*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 28, 2005*

Decided September 28, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1956

DEBRA L. THOMAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHIRLEY STARKS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Southern

District of Indiana, Evansville

Division

No. EV 02-33-C-Y/H

Richard L. Young, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Over the course of two years, the school that Debra Thomas’s daughter

attended in Evansville, Indiana, submitted eight referrals of child abuse and one of

neglect to the county office of child protective services. Records show that

caseworkers substantiated two of the referrals after interviewing Thomas. The

caseworkers, however, never removed Thomas’s daughter, or took any action other

than simply advising her that she should seek counseling for her disciplinary

methods. Thomas acknowledges that a caseworker interviewed her on one occasion, 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1956 Page 2

and that during that interview she admitted the allegations that prompted the

specific referral. But she has always maintained that there were no other

interviews, and that a caseworker’s report confirming a different referral is false. 

Thomas eventually filed this lawsuit against two caseworkers and a supervisor

claiming they violated her rights under the federal Constitution and state tort law

by fabricating investigative reports. The district court granted summary judgment

for the defendants on both claims, reasoning that Thomas failed to establish a

constitutional violation and that she could not pursue a tort suit under Indiana law

because she had not given the county prior notice of her intention to sue. 

Although Thomas filed her complaint pro se, she was at times represented by

retained and appointed attorneys. Her burden on appeal is to demonstrate to us

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Thomas directs us to no flaw in the

district court’s analysis or to any issue of material fact, and our review reveals none. 

To the extent Thomas argues a substantive due process claim arising under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for interfering with her relationship with her daughter, the district

court’s analysis is correct. It is undisputed that the defendants acted under color of

law, but Thomas cannot establish that their actions deprived her of a right secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Case v. Milewski, 327 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir.

2003). The Supreme Court has long held that a parent’s liberty interest in family

integrity is a component of substantive due process, see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (collecting cases), yet the right to family integrity is not

absolute, Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2002), and does not include

the right to be free from child abuse investigations, Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 520

(7th Cir. 2003). Such investigations must be based on definite and articulable

evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is

endangered, Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000), but

Thomas has never disputed that the defendants acted on referrals from her

daughter’s school, nor has she contended that those referrals were themselves

fabricated. 

Moreover, as the district court noted, the right to family integrity could not

have been violated merely by the defendants misrepresenting the content of their

investigations or the conclusions they drew; those actions did not interfere with the

parent-child relationship. Caseworkers did not remove Thomas’s daughter even

temporarily. Compare Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 601 (2d Cir. 1999)

(holding that removal of child for several hours to conduct medical exam was not

“severe enough” interference to violate substantive due process), with Brokaw, 235

F.3d at 1019 (holding that child’s four-month separation from his parents could be

challenged as denial of substantive due process). Neither did they deny Thomas the
No. 05-1956 Page 3

opportunity to spend time with her daughter. See Terry, 346 F.3d at 787 (holding

that denying non-custodial parent one day of visitation did not interfere with family

rights). Nor did Thomas ever contend that she feared her daughter would be taken

away. See Doe, 327 F.3d at 524 (holding that child welfare caseworkers violated

due process by making baseless threats that led plaintiffs to fear that removal of

their children was imminent). Indeed, the very premise of her complaint is that

Thomas was interviewed just one time, and that whatever else the defendants say

they did to investigate the referrals is untrue. 

And that contention is really what her lawsuit is about. The recurring theme

in Thomas’s submissions is that the conduct of the defendants has injured her

reputation in the community, a result that Thomas characterizes as a violation of

her right to procedural due process. But the Supreme Court has held that

procedural due process does not protect against injury to reputation alone because

reputation is neither “liberty” nor “property.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712

(1976); Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 286 F.3d 987, 992-93 (7th Cir. 2002). An injury to

reputation may be a viable theory under state law, but a procedural due process

claim is the wrong vehicle for seeking redress. Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905, 916

(7th Cir. 1999).

Finally, the district court was correct to dismiss Thomas’s state-law tort

claim. Indiana law requires that a party injured by a government employee must

give the employing entity or the attorney general notice of tort claims within 270

days of the loss or else the suit will be barred, even against the employee in his

individual capacity. See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-6 (2005); Bushong v. Williamson, 790

N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 2003); Poole v. Clase, 476 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind. 1985). 

Thomas admittedly filed her notice of tort claim almost two years after she found

out about the substantiated referrals against her, and it is not even clear that she

disputes the dismissal of her supplemental claim under Indiana law. Rather, she

appears to misunderstand the effect of her failure to file the notice because her only

argument on appeal is that § 1983 does not require such notice. What the district

court said, however, was that her failure to file a notice of tort claims bars her state

claim. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.