UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RITA M. CHURCH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 02-1179

STATE OF MARYLAND; RONALD

BALDWIN, Sergeant,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Andre M. Davis, District Judge.

(CA-00-3209-AMD)

Submitted: November 26, 2002

Decided: December 17, 2002

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Robin R. Cockey, COCKEY, BRENNAN & MALONEY, P.C., Salisbury, Maryland, for Appellant. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Michele J. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Glenn T.

Marrow, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellees. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Rita M. Church appeals the district court’s orders awarding summary judgment to Defendants on her claims filed pursuant to Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17

(2000), dismissing her hostile work environment claim filed pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), and dismissing her state law based claim

against Defendant Baldwin. 

Church first claims that the district court erred in concluding that

she failed to establish a reasonable basis for imposing liability on her

employer, the State of Maryland (hereinafter the "State"), for the

actions of a co-worker, Ronald Baldwin. See Causey v. Balog, 162

F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1998) (establishing four-prong test for hostile

work environment claims).* Typically, where harassment comes at

the hands of a fellow employee with no supervisory powers over the

victim, there can be no finding of vicarious liability as to the

employer. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998)

(noting that vicarious liability requires existence of more than coworker employment relationship). In such a situation, the employer is

liable only for its own negligence in failing to take prompt and adequate action to stop [the harassment]." Mikels v. Durham, 183 F.3d

323, 332 (4th Cir. 1999). We find nothing in the record to demonstrate that Baldwin was more than a co-worker. Although he possessed greater seniority than Church, there was no evidence that he

possessed the decision making authority consistent with a supervisory

position. 

We also find that the State took prompt and adequate action to remedy Church’s concerns once they were brought to the State’s atten-

*The parties stipulated for purposes of the motion for summary judgment that Church could establish the first three prongs. 

2 CHURCH v. STATE OF MARYLAND
tion. Like the district court, we have difficulty accepting Church’s

claim that she reported the hostile work environment to the State in

August 1997. Church’s explanations for the multiple dates of complaint are implausible. Furthermore, her own statement to the Equal

Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC") disavows the existence of a complaint prior to 1999. As a consequence, the district

court did not err in concluding that the State was not made aware of

Church’s claims until September 1999 when she forwarded a copy of

her EEOC complaint to the State. 

Once the State was in receipt of the complaint, it acted promptly

to investigate and ultimately, in October 1999, reprimanded Baldwin

for his behavior, reassigning him to a location away from Church.

The district court did not err in concluding that this was prompt and

adequate action. Accordingly, we reject Church’s claim that the district court erred in its determination that she had failed to establish a

claim of hostile work environment within the context of Title VII. 

Additionally, because Church’s § 1983 claim was duplicative of

her Title VII claims, we need not consider them further. See Gairola

v. Virginia Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985)

(finding that elements of prima facie case are same under Title VII

and § 1983). 

Finally, Church claims that the district court erred in concluding

that the principles of res judicata barred her state law based claim

against Baldwin. The basis for the district court’s application of res

judicata was that an action alleging the same claims Church had

brought against Baldwin in state court had been dismissed with prejudice when Church failed to appear for trial. Under the doctrine of res

judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties

or their privies based on the same cause of action. Andrews v. Daw,

201 F.3d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 2000). The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), requires a federal court to apply state res judicata law in determining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment. In re Genesys Data Techs., Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir.

2000). 

Under Maryland law, a dismissal with prejudice qualifies as an

adjudication on the merits. See Moore v. Pomory, 620 A.2d 323, 325

CHURCH v. STATE OF MARYLAND 3
(Md. 1993). Church concedes that her state action against Baldwin

was dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the district court did not

err in dismissing this claim. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

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