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S. HRG. 109–356

UNITED NATIONS REFORM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 21, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware ..................................... 22

Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 47

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50

Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota ............................................ 3

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 43

Gingrich, Hon. Newt, cochairman, Task Force on the United Nations, U.S.

Institute of Peace, Washington, DC ................................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

An Example of a U.N. Reform Scorecard ....................................................... 67

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1

Mitchell, Hon. George, cochairman, Task Force on the United Nations, U.S.

Institute of Peace, Washington, DC ................................................................... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Voinovich, George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, prepared statement ................... 66

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Kofi, Annan, U.N. Secretary General:

Statement to the General Assembly of the United Nations ......................... 81

Report to the U.N. Human Rights Council .................................................... 83

Executive Summary on the ‘‘In Larger Freedom’’ Report ............................. 87

News Release from the U.S. Institute of Peace ..................................................... 91

Task Force on the United Nations ......................................................................... 92

Task Force on the United Nations: Working Groups ........................................... 92

(III)

(1)

UNITED NATIONS REFORM

MONDAY, JULY 21, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar

(chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, Hagel, Sarbanes, Chafee, Dodd,

Coleman, Voinovich, and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.

SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. The world has just marked the 60th anniversary

of the founding of the United Nations. In that time, the organization has accomplished much worth celebrating, not least its role in

helping to prevent a repeat of the calamitous world conflict that

brought about the U.N.’s creation. But unfortunately, the U.N.’s

anniversary has been overshadowed by a series of setbacks that

have raised questions about its ability to live up to its founders’ intentions.

During the Oil-for-Food scandal, billions of dollars that should

have been spent on humanitarian needs in Iraq were instead siphoned off by Saddam Hussein’s regime through a system of surcharges, bribes, and kickbacks. This corruption depended upon

members of the U.N. Security Council who were complicit in these

activities. It also depended on U.N. officials and contractors who

were dishonest, inattentive, or willing to make damaging compromises in pursuit of a compassionate mission.

The capabilities possessed by the United Nations depend heavily

on maintaining the credibility associated with countries acting together in a well-established forum with well-established rules.

Profiteering, mismanagement, and bureaucratic stonewalling

squander this precious resource. At a time when the United States

is appealing for greater international help in Iraq, Afghanistan,

and in trouble spots around the world, a diminishment of U.N.

credibility reduces U.S. options and increases our own burdens.

The Foreign Relations Committee held the first congressional

hearing on the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food scandal a year ago last April.

Since that time, through the efforts of Paul Volcker, Senator Norm

Coleman, and many others, we have learned much more about the

extent of the corruption and mismanagement involved. Senator

Coleman’s work as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as the chairman of the Homeland Security and GovernVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
2

mental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has provided the Senate with extensive knowledge of what went wrong in

the Oil-for-Food Program.

During the last several weeks, Senator Coleman and I have combined efforts to offer the Senate a comprehensive reform bill that

we believe would greatly improve the ability of the United Nations

to be an effective institution in this century. I would like to thank

staff on the Foreign Relations Committee and on the Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations who collaborated for many hours

as we finalized the Coleman-Lugar U.N. reform bill.

We began with the presumptions that the United Nations needs

more focused oversight, better whistleblower protection, greater

transparency in its procurement and financial dealings, and better

management of its personnel. It also needs to reform two functions

vital to international peace and security: Peacekeeping and human

rights protection. Achieving these and other reforms will require a

significant shift in the culture of consensus that often results in

gridlock at the United Nations and has thwarted previous attempts

at reform.

Our legislation provides President Bush with the flexibility and

tools he needs to achieve the objective of a reformed United Nations. Should the President believe that, in spite of his best efforts,

the other member states of the United Nations do not share our

conviction regarding these reforms, our bill grants him authority to

withhold up to 50 percent of our U.N. dues until such time as reform has taken hold.

Other Members of Congress, including members of this committee, also have spent substantial time considering what the

United States should do to achieve reform at the United Nations.

The House of Representatives has already voted for a bill that

would require the President to withhold U.S. contributions to the

United Nations by 50 percent, if certain conditions are not met.

Some Senators have voiced support for this approach, but I believe

that a rigid formula that removes decisionmaking and flexibility

from the President is a mistake. The drive for reform at the United

Nations is not going to occur in a national security vacuum. We

will continue to have national security interests that are affected

by U.N. agencies and U.N. deliberations. Without narrowing the

President’s options, the Coleman-Lugar legislation allows the President to make tactical judgments in the national security interest

about how to apply leverage and about what methods to use in pursuing reform.

On the other side of the equation, some Senators may oppose the

Coleman-Lugar bill because it does allow the President to cut U.S.

contributions to the United Nations by up to 50 percent. Senators

may contend that the U.S. contribution should be predictable and

off the table in negotiations on reform. But U.N. reform is urgent

and is most likely to happen if Presidential initiatives are backed

up by a full range of options, including withholding funds.

The diminishment of U.N. credibility from corruption in the Oilfor-Food Program and other scandals related to peacekeeping

troops and the Human Rights Commission is harmful to U.S. efforts aimed at coordinating a stronger global response to terrorism,

the AIDS crisis, nuclear proliferation, and many other interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
3

national problems. Congress, motivated in large part by these matters and the unwillingness of the Security Council to address appropriately the genocide taking place in Darfur, commissioned an

important study on U.N. reform through the United States Institute of Peace. That study was ably chaired by the distinguished

members of our first panel: Former Speaker of the House Newt

Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell. We

are pleased to have the benefit of their counsel today. I would

strongly encourage my colleagues to read the bipartisan report that

resulted from their efforts, entitled, ‘‘American Interests and U.N.

Reform.’’ It puts forward excellent recommendations for change

that could help the United Nations to regain public confidence and

improve its capability to serve peace and prosperity around the

world. Senator Coleman and I relied heavily on these recommendations as we constructed our bill.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—‘‘American Interests and U.N. Reform,’’ the report of the Task Force of the United Nations was too large to include in this hearing. It will be maintained in the permanent

record of the hearing or can be accessed at the USIP Web site:

http://www.usip.org/un/report/index.html.]

In addition to our first panel, we are very fortunate to be joined

by Nicholas Burns, the State Department’s Under Secretary of

State for Political Affairs. Secretary Burns has been a good friend

to this committee, and he speaks to us today as one of Secretary

Rice’s key advisors on U.N. reform issues.

The United Nations’ ability to organize burden-sharing and take

over missions best handled by the international community is critical to the long-term success of U.S. foreign policy. Americans cannot afford to approach the United Nations purely out of unilateral

frustration. Rather, we have to show resolute leadership that will

drive reform toward a constructive outcome that will reinvigorate

the United Nations. In this process, we must do more than just negotiate for reform. We must also explain why these reforms are

necessary and how they will help the world community. If we can

create international momentum, we have a unique opportunity to

achieve an objective that has long been sought by both critics and

friends of the United Nations.

We look forward to hearing our witnesses and before recognizing

the first panel, I turn to my distinguished colleague, Senator Coleman, for an opening comment.

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MINNESOTA

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman; just briefly. First

I want to begin by thanking you for holding this very important

hearing and for working so closely with me, to develop a legislation

we introduced 2 weeks ago, the United Nations Management Personnel and Policy Reform Act of 2005, S. 1383.

It’s been my pleasure to work with you, Mr. Chairman, and your

staff, and to draw upon your many, many years of expertise on

these matters. Your leadership on this and so many other critical

international issues is greatly appreciated by all. I also want to express my appreciation to Speaker Gingrich and Senator Mitchell

for the comprehensive report they have produced. Which in many

4

ways is a template—we have used as a template—very openly for

the legislation that we developed. There’s a lot of work that went

into this, and we thought we got good work product out of that. We

don’t agree with everything, and there may be some things that

you didn’t address as fully as we’d like to, but it has really served

as a—I think an excellent template for Senator Lugar and myself

as we drafted our legislation.

This is a good report. It represents a rare bipartisan assessment

of the real imperative for U.N. Reform, and it’s been extremely valuable. It has made an extremely valuable contribution to the debate on U.N. Reform, and so for that we thank you and the folks

who work with you.

As chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee Investigations, I

have conducted a thorough investigation of the corruption for the

Oil-For-Food scandal, and the management failures of the United

Nations that allowed this scandal to take place. While the finding

as my 16-month Oil-For-Food investigation have underscored the

U.N. severe loss of credibility, on the positive side I hope that they

have served to generate helpful momentum for reform that will be

necessary for any meaningful changes to be implemented, we need

reform to take place. America cannot be the world’s sole policeman,

it cannot be the almost principal provider of humanitarian aid. We

will continue to do those things, but it is helpful for America to

have a workable, credible, transparent, United Nations.

And I would note, Mr. Chairman, just yesterday I had an opportunity to visit with Chris Burnham who’s now the Under Secretary

General looking at management operations at the United Nations.

I can tell you that the message has been heard. Whether folks can

deliver on the message is going to be the question. The message

from this report, the message from—Mr. Chairman, from your

work that you have done, and the work we’ve done in our bill has

been heard. The challenge is, can it be transformed into action.

I think the task at hand is capitalize on this unique consensus

and push for change that will make the United Nations a suitable

vehicle for facing the world’s most daunting challenges. And I look

forward to the debate and, hopefully, I look forward to real reform

happening.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. And

now I turn to our first panel. We are indeed fortunate to have two

great friends, and two statesmen, who have meant so much to

American governance in our House of Representatives, and the

U.S. Senate. I’ll recognize first of all, the Honorable Newt Gingrich,

cochairman of the Task Force on the United Nations for the U.S.

Institute for Peace. And then second, the Honorable George Mitchell, cochairman of that same task force.

And let me say gentlemen, we really do want to hear from you,

and your statements will be placed in the record in full. Please give

us the benefit of your wisdom. That will be true of Secretary Burns

later on. This is not a meeting meant to restrict people to 5 minutes, it’s to hear how you came to your conclusions and the support

for your report.

Speaker Gingrich.

Mr. GINGRICH. Actually, if I might, Mr. Chairman, we’ve agreed

that Speaker represents a rather a different part of the legislative

5

branch, that in this side of the building it would be far better if

Senator Mitchell led off.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, a very gracious thought. And it is a delight

to recognize the majority leader, Senator Mitchell.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MITCHELL, COCHAIRMAN,

TASK FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF

PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Senator MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. When

we appeared before the House committee I told them that, within

minutes after I was elected majority leader of the Senate, I was informed by the then-Speaker of the House, that the position of

Speaker is established in the Constitution but the position of Senate majority leader is not in the Constitution or any law. The implication was clear, and since then I have deferred to Speakers,

present and past, and I found it to be a very wise and useful thing

to do. So I’m grateful to the Speaker for yielding to me here.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, it’s a great honor

for me to join you, many of my former colleagues in the Senate, to

present the report of the Task Force on the United Nations. I commend you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Coleman, and others who have

been active in this area, and encourage you to continue in your

leadership on this issue.

It’s a special pleasure for me to be doing this with my friend and

cochair, Speaker Gingrich. We worked closely together over a period of several months, along with the other members of the task

force, and many supporting experts, we have done so in good faith

and in a spirit of bipartisanship.

I particularly thank the Speaker for his outstanding leadership,

and his cooperation in this effort.

It was just over 7 months ago, at a time of critical importance

for the United Nations, that Congress authorized the creation of a

bipartisan task force to study and report on how effective the

United Nations is in meeting the goals of its charter. In a very

compressed timeframe, task force members and experts have produced what we believe to be a comprehensive report.

It is based on fact-finding missions by task force members, including visits to peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions in the field, and meetings with U.N. leaders and others in

Geneva and New York. The full task force met in plenary session

for two all-day meetings here in Washington.

The experts who worked with task force members represent

great breadth and depth of knowledge, reflecting the fact that they

come from six of the Nation’s leading public policy organizations.

I would especially like to acknowledge and thank Lee Feinstein of

the Council on Foreign Relations and William Sanders of the American Enterprise Institute for their knowledge of this subject and

substantive contributions to this report. I also want to thank Dick

Solomon, Gary Matthews, and Heather Sensibaugh of the U.S. Institute for Peace; they are present here today as is Rod Hills, one

of the valuable and contributing members of the task force.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. We welcome these distinguished Americans.

Senator MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the report explicitly states, this is a consensus document. Twelve experienced,

6

knowledgeable citizens inquired, debated, discussed. We agreed on

most of the issues, but not all. Obviously, each member has the

right to express his or her individual views, beyond what is set

forth in the report.

We have come together to do what we can to help the United Nations realize more fully the aims of its charter. Our mandate was

to recommend an actionable agenda for U.N. reform. We were

asked to address this subject solely from an American perspective,

and we have done so.

We do not presume to speak for or to other people, but we believe

that the conclusions we’ve reached will be similar to conclusions

they reach. We have carried out this mandate in the firm belief

that an effective United Nations is in American interests and, indeed, that is the first and most fundamental conclusion of our task

force.

Americans have always hoped and wanted the United Nations to

play a major role in the pursuit of a better world. Yet, recent

events have challenged the United Nations and its members, including the United States, to adapt to dramatically different demands: The problem of failed states, catastrophic terrorism, the

need for effective action to prevent genocide, and the promotion of

democracy and the rule of law.

The task force concluded that reform is necessary on two levels.

The first is institutional change, without which other reforms will

be much more difficult to implement. Institutional reform is not a

favor to the United States; it is vital to the continued integrity and

vitality of the United Nations itself.

The task force notes that it undertook this effort at a time of

growing consensus on the imperative for reform at the United Nations, and in light of important reports on reform by the High-Level

Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, and the Secretary General’s own report, ‘‘In Larger Freedom.’’ The task force found that

management systems common in other public and private institutions were lacking in a number of U.N. agencies and bodies we reviewed.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The report by U.N. Secretary General Kofi

Annan, ‘‘In Larger Freedom,’’ was too large to include in this hearing. It can be viewed at the U.N. Web site: http://www.un.org/

largerfreedom/contents.html.]

We recommended a reform program that includes a number of

elements. Among these are: An authoritative Independent Oversight Board that will have all the authority of an independent

audit committee; empowerment of the Secretary General to replace

top officials and the creation of an effective chief operating officer

and modern personnel system; effective whistleblower protection,

and ethics and disclosure standards for top officials, and, very importantly, transparency in all operations; sunset provisions for all

programs and activities mandated by the General Assembly; and

identification of operational programs that should be funded entirely by voluntary contributions.

With respect to peacekeeping, the task force reviewed the disturbing allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo and elsewhere. We recommended immediate

7

implementation of a policy of zero tolerance, better training, and

other disciplinary and preventive measures.

We also recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations become a more independent program with distinct rules

and regulations appropriate for its operational responsibility for

comprehensive peacekeeping missions.

The second kind of reform is operational. Nowhere is this more

important than in crafting an effective strategy and identifying

specific measures to improve the U.N.’s capacity to stop genocide,

mass killings, and human rights violations, including immediate

action on Darfur.

On Darfur, the task force recommended a series of immediate

initiatives, for the United States, the United Nations, and others

to assist the African Union in stopping the killing. Our recommendations include assembling a package of assistance for the

African Union; authorization and establishment of a no-fly zone

over Darfur; and a new Security Council resolution that provides

a strong mandate, backed up by the forces adequate to the mission.

The task force also discussed genocide prevention more generally.

One of the task force’s most important conclusions, I believe, is its

affirmation of every government’s responsibility to protect its citizens and those within its jurisdiction from genocide, mass killing,

and massive and sustained human rights violations.

We recommend that the U.S. Government call on the Security

Council and General Assembly to affirm this responsibility.

The task force further agreed that in certain circumstances, and

I quote from the report ‘‘a government’s abnegation of its responsibilities to its own people is so severe that the collective responsibility of nations to take action cannot be denied. The United Nations Security Council can and should act in such cases. In the

event the Security Council fails to act, its failure must not be used

as an excuse by concerned members to avoid protective measures.’’

We also recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be

replaced. Its reputation has suffered badly, its performance has

been disastrous. It should be replaced by a new Human Rights

Council, ideally composed of democracies—a proposal consonant

with the Secretary General’s own conclusions.

The task force devoted considerable energy and attention to the

critical issue of development. Addressing the needs of the developing world is not icing on the cake. It is a key challenge for how

1 billion people in rich nations will share the planet with over 5

billion in poor countries.

The task force agreed on the importance of greatly increased support for the effort to bring developing nations out of poverty as a

global priority, including government-to-government assistance,

and, we emphasize, private investment, including the legal, political, and economic infrastructure that will allow such aid to be effective and investment to flourish.

The task force did not reach agreement on the details of any Security Council expansion. It did conclude, however, that any such

expansion should enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council

and not in any way detract from the Council’s efficiency and ability

to act in accordance with the charter. Task force members have difVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
8

fering views on this question and they are, of course, free to express them.

Speaking personally, I believe the United States should support

expansion of the Security Council, with the aim of improving the

Council’s ability to carry out its key security and development functions—by which I mean more support for development and more

capacity for peacekeeping operations. The task force discussed, and

I support, an expansion with no new veto powers and no new permanent members, and with the possibility of some longer and consecutive terms. This is similar to one of the proposals advanced by

the high-level panel.

Let me conclude with a few general points. Our task force agreed

that reform is both desirable and feasible. But it can be accomplished only with the concerted leadership of the United States,

working with the growing ranks of the world’s democracies.

A successful U.S. effort will also require bipartisanship here in

our own country. I believe the work of the task force, and the wide

range of views it represents, is itself a demonstration of what is

possible when people of differing views come together in good faith

to chart a course for the common benefit of the Nation.

Let me close again by thanking the chairman, Senator Biden,

and all the members of the committee. I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your years of service and leadership and, especially, the

bipartisanship this committee has demonstrated despite the many

challenges you face.

I am now pleased to yield to my friend and colleague, Speaker

Gingrich.

[The prepared statement of Senator Mitchell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MITCHELL, COCHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE ON

THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the committee, it is

an honor to join my former colleagues in the Senate to present the report of the

Task Force on the United Nations.

It is a particular pleasure to be doing this with my friend and cochair, Newt Gingrich. We have worked closely together over a period of 6 months, along with the

other members of the task force, and we have done so in good faith and in a spirit

of bipartisanship.

Just over 7 months ago, at a time of critical importance for the United Nations,

Congress authorized the creation of a bipartisan task force to study how effective

the United Nations was meeting the goals of its charter.

In a very compressed timeframe, task force members and experts have produced

a very comprehensive report.

The report is based on factfinding missions by task force members, including visits to peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions in the field, and meetings

with the U.N. leadership in Geneva and New York. The full task force also met in

plenary session for two all-day sessions in Washington.

The experts who worked with task force members represent great breadth and

depth of knowledge, reflecting the fact that they come from six of the Nation’s leading public organizations: the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. I would especially like

to acknowledge and thank Lee Feinstein of the Council on Foreign Relations and

William Sanders of the American Enterprise Institute for their knowledge of this

subject and substantive contributions to this report.

As the report states, this is a consensus document. Twelve experienced, knowledgeable citizens inquired, debated, discussed. We agreed on most of the issues but

not all. Obviously, each member has the right to express his or her individual views,

beyond what is not set forth in the report.

9

We have come together to do what we can to help the United Nations realize more

fully the aims of its charter. Our mandate was to recommend an actionable agenda

for U.N. reform.

We were asked to address this subject solely from an American perspective, and

we have done so.

We have carried out this mandate in the firm belief that an effective United Nations is in American interests and indeed that is the first and most fundamental

conclusion of our task force.

Americans have always hoped and wanted the United Nations to play a major

role in the pursuit of a better world.

Yet, recent events have challenged the United Nations and its members, including

the United States, to adapt to dramatically different demands: The problem of failed

states, catastrophic terrorism, the need for effective action to prevent genocide, and

the promotion of democracy and the rule of law.

The task force concluded that reform is necessary on two levels. The first is institutional change, without which other reforms will be much more difficult to implement. Institutional reform is not a favor to the United States; it is vital to the continued integrity and vitality of the United Nations itself.

In this regard, the task force notes that it undertakes this effort at a time of

growing consensus on the imperative for reform at the United Nations, and in light

of important reports on reform by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and

Change, and the Secretary General’s own report, ‘‘In Larger Freedom.’’

The task force found that management systems that are common in other public

and private institutions were lacking in a number of U.N. agencies and bodies we

reviewed.

We recommended a reform program that includes a number of elements. Among

these are:

• An authoritative Independent Oversight Board that will have all the authority

of an independent audit committee;

• Empowerment of the Secretary General to replace top officials and the creation

of an effective Chief Operating Officer and modern personnel system;

• Effective whistleblower protection, and ethics and disclosure standards for top

officials, and transparency.

• Sunset provisions for all programs and activities mandated by the General Assembly; and

• Identification of operational programs that should be funded entirely by voluntary contributions.

With respect to peacekeeping, the task force reviewed the disturbing allegations

of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo and elsewhere.

We recommended immediate implementation of a policy of zero tolerance, better

training, and other disciplinary and preventive measures.

We also recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

become a more independent program with distinct rules and regulations appropriate

for its operational responsibility for comprehensive peacekeeping missions.

The second kind of reform is operational. Nowhere is this more important than

in crafting an effective strategy and identifying specific measures to improve the

U.N.’s capacity to stop genocide, mass killings, and human rights violations, including immediate action on Darfur.

On Darfur, the task force recommended a series of immediate initiatives for the

United States, the United Nations, and others to assist the African Union in stopping the killing. Our recommendations include assembling a package of assistance

for the African Union; authorization and establishment of a no-fly zone over Darfur;

and a new Security Council resolution that provides a strong mandate, backed up

by the forces adequate to the mission.

The task force also discussed genocide prevention more generally. One of the task

force’s most important conclusions, I believe, is its affirmation of every government’s

responsibility to protect its citizens and those within its jurisdiction from genocide,

mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations.

We recommend that the U.S. Government call on the Security Council and General Assembly to affirm this responsibility.

The task force further agreed that in certain circumstances, ‘‘a government’s abnegation of its responsibilities to its own people is so severe that the collective responsibility of nations to take action cannot be denied. The United Nations Security

Council can and should act in such cases. In the event the Security Council fails

to act, its failure must not be used as an excuse by concerned members to avoid

protective measures.’’

10

We also made recommendations to replace the Commission on Human Rights,

whose reputation has suffered badly, with a new Human Rights Council, ideally

comprised of democracies—a proposal consonant with the Secretary General’s own

conclusions.

DEVELOPMENT

The task force devoted considerable energy and attention to the critical issue of

development. Addressing the needs of the developing world is not icing on the cake.

It is a key challenge for how 1 billion people in rich nations will share the planet

with over 5 billion in poor countries.

The task force agreed on the importance of greatly increased support for the effort

to bring developing nations out of poverty as a global priority, including government-to-government assistance, and private investment, including the legal, political, and economic infrastructure that will allow such aid and investment to flourish.

SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION

The task force did not reach agreement on the details of any Security Council expansion.

It did conclude, however, that any such expansion should enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council and not in any way detract from the Council’s efficiency

and ability to act in accordance with the charter.

Task force members have differing views on this question and they are, of course,

free to express them.

Speaking personally, I believe the United States should support expansion of the

Security Council, with the aim of improving the Council’s ability to carry out its key

security and development functions—by which I mean more support for development and more capacity for peacekeeping operations. The task force discussed, and

I support, an expansion with no new veto powers and no new permanent members,

and with the possibility of some longer and consecutive terms. This is similar to one

of the proposals advanced by the high-level panel.

REFORM REQUIRES LEADERSHIP

Let me conclude with a few general points. Our task force agreed that reform is

both desirable and feasible. But it can be accomplished only with the concerted leadership of the United States, working with the growing ranks of the world’s democracies.

A successful U.S. effort will also require bipartisanship at home.

I believe the work of the task force, and the wide range of views it represents,

is itself a demonstration of what is possible when people of differing views come together in good faith to chart a course for the common benefit of the nation.

Let me close again by thanking the chairman, the ranking member, and the entire committee. I commend your years of service and leadership and, especially, the

bipartisanship this committee has demonstrated despite the many challenges you

face.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Mitchell,

and it’s a pleasure now to welcome Speaker Gingrich. Let me mention, as a bit of housekeeping, that it’s probable that a rolecall vote

will soon be called on the Senate floor. My thought would be that

we would have the statement of Mr. Gingrich, and then we will see

whether it is feasible to commence the questioning, or whether we

should take a short recess while members vote so that we can all

hear the questions and answers.

Speaker Gingrich.

STATEMENT OF HON. NEWT GINGRICH, COCHAIRMAN, TASK

FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do want to

thank you and the committee for having us here today, and I want

to also commend both you and Senator Coleman for the leadership

each of you has shown in tackling these questions. I’m going to try

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to be directly responsive to your earlier injunction. I have submitted for the record a statement. And I join Senator Mitchell in

thanking all of the leadership of the U.S. Institute of Peace. And,

in addition, thanking Lee Feinstein, and Commander Bill Sanders,

and also I’d like to add Vince Haley. They’ve done immense work

to make this possible. And I also want to commend the members

of the task force. When we were first gathered together initially at

Chairman Frank Wolfe’s recommendation. I think it’s been the

quality of the investment by individuals on the task force that

made our work possible.

Finally, I want to note the importance of your committee and

this hearing, on the fact Under Secretary Burns is here and I reviewed his testimony and am very gratified by the degree which

the administration is taking seriously our work. I want to, in a

sense, work backward. We have a number of major conclusions, but

I want to start with the one that I know you find the most perplexing, as I did when I was in the House. And that is, what is the

legislative branch’s legitimate interest and how does it gain—exercise leverage over the executive branch in our very complicated

constitutional system. I raise that because I think there are significant questions about how do we monitor and encourage the executive branch to place priorities that may be different than it would

reach on it’s own. That’s part of the constitutional tension we have.

I would only make two observations about that in the beginning

and that is, first, that we have a rare opportunity over the next few

years to make reform of the United Nations a continuing project.

While the September meeting is important and we’ll get a fair

amount done in September, I don’t believe we can actually expect

to have a truly reformed United Nations, unless the United States

shows a consistency of commitment, a level of working with the

other democracies, and a seriousness of purpose which, all too

often, has been lacking because the United States has many interests and has many concerns. And, somehow, things as mundane as

reforming the U.N. personnel system kind of drift away until the

next scandal shows up, and then we go back and decry it, and

we’re back in the same cycle.

I do think there is a middle ground between compulsory withholding of U.S. dues and automatically accepting whatever happens

in New York or Geneva, and I would commend this committee, as

you’ve already begun with the Lugar-Coleman bill, to look for common ground which, frankly, should be one I would hope that would

make the executive branch a little uncomfortable by requiring a

level of annual reporting and a level of certification in order to get

the money. And I would also remind the executive branch that the

Congress always has the legitimate right, every year, to reconsider

appropriate appropriation levels. And I say that because I think

the U.N. bureaucracy and the 120-some countries who collectively

pay less than 1 percent of all U.N. dues have to be reminded that

a free people do reserve some standards to set on whether or not

reforms have occurred.

Let me just start and say, I have seven key points I want to

make, and I’ll try to make them very quickly.

The first is, the United Nations has to be reformed for it’s own

good. I particularly commend the work that Rod Hills and Ed

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Fuelner did on the management side of U.N. reform, but the personnel system is an embarrassment. They have been trying for 2

years to fire somebody who was implicated in the Rwanda massacres, and the personnel system is so cumbersome they can’t fire

him. Now there is something profoundly wrong when you can’t, in

any way, recognize merit or minimize demerit if you will.

And so, first, I think we have to recognize that the United Nations has very serious internal reforms that lead to transparency.

It has to bother everyone. When the Secretary General’s Chief of

Staff shreds documents for 7 months, after having sent a memo

saying, don’t shred any documents. And if there’s no accountability

and no transparency, I think it’s very difficult to explain to the

American people why we should be making the level of investment

we’re making.

Second, and I think here we’re getting almost universal agreement. The U.N. Human Rights Commission has to be abolished,

and replaced by a new organization that has standards for membership. It has been an embarrassment to have the dictatorships

and the murders take over the Human Rights Commission and, basically, use it as a shield for their behavior. Sudan has been elected

to the Human Rights Commission for 2 years in a row, while being

investigated for genocide. It’s clearly an agency that can’t continue

to survive, and I commend the testimony you’ll hear from Secretary

Burns, I think it’s very important that we find a way to set a

standard for a relatively small limited group that replaces the

Human Rights Commission and that actually has standards for democracy and the rule of law as part of the process of being elected

to that group.

Third, I think that there has to be notice taken of the stunning

level of consistent United Nations hostility toward Israel. Just in

the last week, UNESCO’s engaged in an annual dance of attacking

Israel at the very time when there’s serious effort underway to try

to find grounds for peace between the Palestinian people and

Israel. At a very time when the Israeli Government is trying to

withdraw from Gaza and is faced with a tax against Israeli civilians by terrorists. There’s something profoundly wrong and it’s

symptomatic of the underlying weaknesses of the United Nations.

That Israel is consistently singled out for attention, far more attention than Sudan gets for massacring several million people, far

more attention than other countries have gotten for similar kind of

problems.

And I think the United States should be working with other democracies to establish a balance in the United Nations approach to

Israel, and to end the discriminations against Israeli activities in

the United Nations.

Fourth, I think we have to recognize that there are inherent limitations in a universal body. It is good to have a place where as

Churchill once said: ‘‘Jaw, jaw, jaw, is better than war, war, war.’’

And it’s good to have a universal institution. But the fact is, that

means there are people at the table who don’t share our values,

don’t share our beliefs, don’t use language in the same way. When,

for example, the Chinese can be eliminating the word democracy

from Internet application and can have people warned if they use

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the word democracy in their e-mails, clearly the Chinese don’t approach freedom of speech with the same pattern we do.

It’s clearly impossible to consider most of the dictatorships on the

planet as approaching the rule of law the same way we do, and so

I think it’s useful for the United States to recognize that the

United Nations is an important, but a limited body, and that there

are times and places when we may have to organize in other ways.

And our task force was quite clear about this. That the United

States always retains the opportunity to work through regional

bodies, to work through organizations of democracy, to do whatever

is necessary around the United Nations on those occasions when

the nature of the United Nations makes it impossible for it to be

effective.

Along that line, fifth. We had very serious discussions in the task

force and concluded that we strongly wanted to advocate a responsibility to protect. That every government should be put on notice

that the genocidal and murderous behavior against its own citizens

would, in effect, limit the protection of sovereignty. We clearly recognize that there are criminal regimes and that there are times

when, ideally, the United Nations will take steps against those

criminal regimes. But if for political reasons the security council

can’t take those steps, that we believe that regional bodies, or ad

hoc groups, or coalitions of the willing, that there are a variety of

levels, each of them of decreasing desirability but they may be

made necessary if the United Nations can’t operate.

And we want—we tried to make very clear in our report that

sometimes the United Nations gets blamed for things that are

clearly its members’. It is China, in particular, that has blocked

R–4, largely for oil interests that China has with almost $6 billion

dollars of investment in Sudan. There were times when Russia was

blocking activities to save lives in the Balkans, largely for traditional, military reasons.

The United States, itself, has at times been very hesitant about

doing the right things for reasons relating to domestic politics. So

we believe that the United Nations is an important place, and a

place where often you want to start, but we don’t think the responsibility to protect be allowed to wither because the Security Council

turns out to be impotent and we quite specifically said there are

times when working through regional bodies or working through

coalitions of the willing may be necessary.

Sixth, we think that a great deal of economic development is a

function of the rule of law, of private property, and of security. And

that while the United States has joined in considerable leadership

on the issue of economic aid, we think that economic aid is only as

effective as the recipient governments are prepared to reform themselves and modernize themselves and that a substantial part of

that burden has to be on the recipient country.

And finally, we come back again, and again, in our task force report to the notion that the United States has to work with, and organize the other democracies. For reform to truly be effective it

can’t be an American-only product. We think that there’s a great

opportunity through the G–7, and a great opportunity through

other organizations of democracies, for the United States to consistently help move the United Nations toward being more representaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
14

tive of the rights of the entire human race, rather than representative only of the interest of sovereign governments, many of whom

are dictatorships.

And we urge the committee, as it considers legislation to look

both at ways to help focus the executive branch on a routine regular commitment to reform over a number of years, and on executing a large part of that commitment to reform by helping organize and develop a caucus of democracies, in ways that will draw

a clear distinction between dictators who have the right to belong

to the United Nations but don’t have the right to render judgment

on issues like human rights.

And between governments which have sovereignty under international law, but run the risk of losing that protection if, in fact,

they engage in criminal behaviors and fail in the responsibility to

protect their own citizens. And we look forward very much to a

chance to answer questions from your committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gingrich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NEWT GINGRICH, COCHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE ON THE

UNITED NATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Lugar, Ranking Member Biden, and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today, along with Senator Mitchell, on the consensus findings of the Task Force on U.N. Reform, which was mandated and funded

by Congress.

I agreed to participate and cochair this Task Force on U.N. Reform with my

friend, Senator Mitchell, because I share the belief that a dramatically reformed

U.N. can be an effective instrument in the pursuit of a safer, healthier, more prosperous, and freer world—all goals which serve American interests and the interests

of our democratic allies.

As the largest stakeholder in the U.N., the American taxpayer has every right to

expect an institution that is at once effective, honest, and decent. That United Nations—a very different body from the one that stands today in New York—could be

a valuable instrument to promote democratic political development, human rights,

economic self-sufficiency, and the peaceful settlement of differences.

Before I go on, I would like to stress that this report is the product of serious

negotiation. We got here because of a firm integrity and commitment to hammering

out a consensus document. There are people on the right, including myself, who

might have said other things in a different setting. Accordingly, there are people on

the left who might have said other things in a different setting. Nevertheless, we

were able to come together in a very positive way to provide leadership and put

forth a set of recommendations to show how, with the right kinds of reform, the

U.N. can become an effective institution.

THREE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

However, American efforts to reform the U.N. should always be conditioned on

three principles.

First, that telling the truth and standing up for basic principles is more important

than winning meaningless votes or conciliating dictators and opponents. It is time

to end the appeasement strategy of a soft diplomacy which fails to insist on honesty.

Telling the truth is only confrontational to those whose policies cannot stand the

light of day.

Second, all reform proposals should emphasize what is right and necessary, not

what is easy and acceptable. In any given session the United States may only win

a few victories. However in every session the United States should proudly affirm

the truth and fight for principles that matter. Ambassadors Moynihan, Kirkpatrick,

and Pickering were exemplars of this kind of direct tough minded principled advocacy. The repeal of the infamous ‘‘Zionism is Racism’’ resolution in 1991 was an example of courageously doing what was right rather than doing what was comfortable. The time for appeasing the vicious, the dictatorial, the brutal, and the corrupt has to be over.

Third, the members of the U.N. must be made to understand that the United

States wants to reform the U.N. and is committed to doing all it can to achieve that

reform. However, the problems there are so deep, in order that they might be fixed,

15

we must confront roadblocks put up by dictators and other entrenched interests who

will want to defend the status quo and reject reform.

Failure, while not desirable, can be an option for the United Nations. It cannot

be one for the United States. There must be effective multilateral instruments for

saving lives and defending innocent people, and we should be prepared to explore

other avenues for effective action if the U.N. refuses to reform itself. America can

never be trapped by the unwillingness of others to do the right thing.

FIVE THEMES

This statement does not address the details of the task force findings, but rather

stresses five themes which personally think that the Congress should keep in mind

as it considers the future relationship of the United States with the United Nations.

1. An unacceptable gap exists between the ideals of the U.N. Charter and the institution that exists today

By any reasonable measure, it is fair to say that there exists an unacceptable gap

between the ideals of the U.N. Charter and the institution that exists today.

Today, notwithstanding the charter’s goals, the civilized world is in the fourth

year of a new global war against a committed ideological foe bent on using terror.

Thousands of innocents have been murdered and maimed in New York, Washington,

London, Madrid, Beslan, Bali, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Istanbul, and many other cities.

The terrorist Ayman Al-Zawahiri is explicit about al-Qaeda’s ‘‘right to kill 4 million

Americans—2 million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and

cripple hundreds of thousands.’’

And yet, 4 years after 9/11, the U.N. General Assembly still has not reached

agreement upon something as basic to the war on terror as a comprehensive definition of terrorism.

At the same time, genocide continues unstopped in Darfur 10 years after the

world vowed that Rwanda would be the last genocide.

Our faith in the U.N.’s fealty to fundamental human rights is once again shaken,

not only by the egregious paralysis by the U.N. in the wake of mass killings in the

Balkans, Rwanda, and Sudan but also by the existence of a 53-member U.N. Human

Rights Commission whose process for membership selection has become so distorted

that countries with appalling, even monstrous, human rights records—Sudan, Syria,

Zimbabwe, Libya, and Cuba, to name a few—have been seated there. This has led

to a substantive failure to hold many nations accountable for abysmal human rights

records.

Also, an insidious dishonesty can be found in the Oil-for-Food scandal, the rapes

and sexual abuses by U.N. peacekeepers of the very people they were sent to protect, and the consistent failure to admit failure and assign responsibility within the

senior bureaucracy.

Without very substantial reform, there is little reason to believe the U.N. will be

able to realize the goals of its charter in the future. Indeed, the culture of hypocrisy

and dishonesty which has surrounded so many U.N. activities makes it very likely

that the system will get steadily worse if it is not confronted and substantially reformed. Without fundamental reform, the U.N.’s reputation will only suffer further,

reinforcing incentives to bypass the U.N. in favor of other institutions, coalitions,

or self-help.

2. The United States has significant national interests in an effective United Nations

Notwithstanding these and other failures, the United States has a significant national interest in working to reform the U.N. and making it an effective institution.

The United States took the lead after World War II in establishing the U.N. as

part of a network of global institutions aimed at making America more secure. It

was intended to serve as, in the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a ‘‘Good Neighbor,’’ by helping other people achieve safety, health, prosperity, and freedom. It was

that generation’s belief that a freer and more prosperous world was a better world

for America.

Today, a freer and more prosperous world most certainly remains a fundamental

interest of the United States. We believe that if it undertakes the sweeping reforms

called for in the task force report, the U.N. will be in a much better position to be

a ‘‘Good Neighbor’’ to help all nations achieve a larger freedom.

Three generations of Americans have demonstrated not only a strong preference

for sharing the costs, risks, and burdens of global leadership, but also an acute recognition that action in coordination and cooperation with others is often the only

way to get the job done.

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Perhaps there is no more important illustration of this practical recognition than

in the security challenge facing the United States and the rest of the world from

our terrorist enemies and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The current proliferation trends are alarming. North Korea continues to enhance

its nuclear capabilities. Iran is building a uranium enrichment facility that could

be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Pakistan has nuclear weapons and we now know that one of their leading scientists has provided critical equipment and technologies to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps other countries or

terrorist organizations. Even worse, Pakistan’s internal stability is constantly in

question. If fundamentalist Islamists were able to take control of that country and

their nuclear arsenal, the potential threat that would emerge is unimaginable.

As protecting America and preserving freedom are this Government’s primary

missions, I agree with the fundamental conclusion of this task force that countering

terrorism and proliferation effectively is significantly enhanced by broad international participation, which can be greatly facilitated by an effective United Nations.

In addition, if it works, the U.N. can be an effective cost multiplier that can help

achieve humanitarian aims in places where nations might be unacceptable and in

ways which enable the United States to have other countries bear more of the burden than they would in a purely ad hoc world.

For all these reasons and despite its record of grievous and real failures, the U.N.

is a system worth reforming rather than a system to be abandoned.

3. The U.N. Human Rights Commission must be abolished

The task force’s consensus recommendation to abolish the U.N. Human Rights

Commission is of paramount importance.

We are all well aware of the U.N.’s and the international community’s failures

in Rwanda in 1994 and in Sudan today.

The U.N.’s response to the crisis in Sudan is a shocking example of its current

institutional failures. For over two decades the Government of Sudan has been an

active participant in the genocide of its non-Muslim population. Since 1983, the government in Khartoum has been responsible for the killing of over 2 million Christians and animists and the displacement of 4 million more during the ‘‘jihad’’ it

waged in southern Sudan. According to the U.N.’s own calculations, recent violence

in the Darfur region has resulted in the killing of at least 70,000 people and the

internal displacement of over 1.5 million civilians. Some analysts are estimating,

however, that the true death toll could be four or five times higher.

Despite these facts, the U.N. and member states have done virtually nothing to

stop it. Indeed, there has been a consistent effort to describe the mass murders dishonestly because an honest account would require measures that many member

states want to avoid. Former Secretary of State Powell concluded that genocide has

been, and continues to be, committed in Sudan and that the government bears responsibility.

Failure to deal with genocide around the world and the continued inability to address honestly the situation in Sudan is a problem that has its roots in the internal

institutions of the U.N., specifically the Human Rights Commission, which has been

corrupted by political games that have allowed some of the world’s worst human

rights abusers to sit in judgment of others—and to shield themselves from criticism.

The plain and simple facts are that known human rights abusers have served on

the U.N. Human Rights Commission, illustrated by the fact that today the Government of Sudan is currently serving its second term on the Commission. In 2003,

Libya was elected to chair the Commission by a bloc of African and Middle East

nations. Between 1987 and 1988 Iraq was a member in good standing of the Commission at the very time that Chemical Ali was using mustard gas and Sarin nerve

agents upon Iraqi Kurds.

Current U.N. policy is that the human rights records of the 53 countries that sit

on the Commission may not be assessed as a prerequisite to serving on the panel,

which means there is no mechanism to protect the Commission from being manipulated by governments that routinely abuse human rights.

In effect, the dictators and the murderers have systematically come to dominate

the institution designed to bring them to justice.

This policy completely undermines the integrity and decency of the entire U.N.

and should be offensive to free peoples everywhere. Even Secretary General Annan

recognizes that ‘‘we have reached a point at which the Commission’s declining credibility has cast a shadow on the reputation of the U.N. system as a whole and where

perceived reforms will not be enough.’’

17

It is for these reasons that the task force has unanimously called for abolishing

the current Human Rights Commission and replacing it with a new Human Rights

Council.

The task force recognizes that it would be folly to abolish the Commission only

to have it replaced with a new body with a new name but which would suffer from

the same inherent flaws; nations that are human rights violators cannot have the

responsibility to set the standard for global justice.

Therefore, it was the consensus of the task force that a new Human Rights Council must be established that should be comprised of democracies. Democracy is, by

its nature, transparent, accountable, and committed to freedom and liberty. Totalitarian regimes are, in contrast, not. Therefore, what we have said is that only those

who have demonstrated their own commitment to human rights and the rule of law

should be assigned the responsibility to tell the world truths about governments

that rape, torture, and murder their citizens.

4. Any U.N. reform program supported by the United States must insist on a fundamental change in the way the U.N. treats Israel

A true test of whether there is meaningful U.N. reform is whether there is a dramatic reform of the way that the U.N. treats Israel.

A U.N. General Assembly partition plan resolution in 1947 made the establishment of Israel possible, but since that time the U.N. has treated Israel as a secondclass citizen. In many ways the U.N.’s treatment of Israel is a continuing case study

of political manipulation, mistreatment, and dishonesty.

As stated in our report, ‘‘Israel continues to be denied rights enjoyed by all other

member states, and a level of systematic hostility against it is routinely expressed,

organized, and funded within the U.N. system.’’ Ever since Israel’s establishment,

member states who have been fundamentally opposed to its existence have used the

General Assembly forum to isolate and chastise this democratic nation. At the opening session each year these nations challenge the credentials of the Israeli delegation.

More than one quarter of the resolutions condemning a state’s human rights violations adopted by the Human Rights Commission over the past 40 years have been

directed at Israel. Israel is the only nation to have its own agenda item dealing with

alleged human rights violations at the Commission in Geneva; all other countries

are dealt with in a separate agenda item. This systematic hostility against Israel

can also be gleaned from the fact that of the 10 emergency special sessions called

by the U.N. since its founding, 6 have been about Israel. In contrast, none has been

called to address the genocide in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, or the continuing

atrocities in Sudan.

The most vivid historical example of Israel’s mistreatment by the U.N. goes back

to 1975, when the General Assembly passed Resolution 3379 on the anniversary of

Kristallnacht. This resolution declared that ‘‘Zionism is a form of racism and racial

discrimination . . . [and] is a threat to world peace and security’’ and was meant

to deny Israel’s political legitimacy by attacking its moral basis for existence. It was

only repealed in December 1991, following tireless efforts by the U.S. Government,

particularly President Bush, Secretary Baker, and Ambassador Pickering. Its mere

existence however, shows how the General Assembly has often become a ‘‘theatre’’

for bashing Israel.

The U.N. continues to provide a theatre for this sort of behavior. Just last week

the U.N. sponsored an annual Israel bashing meeting at the UNESCO headquarters

in Paris. The meeting, organized by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, adopted an ‘‘Action Plan by Civil Society’’ calling for a global campaign of boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against Israel to

‘‘pressure [it] to end the occupation.’’ Israel’s plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip

was described as ‘‘a ploy to legitimize Israel’s annexation of wide swathes of territory in the West Bank.’’ This meeting took place despite the fact that the U.N. Secretary General has recently made several statements regarding the fair treatment

of Israel as an important component of U.N. reform. Nevertheless, this is one more

example of the ongoing mistreatment of Israel and the U.N.’s one-sided approach

to the Middle East conflict. The U.S. taxpayer should not be subsidizing a one-sided

anti-Semitic assault on the survival of the only true democracy in the region other

than Turkey. A genuine commitment to reform would require abolishing this sort

of U.N. machinery whose only purpose is to demonize Israel.

U.N. member states must recognize that the terrorists and the state sponsors of

terrorism against the State of Israel are of the same evil nature and pose the same

threat to the civilized world as the terrorists who murdered innocent civilians in

London, Madrid, New York, and Washington, and who continue their attacks on the

innocent in Baghdad. The first U.N. Chapter VII sanctions for terrorist acts were

18

against Libya in 1992. This success has been a model for subsequent responses to

the Taliban and al-Qaeda since 9/11. Certain U.N. members have, however, been

unwilling to support these actions against nations such as Syria and Iran who support and fund terrorist activities against Israel. These member states have found

it easier to promote an anti-Israel stance that makes the U.N.’s response to terrorist

attacks against the Israeli people inconsistent and ineffective.

This is why the U.N. must adopt a comprehensive definition of terrorism that is

not manipulated by the very members who are themselves supporting terrorism. As

the task force recommends, a comprehensive definition of terrorism should not be

applied to the actions of uniformed national military forces (which are already

bound by the laws of war), but to the actions of individuals or irregular organizations. Many member states have tried to derail this process by insisting that any

actions in the context of ‘‘wars of national liberation’’ and the ejection of ‘‘occupying

forces’’ by such individuals and irregular organizations should not be considered terrorism. Such a definition would be unacceptable, as its effect would be to legitimize

terrorist attacks against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as against

Israel.

We also made clear in this report that the U.N. cannot presume to be the arbiter

of international human rights and justice when Israel is discriminated against and

excluded from any regional grouping in Geneva and excluded from a permanent regional grouping in New York. Although the U.N. Charter gives every member state

the right to be elected a member of the Security Council, Israel’s segregation from

a permanent regional grouping has denied them the right to seek a seat. It also

means that an Israeli judge can never be elected to the International Court of Justice, nor can Israel even vote on the makeup of this court.

Also, while the task force did not develop any specific recommendations regarding

structural reforms of the Security Council, it did state that any reforms measures

that are adopted must extend to Israel. There is no legitimate basis for allowing

rogue dictatorships, such as Syria, to sit on the Security Council while denying representation to a 50-year-old democracy in the heart of the Middle East.

Accepting Israel as a normal member with full voting and participatory rights

should be considered a benchmark test of any U.N. reform program. This would

demonstrate that the U.N. is genuinely committed to the equality of rights that are

enshrined in its charter.

5. A U.N. with no democratic preconditions for membership will always have inherent limitations that are not subject to reform

Because the U.N. has no democratic preconditions for membership, we must recognize that there are limits to America’s ability to render the U.N. infrastructure

and its decisions compatible with American values and interests through any reform

initiative. There are inherent limitations of the U.N. that are not subject to ‘‘reform.’’

The United States of America is a liberal democratic nation state (as are our principle allies). Our form of government is based on the principle of ‘‘government by

consent of the governed.’’ In other words, it is based on the principle of ‘‘democratic

sovereignty.’’ This is the principle that a democratic people have the right of selfgovernment—the right to rule themselves. And as first set forth in our Declaration

of Independence, we have held this to be true not only for the American people, but

for all peoples.

In this regard, it is only necessary to note that the first seven words of our Constitution—We the People of the United States—accurately reflect our founding belief

that governments derive ‘‘their just powers from the consent of the governed’’ and

the fact that that the sovereign will of the people of the United States was expressed in the Constitution itself and in our ongoing system of government created

by it.

By contrast, the first seven words of the U.N. Charter—We the Peoples of the

U.N.—are only accurate as they apply to its democratic members. The peoples of

countries like Cuba, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran, and North Korea, to name a few examples, have no say in what their governments do in their name, especially in the

United Nations. Countries in which criminal gangs and ruthless dictators impose

their will without the consent of the people are inherently less defensible and morally less sovereign than countries which have earned the respect of their citizens

by deriving their just powers from the consent of their people.

Americans can hardly be surprised then when such member states attempt to

block U.N. action that would hold them accountable for violations of human rights

or organize through the General Assembly highly publicized meetings such as the

2001 U.N. World Conference against Racism in Durban, where illiberal and undemocratic interests prevailed.

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1While NGOs were not a subject addressed in the task force report, the Congress should recognize that NGOs are a growing and unregulated set of special interests and are playing important roles inside the U.N. bodies in which they are accredited, often by procedures highly discriminatory to promarket, prodemocracy ideals. They are not unaccountable to anyone. Incredibly, NGOs are also beginning to make decisions in the place of sovereign governments. At the

recent Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an NGO representative was seated

in the place of a certain Central Asian nation. Consequently, rules governing the participation

of NGOs in the U.N., their accreditation and transparency for those allowed through the door

are a vital requirement for any meaningful U.N. reform.

Any international organization in which a majority of its members are not fullfledged democracies, and which provides a platform to divide democracies by facilitating coalitions with undemocratic states in an effort to trump the United States—

even democratic states often will sacrifice fundamental interests such as human

rights at the U.N. altars of false consensus and regional solidarity—will likely remain an imperfect instrument in adjudging and protecting human rights fairly and

accurately. It will also remain an imperfect instrument in spreading democracy to

the darkest places in the globe and combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation

or the major threats to the security interests of the United States (and our democratic allies).

This ongoing reality that the U.N. is a mix of democratic and undemocratic states

explains why a primary conclusion of the task force is that the challenges and problems faced by the U.N. can only be addressed through consistent and concerted action by the world’s genuine democracies, which is why the task force recommends

strengthening the Caucus of Democracies as an operational entity capable of organizing concerted political action to counter gross violations of human rights and to

save lives and creating or strengthening alternative channels of influence outside

the institution, such as the Community of Democracies.

Additionally, I would personally add that the United States should explicitly affirm the principle of ‘‘democratic sovereignty’’ as a core universal principle in all

international and global relations, and as central to the administration of the

United Nations. The only institution that possesses democratic legitimacy in today’s

world is the liberal democratic nation state. Clearly, democratic legitimacy is not

possessed by the United Nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs).1 All of these institutions have what is often called a ‘‘democracy deficit.’’ None of these institutions is accountable or responsible to a democratic

electorate, genuine democratic institutions, or the give and take of national democratic politics. These NGOs and institutions taken together do not represent something called ‘‘global civil society’’ or ‘‘global governance,’’ amorphous concepts that

purposely blur the constitutional limits and democratic accountability of actors within the liberal democratic nation state.

Clearly, none of these institutions (the United Nations, international organizations, or NGOs) has the democratic legitimacy to impose decisions upon a liberal

democratic nation state without the consent of the people of that democratic state.

Therefore, a coalition of genuine democratic nation states led by the United States

can explicitly and consistently reject any effort by the General Assembly, in special

conferences and meetings, and in any U.N. Organization to adopt rules, treaties,

and systems which would infringe on American constitutional liberties or democratic

institutions, or the constitutional liberties or democratic institutions of other liberal

democratic nation states.

A coalition of genuine democratic nation states led by the United States can explicitly and consistently reject a growing undemocratic international movement that

seeks to create a system of rules, and ‘‘laws’’ which will circumscribe American liberty and coerce America into taking steps which the people of America would never

take. The use of large international meetings (sometimes under U.N. authority) to

create new systems of ‘‘law’’ and new ‘‘norms’’ of international behavior, often advanced under the guise of ‘‘global governance,’’ are a direct threat to the American

system of constitutional liberty and must be rejected.

This is not a narrow, or a partisan concern for a few—but a constitutional concern

for all Americans. U.N. treaties are often vague; open to wide interpretation; and

subject to considerable mischief. The Senate could approve well-meaning general

principles in a U.N. treaty that are interpreted in ways that the Senate did not intend. For example, the U.S. Senate has ratified the CERD (Convention to Eliminate

all Forms of Racial Discrimination) Treaty emanating from the United Nations. The

United States added reservations stating that the ‘‘hate speech’’ provisions in the

CERD are subordinate to our free speech rights under the first amendment.

Nevertheless, some NGOs, international bureaucrats, law professors, and even

judges, are arguing that the CERD Treaty requires that the U.S. Government do

all sort of things that have not been approved by Congress, including implementing

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speech restrictions. In monitoring U.S. compliance with international treaties, U.N.

rappoteurs under the guise of U.N. treaty requirements, and in the name of ‘‘global

governance,’’ often advocate the implementation of policies that challenge both the

legislative authority of the Congress and the federalist prerogatives of the states

under our constitutional system. This is new territory and legal reasoning of this

type is being heard in arguments over U.N. treaty after U.N. treaty.

Surely all Americans could agree with the principle that: ‘‘If there is a conflict

between U.S. constitutional law and international law derived from the Senate’s decision to ratify a U.N. treaty or convention, U.S. constitutional law must take precedence in all cases.’’ No one who believes in the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution

can oppose this simple statement.

A COALITION OF GENUINE DEMOCRACIES MUST WORK TOGETHER TO REFORM THE

UNITED NATIONS

Effective and deep reform will result if there is a coalition of genuine democracies,

the United States chief among them, that want to create a new accountable, transparent, honest, and effective United Nations.

Because so much of the U.N. behavior and culture would be indefensible if described honestly, there is an overwhelming tendency to use platitudes and misleading terms to camouflage the indefensible. There is no institution on earth with

more Orwellian distortion of language than the United Nations. The very dishonesty

of the language helps sustain the dishonesty and destructiveness of its institutions.

A coalition of genuine democracies with representatives willing to speak straightforwardly can do much to reform these institutions by simply telling the truth.

A coalition of genuine democracies can affirm what the task force calls on the U.S.

Government to affirm, that sovereignty belongs to the people of a country and governments have a responsibility to protect their people. And that if a government

fails in its primary responsibility to protect the lives of those living within its jurisdiction from genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations, it forfeits claims to immunity from intervention when such intervention is designed to protect the at-risk population.

Likewise, a coalition of genuine democracies can affirm that when a government’s

abnegation of its responsibilities to its own people is so severe, the collective responsibility of nations to take action cannot be denied. While the U.N. Security Council

can and should act in such cases, in the event it does not, its failure must not be

used as an excuse by concerned members, especially genuine democracies, to avoid

taking protective measures.

A coalition of genuine democracies can help to reaffirm a fundamental faith in

human rights, which is why the task force recommends abolishing the Human

Rights Commission and replacing it by a new Human Rights Council ideally composed of democratic states that respect human rights.

A coalition of genuine democracies can move to replace the emphasis on bureaucratic and often corrupt state-to-state aid programs with a consistent emphasis on

the rule of law, private property rights, incentives for private investment in and

trade with developing countries, private charities and supporting the growth of a

civil society beyond the control of dictators and bureaucracies.

A coalition of genuine democracies can explicitly and consistently reject a growing

antidemocratic international movement that seeks to create a system of rules and

‘‘laws’’ which will circumscribe American liberty and coerce America into taking

steps which the people of America would never take. The use of large international

meetings to create new systems of ‘‘law’’ and new ‘‘norms’’ of international behavior

are a direct threat to the American system of constitutional liberty and must be rejected.

CONGRESS HAS A KEY ROLE IN ENSURING SUCCESSFUL U.N. REFORM

Congress needs to get its act together for U.N. reform to happen. When the Congress of the United States, which has the power of the purse, the power of law, and

the power of investigation, takes U.N. reform seriously and sticks to it year after

year, it will surely have a significant impact.

I recommend that Congress should have a much more robust presence in New

York, have a much more robust interaction with the U.N. Ambassador, once we get

one, and have a much more robust requirement of whoever is in charge at State,

as someone you can hold accountable regarding what we have done over the past

3 months and what is planned for the next 3 months. Congress has every right

within our constitutional framework to tell the State Department that you want

consultations on a regular basis. You cannot actually issue effective instructions, but

you can demand consultations and reports.

21

This is important because we need to elevate U.N. reform to be a continuing and

ongoing part of congressional involvement, both at the authorization and appropriation committee levels and both in the House and Senate. We further need to get

more members engaged so that there is a sophisticated understanding of what has

to get done, how we are going to get it done, and what we ultimately hold the executive branch accountable for.

Additionally, organizing the democracies so that we can then be in a position to

systematically reform the U.N. is a significant undertaking that is going to take real

time.

Having Members of Congress talk with their counterparts in other countries, getting British Parliamentarians, the French Parliamentarians, the Germans, the Japanese, to agree that these are values we should be insisting on will be an enormous

asset to the United States.

This Congress must play a key role in ensuring a successful reform of the United

Nations. The task force report presents a starting point. One proposal for the Congress to move forward on U.N. reform is to pass legislation that requires an annual

review by the executive branch that evaluates the progress of U.N. reform against

a set of performance metrics. Since the task force report sets forth a number of reform recommendations, I have attached as an appendix to this statement an example of what such a U.N. reform scorecard with a set of proposed performance measures might look like with respect to the task force’s reform recommendations. This

list is intended to illustrate the types of performance measures the Congress could

adopt; it is by no means intended to be an exhaustive list. There are surely several

more inventive measures that this Congress could design.

Guided by such a set of performance measures, the Congress could hold hearings

every June or July to review the U.N. reform progress report prepared by the executive branch that identified the progress to date. That report could then become the

basis for an annual discussion on U.N. reform at each summer’s meeting of the

G–8, and then later at each September’s meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. Following the annual hearings on U.N. reform, the Congress could adopt amendments

to the scorecard legislation based on progress so that standards for the following

year could be set forth. In this manner, Congress could develop a continuous practice of monitoring U.N. reform.

I think the United States should enter into this process of reform for as many

days as it takes, with the notion that the most powerful country in the world is

going to get up every morning and is going to negotiate at the U.N., organize the

democracies, tell the truth, and keep the pressure up until we break through and

get the kind of United Nations the people of the world deserve.

I am hopeful and confident that if the Congress moves forward in this spirit and

with the level of commitment that will be required to achieve reforms, the United

States can once again lead the way in designing a United Nations that will be an

effective instrument in building a safer, healthier, more prosperous, and freer world.

I also remain hopeful that the U.N. will adopt and undertake all of the necessary

reform measures that will satisfy the United States and our democratic allies without the need to resort to any type of limitation on the appropriation of U.S. taxpayer

funds to U.N. activities. And while I hope it will not be necessary to use any such

limitations in the U.S. relationship with the U.N., I think it is inevitable that limitations will be enforced by the Congress if the necessary reforms of the U.N. are

not implemented in a timely way.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN RISE TO THE OCCASION AND REFORM THE UNITED NATIONS

During the Second World War, the American system responded magnificently to

defend freedom.

During the cold war, the Congress and the executive branch sustained collective

security for 44 years with amazing stability despite the stresses of Vietnam and

other difficulties.

Now, faced with a very complex world in which people are starving to death, being

killed viciously, being tortured, brutalized and mutilated by truly evil people, there

is a new need for sustained consistent American leadership at the United Nations

if that organization is to become an effective instrument in protecting the safety of

the American people and the dignity of peoples worldwide.

The threat of terrorists with weapons of mass murder and weapons of mass destruction makes this a pressing need of national security (indeed, of our national

survival) and the security of our democratic allies. The ongoing genocide in Darfur

and the need to address humanitarian crises makes reforming the U.N. a pressing

need to save lives.

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Just as the United States took the lead after World War II in forging the consensus that led to the creation of the United Nations 60 years ago, we believe the

United States, in its own interests and in the interests of international security and

prosperity, can and must help lead the U.N. toward greater relevance and effectiveness in this new era. Without change, the U.N. will remain an uncertain instrument, both for the governments that comprise it and for those who look to it for

salvation.

With a President and a Congress united in their desire to advance our national

interests, a reformed U.N. can be fashioned to more effectively meet the goals of its

charter and the new challenges that it confronts.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The appendix containing ‘‘An Example of a U.N. Reform Scorecard,’’ attached to Hon. Gingrich’s statement, can be found in the Additional Material Submitted for the Record section at the end of the hearing.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Speaker Gingrich.

Let me now recognize the distinguished ranking member of the

committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR

FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, I’ll be very brief. Gentlemen, welcome, it’s truly a pleasure to have you here. I think your report is

first rate. And, Mr. Speaker, your reference to, and prior to that,

Majority Leader Mitchell’s references to, responsibility and respect

for citizens is an incredibly important contribution.

I also want to point out, that I think that unless we lead the

other democracies and begin to make clear that there are circumstances in the 21st century that go beyond the Treaty of Westphalia, where you actually yield your claim to sovereignty. One of

those is genocide within your borders. And that will only come, in

my view, not through the United Nations Security Council, but

through the major democracies agreeing after some significant and

serious discussion about what the new international rules of proceeding are.

The United Nations, to state the obvious, you both stated it and

you stated it in your congressional careers, is necessary. And so I’d

like to stipulate at the outset, that it’s absolutely clear that reform

is needed. Quite frankly, as strange as it sounds, under the leadership of Senator Helms we actually began this process, it was a

halting start, but we actually began the process. I find it interesting that Helms and Biden put through the first bit of reform,

and it was really Senator Helms, and now we have Gingrich and

Mitchell which is another odd couple, but a welcome couple.

I want to recognize the leadership of my colleague, particularly

the chairman, as well as our friend who has done more work on

this than anyone else that I know in the Senate in the last 2 years,

and I think the work has been first rate. And I think their contribution has been positive on how to move with reform. This is a

time of significant promise. But also it’s a time of peril with regard

to U.N. reform.

The good news is, there’s now widespread recognition, universal

recognition that there’s a need for significant change. If you had

raised some of the things you’re raising today, 10 years ago it

would have been viewed as heretical. You would have gotten a leftright argument going. The rest of the major powers in the world

would have said we’re rocking the boat too much. The Secretary

General would have had an apoplexy, and so on. But here we are

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with evident attention the Secretary General has given to this

issue. We can argue why he has been spurred to this moment, but

the fact of the matter is, in convening the high-level panel last

year, writing his report ‘‘In Larger Freedom,’’ and undertaking several forms within his own authority, that’s progress.

It also has been significant that Congress is paying attention to

reform, granted it may have been a scandal that, in fact, moved us

to this position, but we used to have debates up here, as the chairman will know, in the past, about whether the United Nations

should exist, not how to make it better. It was, ‘‘you’re either

against it or you’re for it. You’re either the black helicopter crowd,

or you’re the ‘one world’ guys.’’ I mean there was very little serious

debate about modernizing, and bringing the United Nations into

the 21st century.

And so the question for the Congress, Mr. Chairman, and the administration, is not whether, but how to best initiate this reform,

and I think you’re well underway here.

Without going through my whole statement here, let me suggest

that one of the first issues that both of our colleagues have referenced already, that we’re going to have to resolve upfront here,

is withholding, semiwithholding, or encouraging payment of U.S.

dues. It basically breaks down into those categories. And I, for one,

which will not surprise my colleagues, think it’s a mistake to withhold payments. We’ve been down that road before and it takes an

awful lot of time to catch up. And I think it tends sometimes to

be counterproductive. It took us the better part of a decade to get

out from under where we were before, and I would argue, and I

will on the floor, that the House-passed legislation is almost certainly going to move us back into arrears and, in fact, delay reform.

We’re going to argue about the wrong thing. We’re going to be

arguing about whether or not we should, or should not, have withheld dues. Senator Coleman and the chairman’s proposal is much

better, but it does, quite frankly, give me pause as well because it

could unintentionally undermine the negotiating efforts that are

underway at the United Nations. And I would say, at the same

time, we are in a time of peril, because of the things we say and

do in Congress are closely watched by the world. We should take

care that our efforts assist in reform negotiations and not undermine them. We all know that egos exist in other capitals, among

our friends as well as among those who don’t agree with us. We

rightly or wrongly, I will not make a judgment about it, have to

deal with whether or not we are totally unilateral or whether it’s

pox Americana, and so on and so forth. This is not the time for us

to unnecessarily put ourselves into the position of being accused of

that.

We were in, as I said, a similar position in 1997 that took a long

time to get ourselves out of. I think the issue of U.N. reform needs

to be addressed in a bipartisan manner which we have expressed

here and I suspect can occur on the Hill. I think if legislation is

needed, we should stick closely to the recommendations you have

made, that your committee has made. And I think, rather than

threaten to withhold dues if there’s not sufficient reform, I think

we should provide positive incentives if reforms are achieved. We

can always go back to the other option. But it seems to me that

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to put our assessment payments back on the calendar year basis,

so that we pay in January rather than October, would provide significant benefit to the United Nations and earn us some significant

goodwill, which would put us in a better position to get consensus

to make some difficult changes. Not all of our allies and friends are

ready to be as straightforward as you’ve recommended. And I think

we should not let ourselves be gamed in this process as we have

on other occasions in Democrat and Republican administrations. I

truly appreciate your testimony here today.

And, at the risk of raising another contentious issue, I don’t

know whether we’ll ever reach agreement with regard to the nomination of Mr. Bolton, in terms of material being supplied to those

of us in the committee who think we need it, and to the Senate.

I don’t know whether, if it doesn’t occur, the President will make

an interim appointment. That is the President’s judgment, not

mine. But I say with all sincerity, if, in fact, there’s any reconsideration, and I’m not suggesting that any has been undertaken, I

would say to you, Mr. Speaker, I would hope that if the President

came to you, that you would consider taking the position. I can’t

think of anyone who would be more ideally suited for that job. I

mean this sincerely. You and I have disagreed philosophically, I

have great respect for you. The power of your ideas, the power of

your persuasion, and your clear knowledge in this area is the kind

of positive force we need now at the United Nations. I mean this

sincerely. I probably damned any possibility of that happening by

mentioning it. And as soon as I said it I just thought of that. Actually I don’t like you a damn bit, I don’t think you’re capable of

going up there. I don’t think you should, if, in fact, you are asked.

[Laughter].

Senator BIDEN. The more I think about it, you’re totally unsuited

for the job. But, anyway, think about it if it occurs.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden, for

an interesting, even provocative opening statement. But we won’t

go there. Back to the United Nations. Let me just say that the vote

has been postponed for a few minutes, so we’ll proceed with questions. We have a good membership participation, so we will have

an 8-minute limit for our questions and answers on the first round.

And I’ll commence by asking a question about the Oil-For-Food

scandal. It exposed a vast inability to account for funds, considering all the motivations that may have been there. I have already

suggested it at the Security Council level of various nations, to

handle it in various ways.

Is the United Nations capable of handling a program that is that

vast, with those sums of money, the logistic support that is required for the humanitarian aspects, quite apart from the commercial business of getting the food and so forth? And if it is not, are

the recommendations that you have made adequate to solve that

problem, or is some other international organization better

equipped? Have you tried to think through the enormity of how

much money, how much food, how many people either living or

dying were involved in that, and whether the United Nations really

is capable, as an organization, of dealing with that?

25

Senator MITCHELL. In my judgment, as presently structured the

United Nations could not effectively supervise a program of this

complexity and difficulty. The circumstances with respect to that

scandal are well known to this committee, Senator Coleman and

another committee has looked into that in great detail. We did not

conduct an independent investigation given that there are five congressional inquiries and the Volcker panel is considering it. But it

does clearly demonstrate the current inability of the United Nations to effectively operate and supervise such a program.

However, we devoted a great deal of attention to the subject of

accountability and reform of operational methods. The Speaker has

already mentioned Rod Hills and Ed Fuelner, and they were the

task force members who served on the group that dealt with that

subject, it’s chapter 3 in our report. It’s a very comprehensive set

of recommendations. I believe if they were adopted, or something

comparable to them, that there would be a much greater chance of

effectively operating such a program or something like it in the future. We did not evaluate the second question you asked, which is

whether some other institution might be more capable of doing so;

our task force deliberations were limited to the United Nations and

its operations.

In summary and repeating, I do not believe the United Nations

could effectively now administer such a program; I believe they

could if they adopted the reforms that we’ve recommended.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good, and we’ll refer to chapter 3, and study

that more extensively. Let me touch upon the question that Speaker Gingrich mentioned in his opening statement. And that is the

appropriate role of the Congress and the administration in dealing

with each other and, therefore, with the United Nations. Clearly,

as you’ve both pointed out, the appropriation process, the money

process, is here in the Congress. At the same time we cannot all

be President of the United States at the same time, or Secretary

of State and as a result somebody has to be in charge of this. In

the legislation that Senator Coleman and I have fashioned, we’ve

said finally that the President is in charge. He’s not all by himself,

but he is the final arbiter. We have included the withholding of

dues, which clearly is a controversial area, for all the reasons my

colleague, Senator Biden, has pointed out, including in forums that

he and Senator Helms have worked on to try to get us back to

dues-paying status after many, many years in the wilderness.

But I would just observe that in our democracy, people are elected to the Senate and House all the time. Many of them are new.

They may come from places such as one that I can remember very

well on the roads of Indiana, with all the billboards that said, get

us out of the United Nations. From time to time, they reappear.

People have them in the garage, and bring them back out again.

Therefore, members who are so admonished by their own constituents don’t appropriate money for the United Nations. So regardless

of what we’re recommending, the President may, or may not, ever

have the chance of withholding the money, if it’s not even appropriated to begin with. We must understand that.

On the other hand, our thought was that, perhaps, Members of

the Congress and the administration might come to a view that

withholding the funds is one of the ways in which reform might be

26

effected, only one, although it would be a lightening rod for controversy. And if it is to be used, it should be used very sparingly

and effectively at the Presidential level, as opposed to all of us attempting to do this legislatively, year by year.

Now, we’re never going to be able to prohibit people from doing

that, but if we undo a tradition of whoever the Chief Executive

might be dealing with this in this way, this might be preferable.

Obviously, the House of Representatives has taken a different point

of view. That has been applauded by some editorial writers. Others

have applauded our stance, and some have said none of you should

touch the whole thing, you should stay out of it altogether. There

may be still other points of view. But what would your points of

view be? Speaker Gingrich, do you have a thought, having raised

this constitutional issue?

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, if you don’t mind, I think we would be more

comfortable if we would talk as individuals, and we’re not necessarily representing the task force’s unanimous view, and we may

even have some nuances of—from my perspective, and I think—

and you’ve lived through this in your own career. We are now entering a very important evolutionary stage of our constitutional

process. I mean our Founding Fathers wanted to avoid dictatorship, and their method of doing was to invent a machine so inefficient that no dictator could force it to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Checks and balances.

Mr. GINGRICH. And the checks and balances really do spread

money and power in ways that are very complicated. And I don’t

know that we’ve thought through, despite all the efforts to make

sure the executive branch reforms. I don’t know that we’ve always

thought through how the legislative branch also has some challenges in keeping up with a real-time 21st-century information age.

So let me just make my brief observations. First, I think that the

Hyde bill, as a statement by the House, is a useful signal to the

world about how fed up honest Americans are with paying taxes

for a system that, as Senator Mitchell just pointed out, couldn’t effectively implement Oil-For-Food, and literally couldn’t. It doesn’t

have the mechanisms.

On the other hand, I would think that the President would be

very protective of the ability to negotiate with flexibility and to not

be trapped into an automatic mechanism. And I think that that’s

a legitimate distinction between the two branches.

My personal belief is, that first of all, we have to have very

strong leverage at two levels from the legislative branch. One leverage is with 120 nations that together pay less than 1 percent. They

have no natural interest in reform. And they have every interest

in a patronage system version of personnel that is destructive. And

so there’s got to be a fair amount of pressure to get them to change.

The legislative branch, it seems to me, has a second interest.

Which is how do you keep the executive branch’s feet to the fire.

And there, I think I come down, if you will, half way between doing

nothing, and doing as much as the Hyde bill will do, and my recommendation would be, that the Congress pass, and I submit it as

part of my testimony. This is at a personal level, not the task force

document, but I submitted an appendix that’s kind of an example

of what a U.N. reform scorecard would look like.

27

Senator Biden was very generous in saying, I quote: ‘‘We should

stick closely to your recommendations.’’ Something which was certainly—I listen to with great fondness. But I think the trick is to

be able to say, so how a year from now do we know whether or not

we’re getting there, what’s left undone, what’s changed since then.

And my recommendation would be to look at some kind of probably

report language that is literally a check list. And to say in the legislation, we fully expect State to report back next year. We fully expect both branchs of the House and Senate to have hearings on the

check list, and that we give the President, as you do, the authority

to withhold money if he decides that useful and effective.

But I would also say that we require of the President that he report the circumstances under which he didn’t waive it, and under

which he waived. Is he not withholding because he got it done. Is

it not withholding because he’s getting closer to getting it done. I

mean, what is it we Americans should expect from our Government

in what is inherently a multilateral environment where our leverage isn’t 100 percent. So I think some kind of middle ground, in

which we are raising the ante on the United Nations we are serving notice on the State Department, but we’re also recognizing the

President’s legitimate interest and flexibility, I think is useful.

And finally, I actually—I agree this is going to get us both in

trouble, Senator Biden. I agree with some of Senator Biden’s comments which is, if you lead with withholding, you make that the

fight. If you reluctantly have withholding which annually is an option of the Congress under appropriations, if you serve notice that

we’re going to demand reform and that that is an ultimate option,

I think you’re actually in a stronger position than to lead with that

as a mandatory fight in New York.

Senator MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, we’re very grateful and flattered that our report has been so well received. Senator Coleman

referred to it as a template. And I, personally, strongly support

your legislation in most respects. However, with respect to withholding, I’ve had the opportunity this morning to review Ambassador Burns statement in which he will shortly express the Bush

administration’s strong opposition to the withholding of dues. As

you will know, Mr. Chairman, and other members of the committee, from my previous public statements, including our very recent testimony in the House, I share the administration’s view on

this issue.

In the past, the United States used withholding to change the

structure of U.N. dues. It was a money only issue. There has been,

ever since, an unresolved debate as to whether, and if so how

much, withholding dues actually helped in that effort. I believe

that withholding payments to bring about structural and policy reforms of the number and complexity that are at issue here is an

entirely different and much more complex matter.

I conclude that the negative consequences to the United States

would outweigh any benefits. I recognize that your bill makes withholding discretionary by the President, and, in my view, that is certainly far preferable to the mandatory provisions of the House bill.

On the broader issue, Mr. Chairman, if I might say, there is obviously an inevitable tension between the legislative and executive

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uting power. I think the Speaker and I have a legislative bias, as

I’m sure many of you do; but, as you correctly pointed out, there’s

only one President at a time, there’s only one Secretary of State at

a time. I think that it is possible to achieve a constructive tension,

preserving an important role for the legislative branch while not

tying the hands of a President and Secretary of State. And I believe that the mandatory withholding would effectively tie a President’s hands in a way that would be counterproductive for U.S. policy.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. I’m going to recognize Senator Biden. The vote has started, and the Senator may proceed, if he wishes, and recognize whoever happens to be here in the

event that I have not returned. But that way we will continue our

questioning and utilize our witnesses’ time better.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I think this is a tough call. And I think, quite frankly, the

way to put this Rubik Cube together, and I’d like you to respond

to it, is that this is again going to continue to hurt us both. It

seems to me that we should kick the can down the road here, and

have in this reform legislation, benchmarks and expectations of

specific reporting requirements from the President of the United

States, within the calendar year, or whatever criteria we set. And

then seek a recommendation, a policy recommendation in the legislation from the President, at the time that the reporting takes

place. For example, set out the benchmarks, that I think we should

base on your report, based on a growing consensus here. We should

lay out in some detail the prescriptions that we expect the administration to attend to, within a timeframe that we think is reasonable. That’s totally within our constitutional capability. We have

the authority to do that. But shouldn’t add the ending sentence,

that ‘‘we will withhold unless you waive, Mr. President.’’ I have—

and I know you both do as well—scars on my back, politically

speaking, from the numerous meetings at the United Nations and

with Foreign Ministers and heads of state around the world, over

this issue, from what would always start off with a nice way of saying ‘‘you all are arrogant.’’ We’d never get to the question of reform.

We spent all the time talking about whether or not it was in the

spirit of the charter, for us to set conditions for the U.N. members

to follow in order for us to pay our dues. And you all know our dues

are more than our dues. Our dues are peacekeeping, and so on.

I’d like you to respond to the idea of further splitting this issue.

Take out any reference to withholding in the report language. State

that we will reconsider the question of withholding, but let the

President have the authority, unfettered by having to explain

whether or not he’s being unilateral, he’s being arrogant, whether

there’s a veiled threat in the legislation that he has to attend to.

We should lay out with some specificity, the areas, not unlike the

areas you lay out in the report, that we expect the President to be

able to move on, and to give us an explanation of what he was unable to, or did not, do.

Mr. Speaker, and Senator, you guys are right. You’ve been here,

and you were here a long time. This is hard slogging for Presidents. And as much as they want to do it, it almost always ends

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tant, they always have an Assistant or an Under Secretary of

State, or Defense coming in and saying, whoa, whoa, whoa, wait a

minute, wait a minute. We have to deal with this, or that, or this.

What do you think of this sort of generic approach? I’m not looking

for a compromise to get it passed. I’m looking for an approach that

gets us out of the debate. I don’t know how many times you had

to listen to—and go through the whole thing about whether or not,

because we’re the only superpower in the world, our arrogance is

overwhelming; to get into debates that had nothing to do with reform and allow them to avoid any discussion of responsibilities.

That’s my observation and somewhat of a question. I invite your

response.

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, let me say first of all, I think you’re asking

a very important question. But I think you partially answered it

with your own comment that it always somehow slides off the table

as value. The tension that I think is inherent here is, you know,

the United Nations didn’t get to be the current mess by itself. And

I think this is—the United Nations didn’t get to be a current mess,

and then one morning the State Department discovered we were

members. Or the United Nations didn’t get to be a current mess,

and suddenly the President discovered that it’s in New York. I

mean we have had a long stretch of the United States, essentially

practicing benign neglect. And this has been a bipartisan desire,

because it’s a pain in the neck and it’s hard and it’s difficult and

there are so many other issues to worry about, et cetera. I mean

you’re more of an expert on this than I am. You’ve been in more

of these rooms than I have.

So part of what we’re wrestling with, and as I said earlier, I

think Senator Mitchell and I may not totally agree on this, but I’ll

give you my observation. First of all, I think it’s totally legitimate

to say to a multilateral organization you have to earn the money.

Explain to me why the people of my country should be paying this.

And that’s not being arrogant or presumptive, it’s just saying—it’s

going to be a huge problem with the Japanese if we don’t figure

out some solution on the Security Council. Because they’re the second biggest payer. And they’re going to sit and say, wait a second

how come I’m doing all this—you know, explain to me again your

120 countries that collectively——

Senator BIDEN. If you’ll yield on that point. One of my concerns

is, if we put this condition in, the Japanese will put in a condition

saying, unless we are——

Mr. GINGRICH. Right.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Members of the United Nations,

we’re withholding our dues. I think that’s a fight. That’s a series

of fights we should try to kick down the road. You know politics

is the art of the possible.

Mr. GINGRICH. Right.

Senator BIDEN. And that’s one of the main reasons for my concerns about withholding.

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, that’s why I said I wouldn’t. I personally

would not recommend mandatory withholding or automatic withholding. But I think the notion of raising the question the way in

which the United Nations is run ought to have some bearing on

what the United Nations gets.

30

Because, remember the current committee that sets the budget

is an utterly irresponsible organization.

Senator BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. GINGRICH. There’s a real—I’m just saying as background.

The second point, though, I want to raise, it may be a little bit uncomfortable with Secretary Burns right here, but I think, hopefully,

he will concede this. There has to be some legitimate mechanism

for the legislative branch to hold the executive branch’s feet to the

fire, and part of the reason that I asked our team to generate this

appendix of a checklist, is to begin to try to get it down to real

things you can check off. I think because, otherwise, what happens

is, we have five reform meetings. We all agree we love reform. We’d

really like to have reform, reform would really be good. And then

you find a year from now, you’re in the same institution.

I want to add one other piece of the triptych where you’re coming

from, I think. And it’s something I think you and Senator Lugar

would have a unique ability to help develop. I think we’ve got to

look at how does our legislative branch reach out more effectively

and more regularly. Both to the United Nations but also to the

other democracies’ legislative branches so that there’s a more consistent dialog. I think we need less negotiating and more dialog.

And I think that in this modern age, we are—we have not yet

caught up with rethinking how legislators relate to legislators

without getting involved in violations of the executive branch’s control over foreign policy. But we need to build a consensus among

all the democracies, remember that the top aid democracies pay 78

percent of the budget. If they collectively were bringing pressure to

bear, we’d be dramatically closer to serious reform than we are

right now.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with you. George, did you have comment?

Senator MITCHELL. I’ll just make two comments on the subject.

The Speaker just said the eight democracies, I think it was, provide

78 percent of the budget and as you and the Speaker have already

noted, if we say here is our list of reforms, if you don’t adopt them

we will withhold, what is to stop Japan, Germany, the United

Kingdom, and others from presenting their list of reforms, and if

they’re not adopted they will withhold. It seems to me there is a

very dangerous potential there all the way around.

You commented on the reactions of other officials. The Speaker

and I, and other members of the task force, met with dozens and

dozens of officials of other countries and U.N. officials. Significantly, not a single one said to us, there’s no problem here; go

home. Without exception, uniformly, they acknowledged a serious

problem, they expressed a serious intention to reform and they

said—we believe sincerely at the time, this is before we issued our

report—that they look forward to our report and to working with

us.

The usual reform effort requires a substantial early period in

persuading people that reform is necessary; that’s not necessary

here. Second, Senator Biden, more directly to your point. In the

many meetings I had, there was a yearning for American leadership. A desire for what they hoped would be a constructive approach by the United States to lead them, other nations and the

United Nations, itself, out of the difficulties that now exist to creVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ate a more effective United Nations. As I said in my opening statement, we don’t speak for, or to, anybody other than Americans, but

we think most countries and people around the world share the

same values, aspirations and goals, or at least many do.

Senator BIDEN. I agree.

Senator MITCHELL. So, I don’t think that withholding helps. This

is a personal opinion; I think it is counterproductive and I think

we can do much more with a positive incentive-based approach to

the issue.

Senator BIDEN. One of the things, and I realize time is up and

the vote time is up, and I don’t have nearly as sympathetic a majority leader to hold the vote for me as I used to in the old days,

so I’m going to have to go. But I’d like to make two very quick comments. The—the first question is: Influence whom? There’s two

groups that we’re trying to influence. We’re trying to influence the

members of the United Nations. And we’re trying to influence the

administration. It seems to me, that our legislative responsibility

as just conception under the Constitution is in the checks and balances. We don’t do foreign policy separately. We do it through influencing the Executive. We have a right to. The Executive has its

job and influence in foreign policy, it is the single arbiter and negotiator with the United Nations.

It seems to me, to overstate the point, that if we wanted to deal

with influence by withholding moneys, without getting the other

seven countries who pay 78 percent of the U.N. dues with us, really

upset, we could withhold moneys from the Executive. I’m going to

overstate it; Nick’ll die. We could say, unless these reforms take

place, we’re withholding money for the State Department. That

would be conceptually—I’m following into the constitutional law

professor mold here—that would be conceptually the appropriate

mechanism for us to use, in the tools made available to Congress

under the Constitution on the use of money. That is more direct.

So there may be a way to do that without engaging the British

Parliament or the Prime Minister of Japan. The second point is,

my experience with Senator Mitchell, is that 120 countries pay 1

percent; 8 pay 78 percent. The 8 agree on 90 percent of the specific

reforms. But there are differences among the eight on what the

other 10 percent should be, so if we lay down, we’re withholding

unless you adopt reforms, not reform generically, but the reforms

we want, it seems to me it puts us into a circumstance that makes

it totally legitimate for the other seven to say, hey wait, Jack,

you’re not telling me what to do. You’re not going to threaten me

on this, and we end up dividing the very people we need to isolate

the 120. And so I would hope that—I know of no one more ingenious that the two of you—you could give us, on the side, some suggestions about how we can keep the lever on the administration

without communicating to the world that we’re insisting on our dollar for dollar—whatever we produce—the administration produces,

reform for reform. I have to go vote. I thank you very much, both

of you. And I really did mean what I said.

Senator MITCHELL. Thank you, Senator Biden.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Biden. Senator

Obama, you are the survivor here, and, therefore, this is your time

for questions.

32

Senator OBAMA. Well, I appreciate that very much. Gentlemen,

thank you so much for taking the time to be here. Let me just preface this remark by saying it’s hard to find two more accomplished

people to work on such an important issue and the report that the

two of you were able to put together, I think, has uniformly received accolades and people are very impressed with it.

So I want to appreciate both of you taking the time to do this.

As it turned out I was in New York this Friday visiting with the

United Nations. Mostly focused on the situation in Darfur, but inevitably also ended up talking about U.N. reform. And one of the

things that I was struck by, was the degree of awareness that

change does need to take place. I mean I got a genuine impression

that folks recognize that business as usual is not going to be acceptable. And I think that the report that you issued helped keep

people’s feet to the fire on this.

One of the questions I guess that I’m trying to figure out is how,

based on what you seen, we can change the behavior, not just to

the U.N. bureaucracy, but also incentivize the member states to

empower the Secretary General and others to carry out these reforms. Because what I was struck by, was the—that the lack of

power and accountability derives in part from the member states

being very interested in keeping that bureaucracy weak and protecting their own pejoratives and parcels of power and I’m wondering what you think, whether through the State Department, or

other agencies we can be doing things—give the member states, a

sense that change is useful?

Senator MITCHELL. Senator Obama, you have correctly identified

a major obstacle to significant reform. I believe that nations, like

individuals, act out of self-interest. And there is clearly a vast selfinterest in perpetuating a system in which there is not anything

remotely resembling reasonable balance between investment and

benefit.

And with respect to personnel policies, it’s especially pronounced.

Like many other institutions, including our own government, the

United Nations tries to strike a balance between quality and some

form of patronage for members. Unfortunately, the quality has

really not been a factor and now it’s the distribution that is the

paramount consideration; it has led to what I believe to be a withering of the U.N.’s reputation in terms of quality and ability.

I believe that there has to be an all-out effort by the United

States, this issue was discussed previously, and we must do our

best to persuade as many members of the General Assembly that

an effective United Nations is in their interests and it cannot be

effective if it continues in the manner that now exists. Hopefully,

the General Assembly will participate in the preservation of an institution that gives smaller nations a forum that would otherwise

not exist. A place in which they can appear as relative equals to

the larger nations, an opportunity to have their concerns heard, all

of that will, in my judgment, not exist if the United Nations does

not reform itself.

So I think it has to be a case based on their self-interest, and

they have a larger self-interest than in seeing that some former official in their government gets a job at the United Nations where,

33

as the Speaker rightly noted, he can’t be fired no matter what he

does.

Senator OBAMA. Just to follow up on that, I guess. Do you think

that within our administration, when we’re having bilateral talks

with some of these smaller nations, is this something that we’re

bringing up sufficiently. My impression is, that if you talk to folks

who are currently within the United Nations you know the permanent representative or what have you, they may have more of a

vested interest than if you’re talking to their Foreign Minister, or

the head of state when they come to visit. Do you think that we’re

using our leverage—or should we bring up these issues as part of

our broader conversation with these countries?

Senator MITCHELL. I’m not knowledgeable enough to answer the

question, specifically, about how and whether we’re using our leverage. But I do know this, it’s the problem that the Speaker addressed earlier, that Senator Biden addressed, it’s one of establishing priorities. The administration is beset with a large number

of issues. You have an immediate problem which requires help and

a vote from someone and you defer action on the broader, more

general policy issues.

We see it every day. We have a policy of advancing democracy

around the world. But on specific issues, in dire circumstances, we

cooperate effectively with nondemocracies to advance a more immediate, higher priority item, thereby deferring action on the broader

issue of promoting democracy and the rule of law and so forth. It’s

very hard to bring into synchronization your broader policy objectives and the immediate needs in the specific situation. We try in

our report to emphasize the importance to our government, and our

people, and our national interest, in making this a high-priority approach with a comprehensive plan and perseverance and consistency across administrations, including the Congress.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Speaker.

Mr. GINGRICH. Thank you, Senator, and I think your question

goes to the heart of our challenge. The title of our report, very deliberately, is ‘‘American Interests in U.N. Reform.’’ Because we do

think that it’s important for the American people to understand,

this is partly in response to something Chairman Lugar had said

earlier, that there’s a profound reason to be in the United Nations

because it is in our interests.

This is not something we just do out of altruism but because we

have felt as a country for 60 years now that an effective United Nations makes it safer and better for America and the world. But I

think that we consistently understate how truly different the

United States is from much of the world.

We believe in freedom and the rule of law, as you know there are

many members in the United Nations that are dictatorship, some

of the most repressive and antihuman kind. We believe in a system

of accountability, transparency, and competence. As you know the

United Nations has a personnel system that has used nepotism in

effect, and favoritism to ensure that various governments can place

people from back home where they want to. And I think, also, if

you looked at the standard we’ve set with various commercial scandals in the United States in the last decade, and you were to apply

those standards to the way in which we have tolerated incomVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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petence, dishonesty, and inefficiency in New York, it’s pretty

breathtaking—the gap.

But we should be honest about how big the gap is. We believe

that Israel has a legitimacy as a democracy and as a country, created in part by the United Nations recognition. And yet if you

watch the scandalous way in which hostility is institutionalized

and systematized it is clearly a different system than we believe in.

And finally, we think that economic development is ultimately

based on the rule of law, on private property rights, on encouraging

people to invest in a free market which is radically different than

the model of transferring wealth to a kleptocratic dictator, so they

can then send the money out of country to hide it somewhere. Each

of these has very powerful interest groups that want to keep the

old order, and we need to enter the process of reform understanding that this is a really serious long-term engagement. Its not

what will happen between now and September.

I would just say that the State Department has, I think, taken

a very important step in having Secretary Burns take personal—

lead responsibility. I think this is the highest we’ve ever elevated

the U.N. reform inside the institution of the State Department. My

hope is that the U.S. Ambassadors and 190-member countries are

going to be told, as a very significant part of their bilateral responsibility on a regular basis, that they should be communicating our

hopes for reform in the United Nations.

I would finally say, and I have really been reading Rudy

Guiliani’s remarkable book on leadership. There’s an old rule that

you get what you inspect, not what you expect. And my point would

be the tension for the Congress is, how do we communicate with

executive branch, that we will regularly come back and inspect the

amount of reform we’re getting, and how do we get the executive

branch then to comfortably communicate to other countries not

that this is a unilateral American demand, but that these are values the American people expect of an institution that they belong

to, and to which they give not just money, but very substantial

amounts of diplomatic and other support.

I think you put your finger on it. It’s going to be a—it is an uphill but not an impossible challenge, and it’s going to take very consistent institutional leadership by the State Department, and by

the United States for it to happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama. Let me

just mention to members, we’re on an 8-minute system. And, hopefully, members will try to stay within that limit because we still

have Secretary Burns and we want to hear from him.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Leader Mitchell, you

and Ambassador Gingrich, high honor to have you both with us.

You have made a very significant contribution, each of you and

your task force that has presented to the administration and the

Congress of the United States, the United Nations, an important

document.

I have believed, and continue to believe, that this institution is

as relevant and important in the 21st century as it was 60 years

ago when it was formed, and I believe that for many reasons. And

so your contributions here are particularly important at a very

35

transformational time in the world. Transformational time for all

institutions that were formed after World War II whether it was

the United Nations, or NATO, and every multilateral critically important institution. It really structured and framed the second half

of the 20th century, so we should not be surprised that in a dynamic world, institutions will need to adjust and recalibrate to the

challenges of that new dynamic world. And that does not mean, in

my opinion, that you discard an organization like the United Nations, but, in fact, you make it stronger and better and that’s what

you have attempted to do here in your report and the Congress will

deal with that as well.

Here’s a general question I’d like each of you to answer. And I

have not read every page of the report. I’ve read the summary, I’ve

read some of the chapters.

And as you noted, Speaker Gingrich, in your opening comments,

you laid out seven specific areas that you all paid particular attention to, and I think those seven issues are particularly relevant.

But my bigger question is this. And it also reflects on something

you said, Mr. Speaker, as well as Leader Mitchell. And I think you

said something to the effect that the United Nations is a limited

body; it can do only so much. And I think part of what’s happened

over the years is that we have put too many tasks upon top of this

institution and laid before it larger and larger responsibilities with

higher and higher expectations and this body as you noted, Mr.

Speaker, like any institution, is limited as to what it can do, and

how far it can go. It cannot address all the problems of the world.

Should we also be looking at a part two in your reform as to narrowing the scope of the United Nations mission and purpose.

Speaker Gingrich.

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I think that we should—and we say this in

the report, we should consistently be aware that there are alternative ways of getting things done. And our attitude to the United

Nations should be that we’re always willing to consider doing

things through the United Nations. As I mentioned earlier, for example, on the responsibility to protect, it certainly makes sense to

try, first, at the Security Council, but to also have served notice

that if the Security Council, for whatever reason, is incapable of

acting that that doesn’t mean no action. It simply means that there

are regional organizations, there are, if necessary, ad hoc organizations. And I think that, historically, we’ve used the Organization of

American States, the Organization of African Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, in a sense is a regional organizing mechanism. NAFTA, in a sense, is a regional economic organizing mechanism, and I do think—I was trying to write

and I don’t have this aphorism down right, but it’s fair to say that

multilateral institutions expand the pretensions to fill whatever

vacuum is available. And so you notice recently, that the United

Nations got together experts from places like Iran and China to announce grandly that they’re prepared to take over the Internet.

Now if you watch what Iran and China do to the Internet I can’t

imagine a less plausible kind of multilateralism than that kind of

agreement. So I think you’ve got to be aware of the fact that the

United Nations is an important, but limited institution, and it is

necessary but not sufficient. I think that’s as I said earlier, the anVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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swer—I remember very well the billboards Chairman Lugar was

describing, and I think our answer to people has to be, there are

limited places in which the United Nations is truly valuable to

America.

And I had mentioned earlier that our task force was entitled

‘‘American Interest in United Nations Reform.’’ And we approached

this from the standpoint of American values, and American goals.

But we should not ever allow ourselves to be told that we are,

therefore, limited by the United Nations as the only mechanism or

the only vehicle that can achieve things.

Senator HAGEL. Go ahead, Senator Mitchell.

Senator MITCHELL. I’ll try to be brief. I believe that the importance of U.N. reform at this time, and the attendant publicity, is

directly related to the increased significance of the United Nations

in recent years. I mentioned earlier that I had reviewed Ambassador Burns testimony. In his testimony he identifies a dozen circumstances in which the United Nations has been called upon to

act, or has taken some action. And it is precisely that growing importance and the increasing demands upon the United Nations

which make reform all the more necessary.

I think the first thing that the United Nations must do is to do

better at what it is doing. That may involve a process of setting

priorities which reduces the scope of activities, although I don’t

think that should be the first intention. It’s not going to succeed

if it does fewer things, but does them under the same structure

which will guarantee, I think, lack of success; because of the structure, not because of the number or areas in which they’re involved.

So I think the first objective ought to be adopt these reforms, or

something like them, to become a more effective institution. And as

a part of—and a consequence of that process, determine whether

there are some areas that you want to discontinue.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Is there a focus, a more pronounced

role that the United Nations can play in the area of dealing with

counterterrorism. Each nation, obviously, as a sovereign nation entity deals with this, but also as you noted, both noted in relation

to other multilateral institutions that are part of combating terrorism, certainly NATO is a good example. Are there things that

the United Nations could do, or should do more completely or more

clearly, in the area of counterterrorism.

Senator MITCHELL. Emphatically, yes. Beginning with a definition of terrorism that can gain universal acceptance, which does

not now exist. And encouraging and persuading—helping to persuade others to join in the necessary international effort, intelligence, police work, preemption, interdiction, and so forth; that is

crucial.

As we point out in our report, there are many nations for whom

a United Nations seal of approval is important to gaining their assent to actions which they might not otherwise agree to if asked

by a single nation; even a nation as powerful as the United States.

And so that’s true of the war on terrorism, counterterrorism efforts,

and I think it can be even more true there, because it’s so critical

to everyone concerned.

Mr. GINGRICH. I think this is actually a good illustration of why

it’s so complicated. The United Nations, 4 years after September

37

11, and then after—well over a quarter of a century of international terrorism, still cannot bring itself to a simple clear distinct

condemnation of terrorism. And I think that’s a very significant example of why the United Nations is a limited institution in terms

of people expecting primary activity, such as self-defense, or effectively waging a war on terrorism. But to the degree that we can

establish a sound basis within the United Nations for collaboration

across international borders to hunt down and defeat terrorists, I

think that is an advantage and something worth the United States

pursuing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want

to welcome Senator Mitchell and Congressman Gingrich before us,

and thank them very much for the work they did with the task

force. I had a chance to talk with Ambassador Eliasson before he

left to become the President of the General Assembly for the forthcoming session. Of course he’s had extensive experience at the

United Nations, both on a country basis and as part of the U.N.

Secretariat, and he is very strongly committed to a reform agenda.

It is clearly a prime goal for him in assuming this Presidency for

the coming year.

I’m concerned about the efforts in the Congress now to, in effect,

tell the United Nations, here’s what you must do, and if you fail

to do it, or if you don’t carry this through, then either we’re going

to withhold our dues, or have some other form of punishment.

It just strikes me that at a time when the United Nations seems

to be open and receptive to the idea of reform, when a number of

leaders there seem very much committed to it; this approach carries a very high risk of being counterproductive. It may end up provoking the very attitudes we don’t want to see develop.

I’ve been through the previous fight over withholding dues. I actually was very much opposed to withholding our dues, because it

didn’t seem to me the way to go about trying to accomplish the results we were seeking. But let me ask you: What is your estimation

or evaluation of the impact such threats would have? And Senator

Mitchell, let me put it to you first, because you did such a distinguished job of serving as a negotiator in the Irish situation. So

many others had attempted that, but they weren’t really able to

move it through. I think yours was a superb diplomatic performance on one of the most difficult issues. Now it’s not yet altogether

at closure, but it certainly has been in many ways fundamentally

transformed, and, obviously, you had to work your way through a

lot of very strongly conflicting interests and intensely held feelings.

So I ask you: What is the best way to go about trying to achieve

these reforms which we want to achieve? On many of them there

seems to be broad agreement. Not all, I mean the future composition of Security Council is a difficult and tough issue, and, in fact,

your commission, as I understand it, did not reach a unified conclusion on that issue. And that’s, I think, understandable, but on

many of these other issues, such as transparency, management, auditing, and so forth, there is broad agreement. What’s the best way

to try to bring those reforms about?

38

Senator MITCHELL. Senator Sarbanes, in response to an earlier

question from Senator Lugar, I gave a detailed response to that

question. I will provide now a summary of that, so as not to repeat

it in its entirety. I believe that the best approach is a positive one

which seeks to persuade others that it is in their self-interest, as

well as ours, to engage in reform. I expressed my support for the

position to be taken shortly by Ambassador Burns, on behalf of the

Bush administration, strongly opposing the use of withholding of

dues.

You were involved in the prior situation; there was a restructuring of the U.N. dues system. Since then there has been an unresolved debate as to whether the threat of withholding was, or was

not, constructive in that effort. That was money for money. This

issue, involving a wide-ranging number of reforms, is much more

complex and much more difficult, I think, to be susceptible to the

threat of withholding dues. Therefore I concluded, and stated, that

I believe the negative consequences to the United States would outweigh any benefits, in my judgment.

Senator SARBANES. Did you address that earlier as well, Mr.

Gingrich?

Mr. GINGRICH. Yes, I did. Let me say that I think it’s a difficult

call for a reason that I don’t think we spend much time on, and

that is, if you add up everything wrong with the United Nations

in the last 3 or 4 years. The sexual predation by U.N. peacekeepers, the inability to be effective in saving lives in places,

Srebeniza, Rwanda, Darfur, the scale of the Oil-For-Food scandal,

the internal inefficiencies of the personnel system, the chief of staff

to the Secretary General shredding documents for 7 months after

sending out an order, no document should be shredded. If you list

that as a totality and try to go back home and explain how the—

you know why the United Nations automatically deserves a blank

check, I think it’s a really tough mountain to climb. So the question

becomes for the legislative branch: Given our system of government, how do you hold the executive branch’s attention without

being self-destructive? And I characterized earlier that I thought

the Hyde bill, as the way of sending a signal about how big the gap

is between American expectations and current behavior in the

United Nations, was a legitimate vote in the House. It’s not a bill

I would hope comes out of conference. But it sent a signal. And a

signal, if anything, it’s not a bad signal to say to people, this is not

just fun and games, don’t just pawn us off for the same old baloney,

you better have real change if you expect the United States not to

start systematically changing it’s behavior.

For example, you could consciously decide to create a Human

Rights Commission totally outside the United Nations. There are

lots of things you can do to say to the United Nations as a mechanism, you’re now so limited, so lacking in transparency, so ineffective that we’re simply not going to rely on you to achieve what we

believe are multilateral goals. What I suggested earlier was that

combination of establishing a checklist of serious detailed reforms

not just pious hopes but are these things getting done, having

State report on a regular basis every year, and reviewing that kind

of checklist in hearings like this and then giving the President the

authority to withhold, but also requiring him to explain why he

39

didn’t. I mean, I think the burden of proof has to be right now, on

the U.N. system and on the executive branch. Because I do think

the decay of the United Nations was so dramatic when you add it

all together it’s pretty hard to understand how it got to be this bad.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I’m committed to a reform agenda, but

let me pursue that for a moment. If the House Member needs to

do this in order to be able to handle his constituency when he goes

back, why isn’t it necessary for a Senate Member to do it as well?

If you take that position then the bill will pass. I mean, you said

it’s good the House passed it, it sends an important message, and

the Members are able to have that presentation, but you said you

don’t want it to come out of conference. But why shouldn’t we get

the same sort of protection, and pass it here, we’ll send it on down

to the President and then the President will be confronted with either signing it, or vetoing it. If he vetoes it, we may well pass it

over his veto. It seems to me, once we start down that path, it’s

a very dangerous path in terms of how we interact with the United

Nations and how the administration functions.

Mr. GINGRICH. I may have not been clear. I don’t think the importance of the signal was back home to the American people. I

think the importance of the signal is to the 120 countries that collectively pay less than 1 percent of the U.N. budget. And I think

it’s actually helpful that they’re aware that the American Congress

is unhappy. I think there’s a difference, whether it’s the Senate or

the House, there’s a difference between what one House may pass

going into conference, and what comes out as a hopefully signable

bill coming from conference.

But the importance of the signal in my mind was to the U.N.

membership, not to the American people.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it seems to me that this signal can be

sent in other ways, and once you start down this path of enacting

the legislation, it may well carry all the way through. And then you

have to confront whether that is going to be productive or counterproductive. And seems to me we’ve been through that before, and

I have very deep concerns about moving down that path. The exercise of U.S. leadership for U.N. reform is very important. But there

are many ways to do that, and I don’t think we’re in a good posture

if we’re just kind of brandishing the big stick and saying, unless

you do these things you’re going to suffer these punishments. Particularly when the reform effort hasn’t been given a chance to move

ahead. I mean they’ve scheduled a reform summit and there will

be followup from that. So it seems to me we ought to give that an

opportunity to work its way through without sort of brandishing

this sort of club over their heads. Threats don’t strike me, in the

current context at least, as a good way to try to negotiate these

changes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me, on that note, recognize Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First,

I would like to speak—interject that in our legislation we do have

in section 11, a reporting requirement. It does—not as extensive as

your checklist and I want to talk about the checklist in a second.

But I think we need to do that. I think we need to kind of take

stock of what we’ve done. I also have to say, Speaker, that I agree

with your assessment of the Hyde legislation. I think it’s a good

40

signal to the United Nations. I don’t think we’re at a point where

we really need to be laying out a series of preconditions if you do

this, then automatically, if you don’t meet this checklist we’re going

to take away money.

In fact, I think there is enough incentive out there already. I

mean everyone knows we got to do reform. I’m wondering—and to

me actually, this whole—I think the discussion about withholding

funds is it’s kind of been made the major focus, but I think it’s off

center. Essentially, what we’re really saying, if we get to the point

where the President of the United States says, we’re going to be

withholding 50 percent of our funds, we should probably be at the

point where we say, we don’t need the United Nations. Let us do

something else. Because what do—I mean I don’t think we’re provoking anything here. We—if the United Nations can’t provide a

focus on combating terrorism, they can end its obsession with

Israel, if they can’t demonstrate an ability to deal with genocide in

a place like Darfur. If it can’t make itself more transparent and

more accountable, if it can’t make itself more effective, are there

other places to go.

So ultimately, I think reform has to happen and I don’t think

that judgment, that judgment about do we really need the United

Nations, something you do with a formula, a mathematical formula

if you don’t do these things here, then you know you’re over the

edge. I do think the Executive has to have some discretion. I think

we, in Congress, simply have to know, you know whether this stuff

is happening. But I have to ask you, did the committee ever, or did

your commission ever discuss the—when you talk about the consequences of failure to reform, were ever a discussion that says you

know, perhaps, the United Nations isn’t the right vehicle, then, to

do the things that we need to have done. That there are other vehicles out there, if it can’t do all these things that the report talks

about and that we and Congress are talking about?

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I think the task force clearly, and it’s listed

in our report, clearly states that the United Nations is not the only

institution, and that the United States is never limited from pursuing other venues if appropriate. And on the example of the responsibility to protect, we’re very clear that if the Security Council

for some reason, is politically blocked and can’t be effective, that

countries which are concerned about genocide or mass murder or

other such—or massive violations of Human Rights, have other legitimate organizing mechanisms. But I don’t think we went beyond

that at this stage. I think our hope is, to sort of paraphrase what

you just said, our hope is that with our report and with the Secretary General’s report, and with the announcement that Secretary

Burns would take a leading role in this, that there will be a sufficient effort made that over the next year or two we’ll see a dramatically better United Nations. But we do believe, and we state

in here quite clearly, that the United States cannot be trapped

into, for example, a Human Rights Commission that routinely has

dictatorships dominating the Commission. And I think in that

sense, we raise the possibility and we try to remind the United Nations that it does not have a monopoly on legitimacy in getting

things done around the world. Although it is a very important and

very useful institution.

41

Senator MITCHELL. Senator Coleman, if I could just read two

sentences from my report, it answers directly and specifically, and

then I’ll make a brief additional comment. We said we are struck

by the United Nations’ own receptivity to needed reforms. But they

must be real, and must be undertaken promptly. An effective

United Nations is in the interest of the United States, but there

is nothing exclusive about the United Nations as regards American

interest. The United Nations is one of the tools that America, our

allies, and other democracies use cooperatively on the basis of our

shared value.

We also comment in other areas about the history, and in overly

brief summary, the United States took the lead in creating the

United Nations because we believed it to be in our interest. There

were no standards or values at the outset, save one: Power. The

five permanent members of the Security Council were the five nations on the winning side in the Second World War. The Soviet

Union, then headed by Joseph Stalin, was a charter member.

China, which shortly thereafter became a Communist totalitarian

state under Mao Tse-Tung, was a charter member.

Since then, we have tried, the United States and American people, to move the United Nations in a direction that will both make

it more effective and more democratic, because we believe there is

a relationship between the two. We believe that where democracy

does well, the United States does well, and I think it fair to say

that our values are increasingly ascendant in the world. There are

more nations now in the United Nations than there were at the

outset; there are many more democracies now than there were at

the outset.

While, of course, it is always true that there may be circumstances under which we decide that this is a course we no

longer wish to follow, I think that is highly unlikely. I think we

will find that it is in our interest to devote our energy and effort

to encouraging reform of the type that will make it both effective

in advancing American interest and at the same time advancing

American values, democracy, free-market institutions, protection of

human rights and so forth, because I think the two go hand in

hand.

Senator COLEMAN. It is certainly my hopes and the hopes of our

legislation, and certainly the hopes of the Commission that, in fact,

we confront the issue of reform, institutionally, organizationally, et

cetera, and then actually do something about it.

My fear is that there have been lots of reports. And lots of studies. I’m a former mayor, transforming organizations is really hard.

And so you know, this discussion about withholding funds, I think

there’s another issue beyond that. It’s not just about withholding

funds. It’s just that a certain point in time—do we reach a point

in time if there isn’t progress, do we say there are other vehicles.

And I think we have to keep that in the back of our mind.

Speaking to one other issue, and then you can probably combine

an answer, perhaps, to deal with the two of them. I appreciate the

strengths of your comments about the obsession with Israel, the—

I think the report touches upon that somewhat more lightly than

your prepared comments do. I notice, even in your checklist, you

don’t call for the abolishment of the committee rights of the PalesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tinian people. That’s the group, by the way, that just recently you

mentioned last week, the UNESCO conference that put forth, criticized Gaza, Gaza withdrawal as a ploy. There’s the special information program and the question of Palestine, there’s a division of

Palestinian rights, and we don’t see that in other areas of the

world. We don’t see that in the problematic areas, we didn’t see

that about Iraq years ago, we don’t see it about Darfur, I don’t believe the checklist calls for that, is there a—can you give me a little

sense of that background, the committee discussion on that Israel.

The issue was touched, but it wasn’t that hard statement. Our legislation does—and I don’t think it’s strong enough either in this

area by the way and I would say that, that I think we need to

strengthen it somewhat, but I’d be interested in the committee’s reflection on those issues.

Senator MITCHELL. I believe that the task force strongly endorses

the statements made by the speaker, that it is inexcusable that

Israel is not provided equal treatment in an institution that is supposed to be devoted to equality among nations and peoples. We

strongly support the call that insists upon fair and equal treatment

for Israel, as one member nation, and indeed as a democratic nation and as a strong supporter of the United States.

Mr. GINGRICH. I would just say that in the discussions we had

in the task force, there was, I think, a universal agreement on the

general principal, but we did not develop it into a series of things

and it’s been in the process of starting to develop this much more

narrowly checklist kind of approach. The only comment I was going

to make, Senator, and I strongly applaud the leadership you’ve

shown in this area and the firmness and directness you’ve shown.

You really have two totally different audiences. One is the United

Nations, the other’s the executive branch. And I think as you’re

thinking through whether it’s the concept of a checklist or some

other model, what we were trying to wrestle with, is how do we in

our complex constitutional system—how do we ensure that the

White House and the State Department maintain a sense of focus,

that they have a real sense of outcomes, not just effort. This is not

just about sincerity, but it’s about what do we have to do with our

190 Ambassadors at the bilateral relations of members, what do we

have to do in our relationships in New York. How do we systematically and consistently move the ball forward in getting real reform.

And I would just remind everyone, that part of the reason you

get this frustration is the United Nations didn’t get to be this of

mess overnight. There’s been a long gradual slide to the problems

we now have, and at each stage it’s just been sort of too hard to

deal with, or it’s not been as important as whatever this year’s crisis is. And so we’re trying to find a way—both for the United

States, but also for the other democracies—to begin to build a pattern of making U.N. reform a significant part of how they deal with

their foreign policy issues. And I think that’s what the legislative

branch has to think about, is how do we signal and work with our

own executive branch to get them to then work with the other democracies, to then finally get a U.N. reform.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Senator Dodd.

43

Senator DODD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of you

again for your efforts here. And I’d ask consent, Mr. Chairman,

that an opening statement be included in the record, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in full.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM

CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this very important hearing

today. As we all know, it was little over a month ago, on June 15, that the Task

Force on the United Nations—headed up by George Mitchell and Newt Gingrich—

issued its very comprehensive report entitled ‘‘American Interests and U.N. Reform.’’ I would like to thank our distinguished panelists for their hard work on this

vital effort. Their presence here today is, I know, appreciated by every member of

this body who is interested in real reforms at the United Nations. I would also like

to welcome Under Secretary Burns again to this committee. I trust that his input

on behalf of the administration will add much to today’s discussion.

We face many challenges in the world—terrorism, rogue regimes, nuclear proliferation, the HIV/AIDS crisis, and world hunger—to name but a few. These are

global challenges. And they require global solutions. Dealing with issues that have

a worldwide impact is precisely why the United Nations was created.

But much has changed since 1945. The number of member nations has increased.

We face new threats. And as with any bureaucracy, we have encountered problems

that need to be fixed.

In fact, the United States is no stranger to bureaucracies that need rewiring. We,

here in Congress, spend much of our time dealing with these types of problems. We

do so because we hope that through our efforts, we might create a more perfect

union.

Today, we are talking about the United Nations. And indeed, with all the global

problems we face, the formation of a more perfect international union is one of the

most important issues faced by the international community. We need an effective

United Nations, and U.S. leadership on the issue will be critical if we are going to

achieve that goal.

So while some would suggest that problems at the United Nations are a reason

for American disengagement, I couldn’t disagree more. Those problems, and the

interconnected nature of today’s world—for good and for bad—are exactly the reasons that the United States should become more involved in the United Nations and

in the process of U.N. reform.

Who and what are those entities? They are terrorists, drug traffickers, and war

criminals. They are famine, disease, and injustice. Defeating these entities is the

reason why it is so important that we get this process of reform right.

With respect to the task force’s report, I would make one very important point.

The report does not make any recommendations that, in the task force’s view, would

require revision of the U.N. Charter. In my view, that is as clear a statement as

any that the authors of the U.N. Charter were on the right track when they wrote

that document. Indeed, I think that despite all the problems the United Nations

faces, the foundation on which we have to build is strong. We would do well to keep

that point in mind as we move forward with the process of U.N. reform.

Again, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing today, Mr. Chairman.

I know you are very committed to this issue and commend you for your efforts. I

would also like to thank our distinguished witnesses for being here today and I look

forward to asking them some questions at the appropriate time.

Senator DODD. It’s very, very helpful, and I, too, like the title

that you’ve ascribed to this report, American Interests. Which

brings me to an opening question. I don’t want to—let me mention

a criticism or two that I find here. Because I think it goes to the

very heart of the last statement you made, Mr. Speaker.

And that is: How do you get the Congress, the administration,

and American public to think creatively and positively about what

needs to be done? I would have liked to have seen in this report,

at some point, a litany of the things that the United Nations has

done well. And that’s nonexistent here. And I think it contributes

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tainly you’ve enumerated them here, you’ve brought them out in

the report, and it’s, obviously, critically important. This is about reform here, what needs to be changed. But I think in terms of our

goals as you both have recognized, and I think we don’t probably

do as well a job as we should individually, up here, of identifying

the fact that the existence of this organization, created in large

part as Senator Mitchell has pointed out, because of U.S. leadership at the end of World War II, we have been a direct and very

significant beneficiary over the last half a century, more than half

century of this institution’s existence. And I think it’s important as

we talk about this, that we from time to time remind our constituencies of the gains that have been made, of the problems that have

been resolved. Just in the 1990s there have been 40 different

peacekeeping missions conducted by the United Nations. Not all of

them terribly successful, but I try to imagine what the world might

have looked like during the 1990s had there not been a U.N. system that allowed us to respond. Successful ones like East Timor

and Namibia were tremendously helpful. Would we have done it?

Would the United States have responded alone, would have been

able to form a coalition necessarily? I can only imagine the political

problems that would have existed had we tried on our own to do

these things. Or to build coalitions that would have allowed us to

achieve those goals. The world health organizations, eradicating

contagious diseases, today we talk about them in historical terms.

But they were terribly significant of problems that the United Nations was able to grapple with.

And I think if we did more of that, not to be a Pollyanna, not

to be naive or to disregard the legitimate criticisms, then we might,

in fact, build the kind of constituencies with coming administrations, present administrations that doesn’t give the signals—and

there’s an implicit suggestion that somehow this organization is

more of a burden than an asset. It doesn’t really help much. And

I think that contributes to the political rhetoric that we hear from

time to time, that contributes to the kind of legislation that, as

Senator Sarbanes suggest may send a signal there, but it also

sends signals here at home. In terms of our ability then to collectively do the things necessary to strengthen this very, very important institution become harder.

We’re fundamentally, in my view, an isolationist country. For all

the obvious reasons we know, as a nation of immigrants our

forebearers, by and large, came here because they were escaping

problems elsewhere. In fact, even at the outset of World War II, of

course we had to wait until we were attacked ourselves before we

were willing to respond to our first cousins in Europe who were

burning as a result of the work of the Nazis. And so we’re inherently hostile I think to the idea of internationalism. That’s been a

part of our historical fabric for a long time. So that’s one point I

want to raise with you if I can and get you to respond.

Second, it strikes me here, that we’re kind of—we’re talking

about reform here, we’re kind of moving the blocks around a little

bit. But it seems to me, if you were to ask me to list the problems

that they were going to face in the 21st century, and none of us

have a crystal ball, but what are the problems we’re facing? Well,

clearly things like HIV/AIDS, world hunger, a proliferation of

45

weapons, terrorism, Sam Huntington’s notion of the class of civilizations. The notion of the nation states conflict is becoming less of

an issue for us than it was in the 20th century. And yet this institution still seems to sort of react to the nation states issue when,

in fact, the problems we’re going to face here are not really—there

are some nation state issues, but the more compelling ones seem

to defy the boundaries of nation states. And I didn’t see suggestions

here necessarily, and again I haven’t read this as thoroughly as I

probably should, but the notion that this institution has to mature

beyond just the reforms necessary to really grapple with problems

that we never imagined, I think, really dealing with at the outset.

And I’d be interested in your observations about that as well.

And last, the Security Council itself. I’d spent a good part of last

evening meeting with the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, because of the issues in Haiti, and with the

French Ambassador as well as people of the policing operations of

the United Nations to find out what’s going on in Haiti. One of the

frustrations I have with the peacekeeping operations is the lack of

robustness of the peacekeeping operations. And I know you’ve recommended in here no permanent military operation, but I’d be interested in how the task force reacted on the expansion of the Security Council. I’ve heard what Senator Mitchell’s point is on this. I

didn’t hear what yours was, Mr. Speaker, and how the task force

reacted to the expansion here, and veto power. And is there some

middle ground, between trying to fashion military response teams,

on peacekeeping efforts and some more permanent operation that

would give us a chance to react more precisely and more contemporaneously with problems than the present problems? I’m frustrated on that Haiti deal. We can’t seem to get anyone to really

lead this effectively in my view, and it caused me to raise that

issue with you, and let me stop there and thank you again.

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, let me say first of all, as one of the Senates

leading students of foreign policy, you’ve managed to cover a fairly

large amount in that process. I will comment very briefly. The one

place I think I probably most disagree with you is, I don’t think

we are fundamentally an isolationist country. I think from 1941 on,

we have been a remarkably internationalist country. We have

American forces across the planet, we have American interests

across the planet. We’ve founded the United Nations. We were

clearly the leading force founding it. We have consistently worked

to bring together people in a variety of things. And I think that we

are a skeptical country about the limitations of trusting foreign

governments. But I think that’s very different from being isolationists.

And frankly, on that topic, I would also point out anywhere on

the planet humans are hurting, they have relatives in America.

And, therefore, we are drawn to be concerned about the world in

a way that no other country has ever been, because we literally

have relationships that are universal. And I think you see this reflected in Secretary Rice’s visit to Sudan and to Darfur today.

Second, I do think we favor, and we are quite clear in our report,

that we favor potential limitations of nation states. We say that

there is a responsibility to protect and we go on to say that governments which fail to protect in the form of genocide, mass murder,

46

or massive human rights violations, thereby, risk losing their protection of sovereignty and we suggest that there are very strong

burdens placed on the rest of us to be proactively concerned.

We also have very specific calls for a much more robust and effective peacekeeping. I would be very opposed to trying to create

a United Nations army. But I am very much in favor of the United

States working to create effective standby forces at the National

level whether it’s through the organization of African Union or in

other ways.

And finally, as I think it may have, Senator Sarbanes, or somebody pointed out, we shied away from any final comments on the

Security Council because we find it as difficult as everybody else.

I must say at personal level I am sympathetic with the notion, that

first of all, that Japan should certainly be a member of the Security

Council permanently. My person—and that’s the administration position. My personal bias is that India almost certainly deserves a

permanent seat as the largest democracy, and second largest country in the world.

Beyond that I’m very cautious about permanent seats, but I

could be comfortable with an expanded Security Council that had

some arrangement for countries that would serve longer than just

2 years. But I think our view was, that was an entanglement that

was changing regularly, and that it wasn’t something, that if we

were to get—if we had been very specific for—many places around

the world that would have been the only story. And I think by

avoiding it we actually got people to focus on the reform aspects

of our report.

Senator DODD. Let me just, before Senator Mitchell responds,

quickly here. My point about being isolationists was where the

American public has been. Administrations—the Marshall Plan for

instance, was one of our great achievements to day, the time of it’s

enactment it took a major effort by Senator Vandenberg and others

to convince the American public this was worthwhile. The American public was not enthusiastic about it, as you know—I mean

that’s the point on the isolationists. Leadership has been, I think

we’ve been properly involved, but the public itself has always been

reluctant. That was my point. Senator Mitchell, do you have any

comments you want to make.

Senator MITCHELL. Senator Dodd, to respond directly to your

comments, first we accept them as valid, constructive criticism,

presented in a positive way. We certainly, to the extent that we

continue in this, we’ll keep those in mind and attempt to deal with

them.

We do have references to areas in which the United Nations is

effective, or can be effective, in the very opening chapter; indeed on

the second page, which the Speaker and I were principally involved

in drafting, with the help of our aides. We list several areas where

there is a positive benefit from the United Nations.

With respect to the second point you made about the areas of emphasis, when you write a report you never know what’s going to get

attention. And I must say, I frankly have been surprised that of

the six chapters in our report, which includes the opening chapter

written by the Speaker and I, and then five task groups, that really

the one that’s gotten the most attention, is titled: In Need of ReVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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pair, Reforming the United Nations. We have lengthy chapters on

safeguarding human rights and ending genocide, on deterring

death destruction, catastrophic terrorism, and the proliferation of

nuclear chemicals and biological weapons, on war and peace, preventing any conflicts, and on helping people in poor nations

through development and humanitarian assistance.

It just so happens that the chapter on Need of Reform in the

United Nations has gotten most of the attention, most of the questioning, and the others really haven’t received what I think is the

attention they deserve. I hope your comments will serve to focus

attention on those because they are, in my judgment, of critical importance. With respect to the Security Council, we did discuss it in

the task force, and we did not reach agreement. So we stated that

frankly. There were a few areas where that occurred, and it’s explicitly stated in our report. The Speaker has expressed his personal view, I expressed mine previously, and each member of the

task force is free to express his or her own.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd. We thank

our distinguished witnesses for your testimony and your forthcoming responses to our questions. The Chair would now like to

recognize R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of Political Affairs,

the Department of State. Would you please proceed to the table?

Secretary Burns, thank you for coming, thank you for your patience. We’ve had an extended conversation with our first witnesses, and we look forward to visiting with you. But first of all,

we’d like to hear your testimony. Your entire statement will be

made a part of the record in full. And please proceed as you wish.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to me for 10 seconds.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Karen Hughes, your administration’s nominee for

a very important post, I’m supposed to meet with at 10:15. So, Mr.

Secretary, if I leave after your testimony, please don’t be offended.

I’m very much interested in what you have to say, and I would like

permission to able to submit a couple of questions in writing if

she’s on time. I——

The CHAIRMAN. Permission granted.

Secretary Burns.

STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It’s a

pleasure to be here. I found the last 2 hours to be a very serious

stimulating debate and I enjoyed listening to it. And I profited from

it, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the rest of the members

of the committee for the commitment that you’re giving to the

United Nations: An institution that’s a great value to us, but an

institution that’s badly in need of reform.

I have submitted a statement. I will not tax the patience of the

committee by reading it. May I just say a few things that, perhaps,

would frame the position of the administration on this issue and

also respond to some of the points that members have already

raised?

48

First, our administration is committed to U.N. reform. I don’t believe we need to have our feet held to the fire to pay attention to

it. Or to try to achieve some of the very notable aims that you, Mr.

Chairman, and Senator Coleman have put forward in your bill, and

we agree with many of the—nearly all of the reform provisions in

your bill. The United Nations is a uniquely viable institution, but

it is in need of reform. And our administration is committed to seeing that reform through. We have recently, twice in the last month,

sent cables to all of our diplomatic missions asking our Ambassadors to see Foreign Ministers about the list of reforms that we

wish to see accomplished by September when the High Level Summit’s going to be held—President Bush will attend—that’s supposed to be focusing on the idea of strengthening the United Nations.

So I just wanted to assure all of you, we are focused on this, and

we’re focused not just on the effort or on rhetoric, but actually on

results. I also want to reply to Senator Dodd’s, I think, very strong

and good point that we need to speak positively of the United Nations. And give credit where credit is due.

In my testimony I list a high number of examples where the

United Nations has been indispensable. And in this very complex

globalized world, despite the power of the United States, we cannot

go it alone. We cannot be unilateral. And we do have to work

through multilateral institutions; each of them has their own

strengths, own weaknesses. The United Nations has both. But on

the positive ledger, if you look at what the United Nations has

been able to do to organize the elections in Iraq, to frame and support the international communities, continued economic support for

the Government in Afghanistan; if you look at the way that the

United Nations has paid attention to some conflicts where we were

not willing to commit troops for very good reasons, but in Coˆte

d’Ivoire, in Sierra Leone, in Liberia, the United Nations Peacekeeping forces in each of those countries has played an indispensable role in trying to preserve, under difficult circumstances,

peace.

And I think back to—after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri—

when it was the United Nations, through U.N. Security Council

Resolution 1559, that spoke with one voice that essentially said to

the Syrian Government, ‘‘your 29 years of occupation are over.’’

And it was a powerful statement. France and the United States cosponsored it. And it’s that kind of role that the United Nations can

play best that we ought to encourage and we ought to recognize

when the United Nations does good things. Not least of all, the

U.N.’s attention to HIV/AIDS to democracy promotion to poverty

alleviation—it’s something that the United Nations can uniquely do

that we, as a country, are not able to do on our own.

We think that’s important. The next point, I’d like to emphasize,

is that American leadership is important. We are the founding

country, we’re the host country, we’re the leading country, we’re

the largest donor. If we are committed with a positive, and sometimes tough agenda, tough-minded agenda, the United Nations can

be more effective. If we walk away, or we withhold funds, and we

are very much opposed to that, then we’re convinced that the

United Nations will be less successful.

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Now the United Nations has significant flaws, and I would just

commend Senator Coleman for his leadership in calling the United

Nations on those flaws. And we’ve had a chance to meet and we

very much appreciate the work that he is doing to look into the significant deficiencies in New York and the Secretariat, in the management, in budget and the administration.

To listen to Chairman Volker and the work that he is doing on

the Oil-For-Food scandal, where there are further reports coming.

And we are very, very concerned about the revelations on the OilFor-Food scandal and we hope that people will be held accountable

for the grievous lack—abuses in that program.

We look at the peacekeeping scandals, particularly in Congo,

where soldiers who are supposed to protect innocent civilians,

turned on them as sexual predators. It was shameful and those

people need to be held accountable for what they have done.

And finally, I think everyone on your panel, in your committee,

Mr. Chairman, has agreed that the United Nations Commission on

Human Rights ought to be abolished. It is scandalous that Sudan

and Zimbabwe should sit in judgment of the United States and

Norway, and France, or South Africa—all of us democracies—

Sudan and Zimbabwe, not being democracies. So what we have

done in our Government is to ask every U.S. Ambassador in the

world to focus on U.N. reform, to deliver our reform agenda to each

capitol of the world.

Secretary Rice was in the United Nations to see the Secretary

General a month ago; she put our reform proposal before him. I

was up in the United Nations yesterday and I spent 5 hours there

meeting with various regional groupings. I met with eight African

countries, but also with the Secretariat, to say we hope by September the following reforms can be enacted.

First, working with our very fine Under Secretary of Management, Chris Burnham, an American citizen who just took his job,

can we have far-reaching management, budget, and administrative

forms in the United Nations decided upon by this September, in 2

months time?

Second, can we agree to abolish the Human Rights Commission

in Geneva and replace it with a smaller, much more democratically

oriented Human Rights Council, that would actually turn its attention not to propagandize individual countries’ concerns, but to focus

on human rights violators and to try to have the United Nations

be an effective voice for change in countries like Zimbabwe and

Sudan?

Third, is to agree to the construction of a peacebuilding commission, which would be a vehicle that we’ve not had over the last 10

years. After a conflict has ended, how can the United Nations be

more effective in organizing international, civil, and military reconstruction? It’s the type of response we did not have after Bosnia,

Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and which we badly—

we badly need.

Fourth, a Democracy Fund has already been created. That was

President Bush’s idea; it was inaugurated on July 4 by Secretary

General Kofi Annan and the U.S. Government will contribute to

that fund, designed to spread democracy in the world.

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Fifth, can the United States and the other nations agree on what

we ought to be doing to promote development in the world, not the

simplistic notion that 0.7 percent of one’s GDP is sufficient? But in

looking at what we can do with trade, with NGO activities, with

business investment, and with government aid to promote real and

long-lasting development in the world.

And finally, counterterrorism. Can we agree on a definition of

terrorism, and can we have a convention on terrorism that would

be an effective response by the United Nations to 9/11, to the London bombings, and to all the terrorists acts between?

So that’s our agenda for the United Nations. And what’s ironic,

I find, about the discussion this morning in this committee, versus

the discussions that I had yesterday in New York, is that you’ve

all focused, I would say, on a very serious way and very substantial

way, on the these fundamental reforms that must be enacted to

shore up an ailing institution.

But I can tell you 98 percent of the diplomatic oxygen is being

spent on the U.N. Security Council debate. All of my conversations

yesterday, when I tried to press this reform agenda, came around

to the U.N. Security Council debate.

And Secretary Rice has taken the position with all of her interlocutors, and I have as well with mine, that the United States does

not want to have a vote on expansion of the Security Council until

we can demonstrate to the Congress and the American people that

we’ve actually been effective in pushing through these more farreaching reforms. We can’t imagine asking the Senate to amend

the United Nations Charter to enlarge the Security Council, which

is what we’d have to do.

If we came to you and say we want to grow the Security Council

from 15 to 20, or even 25, and yet we had not taken care of the

sickness in the institution, I can imagine what the response of the

Senate would be. And so, I can assure you that while we are interested in Security Council reform, and we have put forward a proposal for new permanent members, as well as nonpermanent members, we are not inclined, we will not agree to have a vote, and we

will vote against any proposal that comes before this major body

of reforms is enacted.

Finally, and my last point, Mr. Chairman, would just be to thank

you for the attention you’ve given this issue this morning. And

thank former Majority Leader Mitchell and former Speaker Gingrich for their very good, very serious report. We agree with nearly

all of the recommendations in it. Secretary Rice and I met with

both of them and their associates and we’re very gratified that they

spent so much of their time producing a report that should be a

guide both for the Congress and for the administration. Thank you

very much.

[The prepared statement of Secretary R. Nicholas Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the invitation to appear before you to discuss U.N. reform. U.N. Reform is

one of the most important issues facing the United States. It is an essential tool

for the successful management and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. It is funVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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damental to the future effectiveness of the United Nations itself. U.N. reform is one

of our most pressing priorities. In that regard, we welcome the leadership of former

Speaker Gingrich and former Majority Leader Mitchell in calling for the United Nations to adopt far-reaching reforms in the months ahead.

WHY WE BELIEVE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Since 1945, but especially since the end of the cold war, the United Nations has

become an important foreign policy tool for the United States in our efforts to advance throughout the world the values we believe in. We often forget—or underrate—just how critical the United Nations has been in helping us to achieve our foreign policy goals and objectives. A quick glance at the headlines proves this point:

Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Haiti, Lebanon, Syria, Western Sahara, Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Liberia. The United Nations is important in each of

these countries as a peacekeeper, a mediator, a unified voice of the global community on very difficult issues.

But the United Nations does not deal just with countries in crisis. The United Nations also plays a vital role in addressing the great transnational issues that are

at the forefront of today’s challenges, such as HIV/AIDS, tsunami relief, illiteracy,

democracy promotion, human rights, trafficking in persons, freedom of the media,

civil aviation, trade, economic development, and the protection of refugees, to name

but a few. Another good example of the U.N.’s long-term work is First Lady Laura

Bush serving as Honorary Ambassador for the U.N. Decade on Literacy, as

UNESCO is developing a literacy initiative focused on combating illiteracy through

mother-child education.

The United States and other countries have freely chosen to take these very complicated matters before the United Nations. We have done so because we know that

by working together we can enhance the prospects for success. And, in working multilaterally, we share the burden financially and in terms of human resources. Our

work in the United Nations reaffirms our unity of purpose with our allies and

friends around the world.

U.S. LEADERSHIP AT THE UNITED NATIONS

As the founding country, host country, and most influential member, the United

States is essential to the success of the United Nations. While the United Nations

is an indispensable partner to the United States in a complex world, it is also true

that the United Nations cannot function effectively without an interested, focused,

and committed United States. It is, therefore, vital that the United States lead the

United Nations, that we have faith in the United Nations, pay our dues, promote

reform, and contribute to strengthen the United Nations for all the many challenges

ahead.

We must help shape the U.N.’s priorities and guide the direction of its activities;

we must resist initiatives that are against our policies; and we must strive to

achieve our goals at lower cost to the American taxpayer.

American leadership is essential to promote fundamental American and U.N.

principles and values:

• Through the United Nations, the United States seeks to make the world a safer

place, by ensuring nonproliferation; by preventing or deterring terrorism; and

by addressing other threats to peace and security, especially regional stability.

• Second, we seek to make the world a better place, by promoting human rights

and democracy, by advancing economic freedom, good governance, food security,

literacy, and development; by improving the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance; and by reducing the number and severity of international health threats.

To those who say that the United Nations is a failed organization and that we

obtain little in return for our contributions to that body, I would point to the following results:

• The Security Council has acted to reduce violence in Sudan, Haiti, Liberia, Coˆte

d’Ivoire, and other countries;

• In Iraq, U.N. officials played a key role in elections earlier this year and are

assisting in the drafting of the new constitution to take effect in January 2006;

• Joint United States-French efforts have resulted in Security Council resolutions

to force Syria to end its occupation of Lebanon;

• Libya signed the Additional Protocol and cooperated in the evacuation of nuclear equipment and materials;

• The General Assembly adopted the Nuclear Terrorism Convention;

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• The Security Council declared terrorist acts unjustifiable and is monitoring the

sale of WMD to nonstate entities such as terrorist groups; • The President’s proposal for a U.N. Democracy Fund has garnered wide political

support, and the Secretary General announced its launch on July 4; • The General Assembly passed a declaration calling for a ban on all forms of

human cloning; • A Democracy Caucus has been established in Geneva and New York; • Several key Commission on Human Rights resolutions important to the United

States were adopted, while Cuba’s Guantanamo resolution was defeated; • We have addressed human trafficking through resolutions in the General Assembly and Commission on the Status of Women, and through a special trafficking protocol to the U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime;

• Americans were elected or appointed to a number of key leadership positions

at the United Nations.

Americans can be assured that, in many important areas, the United Nations is

working well to help bring development, security, and peace to the world. The

United Nations, however, is far from perfect. In many ways, it is an ailing institution badly in need of fundamental and bold reforms. The recent Oil-for-Food scandal, the outrageous abuses by some U.N. peacekeeping troops in the Congo and

management woes at U.N. Headquarters are but three examples of problems that

must be corrected this year. The United States must also lead in this effort.

GINGRICH-MITCHELL REPORT

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to begin discussing the U.S. agenda for U.N. reform by

first offering a few thoughts on the important work done by the Gingrich-Mitchell

Commission on U.N. reform. Though I won’t go into a comprehensive analysis of

their report in this forum, I will say that we support most of the report’s recommendations. They are consistent with the administration’s views on U.N. Reform.

The report rightly emphasizes U.S. leadership as a precondition for attaining significant reform of the United Nations. We also appreciate the report’s emphasis on the

importance of all states playing a role in the reform process; America cannot do this

alone.

We agree that the United Nations needs to give more emphasis to good national

governance, trade, and to economic growth as the means to reducing poverty. As the

report recommends, this means applying new approaches, such as those pioneered

by the Millennium Challenge Account, the Monterrey Consensus, and the U.N.

Commission on the Private Sector and Development.

On human rights issues, we are in strong agreement that the U.N. Commission

on Human Rights (UNCHR) should be abolished. Serial human rights violators such

as Cuba, Zimbabwe, and Sudan are all firmly ensconced Commission on Human

Rights members, lecturing the membership on how to promote and protect human

rights when they do not protect the rights of their own people. Bloc politics continue

to dominate voting at the UNCHR, ensuring that any substantive discourse on

human rights devolves into a political battle. The Office of the High Commissioner

for Human Rights continues to be woefully underfunded.

As such, we strongly agree with the report’s finding that the Commission on

Human Rights should be eliminated and replaced with new U.N. Human Rights

Council. We believe that the Council should have an action-oriented mandate, and

that its membership should be elected by a two-thirds majority and exclude states

under U.N. Security Council sanctions. We continue to endorse the U.N. Democracy

Caucus as a tool to help like-minded states from different regions share ideas and

initiatives on the Commission’s reform and the Council’s future.

In keeping with the report’s references to reform of peacekeeping operations, the

United States strongly welcomed the report of Prince Zeid Raad Al-Hussein, the

Secretary General’s special adviser, to strengthen the U.N.’s ability to investigate

and react firmly to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The United States

also supports the U.N. Secretariat’s request to fund additional positions in peacekeeping missions to enforce the zero tolerance policy.

We agree with the report’s support for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission. Where the United Nations as an institution is concerned, the work on security

must be coordinated with all the other efforts being undertaken in connection with

a particular society; and all the other efforts must be coordinated with each other.

Better coordination among U.N. family entities and with donors, international financial institutions and regional partners, as well as taking aboard the lessons from

the complex U.N. peacekeeping and peace support missions of the last 15 years, can

help us all do a better job of conflict prevention. In the event conflict cannot be

avoided, such coordination and application of lessons learned can improve our collecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tive efforts to assist states to recover from conflict. These activities are central to

successful discharge of the Security Council’s primary responsibility for peace and

security, and a Peacebuilding Commission would be essential in managing these

processes.

Regarding the report’s recommended 2-year budget cycle for peacekeeping operations, we believe most peacekeeping missions benefit from annual review of their

budget. Two-year budgets for peacekeeping missions may not be practical since

evolving conditions on the ground and lessons over the course of the year can lead

to revised mandates and budgets.

The report makes important recommendations on management, budget, and administrative reform in the United Nations, notably in the Secretariat’s work. This

is a key area of current U.N. weakness. We are pleased by the appointment of an

American, former Acting Under Secretary of State for Management, Chris

Burnham, as U.N. Under Secretary General for Management. We support the idea

of an oversight board. The report also offers very constructive proposals for altering

the culture of the U.N.’s troubled human resource system.

Mr. Chairman, we share the strong sentiment in Congress for reform of the

United Nations. We look forward to working with you and other leaders of the Senate to that end. However, we believe that withholding U.N. dues is not a constructive way to achieve sweeping U.N. reform, and withholding is not a prescription suggested in the Gingrich/Mitchell report. We believe withholding dues in order to

achieve a wide array of specific conditions would diminish our effectiveness, and

would detract from and undermine our efforts to play the leading role in reforming

the United Nations. It would represent a tremendous setback in the reliability and

credibility of the United Nations in the world.

The administration objects to the House bill’s certification requirements which

could result in a 50-percent reduction in the U.S.-assessed contribution to the

United Nations. The administration also opposes provisions of the bill that purport

to require the President to direct the Ambassador to the United Nations to take particular actions in the Ambassador’s dealings with the United Nations. Other provisions purport to establish policies for the United States with respect to its relations

with the United Nations. These provisions impermissibly infringe on the President’s

authority under the Constitution to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs. The administration also has a number of other objections to the bill. However, we do support

many of the provisions in the Coleman-Lugar bill. This bill articulates a comprehensive set of reforms that are difficult but attainable, and gives the administration the

necessary flexibility needed to pursue reform.

U.N. REFORM: WHAT IS NEEDED

Mr. Chairman, I think we can agree that the United Nations has been a useful

diplomatic tool over the years. Like any tool, however, maintenance and repairs are

required to ensure maximum effectiveness.

As President Bush has said, ‘‘the success of multilateralism is measured not merely by following a process, but by achieving results.’’ For that reason, the United

States has long advocated reforms to make the United Nations more efficient and

effective. In recent years we have spearheaded efforts to achieve greater transparency in the budgetary process and to increase oversight of U.N. operations to

prevent fraud, waste, mismanagement, and misconduct. We are proud of a number

of important advances in these areas, including a resolution last December that requires that reports by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) be made

available to any member state upon request, and the granting of new authority to

the Secretary General to move positions between U.N. programs to higher priority

areas.

Clearly, however, U.N. management is still woefully lacking, as media reports on

the Oil-For-Food and on sexual exploitation by peacekeepers scandals have highlighted.

The momentum for reform has grown in recent months and is now in an intense

phase. In December 2004, Secretary General Kofi Annan’s High-Level Panel on

‘‘Threats, Challenges, and Change’’ issued its report with 101 recommendations to

modernize the United Nations. In March of this year the Secretary General issued

his own report entitled ‘‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and

Human Rights for All,’’ which puts forward more than 200 reform recommendations.

The United States will support a number of recommendations put forward by the

Secretary General and his High-Level-Panel, but we are also actively pursuing our

own reform agenda. We have contacted U.N. officials and representatives of other

nations to discuss our views and have stepped up our efforts for reform in preparation for the Summit in New York in September and at the 60th General Assembly

54

this fall. We are working assiduously with like-minded countries to seek wide support for the reforms we believe are necessary for the United Nations if it is to meet

the challenges of the 21st century.

OUR REFORM AGENDA: U.S. PRIORITIES

We have outlined six priorities for U.N. reform and are devoting considerable time

and energy over coming months to win support for our proposals. I would like to

outline briefly each of them.

Reform Priority No. 1: Budget and Management Reforms

The United States has consistently pressed the United Nations to undertake

meaningful management, administrative, and budgetary reforms to make it more efficient, effective, and responsive. Budgetary discipline, accountability, and program

relevancy are critical to these goals. We believe that the Secretary General devoted

too little time to these issues in his proposals for the High Level Event. A number

of member states agree with us that it needs to be more broadly addressed in the

Outcome Document for the September summit. In particular, for accountability, we

want to boost the resources and independence of the Office of Internal Oversight

Services, and an expanding role for this Office in peacekeeping and small agencies.

For effectiveness, we seek consolidation of U.N. Information Centers, and rationalization of conferences. To boost relevance, the Secretary General’s authority to redeploy positions should be used and expanded, and all ongoing U.N. programs should

be reviewed for continued relevancy and effectiveness.

Reform Priority No. 2: Effective Human Rights Mechanism

We must reorganize the way the United Nations works to protect Human Rights

throughout the world. The United States supports the creation of a U.N. mechanism

such as the Human Rights Council proposed by the Secretary General to address

more effectively the most serious human rights situations. We also believe that the

Council’s mandate should be to take effective action to address the most egregious

human rights violations such as systematic torture or wide-scale deprivation of freedom of expression and assembly.

In regard to structure, we support a standing, action-oriented Council that

downplays thematic resolutions. We also believe the Council should be a General

Assembly subsidiary, pending a decision whether to create a stand-alone charter

body, because it would be easier and faster to implement. The membership should

be limited—20 is ideal—and exclude nations under Security Council sanctions.

Seats would be filled through elections to 2-year terms with regional allocations.

Members of the Council should have a solid human rights record and states would

have to secure a two-thirds vote to be elected. Countries subject to Security Council

sanctions or an UNSC-authored Commission of Inquiry would be ineligible. Elected

Council members should affirm they will live up to the standards of the Universal

Declaration on Human Rights.

Reform Priority No. 3: Creation of a Peacebuilding Commission

We need a Peacebuilding Commission to provide recommendations on post-conflict

situations and on bridging between peacekeeping missions, reconstruction, and stabilization efforts. A Peacebuilding Commission should be set up to work in an advisory capacity to the Security Council on specific conflict situations as requested by

the Council. The Commission’s tasks would also include serving as a focal point for

donor coordination. We believe participation in the core Commission should be limited to about 20 members and should include the five permanent Security Council

members, five major donor nations, three major troop contributors, five representatives of ECOSOC, the World Bank, and IMF; and a U.N. system representative selected by the Secretary General. The Commission would provide advice to the Security Council on a consensus basis.

Reform Priority No. 4: Economic Development

Building on the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development our approach emphasizes national responsibility, rule of law, governments accountable to

the people, and sound economic policies. Such an enabling framework for development provides the essential context necessary for countries to make effective use of

all available resources, public and private, foreign and domestic.

The United States has an excellent story to tell on development. The United

States led the push for the ambitious ‘‘Doha Round’’ of trade liberalization. At

Monterrey, the United States also joined other countries in agreeing to provide more

aid to support developing countries that are improving their institutions and policies. We have increased official development assistance by 90 percent since 2000,

55

nearly tripled aid to Africa during the same period, established the Millennium

Challenge Account, and led donor funding in the fight against HIV/AIDS. We cannot

and should not endorse aid targets, but need not object to commitments made by

others to such targets.

We are underscoring the importance the President attaches to ending poverty by

promoting political and economic freedom, and emphasizing our leadership on key

issues (the MCA, HIV/AIDS, women’s issues) where aid can be effectively applied.

Most recently, at the G–8 Summit in Gleneagles we made a historic commitment

to Africa and African nations, agreeing among other things to debt relief for qualifying heavily indebted poor countries, scaling up the fight against malaria, increasing our funding of the African Education Initiative and our support for women. We

will again double assistance to Africa between 2004 and 2010. In addition, consistent with the President’s policy, the G–8 agreed that development requires not

just aid, but better governance, stability, and peace in order for the private sector

to grow and create jobs.

The United Nations can make its greatest contribution to development by helping

its members make and implement the right choices about how to build democratic

states with market economies.

Reform Priority No. 5: Democracy Fund

At last year’s General Assembly, President Bush called for the establishment of

a U.N. Democracy Fund and we have worked diligently with the U.N. Secretariat

and other interested member states to make this initiative a reality. The Democracy

Fund will provide grants and in-kind assistance for democracy promotion efforts to

expand the reach of freedom around the world. Several other nations, including

India, Hungary, and South Korea have expressed support for the fund. Allies such

as the United Kingdom and France have signed on and intend to contribute. Secretary General Annan highlighted the idea in his report ‘‘In Larger Freedom,’’

issued proposed Terms of Reference, and on July 4 at the African Union Summit

announced its establishment. We have requested $10 million for the Democracy

Fund in the FY06 budget, and we are seeking FY05 moneys to reprogram for the

fund.

Reform Priority No. 6: Counterterrorism

We are in broad agreement with the counterterrorism strategy proposed by the

Secretary General, but do not agree with all its elements. Regarding a definition of

terrorism, the United States welcomes the position, contained in the Secretary General’s report, that the right to resist occupation does not justify the targeting and

killing of civilians. We do not, however, want the effort to come to agreement on

a definition of terrorism to distract from the more important task of moving forward

on completion of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words about Security Council

reform.

Many nations have expressed the view that the Security Council, the United Nations most powerful body, should be enlarged from its current composition of 5 permanent members and 10 nonpermanent members to become more representative of

today’s world. We have stated consistently that while we are open to considering

expansion proposals, the primary purpose of Security Council reform should be to

make the Council more effective.

The Secretary General’s Panel of Eminent Persons did not endorse a specific plan

on this highly charged issue but proposed instead two options: (1) Increasing the

number of both permanent and nonpermanent members; or (2) enlarging the Council with new nonpermanent members only, albeit with a new category of nonpermanent membership that has a longer term than the current 2-year term and which

allows members to run for reelection.

Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India, known as the Group of Four or G–4, have put

forward an enlargement proposal based on the first option that would give them,

together with two African nations, permanent seats. The G–4 has indicated that

they would like to have a vote by the General Assembly on the resolution in the

coming weeks.

This G–4 proposal would need to receive a ‘‘yes’’ vote of two-thirds of U.N. members if it is to move to the next phases, the selection of the new permanent members, and the adoption of a resolution for amending the United Nations. Charter,

with ratification of the amendment by two-thirds of U.N. membership, including

ratification by all permanent Security Council members. For the United States, this

would require Senate advice and consent. The G–4 proposal is opposed by a number

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of countries, including the United States. We do not think it is timely to support

any proposal until broader consensus is reached. Recently, other proposals for Security Council reform have been put forward, including one by the African Union.

We have engaged in a dialogue with the G–4 and with the other permanent members of the Security Council. I met personally with my counterparts from both

groups. We continue our strong support for a permanent seat for Japan; have expressed our openness to Security Council expansion, and proposed our own criteriabased approach as a constructive way to measure a country’s readiness for a permanent seat. Such criteria could include: GDP, population, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the United Nations, nonproliferation and counterterrorism record, and

geographic balance. We have said that we can support adding two or so new permanent members based on those criteria. In addition, we would endorse the addition

of two or three additional nonpermanent seats, based on geographic selection, to expand the Council to 19 or 20.

We feel that the G–4 resolution is highly divisive. Obtaining wide support for Security Council reform is critical if the reform is to succeed in revitalizing the United

Nations. Clearly, as well, a resolution that enjoys a broad base of support stands

a better chance of General Assembly adoption.

We also want our friends to understand that while Security Council reform is an

important issue, we cannot let discussion on expansion divert our attention from,

and delay action on, other important, more urgently needed U.N. reforms. It is our

conviction that no single area of reform should be addressed to the exclusion of others. The Secretary has communicated this to U.N. Secretary General Annan and to

her counterparts.

As such, we do not think any proposal to expand the Security Council—including

one based on our own ideas—should be voted upon at this stage. If the G–4 puts

its resolution for a vote, we will vote against it and are urging others to do the

same.

CLOSING

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to underscore that United Nations reform

is a very high priority for Secretary Rice and for this administration. The United

Nations has been, and continues to be, a critical element of U.S. foreign policy. We

cannot, however, change the United Nations for the sake of change alone. We want

reforms that will make the United Nations more effective and bring it closer to the

vision it created for itself almost 60 years ago, while simultaneously preparing it

and its member countries for the new challenges of the 21st century.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Burns. It’s

a fact that there is interest in this committee, and even at this

hour we have good participation. We may even have more as questions continue.

Let me suggest maybe 6 minutes for each member this time, because we’re going to have another vote at 12:30. Eventually, members will, in fact, go off to other things, and you will need to return

to your duties. Let me start the 6 minutes of my own by saying

that the agenda that you pointed out, of the members of the United

Nations as they visit with Secretary Rice, is as we might have anticipated; that is, the great powers have an interest in the Security

Council. Maybe nations that are not great powers are much less interested in this.

The predicament, I think, that we have strategically or

tactively—as you may look at it, legislatively—is that we come to

a pretty good agreement in much of the House bill, and certainly

the bill that Senator Coleman and his group has helped fashion

with this committee on the reform agenda that you have mentioned.

At the end of the day, in the House bill they said that if you

don’t pay attention to the reform agenda, why, we’re going to cut

the dues 50 percent. And that has been the big issue in this counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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try. It may be in New York that people are interested in the Security Council, but here much of the press coverage has been over the

50-percent cut. With some justification we went through several

years of this. This has been reiterated today. We are trying to get

back to normal again. Therefore, many people say that if you’re

getting to this, why there we go again. And yet at the same time

we heard Speaker Gingrich pointing out that there was usefulness

in Chairman Hyde’s bill and so forth.

Now the bill that we have tried to fashion here says that Secretary Rice, negotiating for the President, has to have some clout.

Several things are suggested that she might have in her portfolio

there, including, ultimately, a reduction of the dues. But that gives

her and the administration authority to negotiate all these. Some

could point out that before Secretary Rice, or anybody else, ever

gets to this, the Congress may just simply cut the dues, or may for

instance, cut 100 percent for all I know in a fit of unhappiness

about the United Nations. The situation is not going well for the

United Nations in terms of U.S. public opinion right now, not well

at all. We’re trying to reconstruct. But as I understand the administration’s position, they don’t want the dues in the bill, and so I

just query, how do you anticipate proceeding? Let’s say, remove all

mention of the dues, as one of the quivers in the arrow, and so that

satisfies the administration. Does it satisfy Congressman Hyde,

and the House people who have already voted for their bill? And

do we, maybe, prevail one way or another? I don’t know. At the end

of the day, why is this not a useful thing to have in some form?

Or, is your feeling that even the mention of it is not constructive,

and that, somehow, you’re going to be able to effect these reforms

without having, at least, the potential mechanism of the dues reduction as a last resort?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you very much, and you’ve

asked one of the key questions, and I’ll be very happy to respond.

Our administration’s position has been that we object to the withholding—the mandatory withholding—of American dues to the

United Nations. We believe that we should pay our dues, that we

should pay them on time, because we believe that will enhance our

credibility with the other members of the General Assembly and we

think that is befitting the role of the founder and host country,

leading country of the United Nations itself. We all remember, I

know you do, probably even more vividly than I do, the time during

the 1990s when we did not pay our dues and the attacks on American credibility in the mid- to late 1990s.

We even came close in the late 1990s to losing our vote in the

General Assembly because of the large arrears that we have built

up to the U.N. system. I also want to say that we’re very well

aware of the sentiment here in Congress and the tough-minded approach that many members have taken, which is positive. And that

is that the United Nations has to reform, and if there is to be a

clear message from the Congress, in whatever bill emerges in conference, that reforms must be enacted, that the Congress expects

that on behalf of the American public. And, Mr. Chairman, I’m

very well aware of the public opinion polls in our own country

about support for the United Nations. Then a tough-minded message can be helpful to our efforts.

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The CHAIRMAN. Let me parse the thing before my time runs out.

We’re not in favor of mandatory dues. The point, clearly, was that

the President of the United States, finally at the end of the day,

has the discretion to do this. Does he want it or doesn’t he? That’s

really the issue. My guess is that this is likely to be a very unusual

legislative row to hoe, which may give the President the ability to

veto the bill at the end of the trail. So that’s the critical issue. Does

the administration want the discretion in the hands of the President at the end of the day?

Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Chairman, I’ll try to—try to be as helpful as I can. You’ve asked a direct question, and I just want to reaffirm our belief that we should pay our dues. And that’s our obligation. If we are given the choice between mandatory withholding

and withholding that for which the President and the Secretary of

State would have a waiver authority, we would certainly support

the latter and we’ve made that clear. And we very much appreciate

the work that you and Senator Coleman have done to articulate in

your own bill a tough-minded reform agenda for the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that may not be good enough. In other

words, finally the administration has to decide what they want

here. And I’ll say that you have a cafeteria choice that we’re forcing

upon you, including discretionary withholding, as opposed to mandatory. You prefer we didn’t do that. We’re at a point, frankly,

where a bill that is going to have mandatory dues, such as the

House bill is going to pass, unless there is some intervention by the

administration at this point.

We all want to pay the dues. I want to pay the dues. All I’m suggesting is that we have a legislative dilemma with a country that

is very skeptical of the United Nations. Senator Coleman has expressed that in his committee. They have, I think, been very, very

mild in terms of working our way through this. But that’s why I’m

so pointed about the issue. Finally, the administration will have to

decide what they want to do. Touch the dues, or don’t touch the

dues? Now, if the point is just simply, we pay the dues, great. And

we’ll do the best we can. Most members of this committee want to

pay the dues. But I’m not sure where the votes are, and that’s why

I have been so candid in this line of questioning.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think we should pay our dues. Period. There seems to be a

premise here that all these other nations want the United Nations

and that, therefore, the United States has a lot of latitude on how

we behave. There is an assumption that the institution will remain

and continue. So we say, unless you do these things, we’re not

going make our dues payments.

Now let me put a different scenario to you. Suppose there are

some countries at the United Nations who don’t really want it.

They can’t just leave it openly. But they perceive the United Nations as having served U.S. purposes essentially, since its establishment. I would argue that the United Nations has been more

helpful to us than to some of the other major powers. So they say,

let’s frustrate the reforms, the Congress is on the record that

they’ll withhold the dues if we do that, and we can do in the United

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Nations and the blame will fall on the United States, and we’ll

achieve our purpose.

Now, is that a farfetched scenario, or might it, in fact, be possible?

Ambassador BURNS. I just wanted to make sure you had finished

your thought. I think, based on my visit yesterday, and based on

what we’ve been hearing from Secretary General Annan over the

last month or so, it’s likely that the major body of these reforms

that I listed, will be agreed to by September, perhaps not all of

them. The Human Rights Council has been very controversial. A

lot of the countries that are not democratic, that are authoritarian,

don’t like it, don’t like the idea—our idea. But it’s likely that most

of these reforms will be concluded, and there is a reform mindset

in the General Assembly, led by President Jean Marie Ping of

Gabon, and the Secretary General of the United Nations has established a clear reform program and we agree with much of it, not

all of it, but much of it. Our approach is tougher, and it’s more ambitious, but I think the more likely scenario we’ll face is that the

United Nations General Assembly agrees to a large measure of reforms, then the real challenge will be, can they be implemented effectively and can they be sustained?

And that will be a tough job that we, in the State Department,

will have primary responsibility for. So it’s a long term—a longterm venture.

Senator SARBANES. Has the State Department determined where

the locus of that responsibility will be within the executive branch

of our Government?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, obviously the State Department takes

our leadership and our directions from the President.

Senator SARBANES. Yes.

Ambassador BURNS. But we are responsible for the day-to-day

conduct of our—we in the State Department—are responsible for

the day-to-day conduct of our relations with the United Nations

and it’s our Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which I

oversee, which provides instructions to the U.N. mission. So we’re

fundamentally involved in this, and committed to it. For Secretary

Rice, it’s one of her highest priorities. I know that in a discussion

with Speaker Gingrich, there was some questioning of how engaged

we are, she raises this issue with nearly all of her Foreign Minister

counterparts. This is a major concern of ours.

Senator SARBANES. But are you going to carry it out through the

existing arrangements, or have you given any thought to setting up

some special arrangement to deal with the U.N. reform issue,

which could have the impact of assuring a very high-level focus, on

this particular issue. I know you don’t like to do that, because you

get a lot of important issues. Everyone says you’re going to have

set up a special arrangement to deal with this issue. But this may

well warrant an arrangement of that sort. Has any thought been

given to that?

Ambassador BURNS. We have—Secretary Rice appointed, when

she took office after her confirmation, Shirin Tahir-Kheli to be her

Special Representative for United Nations reform, so Ambassador

Tahir-Kheli is frequently in New York and she’s been traveling

around the world talking to the Chinese, the Indians, French, GerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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mans, British, to name just a few, about U.N. reform. And she’s active every day on this. Secretary Rice also asked me to oversee this

in the State Department on a day-to-day basis. This whole effort,

which I’ve been doing among my other responsibilities—we have an

outstanding Acting Ambassador at the United Nations in Anne

Patterson, a very effective person. But most importantly we have

the Secretary of State, who is onto this, and as I said before, has

it very high on her own agenda. It’s a priority for her. And she’s

engaged very much, not just in the strategy but in the tactics of

how we’re trying to get these reforms through this laborious process of 190 countries agreeing in the General Assembly. It’s quite

a diplomatic challenge.

So I think, Senator, that we’ve put a special focus on this, and

I’m confident we’ve got the right degree of intensity. And you can

be assured that we’ll follow through.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Senator COLEMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Secretary, first, before I get in my question. I just want to tell you how

much I appreciate the leadership that you’re providing. I had the

opportunity to work with you when you were our NATO Ambassador. And I think we’ve got a great team in place. We’ve got a

great team with Secretary Rice and Under Secretary Zoellick and

yourself. And, in fact, my meeting at 12 o’clock was with Acting

Ambassador Anne Patterson, I had to apologize and she deferred.

She’s been watching what we’re doing. But I really do thank you,

I think we have an outstanding team in place, and I think the

country’s well-served. And as we have this—I think it’s been a fascinating debate. And worthwhile and important. I just want to publically let you know that I have a great appreciation for the leadership that’s being offered and look forward to continuing with that.

So I just want to say thanks.

Let me get back to the question that I think the Chair was asking about. Where the administration is, on these various bills. I

don’t know whether it’s been said, but is there a—if the mandatory

provision of the Hyde bill were, in fact law, would that face a veto

threat from the administration?

Ambassador BURNS. We have not—the President has not stated

whether or not he would veto such a bill. Secretary of State Rice,

to my recollection, has also not commented upon that. Maybe we’re

very optimistic, we see it as a hypothetical possibility, but we’re

much more hopeful that the kind of approach that you and Senator

Lugar have been leading, and that others have supported, will

triump in the end, and, obviously, we’re just trying to deal in the

real-world basis with the various views that we appreciate here on

Capitol Hill.

Of course we work very closely with Chairman Hyde, have great

respect for him. On this particular—there were two particular provisions in the House bill that we objected to, and we said so in

writing in our report to the House, and we’ve said so since. And

we very much appreciate the effort that you have made with the

chairman in order to put forward ideas that we believe would have

a greater possibility of maintaining the credibility and the effectiveness of the United States at the United Nations.

61

Senator COLEMAN. And I share that, by the way, deep appreciation for the work of Chairman Hyde. His commitment to this issue,

the intellect and integrity that he brings to it. My concern in looking at some provisions of the Hyde bill is that they were—are a bit

too prescriptive. There’s a provision in there that identifies 18 specific U.N. agencies and directs that they go from mandatory funding to voluntary funding. I don’t know enough about those agencies. I don’t know if even the House committee knows enough about

those agencies to make that kind of individualize judgment.

I think there are provisions in there that call for a lot of paperwork. A lot of reporting, and I have a concern about the bureaucracy, the size of the bureaucracy, of the United Nations to date.

And I certainly want to be very careful about the things we do that

call for an increase—increasing that bureaucracy without some

very specific and productive purposes. So again I’ve had a good relationship with Chairman Hyde and we’ve worked closely on this

issue, but on those issues we do have some disagreement. I would

take it that there has not been discussion then about a veto threat

with the provisions in the Coleman-Lugar bill regarding funding?

Ambassador BURNS. Absolutely not.

Senator COLEMAN. Can we talk a little bit about the process. I

appreciate the fact that you’ve laid out some very specific measures

that you want to see taken care of in September. In September

there’ll be a session in the United Nations on reform. You’ve also

stated very clearly, that the President will be at that session. That

will be a very personal and public commitment to reform and he

will be a part of that discussion.

Speaker Gingrich, in his testimony talked about the long-term

nature of reform. Can you give me—we’ve got the short term, and

what we need to see right away, can you talk a little bit about the

long term, are there things out there that you haven’t focused on

in the short term but are in the cue right now, that you’re thinking

about?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, I think you’re right to focus on

that, because there’s always a temptation to think, you know, what

can you get done in the next 60 to 90 days and then think that

you’ve resolved the problem. When, I think, both of us know that

in looking at any institution as complex and as large as the U.N.

reform has to be a continuous process.

I would single out two areas that are badly in need of a continuous long-term rethink. The first is the basic structure of the Secretariat and the management and the budgeting process in New

York itself. You have, in our view, made some very helpful interventions in drawing attention to the Oil-For-Food scandal. It’s a

shocking scandal of major proportions, involving billions of dollars.

And again, we think that people need to be held accountable, people who may have been guilty of abuse, that they’re found to be

guilty in a court of law. But there has to be, very bright people

have to think through over the long term how best to arrange an

institution so that its budgeting, management, and administrative

functions are modern and that they are effective.

When I was Ambassador to NATO we went through the same exercise. It’s infinitely easier in NATO—you’re 26 countries versus

190 at the United Nations.

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The second area would be peacekeeping. We’ve seen dramatic

failures of the United Nations in peacekeeping, in Srebrenica 10

years ago, July 11, when 8,000 men and boys were killed because

the United Nations was unable to prevent the Bosnia and Serb

armed forces from attacking them, from executing them over 3

days.

You’ve drawn attention, quite rightly, to the horrific abuse of the

peacekeepers in the Congo and the sexual violations of innocent civilians by those peacekeepers. And so there has to be a long-term

effort to strengthen the peacekeeping forces, to make them more effective and to try to enact reforms so that the kind of abuses we’ve

seen in Congo and Srebrenica are not going to be repeated in the

future.

Senator COLEMAN. The great thing about having the gavel is that

you really don’t have to worry about whether bells ring or anything. Let me respond a little bit, particularly, I raise the issue of

long term for this reason. I’m a great believer in not raising expectations that can’t be reached. The United Nations needs reform,

there are things that need to be done right way. One of the most—

the difficult one you talked about is one of those that could be most

visible: Abolishing the Human Rights Commission. I made a strong

public statement about a body that has Zimbabwe and the Sudan,

and that has Cuba as members that have the United States—go off

that body a couple of years ago, it’s absurd. I think one of the

strongest public arguments for U.N. reform was that recent admission of Zimbabwe to the Human Rights Commission. Very powerful. My concern as a former Mayor, and I expressed this in my brief

opportunity to question Speaker Gingrich, is structure reform takes

awhile.

I know Senator Voinovich, I believe is coming back and I want

to give him the opportunity to ask some questions. He’s been very

passionate about personnel reform and structure reform, and you

know—in this body, in this government, it’s really hard. It takes

time. I think what we got to do is figure out ways in which we can

show progress to the Congress, show progress to the American people, but recognize that this will take a while. The Secretary General needs the ability to fire people, and has to use that ability. I

have a separate issue which I’m not going to press you on, and I

have raised the issue of the ability of this Secretary General to

make the reform.

I—knowing how hard reform is, how hard it is to change organizations. I have expressed as you’re well aware, very publically my

belief that this Secretary General Kofi Annan doesn’t have the ability to do the heavy lifting that’s needed. That because of the scandals that have taken place, because of the questions of conflict of

interest, because you know Speaker Gingrich talked about chiefs of

staff that have, you know, shredded documents over 3 years, that—

because of that you’re somewhat shackled regardless of what you

did. It’s what so many others did around you. I think it makes it

impossible for him to do the heavy lifting, that has to take place

for reform.

So I’m not going to put you on the spot, I’m not going to create

a moment of conflict here between myself and the administration.

But if we’re really serious about reform, about getting it done, if

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we recognize that it’s going to take heavy lifting over a period of

time, I think we have to recognize that there’s a human dimension

to this too, and that if individuals—if the team in place during so

much of the period of which problems have taken place, is then

being called upon to make the change, I think that’s impossible. At

a minimum, most would say problematic. I think its impossible.

And so I just—I’ll leave it on the record, but I’m not going to ask

whether you’re going to agree with me that the Secretary General

should resign. But you need to know, this is not—this comes from

me, not as part of an attack on the United Nations, but with a belief that if we want to accomplish the reform, to have the United

Nations as an effective partner with the United States, that I think

we kind of need the kind of leadership that has not been scared

by past conduct. So I wanted to make that statement.

With that I will turn the gavel back over to the chairman. And

I’m sure, then, recognize Senator Voinovich.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that from

what I’ve heard from Leader Mitchell that some real progress is

being made on reform of the United Nations. One of my concerns

was that we wouldn’t move quickly to take advantage of what I

consider to be a unique situation. And that’s transformation of an

organization that we’ve been trying to transform for many, many

years. And I was pleased that Kofi Annan himself echoed these

words in his U.N. report in larger freedom decision time at the

United Nations and, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that that document, if it’s not in the record, be put into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will placed in the record.

Senator VOINOVICH. And I’d also like to have my written statement put in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full.

Senator VOINOVICH. And also acknowledge the fact that I have

joined you and Senator Coleman as cosponsors of their piece of legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator.

Senator VOINOVICH. The stars seem to be in line. For watever

reason Kofi Annan has come out with some very strong statements

on reform of the United Nations, including eliminating the Human

Relations Commission, and going to a Human Relations Council,

and many of the recommendations that he has are the same recommendations in the Mitchell-Gingrich report, and it seems to me

that we have this unique opportunity to strike at the right time.

And I am pleased with your testimony today in regard to the fact

that you haven’t wasted any time, and haven’t let anything grow

under your feet, you’re moving fast. And I want to compliment you

and I want to compliment Anne Patterson for the good job that

you’re doing to move forward.

The question I have is this, you indicated that some of our

friends are more interested in discussing the Security Council than

they are reform of the United Nations. Do we have any allies with

us that are on the same team and pushing as hard as we are, for

example, the G–8 group do they—at all on board with this, do they

64

understand how important this opportunity is for the United Nations?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you, and could I just pick up

on what you first said, and say that we believe there is momentum

for reform? There’s a good chance that we can achieve a concrete

result by September. Part of the success should be attributed to the

Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. We respect

him and we support him. And we certainly support the large measure—large bulk of the reforms that he’s put forward.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I’d just like to say to you

that one of the fundamentals of transformation is that the people

trying to transform an organization, respect the organization, and

that the people running the organization respect the people that

are trying to transform them. And I just want to emphasize that

that’s a wonderful situation that you have right now.

Ambassador BURNS. I think you’re exactly right to say that. You

asked about the Security Council. It’s a very complex, and quite

frankly, a divisive debate right now. Four of our best friends in the

world—Germany, Brazil, Japan, and India—have a proposal that

the four of them should come onto the Security Council as permanent members, and they may, or may not, bring that to a vote in

the General Assembly next week. And we’ve had to, very reluctantly, say that we would vote against that proposal.

And then, lots of other friends of ours—Italy and Argentina and

Pakistan—are in another group saying that they don’t support this

proposal, they support another one. So we’ve taken the tactic of

standing back and saying, ‘‘The Security Council is actually one of

the strongest features of the United Nations. It’s not most badly in

need of reform. What needs reform is the management, budget,

human rights, peacekeeping. And so we prefer to see all of these

reforms pushed forward, and then we’ll be happy to look at Security Council reform.’’

Security Council reform would put a major responsibility on the

Senate, as I said before, would require Senate ratification of the

amended U.N. Charter. And so we don’t take it lightly, and we

think that the 15-member Council has worked rather well. We are

open to expanding it, but we are—ours is for a modest proposal,

not the kind of big bang expansion that the four countries have put

forward that would enlarge the Council to 25 members. We’re wary

of that, because we want the Council to work effectively. We don’t

want to be in a situation where we can’t get the Council to make

decisions. And I would assume that would be the question that the

Senate would ask if we ever did put an amended U.N. Charter up

to you for ratification.

Senator VOINOVICH. The task force came back with the recommendation for a Chief Operating Officer, which is something I

think we need at the Homeland—the Department of Homeland Security, and also the Defense Department to carry on the transformations that’s needed there. Are one of the recommendations

that you’re promoting, having a Chief Operating Officer? And the

point is that Kofi Annan, and the others are so busy with their everyday work that somebody has got to drive the management agenda, the transformation agenda. And you need a very competent person to get the job done. Where are you on that?

65

Ambassador BURNS. Well, we certainly agree with you, Senator,

that there has to be a single person who is focused 100 percent of

the time on the management and on running the organization effectively, and we just nominated Chris Burnham, who had been the

Acting Under Secretary of State for Management, to now be the

full time Under Secretary General of the United Nations for Management. He just took his job 30 days ago. We think he’s off to a

very strong start, and if he can have the agenda for reform placed

on his shoulders we’d have a lot of confidence in the ultimate success of this effort.

Senator VOINOVICH. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have further questions?

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. The other issue is that the task force

recommended an independent oversight board which would function like a corporate audit committee and is that at all in your list

of things that you want to get done?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, it is. We support that. And I told lots

of people at the United Nations yesterday we support it, and, in

fact, the United Nations just announced the appointment of a new

auditor from Sweden, yesterday. And we applauded that, but we

think the Oversight Council is an important new reform. There has

to be an independent objective body looking down, much as our Inspectors General do it in Federal agencies, to make sure that we’re

all doing our job in the way we’re supposed to do our job.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, if you’ll forgive me. One of

the concerns that some people expressed to me because of my opposition to Mr. Bolton going to the United Nations, is that things

would be in limbo at the United Nations while we debated the

issue of whether Mr. Bolton should become our Permanent Representative. And I’d just like to underscore today, publically, that

that hasn’t been the case. That you have moved—and I’m not arguing that you don’t need a permanent representative there. But the

fact of the matter is, that the people of America should know that

this administration is moving forward with great speed to try and

get the reforms that all of us want to see made at the United Nations, and that Under Secretary Burns and I appreciate all of the

time you’ve spent on it. I’ve seen you on C–SPAN and you’re doing

a great job and I think Anne Patterson is doing a wonderful job

there as the Acting Permanent Representative, and I say keep

going and anything we can do to be of help to make this happen

we will, including Mr. Chairman, I think we need to have, maybe,

quarterly hearings on the progress that is being made at the

United Nations. I think part of our problem in Congress has been

that we get energized about a problem and we spend a lot of time

on it, and then we kind of let it go. And the folks that have to do

the job get the impression that maybe we’re not as interested as

we were. And I think if we have a quarterly report back to us

about the progress that’s being made, that may be one of the most

worthwhile things that we can do from an oversight point of view.

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, if I could just—or, Mr. Chairman,

if I could just respond by saying we would be very happy to come

up on whatever schedule you wanted to establish to report to you,

but also to seek your advice.

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And, Senator, your very kind remarks, prompt me to say that the

President and Secretary of State very much support the candidacy

of John Bolton—the nomination of Mr. Bolton to become the Ambassador of the United Nations—and very much hope that that will

be able to take place.

Senator Voinovich. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

Mr. Chairman, the reform of the United Nations is long overdue. I am pleased

that we meet today to discuss this issue, because it is important for our country

and for the viability of an organization that fosters unity and global cooperation.

Only with this kind of cooperation, can we hope to achieve a greater good for future

generations.

In the words of one of America’s most prominent U.N. officials and winner of the

Nobel Peace Prize, Ralph Bunche, the United Nations exists ‘‘not merely to preserve

the peace but also to make change—even radical change—possible without violent

upheaval. The U.N. has no vested interest in the status quo.’’

I am pleased that Kofi Annan himself echoed these words in his own U.N. Report,

‘‘In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the U.N.’’ for these words hold great wisdom.

They underscore the importance of building a United Nations that is willing to

seek radical change—both externally, in addressing its missions throughout the

world, and internally, within its own walls, its own budget, its staff, and even its

leadership.

Mr. Chairman, many of my colleagues share the view that the opportunity to

make radical change is before us now. The opportunity to strengthen the viability,

effectiveness, and credibility of the United Nations is here—and it is up to our Nation to advance this objective with a defining purpose, a clear strategy, a true commitment, and a careful diplomatic hand.

I want to commend the U.N. Task Force and the esteemed members of our panel

for what is a truly excellent report on the steps that are needed to achieve this goal

and make the United Nations a stronger, more viable institution.

I want to commend the State Department, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Nick Burns, Ms. Anne Patterson, and the other State Department staff that is currently working at the United Nations to progress this critical task.

With this excellent report and by working together, we can make the United Nations a better institution—one that will not turn away from looming threats, restrained by the shackles of its own bureaucracy, but will face security resolution violations, head on. Face human rights violations, head on. And promote freedom and

peace throughout the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. Let

me just comment that the legislation that you have just cosponsored provides that an annual report be made on reform. And the

Senator suggested quarterly. Maybe that would be more appropriate, to ensure that this reform business is proceeding rapidly. So

the Chair will take that under advisement. You have volunteered

to come when these occur. In your testimony you said the administration supports many other provisions of the Coleman-Lugar bill.

Are there provisions you do not support? I give you an opportunity

to indicate what the problems are that may still be there.

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, I have been able to discuss that bill

with you as well as Senator Coleman, and I can assure you that

we—many might be referring to 98, 99 percent. What happens to

the congressional testimony of someone like me, is it goes through

the clearance process, and that word ‘‘many’’ came back from one

of our fraternal agencies. And—but if I had to testify—I am—if I

had to just, kind of, rate the percentage of reforms with which we

agree, it would be a very high percentage in the high 90s. And

we’re very grateful for what you’ve done.

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The CHAIRMAN. I like the 98, 99, verging on there. And let me

say, I appreciate that point. The reason I was so precise in my previous questioning, however, is that after these statements are vetted through several screens, we will be left with whatever is there,

what with people parsing carefully through. The fact is that these

are serious issues. We take them as seriously as you do. And, obviously, I commend the administration’s efforts. Senator Voinovich, I

think, has stated it well, that the movement toward reform has

been proceeding vigorously. You have illustrated that today, and

with the appointment of Mr. Burnham. Through his public statements, there has been public evidence of that, even from the New

York scene.

So we’re hopeful of a serious legislative effort here. This is why

we probably need to get together to refine out what is the vehicle

that we want, so that this will not be left in limbo. But that may

require some more meetings and some more testimony. We thank

you very much for your thoughtfulness and the time you have expended today. It has been worthwhile for all of us. Having so said,

the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

AN EXAMPLE OF A U.N. REFORM SCORECARD

Implementing policy effectively is ultimately as important as making the right

policy. The American people have every right to expect results from our efforts to

reform the U.N., not excuses.

One proposal by which the Congress can meet the rightful expectations of the

American people is to pass legislation that requires an annual review by the executive branch that evaluates the progress of U.N. reform against a set of performance

measures. Guided by such a set of performance measures, the Congress could hold

hearings every June or July to review the U.N. reform progress report prepared by

the executive branch that identified the progress to date. That report could then become the basis for an annual discussion on U.N. reform at each summer’s meeting

of the G–8, and then later at each September’s meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. Following the annual hearings on U.N. reform, the Congress could adopt

amendments to the score card legislation based on progress so that standards for

the following year could be set forth. In this manner, Congress could develop a continuous practice of monitoring U.N. reform.

Unless the Congress and the executive branch plan back from the desired future,

it will be impossible to distinguish between activity and progress toward U.N. reform. In Washington far too much time is spent on today’s headline and today’s

press conference and not nearly enough time is spent preparing for tomorrow’s

achievement.

While the task force report sets forth a number of reform recommendations, it

does not provide a set of performance measures. Defining the right set of performance measures that will be evaluated annually in a public report will be critical to

directing the energies of the Congress and the executive branch to achieve U.N. reform.

Listed below by number are the task force recommendations, followed by a proposed set of performance measures listed by letter in italics. The list of performance

measures is intended to illustrate some types of performance measures the Congress

could adopt; it is by no means intended to be an exhaustive list. There are surely

several more inventive measures that this Congress could design for the task force

recommendations, in addition to performance measures for other reform requirements that the Congress may adopt. The consensus recommendations of the task

force should be considered as a minimum set of U.N. reform requirements to which

the Congress is likely to add.

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TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSED PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Saving Lives, Safeguarding Human Rights, Ending Genocide

I. DARFUR, SUDAN

1. Assemble a U.S. coordinated package of assistance for the African Union (AU) deployment in Darfur.

a. Has an assistance package been defined by the executive branch?

b. Has the U.S. share of the assistance package been appropriated and authorized

by the Congress?

c. Have U.S. NATO allies committed to making proportional contributions to such

an assistance package?

d. Have U.N. Security Council members committed to making proportional contributions to such an assistance package?

e. Is the total funding amount adequate to meet the need and the objectives set

forth by the executive branch?

f. Are administrative costs exceeding 15 percent of the appropriated funding?

2. The U.S. Government should make clear that the responsibility for the genocide

in Darfur rests with the government in Khartoum.

a. Has a demarche been issued by the State Department?

b. Has this message been given by the U.S. Mission to the U.N., either via the General Assembly or the Security Council?

c. Has the executive branch made this clear in public pronouncements?

3. The United States should welcome the role of the African Union in Darfur and

assist in its development as an effective regional organization that can play a growing role in dealing with crises on the African Continent.

a. Has the Department of State made this clear in public pronouncements?

b. Is the U.S. military providing training and assistance to the African Union?

4. The United States should make every effort to enhance AU capabilities in two

main areas: (a) Ensuring that it is adequate to the task of providing security in

Darfur and protecting civilians, and (b) building on AU capabilities going forward.

a. Has funding for a Darfur assistance package been appropriated and authorized

by the Congress?

b. Has the U.S. military established a permanent training and assistance program

for the African Union?

c. Is there a periodic performance review to ensure training and assistance is enhancing long-term African Union capabilities?

5. At the U.N. Security Council, the United States should pursue a mandate for the

AU-led force that provides for the protection of civilians and authorizes the deployment of a sufficiently large military force to achieve that end.

a. Has the U.S. introduced such a mandate in the Security Council?

b. Has the U.S. demanded a Security Council vote for this mandate?

c. Has the Security Council approved the mandate?

6. The United States should assist in establishment of a ‘‘no-fly’’ zone over Darfur.

a. Has the executive branch adopted a no-fly zone policy?

b. Is the U.S. Air Force participating in the enforcement of a no-fly zone?

c. Are U.S. NATO allies participating in the enforcement of a no-fly zone?

d. Has the Sudanese air force been destroyed?

e. Have portions of the Sudanese air force, namely helicopters, been destroyed?

7. The United States should assist in increasing the number of troops in the AU

mission.

a. Has the Congress authorized funding to assist AU countries in providing a

larger number of troops?

b. Have the number of troops in the AU mission increased in the last year?

8. The U.S. Government should embrace the short-term strategic goal in Darfur of

ending the ability of the militias to control the countryside so that security is adequate for civilians to return from refugee and IDP (internally displaced persons)

camps to their villages and resume everyday life.

a. How many civilians have returned home from refugee and IDP camps?

9. Perpetrators must be held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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a. How many individuals have been prosecuted for war crimes and/or crimes

against humanity out of the total number of individuals who have been indicted

for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity?

b. What is the conviction rate?

c. What is the number of ongoing investigations of war crimes and crimes against

humanity?

10. Press neighboring governments to cooperate with efforts to stop the killing in

Darfur and not to interfere with international efforts under threat of sanction.

a. Has the Department of State made this clear in public pronouncements?

11. Encourage the pursuit of a general peace agreement in Western Sudan/Darfur.

a. Has the Department of State made this a priority, as evidenced by the amount

of diplomatic activity to achieve this end and the frequency of public pronouncements on this subject by the State Department?

12. Support and encourage democratic reform in Sudan.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The United Nations and member states should agree that the most pressing

human rights task today is the monitoring, promotion, and enforcement of human

rights and, in particular, the stopping of genocide and mass killing.

a. Has the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution to this effect?

2. The U.N. Human Rights Commission should be abolished.

a. Has the U.N. undertaken all that is required to abolish the U.N. Human Rights

Commission?

3. A Human Rights Council ideally composed of democracies and dedicated to monitoring, promoting, and enforcing human rights should be created. The council should

coordinate its work with the Democracy Caucus and the U.N. Democracy Fund.

a. Has a Human Rights Council been created?

b. Is there a democratic precondition for membership?

c. Are there safeguards to prevent a country that violates human rights from becoming a member of the Human Rights Council?

d. How many countries on the Human Rights Council are generally considered

human rights violators or are under investigation for violating human rights?

e. If there are undemocratic members of the Human Rights Council, do the democracies substantially outnumber the undemocratic members?

4. The U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations should include an official of

ambassador rank whose responsibility will be to promote the efficacy of the Democracy Caucus within the United Nations and to promote the extension of democratic

rights more broadly among member states.

a. Has the U.S. established this position with this portfolio?

5. The U.S. Government should support authority for the High Commissioner for

Human Rights to appoint an advisory council to exchange information, develop best

practices, promote human rights, and publicize offenses.

a. Has the Security Council adopted a resolution to provide this authority?

6. The U.S. Government should support the work of national and regional courts,

as well as tribunals authored by the Security Council, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions, in identifying those responsible for mass atrocities and prosecuting, and punishing them as appropriate.

a. Has the executive branch provided the necessary policy guidance to make this

a priority?

III. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT YOUR OWN CITIZENS

1. The U.S. Government should affirm that every sovereign government has a ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ its citizens and those within its jurisdiction from genocide,

mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations.

a. Has the Department of State articulated this policy in public pronouncements?

b. Has the U.S. Mission to the U.N. communicated this formally in the General

Assembly and the Security Council?

2. The United States should endorse and call on the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly to affirm a responsibility of every sovereign government to protect its

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own citizens and those within its borders from genocide, mass killing, and massive

and sustained human rights violations.

a. Has the U.S. Congress passed a resolution supporting this?

b. Has the executive branch affirmed this responsibility in its public pronouncements?

c. Has the U.S. Mission to the U.N. communicated this formally in the General

Assembly and the Security Council?

d. Has the Security Council approved such a resolution?

e. Has the General Assembly approved such a resolution?

3. Future Presidents should affirm the ‘‘Not on my watch’’ pledge, articulated by

President Bush in a notation on a document describing the horror of the Rwanda

genocide.

a. Has the U.S. President affirmed the pledge publicly or in policy documents such

as National Security Strategy or Presidential Decision Papers?

4. The urgent task required of all United Nation member states, which the United

States should lead, is to determine available capabilities and coordinate them so

they can be brought rapidly to the fore in a crisis.

a. Has the executive branch assigned this responsibility?

b. Has the executive branch department responsible for this coordination prepared

the document that defines and articulates available capabilities to support a crisis?

5. The United States should be prepared to lead the Security Council in finding the

most effective action across the full range of legal, economic, political, and military

tools.

6. The United States should take the lead in assisting the United Nations and other

institutions in identifying potential assets and creating or improving mechanisms

for coordination.

7. The United States must insist that in cases in which the Security Council is unable to take effective action in response to massive human rights abuses and/or

genocide, regional organizations and member states may act where their action is

demonstrably for humanitarian purposes.

8. Support inclusion of language in all Chapter VII Security Council resolutions calling on member states, regional organizations, and any other parties to voluntarily

assess the relevant capabilities they can contribute to enforcement of the resolutions.

a. Do Chapter VII Security Council resolutions contain this language?

9. Undertake a review of assistance programs to assess what bilateral action the

United States can take that will enhance the capabilities of regional and other international organizations to prevent or halt genocide, mass killings, and massive and

sustained human rights violations.

a. Has the executive branch undertaken such a review and issued a public report

on its findings?

10. The U.S. Government should reiterate that punishing offenders is no substitute

for timely intervention to prevent their crimes and protect their potential victims.

a. Has the Department of State made this clear in public pronouncements?

b. Has this been formally communicated in the U.N. in the General Assembly and/

or the Security Council by the U.S. Mission to the U.N.?

IV. RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

1. The United Nations must create a rapid reaction capability among U.N. member

states that can identify and act on threats before they fully develop. The task force,

however, opposes the establishment of a standing U.N. military force.

a. Has a plan for a rapid reaction capability been developed?

b. Has the plan been implemented?

c. Are member states providing promised material support, i.e., troops, strategic

airlift, etc., to make a rapid, reaction capability viable?

2. The United States should support the principle that those nations closest to a

crisis have a special regional responsibility to do what they can to ameliorate the

crisis.

a. Has the State Department made this clear in public pronouncements?

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b. Has this been formally communicated in the General Assembly and/or the Security Council?

3. The United States should also provide assistance aimed at the development of

regional capacity in advance of a crisis.

a. Is the U.S. military expanding the advice and training missions to likely crises

regions?

4. Support discretionary authority of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

(HCHR) and the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) to report

directly to the Security Council.

a. Has the U.S. Mission to the U.N. formally communicated this support in the

General Assembly and/or Security Council?

b. Has a U.N. resolution or rule been adopted to provide this authority?

5. Ensure that the office of the HCHR and SAPG have adequate resources to rapidly

investigate at the first indication of trouble.

a. Has a U.S. Government official been assigned this responsibility?

b. Are annual increases to their funding levels adequate?

6. Support linkage of early information on potential genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human rights violations situations to early preventive action.

a. Have appropriate ‘‘tripwires’’ been defined?

b. Have the ‘‘tripwires’’ been approved by the Security Council?

In Need of Repair: Reforming the United Nations

I. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United Nations, most importantly, needs to create an Independent Oversight

Board (IOB) that would function in a manner similar to a corporate independent

audit committee. The IOB would receive Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS) reports

and, in consultation with the Board of Auditors and Secretariat management, would

have the authority to fix the budget and approve and direct the assignments of the

OIOS and of the Board of External Auditors just as an independent audit committee

in the United States has such authority with respect to both the internal and external auditor. The OIOS budget must be set by an Independent Oversight Board and

submitted to the General Assembly budget committee in a separate track outside

the regular budget.

a. Has the U.N. created an IOB?

2. The United Nations must provide both the resources and the authority to OIOS

to provide appropriate oversight to every activity that is managed by U.N. personnel

whether or not that activity is funded by the assessments of the General Assembly

or by voluntary contributions.

a. Is there adequate funding for OIOS?

b. Are annual funding raises adequate?

c. Does the OIOS have the authority to investigate as necessary?

3. Oversight reports must be accessible to member states under guidelines that facilitate transparency and meet, at a minimum, the freedom of information flow between U.S. investigative agencies and the Congress.

4. The U.N. Secretariat needs to have a single, very senior official in charge of daily

operations and filling the role of chief operating officer (COO).

a. Has a position been created or assigned this authority and responsibility?

b. Has a qualified individual been hired for this position?

5. The United States should insist on management capability as a fundamental criterion for the selection of the next U.N. Secretary General.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

General Assembly or the Security Council?

6. The United Nations needs to develop a far more robust policy for whistleblower

protection and information disclosure.

a. Do U.N. standards meet U.S. standards?

II. BUDGET AND PROGRAMMING

1. The ‘‘5.6 Rule,’’ which requires the Secretariat to identify low-priority activities

in the budget proposal, should be enforced and bolstered by an additional requireVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ment that managers identify the lowest priority activities equivalent to 15 percent

of their budget request or face an across-the-board reduction of that amount. The

identification of 15 percent of the budget as low priority should not necessarily be

interpreted as a list for elimination, but as information on what programs could be

reduced in favor of higher priority mandates.

a. Is the ‘‘5.6 Rule’’ being followed?

b. Is the list of low-priority budget items available to member nations?

c. Has the 15 percent requirement and consequence been formally adopted?

2. The Secretariat’s leadership must demand that managers define and attempt to

achieve specific outcomes. Future budgets should be tied to whether those results

are achieved. The OIOS should be tasked with a larger monitoring/evaluation role

to evaluate the degree to which programs are achieving their targeted results.

a. Are managers required to provide annual goals?

b. Are these goals measurable and related to effectiveness of the program?

c. Are managers required to provide periodic updates on the status of achieving

those goals?

3. The United States should support the Secretary General’s plan, described in his

March 21 report, to establish a Management Performance Board ‘‘to ensure that

senior officials are held accountable for their actions and the results their units

achieve.’’

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

General Assembly or the Security Council?

b. Has it been implemented?

4. The United States should insist upon both of the Secretary General’s sunsetting

proposals: The 1997 proposal to include sunset clauses for all major new mandates,

and the proposal in the March 21 report this year to review all mandates dating

back 5 years or more. Every mandate and program should have a sunset clause to

ensure that it is regularly evaluated and continues to perform a necessary function.

The sunset clauses should assume that programs will be shut down unless the General Assembly’s budget committee confirms by consensus that they should continue

based on a publicly available analysis identifying the program’s purpose, budget,

and ongoing relevance.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

General Assembly or the Security Council?

b. What percentage of mandates over five years old have not been reviewed?

c. What percentage of new mandates does not include a sunset clause?

d. What percentage of total mandates include a sunset clause?

e. How many programs have been ended?

5. The United States should insist that the United Nations publish annually a list

of all subsidiary bodies and their functions, budgets, and staff. Their budgets should

be subject to the same sunset provisions that apply to other U.N. programs and activities. The United Nations should also publish budget information in a manner

that lays out multiyear expenditures by program and identifies the source of funds

as assessed or voluntary (including the source country) and includes in-kind contributions.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

General Assembly or the Security Council?

b. Is an annual list of subsidiary bodies, functions, budgets, and staffs available?

c. What percentage of them is subject to a 5-year review?

d. Is multiyear budget information available?

e. Are in-kind and voluntary contributions reported and identified by source in

multiyear budgets?

6. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should annually report to

Congress on all U.S. contributions, both assessed and voluntary, to the United Nations.

a. Is the report conducted and available in the public domain?

7. The United States should work with a representative group of member states to

explore ways of giving larger contributors a greater say in votes on budgetary matters without disenfranchising smaller contributors. The consensus-based budget

process has proved effective at reining in increases in the U.N. budget but not at

setting priorities or cutting many obsolete items.

a. Have meetings discussing this occurred in the last year?

b. What changes have been enacted?

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c. Do the major donors have weighted voting?

8. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should become a more independent program with distinct rules and regulations appropriate for its operational

responsibility for comprehensive peacekeeping missions. Its responsibilities must include coordination with broader reconstruction and development activities of the

United Nations.

a. Is coordination between the DPKO and broader reconstruction and development

activities of the United Nations actually occurring?

b. What changes have been adopted?

c. Is DPKO more independent?

d. Has it adopted stronger codes of ethics and conduct?

III. PERSONNEL

1. The United States should insist on the Secretary General’s call in his March 21

report for a one-time severance program to remove unwanted, or unneeded, staff,

and should monitor that program closely to ensure it is designed to remove the staff

who ought to be removed.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

General Assembly or the Security Council?

b. What percentage of staff is being given severance?

c. Has the severance been conducted through the existing budget?

2. The United Nations should not offer permanent contracts to any new employees.

The identification of redundant staff, along with other relevant recommendations in

this report, should apply fully to the U.N.’s nearly 5,000 contractors and consultants.

a. What percentage of contracts is permanent?

3. The U.N.’s hiring practice must reflect the emphasis on competence laid out in

the charter, with geographical considerations taken into account only after the competence test is met.

a. What percentage of personnel has been hired based on a competency test?

b. Has there actually been a change in geographical representation?

4. The United States should insist that the United Nations install a more empowered and disciplined Human Resources Department that employs all the techniques

of modern personnel policies.

a. Has such a system been adopted?

5. The United States should support granting U.N. managers the authority to assign

employees where they can be best used and amending job placement policies to permit promotional opportunities.

a. Has the General Assembly granted the Secretary General this authority?

6. The United Nations should more systematically take advantage of secondments

of personnel from member states on a pro bono basis for specified periods or tasks.

a. In the last year, how many personnel were on a pro bono basis for specified periods or tasks?

b. Is this number increasing, decreasing, or holding constant?

7. The General Assembly must fully implement its new requirement that candidates

for positions on the U.N. Administrative Tribunal must possess appropriate qualifications before being approved.

a. What percentage of personnel on the U.N. Administrative Tribunal has appropriate qualifications?

8. In criminal cases involving U.N. personnel, immunity should be waived unless

the Legal Adviser to the Secretary General determines that justice is unlikely to be

served in the country at issue. The Legal Adviser’s report should be made available

to the proposed Independent Oversight Board to ensure accountability to an independent body. Efforts must be made to find an appropriate jurisdiction elsewhere.

a. What percentage of criminal cases involving the U.N. is immunity not waived?

b. For each of the above cases, is the Legal Advisor’s report available to the Independent Oversight Board or member states if IOB is not yet in place?

c. What was the number of cases where another jurisdiction was used?

9. Legal fees for accused staff should only be reimbursed if the accused staff is

cleared by appropriate legal processes.

a. What number of accused staff had legal fees reimbursed?

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b. How many of those were found guilty?

10. A new standard of personnel ethics must be developed and advertised within

the United Nations. Disclosure forms must be mandatory at the P–5 level and

above. Failure to disclose must be sanctioned, and sanctions dearly laid out. An Office of Personnel Ethics should be established within the Secretariat but accountable

to the IOB to serve as a repository for disclosure documents. These documents must

be made available to member states upon request.

a. Has the Office of Personnel Ethics been established?

b. Are disclosure documents mandatory, verifiable, and available on request to

member states?

11. The United Nations must meet the highest standards of information disclosure.

The United States should carefully monitor the Secretariat’s current efforts to develop a comprehensive information disclosure policy.

a. Do the U.N. information disclosure rules meet U.S. standards?

12. 1f the United Nations is again called upon to administer a large-scale sanctions

regime, it should set up an effective and separate management structure, with serious audit capacity, to do so.

13. The United States should work with other member states to identify which of

the operational programs now receiving funds from the assessed budget should be

funded entirely by voluntary contributions.

a. Has an entity been identified to conduct this study?

b. How many programs have been shifted to voluntary funding?

14. The General Assembly’s committee structure should be revised to increase its

effectiveness and to reflect the substantive priorities of the United Nations, as identified in other parts of the task force report. Bearing in mind the recommendations

of this report, the United States should review the mandates and performance of

the committees with a view to identifying areas of duplication between the committees and other bodies, programs, and mandates in the U.N. system.

a. Has an entity been identified to conduct this study?

b. Is the number of committees smaller or larger?

c. How many committees have been eliminated?

Deterring Death and Destruction: Catastrophic Terrorism and Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

I. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

1. P–5 members should consult regularly on proliferation and terrorism issues. Frequent substantive contacts will not guarantee unanimity, but they could promote

greater convergence in perceptions of the threat and facilitate more constructive engagement when difficult issues are brought before the Council.

a. Are P–5 members regularly meeting?

2. The Council as a whole should also meet regularly on proliferation and terrorism

issues. It should receive closed-door briefings three or four times a year by the Directors General of the IAEA and OPCW, the chairs of the CTC and 1540 Committee,

and other senior officials from relevant U.N. organizations.

a. Is the Council meeting on proliferation and terrorism issues?

b. Is the Council receiving quarterly briefings from IAEA and OPCW, the chairs

of the CTC and 1540 Committee, and other relevant U.N. organizations?

3. The United States and other Security Council members should urge the 1540

Committee to move aggressively in encouraging U.N. members to put in place the

laws and control measures required by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540.

a. Has the U.S. Mission made this clear to the 1540 Committee and in public pronouncements?

4. The United States should press within the Council for improving the effectiveness

of the UNSCR 1373’s Counterterrorism Committee.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council?

5. The United States should promote the ‘‘naming of names’’ that is, the United

States should push the Security Council to have the 1373 Committee publicly list

state sponsors of terrorism.

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a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission in the Security Council?

b. Has the 1373 Committee publicly listed state sponsors of terrorism?

6. The United States should take the lead in the Council to rationalize the work

of the three Security Council committees responsible for terrorism and proliferation

under three separate resolutions (1267, 1373, and 1540).

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council?

b. Has the Security Council rationalized the work of these committees to the satisfaction of the State Department?

c. Are there still overlaps and areas of missed responsibility for these committees?

7. The United States should also take the lead in the Council on steps to strengthen

international verification such as it is in the nonproliferation fields. If the IAEA or

OPCW Technical Secretariat, respectively, is unable with existing authorities to resolve whether a particular country is in compliance, the Council will meet immediately with a view to providing authorization, under Chapter VII, to utilize much

more extensive, supplementary verification methods (e.g., comparable to those authorized for use in Iraq by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441).

8. The Council should also strengthen the U.N. Secretary General’s existing authority to initiate field investigations of alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol or the

Biological Weapons Convention by making it mandatory for states to grant prompt

access and provide full cooperation.

9. To carry out the more robust supplementary verification activities in the nuclear

and chemical fields that may be authorized by the Security Council, the IAEA and

OPCW should be prepared to make available, on short notice, inspectors who are

specially trained in more rigorous verification methods. In the biological weapons

area, where no comparable verification organization exists, the Council should establish and train a roster of specialists who would be available immediately in the

event that the Council Secratary General (under his authority to initiate nor CW

or BW investigations) activated them.

a. Has a roster of biological specialists been established?

10. The U.S. should support a Council instruction to UNMOVIC and the IAEA to

document and archive information on the investigation of Iraqi WMD programs

begun in 1991, with a mandate to complete the task within 6 months.

a. Has such a Council instruction been issued?

b. Have member states received legal advice on the Convention for the Suppression

of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism?

11. On the critical subject of the nuclear fuel cycle and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States should continue to promote the Bush administration’s

initiative to prevent the acquisition of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities by additional countries.

a. Has this been vigorously promoted by the Department of State?

12. The United States should encourage the Council to strengthen legal authorities

to interdict illicit WMD-related shipments and disrupt illicit WMD-related networks.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council?

13. The United States should urge Council action to discourage and impede unjustified use of the NPT’s withdrawal provision, which allows a party to leave the treaty

after 90 days if it asserts that remaining in the treaty would jeopardize its supreme

interests.

[Note: This may be applicable only when a nation attempts to withdraw from the

NPT.]

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council?

b. Has the Security Council taken action to discourage this behavior?

14. The Council should develop a menu of penalties that would be available for future Council consideration in individual cases of violations.

a. Has the Security Council developed a menu of such penalties?

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II. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. The General Assembly should move expeditiously to adopt a definition of terrorism along the lines recommended by the High-Level Panel and endorsed by the

Secretary General. On the basis of that definition, the Assembly should proceed as

soon as possible to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism. The definition of terrorism should cover the actions of individuals or irregular organizations,

rather than armies since the latter are bound by the rules of war and need not be

covered by additional language prohibiting terrorism. Although international consensus on the basis of the formulation contained in the High-Level Panel would be

a major step forward, the definition of terrorism should ideally also cover acts of

violence against noncombatant military units—for example, those deployed to a

given country as part of a U.N.-authorized peacekeeping force or those present on

foreign soil only to provide training or receive logistics support.

a. Has the General Assembly adopted a comprehensive definition of terrorism acceptable to the United States?

2. The Terrorism Prevention Branch of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC) should be encouraged to intensify its efforts to promote wide adherence

to the international conventions on terrorism, especially the new Convention for the

Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and to provide member states legal advice

on domestic implementing legislation necessary to make those conventions effective.

a. Have member states received legal advice on the Convention for the Suppression

of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism?

III. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

1. The United States should continue pressing for establishment of a committee of

the IAEA Board to review the Agency’s role in monitoring and promoting compliance

with nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

a. Has a committee of the IAEA Board actually been established?

b. Have the results of the review been published?

2. The IAEA and its Board should strongly promote universal ratification and rigorous enforcement of the Additional Protocol. Nuclear Suppliers Group members can

assist in this effort by adopting a guideline that makes adherence to the Additional

Protocol by recipient states a condition for nuclear cooperation.

a. Has the IAEA and its board issued a statement on universal ratification and

enforcement of the Additional Protocol?

b. Has such a guideline been established by the Nuclear Suppliers Group?

3. IAEA Board members should urge that the Agency’s relatively new function of

investigating nuclear trafficking networks be expanded.

a. Has the IAEA Board issued a statement on expanding its role in investigating

nuclear trafficking networks?

4. The United States and other Board members must strongly encourage the IAEA

to assign higher priority to nuclear security.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council, the General Assembly, or directly to the IAEA?

b. Have any other board members taken similar action?

5. The IAEA and its Board should examine means of assuring countries that renounce the right to possess their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that

they will have reliable access to nuclear reactor fuel supplies.

a. Has the IAEA undertaken such a study?

b. Has the IAEA communicated the results to member states?

IV. ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OPCW)

1. The missions of OPCW and its Technical Secretariat should be adjusted to deal

more heavily with the nonstate actor chemical weapons threat.

a. Have the missions been so adjusted?

2. OPCW should become a partner of the 1540 Committee to help it implement U.N.

Security Council Resolution 1540’s requirements in the chemical area as in the case

of the IAEA for nuclear issues, including taking the lead in assisting in establishing

international standards for legislation criminalizing CW-related activities by

nonstate actors. It should assist the committee in the area of physical protection,

assessing the adequacy of security and accountancy measures at declared chemical

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weapons storage depots and developing international standards for protecting chemical industry plants against theft or sabotage. With respect to the reports countries

are called upon to submit under 1540, the OPCW would assist in evaluating performance, suggesting improvements, and coordinating assistance efforts.

a. Has the OPCW provided assistance in evaluating 1540 mandated reports?

b. Has the OPCW made suggestions and coordinated assistance to member states

based on its evaluation of 1540 reports?

3. The United States and other CWC parties should request OPCW’s Technical Secretariat to examine the potential for state and nonstate actors to use new technologies, such as microreactors and novel chemical agents, for CW purposes and

make recommendations on whether and how the CWC regime can be modified to

keep up with the evolving CW proliferation threat.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council, the General Assembly, directly to the OPCW, or directly to the

OPCW’s Technical Secretariat?

b. Have other CWC parties taken similar action?

c. Has the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat undertaken such a study?

d. Has the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat made recommendations based on the

study?

e. Have those recommendations been acted on?

V. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

1. While the WHO should strengthen its existing public health capabilities that are

also relevant to reducing the biowarfare threat, consideration should urgently be

given to establishing a new U.N. organization responsible for dealing with biological

weapons issues.

a. Has a study on establishing a new U.N. organization for dealing with biological

weapons been completed?

b. Has the WHO increased existing public health capabilities that are relevant to

biowarfare?

2. WHO should undertake a major upgrading of its global disease surveillance and

response network. The United States should be prepared to take the lead in persuading other donor governments to commit the additional resources required. Informal arrangements should be worked out so that, in the event of a suspicious disease

outbreak that seemed to be the result of intentional BW use, WHO could immediately notify the new U.N. biological warfare organization and the U.N. Secretary

General, who would be in a position to dispatch biowarfare experts to assist WHO

in its investigation.

a. Has WHO upgraded its global disease surveillance and response network?

3. The new U.N. organization responsible for countering the biowarfare threat would

work with the 1540 Committee and relevant international health organizations, including WHO, to develop common international biosecurity standards, both with respect to ensuring that only bona fide scientists have access to dangerous pathogens

and ensuring that facilities engaged in legitimate research with dangerous pathogens have adequate physical security measures in place.

a. Have common international biosecurity standards been established?

b. Do only bona fide scientists have access to dangerous pathogens?

c. Do dangerous pathogens have adequate physical security measures?

4. The new biowarfare organization should also work with the WHO and other

international scientific organizations to develop international guidelines or standards for reviewing, approving, and monitoring dual use bioscientific research

projects, particularly in the area of genetic engineering, that could produce results

that could be applied by states or terrorist groups to offensive BW purposes.

a. Do international guidelines exist for reviewing, approving, and monitoring dualuse bioscientific research projects?

VI. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

1. The CD has outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded. Instead of having

a single multilateral negotiating body take its place, the Security Council should,

as the need arises, set up ad hoc bodies of manageable size to take on discrete, narrowly defined tasks, such as negotiating a treaty banning further production of

fissile materials or developing common international standards for biosecurity.

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War and Peace: Preventing and Ending Conflicts

I. U.N. PEACEKEEPING: DOCTRINE, PLANNING, AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

1. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should develop doctrine that recognizes the need for capable forces in the new security environments in which peacekeepers are mandated by the Security Council to operate, and the United States

should press for member state acceptance of these new realities and their resource

implications.

a. Has the Department of Peacekeeping Operations developed the doctrine?

b. Has the U.S. military provided advice in the development of this doctrine?

2. More broadly, the United Nations should develop doctrine and strategy for multidimensional peace operations that thoroughly integrate the security dimension with

economic and political development requirements. Prior to deployments, a strategic

assessment of the crisis situation should be made to determine the full range of

measures necessary to effectively address the causes of the crisis. Strategic mission

plans should precede deployments, and should be drafted by senior-level mission

strategy groups brought together prior to missions.

[Note: This may only be applicable as future peacekeeping operations evolve.]

a. Has the U.N. developed a multidimensional strategy for peace operations?

b. Does a strategic mission plan exist for each peacekeeping operation?

c. Was this plan drafted by senior-level mission strategy groups prior to executing

the peacekeeping mission?

II. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE

1. The United Nations must quickly implement a policy of zero tolerance of sexual

exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. The United States should strongly support

implementation of reform measures designed to ensure uniform standards for all civilian and military participants in peace operations; training programs relating to

sexual exploitation and abuse; increased deployment of women in peacekeeping operations; deployment of established (rather than ‘‘patched together’’) units to peacekeeping operations; accountability of senior managers; effective data collection and

management; victim’s assistance; staffing increases to enhance supervision; and organized recreational activities for peacekeepers.

a. Is there a policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation?

b. Are there training programs for U.N. civilians and military?

c. Are established units deploying to support U.N. operations?

d. Is there a victim’s assistance program?

e. Is data being collected?

f. Are recreational activities being provided for peacekeepers?

2. While these measures have recently been endorsed by member states, the United

States should urge generous budgetary support for these initiatives, and should also

press for independent investigative capacity.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council or General Assembly?

b. Is there an independent investigative capacity?

3. The United States should seek to ensure effective programs of assistance for victims who make substantial claims, even when neither the victim nor the United Nations is able to obtain redress from the perpetrator of the abuse.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council or General Assembly?

4. States that prove unwilling or unable to ensure discipline among their troops

should not be permitted to provide troops to peacekeeping missions.

a. Has a U.N. resolution or rule change implementing this policy been adopted?

III. RAPID DEPLOYMENT

1. While the task force does not endorse a standing U.N. military force, member

states must increase substantially the availability of capable, designated forces,

properly trained and equipped, for rapid deployment to peace operations on a voluntary basis. The Secretariat should enhance its capacity to coordinate increases in

member state contributions to the Stand-by Arrangements system.

2. The United States should sustain and strengthen its support for regional peacekeeping capacity building, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

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3. The Department of Defense should prepare policy options for U.S. support of capacity enhancements and for U.S. engagement in peace operations consistent with

U.S. national interests.

a. Has the DOD prepared policy options to support capacity enhancements and for

U.S. engagement in peace operations?

IV. THE U.N. ROLE AND CAPACITY IN CONFLICT MEDIATION AND PEACEBUILDING

1. To enhance support for U.N. efforts at conflict mediation and negotiation, the

United States should support an increase in resources for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), following an independent study providing a strategy for enhancing DPA capacity and improving coordination with DPKO.

a. Has an independent study of the DPA and DPKO been conducted?

b. Have the results been provided to the member states?

c. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council or General Assembly?

2. To enhance support for postconflict peacebuilding activities, the United States

should support the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Support Office, and a voluntary peacebuilding support fund.

a. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council or General Assembly?

b. Has a Peacebuilding Commission been created?

c. Has a Peacebuilding Support Office been created?

d. Has a voluntary peacebuilding support fund been established?

3. The United States should also encourage member governments with expertise in

peacebuilding activities, such as those related to rule of law, to play lead nation

roles on these issues in particular peace operations.

a. Has the U.S. Congress passed a resolution communicating this?

b. Has this been formally communicated by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in the

Security Council, General Assembly, or directly to relevant members?

4. The task force supports an increase in funding for the peace operation-related activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the U.N.’s

Electoral Assistance Division.

a. Has funding increased for the peacekeeping activities of the Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights and the U.N.’s Electoral Assistance Division?

V. U.S. CAPACITY IN CIVILIAN POSTCONFLICT STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. To enhance U.S. ability to support postconflict reconstruction and to coordinate

its efforts with the United Nations and other governments, the United States should

strengthen the new State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction

and Stabilization, and Congress should provide it with resources necessary (and requested by the administration) to play its coordination role.

VI. SANCTIONS

1. Sanctions must be part of an overall strategy that integrates diplomacy and coercion in an informed and effective manner, and must be carefully targeted to avoid

unintentional impacts, punish perpetrators of abuses and illegality, and create incentives for change. Member states and the Secretariat must develop dedicated capacities for sanctions analysis, implementation, and enforcement.

a. Does the U.S. have dedicated capacities for sanctions analysis, implementation,

and enforcement?

b. Do other member states?

c. Does the Secretariat have a dedicated capability for sanctions analysis, implementation, and enforcement?

Helping People and Nations: Development and Humanitarian Assistance

I. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The U.S. Department of State should be the policy leader for development and

humanitarian assistance issues, especially with respect to coordinating U.S. Government support to multilateral organizations.

2. Enhance the predictability and coherence of U.S. support of U.N. assistance.

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3. Place greater emphasis on external evaluation of U.N. development and humanitarian programs.

II. REDUCING POVERTY

1. Push the United Nations to balance the interest in poverty reduction with an interest in governance and economic growth.

2. The U.S. Department of State’s new office for the Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should establish a collaborative relationship with the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission, if such a new body is created as part

of U.N. reform.

[Note: This action requires that a U.N. Peacebuilding Commission be established.]

3. Reorient the mission and activities of the Economic and Social Council

(ECOSOC), giving it a clearly focused mission.

4. ECOSOC should eliminate the practice of secret voting by members, and the Department for Economic and Social Affairs should be streamlined.

a. Does ECOSOC continue secret votes?

b. Is the Department for Economic and Social Affairs more streamlined then before?

III. CONTAINING DISEASE

1. Strengthen the U.N. relationship with the World Bank.

a. Are regular meetings taking place between World Bank and U.N. representatives?

b. Are the World Bank and U.N. publishing coordinated documents, plans, and

policies?

2. Connect the U.N. Development Group (UNDG) with the equivalent executive bodies dealing with humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

a. Are the representatives from the U.N. Development Group (UNDG) and equivalent humanitarian and peacekeeping executive bodies meeting regularly?

b. Are the UNDG and equivalent humanitarian and peacekeeping executive bodies

publishing coordinated documents, plans, and policies?

3. Empower resident coordinators with regard to sectorwide strategies and budgets.

a. Are resident coordinators producing and publishing sectorwide strategies?

b. Are resident coordinators actually exercising day-to-day influence over their

budgets?

4. Apply new business models for delivering assistance, including greater partnership between U.N. agencies and the private sector.

5. Rationalize and simplify the funding of U.N. Programs.

6. The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAPS) model—which greatly improves transparency and improves the ability of member governments to donate to priority programs—should be replicated beyond its current application in humanitarian relief

to other domains of U.N. assistance, such as child survival, peacebuilding, rule of

law, postcrisis recovery (including demobilization and reintegration of soldiers), and

disaster risk mitigation.

a. Has the CAPS model been applied to child survival?

b. Has the CAPS model been applied to peacebuilding?

c. Has the CAPS model been applied to rule of law?

d. Has the CAPS model been applied to postcrises recovery?

e. Has the CAPS model been applied to disaster risk mitigation?

7. Allow leading U.N. officials and resident coordinators to appoint the personnel

they wish, but hold them accountable for the mission and results.

8. U.N. field offices should be encouraged to continue moving toward common services.

9. Establish third-party and independent mechanisms for auditing as well as for

monitoring and evaluation.

10. Strengthen the lead coordinating role of WHO in combating infectious diseases.

11. WHO should operate in all areas of the world. Taiwan, for instance, is excluded

from WHO membership due to the opposition of China. This deprives the organization of valuable resources and significantly impedes the fight against the SARS epiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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demic and other infectious diseases. Taiwan should have the closest possible association with WHO.

a. Is WHO operating in Taiwan?

12. Strengthen and mandate UNICEF to regain the lead it once had, 10 years ago,

in the global efforts for child survival and against hunger and nutritional deficiency

diseases.

IV. ALLEVIATING DISASTER

13. Reengineer the relief architecture of the U.N.

14. Require that 15–20 percent of disaster funding being spent toward risk reduction and mitigation.

a. What is the actual percentage of disaster funding being spent on risk reduction

and mitigation?

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF

THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, NY, MARCH 2005

Mr. President, Excellencies, thank you for allowing me to present to you, in person, the 5-year progress report that you requested from me, on the implementation

of the Millennium Declaration.

The main message of that report is that the aims of the Declaration can be

achieved, but only if you, the member states, are willing to adopt a package of specific, concrete decisions this year.

Some of those decisions are so important that they need to be taken at the level

of heads of state and government. It is, therefore, very fortunate that your heads

of state and government have agreed to come here for a summit meeting in September. I am giving you my report 6 months ahead of that meeting, so that your

governments have ample time to consider it. My hope is that world leaders, when

they arrive here in September, will be ready to take the decisions that are needed.

And I hope they will adopt them as a package.

In any such list of proposals, there are items which seem more important to some

than to others, and items about which some have reservations, while others consider

them essential. The temptation is to treat the list as an a` la carte menu, and select

only those that you especially fancy.

In this case, that approach will not work. What I am proposing amounts to a comprehensive strategy. It gives equal weight and attention to the three great purposes

of this Organization: Development, security, and human rights, all of which must

be underpinned by the rule of law. Some states may think that we should give priority to one of those purposes over the others; and within each of them, many states

will have their particular preferences.

But I do not need to remind you that this is an Organization of 191 member

states. We all know that global problems can best be solved if all states work together. We must also accept that that will only happen if, within the common strategy, all states see their specific concerns addressed.

I argue in the report, and I am profoundly convinced, that the threats which face

us are of equal concern to all. I have called the report ‘‘In Larger Freedom,’’ because

I believe those words from our charter convey the idea that development, security,

and human rights go hand in hand. In a world of interconnected threats and opportunities, it is in each country’s self-interest that all of these challenges are addressed effectively. The cause of larger freedom can only be advanced if nations

work together; and the United Nations can only help if it is remoulded as an effective instrument of their common purpose.

You may or may not find my argument convincing. But please remember, in any

event, that if you need the help of other states to achieve your objectives, you must

also be willing to help them achieve their objectives. That is why I urge you to treat

my proposals as a single package.

Excellencies, let me now briefly describe what I propose.

The report is divided into four main sections. The first three set out priorities for

action in the fields of development, security, and human rights, respectively, while

the last deals with global institutions—mainly the United Nations itself, which

must be, as the Millennium Declaration says, ‘‘a more effective instrument’’ for pursuing those priorities.

The first part, entitled ‘‘Freedom from Want,’’ proposes specific decisions for implementing the bargain struck 3 years ago, in Monterrey, between developed and

developing countries.

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I ask every developing country to adopt and begin to implement, by next year,

a comprehensive national strategy bold enough to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015; and to mobilise all its resources behind that strategy.

Specifically, I ask developing countries to improve their governance, uphold the

rule of law, combat corruption, and adopt an inclusive approach to development,

making space for civil society and the private sector to play their full part. The challenge of development is too big for governments to face it alone.

And I ask every developed country to support these strategies, by increasing the

amount it spends on development and debt relief, and doing whatever it can to level

the playing field for world trade.

Specifically, I ask developed countries to commit themselves, this year, to complete the Doha round of trade negotiations no later than 2006, and as a first step

to give immediate duty-free and quota-free market access to all exports from the

Least Developed Countries.

I also ask them to commit themselves to reach, by 2015, the target of spending

0.7 percent of their gross domestic product on official development assistance. This

increase must be ‘‘front-loaded’’ through an international finance facility, since if we

are to reach the goals by 2015 we need the increased spending right away. For the

longer term, other innovative sources of finance must be considered.

All governments must be accountable for fulfilling their part of this bargain, both

to their own peoples and to each other.

I stress that development must be sustainable. All our efforts will be in vain if

their results are reversed by continued degradation of the environment and depletion of our natural resources.

I am glad that the Kyoto Protocol has now entered into force, albeit 3 years after

the deadline set by the Millennium Declaration, but I also note that it extends only

until 2012, and that some major emitters of carbon remain outside it. I ask all

states to agree that scientific advances and technological innovation must be mobilized now to develop tools for mitigating climate change, and that a more inclusive

international framework must be developed for stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions

beyond 2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and both developed

and developing countries.

And I recommend that member states consider building on one of this Organiza- tion’s clear strengths, by setting up a $1 billion voluntary fund to allow us to bring

rapid and effective relief to the victims of sudden disasters, whether natural or manmade. We were able to do this after the recent tsunami thanks to the rapid response

from donors, but we should be ready to do it whenever and wherever an emergency

occurs. In the second part of the report, entitled ‘‘Freedom from Fear,’’ I ask all states

to agree on a new security consensus, by which they commit themselves to treat any

threat to one of them as a threat to all, and to work together to prevent catastrophic

terrorism, stop the proliferation of deadly weapons, end civil wars, and build lasting

peace in war-torn countries.

Among my specific proposals in this area, I ask all states to complete, sign, and

implement the comprehensive convention on terrorism, based on a clear and agreed

definition, as well as the convention on nuclear terrorism, and the fissile material

cutoff treaty. I also ask member states to agree to establish a Peacebuilding Commission, within the United Nations, to help countries make the transition from war

to lasting peace.

In the third part of the report, entitled ‘‘Freedom to Live in Dignity,’’ I urge all

states to agree to strengthen the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in concrete ways.

In particular, I ask them to embrace the principle of the ‘‘Responsibility to Protect,’’ as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes

against humanity—recognizing that this responsibility lies first and foremost with

each individual state, but also that, if national authorities are unable or unwilling

to protect their citizens, the responsibility then shifts to the international community; and that, in the last resort, the United Nations Security Council may take enforcement action according to the charter.

Among other measures, I also ask all states to ratify and implement all treaties

relating to the protection of civilians; and to agree to, and within their means contribute to, a Democracy Fund at the United Nations, which would provide funding

and technical assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy.

In the final part of the report on ‘‘Strengthening the United Nations,’’ I set out

proposals for making this Organization the instrument through which all its member states can agree on the strategies outlined in the first three parts, and help each

other to implement them. This reflects my long-held view that, in order to do its

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job, the United Nations must be brought fully into line with today’s realities. It can

and must be a representative and efficient world organization, open and accountable

to the public as well as to governments.

I start with proposals for the revitalization of this Assembly—to which the Millennium Declaration rightly assigned a central position as the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations, but which in recent times

has suffered from declining prestige, and has not made the contribution that it

should to our activities. I am asking your heads of state and government to reverse

this by instructing you to adopt, at your 60th session, a comprehensive package of

reforms; by resolving to focus your agenda on major substantive issues of the day;

and by establishing mechanisms through which you can engage fully and systematically with civil society, as recommended in the Cardoso Report.

I then recommend a system of three Councils, covering respectively, (a) international peace and security, (b) economic and social issues, and (c) human rights.

This reflects the priorities set out in the earlier parts of the report, on which I believe there is broad consensus.

The first two of these Councils already exist, of course, but need to be strengthened. The third requires a far-reaching overhaul and upgrading of our human rights

machinery.

First, I urge member states to make the Security Council more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities of today.

This important issue has been discussed for too long. I believe member states

should agree to take a decision on it—preferably by consensus, but in any case before the summit—making use of one or other of the options presented in the report

of the high-level panel.

And I suggest that the renewed Security Council should make clear, in a resolution, the principles by which it intends to be guided when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force.

Secondly, I make proposals for enabling the Economic and Social Council, whose

functions are clearly relevant to our all-important development agenda, to play the

leading role that should be expected of it, in making and implementing coherent

United Nations policies for development.

And thirdly, I ask member states to create a new Council to fulfill one of the primary purposes of the Organization, which clearly now requires more effective operational structures—the promotion of human rights. This would replace the present

Commission on Human Rights, whose capacity to perform its tasks has been undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. The Human Rights Council,

I suggest, should be smaller than the Commission, and elected directly by a twothirds majority of this Assembly.

I also make far-reaching proposals for the reform of the Secretariat, which must

be more flexible, transparent, and accountable in serving the priorities of member

states, and the interests of the world’s peoples; and for introducing greater coherence into the work of the United Nations system as a whole, especially its response

to humanitarian emergencies and its handling of environmental issues.

Excellencies, I make no apology for the detailed, matter-of-fact nature of this presentation. As far as detail goes, I assure you it is merely the tip of the iceberg. I

trust that you will read my report in full. You will find in it many more proposals

than I have had time to describe here.

As for being matter-of-fact, I have deliberately spared you any flights of rhetoric.

This hall has heard enough high-sounding declarations to last us for some decades

to come. We all know what the problems are, and we all know what we have promised to achieve. What is needed now is not more declarations or promises, but action

to fulfill the promises already made.

I believe my report provides a clear program of actions that are fully within the

power of your governments to take. I urge you once again to study it. And I urge

your heads of state and government to be ready to take those decisions when they

come here in September.

Thank you very much.

REPORT OF U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

OF THE UNITED NATIONS

[United Nations General Assembly, 59th session, agenda items 45 and 55, integrated

and coordinated implementation of and followup to the outcomes of the major United

Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields. Followup

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* Initially transmitted by the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly on

14 April 2005, with the request that it be brought to the attention of the members of the General Assembly.

to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. Explanatory note by the SecretaryGeneral*]

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PROPOSAL

1. The establishment of a Human Rights Council would reflect in concrete terms

the increasing importance being placed on human rights in our collective rhetoric.

The upgrading of the Commission on Human Rights into a full-fledged Council

would raise human rights to the priority accorded to it in the Charter of the United

Nations. Such a structure would offer architectural and conceptual clarity, since the

United Nations already has Councils that deal with two other main purposes—security and development.

2. The Commission on Human Rights in its current form has some notable

strengths and a proud history, but its ability to perform its tasks has been overtaken by new needs and undermined by the politicization of its sessions and the selectivity of its work. A new Human Rights Council would help serve to overcome

some growing problems—of perception and in substance—associated with the Commission, allowing for thorough reassessment of the effectiveness of United Nations

intergovernmental machinery in addressing human rights concerns.

3. The Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a Human Rights Council

in his March 2005 report entitled ‘‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’’ (A/59/2005). The proposal reads:

If the United Nations is to meet the expectations of men and women everywhere—and indeed, if the Organization is to take the cause of human

rights as seriously as those of security and development, then Member

States should agree to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a

smaller standing Human Rights Council. Member States would need to decide if they want the Human Rights Council to be a principal organ of the

United Nations or a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, but in either

case its members would be elected directly by the General Assembly by a

two-thirds majority of members present and voting. The creation of the

Council would accord human rights a more authoritative position, corresponding to the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the United

Nations. Member States should determine the composition of the Council

and the term of office of its members. Those elected to the Council should

undertake to abide by the highest human rights standards. (A/59/2005,

para. 182)

4. The Human Rights Council would be a standing body, able to meet regularly

and at any time to deal with imminent crises and allow for timely and in-depth consideration of human rights issues. Moving human rights discussions beyond the politically charged six-week session would also allow more time for substantive followup on the implementation of decisions and resolutions. Being elected by the entire

membership of the General Assembly would make members more accountable and

the body more representative. And being elected directly by the General Assembly—

the principal United Nations legislative body—would also have greater authority

than the Commission, which is a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council. Indeed, according to the Charter, responsibility for discharging the functions

under the Economic and Social Council, including the promotion of human rights,

is ultimately vested in the General Assembly. A smaller membership would allow

the Human Rights Council to have more focused debate and discussions.

5. The Secretary-General believes that the Human Rights Council should be located in Geneva, allowing it to continue to work in close cooperation with the Office

of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The World Food Council (1974–1995) represents a precedent for a standing Council established by the

General Assembly sitting outside New York. Similarly, the International Court of

Justice at the Hague represents a principal Charter body located outside New York.

While based in Geneva, as a standing body the Council would have the flexibility

to ‘‘enhance’’ its presence in New York. Options would include holding special sessions in New York or having specific subcomponents based in New York so as to

better interface with the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic

and Social Council.

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6. The Secretary-General further elaborated on a proposed new key peer review

function for the Human Rights Council in a speech to the Commission on Human

Rights on 7 April 2005:

It should have an explicitly defined function as a chamber of peer review.

Its main task would be to evaluate the fulfillment by all States of all their

human rights obligations. This would give concrete expression to the principle that human rights are universal and indivisible. Equal attention will

have to be given to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, as

well as the right to development. And it should be equipped to give technical assistance to States and policy advice to States and United Nations

bodies alike. Under such a system, every Member State could come up for

review on a periodic basis. Any such rotation should not, however, impede

the Council from dealing with any massive and gross violations that might

occur. Indeed, the Council will have to be able to bring urgent crises to the

attention of the world community.

7. The peer review mechanism would complement but would not replace reporting

procedures under human rights treaties. The latter arise from legal commitments

and involve close scrutiny of law, regulations, and practice with regard to specific

provisions of those treaties by independent expert panels. They result in specific and

authoritative recommendations for action. Peer review would be a process whereby

States voluntarily enter into discussion regarding human rights issues in their respective countries, and would be based on the obligations and responsibilities to promote and protect those rights arising under the Charter and as given expression in

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Implementation of findings should be

developed as a cooperative venture, with assistance given to States in developing

their capacities.

8. Crucial to peer review is the notion of universal scrutiny, that is, that the performance of all Member States in regard to all human rights commitments should

be subject to assessment by other States. The peer review would help avoid, to the

extent possible, the politicization and selectivity that are hallmarks of the Commission’s existing system. It should touch upon the entire spectrum of human rights,

namely, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. The Human Rights

Council will need to ensure that it develops a system of peer review that is fair,

transparent, and workable, whereby States are reviewed against the same criteria.

A fair system will require agreement on the quality and quantity of information

used as the reference point for the review. In that regard, the Office of the High

Commissioner could play a central role in compiling such information and ensuring

a comprehensive and balanced approach to all human rights. The findings of the

peer reviews of the Human Rights Council would help the international community

better provide technical assistance and policy advice. Furthermore, it would help

keep elected members accountable for their human rights commitments.

ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER 2005 SUMMIT

9. Member States will need to come to agreement on a number of issues in advance of the summit to be held in September 2005. Consultations with the High

Commissioner would naturally be part of the process and she is ready to assist. Specifically, the Secretary-General suggests the need for agreement regarding the

Human Rights Council on a number of issues as set out below.

Mandate and function

10. In addition to existing functions and responsibilities of the Commission under

Economic and Social Council resolutions 1235 (XLII) and 1503 (XLVIII), the Human

Rights Council would consider the situation of all human rights in all countries

based on the above peer review system. Until being thoroughly reviewed by the

Human Rights Council upon its establishment, the thematic and country-specific

procedure mandates, as well as the intergovernmental working groups and the Subcommission, would be requested to report to the Human Rights Council. The Human

Rights Council would reconsider and refine or amend those according to its own

terms of reference, together with its agenda of work and working methods. The proposed Human Rights Council is only one component of the United Nations human

rights system, which includes the mandate of the High Commissioner, secretariat

functions and the treaty bodies. In determining the mandate and function of the

Human Rights Council, consideration should be given to functions that are best performed at an intergovernmental level, taking into account complementarity with

other bodies and bearing in mind the Commission’s experience. The Human Rights

Council should have the authority to recommend policy measures to other organs

of the United Nations that can help in the process of implementation.

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11. In addition to the proposed peer review outlined above, the Human Rights

Council should also fulfill the following functions:

• Member States should be able to come together and take action when serious

human rights situations develop. The Commission is able to do this by having

the option to adopt specific country resolutions. While this capacity has attained

an unhealthy degree of politicization—which the proposed peer review function

of the Human Rights Council should address—the ability to address serious situations must be retained and revived. In addition, the Commission has the capacity to meet in extraordinary session if a majority of members agree; this capacity should be retained by the Human Rights Council, the envisioned format

of which would facilitate consideration of urgent situations outside the framework of ordinary sessions. Furthermore, the High Commissioner would benefit

from being able to call for action and support from a United Nations standing

body with the authority of a full-fledged Council. A forum for dialogue among

Member States and involving civil society on human rights issues, should be

preserved. The dialogue would allow for constructive engagement on areas of

disagreement and creative responses to deal with new and emerging issues, especially human rights problems for which existing international standards are

ambiguous. The role of NGOs is crucial to providing policy inputs and views

from the field to Member States. Similarly, the increasing prominence and activism of both national institutions and NGOs has elevated their involvement

in the human rights debate to centre stage. • The proposed Human Rights Council should play a pivotal role in overseeing

and contributing to the interpretation and development of international human

rights law. International law and standards are central to the United Nations

system for the protection of human rights; indeed, the body of international

human rights norms developed to date by the Commission is perhaps its greatest legacy. As a standing body, the Human Rights Council might find ways to

overcome the delays currently faced by the Commission regarding some standard-setting activities. The establishment of a Human Rights Council would also

reinforce the critical work of the treaty body system, which has contributed significantly to the development of international law over the past 20 years and

could assist in the process of streamlining and strengthening the system to better carry out its mandate.

Composition

12. Instead of being elected by the Economic and Social Council, the membership

of the Human Rights Council would be elected by a two-thirds vote of the General

Assembly—which would be similar to the election process for Charter bodies. This

would reflect the importance accorded to the body. Universality in voting would

allow the body to be more accountable to the full membership of the Organization.

Member States will need to decide on the length of terms, how Human Rights Council members would be elected and the rotation of members. If Member States choose

to elect Human Rights Council members on a regional basis, all regional groups

should be represented in proportion to their representation in the United Nations.

Size

13. The Commission on Human Rights currently has 53 members, only one less

than the membership of the Economic and Social Council, which elects Commission

members. Originally numbering 18 members, the Commission has grown dramatically over the years. A smaller membership on the Human Rights Council would

allow more focused discussion and debate. Elevating the status of the Commission

into a Council would increase the possibility for States to serve on one of the three

United Nations Councils.

Principal or subsidiary body

14. There are two options for creating the Human Rights Council, as a principal

organ or as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. Establishing the Human

Rights Council as a principal body of the United Nations would allow it to stand

as a peer alongside both the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council

and would require an amendment to the Charter. Establishing the Council as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly would not require an amendment to the Charter. In either case, the high standard of Charter bodies and ‘‘important matters’’ of

a two-thirds majority vote should be retained.

DECISION TO BE TAKEN

15. Upon consideration of the above issues, Member States could agree to endorse,

in principle, the establishment of a Human Rights Council in the final declaration

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of the September 2005 summit. Draft language provided in the report of the Secretary-General reads:

Agree to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations or

a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, whose members would be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members

present and voting. (A/59/2005, annex, para. 8(e))

ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 2005 SUMMIT

16. Further work on how the Human Rights Council would fulfill the outlined

functions above, as well as the details regarding size, composition and establishment, would be dealt with in the post-summit phase. Indeed, the fate of many of

the Commission’s existing functions, procedures, and working groups would be left

to the Council to endorse, renew or consider obsolete. The special procedures and

NGO engagement are two aspects of the Commission that should continue with the

Human Rights Council.

17. Another set of issues requiring further elaboration concerns the role and mandate of the Human Rights Council vis-a-vis the other components of the United Nations human rights system, in particular the Office of the High Commissioner, other

United Nations agencies and programmes dealing with human rights, the treaty

monitoring bodies, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and

Social Council and the proposed new Peacebuilding Commission. The creation of the

Human Rights Council would reinforce and strengthen the human rights work of

those other components. For example, the Human Rights Council would provide an

opportunity to rationalize the agenda of the Third Committee of the General Assembly with the work of the Human Rights Council, as well as to strengthen the General Assembly’s ability to analyse and draw attention to continuing gaps in the implementation and mainstreaming of human rights throughout the United Nations

system. Similarly, the Council could assist in the establishment, support and generation of contributions for various voluntary funds, especially to assist developing

countries.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ON THE ‘‘IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL’’ REPORT

INTRODUCTION: A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY IN 2005

In September 2005, world leaders will come together at a summit in New York

to review progress since the Millennium Declaration, adopted by all member states

in 2000. The Secretary General’s report proposes an agenda to be taken up, and

acted upon, at the summit. These are policy decisions and reforms that are actionable if the necessary political will can be garnered.

Events since the Millennium Declaration demand that consensus be revitalized on

key challenges and priorities and converted into collective action. The guiding light

in doing so must be the needs and hopes of people everywhere. The world must advance the causes of security, development, and human rights together, otherwise

none will succeed. Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not

enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for

human rights.

In a world of interconnected threats and opportunities, it is in each country’s selfinterest that all of these challenges are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of

larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep, and sustained global cooperation among states. The world needs strong and capable states, effective partnerships

with civil society and the private sector, and agile and effective regional and global

intergovernmental institutions to mobilize and coordinate collective action. The

United Nations must be reshaped in ways not previously imagined, and with a boldness and speed not previously shown.

I. Freedom from want

The last 25 years have seen the most dramatic reduction in extreme poverty the

world has ever experienced. Yet dozens of countries have become poorer. More than

a billion people still live on less than a dollar a day. Each year, 3 million people

die from HIV/AIDS and 11 million children die before reaching their fifth birthday.

Today’s is the first generation with the resources and technology to make the

right to development a reality for everyone and to free the entire human race from

want. There is a shared vision of development. The Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs), which range from halving extreme poverty to putting all children into priVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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mary school and stemming the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, all

by 2015, have become globally accepted benchmarks of broader progress, embraced

by donors, developing countries, civil society, and major development institutions

alike.

The MDGs can be met by 2015—but only if all involved break with business as

usual and dramatically accelerate and scale up action now.

In 2005, a ‘‘global partnership for development’’—one of the MDGs reaffirmed in

2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development at Monterrey,

Mexico, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg,

South Africa—needs to be fully implemented. That partnership is grounded in mutual responsibility and accountability—developing countries must strengthen governance, combat corruption, promote private sector-led growth and maximize domestic resources to fund national development strategies, while developed countries

must support these efforts through increased development assistance, a new development-oriented trade round and wider and deeper debt relief.

The following are priority areas for action in 2005:

• National strategies: Each developing country with extreme poverty should, by

2006, adopt and begin to implement a national development strategy bold

enough to meet the MDG targets for 2015. Each strategy needs to take into account seven broad ‘‘clusters’’ of public investments and policies: Gender equality, the environment, rural development, urban development, health systems,

education, and science, technology, and innovation. • Financing for development: Global development assistance must be more than

doubled over the next few years. This does not require new pledges from donor

countries, but meeting pledges already made. Each developed country that has

not already done so should establish a timetable to achieve the 0.7 percent target of gross national income for official development assistance no later than

2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006, and reaching 0.5

percent by 2009. The increase should be front-loaded through an International

Finance Facility, and other innovative sources of financing should be considered

for the longer term. The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria must be fully funded and the resources provided for an expanded comprehensive strategy of prevention and treatment to fight HIV/AIDS. These steps

should be supplemented by immediate action to support a series of ‘‘Quick

Wins’’—relatively inexpensive, high-impact initiatives with the potential to generate major short-term gains and save millions of lives, such as free distribution

of antimalarial bednets. • Trade: The Doha round of trade negotiations should fulfill its development

promise and be completed no later than 2006. As a first step, member states

should provide duty-free and quota-free market access for all exports from the

Least Developed Countries. • Debt relief: Debt sustainability should be redefined as the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the MDGs and to reach 2015 without an increase in

debt ratios.

New action is also needed to ensure environmental sustainability. Scientific advances and technological innovation must be mobilized now to develop tools for mitigating climate change, and a more inclusive international framework must be developed for stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions beyond the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and both developed

and developing countries. Concrete steps are also required on desertification and

biodiversity.

Other priorities for global action include stronger mechanisms for infectious disease surveillance and monitoring, a worldwide early warning system on natural disasters, support for science and technology for development, support for regional infrastructure and institutions, reform of international financial institutions, and

more effective cooperation to manage migration for the benefit of all.

II. Freedom from fear

While progress on development is hampered by weak implementation, on the security side, despite a heightened sense of threat among many, the world lacks even

a basic consensus—and implementation, where it occurs, is all too often contested.

The Secretary General fully embraces a broad vision of collective security. The

threats to peace and security in the 21st century include not just international war

and conflict, but terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and civil

violence. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease, and environmental

degradation, since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these

threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine states as the basic unit of the international system.

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Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats each region of the

world perceives as most urgent are, in fact, equally so for all. These are not theoretical issues, but ones of deadly urgency.

The United Nations must be transformed into the effective instrument for preventing conflict that it was always meant to be, by acting on several key policy and

institutional priorities:

• Preventing catastrophic terrorism: States should commit to a comprehensive

antiterrorism strategy based on five pillars; dissuading people from resorting to

terrorism or supporting it; denying terrorists access to funds and materials; deterring states from sponsoring terrorism; developing state capacity to defeat terrorism; and defending human rights. They should conclude a comprehensive

convention on terrorism, based on a clear and agreed definition. They should

also complete, without delay, the convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.

• Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons: Progress on both disarmament and

nonproliferation are essential. On disarmament, nuclear-weapon states should

further reduce their arsenals of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and pursue arms

control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility, reaffirm their commitment to negative security assurances, and uphold the moratorium on nuclear test explosions. On nonproliferation, the International Atomic

Energy Agency’s verification authority must be strengthened through universal

adoption of the Model Additional Protocol, and states should commit themselves

to complete, sign, and implement a fissile material cutoff treaty.

• Reducing the prevalence and risk of war: Currently, half the countries emerging

from violent conflict revert to conflict within 5 years. Member states should create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding

Support Office within the U.N. Secretariat, so that the U.N. system can better

meet the challenge of helping countries successfully complete the transition

from war to peace. They should also take steps to strengthen collective capacity

to employ the tools of mediation, sanctions, and peacekeeping (including a ‘‘zero

tolerance’’ policy on sexual exploitation of minors and other vulnerable people

by members of peacekeeping contingents, to match the policy enacted by the

Secretary General).

• Use of force: The Security Council should adopt a resolution setting out the

principles to be applied in decisions relating to the use of force and express its

intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate

the use of force.

Other priorities for global action include more effective cooperation to combat organized crime, to prevent illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and to remove the scourge of landmines which still kill and maim innocent people and hold

back development in nearly half the world’s countries.

III. Freedom to live in dignity

In the Millennium Declaration, member states said they would spare no effort to

promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. And over the last

six decades, an impressive treaty-based normative framework has been advanced.

But without implementation, these declarations ring hollow. Without action,

promises are meaningless. People who face war crimes find no solace in the

unimplemented words of the Geneva Conventions. Treaties prohibiting torture are

cold comfort to prisoners abused by their captors, particularly if the international

human rights machinery enables those responsible to hide behind friends in high

places. War-weary populations despair when, even though a peace agreement has

been signed, there is little progress toward government under the rule of law. Solemn commitments to strengthen democracy remain empty words to those who have

never voted for their rulers, and who see no sign that things are changing.

Therefore, the normative framework that has been so impressively advanced over

the last six decades must be strengthened. Even more important, concrete steps are

required to reduce selective application, arbitrary enforcement, and breach without

consequence. The world must move from an era of legislation to implementation.

Action is called for in the following priority areas:

• Rule of law: The international community should embrace the ‘‘responsibility to

protect,’’ as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and

crimes against humanity. All treaties relating to the protection of civilians

should be ratified and implemented. Steps should be taken to strengthen cooperation with the International Criminal Court and other international or

mixed war crimes tribunals, and to strengthen the International Court of JusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:34 Apr 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 963513.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tice. The Secretary General also intends to strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity

to assist national efforts to reestablish the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies.

• Human rights: The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should

be strengthened with more resources and staff, and should play a more active

role in the deliberations of the Security Council and of the proposed Peacebuilding Commission. The human rights treaty bodies of the U.N. system

should also be rendered more effective and responsive.

• Democracy: A Democracy Fund should be created at the U.N. to provide assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy.

IV. Strengthening the United Nations

While purposes should be firm and constant, practice and organization need to

move with the times. If the U.N. is to be a useful instrument for its member states,

and for the world’s peoples, in responding to the challenges laid out in the previous

three parts, it must be fully adapted to the needs and circumstances of the 21st century.

A great deal has been achieved since 1997 in reforming the internal structures

and culture of the United Nations. But many more changes are needed, both in the

executive branch—the Secretariat and the wider U.N. system—and in the U.N.’s

intergovernmental organs:

• General Assembly: The General Assembly should take bold measures to streamline its agenda and speed up the deliberative process. It should concentrate on

the major substantive issues of the day, and establish mechanisms to engage

fully and systematically with civil society.

• Security Council: The Security Council should be broadly representative of the

realities of power in today’s world. The Secretary General supports the principles for reform set out in the report of the high-level panel, and urges member

states to consider the two options, models A and B, presented in that report,

or any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged

on the basis of either model. Member states should agree to take a decision on

this important issue before the summit in September 2005.

• Economic and Social Council: The Economic and Social Council should be reformed so that it can effectively assess progress in the U.N.’s development agenda, serve as a high-level development cooperation forum, and provide direction

for the efforts of the various intergovernmental bodies in the economic and social area throughout the U.N. system.

• Proposed Human Rights Council: The Commission on Human Rights suffers

from declining credibility and professionalism, and is in need of major reform.

It should be replaced by a smaller standing Human Rights Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations or subsidiary of the General Assembly, whose

members would be elected directly by the General Assembly, by a two-thirds

majority of members present and voting.

• The Secretariat: The Secretary General will take steps to realign the Secretariat’s structure to match the priorities outlined in the report, and will create a

cabinet-style decisionmaking mechanism. He requests member states to give

him the authority and resources to pursue a one-time staff buyout to refresh

and realign staff to meet current needs, to cooperate in a comprehensive review

of budget and human resources rules, and to commission a comprehensive review of the Office of Internal Oversight Services to strengthen its independence

and authority.

Other priorities include creating better system coherence by strengthening the

role of Resident Coordinators, giving the humanitarian response system more effective standby arrangements, and ensuring better protection of internally displaced

people. Regional organizations, particularly the African Union, should be given

greater support. The charter itself should also be updated to abolish the ‘‘enemy

clauses,’’ the Trusteeship Council and the Military Staff Committee, all of which are

outdated.

CONCLUSION: OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE

It is for the world community to decide whether this moment of uncertainty presages wider conflict, deepening inequality and the erosion of the rule of law, or is

used to renew institutions for peace, prosperity, and human rights. Now is the time

to act. The annex to the report lists specific items for consideration by heads of state

and government. Action on them is possible. It is within reach. From pragmatic beginnings could emerge a visionary change of direction for the world.

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NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

JUNE 15, 2005

GINGRICH-MITCHELL TASK FORCE ON U.N. REFORM: NATIONS HAVE INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PEOPLE WITHIN OWN BORDERS FROM GENOCIDE

WASHINGTON.—In a report released today, the Task Force on the United Nations

recommends that the U.S. Government endorse and call upon the U.N. and its

members to ‘‘affirm a responsibility of every sovereign government to protect its own

citizenry and those within its borders from genocide, mass killing, and massive and

sustained human rights violations.’’ The report adds that the ‘‘United States should

insist that states asserting an absolutist doctrine of non-intervention explain why

they are preventing action against the world’s genocidaires.’’

The 12-member bipartisan task force, chaired by former House Speaker Newt

Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, calls for abolition of

the current U.N. Human Rights Commission, and establishment of a new Human

Rights Council, ideally composed of democracies and dedicated to monitoring, promoting, and enforcing human rights.

The report notes that without a renewed and more effective United Nations, the

challenges to international security, development and well-being will be all the

greater. The bipartisan task force, comprised of prominent experts, distinguished

practitioners, and business leaders representing a wide range of opinion, issued its

consensus report, ‘‘in the firm belief that an effective U.N. is in American interests.’’

With a President and Congress united in their desire to advance our national interests, the United Nations can be led to meet more completely the lofty goals of

its charter, says the task force. Both the Bush administration and the U.S. Congress

are keenly focused on the U.N. reform process. The report concludes that U.S. leadership will be essential to bringing about meaningful reform and adds that a successful effort will ‘‘require bipartisanship in Washington’s approach to the United

Nations.’’

Mandated by Congress in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations bill at the behest

of Representative Frank Wolf (R–VA), the report offers an actionable American

agenda for strengthening the United Nations. The full report is available at

www.usip.org.

Other report recommendations include:

• Providing immediate U.S support for initiatives to halt the genocide in Darfur,

Sudan, including the assembly of a U.S. coordinated package of assistance for

African Union deployment in Darfur that will serve as a force multiplier, and

support for establishment of a no-fly zone.

• Addressing urgently needed internal U.N. management reform by:

• Establishing a single, very senior official in charge of daily operations and filling the role of Chief Operating Officer;

• Empowering the Secretary General to replace his or her top officials;

• Creating an Independent Oversight Board that has the audit powers to prevent another scandal like Oil-for-Food.

• Increasing support substantially for the effort to bring developing nations out

of poverty as a global priority, including government-to-government assistance,

and private investment, including the legal, political and economic infrastructure that will allow such aid and investment to flourish.

• Implementing quickly a U.N. policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and

abuse by U.N. peacekeepers.

• Adopting in the General Assembly a definition of terrorism and passing a comprehensive convention condemning all forms of terrorism.

Congress established the Task Force on the United Nations in December 2004 to

assess reforms that would enable the U.N. to better meet the goals of its 1945 charter. Congress directed that the study address obstacles to achieving such goals, especially maintaining international peace and security and promoting universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms. The task

force will discuss its findings with Congress in a hearing of the Science, State, Commerce and Justice Appropriations Subcommittee, to be chaired by Representative

Wolf on Wednesday, June 22, at 10 a.m., in 2359 Rayburn House Office Building.

In addition to the cochairs, 10 other distinguished Americans served on the task

force and contributed to the report. They are:

• Gen. Wesley K. Clark (USA, Ret.)—Wesley K. Clark and Associates

• Edwin J. Feulner—The Heritage Foundation

• Roderick Hills—Hills and Stern

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• Ambassador Donald McHenry—Georgetown University • Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering—The Boeing Company • Danielle Pletka—American Enterprise Institute • Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter—Princeton University • Dr. A. Michael Spence—Oak Hill Capital Partners • Senator Malcolm Wallop—Frontiers of Freedom • R. James Woolsey—Boaz, Allen, Hamilton

Gen. Charles Boyd (USAF, Ret.) of Business Executives for National Security and

J. Robinson West of PFC Energy served as Senior Advisors to the task force.

At the request of Congress, the U.S. Institute of Peace coordinated the task force

with the support and participation of leading experts drawn from public policy organizations, including the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. Background information

on the experts may be found at www.usip.org/un/members.

TASK FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS

The United States Institute of Peace was directed by Congress in December 2004

to create a Task Force on the United Nations. The task force will assess the extent

to which the United Nations is fulfilling the purposes stated in its charter and recommend an actionable agenda for the United States on the U.N. The task force,

while not an official U.S. Government effort, is obligated to provide its report to

Congress. The task force expects to release its report in mid-June.

Task Force Members, Senior Advisors and Partners

The members of the task force are a diverse and bipartisan group of distinguished

Americans from a variety of professions and backgrounds. It is cochaired by Newt

Gingrich, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, and George Mitchell,

former majority leader of the Senate. Other members include: Wesley K. Clark,

Wesley K. Clark and Associates; Edwin Feulner, the Heritage Foundation; Roderick

Hills, Hills and Stern; Donald McHenry, Georgetown University; Danielle Pletka,

American Enterprise Institute; Thomas R. Pickering, the Boeing Company; AnneMarie Slaughter, Princeton University; A. Michael Spence, Oak Hill Capital Partners; Malcolm Wallop, Asian Studies Center; R. James Woolsey, Booz Allen Hamilton. The senior advisors to the task force are Charles Boyd, Business Executives

for National Security and J. Robinson West, PFC Energy.

As directed by Congress, the Institute of Peace is organizing the task force with

the support and participation of leading public policy organizations, including the

American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic

and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. These institutions are providing experts to support

the members of the task force.

Task Force Activities

The task force will organize its work in five thematic areas. In addition to conducting research and taking testimony, members of the task force and experts will

undertake fact-finding missions to United Nations headquarters and to missions in

the field. The five thematic areas are as follows:

• Preventing and ending conflicts and building stable societies.

• Preventing and responding to genocide and gross human rights violations.

• Preventing catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

• Ensuring the effectiveness, integrity, transparency, and accountability of the

U.N. system.

• Fostering economic development and reducing poverty.

TASK FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS: WORKING GROUPS

The work of the Task Force on the United Nations is organized into working

groups, consisting of both Task Force members and support staff from leading public

policy organizations. Below is a list of members and experts listed by task force

working group.

Preventing and Ending Conflicts and Building Stable Societies

Members: Wesley K. Clark (Wesley K. Clark and Associates); Malcolm Wallop

(Asian Studies Center)

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Experts: Eric Schwartz (Council on Foreign Relations), Coordinator; Frederick Barton (CSIS); Bathsheba Crocker (CSIS); Michael McFaul (Hoover); William

Nash (Council on Foreign Relations)

Preventing and Responding to Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations

Member: Anne-Marie Slaughter (Princeton University)

Sr. Advisor: J. Robinson West (PFC Energy)

Experts: Tod Lindberg (Hoover), Coordinator; Ivo Daalder (Brookings); Lee Feinstein

(Council on Foreign Relations); Joseph Loconte (The Heritage Foundation)

Preventing Catastrophic Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Member: Thomas R. Pickering (The Boeing Company)

Sr. Advisor: Charles G. Boyd (Business Executives for National Security)

Experts: Robin Einhorn (CSIS), Coordinator; Michael O’Hanlon (Brookings); James

Phillips (Heritage)

Ensuring the Effectiveness, Integrity, Transparency, and Accountability of the U.N.

System

Member: Edwin J. Feulner (The Heritage Foundation); Roderick M. Hills (Hills and

Stern)

Experts: Ann Florini (Brookings), Coordinator; Nile Gardiner (The Heritage Foundation); Branka Jikich (CSIS); James Lindsay (Council on Foreign Relations);

Brett Schaefer (The Heritage Foundation)

Fostering Economic Development and Reducing Poverty

Members: Donald McHenry (Georgetown University); A. Michael Spence (Oak Hills

Capital Partners)

Experts: Patrick Cronin (CSIS), Coordinator; Kenneth Anderson (Hoover); Steve

Hansch (Georgetown University)

Task Force Members and Senior Advisors

• Newt Gingrich, Former Speaker of the House of Representatives (Co-Chair),

CEO, Gingrich Group

• George Mitchell, Former Majority Leader of the Senate (Co-Chair), Chairman,

Piper Rudnick LLP

• Charles G. Boyd, Gen. U.S. Air Force (Ret.)—Senior Advisor, President and

CEO, Business Executives for National Security

• Wesley K. Clark, Gen. U.S. Army (Ret.), Chairman and CEO, Wesley K. Clark

and Associates

• Edwin J. Feulner, President, The Heritage Foundation

• Roderick M. Hills, Partner, Hills and Stern

• Donald McHenry, Ambassador (Ret.), Distinguished Professor, School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University

• Thomas R. Pickering, Ambassador (Ret.), Senior Vice President, International

Relations, The Boeing Company

• Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy, American Enterprise Institute

• Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

• A. Michael Spence, Partner, Oak Hill Capital Partners

• Malcolm Wallop, U.S. Senator (Ret.), Senior Fellow, Asian Studies Center

• J. Robinson West—Senior Advisor, Chairman, PFC Energy, Chairman of the

Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace

• R. James Woolsey, Vice President, Global Strategic Security, Booz Allen Hamilton

Task Force Staff:

• George Ward, Executive Director

• Gary Matthews, Deputy Director

• Sloan Mann, Program Officer

• Heather Sensibaugh, Program Assistant

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