The “New” American Way of War

U.S. Army War College

XIV Annual Strategy Conference 

Compiled by

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen

Strategic Studies Institute

Key Insights:

• The threats posed by new geostrategic realities render the so-called Weinberger and Powell 

doctrines obsolete.

• Released by the Cold War shackles, the United States exerts an assertive foreign policy 

emboldened by its unchallenged military dominance.

• The United States may act unilaterally to eliminate dire threats or multilaterally to bolster 

alliances and foster legitimacy.

• Preemptive strategy is neither new nor applicable for all threats, but one of many available 

options.

• Preemptive war and preventive war are strikingly different concepts that should not be 

confused, less they be misapplied.

• In modern conflicts, the issues of collateral damage, speed of response, and long-term 

presence assume greater importance.

• Decisive military victory does not equal strategic success.

• Transformation heralds a 21st century force with focus on information superiority, shared 

awareness, nonlinear battlefield, and demassification. 

• Coherent jointness means the services operate and think as a cohesive entity. 

• The United Nations must adapt to the evolving international security environment.

• The changing nature of the international security environment will require the United States 

to fight long, deliberate, and sometimes indecisive conflicts.

This year’s topic, “The ‘New’ American Way of War,” was particularly relevant because it occurred during the 

height of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Over 130 national security strategists, including ten flag officers, from the 

Department of Defense, civilian universities, and other policy-related institutions participated in the conference, held 

April 8-10, 2003. As OIF demonstrated, the U.S. military is in the midst of changing the way it fights wars. With such a 

backdrop unfolding, the speakers and panelists used very clear topical examples to make their points.
Dr. Russell Weigley: The American Way of War.

The keynote speaker was the preeminent American 

historian, Dr. Russell Weigley, whose book, The American 

Way of War, inspired this year’s theme. Dr. Weigley 

recounted that the United States continually has modified 

how it fights wars. The strategy of attrition during the 

War of Independence reflected the nation’s weakness, but 

this gave way to a strategy of annihilation during the last 

year of the Civil War. General Grant’s strategy influenced 

the American way of war well into the 20th century. The 

key components were the mobilization of vast resources 

during war, direct confrontation of an enemy, and 

pursuit of the quickest route to decisive victory. While 

this doctrine failed in Korea and Vietnam, Americans 

prefer this method of waging war. Still, this preference 

creates friction with friends and allies, particularly given 

the U.S. prowess at high-tech war. Over-exuberance with 

technology raises expectations of limited casualties in 

warfighting, resulting in frustration and recriminations 

should high casualties arise. Dr. Weigley observed that, 

although it is not yet clear what the new American way 

of war will be, it must reflect the two characteristics that 

made Ulysses Grant the greatest of American generals: 

flexibility in method and resolution in purpose.

The American Way of War: Alternative Views.

With Dr. Earl Tilford moderating the panel, Dr. 

Frank Hoffman, Mr. Max Boot, and Dr. Conrad Crane 

examined various past influences that have shaped 

the American approach to warfighting. One important 

influence is culture, which is the key to understanding 

how a government and its military institutions approach 

war. This culture is shaped by geopolitics, myth, and 

the aggregate experience. The current U.S. military 

interpretation of war is based primarily on the so-called 

Weinberger and Powell doctrines, legacies of the Vietnam 

War designed as a set of criteria for the use of force. 

However, the dynamic and chaotic post-Cold War world 

renders these doctrines impracticable. The emerging U.S. 

doctrine must acknowledge strategic threats and realities 

if security is to be assured. Optimistically, the hallmark of 

U.S. culture, however, is its ability to adapt to changing 

situations.

The Weinberger-Powell doctrines assert that America 

should avoid fighting small wars of limited liability 

where possible. This viewpoint belies the U.S. historical 

record, which reveals a plethora of limited wars across 

the globe since the War of Independence, and the war 

with Iraq is no exception. These small wars (mostly 

guerrilla) were predominantly political rather than the 

strict military confrontation the myth of the “big war” 

engenders. Moreover, most of America’s small wars have 

been successes, and recognizing that fact as the norm 

for future wars is more productive than the irrational 

mania surrounding the Vietnam War experience. The 

United States will not be fighting peers, it will be fighting 

“indians.” Thus, the past as prologue to the future is what 

Americans should expect.

A popular myth characterizes American generalship 

as embracing boldness, innovation, and risk. The historical 

account reveals that, although such generalship is tolerated 

with successful generals, it is rarely encouraged. The 

military remains a student of Jomini and Fuller, focused 

on force ratios and firepower formulas. Development of 

bold, innovative leaders may be fundamental, but good 

staff work (much undervalued) creates the environment 

for innovation, and the commander assesses the need 

for boldness. On the other hand, American armies have 

achieved great success with centralized, risk-averse 

approaches, so why change? Inculcating and encouraging 

boldness and innovation will require major paradigm 

shifts in the military culture and significantly increase 

associated risks. One could argue that the United States 

should focus on producing competent leaders who 

understand and follow doctrine, a centralized command 

and control, and well-trained and fully-resourced staffs.

Dr. Brian Linn introduced three schools of thought 

regarding the American ways of war: the Continentalists, the 

Warriors, and the Strategists. Each school has shaped and 

continues to shape how America fights wars. Although not 

always in accord, they do complement each other and deserve 

continued study and application as the United States lays out 

a new course. In this pursuit, a revival of America’s military 

intellectual past is essential. 

The Emerging Strategic Environment and the American 

Way of War.

Colonel Rich Yarger moderated this panel, which 

featured Mr. Tom Donnelly, Dr. John Ikenberry, Dr. Hank 

Gaffney, and Dr. Jane Lute. One viewpoint averred that U.S. 

dominance has created a unipolar strategic environment. 

Despite charges of unilateralism, the National Security 

Strategy does not embrace unilateral action exclusively 

nor has the United States acted unilaterally in Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM. However, the United States must not 

balk from using its military preeminence to roll back 

radical Islam and democratize the Middle East, while 

hedging against a future threat from China. The United 

States should foster institutions with expeditionary forces 

that can respond to crises immediately rather than relying 

on failed institutions like NATO, EU, and UN. The United 

States should embrace its unipolar position and embark 

on creating new permanent coalitions. 

Another viewpoint argued that a multilateral grand 

strategy lay at the heart of the U.S. construction of a 

world order. Alliances are part of a larger security system 

that has defended the United States and its allies against 

threats, secured U.S. presence abroad in a legitimate and 

predictable order, and inhibited the rise of counteralliances 

against the United States. Washington does not fully 

understand the need and benefits of such a system and 

prefers to act unilaterally against emerging threats, 

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relying on its military and technological superiority. The 

former U.S. security system not only defended against the 

Soviet threat but also created institutions and legitimate 

order based on a positive agenda of liberal democracy. 

It ensured regular consultations and cooperation and 

requires no reinvention. The United States protected allies, 

fostered open and free economic markets, and purposely 

practiced self-constraint to assure allies and promote 

stability.

A third perspective pointed out that a Center for Naval 

Analysis study on the use of force since 1989 reveals that 

conflicts are not quick affairs. Most crises emerged from 

enduring problems, and the United States reacted very 

deliberately in resolving them. As a modus operandi, the 

United States has sought support and partners abroad and 

also enjoyed remarkable success in securing forward bases 

in support of operations. Air strikes initiated hostilities to 

enervate the enemy but were not in themselves decisive. 

Joint operations were essential and reflected increasingly 

networked capabilities; but they were kept under strict 

political control. Most importantly, the end-state required 

an enduring presence measured in years, not months. 

Post-war Iraq will be no different and will require a large 

air, ground, and naval presence even while the United 

States combats Al-Qaida.

The final, insightful perspective invoked the real 

strategic question of how the United States should use 

its power for immediate global access and domination 

of ground, sea, air, and information warfare capability. 

The old paradigm of interests, capabilities, and threats no 

longer applies because the United States has unbounded 

capabilities and has set the precedent of deploying forces 

on behalf of causes or against threats that are remote 

from vital interests. The emerging strategic environment 

complicates matters. Governance is becoming ever more 

internationalized. States are losing the monopoly on the 

use of force, the creation of wealth, and the ability to forge 

coalitions on an increasing basis─these are devolving 

to the individual. These changes force states to act with 

ever greater transparency and accountability including 

military means. Consequently, traditional legitimate uses 

of force will be increasingly constrained. 

The ‘New’ American Way of War and National Security 

Strategy (NSS)/ National Military Strategy (NMS).

Dr. Robin Dorff moderated this panel comprising 

CAPT Sam Tangredi, Dr. Loren Thompson and Dr. 

Daniel Goure. U.S. NSS and NMS documents are quite 

straightforward and lay out exactly how the current U.S. 

administration seeks to use military power for preemption 

of hostile nations seeking weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) capabilities. NSS seeks to dissuade adversarial 

nations from future military competition with the United 

States. Just as there are different types of wars, the United 

States must be capable of fighting them in different ways. 

Unlike past conflicts, the issues of collateral damage, 

speed of attack, and a long-term presence for the purpose 

of reconstruction are assuming greater import.

Strategic preemption may define the new American 

way of war, but its distinction from preventive war 

is becoming blurred. President Bush has stated that 

deterrence and containment are no longer viable concepts 

in many emerging conflicts, and the NSS reflects the view 

that the United States will not wait for threats to manifest 

themselves into attacks before taking action. Despite the 

attractiveness of preemption, the concept is not new to 

U.S. policy because the idea of preemptive nuclear strikes 

existed during the Cold War. The Bush administration 

is simply codifying a tradition of national security 

thought rather than generating a radical new doctrine. 

Still, preemption and prevention are strikingly different 

concepts.

 The United States will not necessarily apply the 

preemptive strategy to all threats though. The war 

against Iraq was clearly the application of this of a 

preventive strategy but not a signal that the United 

States will apply either in every case. Many current 

threats may cause concern to the administration but are 

not imminent. The administration was initially deeply 

concerned about wearing out the force and was highly 

selective about defining the national security missions 

that it sought to pursue, hence the intention to withdraw 

from peacekeeping and nation-building missions. The 

administration also sought to restructure the military by 

relying more on airpower and a smaller, swifter ground 

component; however the events surrounding 9-11 have 

required a reassessment of that initiative.

Richard Perle: The ‘New’ American Way of War and 

Tomorrow’s Security Challenges.

Post-Iraq war evaluations will be positive and may 

conclude that the war set major historic events in motion. 

This may be the first war of the “New American Army” 

and may signal the need for a change of the UN mandate, 

to make it more effective for 21st century threats, not 

as a reactor to the cross-border confrontations of the 

previous century. To remain viable, the UN must become 

an appropriate arbiter that supports necessary defense 

decisions before overt aggressive materializes. The Army 

must accelerate Transformation with emphasis on power 

projection; precision weapons; a smaller, lighter, more 

lethal force; and a requisite doctrine. 

The Road Ahead: Defense Transformation and the 

‘New’ American Way of War.

Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and Brigadier 

General (Promotable) Michael Vane comprised this panel 

with Colonel Mike Matheny moderating. Transformation 

reflects the shift of the military focus from fighting great 

power wars to fighting as a great power force. A greater 

reliance on strategic deployment translates to fewer forces 

deployed forward and less reliance on allies. Future trends 

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point towards information superiority, shared awareness, 

nonlinear battlefield, and demassification. Traditional 

separate processes (e.g., organize, maneuver, jointness) 

will eventually merge into one process─employment. 

Because the U.S. Army is changing into an expeditionary 

force, regional infrastructures will not be required to 

support warfighting. Network centric warfare also 

permits a greater contribution of forces in combat. Of 

course, not all embrace Transformation unquestionably. 

Persistent rigidity in training, misplaced emphasis 

on mass, doctrinaire thinking, and refusal to exploit 

interdependencies illustrate a few of the obstacles, but the 

strategic environment demands adaptation.

A critical component of Transformation is jointness. 

The goal is to achieve coherent jointness, meaning the 

services operate, think, and speak alike as a cohesive 

force. The armed forces must eschew the inclination 

to limit jointness to simple deconfliction, meaning the 

services operate separately and sequentially to avoid 

operational entanglements. It complements rather than 

replaces service cultures. For jointness to endure, services 

must infuse it in key areas such as lift, logistics, space, and 

ISR. Moreover, jointness must become inculcated through 

leadership, training, and war gaming, such as Unified 

Quest. Lastly, jointness must be instituted from captain to 

flag rank through schools and joint war games. 

The Present as Prelude to the Future: Has Tomorrow 

Arrived?

With Dr. Douglas Johnson presiding, this panel 

featured Mr. James Howe, Dr. Steve Biddle, and Dr. 

Steven Metz. Missile technology is creating increasingly 

smaller, cost effective, and more accurate missiles, which 

will permit the United States to project power immediately 

and with greater effect. Their increasing sophistication 

will herald a very different kind of warfare and forces 

necessary to prosecute it. 

The new American way of war must reflect emerging 

forms of armed conflict. The devolution of warfare 

describes a blend of state and nonstate actors with little 

distinction between war and peace. Nonstate actors will be 

self-funded, networked, and unconstrained by laws and 

rules. To counter the U.S. dominance, states and nonstates 

will adopt asymmetric warfare and moral ambiguities. 

Hence, the United States must be prepared to fight 

slow, deliberate and perhaps even indecisive conflicts. 

Decisiveness requires: strategic, operational and tactical 

vision to anticipate threats and form an accurate picture 

of the battlespace; decisional, strategic, operational, and 

tactical speed to permit the United States to respond to 

threats sufficiently; tactical, strategic, and psychological 

precision for permitting accuracy, limiting unintended 

consequences, and achieving desired, controlled effects; 

and government, nongovernment, and interagency 

compatibility. 

The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan illustrated that a 

transformation of sorts took place. For that theater and 

the particular circumstances involved, the SOF-AlliesPrecision Bombing formula worked, but its applicability to 

other conflicts must be tempered by serious examination 

and not as a formula. Regardless, the role of ground power 

is a sine qua non to the new American way of war.

Conference Wrap-up: Assessment and Critique.

Dr. Douglas Lovelace moderated this final panel 

comprising Dr. Robin Dorff, Dr. Jeffrey Record, Dr. 

Grant Hammond, and Dr. Marybeth Ulrich. Events in 

Iraq clearly support the contention that there is a new 

way of conducting war and it, under certain conditions, 

is likely to be a successful way. The new conduct of war 

is not attrition warfare but is increasingly technologically 

based, faster moving over greater distances, fought by 

smaller formations and more precise in selecting targets 

and hitting those targets.

The new way retains aspects of the old in that it is still 

chaotic, requires flexibility, requires effective leadership, is 

inextricably linked to other sources of national power, and 

should be conducted in the context of a grand strategy.

At the strategic level, it is not yet clear if Iraq is an 

aberrant example of warfare or represents a new way of 

war in that it is a preventative war, less concerned with 

international approval, and less multilateral. The danger 

of this becoming our new way is that to sustain such 

policies may result in political isolation and a fear of U.S. 

power. 

Conclusions.

The 14th Annual Strategy Conference vetted the 

implications, risks, and opportunities available to the 

United States. No one can select with certainty the best 

path to take, but relying on the status quo is not an option. 

The conference provided an opportunity to discuss the 

way ahead. Policymakers, academics, and senior leaders 

can continue that dialogue.

*****

The views expressed in this brief are those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position 

of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, 

or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s 

programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at http:

//www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/index.html or by calling (717) 245-

4212.

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