STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE CHAIRMEN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

1990 TO 2005

Richard Meinhart

April 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-239-X
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FOREWORD

Throughout literature, we have learned from the ways that 

others have used systems and processes to respond to challenges. 

This Letort Paper by Dr. Richard Meinhart builds upon his doctoral 

dissertation, Strategic Planning Through An Organizational Lens, 

that examined what higher education leaders could learn from the 

Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff’s strategic planning in the 1990s and 

updates that examination through 2005 to reflect Chairman Myers’ 

use. This update is particularly relevant because the challenges that 

our leaders faced in the first half of the 2000s with the Global War on 

Terror were different than those of the 1990s. In response to these new 

challenges, this strategic planning system continued to evolve as it 

retained stability in plans and resource products and accommodated 

changes in vision, strategies and assessments.

How leaders use strategic planning to position their organizations 

to respond to the complexities of their environment has multiple 

perspectives whether a person has a background in business, 

education, government, or the military. While this paper has historical 

relevancy, its main value is from a leader’s perspective. As such, it 

identifies key concepts relevant for today’s leaders to consider when 

using strategic planning that focuses on vision, strategic planning 

process and product characteristics, magnitude of change, and 

organizational culture.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RICHARD MEINHART is currently serving as a Professor of Defense 

and Joint Processes at the Army War College in the Department of 

Command, Leadership, and Management. He is a retired Air Force 

Colonel who has served in a variety of logistics-related assignments 

on the Air Force Staff, Army General Staff, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

as well as at three overseas locations. Dr. Meinhart’s research and 

writing interests are in the areas of leadership, strategic planning, 

and thinking competencies. Dr. Meinhart received a doctorate 

in education from The George Washington University and has 

masters’ degrees from the Naval War College and Central Michigan 

University.
v

SUMMARY

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in 

various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands 

of the current situation, while simultaneously focusing on future 

challenges. This Letort Paper examines how four Chairmen Joint 

Chiefs of Staff from 1990 to 2005 used a strategic planning system to 

enable them to meet their statutory responsibilities specified in Title 

10 US Code and respond to the ever-changing strategic environment. 

These responsibilities include: assisting the President and Secretary 

of Defense in providing strategic direction to the armed forces; 

conducting strategic planning and net assessments to determine 

military capabilities; preparing contingency planning and assessing 

preparedness; and providing advice on requirements, programs, and 

budgets. 

The Chairman’s strategic planning system is a primary and 

formal way he executes these responsibilities as this system creates 

products to integrate defense processes and influence others related 

to assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans. This planning 

system integrates the processes and documents of the people and 

organizations above the Chairman, which are the President and 

Secretary of Defense, and the people and organizations he directly 

coordinates with, which primarily are the different military services 

and combatant commanders. In addition to influencing the nation’s 

senior leaders, this system provides specific direction for many 

staffs that support these leaders. As such, this planning system is a 

key process that integrates the Nation’s military strategy, plans, and 

resources that consist of approximately 2.24 million active, guard, and 

reserve forces and total defense outlays of $465B by 2005. 

In examining how Generals Colin L. Powell (1989-93), John M. 

Shalikashvili (1993-97), Henry Hugh Shelton (1997-2001) and Richard 

B. Myers (2001-05) used a strategic planning system, this paper briefly 

describes the Chairman’s key responsibilities and strategic challenges. 

There were different strategic challenges in the decade of the 1990s 

versus the first half of the 2000s, and these challenges are compared 

and contrasted. The Joint Staff’s key organizational characteristics 

and the Chairmen’s leadership styles are examined briefly, because 

they will affect how a strategic planning system is used. The paper 
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then describes how the strategic planning system itself evolved 

as processes and products formally changed five different times. 

These incremental changes resulted in the strategic planning system 

evolving from a rigid, Cold War focus at the beginning of the 1990s 

to a more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused system when 

this decade ended. In the 2000s, this system became more focused on 

the War on Terror and on defining joint capabilities.

This planning system produced many products at various 

frequencies that were both classified and unclassified. These products 

are described for their broad impact and influence in the five main 

categories of assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans. The 

paper then summarizes the more significant ways each Chairman 

used this strategic planning system to provide formal advice and 

direction, which is an important part of his leadership legacy. For 

example, General Powell greatly simplified the planning system 

he inherited and published the first unclassified national military 

strategy that endures today. General Shalikashvili kept the flexibility 

and simplicity he inherited, but added long-term direction by 

publishing the Chairman’s first vision and expanded resource advice 

by adding an analytical assessment process and another resource 

product. General Shelton used the planning system in a very processoriented manner and focused on executing his predecessor’s vision 

before updating it. General Myers expanded the system’s focus by 

publishing an additional strategy that was focused on terrorism and 

changed internal processes to cultivate greater joint capabilities and 

interdependence. 

While this comprehensive assessment of each Chairman’s use 

of strategic planning has historical relevancy, its main value is that 

today’s leaders can learn from how these four leaders used systems and 

processes differently to respond to their complex global environment 

and varied strategic challenges. Specific leadership concepts illustrated 

throughout the paper include how leaders used vision; how leaders 

balanced flexibility and structure in strategic planning processes 

and products; how leaders used strategic planning to respond to 

different types of global challenges; and how leaders used systems to 

influence an organization’s climate and culture. The paper concludes 

by identifying five key leadership concepts that future leaders need to 

consider when they use strategic planning.
STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE 

CHAIRMEN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

1990 TO 2005

INTRODUCTION

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning 

in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the 

demands of the current situation, while simultaneously focusing on 

future challenges. This monograph examines how four Chairmen 

Joint Chiefs of Staff—Generals Colin L. Powell (1989-93), John M. 

Shalikashvili (1993-97), Henry Hugh Shelton (1997-2001), and Richard 

B. Myers (2001-05)—used a strategic planning system to enable them 

to meet their statutory responsibilities specified in Title 10 U.S. Code 

and respond to the strategic environment. As the 1990s progressed, 

the first three Chairmen were faced with responding to a strategic 

environment that started with the Gulf War and was followed by 

an increasing number of regional military operations across the 

spectrum of conflict, while accommodating slowly declining financial 

resources and a one-third decline in force structure. Since 2000, and 

particularly after September 11, 2001, the last two Chairmen were 

faced with entirely different strategic challenges dominated by the 

focus on terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, while 

needing to transform by developing future capabilities to achieve 

full spectrum dominance. 

In focusing on how these four leaders used a strategic planning 

system, this Letort Paper briefly describes the Chairman’s 

responsibilities, as well as the Joint Staff’s key organizational 

characteristics. Both the leader’s focus and the organization’s 

characteristics will influence how a strategic planning system is 

used. The author then examines how the strategic planning system 

evolved to better meet each Chairman’s needs. This planning system 

produced many products related to assessment, vision, strategy, 

resources, and plans. These products will be described for their 

broad impact and influence. Because many of these products are 

classified, the assessments necessarily will be brief. The author then 
summarizes the more significant ways each Chairman used this 

strategic planning system, which is part of his leadership legacy. 

While this comprehensive assessment of each Chairman’s use 

of strategic planning has historical relevancy, its main value is 

that today’s leaders can learn from how these four leaders used 

systems and processes differently to respond to their complex 

global environment and varied strategic challenges. During this 

assessment, specific leadership concepts are illustrated throughout, 

including how leaders use vision; how leaders balance flexibility 

and structure in strategic planning processes and products; how 

leaders use strategic planning to respond to different types of global 

environment challenges; and how leaders use systems to influence 

an organization’s climate and culture. Hence, this paper concludes 

by identifying five key leadership concepts that future leaders should 

employ when using strategic planning. 

CHAIRMAN’S RESPONSIBILITIES

Congress specified the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff’s formal 

leadership responsibilities in Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 153, under 

the following descriptive subheadings:1 (1) Strategic direction; (2) 

Strategic planning; (3) Contingency planning and preparedness; 

(4) Advice on requirements, programs, and budget; (5) Doctrine, 

training, and education; and (6) Other matters. These increased 

responsibilities were a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Department 

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), which is considered 

the most significant piece of defense legislation since the National 

Security Defense Act of 1947 established the Defense Department.2

The GNA was the result of almost 4 years of contentious dialogue 

and debate among Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual 

community, and the Reagan administration on how best to organize 

the Defense Department fundamentally to strengthen civilian 

authority, improve military advice to civilian leaders, provide for 

more efficient use of resources, and better execute in the field to 

respond to the nation’s security challenges.3

Since the U.S. Code was changed to incorporate the GNA’s 

provisions, the major functions and broad wording describing the 

Chairman’s key responsibilities fundamentally have remained 
the same, but there have been a few additions. These additions 

are associated with reports required by Congress, which were not 

envisioned in 1986, to assist members with their oversight and 

resource responsibilities. For example, the Chairman must now 

produce an annual report on combatant command requirements 

about the time when a budget is submitted to Congress. Most 

significantly, the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 

required that the Chairman produce, by February 15 of every evennumbered year, a detailed report that is a biennial review of the 

National Military Strategy to include the strategic and military risks 

to execute that strategy.4 This 2004 Act cleared up ambiguity that 

existed as to whether the Chairman actually needed to produce a 

National Military Strategy and what it should encompass. This 

change to existing U.S. Code is an example where the Chairman’s 

responsibilities initially were broad and identified “what” he had to 

do vice “how” to do it. But if Congress is not satisfied with execution 

or information, then the subsequent Code becomes more specific. 

To help with executing his responsibilities, the Joint Staff now 

directly supports the Chairman, an important distinction emphasized 

in the GNA. The Joint Staff has a budget of under $700 million and 

consists of approximately 700 military officers, 210 enlisted members, 

and 195 civilians, which is about a 15 percent military reduction 

from 2000.5 Further, there are others, such as those in the Defense 

Intelligence Agency or contractors, who work alongside this staff 

to support their focused work directly. The Chairmen used a welldocumented strategic planning system, which formally changed four 

different times (1990, 1993, 1997, and 1999), to help them execute 

the first four formal responsibilities identified earlier.6 This planning 

system’s importance is reflected by the words “primary” and 

“formal” that appeared in the beginning of all Joint Staff guidance 

that described the desired impact of its products and processes. 

The Chairman’s strategic planning system creates products 

to integrate defense processes and influence others related to 

assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans.7 This planning 

system integrates the processes and documents of the people and 

organizations above the Chairman (President and Secretary of 

Defense) and the people and organizations with whom he directly 
coordinates (Services and Combatant Commanders). The Chairman 

has no control over any significant defense resources (Secretary of 

Defense and Services control resources) or direct control of operational 

military forces (Combatant Commanders control operational forces); 

however, orders to those forces flow through him. The Chairman 

formally influences his civilian leaders and those with whom he 

coordinates through this strategic planning system. In addition to 

influencing leaders, this system provides specific direction for many 

staffs that support these leaders. As such, this planning system is 

a key function that integrates the Nation’s military strategy, plans, 

and resources consisting of approximately 2.24 million active, guard, 

and reserve forces and total defense outlays of $290B in 2000 that 

increased to $465B by 2005.8

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE

Strategic challenges can affect both a leader’s and staff’s use of a 

strategic planning system. The major challenges the Chairmen faced 

in the 1990s are characterized by the following: global competition 

and regional instability; increased military operations across the 

spectrum of conflict; slowly declining financial and personnel 

resources; rising maintenance and infrastructure costs; Cold-War 

focused equipment; and a need to infuse new technology. Since 

2000, with the Secretary of Defense’s initial focus on transformation, 

followed shortly by the Global War on Terror and then the operations 

in Afghanistan and Iraq, these challenges significantly changed in 

scope and character. To meet these new challenges, there was an 

increase of financial resources and better integrated technology, but 

there was no military manpower growth.9

Each Chairman generally used a consensus and collaborative 

leadership style when dealing with civilian and military leaders, 

but there were differences in their style and focus.10 This style and 

focus can have important influences on their organization’s climate 

and culture. What they pay attention to, what they say, and what 

organizational systems they use can embed and reinforce a certain 

culture within their organization.11 The Chairman establishes his 

unique “joint” climate that has been shaped by years of Service 
culture and experiences. The other Joint Chiefs, who serve dually 

as their separate military Service Chiefs, may embrace that joint 

climate. But they are also steeped in their Service culture and have 

specific Service interests and Title 10 responsibilities they must 

articulate and sometimes defend. For example, each Service Chief 

routinely identified unfunded needs to improve effectiveness. The 

officers on the Joint Staff, who have specific joint responsibilities 

among the eight staff directorates, only serve in this joint climate 

between 2 to 3 years before most return to their respective Services. 

While developing a joint culture was difficult, a strategic planning 

system can be an important reinforcing mechanism leaders can use 

to change existing culture.

In addition to these culture issues, there are multiple structural 

layers between the highest and the lowest levels of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. A strategic planning system must integrate the focused 

interests within these levels. For example, to process a typical Joint 

Staff action, there are between four and six layers where an issue 

will be scrutinized and revised to respond to these focused interests. 

This occurs typically as the staff action flows from action officer to 

division chief to the first general officer to J-Staff Director to Director 

Joint Staff and, finally, to Vice Chairman or Chairman. Within these 

structural layers are the historic cultural influences officers bring 

with them when working on or with this staff for a short time. Hence 

a strategic planning system must be both inclusive and flexible 

enough to accommodate these staff structural realities, while being 

responsive to the leader’s needs. Table 1 summarizes these strategic 

planning challenges and decisionmaking influences. 

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM CHANGES

Having identified the leader’s challenge, culture, and structure 

as they influence strategic planning, this paper now focuses on the 

changes to the planning system itself to give one insight into its use. 

There were four formal changes to the strategic planning system 

in 1990, 1993, 1997, and 1999. While the 1999 version is the current 

Chairman’s operation instruction in 2005, it has not been completely 

followed and is currently being revised. These formal changes, along 

with the current system in use, will be examined. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005

1990s Challenges 2000s Challenges

A.	Regional competition and threats	 A. Global War on Terror

B.	Gulf War	 B. Iraq and Afghanistan

C.	Greater number military operations	 C. Continued global engagements

D.	Declining financial and personnel	 D. Increasing financial resources

	 resources

E.	Need to integrate technology	 E. Need to transform to capabilities

F.	 Well maintained Cold War equipment	 F. Updated but worn equipment

Decisionmaking Influences:

A.	Chairman uses consensus and collaborative leadership style with little direct control

B.	Joint climate versus Service’s unique culture

C.	Financial focus on effectiveness

D.	Four to six structural layers to process actions

Table 1. Key Challenges and Decisionmaking Influences.

1989 Status. 

Prior to 1990 there was a realization that the strategic planning 

system, as specified in the January 24, 1989, Memorandum of Policy 

No. 84, was not accomplishing its purpose to enable the Chairman 

to execute fully his increased 1986 GNA responsibilities. This 

memorandum, the 17th revision since 1952, was described as “. . . 

unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic, and produced no less than 10 

major documents every 2-year planning cycle.”12 Congress criticized 

the strategic planning process itself during hearings that led to 

passing the GNA. Hence, the Joint Staff’s Director of Strategy and 

Planning was tasked to “. . . undertake an end-to-end evaluation of 

the products which are created by the Joint Strategic Planning System 

. . . to seek further opportunities in the cogency and timeliness of the 

process and products.”13 Such a comprehensive evaluation was the 

exception and not the norm.

1990 Change.

The outcome of this complete system overhaul culminated with 

Memorandum of Policy No. 7, dated January 30, 1990.14 This change 

streamlined the system by adding front-end leader’s guidance and 

eliminating or combining many other documents into more concise 
products, as ten products were reduced to four. The front-end 

guidance was provided through a formal joint strategy review for 

“. . . gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the 

integration of strategy, operational planning, and program 

assessments,”15 that culminated in publishing its first product—

Chairman’s Guidance. This concise document (6 to 10 pages) was 

structured to provide the principal, initial guidance in support of 

developing the planning system’s next three documents: the National 

Military Strategy Document, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the 

Chairman’s Program Assessment. 

This system, although streamlined, still required that a classified 

National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) be produced under a 

rigid 2-year cycle with several parts, one of which was called National 

Military Strategy. In addition, there were several separate functional 

annexes added to this document, such as intelligence and research 

and development that totaled hundreds of pages. One annex alone 

had 11 chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs. The part of the NMSD called 

the National Military Strategy (also classified) was sent to the Secretary 

of Defense for review, forwarded to the President for approval, and 

then returned to influence defense resource guidance. As will be 

later described, only the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was produced 

as specified in the memorandum; the other three documents were 

changed significantly during execution. These changes enabled the 

Chairman to respond more nimbly to the strategic environment, then 

dominated by the Soviet Union’s demise and the Gulf War’s quick 

completion.

1993 Change.

The next revision to the organization’s planning system 

culminated with publication of a change to Memorandum of Policy No. 

7 in 1993.16 This change essentially codified what had been executed 

in previous years rather than designing a new system. Major 

revisions, which built on these practices, included placing more focus 

on long-range planning overall by requiring formal environmental 

scanning; issuing the National Military Strategy as an unclassified 

document designed to communicate with the American people 
rather than providing internal military direction; and establishing 

a Joint Planning Document to sharpen the Chairman’s advice to the 

Secretary of Defense on budget issues. The process and product, 

called the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which provided guidance 

to combatant commanders to develop plans to execute the strategy 

in the field, remained fairly constant. 

1997 Change.

The next major revision to the strategic planning system occurred 

in 1997 and again reflected execution changes the Chairman instituted 

in prior years.17 The Chairman needed to provide better resource 

advice and long-range direction to enable defense leaders to make 

needed mission or weapon system trade-offs required by fiscally 

constrained defense budgets. His planning system did not provide 

him this ability. 

To correct this problem, in 1994 General Shalikashvili expanded 

the charter of the existing Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC).18 This council, chaired by his Vice Chairman and including 

the Services’ Vice Chairmen, was empowered to assess specific 

warfighting areas. This expanded charter created analytical rigor 

in an inclusive review process to shape mission or weapon system 

decisions among the Services. It provided recommendations that 

later appeared in a new leader-focused resource document called 

the Chairman’s Program Recommendation. The older Chairman’s 

assessment was retained. In 1996, General Shalikashvili published 

the first Chairman’s vision, Joint Vision 2010, a 34-page document 

designed to provide the conceptual template to channel the vitality 

of people and leverage technology to achieve more effective joint 

warfighting.19 These two new planning products were added 

formally to the planning system’s guidance published in 1997 as a 

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. Memoranda of Policies 

were phased out. 

1999 Change.

The last formal change to the strategic planning system in 1999 

did not change any major processes or products. 20 Instead, it focused 
on Theater Engagement Plans to integrate the strategy’s “shape” 

component and to implement the 1996 Joint Vision, which was a 

priority General Shelton identified when he became Chairman.21

This decade’s evolution is graphically illustrated in Figure 1.22 These 

changes incrementally evolved the strategic planning system from a 

rigid, Cold War focus at the decade’s start to a more flexible, vision 

oriented, and resource focused system at the decade’s end.

Figure 1. Evolution of Strategic Planning System.

2005 System.

While there have been no official changes to the 1999 Chairman’s 

operating instruction that describes the strategic planning system as of 

November 2005, it has not been completely followed during General 

Myers’ tenure. Three strategic planning documents have been added, 

two were deleted, and four retained. The three new products added 

from the 1999 revision were: National Military Strategic Plan for the 
10

War on Terrorism, Chairman’s Risk Assessment, and the Joint Operations 

Concepts (changed to Capstone Concept for Joint Operations in August 

2005). The two strategic planning products deleted were the joint 

vision (vision is now embedded in the strategy) and the Joint Planning 

Document (staff resource advice). The unclassified strategy, two 

leader-focused resource documents, and the war planning guidance 

remained the same. As the 1999 operating instruction is currently 

under revision, the next one will be influenced by these practical 

changes and a recent study on strategic planning by the Institute 

for Defense Analysis. These strategic planning system changes as of 

June 2005 and integrating relationships are depicted in Figure 2.23

Figure 2. Strategy: Foundation for all Major Processes.

STRATEGIC PLANNING PRODUCTS

The Chairman’s strategic planning process just described created 

many products to provide formal direction to manage existing 

demands and respond to future challenges during this 16-year 

period. As mentioned, there were products related to assessment, 
11

vision, strategy, resources, and plans; all subjects identified in the 

academic literature as what a strategic planning system should 

address. The key planning products in each of these major subjects 

are now discussed for their broad direction.

Assessment.

The Chairmen’s assessment of the strategic environment, called 

the Joint Strategy Review, became a constant strategic planning 

product beginning in 1993; however, it was completed in different 

ways and with different focuses.24 A separate classified report was 

issued frequently, but at other times the intellectual output from the 

review process was used to update this system’s strategy or vision 

documents or prepare the Joint Staff to support the Quadrennial 

Defense Review. When a separate report was produced, it often 

would identify issues that needed more intense study or areas 

where existing strategic planning products needed updating. The 

Chairman directed what the strategy review would entail prior to 

its start, hence this review responded to strategic issues he needed 

examined. The strategy review process was not conducted within 

the Joint Staff alone, but included representatives from the Services, 

Combatant Commands, and appropriate Defense organizations. 

The process was inclusive in design, allowing ideas to be initially 

introduced from an organization’s lower levels, which helped ensure 

this strategy review had a broad perspective that resonated with 

those the Chairman influenced.

Another type of assessment, now called the Chairman’s Risk 

Assessment, has been part of the strategic planning system since 2000. 

Earlier, the Chairman assessed strategic issues under the overarching 

construct of a net assessment, which was loosely defined in his 

planning instructions and did not always result in a formal product. In 

addition, Congress required the Chairman to write an assessment of 

the Secretary of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review, which appeared 

at this document’s end. The Chairman’s risk assessment started as 

an annual assessment with the 2000 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA)25 and was modified to require greater specificity by the 

2004 NDAA.26 The Chairman is required to conduct a comprehensive 

examination of the strategic and military risk to execute the National 
12

Military Strategy.

27 There are defined areas this report must address, 

along with a caveat that it must be routed through the Secretary of 

Defense if risk is determined to be significant. 

Vision.

The strategic planning system’s first two vision documents, Joint 

Vision 2010 in 1996 and Joint Vision 2020 in 2000, each consisted 

of about 35 pages.28 They were used to identify joint warfighting 

requirements 10 to 15 years out and directly influence Service 

programs to meet those requirements. In organizational terms, this 

was a way the Chairman was trying to embed a joint climate within 

the Services’ cultures through resource direction. The first vision 

was centered on four operational concepts of dominant maneuver, 

precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional 

protection. It served to focus attention and leverage technology to 

achieve better joint interoperability and warfighting. The second 

vision directly built upon the first, as it kept the same four operational 

concepts. But it placed more emphasis on innovation, information, 

and interagency coordination to transform the force to be fully joint; 

now defined as “intellectually, operationally, organizationally, 

doctrinally, and technically.”29 Both visions had broad acceptance 

as Service leaders spoke positively about each vision’s influence in 

shaping their decisions or in influencing their Service visions. These 

two visions were the most mentioned strategic planning products in 

the Chairman’s annual posture statements to Congress during this 

time frame, which is an indicator of their importance.30

The current joint vision is now embedded in three pages of the 

2004 National Military Strategy. This vision built upon the previous 

joint vision, as it is focused on the goal of full spectrum dominance, 

which is defined as “the ability to control any situation or defeat 

any adversary across the range of military operations.”31 While the 

Chairman’s vision is still specified, its purpose to influence Service 

resource decisions was replaced by the Secretary of Defense’s 

transformation guidance documents in the 2000s, with the Services 

developing transformation plans to execute this guidance. However, 

the vision of full spectrum dominance is in conceptual agreement 

with the more detailed transformation guidance. 
13

Vision can be focused operationally in addition to being strategic. 

The Chairman’s Joint Operations Concepts in 2003 and now the 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations in 2005 provided an operational 

warfighting focus to develop a capabilities-based joint force.32 This 

capabilities focus was described in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 

Review and later in other defense guidance. The focus of the 28-page 

Joint Operations Concepts was to articulate the overarching concept for 

future joint military operations. It broadly defined the construct for 

robust subordinate operating, functional, and enabling concepts to 

create joint capabilities. The 2005 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

incorporated lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, while looking to the future to develop capabilities to fight 

tomorrow’s wars. These operationally-focused vision documents, 

and the substantive complex processes and products developed 

to implement these concepts, are encouraging military personnel 

to think and act jointly. The earlier joint visions, along with these 

operational-focused concepts, will complete the joint journey that 

began with Service deconfliction in the early 1990s, to interoperability 

in the mid-1990s, to now emerging interdependence. This is a journey 

to create a joint military culture. 

Strategy.

The Chairman’s unclassified National Military Strategy, the key 

strategic planning system product, was produced in 1992, 1995, 

1997 and 2004.33 These four strategies broadly outlined the military’s 

global challenges; identified the objectives to be achieved; specified 

the foundations and principles of military power; and described 

the force structure or capabilities to achieve those objectives. This 

was essentially an ends, ways, and means paradigm to respond to the 

ever-changing strategic environment. In the first three strategies, the 

Service’s force structure was defined broadly (carrier battle groups, 

divisions, and wings), but with greater specificity as the decade 

continued. For example, the 1997 strategy identified the numbers 

of Army regiments and brigades, Navy attack submarines, Coast 

Guard cutters, and Special Operations people. In the 2004 strategy, 

there was no reference to specific force structure. Instead, joint force 

attributes and capabilities were broadly identified, along with a need 
14

to size the force in a 1-4-2-1 construct to accomplish the following: 

defend the homeland (1), deter forward in and from four regions 

(4); conduct two overlapping swiftly-defeat campaigns (2); and win 

decisively in one campaign (1).34 This latest approach was designed 

to provide flexibility for force structure changes in concert with a 

capability vice a threat-based military focus.

When the 1990s began, the strategy was focused on global war, 

and the enemy was the Soviet Union. The 1992 strategy changed the 

focus to the core mission of fighting regional wars. The 1995 strategy 

more broadly encompassed global engagement across the spectrum 

of conflict from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to war. In 1997, the 

strategy provided a balance between shaping the environment, 

responding to the multiple missions, and preparing now for the 

uncertain future. The words shape, respond, and prepare and their 

concepts appeared in many other strategic documents, such as the 

1997 National Security Strategy and 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

As these strategies changed in the 1990s, the force structure to 

accomplish these strategies was reduced by about one-third. In 2004, 

the strategy was simply articulated along three “P” words—“protect

the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent

conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries.”35 Its 

success rested on the three priorities of winning the War on Terror, 

enhancing the ability to fight jointly, and transforming the Armed 

Forces through a combination of technology, intellect, and cultural 

adjustments. 

In addition to the unclassified national military strategies, there 

were two classified strategies produced that were focused on the War 

on Terrorism. In October 2002, Chairman Myers and the Secretary 

of Defense issued a National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 

Terrorism to provide guidance to the military services and regional 

commanders to focus their efforts.36 Later, in March 2005, they issued 

an update to that plan. This update, which went through many 

revisions, was described in an news article as “. . . a multipronged 

strategy that targets eight pressure points and outlines six methods 

for attacking terrorist networks.”37
15

Resources.

The Chairman’s three resource documents (Joint Planning 

Document, Chairman’s Program Recommendation, and Chairman’s 

Program Assessment) expanded in the mid-1990s as strategic planning 

processes were developed to influence resource decisions.38 These 

resource documents, along with the Defense documents they were 

intended to influence, were classified. As the decade progressed, 

these documents were focused to enable the Chairman to provide 

more resource influence and specificity, a requirement emphasized 

by the GNA. 

The staff-focused resource document, Joint Planning Document, 

was produced biennially starting in 1993. It went from separate 

chapters developed by Joint Staff directorates or separate agencies 

to a fully integrated resource document in 1997 that used the 

Chairman’s vision and warfighting assessments to produce integrated 

resource advice. However, by decade’s end, this document was no 

longer published, which perhaps was an indicator of its declining 

influence. 

The planning system’s two leader-focused annual resource 

documents, Chairman’s Program Recommendation and Chairman’s 

Program Assessment, increased in influence and specificity starting 

in the middle 1990s. For example, the Chairman’s Program Assessment

went from a few pages in 1992 to an expanded assessment in 1995 

that argued for shifting significant funds and pursuing different 

approaches for recapitalization that would readjust up to 12 percent 

of the defense budget.39 These two leader-focused documents, 

which reflected the Chairman’s style and priorities, were considered 

personal correspondence between the Chairman and the Secretary 

of Defense. Hence, they had limited external review and were 

classified. The program recommendation was designed to influence 

the Secretary’s initial resource guidance to the Services. The program 

assessment was designed to enable the Chairman to assess the 

Service’s Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and influence 

budget deliberations that converted the Services POMs to the defense 

budget submitted to Congress. These two documents, which were 

shaped by the JROC’s meetings, were vetted with the Service Chiefs 
16

and Combatant Commanders instead of being merely coordinated. 

They were a formal way the Chairman, in addition to other 

resource advice, directly advocated the Combatant Commanders’ 

requirements within the Defense processes. 

Plans.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was the one constant among 

all the strategic planning changes during this 16-year period. It 

continued to have the same purpose, which was to provide strategic 

guidance to the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs to 

develop executable plans based on resourced military capabilities 

to execute the military strategy.40 More specifically, it identified 

the various types of plans that Combatant Commanders must 

develop, as this document integrated higher-level guidance from the 

President and Secretary of Defense into a family of executable plans 

and apportioned forces based on completed budgets. It identified 

the agreed assumptions upon which these plans were based and 

specified the numerous functional annexes required by specific 

plans, such as intelligence, logistics, and mobility. 

The actual contents of the JSCP were classified, but it evolved 

during this 16-year time period as the types of plans it tasked 

changed in response to the changing threats and the different 

military strategies. For example, in 1990 it specified global (Cold 

War focused) and regional plans. They were replaced in 1993 with 

Operational Plans (OPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANs), and 

concept summaries for global and regional contingencies. Later 

there was guidance to develop theater engagement plans, which are 

now called security cooperation plans. In the 1990s, these products 

continued to be reviewed formally for currency within an overall 2-

year planning cycle, and were republished or amended during this 

cycle. In the 2000s, the intent was to shorten this planning cycle to 

1 year, and the process by which Combatant Commanders develop 

plans also received additional Secretary of Defense involvement. 
17

CHAIRMAN’S LEGACY

General Powell (1989-93).

General Powell greatly simplified strategic planning by reducing 

the number of formal planning products from 10 to 4 and increasing 

the system’s flexibility to respond to his direction by a concise leaderfocused document called Chairman’s Guidance. He short-circuited the 

system’s processes, as he did not wait for a completed environmental 

assessment specified by his planning system, but issued this guidance 

based on a senior commander’s meeting.41 He did not wait for his 

planning system’s structured processes and coordination cycles to 

produce another classified, voluminous military strategy document 

with hundreds of pages of annexes, but published an unclassified 

27-page National Military Strategy in 1992 under his signature. 

Considered the most significant strategy change since the 1950s, 

this strategy’s content, overall coordination, and the force structure 

incorporated within it were more a result of his interpersonal skills 

than of a formal strategic planning process.42 This strategy’s focus 

on communicating with the American people and Congress, versus 

the internal staff advice it provided before, was an important legacy 

that remains today. In the resource area, while his planning system 

specified a detailed assessment of Service programs not to exceed 

175 pages, his assessment was a very short memorandum.43 While 

General Powell did not use many formal planning processes, he kept 

some structure. For example, he used the Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan and structured processes to keep the military in the field focused 

operationally. 

While his strategic planning products clearly addressed the 

military’s challenges as identified in the Chairman’s annual Posture 

Statements to Congress, very few strategic planning products or 

processes (average five) were mentioned in his statements. In addition, the word “joint” also was not emphasized in his lexicon, as 

this word barely appeared in these same statements.44 As the first 

Chairman fully under the GNA’s direction, a joint climate had not yet 

evolved. Since he did not follow his planning system in producing 

three of its four products, either the system was not nimble enough 

to respond to fast-moving challenges, or he preferred a leadership 
18

style where personal relationships dominated when providing 

formal advice. 

General Shalikashvili (1993-97).

General Shalikashvili used the strategic planning system markedly differently than his predecessor. He kept the flexibility and 

simplicity his predecessor established by limiting the strategy’s 

complexity, but he emphasized using the planning processes to 

develop it. For example, his two national military strategies in 

1995 and 1997 were coordinated fully within the planning system’s 

processes, and other strategic planning products were used in their 

development. He kept the same structure in war planning as his 

predecessor, but he expanded its focus by requiring new theater 

engagement plans to more fully implement his 1997 strategy’s 

“shape” component. 

General Shalikashvili went further in providing long-term strategic direction, when he published the Chairman’s first vision in 1996, 

and later included it in the planning system. He used considerable 

interpersonal skills, which included sending personal notes to his 

colleagues and personally reviewing every recommended change to 

develop this vision.45 He used this same strategic planning system 

to start an implementing process for the vision. He also fostered a 

close relationship with defense officials using the strategic planning 

system through his consensus and process-focused decision style. For 

example, his vision gained wide acceptance with civilian and military 

leaders, aspects of it appeared in Defense resource documents, and 

his environment assessment helped focus the initial work of the 

Department of Defense’s first Quadrennial Defense Review.46

General Shalikashvili expanded strategic planning in the resource 

areas, as he added a short leader-focused document called the 

Chairman’s Program Recommendation that continues today. He used 

his Vice Chairman to expand by roughly a factor of 10 the amount of 

time spent by the JROC to access programs analytically and provide 

resource recommendations that appeared in his two leader-focused 

resource documents.47 Using outputs from this council, his resource 

advice to the Secretary of Defense grew in content and influence. He 
19

mentioned strategic planning products and processes in his annual 

Posture Statements to Congress an average of 15 times, versus his 

predecessor’s average of five. He also mentioned the word joint 

or derivatives of that word about 25 times during these posture 

statements, which is an indicator of his focus.48 Perhaps his most 

important legacy was that his vision, process-focused strategic 

planning system, and joint emphasis embedded a joint climate within 

his staff and those he influenced. This established the foundation for 

today’s joint thinking.

General Shelton (1997-2001).

General Shelton used the strategic planning system in a very 

process-oriented manner. No substantive changes were made 

to this system overall, but he focused on using it to promote 

evolutionary changes to the military and provide difficult resource 

recommendations. Similar to his predecessors, he kept the heavily 

structured war planning document and processes relatively 

untouched, but he more fully integrated theater engagement plans 

within the planning processes. He defined a process to implement 

his predecessor’s joint vision by identifying 21st century challenges 

and the desired operating capabilities to meet them, while providing 

direction to conduct vision-related experiments.49 In 2000, during the 

later part of his tenure, he fully used the strategic planning processes 

to update formally the joint vision to better incorporate concepts 

associated with leveraging the information component, encouraging 

more innovation, and using the interagency to help resolve strategic 

issues.50

He also improved the process and timeliness of the leader-focused 

strategic planning resource recommendations to defense leaders. He 

elevated the work of the JROC and the associated processes to be more 

strategic in nature.51 He used his resources and leadership influence 

to more directly support quality of life programs for military people 

and their families, the importance of which was specifically covered 

in his Congressional Posture Statements.52 For example, he mentioned 

strategic planning products and processes an average of 22 times and 

joint 44 times in these posture statements, which were indicators of 

his process and joint leadership focus.53 Most importantly, he clearly 
20

continued the joint focus. He built on General Shalikashvili’s work 

to embed that joint climate more strongly and perhaps establish the 

beginning of a joint culture within his staff and the Services. 

General Myers (2001-05).

General Myers faced a more challenging strategic environment 

caused by the September 11, 2001, attack. His environment was 

dominated by the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the 

Global War on Terror that continues today. If this was not enough, the 

need to transform in stride also occupied his and his staff’s energy. 

These challenges caused him to modify significantly the strategic 

planning system he inherited. He referenced strategic planning 

processes and products more than any other Chairman, illustrating 

the importance he placed on this system.54 These modifications, which 

involved three new strategy-related products, have not yet been 

codified in a Chairman’s strategic planning instruction. However, 

instructions have been published that specify the processes used 

by the JROC and establish new Functional Capability Boards that 

shape issues before the JROC. The programs this council reviewed 

also greatly expanded, which provided greater joint inclusiveness 

in his resource advice.55 To illustrate this greater inclusiveness, 

the Functional Capability Boards review all programs with a joint 

impact, instead of those with large dollar criteria only, and members 

of defense agencies or even other government agencies such as 

Homeland Security can attend meetings associated with these 

programs. 

The strategy parts of his strategic planning system differed most 

from those of his predecessors. He and the Secretary of Defense 

produced a separate classified strategy focused on the War on 

Terrorism in 2002 and updated it in 2005 to better link the military 

element to the many other national strategies associated with 

combating terrorism. The Chairman’s 2004 National Military Strategy, 

redrafted numerous times, was completed in May 2004 as the need 

for a Chairman’s military strategy, along with the need to assess the 

strategic and military risk to execute that strategy, was clarified by 

Congress in the 2004 NDAA. He also succinctly identified the overall 

joint vision in this strategy. 
21

Chairman Myers’ identified the importance of a joint culture or 

being “born joint” in several of his Posture Statements.56 His focus 

on operationalizing a vision with the additional joint concepts and 

inclusive processes resulting from the 2003 Joint Operations Concepts

and 2005 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations have the potential to 

create a remarkable legacy for transforming to a true joint force. He 

instituted a greater top-down and combatant commander input on 

jointness to develop capabilities to create a synergistic joint end-state 

now called interdependency. It is too early to determine the result of 

his efforts, as developing capabilities to achieve joint interdependency 

takes years; however, he not only enhanced the joint climate, but 

perhaps established a culture of real jointness among all the military 

services. Creating a culture is much more difficult than creating a 

climate, but it is more powerful once established.

CONCLUSION

Today’s senior leaders can learn from examining how others 

used systems or processes to better enable their organizations to 

respond to complex and ambiguous strategic challenges. Examining 

how four Chairmen of different leadership styles used an evolving 

strategic planning system to respond to the complex and ever 

changing strategic environment reveals five key leadership concepts 

today’s leaders should employ. These leadership concepts are 

organized along the following five areas: importance of a vision; key 

characteristics of an effective strategic planning process; the need to 

strike a balance between flexibility and structure within the strategic 

planning system’s products; understanding the magnitude of change 

needed; and using systems and processes to create a culture. 

The first leadership concept is that leaders need to clearly 

articulate a vision, owned by the organization, as part of the 

strategic planning system to influence long-term change effectively. 

Chairman Shalikashvili clearly identified a need for a joint vision in 

1996 and employed an inclusive leader-involved process to create 

that vision, which had wide acceptance among those he coordinated 

with and those above him. Chairman Shelton followed this and 

developed comprehensive processes to implement that vision before 

he formally updated the joint vision in 2000 to place more emphasis 
22

on innovation, information, and interagency. Chairman Myers 

continued with a vision focus through his two concept guidance 

documents to transform the military operationally to a higher level 

of jointness. Much of the joint warfighting progress to date can be 

traced back to the first two visions, and the current vision to achieve 

full spectrum dominance is being directed by the 2005 Capstone 

Concept for Joint Operations. 

The second leadership concept is that leaders need to ensure their 

strategic planning processes are flexible, inclusive, and integrated 

to improve effectiveness. The flexible aspect rests with the fact 

that, in execution, each Chairman modified to different degrees 

the strategic planning system he inherited. This was caused by the 

leader’s style and the strategic environment. For example, Chairman 

Powell’s modification of the planning system from ten classified, 

voluminous products into four products of greater clarity and 

simplicity that were developed more nimbly was influenced by the 

Cold War’s unexpected demise and his personal leadership style. 

Chairman Shalikashvili’s addition of leader-focused resource advice 

and joint vision was influenced by the tight fiscal environment and 

his process-oriented style. The inclusive aspect is supported by the 

diverse composition of the joint boards and councils that developed 

strategic planning products, which allowed divergent views to be 

heard, understood, and incorporated. Interviews with strategic 

planners revealed that these inclusive processes educated and 

created important relationships, and many planners even considered 

planning processes more important than products.57 The integrated 

nature aspect goes one step further than inclusiveness in that this 

system’s planning processes directly influenced other Defense, 

Service, and combatant command leaders and their processes to 

ensure the end result was integrated. 

The third leadership concept centers on the need for leaders to 

ensure their strategic planning products have the proper balance 

between flexibility and structure. The Chairman’s strategic planning 

products related to strategy and vision had great flexibility in providing broad direction, which enabled staffs to use their intellectual 

capacities to develop a wide range of successful responses to complex 

issues. The Chairman’s strategic planning products related to plans 
23

had a much greater degree of structure to provide the needed 

disciplined direction to execute those strategies. This disciplined 

direction in developing war plans is driven by the systems 

integration and overall synchronization that is associated with joint 

interdependence needed by the supportive and supporting combatant 

commanders. Disciplined direction in developing war plans, then, 

allows the creativity needed in execution, as disciplined planning 

considers various options that are vetted prior to execution. 

The fourth leadership concept is that leaders need to understand 

the relationship between the magnitude and speed of change needed 

and how a strategic planning system can be used to influence that 

change. If change is needed quickly and is revolutionary in scope, 

then leaders should not use a strategic planning system but work 

outside that formal system. For example, when Chairman Powell 

created the 1992 National Military Strategy, a strategy revolutionary 

in substance when compared to its predecessors, he did not follow 

the processes or product characteristics described in his strategic 

planning system. Similarly, Chairman Shalikashvili did not follow 

directions in his strategic planning system but used extraordinary 

personnel interaction when creating the Chairman’s first joint vision, 

a direction thought outside the Chairman’s domain. However, in 

implementing both this strategy and vision, which would take a 

decade or more, the strategic planning system was used heavily. 

Hence, a strategic planning system is more valued to make the 

needed evolutionary changes over time that can ultimately lead to 

revolutionary results. 

The last leadership concept is that leaders can use a strategic 

planning system to help them create a climate and embed a culture 

within complex organizations. While there have been many other 

mechanisms that influenced a joint culture such as Congressionalrequired joint promotion, assignment, and educational criteria, 

the strategic planning system reinforced these mechanisms. While 

Chairman Powell was just starting to create a joint climate, Chairman 

Shalikashvili greatly reinforced that climate with his strategic 

planning joint vision and inclusive planning bodies that developed 

the system’s resource products. Chairman Shelton reinforced that 

joint climate and started the beginning of a joint culture through 
24

implementing the joint vision and more inclusive planning bodies. 

Chairman Myers focused on embedding a joint culture through his 

expansive joint operating concepts and more inclusive functional 

capabilities boards. It is this author’s belief, based on working within 

and studying the effects of strategic planning during this period, that 

a culture of jointness, envisioned in the heart and spirit of many of 

our nation’s civilian and military leaders, has taken hold within the 

higher levels of the Joint Staff and the Services. The strategic planning 

system clearly assisted this joint cultural evolution.

Leaders of complex organizations who embrace the concepts just 

mentioned will be able to better use a strategic planning system to 

respond to their strategic challenges and provide direction to their 

organizations to meet the current demands while positioning for the 

future. An examination of history has shown that each Chairman’s 

ever evolving strategic planning system comprised of inclusive and 

flexible processes, along with the right combination of flexibility and 

structure in products, was important in enabling him to provide 

strategic advice and direction to our nation’s civilian and military 

leaders during volatile and uncertain times. 

ENDNOTES

1. Robert H. Cole, et al., The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington 

DC: Joint History Office, 1995, pp. 207-209.

2. Ibid., p. 30.

3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report, 99th Congress, 2nd session, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 12, 1986, Section 3, 

pp. 99-824; and Richard Meinhart, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Leadership Using 

the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 2-7.

4. House Report 108-354, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2004,” Section 903; “Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman 

Joint Chiefs of Staff,” available from http://thomas.loc.gov/, accessed November 11, 

2005. 

5. The Joint Staff, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/FY 2005 Biennial Budget Estimates,” 

February 2003, available from http://www.dod.gov/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/

budget_justification/pdfs/operation/Volume_1_-_DW_Justification/TJS_FY04-05_

PB.pdf; accessed November 30, 2005. Personnel reductions reflect 1999 defense 

reform initiatives and 2002 Nation Defense Authorization Act guidance.
25

6. Detailed strategic planning guidance was reflected in Memorandum of Policy 

(MOP) 7, 1990; MOP 7, 1993; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

3100.01, 1997; and CJCSI 3100.01A, 1999. 

7. Discussion that follows on relationships and integration of the leader with 

organizations above the Chairman and those he coordinates with is covered in 

the 2000 edition of The Joint Staff Officers Guide and in the memorandum and 

instructions that define the organization’s strategic planning system.

8. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, “National Defense 

Budget Estimates for FY 2006,” April 2005; and “National Defense Budget Estimates for 

FY 2001,” March 2000, pp. 4, 33, both sources. 

9. This discussion of challenges is the author’s assessment from reading the four 

national military strategies and attending Service Chiefs’ lectures while teaching 

at the Army War College.

10. Davis, p. 160; and Meinhart, 2003, pp. 11-12. Some Chairmen, such as Powell, 

had a more developed personal relationship with many leaders in Washington, 

DC, based on past experiences than General Shelton, who was relatively new to 

this strategic arena. In addition, each succeeding Chairman used “joint” words 

with varying frequency in his annual Congressional Posture statement. 

11. Edgar H Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, San Francisco: Jossey 

Bass, 1993, p. 231.

12. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, U.S. Department 

of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 10, 35-36.

13. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 84, 

CJCS MOP 84, Joint Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, January 30, 1989, p. 3.

14. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, CJCS MOP 

7, Joint Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 

1990. Discussion reflects materiel in this document.

15. Ibid., p. 20.

16. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 7, CJCS 

MOP 7, Joint Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1st 

Revision, March 17, 1993. Discussion reflects material in this document.

17. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01, CJCSI 3100.01, Joint 

Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1997. 

Note: Chairman’s instructions replaced memoranda of policies during this time 

period.

18. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JROC Planning in a 

Revolutionary Era, Washington, DC: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996, 

pp. 4-5.
26

19. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1996, p. 1. 

20. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01, CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint 

Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1999. 

Discussion reflects material in this document.

21. The shape component was one of the three components of the 1997 National 

Military Strategy. The other two components were titled respond and prepare. 

These components are discussed later in the paper in the “Strategy” section.

22. “Joint Strategic Planning System” briefing slides for Joint Processes and 

Landpower Course 3, Lesson AY 05, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 

October 28, 2004, slide 5. 

23. “National Military Strategy Linkages and the Joint Strategic Planning 

System,” briefing to Joint Faculty Education Conference, Washington, DC: 

National Defense University, June 22, 2005, slide 12. In Figure 2, IPL stands 

for Combatant Commanders Integrated Priority List, which identifies what 

combatant commanders desire that is not funded in Service programs. POMs are 

Program Objective Memorandums, the programs the Services desire to place in 

the upcoming budget submitted to Congress. JOpsC stands for Joint Operating 

Concepts described later in the paper’s vision discussion. CPR is the Chairman’s 

Program Recommendation, and CPA is the Chairman’s Program Assessment, explained 

later in the resource discussion.

24. Author read many classified strategy reviews and correspondence 

documenting the process, and in May 2002 interviewed military planners who 

worked on the vision and military strategies during the 1990s.

25. House Report 106-162, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2000,” Section 1034, available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html; 

accessed December 4, 2005. 

26. House Report 108-354, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2004,” Section 903, “Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by 

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,” available from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin; accessed 

November 11, 2005. 

27. There is a congressional requirement under U.S. Code Title 10 Section 153 

(b) for the Chairman to assess the strategic and military risks associated with 

executing the missions called for under the current National Military Strategy. This 

task is due not later than January 1 of every odd-numbered year. There is also a 

congressional requirement under Section 153 (d) to do a detailed biennial review of 

the National Military Strategy, which includes as part of this review an assessment 

of the military and strategic risks in executing the missions of the current strategy. 

This much more detailed review is due not later than February 15th of every evennumbered year.

28. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010; and Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000. Discussion reflects 

material from these documents. 
27

29. Shelton, 2000, p. 2.

30. Richard M. Meinhart, Strategic Planning Through an Organizational Lens, 

ProQuest UMI Dissertation Services, 2004, pp. 104-107. An analysis was performed 

on key words in the Chairman’s annual Congressional Posture Statements to 

identify what was emphasized. 

31. Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, 2004, p. 20.

32. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Joint Operations Concepts, Washington, DC: Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, November 2003, available from www.dtic.mil/jointvision/secdef_

approved_jopsc.doc; accessed December 1, 2005; and Richard B. Myers, Capstone 

Concept for Joint Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff August 2005, 

available from http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf; 

accessed December 1, 2005.

33. Discussions that follow reflect material in the following strategies: Colin 

L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992; John M. 

Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995; John 

M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997; and 

Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004 (all, 

Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff).

34. The overlapping swiftly defeat campaigns were described as quickly 

denying an adversary’s operational or strategic objective in both locations and 

rapidly reestablishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its 

partners. A win decisively campaign is much broader in scope than a swiftlydefeat campaign. It is designed to bring about fundamental favorable and enduring 

results that may entail lengthy periods of combat and stability operations, along 

with significant investments of the nation’s resources and time. 

35. Myers, NMS, p. 8.

36. U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Observations on 

National Strategies Related to Terrorism, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting 

Office, March 3, 2003, p. 5.

37. Linda Robinson, “Plan of Attack,” USNews.com, August 1, 2005, available 

from http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050801/1terror.htm; accessed 

November 11, 2005.

38. Author’s assessment from listening to many lectures from speakers at the 

U.S. Army War College from 1997 to 2005 who described these documents, and 

from reading some of the 1990 documents.

39. Office of the Vice Chairman, p. 23.

40. These words describing the JSCP’s purpose remained fundamentally the 

same from the MOP 7 through CJCSI 3100.01A. The descriptions of the types 

of plans came from the strategic planning instructions and discussions with 

individuals who worked directly with the plans or taught this subject. 

41. Lovelace and Young, endnote 45, p. 37.
28

42. Harry E. Rothman, Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post Cold 

War World: A Perspective from The Joint Staff, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 1992, p. 16; and Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992, 

Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1993, pp. 48-50.

43. Meinhart, 2004, p. 132. 

44. Ibid., p. 104

45. Interview with Joint Staff planner on May 9, 2000; and Industrial College 

of the Armed Forces, JV 2010 Case Analysis, Washington, DC: National Defense 

University, 2002, p. 6.

46. Joint Vision 2010 was referenced in Defense Planning Guidance and the Defense 

Department’s logistics strategic plan. Many Service leaders spoke positively on 

this vision’s influence. For the QDR influence linkage, see John Y. Schrader, Leslie 

Lewis, and Roger A. Brown, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1999, p. 19.

47. Office of the Vice Chairman, pp. 10-12.

48. Meinhart, 2004, p. 104.

49. Processes described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02, 

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

December 9, 1998; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02A, Joint 

Vision Implementation Master Plan, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 

29, 2000.

50. Interagency is a term used to identify when other government agencies under 

the President collectively work together to respond to our nation’s challenges. 

51. “Statement of General Richard B. Myers, Vice Chairman of The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats 

and Capabilities Subcommittee,” April 4, 2000, http://armed-services.senate.gov/

hearings/2000/e000404.htm; accessed November 20, 2005. 

52. Meinhart, 2003. 

53. Meinhart, 2004, p. 104.

54. Author analyzed Chairman Myers’ posture statements in the same way 

done for the other Chairmen and he averaged the highest. 

55. Author’s assessment from reading the many CJCSIs that covered the 

Joint Requirements Oversight, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, and 

Functional Capability Boards since the middle 1990s.

56. Chairman Myers referenced “born joint” in his 2004 and 2004 Posture 

Statements to Congress. In addition, he talked about the importance of a cultural 

change in his 2002 and 2003 Posture Statements to change mindsets. He was the 

first Chairman to do so. 

57. Meinhart, 2004, pp. 187-188.