

the Army. Since first-stage selection is cognitively loaded, gains in the

prediction of performance in the Sinai are likely to be in the noncognitive

domain. Additionally, recent research on the correlates of peacekeeper

effectiveness indicates that personality factors may be important in this

domain (De Jong & Broesder, 1994). The current effort was designed to

define and measure multiple aspects (i.e., both can-do and will-do

components) of peacekeeper performance in the Sinai.

Note that much of the prior research on soldier performance has

examined the content and structure of soldier performance across a range

of Army jobs (e.g., Campbell & Zook, 1991); however, there has been

less research that examines the nature of soldier performance on a

particular mission. The U.S. soldiers serving in the MFO provide a

unique opportunity to investigate mission-specific requirements in a

peacekeeping context. Although the requirements of peacekeeping are

certain to vary from mission to mission, investigation of peacekeeper
Sinai Performance Measures 121

performance under one set of circumstances may help to understand how

it may vary under different circumstances.

Early in the course of this research, it was determined that supervisor

rating scales and a job knowledge test would be developed to assess

soldier performance in the Sinai. These measures were chosen because

they have been found to adequately tap into different aspects of the

performance domain, with the job knowledge test best assessing job

proficiency, and the rating scales best assessing typical performance.

Because these two performance aspects were anticipated to be largely

independent, their definition was accomplished via parallel procedures.

Thus, development procedures are described separately for the

construct-based dimensions (created to support rating scale preparation)

and for the knowledge/task dimensions (developed to support job

knowledge test preparation).

Although the primary focus of this research is on the enlisted soldier

performance, some activities were undertaken to define and assess

noncommissioned officer (NCO) performance. The NCO performance

measure development and administration activities are described

following the sections on enlisted soldier performance.

ENLISTED SOLDIER PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

DEVELOPMENT

The enlisted soldier performance constructs and knowledge/task

areas were defined, and measures were prepared, according to the

following general strategy: (a) prior research on soldier performance and

information concerning MFO-specific requirements was reviewed; (b)

candidate dimensions were prepared; (c) data were collected to revise,

refine, and validate the performance dimensions; (d) performance

measures were developed; and (e) the measures were administered to

soldiers stationed in the Sinai serving on the MFO mission. These efforts

and their results are first described for the construct-based approach and

secondly for the knowledge/task-based approach.
122 RC Peacekeepers

Construct-Based Performance Dimensions

As a starting point in the development of MFO-specific performance

constructs, a number of earlier efforts to define soldier performance were

reviewed for applicability to performance in the Sinai. Of primary

relevance for this activity were constructs and general task dimensions

that describe basic soldiering performance. General task dimensions

were included during this effort to allow for ratings of typical

performance to be made on frequently performed activities, as well as on

more general performance constructs.

Initial Dimensions of Soldier Performance

Candidate construct dimensions were derived from earlier research

efforts. These include dimensions that were developed to cover

Army-wide soldier performance, common soldiering tasks, infantryman

(1 IB) performance, and MFO-specific requirements. Candidate

dimensions were identified, merged, and selected to form a set of initial

dimensions.

Army-wide performance constructs. Constructs defined and assessed

during Project A (cf. Campbell & Zook, 1991) were useful as a starting

point in this effort because they were designed to be relevant for

describing the performance of a first-tour soldier (paygrades El - E4) in

any Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). These dimensions are

summarized in the first column of Figure 7-1. The dimensions include

both construct-oriented items such as "Integrity," "Effort," and

"Self-Development" as well as a few dealing with general categories of

task performance such as "Maintaining Assigned Equipment," and

"Maintaining Living and Working Areas." Additionally, one dimension

from this source deals with "Technical Knowledge and Skill;" this is due

to the need for these dimensions to be applicable across all Army MOSs.

Thus, additional dimensions dealing with specific technical requirements

had to be identified from other sources. The Army-wide dimensions

were informally ranked by importance in the Sinai by 10 soldiers who

had been deployed in the Sinai as a part of Rotation 25, and the items in

the first column of Figure 7-1 are shown in order of descending

importance. Also, based on this subject matter expert (SME) review, two

dimensions that were judged to be similar were combined ("Maintaining

Assigned Equipment" and "Maintaining Living/Work Areas").
Sinai Performance Measures 123

Proposed Dimension Titles Listed by Source

Army-wide

Dimensions'

Common Soldiering Task

Dimensions

11B MOS-Specific

Dimensions

MFO-Specific

Dimensions

Following Regulations and

Orders

Knowing and Applying

Customs/Laws of War

Self-Control Nondelinquency

Integrity

Tech. Knowledge and Skill

Maintaining Assigned

Equipment/Living and Work

Areas

Maintaining Weapons Maintaining Supplies,

Equipment, Weapons

Peer Leadership Assisting and Leading

Others

Effort

Military Appearance

Self-Development

Physical Fitness

Navigation Navigation

Identifying Threats Guard and Security Duties Reporting Procedures

Communicate Over Radio Operating a Field

Phone/Radio

Estimate Range Reconnaissance and

Patrol

First Aid Survival and First Aid

Cultural Awareness

Tolerance for Boredom

Engage Targets Use of Weapons and

Equipment

Use of Weapons and

Force

Use of Vehicles

Behavioral Flexibility

' Listed in descending order of importance, as judged by SMEs.

Figure 7-1. Draft MFO Performance Dimensions (Construct-Based).

Common soldiering tasks. During Project A, a set of 13 task

dimensions was developed to describe general soldiering activities that

applied across MOSs (Campbell & Zook, 1991). These tasks were

presented to the same SME panel used to review the Army-wide

dimensions. SMEs were asked to comment on the relevance of each task
124 RC Peacekeepers

dimension for performance in the Sinai. Of the 13, 8 were included in

the preliminary set of dimensions considered for further investigation.

Five dimensions were dropped from consideration either because they did

not match MFO requirements (e.g., "Moving under Direct Fire") or

because they could sensibly be joined with similar dimensions (e.g.,

"Navigate Using a Map" was joined with "Navigate in the Field" to form

simply "Navigation"). Dimensions were joined because more general

task categories would increase the likelihood that a supervisor would

have had an opportunity to observe behavior related to the dimension,

and because more specific aspects of task performance were expected to

be assessed with the job knowledge test. The set of common soldiering

tasks included for consideration is shown in the second column of Figure

7-1.

Infantryman (1 IB) performance dimensions. Because soldiers

serving in the MFO line companies are drawn primarily from the

infantryman (1 IB) MOS,1Project A MOS-specific dimensions of

performance for 1 IB were also considered (Campbell & Zook, 1991). Of

13 possible dimensions, 7 were included for further consideration based

on the same criteria as applied to the common tasks. For example,

dimensions such as "Preparing a fighting position" were dropped because

they are unlikely or infrequent requirements for the MFO mission. The

seven 1 IB dimensions included in the initial set are shown in the third

column of Figure 7-1.

MFO-specific requirements. A fourth set of dimensions was

developed to ensure that requirements specific to the MFO mission were

considered. These dimensions were developed based on a review of

MFO training materials, situation reports, and individual interviews with

soldiers who had been MFO-deployed. Although most of the resulting

information applied more directly to the development of the job

knowledge and task dimensions, eight additional candidate construct

dimensions were added for consideration. These dimensions are listed in

the right-most column of Figure 7-1.

1 For example, 88% of the enlisted participants in Rotation 28 were in the Infantryman (11B) or similar

(ll-series)MOS.
Sinai Performance Measures 125.

Initial dimensions. A set of initial dimensions was constructed for

further development and refinement by cross-referencing the four sets of

dimensions aforementioned in a matrix format such as that shown in

Figure 7-1. Dimensions were arranged so that similar or redundant

dimensions were listed in the same row of the matrix. A set of initial

MFO dimensions was then constructed by collapsing the columns of the

matrix to create 19 unique performance areas. Draft definitions were

prepared for each of these, drawing substantially from the existing

definitions of the source dimensions. A list of the initial dimensions is

presented in Table 7-1.

Table 7-1

Set of Initial Performance Dimensions

Following Regulations and Orders Navigation

Self-Control Guard and Security Duties

Integrity Operating a Field Phone/Radio

Technical Knowledge and Skill Reconnaissance and Patrol

Maintaining Assigned Equipment First Aid

Peer Leadership Cultural Awareness

Effort Tolerance for Boredom

Military Appearance Use of Weapons and Equipment

Self-Development Behavioral Flexibility

Physical Fitness

Dimension Development

Once the initial set of dimensions was prepared, several steps were

undertaken to further refine and validate the dimensions, with the

ultimate purpose of constructing a set of behaviorally anchored rating

scales with which supervisors could rate the performance of their soldiers

in the Sinai. Briefly, these procedures involved using the initial

dimensions to solicit incidents of actual soldier performance, using these

incidents to revise the initial dimensions, and retranslating the incidents

into the revised categories. This process is consistent with that suggested

for the development of behaviorally oriented dimensions of performance
126 RC Peacekeepers

by Smith and Kendall (1963) and Campbell, Dunnette, Arvey, and

Hellervick (1973). These steps are described in more detail below.

Critical incident workshops. Four half-day workshops were held

during July of 1994 at Fort Bragg, NC. Participants were officers, NCOs,

and enlisted soldiers who participated in the 26th MFO Rotation. Each

workshop was conducted according to the following procedure:

participants were provided with a briefing on the current research effort

and a description of the workshop activities; the initial dimensions were

described and defined; participants were instructed on how to write

critical incidents; and each participant was provided with a page

describing each dimension on which they were to write a summary of an

incident that occurred in the Sinai. Approximately 2 hours were devoted

to writing incidents, during which the workshop facilitators reviewed

each participant's incidents to ensure they followed the prescribed

format. Finally, a group discussion was held to determine if the

participants thought that some dimensions had been excluded. When

preparing incidents, participants were instructed to describe the action of

an enlisted soldier in the Sinai, the situation that led up to that action, and

the results of the action.

Sixty individuals participated in the workshops and wrote a total of

1,056 critical incidents. Participants were asked to try to write at least

one incident for every dimension; however, it was anticipated that some

dimensions would be harder to write for than others, so no negative

feedback was provided when an incident could not be developed for a

dimension.

Dimension revision. The critical incidents were used to review and

revise the construct dimensions. All performance incidents were edited

to conform to the situation-action-result format and were entered into a

database. As part of the editing process, duplicate, ambiguous, and

incomplete incidents were eliminated, leaving over 500 incident

examples.

Next, project researchers content analyzed the performance

incidents, using the 19 initial performance categories as a starting point.

Specifically, three project researchers independently read the

performance incidents and sorted each into one category based on its

content. Although the incidents had been written to reflect the 19 initial
Sinai Performance Measures 127

categories, this sorting exercise enabled a check on the clarity and

appropriateness of the categories based on the content of the performance

incidents.

Based on results of the initial sorting of incidents, the initial

dimensions were revised. Some of these revisions involved collapsing

categories that could not be distinguished based on the content of the

performance incidents. For example, incidents reflecting the dimensions

of "Tolerance for Boredom" and "Self-Control" could not be consistently

differentiated. Additionally, incidents dealing with the application of

common technical skills were often of a similar nature (e.g., someone

lacking skill in an area makes a costly mistake). Because of the

simplicity of these technical skill dimensions, "Navigation,"

"Communicate over Radio," "Reconnaissance and Patrol," "Using

Weapons and Equipment," "First Aid," and "Technical Knowledge and

Skill" were all grouped into one dimension labeled "Basic Soldiering

Skill."

Some of the initial categories were not supported by the sorting

activity. For example, very few incidents were sorted into the

"Behavioral Flexibility" dimension. Discussions with participants in the

workshops revealed that life in the Sinai is highly regimented, and the

opportunity to observe flexibility was minimal. Dimensions for which

very few incidents could be written or sorted into were dropped from

further consideration.

Finally, some wording changes were made to the titles of the

dimensions and their definitions so that they would better reflect the

content represented in the performance incidents. A total of 10

dimensions listed in Table 7-2 resulted from the sorting and revision

process.

Critical incident retranslation. Four half-day incident retranslation

workshops were held with 58 officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers who

participated in the 26th MFO rotation. The workshops were conducted at

Fort Bragg, NC, during October of 1994. Retranslation provides a way

of checking on the clarity of individual critical incidents and of the

proposed performance dimensions. SMEs were asked to make two

judgments about each performance incident: the dimension to which it

belongs based on its content and the effectiveness level it reflects.
128 RC Peacekeepers

Table 7-2

Set of Revised Performance Dimensions

A. Following Regulations and Orders

B. Self-Control and Personal Discipline

C. Basic Soldiering Skill

D. Maintaining Assigned Equipment

E. Security and Guard Duties

F. Leadership and Effort

G. Appearance and Hygiene

H. Self-Development

I. Physical Fitness

J. Cultural Involvement and Awareness

Disagreement among the SMEs on either of these judgments about an

incident may be a sign that the incident is unclear. These incidents could

then be revised and clarified or eliminated from further scale

development. Also, confusion between two or more categories in the

sorting of several incidents may reflect weaknesses in the category

system.

The participants were provided with definitions of each performance

dimension, a list of the edited critical incidents, and a 1-7 effectiveness

scale (1 = not effective, 4 = moderately effective, and 7 = extremely

effective) to guide their effectiveness ratings of each incident. Each

participant was asked to categorize (i.e., "retranslate") and rate

approximately 160 incidents. Three separate retranslation booklets were

prepared so that all 500+ incidents could be retranslated by a minimum of

20 SMEs each.

The viability of the dimensions was examined through the analysis

of the categorization data. These data were analyzed by examining, for

each dimension, the total number of incidents with greater than 75%

SME agreement on the assignment of the incidents to that dimension.

These totals are presented as the diagonal of the matrix shown in Table

7-3. The off-diagonal elements represent the number of items with less

than 75% agreement, such that the most frequently assigned dimension is
Sinai Performance Measures 129

Table 7-3

Cross-Tabulation of Most Frequent Assignment (columns) by Second Most

Frequent Assignment (rows) for Items With 75% or Less Agreement

Dim A B c D E F G H I J

A 14* 5 3 4 3 9 2

B 15 39* 7 2 5 9 5 5 6

C 1 3 40* 6 5 13 13

D 2 2 6 15* 7

E 2 6 1 2 29* 3 1

F 5 5 9 2 48* 5 2 1

G 3 4 18* 1

H 4 10 1 2 3 11* 2 1

I 1 2 1 18*

J 1 6

diagonal (indicated by '

1

*") repi

2

esent the number

. 20*

Note. Items on the of items with greater

than 75% agreement on the dimension. See Table 7-2 for dimension titles.

represented by the columns of the matrix, and the second most frequently

assigned dimension is represented by the rows. For example, for

dimension A (Following Regulations and Orders), a total of 14 incidents

were categorized in "A" by 75% or more of the SMEs rating the incident,

while 15 incidents were categorized in "A" by fewer than 75% of SMEs

such that the most often chosen category was "A," but the second most

often chosen category was "B" (Self-Control and Personal Discipline).

This analysis helps identify dimensions that may be redundant or

significantly overlap.

The results of this analysis indicated that each of the 10 revised

dimensions were supported with a sufficient number of incidents to

enable the development of behaviorally based rating scales. The most

frequently overlapping dimensions were "Following Regulations and

Orders" (A) with "Self-Control and Personal Discipline" (B), and "SelfDevelopment" (H) with "Basic Soldiering Skills" (C). Examination of

the incidents that were cross-classified in this manner suggests that this

pattern was primarily due to incidents in which soldiers failed to follow

orders (for the former case) and where soldiers lacked critical skills

because they failed to develop them (for the latter case). Because all of
130 RC Peacekeepers

the dimensions were supported with high levels of agreement on several

incidents, all 10 dimensions proceeded into the scale-development phase.

Rating Scale Development

MFO-specific rating scales were developed by first identifying

critical incidents that were unambiguously retranslated into each of the

10 dimensions. Generally, incidents were retained for use in scale

development if greater than 60% of the SMEs sorting an incident placed

it into a single dimension, and if the effectiveness ratings on the incident

varied by less than 1.5 standard deviations. Incidents that met these

criteria were used to develop behavioral anchors for each rating category.

Specifically, the performance incidents were divided into three groups of

effectiveness based on their mean effectiveness rating: low (1 - 2.49),

average (2.50 - 5.49), and high (5.50 - 7.00). Behavioral summary

statements were then written to capture the content of the specific

examples at each of the three effectiveness levels (low, average, and

high) for each dimension. Finally, one or two incidents that passed the

inclusion criteria were selected for each effectiveness level within each

dimension. These incidents were used as performance examples on the

rating scales.

The MFO-specific enlisted soldier rating scales are available in

Reynolds and Campbell (in preparation). Note that each scale has the

following components: (a) a dimension title, (b) a dimension definition,

(c) a seven-point effectiveness scale, (d) three behavior summary

statements that reflect the general content of the critical incidents that

were retranslated into the categories, and (e) performance examples

within each of the three general effectiveness levels.

Rating Scale Administration

During May 1995, the rating scales were administered to supervisors

of a mix of Active Component (AC), Army National Guard (ARNG), and

Reserve Component (RC) soldiers stationed in the Sinai as part of

Rotation 28. Only enlisted soldiers were rated with the MFO

performance scales. The scales were administered in small group settings

(6-15 participants each) according to the following procedures:

participants were provided with rating materials and a card listing the
Sinai Performance Measures 131

subordinates they would be rating; a brief introduction was given

regarding the research effort and the purpose for the ratings; raters were

trained on common rating errors and how to avoid making them; and

raters completed the rating scales so that each ratee assigned to them was

rated on each of the 10 performance dimensions. Two points were

strongly emphasized during the rater training session: (1) the ratings were

for research purposes only and would never be disclosed to the ratee, and

(2) the usefulness of the ratings would depend upon their accuracy. In

total, 57 supervisors completed ratings for 228 ratees.

KNOWLEDGE AND TASK DIMENSIONS

Similar to the construct-based dimensions, the knowledge and task

dimensions developed to form the basis for the job knowledge test were

created by reviewing prior dimensions for similar performance domains

and submitting these to SME review. Unlike the construct dimensions,

however, a substantial body of work had been done previously to define

task dimensions for the MFO mission. The major activity to be

accomplished was identification and selection of the specific tasks to be

tested. A goal of approximately 25 tasks, covering the breadth of the

performance domain, was set for the construction of the test. The

procedures for identifying and selecting these tasks are described in more

detail below.

Task selection and test development were conducted under several

constraints. First, the tasks were required to have some overlap with

existing job knowledge tests for infantryman to allow for direct

comparisons between MFO and other active duty samples. Second,

multiple forms of the test were to be developed to be used in conjunction

with another project dealing with training evaluation. Third, workshop

and pilot test participants who had MFO experience were available only

during a short window of time, requiring that all development activities

be accomplished within a 10-week period.

Dimension and Task Identification

Material review. Two sources describing the task requirements of

MFO soldiers were provided to project researchers by MFO personnel.
132 RC Peacekeepers

These sources included the MFO Infantry Battalion Pre-Deployment

Training Package and the Soldier's Manual (JIB); these sources were

assumed to provide the universe of activities from which individual tasks

to be tested could be derived.

The first source, the MFO Infantry Battalion Pre-Deployment

Training Package, comprises mostly MFO-specific requirements. The

publication is organized into 12 precis, which roughly correspond to

topic or content areas. The title of each precis is shown in the upper

portion of Table 7- 4. When explicit task statements for a precis were not

available, task statements were developed from the content of each

precis. It should be noted that the contents of the first three precis are not

traditional military tasks. They are knowledge- and information-based

issues that are not founded on a behavioral requirement. This does not

lessen their potential importance.

The second source of tasks was an extract of the Soldier's Manual

11B (Skill Level Tasks 1-4). ARI researchers selected tasks from the

Soldier's Manual (SM) based on their MFO relevance prior to the start of

the current effort. Based on tasks from this source, task groupings were

developed and named to reflect major content areas. Tasks were then

assigned to these categories to form task clusters. These SM task clusters

are listed in the lower portion of Table 7-4. Note that several redundant

categories appear between the sources. Similar dimensions were

maintained across the two category systems because, although

MFO-based categories were highly specific to the mission, the SM

categories provided more exact task definitions and substeps, which are

useful for test development. Redundancies between tasks determined to

be critical were resolved by combining task statements during SME

review.

Between the two sources described above, 95 tasks distributed over

18 task categories were identified. These tasks provided the basis for an

MFO SME review of the categories and tasks.

SME workshop. During July 1994, a workshop was conducted at

Fort Bragg with 20 NCOs who had participated in Rotation 26 in the

Sinai. Participants were given a brief overview of the research and then

were presented with a list of the 95 tasks within their respective

categories. Each participant was asked to select the 30 most critical tasks
Sinai Performance Measures 133

Table 7-4

Initial Set of 18 Task Categories

MFO Precis

MFOl. MFO Organization

MF02. General Information on the Sinai

MF03. Field Sites and Patrols

MF04. Observation

MF05. Recognition

MF06. Reporting Procedures

MF07. Communications

MF08. Threat Assessment and Defensive Measures

MF09. Use of Firearms and Force

MFO10. Desert Operations: Survival and First Aid

MFOll. Vehicle Drills

MF012. Identification of Mines and Unexploded Ordnance

Soldier's Manual Task Categories:

SM13. Map Reading and Land Navigation

SM14. First Aid

SM15. Small Arms and Weapons

SM16. Individual Field and Patrolling Techniques

SM17. Surveillance and Reporting

SM18. Chemical Defense

for performance in the Sinai from the list of 95. Following the rating

exercise, SMEs discussed the category scheme, the assignment of tasks to

categories, the rationale for their rankings, and the grouping of similar

tasks and categories. Based on this discussion, redundancies between

tasks were eliminated across the category systems.

The results were totaled by tabulating the number of SMEs that

identified a task as being most critical. A criterion of 50% of the SMEs

judging a task as critical was used to select tasks for testing. A total of 24

unique tasks met this criterion, and all of the categories except two,

"Chemical Defense" and "Small Arms and Weapons," were represented

with at least one critical task. After review, it was determined that two
124 RC Peacekeepers

tasks ("Determine magnetic azimuth" and "Recognize aircraft

components (WEFT) characteristics," both rated as critical by 10 SMEs)

would be dropped in favor of tasks dealing with the maintenance and

operation of an M16A2 rifle (viewed as critical by 9 and 8 SMEs,

respectively), thereby enabling comparisons with two task tests

administered in Project A. The addition of these tasks allowed for the

coverage of the "Small Arms and Weapons" category. "Chemical

Defense" was not assessed because of the very low criticality judgments

for this task area. A summary of the selected tasks, listed by source, and

number of SMEs judging the task to be critical appear in Table 7-5.

Development of Task Tests

Multiple-choice test items were prepared for all tasks to be tested, so

that each task had its own set of items. In this sense, the job knowledge

test developed is a collection of 24 small task tests. All item

development was doctrine based; that is, it relied upon an accepted,

published MFO or U.S. Army source. A practical constraint of a 2-hour

maximum administration time placed a limit on the number of items that

could be included for each task. The final test included 2 versions of 91

items each; the number of items per task ranged from 3 to 6.

All test items were constructed so that one right answer is justifiable

based on current doctrine, and three alternatives were provided that each

met three criteria: (1) they are actions or choices that are often performed

in conjunction with the situation or requirement described in the item

stem; (2) they are actions or choices that are doable, logical, real, and

consistent with the stem; and (3) they are incorrect.

The alternate form of the test was created by changing the situation

presented in the items without altering the basic process involved in

answering the item. For example, one item presents a map and requires

the examinee to determine grid coordinates. The location to be

determined is altered between the two forms. Another strategy involved

splitting the steps involved in a task across the two versions of the test.

Pretest. In August 1994, both versions of the job knowledge test

were administered to soldiers who had been deployed in the Sinai as part

of Rotation 26. In all, 62 soldiers took version A and 64 took version B;

each version was administered as two counterbalanced forms. The item
Sinai Performance Measures 135

Table 7-5

Tasks Selected for Testing, Shown by Source and Number of SME's Judging Item as Critical

#of

Source SMEs Task

MFOl 17

MF02 12

MF03 11

MF04/SM17 18

MF04/SM17 14

MF05 18

MF05 14

MF05 10

MF06 16

MF06 12

MF07/SM17 17

MF08 18

Describe the zonal structure of the Sinai

Identify do's and don'ts of contacts with Egyptians

Describe the mission tasks for the four levels of organizational

field sites

Estimate range

Perform search and scan procedures

Identify specific aircraft by type and origin

Identify Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) forces

*Recognize aircraft components (WEFT) characteristics

Prepare incident reports

Prepare routine/recurring reports

Send a radio message

React to threatening, suspicious, or unusual incidents and

adhere to defensive procedures

Follow rules and principles for use of force and employment

of firearms

Perform operational survival techniques

Take action on incidents involving vehicles

Recognize explosive hazards of the Sinai

*Determine magnetic azimuth

Determine grid coordinates

Give first aid for heat injuries

Perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation

Guide a helicopter to a landing point

Perform self-extraction from a minefield

Collect and report information

Request a medical evacuation

Note. Items with an asterisk were replaced with tasks dealing with maintenance and operation of an

M16A2 rifle, to enable comparisons with Project A Job Knowledge Tests.

MF09 19

MFO10/SM16 15

MFOll 10

MFOl 2 16

SM13 10

SM13 10

SM14 19

SM14 14

SM16 12

SM16 10

SM17 18

SM17 13
13J) RC Peacekeepers

level data resulting from this administration was used to construct the

final test forms (two alternate versions and one combined version).

Development of final testforms. Data from the pretest were used to

eliminate items with very high or very low pass rates and to identify

items that may have been incorrectly keyed or have more than one

correct answer. Problem items were corrected or revised so that each

alternate version of the test remained at 91 items. These alternate

versions were then provided to researchers conducting an evaluation of

MFO training.

The final step in the development of the test was to combine the two

versions into one test to be used as a criterion measure in the validation

study. This was accomplished by choosing the best items from each task

test to include on the final form. "Best" in this circumstance was defined

as having the most power to discriminate between individuals (i.e., p

values close to .50 from the pretest, high item-total correlations). For

tasks that were tested by splitting the steps between versions, the final

test reassembled these steps; thus, the final test was longer than each of

the two alternate versions (99 items). The final version of the test was

also reverse-ordered to create two forms of the test.

Administration of the Job Knowledge Test

The final 99-item version of the Job Knowledge Test was

administered in the Sinai during May 1995. A total of 308 soldiers

serving on Rotation 28 were given the test according to the following

procedures: large groups of soldiers (20-50 soldiers per group) presented

themselves for testing at a gymnasium set up for collecting data using

written measures; soldiers were given a short briefing on the purpose of

the data collection and instructions for completing each of several data

collection instruments; soldiers completed the instruments at their own

pace until all forms were finished; completed forms were checked by

ARI personnel; and examinees were dismissed. The Job Knowledge Test

was typically completed last, after a battery of other measures developed

by ARI. Examinee responses to the Job Knowledge Test were recorded

on a machine-scannable form to facilitate data entry.
Sinai Performance Measures 137

ENLISTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES: RESULTS

Data resulting from both the rating scales and the Job Knowledge

Test were analyzed according to the following strategy: first, data were

screened for aberrant responses; second, descriptive statistics were

computed on all items and scales; third, subscores were developed, either

through factor analysis or rational grouping procedures; reliabilities of

the subscores were computed; and intercorrelations between the

subscores were examined. Each of these steps is described below.

Enlisted Rating Scale Results

Descriptive statistics. Review of scale-level frequencies indicated

that 3 cases out of 228 were missing data on all substantive rating scales.

These cases were dropped from subsequent analyses, leaving a sample of

225 for most analyses. Scale means, standard deviations, and response

ranges are shown in Table 7-6. Note that raters tended to use the full

range of the seven-point scales, the means tend to be near the midpoint of

the scale, and the scale standard deviations are roughly equivalent. These

characteristics suggest that the data tend to be free of the strong leniency

effects often seen in operational ratings.

Rating scale factor analysis. Ratings for 221 ratees with complete

data on all rating scales were factor analyzed. This analysis was

undertaken as a preliminary step in the development of criterion scores to

be used for validation analyses. A principal-axis factor analysis with a

varimax rotation was conducted to examine the constructs underlying the

rating scale dimensions. A three-factor solution, accounting for 56% of

the total variance in the scales, was found to be the most meaningful.

These three factors, the scales loading the highest on each, and the factor

loadings for these scales are shown in Table7-7. The three factors were

nearly identical to prior research on the structure of Army-wide rating

categories (Campbell, 1986), and thus these factors were given labels

consistent with those used in the past: "Job-Relevant Skills and

Motivation" (Factor 1), "Personal Discipline" (Factor 2), and "Physical

Fitness and Military Bearing" (Factor 3).

Unit-weighted factor scores were computed for the three factors

resulting from the factor analysis, such that each factor score represents

the mean of the raw-score scales that comprise the factor. Factor score
138 RC Peacekeepers

Table 7-6

Descriptive Statistics for Enlisted Rating Scales

Scale Mean SD Range

Maintaining Equipment 4.55 1.25 1-7

S elf-Control and Personal Discipline 4.23 1.58 1-7

Basic Soldiering Skill 4.47 1.27 1-7

Following Regulations and Orders 4.37 1.44 1-7

Appearance and Hygiene 4.68 1.30 1-7

Self-development 4.26 1.42 1-7

Security and Guard Duties 4.66 1.32 1-7

Cultural Involvement and Awareness 4.36 1.24 1-7

Leadership and Effort 3.92 1.52 1-7

Physical Fitness 4.64 1.56 1-7

Note. N = 225.

means, standard deviations, and internal-consistency reliabilities

(coefficient alpha) are reported in Table 7-8. Additionally, descriptive

statistics for the mean score across all 10 scales are shown in Table 7-8.

Job Knowledge Test Results

Descriptive statistics. Preliminary review of the Job Knowledge

Test data indicated that a few respondents may have responded randomly.

Evidence of this included respondents finishing the 99-item test in less

than 10 minutes and tests with substantial numbers of repeat response

values. Because of this concern, several error measures were developed.

These included a count of missing values, a count of out-of-range values,

counts for each of the four possible response categories, and the last item

reached by the respondent. Aberrant cases were eliminated from further

analysis by identifying cases with outlying scores on any of these error
Sinai Performance Measures 139

Table 7-7

Rating Scale Factor Loadings

Scale Title Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

H. Self-Development .69 .36 .22

E. Security and Guard Duties .65 .33 .16

C. Basic Soldiering Skill .58 .19 .32

F. Leadership and Effort .56 .52 .29

D. Maintaining Assigned Equipment .49 .35 .41

J. Cultural Involvement and Awareness .42 .15 .13

B. Self-Control and Personal Discipline .32 .74 .19

A. Following Regulations and Orders .36 .68 .32

G. Appearance and Hygiene .19 .19 .83

I. Physical Fitness .31 .24

ent of scales to factors. Factor 1

.44

Note. Loadings shown in bold indicate the assignrr = JobRelevant Skills and Motivation, Factor 2 = Persona Discipline, Factor 3 = Physical

Fitness and Military Bearing. N = 221.

measures. Specifically, cases with more than 19 missing values, more

than 10 out-of-range values, more than 50 responses in any one response

category, or where the respondent did not reach at least the 65th item

were dropped from further analysis. Fourteen of the 308 Job Knowledge

Test examinees did not meet these criteria and were dropped from the

sample.

Table 7-8

Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities

for Enlisted Ratings Factors

Scale Mean SD fxx Range

Job-Relevant Skill and Motivation 4.37 1.01 .85 1.50-6.83

Personal Discipline 4.32 1.39 .81 1.00-7.00

Physical Fitness and Military Bearing 4.66 1.23 .64 1.00 - 7.00

Mean of Supervisor Ratings 4.42 1.00 .89 1.90-6.90

Note. N= 221, Reliability reported is coefficient alpha.
140 RC Peacekeepers

Of the 294 remaining Job Knowledge Test examinees, 187 were

junior enlisted soldiers, 104 were NCOs, and 3 could not be identified.

In the analyses that follow, all test-oriented analyses (e.g., reliabilities,

subscore development) used the entire sample of 294. All other

descriptive statistics and correlational analyses used only the relevant

sample (i.e., junior enlisted soldiers for this section).

The Job Knowledge Test was designed to yield 24 individual

task-test scores. These scores were computed as the percentage of items

pertaining to each task that were answered correctly. Descriptive

statistics and the reliability for each task test are shown in Table 7-9.

The 24 task tests were rationally grouped by general content area to

yield two additional subscores. Specifically, general soldiering tasks

were grouped apart from tasks derived from MFO-specific

responsibilities. The categorization of the tasks was performed by project

researchers involved with the development of the knowledge test. Task

labels shown in Table 7-9 are denoted to reflect the general dimension

into which each was placed. A rationally derived grouping of tasks was

preferred over more analytic approaches for two reasons: the MFO and

general soldiering dimensions represent an important and meaningful

distinction in the research, and knowledge tests used in prior research on

soldiering used a similar distinction. The tests developed under Project A

resulted in a common soldiering and an MOS-specific component

(Campbell & Zook, 1991). Descriptive statistics and reliabilities for

these two subtest components, and for the entire test, are shown at the

bottom of Table 7-9. As with the task tests, subtest and total test scores

were computed as the percentage of items answered correctly.

Summary of Enlisted Soldier Criterion Scores

Rating-based scores. As a result of these analyses, three sets of

rating-based scores are currently available for conducting validation

analyses. The total ratings score can be used as a general summary of

typical performance, factor scores can be used to validate the predictor

tests at the construct level, and individual scale scores can be also used to

address questions about more specific aspects of performance. For

example, the scales "Guard and Security Duties" and "Cultural

Awareness and Involvement" represent areas of performance that may be
Sinai Performance Measures 141

Table 7-9

Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities for Job Knowledge Task Tests

Task # of Items Mean SD f XX

Describe the zonal structure of the Sinai (M) 4 64 30 .53

Identify do's and don'ts of contacts with Egyptians (M) 7 59 27 .64

Describe the mission tasks for four levels of org. field sites (M) 5 64 35 .78

Estimate range (G) 3 33 26 .12

Perform search and scan procedures (G) 4 37 25 .11

Identify specific aircraft by type and origin (M) 8 62 28 .75

Identify Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) forces (M) 5 64 29 .60

Maintain an Ml6A2 Rifle (G) 3 61 34 .54

Prepare incident reports (M) 3 48 30 .21

Prepare routine/recurring reports (M) 5 57 29 .49

Send a radio message (G) 3 63 36 .58

React to threatening, suspicious, or unusual incidents and adhere 4 72 31 .65

to defensive procedures (M)

Follow rules for use of force and employment of firearms (M) 3 75 34 .75

Perform operational survival techniques (M) 6 50 25 .43

Take action on incidents involving vehicles (M) 3 42 34 .47

Recognize explosive hazards of the Sinai (M) 4 33 25 .16

Engage targets with M16A2 rifle (G) 5 30 22 .12

Determine grid coordinates (G) 4 60 36 .76

Give first aid for heat injuries (G) 3 53 32 .40

Perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation (G) 3 55 35 .51

Guide a helicopter to a landing point (G) 5 43 24 .30

Perform self-extraction from a minefield (G) 3 42 29 .19

Collect and report information (G) 3 56 31 .21

Request a medical evacuation (G) 3 51 35 .46

General Soldiering Knowledge 42 49 17 .83

MFO-Specific Soldiering Knowledge 57 58 19 .91

Total test score 99 54 17

t-half, all others are coefficient alpha.

.94"

Note. "Total test score reliability computed as a Spearman-Brown spli

N for reliabilities = 294; all other statistics are based on N = 187. "G" indicates task contributes to the

General Soldiering Knowledge subscore. "M" indicates contribution to the MFO Sole iering Knowledge subscore.
142 RC Peacekeepers

more unique to the MFO mission than other scales. Relationships

between these scales and the predictor measures may be of particular

interest.

Job Knowledge Test-based scores. Similar to the ratings, knowledge

test performance may be expressed in three ways: as a total test score, as

a subscore on either the MFO-specific or general soldiering dimensions,

or as 24 individual task-test scores. Although the two subscores will

probably be the most useful for validation purposes, relationships

between predictor scores and individual task tests may also be of interest.

Note, however, that many of the individual task tests have reliabilities

that are too low to be useful criterion measures by themselves.

Relationships between criterion scores. Table 7- 10 shows the

correlations among the summary scores for the ratings and the Job

Knowledge Test. The intercorrelations between the ratings factors and

the test factors offer a meaningful pattern. Note that ratings on the

Technical Skill and Motivation factor show significant positive

correlations with the Job Knowledge Test factors, and most strongly with

the General Soldiering subscore. The other ratings factors show lower or

no relationship with the knowledge test. This pattern makes sense in that

soldiers lacking critical job knowledge (as shown by the test) would be

less likely to receive high ratings on the technical scales, whereas these

same soldiers' disciplinary and fitness ratings should not be related to

their level ofjob knowledge. Note also that soldiers' General Soldiering

knowledge scores tend to be highly related to their MFO-specific

knowledge scores (r = .78, uncorrected).

NCO PERFORMANCE MEASURES: DEVELOPMENT

Although NCO performance was not the central focus of this effort,

during the course of the work a need developed to gain an understanding

of the performance dimensions that may be relevant for NCOs. This

activity was accomplished primarily by drawing upon existing efforts to

define NCO performance and by evaluating the extent to which these

dimensions may apply in the Sinai. As such, this section focuses on the

results of several job analysis survey administrations with varying

samples. Performance dimensions and rating measures were then based

on the results of the job analysis effort. Note that NCO performance was
Sinai Performance Measures 143

Table 7-10

Intercorrelations Among Rating Factors and Test Subscores

Technical

Skill &

Motivation

Personal

Discipline PFMB

Avg.

Ratings

General MFO

Soldiering Soldiering

Personal .71"

Discipline

Physical

Fitness &

.58" .50"

Bearing

Average

Ratings

.95" .84" .74"

General .24" .09 .03 .18*

Soldering (.29) (.11) (.04) (.21)

MFO .18* .07 -.06 .12 .78"

Soldiering (.20) (.08) (-.08) (.13)

JK Total .22" .08 -.014 .16* .92" .96**

Score (.25) (.09) (-.01)

.01.

e for correlations among ratings = 225, among

ores = 184. Correlations between ratings and

ttenuation in both measures being correlated.

(.18)

test scores = 187, and between ratings

test scores appearing in parentheses

'p<.05. "p<

Note. Sample siz

factors and test sc

are adjusted for a

defined only with respect to performance constructs; task and knowledge

dimensions unique to NCOs were not developed as a part of this research.

MFO NCO Performance Construct Investigation

Candidate dimensions were obtained from a current ARI-sponsored

project known as ECQUIP (Expanding the Concept of Quality in

Personnel) that involves development and validation of predictors of

NCO performance (Peterson, Smith, Hoffman, Pulakos, Reynolds, Potts,

Oppler, & Whetzel, 1993). Much like the enlisted construct-based

dimensions described beforehand, the NCO dimensions were developed

through a process of literature review, initial dimension development,

critical incident collection and retranslation, and dimension revision.

However, these dimensions were created to apply Army-wide and were

developed entirely using NCOs currently stationed in the United States.

The NCO Job Activities Questionnaire (JAQ) was developed to

assess the relevance of these dimensions for the MFO mission. The
144 RC Peacekeepers

The NCO Job Activities Questionnaire (JAQ) was developed to

assess the relevance of these dimensions for the MFO mission. The

instrument defined each of the performance dimensions and required the

respondent to provide a rating of the importance of the dimension for

overall performance in the Sinai (on a 0 - 5-point scale) and the amount

of time spent on activities involving the dimension (also on a 0 - 5-point

scale) while in the Sinai.

The JAQ was administered to MFO-deployed NCOs three times

during the course of this research: first, to a sample of NCOs who served

on Rotation 26 (JAQ Sample 1); second, to a sample of MFO-deployed

Rotation 28 NCOs early in their tour in the Sinai (JAQ Sample 2); and

third, to another sample of Rotation 28 NCO's, later in their tour (JAQ

Sample 3). Data collected with the JAQ were used to inform the

development of a set of NCO-specific rating scales to be used in the

Sinai. The development of these scales is described in the final report by

Reynolds and Campbell (in preparation).

JAQ Sample 1 administration. The survey was first administered to

a sample of former (Rotation 26) MFO NCOs to begin to assess the

relevance of the dimensions for the MFO mission. A total of 20 NCOs

who had served in the Sinai as part of a previous rotation completed the

questionnaire during SME workshops conducted to refine the MFO job

knowledge test (July 1994). NCO ratings of importance and time spent

for each of 13 dimensions on the questionnaire were summed together to

form a "criticality" score. Table 7-11 shows the results of this analysis,

ranked by criticality score, in the column labeled "MFO."

To provide a comparison point, data collected as a part of the

original dimension development activities (as part of the ECQUIP

project) from 25 non-MFO NCOs serving in the continental United States

are presented with the MFO results. To make the most appropriate

comparison, only data collected from 1 IB NCOs were included from the

development sample. A summary of these data appears in the column

labeled "non-MFO" in Table 7-11. (A full report on the data collection

strategy and the development of the Army-wide NCO dimensions can be

found in Peterson et al. (1993).

When MFO NCOs are compared to NCOs whose reference point

was their current assignment at a domestic location, most performance
Sinai Performance Measures 145

Table 7-11

Criticality of 13 NCO Dimensions for Performance in the Sinai/United States

Mean Criticalitv Score Standard Deviation

Dimension MFO Non-MFO MFO Non-MFO p value

Relating and Cooperating with Others 8.25 8.00 1.21 1.08 n.s.

Motivating Others 8.05 7.96 1.36 1.34 n.s.

Following Regulations, Policies, and

Procedures

/

Demonstrating Effort and Motivation

7.95 7.00 2.28 1.58 n.s.

7.85 8.04 2.21 1.34 n.s.

Communicating Orally 7.75 7.72 1.59 1.67 n.s.

Demonstrating Integrity and Discipline 7.55 7.96 2.19 1.26 n.s.

Directing, Monitoring, and

Supervising Work

7.00 7.64 1.41 1.38 n.s.

Representing the Army 6.65 6.76 2.62 2.33 n.s.

Demonstrating Responsiveness 6.60 # 2.14 *

Organizing, Coordinating, and

Executing Work

5.75 7.24 1.45 1.92 <.01

Planning and Providing for Training 5.55 7.60 2.42 1.56 <.01

Demonstrating Technical Knowledge

and Skill

5.50 7.16 2.44 1.82 <.02

Writing 4.95 6.16 2.74 1.65 <.10

Rotation 26, N= 25 for all domestic NCOs; criticality

summing time spent ratings (0-5 scale) and importance

denoted with an asterisk represent dimensions that were not

Note. N = 20 for all items for Sinai NCOs on

score is based on a 11 -point scale, created by

ratings (0-5 scale) for each dimension. Cells

assessed during the domestic data collection.

dimensions do not differ if rated criticality. However, a few dimensions

were viewed as less critical by MFO NCOs: "Organizing, Coordinating,

and Executing Work;" "Planning and Providing for Training;"

"Demonstrating Technical Knowledge and Skill;" and "Writing" were all

rated as significantly less critical by NCOs who participated in the MFO

mission compared to their domestic counterparts. This finding is likely

to be unique to MFO peacekeeping because the requirements of the

mission are well-established, uncomplicated, and routine.
146 RC Peacekeepers

JAQ Sample 2. Additional data were collected to determine the

extent to which these NCO dimensions are perceived as important by

NCOs participating in Rotation 28, and the extent to which some of the

first term (E1-E4) Sinai performance dimensions may apply to MFO

NCOs. MFO NCOs participating in Rotation 28 completed the same

performance dimension rating questionnaire as described previously in

February 1995 in the Sinai. Additional items were also included that

asked NCOs to rate the importance and time spent on the 10 enlisted

dimensions of MFO performance.

A total of 31 NCOs who were serving in the Sinai as part of Rotation

28 completed the questionnaires. Of these, 8 were sergeants (SGT), 22

were staff sergeants (SSG), and 1 was a sergeant first class (SFC). NCO

ratings of importance and time spent for each of the 13 NCO dimensions

on the questionnaire were summed together to form a "criticality" score.

Table 7-12 shows the results of this analysis, ranked by criticality score,

in the column labeled "R 28 Time 1"; data from Rotation 26 (R 26) are

also shown in Table 7-12 to facilitate comparison.

JAQ Sample 3. Only data collected from JAQ Samples 1 and 2 were

used to inform the development of the NCO rating scales; however, an

additional sample of JAQ data was collected at the time of the

administration of the NCO rating scales to verify the importance of the

assessed dimensions and to allow for comparisons with the earlier JAQ

samples.

A total of 71 individuals serving as part of Rotation 28 completed

the JAQ in May 1995 in the Sinai. Of these, 39 were SGT, 20 were SSG,

and 7 were SFC; additionally, 7 were promotable corporals with

supervisory responsibilities. Dimension means from JAQ Sample 3 are

presented in the third column of Table 7-12.

The results presented in Table 7-12 show a similar pattern to those

presented in Table 7-11. Specifically, Rotation 26 NCOs tend to view a

few dimensions as less critical than their counterparts in Rotation 28.

Additionally, when Rotation 28 personnel are compared to their

non-MFO counterparts (see Table 7-11), none of the dimension criticality

scores significantly differ.

There are several factors that may underlie this pattern of

differences. First, Rotation 28 personnel (which include ARNG and RC
Sinai Performance Measures !4Z

Table 7-12

Criticality of 13 NCO Dimensions for Performance

in the Sinai as Rated by NCOs on Two Rotations

Mean Criticalitv Score Standard Deviation

R28 R28 R28 R28

Dimension

Relating and Cooperating with Others

R26

8.25

Time 1

8.16

Time 2

7.49

R26

1.21

Time 1

1.46

Time 2

1.75

Motivating Others 8.05 7.23 7.52 1.36 2.31 1.81

Following Regulations, Policies, and

Procedures

7.95 7.32 7.70 2.28 1.38 1.66

Demonstrating Effort and Motivation 7.85 7.41 7.55 2.21 1.12 1.52

Communicating Orally 7.75 8.06 7.92 1.59 1.15 1.31

Demonstrating Integrity and

Discipline

7.55 7.90 8.01 2.19 1.45 1.53

Directing, Monitoring, and

Supervising Work

7.00 7.58 7.65 1.41 2.08 1.37

Representing the Army 6.65 6.33 6.62 2.62 2.62 2.56

Demonstrating Responsiveness 6.60 6.87 6.93 2.14 1.78 1.45

Organizing, Coordinating, and

Executing Work

5.75a

7.68 7.03 1.45 1.11 1.47

Planning and Providing for Training 5.55 6.61 6.53 2.42 2.14 2.21

Demonstrating Technical Knowledge

and Skill

5.50b6.84 6.24 2.44 1.79 2.12

Writing 4.95"

dotation

6.68

28 means (p

6.49

<.0l).

2.74 1.51 1.70

Note. ' Rotation 26 mean differs from both

Rotation 26 mean differs from Time 1 Rotati on 28 mean only (p <.03)

N = 20 for all items for Rotation 26 NCOs, N = 31 for all Rotation 28, Time 1 NCOs, and N = 71

for Rotation 28, Time 2 NCOs. Criticality score is based on an 11 -point scale, created by summing

time spent ratings (0-5 scale) and importance ratings (0-5 scale) for each dimension.
148 RC Peacekeepers

personnel) may view their responsibilities in the Sinai as more important

than Rotation 26 personnel because many of them reactivated specifically

for the mission. Active duty personnel may view the MFO mission as

light duty compared to their normal responsibilities (note the lower rating

for this group on the "Demonstrating Technical Knowledge and Skill"

dimension). Second, the location of the administration may have led

NCOs actually in the Sinai (Rotation 28) to rate some dimensions higher

than did Rotation 26 NCOs who had returned to Fort Bragg by the time

of the data collection. Third, the time of the administration may have

made a difference. Rotation 28 NCOs who completed the questionnaires

just after their arrival in the Sinai (Time 1) tended to give the highest

ratings; Rotation 26 NCOs, who completed the instrument just after the

completion of their mission, tended to give the lowest. Rotation 28 Time

2 NCOs tended to give ratings that fell between the other samples,

although none of the comparisons between the Time 1 and Time 2

samples were statistically significant.

The Rotation 28 samples (Time 1 and 2) also rated the importance of

the enlisted dimensions for performance in the Sinai. The results of the

ratings for these samples are shown in Table 7-13. Note that all of the

dimensions are rated fairly high and that no significant differences were

found between the samples.

Active Component/Reserve Component comparisons. Because

Rotation 28 NCOs were drawn from both the AC and the RC,

comparisons could be drawn between these groups on the perceived

importance of the performance dimensions. The Rotation 28 Time 1 and

Time 2 samples were combined to improve the sample size for these

comparisons and because no differences were found between the two

samples.

AC and RC NCOs differed significantly in their criticality ratings for

only two dimensions: (1) AC NCOs viewed "Cultural Involvement and

Awareness" as less critical than RC NCOs (mean AC = 5.08, mean RC =

6.95; t = 4.33, p < .001), and (2) AC NCOs viewed "Writing" as more

critical than RC NCOs (mean AC = 6.86, mean RC = 6.05; t = 2.53, p <

.02).
Sinai Performance Measures 142.

Table 7-13

Criticality of 10 Sinai-Specific Enlisted Dimensions

for NCO Performance in the Sinai as Rated by NCOs on Rotation 28

Mean Criticality Score Standard Deviation

Dimension

Leadership and Effort

Self-Control and Personal Discipline

Appearance and Hygiene

Physical Fitness

Maintaining Assigned Equipment

Following Regulations and Orders

Self-Development

Guard and Security Duties

Basic Soldiering Skill

Cultural Involvement and Awareness

R28 R28 R28 R28

Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2

8.33 * 1.27 1.27

8.07 * 1.39 1.39

7.90 7.67 1.68 1.68

7.84 7.83 1.34 1.34

7.70 7.73 1.91 1.91

7.40 * 1.28 1.28

7.35 7.10 1.66 1.66

7.23 8.03 2.80 2.80

6.80 7.11 2.77 2.77

6.32 5.63 1.87 1.87

Note. N - 31 for all Time 1 NCOs. N = 71 for Time 2 NCOs: asterisk (*) indicates dimensions were not

assessed. Criticality score is based on an 11-point scale, created by summing time spent ratings (0-5 scale) and

importance ratings (0-5 scale) for each dimension. No mean comparisons reached statistical significance.

MFO NCO Rating Scale Development

Results from the administration of the JAQ were used to select

dimensions for rating scale development in the following manner: Data

collected from Rotation 26 personnel (Sample 1) were used to select

highly rated dimensions; data collected from Rotation 28, Time 1

personnel (Sample 2) were used to inform judgments regarding the use of

some of the enlisted scales for evaluating NCO performance, and to

verify the importance of the ECQUIP dimensions that were selected

based on the Rotation 26 data: and data collected from Rotation 28, Time

2 personnel (Sample 3) were used to verify the importance of the

dimensions used to form the scales.

Based on the JAQ Sample 1 data collection, dimensions with mean

criticality scores less than 6.0 were dropped from consideration, leaving

nine dimensions. The results of the Sample 2 data collection showed that

all of the enlisted dimensions were considered to be important, to some

degree, for NCOs; however, several dimensions were dropped to

minimize the overlap between the NCO dimensions and the enlisted

dimensions. For example, the enlisted dimension of Leadership and

Effort was dropped because several of the NCO dimensions elaborate on
150 RC Peacekeepers

the constructs implied by the lower level dimension. The final set of

dimensions included in the scales is shown in Table 7-14.

The MFO NCO rating scales were developed for the selected

dimensions by modifying existing scales. Specifically, the behavioral

anchors were removed from the relevant enlisted scales because many of

the statements did not apply to NCOs. Similarly structured, behaviorally

anchored rating scales had also been developed under the ECQUIP

project for the NCO dimensions, and these were also modified to

Table 7-14

MFO NCO Performance Dimensions Used

in Rating Scale Development

Following Regulations, Policies, and Procedures

Maintaining Assigned Equipment

Security and Guard Duties

Appearance and Hygiene

Self-Development

Physical Fitness

Cultural Involvement and Awareness

Communicating Orally

Demonstrating Effort and Initiative

Demonstrating Integrity and Discipline

Relating and Cooperating with Others

Motivating Others

Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work

Demonstrating Responsiveness

eliminate the behavioral anchors, because many of these statements dealt

with activities that would not be performed in the Sinai. The ECQUIP

NCO scales were further tailored by editing the behavioral summary

statements to better reflect MFO performance requirements. The

completed set of MFO NCO rating scales is provided in the final report

by Reynolds and Campbell (in preparation).
Sinai Performance Measures 15_1

MFO NCO Rating Scale Administration

The NCO rating scales were administered to 44 supervisors of 116

NCOs stationed in the Sinai as a part of MFO Rotation 28. The NCO

scales were administered according to the same procedures as the enlisted

scales (described beforehand). Of the 116 NCOs rated, 50 could be

identified as AC NCOs, 55 were RC NCOs, and the service component

of the remaining 11 could not be identified.

NCO PERFORMANCE MEASURES: RESULTS

Performance information collected from NCOs in the Sinai included

both NCO rating scale data and Job Knowledge Test data. In this section,

descriptive summaries are presented for both of these measures, followed

by analyses comparing the performance of AC and RC personnel.

NCO Rating Scale Results

Scale means, standard deviations, and response ranges are shown in

Table 7-15. Note that raters of NCOs did not use the full range of some

scales, and similarly, the means tend to be higher than those reported on

the enlisted scales. Scale standard deviations are roughly equivalent.

Compared to junior enlisted soldiers (see Table 7-6), NCOs tended to

receive higher scores. This pattern might be expected when comparing

more experienced, and more highly selected, ratees to those with less

experience.

An average across all 14 NCO scales was computed as a summary

measure, and the descriptive statistics on this variable are reported in the

last row of Table 7-15. The internal consistency reliability (coefficient

alpha) for this summary measure was r = .88 for this sample. The use of

factor analysis was not considered here because of the large number of

scales (14) and the relatively small sample of NCOs with data on all

variables (116). Additionally, because the NCO scales are in an earlier

stage of development, basing an initial understanding of the structure of

NCO performance on a small and unique sample could be misleading.
152 RC Peacekeepers

Table 7-15

Descriptive Statistics for NCO Rating Scales

Scale Mean SD Range

Maintaining Equipment 5.28 1.13 2-7

Oral Communication 5.03 1.31 2-7

Effort and Initiative 4.91 1.56 1 -7

Following Regulations, Policies, Procedures 4.94 1.24 2-7

Integrity and Discipline 5.09 1.38 1 -7

Relating and Cooperating With Others 4.89 1.51 1 -7

Motivating Others 4.65 1.44 1 -7

Directing, Monitoring, Supervising Work 4.79 1.39 1 -7

Demonstrating Responsiveness 4.83 1.39 1 -7

Appearance and Hygiene 5.69 1.34 1 -7

Self-Development 5.01 1.50 1 -7

Security and Guard Duties 5.68 1.06 3-7

Cultural Involvement and Awareness 4.70 1.39 1 -7

Physical Fitness

Average Rating Score

5.22

5.05

1.52

^7

1 -7

2.4-6.9

Note:JV= 116.

NCO Job Knowledge Test Results

One hundred and nine NCOs completed the Job Knowledge Test

under the same conditions as the junior enlisted soldiers. Five cases were

eliminated from the sample because of high scores on the error measures.

Descriptive statistics on the Job Knowledge Test for the 104 remaining

NCOs are reported in Table 7-16. It is important to recognize that the

Job Knowledge Test was originally developed to assess junior enlisted

personnel; thus, the test's applicability to NCOs as a knowledge measure

may be questionable.
Sinai Performance Measures 153

Table 7-16

Descriptive Statistics. Reliabilities for Job Knowledge Task Tests

(NCOs only)

Task

Describe the zonal structure of the Sinai

Identify do's and don'ts of contacts with Egyptians

Describe the mission tasks for four levels of org. field sites

Estimate range

Perform search and scan procedures

Identify specific aircraft by type and origin

Identify Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) forces

Maintain an M16A2 Rifle

Prepare incident reports

Prepare routine/recurring reports

Send a radio message

React to threatening, suspicious, or unusual incidents and

adhere to defensive procedures

Follow rules for use of force and employment of firearms

Perform operational survival techniques

Take action on incidents involving vehicles

Recognize explosive hazards of the Sinai

Engage targets with M16A2 rifle

Determine grid coordinates

Give first aid for heat injuries

Perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation

Guide a helicopter to a landing point

Perform self-extraction from a minefield

Collect and report information

Request a medical evacuation

General Soldiering Knowledge

MFO-Specific Soldiering Knowledge

Total test score

Mean

69

62

75

41

46

68

66

68

47

64

66

75

SD

29

28

32

30

24

29

30

32

32

23

35

30

76 34

54 22

46 32

38 26

30 20

60 36

66 33

61 34

52 25

49 24

59 28

58 32

56 16

62 19

59 " 17

Note. N= 104.
154 RC Peacekeepers

Relationships between the NCO rating scales and the test subscores

are reported in Table 7-17. The pattern of low relationships between

these measures suggests that the Job Knowledge Test may not be an

adequate measure of the knowledge that underlies NCO performance.

Table 7-17

Intercorrelations Among Average NCO Ratings

and Knowledge Test Subscores

Total JK Test General

Score Soldiering

General Soldiering .91"

MFO Soldiering .95" .75"

Average NCO Rating -.03 .02

MFO

Soldiering

.06

p<.01.

Note. For correlations among test scores N= 104, and for correlations between ratings factors and test

scores N= 86.

Comparisons Between Active and Reserve Component NCOs

As indicated above, the unique make up of Rotation 28 included

NCOs drawn from both the AC and RC. To test whether there are

differences in the performance levels between the NCOs with these

backgrounds, mean comparisons were made on the rating scale scores

and the Job Knowledge Test subscores between these groups. The results

of this comparison are shown in Table 7-18.

The data presented in Table 7-18 suggest two conclusions regarding

this comparison. First, RC NCOs received lower ratings than AC NCOs

on several dimensions. Second, the Job Knowledge Test scores were

essentially equivalent between these groups. Regarding the rating

differences, 5 of the 14 scales, as well as the average ratings score,

showed significant differences in favor of the AC NCOs. These

differences range in size between a half and a whole standard deviation

on the measures. It is interesting to note, however, that one of the few

areas in which RC NCOs were rated higher than their AC colleagues was
Sinai Performance Measures A51

Table 7-18

Means and Standard Deviations for Active Component

and Reserve Component NCOs on Several Performance Measures

Mean Standard

Deviation

Performance Measure Active Reserve Active Reserve

Rating Scales

Relating and Cooperating With Others 4.90 4.95 1.68 1.41

Motivating Others 5.02 4.38* 1.39 1.46

Following Regulations, Policies, and Procedures 5.12 4.81 1.30 1.22

Demonstrating Effort and Initiative 5.12 4.78 1.49 1.65

Communicating Orally 5.18 4.96 1.30 1.36

Demonstrating Integrity and Discipline 5.06 5.07 1.24 1.55

Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work 5.28 4.42" 1.18 1.45

Demonstrating Responsiveness 5.14 4.65 1.47 1.25

Maintaining Assigned Equipment 5.82 4.85" .92 1.14

Security and Guard Duties 5.90 5.49 .97 1.17

Appearance and Hygiene 5.92 5.44 1.03 1.54

Self-Development 5.46 4.62" 1.18 1.75

Physical Fitness 5.70 4.85" 1.43 1.58

Cultural Involvement and Awareness 4.56 4.78 1.40 1.38

Average Rating Score 5.30 4.86* .80 .92

Knowledge Test Summary Scores

General Soldiering Knowledge 57 54 16 17

MFO-Specific Knowledge 62 62 19 20

Total Test Score 60 60 T6 T7

><.05 "P<m

Note: N= 50, 55 respectively for Active Component. Reserve*Component Ratees. N = 40, 44 respectively

for Active Component, ReserveComponent examinees taking the Job Knowledge Test.
156 RC Peacekeepers

on the "Cultural Involvement and Awareness" dimension. Recall that

this one dimension was viewed as significantly more critical by RC

NCOs than by AC NCOs responding to the JAQ.

It was hypothesized that one reason for these group differences could

be differential rating patterns provided by raters from the alternate service

component. To test whether AC NCO raters were rating RC NCOs lower

than their AC peers, 2 by 2 analyses of variance (ANOVA) were

conducted. These analyses compared ratings provided by raters from

both service component groups with the service component of the ratees.

A significant interaction would indicate that raters viewed ratees from

their own component differently from ratees from the alternate

component.

The results of the ANOVAs did not support the differential rating

hypothesis. Specifically, RC ratees were generally rated lower by ratees

from both service components. However, these analyses did reveal an

interesting pattern: on most dimensions, RC NCOs tended to rate their

own NCOs lower, and the AC NCOs higher, than did the Regular Army

raters. That is, the difference between the performance of the NCOs from

different service components was more profound for the raters from the

RC.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The measures of MFO peacekeeper performance described in this

chapter were designed to fulfill two purposes: to provide criteria in a

larger effort to validate measures that may predict performance as an

MFO peacekeeper and to describe the performance levels of the

participants in the 28th Rotation for the mission. Two aspects of the

performance domain were considered independently: motivational or

"will-do" aspects, and job proficiency on various important knowledge

and task areas or "can-do" aspects of performance. Based on efforts to

specify the content of the domain, two measures were developed to

assess performance (rating scales and a knowledge test).

Most soldiers serving on the MFO mission are drawn from the

infantryman MOS, and for this reason this research used prior work to

define the general soldiering and 11B performance domain as a starting
Sinai Performance Measures 1^2

point. The importance of many of these constructs and tasks for

performance in the Sinai was supported by this work; however, several

Sinai-specific requirements were identified. For example, the

construct-based rating scales include new dimensions for "Cultural

Involvement and Awareness" and "Security and Guard Duties" as well as

Sinai-specific definitions and examples of performance on common

soldiering dimensions. Although several MOS have security and guard

duties as a part of their regular activities (e.g., Military Police), this

dimension is unique in this context because it would not typically be such

a critical component of the infantryman's job.

Factor analyses of the rating scale dimensions indicated that the

structure of the dimensions is quite similar to that found for soldiers,

Army-wide, in prior research. The Sinai-specific dimensions tended to

fit best with other technical skill and motivation dimensions. The Job

Knowledge Test has a heavy emphasis on observation and identification

skills as well as reporting procedures, consistent with the central

activities of the MFO peacekeeper. Scores on the knowledge test were

broken down into a score for tasks dealing with MFO-specific knowledge

and general soldiering knowledge, commensurate with the structure of

prior tests of soldier knowledge.

The work presented here represents a typical criterion development

effort conducted for a job in an atypical environment. The MFO

peacekeeping mission is atypical because it places individuals trained in

infantry (warfighting) skills in a situation where many of these skills may

not be relevant and new skills may be critical. The results of this

investigation indicate that both the similarities and the differences

between the requirements of the MFO mission and those of regular

soldiering are important for understanding the nature of performance in

general and for selecting soldiers for the mission in particular.

The final set of dimensions used to develop the rating scales are

similar to the dimensions found to be important for soldiering

Army-wide, and the underlying structure of these scales is similar to that

found for the Army-wide scales in earlier research. This finding is

significant because it allows for a comparison between the structures

obtained under different mission conditions. The finding that a similar

structure was obtained for MFO-specific scales is consistent with current

research on the nature of performance (e.g., Campbell et al., 1993). That
158 RC Peacekeepers

is, the nature of what makes for good performance is fairly stable across

environments, even when the content of what is done is quite different.

These findings indicate that having the required technical skills and

knowledge, staying out of trouble, and maintaining your fitness and

military bearing are the ingredients for being a good soldier, whether the

soldier is in garrison in the United States or in the desert of the Sinai.

The finding of similar performance structures across missions must

not be confused with similarity in content, however. The manner in

which the rating dimensions were defined, and the examples of good and

poor performance on which they are based, reflect the unique

requirements of the MFO peacekeeper. The uniqueness of content was

most evident in the task dimensions selected for testing.

Comparison of the tasks selected as most critical for the MFO

mission to other sets of infantryman tasks demonstrates the largely

passive nature of the mission. The critical tasks have a heavy emphasis

on observation and identification skills as well as reporting procedures,

consistent with the central activities of the MFO peacekeeper. By

comparison, tasks selected through a similar process when developing a

knowledge test for infantryman in general (cf. Campbell, 1986) tend to

reflect a heavier emphasis on weapon use and maintenance, combat

techniques, and navigation. Although it is not surprising that

infantrymen in a well-defined peacekeeper role view different tasks as

important compared to those who are in the traditional warfighter role,

the stark differences between these content areas serve as an interesting

contrast to the similarity in the rating dimensions. Again, this is taken as

evidence that the dimensions of performance are consistent, even when

the behaviors performed on various missions differ.

This research also included a preliminary examination of NCO

performance in the Sinai. Through a series ofjob analysis survey efforts,

the importance of several dimensions for the MFO mission was

evaluated. Rating scales were developed to correspond to the most

highly rated dimensions.

Results from these job analysis efforts indicated that some

differences may exist in the performance requirements for MFO NCOs

compared to NCOs who are on a stateside assignment. These differences

were observed primarily on dimensions dealing with work organization,
Sinai Performance Measures 159

training, technical skill, and writing, and the differences probably reflect

the fact that the MFO mission is highly structured and typically routine.

It is interesting to note that these differences were not as apparent for

Rotation 28 NCOs; however, this difference may have been due to

differences in the timing of the data collections between the various

samples investigated.

Perhaps the most interesting findings stemmed from the fact that the

Rotation 28 NCO sample allowed for performance comparisons between

AC NCOs and RC NCOs, which revealed that AC NCOs tended to be

rated higher than their RC peers. Some of the differences found between

these groups may be explained simply by differences in supervisory

experience: several of the dimensions with the biggest differences

involve traditional supervisory responsibilities (e.g., motivating

subordinates, directing and supervising work). It is reasonable to expect

that AC NCOs whose pre-MFO daily activities emphasized these

components would be superior in these areas. Other differences may be

the result of different long-term priorities. For example,

self-development may not have been a priority for RC NCOs, because

developing one's military skills (through extra course work and training)

would not be as instrumental to career advancement as it would be for

AC NCOs.

It is also interesting to note that the largest performance difference

favoring RC NCOs was on the "Cultural Involvement and Awareness"

dimension, a dimension that RC NCOs rated as more important to overall

performance than AC NCOs in the job analysis. This finding might

indicate that RC NCOs placed more emphasis on the features of the

MFO-mission that are unique to peacekeeping than did the AC NCOs.

When comparing NCOs from the two service components, it is

critical to recognize that NCOs in both groups had performance scores

that were above average in all areas. Superior performance should be

expected from AC NCOs, who are full-time leaders and supervisors. The

fact that the RC NCOs were rated higher in some areas attests to the

value of a unique perspective they may bring to the peacekeeping task.

Unfortunately, the design of this research did not allow for similar

performance-level comparisons to be conducted for enlisted soldiers.
160 RC Peacekeepers

Aside from the description of the performance of the soldiers and

NCOs participating in Rotation 28, the second focus of this effort was on

the validation of predictors of peacekeeper performance. These findings

suggest that measures found to predict performance of soldiers in other

environments are likely to be useful here. Specifically, cognitive

measures are likely to be important for the prediction of the technical

aspects of the job, and personality and temperament measures may be

important for predicting the other areas (e.g, "Personal Discipline" and

"Physical Fitness and Military Bearing"). As noted in the introduction,

because cognitive measures have already been given to all soldiers at the

time of enlistment, the biggest gains may be made with the addition of

noncognitive measures.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank several individuals who assisted with this

research. At the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and

Social Sciences, Drs. Michael Rumsey and Dale Palmer provided

important guidance and suggestions throughout the project; Drs. Ruth

Phelps, Paul Gade, Robert Wisher, Elizabeth Brady, and Hyder Lakhani

assisted with data collection in the Sinai; and LTC Robert Martinez, from

the Army National Guard, provided essential logistical support. At the

Human Resources Research Organization, Deirdre Knapp and James

Harris provided skilled management oversight and technical assistance,

and Dolores Carson contributed administrative support and document

preparation.

Although the support of U.S. Army personnel was critical

throughout the project, it should be recognized that the views, opinions,

and findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should

not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy,

or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.
Sinai Performance Measures 161

REFERENCES

Campbell, J. P. (1986). Improving the selection, classification, and

utilization ofArmy enlisted personnel: Annual Report, 1986fiscal

year (ARI Technical Report No. 792). Alexandria, VA: U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

(AD A198 856)

Campbell, J. P, Dunnette, M. D., Arvey, R., & Hellervick (1973). The

development and evaluation of behaviorally based rating scales.

Journal ofApplied Psychology, 57, 15-22.

Campbell, J. P., McCloy, R. A., Oppler, S. H. & Sager, C. E. (1993). A

theory of performance. In N. Schmitt & W. Borman and

Associates (Eds.), Personnel selection in organizations. San

Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Campbell, J. P. & Zook, L. (1991). Improving the selection,

classification, and utilization ofArmy enlisted personnel: Final

report on Project A (ARI Research Report No. 1597). Alexandria,

VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences. (AD A242 921)

De Jong, R. D. & Broesder, W. A. (1994). Functioning in peacekeeping:

Relation to leadership, threat, and individual differences.

Proceedings ofthe meeting ofthe International Military Testing

Association, 36, 405-410.

Mael, F., Kilcullen, R., Olszewski, T., and White, L. (1995). Developing

peacekeeper predictor measures. In Z. Simutis (Chair), Selecting

warriors to be peacekeepers. Symposium conducted at the

Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association,

New York, NY.

McHenry, J. J., Hough, L. M., Toquam, J. L., Hanson, M. A., &

Ashworth, S. (1990). Project A validity results: The relationship

between predictor and criterion domains. Personnel Psychology,

43, 335-354.
162 RC Peacekeepers

Multinational Force and Observers (1992). MFO Infantry Battalion

Pre-Deployment Training Package. MFO Headquarters.

Multinational Force and Observers (1993). Multinational Force and

Observers: Servants ofPeace. Rome: MFO.

Peterson, N. G., Smith, D., Hoffman, R. G., Pulakos, E. D., Reynolds, D.

H., Potts, B. C, Oppler, S. H.,& Whetzel, D. L. (1993).

Expanding the concept ofquality in personnel: Base periodfinal

report (AIR Final Report). Washington, DC: American Institutes

for Research.

Reynolds, D. H., & Campbell, R. C. (in preparation). Development of

measuresfor Sinai peacekeeping performance. Alexandria, VA:

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences.

Rumsey, M. G. (1995). The Sinai peacekeeping selection project. In Z.

Simutis (Chair), Selecting warriors to be peacekeepers. Syposium

conducted at the Annual Convention of the American

Psychological Association, New York, NY.

Smith, P. C. & Kendall, L. M. (1963). Retranslation of expectations: An

approach to the construction of unambiguous anchors for rating

scales. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 47, 149-155.

U.S. Department of Defense. (Undated). Soldiers Manual (1 IB). U.S.

Army Training Document.
8

TRAINING AND TASK PERFORMANCE

Robert A. Wisher

Beatrice J. Farr

INTRODUCTION

Military operations are only as successful as the training conducted

in their preparation! Although that statement sounds like incontrovertible

truth which hardly anyone would deny, the literature on peacekeeping

operations relegates training to a decidedly secondary role. Most authors

focus on geopolitical issues, internationalism, military strategy, and

economics. To the extent that training is addressed at all, it is only with

respect to a limited number of problems, e.g., the "tiger" vs. "pussycat"

phenomenon.

Some military authorities (e.g., Diehl, 1988; Kutter, 1986) believe

that using highly trained combat soldiers for peacekeeping operations

places our troops in a paradoxical situation. Successful peacekeeping

soldiers must function well in environments where only minimal force is

applied. However, their strength under these circumstances lies not in

their lethality (behaving like a tiger), but rather in their ability to make

compromises and negotiate (in other words, act like a pussycat).

Kutter (1986) claims that previous behavioral research has fairly

conclusively established that careful predeployment training can succeed

in preparing both soldiers and leaders psychologically for peacekeeping.

During preparation for deployment, of necessity, most training focuses

more on mission-relevant rather than basic soldiering tasks. The

emphasis of subsequent postdeployment training reverts back to combat

performance as a way of recapturing competencies that may degrade

during peacekeeping service.

163
164 RC Peacekeepers

Peace operations are generally not the sole focus of predeployment

training. Training on established combat and basic soldier tasks

continues, to a degree, throughout the predeployment period. Since most

facets of normal military operations apply to peace operations, training to

enhance the skills of a unit's primary mission should be a significant

feature of predeployment training (Field Manual 100-23). Of course, the

singular mission of Rotation 28 was the Sinai assignment. Indeed, the

unit was formed solely for this mission. Unlike units from the active

component (AC), it did not have to adjust from a warfighting mission to a

peacekeeping operation, nor did it need to reorient, as an intact unit, to a

warfighting mission afterwards. This unique characteristic could prove

advantageous when deploying a newly formed composite unit to a stable,

peacekeeping operation.

The possible rapid degradation of warfighting skills that are not

applied or trained during a peacekeeping mission has been recognized as

a drawback to deploying AC units to such missions (Taws and Peters,

1995). The drawback comes from an immediate reduction in readiness to

the unit's parent brigade. The time needed to prepare (about 3 months),

execute (6 months), and then reorient to warfighting afterwards (at least 3

months) adds up to at least 1 year of reduced readiness for the brigade. In

fact, studies of units that have deployed in recent peace operations in

Macedonia, Somalia, Haiti, and the Sinai have demonstrated that most

units require between 4 and 6 months to return to a normal level of

readiness (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1996). The time to restore

normal combat readiness includes time for block leave, personnel

restructuring, individual training, and collective training.

In contrast, a unit derived largely from reserve volunteers has much

less of a negative impact on overall readiness because a go-to-war unit is

not being immediately impacted. In fact, units from the Army National

Guard (ARNG) usually have about 20% of their positions filled by

soldiers who are not yet qualified in a military occupational specialty

(MOS) and are thus not deployable (Buddin and Grissmer, 1994).

Furthermore, as is the case with Rotation 28, volunteers were drawn from

37 different units (across nine battalions) of the parent division (the 29th

Infantry Division), so there is unlikely to be any concentrated negative

impact on unit readiness. Furthermore, upon return from a peacekeeping

mission, the unit's readiness can be upgraded with better trained soldiers
Training and Task Performance 165

rejoining the ranks, as occurred in the present study (Smith and Hagman,

Chapter 16). Constructing a peacekeeping unit from reserve volunteers,

then, has likely advantages to overall readiness. Because of these

advantages, it is instructive to describe the predeployment training

activities of Rotation 28 and contrast it with the predeployment training

phase of an AC unit.

There are very few treatments of peacekeeping operations which

deal with the everyday problems of planning and implementing a training

program for a specific peacekeeping mission. This chapter attempts to

document all of the stages related to the training activities of the 4th

Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Rotation 28) in

preparation for deployment to the Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) Sinai peacekeeping mission. This chapter includes an overview

of the training requirement; an explanation of the sources of information;

and a description of the occupational and military training backgrounds

of the volunteers, the predeployment training phases, the

mission-relevant and soldiering tasks trained, the certification exercise,

performance on job knowledge tests, and training activities and physical

performance while in the Sinai. Also, described briefly are the

educational and professional development accomplishments of the unit

while in the Sinai. When appropriate, a baseline comparison with an AC

unit is provided. Finally, a discussion of our observations and findings is

presented along with recommendations.

Overview of Training Requirement

Rotation 28 was formed from reserve volunteers and Regular Army

(RA) soldiers solely for peace operations in the Sinai (for a complete

description of demographics of this rotation, cf. Farr, Chapter 5). The

predeployment training activities for Rotation 28 spanned a period of 11

months, beginning with a planning stage in February 1994 and ending

with deployment to the Sinai in January 1995. The training encompassed

a variety of topics that ultimately shifted the soldiers' main focus from

wartime missions to the unique demands of peace operations, such as

learning the history and culture of the Sinai region, making detailed

observations and reports, and becoming familiar with new and explicitly

defined rules of engagement.
166 RC Peacekeepers

A key element of the MFO mission was to observe and report

violations of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. The soldiers were required

not only to be able to recognize aircraft, ships, vehicles, license plates,

and uniforms, but they also needed to be knowledgeable about standard

reporting formats for the mission. Learning the individual tasks unique

to the MFO mission was critical in the predeployment training phase.

Other more traditional facets of training, such as personal discipline and

physical training, were included in the schedule before deployment. A

program to develop unit cohesion and sharpen leadership skills was

another component of the predeployment preparation. Training on

small-unit collective tasks—mainly squad level—was also conducted, in

part to develop cohesion. Training on traditional soldiering tasks was

conducted in three tiers, two during the predeployment phase and one

while in the Sinai.

The training was conducted mostly by the leadership cadre of

Rotation 28. These internal trainers gained current proficiency on the

tasks during a "train-the-trainer" period, just prior to the arrival of the

bulk of the unit. Notable exceptions to the internal training were the

Infantry Leaders Course (ILC) at Fort Benning, the Individual Ready

Reserve (IRR) training at Fort McCoy, and some weapons and specialty

training, such as cooking and generator repair, conducted at Fort Bragg.

Training in the Sinai. Maintaining individual soldier skills during a

Sinai tour is important for members of all rotations, regardless of their

follow-on assignments. It is useful, then, to examine the daily patterns of

training that occur during assignment to the Sinai. Composite units are

unlikely to have follow-on missions simply because they disperse upon

redeployment. This can prove advantageous in peacekeeping operations.

For example, a composite unit can, without later penalty, emphasize

peacekeeping tasks throughout the mission. Some of those tasks would

surely be susceptible to decay unless used or trained regularly. On the

other hand, an RA unit may, in anticipation of its follow-on mission, shift

its emphasis away from peacekeeping tasks toward individual soldier

tasks midway through a rotation. Balancing the training needs of the

immediate mission against the need to maintain selected soldier skills is a

significant judgment call for trainers at all levels, but especially at the

squad level, where responsibilty rests in the day-to-day training at the

Sinai's remote sites. Precisely how this balance is established can be
Training and Task Performance 167

revealed from daily training patterns. Consequently, both predeployment

training and subsequent training during the mission must be analyzed to

gain a broad understanding of training for peace operations.

Since Rotation 28 was the first AC/RC unit to deploy to the Sinai,

documentation of their predeployment training can be valuable in

understanding the planning, scope of training responsibility, training

execution, and certification as "good to go" to the Sinai. This

documentation, then, can serve as a formulation for possible future

efforts. The unique training requirements for a composite task force

become clear when they are contrasted with similar dimensions from an

active unit. These can then be considered in the broader debate on the

value of forming and training composite units for success in peace

operations.

Sources of Information

Information on the predeployment training was assembled from

several sources: the training guidance issued by the Commander of

Rotation 28; the unit's training calendar; the memorandum of instruction

for MFO sector training and certification exercise; the MFO Infantry

Battalion predeployment training package; the after action review of the

IRR training; the surveys developed and administered by the U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI); task

performance booklets created by ARI for use during the certification

exercise; observations by ARI researchers during the training; and

interviews with squad leaders and staff of the unit's S-3 Section

(Operations and Training). Also, individuals from the U.S. Army Forces

Command, the National Guard Bureau, and the MFO Cell of the XVIII

Airborne Corps provided specific details on background. For the

comparison to AC units that had already served in the Sinai, reviews of

training calendars, interviews with key personnel, and surveys and tests

with unit members during deployment to the Sinai were conducted.

Rather than have a single unit serve as the comparison baseline,

more than one rotation was used to form the baseline. This was done not

only to avoid a direct comparison between two rotations, but also to take

into account variations between the preparation and deployment of units

from the AC. Information and data from at least four rotations were
168 RC Peacekeepers

reviewed in forming the comparison unit, hereafter referred to

collectively as the AC unit, in contrast to Rotation 28 composite unit.

Training Background of Soldiers

The demographic characteristics of Rotation 28 are covered

elsewhere in this volume (cf. Farr, Chapter 5). Additonal backgound

information relevant to predeployment training concerns the volunteers'

prior occupations and military training. Table 8-1, which lists many of

the job titles of employed volunteers reporting to Fort Bragg, reveals a

wide range of occupations, with a particular emphasis on the trades,

laborers, and security. This information was gained from an ARI survey

administered before deployment, which included a question asking "If

you were employed prior to this training, what was your civilian job?"

Table 8-1

Occupational Catej^ories of Reserve Volunteers Prior to MFO

Task Force (n=214, enlisted personnel)

Categorv n Examples

Trades or craft worker 51 electrician, metal sheet worker

Carpenter/Laborer 32 construction, dockworker, stocker

Security 27 police officer, security guard

Restaurant 20 cook, waiter, bartender

Administrative 19 property management, fund raiser,

residential advisor

Transportation 14 home deli\ery, truck driver

Sales 14 hardware, grocery, customer service

Machine operator 12 forklift/crane/lathe operator

Technical 11 pharmacy technician, data processing

Government 5 postal service, park ranger

Office 4 pay clerk, secretary

Farm worker 2 farmer

Professional analyst 2 chemist, communication systems

Proprietor 1 owner of business
Training and Task Performance 169

Such diversity places added demand on the trainers. Not only are the

volunteers, on average, less experienced as soldiers but they also arrive

with a wide assortment of skills and work experiences that mix

differently with the skills needed for peacekeeping in the Sinai. In view

of the range of occupations, the prospects for much "transfer of training"

is not apparent, with the possible exceptions of security guards, truck

drivers, and cooks.

The military training background is also quite mixed. For the overall

unit, the frequencies for various training and professional development

programs are presented in Table 8-2. These data were derived from the

ARI surveys given to members of Rotation 28. The data are presented in

terms of the respective percentages within the junior enlisted,

noncommisioned officer (NCO), and officer ranks of the unit.

Table 8-2

Military Training Backgrounds of Rotation 28

Achievement JrEnl NCO Officer

Air Assault 7% 26% 33%

Airborne 9 20 52

Bradley Fighting Vehicle 1 1 5

Combat Lifesaver 11 16 10

Pathfinder 1 3 5

Ranger 0 2 29

Sniper 3 8 5

Primary Leadership 16 80 -

Basic NCO 3 46 -

Advanced NCO 0 2 -

Battle Staff NCO 0 3 -

Officer Basic - 2 90

Combined Arms Services - 2 10

Command and General Staff 1

rved as officers while on active duty.

0

Note. Some NCO reserve volunteers se
170 RC Peacekeepers

PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING PHASES

The training concept called for dividing the predeployment training

into three phases. These phases were geared to the formation of the unit

in three stages, beginning with key leaders and staff personnel, adding the

leadership cadre, and finally the bulk of the junior enlisted volunteers.

An overview of each phase is described here, with details to follow.

Displayed in Figure 8-1 is the time course change in unit size during the

11-month predeployment phase.

700 -p

600 --

500 --

S) 400 --

c

0)

<" 300 --

'E

200 --

100 --

PHASE III

"bulk training"

MFO tasks

Soldier tasks

Certification

PHASE II

"train the trainer"

IRR refresher

ILC

PHASE I

"unit formation"

planning

FEBRUARY 1994 TO JANUARY 1995

Figure 8-1. Unit strength during the predeployment training phase.

Overview Phase I. Phase I occurred between 7 February 1994 and 2

May 1994. The first phase was oriented toward planning by the first five

members to join the staff. These were the Commander, the S-3 Section

Chief (operations and training), and Property Book Officer, all from the

AC, and the Executive Officer and S-4 Section Chief (logistics), both

from the ARNG. In April, the Command Sergeant Major (AC) joined the

unit. The mission analysis was performed during this phase, and a

mission essential task list was established with associated collective and
Training and Task Performance 171

individual tasks. The primary outcome was the predeployment training

guidance issued on 6 May 1994.

Overview Phase II. Phase II occurred between 3 May and 30

September 1994. The emphasis during this phase was to train the trainer

on both soldiering tasks, which are commonly referred to in the Army as

common tasks, and MFO-specific tasks. During this phase, 29 soldiers

were added to the unit in early May, 3 in June, and 181 in early August,

bringing the unit strength to 219. The second phase concluded with the

unit's leadership participating in the ILC at Fort Benning. Also, the

refresher training of 36 volunteers from the IRR took place at Fort

McCoy, WI, for 2 weeks in June. The IRR training, which did not

include MFO-specific tasks, was conducted by a unit from the 84th

Division (Training), Milwaukee, WI.

Overview Phase HI. Phase III occurred between 1 October 1994 and

7 January 1995. This final phase served as the bulk training period for

the unit, since most soldiers (an additional 351) joined the unit in early

October, raising the unit strength to 570. This phase covered rifle

marksmanship, common task training, squad training and patrolling, and

MFO-specific tasks (e.g., Arabic phrases, aircraft identification) and

MFO specialized tasks (field sanitation, generator operations, cooking).

The third phase included an MFO site Field Training Exercise from 28

November to 9 December 1994. The culmination of the third phase was

a certification exercise from 12 to 16 December 1994, followed by 2

weeks of block leave. The advance party departed for the Sinai on 7

January 1995.

Training Support

The principal form of training support was through the MFO Cell of

the XVIII Airborne Corps. The cell, consisting of a Lieutenant Colonel

and a civilian aid, served as the repository of training materials, a link to

previous rotations, and an interface to the rotation that was then in the

Sinai as well as the MFO Forces headquartered in the North Camp of the

Sinai sector. Since the MFO Cell was located at Fort Bragg, their

expertise was readily available to Rotation 28.

A key document provided to Rotation 28 was the MFO

Predeployment Training Management Plan, prepared by the MFO Forces
172 RC Peacekeepers

headquarters. This document assisted the leadership of the unit in

identifying the essential predeployment training requirements. It also

recommended that rotation commanders tailor their training, taking into

account the current levels of training, available equipment and resources,

as well as time available. It also advised the inclusion of some senior

trainers in a reconnaissance to the Sinai, enabling them to better direct the

predeployment training.

The management plan identified 18 lessons, each specifying

objectives, conditions, and standards for the training of various tasks and

background knowledge specific to the Sinai mission, as well as required

equipment and a suggested method for the conduct of training. Table 8-3

lists the 18 lesson areas.

Table 8-3

Predeployment Lessons Concerning MFO-Specific Tasks

1) Introduction to the MFO 10) Use of Force and Firearms

2) Introduction to the Sinai 11) Survival

3) Field Sites 12) Hygiene

4) Patrols 13) First Aid

5) Observation 14) Vehicle Drills

6) Recognition 15) Explosive Ordnance

7) Reporting Procedures 16) Helicopter Operations

8) Communications 17) Cooking

9) Threat Assessment and

Defensive Measures

18) Generators

Throughout the predeployment training, the commander sought

opportunities to build teams. Training on the mission-essential tasks was

to be conducted primarily by squad leaders. One purpose for this was to

encourage the early development of small-unit cohesion, which would

presumably promote performance of the units during their deployment to

the Sinai. Specific details on each of the three phases in presented below,

followed by a comparison to an AC unit.
Training and Task Performance 17_3

Training Phase I

The planning phase was led by the unit commander, who had

relevant experience from an earlier assignment to the MFO Sinai mission.

Participating in the planning phase, among others, was the head of the

S-3 Section who also had been on an earlier Sinai assignment. Among

the early objectives was a compilation of soldiering tasks that would be

trained first to the leadership cadre during Phase II and in turn by the

leadership cadre to the bulk of the unit during Phase III. These tasks

were segmented into three tiers. The first two tiers, detailed in Table 8-4,

were trained at Fort Bragg during the predeployment period. The third

tier of tasks, detailed later in this chapter, were to be trained while in the

Sinai in preparation for the Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB) award.

Each tier is further divided into blocks, most blocks comprising tasks

from a common area, such as first aid in Block 2.

Training Phase II

Early in Phase II, the unit increased to 37 members with the addition

of volunteers from the ARNG. The unit held Battalion training meetings

every Thursday morning, attended by all commanders, specialty platoon

leaders, primary and secondary staff, and the command sergeant major.

Battalion training support meetings were held every Monday afternoon to

coordinate resources needed for training, such as ammunition, training

areas, and transportation. During the early part of this phase, there was a

concentration on both the physical training itself and how to conduct

physical training. A diagnostic Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) was

conducted on 13 May. A record APFT test was held on 22 July.

The unit increased in size substantially during this phase, with 219

members on board by early August. The "train-the-trainer" process was

conducted in August on the Tier 1 and Tier 2 tasks outlined in Table 8-4.

Since the trainers were NCOs familiar with many of these tasks, the

training was more of a refresher course. The first MFO-specific training

was conducted on 25 May with Sinai background as the initial topic. The

remaining MFO topics, outlined earlier in Table 8-3, were covered

periodically during this second phase. Other significant training

activities during this second phase were the IRR refresher training and

the leader's training, described below.
174 RC Peacekeepers

Table 8-4

Soldiering Tasks Trained During Predeployment

TIER 1 TASKS

Block 1

Estimate range

Navigate from point to point dismounted

Determine grid coordinates

Locate an unknown point by intersection

Identify topographical symbols on a map

Determine location on the ground by

terrain association

Block 2

Prevent shock

Splint a fracture

Evaluate a casualty

Practice preventive medicine

Put on a tourniquet

Apply dressing to an open chest wound

Transport casualty using one man carry

Clear object from throat of conscious

casualty

Block 3

Zero an M16A2 rifle

Maintain an M16A2 rifle

Unload an M16A2 rifle

Load an M16A2 rifle

Maintain an M203

Load an M203

Correct malfunction on an M203

Perform maintenance on an M249 SAW

Zero an M249 SAW

Operate a 9MM

Determine magnetic azimith

Identify terrain features on a map

Orient a map to the ground by

terrain association

Locate an unknown point by resection

Measure distance on a map

Put on field dressing

Perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation

Recognize and give first aid for heat

injuries

Give first aid for burns

Apply dressing to an open abdominal

wound

Apply dressing to an open head wound

Transport casualty using two man carry

Engage target with an M16A2 rifle

Perform a functions check on an M16A2

Correct malfunction on an M16A2 rifle

Zero an M203

Perform a functions check on an M203

Unload an M203

Engage targets with an M203

Operate an M249 SAW

Perform maintenance on 9MM

(table continues)
Training and Task Performance 115

Table 8-4 (Continued)

Soldiering Tasks Trained During Predeployment

TIER 2 TASKS

Block 4

Use challenge and password Report information

Noise, light, and litter discipline Operate a TA-312

Prepare a range card Request medivac

Clear fields of fire Operate night vision goggles

Block 5

Perform self-extraction from a mine field Move as a member of a fire team

Guide a helicopter Search and scan

Locate mines by visual means Move under direct fire

Use visual signaling techniques while

dismounted

Block 6

Maintain Ml7 series protective mask Decontaminate skin and personal

Replace filters in M17 protective mask equipment

Block 7

Send radio message Recognize vehicles & aircraft

Perform surveillance

IRR refresher training. Details of the IRR training are provided

elsewhere in this book (cf. Palmer, Rumsey, Smith, & Wisher, Chapter

4). The critical areas of training during the IRR refresher training held at

Fort McCoy, WI, were basic rifle marksmanship (day/night fire), the

APFT, vehicle operations and maintenance, and common task training.

In addition to the critical training areas, soldiers were also trained on

topics such as guard duty, land navigation, radio-telephone operator

procedures, civil disturbance, water safety, counterterrorism, military

justice, and alcohol and drug abuse.

The common task training, along with the land navigation course,

was integrated into a 4-day field training exercise. For the common

tasks, a preassessment test on the 13 common tasks selected for training

demonstrated an overall 72% "GO" rate before any training was
176 RC Peacekeepers

provided. The tasks that proved to be most difficult during the

preassessment were "Use an automated signal operator instruction" (13%

received "GO") and "Recognize friendly and threat armored vehicles and

aircraft" (29% received "GO"). Upon completion of the refresher

training, all soldiers tested received a "GO" on each task.

Other items during the refresher training included a memorandum

from the commander of the receiving unit (Rotation 28) specifying the

education programs available in the Sinai. A survey of interests in the

education program was conducted. As detailed in Chapter 4, of the 36

soldiers reporting to Fort McCoy for refresher training, only 10 soldiers

(28%) ultimately became members of Rotation 28.

Leaders' training. The leadership cadre of Rotation 28, 154

soldiers, reported to Fort Benning to attend the ILC from 26 August to 23

September. This course, specializing in infantry doctrine and tactics, as

well as collective infantry skills, was the first major training event and

the first opportunity for Rotation 28 to function as a unit, since many

NCOs did not join the unit until early August. The ILC has three primay

purposes: (1) to ensure that personnel are trained on the doctrinal

standards of current squad/platoon level collective tasks, (2) to ensure

that leaders are ready to conduct training to standard in their units, and

(3) to promote teamwork and cohesion through shared common

experiences. Detailed information, along with observations, on that

training was obtained by researchers at ARI's field unit at Fort Benning

and is reported elsewhere in this volume (cf. Salter, Fober, Pleban, &

Valentine, Chapter 9).

Training Phase III

The training of soldiering tasks as described in Table 8-4 was

conducted during approximately the first 5 weeks of the third phase (10

October to 12 November). Training was primarily accomplished at the

squad level. Squad leaders, all of whom participated in the

"train-the-trainer" program during Phase II, were the primary instructors.

A "crawl-walk-run" approach to training—that is a level of instruction

starting at an elementary level and progressing to a level of task

performance conforming to the required conditions and standards—was

adopted.
Training and Task Performance 122

Included in this 6-week period was 2 weeks of squad training, during

which each squad was trained on squad collective tasks. A series of

situation training exercise lanes were used, each lane accommodating

about three collective tasks. Each company conducted this training

internally for each of its squads.

Also during this period was a 4-day patrolling exercise. The goal was

to train fire teams and squads in dismounted patrolling, such as

conducting a local security patrol, and establishing temporary observation

posts, activities that would be performed at the remote sites in the Sinai.

Each company set up a temporary sector control center, and, in response

to orders from the company commanders, a fire team or squad conducted

the patrol. The training for this exercise was conducted internally.

The concentrated training of MFO tasks was conducted by the

companies from 14-23 November. This training was the soldier's

introduction to the Sinai. In addition to the MFO-specific tasks (lessons

1-15 in Table 8-3), training on helicopter operations and specialized tasks

(cooking, generator operations, truck/bus driving, field sanitation, mail

handling, and life guard procedures) was conducted during this period.

Trainers from other units at Fort Bragg conducted most of this

specialized training.

Sector training. Squad sector training was conducted as a

battalion-level field training exercise from 28 November to 9 December

1994. The goal of this exercise was for the battalion to execute the

mission in the Fort Bragg training area as it would be conducted in the

Sinai. Two line companies occupied the training site for the first 5 days

and the other two companies the last 5 days. The sites were constructed

by the companies 2 days before the training. During the sector training,

posts were constructed to resemble the layouts of a remote site (either an

observation post, check point, or sector control center) as would be found

in the Sinai. Every detail from sleeping quarters to fighting positions was

replicated as closely as possible. During the occupation of sites, the

squads trained for 4 days on specific MFO tasks that would be tested

during the external certification exercise the following week. This

training period was also referred to as MFO site training.
178 RC Peacekeepers

Certification Exercise

An external evaluation by members of the 4th Battalion, 325th

Parachute Infantry Regiment was held from 12-16 December 1994 at

Fort Bragg. This evaluation served as the certification exercise that

would establish the readiness of Rotation 28 to accomplish the Sinai

mission. The evaluating battalion had been assigned to the Sinai for

Rotation 26, so they obviously had appropriate qualifications to evaluate

soldiers on critical MFO tasks.

The companies reoccupied the same posts that they used during

sector training. An observer/controller was attached to each site to

evaluate squad collective tasks, individual soldiering tasks, and the

MFO-specific tasks. There were eight critical MFO-specific tasks

evaluated during the certification exercise. These tasks were:

• Aircraft Identification—Recognize Arab Republic of Egypt, Israeli

Defense Force, and MFO fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.

• Vehicle Identification—Recognize Arab Republic of Egypt and

Israeli Defense Force military vehicles.

• Arabic Phrases—Translate selected written English words or

phrases verbally into Arabic.

• Arabic Numbers—Recognize and translate Arabic numbers and

number combinations into English.

• Sinai Area License Plates—Identify Israeli and Egyptian license

plates.

• Uniforms and Insignia—Recognize uniforms and insignia found in

the Sinai area of operation.

• Rules of Engagement—Understand and comply with MFO rules of

engagement.

• Treaty Background—Display knowledge of the Treaty of Peace,

1979.

Data collection instruments and results. A meeting between ARI

researchers and key members of the evaluating unit was held in early

December to determine the level at which performance data could be
Training and Task Performance 179_

recorded. The focus was to be on the eight MFO-specific tasks listed

above. The outcome of the meeting resulted in ARI developing and

producing special task-recording booklets that would not burden the

evaluation unit, but would still provide ARI with data sufficient for

analytic purposes. Booklets consisted of 15 pages, with each page listing

the eight critical individual MFO tasks. There was also space for the

soldier's name, unit, and a series of columns for recording how many

attempts at a task a soldier required before achieving a "GO." In

previous research (Kern, Wisher, Sabol, & Farr, 1994) this variable,

number of attempts to achieve a "GO," has proven to be a sensitive

indicator of how well a soldier knew, remembered, or sustained

performance on a particular task.

A total of 535 soldiers from Rotation 28 were evaluated. Those who

remained at Fort Bragg as part of the rear detachment were not tested.

Soldiers were required to achieve a "GO" rating on all eight critical MFO

tasks before they were approved for deployment to the Sinai. There was

no set limit on the number of attempts a soldier could make on a

particular task, but the evaluators maintained established conditions and

standards in qualifying a soldier as a "GO" for any particular task.

Overall, soldiers performed extremely well, with 98% of the tasks

being performed successfully on the first attempt. The breakout per task

with the percentage of soldiers obtaining a "GO" on first attempt are

listed in Table 8-5.

The data were also analyzed at the company level—four line

companies and a headquarters company. These data were examined in

terms of percentage of soldiers in each company who scored a "GO" on

all eight critical tasks on the first attempt, also referred to as first-time

pass. The average percentage was 90%. The performance of one

company is noteworthy, as its 74% was well below the relatively even

performance of the others. There is currently no explanation for these

differences; these scores might just as easily relate to the cohesion and

motivation of the company as to the aptitudes and backgrounds of the

unit members.
180 RC Peacekeepers

Table 8-5

Percentage of Soldiers Receiving a "GO" Rating on

Misson-Related Tasks

Task Percent "GO" (first attempt)

Aircraft Identification 97%

Vehicle Identification 96%

Arabic Phrases 100%

Arabic Numbers 98%

Sinai Area License Plates 98%

Uniforms and Insignia 98%

Rules of Engagement 99%

Treaty Background 96%

COMPARISON TO ACTIVE COMPONENT UNIT

Predeployment Phase

An AC battalion assigned to the Sinai mission was examined to

contrast its period of preparation training prior to deployment with that of

Rotation 28. The predeployment training for an AC unit assigned the

MFO mission necessarily differs from a composite unit because the AC

unit is already intact. No "build-up" phase is required, other than

accessing some specialized personnel, such as linguists, into the unit.

Rather, a somewhat abrupt shift from warfighting mission to preparation

for a peacekeeping operation takes place. Obviously, the MFO-specific

skills described earlier need to be acquired, so, of necessity, there is a

period of intense training during the predeployment phase.

The AC battalion that was examined had been tasked with the

mission 6 months (D-186) prior to their deployment date. (The

convention of D + or - a number will be used. The D refers to day of

deployment and the + or - refers to the number of days relative to the

deployment date. Thus D-186 means 186 days prior to deployment.)

Assignment to the mission was unexpected. The initial "steering

committee" meeting within the battalion occurred on D-166. Internal

planning for the predeployment training began on D-163, with the
Training and Task Performance 181

assistant S-3 and two NCOs attending full time to this planning function.

The main product of this planning was a predeployment Memorandum of

Instruction similar to the training guidance developed by Rotation 28.

During this period, the remainder of the battalion was busy with live fire

exercises in preparation for a cycle of high preparedness in which the unit

would remain on ready status from D-145 to D-l 14. During this time, no

MFO training was conducted and planning was primarily limited to a

small cell of individuals. Predeployment training began in earnest on

D-l 11. As was the case with Rotation 28, the principal form of training

support was through the MFO Cell of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Soldiers from other units within the parent division were attached to

the AC battalion to satisfy the proper personnel mix required for the

MFO mission. The task force so established for the mission had 43

(about 8%) of its members from other units. They had the following

military specialties: 21 military police, 6 medics, 5 linguists, 3 legal, 3

finance, 2 chaplain, 2 mental health, and 1 public affairs. Those

remaining behind in the rear detachment (n=135) were primarily soldiers

nearing either retirement or an expiration of term of service date. Most

were available to the parent division for detail.

The initial week of MFO training consisted of 2-hour blocks of

leader and individual training on tasks such as Arab customs and

courtesies, rules of engagement, survival skills, and reporting procedures.

The second week of training focused on squad leader training and

validation, squad specialty training (e.g., radio transmission, cook), and

an exercise conducted at the simulation center on post. The simulation

exercise, essentially a command post exercise, used the JANUS system, a

battalion-level, staff synchronization simulation trainer. In this particular

application, each remote site, sector control center, and the tactical

operations center were represented by computer terminals which, in turn,

were networked into a command and control structure similar to the MFO

mission. Icons in the simulation represented "opposing force" objects

such as trucks moving down the main supply route, aircraft flying

overhead, children asking for food at an observation post, and other daily

activities typical during the Sinai mission. Linguists played the role of

Arabic speakers interacting with soldiers at a remote site. Flash cards

were briefly displayed for the aircraft or vehicle recognition task. The

overall goal was to provide squad leaders and the task force chain of
182 RC Peacekeepers

command with the a big-picture understanding of observing and

reporting to either a sector control center or the tactical operations center.

The unit reported great success with such an exercise.

A physical mock-up of an MFO site was completed on D-97.

Predeployment training for squads continued through D-66. This training

period included basic and advanced marksmanship, specialty training,

testing for the expert field medics badge, lifeguard training, and language

training. A field training exercise, during which squad validation was

internally conducted, started on D-61. Squad validation was completed

on D-46. General preparation and block leave for the advance party took

place next. The main body went on block leave from D-25 to D-9. Final

preparations were underway during this period, with the first main body

departing on D-Day.

As outlined in Table 8-6, the dissimilarity between predeployment

training for the two rotations occurred during two periods. The table

divides the predeployment period into four segments, each tied to a

significant event for one or the other of the units. First, between D-342

and D-164, Rotation 28 was forming as a unit and increasing in strength

from 5 to 32, while during the same relative period, the AC unit had

virtually no connection to the MFO mission, other than understanding it

to be a future assignment. The second dissimilarity was apparent from

the D-163 to D-l 12 period, during which Rotation 28 increased in

strength to 219, most of whom attended the ILC at Fort Benning. During

the same relative period, the AC unit had limited involvement with any

planning action, since they were on ready status during this time. There

is clearly a convergence of predeployment training activity during the

D-l 1 i to D-Day period, with the bulk of training beginning on D-l05 for

Rotation 28 and on D-l 11 for the AC unit. One slight difference here

was that the AC unit needed to train the trainer (mostly squad leaders) on

the MFO tasks for 5 days at the beginning of this period. Another

substantial contrast was in the certification: namely, Rotation 28 was

externally validated and the AC unit was internally validated. The AC

unit succeeded in the certification exercise, but no specific data are

available, as shown earlier in Table 8-5, on first attempt "GO" as a basis

for a comparison to Rotation 28.
Training and Task Performance 183

Table 8-6

Comparison of Predeployment Training Activities

Predeplovment

Period Unit Rotation 28 Active Component

D-342 to D-258 Unit formation No MFO activity

D-257toD-164 IRR refresher («=36) Assigned MFO mission

Train the trainer (On D-186)

D-163toD-112 ILC training (n-154) Plan training (n=3)

Ready Status

D-lll toD-Day Soldiering tasks Train the trainer

Individual MFO tasks Individual MFO tasks

Specialty training Specialty training

Squad validation Squad validation

2-week block leave 2-week block leave

Job Knowledge Measure

A job knowledge test was constructed (cf. Reynolds & Campbell,

Chapter 7) in conjunction with research on individual performance

measures for the MFO mission. This instrument proved useful in

measuring the knowledge acquired during the predeployment phase. It

also allows for comparison to the knowledge of an AC unit deployed to

the Sinai. The job knowledge test, consisting of questions related to

either individual MFO tasks or individual soldiering tasks, was

administered upon completion of the predeployment training. For our

purposes, an analysis of 73 test items was conducted, 41 related to

MFO-specific tasks and 32 related to general soldiering tasks (for the

performance measure research, additional items were used for analysis

which accounts for slight differences in means). The items, patterned

after the Project A item pool (Campbell & Zook, 1991) were designed to

be difficult, so the fact that the scores seem low is an indication of a

difficult test rather than a reflection of inadequate levels of knowledge.

For members of the four line squads from Rotation 28, an average

score of 67% correct on the MFO items and 57% of the soldiering items

was achieved at the end of predeployment training. Although no
184 RC Peacekeepers

comparable administration, in terms of time relative to deployment, was

given to an AC unit, the same knowledge test was administered to an AC

unit toward the end of their Sinai deployment. It is important to note, in

this case, that there could have been some decay of skills and knowledge

since the predeployment training of the AC unit; however, given the fact

that both MFO and soldiering skills were maintained during squad

training at the remote sites, this decay is probably minimal. Table 8-7,

then, presents a comparison of these two units. For the MFO tasks, there

was a slight advantage for members of Rotation 28 (67% vs. 63%, t =

3.65, p < .001); for the soldiering tasks, there was no difference (57% vs.

56%, t = .34, ns). Since the test was administered at different times

relative to the deployment date, a decisive conclusion cannot be drawn.

It is probably safe, however, to say that Rotation 28 was as

knowledgeable about MFO and soldiering tasks as was an AC unit.

Table 8-7

Comparison of Job Knowledge Test Results

Percent correct

Sample MFO-tasks Soldiering-tasks

Rotation 28 (n = 309) 67% 57%

(end of predeployment training)

AC unit (n = 233) 63% 56%

(near end of Sinai deployment)

On the basis of the results from the job knowledge test, as well as the

certification exercise, soldiers from Rotation 28 appeared to be well

trained for the Sinai deployment. It would be interesting to learn, then,

how the soldiers judged the adequacy of their predeployment training and

compare that judgement to an AC unit.

Soldier assessment of training. The adequacy of the predeployment

training, from the soldiers' viewpoint, was accomplished through a pair

of questions included in an ARI questionnaire related to leadership,

motivation, and cohesion (cf. Siebold, Chapter 10). Soldiers from the
Training and Task Performance 185

line squads of Rotation 28 and an AC unit were asked to rate the

adequacy of training, in the months just prior to deployment, for both

MFO tasks and soldiering tasks. For each group, the rating was done

toward the end of their Sinai deployment, when they would best be able

to reflect on the adequacy of training in light of their Sinai experience.

As shown in Figure 8-2, about half of each group thought that there had

been too much MFO training, and only about 15% thought there had

been less MFO training than needed. The pattern of ratings on training

adequacy for MFO tasks, then, shows no difference between groups

(Chi-square test for independence, #

2

= 0.43, ns).

ADEQUACY OF PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

RATING BY SOLDIERS

S More than needed

E^ About right

O Less than needed

Composite AC unit

D+120 D+143

(n-318) (n-283)

Composite AC unit

D+120 D+143

(n-318) (n-283)

Figure 8-2. Soldier rating of predeployment training.

A much different story emerges for the soldiering tasks, as shown in

Figure 8-2. Here, there is a distinct difference in the rating patterns

between the two groups {%2= 23.2, p < .001). For Rotation 28, 39%

believed that the training on soldiering tasks was more than needed; this

compares to only 22% of the AC unit. One explanation for the difference

can be the orientation by the AC unit of their usual warfighting mission,

which, of course, demands a high level of proficiency in soldiering skills.

Even a temporary departure from this orientation may have induced a

perception of inadequacy by these soldiers. It should be noted that upon

return from the Sinai, an AC rotation typically requires from 3 and up to
186 RC Peacekeepers

6 months of reorientation training to be mission ready, as described in the

introduction to this chapter.

TRAINING WHILE DEPLOYED

During any unit's 6-month deployment to the Sinai, training

continues on both MFO and soldiering tasks. This training is generally

conducted by squad leaders at the remote sites during the typical 3-week

rotation to their sites. After a squad completed this 3-week, remote-site

rotation, it moved to South Camp where it had National Training for 1

week, 1 week of rest and recreation (R&R), and 1 week of serving on the

perimeter defense at South Camp. It then rotated to its remote site for

another 3-week period. Approximately 1 week out of 6, then, is available

for squad- and platoon-level tasks with access to a small arms range.

The amount of training directed at collective, warfighting skills is

necessarily restricted while soldiers are in the Sinai. This restriction is

due not only to the lack of an adequate manuever area, the lack of time,

and the demands of other duties, but also to an MFO requirement that

U.S. forces not appear aggressive. For example, the attachment of

laser-engagement simulators to weapons during the training of small-unit

warfighting skills, a normal practice at home station that adds realism to

the training, could not be used in the Sinai. As a result of this limitation,

then, AC units must take the time to reorient to warfighting, particularly

collective tasks, upon redeployment.

Training Patterns at Remote Sites

While deployed to the Sinai, squads assigned to the remote sites have

the continuing requirement to train on individual tasks, both

MFO-specific and soldiering tasks, generally at the call of the squad

leader. Training on MFO-specific tasks, such as aircraft identification,

use of Arabic phrases, and reading Egyptian license plates, begins during

predeployment training and continues as refresher training during

deployment to the Sinai. Training on soldiering tasks, such as installing

mines and disassembling/assembling an Ml6 rifle, starts with entry into

the Army and continues throughout a soldiers career, regardless of the

assignment.
Training and Task Performance 187

A peacekeeping assignment demands that the soldier perform a new

set of tasks in addition to maintaining proficiency on previously learned

soldiering skills. In the context of ARFs research on the unit assigned to

the MFO Sinai, how the training on MFO and soldiering tasks are

balanced within squads might have shown important differences between

AC units and AC/RC composite units. An important consideration in

deploying an active unit to a peacekeeping mission is the degree to which

the individual's and unit's performance on mission-essential warfighting

tasks degrade after a period of little or no use. As discussed in the

introduction to this chapter, in anticipation of this skill degradation an

AC unit could accelerate the inclusion of soldiering tasks into the training

schedule, midway through a rotation. This shift would serve to prepare a

unit for its subsequent warfighting mission. The situation is likely to be

different for a composite unit. Such units could concentrate equally on

MFO and soldiering tasks, since upon redeployment they would not

regroup as a unit, let alone prepare, intact, for a warfighting mission.

A straightforward way to examine differences in training patterns

between an AC unit and Rotation 28 was by tracking the daily training

activities of squads working at the remote sites. Squad leaders were

required to schedule daily training activities, which typically involve

three or four individual tasks. This training reflects both the squad

leader's sense of the tasks on which the squad needs training as well as

training guidance from the unit's leadership. By categorizing the tasks

selected for training as either MFO-specific or soldiering, the cumulative

patterns of training could then be examined for trends within a rotation

and, ultimately, between rotations. The training patterns for an AC unit

will be described first followed by a comparison with Rotation 28.

Active component training. Special squad training booklets were

developed by ARI and distributed to all squad leaders. Instructions on

their use were given on the front page of the booklet. Six weeks into the

rotation, ARI researchers met with each squad leader to encourage the

accurate recording of daily training schedules. Separate books were used

at remote sites and at South Camp. The 7-day training period at South

Camp was generally devoted to training soldiering tasks, including

squad-level drills.

The analyses described below are derived from the recording of

4,622 tasks trained at remote sites during the first 20 weeks of the
188 RC Peacekeepers

6-month rotation. Interestingly, the number of times that MFO tasks

were trained, 2,301, nearly equaled the number of times soldiering tasks

were trained, 2,321. Figure 8-3 charts these data in terms of tasks trained

per day, beginning with D day (arrival in the Sinai) and incremented at

7-day intervals, so the D point on the abscissa represents training during

the first week, D+7 represents training during the second week, etc.

Tasks Trained per Unit per Day

-\ 1 1 1 h -I 1 1 1 1 1 h H 1 h H 1 1 1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + +

QQQQQOQD OOOOQ

8 SS 2 s a

Days Into Rotation

Figure 8-3. Tasks trained on daily basis - active component unit.

Each point in Figure 8-3 represents the average number of MFO or

soldiering tasks trained during that week. Clearly, there is an emphasis on

training MFO tasks during the first 4 weeks, then a convergence through

D+105 (week 16), then a divergence toward soldiering tasks out to week

D+133 (week 20), when data collection discontinued. Apparently, the

AC unit was concentrating training time on the peacekeeping tasks early

and then slowly shifted to soldiering tasks as they neared their

redeployment date.

Comparison to Rotation 28. The same squad training booklets

described earlier were provided to the squad leaders at the remote sites.

Unfortunately, we were able to collect data only from D+35 through

D+126, so our comparison is restricted to this period. The data obtained

were sampled from the remote sites in about the same proportion from

the three types of remote sites, sector control, observation post, and check
Training and Task Performance 189

point, allowing an acceptable comparison to be made between the AC

unit and Rotation 28.

The comparison data are presented in Figure 8-4. To illustrate an

effect that we believe is revealing, the AC unit data from Figure 8-3 have

been replotted in the following manner: rather than charting the number

of MFO or soldiering tasks, we have combined those measures into a

single measure. Specifically, we computed and plotted the proportion of

tasks trained that were MFO, so if 80 MFO tasks and 20 soldiering were

taught during a week, the value 80% was plotted. All available data

points are plotted in Figure 8-4. A linear trend line (depicted as a dashed

line) is superimposed over the data points for both Rotation 28 and the

AC unit. The statistical analysis of these trends, however, was restricted

to the D+35 through D+126 time period, since both units furnished data

for comparison during this period.

Percentage of Tasks Trained that were MFO

100%

80%

60%

o

u.

s

o

Dl

a

a> 40% f

o

0)

a.

20%

Rotation 28

50% line

- AC Unit

o% -H— -+-

+

CO CM CO

CM *• in

+ + +

Q D Q

O

+

co

+

CO CM

cn --

+ TCO

CM

+

Days relative to deployment

Figure 8-4. Trends in training MFO tasks at remote sites.

These data (D+35 through D+120) were analyzed through a

moderated regression analysis with two variables (time and unit) and an

interaction (time by unit). The first step of the regression shows that as

time increases, there is not a significant relationship in the ratio of MFO

tasks taken together (r = .35, p = .73). Step two of the regression shows
190 RC Peacekeepers

that there is a significant difference in the ratio of MFO tasks trained

between the two units (r = 7.26, p = .001). Finally, the third step shows

the interaction of time and unit to be significant (r = 2.57, p = .02),

indicating that the slopes of patterns in training differ between the two

units. This is graphically illustrated with the divergence of the linear

trend lines (depicted as dashed lines in Figure 8-4). This, then,

establishes that the training patterns at the remote sites does differ

between the two units, with the AC favoring soldiering tasks, and

increasingly so as the rotation progressed.

It should be noted that EIB testing was performed about 20 weeks

into the rotation for both units. Preparation on soldiering tasks leading

up to the test period can, in part, explain the training acceleration in those

tasks for the AC unit. However, Rotation 28 also trained for the EIB at

about the same time, so a comparison between rotations is valid. Also,

much of the training for the EIB was conducted at South Camp, not the

remote sites. The data in the analyses were from the remote sites only.

Patterns Between Remote Sites

There were three types of remote sites at which soldiers performed

their duties to observe and report: sector control, observation posts, and

check points. A classification of the same training data by site category

is shown in Table 8-8.

Table 8-8

Proportion of Tasks Trained That Were MFO by Site Category

Site category AC Unit Rotation 28

Check Point 61% 78%

Sector Control 49% 66%

Observation Post 45% 56%

The pattern of these data seems to make sense. Since the check

points have regular, daily contact with Egyptians, international tourists,

and official visitors traveling through the sector, they should have the

greatest need to maintain proficiency on MFO tasks, such as identifying

license plates. This is the case for both the AC unit and Rotation 28, who
Training and Task Performance 19J_

trained MFO tasks 61 % and 78% of the time, respectively. The

observation posts, on the other hand, have the greatest need to maintain

soldiering skills since they are required to move about the sector (as a

temporary observation post) and apply skills such as land navigation and

first aid on a regular basis. This training pattern is evident in Table 8-8.

By subtracting from 100% (since tasks were either MFO or soldiering), it

can readily be determined that 55% (100%-45%) of the tasks trained by

the AC unit and 44% (100%-56%) of the tasks trained by Rotation 28

were soldiering tasks, higher than the other two site categories. The

frequency of training MFO tasks at the sector controls are in between for

both units. As previously demonstrated in Figure 8-3, the AC unit

emphasized soldiering tasks to a greater degree than Rotation 28. There

was also a corresponding pattern between site categories.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the training plan called for three

tiers of tasks. The first two were trained at Fort Bragg and were

presented in Table 8-4. A third tier of tasks, related to EIB, was reserved

for training while deployed to the Sinai. These tasks are listed in Table

8-9. Testing for the EIB occurred about two thirds of the way through

the rotation.

There were two other sources of training and education in the Sinai

in addition to that received at remote sites and during the National

Training period. These were teletraining for more formal military

instruction and educational opportunities available through the Army

Continuing Education System. These are described below.

Teletraining

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installed a

satellite down-link and up-link capability at the South Camp Education

Center. This communications link permitted, for the first time, a

distance-learning classroom to be created in the Sinai. This classroom,

featuring two-way video and two-way audio, tied into the Army's

teletraining network (TNET). This unique opportunity allowed 84

soldiers to complete the Primary Leadership Development Course

(PLDC), 5 to complete the Infantry Officers Basic Course, and 2 to

complete the Infantry Officers Advanced Course (these data were as of

mid-May when ARI last surveyed Rotation 28). These numbers are quite
122 RC Peacekeepers

Table 8-9

Soldiering Tasks Trained in the Sinai

Perform mouth to mouth resuscitation

Day land navigation

Night land navigation

12-mile foot march/weapon proficiency test

Move under direct fire

Estimate range

Prepare M47 dragon for firing

Challenge and password

Locate a target by shift from a known point

Call for/adjust indirect fire

Operate as a station in a radio net

Identify terrain features on a map

Employ hand grenades

Install/recover an Ml8Al claymore mine

Administer nerve agent antidote to self

Report enemy information/SALUTE

Prepare an Ml36 AT-4 for firing

Perform misfire procedures on an Ml36 AT-4

W/in 5 min. disassemble M249 SAW into groups & components

W/in 4 min. assemble M249 SAW & perform function check

Load, correct a malfunction, and unload an M249 SAW

Put on field/pressure dressing, apply tourniquet, prevent shock

Put on, wear, remove, and store Ml7 protective mask w/hood

Decontaminate your skin and personal equipment

Camouflage yourself and your individual equipment

Determine enemy target location using grid coordinates

Load, reduce a stoppage, and clear an M16A2 rifle

Use visual signaling techniques - dismounted

Install/recover an M21 metallic antitank mine

impressive. Indeed, 16% of the junior enlisted had completed PLDC prior

to reporting to Fort Bragg for predeployment training (Table 8-2). With
Training and Task Performance 19.3

the distance-learning classroom opportunity, the percentage of PLDC

qualified increased to 42%. A downside was that 66% had to sacrifice an

R&R tour to complete the PLDG, which might have negatively affected

moral.

Educational Activities

Opportunities to gain college credits were available to soldiers

through various educational institutions. Lecture courses were available

from Central Texas College for vocational-type courses and from the

University of Maryland for general education courses. Video

independent study was provided by City Colleges of Chicago. These

college credits were made possible through classes at South Camp and

self-study at the remote sites. All educational activities were administered

through the Education Center located at South Camp. Because of the

remote location of South Camp, faculty were recruited from the battalion.

It was possible to earn up to 18 semester hours during a 6-month tour.

There is a 90% tuition assistance for enlisted soldiers, E5 and above

with less than 14 years of service, and a 75% assistance for all other

soldiers entitled to this benefit. Courses from Central Texas College, for

example, cost $24.83 for soldiers entitled to the 90% assistance. Books

were loaned, at no cost, from all schools except the University of

Maryland, which required students to purchase textbooks.

An education statistics report from the Education Center indicated

that 1,639 credits were earned by Rotation 28. Compared to other recent

rotations, which had similar tuition assistance policies, this was about

average. A possible explanation for participation not being higher is that

the course offerings were almost entirely lower level courses, more

appropriate for soldiers seeking an associates degree. As described in the

demographics chapter (cf. Farr, Chapter 5), soldiers in Rotation 28 had

higher educational levels than soldiers from a typical AC unit.

Physical Performance

The physical demands and performance of Army peacekeepers was

of interest for several reasons. First, it gives us a good indication of

general physical fitness within the Army. ARI has been examining issues
194 RC Peacekeepers

of physical fitness as it relates to job performance for a number of years

(Brady & Rumsey, 1993; 1990). Another reason focuses on establishing

a baseline for possible future comparisons with other peacekeeping

missions. For example, the physical requirements for missions conducted

in Somalia and Bosnia may be quite different from those for the Sinai.

The Physical Performance Questionnaire (PPQ) contains items

dealing with issues such as upper body strength, endurance, physical

training, and the most physically demanding tasks performed while in the

Sinai. Table 8-10 shows the three tasks that require the greatest physical

effort (Brady & Rumsey, 1995). Anything to do with sandbags was

deemed to be the most physically demanding. This includes filling,

lifting, or moving sandbags as well as building sandbag walls. Tasks

related to Physical Training (PT), including regular PT in addition to PT

runs and PT tests, were perceived to be the second most physically

demanding. Training, which includes qualifying for the Expert Infantry

Badge, Expert Field Medical Badge, and the Primary Leadership

Development Course, was third.

Table 8-10

Tasks Listed as Most Physically Demanding

Task

Sandbags

Number Identifying Task

50

Filling

Lifting/moving

Sandbag walls

Sandbags - general

19

13

10

8

Physical Training 30

Regular PT

PTruns

PT tests

20

6

4

Training 28

Expert Infantry Badge

Expert Field Medical Badge

Primary Leadership Development Course

19

5

4
Training and Task Performance 125

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

At the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Peacekeeping and Peace-Enforcement Policy, the Department of Defense

Inspector General formed a study team to review specialized training for

peace operations (DOD Inspector General, 1994). The study concluded

that peace operations had different requirements for knowledge, skills,

attitude, and environmental considerations than warfighting. The study

endorsed the view that some type of preparation prior to deploying to a

peace operation is necessary. Indeed, a recent report on preparations for

the Bosnia deployment concluded that peacekeeping does require a

train-up in the form of situational exercises for soldiers and leaders

(Center for Army Lesssons Learned, 1993). Other analyses of preparation

for peacekeeping concluded that specialized training to sensitize forces to

local conditions, cultures, and laws before deployment was essential

(Kahan, 1994). A more recent report on Operation Joint Endeavor

(Wisher, Sabol, & Ozkaptan, 1996) advised on the importance of

refresher training during peace operations, especially for critical tasks

that are prone to rapid performance decay.

Training

From a purely training standpoint, the composite unit appeared to be

as well prepared to execute the MFO mission as was a unit from the AC.

Three analyses reported in this chapter support this conclusion. First, the

predeployment training was clearly as extensive as that of an AC unit, as

seen in the comparison between Rotation 28 and an AC unit's

predeployment training schedule (Table 8-7). The certification exercise

reflected the success of Rotation 28's training. Second, soldiers from

both units agreed, in retrospect, that the mission-related MFO training

was more than adequate for the operation (Figure 8-2). Furthermore, the

training that was conducted in the Sinai continued to emphasize the MFO

tasks for Rotation 28, so their preparedness on MFO tasks probably

remained at a high level. Third, Rotation 28's level of knowledge related

to individual MFO and soldiering tasks remained comparable to that of

an AC unit throughout the rotation. Taken together, these findings

indicate that a unit composed primarily of reserve volunteers can acquire

and maintain the skills and knowledge necessary for the Sinai mission.
196 RC Peacekeepers

At the same time, the Inspector General study (DOD Inspector

General, 1994) also concluded that a well-trained, disciplined force was a

fundamental prerequisite for conducting peace operations, since peace

operations span the operational continuum from limited combat to a

stable peace environment. Factors related to this issue, however, could

not be addressed directly by our study. Specifically, we were unable to

examine the preparedness of squads or platoons to perform collective

tasks in the Sinai, such as defensive or manuever tasks that might be

required in reacting to a hostile event. Although the need for such a

response has been very limited throughout the history of U.S.

participation in the MFO Task Force, a unit's ability to respond

effectively can be of critical importance. It is debatable whether squads

from an AC unit are better able to execute collective tasks than a newly

formed RC unit. What is known, however, is that a long-established

tenet in human learning, the Law of Use, would favor an AC squad

which had been performing these tasks for longer periods. Clearly,

Rotation 28 placed a greater emphasis on sustaining skills and knowledge

related to the MFO tasks, but we cannot interpret this as affecting

preparedness of the unit's ability to respond to a potential hostile event.

Conversely, the AC unit had a clear trend toward favoring soldiering

tasks in their training while in the Sinai. The concentrated training of

MFO tasks for the first 4 weeks of the rotation (see Figure 8-4), coupled

with the perception that the MFO training was more than adequate during

the predeployment training phase (Figure 8-2), might have been

sufficient for the AC unit to execute the mission. Although they

continued to sustain MFO tasks, through training and of course through

job use, the AC unit favored the training of soldiering tasks toward the

end of the 6-month rotation. The EIB test, which consists of soldiering

tasks only, was conducted late in the rotation, but the same was true for

Rotation 28. What is important here is the relative pattern: as time

progressed, the trend of Rotation 28 was to remain at a steady ratio of

MFO to soldiering tasks while the diverging trend of the AC unit was to

emphasize, in increasing measure, soldiering tasks. This observed

pattern is consistent with the findings reported in the Reynolds and

Campbell chapter in Section 3 (Chapter 7). They reported that for

performance rating purposes within Rotation 28, NCOs from the RC

placed more emphasis on the features of the mission that are unique to

MFO peacekeeping than did the AC NCOs.
Training and Task Performance 122

Thus, the "tiger versus pussycat" phenomenon emerges. The DOD

Inspector General (1994) study identified the MFO Sinai as a long-term,

continuing mission that can be planned for in advance. With over 30

rotations completed, we have a better understanding of how to balance

the "tiger versus pussycat" paradox for units undertaking the MFO Sinai

mission. Knowing that balance can lead to more efficient training of

reserve units for future peace operations without reducing the readiness

of a "tiger" unit drawn from the AC. An example of this can be seen in a

statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, in a

recent interview on Operation Joint Endeavor. Responding to a question

on how well reservists are fitting into peace operations in Bosnia: "The

reports I get from the field are that the commanders have no idea who's

active and who's reserve in most cases ... they are doing exactly the job

that we want them to do and that we've trained them to do" (Steele,

1996).

Readiness

As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, an inherent drawback

to deploying AC units to any peacekeeping environment is the potential

reduction in readiness of the parent brigade. For the Sinai mission, this

reduction extends for at least 1 year. Our data indicate that not only does

an AC unit view their predeployment training of soldiering tasks as being

less than needed (41% vs. 27% for Rotation 28, see Figure 8-2) they also

lean toward soldiering tasks as the mission progresses. Perhaps the unit

leadership is more sympathetic to their primary mission as warfighters

rather than their temporary mission as peacekeepers. This argument

would not extend to a specially formed unit of reserve volunteers, who

disperse to many different units upon redeployment.

Related to this issue is the nagging question regarding the immediate

deployability of reserve units to combat missions. For example, in a

survey given to over 12,000 reservists shortly after Operation Desert

Storm, soldiers reported shortcomings in individual job skill and combat

preparation as these related to warfighting missions (Griffith, 1995). In

the same study, Griffith concluded that findings in the areas of individual

skill preparation and collective training raise questions about the reserve

soldier's availability for immediate deployment. As reported in Salter et

al., Chapter 9 in Section 3 of this volume, many more RC soldiers
198 RC Peacekeepers

self-reported being less prepared to train collective infantry tasks than

their AC counterparts within Rotation 28. AC units have a known

strength for a warfighting mission. It makes sense to preserve this

readiness strength by redirecting RC assets to missions that they can

accomplish successfully. Such a policy makes even more sense if the RC

unit is drawn from volunteers from many units, which further should

reduce the erosion in readiness of any individual unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made:

1. A unit derived from reserve volunteers is a viable alternative to an

AC unit. Not only can the volunteers do the job, but an AC unit, which

might otherwise deploy, could maintain readiness for a warfighting

mission. Future deployments to the MFO Sinai mission should include

units drawn from reserve volunteers.

2. The predeployment prepartion time for a reserve volunteer unit

could be reduced by several weeks, particularly during Phase II. The ILC

portion, for example, might be reduced by at least 1 week, or even

replaced by an externally conducted "train-the-trainer" event.

3. There should be some revision to the content of the training.

Since the leadership cadre believed they were not getting sufficient MFO

training early in the predeployment phase, they should be provided with a

"big picture" overview of the MFO mission. For example, the use of

preconceived, staff sychronization training exercises (e.g., JANUS) to

rehearse the command and control of the observe and report function

would help form an early mental model of the mission in which

subsequent MFO tasks could then be readily integrated.

4. The IRR refresher training should be eliminated, as only 28% of

those attending the training joined Rotation 28. Also, the training

provided was redundant with that received at Fort Bragg during Phase III.
Training and Task Performance 199

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Dr. Lisa Drexler for her enthusiastic assistance in

organizing data collection and compiling a bibliography during the early

phase of the project. We also thank Mr. Cecil Fulmore and Ms. Christina

Curnow for their keen assistance in data analysis and Mr. Ben Knott for

his work in preparing questionnaires. Finally, we thank Dr. Elizabeth

Brady for her contribution on physical performance measures.
200 RC Peacekeepers

REFERENCES

Brady, E. J., & Rumsey, M. G. (1995, August). Physical performance of

Army peacekeepers. In Z. Simutis (Chair), Selecting warriors to

be peacekeepers. Symposium conducted at the 103rd annual

convention of the American Psychological Association, New

York, NY.

Brady, E. J., & Rumsey, M. G. (1993, November). Physical performance

in Army enlisted MOS revisited. Paper presented at the meeting

of the Military Testing Association, Williamsburg, VA.

Brady, E. J., & Rumsey, M. G. (1990, November). Upper body strength

and performance in Army enlisted MOS. Paper presented at the

meeting of the Military Testing Association, Orange Beach, AL.

Buddin, R., & Grissmer, D. W. (1994). Skill qualification and turbulence

in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Santa Monica,

CA: RAND.

Campbell, J. P., & Zook, L. M. (Eds.). (1991). Improving the selection,

classification, and utilization ofarmy enlisted personnel: Final

report on Project A. (ARI Research Report No. 1597).

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences. (AD A242 921)

Center for Army Lessons Learned. (1993). Bosnia predeployment

lessons learned initial impressions report. Fort Leavenworth,

KS.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. (1996). The effect ofpeace operations

on unit readiness. Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Diehl, P. E. (1988). Avoiding another Beirut disaster: Strategies for

deployment of U.S. troops in peacekeeping roles. Conflict, 8,

261-270.

DOD Inspector General. (1994). Specialized military trainingfor peace

operations. Program Evaluation, September 1, 1994.
Training and Task Performance 201

Griffith, J. (1995). The Army reserve soldier in Operation Desert Storm:

Perceptions of being prepared for mobilization, deployment, and

combat. Armed Forces & Society, 27(2), Winter, 1995.

Kahan, J. K. (1993). Peace support operations: Senior military

perspectives. In D. J. Quinn (Ed.), Peace support operations and

the U.S. military. Washington, DC: National Defense University

Press.

Kern, R. P, Wisher, R. A., Sabol, M. A., & Farr, B. J. (1994).

Reacquisition ofskills by combat engineers mobilizedfrom the

Individual Ready Reserve (ARI Research Report No. 1667).

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences. (AD A286 244).

Kutter, W. D. (1986). Operational guidelinesfor U.S. peacekeeping

commanders. Carlyle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.

Steele, D. (1996, April). We are reshaping the force. Army.

Taws, J. M., & Peters, J. E. (1995). Operations other than war:

Implicationsfor the U.S. Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Wisher, R. A., Sabol, M. A., & Ozkaptan, H. (1996). Retention of "peace

support operations" tasks during Bosnia deployment: A basisfor

refresher training (ARI Special Report). U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING AT THE

INFANTRY LEADERS COURSE

Margaret S. Salter

Gene W. Fober

Robert J. Pleban

Patrick J. Valentine

INTRODUCTION

The senior leaders, both officers and noncommissioned officers

(NCOs), of the newly constituted Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) Rotation 28 deployed from Fort Bragg, NC, to attend the Infantry

Leaders Course (ILC) at Fort Benning, GA, from August 26 through

September 23, 1994. This unit was specially formed as a composite of

Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers to serve

as the 28th Rotation of the MFO Task Force assigned to the Sinai. The

ILC was the initial leadership training event for the leaders of this

battalion and provided their first opportunity to function as a group. The

ILC occurred during the second phase of predeployment training as

discussed in Wisher and Farr, Chapter 8. It was intended to prepare the

Rotation 28 leaders to conduct training for their troops later at Fort

Bragg. Further training with the battalion's enlisted soldiers occurred

between October and December 1994.

The Infantry Leaders Course

The ILC focuses on infantry doctrine and tactics and collective

infantry skills. It is a "train-the-trainer" course offered by the elite

203
204 RC Peacekeepers

Ranger Training Brigade (RTB) at Fort Benning. The ILC's three

primary stated purposes are: (1) to ensure that personnel are trained on

current squad/platoon-level collective task doctrinal standards; (2) to

ensure that leaders are ready to conduct training to standard in their units;

and (3) to promote teamwork and cohesion through shared common

experiences. (Full information on the course is found in the U.S. Army

Infantry School Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet SH 21-75-7,

1993.)

The ILC is available for Light and Mechanized Infantry units and

other selected agencies. Initial contact between the ILC and the unit is

made about 6 months prior to the start of the course. The unit provides

the ILC with its Mission Essential Task List (METL), and the ILC and

the unit jointly develop a tentative training schedule. The training

schedule is finalized, with equipment and resources requested 12-14

weeks prior to the start of the course.

Training is based on a 28-day cycle at Fort Benning. However, units

have the option of decreasing the duration of the course or even

requesting a mobile training team to teach the course at home station.

The average training day is 12 hours, usually 7 days a week. The

emphasis throughout is on developing each student's ability to teach

soldiers infantry skills. The course presumes that soldiers are proficient

in the tasks appropriate to their rank and military occupational specialty

(MOS), and that all personnel, regardless of rank, will participate in

every training event.

Normally, course capacity is 104 personnel. Suggested attendees are

the battalion commander, 3 line company commanders, 9 platoon leaders,

9 platoon sergeants, 27 squad leaders, and 54 team leaders. All personnel

attending hold at least the rank of sergeant (E-5).

The key focus of the course is dismounted small-unit (squad and

platoon) infantry tactics. The battalion selects the contents of the

program of instruction (POI) based on its METL, training status, and any

special needs. Training options are based on the seven infantry squad

and platoon missions detailed in the platoon's mission training plan

(MTP) (DA, 1988a) (movement to contact, attack, raid, ambush,

reconnaissance & surveillance, defend, retrograde). Collective tasks and

battle drills are also available. Field Manual (FM)7-8 (DA, 1992)
Infantry Leaders Course 205

provides details on doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for

infantry rifle platoons and squads.

Special skills training is offered. It includes such subjects as land

navigation, aeromedical evacuation, training (how to develop a training

plan), and training the trainer (how to execute training). The collective

tasks and drills are combined into Situational Training Exercises (STXs)

and Field Training Exercises (FTXs); the specifics are at the discretion of

the unit.

Training is conducted based on the Army's "crawl, walk, run"

philosophy. Initial training (learning the tasks) is followed by refresher

training (training to standard) and finally, sustainment training (training

with realism) (DA, 1988b; DA, 1990). All training events are followed

by after action reviews (AARs) (DA, 1991).

Central to the bonding and cohesion portions of the course is the

selection of activities from team building exercises. These include the

Camp Darby Confidence Course (obstacles); the Water Confidence

Course at Victory Pond (physical challenge above water hazard); the

Leadership Reaction Course (small-group problem solving); rappelling

(tower and helicopter); hand-to-hand combat; student-led instruction; and

bayonet/pugil stick training.

Purpose of the Research

This chapter documents the training that took place while the

leadership elements of Rotation 28 were at the ILC. It also answers

several questions related to the effectiveness and efficiency of the ILC as

a training event for an MFO task force. Three questions were addressed:

(1) Did the ILC accomplish its training mission—i.e., were the leaders

trained to standard and prepared to conduct training? (2) Did the leaders

bond and become cohesive? and (3) Is the ILC the best place to train for

the MFO?

METHOD

Four U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences (ARI) researchers based at Fort Benning collected data designed
206 RC Peacekeepers

to answer the overall research questions listed above. Information was

gathered via written questionnaires, interviews, and training observations.

The approaches and data sources are detailed below.

Subjects

The 154 personnel who attended the ILC comprised 74 AC and 80

RC soldiers. The RC included 74 National Guardsmen, 5 Army

Reservists, and 1 officer from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

There were 11 AC officers, 11 RC officers, and 132 NCO and enlisted

personnel (63 from the AC and 69 from the RC). A few of the original

personnel arrived too late for the start of the course and some departed

before it ended.

Materials

Past experience and Rotation 28 preparedness. Several survey

instruments were designed to elicit self-assessment of readiness,

leadership qualities, and course expectations. The experience survey

provided demographic information on the soldiers' AC or RC status,

their Combat Training Center (CTC) experience, and their Army and

professional development training. The purpose of this instrument was to

identify variations in training experience within the battalion leadership.

The pretraining questionnaire (i.e., the MFO Unit Preparedness

Survey) asked them to rate themselves on how prepared they were to

train 17 specific collective tasks (e.g., Disengage, Defend, Cross Danger

Area, Reconnoiter Route, Occupy Observation Post) and 11 battle drills,

special skills, and individual tasks (e.g., React to Ambush, Land

Navigation, Aeromedical Evacuation). A second section asked them to

assess which of their leadership skills needed improvement; the next part

asked them to rate their new immediate supervisor in some broad areas of

leadership (e.g., Planning, Supervision).

The final sections asked them to rate their confidence in the ILC's

ability to prepare them to train their subordinates. It also asked whether

they felt confidence, before the course, in their ability to develop and

execute unit training plans. The last question asked respondents what

they expected the ILC course to do for them and their specific unit

element.
Infantry Leaders Course 207

Prior MFO rotation. The 19 officers and NCOs of Rotation 28 who

had been on previous MFO missions with other units completed a

questionnaire on their prior training. The first portion of this survey

asked about their former duties in the Sinai, their workload, and their free

time activities. These soldiers also described the training their earlier

units had prior to departing for the Sinai and what tasks they wished they

had spent more time on.

The second portion of the Prior Rotation Questionnaire focused on

the soldiers' present situation, including how much MFO-specific

training they remembered from the earlier rotation. They were asked

whether they thought MFO units need courses like the ILC in order to

prepare for deployment. They were also asked whether the ILC was the

proper course and whether they perceived any specific problems

attributable to the use of a volunteer task force rather than a

command-selected standard battalion. These questions, all open ended,

were designed to elicit "lessons learned" from previous rotations.

ILC posttraining: End of course. At the conclusion of the course,

the leaders completed a questionnaire to assess their current levels of

performance and any changes resulting from their training. They were

asked to rate their confidence in their ability to develop and execute

training, and what other tasks should have been included in the POI for

the ILC. They rated the ILC course on how well it prepared them to train

other soldiers and how much it succeeded in promoting bonding within

the unit. The soldiers also listed course strengths and weaknesses. The

final questions repeated the leadership questions that were in the original

survey in order to determine self-perceptions of leadership growth.

ILCposttraining: During deployment. The final instrument

administered to Rotation 28 soldiers was during their Sinai mission,

about 5 weeks into the deployment (i.e., 5 months after the ILC). The

intent of the questionnaire was to see the extent to which perceptions had

changed over time.

Assessment by the ILC Ranger Instructors. Another source of data

was a survey administered to the Fort Benning ILC cadre 2 months after

the Rotation 28 training. They were asked for an overall assessment of

the unit in comparison to other battalions and for their opinions on how
208 RC Peacekeepers

the course should have been conducted or might be used for future MFO

rotations.

Procedures

Ranger Instructors. Before the 28th Rotation leaders arrived at the

ILC to begin their training, the Ranger Instructors (RIs) from the RTB

and staff met as a group with ARI to discuss the overall MFO mission.

The discussion also covered typical ILC POIs, procedures, and outcomes.

During this time, the RIs learned about the events ARI was interested in

observing and the kinds of information we sought. We stressed the

importance of the individual cadre observations and opinions, as well as

the need for candor.

This group-interview procedure was repeated at the end of the course

as an AAR. It was deliberately kept very informal to elicit as much

information as possible from the cadre. For some of the instructors, this

ILC had been their first. Others had been RIs for several years and had a

great deal of information to use as a basis of comparison. All spoke at

length and contributed to the overall discussion. Generally, they were in

complete agreement with each other on the issues.

MFO questionnaires. Procedures for the administration of surveys

varied. On the afternoon that Rotation 28 leaders arrived at Fort

Benning, they were given the surveys related to experience and

pretraining. The soldiers were in one large group, with four ARI

personnel present. We introduced ourselves and explained our role in

their training experience. We explained that we would be present every

day, would ask specific questions, and would welcome any comments or

questions from them. As with the cadre, we stressed the importance of

candor and assured them that every soldier's opinion was of value.

For the Prior MFO Rotation survey, the respondents answered the

questions at their own convenience and returned them to ARI when

finished—typically 3 days later. The instructions stressed that they were

to take their time in responding. The posttraining survey was planned for

group administration by ARI; but, because the battalion schedule

changed, staff personnel distributed and collected the survey. The Sinai

questionnaire was administered on site by ARI personnel.
Infantry Leaders Course 209

Training observations. ARI researchers observed the leader training

throughout the entire 4-week period. We saw both classroom and field

events and watched the group begin to take shape over time. By our

nearly constant attendance during training (including road marches and

evening/weekend classes), we gained the confidence of the leaders.

They spoke candidly about their concerns and impressions. These

findings, although less rigorous and systematic than the questionnaires,

provided excellent information and served as validation of the

questionnaire data.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The training of the MFO composite battalion at ILC differed in many

ways from that of the typical battalion. The tasks selected were quite

different from those of most light infantry battalions. The mixture of AC

and RC soldiers posed a potential problem; however, the newness of the

battalion turned out to be even more critical. Since the unit had no

history, no overall training status could be determined in advance. The

effects of these and other issues will be detailed below. The

questionnaire data are reported first, followed by the training

observations. The overall questions that guided the research are

addressed in the Conclusions section.

Questionnaire Data

Experience survey and demographic data. The brief demographic

questionnaire provided information on student background and

experience. Of the MFO leaders (N=\5A) who responded, 74 were AC

soldiers (11 officers and 63 NCOs). The remaining 80 were RC (74

Army National Guard [ARNG], 6 Army Reserve). Of the RC, 11 were

officers and 69 NCOs. Although there were some officers in the group

with prior enlisted service and one NCO who had been an officer, data

for this and all other surveys were tabulated according to the respondents'

present status. Also, because there were a large number of National

Guardsmen with prior active duty service, it was impossible to verify

when (or in what capacity) they attended specific schools. Table 9-1

shows advanced military education.
210 RC Peacekeepers

Table 9-1

Number of Soldiers Reporting Attendance at Officer/NCO Courses *

Respondents

Total

Active Component

Officer NCO

11 63

Reserve Component

Officer NCO

11 69

Ranger 9 12 4 1

Airborne 11 54 6 14

Air Assault 3 34 7 21

Combat Life Saver 1 29 2 9

PLDC* 0 59 0 61

BNCOC* 0 34 0 33

ANCOC* 0 10 0 12

OBC* 11 0 11 0

OAC* 4 0 10

velopment Course (PLDC), Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officers

),Officer Basic and Advanced Course (OBC and OAC).

Note. *Primary Leadership De

Course (BNCOC and ANCOC

The CTC experience was somewhat greater for the AC soldiers (see

Table 9-2). The relatively high RC attendance probably reflects the high

number with prior active duty service. The low percentage for officers

may reflect the fact that 14 of the 22 were lieutenants who may not have

been in service long enough to have had a CTC opportunity. Of the 154

respondents, some had been to only one CTC and others to several; 31

had been to none.

MFO unit preparedness survey results. The pretraining survey

documented the MFO task force's precourse preparedness to train

specific tasks. The leaders were asked to rate each of the collective tasks,

drills, and individual-specialty tasks according to whether they felt very

well prepared, prepared, somewhat prepared, or not prepared to train

those tasks before the start of the course. Table 9-3 shows percentages of

the AC and RC officers and NCOs who considered themselves either

prepared or very well prepared to train 17 collective tasks prior to ILC.

No AC officers, and very few AC NCOs, reported being unprepared

in any category. Although there were AC soldiers (both officers and
Infantry Leaders Course 211

Table 9-2

Numbers and Percentages of Soldiers Reporting Experience at

Each of the Combat Training Centers

Active Component Reserve Component Total

Officer NCO Officer NCO

CTC n % n % n % n % n %

JRTC 6 55 50 79 4 45 35 51 96 62

NTC 3 27 34 54 1 9 24 35 62 40

CMTC 1 9 10 16 2 18 4 6 17 11

Any CTC 7 64 59 94 7 64 50 72 123 80

None 4 36 4 6 4 36 19 28 31

"C, the Joint Readiness Training Center, for light infantry, is located at Fort Polk,

ational Training Center, for armored/mechanized units, at Fort Irwin, CA;

Combat Maneuver Training Center, for armored/mechanized units, at

Germany.

20

Note. JR] LA;

NTC, the N

the CMTC,

Hohenfels,

NCOs) who admitted being only somewhat prepared to train some tasks,

many more RC perceived themselves to be less than prepared. Similarly,

a larger percentage of the AC soldiers rated themselves as very well

prepared overall.

There were, however, differences between tasks. For example, every

respondent rated himself as at least somewhat prepared to train the task

Move Tactically; no one claimed to be notprepared. In contrast, for the

task Cross Defile more than 25% of the NCOs, both AC and RC, rated

themselves notprepared. Besides Cross Defile, only three tasks

(Disengage, Perform Linkup, and Reconnoiter Route) had less than half

of the respondents rate themselves as either prepared or very well

prepared, and all of these were RC NCOs.

This means that prior to the start of the course, more than half of all

personnel thought they were already prepared to train other people on the

subjects they were about to be trained on. Even though there was no way

to measure the accuracy of these self-perceptions, their impact cannot be
212 RC Peacekeepers

Table 9-3

Collective Tasks: Percent Rating Themselves as Very Well Prepared

Prepared to Train Their Soldiers to Standard

or

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Disengage 82 55 79 48

Hasty ambush 100 73 84 56

Point ambush 91 63 87 53

Defend 100 73 85 55

Occupy assembly area 82 73 83 67

Move tactically 100 73 94 80

Cross danger area 91 72 92 74

Occupy ORP 91 82 84 66

Occupy patrol base 100 82 84 66

Linkup 72 55 68 36

Cross defile 45 46 53 20

Recon zone 100 64 70 51

Recon route 100 63 75 47

Occupy OP 100 64 82 64

Surveillance 82 55 80 52

Prepare for combat 91 82 88 72

Consolidate/reorganize 90 54

nt); OP (Observation Post).

83 67

Note. ORP (Objective Rally Po

ignored. Many felt that what they should have been receiving was

training in the MFO tasks which they did not know. The mismatch

between perceived needs and course expectations and the actual conduct
Infantry Leaders Course 213

and content of the course continued throughout the duration of the ILC

experience.

For the four battle drills polled, AC respondents were very confident

in their ability to conduct training; 87% of all respondents rated

themselves as prepared or very well prepared on React to Contact and

Break Contact, and React to Ambush, and React to Indirect Fire (see

Table 9-4). For the RC soldiers, the highest percentage for any drill was

81%.

The overall pattern of AC being more likely to rate themselves better

prepared than RC continued for the other tasks and skills. The only

exception was the task Pathfinder Operations where very few of any

group felt prepared to train to standard—not surprising given the small

number of personnel who had attended Pathfinder School.

Other questions covered leadership. Generally, the AC soldiers rated

themselves less in need of improvement than the RC did, but differences

were small, except in self-perceptions of tactical proficiency. The

soldiers were also asked to rate the leadership skills of their immediate

superiors. Generally, most respondents were fairly favorable, with the

RC slightly more so than the AC. At the start of the course, these ratings

were given with the knowledge that most personnel did not really know

their superiors; they were taken as a rough baseline, to assess the changes

over time.

Three questions asked the soldiers to rate their confidence before the

ILC in their ability to develop and execute training plans. It also asked

them to rate their confidence in the ability of ILC to prepare them to train

their subordinates. Percentages are shown in Table 9-5.

Generally, the AC soldiers had less confidence in the ILC's ability to

meet their needs than did the RC. The RC soldiers were also less

confident in their own precourse ability to develop and execute training.

Many NCOs, both AC and RC, admitted to not being overly confident in

their ability to execute training.

The final question asked the leaders what they expected from the

course, given their unique mission and make up of the unit. The question

was open ended; some did not answer, others responded more than once.

Responses clustered in five broad categories. One was bonding, cohesion
214 RC Peacekeepers

Table 9-4

Battle Drills, Special Skills, Individual Tasks- Percent Rating Themselves as

Very Well Prepared or Prepared to Train Their Soldiers to Standard

Active Component Reserve Component

Tasks Officer NCO Officer NCO

React to contact 91 94 64 71

Break contact 91 89 64 66

React to ambush 91 87 73 65

React to indirect fire 91 95 73 81

Leader reconnaissance 91 76 64 57

Land navigation 91 95 64 72

Construct fighting positions 91 89 73 68

Aeromedical evacuation 91 52 55 24

Pathfinder operations 36 33 46 12

Unaided night vision 55 68 50 34

Report enemy information 100 94 73 78

and team building; it was the item most stressed by the battalion

commander. Another category focused on assessment of unit strengths

and weaknesses. A third response category highlighted specific skills

and refresher training. A fourth category covered troop leading

procedures (TLPs). The fifth category was one of negative responses

(i.e., soldiers who replied "nothing" or "not much").

Percentages are shown in Table 9-6. Second responses (if any) are

shown in parentheses. Differences in expectations appeared to be greater

between officers and NCOs than between AC and RC soldiers; as before,

though, both RC officers and NCOs were highly focused on refresher

training and TLPs.
Infantry Leaders Course 215

Table 9-5

Soldier Confidence Rating*s of Ability to Train (Percentages)

Active Reserve

Component Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Can develop training now

Extremely confident 46 10 36 6

Very confident 46 36 9 20

Fairly confident 9 24 36 36

Somewhat confident 0 20 9 25

Not very confident 0 10 9 13

Can execute training now

Extremely confident 36 18 9 6

Very confident 27 31 36 29

Fairly confident 36 26 27 36

Somewhat confident 0 16 18 17

Not very confident 0 8 9 12

ILC will prepare me to train

Extremely confident 9 19 46 18

Very confident 64 39 46 60

Fairly confident 27 25 9 21

Somewhat confident 0 10 0 0

Not very confident 0 7 0 2

i

Prior MFO experience. Three officers and 16 NCOs had been on

one prior MFO mission, and 2 had been twice before. Ten were

volunteers for this rotation, nine were not. They were asked to look back

at their earlier rotation (for some this was only 6 months prior; for others

it was nearly 10 years). They answered questions based on their

experiences and said that they remembered most of the MFO precis items

(reports, identification), but 15 admitted that they needed/desired

refresher training.
216 RC Peacekeepers

Table 9-6

Percent of Soldiers Reporting Specific Expectations

and (Second) Responses

From the ILC: First

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Bonding 55(25) 22(21) 10 (50) 17(21)

Assessment 0(25) 16(16) 0 (0) 6 (0)

Skills 27(13) 31 (26) 60 (0) 35 (38)

TLPs 18 (38) 17 (32) 30 (50) 37 (38)

Not much 0 (0) 14 (5) 0 (0) 5 (4)

When asked to respond to a question about train-up tasks other than

the MFO tasks their prior unit had used, 11 of the 19 reported those MFO

tasks anyway. Others mentioned common task training. There was little

consensus on this question or on another one which asked what they

wished they had spent more time on. They were asked to use their

experience to determine what most units need to train on, other than

MFO tasks. Eight again cited the need for MFO tasks. Those who had

already been on the mission continued to emphasize MFO tasks (e.g.,

vehicle, aircraft, and license ID; first aid because of civilian accidents).

This intensified feelings that the ILC was not focused on the right tasks.

Two soldiers specifically mentioned Arabic language training as

something that was lacking.

One vital question asked whether MFO battalions need the ILC, or at

least something like the ILC. Nine said yes, they needed something like

the ILC; six said no; the other four hedged by responding both yes and

no. Fifteen indicated that something else (i.e., not ILC) would have been

useful; nine thought that tasks from the long-range surveillance course

might have been beneficial.

Asked what problems they perceived as coming from the use of a

volunteer force, nine said none and five focused on uneven ability levels.

Another five mentioned problems resulting from the fact that it was

possible to volunteer for the wrong reasons, or that RC personnel were
Infantry Leaders Course 217

able to change their minds after they had started. On the other hand,

asked about the benefits of using volunteers, 15 commented on the high

level of motivation. Eleven felt that unit cohesion could easily be

developed under the present circumstances; five said no, and three were

unsure. One said "I wish we had more than one month." Ten said that

cohesion was never a problem to begin with.

The parts of the ILC perceived to be worst were the confusion

created by the mission, and some chain-of-command issues. Leaders also

commented on the hardship of being away from their families. The best

part of the deployment was the training itself, or opportunities for "travel

and culture." Some mentioned the potential for personal growth, getting

to know other people(s), or belonging to a good squad or team.

Asked whether the MFO mission should be conducted by AC units,

RC units, or a mixture, 11 opted for the composite unit. Six added that

such a mixture would benefit both RC and AC. In response to the final

question, which invited overall comments about the MFO mission, nine

volunteered that the MFO is a good mission ("Great tour but not to be

taken lightly"). One suggested that it be made a 1-year tour.

ILC posttraining: End of course. The posttraining survey was

administered on the final day of training. Of the original 154 soldiers,

147 responded to this questionnaire, 70 from the AC and 77 from the RC.

Missing were two officers (AC) and five NCOs (two AC and three RC).

There is a need to be cautious in interpreting these data because all

personnel were eager to get home, and were thus poorly motivated to

answer questions about the ILC.

Highlights of the survey are detailed in Table 9-7. The first two

questions paralleled the pretraining survey in asking how confident

respondents were in their ability to develop and execute training plans.

Table 9-7 shows the number and percentages of respondents who

selected each confidence level.

A primary purpose of the course was to enhance the soldiers' ability

to develop and execute training plans. Both AC and RC described

themselves as very or extremely confident that they could develop (AC

84%, RC 70%) and execute (AC 84%, RC 72%) training plans for their

units.
218 RC Peacekeepers

Table 9-7

Soldiers Confidence in Their Abilities After the ILC

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

n % n % n % n %

Develop training plans

Extremely confident 6 75 23 41 3 27 12 19

Very confident 1 13 24 43 3 27 34 54

Fairly confident 0 0 9 16 2 18 12 19

Somewhat confident 1 13 0 0 1 9 4 6

Not very confident 0 0 0 0 2 18 1 2

Execute training plans

Extremely confident 7 88 24 43 3 27 17 27

Very confident 1 13 22 39 3 27 30 48

Fairly confident 0 0 8 14 2 18 11 17

Somewhat confident 0 0 2 4 1 9 3 5

Not very confident 0 0 0 0 2 18 2 3

Direct comparisons of these results with the pretraining ratings

indicates that most overall confidence ratings appear to have increased

after the course. Table 9-8 shows the comparisons. NCO shifts toward

greater confidence over time indicate that the course, despite its

difficulties, had the desired effect upon those who were actually going to

be responsible for daily training.

Many soldiers did not respond to an open-ended question that asked

which other specialized skills or tasks should have been included in the

ILC POL The responses of those who did reply clustered into five

categories: MFP tasks in general (39); specific MFO tasks (20); other

11-series tasks (11); troop leading procedures (5); and bad-attitude

responses (4). Focus on MFO tasks remained strong. One soldier

volunteered "I don't think ILC was suited to our unit's mission. We have
Infantry Leaders Course 219

Table 9-8

Comparison of Pretraining and Posttraining

(Percentages)

Active Component

Officer NCO

Confidence Ratings

Reserve Component

Officer NCO

Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post

Develop training

Extremely confident 46 75 10 41 36 27 6 9

Very confident 46 13 36 43 9 27 20 54

Fairly confident 9 0 24 16 36 18 36 19

Somewhat confident 0 13 20 0 9 9 25 6

Not very confident 0 0 10 0 9 18 3 2

Execute training

Extremely confident 36 88 18 43 9 27 6 27

Very confident 27 13 31 39 36 27 29 48

Fairly confident 36 0 26 14 27 18 36 17

Somewhat confident 0 0 16 4 18 9 17 5

Not very confident 0 0 8 0 9 18 12 3

one week until our soldiers arrive. We need to be studying and having

classes on our MFO precis..."

The next few questions asked how well the ILC prepared the unit to

train to standard and promote bonding. The ratings are shown in Table

9-9. Approximately half (48% to 58% of each group) thought the course

was effective or very effective in preparing them to train. More officers

(AC 77% and RC 81%) than NCOs (AC 48% and RC 58%) thought it

was effective or very effective for bonding.

Another question asked how useful they felt the ILC had been in

preparing units like theirs for MFO missions. Only 22% of the AC

officers and 40% of the RC officers thought that the ILC could be rated

very useful or better. The NCOs (AC 25% and RC 23%) were similarly

unconvinced. The high percentages for not very useful or not at all useful
220 RC Peacekeepers

Table 9-9

Rating of Course Effectiveness and Usefulness

Active Component Reseve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

n % n % n % n %

Prepare to train

Very effective 1 13 8 13 0 0 10 15

Effective 3 38 26 44 6 55 28 43

Somewhat effective 2 25 13 22 3 27 22 34

Somewhat ineffective 2 25 6 10 0 0 4 6

Ineffective 0 0 4 7 0 0 1 2

Very ineffective 0 0 2 3 2 18 0 0

Promote bonding

Very effective 3 33 14 23 4 36 17 26

Effective 4 44 15 25 5 45 21 32

Somewhat effective 2 22 21 34 2 18 20 30

Somewhat ineffective 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 3

Ineffective 0 0 4 7 0 0 4 6

Very ineffective 0 0 5 8 0 0 2 3

Preparing for MFO Missions

Extremely useful 1 11 5 8 1 10 3 5

Very useful 1 11 10 17 3 30 12 18

Somewhat useful 6 67 19 32 2 20 31 47

Not very useful 0 0 16 27 3 30 16 24

Not useful at all 1 11 9 15 1 10 4 6

most likely reflect the mismatch between perceived needs and course

content for this particular battalion.

Table 9-10 shows number and percentage of responses to the

question "Should the ILC continue to be used to train MFO Battalions

like yours for future rotations?"

In explaining their ratings, most soldiers who were positive noted

that the ILC and the RIs are the standards; i.e., the best of infantry

training, but that any training would be of benefit. Others mentioned the
Infantry Leaders Course 221

teamwork opportunities fostered by the environment. Those who were

not in favor of the course focused on the lack of MFO-specific classes.

They believed that a Fort Bragg-based course (specifically the Airborne

Leaders Course) could have done as well or better.

Table 9-10

Should the ILC Continue to Train the MFO?

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Yes 7 (78%) 27(47%) 5 (56%) 40(63%)

No 2 (22%) 30(53%) 4 (44%) 24 (38%)

Table 9-11 relates to team building and training. Specifically, given

the nature of the battalion, could team building and/or training have been

accomplished better somewhere else? The battalion was about evenly

divided with respect to bonding. However, 68% of those who answered

said that the training could have been done more cost effectively at home

station. The uncertain, undecided, or yes and no responses show that

many saw possible benefits deriving from being away from home and

home-station training distractors. As before, several mentioned the ILC

as a minideployment and a test of the battalion's internal logistics system.

Two questions sought opinions on the major strengths and

weaknesses of the ILC. Strengths again clustered into predictable

categories, as shown in Table 9-12. For both AC and RC, the major

benefit was team building or confidence enhancement. Refresher

training and "reblueing" on infantry skills were also praised. One noted:

"ILC kind of shook people up and put them into the military mode." A

few soldiers could find nothing positive to say; however, several made

more than one good comment. For these, only the first two responses

were tabulated.

Weaknesses that were identified are shown in Table 9-13.

Communication was a major problem—primarily the mismatch between

student expectations and course content. Problems focused on the
222 RC Peacekeepers

Table 9-11

Favorable to Change of Location

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

For Team Building

Yes 4 (50%) 29 (52%) 8 (80%) 32 (57%)

No 4 (50%) 27 (48%) 2 (20%) 4 (43%)

For Training

Yes 4 (44%) 47 (77%) 8 (73%) 40 (63%)

No 2 (22%) 7(11%) 0 (0%) 3 (5%)

? 3 (33%) 7(11%) 3 (27%) 21 (33%)

absence of MFO-specific material and the perceived lack of assurances

that the soldiers' needs were being satisfied ("ILC instructors hands were

tied too much. The course was weak for our needs because it was not

MFO related"). Some said that the instruction was "OK for the Guard"

or otherwise too basic; others repeated typical "bad attitude" responses.

Two questions that focused on leadership skills were identical to

questions on the first pretraining questionnaire. Overall, few said that

leadership skills had improved much. As for perceived

self-improvement, the critical areas of concern were those which

paralleled the aims of the course: team building and tactical and

technical proficiency. Table 9-14 shows perceptions for these areas. The

only respondents included in these tabulations were those who had

indicated on the first survey that they needed improvement in these areas.

In this instance, only improved or did not improve responses were

counted. Therefore, the overall self-assessment numbers were very small.

ILC posttraining: During Sinai deployment. Of the original 154

soldiers who attended the ILC, only 74 could be reached to complete this

survey. Since all four line companies and HHC responded (the number

per company ranged from 8 to 24), the data are probably adequately
Infantry Leaders Course 223

Table 9-12

ILC Strengths: Frequency of Response in Each Category

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Bonding 1 7 0 10

Assessment 5 26 7 41

Skills 2 21 3 21

TLPs 2 2 4 0

Not much 1 6 1 5

n = 7 50 11

explanation of descriptors. Several respondents had multiple

59

Note. See text for responses.

Table 9-13

ILC Weaknesses: Frequency of Response in Each Category

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Communication 4 7 1 5

No MFO Tasks 2 8 3 9

Content; logistics 1 8 2 7

Level of instruction 1 11 3 14

Bad attitude 0 13

multiple responses.

2 13

Note. Several respondents had
224 RC Peacekeepers

Table 9-14

Soldier Reports of Perceived Improvement in Team Building, Tactical

Proficiency and Technical Proficiency

Active Component Reserve Component

Officer NCO Officer NCO

Team building

Needed improvement 2 15 3 26

Improved 2 9 1 14

Did not improve 0 6 2 12

Tactical proficiency

Needed improvement 3 21 4 40

Improved 1 10 4 28

Did not improve 2 11 0 12

Technical proficiency

Needed improvement 2 20 7 45

Improved 0 7 3 31

Did not improve 2 13 4 14

representative, although limited. The sample contained 9 officers (4 AC,

5 RC) and 64 NCOs (31 AC and 34 RC). Approximately 70% of the

respondents were either team or squad leaders; 17% were in traditional

company-level leader jobs—i.e., company commander, first sergeant,

platoon leader, or platoon sergeant.

Although other comments were collected, the primary intent of this

survey was to determine if there were any tasks that the soldiers wished

they had spent more (or less) time on during the ILC. They were first

asked for open-ended responses, and then later to rate the actual tasks

from the program of instruction. The 5-point rating scale consisted of

way too much time, too much time, about the right amount oftime, not

quite enough time, and not nearly enough time.

A sizable percentage of the soldiers felt comfortable with the amount

of time allocated to each of the 29 rated tasks. The highest percentage in
Infantry Leaders Course 225

this group was for the task AAR where 60% of the respondents marked

about the right amount oftime. Land Navigation (59%), Use of Hand

and Arm Signals (58%), and Self-Extraction from a Minefield (54%) also

scored high in this category. All of these tasks can be considered MFO

mission-relevant tasks.

There were several tasks with high ratings for too much time or way

too much time. The tasks with the highest incidence of this perception

were Ambush (64%), Cross Danger Area (62%), Occupy an Assembly

Area (60%), Move Tactically (58%), Occupy a Patrol Base (58%),

Objective Rally Point (56%), and Perform Linkup (53%). These tasks

are traditional infantry tasks. Conversely, some tasks received high not

enough time and not nearly enough time ratings although there were far

fewer of these. The most nominated tasks in these categories were

Aeromedical Evacuation (60%) and Perform Sling Load Operations

(42%). These tasks are especially important to successful performance, of

the MFO mission.

There were only limited differences between the AC and the RC in

their perceptions, although the AC tended to select too much time or way

too much time more frequently. The only task which showed a large

difference between the two groups was familiarization with the M249

Squad Automatic Weapon. For the AC, 41 % said there was too much

training, whereas only 16% of the RC felt that way. This is easily

explained by the fact that for many RC soldiers this was their first

experience with the M249; most AC soldiers were familiar with it, and

many had fired it.

Many other issues and concerns that had been raised before were still

in force at the time of this survey. As before, the majority of the soldiers

felt that more MFO tasks should have been included in the ILC,

including aircraft identification, reporting procedures, MFO rules of

engagement, OP operations, and Arabic classes. Very few respondents

felt that emphasis on basic infantry tasks was the correct approach; a

similar number noted that ILC was acceptable as a means of building

teamwork and evaluating soldier competency in infantry skills. Several

expressed the opinion that the RIs had been underutilized.

The final question solicited the soldiers' help in planning for future

MFO rotations. As before, the majority of the responses focused on three
226 RC Peacekeepers

themes: (1) the ILC, as developed for this particular rotation, was a waste

of time; (2) not enough time was spent on MFO specific tasks; and (3)

the training could have been done more cheaply and more effectively at

Fort Bragg. One soldier commented that "more time should have been

spent on leadership, how to train, train the trainer and troop leading

procedures."

Assessment by Ranger Instructors. Of the ILC cadre who had

participated in training MFO leaders, 21 who were still available 2

months afterwards completed a final survey. The number of prior ILC

classes each had taught varied from 1 to 21. For three, it was their first

class; two had over 20 classes; the mean was 7.

They were asked to give their opinions on what should be done to

train the leaders of future MFO battalions. Several gave more than one

answer, but the majority (13 of 21 responses) indicated that the MFO

should "deploy to a desert terrain using a mobile training team of ILC

cadre." Two suggested remaining at home station with an ILC team;

three said it would be best to repeat what had been done for Rotation 28.

The primary concern that surfaced, however, was the need for both

the battalion and the ILC to be clear, in advance, as to the exact intent of

the course. Some suggested that no MFO tasks be included and that such

a decision be publicly stated before the start of the course. Others thought

the ILC should be tailored to the MFO mission ("They would be better

served by doing tasks that apply in the desert"). Several commented that

the entire unit needs to be focused when attending, including officers—

be prepared to play the game.

Observations

Training schedule/content. The overall training schedule and POI

content were finalized before the company commanders and first

sergeants reported to the battalion, and no company driven changes

occurred after the class started. A consequence of the lack of widespread

input to the training schedule was that the overall intent of the training

was lost outside the battalion staff. For example, the NCOs had expected

practice in MFO-specific tasks; such expectations were evident from

initial questionnaire data and from daily conversations with the soldiers.

Although the ILC was not intended to include MFO-specific training,
Infantry Leaders Course 227

unfortunately the students were not aware of this. The training, all light

infantry oriented, was perceived as virtually irrelevant to their MFO

mission. They did not realize that MFO tasks would be the focus when

the unit returned to Fort Bragg.

Team building events. The commander's METL included "form an

Infantry Task Force (receive, organize, equip and train the force)." A

major element of this task was the cohesion and team building required to

make a unified battalion from the diverse group of the soldiers who

arrived at the ILC. Team building is always important. In this instance it

was perceived as critical if the MFO was to succeed in integrating AC

and RC soldiers.

Several classes aimed at cohesion were held. The first was the Water

Confidence Course in which all personnel were required to perform tasks

that demanded a public display of courage. These involved climbing to

the top of a 30-foot tower, sliding down a pulley line across water, and an

over-water walk across an 8-inch-wide "log" pathway. This event

provided an excellent beginning for the battalion; enthusiasm was high,

and the soldiers encouraged and cheered each other on, rallying behind

those who found the task especially difficult.

The next confidence and team-building event was held on the first

full training day. The Leaders Reaction Course (LRC) was offered by the

U.S. Army Infantry School. The officers, first sergeants, and platoon

sergeants joined the cadre as observers. The soldiers were randomly

assigned to eight-man groups. The course consisted of 17 stations, 10

water hazards, and 7 so-called dry stations. Each station presented a

problem or scenario. The intent was to force the group to come up with

creative solutions and to work together as a team. There were several

possible ways to solve each problem, but each required that the personnel

cooperate and rely on each other. This event was well received; laughter

and high spirits were very apparent. Between-group competition was

high, and within-group motivation appeared to be good.

The final scheduled teamwork and bonding event, rappelling from

both low and high platforms and from a helicopter, was held at the end of

the second week. Bad weather precluded the helicopter portion, but the

entire battalion participated in the rappelling. Some soldiers were
228 RC Peacekeepers

experienced; others had never done it before. Again, this was a very

spirited event, with considerable overall competition and camaraderie.

Physical training. A physical training (PT) program was planned for

the unit. Occasionally, Rotation 28 personnel led exercises; more often

the RI cadre led instruction. Further "toughening" was accomplished

through the unit's marching, by company element, from the Ranger

cantonment area to the daily training sites. Additionally, there were early

morning tactical road marches of 4 to 6 miles; the soldiers were in

complete uniform with load-carrying equipment, rucksacks, and weapons.

Classroom instruction. The classroom/bleacher instruction was

generally presented, by the RI instructors, to the battalion as a whole.

The success of the instruction varied. Some classes such as Train the

Trainer, After Action Reviews, How to Train, and How to Brief, were

well received. Another, Troop Leading Procedures, was extremely

popular and received considerable praise from almost everyone,

particularly the RC soldiers who said they were "rusty." For these

classes, most of the NCOs were present; the officers attended only

irregularly.

An opportunistic class on principles of Unaided Night Vision was

offered experimentally one evening to 33 personnel from the battalion. It

turned out to be one of the most popular classes and was highly praised.

Other classes; e.g., Land Navigation, were called too basic, too long, or

just not relevant. Pace Count and Compass Check served as refresher for

some soldiers, but were considered boring by most. Opinions on the

Global Positioning System (GPS) class varied.

Weapons training. The Ml6 rifle live-fire and weapons classes were

completed in 1 day, at three different ranges. The soldiers zeroed,

qualified, and then fired on the advanced rifle marksmanship ranges. The

AC soldiers were all familiar with the M16A2 rifle, but most RC had

fired only the M16A1. The two rifles have slightly different zeroing

procedures, and this caused delays until those who had never fired the

M16A2 before became familiar with the process. Another class covered

familiarization with the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). This

training was very well received, probably because so many had never

seen it. However, no one had the chance to fire the SAW.
Infantry Leaders Course 222

Collective training and situational training exercises. Collective task

training was conducted during week two. In contrast to the previous

week's procedures, most training was presented by student instructors to

the rest of the unit. The tasks were: Move Tactically, Consolidate and

Reorganize, React to Contact, Break Contact, Disengage, React to

Indirect Fire, Cross Danger Area, Cross Defile, Perform Leader

Reconnaissance, Occupy an Observation Post, Occupy a Patrol Base,

Sling Load/Cargo Net, and Use Arm and Hand Signals.

The Rotation 28 students prepared these classes lor 2 days in

advance of the lesson, using manuals and materials provided by the

cadre; they led their platoons through performance of the activities using

the Army's "crawl, walk, run" method. After a short class, the instructor

and an assistant demonstrated the actions or elicited the participation of

student demonstrators and talked them though the steps (crawl phase).

The unit practiced several iterations of the task, with critiques (the walk

phase), and finally performed the task from start to finish without

interruption (the run phase). This was followed by a student-led AAR,

then by a cadre critique for the student instructor. The classes varied

according to the skills of the student instructor.

Student-led field exercises continued in the third week. Tasks

included: Self-extraction from a Minefield, Occupy an Observation Post,

Perform Surveillance, and Make a Terrain Model. For the last of these,

the RIs had constructed a prototype, and after discussing it, each of the

training platoons broke into small groups and constructed their own

terrain models.

The final portion of the third week set the stage for the fourth week's

STXs. The battalion practiced Reconnaissance (area, zone, and route)

and Surveillance as a part of, and in preparation for, the fourth week's

Defend mission.

CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of the MFO

composite battalion at the ILC. Caveats which have been included all

along, however, must be remembered, as well as the fact that this was, in
230 RC Peacekeepers

effect, the first iteration ofa pilot experiment. The lessons learned by

everyone will be important for future rotations.

Training to Standard

The first question addressed by this research asked whether the

Rotation 28 leaders were trained to standard and prepared to conduct

training of their own troops upon returning to home station. Although as

noted, some portions of the training went more smoothly than others,

generally, the answer is yes. The Rotation 28 leaders were trained and

able to conduct internal training.

Part of the success is due to the caliber of the RTB cadre and part to

high-quality performers of the volunteer battalion. The ILC cadre were

experienced in training leaders; they were aware not only of the

doctrinally correct standards and procedures, but also of the pitfalls

experienced by other units. The high-quality volunteers of Rotation 28

helped to overcome any performance-based inequalities between the RC

and the AC. Those who had skill deficiencies when they arrived at the

course were highly motivated and generally benefited most. Some AC

leaders adopted mentoring roles and helped their RC counterparts when

possible.

However, a larger training issue arose because of the precourse

decision not to have MFO-specific tasks included. This decision was in

line with the ILC's mission statement which focuses on reblueing

infantry skills. Unfortunately the decision was perceived as wrong by

many of the Rotation 28 leaders who had expected that they would

receive MFO training. The problems caused by these varying

perceptions about what should have been taught interfered with the

training.

Teamwork and Bonding

The second major question focused on the unit's ability to become a

cohesive unit. Most of the original concern centered on the issue of the

AC/RC mixture—whether these two disparate elements could be

combined and work well together. However, very early during the

course, it became obvious that most personnel in both groups accepted

each other as members of a common MFO unit, and that the AC/RC
Infantry Leaders Course 231

difference per se was essentially irrelevant. Some AC soldiers admitted

to being pleasantly surprised by the capabilities of individual RC

members. Cohesion was largely personality dependent; it was also

somewhat dependent on the specific situation. In a more well-defined

training environment, the month-long course would have promoted a

strong within-unit bond; as it was, the results varied.

Is the ILC the Place to Train the MFO?

The final question was whether the ILC located at Fort Benning is an

appropriate predeployment training event for the MFO. This question

must be broken down into various aspects: content of the course, the face

validity of the location, the RTB instructors, and the advantages of

soldiers being away from their home station.

Any battalion derives benefit from external evaluation of its training;

and, when the evaluators are the professional caliber of the RTB, these

advantages can be very great. The MFO composite battalion profited

from the evaluation of unit readiness, strengths, and weaknesses.

The location of the training is more questionable. The terrain was

primarily wooded or grassy with open spaces. Signs of Fort Benning

civilization (telephone and electrical wires, roads, installation signs) were

never far from the training sites. While this did not interfere with

training, it reduced the verisimilitude of the course, primarily for those

who had expected an MFO-related course. A training venue more nearly

representative of the area to which the battalion was going for its mission

would have been preferable.

The decision to include no MFO-specific classes should be

reevaluated. Although there is no need to have all training be MFOspecific, inclusion of some MFO-related tasks or training vignettes would

have helped. Student concerns could be allayed by telling them that time

at home station would be allocated to MFO-specific tasks.

Although many complained about their training not being conducted

at Fort Bragg, most admitted that being away from the distracters of

home station was a good idea that even helped promote unity. Some

soldiers also recognized it as a trial separation for those who had not been

deployed recently. It also served as a preliminary test of the battalion's
232 RC Peacekeepers

operations and logistics functions (e.g., payroll, mail, communication

with the rear detachment, emergencies).

The lessons learned from this first iteration of an MFO Sinai rotation

at the ILC were many. Unit performance data may address the question

as to how useful the ILC actually was and the wisdom of hindsight plus

the passage of time may change the evaluations of the ILC. The ILC

lessons will, however, enable future MFO battalions to have a more

effective and focused predeployment training experience.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A composite unit, or any all-volunteer force, needs some form of

predeployment training experience like the ILC (although not necessarily

the ILC) to assess readiness status. It is also clear that the content of

whatever course is given must appear to be related to the unit's

objectives and METL.

The ideal situation would probably have a special mobile training

team of RTB, or a similarly qualified instructor cadre, training the unit.

They would teach a mixture of core infantry and MFO-specific tasks.

The schedule should incorporate team building, but focus on

improvement of squad-level drills and collective tasks.

The precise location for training should depend on resources

available and possibly on the locations from which most of the personnel

will be drawn. It should, if possible, be conducted in a desert-like

environment. Regardless of location, the ideal scenario would allow the

unit to have everyone on site far enough in advance so that unit bonding

and gauging junior leader performance can begin before the start of the

actual training. There is very little for senior leaders and staff to do at the

ILC, and lower level leaders need to begin to experience the autonomy

they will have on the MFO mission.

With the RTB or other similarly qualified personnel as on site

instructors, senior leaders could be utilized to prepare for and welcome

the enlisted personnel into the battalion at home station. Staff officers

could begin to run their tactical operation centers (TOCs) at home station.

Other personnel could create professional-development classes on
Infantry Leaders Course 233

culture, customs, tours, etc., to promote unit cohesion when the lower

level leaders have returned to the battalion. Linguists could be available

to help build spirit by beginning to teach battalion personnel things such

as reading and counting in Arabic.

All of this would have the salutary effect of permitting all platoon

leaders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, and team leaders to participate

in and conduct training they will be responsible for during the

deployment. The time to encourage the independence ofjunior leaders is

during their initial training event.
234 RC Peacekeepers

REFERENCES

Department of the Army. (1988a). Mission training plan for the infantry

rifle platoon and squad (ARTEP 7-8 MTP). Washington, DC:

Author.

Department of the Army. (1988b). Training the force: Soldiers, units &

leaders (FM 25-100). Washington, DC: Author.

Department of the Army. (1990). Training the force: Battle focused

training (FM 25-101). Washington, DC: Author.

Department of the Army. (1991). A leader's guide to after action

reviews (Coordinating Draft) (TC 25-20). Washington, DC:

Author.

Department of the Army. (1992). Infantry rifle platoon and squad (FM

7-8). Washington, DC: Author.

Department of the Army. (1993). Infantry leaders course pamphlet (SH

21-75-7). Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army Infantry School.
SECTION 4

SOLDIER ATTITUDES AND

PERCEPTIONS

The fourth section includes four chapters describing the soldiers'

attitudes and perceptions about their squads, their leaders, and the

impacts of the deployment on their personal lives. The chapters analyze

how the soldiers' attitudes and perceptions changed from when they first

reported for duty through nearly the end of the deployment in the Sinai.

We attempted to identify what they thought, why they thought it, and

how these perceptions might affect their civilian lives and military

careers as well as their propensity to volunteer in the future.

In Chapter 10, Siebold analyzes the squad cohesion, soldiers'

motivation for performing the mission, and their level of morale within

the line company squads. This chapter also uses small-unit dynamics

theory to explain and interpret the findings.

In Chapter 11, Mael and Palmer describe the attitudes and

perceptions reported by leaders on their own training and morale, the unit

leadership, and the accomplishment of the mission. They also document

how the leaders perceived the relationships between Active Component

(AC) and Reserve Component (RC) personnel as well as the

recommendations for future use of RC soldiers for peace missions.

Chapters 12 and 13 both focus on how the Multinational Force and

Observers experience has impacted the military and civilian lives of AC

and RC soldiers. Chapter 12 (Oliver, Hayes, and Tiggle) compares the

predeployment expectations reported in Chapter 6 with the soldiers'

reports of what they actually experienced during the deployment.

Lakhani and Abod (Chapter 13) describe the financial gains and losses of

both components, relating the amount of gain or loss to the soldiers'

intention to remain in the service.

235
10

SMALL UNIT DYNAMICS: LEADERSHIP,

COHESION, MOTIVATION, AND

MORALE

Guy L. Siebold

INTRODUCTION

The full scope of the research on small unit dynamics, from which

this chapter was derived, was designed to address specific domains of

behavioral science theory, certain applied issues, and a set of continuing

methodological concerns. The meso-level (middle-level) scientific

theories which were addressed concerned cohesion, motivation, and

leadership. The military-oriented theories dealt with group performance,

"The Mission," and peacekeeping. The main applied issues related to

how well Reserve Component (RC) (Army National Guard [ARNG] and

Army Reserve) soldiers would carry out a mission traditionally

performed by Active Component (AC) soldiers, how well soldiers from a

mix of AC and RC units would work together, what the impact of the

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Task Force in the Sinai

experience would be on soldiers (e.g., on their retention), and what

lessons could be learned (e.g., for force structuring). The major

methodological concerns were whether the measures used would show

the desired characteristics across soldiers over time; whether changes in

the level of the measures appeared to be a function of individuals, groups,

or time; and whether the data collected would meet standards for validity

at a given period and over time. The research was planned to provide

valuable input to theory, to military knowledge and planning, and to the

training of the leaders of future deployments and peacekeeping missions.

237
238 RC Peacekeepers

Specifically, this chapter describes the perceptions of leadership,

cohesion, motivation, and morale of the soldiers of the 28th Rotation as

they prepared for and carried out their assignment to the MFO in the

Sinai Peninsula, Egypt. The focus is on the soldiers at the platoon and

squad level, with an emphasis on those situated at remote sites where

their primary purpose was to observe and report. This chapter covers

research orientation, methods and measures, data quality, mission trends

over time in the variables measured, interrelations among the main

variables, remote site structure and dynamics, and the relation between

unit dynamics and some important outcomes.

RESEARCH ORIENTATION

Leadership

Most leadership research has its roots in historical analysis,

personnel selection and compensation, or training. The thrust of the

research has at times been on the leader as an individual (personality,

traits, or charisma), as a leader under contingent situations (effective

under condition "A", not effective under condition "B"), or as a leader

located in a social structure (a hierarchy or in relation to those around

him—followers, peers, superiors). For the most part, this set of research

has shared certain assumptions and a world view that is consistent with

and supportive of the "industrial society" motif under which the research

was conducted. The focus has been on the rational analysis of leader

characteristics or behaviors that can be role-modeled, selected for, or

trained in individuals so that they can lead, manage, and orchestrate small

or larger parts of the industrial machine (e.g., Bass, 1996; Blades, 1986).

Some recent research has begun to address the softer side of

leadership (e.g., interpersonal relations and organizational culture) and to

return to the nonrational (e.g., symbolism or charisma). This type of

research is a transition to addressing leadership within the motif of the

postindustrial, information society. That motif includes a focus on

groups of leaders rather than on dominant individuals, on a climate of

learning rather than on one of control and contingency planning, and on

leaders as enablers and context setters rather than as drivers of machine

systems. This focus is on groups of leaders working together to provide

the conditions and the environment for soldiers to understand, personally
Small Unit Dynamics 232

want to, and succeed at theirjobs and missions, both individually and as

cohesive collectives. The emphasis is on the integrative as opposed to

the directive functions of leadership.

The leadership variables in the MFO peacekeeping research reflect

this information society motif. They are familiar rather than new

variables: (1) the effectiveness of the top leaders in a platoon (at

performing their tasks and at taking care of their soldiers) and (2)

leadership team cohesion. Note that the variables are at the group rather

than the individual leader level. The research provided no assessment of

specific individual leaders and their characteristics; there was no attempt

to relate the behavior of specific individual leaders to the performance of

their subordinate elements; there was no attempt to determine the precise

leader skills and abilities needed to accomplish the mission; and there

was no effort to identify how leaders developed during the research

period.

The use of the group level in the research is consistent with the high

degree of turnover of leaders in Army units, the experience that leaders in

a group will compensate for the limitations of any given leader, and the

tendency of soldiers to view individual leaders along a single, "very good

to very bad" dimension. In terms of unit cohesion, these leadership

variables represent the dimension of vertical bonding, i.e., soldier

perceptions of their ties to their leaders. It was expected in this MFO

peacekeeping research that for units with strong leadership there would

be higher levels of squad member cohesion and soldier motivation as

well as more positive perceptions of the command climate in the unit.

The command climate was defined in terms of: (a) unit learning climate,

(b) rule clarity (anomie), and (c) unit pride. The command climate, in

unit cohesion terms, would represent the dimension of organizational

bonding, i.e., the soldier perceptions of their ties to the unit as a whole.

Of course, all these variables are intertwined. One of the goals of the

research project was to make progress in sorting out how these variables

were related among themselves over time.

Cohesion

Cohesion has been one of the standard variables measured in

research on group dynamics. Due to recent improvements in its
240 RC Peacekeepers

conceptualization and measurement, the variable has seen a resurgence in

use and theoretical importance. In general terms, small unit cohesion (or

more correctly—cohesiveness) can be defined as the degree to which the

forces of social control, internal and external to individual group

members, maintain a pattern of relationships among the members which

allows the group to accomplish its mission (Siebold, 1987). The value of

cohesion in a group is that it allows the group to operate with greater

teamwork and unity, to withstand higher levels of stress, and generally

operate more efficiently and effectively in its environment (Siebold,

1988).

Military unit cohesion is more "full" than the cohesion examined in a

great deal of academic research (Siebold & Lindsay, 1994). It is more

full because of the nature of military groups. They exist in the real world

rather than just in the laboratory; military groups have a hierarchy of

formal leaders; military groups are ongoing, relatively permanent entities;

and military groups have real world, meaningful missions. Thus, military

unit cohesion is measured not only in terms of the affective (e.g., trust)

and instrumental (e.g., mutual aid) bonds but also at three different

dimensions: among peers, between leaders and subordinates, and

between group members and the unit as a whole (Siebold & Kelly, 1988).

Given that the soldiers assigned to Rotation 28 for the MFO force in

the Sinai were an ad hoc unit put together especially for that rotation and

that they were a mixture of AC and RC soldiers, a key issue was the

extent to which they would build and maintain cohesion over their tour of

duty. Of specific interest was the degree of cohesiveness that would be

obtained at the various Sinai remote sites where much of the primary

mission would be carried out under AC or RC site commanders. In a

more academic sense, there was concern over how unit cohesion would

interplay with the other variables measured over time.

Motivation and Morale

Past research has shown that motivation is a strong predictor of unit

performance, especially under effective leadership and a positive

command climate (Siebold, 1994). Two types of motivation were

examined: job motivation and mission motivation. Job motivation was

conceptualized in terms of the level of effort that soldiers would
Small Unit Dynamics 241

contribute to their day-to-day task activities. Mission motivation was

conceptualized in terms of the support of a soldier for the MFO mission

in the Sinai. Of interest were the levels of both types of motivation over

the tour and whether that motivation was related to the reasons a soldier

gave for volunteering for the assignment.

Morale was conceptualized in terms of how the soldier felt about his

current situation—negatively or positively. Of interest was how the

motivation of a soldier related to his morale over time and whether

extraneous factors such as family concerns and opportunities for travel

and education related to motivation and morale. Again for academic

purposes, there was concern over how motivation and morale would

interplay with the other variables over time.

Military Oriented Theories

It has been the position of this author that small unit performance is

primarily a function of soldier motivation, cohesion, intelligence, and

training under the condition of positive leadership (i.e., effective leaders

and a positive command climate). As noted previously, the research was

designed to examine the interplay of these variables over time and relate

them to whatever outcome measures could be obtained. In addition, there

was a desire to understand the nature of the MFO Sinai Mission on its

own terms. Do soldier attitudes and perceptions (a) remain constant over

time, (b) modulate, (c) become more positive, (d) decline steadily after an

initial honeymoon period, or (e) decline for a while and then make a

partial recovery? Also, the findings about the 28th Rotation needed to be

put in the context of other rotations to the Sinai so that one could

determine what effects appeared to be a function of Rotation 28 dynamics

and what appeared to be the typical result of any rotation to the Sinai.

METHODS AND MEASURES

Data Collection

Data for the research described in this chapter were obtained by

questionnaires administered primarily by researchers from the U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) on site

where the soldiers were located. Questionnaires were administered at the
242 RC Peacekeepers

start of training for the rotation in August 1994 at Fort Bragg, NC

(leaders only), in October 1994 at Fort Bragg (soldiers and any leaders

who missed the August administration), in December 1994 at the end of

training for the rotation at Fort Bragg, in February 1995 at South Camp in

the Sinai, and again in May 1995 at South Camp in the Sinai. In the

August and October 1994 administrations, soldiers responded right on the

questionnaire booklet. In the remaining administrations, soldiers

responded by marking their answers on a machine-scannable answer

sheet. Sheets containing soldier responses were returned to ARI where

they were cleaned for errors and scanned; the data were then entered into

an SPSS Windows database.

Questionnaire Scales

Sets of items in the questionnaire formed scales measuring key

concepts for the research. All the scales had been used in earlier

research. However, the specific wording or verb tense of many items

were tailored to fit the soldiers in Rotation 28 or reflect the stage of the

rotation during which the soldiers responded. For the August and

October 1994 administrations, respondents were asked to answer the

items as they related to their losing (past) unit, except for the items on

their motivation for the mission in the Sinai. In the remaining

administrations, soldiers were asked to respond in terms of how they

currently saw things in their Rotation 28 unit. In addition to substantive

items, soldiers were asked to provide demographic information such as

their unit, remote site, rank, racial/ethnic group, sex, educational level,

and social security number. Tables 10-1 - 10-3 present the items that

composed each major scale for the May 1995 round of data collection.

Also given are the response alternatives for the scale questions and scale

reliability data from previous research (denoted with an "x").

Morale was measured simply by asking respondents to rate their

personal morale (Very high, High, OK, Low, Very low) on the February

and May 1995 questionnaires and on the separate May 1995 Family

Questionnaire (Very High, High, Moderate, Low, Very Low). For the

analysis, responses to the two virtually identical morale items on the two

different May 1995 questionnaires were averaged together to make a

two-item scale on morale.
Small Unit Dynamics 243

Table 10-1

Scales Measuring the Leadership Elements

Leadership Team Cohesion

(In my platoon:)

20. Top leaders (platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders) work

well together as a team.

21. Top leaders pull together to get the job done.

22. Top leaders really care about each other.

23. Top leaders trust each other.

Response alternatives for all items: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree,

Disagree, Strongly disagree.

Scale data: alpha = .89x; item-total r range = .73x - .85x.

Learning Climate

(In my platoon, SOLDIERS:)

9. Are given a lot of responsibility for their work.

10. Are encouraged to do things on their own even if they sometimes

make mistakes.

11. Get feedback from their leaders on how well the soldiers are doing.

12. Feel that the emphasis is on getting things right, and notjust on looking good.

13. Can admit their mistakes and are helped to learn from them.

14. Feel the leaders have confidence that their soldiers will do their jobs right.

15. Are provided with guidance and direction when assigned new duties.

Response alternatives for all items: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree,

Disagree, Strongly disagree.

Scale data: alpha = .87x; item-total r range = .47x - .68x.

(table continues)

RESULTS

Data Quality

Analysis of the data showed that the reliability of the scales

measuring the major constructs was high. With only one exception for

one data collection period, the Cronbach's alphas were .74 or higher for

all the scales over all the periods. Most of the alphas were in the .80s or

above. There was general stability over time for the scales in their alpha
244 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-1 (Continued)

Scales Measuring the Leadership Elements

Leader Effectiveness

(How often do the top leaders in your platoon:)

24. Look out for the welfare of their soldiers?

25. Encourage soldiers to work together as a team?

26. Act friendly and approachable?

27. Settle conflicts when they occur in the platoon?

28. Demonstrate they know Army tactics and doctrine?

29. Work hard and try to do as good a job as possible?

30. Pull their share of the load in the field?

31. Maintain high standards for unit performance?

32. Demonstrate they are effective leaders?

33. Show they are the kind of leaders one would want to serve under in

combat?

34. Keep subordinates well informed about what is going on?

35. Keep themselves informed about the progress subordinates are

making in their training?

36. Demonstrate they have the expertise to show subordinates how best

to perform a task?

37. Listen well and care about what a subordinate says when he goes to

his leaders for help?

(Leader effectiveness items address: initiating structure,

soldier consideration, and task effectiveness.)

Response alternatives for all items: Almost always, Usually,

Sometimes, Not usually, Almost never; (or Don't know or can't answer).

Scale data: alpha = .97x; item-total r range = .79x - .97x.

Note. Item numbers are from the questionnaire. Item-total r range is the range of correlations between each

item and the scale mean with the item deleted. An "x" after the scale data numbers indicates the numbers

were from prior research.

values and in the ranges of inter-item and item-scale total correlations.

Further, the values of the reliability characteristics for the scales were

similar to those in previously collected data sets, as noted in Tables

10-4 - 10-5. In addition, the standard deviations of the responses to the

scales were relatively consistent over the various data collection periods.
Small Unit Dynamics 245

Table 10-2

Scales Measuring the Squad Member Cohesion Elements

Squad Member Cohesion Scale

(In my platoon:)

16. Squad members work well together as a team.

17. Squad members pull together to get the job done.

18. Squad members really care about each other.

19. Squad members trust each other.

Response alternatives for all items: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree,

Disagree, Strongly disagree.

Scale data: alpha = .86x; item-total r range = .68x - .71x.

Rule Clarity (Anomie) Scale

38. The soldiers in my platoon know what is expected of them.

39. Rules are consistently enforced.

40. The reasons for being rewarded or promoted are well known.

41. The behaviors that get you in trouble or punished are well known.

42. The priorities in my platoon are clear.

Response alternatives for all items: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree,

Disagree, Strongly disagree.

Scale data: alpha = .86x; item-total r range = .68x - .71x.

Pride in the Platoon Scale

43. The soldiers in my platoon feel they play an important part in

accomplishing the mission.

44. Soldiers are proud to be in my platoon.

Response alternatives for all items: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree,

Disagree, Strongly disagree.

Scale data: alpha = .69x; inter-item r - .52x.

Note. Item numbers are from the questionnaire. Item-total r range is the range of correlations between each

item and the scale mean with the item deleted. An "x" after the scale data numbers indicates the numbers

were from prior research.

This occurred despite variations in the sample for each data

collection. The Fall 1994 data collection did not include the full

complement of subjects; they had not all been incorporated into their

units. The Sinai data collection early in the rotation (February 1995) was

truncated due to weather and mis-scheduling; only a partial sample was

obtained. The final (May 1995) late rotation data collection was an
246 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-3

Scales Measuring the Soldier Motivation Elements

Job Motivation Scale

(Regarding your work with your platoon:)

5. I don't mind taking on extra duties and responsibilities in my work with this platoon.

6. I work hard and try to do as good a job as possible.

7. I look forward to starting work every day.

8. I am very personally involved in my work.

Response alternatives for all items: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree,

Disagree, Strongly disagree.

Scale data: alpha = .77x; item-total r range = .50x - .64x.

Mission Motivation Scale

45. It really matters to me that we do well on our mission in the Sinai Peninsula.

46. I am willing to put in extra effort to accomplish our assignments during this rotation to

the Sinai Peninsula.

47. I am learning a lot during this rotation to the Sinai Peninsula.

Response alternatives for all items: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree,

Disagree, Strongly disagree.

Scale data: alpha = .84x; item-total r range = .68x - .73x.

Note. Item numbers are from the questionnaire. Item-total r range is the range of correlations between each item

and the scale mean with the item deleted. An "x" after the scale data numbers indicates the numbers were from

prior research.

enhanced sample which included substantial numbers of Headquarters

Company respondents.

Yet the responses demonstrated remarkable consistency and stability

in scale characteristics. Factor analyses (principal component, varimax)

done for each time period showed that the scales held together very well.

Seven factors accounted for 66% to 71 % of the variance, depending on

the time period. Each scale composed one of the factors, except for the

two-item Pride scale, which loaded on the Rule Clarity scale factor. The

scale measuring morale was not entered into the series of factor analyses

because it was derived post hoc and existed only for the May 1995 data.

However, it was included in a subsequent factor analysis, wherein the

Morale scale did form a separate factor. In short, the quality of the

measures and of the data appeared very good across the various scales

and time periods.
Small Unit Dynamics 247

Table 10-4

Scale Reliability Characteristics Over Time

Data Collection Period

Seal? FALL94 PRC94 FEJ395 MAY95

Leadership Team .92 .90 .92 .92

Cohesion (4) .67-.83 .64-.79 .68-.86 .69-.85

.78-.84 -75-.81 .77-.86 Z76-.85

Learning Climate (7) .92 .86 .87 .89

.52-.74 -36-.61 .37-.63 .40-.64

.70-.79 .58-.70 51-11 .61-.77

Leader .98 .96 .96 .97

Effectiveness (14) .59-.87 .50-.79 .44-.83 .58-.82

.77-.92 .71-.87 .70-.88 .78-.88

Squad Member .93 .90 .91 .89

Cohesion (4) J2-.84 .67-.76 .67-.86 .61-.78

.82-.84 .78-.79 .76-.83 .74-.77

Rule Clarity (5) .85 .84 .83 .84

.47-.60 .44-.61 .42-.57 .41-.58

.60-.71 .61-.67 .59-.66 .57-.72

Pride (2) .79 .82 .65 .77

.65 .69 .48 .63

Job Motivation (4) .78 .74 .77 .77

.39-.59 .32-.53 .36-.54 .31-.53

.50-.64 .47-.59 .50-.62 .52-.64

Mission Motivation (3) .87 .83 .74 .76

.62-.78 .57-.70 31-.12 .42-.73

.69-.81 .62-.72 .44-.68 .46-.68

Morale (2) .85

.74

Note. The number in parentheses after each scale title is the number of questionnaire items in the scale. The first

number in each cell is the alpha value; the second set of numbers in each cell s the inter-item correlation range or

item correlation if the scale has only two items the third set of numbers in each cell is the range of corrected

item-total correlations, if the scale has more than two items. (See Tables 10-1 -10-3.)
248 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-5

Scale Descriptive Characteristics Over Time

Data Collection Period

Scale FALL94 PEC94 FEB95 MAY95

Leadership Team 3.79 3.33 3.05 2.86

Cohesion 1.03 .92 1.04 1.07

309 340 204 442

Learning Climate 3.78 3.51 3.35 3.07

.89 .83 .86 .95

324 340 204 443

Leader Effectiveness 3.56 3.84 3.64 3.32

1.13 .92 1.00 1.08

313 335 203 439

Squad Member 4.01 3.79 3.69 3.49

Cohesion .89 .86 .89 .94

318 340 204 442

Rule Clarity 3.74 3.56 3.50 3.26

.88 .86 .86 .93

310 333 203 443

Pride 3.78 3.32 3.35 3.05

1.04 1.08 .96 1.09

306 333 203 443

Job Motivation 4.19 3.84 3.79 3.54

.70 .70 .73 .81

325 339 205 443

Mission Motivation 4.69 4.09 4.02 3.59

.60 .89 .82 .99

306 333 203 443

Morale 2.93

1.13

0 (low) to 5.0 (high). The first number in each cell is the scale mean

476

Note, Scales range from 1 the second number

is the scale standard deviation; the third is the number responding (n) The Fall 1994 scale references were to the

soldier's old unit, except for "Mission Motivatior ," which referred to the MFO-Sinai.
Small Unit Dynamics 24£

The Mission

Mission (tour of duty) analysis was used to examine the levels of the

specific scales or variables of interest. Mission analysis examines the

general trend of attitudes and perceptions as a whole, over time, and

across rotating units. For the 28th Rotation in the Sinai, a single trend

was dominant. There was a steady decrease over time in the levels of the

major scales.

To prepare for the mission analysis, similar baseline data were

collected during a prior rotation to the Sinai carried out by an AC, light

infantry battalion. The general trend of attitudes and perceptions for this

prior unit was similar to that of Rotation 28, i.e., a steady decrease over

time in the levels of most of the major scales. Although the two

battalions were somewhat different in their scale levels during the

predeployment stage, their levels (i.e., scale means) were almost identical

by the late mission stage. This indicates that there was a mission effect,

with similar influences exerted on unit dynamics by the nature of the

mission, the rules of engagement, the physical environment, and/or

cultural factors (see Table 10-6).

An examination of the data (Table 10-7) from the two rotations

shows that the construct scales, whose mean levels decreased the most,

were the same. These were the leadership influenced scales, including

Mission Motivation. The erosion in mission motivation is supported by

anecdotal evidence obtained through conversations which occurred

during data collection (also see the next chapter reporting on leader

attitudes). Many soldiers expressed an opinion that the mission simply

was not that important and said that the MFO presence was predicted to

end within a few years because it was not really needed any longer. The

soldiers did not feel like peacekeepers; they felt they were in the Sinai for

show and to aid the local tourist economy. The decrease in mission

motivation might have been exacerbated by the generally modest levels

of morale at the late misssion stage. The latter was due in part to the

feelings of the soldiers that they were overly confined and bored.

Soldiers typically were not allowed free movement in the local areas nor

encouraged to mingle with the local population. The principle of

achieving mission success by avoiding incidents meant the soldiers were

somewhat trapped on site. Further, trips to tourist areas (Cairo, Israel)

were few, and facilities and recreation at remote sites were limited.
250 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-6

Two Rotations: Comparat ive Scale Means Over Time

Rotation Stage Delta

Scale Pre Earlv Late B-A Late

Leadership Team Cohesion A 3.33 3.05 2.86

B 3.31 3.07 2.87 .01

Learning Climate A 3.51 3.35 3.07

B 3.38 3.16 3.05 -.02

Leader Effectiveness A 3.84 3.64 3.32

B 3.59 3.48 3.41 .09

Squad Member Cohesion A 3.79 3.69 3.49

B 3.92 3.68 3.61 .12

Rule Clarity A 3.56 3.50 3.26

B 3.60 3.38 3.26 .00

Pride A 3.32 3.35 3.05

B 2.95 3.18 3.07 .02

Job Motivation A 3.84 3.79 3.54

B 3.78 3.67 3.58 .04

Mission Motivation A 4.09 4.02 3.59

B 4.21 3.90 3.56 -.03

Morale A 2.93

B (single item)

.0 (high). The first number

2.97 .04

Note. Scales range from 1.0 (low) to 5 in each cell (row A) is the scale mean for

Rotation 28 to the Sinai; the second number (row B) is the comparable scale mean for ar Active Component

light infantry battalion on a prior rotation to the Sinai. The differences between the means at a "Late" stage in

the rotation for the prior rotation and the 28th Rotation are shown in the last column; i.e the row B mean minus

the row A mean. Rotation stages: Predeployment, Early Sinai, and Late Sinai tour of duty.

The decrease in the Leadership Team Cohesion may be in part a

structural artifact of how the battalions were organized. The primary

mission, to observe and report, was performed mostly at remote sites,

which were usually commanded by squad leaders. This structure left

platoon leaders and platoon sergeants in an auxilliary role rather than in

the direct, daily command to which they were accustomed. Thus there

was a tendency for the platoon leaders and sergeants (and some higher

leaders) to micromanage from outside or otherwise try to replace their
Small Unit Dynamics 251

Table 10-7

Two Rotations: Comparative Scale Mean Decreases Over Six Months

Scale

Leadership Team

Cohesion

Learning Climate

Leader Effectiveness

Squad Member

Cohesion

Rule Clarity

Pride

Job Motivation

Mission Motivation

Rotation Stage Decrease

Pre Late Pre-Late Average

A 3.33 2.86 .47

B 3.31 2.87 .44 .46

A 3.51 3.07 .44

B 3.38 3.05 .33 .39

A 3.84 3.32 .52

B 3.59 3.41 .18 .35

A 3.79 3.49 .30

B 3.92 3.61 .31 .31

A 3.56 3.26 .30

B 3.60 3.26 .34 .32

A 3.32 3.05 .27

B 2.95 3.07 -.12 .08

A 3.84 3.54 .30

B 3.78 3.58 .20 .25

A 4.09 3.59 .50

B 4.21 3.56 .65 .58

Note. Scales range from 1.0 (low) to 5.0 (high). The first number in each cell (row A) is the scale mean for Rotation

28 to the Sinai; the second number (row B) is the comparable scale mean for an Active Component light infantry

battalion on a prior rotation to the Sinai. The differences between the means at the Predeployment stage and the Late

Sinai tour of duty stage in each rotation are shown in the third column; i.e. the "Pre" mean minus the "Late" mean.

The average decrease for each scale for row A and row B is shown in the last column.

reduction in authority. The situation was aggravated by the platoon

leaders and sergeants spending more time near the flagpole at South

Camp and being more subject to details, taskings, and VIP visits.

In any case, it is clear that the unit dynamics of the 28th Rotation

appeared similar to that of the light infantry battalion and to be
252 RC Peacekeepers

influenced by the mission. And the mixed component 28th Rotation

acted more or less the same as an AC battalion did. All subsequent

analyses must be viewed within this context and with the mission effect

in mind.

Unit Dynamics: Intervariable Correlations

An initial look at unit dynamics can be obtained through an

examination of the correlations among the scale variables over time. The

previously described factor analysis indicated how the variables separated

out; the pattern of correlations shows how the scales cluster together.

Their commonalities indicate where the mutual influences are strongest,

assuming a two-way influence and lack of an exogenous causal variable.

The data (Table 10-8) from Rotation 28 suggest that there is a strong

leadership cluster in the set of scales (i.e., Leadership Team Cohesion,

Learning Climate, Leader Effectiveness, Rule Clarity, and Pride). For

example, the largest correlate of Leadership Team Cohesion is the

Learning Climate scale, with correlations of .71, .57, .62, and .62

between the scales for the data collected in Fall 1994, December 1994,

February 1995, and May 1995, respectively. Since the reference for the

fall of 1994 was the prior (losing) unit, that correlation, .71, is less

relevant. Taking the last three correlations as a group, it appears that

there is a rather consistent mutual influence or correlation between the

two scales at about the r = .6 level. There are also consistent substantial

correlations between the Leadership Team Cohesion scale and the Leader

Effectiveness, Rule Clarity, and Pride scales, with r's in the .5 range.

The Learning Climate scale, in turn, also is related to the Rule Clarity and

Pride scales, with r = .6. The Leader Effectiveness scale, while related to

the other scales in the cluster, is more weakly so. Squad Member

Cohesion, on the other hand, is not strongly related to the other scales at

all. Its relative independence is shown by its lack of correlation at .5 or

higher for the last three periods of data collection.

There also appears to be a weak cluster surrounding personal

motivation and morale, consisting of the Pride, Job Motivation, Mission

Motivation, and Morale scales, which are joined to the other variables

through the Learning Climate, Rule Clarity, and Pride nexus. While the

numbers are obviously not crystal clear, they nonetheless portend three
Small Unit Dynamics 253

Table 10-8

Correlations Among Scales Over Time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Leadership Team Cohesion

2.

3.

Learning Climate

Leader Effectiveness

,71,.57

.62,.62

,34,53

.51,.63

,34,„53

.48,.54

[Cell Data Sets:

FALL94.DRC94

FEB95, MAY95]

4. Squad Member Cohesion ,66,43

.38,-38

,70,43

.44,.49

.27,-31

.18,-35

5. Rule Clarity .63..52

.58,.57

.63-61

.63,.62

.29.48 .51-42

.52..50 .28,.48

6. Pride .66..52

.57,-59

,64„63

.60..61

.29-45 .62-45 .72-69

.42,-49 .41,48 .68,-67

7. Job Motivation 30,41

.32,37

,44„56

.46,.54

.09-37 .37.41 43.47 .32-51

.22,.34 .33,44 .33,48 .27,-53

8. Mission Motivation ,11 „30

.32,.39

,12„46

.36,-44

.02..31 .15.-33 .18.48 .19-56 .22-54

.27,36 .25,37 41,44 .43,-51 .44,-54

9. Morale (May 1995)

05;ifr =

.37

. 15 or above, i

.42 .35 .29 .32 .44 .50 .38

Note. If r= .12 or above, p < <.01. See Table 10-5 for n's.

major axes in the unit dynamics, which are built upon a base of

individual differences. These axes or dimensions are: (1) leadership, (2)

squad members and their cohesion, and (3) organizational culture. The

dimensions fit with previous theoretical conceptualizations of military

unit cohesion (Siebold & Kelly, 1988) and that mentioned in the section

above on research orientation. The fact that the correlations among the
254 RC Peacekeepers

scales are relatively stable over time suggests that these unit dynamics

might be portrayed adequately within a static systems model. In such

models, the constructs are related in specified stable ways, and change

comes primarily from exogenous variables or events, such as change in

group membership. For example, turnover in members or leaders can

effect the array of individual differences on such characteristics as

attitude towards one's job and a general postive or negative outlook.

Since unit performance is not well addressed in the MFO data, the

important interplay between the degree of successful performance by the

unit in its environment and the other major constructs cannot be

addressed in a clearcut manner.

Remote Sites

Structure. The four line companies (A, B, C, and D) each had two

line platoons. Each line platoon had three or four squads, for a total of

six or seven line squads per company. The 13 squads from two line

companies would man the remote sites for a 3-week shift while the 13

squads from the other two line companies were in South Camp. Then

they would switch. After completing the 3-week shift at the remote sites,

the squads would return to South Camp where the soldiers would be

assigned to a Quick Reaction Force, details, or specific training, or

scheduled for tours or rest and recreation.

There are four types of remotes sites. Observation posts (OPs) are

typically located at strategic high positions offering a wide view. OP

3-11, for example, is located on Tiran Island at the entrance to the Gulf of

Aqaba, about halfway between the Sinai and the Saudi Arabia mainland.

At OP 3-11 there is a panoramic view permitting soldiers to observe all

ships (and planes overhead) entering or leaving the Gulf of Aqaba

through the Tiran Strait. Check points (CPs) are typically located at a

strategic road intersection or along a main traffic artery. CP 3-A, for

example, is located on the main road along the Gulf of Aqaba just south

of the Israeli-Egyptian border. Besides presenting a view of the main

road, the CP 3-A location offers views of the Sinai area, Israel, Jordan,

and Saudi Arabia as well as a small island nearby (with the ruins of a

castle built during the Crusades). Sector control centers (SCCs) are

located and function like either an OP or CP, but they are centrally

positioned among a cluster of remote sites, whose activities they monitor
Small Unit Dynamics 255

and coordinate. Finally, there is a quasi-remote site, the Front Gate at

South Camp. Although obviously not remote, the two squads that man

the Front Gate are from line companies and are structured and operated

as if they were at a remote site.

The typical remote site is headed by a site commander, usually a

staff sergeant (E6). Under him are two sergeants (E5) who function as

team (or site "squad") leaders. Under each sergeant are four squad

members (total JV = 11). One of the eight squad members would be a

medic or emergency medical technician (EMT). Of course, there is some

variation in structure among the remote sites. For example, at CP 3-A

there are also a linguist, a military policeman, and one of the platoon

leaders (a lieutenant). At SSCs 5 and 7, their respective company

commanders stay much of the time along with some company

headquarters personnel. At SCC-6, another platoon leader usually

resides. Some remote sites are divided into three teams instead of two.

Further, at SCCs, the medic is typically a sergeant rather than a specialist

(E4) as at the other remote sites.

Demographics. Before the analyses of the remote sites are

presented, it is useful to provide a demographic profile of the soldiers at

those sites. A list of remote sites along with the number of enlisted

soldiers at them (by service component) is presented in Table 10-9.

Remote sites are given twice since two companies had a squad assigned

at each site. Note that the majority of the soldiers were ARNG, that there

were no more than three Regular Army (RA) noncommissioned officers

(NCOs) at any site, and that the number of soldiers at a site varied from

10 to 15. (In this and subsequent tables, each company was assigned an

arbitrary number in place of a letter to provide some anonymity to the

respondents.)

The distribution of soldiers by component by position is provided in

Table 10-10. Note that all the squad members were either from the

ARNG or Army Reserve (AR). Note also that while there were 16 RA

site commanders but only 10 ARNG site commanders, the total number

of NCOs and line platoon leaders from each of these two components

was equal-53.

The platoon leader and platoon sergeant position numbers are given

in Table 10-10 for informational purposes. Leaders in these positions, for
256 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-9

Service Component of Personnel by demote Site

Component

Remote Site AR ARNG RA Total

OP 3-1, Col 10* 1 11

OP 3-2, Co 1 10* 1 11

OP 3-8, Co 1 12* 12

OP 3-9, Co 2 1

9* 2 12

OP 3-11, Co 2 10 2* 12

CP 3-A, Co 1 10 3* 13

CP 3-B, Co 1 10 2* 12

CP 3-C, Co 2 8 2* 10

CP 3-D, Co 2 10* 1 11

SCC 5, Co 1 10 3* 13

SCC 6, Co 1 12 1* 13

SCC 7, Co 2 10 2* 12

Front Gate, Co 2 10 2* 12

OP 3-1, Co 4 10 1* 11

OP 3-2, Co 4

9* 1 10

OP 3-8, Co 4

9* 2 11

OP 3-9, Co 3 11 2* 13

OP 3-11, Co 3 11* 1 12

CP 3-A, Co 4 10 2* 12

CP 3-B, Co 4 9 1* 10

CP 3-C, Co 3 7

3* 10

CP 3-D, Co 3 1

9* 2 12

SCC 5, Co 4 13 1* 14

SCC 6, Co 4 8 3* 11

SCC 7, Co 3 13 2* 15

Front Gate, Co 3 14* 1 15

Total 2

sted ] jersonnel

264

no officers, as of May 1995.

44

Component: AR =

310

Note. Numbers reflect only enl Army Reserve,

ARNG = Army National Guard RA == Regular Army. Companies are labeled by an assigned number rather than

their letter to limit identification * = number includes Site Commander. Of the 309 remote site personnel who

identified themselves by racial/ethnic group, 4 (1.3%) were Asian, 7 (2.3%) were Hispanic, 10 (3.2%) were Other

(e.g., Native American Indian), 42 (13.6%) were Black, and 246 (79.6%) were White. One remote site

commander identified himself as an Other; 4 reported themselves as Black; <ind 21 listed themselves as White.
Small Unit Dynamics _252

Table 10-10

Service Component of Line Personnel by Position

Component

Position AR ARNG RA Total

Squad Member 2 196 198

Specialist Medic/EMT 22 22

Team Leader/Other NCO 33 25 58

NCO Medic 3 3 6

Site Commander 10 16 26

Platoon Sergeant 3 5 8

Platoon Leader 4 4 8

Total 2 271

AR = Army Reserve, ARNG

53 326

Note. Numbers as of May 1995. Component = Army National Guard, RA =

Regular Army. One platoon leader identified himself as iispanic; the other ] )latoon leaders and all platoon

sergeants listed themselves as White.

the most part, were not involved in the day-to-day operations of most

remote sites. Platoon sergeants and most platoon leaders usually

operated out of South Camp.

Basic demographic characteristics for the enlisted personnel at the

remote sites are provided in Table 10-11. Note that there is quite a bit of

variability among the sites in terms of these characteristics. Expressed

differently, one can say that the sites were not demographically

homogeneous.

Contexts. Before one can examine the dynamics of remote sites, it is

necessary to consider the impact of contextual variables on those

dynamics. In particular, there are potential impacts from the company

under which a remote site is organized, the service component of the site

commander, the nature of a given type of site, and the jobs or positions

which the personnel in a remote site occupy.

The mean scale values for each company and their change from the

predeployment stage are shown in Table 10-12 and indicate one context
258 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-11

Personnel Characteristics by Remote Site

Characteristic

Remote Site No. States % College % Minority % Married

OP 3-1, Co 1 6 54.6 36.4 18.2

OP 3-2, Co 1 6 36.4 9.1 36.4

OP 3-8, Co 1 5 41.7 41.7 33.3

OP 3-9, Co 2 4 33.3 16.7 33.3

OP 3-11, Co 2 5 50.0 41.7 66.7

CP 3-A, Co 1 5 53.9 15.4 23.1

CP 3-B, Co 1 3 50.0 16.7 58.3

CP 3-C, Co 2 4 40.0 20.0 30.0

CP 3-D, Co 2 4 18.2 18.2 27.3

SCC 5, Co 1 4 46.2 23.1 30.8

SCC 6, Co 1 6 53.9 38.5 15.4

SCC 7, Co 2 6 33.3 50.0 27.3

Front Gate, Co 2 5 50.0 16.7 18.2

OP 3-1, Co 4 5 36.4 18.2 36.4

OP 3-2, Co 4 4 50.0 20.0 40.0

OP 3-8, Co 4 7 18.2 9.1 18.2

OP 3-9, Co 3 4 53.9 23.1 30.8

OP 3-11, Co 3 4 41.7 8.3 16.7

CP 3-A, Co 4 5 33.3 16.7 50.0

CP 3-B, Co 4 4 70.0 10.0 0.0

CP 3-C, Co 3 3 50.0 10.0 10.0

CP 3-D, Co 3 7 41.7 0.0 25.0

SCC 5, Co 4 4 42.9 21.4 21.4

SCC 6, Co 4 4 45.5 0.0 36.4

SCC 7, Co 3 4 26.7 33.3 42.9

Front Gate, Co 3 4 60.0 20.0 20.0

Mean 4.7 43.5 20.5 29.5

Minimum 3 18.2 0.0 0.0

Maximum 7 70.0 50.0 66.7

Note. Numbers reflec t only enlisted personnel, no officers, as of May 1995. No. of States = the number

of home states of the Guardsmen at a site. % College = the percentage of soldiers at a site who at least had

some college education before joining the rotation. % Minority = the percentage of soldiers at a site who

described themselves as Asian, Hispanic, Black, or Other (than White or one of the preceding). %

Married = the percentage of soldiers at a site who reported themselves to be married.
Small Unit Dynamics 259

Table 10-12

Mean Scale Values and Change by Company

Company

Scale 1 2 1 4

Leadership Team 2.66 3.12 2.28 2.94

Cohesion -.58 -.52 -.64 -.16

Learning Climate 2.95 3.12 2.32 3.00

-.79 -.40 -.80 -.31

Leader Effectiveness 3.18 3.64 2.75 3.46

-.71 -.43 -.78 -.31

Squad Member 3.32 3.46 3.09 3.60

Cohesion -.61 -.23 -.24 -.27

Rule Clarity 3.20 3.33 2.70 3.09

-.53 -.37 -.62 -.33

Pride 3.11 3.23 2.11 2.83

-.43 -.24 -.84 -.31

Job Motivation 3.53 3.42 2.88 3.54

-.44 -.42 -.73 -.09

Mission Motivation 3.59 3.46 2.96 3.66

-.54 -.81 -.99 -.30

Morale 3.03 3.02 2.08

note site means derived from responses by enlisted personnel, i

2.93

Note. Numbers io officers, n are based on rer

= 7 remote sites for companies I and 4; n = 6 remote sites for companies 2 and 3. The first number in each

cell is the mean of the means of the remote sites within the company late (May 1995) in the Sinai rotation.

The second number is the change in that value from the predeployment (December 1994) level Morale was

not measured in December 1994

effect. The scales go from 1 (low end) to 5 (high end), with 3 as a

midpoint. Table 10-12 presents, for each scale, the mean of remote site

means for each company as well as the change in that mean from

predeployment to late in the rotation. It is clear from the table that there

is a general parity among Companies 1, 2, and 4. However, Company 3

is much lower than the other three both relatively and at an absolute level

on many of the scales. Any analysis using data from remote sites within

Company 3 must take this company context into account.
260 RC Peacekeepers

By comparison, the component of the site commander seems to have

had only a small impact on the scale values for the remote sites. For each

scale, the mean of the means at the remote sites with an RA site

commander is higher, by a small amount, than those where the remote

site commander was from the ARNG. The decrease in scale values from

predeployment levels is also typically less at remote sites with an RA site

commander. However, this effect is somewhat misleading because the

RA site commanders were not equally distributed among the remote sites.

Rather, they were concentrated in the SCCs and CPs. For example, if

one considers only the remote sites other than the SCCs, the difference in

scale values between the sites with ARNG commanders and those with

RA commanders narrows. In a comparison among the remote site types,

SCCs had the highest scale levels, OPs had the next highest levels, CPs

were third, and the Front Gate sites were clearly at the bottom. The Front

Gate personnel never actually "escaped" from South Camp. They had

the most risky and tedious set of tasks in checking vehicles and

identification documents; they also had to deal with the problems

presented by impatient VIP visitors. SCCs, on the other hand,

presumably benefitted from the frequent on-site presence of an officer

and headquarters personnel. Scale values by component of site

commander and site type are given in Tables 10-13 and 10-14.

While the remote sites have a basic manning structure, they do vary

in size, number of NCOs, and component mix (refer to Tables 10-9 -

10-10). As a last contextual consideration, it is useful to look at the

impact of being in a particular position and component. In general, the

higher the rank or position of a respondent, the higher or more positive

are his responses to questionnaire items about his attitudes and

perceptions. Thus one would expect site commanders to report the

highest scale values and squad members to report the lowest, with the

team leaders and other NCOs somewhere in between. In contrast,

members with marginal status in a unit (i.e., those different from the

standard) often view the cohesion and culture of a unit in a less positive,

sometimes more objective way. At remote sites, these marginal figures

were the squad member level medics or EMTs. The squad member

medic/EMT had a special skill and status which was, for the most part,

dormant and hence not necessarily status enhancing. For practical

purposes, the medic/EMT could be treated as just another squad member.

Thus one would expect that squad member medics and EMTs might
Small Unit Dynamics 261

Table 10-13

Mean Scale Values and Change by Component of Site Commander

Scale ARNO RA

Leadership Team Cohesion 2.64 2.82

-.57 -.41

Learning Climate 2.76 2.93

-.62 -.54

Leader Effectiveness 3.11 3.36

-.56 -.55

Squad Member Cohesion 3.23 3.47

-.44 -.29

Rule Clarity 3.01 3.13

-.57 -.39

Pride 2.74 2.88

-.60 -.35

Job Motivation 3.27 3.41

-.51 -.35

Mission Motivation 3.40 3.45

-.63 -.65

Morale 2.59 2.90

Note. Numbers are based on remote site means derived from responses by enlisted personnel (no officers).

n = 10 remote sites for Site Commanders from the Army National Guard (ARNG); n = 16 remote sites for Site

Commanders from the Regular Army (RA). The first number in each cell is the mean of the means of the

remote sites with a Site Commander from a given component in May 1995. The second number is the change

in mean values from prerotation (December 1994) levels. Morale was not measured in December.

experience and report different levels of cohesion and command climate

factors than those squad members with mainstream status. Note that the

status situation was not marginal for the six NCO medics located at SCCs

who functioned as NCOs and served in their primary specialty.

The scale values by position and component are provided in Table

10-15. Generally, the levels of the scale values per position followed

expected patterns. For example, the site commanders from the ARNG

had higher levels on all scales compared to the ARNG squad members.

However, it is interesting to note that the ARNG team leaders and site

commanders had higher scale levels on most scales than did their RA
262 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-14

Mean Scale Values and Change by Type of Remote Site

Remote Site Type

Scak QE £P_ S£C EG

2.22

-.96

2.80

-.27

2.48

Leadership Team Cohesion 2.78

-.53

Learning Climate 2.88

-.58

Leader Effectiveness 3.30

-.48

Squad Member Cohesion 3.40

-.42

Rule Clarity 3.18

-.43

Pride 2.94

-.35

Job Motivation 3.42

-.39

Mission Motivation 3.50

-.59

Morale 2.81

Note. Numbers are based on remote si

Remote Site Tvne

£P_ see

2.71 2.94

-.38 -.32

2.74 3.01

-.71 -.48

3.26 3.46

-.57 -.56

3.39 3.42

-.22 -.34

2.97 3.19

-.60 -.26

2.75 2.87

-.55 -.40

3.25 3.47

-.52 -.28

3.32 3.58

-.66 -..57

3.09

-.45

2.76

-.64

2.53

-.60

3.11

-.43

3.09

1.03

2.73 2.95 2.34

personnel (no officers). Remote site types: OP = observation post, CP = check point,

SCC = sector control center, and FG = front gate; n = 10 for OP remote sites (i.e., 5 sites

X 2 shifts); n = 8 for CP remote sites; n = 6 for SCC remote sites; and n = 2 for FG sites.

The first number in each cell is the mean of the means of the remote sites within that type

late (May 1995) in the Sinai rotation. The second number is the change in that value from

the prerotation (December 1994) level. Morale was not measured in December.

counterparts. Even squad members had somewhat higher levels than did

the RA team leaders. The squad member medics reported lower scales

values than other squad members, except for Job Motivation and Morale.

On a substantive basis, all groups showed moderate to low Morale scale

values; squad members and team leaders confirmed a weakness in

Leadership Team Cohesion, a constrained Learning Climate, and limited
Small Unit Dynamics 263 <

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264 RC Peacekeepers

Pride. Also, for most positions, there was a hefty drop in Mission

Motivation from predeployment levels.

Remote Site Dynamics

Mission Motivation. Mission motivation is one of the most

important dynamic factors because it has been shown to be highly

correlated with unit performance (Blades, 1986; Siebold, 1994). It is also

one of the more complex factors in that many variables are related to it.

The leader-centric view (Bass, 1996; Blades, 1986; Kane & Tremble,

1994) is that mission motivation is a function of an articulate leadership

which focuses subordinates on their mission and convinces them of its

importance. Further, soldier motivation is a resource that interacts with

leadership to influence unit performance. The soldier-centric view

(Siebold, 1994) is that subordinates, especially volunteers, already have

substantial mission motivation and that one function of leadership is to

allow subordinate motivation to be actualized and not to depress it in the

process of organizing to accomplish the mission. The learning theory

view is that mission motivation is learned and grown through reward and

reinforcement (see Siebold, 1994). These views, while different, are not

fully mutually exclusive.

Mission motivation was measured for each remote site by the

average (mean) of responses to the Mission Motivation scale on the

questionnaires completed by the soldiers and NCOs at each site. The

analyses consisted of determining what variables significantly predicted

the mean levels of mission motivation prior to deployment (December

1994), the mean levels late in the Sinai mission (May 1995), and the

change in those levels from December to May. The analyses did not

focus on the stage prior to train-up (August-October 1994) or the early

period in the Sinai (February 1995) because there were too many missing

cases at the individual respondent level.

For the posttrain-up, predeployment stage, the leader-centric view

expressed above seemed to be supported. The strongest predictors were

leadership related: Leadership Team Cohesion, Pride, and Leader

Effectiveness. On the other hand, the influence of the mission motivation

of the site commander was only modest, implying that the influence of

the leaders as a group was more important than that of a specific leader.
Small Unit Dynamics 265

Note from Tables 10-12 and 10-14 that Mission Motivation was

relatively high at predeployment, with typical individual-level scale

means above 4.0 on the 5-point scale. As the prior tables have shown,

Mission Motivation did not remain high over the tour of duty.

However, for the late-mission stage, the soldier-centric view about

mission motivation seemed at least equally supported. Late-mission

mean motivation over the remote sites was strongly and negatively

associated with the problematic leadership in Company 3 and strongly

and positively associated with prerotation Squad Member Cohesion and

late-mission mean individual Job Motivation. Further, one can see from

the Decr(ease) column in Table 10-16 that the strongest correlate with the

decrease in Mission Motivation was the corresponding decrease in mean

individual Job Motivation. Anecdotally, some soldiers from a prior

rotation commented verbally that many soldiers felt the Sinai mission

was primarily to fulfill an outdated treaty obligation and to have a U.S.

presence in the area rather than to do a military job that was really

necessary. They heard rumors that the mission in the Sinai might be

terminated in a couple of years. The correlation between predeployment

Mission Motivation and the decrease in Mission Motivation (r = .53) is

an indication of the mission effect and an entropic regression to the mean,

i.e., the higher the predeployment level of Mission Motivation, the

greater was its decrease over time.

Statistically, late-stage Mission Motivation is overdetermined, i.e.,

combinations of different variables account for 100% of the variance.

This does not help in determining which view or combination of views of

mission motivation is more accurate. It seems that early on in a unit's

history there is a honeymoon period in which the group as a whole is

excited about its mission and that is exemplified by those in leadership

positions; hence the early strong correlation between Leadership Team

Cohesion and Mission Motivation. As time goes on and learning

proceeds, individual factors such as job motivation, morale, and

perceptions of reality additionally come into play. The correlation of the

decrease in Site Commander Mission Motivation with the decrease in

Mission Motivation implies that leaders can drag motivation down as

well as build it up.

The strongest predictors of Mission Motivation were those measured

with the same methodology and at the same time as Mission Motivation,
266 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-16

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Mission Motivation

Mission Motivation

Predictor Scale or Variable Pis Lais Deer

Pre: Leadership Team Cohesion .81* .39* .35

Learning Climate .53 .54*

Leader Effectiveness .67 .54*

Squad Member Cohesion .52 .71*

Rule Clarity .67 .41

Pride .75 .55*

Job Motivation .67 .34

Mission Motivation 1.00 .37* .53*

Site Commander Mission Motivation .37

Late: Leadership Team Cohesion .62*

Learning Climate .71*

Leader Effectiveness .72*

Squad Member Cohesion .54

Rule Clarity .59

Pride .77*

Job Motivation .77* -.48*

Morale .76* -.43

Site Commander Job Motivation .38 -.43

Site Commander Mission Motivation .50* -.49*

Deer: Leadership Team Cohesion -.33 .56

Leader Effectiveness -.44

Rule Clarity .37

Pride .51

Job Motivation -.49* .71*

Mission Motivation -.59* 1.00

Site Commander Job Motivation .48

Site Commander Mission Motivation .60

(table continues)

i.e., the eight other scales addressing unit dynamics. The "Other"

category of predictors, i.e., demographic variables or measures from

other questionnaires or time periods, which had more methodological

independence, provided some useful insights to mission motivation. In

the case of remote sites from Company 3, the negative correlation (-.70)

demonstrates the damage to motivation that can be done by a problematic
Small Unit Dynamics 267

Table 10-16 (Continued)

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Mission Motivation

Mission Motivation

Predictor Scale or Variable Em Late Deer

Other: Volunteered for the Money

OCT-Career Commitment—Emotional

Mean Job Knowledge Test Score

Site From Company 3

Number of States Represented

Percentage—Married

Percentage—Minorities

Percentage—Regular Army

Standard Deviation of Age at Site

One State Dominant at Site

Late-Career Commitment—Emotional

Late-Like New Experiences

.39

.36

-.50*

.41*

.40

-.70*

.34

.34

-.34

.45

.33

.51*

.42*

.47

-.34

-.42

Note. Pre = Predeployment (December 1994); Late = Late in the rotation (May 1995); Deer = Decrease from

Pre to Late; and "Other" = Other correlated variables outside the primary set of cohesion, motivation, and

leadership scales. OCT = Career Commitment measured in August or October 1994 at the start of the train-up

for the rotation. "Site From Company 3" is a dummy variable coded as 2 = site from Company 3 and 1 = site

from another company. Career Commitment—Emotional has been labeled elsewhere as Career

Commitment—Affective. Like New Experiences is a 3-item scale: (1) I like to travel, (2) I look forward to

new experiences, and (3) I like to try foreign foods; responses were on a 5-point scale going from strongly

disagree to strongly agree. Numbers in cells are correlation coefficients; if r = .33, p < .05 (one tailed); if r =

.45, p < .01. A row or cell is empty if the correlation is not significant (r < .33). /V = 26 remote sites. * =

variable would register as significant in stepwise regression equation explaining variance in dependent column

variable (e.g, Mission Motivation in Table 16 or Squad Member Cohesion in Table 10-17). If there are more

than three asterisks in a column, different combinations of predictors account for 100% of the column variable

variance. An exception is the Decrease in Mission Motivation where the variables with the asterisks explain

only 75% (r = .87) of the variance.

leadership situation. More interesting are the correlations between the

Mission Motivation scale and (a) Volunteered for the Money (r = -.50)

and (b) Career Commitment—Emotional (r = .41 at the Pre stage and .51

at the Late stage). The first pairing shows the effect of those who

volunteered because they needed the money. The second pairing shows

the effect of an affective tie to the Army. The contrast between the two

pairings has obvious policy implications for recruiting and selecting

volunteers. However, none of the "Other" variables supplant the
268 RC Peacekeepers

leadership and soldier job motivation factors as the main determinants of

mission motivation over the mission.

Squad Member Cohesion. One of the fundamental assumptions

underlying personnel policy for the 28th Rotation to the Sinai was that

the Army can form cohesive units out of a volunteer, temporary,

just-in-time workforce from geographically distributed locations that can

carry out a peacekeeping mission in a limited threat environment. While

this assumption proved viable in the case of Rotation 28 to the Sinai, the

empirical support undergirding the policy is limited. Thus it is important

to examine the fundamental factors appearing to drive cohesion,

especially for remote site squads. Therefore, analyses focused on those

variables associated with initial predeployment cohesion, late mission

cohesion, and any change in cohesion at the set of remote sites.

Three basic hypotheses guided the analyses. The first hypothesis is

that squad member cohesion, especially initial cohesion, is a result of

demographic homogeneity (mechanical solidarity). In short, people of

the same age, race, ethnic group, geographic area, life stage (e.g., marital

status), education level, and so forth have more in common, can

communicate more easily, have less distrust, and hence are more attracted

to the group, can invest in the group at less expense, and can work

together more readily (see Butler, Blair, Phillips, & Schmitt, 1987). The

second hypothesis is that squad member cohesion is a function of

normative forces and rational choice (democratic organic solidarity). In

brief, where there are clear and coherent rules, a positive goal-oriented

climate (culture), and an accepted group goal (mission), group members

will choose to work together, trust one another, and develop and support

norms of behavior that will accomplish the group goals (Siebold, 1988).

The third hypothesis is that squad member cohesion is a result of strong

leadership which inspires group members to bond to each other and go

beyond themselves in commitment to achieving an elevated goal

(charismatic solidarity; see Bass, 1996). Of course, these three

hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; rather, the issue is one of relative

strength.

The data show no meaningful support for the homogeneity

hypothesis (mechanical solidarity). Variables such as similarity in age,

education, and home state had no significant correlation with Squad

Member Cohesion. In fact, two variables measuring (for this sample)
Small Unit Dynamics 269

heterogeneity were significantly correlated with cohesion; these were the

percentage of soldiers who were married and the percentage who were

minorities. However, it is likely that these correlations are artifacts

resulting from the distribution of different types of personnel across the

remote sites. At the individual respondent level, there was no significant

difference (using the Scheffe Test or Tukey-Honestly Signficant

Difference Test at the p < .05 level) in Squad Member Cohesion (Pre,

Late, or Decrease) between those who were married and those who were

not married; likewise, there was no significant difference in Squad

Member Cohesion between those who listed themselves as White and

those who described themselves as belonging to one of the other

racial/ethnic group categories.

The most support, at the predeployment stage, is for the normative

hypothesis. Rule Clarity, Learning Climate, and Mission Motivation are

all significantly correlated with Pre-Squad Member Cohesion. Leader

Effectiveness is correlated to a lesser degree, and site commander

variables are not significantly correlated with cohesion, which shows

limited support for the hypothesis that charismatic leadership is the key.

For the Late stage, the picture is less clear. Leadership variables

took on a stronger association with cohesion, especially Leadership Team

Cohesion and Leader Effectiveness. This is not inconsistent with the

Forming-Storming-Norming-Performing view of group development

(Tuckman, 1965). Presumably during the predeployment stage, the

remote site squads were in the Norming phase where one would expect

Rule Clarity to be key. Late in the Sinai tour, the squads were in a

Performing phase in which Leadership Team Cohesion and Leader

Effectiveness were key to sustaining group performance.

On the other hand, if one looks at the decrease column of Table

10-17, the main variable associated with the decrease was the level of

Squad Member Cohesion at predeployment. The higher the initial level

of cohesion, the greater was the decrease by late mission. This implies an

entropic withering away of early cohesion that "regresses towards the

mean." Those sites with greater numbers of RA NCOs experienced less

of a decrease. The data are not able to show whether this was due to the

distribution of personnel by site, stronger leadership by RA NCOs, or

some other reason. However, a scattergram graph portraying the

decrease in Squad Member Cohesion on one axis and the
27JL RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-17

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Squad Member Cohesion

Squad Member Cohesion

Predictor Scale or Variable Pre Late Deer

Pre: Leadership Team Cohesion .51 .35

Learning Climate .50

Leader Effectiveness .45

Squad Member Cohesion 1.00 .56 .53*

Rule Clarity .60* .34

Pride .59 .36

Job Motivation .49

Mission Motivation .52

Late: Leadership Team Cohesion .68*

Learning Climate .59

Leader Effectiveness .63

Rule Clarity .50

Pride .60

Job Motivation .60

Mission Motivation .54

Morale .58

Deer: Leadership Team Cohesion -.43

Learning Climate -.37

Leader Effectiveness -.57

Squad Member Cohesion -.41

Job Motivation -.42

Site Commander Job Motivation .39

Other: Volunteered for the Money -.33

OCT-Career Commitment—Emotional .34

Mean Job Knowledge Test Score .34

Site From Company 3 -.50 -.39

Number of Soldiers at Site .36

Percentage—Married .43 .39

Percentage—Minorities .33 .50

Percentage—Regular Army -.53*

Late-Career Commitment— Emotional .38

Late-Career Commitment— Practical .43

Late-Like New Experiences .39

Note. See note after Table 10-16.
Small Unit Dynamics 221

Percentage—RA NCOs for the remote sites on the other axis showed a

general shotgun pattern with an extreme outlier case at each end that

accounted for much of the correlation. In all, the predeployment level of

Squad Member Cohesion and the Percentage—RA account for only 44%

of the variance in the decrease in Squad Member Cohesion. It seems that

the most probable explanation for the general decline in cohesion is that

it was a mission effect, which more effective and cohesive groups of

leaders were able to dampen.

Leadership Team Cohesion. Most of the concepts underlying the set

of predictor scales are very intertwined; mutual influence goes both ways

over time and in varying proportions. This is what makes small unit

dynamics difficult to measure and interpret. Some constructs logically

may precede others, such as leader effectiveness coming before

leadership team cohesion. However, the feedback loops and mutual

causation are so endemic that the two constructs are difficult to separate

and measure outside the laboratory. Although theoretically distinct,

leader effectiveness and leadership team cohesion usually vary closely in

real units. In addition, these leadership factors can operate as major

contingent variables, i.e., unless the leadership factors are up to a certain

threshold level, the relations among the other variables and criteria will

be muted or may be negative (Siebold, 1994). If leadership fails, units

fall apart (go through chaotic entropy until dissolution).

Two variables, predeployment Mission Motivation and the

Percentage—Married account for 77% of the variance in Pre-Leadership

Team Cohesion (see Table 10-18). That percentage may reflect an

imputation of cohesion by the respondents rather than reality. Neither

variable is a major contributor toward explaining late mission Leadership

Team Cohesion. Why the Percentage—Married, which is also correlated

(r = .50) with Mean Age at Site, should be correlated with

Pre-Leadership Team Cohesion is not clear, if indeed it is more than an

imputation or an artifact. Perhaps the older, married soldiers were more

easily managed, which might have allowed the leaders to spend more

time and energy on building their own cohesion instead of handling their

units (see Kane & Tremble, 1994). On the other hand, Pre-Mission

Motivation's correlation with Pre-Leadership Team Cohesion can be seen

as much an effect as a cause.
272

Table 10-18

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Leadership Team Cohesion

Leadership Team Cohesion

Predictor Scale or Variable Ere Late Deer

Pre: Leadership Team Cohesion 1.00 .58*

Learning Climate .60 .38

Leader Effectiveness .70 .50*

Squad Member Cohesion .51 .59

Rule Clarity .67 .39

Pride .74 .44

Job Motivation .70 .33*

Mission Motivation .81* .44

Site Commander Job Motivation .41 .63

Site Commander Mission Motivation .49 .58

Late: Learning Climate .81 -.40

Leader Effectiveness .90* -.41

Squad Member Cohesion .68 -.43

Rule Clarity .80 -.38

Pride .77

Job Motivation .64*

Mission Motivation .62* -.33

Morale .64

Deer: Leadership Team Cohesion -.59* 1.00

Learning Climate -.51 .56

Leader Effectiveness -.75 .71*

Rule Clarity -.43* .57

Pride -.45 .60

Job Motivation -.36 .56

Mission Motivation .56

Site Commander Job Motivation .61

Site Commander Mission Motivation .73*

Other: OCT-Career Commitment--Practical .40 .35*

Mean Job Knowledge Test Score -.36

Site From Company 3 -.40 .54

Front gate Site .34

Percentage—Married .56* .34

Percentage—Minorities .38

Mean Age at Site .44

One State Dominant at Site .33

Late-Career Commitment— emotional .34

Note: See note after Table 10-16.
Small Unit Dynamics 273

Leadership Team Cohesion late in the mission appears more in line

with traditional findings. It is strongly related to Leader Effectiveness

and overdetermined (i.e., 100% of the variance is explained by different

combinations of variables) primarily by leadership- and motivationrelated variables. Also, 69% of the variance in the decrease can be

accounted for by decreases in the perception of Leader Effectiveness and

Site Commander Mission Motivation. Generically, the level of

late-rotation Leadership Team Cohesion appears a function of the

mission effect, with possibly excessive micromanagement problems

added in.

Morale. Morale has typically been used for description or as a

criterion; it has limited explanatory power compared to the other

constructs concerning unit dynamics. Nonetheless, morale has been

instinctively of interest to commanders. Presumably, that is because they

view it as related to the effort and spirit with which their soldiers will

address their mission. There is a question of whether morale is the result

of downward emanations from strong leadership or of inner emanations

shining outward from proud and determined soldiers. The data suggest

the latter is the case. Late mission Job Motivation and Pride explain 80%

of the variance in Late Mission Morale (see Table 10-19). Leader

Effectiveness and Leadership Team Cohesion are not nearly as strongly

correlated. As the dummy variable for Company 3 indicates (r = -.80),

poor leadership may be responsible for damaging morale while personal

motivation and pride may be responsible for sustaining it.

In the "Other" set of variables, it is interesting to note for policy

reasons that the importance attached to volunteering for money at a

remote site is negatively related to morale. On the contrary, the two

aspects of career commitment, at both the predeployment and late

mission stages, are positively correlated with Late Mission Morale.

Outcomes

Feelings about the Sinai. Many past research efforts on unit

dynamics used externally scored measures of unit performance on field

exercises, operational readiness evaluations, or combat training center

rotations as criteria. The use of unit dynamic variables has been very

effective in accounting for unit success in terms of these externally
274 RC Peacekeepers

Fable 10-19

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Late Mission Morale

Predictor Scale or Variable Late Mission Morale

Pre: Leadership Team Cohesion .50

Learning Climate .47

Leader Effectiveness .54

Squad Member Cohesion .62

Rule Clarity .34

Pride .44

Job Motivation .34

Late: Leadership Team Cohesion .64

Learning Climate .75

Leader Effectiveness .64

Squad Member Cohesion .58

Rule Clarity .65

Pride .82*

Job Motivation .86*

Mission Motivation .76

Site Commander Job Motivation .38

Site Commander Mission Motivation .38

Deer: Learning Climate -.35

Leader Effectiveness -.33

Pride -.51

Job Motivation -.58

M ission Motivation -.43

Other: Volunteered for the Money -.42

OCT-Career Commitment—-Emotional .37

OCT-Career Commitment--Practical .39

Site From Company 3 -.80

Percentage—Married .44

Standard Deviation of Age at Site .41

Late-Career Commitment—-Emotional .48

Late-Career Commitment--Practical .36

Note. Late Mission Morale was measured lats in the rotation (May 1995). Numbers in cells are

correlation coefficients; if r = .33, p < .05 (one tailed); if r = .45, p < .01. No row entry was made if the

correlation was not significant (r < .33). N= 26 remote sites. * = variable would register as significant in

stepwise regression equation explaining variance in dependent column variable (Late Mission Morale).

See note after Table 10-16.
Small Unit Dynamics 275

scored unit performance measures. However, in the case of Rotation 28

to the Sinai, there were no comparable and appropriate criteria for group

performance. While from all indications, Rotation 28, as a whole, did

well in carrying out its mission, there were just no site-by-site

performance data that could be collected. Thus this section provides

analyses of other outcomes that have been considered important from

different perspectives. This provides a useful extension of the research

on unit dynamics and a greater insight to the peacekeeping mission in the

Sinai.

The first outcome of interest is a "gut check" about how the soldiers

felt about being in the Sinai by the late mission stage. They literally were

asked "How do you feel about being in the Sinai?" The 5-point response

scale went from very negative to very positive. As with Late Mission

Morale, there was a question of whether the dominant influence would be

that of leadership or that of the characteristics of the soldiers themselves.

Again, the latter received the strongest support (see Table 10-20).

About 63% of the variance in the remote site mean responses to the

question was accounted for by the late stage mean level of Mission

Motivation and the mean response to a 3-item scale concerning how the

soldiers thought about foreigners. The 3 scale items were: (1) It's much

more difficult to work with foreign nationals than with people from the

United States (reverse scored), (2) You can trust foreign nationals as

much as you can trust people from the United States, and (3) Most people

from most countries are pretty much alike. The 5-point response scale

went from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Here too, there was a

negative correlation (r = -.48) between the importance attached to

volunteering for the money and late mission feelings of being in the Sinai.

The Expert Infantryman Badge. Available data were obtained on the

soldiers from Company 3 and Company 4 who tried for the Expert

Infantryman Badge (EIB). The EIB training and testing was a major

effort of the 28th Rotation to benefit both the soldier and the Army

through enhanced training, recognition of soldier excellence, and

occupying time in a positive way. The test for the EIB is challenging and

encompasses physical fitness, skill, and knowledge. The number of

soldiers per remote site who tried for the EIB ranged from 3 to 9. There

were three sites in which no one passed the test. There were six sites

where only one soldier passed, three sites where two soldiers passed, and
276 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-20

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Mean Sinai Feelings

Predictor Scale or Variable Mean Sinai Feelings

Pre: Leader Effectiveness .48

Squad Member Cohesion .48

Late: Leadership Team Cohesion .34

Learning Climate .58

Leader Effectiveness .43

Squad Member Cohesion .38

Pride .47

Job Motivation .62

Mission Motivation .67*

Morale .64

Site Commander Job Motivation .34

Site Commander Mission Motivation .35

Deer: Job Motivation -.42

Other: Volunteered for the Money -.48

OCT-Career Commitment—Emotional .45

Site From Company 3 -.45

Percentage—Minority .34

Standard Deviation of Age at Site .43

Late-Career Commitment—Emotional .45

Late-Like Foreigners .53*

Note. The questionnaire item, measured late in the rotation (May 1 395), was "How do you feel about being in

the Sina ?" with a 5-item response scale going from "Very negative ' to "Very positive." Numbers in cells are

correlation coefficients; if r = .33, p < .05 (one tailed); if r = .45, p < .01. No row entry was made if the

correlation was not significant (r < .33). /V = 26 remote sites. * = variable would register as significant in

stepwise regression equation explaining variance in dependent column variable (Sinai Feelings).

one site where three soldiers passed the EIB test. Because relatively few

soldiers passed this difficult test, the interesting question at the small-unit

level is what accounted for the range in number of soldiers who tried for

the EIB.

The soldier-centric view would posit that in units where there was

strong job motivation, career commitment, squad member cohesion, and

a high level of skills, more soldiers would try for the EIB based on their

own initiative and peer group influence. The leader-centric view would

posit that in units where there was high leader effectiveness, leadership

cohesion, and leader job motivation, the leaders would act as role models
Small Unit Dynamics 277

and influence soldiers so that many would apply for the EIB. The

climate-centric (organizational culture) view would posit that more

soldiers would try for the EIB under a strong learning climate, high rule

clarity, and unit pride.

None of these views were clearly supported by the data. Even the

question needed modification. Rather than trying to explain the range in

number of soldiers who tried for the EIB, the question is better posed as

what explains the number of soldiers who did NOT try for the EIB. The

results presented in Table 10-21 indicate that the strongest correlations

with the percentage of soldiers at a site who tried for the EIB are

negative; these correlations are with the decreases in the Learning

Climate, Pride, and Leadership Effectiveness. In other words, soldiers at

the sites would volunteer to test for the EIB unless they were turned off

by their leaders and unit climate.

Table 10-21

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Taking the EIB Test

Predictor Scale or Variable % Taking the RIB Test

Late: Learning Climate .54*

Pride .51*

Site Commander Mission Motivation .60*

Deer: Leadership Team Cohesion -.55*

Learning Climate -.70*

Leader Effectiveness -.66*

Pride -.70*

Other: Mean Job Knowledge Test Score .55*

Note. The dependent column variable represents the percentage of soldiers at a site that tried for the Expert

Infantryman Badge (EIB). Numbers in cells are correlation coefficients; if r= .48,/) < .05 (one tailed); if r =

.64, p <.01. No row entry was made if the correlation was not significant (r< .48). N = 13 remote sites

from Company 3 and Company 4. * = variable would register as significant in stepwise regression equation

explaining variance in dependent column variable. Different combinations of the predictor variables would

account for 100% of the variance in the percentage trying for the EIB among the set of 13 remote sites.

There did appear to be, however, a moderate countervailing positive

influence from a composite of the leader-centric, soldier-centric, and

climate-centric factors. Table 10-21 shows that there were moderate

correlations between the percentage of soldiers taking the EIB test and
278 RC Peacekeepers

Site Commander Mission Motivation (leader centric), Mean Job

Knowledge Test Score (soldier centric), and Learning Climate and Pride

(climate centric). Together, the negative influence of the "Decr"(ease)

variables and the positive influence of the "Late" and "Other" variables,

in different combinations, accounted for 100% of the variance in the

range of soldiers per site who took the EIB.

Mean job performance. There were no measures of site performance

useful as criteria. However, for research purposes during May 1995,

ratings of individual job task performance were made on soldiers and

NCOs at each site by their superiors up through the platoon leader or

platoon sergeant level. Mean ratings of the overall job performance

ratings of the soldiers were calculated for each remote site. Of course,

like many job performance ratings, they may say more about the raters

and the rating system than the individuals rated. Nonetheless, in lieu of

an externally rated group performance measure, these mean job

performance ratings were used in the analysis.

Table 10-22

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Mean Job Performance

Predictor Scale or Variable Mean Job Performance

Pre: Mission Motivation .45

Other: Volunteered to Serve the Country/Army .36

OCT-Career Commitment—Emotional .50*

Note. Mean Job Performance, measured late in the rotation (May 1995), was the average ofjob task

performance ratings (1 = lowest; 7 = highest) for a site; ratings were done by several superiors. Numbers in

cells are correlation coefficients; if r = .33, p < .05 (one tailed); if r = .45, p < .01. No row entry was made if

the correlation was not significant (r < .33). N = 26 remote sites. * = variable would register as significant in

stepwise regression equation explaining variance in dependent column variable (Mean Job Performance).

The basic question is whether any of the unit dynamic variables are

useful in explaining mean job performance ratings, whether the variables

be soldier, leader, or climate centric. The answer is a rather surprising,

"not really." The data show that mean job performance ratings were only

significantly correlated with the extent to which the personnel at a remote

site were, before deployment, emotionally committed to the Army,
Small Unit Dynamics 279

motivated by the mission in the Sinai, and volunteering due to patriotism.

In other words, remote site mean job performance ratings appeared to be

a function of the extent to which the site personnel had the spirit of the

"citizen soldier." It may be this spirit which carried them through the

mission despite any later reservations about the leadership, mission, job,

or, in general, the tour of duty. Assuming this conclusion is valid, the

policy implications for selecting and training soldiers and their leaders for

future similar missions are obvious.

Career intent. The last of the outcome variables of interest goes

beyond the immediacy of the Sinai mission and affects the longer term.

The question is about how unit dynamics, by the late mission stage,

impact upon expressed intent to stay in the military until retirement. For

analytic purposes, the individual-level item on career intent was treated

as a continuous response variable and calculated as a mean at the remote

site (group) level. The item was also reverse scored so that a higher

value represented a greater likelihood of those in the group staying in the

military until retirement.

Obviously, one would expect certain "Other" items measuring career

commitment to correlate strongly with career intent. The precise issue is

whether the dynamic variables concerning leadership, the soldiers, and

the command climate over time are influential in explaining the

expressed level of intent for a military career toward the end of the Sinai

mission. One would predict that the more positive were the perceptions

of the unit dynamic factors, the greater would be the mean expressed

career intent. In fact, this is what the results were.

What is interesting about Table 10-23 is not that Late-Career

Commitment variables were strong correlates of Intent, that the Late unit

dynamic variables were modestly correlated with Intent, or that the three

variables with asterisks together explained 59% of the variance in Career

Intent. What is interesting is that: (a) several predeployment variables

from the unit dynamics set still correlated with Career Intent late in the

tour of duty and (b) specific structural effects were significant dampeners

of intent, i.e., duty at the Front Gate or at a site lead by an ARNG site

commander. The latter may say as much about the site as about the fact

that the assigned commander was from the ARNG, since such

assignments were not random.
280 RC Peacekeepers

Table 10-23

Correlations of Predictor Variables With Mean Career Intent

Predictor Scale or Variable Mean Career Tntent

Pre: Learning Climate .50

Squad Member Cohesion .59*

Rule Clarity .37

Pride .44

Job Motivation .42

Late: Leadership Team Cohesion .37

Learning Climate .35

Leader Effectiveness .45

Squad Member Cohesion .35

Rule Clarity .44

Pride .40

Job Motivation .45

Mission Motivation .40

Morale .42

Other: OCT-Career Commitment—Emotional .36

Mean Job Knowledge Test Score .41

Site Was the Front Gate -.35

Site Commander From the Guard -.39*

Percentage—Married .33

Percentage—Served Overseas Before .35

Number—Served in Combat Zone Before .37

Late-Career Commitment—Emotional .60*

Late-Career Commitment—Practical .58

Note. The questionnaire item on Career Intent, measured late in the rotation (May 1995), had six responses

which asked whether a soldier had or planned to stay in the military beyond or until 20 years, was undecided,

or would probably or definitely leave the military before his retirement. The more likely a soldier would stay

until retirement, the higher was the response value. Numbers in cells are correlation coefficients; if r = .33,

p< .05 (one tailed); if r= .45, p < .01. No row entry was made if the correlation was not significant (r< .33).

N =26 remote sites. * = variable would register as significant in stepwise regression equation explaining

variance in Career Intent.

DISCUSSION

The foregoing has been a long walk through the details of an

extensive set of data. This section reviews the results and discusses them

in terms of the issues and questions that were presented at the beginning
Small Unit Dynamics 281

of the chapter. Clearly, the most prominent result was the identification

of the mission effect, which impacted soldiers and leaders alike as well as

both mixed component and AC battalions. The effect is not new but,

rather, is similar to effects found in longitudinal research on the

COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training) personnel

system (e.g., Siebold, 1989; Vaitkus, 1994). However, its strength and

pervasiveness do invite further investigation of the phenomenon.

Perhaps it can be related to Karl von Clausewitz's concept of "friction" in

battle. The leaders of Rotation 28 did not come to the mission

uninformed. They knew well from previous rotations what to expect,

with perhaps the exception of the extra VIP attention. Their plans and

preparations appeared very professional. And Rotation 28 accomplished

its mission, as did the preceding battalion. Yet the mission had its effect,

as it had for the preceding rotation.

Undoubtedly, the strong mission effect suggests that for

peacekeeping it may be desirable to revisit such issues as selection, the

motivational function of leadership, the optimal personnel replacement

system, tour length, compensation and benefits, principles for interacting

with local nationals, and force structure and use. Further, it suggests that

leaders of limited-threat peacekeeping forces might benefit from training

on dealing with the stages of group development and entropy.

The analysis of the data permitted a look at the unique characteristics

of Rotation 28. In particular, the results showed that the RC soldiers

worked as well, if not better, with RA leaders as they did with leaders

from the ARNG. Further, squad member cohesion and job performance

were not affected by assigning temporary, just-in-time soldiers from

different components or from different states to work together. Personnel

turbulence was kept low, and strong cohesion developed quickly during

mission train-up. The "rainbow" concept worked.

The longitudinal, panel structure of the research allowed for

important progress in the investigation of small unit dynamics. The

results showed that the measures used were reliable and stable over time,

implying that a static systems analysis would be an appropriate approach

at the individual respondent level (see Table 10-8). At the group level,

the measures demonstrated more dynamic properties. For example, Rule

Clarity at the group level was correlated with mean Squad Member

Cohesion at r = .60 at the predeployment "Norming" stage but only at r =
282 RC Peacekeepers

.50 late in the mission; conversely Leadership Team Cohesion was

correlated with mean Squad Member Cohesion only at r = .51 before

deployment but at a higher r = .68 in the late tour "Performing" stage (see

Table 10-17). It seems clear that one cannot adequately investigate

small-unit dynamics in a piecemeal fashion. Meso-level theories about

leadership, cohesion, motivation, or morale must take into account a wide

array of variables, over time, as an interacting, nonlinear system. In the

current research, there was obviously some common method variance

and a general (or "G") attitudinal factor that increased the

intercorrelations among the variables. These commonalities need to be

reduced in future research so that system parameters and their limits can

be more precisely specified.

The results showed some familiar patterns. For example, the

motivation of squad members and their squad leader showed some

convergence over time (see Table 10-16 and Savell, Teague, & Tremble,

1995). But some new findings were also obtained. One of the most

important is that some of the variables (e.g., Mission Motivation) are

overdetermined in that different combinations of predictor variables can

account for 100% of the variance in (what can be treated as) a dependent

variable. This finding is important because it means that the level of the

dependent variable might be raised through different avenues; it also

means that an effort to increase a dependent variable by one avenue

might be offset or hindered by a countervailing decline in another

avenue, if not controlled for.

Also, new findings were obtained through the inclusion of a number

of "Other" variables into the analysis beyond the basic demographic

variables. Especially important were the newly found correlations

between the unit dynamics set of variables and the reasons for

volunteering, career commitment, and individual dispositions toward new

experiences and foreigners. As an exogenous set of variables operating

either before or early in group formation, they can function as predictor

or moderator variables affecting the dynamics and performance of a unit.

They permit an extension of group dynamics theory to wider parameters.

A useful finding was the delineation of variables that did NOT relate

to most of the core variables. Of particular note was the finding that

whether those at the sites were gaining or losing financially by going on

the rotation did not matter to the unit dynamics; this of course is useful
Small Unit Dynamics 283

policy information and complements the findings by Lakhani and Abod

(in Chapter 13) about financial variables. Most demographic variables

were unrelated to the core variables (although they might have been at

the very early "Forming" stage, when the variables were not measured).

For example, the percentage of soldiers from rural or nonrural

backgrounds did not matter. Likewise, the number of soldiers at a site

who had been to the Sinai on a previous tour did not have any noticeable

impact, and neither did the percentage who had some college education.

Thus, while some of the "Other" variables permit an extension of the

parameters of group dynamics theory, the lack of significant correlation

for other "Other" variables permits a reduction in the number of variables

which need to be considered in future research on small unit dynamics.

Theoretically, the major influence on unit dynamics can be attributed

to three categories of variables: (1) leader-centric variables—Leader

Effectiveness, Leadership Team Cohesion, and Mission Motivation, (2)

soldier-centric variables—Squad Member Cohesion and Job Motivation,

and (3) organizational culture-centric (command climate-centric)

variables—Learning Climate, Rule Clarity, Pride, and Morale.

Empirically, as demonstrated by the foregoing results, the category

boundaries break down, and the relations among the variables are shifting

and overlapping. A strong, purposeful criterion (e.g., externally

evaluated and validly measured mission performance), which was not

available for this research, is needed to make further progress in future

research on small unit dynamics. Nonetheless, there is enough data to

suspect that leadership, soldier characteristics, and unit culture are the

driving engines that interact and generate the shifting dynamics in units.

The current research produced some very interesting findings about

the outcome variables. It is surprising that (see Table 10-20) one can

explain 63% of the variance in how groups feel about being in the Sinai

by their mean Mission Motivation and the extent to which they "Like

Foreigners." This disregards cohesion, pride, leadership, and a number

of other possibly relevant variables. It is not surprising, but highly

confirmatory, that one can explain 100% of the variance in the

percentage of soldiers willing to test for the EIB by a handful of

organizational culture and leader-centric variables (see Table 10-21). Of

special interest is the finding that among all the variables, the "citizen

soldier" cluster (emotional attachment to the Army, motivated by the
284 RC Peacekeepers

mission, and volunteering to serve the country and Army) measured prior

to deployment was the only set that was significantly correlated with

mean job performance among the remote sites late in the tour (see Table

10-22). Perhaps this finding is the key to the essence of Rotation 28, its

small unit dynamics, and its success in the Sinai.
Small Unit Dynamics 285

REFERENCES

Bass, B. M. (1996). A new paradigm ofleadership: An inquiry into

transformational leadership. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Blades, J. W. (1986). Rulesfor leadership: Improving unit performance.

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

Butler, J. S., Blair, J. D., Phillips, R. L., & Schmitt, N. (1987).

Framework for research on leadership, cohesion, and values

(ARI Technical Report No. 770). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD

A192 070)

Kane, T. D., & Tremble, T. R., Jr. (1994). The impact ofleader

competence and platoon conditions on platoon performance in

simulated combat exercises (ARI Technical Report No. 1001).

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences. (AD A282 453)

Savell, J. M., Teague, R. C, & Tremble, T. R., Jr. (1995). Job

involvement contagion between Army squad leaders and their

squad members. Military Psychology, 7(3), 193-206.

Siebold, G. L. (1987, August). Conceptualization and definitions of

military unit cohesiveness. In J. Griffith (Chair), New challenges

and advancements in the conception ofmilitary cohesion.

Symposium conducted at the 95th Annual Convention of the

American Psychological Association, New York, NY.

Siebold, G. L. (1988, November). How small unit cohesion affects

performance. Proceedings ofthe 30th Annual Conference ofthe

Military Testing Association, Arlington, VA, 87-92.

Siebold, G. L. (1989, April). Longitudinal patterns in combat platoon

cohesion. Proceedings ofthe 1989 Leadership Conference,

Kansas City, MO. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, Center for Army Leadership.
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Siebold, G. L. (1994). The relation between soldier motivation,

leadership, and small unit performance. In H. F. O'Neil, Jr. & M.

Drillings (Eds.), Motivation: Theory and Research (pp. 171-190).

Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Siebold, G. L., & Kelly, D. R. (1988). Development ofthe Combat

Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire (ARI Technical Report No.

817). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A204 917)

Siebold, G. L., & Lindsay, T. J. (1994, August). Military cohesion:

Evolution of the measurement of cohesion. In A. D. Mangelsdorff

(Chair), Quantification and theory ofmilitary cohesion.

Symposium conducted at the 102nd Annual Convention of the

American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, CA.

Tuckman, B. W. (1965). Developmental sequence in small groups.

Psychological Bulletin, 63, 384-399.

Vaitkus, M. A. (1994). Unit Manning System: Human dimensionsfield

evaluation ofthe COHORT company replacement model (Walter

Reed Army Institute of Research Technical Report 94-0017). Fort

Detrick, MD: U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel

Command. (AD A285 942)
11

MFO LEADERS:

OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND

EXPERIENCES

Fred A. Mael

Dale R. Palmer

INTRODUCTION

This chapter concerns the attitudes, unique challenges, opportunities,

and experiences of the leaders who participated in the Multinational

Force and Observers (MFO) 28th Rotation and were deployed in the

Sinai during the period January-July 1995. It is important to understand

that the intention was a study of leaders, not leadership. Our mandate

was not to assess who was considered a particularly effective leader, or

what behaviors were being demonstrated by more or less effective

leaders. Rather, it was the attitudes and experiences of those in

leadership roles that were of concern, regardless of whether or not they

were effective. Leader effectiveness could easily shape attitudes, and

would almost certainly affect interpersonal relationships that would spill

over into global assessments of the mission. However, our data

collection strategy and credibility would have been compromised by

trying to both talk openly with and evaluate the leaders.

The following were the primary concerns that were assessed and

followed during the course of the mission, including predeployment: (a)

How did serving in an MFO mission compare to other assignments, in

terms of the challenges of the mission itself; (b) What effect did serving

in the MFO have on both the use and the honing of individual soldiering

and leadership skills; (c) What, if any, were the challenges associated

with integrating Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC)

soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers; (d) What, if

any, were the challenges associated with integrating with the forces of

287
288 RC Peacekeepers

other nations involved in the MFO and with indigenous (primarily

Egyptian) populations; and (e) What was the perceived comparability of

the MFO experience to other peacemaking roles that have either

involved U.S. troops (i.e., Somalia, Haiti) or the troops of other countries

(i.e., Bosnia, Cyprus). Certainly, not all of these questions are solely the

concern of leaders. However, the opportunity to personally interview

many of the decisionmakers and opinionmakers of the battalion provided

the needed opening to delve into these issues. We also investigated

concerns that would apply to all MFO participants, such as boredom and

family issues, as they related specifically to leadership roles. In the

course of speaking with and assessing the attitudes and experiences of

these leaders, a number of other issues surfaced, each of which will be

discussed below.

THE DATA COLLECTIONS

Sample

The sample for each data collection included officers (Battalion

Commander [BN CO], Battalion Executive Officer [BN XO], Company

Commanders [CO CMDR], Staff Officers for Personnel, Information,

Operations, etc. [S-l through S-5], Company Executive Officers [CO

XO], Platoon Leaders [PLT LDR], and Headquarters [HHC] officer staff)

and NCOs (Command Sergeant Major [CSM], Company First Sergeants

[1SG], Platoon Sergeants [PSG], Squad Leaders [SQD LDR], and HHC

support staff) in the 28th Rotation. It should be noted that the 28th

Rotation officer cadre was designed to have a 50% AC and 50% RC split.

Our sample approximates these totals. The actual numbers for specific

data collections varied slightly, and are mentioned below.

The Data Collection Plan and Execution

Data collections took place at three intervals during the battalion's

life. The first took place late in predeployment (December 1994) at Fort

Bragg, NC, and consisted of interviews with 71 officers and NCOs. The

second consisted of 52 interviews taking place early in the deployment

(February 1995). At this time, interviews were conducted in classrooms

at the Learning Center Building on the U.S. Battalion's South Camp near

Sharm-el Sheikh, Egypt. Included among the interviewees were 35 who
MFO Leaders 289.

had been interviewed at Fort Bragg. Thus, a total of 88 officers and

NCOs were interviewed one or more times during the DecemberFebruary period. The final data collection at South Camp (Sinai) took

place late in the deployment (May 1995). This data collection differed

from the first two, which consisted solely of narrative responses to

interview questions. During the May data collection, questionnaires were

used to allow the soldiers to provide their answers in a fashion which

could be evaluated empirically and comparatively. However, as the

empirical questions were asked in an interview-like setting, the leaders

were also provided the opportunity to elaborate verbally on their

responses. The May data collection assessed a total of 75 NCOs and

officers, 58 of whom had been interviewed previously. Of these, about

58% were NCO as opposed to officers, and about 51% were AC as

opposed to RC. Thus, a total of 105 leaders of Rotation 28 participated at

one or more points in this research.

Format of Interviews

Interviews lasted 30-120 minutes and were generally conducted in

groups of one to four at each interview session. The interviews followed

a structured format (Fear, 1958), although opportunities were provided to

discuss other concerns and issues both as sidelights to questions and

during a "final comments" period at the end of the interviews. A single

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

(ARI) scientist generally conducted each interview, although on occasion

a second ARI psychologist would collaborate. Respondents were asked

their opinions on various topics related to leadership experiences.

Generally, a respondent would verbally answer the questions one at a

time, then rate his/her opinions on a Likert scale specifically designed for

each question. Finally, the respondent would write specific comments to

explain (i.e., give weight to) the ratings. All questions were placed on a

5-point continuum, with worded anchors only at the extremes. The

exception was a question about MFO service's effect on one's military

career, which was placed on a 10-point continuum.

The result was two separate sources of data. The first was composed

of overall comments by the leadership group, recorded by the interviewer

as "group comments." The second data source was composed of the
290 RC Peacekeepers

comments and Likert ratings by each individual about their own

perceptions.

THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN

LEADER PERCEPTIONS

Any survey of attitudes and perceptions, especially of an

organization's climate, culture, or effectiveness, is capable of revealing a

mixture of external and objective reality—a situation which is evident to

all who interact with that entity—as well as the subjective perceptions of

those individuals (Hellriegel & Slocum, 1974). The preconceived

notions of individuals, as well as their idiosyncratic predilections to

positive or negative affectivity (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989), may cause

the same events to be perceived by different persons in radically different

ways. In addition, when the events involve interpersonal experiences,

such as relations with one's superior, then two leaders in parallel

positions may in fact be experiencing the deployment very differently.

We found evidence of consistent individual differences in

responding as a result of tracking some individuals comments over the

period from December through the May data collection. While

fluctuations existed over time, individuals entering the MFO experience

with a negative outlook or attitude tended to continue to express

negativity throughout the mission. This pattern of negativity (and in the

opposite direction, positiveness) prevailed in several individuals

throughout all data collections.

Several of these negative patterns can be attributed to a specific

person or event exerting a negative influence on an individual or to an

individual "getting off on the wrong foot," either of which tended to

influence a person's attitudes throughout the tour. An example of this

can be seen from several AC individuals who did not volunteer for the

mission, but were rather "volunteered." Further, some were extremely

upset that theirjump status pay was being taken away from them,

because this skill was not included in the mission requirements. "Jump

pay" was important to many because it was the way soldiers could afford

car payments or rent at an off-post apartment. Involuntarily losing this

source of income tended to engender negative attitudes toward the MFO
MFO Leaders 221

mission, which in turn colored opinions about other MFO-related issues

in negative ways.

THE IMPACT OF MFO SERVICE ON LEADERSHIP SKILLS

AND CAREERS

MFO participants were split as to whether their experiences were

generally beneficial or counterproductive to developing leadership skills

and to career progression. For example, MFO experience was considered

career enhancing or skill enhancing in the following ways: Some found

the experience of leading a wider range of soldiers to be useful. For

others, exposure to a war zone (albeit inactive) and to battalion-level

work added to their skill repertoires. The high visibility of this rotation,

specifically because of the attempted AC/RC integration, was seen as

career enhancing.

However, there were also concerns expressed about loss of skills.

These included loss of specific skill proficiencies such as jump master

and airborne assault skills, as well as various MOS-specific skills. There

were also misgivings about loss of infantry and unit-maneuver skills.

Concern about loss of leadership skills was particularly acute among

those who did not have direct subordinates or those whose subordinates

were atypically autonomous. This was the case at remote site

observation posts where the squad leader, not the platoon leader or

sergeant, is the de facto authority who works without immediate

platoon-level oversight.

Some leaders indicated that loss of leadership authority led to loss of

skills. This was particularly reflected in comments during the May data

collection, when several 1 SGs and CO CMDRs complained about their

UCMJ (summarized Article 15s) powers having been taken away from

them. The resultant loss of power as a leader was somehow seen as a

detriment to retaining a high skill level of leadership. Other than the loss

of leadership skills, some SQD LDRs minimized concerns about skill

erosion, saying that, once soldiers rotated back to CONUS and their

former jobs, the only effect would be "getting used to changes in new

equipment."
292 RC Peacekeepers

It should be noted that in the combat-oriented U.S. Army, simply

being involved in peacekeeping was not seen as being inherently

prestigious or as a "plum assignment." Thus, perceived benefits from

being part of this rotation had more to do with the high visibility of this

rotation, and perhaps with peacekeeping being a "hot" issue, rather than

any longstanding allure of peacekeeping. This is in contrast to countries

like Canada and Australia. In the latter, there is fierce competition for

slots in peacekeeping missions, which are seen as opportunities to earn

ribbons (Bonner, 1994). In Australia, there is also jealousy of those who

earn spots on these types of missions, jealousy so keen that those who

deploy are debriefed about how to defuse such envious animosity.

Suffice it to say that at least in the AC, there was little indication that this

was considered an envied opportunity.

The May data collection helped put these issues into perspective. In

terms of overall perceptions of enhanced or decreased soldiering skills,

about 19% of the sample said that MFO service had not eroded their

skills at all, while 12% said that their skills had been greatly eroded.

Only about 25% marked above the midpoint, such that about three

fourths of the sample did not consider skill erosion a concern. Generally,

soldiers from AC units (r = .32, p < .001) felt that their soldiering skills

had eroded more.

In terms of leadership skills, about 12% of the sample said that MFO

service had not aided their leadership skills at all, while 22% said that

their skills had been greatly enhanced. The mean was 3.4 on this 5-point

scale. Generally, officers (r = .39, p < .001) and RC soldiers (r = .32, p <

.001) felt that their leadership skills had been enhanced more. Improved

leadership skills were associated with being more busy, less bored, and

more autonomous. Moreover, those who said that their leadership skills

were enhanced were also more likely to see their own jobs and the MFO

mission as necessary, and were also more likely to see their MFO

experience as relevant to other potential peacekeeping missions. Finally,

as would be expected, perceived skill erosion and perceived enhanced

leadership skills had a significant (r = .43, p < .001) negative relationship.

In terms of impact of their MFO service on their military careers, on

a scale ranging from 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive), the sample as

a whole had a mean of 6.45, with only about 20% of participants

choosing options lower than 5. Although officers and NCOs did not
MFO Leaders 223

differ significantly on this question, RC participants were more likely to

see MFO service as career enhancing (r = .39, p < . 001). Those who

were busier, less bored, and more autonomous also saw MFO experience

as more career enhancing. Similarly, perceptions of career enhancement

were positively related to perceived improved leadership skills and to the

perceived relevance of MFO to other peacekeeping, and negatively

related to perceived erosion of soldiering skills.

LEADER CONCERNS ABOUT MFO SERVICE

Leaders expressed various concerns about their roles in the MFO,

both as leaders and as subordinates, and vis-a-vis their own successful

functioning.

Concerns in Relation to Subordinates

Inactivity. One concern of leaders, regarding their subordinates, was

a function of their own inactivity. As identified in earlier interviews with

previous rotations and with the current sample, platoon-level leaders

often had insufficient responsibilities to occupy their time. Their squad

leaders had unusual degrees of autonomy in their primary roles as remote

site observers. Leaders worried that as a result of their own inactivity,

they would be spending the deployment bored and directionless; worse,

they would end up micromanaging their own subordinates. They shared

the same concern about their superiors' potential inactivity and resultant

micromanagement, as discussed below.

Autonomy. A related concern was that once subordinates (such as

E-6 NCO) had tasted autonomy in the context of their MFO roles, they

may have trouble returning to a more diminished, subordinate role upon

returning to CONUS or in future missions.

Alcohol abuse. There is evidence of a link between boredom

(discussed below) and both drug and alcohol abuse, in the military and in

civilian life (Klapp, 1986; Schwartz, Turner, & Peluso, 1973). Leaders

were concerned that their subordinates, in the face of the tedium and

sensory deprivation of MFO duty, would descend into alcohol abuse.

This is not to say that the soldiers' previous occupations (or in the case of
294 RC Peacekeepers

AC soldiers, previous positions) were necessarily interesting or exciting.

However, many of the mind-numbing props of modern society—radio,

television, portable tape recorders, computers and video games,

telephone, and electronic mail that can appear to alleviate tedium (Klapp,

1986)—were not as easily accessible to the MFO soldiers. Although

various efforts were made to make excessive drinking more difficult,

there was little confidence that external controls would be sufficient to

combat the compensatory and time-filling role that alcohol could play.

Religious tension. A chaplain mentioned that there was the concern

that as a result of the long hours spent in relative isolation, some devout

soldiers would use the time to proselytize, perhaps to the point of

pressure or coercion, and thus make other unit members uncomfortable.

Part of his role was to protect soldiers from well-intentioned,

religious-based harassment by others at remote sites.

Leader Concerns About Themselves

Boredom. Boredom during the drudgery of observation post duty is

a concern that affects all participants in the MFO (Segal & Segal, 1993),

and to a certain degree affected most members of this rotation (Struck,

1995). What differentiates leader boredom is simply not having enough

responsibilities to occupy their time (Harris, Rothberg, Segal, & Segal,

1993). Some of the MFO leaders, most of whom appear highly

industrious and achievement-oriented, are essentially underemployed for

the duration of the mission. Undemanding, boring roles often cause more

stress than do demanding ones (Klapp, 1986; Palmer, 1981). Moreover,

by being less busy than subordinates, there is the threat of "losing face"

in the eyes of their troops.

The May data collection contained specific questions about being

bored during the deployment. About 19% of the sample said that they

were almost always bored, and about 19% said that they were almost

never bored. Other respondents were split evenly among all options,

such that no consensus emerged on this question. Generally, NCOs were

more bored than were officers. Boredom was also associated with

negative attitudes about one's own accomplishments, about the value of

one's own job and the role of the MFO, and about effects of MFO service

on one's career.
MFO Leaders 225

Our inquiry did not permit in-depth evaluation as to what extent

these responses about boredom were a function of each leader's position,

and to what extent they reflected individual differences. Parallel research

(Mael, Kilcullen, Olszewski & White, 1995) conducted on MFO soldiers

investigated individual difference variables that have been seen as

components of tolerance for boredom; however, it was not conducted

with leaders and, in fact, collection of such data with such a small,

relatively nonanonymous sample may have impeded the collection of

interview data.

Research has shown numerous ways in which individuals differ in

their tendency toward boredom (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989; Drory,

1982; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Fisher, 1993). There may also have

been differences in the MFO leaders' ability or motivation to structure

their relatively purposeless time in ways that would be more productive.

In our predeployment discussions with leaders, we detected three coping

strategies advanced by various leaders: The first was to be as busy or

busier than in other assignments by helping out wherever possible; for

example, by serving as a military instructor for certain skills. The second

was to recognize one's diminished personal role and to compensate by

doing other types of activities, such as engaging in a more intensive

physical fitness regimen or by taking college courses if available. A third

strategy was "winging it" or increasing participation in rest and recreation

(R&R). Unfortunately, no empirical evidence is available to demonstrate

that those who chose the third option had greater difficulties in coping,

though logically the first two strategies appear more proactive and

productive.

Alcohol. Another concern was that as a result of inactivity-caused

boredom, leaders themselves may have been tempted to overuse alcohol,

which could be harmful to the leaders, their careers, and their standing

with subordinates.

Stress. Job or "mission" stress was not mentioned often in this

rotation. Throughout the interview process the overwhelming feeling

was captured by one who stated "hey, this is one of the easiest jobs you

can get in the Army and if this stresses you out, then maybe you're not

cut out for the Army." This perspective that the Stressors of MFO service

were manageable was enunciated most clearly by RC soldiers, perhaps

because they wished to demonstrate that they were "as good as the AC."
296 RC Peacekeepers

Nonetheless, some personal stress was mentioned in the context of

missing relatives and loved ones at home. Several PSGs felt that their

roles expanded to "father figure" because they had to sit down with a

number of soldiers and listen to their concerns about missing those back

at home. The PSGs expressed their beliefs that RC soldiers were

somewhat more susceptible to this type of stress because they were not

used to being away from home (Schumm, Bell, Segal, & Rice, Chapter

15).

Other instances of stress seemed to stem from money issues, mainly

because recreational travel costs were much higher than expected. This

type of stress was compounded by the fact that individuals who could not

afford travel were usually stuck with "pulling duty" on South Camp for

others who could. By contrast, physical Stressors were not a significant

problem (Brady, 1995). Very few instances of heat exhaustion were

mentioned, and the soldiers kept themselves well hydrated. Soldiers

praised the quality of food at South Camp and even commented on the

"better than expected" quality of food at the remote sites.

Living conditions were generally good, which helped to keep the

spirits of the troops high. An exception was the remote site sleeping

arrangements which were, for the most part, somewhat cramped. This

produced some discomfort, as the proximity to others violated personal

space norms to which American soldiers typically become acculturated

(Altman & Chemers, 1980). Lack of privacy, such as was experienced at

the remote sites, can itself be stressful (Harris et al., 1993), and persons

deprived of privacy often suffer inabilities to relax and loss of self-esteem

and individuality (Bloustein, 1964; Fried, 1968; Gavison, 1980).

Midlevel Leader Concerns About Their Own Leaders

Micromanagement. Leaders complained, often bitterly, about being

micromanaged by superiors at various higher levels. They attributed this

behavior to excessive mistrust by senior leaders, as well as the tendencies

of some individuals to be "control freaks." In other cases, they attributed

this behavior to bored leaders, some of whom were having their own

duties usurped by their senior leaders. Thus, a "trickle-down" effect of

micromanagement was perceived, in which a micromanaged and

mistrusted leader responded in kind to his or her own subordinates.
MFO Leaders 222

Two questions in the May data collection addressed this issue. The

first question asked leaders to evaluate the degree of autonomy they had

in their MFO position compared to previous assignments. About 43% of

the sample said that they had somewhat or much less autonomy, and

about 29% saying that they had somewhat or much more. Perceptions of

greater autonomy were associated with more positive views of the

mission and of the value of MFO service for one's career. In addition,

those who felt they had more autonomy were also those who were less

bored. It is important to reiterate that without measures of individual

temperament, it is not possible to determine whether or to what extent

differences in general affect had an impact on differences in perceptions

about one's own situation and the efficacy of the MFO deployment.

The second question asked to what degree the leader had felt

micromanaged during the MFO deployment. A quarter of the sample

said "not at all," 32% said "very much," and another 15% chose the next

lower option. Since only 7% chose the midpoint option, it appears that

battalion members were split as to how much they had been

micromanaged, and that one cannot dismiss micromanagement concerns

as simply the complaints of isolated individuals. Moreover, these

findings were consistent with interviews with members of a prior rotation

in which soldiers complained bitterly about being micromanaged by

leaders (both NCO and officer) with "nothing better to do."

As a follow up, those who felt they were at least somewhat

micromanaged (i.e., 75% of the sample) were asked whether the

micromanagement was "a function of mistrust or negative feelings about

your capabilities as a leader." Respondents were equally split on this

question, with about 25% interpreting their leader's micromanagement as

very much a direct, negative comment about their own capabilities. One

can only speculate on the extent to which these perceptions were based

on impressions actually conveyed by the leader, or whether they were

really incorrect interpretations of actions taken by leaders assuaging their

own boredom and felt lack of purpose. Interviews with members of the

prior rotation indicated that leaders who were perceived as contributing

less, or appeared to be lax in their standards, were also resented by

subordinates. Thus, a leader lacking the resources to occupy his/herself

elsewhere may have felt compelled to get more involved in subordinates'

work to demonstrate his/her active presence, to reduce guilt of not
298 RC Peacekeepers

working as hard as subordinates, or as an antidote to boredom. Any

perceived discredit of the subordinates' work may have been unintended.

Nevertheless, these results point out the dangers of a trickle-down chain

of micromanagement to unit morale.

Time off. Time for travel to various area locales (Israel, Egypt,

Cyprus) is a key incentive for many to volunteer for the MFO Sinai

mission (Struck, 1995). In addition, travel to regional attractions can

provide relief from cultural deprivation, which Harris et al. (1993)

identify as one component of boredom in the MFO. However,

discretionary decisions by upper leadership led to the cancellation of time

off early in the deployment, with the time being used instead for

additional training. MFO personnel saw time off and travel as

problematic primarily for two reasons. The first was an overwhelming

mistrust of the abilities of those responsible for setting up travel. Several

examples cited in support of this mistrust were that (1) the travel office

was open only 1 day per week and soldiers could not always adjust their

work schedules accordingly; (2) travel information was not being

disseminated in a timely fashion, if at all; and (3) soldiers ended up

paying more for trips than they should have because they felt compelled

to bypass the travel personnel and set up their own tours.

Insufficient time also contributed to other travel-related problems.

MFO personnel felt that they were not getting enough time off to travel

because of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) rotations and other

work-related duties and training added to their busy schedule. While

availability of Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) and

Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) training were seen as advantageous

(some asking for Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course [BNCOC] as

well), they also "caused shortages in the number of people needed to pull

duty around South Camp." QRF rotations were seen as misaligned,

causing platoons to be "taxed too heavily." As a result, both problems

"made it impossible to give 1 week off every 6-week rotation for travel"

as the soldiers believed they had been promised.

Misconceptions about time off could, at least partially, be traced to

the National Guard Bureau's (NGB's) material on volunteering for MFO

peacekeeping which included a videotaped production outlining the

mission. Using this material, NGB recruiters told the potential volunteers

that they would have 3 weeks on site and 3 weeks at South Camp every
MFO Leaders 299

6-week tour period. The videotape documents the battalion commander

of an earlier rotation commenting that the 3 weeks at South Camp were to

be "generally" divided into 1 week of training, 1 week of QRF, and 1

week of travel and R&R. During several recruiting speeches, battalion

command for the 28th Rotation also made references to 1 week of R&R

per 6-week rotational period. However, according to battalion command,

this was never official battalion policy.

Leaders reported that throughout the mission, the "Joes" (enlisted

soldiers) resented that their week of promised travel had been replaced by

more training. This became a source of extreme frustration, anger, and

disappointment for them. They felt they had been "promised" one thing

to get them to volunteer and then were treated differently once they were

in the Sinai. This led to comments such as, "Wait until next time,

nobody will volunteer for this," and "The word is out that they'll (i.e.,

Army National Guard) lie to you to get you to come here...then when you

do, forget it." The sense by soldiers that their trust has been betrayed can

be a major Stressor for peacekeepers (Gifford, Jackson, & DeShazo,

1993). These comments bespeak a possible failure to provide "realistic

job previews" (RJP; Wanous, 1989) to those who volunteered for the

MFO. On the other hand, if the disappointments were not intrinsic to the

MFO Sinai mission, but were changes instigated at the discretion of the

senior leadership, then no RJP would have availed.

Leaders were also disappointed with travel arrangements and

policies. The empirical data revealed that only about 28% of leaders had

their travel expectations met "very much," while 16% said "not at all,"

with a mean of only 2.88 on a 5-point scale. Both NCOs and RC were

generally more disappointed with actual travel compared to expectations

(Oliver, Hayes, & Tiggle, Chapter 12). Dissatisfaction with travel had

the potential for adverse effects on morale, or at very least served as

another justification for the disaffected to be bitter about their MFO

experiences. Thus, those who were more bored, more micromanaged,

and less autonomous than usual were all more disappointed with their

travel experiences.

Education. As with travel, many soldiers look forward to

accelerating their graduation from college by taking courses during their

MFO tour of duty. In this sense, American soldiers differ from other

peacekeepers; in the Australian Army, for example, few enlisted soldiers
300 RC Peacekeepers

aspire to college degrees (Bonner, 1994). However, in this realm there

were also gaps between explicit or implicit promises, resultant

expectations, and reality. Specific problems centered on the low level

and limited selection of courses; the unanticipated expenses involved in

taking courses; the difficulty of those assigned to remote observation

posts to complete their course requirements; and upper leadership's shift

of focus from "college" education to military training, such as PLDC.

These gaps between expectations and reality caused problems of morale

among these leaders. Almost 30% of leaders said that their educational

expectations were not met "at all," while one quarter said that their

expectations were met very much. Generally, NCOs were more likely to

be disappointed with educational opportunities, something that may

simply be a reflection of the greater number of NCOs who had not yet

completed college degrees. Dissatisfaction may also have been related to

the specific courses and disciplines available or unavailable for study;

previous interviews indicated that universities serving as the vendors of

courses differed in their flexibility and ability to address the needs of the

MFO soldiers, who were trying to integrate their coursework with

responsibilities at different locations.

Interpersonal problems with leaders. The normal and inevitable

clashes between some leaders and their own superiors were also a

concern for leaders. Several interpersonal problems emerged among

officers in the HHC. These problems were related to control and

micromanagement. Several individuals believed it came from personality

differences. The best example of this would be the problems that

surfaced between a midlevel leader in the battalion and various other

officers on the HHC staff. Many individuals felt that the midlevel

leader's "personality style" was too overwhelming, too overbearing,

controlling and manipulative, that everything had to be done "his way or

the highway" and that no other input on how things should be done was

needed from anyone else. Previous research (Campbell & McCormack,

1957) has shown that authoritarian subordinates tend to be more

accepting of this type of leadership. Thus, dissatisfaction with some

leaders' style may have been a function of individual differences (Vroom,

1960). Generally, however, research has shown that even in military

units, authoritarian leaders are less popular with their subordinates

(Hollander, 1954; Ley, 1966).
MFO Leaders 201

Several officers stated that they had interpersonal problems with a

senior-level leader as well. For the most part, individuals also saw this

senior leader as inflexible, overbearing, controlling, and manipulative.

Many of this leader's policies were seen as self-serving and/or

self-promoting. They did not allow for input from anyone else but one

other midlevel leader.

An example of this can be seen in the senior-level leader's policy

change that all Article 15s and similar punitive actions go through his

office for review. Many officers viewed this policy as a direct result of

the senior-level leader's "inability to trust anyone to do a good job."

Trust is a crucial aspect of organizational life and cohesive unit

functioning (Hosmer, 1995; Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Lack of travel

opportunities were also seen as the senior-level leader's way of "keeping

control over his soldiers" to minimize the chance for soldiers "getting

into trouble and making him look bad."

However, one might advance a partial defense for the leadership.

They were tasked to lead an unusually visible rotation and also entertain

a steady stream of inquisitive VIP guests. They were also under the

constant scrutiny of a team of social scientists who were ultimately to

report to the Army Chief of Staff. That, in itself, would be cause for the

leadership to be under exceptional stress, and perhaps react differently

than they would otherwise.

AC/RC COORDINATION

One reason that this rotation was the subject of such interest was that

it served as a laboratory for observing the feasibility of smooth

integration of AC and RC soldiers. Originally, there were concerns about

how the RC soldiers would be perceived by their AC peers. Specific

concerns focused on RC soldier fitness, quality, and experience. There

was also some concern about RC and AC soldiers breaking off into

mutually exclusive cliques.

It is noteworthy that participants, especially those in upper

leadership, consistently downplayed any hint of problems in this area

during the December predeployment interviews. They also asserted that

skill and performance were more important than AC/RC designation
302 RC Peacekeepers

when deciding who was deserving of respect and trust. They also

expressed the view that the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC) and MFO

training promoted group cohesion during predeployment (Salter, Fober,

Pleban, & Valentine, Chapter 9). The sole exception was that AC NCOs

expressed reservations about being rated by RC NCOs, whom they

viewed as insufficiently experienced to be having such strong impact on

the career progression of the AC soldiers.

However, over the course of the deployment, some evidence of

changes in the AC/RC relationship emerged. Group development or

group cohesiveness occurs as a function of similarity of attitudes,

opinions, values, and behaviors among group members (Bennis &

Shepard, 1965; Siebold, Chapter 10; Tuckman, 1965). This, in turn, can

effect the perceptions of group members (Cartwright, 1968). Group

cohesion can lead to ethnocentrism and in-group favoritism, which in

turn can lead to exaggeration of differences between one's own group

and outgroup members (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Brown, 1986; Locksley,

Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1984).

Perceived inequity ("us" against "them") may also be experienced at the

group level, and evidence of preferential treatment may be sought or

highlighted.

This appeared to become an issue during the MFO deployment. AC

soldiers felt that RC soldiers were receiving preferential treatment, such

as being allowed to "get away with" behaviors that would have been

censured if exhibited by AC soldiers. In addition, AC/RC social

segregation eventually became evident to some. Generally, mutual dislike

was not a concern; rather, the two groups were seen as having different

life and career concerns, and therefore less in common. However, these

differences did cause a certain amount of friction and animosity between

the groups, which spilled over on some occasions. For example, there

were several reported cases of "rough-housing" between AC and RC

opponents during the officers' sporting activities (e.g., volleyball, Softball

games, and soccer matches). Several extreme cases resulted in physical

injury, which included a broken leg, broken arm, and a torn Achilles

tendon.

Two points must be kept in mind: First, most of the focus in both our

work and that of others was on whether AC personnel had any problem

with the performance and behavior of RC soldiers. Consequently, little
MFO Leaders 3Q3

attention was paid to the RC soldiers' perceptions of their AC peers.

Second, the perception of some leaders that many of the AC participants

in the MFO were not topflight representatives of the AC may have

colored some of the reporting of the RC having been "just as good."

In terms of skills, some AC leaders did suggest that some roles and

assignments be reserved for AC personnel. An example was some of the

supply and requisition work needing to be done prior to the beginning of

the rotation. It was felt that an active duty leader might be more familiar

with protocol and how to unofficially "make things happen." Since one

of the expressed frustrations of the battalion members was that their

startup was from ground zero—without any telephones, computers,

etc.—there was a real preference for key personnel who could get things

started quickly.

Another issue of concern was ratings across the two groups.

Specifically, AC personnel were concerned about being rated by what

they viewed as relatively inexperienced RC NCOs. Our impression was

that another dynamic was at play: A common perception is that it is

typical in the active duty Army for leaders to receive inflated ratings,

such that the norm is to be rated as exceptional. Any rating that was

originally designed to denote "merely" excellent or very good

performance is now seen as a de facto "kiss of death" for advancement.

This situation is no different from that in other organizations, in which

political and career considerations impinge upon and often override the

stated purposes of performance appraisal (Longenecker, Gioia, & Sims,

1987). However, some of the leaders claimed that the same culture of

hyperinflated ratings does not exist in the RC, and that a wider range of

the rating scale is used. Thus, AC raters may have been concerned that

RC raters would use the Officer's Evaluative Rating (OER) or other

rating forms as written, and unwittingly give them the equivalent of a bad

rating, even though the RC rater may have felt that the ratee was quite

capable. Under those conditions, AC soldiers were leery of trusting their

careers to these raters and may have felt that this was indicative of

"inexperience." Parallel to this phenomenon was a senior leader's

acknowledgment during an interview that he used a wider range of scores

to rate RC; in doing so, he may have understood that the damage would

be lesser in following the ratings as they were meant to be used.
304 RC Peacekeepers

INTERACTION WITH OTHER NATIONALITIES

The U.S. Army, at the suggestion of social scientists, has accelerated

cultural sensitivity training and foreign language training for soldiers

deploying to peacekeeping missions (Birch, 1995). Based on interviews

with both a prior rotation and other countries' peacekeepers, we felt it

necessary to inquire about tensions or friction involving members of

other nationalities. This concern was made up of two separate issues:

The first involved interactions with indigenous peoples, in this case

Egyptians from nearby villages, as well as workers or vacationers at areas

popular with soldiers for R&R. The second related to interactions with

peacekeepers of other nationalities. For nations with longstanding

involvement in truly integrated peacekeeping missions, these are serious

concerns. For example, Australian soldiers, who take a very dim view of

homosexuality, are sometimes paired with soldiers from other countries

who deem homosexuality not only acceptable but an entitlement for their

service in a host country (Bonner, 1994). Nationalities with longstanding

mutual antipathy are sometimes paired in peacekeeping missions.

In predeployment interviews, the leaders downplayed these

concerns. Unlike other peacekeeping settings, in which soldiers had to

deal with differing values related to sexual mores or the sacredness of

life, this was not a factor in the Sinai. This MFO mission did not involve

active daily interaction with local nationals, certainly not to the extent

that was experienced in Somalia, Haiti, or other locations involving

peacekeepers from other nations (Gifford et al., 1993). The second

concern, about interactions with other peacekeepers, did not materialize.

Compared to other missions, in which several Western peacekeeper units

have worked closely with soldiers from many different nations, there

were virtually no joint roles shared by Americans and other MFO Sinai

members. The United States Battalion (USBATT) operates all

checkpoints and observation posts (OP) in the southern sector of the Sinai

and its main outpost (South Camp) is in Sharm-el Sheikh, while the

Fijian and Columbian Battalions operate the northern sectors and are

located at North Camp in El Gorah. Interactions with other nationals

involved in MFO (from Italy, the Netherlands, and Fiji) were primarily

social, if at all. Potential concerns to which we were alerted included

possible exposure to ethically or morally offensive or degrading behavior

that might even involve harming others. Such behavior is likely to be
MFO Leaders 205

seen as reprehensible from the perspective of an American soldier, but

not from the perspective of the perpetrators. A special concern centered

around possible altercations during R&R periods. In terms of tolerating

the behavior and values of other nationals, some AC soldiers expected

their RC peers, some of whom had never left the United States (or even

their own states), to experience the greatest "culture shock."

In terms of empirical data, over 50% of the sample said that they

were not bothered at all by the behavior or values of local people. At the

other extreme, about one eighth of the sample said that they were

bothered "very much by the behavior or values of indigenous peoples."

Several individuals expressed concerns about the way locals seem "to

beg all the time and ask for handouts." Irritation with the indigenous

population related to their laziness ("... they won't do anything for

themselves, they try to get us to do it for them"); cleanliness ("... garbage

is everywhere and they never pick it up"); verbal abuse ("... after they

realized we weren't going to give them anything they stood outside our

OP and called us names and said things like, 'Yankee, go home' and

'Hurray for Oklahoma City'); and locals' prejudice toward U.S. soldiers

("... at night they don't let us into their clubs on the boardwalk unless we

have a date, and most of the hotels won't let us on their property").

These negative feelings were compounded by the tourist economy around

the area of Sharm-el Sheikh ("... they want your money, but if you aren't

buying anything they'll treat you like dirt. They treat the tourists from

other countries a thousand times better").

Some of the negative feelings spilled over into verbal retaliation by

the U.S. soldiers. The term "Gyppos" was used as a negative slur about

Egyptian nationals. Interviews with members of previous rotations

produced similar comments, indicating that distaste for standards of

cleanliness and sanitation were fairly universal, though there was also

some displeasure about honesty and ways of doing business in the host

country. A burgeoning area of research into individual differences in

cross-cultural orientation and openness or tolerance for other cultures

(Caligiuri, 1994; Evans, Sculli, & Yau, 1987; Mendenhall, Dunbar, &

Oddou, 1987) may help explain the range of reactions to indigenous

people by the MFO soldiers.

In our first interview prior to deployment, MFO leadership did

express a fair amount of concern over the possibility of U.S. soldiers
306 RC Peacekeepers

offending the locals and getting into trouble outside of South Camp.

However, no substantial evidence of such problems was brought to our

attention beyond a minor "verbal altercation" between one young, male

soldier and a local female. Comments by leaders were very positive in

this area with most reporting that the soldiers were exceptionally well

behaved and very mature in their interactions with locals.

FAMILY ISSUES AS LEADERSHIP CONCERNS

The concerns of MFO soldiers and their families about their

relationships, and about the disruption of regular family roles, are

covered in depth elsewhere in this volume (Schumm, et al., Chapter 15).

Here, we touch only on some of the concerns that emerged during the

predeployment period and that may relate somewhat to leadership roles.

Family support. One stated concern was the degree to which a

soldier's spouse (typically a wife, although conceivably a girlfriend or

husband) was accepted by other spouses, in the sense of being kept

informed of both the soldiers' welfare and the activities of spouses. The

leadership issue surrounds the role of the battalion leaders' wives as de

facto leaders of spouse-support networks, regardless of their capabilities

for the role. A related complaint was a degree of perceived cronyism

among the wives of the leadership cadre. Although similar concerns

were expressed in previous rotations as well, they took on a different tone

in this case both because of the geographical dispersion of the RC wives

and the fact that the RC wives may have felt an even larger gap between

themselves and "career spouses." As a hypothetical example, an RC

leader from the Maryland National Guard may have left a spouse behind

in Maryland in the community where she grew up, with a circle of friends

that did not include other military wives. Moreover, the family home

could be 50 or more miles away from the location of the nearest meeting

place for interaction with other battalion spouses. This could increase

feelings of isolation, both in terms of being outside of (or excluded from)

the information loop, as well as not having contact with women in similar

straits. It is noteworthy that in both previous and current interviews,

there were sharp discrepancies between leader-subordinate evaluations of

support group performance. Upper leaders were full of praise for the

wives who were running support groups, citing the many activities that
MFO Leaders 307

they were involved in. From the perspective of more junior battalion

members, however, the activities were poorly advertised or were

irrelevant to the real needs of those who were physically isolated. Those

who were unaccustomed to managing a household without the relief of a

spouse, or dealing with fears unknown in civilian circles, needed

one-to-one support more than social events.

Adultery and battalion values. In the predeployment phase, we

detected a quizzical approach to concerns about nonmarital sexual

interaction. Literature disseminated to the soldiers strongly advocated

refraining from adultery and even nonmarital sex, both for health and

family reasons. However, this was at odds with the stated expectations of

the soldiers, that a highlight of their R&R experiences would involve

sexual adventures. In some ways, the literature actually irritated the

soldiers in that it was also sent to spouses, raising their suspicions and

concerns. Preliminary to February's data collection, we were assured by

the mental health officer that there was much less adultery occurring in

the MFO Sinai than in other peacekeeping missions. Therefore, we did

not formally revisit this issue during the deployment data collections.

A model depicting the interrelationship of the various leader

concerns and outcomes, as well as the situational and organizational

influences on these concerns, is shown in Figure 11-1.

CONCLUSION

Several major findings emerged from our interviews and empirical

research. First, integration of willing and unwilling participants is a far

greater concern than AC/RC integration. Persons whose personalities or

unwillingness to be in the MFO make them unhappy or dissatisfied often

take a dim view of the mission, including its usefulness and raison d'etre.

Beyond that, they are more likely to be bored, to feel micromanaged, and

be unhappy with accommodations.

Second, micromanagement, combined with not enough work to do,

jointly lead to role ambiguity, frustration, and "trickle-down"

micromanagement lower into the battalion. Questions must be raised

about whether Sinai missions require the same number of leadership

levels as other missions. Some may argue that to send the battalion
308 RC Peacekeepers

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MFO Leaders 202

without platoon leaders, for example, may cause additional problems

once the units finish the deployment and members return to more

traditional roles. This concern is granted, but the need for an alternative

solution is no less pressing.

Third, policy changes that negate expectations or actual

commitments, especially if not communicated properly, destroy morale.

It might be easy to ridicule the "expectations" of soldiers for travel or

education, arguing that they have joined the MFO to prevent war, not to

see the world. This, however, does not change the fact that MFO work

involves great tedium for many, as well as loss of certain military skills,

and that travel and education serve to some degree as compensatory

remuneration. Also, if people volunteered based on unfulfilled premises,

they cannot be blamed for feeling betrayed. If problems with travel and

education are foreseen, providing a more realistic job preview might still

be preferable.

Fourth, MFO experiences probably do not generalize to other

potential peacemaking roles for U.S. forces. The lack of coordination

with other national forces, the absence of daily contact with indigenous

populations, and the special soldier attributes needed to successfully

perform this mission all limit generalizability. The unique attributes

needed for success in MFO, and how they differ from those needed in

other peacekeeping missions, are addressed in Mael et al. (1995). On the

other hand, we are convinced that MFO "lessons learned" can have some

relevance for future volunteer, composite forces, at least in situations and

deployments with low expectations of combat.
21Q RC Peacekeepers

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12

SOLDIERS' PERCEPTIONS OF

DEPLOYMENT EFFECTS

Laurel W. Oliver

Stephanie M. Hayes

Ronald B. Tiggle

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to document middeployment findings

for the life course variables and, where appropriate, to compare the

results to soldiers' perceptions and attitudes before deployment. Chapter

6 contains a summary of the deployees' predeployment status on the life

course variables covered in this chapter. Oliver, Hayes, and Tiggle (in

press) contains a more complete account of the findings reported in this

chapter.

Research Questions

The questions to be explored in this chapter are:

1. Current effects ofdeployment on soldiers' lives. At this point

during the deployment, what effects do soldiers perceive the deployment

has had on various aspects of their lives? The specific aspects of their

lives we asked about were:

• physical health

• emotional well-being

• civilian job/career

• military career

315
316 RC Peacekeepers

• marriage

• adjustment to spouse upon return

• children

• likelihood of volunteering for future operations

• likelihood of remaining in the military

2. Middeployment status. At this middeployment point, what are

soldiers' career intentions, educational aspirations, and organizational

commitment?

3. Comparison with predeployment status. How do the effects

anticipated by the soldiers before deployment compare with the effects

they reported during deployment? How do soldiers' attitudes toward

careers, education, and travel, and the Army organization compare with

the attitudes they had before deployment?

METHOD

Sample

The sample for this research comprises the 412 soldiers who

completed a usable survey. Of these, 283 identified themselves as

Reserve Component (RC) soldiers and 69 as Active Component (AC)

soldiers. The RC subjects were from Army National Guard (ARNG)

units and from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

Measures

Middeployment life course variables. Chapter 6 and Oliver, Tiggle,

and Hayes (in press) described how we operationalized the life course

variables for the surveys administered before deployment. The findings

we present here are based on data from the Opinions questionnaire,

administered to deployees in the Sinai in May 1995. This

middeployment survey contained the same variables as in the earlier

survey, although the wording in the Opinions survey was in the present

tense rather than the future tense as in the predeployment questionnaire.
Deployment Perceptions 317

See Oliver, Hayes, & Tiggle, (in press) for a copy of the Opinions

questionnaire.

Additional items. Three items were added for the middeployment

survey. The additional items related to civilian job satisfaction, military

job satisfaction, and the respondent's expectations concerning the effect

of the deployment on an RC soldier's chances of going into the Regular

Army (RA). The measures ofjob satisfaction were based on research in

the industrial/organizational psychology literature (e.g., Cook, Hepworth,

Wall, & Warr, 1981; Seashore, Lawler, Mirvis, & Camman, 1982).

Comments from soldiers and interviews with their wives (conducted by

other researchers and reported elsewhere) led to the inclusion of the item

concerning soldier expectations of getting into the RA as a result of

participating in the deployment. These three items were also included in

the Opinions questionnaire administered during deployment (Oliver,

Hayes, & Tiggle, in press).

Procedure

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

(ARI) researchers administered the Opinions questionnaire (plus other

instruments) to groups of soldiers in the Sinai during May 1995. The

procedure was similar to that followed in the predeployment data

collections conducted at Fort Bragg in 1994.

Analyses

The analyses for the research reported here involve middeployment

data. Results are generally reported for the entire sample. Where

appropriate and of interest, results are broken out by component (RC and

AC) or by rank (junior enlisted, noncommissioned officers [NCOs], and

officers). We also present some comparisons of data collected before and

during the deployment. We have presented the predeployment data in

Chapter 6 and in Oliver, Tiggle, & Hayes (in press). This chapter is

based on data reported in Oliver, Hayes, and Tiggle (in press).
318 RC Peacekeepers

Use of Comments to Clarify Results

To clarify the results contained in this chapter, we include comments

made by soldiers on the surveys they completed during the deployment.

That the overwhelming majority of these comments were negative in tone

helps explain some of the results that we present.

In considering the results, we need to note that ARI came in for its

share of criticism in the comments. Completion of surveys was

considered an onerous task and an invasion of privacy. As one soldier

sarcastically commented, "Thanks for holding another survey on my day

off in a hot gym, wasting my time and prying into my personal life." The

opinion that the surveys would change nothing was reflected in several

dozen of the comments. Two examples: "I wonder if these ARI

questions are really going to do any good. Especially negative comments

or will those 'accidentally' be destroyed?" and "I honestly feel that these

surveys are pointless. We've all given thought-out, legitimate complaints

multiple times with no change."

Removal of Cases From Database

We have explained in Oliver, Hayes, and Tiggle (in press) how we

developed decision rules for removing questionable cases. (See Appendix

B of that report for the specific rules.) Although removing these cases

did not appreciably change the results, we feel that the data reported here

is more accurate because of our having done so. Our decision to remove

questionable cases is supported by a number of the comments. For

example, one respondent wrote: "Look, you're never going to get

accurate information on these surveys. The way they are given

encourages people to want to get them done fast. When people do these

fast, they don't care what they mark. I heard a guy singing the alphabet

using only ABCDE. He was done with the survey in 10 minutes. You

tell me that's accurate? Most of the soldiers consider ARI surveys to be

an inconvenience. So, why try to be accurate they say. Who cares, they

say. Nobody has any good answers for them."

1 The appendix of this book contains a summary of 693 comments classified into six major categories.

2 One of the decision rules we developed was designed to eliminate cases that had answer sheets showing a

repetitive pattern such as A-B-C-D-E.
Deployment Perceptions : 319

FINDINGS

Middeployment Perceived Effects

Before they deployed, soldiers were asked to indicate how they

expected various aspects of their lives to change as a result of the

deployment to the Sinai. During the May 1995 data collection (reported

here), soldiers were asked what these effects were at this later point in

time. Table 1 contains means and standard deviations for soldier

perceptions of deployment effects on various aspects of their lives both

by component and for the entire sample. Note that the means represent a

5-point scale.

The pattern of effects as perceived by the RC and AC soldiers during

the deployment was very similar. The perceived effects related to

marriage, adjustment, and children were essentially the same for both RC

and AC, although the means on the other effects were lower for both

groups than they had been before deployment. The largest change in

means from before the deployment to during the deployment was in the

soldiers' willingness to volunteer for future similar operations. The

overall mean for this effect fell from 3.91 to 2.63. Willingness to stay in

the Army also dropped from 3.96 to 3.12. Another sizable drop occurred

in effects of the deployment on physical health (from 4.50 to 3.58) and

on military career (from 4.39 to 3.47). Sizable declines on these

variables occurred for both components.

Table 12-1 shows that the component pattern for perceived effects

during deployment was similar to the one we had noted in the

predeployment data for expected effects. Before deployment, we found

significant differences between components on five variables; during

deployment, we found significant differences on four of those five

variables. Mean ratings for military career effects were 3.63 and 2.91 for

the RC and AC groups, respectively. On the future volunteering item,

the means were 2.81 for the RC and 1.99 for the AC. We found smaller

but still significant differences on physical health and on staying in the

Army, with RC respondents rating these effects more positively.

As can be seen in Table 12-2, differences among ranks tended to be

small even when statistically significant. The largest rank difference was
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Deployment Perceptions ; 321

for the adjustment variable. Officers (mean = 4.19) and NCOs (mean =

3.53) were significantly more positive than junior enlisted (mean = 3.14).

Junior enlisted respondents, on the other hand, perceived significantly

more positive effects on their military careers than the other two rank

groups and also were more willing to volunteer in the future. Although

statistically significant, these differences were rather small.

Middeployment Attitudes

This section deals with middeployment attitudes related to

organizational commitment, how soldiers felt about being in the Sinai,

and job satisfaction. Table 12-3 contains means and standard deviations

for these variables for the entire sample, and by component, and Table

12-4 contains similar data for the three rank groups. As in Tables 12-1

and 12-2, these means represent a 5-point scale.

Organizational commitment. The data in Table 12-3 represent a

small drop in affective commitment from before the deployment (3.48) to

during deployment (3.05). Continuance commitment stayed at

essentially the same level (from 2.76 to 2.51). There was a steep decline

in attitudes toward being in the Sinai. Ratings on this variable fell from

4.69 to 3.01. There were no marked component or rank differences on

either the organizational commitment dimensions or feelings about the

Sinai, except for the generally more positive officer ratings.

Job satisfaction. We did not measure job satisfaction before

deployment, so we cannot compare perceptions of either military job

satisfaction or civilian job satisfaction over time. There were no notable

differences between components on these variables except for a higher

AC mean (4.00) than RC mean (3.22) on civilian job satisfaction. In

accordance with the typical pattern, officers reported higher military job

satisfaction than did enlisted personnel.

Middeployment Career and Education Effects

Tables 12-5 and 12-6 contain data relating to career and education

effects perceived by the respondents during deployment. For these

nominal variables, the data are presented in terms of percentages. Table
322 RC Peacekeepers

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Table 12-5

Middeployment Career and Education Effects by Component

Component

All soldiers Active Reserve

Career intent

Stay until/beyond 20 years 44.7% 52.1% 42.9%

Undecided 34.1 26.8 34.7

Retire before 20 years 21.2 21.1 22.4

Deployment good for career

Yes 55.8 29.2 62.9

No 20.0 43.1 14.4

Not sure 24.3 27.7 22.7

Effect of deployment on joining RA

No effect on RC getting into RA 10.5 11.9 10.0

Increases chances of RC getting 19.4 11.9 21.6

into RA

Definitely let RC into RA 14.1 7.5 15.5

Didn't know effect for RC 56.0 68.7 52.9

Taking courses during deployment

Yes 53.3 47.1 55.0

No 46.7 52.9 45.0

Traveling during deployment

, Yes 88.1 79.7 90.6

No 11.9 20.3 9.4

12-5 shows results for the entire sample and by component. Table 12-6

contains data for rank groups.

Career intentions. The pattern of middeployment career intentions

shifted somewhat from the predeployment pattern. Although the

percentage of undecided remained about the same, a larger proportion of

all soldiers (21%) intended to retire before 20 years than they had before

deployment (12%). A somewhat smaller percentage of the entire sample
326 RC Peacekeepers

Table 12-6

Middeployment Career and Education Effects by Rank

Rank

Junior enlisted NCOS Officers

Career intent

Stay until/beyond 20 years 37.1% 56.8% 51.9%

Undecided 40.1 25.8 29.6

Retire before 20 years 22.8 17.4 18.5

Deployment good for career

Yes 63.6 40.8 46.2

No 15.0 30.8 11.5

Not sure 21.4 28.3 42.3

Effect ofdeployment on joining RA

No effect on RC getting into RA 6.6 10.2 29.6

Increases chances of RC getting 22.7 16.4 11.1

into RA

Definitely let RC into RA 16.2 11.7 3.7

Didn't know effect forRC 54.6 61.7 55.6

Taking courses during deployment

Yes 53.6 57.9 18.5

No 46.4 42.1 81.5

Traveling during deployment

Yes 87.6 86.7 96.3

No 12.4 13.3 3.7

(45%) intended to stay until or beyond 20 years than they had before

deployment (56%).

In Chapter 13, Lakhani and Abod have reported that "career

commitment" (which he defined as intent to stay in the military for at

least 20 years) became more similar across components as time passed.

Before deployment, significantly more RC soldiers than AC soldiers

planned a career of 20 years or more in the military. During deployment,

this difference was no longer significant.

Benefit to careers. There were differences among groups in

assessing the effect of the deployment on their careers. Less than one

third (29%) of the AC soldiers felt the deployment was good for their
Deployment Perceptions 327

careers, and close to half (43%) felt it was not good for their careers. The

RC soldiers, on the other hand, were more positive about the

deployment's effect on their careers: 63% felt it was good and 14% felt

it was not good for their careers. For rank groups, more junior enlisted

rated the deployment as good for their careers (64%) than did either

NCOs (41%) or officers (46%).

Chances ofgetting into Regular Army. The item asking about the

effect of the deployment on an RC soldier's chances of getting into the

RA was not administered before deployment, so we cannot make any

comparisons over time for this item. More than half (56%) the entire

sample reported that they did not know what effect the deployment

would have. Table 12-5 shows that almost twice the proportion of the

RC (37%) than AC (19%) believed that the deployment would either

increase a soldier's chances or definitely allow the soldier to get into the

RA. As can be seen in Table 12-6, the proportion ofjunior enlisted

expressing this opinion was larger (39%) than either NCOs (28%) or

officers (15%).

Travel and educational courses. The proportion of soldiers who

reported traveling and taking educational courses during deployment was

less than the proportion planning to do so before deployment. Of the

95% of the entire sample who had expected to travel, 88% reported

having actually done so. Of the 82% of soldiers overall who had planned

to take courses, 53% reported having done so during the deployment.

The percentage of decline was roughly equivalent across both

components and rank groups.

DISCUSSION

Specific Perceived Effects

In general, the deployment effects soldiers reported for various

aspects of their lives were less positive than they had anticipated before

the deployment. This finding is a common phenomenon—soldiers just

beginning a new Army experience (deployment, new unit, etc.) tend to be

enthusiastic and positive. The initial enthusiasm, however, usually wanes

as time goes on and reality sets in. ARI research in a variety of areas has
328 RC Peacekeepers

demonstrated this phenomenon repeatedly. Hence we consider the

overall drop from before to during the deployment an expected result.

But we noted declines that seemed more marked than we would

expect for some of the effects. In fact, we would characterize some of

these declines as precipitous. For example, there were substantially

lower means during the deployment for willingness to volunteer for

similar assignments in the future and for willingness to stay in the Army.

This finding suggests disappointment or disillusion with the Army with

respect to the deployment experience. Among the comments made by

soldiers on their surveys we found many that reflected considerable

disappointment and disillusion with the deployment. One individual

summed it up thusly: "When I first came on this, I was very excited. But

now I have to say that I am very disappointed in this mission." Many of

these disappointments dealt with issues such as broken promises ("lying"

was a frequently used term), being treated like juveniles, and lack of

communication.

Perceptions of physical health were also much less positive than

soldiers had expected before deployment. We speculate that perhaps

expectations for physical activity and exercise were not met in the actual

deployment situation. However, we did not find any comments that

related to this particular effect.

Although the drops in ratings were precipitous for both components,

RC soldiers were more positive about some deployment effects than the

AC soldiers. Only on adjustment did AC respondents give significantly

higher ratings than those from the RC. In addition to effects on their

physical well-being which we noted previously, RC soldiers were

significantly more positive about effects on their military career, their

willingness to volunteer in the future, and their willingness to stay in the

Army than were the AC soldiers. We believe the more positive

perceptions of RC soldiers of these effects and, in particular, military

careers and assignments may be related to their volunteer status. Because

they had chosen to go on the deployment, the deployment must have had

positive effects for them.

There is also evidence that AC leaders perceived more negative

deployment effects than did the RC leaders. In the interviews with

leaders (squad leaders and higher) described in Chapter 11, Mael and
Deployment Perceptions 222

Palmer reported that the AC leaders felt their soldiering skills had eroded

more than their RC counterparts did. If this was the case, we are not

surprised that these AC soldiers would rate deployment effects on their

careers more negatively.

Although most comments were negative in nature, a few were

positive. Three comments, for example, noted positive effects for the

respondents' careers ("I feel that the mission will look good on my 201

file.")

Middeployment Attitudes

Organizational commitment (affective dimension only) dropped

slightly and feelings about the Sinai deployment were sharply less

positive during the deployment than they had been before the

deployment. We found no noticeable group differences except for the

generally more positive attitudes of officers. Officers also reported

higher levels of military job satisfaction than did the other rank groups.

Middeployment Career and Education Effects

There was a shift in career intent patterns from before the

deployment to during deployment. In general, soldiers became less

interested in staying in the Army until or beyond 20 years, and more

soldiers felt they would retire before 20 years. This pattern was observed

for all groups. If this finding is related to the deployment experience, it

may reflect unmet expectations or disillusionment with the deployment.

Some of the comments were directly related to the retention issue. ("It is

because of this mission that I have decided to exit military service.")

Although the career intent pattern seemed similar across groups, the

item asking if the deployment was good for careers demonstrated

differences between components. RC soldiers clearly considered the

deployment better for their careers than did the AC soldiers. However,

RC and AC careers differ. For almost all RC soldiers, reserve duty

involves a part-time job. Participating in the Sinai deployment would

increase service time and its corresponding rewards. For AC soldiers,

service in the RA is not only a full-time job but also, in many cases, a

career as well; and AC soldiers' views of the effect of a 6-month
330 RC Peacekeepers

deployment may vary from those of their RC counterparts. Thus we feel

that differences on this item probably reflect differences in the two types

of careers.

Although the Army did not link the Sinai deployment experience to

enhancing RC soldiers' chances of getting into the RA, many

respondents (especially RC and junior enlisted personnel) thought that it

would do so. This finding suggests that RC soldiers may have done

some wishful thinking about future Army careers in the RA—or,

alternatively—that they interpreted the information they received about

the deployment in this manner.

Overall, and across all groups, somewhat fewer soldiers reported that

they had traveled outside the Sinai and many fewer soldiers reported

taking courses than we would have expected from the predeployment

data.

In Chapter 11, Mael and Palmer discuss interview data obtained

from leaders (from squad leaders up). These results reflect the

discrepancy between soldier expectations concerning travel and

education and what they actually experienced in the Sinai. Many of the

deployees had been motivated to volunteer because of the enticement of

foreign travel. Travel was also seen as an antidote to the boredom

encountered during the deployment. Hence curtailment of travel

opportunities constituted a real disappointment for many soldiers. They

complained about the limited time the travel office was open (the 1 day

per week did not always conform to soldiers' work schedules), and

communication about travel opportunities was not always timely. The

result of the perceived inadequacies of the travel office led soldiers to

arrange trips on their own, which was a more costly alternative. Soldiers

also believed that they had been promised 1 week off for each 6-week

rotation. Because of the Quick Reaction Force rotations plus the

additional training and work-related duties that were added, this level of

time off became impossible.

Similar problems emerged with respect to education. Here again

there was a wide discrepancy between soldier expectations and reality.

Specific problems involved the low level of courses, the limited selection

of courses, the expense of the courses, and the lack of time to spend on

the courses. Soldiers assigned to remote observation posts found it
Deployment Perceptions 331

especially difficult to complete course requirements. Soldiers also felt

angry about what they perceived was upper leadership's decision to focus

on military training rather than college courses.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The pattern of responses from soldiers during the deployment was

similar to the pattern found before deployment—that is, the group

differences across component or rank were generally not large. The

group differences that did occur were to be expected: officers were

sometimes more positive than enlisted soldiers, and the RC soldiers (who

were volunteers for the mission) tended to be more positive than the AC

soldiers.

However, means for all soldiers and for all subgroups dropped on

most variables from before the deployment to during the deployment,

indicating less positive attitudes at the latter point. We found particularly

large declines during this period on the variables of military job

satisfaction, career intentions, and willingness to volunteer for future

similar missions. We also found that predeployment expectations

concerning the opportunity to take courses for credit had not been

achieved during deployment.

Although there were a few positive comments written on the

surveys, most of them were negative—many of them very negative

indeed. Among these negative comments, we found a great many

complaints about inadequate or misleading communication from the

Army as well as accusations of outright "lying." At least from the

standpoint of many of the deployees, they had been misled or

misinformed before and during the deployment. We believe these

perceptions led to the precipitous declines we found on some of the

variables. Perhaps unrealistic expectations on the part of soldiers and/or

the Army may be responsible for the more negative results obtained

during deployment. We hope to clarify this issue with data collected in

follow-up research.
332 RC Peacekeepers

REFERENCES

Cook, J. D., Hepworth, S. J., Wall, T. D., & Warr, P. B. (1981). The

experience ofwork: A compendium and review of249 measures

and their use. London: Academic Press.

Ivie, R. L., Gimbel, C, & Elder, Jr. (1991). Military experience and

attitudes in later life: Contextual influence across forty years.

Journal ofPolitical and Military Sociology, 19, 101-117.

Oliver, L. W., Tiggle, R. B., & Hayes, S. M. (in press). Preliminary

report on selected life course variables and reasonsfor

volunteering for the 28th Sinai deployment (ARI Technical

Report No. 1046). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Oliver, L. W., & Hayes, S. M., & Tiggle, R. B. (in press). Interim report

on deployee attitudes and perceptions during the 28th Sinai

deployment (ARI Technical Report). Alexandria, VA: U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Seashore, S. E., Lawler, E. D., Mirvis, P., & Camman, C. (Eds.).

(1982). Observing and measuring organizational change: A

guide to field practice. New York: Wiley.
13

THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF

PEACEKEEPING IN THE SINAI

Hyder Lakhani

Elissa T. Abod

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has two objectives. The first objective is to determine

perceived financial gains or losses during training and deployment phases

of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai mission by Active

Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers. The second

objective is to estimate the impact of these gains or losses on long term

career commitment of the soldiers (i.e., to stay in their respective

component until retirement).

Given the rise in military commitments and the greater drawdown of

the active duty force, the relative importance of reservist soldiers in the

military is increasing (Lakhani, 1995). The Air Force has already

implemented a plan that relies on reservists to fly cargo planes, aerial

tankers, and fighters around the world. The Army implemented a similar

plan as part of the MFO Task Force (Matthews, 1995).

Reserve jobs are part-time volunteer assignments that are similar to

civilian part-time jobs in a number of ways. Both groups ofjobholders

come from diverse backgrounds, select part-time work for a variety of

reasons, and fill jobs in different occupations (Thomas & Kocher, 1993).

Reserve jobs also differ substantially from civilian part-time jobs. The

Army National Guard (ARNG) component of the reserve force involves

primarily combat missions and is committed to a specified length of

service. Reservists must be interested in "military service, meet

333
334 RC Peacekeepers

enlistment standards, complete initial training, and adapt to the military

environment" (Thomas & Kocher, 1993, p. 340). Most reservists accrue

eligibility for retirement benefits, compared to less than 20% of part-time

civilian workers (Blank, 1990, as cited in Thomas & Kocher, 1993).

Selected reservists may participate in missions that present family

and/or job conflicts. As recent events in the Middle East have shown,

reserve participation may include the risk of civilian job disruption and

family separation if a reservist is "activated" (Thomas & Kocher, 1993).

Because of this, officials are concerned about the impact on reservists'

families, civilian jobs, and earnings (Matthews, 1995). Francis (1992)

reported that reservists deployed in Operation Desert Storm lost civilian

income, health, and other benefits, as well as faced reduced promotional

opportunities in civilian occupations. As a result, more soldiers planned

to leave the Army after their return (26%) than when they joined (18%)

(Lakhani, 1995).

The required growth of the reserve force to adequately support the

AC force can be maintained by increasing reenlistment of reservists.

However, retention can be problematic because the overall annual

attrition rate in reserve services is 25% (Lakhani, 1995). Wong, Bliese,

and Halverson (1995) examined the effects of multiple deployments on

soldier well-being and on soldiers' intentions to remain in the Army.

Using hierarchical regression, results showed that marital status was not

significantly related to positive retention intentions, but multiple

deployments were negatively related to retention intentions. There was

also a significant interaction between marital status, previous

deployments, and retention intentions. Single soldiers with previous

deployments were less likely to remain in the Army. Previous

deployments were not significantly related to retention intentions for

married soldiers.

Our research addresses some of the Army's concerns regarding

deployment of reserve forces. In this chapter, we assess how

demographic and economic variables affect Army career intentions. We

draw on the economic and military literature to provide an overview of

current research.
Financial Impact 335

LITERATURE REVIEW

Many turnover models emphasize intervening variables such as job

satisfaction, commitment, intention to quit, and search behavior (e.g.,

Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979; Price & Mueller, 1981).

While these models identify causal paths in making a turnover decision,

the relative importance of other determinants has been neglected. For

example, the direct effects of demographic and economic variables have

received limited attention (Thomas & Kocher, 1993). Cotton and Tuttle

(1986) conducted a meta-analysis on the correlates of turnover and found

that the type of industry moderated the relationship between turnover and

pay, job satisfaction, and gender. They also found that individual

perceptions about employment alternatives are consistently related to

individual turnover.

Thomas and Kocher (1993) adopted Cotton and Tuttle's (1986)

categorization of turnover correlates in their research. Cotton and Tuttle

(1986) summarized numerous studies and reported three factors affecting

turnover intention: external market (e.g., alternative employment

opportunities), personal (e.g., demographic, work experience), and

work-related (e.g., job characteristics).

Thomas and Kocher (1993) were interested in determining a range of

factors that are likely to influence recruiting and retention policies. They

tested hypotheses about the relative contribution of external market,

personal, and work-related factors to an Army reservist's decision to

remain in the Army. The initial turnover model was run for all reservists,

and results showed a significant gender effect. Subsequent analyses were

performed using gender-specific models. We report the male model

because it is consistent with the sample in our study. Results showed that

logistic regression coefficients for age at reserve entry, school attendance,

current financial benefits, and retirement benefits positively predicted

turnover decision. Race did not significantly impact the turnover

decision. Based on these results, Thomas and Kocher (1993) evaluated

policy approaches and suggested that policy should target older

individuals in reserve recruiting (e.g., ages 20-22).

Thomas and Kocher (1993) described the need for longitudinal

research using survey and personnel data. Over time, "leavers" and

"stayers" could be tracked beyond their turnover decision points to
336 RC Peacekeepers

update personal, financial, and work-related data. In addition, research

comparing civilian to reserve turnover decisions can shed light on

individual differences between these groups that may affect turnover.

The research presented below focuses on a narrower set of variables to

address turnover intentions among Army reservists.

Demographics

Grissmer and Kirby (1985) found that age and the number of

dependents negatively predicted reenlistment decisions, while marriage

positively predicted reenlistment decisions. This suggests that single

reservists have higher retention rates than married reservists, but married

reservists with dependents have higher retention rates than single or

married and childless reservists. Results also showed that higher

retention rates were found among African-Americans and people with

some college education. Grissmer and Kirby (1985) stated that these

results may reflect a preference for reserve service among these groups or

more uncertain civilian economic prospects for African-Americans and

less educated people. Phillips, Andrisani, Daymont, and Gilroy (1992)

stated that minorities are more likely to remain in the Army than whites.

For example, African-Americans reenlist after their first term at about a

rate of 50% higher than whites.

Attitudes

Lakhani and Fugita (1993) used a sociological theory to explain how

spouse attitudes toward reserve participation affected reserve

reenlistment. Results showed that family earnings and a spouse's

favorable attitude toward the reservist's career plans increased the

probability of reenlistment. Lakhani (1995) found that reservist's

satisfaction with military life and job satisfaction were also positively

associated with reenlisting. Lakhani (1995) suggested that economists

should include attitudinal and affective variables in analyses of retention

intentions.

Military Experience

Reserve retention rates also show strong dependence on military

experience variables. Grissmer and Kirby (1985) reported that higher
Financial Impact 337

pay grades were associated with higher retention rates, and reservists in

noncombat jobs were more likely to reenlist than those in combat jobs.

Holding risk constant, it is possible that skills acquired in combat jobs

may not be easily transferred to civilian jobs.

Burright, Grissmer, and Doering (1982) included reserve-specific

variables in their analysis, concluding that variables such as prior active

military service, pay grade, civilian employer's attitude toward the

reserves, and prior reenlistment in the reserves had a positive and

significant effect on reenlistment. In contrast, years of service and

assignment to combat positions were negatively related to reenlistment.

The U.S. General Accounting Office (1991) found that reserve

attrition rates were higher for reservists who lost overtime pay

opportunities and when a reservist's primary military occupational

specialty (PMOS) mismatched their duty occupation. Based on these

results, they recommended more flexible training requirements and

further analysis of matching PMOS with duty occupations.

Economics

Several researchers analyzed the role of economic variables in

predicting retention intentions. Grissmer and Kirby (1985) found that

reservists who live in areas with relatively high unemployment and low

per capita income have relatively higher retention rates. This implies that

reserve service may be economically motivated by supplementing

income. They also tested the effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses

(SRBs) on reenlistment decisions. Results showed that SRBs were

significantly related to retention rates. Reservists receiving bonuses

extended or reenlisted more frequently than those in a control group.

However, results suggested that separation decisions may be weakly

sensitive to pay increases.

Mehay (1991) tested whether the decision by civilians to join the

reserves is equivalent to the decision by civilians to moonlight. Results

showed two distinct models for reservists and moonlighters, suggesting

that the decisions are not equivalent. Results also showed that

participation in the reserves is a labor force decision which is strongly

influenced by individual and family economic status and local
338 RC Peacekeepers

employment conditions. These findings are consistent with research

related to reservists' intention to remain in the Army.

Finally, Lakhani (1995) found that reenlistment increased with

increases in reserve pay and decreased with increases in civilian

moonlighting wages. In addition, reenlistment intentions correlated

positively and significantly with actual reenlistment behavior. Thus, both

variables are appropriate for analyzing turnover.

The literature presented here shows that demographic, attitudinal,

military, and economic variables explain important aspects of the

reenlistment decision. As Lakhani (1995) states, "(these variables)

occupy an important place in the reenlistment analysis" (p. 126).

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

A primary purpose of this research was to test a model of career

commitment in the Army. The model includes financial variables as well

as demographic and psychological variables. To test this model, career

intentions were regressed on financial status (gains or losses) to

determine whether financial gains are associated with Army career

commitment, while statistically controlling for other variables affecting

career commitment.

In this research, career commitment is defined as "the intention to

stay in the RC or AC until retirement." In future research, career

commitment will be defined as reenlistment behavior during the

postdeployment period. Future long-term earnings and reenlistment

behavior has been, and will continue to be, analyzed by follow-up

surveys for 3 years after the soldiers' return (end of 1995, 1996, and

1997). Educational attainment, a sociological variable, will be assessed

from educational levels attained by the Sinai veterans from the

postdeployment follow-up surveys.

METHOD

To determine the economic impact of deployment to the Sinai on the

soldiers, data were collected in two waves. Wave one data were collected

during the MFO task force training phase and wave two data were
Financial Impact 332

collected during deployment at the South Camp in the Sinai. Similar

surveys and methods were employed during both data collection waves.

Most demographic information was collected during wave one, but was

used in both wave one and wave two data analyses.

Wave One: Training Phase

The survey instrument, 1994/95 Questionnaire ofSocioeconomic

Impact ofDeployment in Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

Task Force, was administered, in person, to a population of

approximately 500 soldiers during predeployment training at Fort Bragg,

NC, in August and October 1994. The response rate ranged between

66% and 90% for most of the 28 demographic and financial items in the

survey. Financial items included military and civilian pay and

allowances, self-estimated financial gains or losses from volunteering for

the MFO assignment, civilian and military employment experience,

spouse employment experience and earnings, and Army career intentions

prior to, and subsequent to, deployment to the mission. The specific

variables of interest for this chapter are described below.

The dependent variable, career intention, was measured in response

to the question, "Has your likelihood of staying in the Guard/Reserve or

Regular Army until retirement increased, decreased, or remained the

same due to deployment in the MFO?" Responses were coded as

follows: decreased=l, remained the same=2, and increased=3. "Don't

know" responses and missing values were excluded from the analysis by

listwise deletion.

The quantitative independent variables were self-reported financial

gains and losses, monthly pay, civilian earnings, and education.

Respondents estimated the values of financial gain and loss to

open-ended items. We calculated the soldiers' monthly salaries based on

the 1995 Army Times Pay Chart using individual data on rank and years

of service. Years of service was defined as the aggregated total number

of years in active and reserve duty. Education was defined as a

continuous variable with the following values: some high school, no

diploma=l; GED or equivalent=2; high school diploma=3; 1-2 years

college=4; Associate's Degree, occupational program=5; Associate's

Degree, academic program=6; 3-4 years college, no degree=7; Bachelor's
340 RC Peacekeepers

Degree=8; graduate credit, no degree=9; and graduate or professional

degree=10. Variables for categorical data were dummy coded. These

variables included race (white=l; else=0), marital status (married=l;

else=0), and force component (Reserve=l; Active=0).

Wave Two: Deployment Phase

The deployment phase survey was administered, in person, during

May 1995 to the same population of soldiers who completed the training

phase survey. The population consisted of approximately 500 AC and

RC soldiers at the South Camp in the Sinai Peninsula. The survey

consisted of 41 items of both financial and family impact variables. The

subset of financial and nonfinancial variables used for the analyses is

specified below.

Data were collected for the dependent variable, career intention,

during the deployment phase survey administration. The item and its

response options were identical to the career intention item included in

the training survey. Data for financial gains and losses were also

collected as independent variables, but did not reflect open-ended

responses as in the training phase survey. Instead, responses were framed

in terms of value ranges to reflect the ranges in the training wave data.

The midpoint of each range was used as an item response. Midpoint

values for financial gain/loss were computed as follows: did not

gain/lose financially=$0, less than $100/month=$50, $100-$200/

month=$150, $201-$300/month=$250, $301-$400/month=$350,

$401-$500/month=$450, and $500+=$750. These midvalues were

combined to create a variable that ranged from losses to gains. The

variable reflected change in financial status during deployment, with

values ranging from negative $750 (indicating loss) to positive $750

(indicating gain).

Army satisfaction was also an independent variable and was

measured in response to the question, "Overall, how satisfied are you

with the Army as a way of life?" Likert-type responses ranged from

"very dissatisfied"=l to "very satisfied"=5. This question was not asked

during the training phase survey.
Financial Impact 341

Design and Analysis

Survey data collected during waves one and two were used to

analyze financial gains/losses and their effect on career intentions. We

used summary statistics to describe demographic, economic, and

psychological variables of the RC and AC. We also compared financial

variables between the training and deployment phases.

To determine the financial impact of the deployment experience on

RC soldiers, hierarchical regression equations were used for training and

deployment wave data. In our data, the monthly basic pay variable

(MO_PAY; calculated from rank and years of service) was related to the

financial gain/loss variable (T_FINANC) and the Army satisfaction

variable (ASATIS) (see Table 13-1). Prior to regression analyses, all

variables were tested for normality, outliers, and linearity. No variables

violated these assumptions.

Table 13-1

Pearson R Correlation Coefficients Among Quantitative Predictors

T_FINANC D_FINANC MO_PAY EDUCAT ASATIS

T_FINANC 1.00 .413* .030 .049 NA

D_FINANC 1.00 .048 .055 .137*

MO_PAY 1.00 .543* .286*

EDUCAT 1.00 .082

ASATIS 1.00

* p < .05

NA = Not applicable; T_FINANC = Financial gain/loss, training;

D_FINANC = Financial gain/loss, deployment; MO_PAY = Basic monthly

EDUCAT = Education level completed; ASATIS = Army satisfaction.

pay;

Wave one variables included career intention during the training

phase as the dependent variable, and financial status, force component,

race, marital status, and education as independent variables. Financial

status during the training phase referred to the perceived gain/loss in

finances compared to their financial status prior to volunteering for the
342 RC Peacekeepers

MFO. Therefore, for the AC, this variable represented military pay and

allowances at the time of data collection; for the RC, this variable

represented the change in financial status from civilian earnings plus drill

pay received from the pretraining to the training phase. We hypothesized

that financial gain is positively associated with the intention to stay in the

AC or RC until retirement, while statistically controlling for the effects of

other explanatory variables (e.g., Army satisfaction, marital status,

education, etc.).

Wave two variables included career intention during the deployment

phase as the dependent variable; change in financial status and Army

satisfaction as independent variables. Other independent variables

included force component, race, marital status, and education. These

demographic data were previously collected during wave one and were

match-merged with wave two data by social security numbers.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Summary statistics for the study group are organized into three

sections: (1) analysis of demographic and psychological variables, (2)

comparison of AC and RC data, and (3) comparison of training and

deployment data. Please note that percentages listed in the tables may

not sum to 100% due to rounding error.

Descriptive Statistics for Demographics and Career Commitment

The age distribution of the soldiers revealed that most of the RC

soldiers were very young, junior in rank (El to E4), and unmarried. AC

soldiers were mostly noncommissioned officers (NCOs), older, married,

and with dependent children. The rank distribution of the soldiers

revealed that 96% of all junior enlisted soldiers were from the RC.

Approximately two thirds of all soldiers were not married, 4% were

separated, and only one-third were married. The average (arithmetic

mean) educational level of the soldiers was 4.23 (i.e., 1 to 2 years of

college). [See Chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis of demographics.]
Financial Impact 343

Financial Gains and Losses by Component

Table 13-2 reports the results of financial gains and losses by

component. The column for net change shows that the AC reported an

average net loss of $154.89 per month during the training phase and an

average net gain of $52.52 per month during the deployment phase.

Therefore, the AC reported an overall average net financial loss of

$102.37 per month during the mission.

Table 13-2

Mean Values of Financial Gains and Losses by Component

Active Component Reserve Component

Phase $Gain $ Loss $Net $Gain $ Loss $ Net

Training Phase 45.40 200.29 -154.89 554.05 287.42 266.63

(55) (71) (233) (207)

Deployment Phase 101.69 49.11 52.52 218.22 99.17 119.05

(59) (56) (225) (241)

Total Mission 147.09

ntheses.

249.40 -102.37 772.70 386.59 385.68

Note. Sample size in paie

Table 13-2 also shows that, in contrast to the AC, the RC reported a

net financial gain. For example, the RC made average net gains of

$266.63 per month during the training phase and $119.05 per month

during the deployment phase. Therefore, the RC made an overall average

net gain of $385.68 per month during the mission.

The overall average net benefit from the mission can be obtained by

subtracting the average net loss reported by the AC from the average net

gain reported by the RC. It amounted to $284 ($386 minus $102) per

month. Therefore, the soldiers overall average net gain exceeded the

average net loss during the mission.

The average net incremental benefit (identified in this study) to all

soldiers can be combined with, and related to, the incremental cost of the

composite battalion estimated by Brinkerhoff and Horowitz (1995).

They reported that the incremental cost of the composite battalion in the
344 RC Peacekeepers

28th Rotation was $21 million, with $18 million covering pay and

allowances. They also noted that the cost of pay and allowances for the

27th Rotation comprising only AC soldiers was $18 million. The

differential cost of $3 million for the composite battalion was incurred by

the permanent change of station (PCS) costs to cover RC soldiers'

moving expenses from 43 states to Fort Bragg for training.

Economic theory stipulates that if the incremental cost of two

alternatives is the same, but the incremental benefit of one alternative is

greater, it is economically efficient to adopt the alternative with the

higher incremental benefit (Layard, 1976). The literature suggests that

there was no substantial increase in incremental cost to field this

composite mission compared to the cost of fielding the alternative, a

battalion of 100% AC soldiers. In addition, the results of this study

showed that an incremental benefit was realized by the average soldier

(either AC or RC) which exceeded the incremental cost. Moreover, the

benefits were spread more equitably for Rotation 28 than Rotation 27

because greater gains were realized by RC soldiers who comprised 96%

of the junior enlisted ranks. To sum up, the cost-benefit analysis revealed

that while costs were the same, the benefits were greater and distributed

more equitably for the composite battalion.

Comparative Statistics Between the AC and RC During Training

The survey respondents included junior enlisted, NCOs, and

commissioned officers from both the AC and RC. The number of

soldiers was 634, with 80% RC soldiers and 20% AC soldiers. The rank

structure revealed that 63% of the soldiers were junior enlisted, 30%

were NCOs, and the remaining 7% were officers. This distribution of

ranks represents the population of all soldiers in the peacekeeping

assignment. While the officers and NCOs were equally divided between

the RC and AC, junior enlisted soldiers were drawn mostly from the RC

(61 % vs. 2% from the AC of the total battalion of AC and RC).

Table 13-3 shows that career intentions for most respondents during

the training phase remained unchanged (68% of the AC and 53% of the

RC). However, the probability of increased retention was greater for the

RC than the AC (32% vs. 12%). The probability of decreased retention

was greater for the AC than the RC (11% vs. 4%). Therefore, RC
Financial Impact 345

soldiers (relative to AC soldiers) perceived that they were more likely to

stay in the Army after their Sinai experience.

Table 13-3

Self-Reported Impact of AC and RC Soldiers

on Army Career Intentions During Training

Change in Career Intentions

Increased

Decreased

Unchanged

Don't Know

Total (N)

AC RC

Freq. _% Freq. %

11 12.2 117 31.8

10 11.1 14 3.8

61 67.8 194 52.7

8 8.9 43 11.7

90 100.0 368 100.0

Comparative Statistics Between Training and Deployment Phases

Table 13-4 shows the data for career intentions of AC and RC

soldiers. The data for the training phase revealed that career intentions

remained unchanged for most of the soldiers (67.4% for the AC vs.

52.7% for the RC). During the training phase, RC soldiers reported they

were more likely to stay in the Army until retirement than AC soldiers

(31.9% vs. 12.0%). On the other hand, during the deployment phase,

perceived career commitment decreased considerably for both

components.

Table 13-4

Comparison ofChanges in Army Career Intentions

During Training and Deployment Phases

AC RC

Training Deploy. Training Deploy.

(n = 92) (n = 67) (n = 370) (n = 284)

Response % % % %

Increased 12.0 6.0 31.9 17.6

Decreased 12.8 38.8 3.8 28.9

Unchanged 67.4 49.3 52.7 43.3

Don't know 8.7 6.0 11.6 10.2
346 RC Peacekeepers

Regression Results

Table 13-5 provides descriptive statistics of the independent

variables used in the regression analyses. Table 13-6 shows the results of

two separate regression equations for predicting career intentions during

the training and deployment phases of the mission.

Table 13-5

Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Regression Equations

Variables a M Std. Dev. Min. Max.

Dependent

Intent to Stay, Training 433 2.25 0.56 1.0 3.0

Intent to Stay, Deployment 330 1.83 0.70 1.0 3.0

Independent

Financial Gain/Loss, 357 174.74 1,024.72 -3,666.7 3,900.0

Training $/month

Financial Gain/Loss, 320 97.50 362.56 -750.0 750.0

Deployment $/month

Army Satisfaction 363 3.23 1.15 1.0 5.0

Basic Monthly Pay 328 1,442.08 514.61 957.6 4,313.1

Education* 481 4.23 2.11 1.0 10.0

* l=some high school, no diploma; 10=g raduate or professional degree

Financial status (gain or loss) was entered in block one using the

training phase data to predict career intentions. Financial gain accounts

for a statistically significant portion of variance in explaining career

intentions. Thus, financial gains during this phase are positively

associated with intentions to remain until retirement.

Army satisfaction (block two variable) was not included in the

training phase regression equation because this question was not asked as

part of the training survey. To accurately compare training and

deployment phase results, the next set of variables is described as block

three variables. Independent variables entered in block three were basic

monthly pay and force component (RC=1; AC=0).

Block three variables added significant variance above and beyond

the financial explanatory variable in block one. However, only force
Financial Impart _ _

Table 13-6

Regression Resulls for Career Intentions During Training and Deployment Phases

Independent Training Phase Deployment Phase

Äabjes, (yy = 209) (N = 187)

Biockl R

2 = .036, KU07) = 7732* R2 = .073, F(l,185) = 14.639*

Financial Status ß = .190, t = 2.781 *= .271, f= 3.826*

Block2 NA A/?2

=.047,F(1,184) = 9.781*

Army Satisfaction NA J» = .219, ? = 3.127*

2^^ A/?2= .072, F(2,205) = 8.273* A/?2= .017, n.s.

RC ^ = .275, ? = 4.027* ß= 132 ns

Monthly Pay /> = . 102, n.s. /? =..005*, n.s.

liocki Afl2= .017,n.s. A/?2= 015 ns

*

aCe

]c /»=.043, n.s. /»=-.030, n.s.

Marital Status 0 =-. 131, n.s. /? = 040 n s

Education /»=.016, n.s. /»= .141,'n.s.

** .125, F(7,201) = 4.797* .153, F(6,180) = 4.606*

Note, Standardized regression coefficierts are shown.

*p <.05.

NA = Not applicable, question not asked during the training survey.

component (i.e., RC) had a significant positive, linear relationship with

career intentions. Thus, during the training phase, RC, but not AC

soldiers, reported increased likelihood of remaining in the military until

retirement. It is important to note that the criterion variable in the

equation refers to career intention, not behavior, so these results are

tentative until we examine career behavior data. Career behavior data

will be collected in postdeployment surveys.

Independent variables entered in block four were demographic

variables: race, marital status, and level of educational attainment. These

variables did not contribute significant variance to predicting career
348 RT. Peacekeepers

intentions. Therefore, they were not crucial in explaining career

intentions.

It is important to note that the results reported here on the

relationship between perceived financial gains or losses on career

commitment differ from the results reported by Dr. Siebold (Chapter 10).

Three reasons may account for this discrepancy. First, different survey

items were used in the two analyses. Siebold used the qualitative item of

perceived gain or loss: "Did you gain or lose financially during

deployment?" with Gain=l, and Loss=0. We used the quantitative item

of gain or loss: "Overall, how much do you estimate you gained or lost

from deployment?"

Different career commitment items were also used. Siebold

employed a 6-point organizational commitment item: "I have been in the

military for 20 or more creditable years" =1, to "I will definitely leave the

military before retirement" =6. We analyzed a 3-point item: "Has your

likelihood of staying in the Guard/Reserve or Regular Army until

retirement increased, decreased, or remained the same due to deployment

in the MFO/Sinai?" Second, the sample size varied in the two analyses by

using different items. In addition, Siebold used data at remote sites and

we used data from all sites. Third, statistical procedures were different.

Siebold estimated a correlation coefficient between financial gain/loss

and career commitment; we estimated a regression equation with career

commitment as a dependent variable and financial gain/loss, Army

satisfaction, and demographics as independent variables. Despite these

differences, however, the gains reported in this chapter are modest, albeit

statistically significant.

For the deployment phase analysis, the financial gain/loss variable

was also entered in block one to predict career intentions. The results

reveal that this variable accounts for a significant portion of variance in

explaining career intention during deployment. This indicates that

financial gains during the deployment phase are related to a greater

likelihood of staying until retirement.

Army satisfaction, entered in block two, explained significant

variance in addition to the financial independent variable in block one.

This variable had a positive, linear relationship with career commitment
Financial Impact 349

during the deployment phase. This indicates that soldiers satisfied with

the Army were more likely to remain until retirement.

Independent variables entered in block three were basic monthly pay

and force component (RC). Block three variables did not add significant

variance beyond Army satisfaction and change in financial status

variables. During the deployment phase (unlike the training phase), force

component does not have a significant linear relationship with career

intentions. In the deployment data analysis, Army satisfaction was

included as an independent variable. To identify potential reasons for the

different results, force component and monthly pay were reanalyzed,

excluding Army satisfaction from the second equation. This structure

parallels the training phase analysis. The results indicated that force

component did not have a significant relationship with career intentions.

However, when Army satisfaction was included in the equation, the

regression coefficient for RC increased. It appears that force component

was suppressed by Army satisfaction and, hence, does not predict career

intentions at the time of deployment. When RC soldiers faced the

realities of deployment, their career commitment declined substantially

and was not different from career commitment levels of AC soldiers.

The independent variables entered in block four were demographic

variables: race, marital status, and educational attainment. This set of

variables did not contribute significant variance to the prediction of

career intentions.

Test of Equality of Regression Coefficients

Separate regression equations were estimated for the RC and AC

during the training and deployment phases to test the null hypothesis that

the parameters are not different for the AC and RC. Regression

coefficients from each equation were compared to the overall model to

test for equivalence of the coefficients across the two regressions. In the

original model, force component was included as a dummy-coded

variable. Since we estimated separate equations for each component, this

variable was no longer appropriate. Therefore, the pooled equation was

reestimated by dropping the component variable.

The analysis of equality of regression coefficients revealed that the

AC and RC soldiers were statistically different groups during the training
350 RC Peacekeepers

phase, but they were not significantly different during the more critical

deployment phase. Therefore, we conclude that one can consider the

pooled data analysis for deployment phase to be representative of the

subgroups of soldiers. See Lakhani and Abod (in press) for a more

detailed and technical account of this analysis.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ON CAREER

COMMITMENT AND EARNINGS

In this research, we analyzed the impact of volunteering for the MFO

peacekeeping mission on Rotation 28 soldiers. A survey (N=500) was

conducted during training and deployment phases. Analysis of these data

resulted in the following major conclusions:

• RC volunteers were mostly younger, junior in rank, unmarried;

were either unemployed, underemployed, or in school; and gained

financially from volunteering for the mission.

• AC soldiers were senior in rank, older, married, and lost financially

relative to the RC.

• RC soldiers reported greater career commitment than AC soldiers

during the training phase, but no significant difference was found

between these groups during the deployment phase.

• Career commitment for both AC and RC was enhanced

significantly (p < .05) by financial gains and satisfaction with Army

life.

While the model explained significant variance in career intentions

during both phases, we are less interested in the total variance explained

because we did not have a complete model. Other variables that might

explain greater variance in career commitment were not included in the

study because we did not have the required data.

Data for veteran volunteers who returned from the Sinai will be

collected in postdeployment follow-up surveys conducted at the end of

1995, 1996, and 1997. Future research will include analyses of

reenlistment behavior of the soldiers as well as their plans to stay in the

RC until retirement.
Financial Impact ; 351

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SECTION 5

THE MFO FAMILY

One of the major research questions about using Reserve Component

(RC) volunteers is its effect on families. We believed that providing support

for RC families would have been more difficult than usual simply because

families were located in 27 different states instead of a single installation.

Therefore, the risk of adversely affecting families seemed higher for

Rotation 28 than for previous all-Active Component (AC) rotations.

Furthermore, the lessons learned from this rotation could be used for other

missions where RC soldiers come from widely dispersed locations.

There were two major family questions concerning the use of RC

volunteers. First, did the Army currently have the ability to support RC

families across the country, with 44% of them more than 50 miles from a

military installation? Second, what was the impact of volunteering for the

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) on soldiers' family lives? That

is, did the RC volunteers and their spouses experience changes in the

stability or quality of their marriages as a result of full-time military service

away from home?

In Chapter 14, Bell, Schumm, Segal, and Rice discuss the family

support system specially designed and implemented for assisting RC as well

as AC families. They describe the system as a composite of AC assets,

similar to those used in the first MFO rotation of 1982, and RC assets drawn

from the Army National Guard. This chapter concentrates on the procedures

and structures used, their assessment, and recommendations for future family

support systems.

In Chapter 15, the same authors describe changes perceived by the

soldiers and spouses in their marriages over the duration of the mission. The

focus is on marital satisfaction, quality, and stability and how these changes

affect soldiers' morale while in the Sinai.

353
14

THE FAMILY SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR

THE MFO

D. Bruce Bell

Walter R. Schumm

Mady W. Segal

Rose E. Rice

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Science's (ARFs) family research during the Multinational

Force and Observers (MFO) deployment was to provide the Army with

information that would improve the effectiveness of formal family

support operations during this and similar Army deployments. This

charter was consistent with the Army Chief of Staff's criteria for a

successful MFO experience: the unit should perform the mission well

and take care of its families. The 28th Rotation faced some formidable

obstacles in putting together its family support system. It was a new unit

with no corporate history of how to do things; it received a lot of

high-level attention; it had to deal with both Active Component (AC) and

Reserve Component (RC) structures; and its members were drawn from

all over the country.

1 According to unit records, the soldiers came from 33 states and had spouses in 31 states. ARI surveys

indicated that the soldiers' "homes of record" included 39 states plus the District of Columbia.

355
356 RC Peacekeepers

METHOD

Married Soldier Sample

The data presented here are based on the 32% of the unit which was

married and the 69 civilian wives who completed questionnaires. The

ages of married soldiers ranged from 19 to 55 years old; the average age

was 31 years. Seventy-two percent of married couples had at least one

child at the time the soldier joined the 28th Rotation. The racial

composition of married 28th Rotation soldiers was similar to that of the

larger sample (75% White, 19% Black, and 7% other races).3 Almost all

soldiers had at least a high school diploma or equivalent (96%). More of

the AC (64%) than RC (46%) had attended college. This difference is

consistent with the rank differences discussed below.

Married soldiers in the 28th Rotation were very dispersed. Figure

14-1 shows that 18 states had RC families, 5 states had AC families, and

9 states had both AC and RC families. An alternate way of looking at

dispersion is how far away soldiers were from AC installations. In the

unit as a whole, 34% of the wives lived more than 50 miles from the

nearest post. This figure is much higher among RC (45%) than AC

(15%) spouses.

Married AC soldiers had more military and deployment experience

than RC soldiers. More AC soldiers (96%) than RC soldiers (49%) were

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) or officers. Eighty percent of the AC

married soldiers had prior overseas assignments as compared to 48% of

the RC soldiers. Very few (7%) soldiers had previously been assigned to

Sinai duty. Those soldiers who had been assigned were much more

likely to be from the AC (83%).

Spouses ranged in age from 20 to 55 (average: 30 years). Like their

husbands, nearly all of these wives had at least a high school diploma or

equivalent (95%). Most spouses (56%) were employed full-time; many

were employed part-time (18%). RC spouses were more likely than AC

2 Although most RC and AC soldiers were married, 32% of soldiers being married is typical of MFO units.

These spouses are referred to as wives, because all of the soldiers who were married were males.

3 The AC has a higher percentage of Blacks (particularly in its combat units) than this unit had. However, the

racial composition of the 28th Rotation is quite similar to that seen in the RC, as a whole.
The Family Support System for the MFO 357

spouses to be employed (80% and 47%, respectively). AC spouses were

more likely than RC spouses to be "homemakers" (40% vs. 13%).

Reviewing Prior Support Systems

We reviewed 46 military family support reports from overseas

deployments since 1980 that involved at least 150 individuals, lasted 6

months or longer, and produced a report, How to Support Families

During Overseas Deployments: A Sourcebookfor Service Providers

(Bell, Stevens, & Segal, 1996). The findings from that research review

which have the most relevance for the MFO follow.

At the battalion level and below, the family support system actually

consists of two systems: (1) the unit and its leadership, the Family
358 RC Peacekeepers

Support Group (FSG), and Rear Detachment (RD), and (2) the families'

own interpersonal resources (relatives and friends). Unit leadership has

always been essential to effective family support; if leaders do not know

or do not care about families and/or the Army's programs to help families

with deployments, the otherwise positive aspects of the system can be

nullified. As formal organizations, FSGs are usually tied to units in the

AC; during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS/S), the

Army National Guard (ARNG) found it useful to establish FSGs by area

rather than by unit.

Past deployments have been found to affect families in various ways.

Most families cope successfully with long deployments, loneliness, and

financial strain. Marital difficulties are common experiences.

The report (Bell et al., 1996) recommended that family support be

improved by focusing on prevention, doing a better job of providing

support services (e.g., training FSG leaders, operating telephone trees,

and briefing family members on what to expect), and ensuring that

certain families (e.g., those of filler or cross-leveled personnel) are not

left out of the information loop.

Interviewing Family Support Personnel

The 1996 report also contains information from interviews the

authors conducted with service providers associated with a North

Carolina and a Maine unit that deployed to Central America as part of

Caminos Fuertes (Strong Roads)—a 6-month training exercise for ARNG

engineers. The authors also interviewed family support personnel

associated with three AC MFO units that deployed as peacekeepers to the

Sinai. These efforts helped them to form research questions and to

understand the information received about the 28th Rotation.

Observing Unit and Related Army National Guard Operations

ARI family support researchers also observed and conducted

interviews at many points in the lifecycle of the unit. These occasions

included attending: the 29th Infantry Division's (Light) (29th ID[L])
The Family Support System for the MFO 359

soldier-family orientations (April, July, and September 1994)4, the unit

activation ceremony, a regional MFO family-support workshop in

Staunton, VA (Harman, 1995b), and other unit activities.

Interviewing Army National Guard State Family Program

Coordinators (NGSFPCs)

There are 54 "state" ARNGs (i.e., the 50 states, plus the District of

Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the territories). Each of those "states" has an

NGSFPC that coordinates services for families. ARI conducted

structured telephone interviews with NGSFPCs during late January and

early February 1995. The interviews covered: the NGSFPCs'

backgrounds and experiences with other long, overseas deployments,

what they knew about the 28th Rotation; where they had learned these

facts; and what family services they had provided or planned to provide.

ARI was able to reach 18 of the 33 NGSFPCs who had soldiers in

the 28th Rotation. The reasons for not contacting and interviewing the

others included: the position was vacant, the NGSFPC was new to the

position, the NGSFPC was on leave for an extended period of time, or

they were not included because their records indicated that they had no

28th Rotation spouses living in their state (Bell, 1995a; Harman, 1995a).

Interviewing the People Who Operated the Support Activities

The operators of the family support system for the 28th Rotation

were interviewed on several occasions. Fort Bragg's family support

personnel were interviewed in May 1994; the unit leadership and staff

were interviewed in the Sinai in February 1995, and the RD and FSG

leaders were interviewed in July 1995.

The Sinai interviews consisted of individual interviews with all of

the personnel segment of the 28th Rotation staff (i.e., the Battalion

Commander, the Battalion Executive Officer (XO), the First Sergeant,

4 The official name for this event was Soldier Readiness Processing or SRP. Because the unit was assembled

in segments there were actually three of these events held at Fort Belvoir: April 1994 for the unit leaders; July

1994 for the rest of the sergeants and above, and September 1994 for the junior enlisted soldiers. Spouses were

invited to each of these events. The bulk of those who attended came to the July or September meetings.
360 RC Peacekeepers

the Personnel Officer (S-l), the Command Sergeant Major, the Battalion

Chaplain, the Battalion Psychologist, and the Finance Officer). At the

company level we also interviewed the Company Commanders and their

S-ls. Group interviews were also held with up to 10 junior enlisted

soldiers, junior NCOs, senior NCOs, and junior officers.

Administering and Analyzing Soldier and Spouse Surveys

Three questionnaires were administered—two for soldiers and one

for their spouses. The first soldier questionnaire was administered

shortly after the soldiers arrived at Fort Bragg (i.e., in August 1994 for

the officers and NCOs and October 1994 for the junior enlisted soldiers).

The second soldier questionnaire was administered in May 1995, more

than halfway through the deployment.5The types of questions asked on

the first questionnaire included: family characteristics, expectations

about the mission and its effects on the soldier's family, worries about the

family being left behind, and the availability and use of Army and

community resources. The second soldier questionnaire repeated many

of these items to discern whether changes in soldier attitudes and life

situations had occurred during the deployment.

The spouse questionnaire (April 1995) was mailed to the 199

spouses of unit members. Sixty-nine of the spouses returned usable

questionnaires.6The questionnaire was modeled after the soldier

instruments and covered much of the same information, but from a

spouse's point of view. The first analysis of questionnaire data explored

differences in the availability and use of family support systems among

the families of RC soldiers living in different parts of the United States

5 It is hard to say exactly how many soldiers participated in the 28th Rotation since we were not on site and

the records kept changing. We believe 570 soldiers had participated by the time we completed the first family

questionnaire (October 1994). Of those, 536 (94%) provided usable questionnaires. We believe that there were

527 soldiers in the Sinai at the time of the second soldier questionnaire. Of those, 464 (88%) provided usable

questionnaires. According to recent conversations with the Battalion S-l, 570 individuals served in the unit.

The maximum strength at any one time was 556 individuals. The unit expected to train more individuals than

would actually deploy because of needed adjustments in the unit structure (e.g., more Military Police and less

Infantrymen) expected attrition (e.g., illness, injuries, and family problems), and the need for an RD. Five

hundred twenty-four individuals were deployed in January. Five hundred eighteen individuals were still

deployed when we surveyed the unit in May 1995.

6 We were unable to locate 70 of the 199 unit spouses. Among those we were able to locate, we received 69

usable questionnaires (a 53% response rate).
The Family Support System for the MFO 261

(Bell, Segal, & Rice, 1995). Analyses of other aspects of the family

support system appear in the tables.

FINDINGS

The Structure and Functioning of the Family Support System

The design of a family support system for the 28th Rotation was

particularly challenging. Most of the soldiers left their families "at

home" rather than bringing them to Fort Bragg. Furthermore, many of

these families might have found it more convenient or comfortable to get

their formal family support outside of the MFO unit (e.g., an AC

installation other than Fort Bragg, an RC unit, or RC family support

professionals). Furthermore, many RC families are not accustomed to

receiving assistance from Army agencies. Since the 28th Rotation was a

unit designed for a single mission, many of the support mechanisms had

to be invented or at least initiated by the unit.

The support system that evolved was a hybrid of AC and RC

structures which were unevenly coordinated with the MFO unit. The

major elements of that system were: the unit (both the part that deployed

and the RD that remained at Fort Bragg), the unit's FSG at Fort Bragg,

the NGSFPCs in the affected states, and that portion of the Army which

was physically close to the families (e.g., RC units, RC FSGs, and AC

installations). For at least part of the time, the soldiers and some of the

families also had access to family support services at Fort Bragg. The

location and functioning of this "support system" in terms of handling

family difficulties is shown in Figure 14-2 (Bell, 1995a & 1995b).

The unit. Interviews with unit leaders showed that the main people

involved with family support from the initial organization of the unit

were the Battalion Commander, the Commander's wife, the Battalion

Chaplain, the Battalion S-l, and the person filling the position of Family

Assistance Officer (FAO).

The key people during the planning phase of the operation were the

Chaplain, the psychologist, and the FAO, who wrote the majority of the

unit's Family Support Handbook (TF 4-505 PIR, 1994). The handbook

was much more informative than the typical battalion-authored

document. It contained many practical tips on how to cope with
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deployment stress, telephone numbers, and general information about the

MFO. However, it fell short in several areas. It was delivered in January

when the unit deployed. This was too late to use much of its advice. It

focused too much on Fort Bragg operations and was not well organized.

For example, it would have been more useful if it had provided:

• A separate list of helpful phone numbers (not imbedded in the text);

• Separate sections of information for those living at Fort Bragg and

elsewhere;

• The unit 1-800 number (approved too late for inclusion);

• More specific MFO information (e.g., time difference to the Sinai,

telephone calling plans, audio quality of telephone calls, advice on

when and how to call the soldiers and costs);

• More current list of other military helping agents.

The unit also published seven issues of a battalion newsletter

known as the "Panther Paw." It contained information about who the

leaders were, upcoming social and family support activities, and limited

information about how to deal with deployment stress. All of the articles

for the newsletters came from the battalion staff. Thus there was an

emphasis on the unit's mission and the Army activities. There were

relatively few articles on family matters (e.g., births, marriages, human

interest stories, or advice on coping with deployment stresses).

The unit was fortunate to have as one of its early volunteers from the

ARNG a Chief Warrant Officer whose ARNG job was in the area of

family assistance and who was highly committed to serving as the FAO.7

This individual became the FAO even before the unit was fully formed

and continued to assist families as a part of the RD. Unit leaders felt that

having a single individual who was charged with helping families

throughout the lifecycle of the unit was one of their better ideas. The

FAO was greatly helped by having a toll-free telephone line for the

battalion which was staffed on a 24-hours-per-day basis. The toll-free

7 Having an FAO (which is not standard position in an ordinary combat unit) was planned from the start.

Given that there is no Army school that is geared to train an FAO, getting an individual who was prepared to

do all of the requirements of the job was very lucky.
364 RC Peacekeepers

number not only allowed the families to "plug into" an Army helping

system but it also allowed the FAO to communicate easily with other

Q

helping professionals.

The FAO kept a list of soldier and family problems that he and

others in the RD had encountered and addressed. That list showed the

great variety of tasks RDs do which help soldiers and their families.

These activities included: sending flowers to the families that had

experienced a death, following up on Red Cross messages; putting

families in touch with agencies (e.g., Army Emergency Relief) that could

help them with financial problems; helping them obtain identification

(ID) cards for dependents or powers of attorney, and supporting the unit's

FSG. The RD also handled more difficult problems, such as a soldier or

spouse threatening divorce, through referral to appropriate agencies.

The commander's wife and the battalion staff who were very

concerned with family matters traveled to various functions in Virginia

and Maryland. They talked to the RC soldiers and their families about

the MFO mission and the efforts that the unit was making to support

families. For example, the 29th ID(L) of the ARNG, which draws most

of its members from either Virginia or Maryland, held three

soldier-family orientations at its home station—Fort Belvoir, VA.

Those two day events (1 day for Virginia Guardsmen and 1 day for

Maryland Guardsmen), held in April, July, and September 1994, were not

only attended by a good part of the 28th Rotation's command group, but

also by the commander's wife and the Virginia and Maryland's

NGSFPCs. These events gave the soldiers and their families an

opportunity to learn what the deployment would be like and what family

support mechanisms would be available, as well as to meet other unit

spouses from their state. As the head of the unit's FSG, the commander's

wife continued to attend family-oriented events in Virginia and Maryland

even after the unit deployed.

8 Although the system worked well, there was a downside to having family support handled by the battalion

staff (i.e., the Commander, the S-l, and the FAO). Battalion staff tended to treat the company leaders as

sources of information in an "action" the staff was handling rather than as full partners in taking care of the

company's soldiers. This role shift caused some resentment, particularly among RC leaders who were more

used to handling their own soldiers' problems.
The Family Support System for the MFO 2£5

The unit's FSG. The unit had an FSG which was located at Fort

Bragg. This group was responsible for both unit social events and the

support/educational events that were held once the bulk of the soldiers

had deployed to the Sinai. The FSG was organized at the battalion level

with the points of contact at the company level. The designated leaders

tended to be officers' wives, though there were some notable exceptions.

Predeployment social events were well attended. Postdeployment

meetings tended to draw the same individuals-15 or 20 people per

function. Those who attended FSG meetings found them to be valuable,

particularly as a way of making friends with other spouses. In this unit,

the FSG seemed to refer to the FAO many of the family problems that

FSGs traditionally get involved with in other units.9

National Guard State Family Program Coordinators (NGSFPCs).

The primary questions NGSFPCs asked our ARI interviewer were: (1)

Are the families of the 28th Rotation getting the services they need? and

(2) Do the RC families understand AC family programs, policies, and

practices? Many of these NGSFPCs stated that they knew too little about

the 28th Rotation and that they found that the best source of information

was Virginia's NGSFPC. Another valuable source of information was

the 1993 National Guard Bureau's National Workshop. Half of the

NGSFPCs were dissatisfied with the completeness and timeliness of the

information that had been given them by their own or higher

headquarters.

About half (55%) of the NGSFPCs that ARI was able to reach said

that they had established contact with the MFO unit. Most of the others

had tried but were unsuccessful in reaching it. The NGSFPCs who had

made contact with the MFO unit praised the performance of its FAO.

Most NGSFPCs felt that there were relatively few family problems

that needed to be addressed. They did, however, provide assistance by

helping families get information on the welfare of their soldiers, how to

use CHAMPUS, powers of attorney, and the AC Army pay system.

Some spouses also wanted and received help with budgeting, getting AC

9 Interviews showed that most spouses knew about the FAO and the toll-free telephone number. Also, most

spouses found the FAO to be very helpful.
366 RC Peacekeepers

Army ID cards, tax information, and childcare. The primary "service"

that NGSFPCs provided to the RC families of the 28th Rotation consisted

of NGSFPC or volunteer contacts via the telephone, mail, or briefings.

Similarly, most of the assistance offered was in the form of providing

information or referral to an existing service.

The bulk of the RC soldiers came from the 29th ID(L). Therefore, it

is not surprising that the majority of the RC soldiers came from its two

main states, Virginia and Maryland. Nor is it surprising to note that the

NGSFPCs from these two states were quite active in providing family

support for this mission. Both states tried to organize local FSGs in the

areas with the most troops (e.g., Baltimore). However, they had more

success with regionally based events. For example, Virginia held

regional family support workshops in four different locations that

covered such topics as coping with separation, FSG operations, and

reunion issues (Harman, 1995b). The Virginia and Maryland NGSFPCs

were particularly active in calling the spouses of unit members to ensure

that they were doing well. Maryland's NGSFPC also found ARNG

spouses with prior deployment experience to keep in contact with the

MFO spouses living in Maryland.

Other localfamily support mechanisms. Interviews, unit records,

and respondent comments on ARI questionnaires indicated that much of

the help the families received came from local agents or agencies. The

28th Rotation usually contacted the RC soldier's home unit for help,

which was given by unit leaders or someone in the unit's FSG. Through

the distribution of spouse questionnaires we learned that many of the

problems the families were experiencing during the deployment were

rather ordinary problems of living which did not require Army help (e.g.,

automobile and home repairs, and relations with in-laws).

Geographical Differences in the Family System

The interviews with NGSFPCs, attendance at unit functions, and

interviews with other interested parties all suggest that families living in

either Virginia or Maryland (the home area of the 29th ID[L]) had better

access to Army services than those families living elsewhere (the

outlying states). Since the presence of geographically dispersed families

was one of the key features of the MFO experiment, the survey data were
The Family Support System for the MFO 3_6_2

used to contrast how the support system and family adaptation differed

between those living in the "home area" and those living in the "outlying

states." The results of those analyses (Bell, Segal, & Rice, 1995) are

summarized here.

The sources for soldier data were the initial predeployment (August

and October 1994) and middeployment (May 1995) soldier

questionnaires. The source for spouse data was the middeployment

questionnaire (April 1995). Further details on data collection have been

presented earlier in this book (Phelps, Chapter 2). Whether or not

soldiers and their families sought military help depended not only on

whether they experienced difficulties but also whether they had the

physical and psychological skills to address the problems without

additional help. The analyses showed that the home area and outlying

state groups were remarkably similar in terms of marital characteristics,

social network, and attitudes/expectations about the Sinai mission. The

two differences that did emerge (level of civilian education and home

ownership) favored those from outlying states. For example, 63% of the

soldiers from outlying states had some college education compared to

only 34% of the soldiers from the other states; the rates for home

ownership were 55% and 32%, respectively, even though rank

differences were not significant.

Differences in rates of home ownership may have accounted for the

fact that those in outlying states were more worried, when they first

arrived at Fort Bragg, about household repairs. However, it does not

explain why those from outlying states were also more worried about

their family's safety and health. Those differences may be explained by

looking at the "services" that the soldiers believed their families were

using. Soldiers from outlying states were less likely to say that their

families had received ARNG flyers in the mail or to have used the help of

other military spouses.

Taken altogether, the increased worry seemed to be a function of a

lack of someone the soldier could trust to help his spouse. That is, he

10 Note that using the help of military spouses is not the same as using FSGs. There is a difference among RC

families in the "use" of military spouses even though there is not a difference in either use of FSG services

(which may have been delivered by mail or by telephone) or actual attendance at FSG functions.
368 RC Peacekeepers

feared his spouse was not getting emotional support from the people who

most understood what a deployment was all about—military spouses.11

Likewise, such soldiers' spouses were not getting the instrumental or

concrete help represented by the actions of the NGSFPC (e.g., sending a

flyer). Another factor that may have added to the worries of soldiers

from outlying states was that more of them were recruited later and thus

missed the soldier-family orientations, had less time to get their affairs in

order, and had less time to see how well most military spouses can and do

cope with these deployments (Bell, 1991).

In addition to reporting on worries, soldiers were also asked to

estimate how MFO service would affect (or had affected) their marriages,

their children, and their roles as parents. Although 48% of the soldiers

from outlying states expected negative effects on their marriage and 20%

expected negative effects on parenting relationships (compared to 40%

and 32%, respectively, for soldiers from Virginia/Maryland), those

apparent differences were not significant statistically. There was no

geographical difference on this measure and no change over time. There

were no geographical differences in family finances, tendency to relocate,

or whether family difficulties affected the soldiers' perceptions about

their ability to perform the MFO mission. Although 86% of soldiers

from outlying states reported their spouses as being supportive compared

to 82% from the other states, the difference was not significant. There

was also no geographical difference in the level of spouse support for

having the soldier participate in the MFO mission. However, there was a

difference in this level of support over time. As we have seen in other

deployments (Bell et al., 1996), the level of support declined over time

for all groups.

The predeployment (August and October 1994) and middeployment

(May 1995) soldier questionnaires, along with the questionnaire for the

married soldiers' spouses (April 1995), were used as the sources for the

analyses that follow. The specific topics covered were: (1) participation

in family support activities, (2) use of family support services, (3)

11 Prior literature (Bell et al., 1995) shows that military spouses really want to be associated with others who

are experiencing or have recently experienced the same stresses they are currently undergoing. In other words,

they wanted to be associated with other military spouses.
The Family Support System for the MFO 362

evaluation of the support system, and (4) how family support affected

soldiers and their families.

Participation in Family Support Activities

Participation in predeployment meetings. Table 14-1 shows the

percent of soldiers and spouses who attended two predeployment events:

the joint 29th ID(L)-28th Rotation soldier-family orientation meetings at

Fort Belvoir (April, July, and September 1994) and the unit activation

ceremony (November 1994).

Twenty-two percent of the married soldiers said that some family

member (probably their spouse) attended the soldier-family orientation

meeting. Since that meeting was held by the ARNG for ARNG families,

it is not surprising RC soldiers would have a much higher participation

rate than the AC soldiers. In fact, the only AC family member that the

researchers remember seeing was the 28th Rotation Commander's

spouse; only one active duty spouse reported that she had attended the

orientation. The attendance was not expected to be 100% among the RC

families. Some spouses did not need soldier-family orientation; some

could not afford the trip; some had prior commitments; and some were

not invited (their soldiers joined the unit after the orientation had been

held).

Attendance was higher for the unit activation ceremony: 37% of the

soldiers and 49% of the spouses said that a family member had attended

that function. The fact that spouses reported a higher attendance rate than

did soldiers is probably due to peculiarities in the spouse sample.12

Participation in activities during the deployment. Table 14-2

presents both soldier and spouse accounts of whether the spouses

attended: FSG meetings at Fort Bragg, FSG meetings held elsewhere,

teleconferences between spouses and the soldiers in the Sinai, and

12 The spouses that responded to the spouse survey were remarkably similar to those who did not on most

variables. However, they were more likely to be Caucasian, well adjusted to Army life (at least in the eyes of

their soldier spouses), and more likely to be married to AC soldiers relatively high in rank. Many of these

characteristics, in turn, are associated with being at Fort Bragg and being active in attending unit events such as

the activation ceremony.
370 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-1

Percentage of Family Members or Spouses

Predeployment Meetings

Who Attended

Meeting

Source

MFO Activation

Ceremony:

Group Percent Attending

Soldiers All Married 37

Spouses

Fort Belvoir

Orientation:

All 49

Soldiers All Married 22

Spouses

Active Component 7

Reserve Component 29 (p< .01)

All 28

loyment survey, question 13; Spouse survey, question 9.

shown, chi-square analyses revealed no significant

Source. Soldier dep

Note. Other than as

ARNG-sponsored family support workshops held in Virginia or

Maryland.

Analyses from both the married soldier and spouse questionnaires

showed that spouses living in the Fort Bragg area were much more likely

than spouses living elsewhere to have attended a Fort Bragg-based FSG

meeting. Both the soldier and spouse questionnaires showed the same

results with regard to which Fort Bragg area spouses attended the

meeting. That is, there were no AC/RC or soldier rank differences

among those who attended. Fort Bragg area spouse attendance (i.e.,

67% to 69% had attended at least one FSG function) was unusually high

compared to other FSGs (Bell et al., 1996) and suggests that the FSG was

meeting at least some of the needs of those living in the Fort Bragg area.

13 The spouse surveys contained a rank difference that reached the .10 level of significance. If the sample had

been larger, this difference (spouses married to higher ranking solders were more likely to attend) might well

have reached the required .05 level of significance.
The Family Support System for the MFO 371

Table 14-2

Percentage of Families Participating in Family Support Activities

During Deployment

Activity

Source Group Percent Attending

Family Support Group/Fort Bragg:

Soldier All Married Soldiers 20

All Married Soldiers whose 69

families lived near Ft. Bragg

All Married Soldiers whose 3 (p< .001)

families lived away from Ft. Bragg

Among Soldiers whose families

lived near Ft. Bragg:

Active Component 72

Reserve Component 50 (n.s.)

Officers 88

NCOs 61

Junior Enlisted 50 (n.s.)

(table continues)

Attendance at FSGs outside of the Fort Bragg area was much lower

(i.e., 19% to 29% of the spouses). Not surprisingly, those who attended

these non-Fort Bragg meetings tended to live outside of North Carolina.

There were no AC/RC or rank differences in those who attended. As

reported earlier, there were also no geographical (home area vs. outlying

states) differences in FSG attendance (Bell et al., 1995).

The teleconferences were held at Fort Bragg, Fort Lee, VA, and Fort

Meade, MD. Given the location of these events, it is not surprising to see

that where the spouse lived greatly affected whether or not they attended

(Table 14-2). Even at Fort Bragg (where distance to the telephone site

was not a issue), we could not have expected 100% attendance, since

approximately 40% of the soldiers at any given time were "on station" at

MFO outposts where there were no telephones.

Relatively few spouses (i.e., 8% to 15%) attended regional family

support workshops for families. Restricting the sample to the states

(VA/MD) where we were sure these events took place did not

appreciably raise the numbers. This suggests that some of the other states
372 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-2 (Continued)

Percentage of Families Participating in Family Support Activities

During Deployment

Activity

Source Group Percent Attending

Family Support Group/ Fort Bragg (continued):

Spouses All 22

Spouses who lived near

Ft. Bragg 67

Spouses who lived away

from Ft. Bragg 8 (p< .001)

Among Spouses who lived

away from Ft. Bragg:

Active Component 73

Reserve Component 50 (n.s.)

Officers 100

NCOs 50

Junior Enlisted 0(p<.10)

Family Support Group/Not Fort Bragg:

Soldier All Married Soldiers 19

All Married Soldiers whose

families lived outside

North Carolina 24

All Married Soldiers whose

families lived in North Carolina 3 (p< .05)

(table continues)

must have also held events that the spouses interpreted as "regional

meetings." However, we have no information about what those meetings

might have been.

Use of Family Support Services

Helping agents or agencies. During deployments families often

reach out for help to either an organization that is designed to provide
The Family Support System for the MFO 311

Table 14-2 (Continued)

Percentage of Families Participating in Family Support Activities

During Deployment

Activity

Source Group Percent Attending

Family Support Group/Not Fort Bragg (continued):

Soldier Among All Married Soldiers

whose families lived outside

North Carolina:

Active Component

Reserve Component

Officers

NCOs

Junior Enlisted

7

28 (n.s.)

60

24

24 (n.s.)

Spouses All

Spouses who lived away from

Ft. Bragg

Spouses who lived near Ft. Bragg

31

29

13 (n.s.)

Among Spouses who lived away

from Ft. Bragg:

Active Component

Reserve Component

Officers

NCOs

Junior Enlisted

0

32 (n.s.)

75

25

29 (n.s.)

(table continues)

help or to other, more personal support systems such as relatives who,

although not part of a helping agency, can be expected to provide

assistance. The family support literature generally refers to the help

given by organized agencies as "formal support" and the help rendered

by friends and relatives as "informal support." Both soldier and spouse

accounts of the extent to which the soldiers and/or their families made

use of these types of help is displayed in Table 14-3.
374 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-2 (Continued)

Percentage of Families Participating in Family Support Activities

During Deployment

Activity

Source Group Percent Attending

Teleconferencing:

Soldier All Married Soldiers

Families lived near Ft. Bragg

Families lived in Virginia

or Maryland

Families lived elsewhere

21

63

9

8(p<.001)

Spouse All

Lived near Ft. Bragg

Lived in Virginia or

Maryland

Lived elsewhere

29

56

21

8(p<.01)

National Guard MFO Workshops:

Soldier

Spouse

All Married Soldiers:

Active Component

Reserve Component

Among RC families living

in Virginia or Maryland

All

Among RC spouses living in

Virginia or Maryland

deployment survey, question 13; Spouse survey, question 9.

8

2

10 (n.s.)

11

15

21

Source. Soldier

Note. Other thar as shown, chi-square analyses revealed no significant differences (p<.05) in percentages

as a function of component or rank.

The Army services used by married soldiers and their families were

different for different groups. According to the husbands, the service that

was most likely to be used was the RD (31%).14 Other services reported

by husbands as relatively frequently used were legal services (24%), FSG

14 AC soldiers and officers were the most likely soldier groups to use the RD.
The Family Support System for the MFO 321

Table 14-3

Reported Use of Family Support Services by Soldiers and Spouses

During the MFO Deployment

Percentage

Percentage Use by Use by

Soldiers Spouses

Service/Agency All Married AC/RC F/N/Q AU

Formal, Army Support:

Rear Detachment Command (RDC) 31 46/23 22/26/71 46

Family Support Groups (FSG) 18 23/13 12/16/57 34

Army Legal Services 24 11

Army Chaplains 18 24/12/11 7

Army Financial Services 16 3

Army Community Services (ACS) 8 6

Army Emergency Relief (AER) 7 5

Army Social Work Services 3 5/1 2

Army National Guard State HQ 5

a

15a

Your National Guard/Reserve 25a

46a

Formal, non-Army Support

American Red Cross 10 6

Local civilian support services or agencies 4 5

Professional counselors 4 11/0 3

Informal Support:

Your extended family members 54 88

Friends/Neighbors 44 32/44/86 85

Other Army/National Guard spouses 17 10/18/57 36

Your supervisors at your job 17 36

Your coworkers 15 5/15/57 47

Church members 18

4; spouse survey, question 11.

26

Source. Soldier deployment survev. question

Note. Differences for component and rank are shown only when either statistically significant or substantially

different.

RC data only.
376 RC Peacekeepers

services (18%)15, Chaplain services (18%)16, and financial services

(16%). Twenty-five percent of the RC soldiers reported that they and/or

their families had made use of their RC unit.

In general, spouses were more likely than soldiers to report using

Army services. For example, 46% used the RD, 34% used an FSG, and

11 % used Army legal services. RC spouses also reported a higher use of

the RC unit (46%) and ARNG state headquarters (15%) than did the

soldiers. This interaction probably consisted of some contact with their

state NGSFPC. These use rates are much higher than were seen in the

first MFO (Bell et al., 1996) but lower than in either Operation Restore

Hope (ORH) in Somalia or Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) in Bosnia

(Bell, 1996).

As we have seen in other deployments (Bell and Teitelbaum, 1993),

the use of non-Army agencies was quite low. According to unit records,

the main use of the American Red Cross was to get messages to the

soldiers and to verify serious illness and other family events.

As expected, both soldiers and spouses were much more likely to

report that they made more use of the "services" of family and

friends/neighbors than either Army or non-Army agencies. The spouses

were more likely to report that they (or someone else in the family) made

use of these services than did the soldiers. The only readily available

comparison is to the AC spouses during ORH. This comparison shows

that the MFO spouses made less use than did ORH spouses of these kinds

of informal supports. The exception was that MFO spouses made much

more use of other Army spouses and much less use of coworkers than

was seen in ORH (Bell and Teitelbaum, 1993). Usage rates for other

forms of informal support are much lower than they are for family and

friends.

Receipt ofprinted materials. Table 14-4 shows, according to the

soldiers and their spouses, what percent of the families received printed

support materials from the unit and the ARNG. More than three fourths

of the married soldiers and their spouses reported that their families had

15 The groups of soldiers or families that were most likely to use FSGs were AC soldiers and officers.

16 The group that was most likely to use Chaplains was the enlisted soldiers.
The Family Support System for the MFO 222

Table 14-4

Information Sources Received by Families According to Soldiers and

Spouses During the Deployment

Percent Families Who

Received Information

Married Soldier Spouse

Source of Information Report Report

Married Soldiers:

Battalion newsletter 76 94

Battalion Family Support Handbook 82 81

National Guard flyers 55a33a

National Guard letters 51a35a

Source, Soldier deployment survey, question 6; spouse survey, question 8.

a

ARNG respondents only, since Army National Guard materials were only sent to Army National Guard

members.

received the battalion newsletter and Family Support Handbook (TF

4-505 PIR, 1994). Only about half of ARNG soldiers and one third of the

ARNG spouses said that their families had received ARNG flyers or

letters. The data show that the reason for the lack of ARNG coverage

was that most of the NGSFPCs outside Virginia and Maryland were not

sending these materials to the participants from their states (Bell et al.,

1995).

Receipt of other important information. Spouses were asked whether

they had received any information about the mission, benefits, and family

support issues (Table 14-5). Most (74% to 96%) of the spouses said that

they received it. The type of information they were least likely to receive

was information about the MFO before the soldierjoined the unit,

information about communicating with soldiers in the Sinai, and

information about children's adaptation to the stresses of deployments.17

17 As expected, families with children were much more likely than those without children to get information

about, children's adjustment (93% vs. 63%). We expected that since RC soldiers were "recruited" for this

mission, they would be more likely to have received information about all aspects of it. However, there were

no AC/RC differences in terms of the kinds of information received.
378 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-5

Percentage of Spouses Receiving Army Information on the Mission,

Benefits, and Family Support Issues

Topic All Spouses

Mission of the MFO Task Force before soldier joined 74

Mission of the MFO Task Force since soldier joined 94

How to use Army benefits while you are with the

MFO Task Force 90

Cost of telephone calls to the Sinai 83

Information on how to make calls from the Sinai to the

United States 87

Information on how to make calls from the United

States to the Sinai 85

Information on what the Army will do to help meet

the needs of soldiers families during this peacekeeping mission 94

Information on adjustment to family separation 96

Information on children's adjustment to family separation 85

Source, Spouse survey, question 1.

Note. None of the differences by component or rank were significant (p< .05).

Family support via telephone contacts. Given the wide geographical

spread of the families and the availability of toll-free telephones in both

the unit RD and the ARNG headquarters, we expected to see a great deal

of the family support being delivered via the telephone. Tables 14-6 and

14-7 show the percentage of families that the soldiers and spouses,

respectively, said received a telephone call from an Army agent or

agency.

What happened? Although spouses were more likely than soldiers to

report that they had received Army support telephone calls, the level of

calling was nowhere near the 100% that some of the interviews suggested

would occur for each of the agencies involved: the unit, the RC unit, and

the NGSFPC. However, the combination of those calls that did occur

resulted in 96% of the spouses reporting that they received at least one

call from someone.

18 The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is that the spouses did not notify the soldiers that they

received these various calls.

19 There was a definite tendency for AC agents/agencies to contact AC families and RC agents/agencies to

contact RC families. However, the unit did not attempt to duplicate the highly successful ARNG program in

North Carolina that called each of the spouses during the months of their birthdays and wedding anniversaries

to check on the spouses' well-being and to wish them well during the deployment (Bell et al., 1996).
The Family Support System for the MFO JÜ2.

Table 14-6

Family Support Calls Received by Families/Spouses During the MFO

Operation (Soldiers' Account)

Percent Received

AIL AC/RC

Your company at Fort Bragg 12 21/8**

The MFO Task Force Rear

Detachment at Fort Bragg 30 40/24+

National Guard Family

Program Coordinator 21a

The Pentagon 3

Your Army National Guard unit 31a

Army National Guard regional volunteer 6

a

An Army spouse who is a friend 20

Some other Army spouse 20

Source. Soldier deployment survey, question 12.

a RC data only; + p< .10;* p< .05; ** p< .01.

Evaluation of the Support System

Spouse knowledge ofrelevant deployment information. Table 14-8

shows soldier estimates of what spouses knew about key family

documents and communication with spouses in the Sinai. It is clear that

soldiers, as a group, knew a lot more about documents than they did

about communication. The most likely reason for this difference is that

the documents were more relevant than communication issues at that

time (August-October 1994). Both the soldiers and their spouses needed

to get the family documents in order before the soldierjoined the unit.

They did not need to know about telephone calls, etc. until January 1995.

The main advantage to the families knowing at that time is that it may

have helped them to plan and thus reduce their anxieties.

Most of these measures also showed component and rank

differences. That is, AC soldier families knew more than RC families.

Also, officer (and sometimes NCO) families knew more than enlisted

families. These findings suggest that soldier orientation should be
380 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-7

Family Support Calls Made to Families/Spouses During the MFO

Operation (Spouses' Account)

Your company at Fort Bragg

The MFO Task Force Rear Detachment

at Fort Bragg

Army National Guard Family Program

Coordinator

The Pentagon

Your Army National Guard unit

Army National Guard regional volunteer

An Army spouse who is a friend

Some other Army spouse

All AC/RC E/N/O

29 58/18**

46 68/37*

43a

13 28/6*

45a

27a

22/21/80a*

47 28/50/88

40

Source. Spouse survey, question 7.

a

RC data only; * p< .05; ** p< .01

improved in future deployments. However, there was ample time to give

the soldiers and families this information prior to the deployment.

Satisfaction with support information received. Table 14-9 presents

soldier and family perceptions of the adequacy of Army information

about the mission, benefits, and family support issues. About one third to

three fifths of the soldiers were satisfied with the information they

received on critical issues such as Army benefits, costs, and the mission.

The area of greatest dissatisfaction was information known prior to the

deployment, which again points to the area of soldier orientation back at

the previous AC or RC unit. The percentage of spouses who were

satisfied with the information they received varies from 25% (the cost of

calls to the Sinai) to 62% (the details about the mission once the soldier

joined). The fact that the spouse responses were being gathered in April

1995 suggests that the spouses should have received this information by

then—that is 7 to 9 months after the soldierjoined the unit and 4 months

after he went to the Sinai. The satisfaction levels for junior enlisted

soldiers and their spouses were even lower for some of the items in Table

14-9, suggesting that action should have been taken earlier in the

operation.
The Family Support System for the MFO 381

Table 14-8

Percentage of Married Soldiers Who Believe Their Spouses Know Army

Procedures and Documents

Percent Reporting T<?s"

Procedure/Document AIL AC/RC E/N/O

Procedures and Documents:

Location of insurance, other documents 92 100/88

How your pay entitlements are handled 90 98/86 80/96/88

Your total family financial obligations 90

Insurance entitlements 88 98/82

Procedures for contacting soldier in

an emergency 83

Military pay and allowances 77 96/66 59/84/88

How to read your LES 72 100/58 57/82/77

U.S. Army casualty notification

procedures 46

Communications:

How to send mail to the Sinai 35

How to send audiotapes and videotapes

to the Sinai 32

How to contact soldier by telephone in

the Sinai 20 29/15 14/19/41

How to FAX a message to the Sinai 16 15/14/29

How to use MARS radio system to talk

to soldier in the Sinai 11 14/9

How to use electronic mail (E-mail) to

send messages to the Sinai 9 16/5 5/9/12

Source. Predet>lovment soldier survey, auestion 21.

Note. All AC/RC and rank differences shown are significant (p< .05).

Leaderfamily knowledge and concern. These questions (Table

14-10) were asked shortly after the soldiers arrived at Fort Bragg.

Therefore, it was more a test of what the soldiers expected than what they

had observed. Nearly all the soldiers (87% to 90%) thought that the unit

leaders were knowledgeable and concerned about families. Fewer

soldiers thought that the unit leaders encouraged family activities (66%).

The only difference of opinion on these matters involved family

activities: the more senior the soldier, the more he thought that the

leaders would encourage such events.

Counting on the leaderfor help (soldier). The questions in Table

14-11 were also asked shortly after the soldiers arrived at Fort Bragg.

The analyses show that more soldiers had confidence that they would
382 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-9

Percentage of Soldiers and Spouses Reporting Satisfaction With Army

Information on the Mission, Benefits, and Family Support Issues

Topic Soldiers Spouses

How to use Army benefits while you are with the

MFO Task Force 50 NA

How spouses and family members can use Army benefits 47 57

Cost of telephone calls to the Sinai NA 25

Information on how to make calls from

the Sinai to the United States 37 56

Information on how to make calls from the United

States to the Sinai 32 45

Information on what the Army will do to help meet the

needs of soldiers families during this peacekeeping mission

Information on adjustment to family separation

Information on children's adjustment to family separation

MFO mission information before soldier volunteered

MFO mission information after soldier volunteered

45 52

NA 50

NA 51

31 45

60 62

Source. Soldier predeployment survey, question 1; spouse survey, question 1.

NA = Not asked on the survey.

Note. None of the differences by component were significant {p< .05). For the first two items, rank

differences for soldiers were significant (/? < .05), with the percentages ofjunior enlisted, NCOs, and

officers being 58/40/71% and 60/31/77%, respectively. For the last two items, rank differences were also

significant (p < .01), at 30/23/71% and 67/48/88%, respectively.

receive needed help with a personal or family problem from an MFO

Task Force leader than from any of the other helping agents listed in the

table (e.g., the unit RD). Officers were more likely than enlisted soldiers

to say that one could depend on unit leaders and the unit RD for help

with a personal/family problem.

Counting on the leaderfor help (spouses). The final set of these

predeployment leader questions concerned whether the soldiers thought

that their spouses could also count on the leaders if they had a personal or

family problem (Table 14-12). There is one AC/RC difference here.

More AC than RC soldiers felt that the Fort Bragg-based FSG would help

their spouses. A higher percentage of officers than enlisted soldiers were

sure that the RD would help their spouses. In contrast, NCOs were much

less likely than either officers or junior enlisted soldiers to believe that

either the Fort Bragg or non-Fort Bragg FSGs would help their spouses.
The Family Support System for the MFO 3_8_3_

Table 14-10

Soldier Perceptions of Leadership's Knowledge of

Family Programs and Concern for Families

Percent of Married Soldiers

Responding "Moderate to Very

Concern Great Extent"

Unit leaders encourage unit-wide family activities 66

Unit leaders know about Army family programs 90

If war broke out, unit leaders would be concerned

about family welfare 87

Source. Soldier predeployment survey, question 5.

Note. The only significant difference by rank or component was for rank and the first item (p <.01),

with 54/66/100% ofjunior enlisted, NCOs, and officers, respectively, responding moderate to very great

extent.

Table 14-11

Percentage of Soldiers Who Believe They Could Count on the Leaders

to Help With Personal/Family Problems

Group

For Help for Own Personal

or Familv Problem

AU AC/RC E/N/O

MFO Task Force leaders

Local RC Component leaders

MFO Rear Detachment

MFO Fort Bragg Family Support Group

Other Family Support Group

81 82/80/85**

74a

73 69/73/93*

74

73a

s are more relevant to RC family needs;

Source. Soldier predeplovment survev. question 3.

a

Figures are from reserve component soldiers only since item

*p<.05;** p<.0l.
384 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-12

Percentage of Soldiers Who Believe Their Spouse Could Count on the

Leaders to Help With a Personal/Family Problems

For Help for Spouse/Friend's

Personal or Family Problem

Group

MFO Task Force leaders

Local RC Component leaders

MFO Rear Detachment

MFO Fort Bragg Family Support Group

Other Family Support Group

All AC/RC E/N/O

66

76a

67 69/65* 63/67/82*

67 77/55/88*

60a73/35/73**

Source. Soldier predeployment survey, question 20.

Figures are from reserve component soldiers only since items are more relevant to RC family needs;

*/?<.05; **/><.01.

Spouse confidence in leader helpfulness. Table 14-13 shows the spouses'

views of whether they could count on various sources of support. Note

that these views were being rendered at the midpoint of the deployment

(i.e., about 6 or 7 months after the soldiers gave their opinions). The

percentage of spouses who reported being able to count on the RD for

help was about the same as we saw for the soldiers (Tables 14-11 and

14-12). All of the other percentages were much lower.

There is also a sizable (and nearly significant) difference between

AC and RC spouses with regard to the potential helpfulness of the Fort

Bragg FSG. While 67% of the AC spouses reported that they could

count on FSG support, only 27% of the RC spouses made that statement.

That difference is probably realistic, since the Fort Bragg FSG tended to

refer RC problems (which tended to occur at some distance from Fort

Bragg) to other agencies (mostly the FAO).

Helpfulness ofsupport agents/agencies. In Table 14-3 soldiers and

spouses were asked whether they (or someone in their families) had made

use of 19 potentially helpful agents (friends) or agencies (FSGs). Table

14-14 presents soldier and spouse ratings. Both soldiers and spouses

made their ratings at essentially the same point in time: April-May 1995,

which was the midpoint of the deployment. Since respondents were

asked whether the agent/agency was helpful to them or to others, their
The Family Support System for the MFO 385

Table 14-13

Percentage of Spouses Who Believe They Could Count on the Leaders

to Help With a Personal/Family Problems

For Help for Own Personal

or Family Problem

All Spouses

35

47

62

37

46

Group

MFO Task Force leaders

Local RC Component leaders

MFO Rear Detachment

MFO Fort Bragg Family Support Group

Other Family Support Group

Source. Spouse survey, question 10.

Note. There were no significant differences (p < .05) by component, although 67% of

AC spouses counted on the Fort Bragg FSG compared to only 27% of the RC spouses

(p < .06).

answers were a mixture of personal experiences and the general

reputation of the helping service.

The agents more soldiers and spouses rated as helpful were their

family and friends. Other agencies that at least 67% of the soldiers rated

as helpful included: Army legal and financial services and the American

Red Cross.

Spouses were much more likely than soldiers to rate agents and

agencies as helpful. In addition to friends and relatives, at least 67% of

spouses rated the following agents/agencies as helpful: the RD, FSGs,

coworkers, Army spouses, church members, Army chaplains, and the

American Red Cross. Although the differences are not always

statistically significant, the pattern is the same for virtually every agent:

AC soldiers and spouses were more likely than RC soldiers and spouses

to see the agent/agencies as helpful. Likewise, among soldiers (where the

sample is large enough to more easily find differences), the higher the

rank, the more likely that the rank group would say that the service was

helpful. It would be interesting to speculate about why some of these

differences occurred. Is a given service rated as less helpful because they

did a bad job for one or more clients or because it was unavailable or

irrelevant for the respondent's situation?
386 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-14

Soldier and Spouse Ratings of Helpfulness of Potential Support

Agents/Agencies

Percent bating of Helpful by

Soldiers Spouses

Service/Agencv Married AC/RC F/N/O M AC/RC

Formal, Army Support:

Rear Detachment Command (RDC) 61 65/59 80 91/75

Family Support Groups (FSG) 56 72/49 57/44/100* 85 100/80

Army Legal Services 73 81/68 62 100/38*

Army Chaplains 64 75/59 69 100/58

Army Financial Services 67 77/63 50 100/38

Army Community Services (ACS) 57 73/47 32/67/100** 46 67/38

Army Emergency Relief (AER) 54 63/50 39/55/100* 46 100/33

Army Social Work Services 43 67/82* 38 100/17*

Army National Guard State HQ 31a — 30/11/100* 42a

Your National Guard/Reserve 52a — 78a —

Formal, Non-Army Support:

Red Cross 67 82/60 48/75/100* 67 100/64

Local civilian support services or agencies 42 55/37 46 0/50

Professional counselors 42 67/33* 36 100/25*

Informal Support:

Your extended family members 89 90/88 98 100/98

Friends/Neighbors 78 93/71* 62/84/100* 91 100/89

Other Army/National Guard spouses 58 58/58 72 100/63*

Your supervisors at your job 52 73/44 38/48/100* 65 71/63

Your coworkers 62 88/51* 40/65/100* 79 88/77

Church members 62 80/55

spouse survey, question 11.

71 100/65

Source. Soldier deployment survev. question 14:

RC data only; * p< .05; **/>< .01.

Soldier recommendationsforfuture MFO units. Most of the items in

Table 14-15 are features of the 28th Rotation's family support system. In

recommending these features of the system for some future system, the

soldiers are, in effect, saying that the features of the 28th Rotation's

family support system worked well. Most soldiers either agreed or

strongly agreed with all 19 suggestions. The only ones that were

endorsed by less than half of the soldiers were: having an FSG at Fort

Bragg (but that suggestion was endorsed by most of the AC soldiers),

advising spouses on child management, and limiting future deployments

to four adjacent states. The ideas that were endorsed by more than 75%

of the soldiers were all the things the unit did (the toll-free line to Fort

Bragg, the Family Support Handbook, and an orientation for RC
The Family Support System for the MFO 387

Table 14-15

Soldier Recommendations for Future MFO Family Support Systems

Percent Married

Measures iSoldier Agreement

Measures Implemented for 28th Rotation:

Distribute a Family Support Handbook 77

Orientation meetings for RC families 76

Full-time family assistance officer 74

Battalion newsletters for families 73

Facilitate videotape exchanges from Sinai to home 74

Facilitate videotape exchanges from home to Sinai 72

Family Support Group meetings at other locations 71

Family Support Group meetings at Fort Bragg 43

Active Component 69

Reserve Component 30(p<.01)

Recommend Improvements to Existing Measures:

Better plan for family emergency leaves 71

More specific, timely, and relevant battalion

publications 68

Help spouses deal with local banks/merchants 66

More family time prior to deployment 66

Junior Enlisted 66

NCOs 70

Officers 31 (p<.05)

Faster American Red Cross messages 64

More leader training on family problems 62

(table continues)

families) or things the unit did but wished it could have done more often

(more free overseas calls and encouraging RC units to write to their

soldiers). AC soldiers were more likely than RC soldiers to recommend

having an FSG at Fort Bragg. Officers were less likely than others to

recommend having more family time prior to deployment or having more

free overseas calls.
388 RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-15 (Continued)

Soldier Recommendations for Future MFO Family Support Systems

Percent Married

Measures Soldier Agreement

Proposed Measures:

Toll-free number to Fort Bragg for families 88

More free telephone calls home 83

Junior Enlisted 80

NCOs 88

Officers 77 (p< .05)

Encourage RC units to write soldiers 75

Advise spouses on child management 48

Soldiers from no more than four adjacent

states assigned to the MFO 47

How Family Support Affects Soldiers and Their Families

The final test of the family support system was whether participating

in any of these support activities, receiving any of these services, or

believing that the system would offer support to families had any

measurable impact on variables of interest to the Army. The three

desirable outcomes were: (1) improved soldier morale, (2) the ability of

the family to adapt to Army demands, and (3) the ability of the family to

successfully handle its own affairs. The measures for each of these

outcomes appear below. The discussion of the three outcomes is

followed by a discussion of the 14 family support variables and the

relationship of family support to family/Army outcomes.

Individual soldier morale. There were three measures of soldier

morale. All of them came from the soldier middeployment questionnaire.

The specific questions were: soldier morale, satisfaction with Army life,

and changes in soldier willingness to remain in the Army.
The Family Support System for the MFO 232

Family adaptation to Army life. There were six measures of family

adaptation, four from soldier questionnaires and two from spouse

questionnaires. The four measures from the soldier questionnaires were:

(1) the soldier's estimate of how much the spouse supported the MFO,

(2) the soldier's estimate of how the MFO was affecting the marriage, (3)

how the marriage was affecting the soldier's estimate of his ability to

accomplish his job, and (4) the soldier's estimate of how well the family

was adapting to Army life. The two measures from the spouse

questionnaire were: (1) spouse's level of support for the soldier being in

the MFO, and (2) the spouse's view of how the MFO was affecting her

family.

Internalfamily dynamics. There were four measures for this

concept, three from the soldier and one from the spouse. The three

measures from the soldier were taken from the middeployment

questionnaire. The topics were marital satisfaction, marital stability, and

the soldier's estimate of the family's financial situation. The measure

from the spouse questionnaire was her estimate of how well the family

was doing financially.20

Family support measures. Fourteen measures of various aspects of

the family support system were examined to see if they were related to

the three outcome measures listed. Some of the 14 measures were: the

battalion newsletter, the Family Support Handbook, ARNG flyers, family

support information, receipt of family support telephone calls, spouse

knowledge of Army documents and how to communicate, satisfaction

with the family support information received, and assessment of leader

support for families. We also looked at whether the spouses could count

on MFO leaders, RC leaders, the RD staff, the Fort Bragg FSG, and the

FSG located outside of Fort Bragg.21

Relation ofsupport to Army/family outcomes. Table 14-16 is a

summary of all of the individual correlations between each of the

20Two of these outcome variables are actually a combination of similar questionnaire items which have been

combined together to form scales. Marital stability and MFO impact on the families are composed of four and

three questions, respectively. The reliability of these scales is quite high (i.e., .80 and above).

21 Six of these predictor variables are also scales. One scale in the middeployment soldier questionnaire is the

receipt of family support calls which is composed of nine separate questions. The predictor scales from the

spouse questionnaire are: receipt of family support calls (9 questions), satisfaction with Army support

information (9 questions), and receipt of Army information (9 questions).
22Q_ RC Peacekeepers

Table 14-16

Summary of Relationships Between Outcomes and Predictor Variables:

Percentage of the Correlations That Were Statistically Significant

Outcome Variables

Internal

Individual Army-Family Family

Independent Soldier Morale Fit Situation

Variables (3 measures') (6 measures") (4 measures')

Received Battalion

Newsletter 33 42 0

Received FS Handbook 33 25 0

Received ARNG Flyers/

a

Letters 0 38 19

Information

Received 33 , 0 25

Received Telephone Calls 33 33 25

Knowledge of:

Army Documents 0 17 75

Communications 0 0 0

Satisfaction With Information 33 42 13

Leader Support 33 50 0

Being able to count on:

MFO Leaders 67 42 0

G/R Leaders 0 25 0

Rear Det Staff 67 42 13

Ft. Bragg FSG 33 25 13

Other FSGs 0 0 38

Average Percentages: 24.3

; at middeployment.

25.4 14.7

a

Data from both soldier and spouse

Data from spouse only, at middeployment.

Data from soldier only, at predeployment.

Data from soldier only, at predeployement, with respect to self and spouse.
The Family Support System for the MFO 3.21

predictors and each of the outcomes. For example, receipt of the

battalion newsletter (according to the soldier and his spouse) had a

statistically significant relationship (correlation) with one third of the

measures of individual soldier morale. The table shows that one third of

the possible correlations was statistically significant by showing one in

three as a percent: 33%. Likewise, 5 of the 12 correlations were

significant with Army-family fit (42%) and none of the three correlations

with the three measures of the internal family situation were statistically

significant. Based on this rather crude analysis, it would appear that the

relationship between family support and either soldier morale or family

adaptation (Army-family fit) was much stronger than between family

support and the internal working of the family. That is, the average of all

99 correlations for those two outcomes was much higher.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The 28th Rotation faced some formidable obstacles in putting

together its family support system. It was a new unit with no corporate

history of how to do things. It received a lot of high-level attention. It

had to deal with both AC and RC structures. Finally, its members were

drawn from all over the United States.

The support system which was assembled had several distinct parts:

(1) the unit prior to deployment, (2) the elements at Fort Bragg after the

deployment, (3) the elements in the Sinai, and (4) the RC elements.

The unit's portion of the support system had some good and

effective ideas and solutions. The FAO, the Family Support Handbook,

and the battalion newsletter were important contributions to the family

support system. The unit could have done better if it had asked for help

from many of the Army-wide organizations that were interested in its

fate. However, the unit chose to limit itself to the help it could get from

agencies at Fort Bragg or its own personnel. The consequences were that

22 Since it was possible that rank might be a confounding variable for the correlations summarized in Table

14-16, we ran partial correlations for the same relationships, controlling for rank. Considering the potentially

powerful effects of rank as a control variable, relatively few changes occurred. The percentage of significant

relationships for individual soldier morale variables increased to 25% while the percentages for Army-family

fit and the internal family situation declined a bit, to 22% and 13%, respectively.
392 RC Peacekeepers

it produced solutions that were good for a standard AC unit, but did not

fully address the RC and other dispersed families' needs.

The unit was given a toll-free telephone line to maintain contact with

families. The telephone helped them to coordinate with the RC and to

solve family problems. However, the unit did not use the telephone

proactively to prevent problems as was done during Caminos Fuertes

(Bell et al., 1996). The telephone line was established relatively late in

the deployment, further limiting its usefulness.

These comments should not be taken as an indication that the FAO

was not effective. He was. By middeployment, the RD was one of the

most used services with some of the highest "helpfulness" ratings by both

soldiers and their spouses. Furthermore, the NGSFPCs stated that the

FAO was doing a good job.

The RD support elements worked hard, particularly those in Virginia

and Maryland. They organized events, telephoned spouses, and kept in

touch with the FAO. Nonetheless, they did not fully overcome the

effects of "distance from the source of assistance," as has been seen in

other deployments. This is an area that needs more research and testing

to develop new models of how distant families can and should be

assisted. Part of that research should examine how to better coordinate

the potential helping team so that all the families feel that they are

important to the Army.

Another area that could and should be addressed is how to make

communications between the deployed soldiers and their families more

accessible and less expensive. The unit leadership tried teleconferences,

which worked for some of the families. The soldiers and their families,

however, seemed to be more concerned about how to make individual

calls cheap, reliable, and, if possible, free.

Finally, what family support can and cannot do needs to be

addressed. Good support can help soldier morale and family adaptation

to deployments and the Army, in general. It cannot "fix" marriages or

change the fact that deployments are hard on couples and their children.

However, our research here and elsewhere strongly suggests that family

support not only helps the families, but that it helps the Army as well.
The Family Support System for the MFO 393

REFERENCES

Bell, D. B. (1991, November). The impact of Operations Desert

Shield/Desert Storm on Army families: A summary of findings to

date. Paper presented at the 53rd annual conference of the

National Council on Family Relations, Denver, CO.

Bell, D. B. (1995a). How to supportfamilies during peacekeeping

missions: Some preliminary findings—A briefingfor Dr. Phelps

(Unpublished manuscript). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Bell, D. B. (1995b). How to supportfamilies during peacekeeping

missions: Some preliminary findings—A briefingfor Drs. Johnson

and Simutis (Unpublished manuscript). Alexandria, VA: U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Bell, D. B. (1996). Operation Joint Endeavor: Early family research

findings (Unpublished manuscript) Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Bell, D. B., and Teitelbaum, J. M. (1993, October). Operation Restore

Hope: Preliminary results ofa survey ofArmy spouses at Ft.

Drum, New York. Paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar

on Armed Forces and Society Biennial Conference, Baltimore,

MD.

Bell, D. B., Segal, M. W., and Rice, R. E. (1995, October). Family issues

in the assignment ofreservists to peacekeeping duty. Paper

presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and

Society Biennial Conference, Baltimore, MD.

Bell, D. B., Stevens, M. L., and Segal, M. W. (1996). How to support

families during overseas deployments: A sourcebookfor service

providers. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences.
124 RC Peacekeepers

Harman, J. (1995a). Interviews ofNational Guard State Family Program

Coordinators. (Unpublished manuscript). Alexandria, VA: U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Harman, J. (1995b). Trip to NG Armory, Staunton, VA. (Unpublished

manuscript). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for

the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

U.S. Department of Defense. (1994). Family support handbook: Desert

Panthers. TF 4-505 PIR Fort Bragg, NC: Headquarters, 4th

Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment.
15

CHANGES IN MARITAL QUALITY

AMONG MFO COUPLES

Walter R. Schumm

D. Bruce Bell

Mady W. Segal

Rose E. Rice

INTRODUCTION

As former Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Myer was fond

of saying: "We recruit soldiers; we retain families." The Army has long

known that family separation—the natural consequences of deploying

soldiers to overseas locations—is one of the most stressful things that the

Army can do to married soldiers.1 Therefore, the Army should be quite

interested in whether deployments of a largely volunteer and reserve

force to the Sinai would have the same negative effects noted by others in

the deployment of Active Component (AC) units to distant locations.

Spouses were asked after the first Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) Rotation how the deployment had affected their marriages. Forty

percent indicated that the separation had a positive effect, 29% replied

that it had had no effect, and 31 % said it had had a negative effect (Van

Vranken, Jellen, Knudson, Marlowe, and Segal, 1984). Marital

satisfaction questions were asked of spouses of soldiers who deployed to

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS/S) (Peterson, 1992),

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (Bell, Teitelbaum, & Schumm 1996),

1 A RAND study (Vernez and Zellman, 1987) lists family separation as being either the first or second most

important reason married soldiers give for leaving the Army.

395
396 RC Peacekeepers

and Operation Joint Endeavor (Bell, 1996). Analysis of these data sets

indicated that spouses whose soldiers were still deployed had less marital

satisfaction now than they did prior to the start of the deployment.

Marital satisfaction also was quite different for spouses who were living

in a different location than the soldier, particularly those who were

married to soldiers who were on unaccompanied tours. Research on

marital stability during ODS/S was done by Teitelbaum (1991) and

Durand (1992). Although these two researchers used different

approaches, they reached the same conclusion: being deployed to ODS/S

did not increase the probability of divorce among returning soldiers.

However, family separation has long been known to be the primary

reason that married soldiers give for not remaining in the Army (Vernez

and Zellman, 1987). It is unclear whether going on a single deployment

(particularly one in which the soldier volunteered to participate) would

have the same effect.

METHOD

The data for this chapter come from two sources (married soldiers

and spouses) and, for the soldiers, from two different times: shortly after

they arrived at Fort Bragg (i.e., August 1994 for officers and

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and October 1994 for junior enlisted

personnel) and halfway through the Sinai deployment (i.e., May 1995).

The spouse questionnaire was administered to all spouses of soldiers in

the unit during April 1995. The number of soldiers and spouses

completing these questionnaires were 171, 139, and 69, respectively.2

The names of the measures used in this chapter and a brief

description of them appear in Table 15-1. The four basic measures

shown in the table appeared in either one of the two soldier

questionnaires or in the spouse questionnaire. The four scales vary in

length from one to six items. The concepts measured include: marital

stability, marital quality, and marital satisfaction.

2 For details on questionnaire administration see Chapter 2 and Chapter 14.

3 The marital stability measure is based on the work of Booth and Edwards (1983), Crane and Mead (1980),

and Crane, Newfield, and Armstrong (1984).
Changes in Marital Quality 397

Table 15-1

A Description of Items and Scales

Used to Measure Marital Quality and Stability

1. Marital Stability. This was a series of four (yes/no) questions

that are summed to yield a single score. The questions ask about

successive signs of marital trouble ending with actually filing for a

separation or divorce. This question was asked when the soldier first

arrived at Fort Bragg (Time 1) and midway during the Sinai deployment

(Time 2).

2. Marital Quality. The respondents were asked to separately rate

on a 5-point scale (Very poor to very good) the following five aspects of

their marriages: trust, spiritual values, communication, mutual support

faithfulness, and capability to handle conflict. This question was asked

when the soldier first arrived at Fort Bragg (Time 1) and midway during

the Sinai deployment (Time 2). Spouses were also asked this same

question at the midpoint of the deployment.

3. Marital satisfaction. The respondents were asked to rate the

extent to which they have happy marriages at a given time. Soldiers

were asked: before they joined the MFO (retrospective question, Time

0), when they first arrived at Fort Bragg (Time 1), and midway through

the Sinai deployment (Time 2).

Table 15-2 shows the basic psychometric properties of the scales

each time they were used. The most important of these properties is the

Cronbach (1951) alphas (.81 to .94), which show that the scales have

high internal consistency reliability.

While we have not developed estimates of the validity of the marital

scales and items, those measures were, for the most part, significantly

correlated with each other (Table 15-3). All of the soldier measures were

correlated with one another. However, soldier measures were

significantly related to less than half of the spouse measures. The

couples seemed to agree on marital quality. Likewise, spouse estimates
32S_ RC Peacekeepers

of marital quality were correlated with one of three soldier estimates of

marital satisfaction: the one that was measured at middeployment.

Finally, spouse perceptions of marital quality did not correlate with either

of the two soldier estimates of marital stability. As a whole, these

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correlations were most likely to be statistically significant when: they

were from the same source (e.g., soldiers), on the same topic (e.g.,

marital quality), and taken at the same point in time (e.g.,

middeployment).

The first research question had to do with the stability and quality

of various aspects of the marriage as seen by the soldiers and their

spouses. This question was answered using four tests:

1. Did levels of soldier marital satisfaction remain stable over three

periods of time: before joining the unit, at predeployment, and at

middeployment?

2. Did soldier estimates of marital quality remain stable over two

periods of time: at predeployment and at middeployment?

3. Did soldier estimates of marital stability remain stable over two

periods of time: at predeployment and at middeployment?

4. Did soldier and spouse estimates of marital quality differ from one

another during two periods: at predeployment and at middeployment?

These questions were addressed using paired sample t tests and

analysis of variance with repeated measures.

The second research question was whether we could build a

typology for mapping changes in soldier reports of marital satisfaction

over time and, if so, would it be useful? The initial topology divided the

sample into three groups: (1) those whose satisfaction declined (a loss of

two or more points), (2) those whose satisfaction remained the same (a

loss or gain of one point or less), and (3) those whose marital satisfaction

improved (a gain of two or more points).

The third research question was whether changes in marital

satisfaction could predict, or could be predicted by, other variables of

interest and thus potentially help the Army and families successfully deal

4 Most of those in the "no change" group had high satisfaction scores on both surveys. To make that group

more homogeneous, we eliminated four soldiers with very unhappy marriages (i.e., they had a score of three or

less on both surveys). Thus all soldiers in subsequent analyses had at least moderately satisfying marriages at

one or more of the times they were surveyed. Thus the "decrease" group consisted of soldiers who were

moving from happy to only moderately happy marriages, the "same" group was "happy" at both occasions, and

the "increase" group was moving from moderately happy to fairly high happiness during the deployment.
400 RC Peacekeepers

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which were examined as possible predictors of, or outcomes from,

changes in marital satisfaction. Specifically, the table shows the name of

the variable and the questionnaire it was used in.
Changes in Marital Quality 401

Table 15-4

Variables That Should Predict or Be Predicted by Marital Satisfaction

Predictor variables Source*

A B C

Soldier paygrade X

Service component: Active or Reserve X

Spouse location X X X

Distance from spouse's home to nearest X X X

military installation

Spouse completion of survey X

Spouse's employment status X

Soldier's satisfaction with Army life X X

Number of times the soldier has been married X

Spouse's initial supportiveness of MFO mission X X

Spouse's current supportiveness of MFO mission X X X

Expected impact of the deployment on marriage X

Soldier's predeployment marital stability X

Soldier's predeployment family adaptability X

Number of children X

Spouse's level of education X

Duration of current marriage in years X

Spouse's age X

Soldier's age X

Army - family fit X

Financial impact of the deployment X X

Outcome variables Source

A B c

Soldier's retention intentions X

Soldier satisfaction with Army life X

Soldier morale X

Impact of soldier's marriage on his ability X

to perform his MFO job

Source: A: Soldier survey administered August & October 1994.

B: Soldier survey administered May 1995.

C: Spouse survey administered April 1995.

For nominal level variables we used chi-square tests to assess the

significance of the association; for ordinal or interval-level variables, we

used one-way analyses of variance. Because question three involved a
402 RC Peacekeepers

large number of analyses, we set the required level of significance for

these analyses at the .01 level.

FINDINGS

Changes Over Time and Couple Agreement

The Hotelling's T

2

test yielded a value of 7.90, F(2, 96) = 3.9\(p <

.03), indicating that there was a significant change over time in soldier

reports of marital satisfaction. A follow-up analysis indicated that the

only difference was a decline between marital satisfaction prior to joining

the MFO and when the soldiers first reported to Fort Bragg. Marital

satisfaction during the deployment (mean = 5.30) was lower then either

prior to the MFO (mean = 5.70) or after joining the unit at Fort Bragg

(mean = 5.38). However, the latter two scores were not significantly

different.

There was a difference in soldier reports of marital stability but not

in marital quality between the time when the soldiers joined the unit and

at middeployment in the Sinai. The marital stability rating declined from

an average of 7.59 to 7.26 during the deployment.

Spouse and soldier reports of marital quality correlated (r = .38)

with each other at middeployment. However, there was a significant

difference in the mean scores: spouses reported higher levels of quality

than did soldiers.

The Typology of Change in Marital Satisfaction

Of the 98 soldiers who provided reports of marital satisfaction

during and before deployment, 31 reported exactly the same level of

happiness at both times, while another 27 differed only by one point

between the two times. As reported earlier, three of these individuals

with the "same" scores were eliminated because their scores were less

than "four," indicating that they had very unhappy marriages. Among

the rest, 19 soldiers' scores declined and 21 soldiers had scores that

improved. Among those who improved, one soldier was eliminated from

further analyses because, despite the improvements, both scores were still

below four on the 7-point satisfaction scale.
Changes in Marital Quality 403

Correlates of Change in Marital Satisfaction

Few of our predictors or outcomes were related to changes in marital

satisfaction. Only 2 of the 19 predictors in Table 15-4 were significantly

related to changes in marital satisfaction. The exceptions were

middeployment soldier reports of Army-family fit and current levels of

spouse support for the soldier's involvement in the MFO mission. In

both cases, Scheffe's post hoc tests showed that Army-family fit and

spouse support was lowest among soldiers who reported that their marital

satisfaction had declined, followed by those who reported that it had

remained the same, followed by those who reported that it had improved.

Predictor variables that were not related to changes in marital

satisfaction included, for example, such variables as: soldier rank,

component, spouse location, distance of spouse to the nearest military

installation, whether the spouse completed a spouse survey, spouse

employment status, and many other marital, support, and attitudinal

variables.

In contrast, the changes in marital satisfaction were significantly

related to two of the four outcome variables in Table 15-4. They were

soldier morale and soldier estimates of the impact of their marriages on

their ability to perform their MFO jobs. The post hoc testing was

again used to show which groups were responsible for the observed

differences in the measures overall. As expected, soldiers with declining

marital satisfaction had the lowest morale. However, there was no real

difference among the other two satisfaction groups. Soldiers whose

marital satisfaction scores had declined were much more likely, than

those whose scores had remained stable, to say that their marriages were

interfering with their abilities to do their MFO jobs. There was no

significant difference between those with steady and increasing levels of

marital satisfaction.

5 Army-family fit is a 4-item scale with a mean of 8.67, a standard deviation of 3.93, and a Cronbach alpha of

0.85. The five point (agree/disagree) items include the following statements: (1) My spouse is someone I can

really talk with about things that are important to me, (2) My spouse and I consider ourselves to be a team

working for Army goals, (3) My spouse understands the demands of my Army job, and (4) My spouse does a

great deal to further my military career. This scale was first used in the 1989 worldwide Army Family

Research Program survey (Segal and Harris, 1993). It has subsequently helped define the concept of "external

adaptation" (i.e., how the family is adapting or adjusting to the Army) as opposed to how well it is able to meet

its own, internal needs ("internal adaptation").
404 RC Peacekeepers

DISCUSSION

Changes in Marital Satisfaction, Quality, and Stability

Given what has been seen in other deployments, we expected to see

a decline in all three of these measures: marital satisfaction, quality, and

stability. That would have matched the lowered morale seen for the unit

as a whole (See Siebold, Chapter 10) and the decline in spouse support

for this mission reported earlier (Bell, Segal, & Rice, 1995). What we

saw instead was a small drop in marital stability, a small (but not

statistically significant) drop in marital satisfaction, and an actual

increase in marital quality. Finding decreases in marital stability in the

face of increasing (albeit not statistically significant) levels of marital

quality was also unexpected. Normally, social exchange theory would

predict that changes in stability would follow changes in satisfaction

(e.g., people do not start looking for new partners until they first have

become dissatisfied with their current spouses). However, the absence of

a decrease in stability may indicate that the soldiers were expecting their

marital satisfaction to return to "normal" once they returned to the States

or at least that they were going to wait until then to take any action to end

their marriage. Further research with large samples will be required to

explore this unanticipated finding.

Marital quality did not decline over time for all married soldiers.

Although marital quality for all soldiers was higher than for all spouses,

the husbands of the spouses who completed the spouse questionnaire

reported lower marital quality than did their spouses at middeployment.

That result reverses the more typical situation in which husbands report

greater marital quality or satisfaction than wives (Fowers, 1991; Schumm

& Silliman, 1996). If marital quality has declined for soldiers, it would

have been convenient to argue that its decline was great enough to push it

below marital quality for the wife, perhaps due to the unique hardships of

deployment. However, if that were true, it would have been true for all

married soldiers, not just the subset of soldiers whose spouses completed

the spouse questionnaire. Obviously, more analyses are needed to

determine why this anomaly occurred.

6 The effect size in the decline in marital satisfaction (0.04) is large enough that it might have been statistically

significant in a larger sample. The effect size for marital stability (0.26) is small to moderate in size.
Changes in Marital Quality 405

Predicting Changes in Marital Satisfaction

Although these variables are called predictors, the two that actually

correlate with changes in marital satisfaction are happening concurrently.

That is, soldiers at middeployment who say that their marital satisfaction

is dropping are also highly likely to report that their spouses are not

supporting the MFO nor are they, as a couple, working as an Army team

(Army-family fit). It is not hard to understand that all three things would

be happening simultaneously. However, it is virtually impossible to

determine whether the marital satisfaction is a cause or consequence of

the relatively poor support of Army goals. The fact that a host of factors

do not predict changes in marital satisfaction is interesting, but it does not

answer what is really going on. Obviously more research is needed.

Predicting Outcomes of Changes in Marital Satisfaction

The finding that soldier morale and perceived effects of marriage

affect one's ability to do one's job suggests that marital satisfaction has a

meaningful relationship with two aspects of Army life that commanders

find to be important: soldier morale and job performance. The size of

these relationships suggests that these relationships are indeed real and

powerful. It is also interesting to note that drops in marital satisfaction

are not associated with satisfaction with Army life or retention intentions.

In other words, it is as if these soldiers are blaming their poor morale and

job performance on their marriages rather than on the Army. One way

for the soldier to avoid these problems may be to get out of the Army or

at least not volunteer for deployments (and hence, long family

separations). However, the Army may be better served by helping

deployed soldiers (as well as their nondeployed spouses) deal with family

separation.

Taken together it would seem that drops in marital satisfaction

during deployments are related to lowered spouse support for this

mission, reduced willingness for the couple to be an Army team, lowered

7 The effect sizes between changes in marital satisfaction and morale and perceived MFO performance are

0.78 and 0.77, respectively.
406 RC Peacekeepers

soldier morale, and greater interference of the marriage with actual

soldierjob performance.

One interpretation of this pattern of findings is to call it "home

sickness." The deployment was in its fourth month, and the family had

been supportive but was now much more realistic about how much this

deployment was costing them in terms of the missed opportunity to

function as an intact family. Spouse complaints about what it was like to

be at home alone may have been affecting soldier morale as well as

interfering with the job. Notice that it was the soldiers, rather than the

spouses who were claiming that the spouses were not supportive. It was

the soldiers, rather than the spouses, who were experiencing lowered

morale and feeling that the family was interfering with their work.

Therefore, if we are to "fix" marital satisfaction, morale, and job

performance, the soldier must be included as a part of the solution.

"We recruit soldiers but retain families" in this case means the whole

family. It is not soldiers and their families, it is a single entity: the

soldier's family. Future work on family support should make a conscious

effort to include advice and support to deployed soldiers as a way of

increasing soldier performance and morale.
Changes in Marital Quality 407

REFERENCES

Bell, D. B. (1996). Operation Joint Endeavor: Early family research

findings (Unpublished manuscript). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Bell, D. B., Segal, M. W., & Rice, R. E. (1995). Family issues in the

assignment ofreservists to peacekeeping duty. Paper presented at

the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society

Biennial Conference, Baltimore, MD.

Bell, D. B., Teitelbaum, J. M., & Schumm, W. R. (1996). Keeping the

home fire burning: Family support issues. Military Review,

76(2), 80-84.

Booth, A., & Edwards, J. (1983). Measuring marital instability. Journal

ofMarriage and the Family, 45, 387-393.

Crane, D. R., & Mead, E. (1980). The Marital Status Inventory: Some

preliminary data on the instrument to measure marital dissolution

potential. American Journal ofFamily Therapy, 8, 31-35.

Crane, D. R., Newfield, N., & Armstrong, D. (1984). Predicting divorce

at marital therapy intake: Wives' distress and the Marital Status

Inventory. Journal ofMarital and Family Therapy, 10, 305-317.

Cronbach, L. J., Jr. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of

tests. Psychometrika, 16, 297-334.

Durand, D. B. (1992). The redistribution ofresponsibilities and power in

Army familiesfollowing Operation Desert Shield/Storm Reunions.

Paper presented at the Section on Sociology of Peace and War at

the 87th annual meeting of the American Sociological

Association, Pittsburgh, PA.

Fowers, B. J. (1991). His and her marriage: A multivariate study of

gender and marital satisfaction. Sex Roles, 24, 209-221.
408 RC Peacekeepers

Peterson, M. (1992). 1991 Survey ofArmy Families II: Final summary

(Unpublished manuscript). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Schumm, W. R., & Silliman, B. (1996). Gender and marital satisfaction:

A replication with a sample of spouses from the Christian Church

(Disciples of Christ). Psychological Reports, 79, 496-498.

Segal, M. W., & Harris, J. J. (1993). What we know about Army families

(ARI Special Report 21). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A271 989)

Teitelbaum, J. M. (1991). Unit level spouse support and generic family

assistance at major army supports during Operation Desert

Shield/Storm. Paper presented at the Biennial International

Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and

Society, Baltimore, MD.

Van Vranken, E. W., Jellen, L. K., Knudson, K. H. M., Marlowe, D. H.,

& Segal, M. W. (1984). The impact ofdeployment separation on

Armyfamilies (WRAIR Report NP-84-6). Washington, DC:

Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of

Research.

Vernez, G., & Zellman, G. L. (1987). Families and mission: A review of

the effects of family factors on Army attrition, retention, and

readiness (RAND Note N-2624-A). Santa Monica, CA: The

RAND Corporation.
SECTION 6

IMPACT ON HOME UNIT

The loss of volunteers to peacekeeping missions is likely to have

some impact on contributing Reserve Component (RC) home units.

Knowledge of the extent of this impact, be it positive or negative, will

enable the Army to anticipate the consequences of deploying RC

volunteers on future peace missions. Thus, unlike previous chapters that

cover research on the deployed 28th Rotation, Chapter 16 (Smith and

Hagman) identifies the personnel, training, and readiness impact of the

Sinai peacekeeping mission on the Army National Guard's 29th Infantry

Division (Light), the unit responsible for providing the majority of the

28th Rotation's RC volunteers. Reported findings are based on responses

obtained via survey and interview from those RC soldiers who remained

behind at home station during the course of the peacekeeping mission.

Resulting recommendations should apply to future deployment scenarios

in which a single RC division is called upon to be the primary source of

peacekeeping volunteers.

409
16

IMPACT OF MFO MISSION ON

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HOME UNIT

Monte D. Smith

Joseph D. Hagman

INTRODUCTION

Unlike previous chapters that cover research on the deploying

battalion, this chapter assesses the peacekeeping mission's impact

stateside on the Army National Guard's (ARNG's) 29th Infantry Division

(Light) (29th ID[L]). This division held administrative responsibility for

the Reserve Component (RC) portion of the mission and contributed

most of the composite battalion's RC volunteers.

Although RC soldiers have been involved in virtually every

contingency operation since the Gulf War (Hultman, 1996), little is

known about the impact of a peacekeeping mission on a sponsoring

ARNG division. This is because the 28th Rotation was the first of its

kind to rely on one ARNG division for the majority of its peacekeeping

volunteers. In addition, the thrust of past research has been on the

deploying battalion, as opposed to the nondeploying units, of

AC-sponsored rotations (e.g., Brinkerhoff, 1995; U.S. General

Accounting Office, 1995; Segal, 1994; Segal & Segal, 1993). Thus, little

attention has been paid to determining peacekeeping mission impact on

the units that remain stateside.

To this end, this chapter documents the results of U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Science's (ARFs)

research effort to assess the impact of the peacekeeping mission on the

sponsoring ARNG division, as determined from the perspective of those

soldiers who remained behind at home station. In doing so, it provides

411
412 RC Peacekeepers

information for determining whether or not extension of the

composite-battalion concept to future peacekeeping missions is a good

idea. If so, this information can then be used to facilitate the planning

and execution of future peacekeeping missions involving extensive RC

participation.

METHOD

Of the 294 volunteers from the 29th ID(L) who participated in the

peacekeeping mission, 265 (90%) came from the division's nine infantry

battalions. Table 16-1 shows the number and percentage of soldiers lost

to the peacekeeping mission from each. Under the assumption that

peacekeeping mission impact would be most likely to occur in units that

suffered the majority of personnel loss, data collection was restricted to

these nine battalions.

Design and Procedure

A longitudinal, questionnaire/interview-based data collection design

was used to assess peacekeeping mission impact. Questionnaires were

mailed to senior leaders (twice) and to junior leaders/soldiers (once) from

the selected infantry battalions. Additionally, senior leaders who

completed both of their questionnaires were subsequently interviewed by

telephone.

Participants

Senior leader sample. On the basis of their duty assignments, 112

senior leaders from the selected infantry battalions were identified as

qualified to observe and evaluate any impact that might have resulted

from the loss of soldiers to the peacekeeping mission. This sample

consisted of the company commanders and first sergeants (lSGs) from

all 36 companies of these battalions {n = 72); as well as the battalion

commanders, staff training officers, and sergeants major (n = 27); the

brigade commanders, staff training officers, and sergeants major (n = 9);

and the division's chief of staff, staff officers for personnel and training,

and sergeant major (n = 4).
Impact on Home Unit 413

Table 16-1

Number and Percentage of Soldiers Lost to the Peacekeeping Mission

From the 29th Division's Nine Infantry Battalions

Contributing Number of Percentage of

Battalion Soldiers Soldiers

1/116th 38 11.44%

2/116th 27 6.51%

3/116th 53 12.01%

1/170th 26 6.56%

1/183rd 16 4.02%

1/115th 32 6.16%

2/115th 32 8.29%

1/175Ü1 18 6.77%

2/175th 23 5.40%

Total 265 7.40%

Junior leader/soldier sample. Potential recipients of the junior

leader/soldier questionnaire consisted of all soldiers from the nine

selected infantry battalions, excluding those soldiers participating in the

peacekeeping mission and those already included in the senior leader

sample. Because of the large numbers involved, this sample was

restricted to all infantry platoon leaders (n = 168) and platoon sergeants

(n = 107) as well as to 400 squad leaders and 200 squad members from

the selected battalions, with participants holding the latter two duty

positions selected randomly from the 992 and 1,982 soldiers available,

respectively. Thus, the total junior leader/soldier sample size was limited

to an n of 875.

Questionnaires

Administration. Questionnaires were administered to senior leaders

about 60 and 170 days, and to junior leaders/soldiers about 120 days,

after peacekeeping troops had deployed to the Sinai on their mission.

Questionnaires were sent by regular mail and were designed to require

less than 1 hour to complete. To encourage participation, telephone calls

(to senior leaders only) were made in cases of nonresponse. Ultimately,

however, participation was on a voluntary basis.
414 RC Peacekeepers

Content. The questionnaires were designed to identify potential

impact on the areas of training, personnel, and readiness (positive or

negative) perceived as attributable to the loss of unit volunteers to the

peacekeeping mission. Questioned areas of training impact included: the

presence and extent of training impact, unit adaptability, impact on

training plans and performance standards, and impact on work hours.

Questioned areas of personnel impact included: morale, attitudes toward

future peacekeeping participation, and anticipated reassignment

problems. Questioned areas of readiness impact included: presence and

extent of readiness impact, leadership capabilities, performance of

mission essential tasks (METs), and weapons qualification. Whenever

responses indicated that an impact was perceived, respondents were

asked additional questions to document its extent and to determine what

adjustments were made. For the most part, identical questions were

asked of both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers.

Interviews

Conduct. About 90 days after peacekeeping troops had returned to

home station, telephone interviews were conducted (by the same

researcher) with 65 of the 71 (91.5%) senior leaders who had completed

both previous questionnaires. The timing of the interviews was selected

so as to provide an optimal opportunity to assess impact perceptions

related to the peacekeeping mission after it was completed but before

memory of its impact faded.

Content. The focus of the interviews was on the training status of

peacekeeping troops who had returned from the Sinai and their impact on

subsequent unit morale and readiness.

RESULTS

Questionnaire Return Rates

Senior leader return rates. Of the 112 questionnaires sent to senior

leaders on the first mailing, 102 were completed for a return rate of 84%.

Of those who responded to the first questionnaire, 78 remained in the

same (or similar) duty position within their units during the approximate

4-month interval between questionnaire administrations, and therefore
Impact on Home Unit All

served as the sample for the second questionnaire. Of those mailed, 71

were completed for a return rate of 91 %. Because of the longitudinal

nature of data collection, the 71 senior leaders who returned both

questionnaires served as the sample from which responses were analyzed.

For analysis purposes, all battalion-level leaders (or above) were

combined into one category (hereafter referred to as simply battalion

leaders) to facilitate comparisons with company commanders and lSGs.

Overall, returns for senior leaders were relatively uniform across

battalions, as shown in Table 16-2.

Table 16-2

Number of Returns by Duty Position for Each Battalion

Dutv Position

Company Battalion

Battalion lSGs Commanders Leaders Totals

11/116th 4 2 2 8

2/116th 3 4 3 10

3/116th 2 3 5 10

l/170th 2 2 2 6

l/183rd 3 2 3 8

1/115th 3 2 1 6

2/115th 3 2 1 6

l/175th 4 2 2 8

2/175Ü1 1 2 1 2

Total 24 23 24 71

Junior leader/soldier return rates. Of the 817 questionnaires sent to

junior leaders/soldiers (adjusted downward from the 875 indicated earlier

because of undeliverables), 196 were completed for a return rate of 24%

(see Table 16-3). Although this return rate was considerably lower than

that observed for senior leaders, the responses obtained from both

samples were highly similar.
416 RC Peacekeepers

Table 16-3

Composition of the Junior Leader/Soldier Sample

Duty

Position

#

Mailed

UndeliverablesAdjusted

Base Returns

Return

Rate

Platoon

Leaders 168 13 155 55 35.5%

Platoon

Sergeants 107 3 104 47 45.2%

Squad

Leaders 400 22 378 77 20.4%

Squad

Members 200 2Q 180 11 9.4%

Total 875 58 817 196 24.0%

Interview Completion Rate

Sixty-five of the 71 senior leaders (91.5%) who had completed both

of their questionnaires also completed the postpeacekeeping mission

interview.

Table 16-4

Training Impact of the Peacekeeping Mission

Response

Had an Impact

Positive

Negative

No Impact

Do Not Know

Senior Senior Junior/

Leaders Leaders Leaders

at Time 1 (%) at Time 2 (%) Soldiers (%)

52.1 47.8 48.5

18.3 23.9 33.2

33.8 23.9 15.3

45.1 52.1 50.0

2.8 0.0 1.5
Impact on Home Unit 417

Training Impact

About one half of the infantry battalion's senior leaders and junior

leaders/soldiers reported that the peacekeeping mission impacted training

(see Table 16-4). Senior leaders initially rated the impact as negative, by

almost a 2-to-l margin. By the second measurement, however, senior

leaders had shifted substantially in their evaluations, with the same

proportion (23.9%) reporting positive and negative impacts. Junior

leaders/soldiers, on the other hand, reported a positive impact by about a

2-to-l margin.

Table 16-5 shows how senior leaders shifted toward a less negative

view of training impact. The first column shows the number of senior

leaders who initially reported positive training impact, no impact, or

negative training impact. The next three columns show how senior

leaders within each rating category subsequently evaluated the training

impact of the peacekeeping mission. As can be seen in the first data row,

of the 13 senior leaders who reported a positive impact at Time 1, 6 also

reported a positive impact at Time 2, 6 shifted by one position to a rating

of no impact, and 1, who was initially positive, shifted two rating

positions to give a negative rating at Time 2.

Table 16-5

Time 1 and Time 2 Senior Leaders' Training Impact Ratings

Time 2

Positive No Impact Negative

Time 1 Oz=16^ (n = 36) (n=\7)

Positive (n = 13) 6 6 1

No Impact (n = 32) 5 23 4

Negative (n = 24) 5 7 12

The second data row of Table 16-5 shows that senior leaders who

reported no training impact at Time 1 also tended to report no impact at
418 RC Peacekeepers

Time 2. Of those who shifted, there was about an equal tendency to shift

to either positive or negative ratings.

It was among senior leaders who were initially negative, however,

that the greatest degree of shifting occurred. Twenty-nine percent of the

senior leaders with an initially negative impact rating subsequently

shifted their ratings to no impqdt, and another 21% shifted from their

initial negative evaluation all the way to a positive rating. Although

shifting in training impact ratings occurred in all three categories, more

occurred from negative-to-positive than from positive-to-negative.

Amount oftraining impact. Senior leaders and junior leaders/

soldiers who reported that the peacekeeping mission impacted their units

training activities (in either a positive or negative direction) were asked to

rate the magnitude of this impact using a 5-point scale where a rating of 1

indicated "minor impact" and a rating of 5 indicated "major impact."

Table 16-6 presents the mean ratings for magnitude of training impact.

Means for positive impact are in the first data row, and means for

negative impact are in the second row. The last two data rows present the

results of analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests of significance between

positive and negative means. For junior leaders/soldiers, and for senior

leaders at Time 1, positive impact did not differ significantly from

negative impact. At Time 2, however, senior leader positive impact was

significantly greater than senior leader negative impact.

Table 16-6 also illustrates how senior leaders shifted toward more

positive views over time. Although mean ratings of amount of change at

Time 1 were equivalent for negative and positive impact groups, almost

twice as many senior leaders reported negative impacts as positive

impacts, so the absolute (or net) impact at Time 1 was negative. At Time

2, however, the number reporting positive impact equaled the number

reporting negative impact. Moreover, the amount of positive impact at

Time 2 was significantly greater than the amount of negative impact.

Across time, senior leaders changed from a negative stance, to a

decidedly positive one. Junior leaders/soldiers were pro peacekeeping

mission at the one time that they were questioned.

The postpeacekeeping mission interview revealed that any negative

training impact perceived by senior leaders during the peacekeeping

mission was offset by the return of peacekeeping volunteers who were
Impact on Home Unit 419

judged to be better trained upon their return than upon their departure for

peacekeeping duty. When asked during the interview if returning

soldiers were better trained, about the same, or not trained as well as

before they left, 72.7% of the 65 senior leader respondents replied that

their returning soldiers were better trained now than before. In addition,

no senior leader thought that the training status of returning peacekeeping

volunteers had deteriorated during the mission.

Table 16-6

Mean Magnitude of Positive and Negative Training Impact

Direction Senior Leaders Senior Leaders Junior Leaders/

of Change at Time 1 (%) at Time 2 (%) Soldiers (%)

Positive 2.08 2.71 2.78

Impact (n=13) (n=17) in = 65)

Negative 2.27 2.00 2.43

Impact (n = 22) (/i =17) (n = 30)

F(df) < 1(1, 33) 4.59(1,33) 1.86(1,93)

P ns <.05 ns

Relation between troop loss andjudgments oftraining impact.

Percentage of unit strength lost to the peacekeeping mission varied

substantially across units. Five senior leaders reported losing only 1% of

troop strength. Three senior leaders, however, lost 12% of their troops,

and almost one fifth of the senior leaders reported losing 10% or more of

their troops to the peacekeeping mission. Not surprisingly, percentage of

unit strength lost to the peacekeeping mission was related, especially

early in the mission, to senior leaders' propensity to rate the mission's

training impact as positive or negative (see Table 16-7).

An ANOVA of senior leader troop loss data at Time 1 indicated a

significant difference, F(2, 60) = 3.65, p < .05, among the displayed

means. (Eta squared = .1084.) Because the comparison of primary

interest was between positive and negative training impact groups, a

second ANOVA was conducted using only these two groups. This test

indicated that the reported percentage of unit strength lost to the mission
420 RC Peacekeepers

Table 16-7

The Relation Between Mean Percentage of Troop Loss and Training

Impact Ratings

Percentage of Unit Strength

Lost to the Peacekeeping Mission

Training Time 1 Time 2

Impact Rating Mean SD Mean SD

Positive Change 5.3 3.3 6.5 3.2

No Change 5.7 2.5 5.5 2.9

Negative Change 7.7 3.2 8.2 2.5

was significantly greater among senior leaders reporting a negative

training impact than among those reporting a positive training impact,

F(l, 31) = 4.25, p < .05. (Eta squared = .1205.)

An ANOVA of troop loss data based on training impact ratings

given by senior leaders at Time 2 also produced a significant outcome,

F(2, 60) = 3.84, p < .05. (Eta squared = .1134.) A follow-up comparison

of negative and positive training impact groups, however, yielded a

nonsignificant result at Time 2, F(l, 25) = 2.05, p > .05.

Newman-Keuls pair-wise comparisons indicated that the only significant

comparison was between negative and no impact groups (p < .05).

Impact on training plans and standards. Senior leaders were asked

if the peacekeeping mission had required changes in Annual Training

plans or in training standards, required more special training, or caused

critical training to be delayed. Responses to these questions are

summarized in Table 16-8. Few senior leaders reported changes or

impacts at either Time 1 or Time 2, but uncertainty concerning the

mission's eventual impact increased considerably across the two

measurement occasions. Senior leaders who responded "no" to these

questions at Time 1 tended to respond "don't know" at Time 2.

Similar questions were asked ofjunior leaders/soldiers. Responses

were consistent with those obtained from senior leaders, indicating that

although there had been some training impact, it had been minor. Only

3.6% ofjunior leaders/soldiers reported that the peacekeeping mission
Impact on Home Unit 421

Table 16-8

Auxiliary Training Issues (Senior Leaders)

Time 1 (%) Time 2 (%)

Training Issue Yes No. Dk Yes No Dk

Training Plans Changed? 4 88 7 9 51 41

Training Standards

Changed? 3 59 38 0 32 68

More Need for Special

Training? 13 51 37 4 26 69

Critical Training Delayed? 3 58 39 1 30 68

Note. Dk = Do Not Know.

had caused a delay in their own training. Somewhat more junior

leaders/soldiers said they had received additional training (11.2%), or

assumed additional duties (21.9%) as a result of the peacekeeping

mission, and 9.7% ofjunior leaders/soldiers thought the peacekeeping

mission might lead to promotion opportunities.

Increased work hours. When asked if their soldiers were required to

work longer hours as a result of the peacekeeping mission, 15.5% of

senior leaders said yes at Time 1 and 14.1% said yes at Time 2. Senior

leaders were also asked if they personally worked longer hours as a result

of the peacekeeping mission. Affirmative responses were given by

14.7% at Time 1 and by 15.5% at Time 2. The mean number of weekly

extra work hours reported by senior leaders at Time 1 was 3.80. By Time

2 that mean had dropped to 3.09. Seventy percent of the senior leaders

who reported longer hours at Time 1 also reported longer hours at Time

2, indicating that the effect tended to last throughout the duration of the

mission. For senior leaders reporting longer work hours at both Times 1

and 2, the mean additional weekly hours were 3.57 and 2.86,

respectively, at the two measurement occasions. This decrease was not

statistically significant, t(6) = 0.53, p > .05.

One junior leader/soldier in 10 (10.2%) reported working longer

hours as a result of the peacekeeping mission. The mean number of
422 RC Peacekeepers

additional weekly work hours (for the 10.2% ofjunior leaders/soldiers

affected) was 4.15.

Unit adaptability. Regardless of whether senior leaders thought the

training impact of the peacekeeping mission was positive or negative,

they were confident of their units' ability to adapt to changing

circumstances. When asked to rate the extent to which their units had

been able to adjust to training impacts caused by the peacekeeping

mission, senior leaders responded with mean ratings in excess of 4.0 on a

5-point scale, regardless of whether they had evaluated the training

impact of the mission as positive or negative.

Personnel Impact

Morale. Approximately one third of the junior leaders/soldiers and

senior leaders who were questioned said that the peacekeeping mission

had impacted on morale in their units. Of those who reported an impact,

the direction of the impact was predominantly in the positive direction

(see Table 16-9).

Table 16-9

Reported Change in Morale

Direction Senior Leaders Senior Leaders Junior Leaders/

of Change at Time 1 (%) at Time 2 (%) Soldiers (% )

Positive Change 33.8 28.2 33.9

Negative Change 2.8 4.2 4.2

No Change 63.4 67.6 62.0

Among senior leaders, perceptions of morale change varied

substantially by duty position. The highest levels of perceived positive

morale change were reported by company commanders (see Table

16-10). Reports of negative morale change were negligible, regardless of

duty position. In addition, the postpeacekeeping mission interview

revealed that almost 85% of the senior leaders thought that overall unit

morale had improved because the peacekeeping volunteers themselves
Impact on Home Unit 423

returned with morale either improved or about the same as before they

left for peacekeeping duty.

Table 16-10

Reported Positive Morale Change by Duty Position

Duty Position

lSGs

Company Commanders

Battalion Leaders

Total

Time 1 (%)

16.0

52.0

333

33.8

Time 2 (%)

16.7

39.1

222

28.2

In the junior leader/soldier survey, judgments of positive morale

impact also varied by duty position (see Table 16-11). Platoon leaders

were most likely to report a positive morale impact. Few reports of

negative morale change occurred at any duty position among the junior

leaders/soldiers. The mean amount of positive morale change (as

measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = minor change and 5 = major

change) was 2.5 at Time 1 and 2.85 at Time 2 for senior leaders, and 2.86

for junior leaders/soldiers at the one time they were questioned.

Table 16-11

Reported Positive Morale Changes Among Junior Leaders/Soldiers

% Reporting Positive Morale Change bv Duty Position

Platoon Leaders

Platoon Sergeants

Squad Leaders

Squad Members

Total

53.7

31.9

27.6

JLQ

33.7

Future peacekeeping participation. When asked if the 29th ID(L)

should participate in more assignments like the peacekeeping mission,

the vast majority of respondents replied "yes." Senior leaders
424 RC Peacekeepers

unanimously endorsed this prospect at Time 1, and it was affirmed by

98.6% of senior leaders at Time 2. Endorsement by junior leaders/

soldiers was almost as widespread, at 92.7%.

Fewer than one senior leader in five (15.7%) had volunteered for the

current peacekeeping mission. When asked if they would volunteer for a

future peacekeeping mission, however, 38.0% of senior leaders said

"yes" at Time 1 (see Table 16-12). This proportion had grown to 46.5%

by Time 2. The increase from Time 1 to Time 2 in senior leaders'

professed willingness to volunteer for future missions came principally

from senior leaders at the battalion level (and above).

Table 16-12

Percentage of Senior Leaders Who Would Volunteer for a

Future Peacekeeping Mission

Duty Position Time 1 (%) Time 2 (%)

lSGs 40.0 41.7

Company Commanders 40.0 43.5

Battalion Leaders 33.3 54.2

Total 38.0 46.5

Almost one quarter of the junior leaders/soldiers (24.5%) said they

had volunteered for the current peacekeeping mission, and 36.7% said

they would volunteer for a future mission. One junior leader/soldier in

five (22.6%), however, said they did not receive sufficient information

about the peacekeeping mission to make an informed decision about

volunteering (See Chapter 3 for more on this issue).

Reassignment. Based on questionnaire responses, only one senior

leader in five anticipated problems with integrating peacekeeping

volunteers back into their units. This figure varied little from Time 1

(18.3%) to Time 2 (19.7%). Approximately 1 junior leader/soldier in 6

(15.9%) anticipated problems following the return of the peacekeeping

volunteers. The most frequently anticipated concern was that

peacekeeping volunteers—especially the better soldiers among
Impact on Home Unit 425

them—would seek other active duty assignments rather than return to

their ARNG units, thereby weakening the performance capability of their

units. The only other anticipated problem to receive more than scattered

mention was that similar duty positions would not be available for

returning peacekeeping soldiers because of anticipated unit restructuring.

Readiness Impact

Readiness questions focused on determining whether or not changes

had occurred in readiness levels since volunteers had left their units to

participate in the peacekeeping mission, and if so, whether or not these

changes had been caused by the peacekeeping mission. Senior leaders

were asked to assess changes in readiness in the following areas: officer

leadership capability, soldier's ability to perform mission-essential tasks,

weapons qualification capability, and overall combat readiness. A subset

of these questions was asked ofjunior leaders/soldiers. In all areas,

respondents were asked to compare present conditions with those that

had existed 6 months before volunteer soldiers departed for the

peacekeeping mission.

If a change in readiness level had occurred, respondents were next

asked to indicate whether the change was positive or negative. Then,

using 5-point rating scales, they indicated the magnitude of change

(ranging from minor change = 1, to major change = 5) and the extent to

which the peacekeeping mission had caused the change (ranging from not

at all = 1 to totally = 5).

Impact of the peacekeeping mission on combat readiness was

perceived to be negative, although this negative impact lessened with

time for most senior leaders (see Table 16-13). The proportion of

negative combat readiness ratings varied across time as a function of duty

position. Both company commanders and battalion-level senior leaders

became less negative across measurement occasions, while lSGs became

more negative. In the junior leader/soldier survey, positive impacts on

combat readiness were reported by 10.2% ofjunior leaders/soldiers and

negative impacts were reported by 23.5%.

Early in the mission the tendency to judge the impact of the

peacekeeping mission as either positive, negative, or neutral was related

to the percentage of unit troop loss to the peacekeeping mission. At Time
426 RC Peacekeepers

Table 16-13

Reported Change in Combat Readiness (Senior Leaders Only)

None/Dk (%)

limsJ. Time 2

Duty

Position

Company

Positive

Time 1 Time 2

Negative

Time 1 Time 2

Commanders 12.0 13.0 40.0 21.7

lSGs 16.0 16.7 24.0 37.5

Battalion

Leaders Ofl 8.3 47.6 25.0

Total 9.9 12.7 36.5 28.2

48.0 65.2

60.0 45.8

52.4 66.7

53.5 59.1

1, senior leaders who said that the mission produced a negative impact on

combat readiness experienced the largest percentage of troop loss. Those

saying the impact was positive had the smallest percentage troop loss,

and those reporting no impact on combat readiness experienced an

intermediate level of troop loss. This correspondence was statistically

significant at Time 1, F(2, 59) = 4.23, p < .05. (Eta squared = .1253.) A

Newman-Keuls test indicated that the negative change mean was greater

than either the positive change mean or the no change mean (p < .05).

The relation between percentage of troop loss and combat readiness

ratings did not occur at Time 2, F(2, 59)<l,p> .05). The data on

proportional troop loss at both measurement occasions are shown in

Table 16-14. Although the absolute difference between the highest and

lowest means at Time 1 was not great, the largest mean troop loss (7.4%)

was 72% greater than the smallest mean troop loss (4.3%). Thus, relative

loss seems to have been the key.

The mediating influence of percentage of troop loss upon judgments

of combat readiness may partially explain the anomalous divergence,

noted above, between decreasing negative judgments of company

commanders and battalion leaders versus increasing negative judgments

of lSGs. As shown in Table 16-13, lSGs became more negative over

time in theirjudgments of the peacekeeping mission's impact upon

combat readiness, whereas company commanders and battalion leaders

became less negative. Troop loss may interact with time, becoming more

aversive at the most direct level of contact. Although company

commanders and battalion leaders can make administrative adjustments,
Impact on Home Unit 427

lSGs may find it progressively more difficult to adjust to the undeniable

reality of fewer bodies.

Table 16-14

The Relation Between Mean Percentage of Troop Loss and Combat

Readiness Impact Ratings

% of Unit Strength

Lost to the Peacekeeping Mission

Combat Readiness Time 1 Time 2

Impact Rating Mean SD Mean SD

Positive Change 4.3 2.6 6.8 2.8

No Change 5.6 2.9 6.0 3.2

Negative Change 7.4 2.9 6.8 2.6

Although more senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers reported

negative than positive changes in combat readiness, those who reported

positive changes rated them as having greater impact. Table 16-15

summarizes mean ratings of the amount of observed changes, as

measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 = minor change and 5 = major

change. The difference between positive and negative mean ratings was

significant among junior leaders/soldiers, but not among senior leaders.

Senior leaders who reported negative changes, however, were more

inclined to attribute the changes to the peacekeeping mission, although

this tendency diminished somewhat across measurement occasions. At

Time 1, mean attribution ratings (on a 5-point scale) for negative and

positive change were 3.5 and 2.1, F(l, 31) = 5.58, p < .05, respectively.

At Time 2, negative and positive attribution ratings were 3.5 and 2.7,

F(l, 27) = 2.10, p > .05, respectively. Among junior leaders/soldiers, the

tendency for greater attribution of negative changes to the peacekeeping

mission did not occur. Mean junior leader/soldier attribution ratings for

positive and negative changes in combat readiness were 3.1 and 2.9.

These means did not differ statistically (p > .05).
428 RC Peacekeepers

Table 16-15

Mean Ratings of the Extent of Change in Combat Readiness

Junior Leaders/

Senior Leaders Senior Leaders Soldiers

at Time 1 at Time 2 at Time 1

Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative

(n = 7) (n = 26) (n = 9) (n = 20) (TI = 20) (71 = 46)

2.7 2.0 3.2 2.5 3.4 2.4

F(l, 31) = 2.57, F(l,27) = 2.86, F(l, 64) =11.01,

ns ns p<.01

The postpeacekeeping mission interview of senior leaders revealed

that the return of peacekeeping volunteers to their home-station units had

a positive impact on unit readiness. No senior leaders reported a negative

impact while 35% of them reported a positive impact, with the reported

mean amount of change being equal to 3.09 on a 5-point scale.

Leadership capability. Both senior leaders and junior

leaders/soldiers were asked if there had been a change in the ability of

officers and lSGs to lead effectively (see Tables 16-16 and 16-17). More

senior leaders reported positive than negative change in leadership

capabilities, and positive change was reported increasingly across

measurement occasions, especially at the battalion level (and above).

Table 16-16

Reported Change in Leadership Capability

Direction Senior Leaders Senior Leaders Junior Leaders/

of Change at Time H%^ at Time 2 (%) Soldiers (%)

Positive Change 12.7 18.3 11.7

Negative Change 7.0 5.6 10.7

No Change or

Do Not Know 80.3 76.0 77.6
Impact on Home Unit 429

The mean amounts of positive change (on a 5-point scale) were 3.6 at

Time 1 and 3.3 at Time 2. The negative change mean ratings (on the

same 5-point scale) were 2.4 at Time 1 and 2.5 at Time 2.

Table 16-17

Reported Positive Change in Leadership Capability by Duty Position

Duty Position

lSGs

Company Commanders

Battalion Leaders

Total

Time If%1 Time 2 (%)

12.0 12.5

24.0 17.4

0,0 25.0

12.7 18.3

Although the majority of the senior leaders reported no change in

leadership capability, it is noteworthy that of those who did report a

change, more thought the change had been positive than thought it had

been negative. Those who reported a positive change also rated it as

substantially higher in magnitude than those reporting a negative change.

Mean attribution ratings (the extent to which observed changes could be

attributed to the peacekeeping mission) were equal for those reporting

positive and negative change: 3.2 on a 5-point scale.

About an equal proportion ofjunior leaders/soldiers reported positive

(12%) and negative (11%) changes in the leadership capabilities of their

officers and lSGs. The mean amount of change reported by junior

leaders/soldiers was equal for those reporting positive and negative

impacts: 2.9 on a 5-point scale. Mean attribution ratings also were

comparable: 2.8 for those reporting a positive change and 2.6 for those

reporting a negative change.

Performance ofmission essential tasks. Senior leaders were asked if

there had been a change in the capabilities of soldiers in their units to

perform METs. The ratio of senior leaders reporting positive versus

negative impacts was about 2-to-l, at both Times 1 and 2 (see Table

16-18). Moreover, the amount of positive change was substantially

greater than the amount of negative change (3.3 vs. 2.0 at Time 1, and 3.0
430 RC Peacekeepers

Table 16-18

Reported Change in Ability to Perform METs

Direction Senior Leaders Senior Leaders

of Change at Time 1 (%) at Time 2 (%)

Positive Change 19.7 15.5

Negative Change 9.9 8.5

No Change or

Do Not Know 70.4 76.0

vs. 2.3 at Time 2). The Time 1 means differed significantly, F(l, 19) =

9.87, p<.01.

Although senior leaders were twice as likely to say that observed

impacts on ability to perform METs were positive in direction and also

inclined to rate the amount of positive change as greater in magnitude

than negative change, there was a tendency to attribute negative impacts

to the peacekeeping mission to a greater degree. At Time 1, those who

reported a negative impact on ability to perform METs were significantly

more likely to attribute the change to the peacekeeping mission than were

those who reported a positive impact. The mean negative attribution

score was 4.4 on a 5-point scale, and the mean positive attribution score

was 2.6. The difference between these means was significant, F(l, 19) =

13.21, p <.01. At Time 2, the difference was less extreme, with a mean

negative attribution score of 3.3 and a mean positive attribution score of

2.5. The latter two means did not differ significantly (p > .05).

Weapons qualification. Neither senior leaders nor junior

leaders/soldiers reported substantial change in weapons qualification

capability. Ninety-two percent of the senior leaders at Time 1 and 87%

of senior leaders at Time 2 reported no change on this readiness

dimension. Among those reporting a change, the ratio of

positive-to-negative reports was about 2-to-l. Ninety percent of the

junior leaders/soldiers reported no change, and the remaining 10% were

equally divided between reports of positive and negative change.
Impact on Home Unit 431

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Impact on Training and Combat Readiness

Training impact. An important finding of this research is that senior

leaders' perceptions of peacekeeping mission impact on training changed

substantially over time. At first, many senior leaders were suspicious of

the peacekeeping mission's impact on training, perhaps being concerned

that such a mission would siphon away scarce personnel resources. As

the peacekeeping mission progressed, however, evaluations of its training

impact shifted from negative to positive. During this time, some

respondents (i.e., 15% of the senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers)

compensated for reductions in unit strength by working extra hours.

According to written comments, longer hours were necessary especially

when the missing soldiers were full-time personnel (i.e., Active Guard

and Reserve).

By the time the mission was over and the peacekeeping volunteers

had returned to their units, 72.7% of senior leaders reported that the

volunteers returned better trained than before they left. If this perception

is correct, then one can conclude that long-term positive training benefits

will occur within units of the 29th ID(L) as peacekeeping mission

volunteers are fully integrated back into their units. Indeed, the results of

postpeacekeeping mission interviews with senior leaders support this

conclusion.

Readiness impact. A similar shift in perceived impact was found in

the area of combat readiness. Throughout the duration of the

peacekeeping mission, senior leaders reported that its impact on combat

readiness was negative. A shift toward the positive, however, did occur

over time. In fact, by the time senior leaders were interviewed after the

peacekeeping mission was over and its soldiers were reassigned to their

units, 35.4% of senior leaders reported a positive impact on combat

readiness while none reported a negative impact. Although a change in

measurement method did occur (i.e., from questionnaire to interview),

and hence could have influenced the results somewhat, it appears safe to

say that a substantial shift in senior leader perception did occur over time.

Thus, the peacekeeping mission's short-term effect on combat readiness
432 RC Peacekeepers

was negative, whereas its long-term effect on combat readiness was

positive.

Mediating Effects of Troop Loss

Another important finding of this research is that senior leader

perceptions (especially those expressed early on when the prevalent

sentiment was negative) of peacekeeping mission impact on both training

and combat readiness appear to be related to the extent of unit troop loss.

Senior leaders who reported negative impact experienced a relatively

large percentage of troop loss, whereas those reporting positive impact

experienced a relatively small percentage of troop loss. The relation

between troop loss and judgments of impact on both training and combat

readiness suggests that consideration should be given in future missions

of this nature to selecting volunteers proportionally from all eligible units.

Impact on Morale

The final important finding of this research is that peacekeeping

mission impact on morale was consistently positive. About one third of

the senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers reported positive morale

impact within their units while the peacekeeping mission was in progress.

In addition, most senior leaders reported that the peacekeeping volunteers

themselves returned from the Sinai with enhanced morale. Reports of

positive morale impact were confirmed by the substantial percentages of

both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers who indicated willingness

to volunteer for a peacekeeping mission in the future. Furthermore,

virtually all senior leaders and over 90% ofjunior leaders/soldiers

thought that participation in the peacekeeping mission by the 29th ID(L)

was a good idea and endorsed future participation in similar missions.

The following comments from an officer in one of the division's infantry

units illustrates the overall positive evaluation which the peacekeeping

mission enjoyed.

I do not feel that the temporary loss of the peacekeeping

mission soldiers had any impact on the type or quality of the unit's

training during the past year. The positive impact on our combat

readiness that I indicated in this survey, I feel, results from the

psychological effect the peacekeeping mission has had on all of
Impact on Home Unit 433

our soldiers. This was the first time that these Guardsmen have

been given this opportunity to serve. Even for those that did not

volunteer to go to the Sinai, there is a sense of pride that members

of this unit and this division were called upon to perform a real

world mission. This makes them feel more a part of the total

Army, and makes them realize that with the downsizing of the

military, there is an increased chance that they could be called to

active service in defense of our national interests. Overall, I feel

that this is a good mission for the Guard, and should be "fine

tuned" with lessons learned, and continued in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Monitor the proportion of volunteers recruitedfrom each unit to

avoid disproportionate impact.

Substantial negative impact of the peacekeeping mission was

observed only in the area of combat readiness, and these perceived

negative impacts were associated with high proportions of troop loss.

Although negative combat readiness impacts tended to self-rectify

somewhat across the duration of the mission, they may be avoidable

entirely by implementing strict limitations on the percentage of troops

taken from any unit.

• Recruitfrom the largest practicable volunteer pool to spread the

impact oftroop loss and minimize its effect on individual units.

Administratively, this is probably a difficult recommendation to

implement because a broadened volunteer pool entails substantially

incremented coordination efforts. It should be recognized, however, that

volunteer assignments such as the peacekeeping mission have the

potential of delivering considerable psychological benefits to

participating units. Senior leaders in the 29th ID(L) convincingly stated

that the mere opportunity to participate in the peacekeeping mission

produced a huge psychological boost for the soldiers in their units. It

inspired renewed pride in their units and pride in the ARNG as an entity
434 RC Peacekeepers

capable of making significant real-world contributions to world peace. It

gave ARNG soldiers an enhanced feeling of being a mainstream

participant in the defense of our national interests. That kind of esprit de

corps is worth an extra administrative effort.

• Capitalize on morale benefits associated with peacekeeping

mission participation.

Evidence from all points in time and from every source (junior

leaders/soldiers as well as senior leaders) indicated that the peacekeeping

mission resulted in positive morale changes. These morale

improvements were reported not only for participating peacekeeping

volunteers, but also for division soldiers who did not participate in the

peacekeeping mission. It is to be hoped that these positive morale

changes can be built upon and expanded through future ARNG volunteer

missions. Support for future participation in similar missions was nearly

unanimous among both senior leaders and junior leaders/soldiers of the

29th ID(L). Clearly, the peacekeeping mission struck a responsive chord

among ARNG soldiers. ARNG participation in peacekeeping missions is

apparently a good idea whose time has come.
Impact on Home Unit 4_3_5_

REFERENCES

Brinkerhoff, J. R. (1995, May). Case studies in reserve component

volunteerism: A composite battalion taskforce for the U.S. Army

element ofthe multinationalforce and observers mission, Sinai

(IDA Document D-1665). Washington, DC: Institute for Defense

Analyses.

Hultman, E. L. (1996, May). GAO testimony: Reserve issues pertaining

to readiness. The Officer, 38, pp. 19-22.

Segal, D. R. (1994). Peace operations: Workshop proceeding (ARI

Research Report No. 1670). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Segal, D. R., and Segal, M. W. (1993). Peacekeepers and their wives:

American participation in the Multinational Force and

Observers. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

U.S. General Accounting Office. (1995, October). Peace operations -

effect oftraining equipment, and otherfactors on unit capability

(GAO/NSIAD-94-14). Washington, DC: Author.
SECTION 7

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this final section to Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers,

Chapter 17 (Phelps) consolidates the major conclusions from the

preceding chapters and makes recommendations for future use of Reserve

Component volunteers in either other Multinational Force and Observers

rotations or other missions. A critical caveat to all our findings is: they

apply to some other missions and configurations of soldiers, but by no

means to all. In this final chapter Phelps helps readers determine which

findings are likely to generalize by comparing the Sinai mission to other

recent peacekeeping missions.

437
17

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Ruth H. Phelps

The results of our research described in this book leave little doubt

that the concept of deploying a composite Active Component/Reserve

Component (AC/RC) battalion for peacekeeping in the Sinai is a good

idea. Enough qualified RC soldiers volunteered, they were successfully

trained to Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping

mission standards, and their families, despite being dispersed nationwide,

were adequately supported by existing AC/RC family support systems.

Unit cohesion turned out not to be a problem, although morale dropped

considerably over the duration of the deployment, a finding related to

misconceptions that occurred during predeployment recruiting and

training. The RC home division, from which most of the mission

volunteers were drawn, successfully compensated for the temporary loss

of these volunteers and benefited from increased morale.

Problems that were encountered by the 28th Rotation, e.g.,

micromanagement in a harsh, isolated, and monotonous operational

environment; dissatisfaction with leadership over rest and recreation

restraints; and decreased morale, were similar to those identified by Segal

& Segal (1993) in previous all-AC rotations. This tendency was

exacerbated in Rotation 28 because it was executed under intense

scrutiny by not only the Army leadership but also the Egyptian/Israeli

governments and the media.

439
440 RC Peacekeepers

APPLICABILITY TO OTHER MISSIONS

The Chief of Staff's original question asked about the general

feasibility of using volunteer RC soldiers to augment or replace AC

soldiers for selected peace missions. The answer appears to be "Yes" to

the notion of augmenting and "Maybe" to the notion of replacing.

Technically speaking, the findings of our research with the 28th Rotation

can be generalized only to future 80% RC/20% AC configured units with

the same Sinai peacekeeping mission. However, many of our findings

are, nonetheless, likely to apply to other AC/RC unit compositions as

well as to all-RC unit compositions. Findings on recruiting and selection,

and family support, for instance, are most likely not specific to the

composite 28th Rotation and the Sinai peacekeeping mission. In

addition, morale problems are likely to occur anytime soldiers feel that

their expectations have not been met.

Some findings, however, may or may not apply to other missions.

For example, soldier performance demonstrated under stable, low-threat

conditions, such as those experienced in the Sinai, may be quite different

under unpredictable, high-threat conditions, such as Bosnia. To help

identify other peace missions to which the present findings might apply,

the Sinai and four other missions are rated on seven dimensions as shown

in Table 17-1. Missions most similar to that conducted in the Sinai

should be reasonable candidates for using composite AC/RC, or possibly

all-RC, units. For example, the conditions in Macedonia, while not as

stable and with somewhat greater threat, are more similar to the Sinai

conditions than those of Somalia or Bosnia. Clearly, future research

involving such missions is needed to arrive at a definitive answer.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the above caveats, we recommend the following for each of

the five areas researched:

1. Personnel: Although the RC eventually filled all its personnel

slots for the Sinai mission, the recruiting/selection process could be

improved. First and foremost, we recommend that the unit responsible

for recruiting maintain frequent communication with volunteers about
Conclusions and Recommendations 441

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442 RC Peacekeepers

their selection status. Second, the conditions, opportunities, and benefits

of volunteering need to be spelled out in advance, standardized, and

presented in writing to all volunteers, regardless of their component, unit,

or location. Adherence to these recommendations should reduce RC

volunteer drop-out rate.

2. Training: Improvements can also be made in the area of training.

First, shorten predeployment training by focusing on only

mission-specific peacekeeping tasks. Concentrate leader training on

"training the trainer" and on building unit cohesion. Conduct this training

as part of mission-specific task training to eliminate the need for a

separate Infantry Leaders Course. Second, reorient training to include

synchronization of command and control functions under a variety of

situations; e.g., unauthorized aircraft sightings, medical emergencies, and

armed attacks. Consider use of simulations and simulators to support the

conduct of this training. Third, use the job knowledge test from this

research to identify topics in need of training emphasis. Validate the

supervisor rating scale that we developed and then use it to assist leaders

in evaluating job performance. Fourth, develop measures of unit

peacekeeping performance. One limitation of our research has been the

inability to measure how well the composite unit performed its mission.

Our individual measures of performance and job knowledge do not

necessarily reflect aggregate unit performance. Unit performance

measures would enable diagnostic assessment before a unit prepares for a

peacekeeping mission, unit evaluation before deployment, and a better

means of validating individual performance measures.

3. Attitudes and Perceptions: Many of reported morale problems

were traced to a discrepancy between what the soldiers expected from the

Sinai experience and what actually occurred. To preclude this situation,

set more realistic soldier expectations by improving the frequency and

accuracy of information disseminated during recruiting and reinforce

during training. In addition, train leaders to recognize conditions of

peacekeeping that often lead to morale problems; e.g. boredom,

repetitious tasks, isolations, and ambiguous rules of engagement.

Leaders also need to be aware that it is common under these same

conditions for leaders to contribute to decreased morale by

micromanaging their subordinates.
Conclusions and Recommendations 443

4. Family Support: To ensure continued success in this area, we

recommend first that family support be kept as a high battalion priority.

Second, use family support providers as geographically close to families

as possible by maximizing the use of existing state and local family

assistance programs. Third, improve the accuracy of information on

addresses and telephone numbers to promote more proactive family

support. Fourth, provide information on how and when soldiers can call

home most inexpensively. Budget for morale calls (at least one

free-of-charge telephone call home per month) and provide toll-free

numbers to reach family assistance officers even before deployment.

5. Impact on RC Home Unit: To minimize the readiness impact on

home units due to the loss of personnel to peace missions, we recommend

first that only a limited number of soldiers be drawn from individual

battalions and that recruiting be done from the largest volunteer pool

possible. Second, we recommend that RC units consider sponsoring

more special missions, such as peacekeeping, to take advantage of the

morale benefits observed in the present research.

Finally, the strategy of using RC soldiers to augment or replace AC

soldiers on peace missions can free up AC soldiers for future

contingencies. Lessons learned from this research can be applied to

future Sinai peacekeeping rotations as well as to other potential peace

missions throughout the world. As we move toward a more global

society in the 21st century, it is time to expand our military strategies to

include an increased role for citizen soldiers. Certainly, the 28th Rotation

to the Sinai has demonstrated their willingness and ability to serve.
444 RC Peacekeepers

REFERENCES

Litz, B. T. (1996, Winter). The psychological demands of peacekeeping

for military personnel. Clinical Quarterly, 6, 1-8.

Segal, D. R, & Segal, M. W. (1993). Peacekeepers and their wives:

American participation in the Multinational Force and

Observers. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Steinberg, A. G. (1994, October). Changing requirements in U.S. Army

leader development. Paper presented at the meeting of the 36th

Annual International Military Testing Association Conference,

Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
APPENDIX

Beatrice J. Farr

SUMMARY OF SOLDIER COMMENTS

Following the administration of the soldier surveys 4 months into the

deployment in the Sinai, we asked soldiers to anonymously provide us

written comments on their MFO experience. Each soldier was provided

with a blank piece of paper; soldiers were not required to provide these

comments. We received 553 comments from 184 members of Rotation

28 (23 from A Company, 37 from B, 36 from D, and 43 from

Headquarters). The comments fell into the six broad areas listed below.

The frequency and percent of total comments in parentheses indicate how

many comments related to the topic were made by the Rotation 28

members. The six areas are listed from least to most frequently

mentioned.

1. ISSUES RELATING TO ARI'S SURVEYS (33 comments; 6%)

The most common complaint about ARI surveys was that there were

too many surveys and that they were too personal. The other main

concern was that no one would pay attention to the surveys.

• "I think that this test is taken too often and that the soldiers are

getting tired of it."

•

•

"Your questions about my wife and herfinances in her civilian job

are none ofyour business. "

"I know that whoever reads this will likely disregard what's been

written, but I have hope. "

445
446 RC Peacekeepers

• "/ wonder ifthese ARI questions are really going to do any good.

Especially negative comments...or will those 'accidentally' be

destroyed? "

• "I honestly feel that these surveys are pointless. We 've all given

thought-out, legitimate complaints multiple times with no change."

2. COMMENTS RELATING TO COMMUNICATION (55

comments; 10%)

These were primarily complaints about being lied to and not having

promises kept, as well as problems relating to an inadequate flow of

information.

• "We, National Guardsmen, have been treated poorly, promised

things that never happened, disrespected as human beings and

consistently screwed."

• "This unit lied to every Active Duty soldier, and continues to lie

aboutfollow-on assignments and other bull."

3. PROBLEMS SPECIFIC TO THIS MISSION—WHAT WENT

WRONG (79 comments; 14%)

Many complained about inadequate education and rest and relaxation

(R&R) opportunities. About 25% felt that various aspects of training

were not appropriate, and quite a few noted that services such as phone,

transportation, and mail were inadequate.

• "No R&R, no free time, and all the dog and pony shows get old

fast."

• "We 've all spoken with soldiers who have been on this mission

before, and they all had much more time off. "
Appendix , 447

• "We do very stupid training."

• "Ifeel I'm going to have to be retrained when I get back to my

unit."

4. COMMENTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE

MISSION (107 comments; 19%)

This category included both favorable and unfavorable comments

(particularly about disapproval of the mission), unpleasant tasks, and

negative comparisons to other missions.

• "This is my third tour with the MFO, and it couldn 't have been

better."

• "This deployment has been the worst experience ofmy ten year

career in the Active Army. Never have I been more disgusted with a

unit, and the military in general, than now."

• "I do not wish any help on my part, but I wish someone would look

into this to helpfuture soldiers who may be on a mission like this."

• "Let the world police its own!"

5. COMMENTS ABOUT THE COMPOSITE UNIT (105 comments;

19%)

About 25% of the comments on the composite unit expressed a dim

view of the mixed battalion, and another 25% related to RC soldiers'

complaints about AC soldiers and leaders.

• "Ifeel the RC is able to do peacekeeping missions but I don't think

using Active Duty mixed is a good idea."

• "This composite unit is a prime example ofa good idea gone bad."

• "Morale took a dive because ofthe treatment the National

Guard/Reserve units got."
448 RC Peacekeepers

• "Officers and a few NCOs try to findfault with anything the

National Guard/Reserves do. Even when we are being counseled,

we are the dirt bags."

6. ISSUES RELATING TO LEADERSHIP (174 comments; 31%)

This was clearly the most disturbing aspect of the mission for many

soldiers. Many complained about being micromanaged, treated like

children, and feeling that they were not respected. The chain of

command, especially high-level leaders, received more criticism than did

midlevel managers.

"Top management is more concerned with their own careers and

evaluation reports than the welfare oftheir troops."

"I think the fear of failure' climate detractedfrom the overall

mission effectiveness."

"The leadership doesn't care how the enlisted men are treated as

long as we are looking good."

"Never before have I witnessed such a deep lack of concern for the

soldier and hisfamily...especially the Active Duty soldier."

"Our Active Duty [high level leader] does not appear to trust or

respect the men from the Reserves or Active Army."

"Ifeel that my immediate leadership is very lacking. I have not

been counseled in 3 months."

"The majority ofthe National Guard are over 21, educated, have

civilian jobs, but are still treated like children. "

"I have stood up for all my soldiers and anyone who needed some

help, until theyfinally brought charges against me."

"I see many soldiers who work hard and are getting nothing, and I

see those who use them as stepping stones being consideredfor

MSMs and ARCOMs."
Appendix 449

• "This Battalion is possibly the most ineptly run, and possibly the

lowest morale ofany Battalion I have ever seen. "

• "Please help prevent this [all the things causing low morale]from

happening in the future. I care about the Army, my country and

myselfand I cannot stand to see these things happening. Thank

you."

449