JUN

2016

Version 1.0

TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Threat Tactics Report:

Iran
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

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This (U) Threat Tactics Report (TTR) was produced in accordance with (U) Intelligence Community Directive Number 203: Analytical Standards 

(Effective: January 2015). This TTR was coordinated with:

 National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)—Mr. James Bellette

 HQDA DCS G-2—Mr. Dana R. Dillon

 FMSO—Mr. Tom Wilhelm

 ASCC—ARCENT ACE (available on SIPR)

Comments and feedback are welcome.

Jon S. Cleaves

Director, ACE Threats Integration

Executive Summary

 The US State Department has “long-standing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, sponsorship 

of terrorism and human rights record.”1

 Iran would likely use an adaptive hybrid threat consisting of regular, irregular, and criminal 

elements to defend its territorial assets and national interests.

 Iran’s military presents a threat that uses both high- and low-tech threat capabilities to 

challenge a potential technologically-superior adversary.

 Iran is geographically positioned on a major strategic chokepoint (Strait of Hormuz). 

 Iran conducts well-organized and effective information warfare (INFOWAR) operations,

sometimes in the form of military exercises that demonstrate the potential and intent to disrupt 

maritime operations in the Strait of Hormuz.

 Iran’s operatives continue to support groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, 

Badr Group, and Iraqi militias.

 Iran continues to support Assad’s regime in Syria.

 “Iran’s destabilizing activities” are a continued “problem” for the US.

2

 The Iranian military consists of two elements: The Artesh composes the conventional military 

that resembles the pre-1979 force before the Islamic Revolution. The 1979 revolution created 

the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that primarily protects the Islamic regime.

 The IRGC espouses an unconventional military doctrine.

 The IRGC has projected Iran’s agenda via terrorist operations in Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, and 

Thailand in 2012.3

Cover photo: IRGC Seal, 20 November 2013. 
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Introduction

TRADOC G2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) is the source of the Threat Tactics Report (TTR) series of 

products. TTRs serve to explain to the Army training community how an actor fights. Elements that 

contribute to this understanding may include an actor’s doctrine, force structure, weapons and 

equipment, education, and warfighting functions. There will be a discussion of the actor’s tactics and 

techniques, and recent examples of tactical actions will be described. An actor may be regular or 

irregular, and a TTR will have a discussion of what a particular actor’s capabilities mean to the US and its 

allies. 

A TTR will also identify where the conditions specific to the actor are present in the Decisive Action 

Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be 

implemented across all training venues. 

Section 1: Introduction to Iran

This is version 1.0 of the TTR Iran series that focuses on the Iranian military and how it can be translated

to the Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series. This product was produced for an unclassified venue for the US 

training community. 

Iran as a state actor has numerous internal and external factors that influence its military spectrum and

affect everything from equipment procurement to overall military strategy. Issues within the Iranian 

operational environment, compounded by current sanctions (that are in the process of being reduced), 

the controversial nuclear program, and the ongoing support to terrorist organizations, have created 

divides between religious/political conservatives and moderates within the country, as well as criticism 

from state and non-state actors globally.4

In recent years, the Iranian leadership’s stance on its nuclear program has heightened tensions between 

Iran and the rest of the world.5Iran’s lethal aid support to proxy actors worldwide, especially in Bahrain, 

Yemen, and Syria, continues to agitate regional tensions with the focus to disrupt Saudi Arabia’s 

interests.

6 The five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) talks have

temporarily defused the Iranian nuclear issue; however, the country’s nuclear ambitions still have the 

potential for being a future flashpoint.7 

Strategy and Goals

The Iranian leadership’s hierarchy is complex, intertwined, and sometimes inconsistent, which at times 

hinders the country’s overarching strategic objectives.8Factors that influence the paradigm of Iran’s 

military strategies are manifested in the ongoing tentative balance between religious, political, and 

historical rivalries (both real and perceived); the current fragile economy; and the geopolitical 

characteristics that are consistent with the Iranian operational environment.9 These variables converge 

to shape the strategic, operational, and tactical echelons within the armed forces’ structure, which is 

further translated into their capabilities, tactics, and equipment. 
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Figure 1. Iranian leadership

These factors drive Iran’s decisionmaking process with regard to military equipment/weapons 

acquisition (purchased or developed organically) and how these systems are employed on the battlefield 

in training or in conflict. Further muddling Iran’s strategy and goals are the two unique and, at times,

competing military entities. The joint headquarters has command authority over both the Iranian 

Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Artesh (regular military), even though below this command level 

the chain of command for both the IRGC and the Artesh usually plan and conduct operations separately. 

Iran’s military espouses four major intertwined strategic imperatives:

10

 Modernizing the military11

 Exporting the evolution paradigm (military projection) 

 Defending Iran’s sovereignty and territorial assets

 Becoming the dominant regional military power and being regarded as a global power 

Military Modernization 

As mentioned above, Iran has engaged in a logical sequence of imperatives in order to support its

overarching strategic goals. The first imperative consists of Iran’s military modernization initiative. Iran’s 

military is currently experiencing a considerable modernization and rearmament effort that by itself is a 

strategic objective intertwined with implications on the other three lines of effort.12 The IRGC and 
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Figure 2. Iranian/proxy terror attacks

Artesh (ground and air) have an aging fleet. Iranian modernization emphasizes Iranian-based weapons 

development, updating, and reverse-engineering that permits Iran to become self-sufficient even with 

past sanctions.13 Iran is upgrading its mechanized forces but still is dependent on an aging armor fleet; 

however, the country is beginning to produce its own mechanized vehicles based on older 

models/chassis within its inventory. The focus has shifted to less armor and more fast-attack vehicles,

such as motorcycles or speedboats, to align with pieces of Iran’s adaptive doctrine. The air force’s aging 

inventory presents challenges to mission readiness with regard to air power. Iran’s military industry has

primarily focused on development and expansion within the following categories: cruise and ballistic 

missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and cyber warfare.14

Exported Revolution Paradigm (Military Projection)

Iran has been listed since January 1984 as a state sponsor of terrorism according to the United States 

Department of State, and has supported multiple acts of terrorism in recent years.

15 In the future, Iran

will likely continue to keep exporting its ideologically-charged Shia-based revolution with the use of 
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

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Figure 3. Snapshot of the Iranian military

smaller clandestine units within the IRGC’s Quds forces. The IRGC’s Quds forces advise, train, and equip 

anti-Western factions in Syria, Yemen, Gaza and Lebanon.

16 The majority of Iran’s lethal aid support is 

geared toward Shia-based militias; however, Iran also supports Sunni groups, such as is the case with 

Hamas.17

The IRGC’s export of lethal aid to terror groups has a multi-pronged benefit for Iran’s military complex. 

This force projection is intended to disrupt US interests and/or other potential adversaries, confirm 

Iran’s role as a regional power, and create an outlet for a recurring financial gain through the sale of 

lethal aid.18 The IRGC’s relationships with terror groups are vital to its ability to supply lethal aid, conduct 

clandestine direct action missions, and support Iran’s intelligence-gathering apparatus. The IRGC has 

projected its influence in the form of terrorist operations in Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, and Thailand in 

2012 alone.

19

The key appendage for the Iranian military’s projection is the IRGC and in particular the Quds forces.20

The conventional (Artesh) Iranian military has a limited reach capability as related to forced entry 

operations. The IRGC, especially the Quds forces, has links to terror and criminal organizations with a 

potential global strike capability, including targets within the United States.21

Defend Iran’s Sovereignty and Territorial Assets

The primary mission of the Artesh is to protect 

the territorial sovereignty of the Islamic 

Republic of Iran and that of the IRGC is to 

protect the regime. Iran has developed a 

flexible military doctrine and often uses 

aggressive information warfare (INFOWAR) 

campaigns in order to defend the country’s

interests.

The Iranian government, in the past, has used hostile INFOWAR messages with the repetitive theme of

disrupting maritime operations in the Strait of Hormuz, which is a transit point for 30% of all seabornetraded oil.22 A recent example of INFOWAR arose in late December of 2011, when the US threatened to 

restrict Iran’s oil exports. At the time, Iran’s Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi stated, “If Iran oil is 

banned, not a single drop of oil will pass through Hormuz Strait.”

23

The Strait of Hormuz consists of a constricted channel that provides an entrance into the Persian Gulf 

from the Gulf of Oman, making it a natural chokepoint.24 The Strait of Hormuz’s narrowest point is 21 

miles wide. The shipping lane in each direction is two miles wide, with a two-mile buffer zone. The 

IRGCN incorporates the natural chokepoint into its military wargaming and defensive protocols.25 The 

Iranian military developed these tactics based on the lessons from the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)—

which also encompassed the Tanker Wars (1984–1987)—and now includes its learned experiences in its 

adaptive tactics.26

Key Alliances

In the past, China, Russia, and North Korea have supplied Iran with military technology and have 

maintained some type of diplomatic relationship. The connections have fluctuated over the years
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depending on the strategic environment. This project acknowledges the importance of these bonds; 

however, it will not examine these particular relationships. This portion focuses instead on Iran’s major 

exports of lethal aid to terror organizations. 

Lebanese Hezbollah

Iran has an extensive history and played a critical role in the creation and development of Lebanese 

Hezbollah (LH) dating back to 1982. In the past, Iran has used LH as a proxy and to support lethal aid 

shipments.27 Iran supplied weapons and equipment to LH during the 2006 conflict with Israel, during 

which reports indicate that Hezbollah launched 10,000 Iranian rockets at Israeli cities.28 The 2006 

Hezbollah conflict supports Iran’s military doctrinal theory of how a hybrid threat using adaptive tactics 

can defeat a technologically-superior adversary. Hezbollah links to the IRGC are also playing a large role 

in the Syrian conflict.29

Syria

Historically, Iran’s closest Arab supporter has been the Syrian political regime. Iran is providing a 

considerable amount of resources in the form of funding, weapons, and advisors to the Syrian civil war 

against the Sunni-led insurgents.30 If the Syrian regime were to be defeated by the rebels it would be a 

substantial setback for Iran’s strategic influence and would greatly disrupt Iran’s lethal aid logistical 

network.31 The Iranians have used Syria has a distribution point for lethal aid shipments in support of 

Hezbollah, among other terror organizations. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report in 2012

stated that “the fighting in Syria also reflects the regional tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, 

Arabs and Kurds, and Arabs and Iranians that have shaped events in Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain in recent 

years.”

32 The conflict in Syria is divided along sectarian lines and has the potential to spread to other 

locations with similar demographics such as, but not limited to, Yemen, Bahrain, and Iraq. These 

potential sectarian proxy conflicts could be fueled by supporters loyal to Iran’s Shia population or Saudi 

Arabia’s Sunni-based majority.

Hamas

Iran remains flexible in its foreign policy and is willing to support either Shia or Sunni terror 

organizations when it suits the country’s geostrategic needs, in spite of its repeated INFOWAR messages 

focused on exporting Shia-based ideology. An example that personifies the willingness of the Iranians to 

ignore the Shia-Sunni divide was reported in the US State Department’s 2014 Country Report on 

Terrorism, which specified that Hamas received “funding, weapons and training from Iran.”33

Iran’s support to the Syrian regime with regard to the ongoing civil war diminished its relationship with

Hamas. CRS reports that, as of late 2012, Iran had made multiple attempts to restore the damaged 

connection with Hamas using “missile technology” as one source of leverage.34 The same report also 

states that Iran has supported Hamas with the Fajr-5, a short-range missile that can reach Israel. Hamas 

has reversed-engineer the Fajr-5 to create its own variant, which was used in the November 2012 

conflict between Israel and Palestinian militant groups.35 Another example of Iran’s lethal aid logistical 

support to Hamas was reported on 5 March 2014 by CBS News, which stated that the Israeli navy seized 

a ship on the Red Sea with a cargo of M-302 rockets destined for Gaza militants.36
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Figure 4. IRGC and Artesh 

(ground)

Iraq

Strategically, the removal of Iran’s longtime rival Saddam Hussein in Iraq from his position as dictator by 

coalition forces greatly benefitted Iran’s interests.37 The two regimes had an historical tension that 

predated the Iran-Iraq War. Sixty to sixty-five percent of the population in Iraq is Shia, heavily 

congregated in the southern provinces neighboring Iran.38 This virtually ensured that Iran, through its 

influence of Shia political parties, would have a significant impact on the Iraqi operational environment. 

The remodeling of the Iraqi political system led to further isolation of the Sunni minority. Iran is 

currently supporting the Iraqi military as well as the Shia-based militias.

39 Kataib Hezbollah (KH) is an 

example of a militia group that is militarily engaging the Sunni-based Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL) in an attempt to halt the latter’s progress in Iraq. The US State Department has designated KH as a 

foreign terrorist organization that has “exacerbated sectarian tensions in Iraq and have committed 

serious human rights abuses against primary Sunni civilians.”40

Organizational Size and Structure 

The Iranian military is comprised of two main components that consist of the Artesh and the IRGC, both 

of which consist of a ground force, navy, and air force. The IRGC was 

originally created in 1979 to protect the newly-founded religiousbased Islamic regime from potential threats, including the Artesh.41

The IRGC elements are providers of lethal aid to radical Islamic 

terror groups worldwide in exporting of the Islamic Revolution’s 

vision. The IRGC has an adaptive and unconventional-based doctrine 

derived from firsthand experiences, such as the Iran-Iraq War,

extracting lessons learned from historical conflict, and monitoring

current military engagements. Iran views the US as a major threat 

and is attentive to the US military’s activities, including the 

past/current involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran also extracts 

lessons learned from the ongoing Israel/Hezbollah conflicts,

including important lessons from the 2006 conflict. The Iranian 

military has developed a defensive posture and a flexible, adaptive 

doctrine for its military forces.

The Iranian Revolution Guard Corps

The IRGC was originally created to protect the religious-based 

Islamic regime and has adapted the lessons from the Iran-Iraq War 

that formed the current unconventional doctrine. The IRGC is 

divided into 31 separate commands across the country, one for each

province.

42 These units are semi-independent with a decentralized 

command structure that, in theory, would mitigate damage to 

command and control (C2) if an invasion by a technologicallysuperior adversary were to become a reality. If provoked, the Iranian 

military could be described as a hybrid threat with regular, irregular, and criminal elements working in 

tandem to defend Iran’s borders and territorial assets. The IRGC’s units would likely organize into 
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smaller hunter-killer type units fighting an irregular fight with emphasis on speed, mobility, and surprise. 

The Iranian doctrine emphasizes the use of fast-attack vehicles on land and sea that would put a 

premium on mobility, and decentralized command and control to ensure a flexible, more adaptive 

military force that takes advantage of the restrictive terrain within the country. 

The IRGC has become a powerful element within Iran and is entangled in the political, religious, and 

economic sectors. The dynamics of these relationships in many instances have translated into better 

funding, missions, and equipment for the IRGC.

Artesh: Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Forces (IRIGF)

The Artesh maintains a robust conventional military organization. The Artesh has a military force that 

consists of 350,000 soldiers divided into the army, navy, and air force.43 The ground forces possess six 

infantry divisions, four armor divisions, six artillery divisions, two commando divisions, one airborne 

brigade, and one special forces brigade.44

Figure 5. Iranian ground forces
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The primary mission of the Artesh is to protect the territorial sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

The Artesh IRIGF consists of 222,000 active duty soldiers (excluding the navy and air force).

The following are significant weaknesses that would hinder the Artesh’s regular capabilities:

 Antiquated and poorly maintained equipment

 Primitive and localized C2 capabilities

 A lack of highly-training technical professional soldiers

 Insufficient replacement parts for equipment, especially air assets

 The rugged terrain and Iran’s size create mobility gaps and challenges for defender or aggressor

 Lack of logistical capabilities for long-term operations

The Iranian Air Forces

Iran’s military possesses two distinct air force organizational structures. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air 

Force (IRIAF) maintains many of the fixed wing aircraft and is similar to the air force’s structure before 

the 1979 revolution. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC AF) has control of 

the controversial ballistic mission program, a UAV program, a large number of rotary wing aircraft, and a 

small number of fixed wing aircraft. 

The primary mission of the Iranian Air Forces (both IRGC and IRIAF) is to protect and defend Iran’s 

airspace and sovereignty. The IRIAF’s air inventory consists of a mixture of aircraft from a range of 

different ages and a multitude of different countries. However, the majority of the Iranian aging 

inventory consists of US-supplied aircraft predating the 1979 revolution.45

Overall, the Iranian air components do not comprise a formidable threat to a technologically-advanced 

air force. Many of Iran’s aircraft are still operational due to the efforts of its domestic military industry, 

which has worked on gaps caused by the lack of replacement aircraft parts due to past sanctions. The 

IRGC clandestine elements have attempted to purchase parts from the black market using witting and 

unwitting sources.46 Despite Iran’s creative problem-solving, the issues of operational readiness, 

sustainment, and training, as well as the overall air force as an organization, are problematic and 

contradictory to the vision of Iran’s modernization goal. 

Jane’s reports that China supplied at least 65 F-7 fighters—a Chinese-replicated MiG-21—to Iran.

47 The 

American F-14 and the Russian MiG-29 remain the biggest air threats to Western forces. Air elements 

primarily support their ground forces. Iran’s military leadership would likely position the best air defense 

artillery (ADA) assets and prized aircraft near strategic sites, such as nuclear plants, in order to interdict 

and deter possible attacks. Overall, the Iranian air component does not comprise a formidable threat to 

a technologically-advanced air force.

The IRIAF’s headquarters, training, sustainment, and air defense center is located in the capital of 

Tehran. The IRIAF is organized into three geographical commands: Western Area Command (WAC), 

Southern Area Command (SAC), and Eastern Area Command (EAC), with an estimated 30,000 personnel 

overall divided among the three separate commands.

48 Reporting indicates that the WAC has the 

majority of the combat air power divided among the following bases: Mehrabad, Tabriz, Hamadan, 

Dezful, Omidiyeh, Shiraz, and Esfahan.

49 The WAC has the key responsibility of monitoring the airspace 

along the Iraqi border and is tasked with securing Tehran’s airspace. The heavy support to the WAC 

illustrates the importance that the Iranian hierarchy has placed on its organizational responsibilities. The 
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SAC has the mission to protect the airspace along the Persian Gulf with bases in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas,

and Chah Bahar. The EAC main airbase in Mashhad is assigned to protect the Iran-Afghanistan border.

Jane’s estimates that Iran could potentially possess 16 combat squadrons; however, the exact 

operational readiness number is still unknown. Open source reports greatly vary from source to source 

and compounding the problem is the mixing of IRGC air elements with the Artesh air assets.50

The IRGC has control over Iran’s extensive missile program, which has received support from China, 

Russia, and North Korea in the past.51 As an example, Iran’s Shahab 3 missile is a modified version of 

North Korean’s No Dong missile that can range targets out to 2,000 km.

52

Single-source reporting from Jane’s states that the IRGC missile force consists of five brigades (BDEs):53

 15th Ghaem Missile BDE, location unknown, with short-range missiles (Fajr) 

 5th Ra’ad Missile BDE northwest of Tehran in Karaj, with Shahab 3 & 4 missiles

 7th Al-Hadid Missile BDE located in Karaj, with Shahab 1 & 2 missiles, has C2 over the Ali Missile 

Site in Khorrambab 

 19th Zulfeqar Missile BDE located in Karaj, also has short-range systems (Nazeat and Zelzal)

 23rd Towhid Missile BDE located in Khorramabad

The Iranian Naval Forces

Iran has two distinct navies that consist of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the 

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN). The missions are similar for both organizations, which are to defend 

Iran’s littoral territories and protect Iranian interests. The IRGCN and the IRIN have different areas of 

operations. The IRGCN possesses a lighter fleet of ships and is charged with the vital close-in mission of 

coastal defense and the responsibility to protect the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.54 The IRGCN’s 

naval doctrine has adapted to use swarming and fast-attack tactics.55 The IRIN is considered the more 

Figure 6. Overview of Iranian air and naval assets
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conventional navy and possesses a longer force projection, considered the “blue water” mission; 

however, the IRIN ships and boats are suffering from antiquated equipment, which leads to 

questionable operational readiness. The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) noted that 

the overall IRIN remains “far less capable of fighting a conventional battle at sea than when it was 

decisively defeated by the US Navy in the ‘tanker war’ of 1987-1988.”56

Most of Iran’s military operates in defensive belts in order to deter an aggressor.

57 As an example, if an 

opponent was to engage by sea, the IRIN would be the first entity to attempt engagement, while the 

IRGCN would be second and commit closer to the borders. The biggest threats posed by Iran’s navies 

would consist of swarming attacks by fast boats with missiles and vehicle borne improvised explosive 

devices (VBIEDs), submarines, and mining the Strait of Hormuz.

58

 

Paramilitary Forces and Intelligence

The Iranian government tasks its paramilitary forces with the following missions: basic law enforcement, 

border control, and maintenance of public order.59 The paramilitary agencies within Iran are divide into 

the following organizations: the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the Law Enforcement 

Forces (LEF) under the Interior Ministry, and, in a separate chain of command, the IRGC, which includes 

the Basij militia. Jane’s estimates that Iran possesses at least 400,000 paramilitary personnel throughout 

the country.60

When viewed from the Western perspective, the multi-organizational paramilitary presents an illusion 

of chaos and disarray. The multifaceted institutional structure, however, is not in a state of constant 

anarchy, such as it might appear; rather, the smaller components collaborate in a semi-competent 

overlapping manner to support the regime’s overall agenda. In 2009, the US State Department reported 

that Iran’s security forces faced corruption issues and acted with impunity as they conducted serious 

human rights violations, especially in demonstrations after the 2009 elections.61

Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)

According to Jane’s, the Iranian government formed the LEF in 1991 by unifying the police, gendarmerie, 

and the revolutionary committees.62 In 2007, the Iranian government announced a new program to 

improve the border regiment’s equipment. The government provided updated technology to strengthen 

border security as a method to combat smuggling and insurgency groups that pose a threat to the state. 

The LEF conducts law enforcement, border control, and maintains internal civil order. The Supreme 

Leader approves the LEF chief, who is recommended by the president even though the organization falls 

under the Ministry of Interior. Multiple units overlap, such as the Social Corruption Unit and the Public 

Establishment Office, which attempt to weed out unacceptable, lewd social behaviors such as 

questionable clothing or music and public interaction between males and females.63

The Basij: “Mobilization of the Oppressed”

The IRGC has command of the Basij—another category of reserve military personnel or militia. 

Translated, the Basij means “Mobilization of the Oppressed.” The organization was established during 

the 1979 revolution, but gained prominence in the Iran-Iraq War. The Basij became infamous for military 

operations that consisted of young boys and/or older men that conducted human wave attacks against 
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the Iraqi defensive lines.

64 Human waves would advance into Iraqi defensive positions, including 

minefields, and in many cases be “martyred.” 

The Iranian government organized the Basij geographically around local cities or districts. Basij Ashura 

battalions contain only males while Basij al-Zahra battalions contain only females.65 The Iranian 

government subordinates the Basij units to the IRGC and would likely use their personnel to fill out the 

IRGC’s ranks in a large-scale conflict.

The Basij organizational structure has three major categories:66

 Regular Members consist of unpaid volunteers that can be mobilized during periods of internal 

civil unrest or conflict. The member is paid if he takes part in war-time duty.

 Active Members receive compensation during periods of non-conflict and tend to be political 

and religious hardliners that go through extensive indoctrination.

 Special Members are paid cadre that are dual members of the Basij and the IRGC’s ground 

forces.

Actual Basij members are estimated at around 300,000 with the potential to mobilize 1,000,000 more, 

although Iran publicly claims numbers as high as twelve million.67 In addition to traditional military 

operations, Basij units perform civil support missions. In the past, Basij units assisted with public health 

activities, assisted in construction projects, guarded administrative centers, and assisted the police. 

The government considers the Basij as a critical section with regard to internal security, as witnessed 

during the 2009 elections. The government also considers the mobilization of the Basij as crucial if an 

aggressor threatens Iran. The Basij would fill the ranks of the IRGC, as was the case during the Iran-Iraq 

War.

IRGC’s Quds Forces

The IRGC’s Intelligence Directorate controls the Quds forces, which is a paramilitary elite entity that has 

the mission for extra-territorial covert operations including an unconventional warfare component. The 

organization is headquartered out of the southwestern city of Ahvaz. CSIS reports that the unit was 

5,000 and was to increase to 15,000, including support elements.68 The missions consist of lethal aid, 

advising, financing, and building relationships with terror organizations like Hezbollah.69 These elements 

sometimes use diplomatic institutions like embassies as backstops to conduct operations. 

Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)

Iran has a number of intelligence services including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), 

which handles the more traditional foreign and domestic intelligence responsibilities. MOIS belongs to 

the Ministry of the Government and has a close relationship with the president—unlike the IRGC, which

is closer to the Supreme Leader. The main headquarters for MOIS is in Tehran. There are five 

directorates included in MOIS:70

 The Directorate of Analysis and Strategy’s main function is to provide Iran’s leadership with 

intelligence analysis.

 The Internal Security Directorate’s main function is to safeguard state institutions, including 

transit points such as airports, seaports, and border crossings.
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 The National Security Directorate has the mission of monitoring and conducting surveillance on 

opposition movements.

 The Counterintelligence Directorate’s main purpose is to eradicate espionage within and outside 

the country.

 The Foreign Intelligence Directorate’s mission is to collect, conduct research, and prepare 

analysis on foreign intelligence entities. 

The MOIS also has a subset of departments embedded in the five main directorates that differs in 

responsibilities, such as interior intelligence, foreign affairs, open source intelligence, religious studies, 

planning, attorney general, operations, training, administration, financial services, and stores.71

Section 2: Iranian Weapons and Equipment

The majority of Iran’s air/land weapons and equipment is antiquated. Iran’s military inventory presents 

challenges to mission readiness with regard to ground and air power. Its arsenal consists of systems 

from a myriad of different countries; however, a large portion of its inventory was supplied by the 

United States before the 1979 revolution. Iran’s military industry has focused on the development of 

UAVs, missiles (both cruise and ballistic), and extending cyber capabilities.72 This action is consistent 

with its defensive adaptive doctrine to deter attacks.

Iran has focused a large amount of resources on an inventory of fast-attack vehicles that emphasize 

speed and mobility, like motorcycles and fast-attack boats. During the Prophet 9 exercise, motorcycles 

with Iranian soldiers armed with anti-tank weapons and boats with cruise missiles swarmed targets.73

This weapons/equipment procurement could be perceived as a cost-effective way to counter a heavymechanized adversary. 

Due to sanctions, Iran’s military industry has upgraded and reverse-engineered a number of systems in 

the mechanized arsenal. Iran claimed to produce its own mechanized vehicles, such as armor and 

armored personnel carriers; however, many of its claims with regard to these new vehicles are based on 

older chassis and models within the preexisting inventory.

ARMY

Armored Equipment in Service

Zulfiqar 150 Chieftain Mk 3/5 150 BMP-2 400

T-72 / T-72S 480 M47M UNK Sarir UNK

T-72M1 50 M48A5 150 Boraq Type-86 140

Safir-74 100 M60A1 150 BTR-50/60 300

Type 72Z UNK Tosan UNK M113A1 200

T-54/55 320 BRDM-2 UNK BMT-2 (Cobra) UNK

Type 59 220 Scorpion 80 Rakhsh UNK

T-62 75 EE-9 Cascavel 35 Type-80 UNK

Type 69- II 200 BMP-1 / Boraq 140 Half-track UNK
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Artillery Systems in Service

155 mm / Raad-2 

(Thunder 2) UNK 122 mm / D-30 / Shafie D30 1 550 122 mm / Arash 50

122 mm / Raad-1 (Thunder 

1) UNK 122 mm / Type 54 / M-30 100 240 mm / Fadjr-3 UNK

203 mm / M110 30 75 mm / M116 115 330 / Fadjr-5 UNK

170 mm / M1978 (Koksan) 30 105 mm / M56 20 333 mm / Shahin 1 / 

Shahin 2

UNK

175 mm / M107 22 105 mm / M101A1 130 120 mm / M-65 200

155 mm / 2S1 (Gvozdika / 

M1974) 60 122 mm Type 60 / D-74 30 120 mm / DIO 500

155 mm / M109 / 109A1 / 

109A1B 150 130 mm / Type 59-1 985 107 mm / M30 150

155 mm / GH N-45 120 85 mm / D-44 80 37 mm UNK

203 mm / M115 20 107 mm / Type 63 UNK 81 mm 900

155 mm / M114A1 70 107 mm / Haseb (Fadjr 1) 600 81 mm / M-29 UNK

155 mm / HM41 UNK 122 mm / BM-21 100 60 mm / M19 500

AT/SAM Weapons in Service

9k111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot) UNK RPG-7V 490 SPG-9 Kopye (73 mm) UNK

9k14/9k11 Malyutka (AT-3 

Sagger) 4000 Saeghe UNK Misagh-1 UNK

9M111 (AT-4 Spigot) 1 4500 Saeghe 2 (Dragon) UNK Misagh-2 UNK

9M113 (AT-5 Spandrel) 2 2400 Shahin 1 1000 FM-90 UNK

9M114 (AT-6 Spiral) 3 500 SPG-9 Kopye (73 mm) UNK FM-80 / Crotale / Shahab 

Thaqeb UNK

BGM-71A 250

Toophan /Toophan 

2/3/4/5/6

(TOW / Improved TOW)

UNK MIM-23 HAWK 120

Entac 90 TOW 150 Pantsyr-S1 / 96K6 SA-22 

(Greyhound) UNK

FGM-77 / Dragon 30 Konkurs / Towsan-1 

(9K113) UNK 57 mm / ZSU-57-2 80

M18 (57 mm) 150 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin) 200 23 mm / ZSU-23-4 100

M20 50 Pantsyr-S1 96K6 SA-22 

Greyhound 10 14.5 mm / ZPU-2 / ZPU-4 UNK

M20 (75 mm) 200 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch) UNK 23 mm / ZU-23-2 300

M40A1 (106 mm) 200 Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) 29 85 mm / M1939 300

Nafez (40 mm) UNK FIM-92A (Stinger) UNK 57 mm / S-60 200

Red Arrow UNK Strela-2M / 9K32M SA-7b 

Grail 250 40 mm / L/70 50

RPG-22 Neto 200 HN-5A 190 35 mm / Skyguard 92
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

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ARMY AVIATION

Rotary Wing Aircraft in Service

EC-635 4 Mi-171E 22 SA 342 Gazelle 6

Mi-17 16

AIR FORCE

Fixed Wing Aircraft in Service

F-5 (and variants) 60 J-7 60 PC-6 8

C-130E Hercules 22 Boeing 707 6 P-3 Orion 4

Su-24 29 Boeing 747 11 Tazarve 25

Su-25 13 F27 Friendship 15 TB-21 8

Saeghe 3 Il-76 7 TB-200 4

F-14 Tomcat 44 Y-12 9 F33 Bonanza 34

F-4 Phantom II (and 

variants) 54 Jetstar 1 EMB-312 15

MiG-29 48 Falcon 50 3 PC-7 35

Mirage F1 20 Falcon 20 1

Rotary Wing Aircraft in Service

CH-47 Chinook 2 Bell 212 6 Bell 412 2

Bell 206 2 Bell 214 19 Shahed 274 2

Sea King 2

Missiles in Service

AIM-9P Sidewinder UNK PL-2 Atoll UNK AS-11 Kilter UNK

AA-8 Aphid UNK PL-5 UNK AS-12 Kegler UNK

AA-9 Amos UNK PL-7 UNK AS-14 Kedge UNK

AA-10 Alamo UNK PL-9 UNK AS-16 Kickback UNK

AA-11 Archer UNK Sattar-1 UNK YJ-6 (CAS-1) UNK

AIM-7F Sparrow UNK Sattar-2 UNK C-801C Sardine UNK

AIM-54 Phoenix UNK AGM-65 Maverick UNK Fajr-e-Darya (CPMIEC C802K) UNK

MIM-23B Hawk UNK AS-10 Karen UNK RIM-66 Standard UNK

R 550 Magic UNK
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

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NAVY

Vessels

Swiftships 35 m 6 Type 2010 4 Seaspray 24

Al-Uboor 3 Type 200 2 Al-Shams 1

Predator 5 Defender 26

Table 1. Iran military equipment

Military Capabilities

Command and Control

Iran possesses the only government in the world in which the executive branch does not control the 

military. Instead, the Supreme Leader, not the President or Prime Minister, serves as the military‘s 

commander-in-chief and maintains sole authority to declare war and peace.74 He controls the Islamic 

republic‘s intelligence and security directorates and sets the country‘s foreign and domestic goals. The 

Supreme Council for National Security (SCNC), under nominal control of the president, acts in an 

advisory capacity and its purpose lies in the preservation of the Islamic revolution, the protection of 

Iranian physical territory, and the maintenance of national sovereignty.

The military‘s chain of command does not include the SCNC, but SCNC members include many of those 

commonly associated with national security issues.75 The SCNC membership includes the Iranian 

president; speaker of parliament; head of the judiciary; chief of the combined general staff of the armed 

forces; ministers of foreign affairs, intelligence, and interior; two additional representatives appointed 

by the Supreme Leader; and heads of the IRGC and Artesh.76 The Supreme Leader also embedded his 

personal representatives in the SCNC. Day-to-day functioning of the armed forces falls upon the joint 

headquarters, so named because both the IRGC and the Artesh are under its command.77

Iran lacks a robust, secure, interoperable ground communications system that can handle a high volume 

of message traffic.78 Iran experiences communications difficulties within the various military branches.

The communication equipment includes HF, VHF, and UHF bands and encryption systems.79

Maneuver

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran used mass infantry assaults against Iraqi positions. The IRGC’s Basij 

attacked in human waves as light infantry, most of the time taking heavy casualties.80 The use of armor 

during this war was generally ineffective and Iran took heavy casualties to its armor forces.81 Both 

militaries took up defensive postures; however, Iran learned to seize the initiative and attack during the 

night or during inclement weather. Limited logistical support kept the mechanized force from seizing the 

initiative over large distances.82 During the Prophet 9 exercise, the IRGC used preparatory fires before 

motorcycles and armor maneuvered to engage. In a fight against a technologically-superior opponent, 

Iran’s IRGC would likely use its fast-attack vehicles, such as jeeps and motorcycles, as a major part of its 

maneuver fight. 
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INFOWAR

The Iranian government and military consider INFOWAR as a core competency for their organizations. 

Iran integrates INFOWAR at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The country remains cognizant 

of its growing conventional military weakness in comparison to the US and plans to mitigate its

deficiencies with a national defense strategy based upon unconventional tactics.

83 Iran involves itself 

heavily in all INFOWAR tools, with an emphasis on perception management, deception, and computer 

attack.

Computer Attack: Iran has offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. The regime has created an 

intricate system within the country to track Internet traffic—targeting internal threats and criminal 

behavior—and most likely based from the Cyber Defense Center.84 The Iranian Cyber Army, which is 

thought to be linked to the IRGC, is the primary organization that conducts offensive cyberattacks.85 In 

December 2014, Iran’s offensive cyber elements were deemed responsible for cyberattacks that 

targeted the US military, transportation, public utilities, and other critical infrastructure networks.86 Iran 

has invested heavily in cyber capabilities in its programs. These programs will evolve, mature, and 

continue to maintain the ability to threaten Western targets in cyberspace.87 

Perception Management: Iran uses perception management as a critical element to simultaneously rally 

the population against external threats and support the Islamic republic; to marginalize internal dissent; 

and to deter, dissuade, and defeat external actors that might attack Iran.88 An example can be drawn 

from the Prophet 9 exercise, when the IRGCN used a mock-up of a US aircraft carrier as the main target. 

A video was released on YouTube, with the INFOWAR theme targeted at internal and external 

audiences.89 

Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA)

Iran’s military has multiple means of collecting intelligence and conducting target acquisition and 

surveillance. From the air, it has UAVs and fixed-wing capability that can observe potential targets and 

collect target information. Pre-1979, the US shipped F-14As that were equipped with long-range AWG-9 

radar systems.90 Iran is reported to have one Boeing 707-3J9C transport in service that has the capability 

of conducting signals intelligence missions.91 Field artillery and air defense elements have radars that 

collect on incoming air targets. Iran’s ground forces have a robust special forces and commando element 

that consists of three divisions and six brigades of troopers that can conduct RISTA.92 The mechanized 

force has common reconnaissance vehicles such as the BRDM-2, Scorpion, and EE-9 Cascavel.93 

Fire Support

Jane’s estimates that Iran now possesses 3,000 to 3,200 medium to heavy artillery weapons and rocket 

launchers.94 Iran’s fire-support arsenal continues to have a large number of US-supplied systems 

predating 1979; however, due to lack of mobility of the systems during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran invested 

in Russian self-propelled guns. Iran’s military industry is now producing systems that are most likely 

reverse-engineered copies. 

In theory, if Iran was attacked it would most likely disperse the weapons systems and rely heavily on 

cover, concealment, decoys, and tactical shielding to protect from air and counterbattery attacks. It is 

questionable how effective the coordinating efforts would be between the IRGC and Artesh elements 

with regard to fire support. Fire support coordination during the Iran-Iraq War was substandard.95 The 
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

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decentralized commands that make up the Mosaic Defense would also possibly negatively affect fires 

coordination and increase the possibility of likely fratricide. During the Prophet 9 exercise, a video shows 

field artillery used as preparatory fires before the ground force assault.96 

Protection

Iran most likely can execute most of the 15 warfighting tactical tasks for protection if engaged in a major 

conflict. The proficiency level would be dependent on the type of unit and most likely be inconsistent 

across the spectrum of the IRGC or Artesh. However, from Iran’s perspective, conducting the tasks of 

“law and order” is the primary objective throughout the country. Of the 15 protection tasks, Iran is 

remarkably good at suppressing dissidents, who are perceived as criminals, as witnessed with the 2009 

elections.97 

Logistics

Like Iran’s military doctrine, the logistical system is intended to support a defensive military posture.98 

Iran’s military is not organized to support a long-range conventional force projection of power outside 

the country.99 The challenge presented by the mixture of equipment and weapons within the IRGC and 

Artesh compounds the logistical and resupply problems faced by the warfighting systems. The IRGC has 

provided lethal aid to a number of terror organizations. This allows for an irregular power projection 

with regard to logistics and lethal aid.100 Iran’s military industry produces, stores, and transports an 

extensive variety of munitions. Its air force can provide troop airlift resupply support with C-130s and 

Boeing 707s/747s; however, the fleet is aging and operation readiness is questionable.101 Iran’s navy has 

the capability to insert or resupply commandos using naval assets. 

Air Defense (AD)

In 2007, Iran was promised the “highly capable S-300 air defense system” by the Russians.102 The 

shipments were not delivered for years; however, after the lifting of sanctions in 2015, Russian officials 

indicated they would proceed with the S-300 delivery. In a recent article by the BBC the Iranians 

showcased the S-300 tube and radar in a parade.103 In 2009, Iran established a new air defense

command with responsibility charged to the Artesh. This command provides C2 and was designed to 

unite and consolidate equipment with regard to the country’s land-based air defense systems.104 This 

new command consolidation effort was in order to increase AD maneuverability and operability, and to 

consolidate intelligence collection efforts. This action was initiated due to the increased potential of an 

air attack on its nuclear facilities. Iran’s air defense apparatus consists of a headquarters in Tehran and 

five regional air defense sectors.105 The air defense assets generally follows the ring of air bases across 

the northern border and down the western section of the country, which Iran likely considered the most 

likely air avenue of approach. Interoperability and lack of quality maintenance for the aging equipment

in the command creates difficulties in carrying out the mission.

106 Iran has a wide territory to protect 

and will likely use a point defense strategy to protect key bases and facilities. 

The following are Iran’s major AD threats for an adversary:

107

 S-300 air defense system108

 Surface to air missile systems: Hawk, SA-24, FM-80 (see ADA chart above)

 Anti-aircraft artillery: 100 mm, 57 mm, 35 mm, 23 mm
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UAVs

Iran’s research and development program on unmanned aerial vehicles dates back to around 1984, 

during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran learned the value and importance of timely intelligence as it related to 

UAVs during this war and made them a priority for the military industry. The Iranians will continue to 

improve their UAV technology through research and development. The military industry within Iran has 

an extensive production of surveillance and reconnaissance equipment with regard to UAVs. In 2010, 

Iran released an armed UAV named the Karrar. The news agency Fars reported that the Iranian military 

industry has designed and produced 40 categories of unique UAV systems.109

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Official US intelligence reporting indicates that Iran is assessed as possessing a weapons of mass 

destruction program that includes offensive chemical and “probably” biological warfare agents.110 Even 

with these capabilities, the Congressional Research Report states “Iran is widely believed unlikely to use 

chemical, or biological weapons or to transfer them to its regional proxies or allies.”

111

Section 3: Iranian Tactics and Techniques

Iran’s military posture is mostly defensive in nature despite INFOWAR and the IRGC’s force projection.

Iran’s doctrine was created to deter potential attacks and/or fight a retrograde adaptive conflict that

would trade time for casualties in order to allow a resolution in the political arena and/or a defeat of the 

invader’s national will. The following diagram illustrates a snapshot of sequences on how Iran’s coastal 

defenses would likely conduct anti-access tactics.112 Hypothetically, if an invader attacked Iran, the IRIN, 

IRGCN, and air forces would be the first opposing forces that would engage the invader with anti-access 

operations.113

Iran would use ballistic and cruise missiles to 

attack maritime ships. The IRGCN would then 

use swarming attacks and fast-attack ships to 

isolate and overwhelm potential targets. These 

tactics of fast-attack vehicles also translate to 

ground units that put a premium on mobility.114

An example was illustrated in February 2015,

when the Iranian military showcased the 

IRGCN’s adaptive anti-access capabilities during 

the Prophet 9 annual exercise.115 The IRGCN

exercise demonstrated the ability to deploy 

mines; operate fast-attack boats; and launch 

cruise/ballistic missiles from land, air, and sea.116

The IRGCN used fast-attack boats, some armed 

with C-802 anti-ship missiles, to conduct a 

swarming attack to overwhelm one potential 

target that was a mock-up of a US aircraft 

carrier.117

Figure 7A. Swarming attack
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This was another example of ominous INFOWAR 

messages directed towards the US. These are four 

key observations extracted from the Prophet 9 

exercise:

 The IRGCN coastal defense fired cruise 

and ballistic missiles, hitting the target; 

however, this did not demonstrate an 

over-the-horizon missile capability. It is 

also worth noting that a US aircraft 

carrier would most likely not be traveling 

alone, but with convoy and air support,

and would also return fire as well as 

employ defensive countermeasures.

 The IRGCN used fast-attack boats with 

missiles to overwhelm and isolate targets 

with a swarm attacks. 

 The IRGCN used boats as VBIEDs.

 A helicopter fired a cruise missile during 

the attack on the mock-up US aircraft 

carrier. This illustrates a fast-attack

missile threat from land, air, and sea.

At a tactical level, the IRGCN armed its coastal 

defense force with the Ra’ad anti-ship missile 

that is likely based on the modified Chinese HY-2 

Seersucker cruise missile.118 The IRGCN deployed 

the Ra’ad missiles to 5–7 locations along the 

Iranian coast, utilizing the natural terrain and 

narrow channel to its advantage.119 The Ra’ad is a 

subsonic cruise missile with a low flight altitude 

and a range of 150 km.120 The IRGCN can launch 

cruise missiles from land, sea, and air-based 

weapons platforms.

The IRGCN’s tactics of fast-attack vehicles put a 

premium on speed and mobility. In a real-world 

scenario, the theory is that these fast boats could 

fire and maneuver quickly to safety, unlike larger 

naval platforms.

IRGC’s elements, while conducting fast-boat 

swarming tactics, could simultaneously start 

operations with missiles that can range regional 

adversary’s bases. The use of UAVs, cyber 

operations, and clandestine/covert proxies or 

Figure 7B. Swarming attack

Figure 7C. Swarming attack
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

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terror sleeper cells could also be used as a means to attack targets. Sleeper cells and commandos could 

potentially be used to attack military installations worldwide.121

After anti-access operations, the Artesh would be the first major resistance encountered in most 

ground-based invasion scenarios.122 Theoretically, if a technologically-superior country invaded Iran, it 

would immediately be confronted with the Artesh’s ground forces, which consist typically of light and 

mechanized infantry.123

The Artesh would attempt to repel or destroy the invader with conventional force-on-force

engagements. If this course of action failed to deter the aggressor, then the operational and tactical task 

would likely shift to delay for time, to allow the mobilization process and the “asymmetrical doctrine” to 

commence.124

The Artesh’s forces would rely heavily on cover, concealment, and deception. The Artesh would use key 

terrain and lines of communication, such as natural chokepoints and/or man-made infrastructure, to 

canalize enemy forces. Iran’s military during the Iran-Iraq War also realized the significance of using 

terrain to mask troop movements while forcing the aggressor to engage at a disadvantage in urban or 

canalized terrain, thus limiting a technologically-advanced enemy.125

A terrain analysis of Iran’s physical environment quickly explains the disposition of its military forces. 

The Zagros Mountains canalize movement from the northwest to the southeast. 

Figure 8a. Artesh defense
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

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Overall, Iran’s size and terrain dictate its military defensive strategy, as adapted by Iranian doctrine. 

Iran’s ground forces would likely fight a retrograde delay similar to a maneuver defense as described in 

Training Circular 7-100.2. This tactical action would maximize the advantages of the restrictive terrain

while falling back to preplanned battle positions. 

This course of action would draw the invader further into the country and potentially overextend his

logistical lines, making him vulnerable to raids, assaults, and ambushes. The Iranians would likely take 

advantage of interior lines of communication that would allow them to concentrate on the enemy at 

chokepoints, such as mountain passes, and put a premium on urban fighting.

Simultaneously during the Artesh’s maneuver defense, the IRGC would begin its Mosaic Defense 

doctrine, consisting of a hybrid threat that would conduct irregular warfare.126 During this stage of the 

conflict, the Iranians—mostly the IRGC and Basij—would use small units, such as hunter-killer teams 

equipped with motorcycles and fast-attack vehicles, to conduct ambushes, raids, and assaults.

Iran’s military learned the importance of these types of small unit tactical actions towards the end of the

Iran-Iraq War. The IRGC started to empower junior leaders in order to seize the initiative on the 

battlefield at lower-level military echelons. The use of reconnaissance and assaults during bad weather 

in conjunction with night raids became a common variable for success against the Iraqi military. Iran’s 

military leadership started implementing a decentralized C2 with smaller units that conducted irregular 

warfare on targets of opportunity and high-value targets.127

Figure 8b. Artesh defense
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During the first stages of the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC used human waves to conduct tactical assaults on 

Iraqi military lines. The first evolution of these assaults mostly took place during daylight without the use 

of reconnaissance to identify weakness within the Iraqi defenses. Even though the human wave tactic 

was not overly effective during the Iran-Iraq War, it still was psychologically damaging to the defenders 

and the Iranians did capitalize on the INFOWAR narrative. The IRGC’s Basij could potentially conduct 

human wave attacks against invaders’ military lines.

The diagrams below are illustrative of examples taken from the Iran-Iraq War. This course of action is 

consistent with events during that war and could be seen again in a modern conflict.

The Iran-Iraq War was Iran’s last major conflict and still heavily influences the country’s military 

doctrine. Many of its senior military leaders are veterans of that conflict. Many hardliners and veterans 

within Iran’s hierarchy have rationalized that innovative tactics, self-sacrifice, and the Iranian people‘s 

faith overcame a technologically-superior Iraqi force. This rationale is translated by the Iranians into 

future potential conflicts with other technologically-superior adversaries.

Figure 9a. Wave attack 
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

24 UNCLASSIFIED

 

Conclusion

The Government of Iran’s responses to its nuclear program and continued support for terror 

organizations increased regional and global tensions during 2014. The US should be concerned with 

Iran’s continued support in the form of lethal aid and advisors to terror organizations in Gaza, Lebanon, 

and Yemen. Iran has and will continue to support the Syrian regime’s civil war. The P5+1 talks reached

an agreement for the future of the Iranian nuclear issue; however, this issue still has the potential to 

develop into a crisis. Iran uses a repetitive INFOWAR narrative of threatening to disrupt shipping in the 

Strait of Hormuz. If Iran’s INFOWAR narrative is physically translated and executed into a tactical action 

by the IRGCN, it may potentially hamper US and global interests. Iranian military doctrine focuses on an 

adaptive hybrid threat defensive posture against a modern industrialized enemy. The Quds forces and 

other intelligence organizations allow the Iranians the capability of military power projection. In the 

future, Iran will continue to support terror organizations with advisors and lethal aid and will increase 

influence in countries like Iraq and Yemen. 

Figure 9b. Wave attack 
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25 UNCLASSIFIED

 

REAL-WORLD CONDITIONS APPLIED TO TRAINING

The Training Circular (TC) 7-100 Hybrid Threat series, the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), 

and the Worldwide Equipment Guide provide training resources for applying real-world conditions to 

training. The tactics used by Iran’s military can be found as part of the composite threat model that 

exists in the Hybrid Threat Doctrine series. Iran’s Artesh and IRGC use principles of offense and defense 

very similar to those present in TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics and TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing

Forces. Additionally, the operational environment outlined in DATE also includes characteristics of the 

Artesh, the IRGC, and the Iranian operational environment.

Replication in Training

Of the countries in DATE, the one that can most realistically replicate Iran is Ariana. Ariana possesses the 

second-strongest military within DATE. Like Iran, Ariana is a country intent on growing its national power 

through diplomatic and irregular force projection by military means. Ariana is not a complete 

representation of Iran due to military equipment and organizational readiness. In order to portray Iran

in a training environment, Ariana’s military equipment would need to be downgraded to tier 3 or 4

systems with niche technology focused on missiles, cyber, and UAVs.

All of the tactics in this report can be found in TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. For more information 

on how to replicate these actions, reference the TC 7-100.2. For information on how to build a force 

structure to conduct these actions, reference TC 7-100.4, Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization 

Guide (Chapter 3, Section VIII, “Building an OPFOR Order of Battle”). The table below contains excerpts 

from the TC 7-100.2 that define the tactical actions discussed in this report.

TC 7-100.2 & TC 7-100.3 Tactics

IRGC/Basij Human Wave Attacks

(Dispersed Attack)

 

TC 7-100.2 Para 3-74. Dispersed attack is the primary manner in which 

the OPFOR conducts offensive action when threatened by a superior 

enemy and/or when unable to mass or provide integrated C2 to an 

attack. This is not to say that the dispersed attack cannot or should 

not be used against peer forces, but as a rule integrated attack will 

more completely attain objectives in such situations. Dispersed 

attack relies on INFOWAR and dispersion of forces to permit the 

OPFOR to conduct tactical offensive actions while overmatched by

precision standoff weapons and imagery and signals sensors. The 

dispersed attack is continuous and comes from multiple directions. 

It employs multiple means working together in a very 

interdependent way.

Artesh Defense

(Maneuver Defense)

TC 7-100.2 Para 4-62. In situations where the OPFOR is not completely 

overmatched, it may conduct a tactical maneuver defense. This type 

of defense is designed to achieve tactical decision by skillfully using 

fires and maneuver to destroy key elements of the enemy’s combat 

system and deny enemy forces their objective, while preserving the 

friendly force. Maneuver defenses cause the enemy to continually 

lose effectiveness until he can no longer achieve his objectives. They 

can also economize force in less important areas while the OPFOR 

moves additional forces onto the most threatened axes.
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26 UNCLASSIFIED

 

Positional Defense

(Area Defense)

TC 7-100.2 Para 4-85. In situations where the OPFOR must deny key 

areas (or the access to them) or where it is overmatched, it may 

conduct a tactical area defense. Area defense is designed to achieve 

a decision in one of two ways: 

 By forcing the enemy’s offensive operations to culminate 

before he can achieve his objectives. 

 By denying the enemy his objectives while preserving combat 

power until decision can be achieved through strategic 

operations or operational mission accomplishment.

TC 7-100.2 Pg 4-1. OPFOR defenses can be characterized as a “shield of 

blows.” Each force and zone of the defense plays an important role in the 

attack of the enemy’s combat system.

Artesh Defense

(Simple Battle Position)

TC 7-100.2 Para 4-107. A simple battle position (SBP) is a defensive 

location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. SBPs are 

not necessarily tied to complex terrain. However, they often employ as 

much engineer effort and/or camouflage, concealment, cover, and 

deception (C3D) measures as time allows.

Artesh Defense

(Complex Battle Position)

TC 7-100.2 Para 4-108. A complex battle position (CBP) is a defensive 

location designed to employ a combination of complex terrain, C3D, and 

engineer effort to protect the unit(s) within them from detection and 

attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. CBPs 

typically have the following characteristics that distinguish them from 

SBPs:

 Limited avenues of approach. (CBPs are not necessarily tied to 

an avenue of approach.)

 Any existing avenues of approach are easily observable by the 

defender.

 360-degree fire coverage and protection from attack. (This may 

be due to the nature of surrounding terrain or engineer activity 

such as tunneling.)

 Engineer effort prioritizing C3D measures; limited 

countermobility effort that might reveal the CBP location.

 Large logistics caches.

 Sanctuary from which to launch local attacks.
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

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IRGC/Quds Terrorism Force Projection

(Terrorism Actions)

TC 7-100.3 Para 6-51. Irregular forces use a wide array of tactics and 

techniques to apply terrorism. The TTP [tactics, techniques, and 

procedures] are intended to be flexible and adaptive approaches. 

Surprise, secrecy, and indirect methods of attack are fundamental to acts 

of terror. The tactical options are as broad and diverse as the resolve of 

the irregular force leader to improvise and/or innovate with available 

resources.

TC 7.100-3 Para 6-54. Tactics, techniques, and procedures typical of 

irregular force actions and terrorism include—

 Threat-Hoax.

 Arson.

 Sabotage.

 Bombing.

 Hijack-Seizure.

 Kidnapping.

 Hostage-taking.

 Raid or ambush.

 Assassination.

 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Anti-Access Operations in the Strait of Hormuz

(Access Limitation)

FM 7-100.1 Para 1-61. Access limitation seeks to affect an extraregional 

enemy’s ability to introduce forces into the theater. Access-control 

operations do not necessarily have to deny the enemy access entirely. A 

more realistic goal is to limit or interrupt access into the theater in such a 

way that the State’s forces are capable of dealing with them. By 

controlling the amount of force or limiting the options for force

introduction, the State can create conditions that place its conventional 

capabilities on a par with those of an extraregional force. Capability is 

measured in terms of what the enemy can bring to bear in the theater,

rather than what the enemy possesses.

Table 2. Excerpts from US Army doctrine

Additional considerations for replicating Iran in training environments would be duplicating Iran’s 

capabilities. These areas are focused mostly on INFOWAR, terrorist acts via proxies, and direct fire 

support. The chart below details how training centers could replicate a capability comparable to Iran.

Capability (What) Actor/Order of Battle (Who) Tactic (How)

INFOWAR Ariana has an INFOWAR brigade (section 

2A-9 of DATE) that can be used for 

INFOWAR replication.

TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 7

FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations

Chapter 5

To replicate Iran: Highlight strategic 

INFOWAR operations discussed in the FM.

INFOWAR (Information Attack) Ariana has an INFOWAR brigade (section 

2A-9 of DATE) that can be used for 

INFOWAR replication.

TC 7-100.3, Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 6

FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations Para 

5-48
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28 UNCLASSIFIED

 

To replicate Iran: Place emphasis on proxy or 

small clandestine cells.

TC 7-100.3; Para 6-108

an enemy can include―

 Sabotage cyber networks.

 Extort concession from an enemy.

 Damage enemy or supporting 

activities and infrastructure.

Indirect Fire Support Ariana has a very powerful fire support 

capability that can be scale back by the 

exercise designer with niche technologies 

to replicate Iranian surface-to-surface 

missiles (SSMs) and indirect fire assets. 

Ariana’s units are equipped with tier 2 fire 

support as a default.

TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 9

FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations

Chapter 7.

To replicate Iran: Highlight missile systems.

The OPFOR doctrine stresses that fire 

support should combine air assets, SSMs,

and artillery into an integrated attack of 

enemy targets throughout the area of 

responsibility.

Special Purpose Forces (SPF)

(proxies and clandestine terror 

cells) 

Iran has placed great emphasis on growing 

its SPF and irregular forces capability. 

Ariana’s SPF has a BDE that can sufficiently 

represent Iran’s organizational network. 

TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 

15

FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations

Chapter 13

To replicate Iran: Highlight amphibious and 

airborne operations.

Table 3. How to use doctrine to replicate Iran

Related Products

Follow these links to view related products:

 Training and Doctrine Command G-2. Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic 

Environment for Unified Land Operations. 2012

 Operational Environment Assessment: Iran 2010

 Attacks Against the Iranian Nuclear Program 2012

 Irregular Forces Financing Handbook March 2012

 Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism 2007

See also the Red Diamond Newsletter, which contains current articles on a variety of topics useful to 

both soldiers and civilians, ranging from enemy tactics and techniques to the nature and analysis of 

various threat actors. 

For detailed information on weapons and equipment, see the Worldwide Equipment Guide. 
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

29 UNCLASSIFIED

 

To see more products from TRADOC G2 ACE Threats Integration, visit the Army Training Network (ATN)

with CAC access: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=377

POC

Author

Kristin Lechowicz

913-684-7922 (COMM)

552-7922 (DSN)

TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI)

803 Harrison Drive, BLDG 467

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Jon Cleaves, ACE-TI Director

Jennifer Dunn, ACE-TI Deputy Director

Jon Moilanen, ACE-TI Operations

References

American Enterprise Institute. “Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Iran’s IRQC Global Force Projection 

Network.” 20 March 2013.

American Foreign Policy Council. “Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies The Iranian Cyber Threat, 

(Revisited).” 20 March 2013.

Central Intelligence Agency. “World Factbook, Iran.” 22 June 2014. 

Commander, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command. “Testimony 

(NORTHCOM Command Posture), before the House Armed Services Committee.” 26 February 2014.

Commander, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). “Testimony (SOUTHCOM Command Posture), Before The 113th 

Congress House Armed Services Committee.” 26 February 2014.

Congressional Research Service. “Latin America: Terrorism Issues.” 15 August 2014. 

Department of Defense. “Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2012.

Department of Defense. “Quadrennial Defense Review.” 3 March 2014.

Department of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2014.

Director, National Counterterrorism Center. “Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs: The Homeland Threat Landscape and U.S. Response.” 14 November 2013.

Director, National Counterterrorism Center. “Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Worldwide Threats 

to the Homeland.” 17 September 2014.

Note: Not all references listed in this publication are readily available to the public; some require 

a government common access card (CAC) to view.
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

30 UNCLASSIFIED

 

Director, National Counterterrorism Center. “Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “Extremism and 

Sectarianism in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.” 6 March 2014.

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. “Annual Threat Assessment. Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

United States Senate.” 11 February 2014.

Director of National Intelligence. “National Intelligence Strategy.” 18 September 2014.

Director of National Intelligence. “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” 26 February 2015.

Director of National Intelligence. “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” 29 January 2014.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Tampa Division. “National Security Threat Awareness Monthly Bulletin.” April 2014.

Federal Research Division. “Country Profile Iran.” Library of Congress. May 2008.

Hayden, Michael. “Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Examining what a Nuclear Iran Deal Means for 

Global Security.” 20 November 2014. 

National Air and Space Intelligence Center. “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.” 2013.

Nader, Alireza . “Iran After the Bomb, How Would a Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave?” Rand. 2013. 

Nader, Alireza, Ali Scotten, Ahmad Rahmani, Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad. “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: Implications 

for the U.S. Drawdown.” Rand. 2014.

Select Committee on Intelligence of the US Senate. “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States.” 12 

March 2013.

United Kingdom Government. “Country Information and Guidance Iran: Background information, including actors of protection, 

internal relocation and illegal exit.” 25 November 2014.

United Kingdom Government. “Iran Country of Origin Information Report.” 26 September 2013.

US Department of Treasury. “Treasury Targets Networks Linked To Iran.” 2014. 

US Energy Information Administration. “Iran Country Analysis.” 22 July 2014.

US State Department. “Country Reports on Terrorism.” 2013.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Testimony submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 

on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Iran’s Support for Terrorism 

Worldwide.” 4 March 2014. 

Figure Credits

Figure 1. Iranian leadership. Source: Congressional Research Service. 25 July 2014.

Figure 2. Iranian/proxy terror attacks. Source: Congressional Research Service. 25 July 2014.

Figure 3. Snapshot of the Iranian military. Source: Adapted from Multiple Sources. Created by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats

Integration. 9 June 2015.

Figure 4. IRGC and Artesh (Ground). Source: Congressional Research Service. 23 January 2012.

Figure 5. Iranian ground forces. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 9 June 2015.

Figure 6. Overview of Iranian air and naval assets. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 9 June 2015. 

Figure 7a. Swarming attack. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 24 June 2015.

Figure 7b. Swarming attack. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 24 June 2015.

Figure 7c. Swarming attack. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 24 June 2015.

Figure 8a. Artesh defense. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 13 May 2015.

Figure 8b. Artesh defense. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 13 May 2015.

Figure 9a. Wave attack. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 13 May 2015.

Figure 9b. Wave attack. Source: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. 13 May 2015.

Endnotes

 

1 US State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism.” 2014.

2 Barack Obama. “Remarks by President Obama in Press Conference after GCC Summit.” 15 May 2015.

3 Director, National Counterterrorism Center. “Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Worldwide Threats 

to the Homeland.” 17 September 2014.
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

31 UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

4 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 25 

July 2014.

5 Paul Kerr. Iran’s Nuclear Program: “Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations.” Congressional Research Service and 

US State Department. 28 April 2014.

6 Director, National Counterterrorism Center. “Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Worldwide Threats 

to the Homeland.” 17 September 2014.

7 Alon Bernstein. “Military Action Against Iran Still Possible, Says Israeli Official.” The World Post. 6 April 2015. 

8 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran’s Foreign Policy.” 30 June 2015.

9 Training and Doctrine Command G-2. “Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land 

Operations.” August 2012.

10 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2014.

11 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

12 Vincent Stewart. “Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Armed Services Committee United States House 

of Representatives.” 3 February 2015.

13 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

14 American Foreign Policy Council. “Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies The Iranian Cyber Threat, 

(Revisited).” 20 March 2013.

15 US State Department. “Country Reports on Terrorism.”2013.

16 Select Committee on Intelligence of the US Senate. “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States.” 12 

March 2013.

17 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran’s Foreign Policy.” 30 June 2015.

18 US Department of the Treasury. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism Treasury 

Announces New Sanctions against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force Leadership.” 3 August 2010.

19 Director, National Counterterrorism Center. “Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Worldwide 

Threats to the Homeland.” 17 September 2014.

20 US State Department. “Country Reports on Terrorism.” 2013

21 Senior Administration Officials, US State Department, “Background Briefing By Senior Administration Officials On Iran, the 

IRGC, and Hezbollah's Increased Terrorist Activity Worldwide.” US State Department. 31 May 2013.

22 US Energy Information Administration. “World Oil Transit Chokepoints.” 10 November 2014.

23 Steve Hargreaves. “Oil jumps over 2% as Iran threatens supplies.” CNN. 27 December 2011.

24 Kenneth Katzman, Neelesh Nerurkar, Ronald O’Rourke, Chuck Mason, and Michael Ratner. “Iran’s Threat to the Strait of 

Hormuz.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 23 January 2012. 

25 US Energy Information Administration. “World Oil Transit Chokepoints.” 10 November 2014. 

26 United States Department of Defense. “Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerrilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy.” Office of 

Naval Intelligence. Fall 2009.

27 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2010.

28 US State Department. “Country Reports on Terrorism.” 2013.

29 Director of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). “Annual Threat Assessment: Statement Before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee United States Senate.” 11 February 2014.

30 Director, National Counterterrorism Center. “Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ‘Extremism and 

Sectarianism in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.” 6 March 2014.

31 Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard. “Armed Conflict in Syria US and International Response.” Congressional Research 

Service. 12 July 2012.

32 Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard. “Armed Conflict in Syria US and International Response.” Congressional Research 

Service. 12 July 2012

33 US State Department. “Country Reports on Terrorism.” 2014.

34 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 25 

July 2014.

35 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 25 

July 2014.

36 CBS News, Israel: “Naval raid nabs Gaza-bound arms from Iran.” 5 March 2014.
Threat Tactics Report: Iran

32 UNCLASSIFIED

 

 

37 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 25 

July 2014.

38 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “World Fact Book, Military.” 23 July 2015. 

39 US State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism.” 2014.

40 US State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism.” 2014.

41 United Kingdom Government. “Country Information and Guidance Iran: Background information, including actors of 

protection, internal relocation and illegal exit.” 25 November 2014.

42 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2010.

43 Anthony Cordesman and Bryan Gold. “The Gulf Military Balance Volume I: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions.” 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 22 May 2013.

44 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

45 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

46 US Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York. “Four Individuals Charged in the Southern District of New York with 

Exporting Various Goods from the United States to Iran and China.” Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office. 

5 December 2012.

47 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

48 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

49 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

50 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

51 National Air and Space Intelligence Center. “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.” 2013.

52 National Air and Space Intelligence Center. “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.” 2013.

53 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

54 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 25 

July 2014.

55 Office of Naval Intelligence. “Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy.” Fall 2009.

56 Center for Strategic & International Studies. “Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities.” May 2005.

57 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2014.

58 Office of Naval Intelligence. “Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy.” Fall 2009.

59 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “Security and Foreign Forces, Iran.” 23 April 2014.

60 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “Security and Foreign Forces, Iran.” 23 April 2014.

61 US State Department. “2009 Human Rights Report: Iran.” 11 March 2010.

62 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “Security and Foreign Forces, Iran.” 23 April 2014.

63 UK Border Agency. “Country of Origin Information Report, 2009.” 2009.

64 BBC. “Profile: Basij militia force.” 18 June 2009.

65 CNN. “Basij commanders.” 24 June 2009

66 United Kingdom Government. “Iran Country of Origin Information Report.” 26 September 2013.

67 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “Security and Foreign Forces, Iran.” 23 April 2014.

68 Anthony Cordesman. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces.” 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 16 August 2007.

69 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2010.

70 United Kingdom Government. “Iran Country of Origin Information Report.” 26 September 2013.

71 United Kingdom Government. “Iran Country of Origin Information Report.” 26 September 2013.

72 American Foreign Policy Council. “Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies The Iranian Cyber Threat, 

(Revisited).” 20 March 2013.

73

 YouTube. “Iran 9th Great Prophet Wargame Phase one_February 25, 2015.” 25 February 2015.

74 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 25 

July 2014.

75 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

76 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 25 

July 2014.
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77 Kenneth Katzman. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service and US State Department. 25 

July 2014.

78 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

79 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

80 Ben Wilson. “The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran-Iraq War.” Foreign Military Studies Office. July-August 

2007.

81 Ben Wilson. “The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran-Iraq War.” Foreign Military Studies Office. July-August 

2007.

82 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2010.

83 Michael Eisenstadt. “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Operational and Policy Implications.” Middle East 

Studies, Marine Corps University. August 2011.

84 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: “The Gulf States. Iran Procurement.” 13 May 2015.

85 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: “The Gulf States. Iran Procurement.” 13 May 2015.

86 Director of National Intelligence. “National Intelligence Strategy.” 26 February 2015.

87 American Foreign Policy Council. “Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies The Iranian Cyber Threat, 

(Revisited).” 20 March 2013.

88 Michael Eisenstadt. “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Operational and Policy Implications.” Middle East

Studies, Marine Corps University. August 2011.

89 YouTube. “Iran 9th Great Prophet Wargame Phase one_February 25, 2015.” 25 February 2015.

90 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

91 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

92 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

93 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

94 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: “The Gulf States. Iran Procurement.” 13 May 2015.

95 Ben Wilson. “The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran-Iraq War.” Foreign Military Studies Office. July-August 

2007.

96 YouTube. “Iran 9th Great Prophet Wargame Phase one_February 25, 2015.” 25 February 2015.

97 US State Department. “2009 Human Rights Report: Iran.” 11 March 2010.

98 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

99 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2010.

100 American Enterprise Institute. “Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Iran’s IRQC Global Force 

Projection Network.” 20 March 2013.

101 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

102 Congressional Research Center. "Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy." 30 March 2016.

103 BBC. “Iran Displays New Russian S-300 Defence Missile Parts.” 17 April 2016.

104 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

105 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2010.

106 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Air Force Iran.” 5 January 2016.

107 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States. Iran Defence Production and R & D.” 9 October 2014.

108 Congressional Research Center. "Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy." 30 March 2016.

109 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States. Iran Defence Production and R & D.” 9 October

110 Congressional Research Center. "Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy." 30 March 2016.

111 Congressional Research Center. "Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy." 30 March 2016.

112 YouTube. “Iran 9th Great Prophet Wargame Phase one_February 25, 2015.” 25 February 2015.

113 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2014.

114 Office of Naval Intelligence. “Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy.” Fall 2009.

115 YouTube. “Iran 9th Great Prophet Wargame Phase one_February 25, 2015.” 25 February 2015. 

116 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2014.

117 Jeremy Binnie. “IRGC Attacks Replica Carrier in Latest Exercise.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. 25 February 2015.

118 Missile Threat. “Cruise Missiles, Ra’ad.” 10 April 2013.

119 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “The Gulf States, Iran Navy.” 16 April 2015.
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120 Missile Threat. “Cruise Missiles, Ra’ad.” 10 April 2013.

121 Federal Bureau of Investigation Tampa Division. “National Security Threat Awareness Monthly Bulletin.” April 2014.

122 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

123 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. “World Armies, Iran.” 5 January 2016.

124 Michael Connell. “The Iran Primer Power, Politics, and US Policy.” United States Institute of Peace. 2010. 

125 Ben Wilson. “The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran-Iraq War.” Foreign Military Studies Office. July-August 

2007.

126 Secretary of Defense. “Unclassified Executive Summary Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” 2010.

127 Ben Wilson. “The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran-Iraq War.” Foreign Military Studies Office. July-August 

2007.