Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30259

Summary Calendar

RICKY VEALS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

NAUTICAL ADVENTURES, LLC; PRIDE OFFSHORE INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:06-CV-3776

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ricky Veals filed suit for personal injuries sustained during his transport

from an offshore oil rig to a nearby vessel. Following Veals’s presentation of

evidence at trial, the district court granted the defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion for

judgment as a matter of law. We AFFIRM.

Veals’s claims stem from an accident on the M/V C-HERO, a vessel owned

and operated by defendant Nautical Ventures, LLC. At the time of the incident,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 29, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 09-30259

2

Veals was an employee of Sperry Sun/KBR, working as a sample catcher on an

offshore oil rig. After an altercation with a supervisor, Veals was ordered off the

rig. In order to reach the shore, Veals first had to be transferred in a personnel

basket from the rig to the M/V C-HERO. The crane used for personnel basket

transport was operated by defendant Pride Offshore, Inc. Veals allegedly

informed a Pride employee that he had never ridden a personnel basket before,

and did not receive any instruction on the proper way to exit it. 

Veals boarded the basket, which according to his own testimony at trial,

landed flat on the deck of the M/V C-HERO. The sea was calm, there was no

wind, and the weather was clear. Stepping off, Veals placed both feet on the

ship. He then fell backwards, sustaining personal injuries.

Veals brought suit against Nautical Ventures, which was the owner and

operator of the vessel, and against Pride, the operator of the personnel basket.

At the jury trial, Veals testified that Pride failed to follow its own procedures

that required employees to instruct first-time riders on the appropriate methods

for getting on and off. There was no evidence of negligent maintenance or

operation other than the absence of instructions to a first-time rider. 

After Veals presented his case, defendants moved for judgment as a matter

of law. The judge granted the motion, finding no evidence that negligence by

either defendant caused the fall and injury. On appeal, Veals does not make any

argument concerning possible error in granting judgment to the vessel owner.

Thus, the only question we must answer is whether there was error in the

judgment in favor of the operator of the personnel basket.

We review a grant of judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 de

novo, applying the same standard used in the district court. Rutherford v.

Harris County, Texas, 197 F.3d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1999). In a jury trial,

judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where a party has been fully heard

on an issue, and facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of one party that
No. 09-30259

3

reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Wallace v. Methodist.

Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001). A mere scintilla of evidence is

insufficient to present a question for the jury. Id. 

Here, Veals alleged injury under two separate statutes. First, he sought

relief under Louisiana tort law. That law operates as surrogate federal law

pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”). 43 U.S.C. §

1331, et seq. No issue is raised here as to whether OCSLA applies, and thus we

accept that it does and that it borrows Louisiana tort law for this case. 

The Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[e]very act whatever of man that

causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (1999). Louisiana courts have interpreted this

section to require proof of the basic elements of negligence. Namely, a plaintiff

must prove: (1) defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific

standard; (2) defendant’s conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard;

(3) defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries;

(4) defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries;

and (5) actual damages. Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 782 So. 2d 606, 611 (La.

2001). Failure to prove even one of these elements precludes recovery. Mathieu

v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318 (La. 1994).

The district court expressly assumed that Veals’s factual allegations were

true. Specifically, the court accepted that Pride failed to give instructions to

Veals on the procedures for exiting the basket. The causation inquiry is

whether, but for the defendants’ substandard conduct, the accident would not

have occurred. Perkins, 782 So. 2d at 611. Veals did not allege that the

instructions he should have received would have prevented the type of injury he

suffered. He presented evidence that Pride typically instructed riders to bend

their knees when the basket landed, but he did not testify that Pride

recommended procedures applying to stepping off the basket onto the deck of a
No. 09-30259

4

vessel. Although he claimed that the boat was rocking when he first landed,

Veals did not present evidence that the boat operator acted negligently, that the

crane malfunctioned, or that the weather was inclement. Indeed, undisputed

evidence showed that the weather was calm and the wind was not blowing. Veals

admitted that he did not know how his fall occurred. 

On appeal, Veals complains that the trial judge made credibility

determinations, weighed evidence, and did not draw all reasonable inferences

in his favor. We disagree. Although the trial judge recounted some of the

testimony in the oral ruling on the Rule 50(a) motion, he expressly assumed that

Veals had not been properly warned. The absence of a warning was the only

issue in dispute. There simply was no evidence as to why Veals fell and

therefore nothing on which jurors could rely in assigning fault to the personnel

basket operator. Absent evidence that a proper warning could have prevented

the injury Veals suffered, he failed to make out a prima facie case for negligence.

Veals also sought relief pursuant to Section 905(b) of the Longshore and

Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). The only reference to

the statute is in a jurisdictional statement at the beginning of Veals’s brief. Not

having made any argument regarding the Act, Veals abandoned the issue. See

Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

No reasonable juror could find that Veals proved a causal relationship

between his injuries and the defendants’ alleged conduct. We AFFIRM.