GENERAL SIRANDREW SKEEN, 

1873-1935 

The terrain and enemy have not changed. This 

19 3 2 book, originally published as a guide for 

British lieutenants and captains fighting on the 

border with Afghanistan, demonstrates that 

improvements in technology - much of it 

available to both sides 

- have had only a modest 

impact on fighting in this rugged terrain. 

Recommended for leaders serving in infantry 

battalions in Afghanistan. 

Fighting the Pushtun 

on Afghanistan's 

Frontier 

General ~ Sir Andrew Skeen 

LESTER W. GRAU 

& 

ROBERT H. BAER, 

EDITORS 
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Introduction

Passing 

 It On

Fighting the Pushtun 

 on 

Afghanistan’s Frontier
ii Passing I
Introduction

Passing 

 It On

Fighting the Pushtun 

 on 

Afghanistan’s Frontier

By General Sir Andrew Skeen (1932)

 

A Republished and Annotated Edition of

Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting 

on the North-West Frontier of India

with a Forward and Lessons Learned

Editors

Lester W. Grau & Robert H. Baer 

Foreign Military Studies Office

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
iv Passing It

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US 

Government.

© 2010 Lester W. Grau

Permission granted for unblimited use by the Foreign Military 

Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Maneuver 

Center of Excelence, Fort Benning, Georgia. 

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an 

open source research organization of the U.S. Army. Founded as the Soviet Army 

Studies Office in 1986, it was an innovative program that brought together military 

specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived 

from unclassified, foreign media. The results were unclassified articles and papers 

that provided new understandings and broad access to information from a base of 

expertise in the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, and foreign and U.S. defense 

communities and universities.

Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly 

collaborative work. FMSO conducts unclassified research of foreign perspectives 

of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered but that are 

important for understanding the environments in which the U.S. military operates. 

FMSO’s work today is still aimed at publication in unclassified journals and its 

research findings are taught in both military and civilian venues in the United States 

and around the world. FMSO is organized in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command under the TRADOC G-2.

Foreign Military Studies Office

731 McClellan Avenue

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

leav-webfmso@conus.army.mil
Introduction 

Contents

Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI

Editors’ Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX

________________________________________

Passing It On

By General Sir Andrew Skeen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Contents and Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 1 - General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 2 - Still General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 3 - Introducing Detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 4 - The Vanguard and the Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

 5 - The Flank Piquets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

 6 - The Flank Piquets and the Rear Guard . . . . . . . . 54

 7 - Taking Up Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

 8 - Taking Up Camp -Enemy Sniping and Assaults . . . 73

 9 - Permanent Piquets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

10 - When a Column Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

11 - Attacks and Withdrawals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

12 - Foraging and Demolition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

To Sum Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

________________________________________

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXV

Photos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXV

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XLII

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XLIV
vi Passing It
Introduction 

Foreword 

The American infantry battalion is now a well-established actor in 

the Afghan theater. So why would the Foreign Military Studies Office 

and the Maneuver Center of Excellence resurrect a book from 

1932 for the leaders of those units? Well, the book is about fighting 

Pushtun tribesmen in the remote regions of Afghanistan/Pakistan — an 

unchanged battlefield and an opposing force consistent in the difficulties 

it has caused for great armies over millennia. This book, originally 

published as a guide for British lieutenants and captains, demonstrates 

that improvements in technology—much of it available to both sides 

— have had only a modest impact on infantry fighting in this rugged 

terrain. However, it also demonstrates that the key to enhancing basic 

infantry effectiveness is using the terrain effectively, maintaining force 

security and understanding the mountain people.

General Sir Andrew Skeen spent decades dealing with this frontier. 

His combat experience in the Afghanistan frontier region was extensive, 

but he also saw action against the Boxers in China, in Somaliland, 

Gallipoli and the trenches of the Western Front in World War I. His 

final field posting was as the Chief of the General Staff of the Army 

of India. “Passing it on” is about passing on his experience in this 

turbulent region to the lieutenants and captains who were then dealing 

with the problems of mountain combat against Pushtun tribesmen. His 

advice is still relevant to what our soldiers are facing today.

The mission of the Foreign Military Studies Office is to research and 

present foreign ideas and perspectives to better understand present and 

future problems. Occasionally we visit the past to find those ideas and 

perspectives. This 1932 book is not so much a step backwards as the 

(re)discovery of a useful map for now and the future. We hope it will be 

of value to our readers. 

Tom Wilhelm

Director, Foreign Military Studies Office

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
viii Passing 

Editors

Les Grau is a retired infantry Lieutenant Colonel who fought in Vietnam 

and trained as a Soviet Foreign Area Officer. He has published over 100 

articles on tactical subjects and three books on Afghanistan—The Bear 

Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan; The 

Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan 

War (coauthored with Ali A. Jalali); and The Russian General Staff ’s 

The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (translated 

with Michael Gress). He has a doctoral degree in Military History with 

a concentration in Central Asia and South Asia.

Bob Baer is South Asia Analyst (2009) at the Foreign Military Studies 

Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Bob served as a military contractor, 

training Pashtun Levy Security Forces, in the North-West Frontier of 

Pakistan (2008). Bob is a graduate of Georgia Military College, and 

served as an Infantry Officer in the U.S. Army. He is a graduate of the 

Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami (MA, 

Asian Studies) and holds a Doctorate in Public Administration (DPA, 

Public Policy) from Nova Southeastern University. Bob is a registered 

professional archaeologist (RPA), with undergraduate and graduate 

credentials in archaeology and ancient history from the Universityof 

Leicester, UK, and the University of Oxford, UK. Bob has completed 

more than 200 archaeological investigations world-wide, the majority of 

which were in the underwater environment. 
Introduction 

Passing t 

Editors’ Intro

Warfare has evolved over thousands of years, but in many aspects, has 

remained the same. This is particularly true in the mountainous regions 

along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the region that the 

British named the North-West Frontier. The hill-country and mountains 

of this region presented a difficult and often deadly battlefield for forces 

unfamiliar or untrained in fighting in this rugged and inhospitable 

terrain. 

Today, United States and NATO Coalition forces are engaged in 

a conflict in Afghanistan and along the border of the Pakistan tribal 

area that poses the same challenges encountered by the British in the 

nineteenth and first three decades of the twentieth century, and again 

by the Soviet Union during its nearly decade-long conflict in Afghanistan 

(1979-1989). As in previous conflicts, modern weapons provide a ‘tactical 

edge,’ but it is still the individual soldier engaging in combat on the 

ground that wins battles and consolidates victory. 

Afghanistan and the tribal area of Pakistan pose unique problems 

for the United States and their NATO allies. While modern forces prevail 

in flat open planes or desert terrain, in the hills and mountains of 

Afghanistan, and the frontier territory of Pakistan the guerrilla tactics 

utilized by Pathan (Pushtun) tribesman against the British Indian Army, 

the Soviets, and now the NATO coalition forces have changed little.

In 1932, General Sir Andrew Skeen, who first served on the NorthWest Frontier of India in 1897 and 1898, in the Third Afghan War of 

1919 and the subsequent Waziristan Campaign, published a handbook 

for young officers titled, Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting 

on the North-West Frontier of India. Skeen’s book was first published in 

Britain in 1932, and went through several editions. It is out of print.1

The Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas has republished Passing It On, believing that Skeen still offers valuable insight 

into unconventional war fought on mountainous terrain. 

1. General Sir Andrew Skeen’s Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the NorthWest Frontier of India was first published in 1932 in Delhi, India, and ran in three editions. 

Another edition of 250 copies was published in 1978 by Nisa Traders of Quetta, Pakistan.
x Passing It 

The frontier border region continues to have strategic importance 

for Pakistan where Afghanistan, and the conflict in Afghanistan 

has spilled over into Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area 

(FATA). Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani forces in western 

Pakistan are engaged in a conflict that General Sir Andrew Skeen would 

understand all too well. Despite the evolution of modern weaponry, 

the terrain and the tactics of the tribal Pathan fighters are the same as 

encountered by Skeen and the Indian Army in the border conflicts of 

the late nineteenth and first three decades of the twentieth century. 

This republication of Passing It On has three sections; the first is 

a short biographical background of General Sir Andrew Skeen, and a 

brief description of the conflicts that pitted the British Indian Army 

against the Pathan tribesmen of Afghanistan and the frontier region of 

India. The second section of this book is Passing It On. The manuscript 

has been footnoted to help with terms and events from the Skeen Era 

that might not be readily understood by the contemporary reader. The 

manuscript ends with a ‘lessons learned’ section that offers tactical 

tips extracted from Passing It On that remain applicable to fighting in 

Afghanistan and the tribal area of Pakistan.

Background To 

Afghan wars have evolved more in weaponry, less in the tactics of 

mountain warfare which rely on ambush and sniping. Bows and arrows, 

spears, and swords evolved to the matchlock firearm of the sixteenth 

century, the nineteenth century Jezail flintlock, and then a Brown 

Bess musket captured or stolen from the British Indian Army.2

 Late 

in the nineteenth century with the invention of smokeless powder 

(1888) the British adoption of the Martini and Lee Enfield rifles allowed 

combatants to conceal their positions, increase their weapons rate of 

fire and accuracy, and ultimately their ability to inflect more casualties 

on the enemy. Following World War I, motorized transport vehicles, 

armored cars and light tanks increased the speed of deployment in 

the frontier region, and allowed some protection for convoys when 

operating in mountain passes and river valleys. After World War I, the 

introduction of aircraft on the frontier permitted the British to carry out 

aerial reconnaissance, and bombing missions that provided a temporary 

psychological edge in conflict.3

 

2. See Frank L. Holt, Into The Land of Bones: Alexander the Great in Afghanistan 

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

3. For a military history of Afghanistan and associated references to Pakistan see Edgar 

O’Ballance, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land (London: Brassey’s, 2002). 
Introduction 

While the weapons of frontier warfare have changed, the topography 

of the area has not. The borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan are 

not just the ‘lunar landscape’ portrayed on the evening news. The area 

has irrigated ‘green zones’ in the river-valleys and upland areas where 

snowmelt can be diverted to small parcels of land. In the lowlands there 

are some marsh and swampy areas, and in many areas the growth of 

thick pine forest camouflages the mountainous terrain. In Skeen’s day 

tigers and wolves roamed the mountains of the Hindu Kush.4

Andrew Skeen was born on January 20, 1873 into a middle-class 

household, descended from Scottish yeoman stock.5 At the beginning 

of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and at the height of the 

‘Industrial Revolution’ Britain was the most powerful military and 

manufacturing nation in the world. In British India, the memory of 

the Indian Mutiny of 1857 was beginning to fade, and except for the 

tribal areas of the North-West Frontier the Indian sub-continent was at 

peace. The British fought the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881) in 

Afghanistan from staging areas in the North West Frontier. 

In 1891 at age eighteen, Andrew Skeen entered the Royal Military 

College at Woolwich. After graduation in 1893, Skeen was commissioned 

in The King’s Own Scottish Borderers. He was posted to the NorthWest Frontier of India, where, in 1897, Mullah Sadullah led a tribal 

uprising. Also known as the ‘Mad Fakir,’ Sadullah was an adherent 

of the fundamentalist Wahabi sect that originated in Arabia in the 

eighteenth century, then spread through the Islamic community of 

India into the North-West Frontier.6 This uprising was centered in the 

Swat Valley north of the present Mohmand Agency of the Federally 

Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Mullah Sadullah raised a tribal 

fighting force (‘lashkar’) of approximately twenty thousand men and 

advanced on the British Frontier post at Malakand about thirty miles 

north of Peshawar, the capital of the North-West Frontier Province.

On the evening of July 29, 1897, Mullah Sadullah launched a series 

of frontal attacks against British breastworks at Malakand Station. 

After a number of assaults and hundreds of casualties (Mullah Sadullah 

was one of the wounded) the tribesman withdrew. Battles continued in 

the area. At Chakdara Bridge, a British force of Sikhs from the Punjab 

4. The varied topography of the NWFP and Afghanistan is described in John Keay, When 

Men and Mountains Meet (Oxford; University Press, 1993).

5. Biographical information from “Obituary: General Sir Andrew Skeen.” The Times 

(London), February 20, 1935. P.9.

6. For the little discussed Wahabi influence in Pakistan’s NWFP and Afghanistan see 

Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists: The Wahabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad

(London: Abacus, 212-33). 
xii Passing I

commanded by British officers held off a Pathan force reported at seven 

thousand fighters. On 3 August the column known as the Malakand 

Field Force of three full brigades arrived under the command of General 

Bindon Blood, and the tribal rebellion quickly collapsed. 

It was Skeen’s experience with the Malakand Field force that gave 

him his first taste of fighting on the North-West Frontier. During the 

Malakand campaign Skeen was a member of a cavalry unit, as was 

another young British subaltern—Winston Churchill.7

 Skeen, like 

Churchill, was a superb horseman, and like Churchill was considered one

of the finest polo players in the Indian Army.

In 1900, Captain Skeen was posted to China where he fought 

against Chinese Rebel forces known as the ‘Society of Harmonious 

Fists’ or ‘Boxers.’ This would eventually become the Boxer Rebellion 

of 1905. In 1902-1904, Skeen served in Somaliland in British East 

Africa where he took part in the campaign against the forces of ‘Mad 

Mullah’ Mohammad Abdullah Hassan. This campaign lasted for about 

a year; the British, as in many of their frontier wars, had a difficult 

time bringing the enemy to battle. The forces of Hassan would attack 

the British forces, and then withdraw into the bush. Major Skeen was 

‘mentioned in dispatches’ for bravery in an action at Jedballi. This 

African campaign gave Skeen additional experience in warfare against 

tribesmen. In Africa, Skeen honed his skills as a tracker and big game 

hunter, skills he would eventually put to good use in India, and would 

refer to a number of times in Passing It On. Skeen believed that the 

traits that led to success in hunting big game, were equally valuable, in 

fighting Pathan tribesmen on the Indian frontier. 

Following the 1914 outbreak of World War I, Colonel Skeen was 

posted to the Western Front in France where he commanded Indian 

troops and served in various staff positions. After a year of service 

in France, he was posted to the Straits of the Dardanelles, and served 

with distinction in the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign of 1915. At the time 

of the Gallipoli Campaign, Skeen had been promoted (temporarily) to 

brigadier and was awarded the British Order of St. Michael and St. 

George (CMG) and the French Croix de Guerre for his actions in the 

Dardanelles Campaign.

In 1916 Skeen returned to India where, again a Colonel, he filled a 

series of staff and command positions. In early 1916, he was assigned to 

Indian Army Headquarters in Delhi as Director of Military Operations—

7. Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (New York: W.W. Norton, 

1989),.7. 
Introduction 

responsible for all field operations in the North West Frontier. In 1917, 

Skeen became Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Indian Army, 

two grades below the commander of all military forces on the Indian 

Subcontinent.

In 1919, at the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, Colonel 

Skeen returned to action as a field commander. In early 1919, Skeen 

served as commander of the 3rd Indian Infantry Brigade headquartered 

in Abbottabad north of Peshawar. In October 1919, Skeen and the 3rd 

‘Indian’ were ordered into the field, and he took command of Indian 

and British Army units which formed the Kohat-Kurram field force on 

the North-West Frontier. In late 1919 and throughout 1920, Skeen and 

his Indian troops fought well-armed Pathan tribesman in the Waziristan 

Campaign. Skeen was promoted to General and served as the Commander 

of the North-West Frontier District, headquartered at Peshawar.

From 1924 until 1928, General Skeen served as the Chief of the 

General Staff of the Indian Army as the force modernized with trucks, 

armored cars, and aircraft and its regimental and officer corps were 

reorganized. Before World War I, native Indian officers were mostly 

platoon and company commanders, but it was clear that eventually 

Indian officers would serve in higher command and staff positions. 

As Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, Skeen chaired the Indian 

Sandhurst Committee, to select the best possible cadets for entrance 

to The Royal Military College (RMC) in England. Indian cadets had 

been admitted to Sandhurst since 1918, but their record had been 

‘mixed’ due to weaknesses in the Indian secondary school system, and 

the acculturation to military tradition and life that English schoolboys 

routinely experienced in the traditional English Public School. Under 

the auspices of the Indian Sandhurst Committee, selected Indian cadets 

were culturally and academically prepped for the RMC, and as a result 

of this training their graduation rate improved significantly. Sandhurst 

trained Indian cadets until the Indian equivalent of Sandhurst—the 

Indian Military Academy at Dura Din—opened in 1932.8

 

In 1928, General Sir Andrew Skeen retired from active service, at 

which time he was honored by King Edward VIII, with promotion to 

General, Aide de Camp to the Monarch. Shortly thereafter, no longer in 

good health, Skeen retired to the village of Broadway, Worcestershire. 

General Sir Andrew Skeen died in February 1935, survived by his widow 

and a son who had followed his father into the Indian Army. 

8. Skeen’s role in the Sandhurst Commission is described in Philip Mason, A Matter of 

Honour (London: Peregrine 1974), 463.
xiv Passing It

Passing t On: Histori

As a young subaltern, Skeen and the Indian Army forces were dispatched 

to the India-Afghan frontier to deal with tribal raids into India that were 

a continuation and extension of conflicts from the end of the eighteenth 

century. There were several factors that led to continued conflict in the 

region. First, Afghanistan was a poor country and the power of the king 

did not always predominate among the border tribes. Ethnic and tribal 

tensions and ensuing conflicts were fed by neighboring countries, Russia 

and Central Asia to the north, and Persia to the south. The British had 

always feared the territorial aspirations of Russia through Afghanistan 

and into India. This led to ‘The Great Game,’ a contest for influrnce, 

where political agents of Russia and Britain vied for intelligence and 

tribal allegiances’ in both Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier of 

India.9

In 1893, the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimar Durand, and 

Abdur Rahman, then the Afghan Amir, signed an agreement that defined 

the areas of influence of the Kingdom of Afghanistan and British India. 

This demarcation came to be known as the Durand Line and extended 

some 1,600 miles following the natural watershed from the Pamir 

Mountains in the north to the Arabian Sea. The British considered the 

Durand Line to be the border between Afghanistan and India, whereas 

the Afghan King did not. The Pathan tribes ignored it when possible.

Russian expansionism and empire-building in Central Asia began 

in the eighteenth century. Britain watched Russia’s absorption of the 

Caucasus, Georgia, Khirgizia, Turkmenistan, Khiva and Bukhara, and 

felt threatened by the Russian presence near India. The British believed 

that Russian motives were to weaken British power in the region and 

to gain access to a warm water port on the Arabian Sea. Britain 

maintained a strong military presence on the Afghan border to protect 

the frontiers of British India.10

The Great Game spilled into Afghanistan when British forces 

invaded during the First (1839-1842) and Second (1878-1881) AngloAfghan Wars. The British fought the First Anglo-Afghan War to replace 

one Afghan ruler, Dost Mohamed, with a previous ruler, Shah Shuja, who 

9. In 1831 Arthur Conolly a subaltern in the 6th Bengal Cavalry first used the term ‘Great 

Game’ in a letter to a friend describing his reconnaissance activities in Central Asia. See, 

Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia (Oxford: University Press, 

1990), 1-2.

10. See Patrick French, Younghusband (London: Harper Collins, 1994). Sir Francis 

Younghusband, 1863-1942, was a British Army officer and explorer of the mountains along 

the Sino-Russian borders.
Introduction x

was thought to be loyal to Britain. The campaign was ill conceived and 

badly managed. British forces prevailed on the traditional battlefield, 

the assault against Kabul and other towns, but failed in the hills and 

mountains. The worst defeat came in the winter of 1842 during the 

British retreat from Kabul that resulted in the annihilation of nearly 

the entire column of 4,500 men, by tribesmen who ambushed the British 

in the mountain passes.11

In 1878, the Afghan Amir, Sher Ali, received a Russian diplomatic 

mission to Kabul. The British asked for equal representation which 

was refused; that led to another British invasion and the Second AngloAfghan War. This campaign was fought with improved British logistics 

and with better-trained troops. The outcome of the campaign was that 

Britain managed Afghan foreign affairs from 1881 to 1919, creating a 

buffer state between Russian Central Asia and British India.12 

In the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty, Russia agreed that Afghanistan 

lay outside its sphere of interest and agreed to confer with Britain on 

matters relating to Russian-Afghan relations. In return, Britain agreed 

not to occupy or annex any part of Afghanistan nor interfere in the 

internal affairs of that country. Although the Amir of Afghanistan 

refused to recognize the treaty, Britain honored the treaty until 1919 

when Afghan troops crossed into British India, seized a village and 

attempted to raise a popular revolt in the area. The British responded 

and pushed the Afghan forces back across the border and occupied small 

portions of the country. Most of the fighting was over in a month, 

although the war lasted until a treaty was signed months later.

Frontier Wa

in he Tme

In the first three decades of the twentieth century, the British Indian 

Army continued to carry out campaigns against the Pathan tribes that 

inhabited the hills and mountains of Afghanistan and the North-West 

Frontier Province of British India. The Pathan are a tribal people, 

the basic political, social-cultural order, is the family, clan and tribe. 

The British considered the Pathan a warrior culture and ‘raiding’ and 

‘banditry’ was central to the Pathan lifestyle. The Pathan as a tribal 

people, dominate the population of western and southern Afghanistan, 

and about 90 percent of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. 

11. O’Ballance, 29-49.

12. Hopkirk, 400.
xvi Passing It

Historically, the Pathan when not fighting outsiders, fought among 

themselves in tribal and inter-tribal conflicts. 

There are two possible reasons for the Pathan propensity for 

conflict and warfare. First, the economic potential of the frontier 

area is extremely poor, there are few natural resources, the climate is 

harsh and agriculture outside of the hardy opium poppy is a tenuous 

proposition. There is very little physical infrastructure in the tribal 

area, poor roads make travel difficult and except for a few large towns 

and the provincial capital, Peshawar, the Pathan live in small villages 

and fortified farmsteads. Second, the Pathan tribal lands are on the 

historic trade and invasion route from west to east—and from the times 

of Alexander the Great, the Pathan of Afghanistan and India were often 

invaded. In the past the Pathan were accomplished bandits and raiders, 

and the historic smuggling routes from Russia, China, and Persia have 

always served (and continue to serve) as the cornerstone of the Pathan 

economy; however it was raiding that brought the Pathan into conflict 

with British Colonial India.13

The basic combat unit of a Pathan tribe is a lashkar, a force similar 

to a western militia. A tribal lashkar may be composed of 100 men—

to combined tribal lashkars as large as a thousand men. A lashkar is 

raised by the Pathan tribal council, the Jirga, and the tribal chief, the 

Malik. A lashkar is usually led by a warrior recognized for his prowess 

and leadership. All adult Pathan men are eligible to serve in a lashkar. 

A boy receives his first weapon at about age nine, and is taught to shoot 

and hunt. Pathan males in the tribal area are always armed; attempts 

by local authorities to curtail the open bearing of arms have never been 

successful.14 

Pathan tactics, like Pathan law are not formalized in a written or 

standardized code or manual. The ambush and raid are common. Larger 

raiding forces would descend into the Indus valley attacking farmsteads 

and villages. They used fire and maneuver as well as supporting fire, 

but basic Pathan tactics came through trial and error to fit the situation 

at hand and are well described by Skeen. Pathan fighters admire 

individual prowess and acts of bravery and tend to act on impulse, thus 

making control difficult.

Pathan raids into settled areas of India led to Indian Army 

military expeditions against the Pathan tribal areas and strongholds. 

In the nineteenth century the main British military cantonment was 

Peshawar, the provincial capital of the North-West Frontier. From 

13. The classic study of the Pathans-Pashtuns is by Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 550 

BC - AD 1957 (London: Kegan-Paul, 2000). Caroe was the Governor of the North West 

Frontier Province of India in 1946–47, the period of the India-Pakistan partition. 

14. Ibid., 76-7.
Introduction x

Peshawar, it was approximately a three-hour horseback ride west to the 

Khyber Pass that led into Afghanistan and terminated at the capitol 

of Kabul. The route east from Peshawar was the Grand Trunk Road 

that crossed the Indus River and entered the British military outpost at 

Rawalpindi. From Rawalpindi, the Grand Trunk road continued south 

to the Headquarters of the Indian Army at Delhi. British military 

expeditions were generally launched from either Peshawar, or Quetta 

the provincial capital of Waziristan; the logistics base remained on the 

plains of India at Rawalpindi.15

When Skeen served on the North-West Frontier, the organization of 

the Indian Army had not substantially changed since the reorganization 

of 1863. A battalion had about 1200 men sub-divided into eight rifle 

companies. An Indian Army battalion in Skeen’s day would have seven 

British officers; there was a commanding officer, usually a lt. colonel; a 

second-in-command, a major; an adjutant captain, and four Lieutenants. 

Troop command was filled by Indian officers; an infantry battalion had 

eight companies and a cavalry regiment of six troops. British lieutenants 

served as supervisors and not in direct positions of command, (officer 

directing sepoy) although training and tactics was purely a British 

responsibility. There were no British non-commissioned officers in the 

Indian line units. There were British non-coms in specialized units like 

engineers and sappers.16

The British referred to warfare on the North-West Frontier 

alternatively as hill warfare, tribal warfare or mountain warfare or more 

commonly frontier warfare. Lessons learned by the British armed forces 

during this combat were passed on to successive generations of officers 

and men in training manuals. Tactical lessons learned by British officers 

in the field were passed on verbally, and in training exercises, but were 

also collected into more formal publications, and a series of specialized 

manuals for frontier warfare. ‘Lessons learned’ often remained within 

the informal culture of the officer’s mess, in memoirs, or in anecdotal 

form. Unfortunately, in 1909 the specialized manuals published after 

the 1897-1898 frontier expeditions were abandoned by the Indian Army 

training staff and subsumed into the Field Service Regulations (FSR) 

which had only six paragraphs on tribal fighting.17

15. Routes from India and the NWFP into Afghanistan are discussed in, Paddy Docherty, 

The Khyber Pass: A History of Empire and Invasion (Oxford: University Press, 2007).

16. The organization of the British Indian Army is discussed in Mason, A Matter of Honour, 

326-27, 411, 454; also see Byron Farwell, Armies of the Raj (New York: W.W. Norton, 

1989), 191-203. 

17. For a study of frontier and ‘lessons learned’ on the Indian Frontier see Tim Moreman, 

The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare 1849–1947 (London: Palgrave 

Mcmillan, 1998).
xviii Passing 

In 1925, the Indian Army General Staff published a Manual of 

Operations for the North West Frontier. Chapters included descriptions 

of the trans-border Pathans, the topography of the frontier, and Pathan 

tactics of ambush and sniping, British response to these tactics, the 

counter-attack and tactical withdrawal in the face of enemy fire.18

Other chapters dealt with protection of the column on the march, and 

when halted, along with the organization and protection of lines of 

communication. 

Frontier war was in evolution; Skeen who first served on the frontier 

in 1898 and then after World War I, could not have conceived of the 

tactical use of air power at the beginning of his career. Born thirty 

years before the Wright Brother’s flight at Kitty Hawk in 1903, Skeen 

experienced the early ‘dog fights’ over the trenches of the Western Front 

in World War I and the limited use of aircraft for reconnaissance and 

bombing operations in the Third Afghan War of 1919. 

On The M

When the British Indian Army deployed from Peshawar, it was a twoday march for an infantry column to the Khyber Pass. The column 

generally had at least two battalions and marching time was limited 

by the rate of an infantryman on the march and the speed of pack 

mules and camels. Columns marching north to Bajur or Mohmand 

agencieses could take a week or more. Expeditions south of Peshawar 

to Waziristan could be launched from Peshawar or Quetta and often 

took considerably longer. The important criteria for a column on the 

march were the changes in terrain which affected the rate of movement 

and security of the column. Through open country, an Indian Army 

Column could move, on average, six to eight miles per day, in the hills 

and mountains sometimes half that distance. At the end of each 

day’s march, a bivouac (camp) had to be established and security 

(pickets) put out to protect the camp during the hours of darkness. 

Due to security measures—putting out pickets and securing the camp 

perimeter—the British generally began their days march just after dawn 

and concluded that day’s journey around 3:00 in the afternoon.

The Pathan tribesmen matched their relative strengths of 

mobility, flexibility and marksmanship, in guerrilla warfare against 

cumbersome British columns. As the column moved into hills 

or rocky terrain, there was the chance of ambush or sniping. 

18. In Tim Moreman, “The Army in India & Frontier Warfare 1914–1939,” (2009) p. 10, 

http://king-emperior.com/article4.htm.
Introduction x

Troops were tied to protecting long, vulnerable and cumbersome columns 

of pack animals transporting, food, water and ammunition. Freedom of 

movement for British forces was restricted to the valley floors, while the 

lightly-equipped Pathan operated with comparative freedom on the hill 

and mountainsides. Thus, to meet the tribesmen, at least on near equal 

terms, infantry officers had to develop tactical skills specific to hill and 

mountain terrain. These skills included marksmanship, the establishment 

of pickets and outposts and skirmishing tactics. Repeated practical 

experience and specialized training in hill fighting helped forge effective 

Indian Army units.19 

The objective of the British military column was to bring the 

enemy to combat, instead of continuing hit-and-run tactics and sniping. 

Generally, the British punishment for Pathan raids was the destruction 

of Pathan villages. They burned Pathan houses and filled wells with 

rocks and boulders. Since Pathan tribal ties were stronger than ethnic 

identities, the British sometimes gained intelligence from Pathan soldiers 

serving with the Indian forces. Pathans were happy to offer information 

about other Pathan tribes that were often their hereditary enemies. 

However, Pathan mixed loyalties sometimes led to desertion, usually 

with British firearms. 

Security from ambush was the most pressing concern for an Indian 

Army column on the move. The British had to prevent the harassment 

of the main body of the column. Often a British column stretched for a 

distance of eight to ten miles. Controlling the flanking high ground and 

dominating the surrounding terrain by presence and fire was key. Outlying pickets shielded the columns by securing the heights on either side 

of the marching column. 

Pickets were both mobile and fixed. A mobile picket (skirmishers)

advanced ahead of a column and on the flanks in order to make contact 

with the enemy, prevent sniping or provide early warning. Terrain 

forced columns to travel through dry river beds surrounded by hills or 

mountains. Pickets on the high ground insured that the column was 

out of the range of hostile fire—crowning the heights. These forward 

and peripheral picket movements were slow work; but were an essential 

security measure that slowed the rate of movement of a column. 

Fixed pickets, or outposts were established around the periphery of a 

camp or bivouac as early warning posts in the event that Pathans would 

attempt a night attack. A fixed picket was a small fortified position 

19. The British Indian Army historically campaigned on the flat plains of the Punjab. 

Campaigns in the NWFP and Afghanistan called for specialized training that began in 

military cantonments and was honed in frontier fighting.
xx Passing It 

constructed with barbed wire, rock walls, sandbags, and bales of packanimal fodder. Chicken wire stretched over a position could deflect hand 

grenades. Artificial light, flares and torches (flashlights) were integrated 

into planned fields of rifle and automatic weapons fire. Fixed pickets 

were the first line of defense, and pickets rather than the main body, 

were often the object of Pathan attack. On some occasions, a Pathan 

force of fifty tribesmen would attack a picket force of fifteen or twenty 

men. Here the chance of a Pathan victory through ‘force of numbers’ 

was possible but these opportunities lessened considerably after World 

War I, when Indian Army units were armed with machine guns. 

Weap

The Martini-Henry Rifle adopted in 1871 had served the British well. 

The Martini-Henry, a single-shot drop-block rifle, could be quickly loaded 

and was deadly when fired in disciplined volleys. Smokeless powder was 

invented in 1884 by a Frenchman, Paul Vieille, and the French Lebel 

Rifle fired the first smokeless cartridge. By 1895, smokeless powder 

changed the battlefield drastically. In the black-powder era, the smoke 

discharged from a rifle served to identify the enemy and allowed troops 

to spot hostile fire and return fire. By World War I, the British had 

adopted the .303 Lee-Enfield, bolt-action, clip-fed rifle that had a morerapid rate of fire than the Martini-Henry rifle. The bayonet was an 

important tool, widely used in frontier fighting. The disciplined use of 

the bayonet by the British gave them a distinct advantage in hand-tohand fighting against tribesman who preferred slashing weapons. The 

standard British handgun at the turn of the century was the Webley 

front-break revolver; however a wide array of weapons were privately 

purchased by officers.20

The tribesmen’s weapons remained a step or two behind the British 

forces. The Jezail, or ‘Khyber’ long rifle, a black-powder flintlock weapon 

was the primary weapon employed by tribesman during the middle and 

late nineteenth century. Tribesman also used swords and knives in close 

combat, but these were no match against the British bayonet. The 

Royal Afghan Army was equipped with modern European weapons, 

and British-manufactured weapons purchased on the open market. The 

Pathan tended to keep up with modern weapons technology by capturing 

weapons on the battlefield or by stealing or bartering for weapons. In 

the twentieth century a ‘cottage industry’ of local gun manufacturers 

was established in the North-West Frontier centered in the small village 

20. For a look at weapons, kit and an outline of campaigns against the Pathan see Robert 

Wilkinson-Latham, North-West Frontier 1837–1947 (London: Osprey 2005).
Introduction x

of Derra Adam Khel. 

After World War I, pack mules and camels, were still used on 

mountain trails, while motorized transport traveled the valley floors. In 

the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) the British used armored cars, light 

tanks and several types of observation and bomber aircraft. Motorized 

transport allowed the British to deploy more rapidly into the frontier 

area, however, once the forces had reached the hill-country the advancing 

column had to revert to pack animals to climb into the mountains where 

the Pathan villages were situated. British columns were reduced to a 

crawl, sometimes traveling as few as two miles a day. The British could 

not mask their movements; the Pathan knew the lines of advance and 

could constantly keep the column under observation and place ambushes 

or even trigger an avalanche to block the advance of the column.21

Modern weapons, ammunition and transport led to tactical trade-offs; 

rifled weapons and smokeless powder had significantly increased the killing 

range on the battlefield. This forced skirmishers and moving picket parties 

to increase their distance from the columns they protected; it also led 

to the installation of semi-permanent pickets and fixed outposts at key 

points along the route of march. In the black powder era, the effective 

range of a sniper was at best about 500 yards, now with the smoke-less 

powder rifle the killing range was increased from 1000 to 1500 yards.

In the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the Vickers and the Lewis Gun 

multiplied the rate of British fire significantly. Automatic weapons were 

crew served, thus there was a trade off in weaponry and man-power as 

well. After the war, a company of Vickers medium machine guns was 

placed in every British and Indian infantry battalion. This increase 

in crew-served weapons considerably reduced the rifle strength that an 

infantry battalion could provide for picket duty. Motorized transport 

allowed for the relatively rapid movement of artillery weapons into the 

frontier territory, but again larger crew-served weapons were relegated to 

river-valleys and plateaus. Small artillery pieces, mountain batteries that 

consisted of pack howitzers and screw-guns that could be disassembled 

and packed onto mules were used for fire support in mountainous terrain. 

The Stokes mortar, a popular weapon from the trench warfare of World 

War I, was also used in frontier fighting. 

Logistics were stretched during the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Supplies 

moved along the road from cantonment to battlefield—Rawalpindi to 

Peshawar—then to the hills and mountains where the fighting began. 

Road and bridge construction supported operations and also opened 

21. See “The Lessons of the 1919-20 Waziristan Campaign”; “The Mohmand Campaign, 

August-September 1935”; “The Lessons of the 1936-37 Waziristan Campaign” in Moreman, 

(2009).
xxii Passing I

the countryside to travel, allowing the tribesmen a better opportunity to visit market towns and agency headquarters. Eventually 

raiding gave way to the lucrative smuggling trade along the improved 

road system. 

Modernization of the Indian Army resulted in a more complicated 

and sophisticated table of organization and equipment (TO&E) that 

made campaigning more difficult. Combat units became boggeddown with the protection of support units that included signal units, 

ambulances and field hospitals. Camps and depots were located on flat 

ground where there was some safety from enemy firing positions on 

high ground. Large camps were constructed and fortified on plains and 

plateaus near operations where columns could be rapidly re-supplied. 

Modern transport required fuel and motor-pools and aircraft required 

aerodromes. These bases required more troops supported by armored 

cars, permanent pickets, and mobile fighting patrols. 

All told, British Indian Army operations against the Pathans were 

a mixed success. Long marches, difficult picketing and time consuming 

preparation for night bivouacs rarely allowed the British to engage the 

enemy on the battlefield. The Pathan always seemed to be a step ahead. 

The Pathan understood that raiding into the Indus Valley would bring 

retribution from the British; the destruction of villages, and often some 

casualties to the raiders—but also more hardship to women, children and 

the elderly who were evicted from village and home. Compared to larger 

battles in the lowlands, the casualties of these operations were relatively 

few; however, this takes nothing away from the physical difficulty of the 

operations and death that could come swiftly from ambush and sniper fire.

Reading 

General Sir Andrew Skeen explains his writing style in the preface 

to Passing It On, “I find it easier to write as I used to speak when I 

taught.” This style of writing is evocative of a nineteenth century 

troop leader, with his men gathered around a campfire, after a long day 

of campaigning on the North-West Frontier of India, and as Skeen has 

accomplished in his book—‘passing on’—a careers worth of field-craft 

to the next generation of officers. Today, the small unit commander 

is engaged in yet another conflict in Afghanistan and the frontier 

territory of Pakistan and faced with an enemy that Skeen would 

recognize and understand all too well. The editors hope that passing on 

these lessons will help.
Introduction x

Passing It On presents a few challenges to the contemporary reader. 

First published in 1936, the language is dated, and British English 

is, in many ways, very different from American English. The editors 

have have provided translations of some “Britishisms” and extensively 

footnoted the manuscript, whereas Skeen only included one footnote in 

the original edition. The intent of the footnotes is to keep the reader 

from constantly referring to a dictionary, and to offer sources for further 

reading and research. The editors believe that the lessons of Passing 

It On are applicable to the contemporary Afghan battlefield and that 

Skeen’s insight into hill and mountain warfare is still valid.
xxiv Passing It
General 1

Passing It 

Short Talks On Tribal Fighting 

On The North-West Frontier of India

By

General Sir Andrew Skeen

K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

With a Foreword by

His Excellency General Sir Philip W. Chetwode

G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Commander-in-Chief in India 

Price 5/ - net

By post 5/6

Aldershot:

Gale & Polden, Ltd., Wellington Works.

Also At London And Portsmouth.
2 Passing It 

Printed in Great Britain

By Gale & Polden, LTD.,

Wellington Works,

Aldershot
General 3

Preface

When young I once had cause to thank a senior for his w

teaching of the needs of frontier fighting. His reply was: “That’s all right, 

youngster, pass it on.” I acted on it during the rest of my service, and am 

doing it now, in the only way left to me.

* * * *

This book is addressed to the junior officer of Infantry, of the British 

Service in particular, as he is less likely in his wider range of service to 

be trained for the local problem which all officers in India have to keep 

in mind. To officers of Infantry, because that is the arm on which falls in 

chief part the need for adjusting its methods to the circumstances of this 

special form of war. And to junior officers, because in frontier fighting the 

junior officer’s problems are many and varied, and their correct solution far 

more important in immediate results than in any other form of war.

* * * *

My readers must forgive the personal approach. I find it easier to 

write as I used to speak when I taught. It also, I think, avoids too close a 

likeness to the Training Manuals, which can sometimes be indigestible to 

the young soldier.

 

 
4 Passing It 

Conten

 

ChapteI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

General

Tribal country, its character; and that of its men – Their fighting qualities – 

Analysed, we find they can be neutralized by fire and movement, by 

alertness, and by cunning.

 

Chapte II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Still Genera

Changes in tribal methods – Other factors adding to our difficulties 

due to the High Velocity Rifle – Increasing slowness of movement in the hills 

due mainly to the same thing – The Permanent Piquet a product of 

the same thing, which will also enforce advance in touch 

with motorable roadhead.

Chapte III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introducing De

The “Manual” must be the guide – Bird’s-eye view of a Column on the 

march, in its various activities.

 

Chapter IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aspects of Work Faling To Junior Officers On

Work with the Vanguard; and with the Transport.

 

Chapter V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Aspects of Work Faling To Junior Officers On The March –

Junior Officers’ work with the flank piquets.

 

Chapter VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aspects of Work Faling To Junior Officers On The March –

Junior Officers’ work with the flank piquets, and with the rear guard. 
General 5

Chapter VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Aspects f  Work Faing To Junior  Officer 

Occupation of protective piquet positions by the advanced guard – 

Work of camp colour parties – Principles of lay-out and protection of a 

perimeter camp – Occupation of camp piquets.

Chapter VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aspects of Work Faling To Junior Officer In Taking U

Occupation of perimeter defences and subsequent work – 

Occupation of a village in emergency – Points to be guarded against 

in camp – Sniping – Assault – Daily Routine.

Chapter IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aspects of Work Faling To Junior Officer Putting Up Perm

Slow process of putting up permanent piquets – The operation – 

Dispositions to cover the work – The work – Duties after occupation and in 

succeeding days – The value of the system – Convoy escort duty – 

Dangers of the “Raghza” – The floating platoon.

Chapter X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Aspects of Work Faling To Junior Officers When a

Early preparations and start of advanced guard – Preliminary work of rear 

guard – Duties with transport – Rear guard Activities.

Chapter XI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Aspects of Work Faling To Junior Officers in Attack and

Opportunity for a “formal” attack seldom offers; and must be 

taken fully when given – Distribution; and points to guard against – 

Further action in case of an advance – Or of a withdrawal – 

Ravines and other dangers – Danger of intersected and 

bushy country – Night work.

Chapter XII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aspects of Work Faling To Junior Officers in Foragi

Foraging equipment – Organization for the work – Points to be 

watched, and methods found safest and best – Constant vigilance 

needed – Method of withdrawal – Demolition, a more serious matter – 

Organization for the work, and method of destruction – 

Manner of withdrawal.
6 Passing It 
General 7

Fore

By

His Excellency

Field-Marshal Sir Philip W. Chetwode

G.C.B., G.C.S. I., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Commander-in-Chief in India.

There are few soldiers with a wider knowledge of Indi

Frontier Warfare than General Sir Andrew Skeen, and it is greatly to our 

advantage that he has put some of this knowledge at our disposal.

His chapters do not aim at replacing the official regulations, but 

supplement them with a wealth of first-hand experience.

This book will be of great value to all who need to study Indian 

Frontier Warfare, and more particularly to those who lack the advantage of 

familiarity with the local atmosphere and conditions. 

P. C.

24th June, 1932.
8 Passing It O
General 

Chapter

General

Tribal country, its character; and that of its men - Their fighting

qualities - Analysed, we find they can be neutralized by fire and movement, 

by alertness, and by cunning.

“What is the North-West Frontier like? The country and its fighting 

men? “This, in one form or another, is a question often shot at me, even 

now. Not easy to answer. In fact it cannot be answered in a few words. 

Though I have footslogged or ridden most of the frontier from Mastuj to 

Kalat, I can only tell you that no short stretch of it is like its neighbor, and 

that a description of it as a whole is bound to mislead. You will never find 

ground of the same nature for twenty miles on end. First, miles of cliff 

and stony slopes giving way to open fans of cultivation backed by steeps 

and sheer cliffs, narrow river gorges opening out of fir-covered mountains, 

which drop to swelling bush-covered hills or bare grazing grounds with 

patches of forest. Then open plains flanked by low, bare hills, and scored 

by deep ravines, after which you come to the great bare hills and cliffs of 

the Khaibar, and so on through wooded Maidan and Mastura and Khanki, 

and the bare Kurram and Tochi valleys to the hills of Mahsud Waziristan, 

ilex covered in the centre, deodar forest on the mountains which dominate 

the strips of open downs, and in the lower parts, scrub and shale-covered 

hills, and most dangerous of all, the bush-tufted, stony plains and ravines 

where the dashing tactics of the Mahsud find their fullest scope. And then 

the opener country of the Gomal and the Zhob, until near Peshin the tribal 

country is left for the kindlier open stretches of Quetta and Kalat, and there 

my knowledge ends.1

1. A useful source on Pathan tribes and tribal lands is, A Dictionary of Pathan Tribes on 

the North-West Frontier of India (Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2005). It 

was originally published by the India Intelligence Branch, London, 1899. Also see Sir Olaf 

Caroe, The Pathans: 550 BC - A 957 (London: Kegan Paul, 2000). For a general history of 

the frontier area see, Paddy Docherty, The Khyber Pass (Oxford University Press, 2007).
10 Passing It O

way to make the tribesman feel defeat.

Their power of moving concealed is astounding, not only in moving 

from cover to cover, but in slipping from light to shadow, and background 

to background. It has to be seen to be believed. And their stillness in 

cover is equally striking. You can never train your men to the same pitch, 

but you can do a great deal. And another way in which you can train your 

men, one which is seldom tried, is in using their eyes. Next time you have 

your men out for field training, watch them. I wager you will find all of 

them except, I hope, yourself, engrossed in anything but what should be 

engrossing them—that is, the possible enemy. Thomas Atkins3 thinks of 

the future, or of special incidents of the past, his eyes on the ground or 

on a comrade, or on a cigarette, while Sundar Singh,4 his Indian opposite 

number, is intent on what is to be done when the expectant buffalo at 

home has calved, or on some such homely interest; but not one is really 

concentrating on the job in hand unless specially ordered to.

I have a memory of part of a famous frontier battalion held up on a 

ridge by snipers on the flank whom they could not locate, and of two guns 

coming up to help, spotting the snipers in less than twenty seconds, and 

dispersing them with a couple of rounds. This particular battery had a 

system of training which produced super look-outs, human wolves, redeyed with watching for victims, but what they did, any troops can do. So 

when you go to India, take your first leave shooting in Chamba or Kulu, or 

some wild part of Kashmir, and learn to use your eyes and glasses in the 

hills.5

 And then use your knowledge to train your men in keeping their eyes 

moving whether halted or on the move. With many young eyes quartering 

the front and watching every ridge and rock and bush, no enemy movement 

3. Tommy Atkins is a nickname used to describe the typical British enlisted soldier. This 

nickname was made famous by Rudyard Kipling in his 1892 poem “Tommy” in Barrack 

Room Ballads. For more on the history and culture of the British Tommy see Richard 

Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier On The Western Front 1914-1918 (London: Harper 

Collins, 2004), xv-xvi.

4. ‘Sundar Singh’ is Tommy Atkins opposite and ‘brother in arms,’ a Sikh soldier from the 

Indian Punjab, the province located just east of the North West Frontier. The Sikh’s are 

considered a martial race and formed the ‘backbone’ of the British Indian Army. For a good 

general history of the British Indian Army see Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An account 

of the British Indian Army, Its Officers and Men (London: Penguin 1974).

5. Chamba, Kulu and Kashmir are located in the cool, forested highlands of North-West 

India and were known as prime hunting areas for mountain goat and tiger. Skeen often 

refers to the parallels between hunting and warfare. In Skeen’s day, Kashmir was an Indian 

Principality and today constitutes a partitioned area contested by Indian and Pakistani 

forces. As for the background and history of the Kashmir conflict see Shuja Nawaz, 

Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army and the Wars Within (Oxford: University Press, 2008).
General 1

But in no one place are conditions a guide to what may be found 

in another, and only principles can help you to use your men to the best 

advantage in any part; while for details you will be wiser if you turn to the 

military reports of the particular areas you are to work in than to trust to 

the memory of one who has not been in any of them for some years.

* * * *

The people differ less than do the parts they live in. All are men 

to reckon with. I place the Mahsud highest as a fighter along with the 

Mamund, a little folk but stark. The Afridi probably comes third—his 

blood feuds and sectional quarrels make him somewhat less ready to die. 

But all are apt in war, and taken all in all are probably the finest individual 

fighters in the east, really formidable enemies, to despise whom means sure 

trouble.2

They have a great reputation for cunning, which really is based on great 

mobility on cliffs and steep slopes, marked ability, which their warring life 

fosters, to make use of ground to hide their movements and to protect them 

when not moving, great patience, and intimate knowledge of the ground.

Mobility is a weak word for the tribesman’s power of movement. In 

pursuit, where everything holds out promise of success, these fellows are 

wonderful. They come down hillsides like falling boulders, not running 

but bounding, and in crags they literally drop from foothold to foothold. 

To deal with such mobility on their own lines is impossible. These men 

are hard as nails; they live on little, carry nothing but a rifle and a few 

cartridges, a knife and a bit of food, and they are shod for quick and sure 

movement. Against all this you can only ensure that your men are hard, 

and can move quickly and surely on broken ground and stony slopes. Add 

that the tribesman can always move behind a screen of hills and ravines 

or under cover of night, and in mobility the balance is well against you. 

But you can redress it by the things in which you and your men should 

excel—discipline and fire power. Use these to combine fire and movement, 

whether that movement be forward or backward, and handicaps of heavy 

boots and equipment and the enemy’s freedom to select the point of attack 

fall into their proper place. Indeed, this very mobility of theirs may often 

lead them too far and give you better chance of killing, which is the only 

2. It is believed that there are 60 major tribes and 400 sub-clans. In the Skeen era the 

tribesmen were referred to as Pathan; today they are known as Pathan; or based on dialect 

Pashtuns or Pukhtuns; their language is Pashto. Today there are seven tribal areas, Bajur, 

Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, and North and South Waziristan. Again, see Caroe, 

2000.
12 Passing It O

should escape you, and you will be ready for them.

And that brings me to the tribesman’s patience. These folks have 

nothing to do but to watch for an opportunity. If it doesn’t come one day, it 

is bound to come the next or the next, or, at any rate often enough to make 

it worth their while to watch for it. And if, when it comes, it looks like 

being too costly, they are perfectly ready to put it off till a better chance 

comes. Remember, they have had no work to do, no camp to get to, they 

have range upon range of hill to screen them for as long as they choose, 

and night has no terrors for them. They will return to the job day after day 

without anyone having an inkling of their presence, and then when the real 

chance comes they seize it like lightning.

* * * *

Now at the risk of boring you, here is the sort of thing that happens.

In 1919, a piquet6

 of 60 men held a hill over-looking the Tochi River 

at some distance and securing a big stretch of road near Miranshah. Each 

morning this piquet had to send out a day party of ten rifles to hold a knoll 

about eighty yards off which overlooked a side ravine. Between the knoll 

and the main piquet lay a bit of dead ground, and so each morning the 

entire piquet stood to arms in its “sangar”7 to cover the passage of the 

detached party to its day post. Days passed, quiet and deadly dull, and 

standing to at dawn became a tiresome duty, and then a neglected one. 

Where thirty or more rifles had watched the knoll, a sleepy sentry now 

followed the party moving out with lack-lustre eyes. Then, one morning, 

as the day party reached the dead ground, a blast of fire downed it, while 

another swept the “sangar” and for ten minutes kept its occupants firing 

blindly and intermittently, while a bunch of the enemy dashed into the dead 

ground,8

 secured the rifles and most of the ammunition of the day party, 

6. A ‘piquet’ is a small force (squad to 60 men) used as a patrol or advance party to 

reconnoiter ahead of a main force. The piquet is much discussed by Skeen and is 

essential as a tactical force, in hill and mountain warfare where line-of-sight observation is 

constrained by terrain and ambush is a constant threat. A piquet could also be established 

in a sangar as an outpost-fortification force. A piquet line may also be used to tether horses 

or mules. (in American usage – picket).

7. A ‘sangar’ is a small temporary fortified outpost or position constructed out of rocks 

and sandbags. The term ‘sangar’ is derived from the Persian and Kurdish that means 

barricade. The British Indian Army used the sangar as an outpost, carefully positioned 

in the countryside, or as observation and listening posts to protect a camp, bivouac, or 

base area. A more highly fortified sangar-outpost is utilized in the contemporary conflict in 

Pakistan and Afghanistan.

8. Dead ground generally constitutes shallow depressions in the ground that may hidden 

from an outpost or by a unit on patrol, and often used by the Pathan as hiding places from 
General 1

and legged it. Fire slackened, and then ceased, and the occupants of the 

piquet issued to find the enemy several hundred yards off, and ten of their 

comrades dead. 

So far, you see, only bad work on the part of the piquet, and an 

opportunity seized by the enemy. Yes—but let us see it from the enemy’s 

side. Five days before the raid, a party of about forty Mahsuds had arrived 

at some caves nine miles south of the piquet, across the Tochi. They must 

have had previous knowledge of the ground and some idea of the habits of 

the piquet, for the very first night they occupied the knoll and got ready. 

Then, about midnight, a star fell from an unlucky direction, and this omen 

caused a silent retreat. Next night the Tochi was swollen and they could 

not cross. The next night they had nearly reached the hill when the dogs 

in a village they had passed began to howl. This might have startled the 

piquet, thought the raiders, so back they tramped the weary miles to their 

lair. The next night all went well, and they got into position. The night 

wore on and one unwary lad stood up and relieved himself. The elders 

of the party at once decided that the sound must have carried by the wind 

to the piquet, and once more the trail to the caves was taken. On the fifth 

night all went well, and as each man carried a stem of a dwarf palm down 

which to direct the flow, they avoided the sound of many waters. At dawn 

their reward came, the day party issued, entered the fringe of the dead 

ground, and were immediately shot down by part of the gang, the rest of 

whom kept the piquet under subjection as described. If that doesn’t show 

patience, I don’t know what does, and I take off my hat to that party of 

raiders. They deserved what they won.

* * * *

You will now want to know how you are to deal with this “patience” 

danger. The solution—never relax any precautions—is obvious and easy to 

state, but devilish hard to apply because it is not natural to keep nerves and 

imagination on the stretch when there is apparently nothing to justify it. 

That is the trouble—day after day, whether on baggage escort or convoy 

or covering duties of patrol or any of the duties on which a young officer 

may be off on his own, you will see nothing but bare hills or rock or bush, 

quiet as the grave, and on your part nothing but a weary track or hillside to 

be trod.

which to launch an ambush. Dead ground provides protection from flat trajectory fire and 

consequently needs to be covered with grenade, mortar or artillery fire by the defending 

force. Dead ground may also be larger natural places of concealment.
14 Passing It O

It needs a great effort of will to keep yourself and your men alert, but 

if you are not, however empty the hillsides may be one minute, you may 

be paying the penalty the next. For remember the enemy is always there, 

and looking for you to make a mistake. I don’t say every mistake brings its 

punishment, but I do say that though you may make one mistake without 

paying for it, and if your luck is in two or three, all the time you are marked 

by unseen eyes as likely to give chances, and it will not be long before you 

know it. Conversely, if you are spotted as alert, and your battalion as one 

not to be monkeyed with, its reputation will spread behind the hills, and the 

raider will look for easier prey.

* * * *

Here is another instance of the repeated mistake and its punishment.

To give freedom in patrolling on one of the guarded sections of the 

Tochi road, to avoid the risk to weak patrols issuing from piquets, and to 

give those patrols a chance of effecting surprise and of varying their route 

each day, a system was started called “The Floating Platoon.” A quaint 

name, but the most descriptive to be found. A lightly equipped platoon 

moved up and down as the spirit moved it on the flanks of the road between 

the permanent piquets, and at nightfall billeted itself on any suitable piquet, 

resuming its work at dawn and moving back to a main camp at reasonable 

intervals for rest. The guiding principle was that on no two successive 

nights was the platoon to be at the same piquet. The system was most 

successful till this principle was abused, and one of the platoons for some 

reason spent three nights in one piquet. In fact the floating platoon ceased 

floating, and of course this was spotted by the enemy.9

The first night, naturally, nothing happened, but when the platoon 

returned to the piquet for the second night the watchers seemed to have 

pricked their ears to some purpose, for on the fourth morning when the 

platoon left and came down the apparently safeguarded slopes in full 

view of the piquets across the valley, moving on two adjacent spurs and 

all according to Cocker,10 it was completely wiped out by two parties of 

tribesman in ground dead to the piquet just issued from, each enfilading the 

9. Another use of the floating platoon would be as a quick reaction (reserve) force to 

respond to any tactical emergency.

10. ‘According to Cocker’ is a British proverbialism that means to be ‘absolutely correct.’ 

It is much like the saying ‘according to Hoyle’, the definitive book on the rules of card 

games (first published in 1750). Edward Cocker was a 17th century English engraver 

who published a standard math primer (Cockers Arithmetick) that went through numerous 

printings; thus the relation between math, and being correct as Cocker. 
General 1

troops coming down the spur to their right or left,

So far, only good tactics, but each party of the enemy had taken steps to 

protect itself from being seen from the piquets across the valley by building 

thin stone walls at their backs, and were crouching in the open to meet the 

men coming down from the piquet. One night to spot the possibility of a 

scoop and the next night to lay the trap with every precaution against its 

being detected.

One can’t help admiring these folk, and if we don’t take lessons from 

their doings, we deserve all we get.

* * * *

They are equally careful with their minor ambushes, and clever as 

can be with them. This is not surprising, for they have constant practice in 

their daily life in conditions where a mistake means death. They have full 

knowledge of the ground which they have grazed their goats over since 

childhood, protective colouring to a marked degree in their filthy rags, good 

eyesight, and instinct for danger, without which they could not survive in 

this land of blood feud and inter-tribal war. Take one example only, the 

Khuzma Nullah incident.11 Here a party moving in a little valley were fired 

on from the left. No one was visible, but the party did the right thing and 

dashed with fixed bayonets up the slope towards the shot. And as soon as 

they were spread-eagled thus, a blast of fire from the right dropped the 

lot. Probably no sign of anything till the burst of fire, and then the swift 

rush with knives, the stripping of the dead, and the unhurried mutilation of 

the infidels.12 Yet a portion of the party a short way behind whence they 

could cover with fire might at least have saved the ambush from becoming 

a slaughter place. You see how the commander of the smallest parties has 

always to be thinking, for he is out against men who know their own game 

well, and play it hard.

* * * *

But there is no need to become discouraged with tales of fiendish 

cunning and unescapable disaster. Fire and movement should be your 

11. A ‘nullah’ in Punjabi dialect is a narrow ravine or depression in a hilly or mountainous 

area. A nullah may stretch for long distances and were used by Pathan tribesmen as both 

hiding places and routes of passage for gun-runners and smugglers. They are used today 

for the same purposes. 

12. Rudyard Kipling summed up the tribesmen’s brutality in the poem “The Young British 

Soldier” writing, “When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains, and the women 

come out to cut up what remains, jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains, an’ go to 

your Gawd like a soldier.” The Collected Poems of Rudyard Kipling (London: Bibliophile 

Books, 2001), 429.
16 Passing It O

slogan, and why should you not on your side use cunning? I see no reason 

why an active minded man who can put himself into the enemy’s skin 

should not outwit him quite often enough to put the fear of death into him. 

And once that is done be sure that the battalion which does it well will get 

a name for it, and in all its little independent or detached duties will be 

given a wide berth, just as surely as the one which is known to be heavy 

and dull is selected as a victim.

How are you to do it? Think out evil little dodges. The best known is 

the “Silly Fool” piquet. On a suitable occasion the men of the piquet get 

up slackly, dust their seats, pick up rifles by the muzzle, and slope off under 

the loud words of command a few steps down hill, leaving bright lookouts 

in cover. The enemy, if there, make a rush for the discarded piquet position, 

and is met by the full strength of the piquet at short range. I have seen this 

worked twice. The second time was certainly against Afghan Mohmands, 

not quite the wily folk our tribesman are, but it worked admirably. The 

officer who ran it was a first-class lad, and his men were Gurkhas; but you 

are a first class lad, and there is no reason why your men should not lie low 

as well as the Gurkhas.13

That is only one way. Lying-out for snipers after dark is another. Note 

the “lying-out,” for nothing will be done if you patrol. Movement spoils 

all. Therefore, if you are going to set a proper night “chapao”14 or ambush, 

settle into it and conceal yourselves as early in the afternoon as you would 

if sitting up for a tiger, for you don’t know where the human tiger may 

be watching from. And distract him, as you do the tiger, by having men 

moving naturally about and clearing off normally, and then leaving you 

and your men to the night and luck. Or else move out to the place, if near, 

after dark, settle in and lie low. But there must be no silly idea of stalking 

at night. The man who moves gives himself away, and to do any good 

13. The Gurkhas are Nepalese who have been recruited into the British Indian Army and 

contemporary British Forces since 1857. The Gurkha’s served with distinction in actions 

on the Indian, North West Frontier and in the three Anglo-Afghan Wars. Historically the 

Gurkhas have served under British officers; however, today Gurkha officers also serve in 

Gurkha Regiments. Like the Indian Sikhs from the Punjab, the Gurkhas are a ‘martial race’ 

and have a natural aptitude for soldiering. Gurkha units are serving (2010) in the conflict in 

Afghanistan; see James Fergusson, A Million Bullets (London: Bantam, 2008, 47-85. Also 

for a history of the Gurkhas see, Byron Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: Norton, 1990).

14. The word, chapao, (ambush) was used by British Forces serving on the NWFP up 

through World War II. For a good article describing a British officer’s service with the 

Indian Army Frontier Corps and their setting up a ‘chapao’ against Afghan raiders see the 

article by Leonard Richards, “Serving on the Afghan Frontier,” Legion Magazine, 1 Nov, 

2002, 27. Legion Magazine is a publication of the Royal Canadian Legion, a veteran’s 

organization.
General 1

himself the enemy must approach, and in doing so may be got. By the 

way, when you go in for night work, in the absence of a brigade sign, you 

should have a recognition signal. Light taps on the pouch or on the pocket 

if pouches are discarded, are good and can be varied. The butt of the rifle 

is not so good as the enemy have butts to play tunes on also. But have a 

signal—it may prevent much palpitation and possible accidents.

But there are other ways, without risk, all of the booby trap type. A 

guncotton charge in a dud grave will discourage desecration of graves, 

a nice little habit of these folk, and is far better than the old dodge of 

burying a mule or litter above the body. A similar charge, complete with 

friction tube, will ‘do in’ a sportsman cutting cable. This is a very common 

annoyance, not done for military reasons but to secure a really stout 

material for stringing the family bed; and if as our friend runs merrily along 

coiling up quarter of a mile of usefulness he finds the cable checked, he 

will naturally think it is a bush or stone, give the cable a jerk, and himself 

be jerked noisily across Jordan.15 That usually chokes off all cable cutting 

for a bit. Another, best ordered by higher authority, is an ammunition box 

with guncotton for contents, and a friction tube on the split pin, realistically 

dropped in withdrawal; a stout group will certainly gather round the best of 

all loot to share it out, et voila! Cad trick,16 but all booby traps are more or 

less that, and when you fight with dogs you must bite like a wolf.

* * * *

But you have only to sit down and think out ways. You can easily 

outwit the Pathan if you set out to do it, because by setting traps instead 

of walking into them you take the initiative and keep him guessing. 

Moreover, he is used to our blundering, straightforward ways of war, and 

a change to his own ways upsets him badly. I have tried this and know 

it. When we forced the Barari Tangi17 we had a lot of men out against us, 

and few enough to tackle them with. So we first took some heights to the 

15. ‘Jerked across the Jordan’ was a British soldier’s euphemism for dying violently. The 

phrase was taken from the American hymn “Swing Low Sweet Chariot” (1862). The hymn 

became popular among British evangelicals serving in the Victorian British Army. Pathan 

cable and line cutting plagued the British signal corps on the frontier.

16. Skeen sums up the use of ‘booby traps’ against the Pathan with the French term et voila! 

—translated as, ‘there you have it.’ ‘Cad trick,’ in British parlance means ungentlemanly 

behavior. Booby traps have a long history from the Afghan Wars of the 19th and 20th 

centuries, through the Soviet-Afghan War (1969-1979) and the contemporary Operation 

Enduring Freedom. 

17. While a nullah is a ravine or cut through a hilly or mountainous area, a tangi is larger—a 

small pass, defile, or valley. Because a tangi is passable for troops and vehicular transport, 

they were often the sites of ambush.
18 Passing It O

south, and established a stout piquet there. This was necessary in any case. 

Then we put up a similarly necessary one north of the Tangi. There was an 

important height in the centre, just above the Tangi, and a piquet had to be 

put on that. So we gambled on the enemy thinking the next move would 

just mean the same old piquet building which they could harass as usual 

about 11 a.m., and no point in getting up earlier. It worked, and as a result 

we got through the Tangi and occupied a really appalling ridge beyond with 

something under twenty casualties, a job which would have cost us at least 

a hundred if the enemy had been ready for us. Mystify and mislead-the old 

rule. Nothing new in it, but how often forgotten!

Another time, which I shall never forget as it caused the worst night 

of mental misery I have gone through, was the withdrawal of two distant 

camp piquets at Makin. We wanted to get the bulk of our camp off quietly, 

but of course the enemy knew we were clearing some day and were ready 

to worry us. Had the two piquets been brought in as they ought to have 

been, decently and in order during the day, the gaff would have been blown 

and we would have had snipers round us all night and packs of them at 

dawn. All right when you haven’t some fifteen hundred transport animals 

to load and pass out, bad when you have. So the piquets were ordered to 

come away half an hour after the moon set, about 2.30 a.m. Why after the 

moon set? Put yourself in the Pathans’ skin. They knew we were unlikely 

to move in the dark in preference to moonlight, and, so, though they were 

all round the piquets at 2 a.m., they went off to a well-earned sleep shortly 

after, and both piquets came through without casualty. And next morning 

the enemy woke to find the camp gone, and the fighting portion of the 

column ready for them. A great deal was due to the officers and men of the 

piquets—a most gallant feat, but if they had not waited it would have been 

the last time they ever left a piquet. 

The truth is, you can do a great deal that seems risky, provided you put 

yourself in the enemy’s place, think as he would, and then don’t do what he 

expects you to. And when he has been fooled two or three times, play for 

a change the straight silly game he is accustomed to from us, and his heart 

will break.

This applies to every act, from the decisions of the higher commanders 

to the handling of the section by the latest lance-corporal. One of the 

reasons why the Pathan has been so successful in the past and has such a 

reputation for cunning is that he has reckoned on our playing the obvious 

soldier’s game, and has been right. Copy his game, and go one better, and 

he is done.
Still General 19

Chapter 

Still General.

Changes in tribal methods – Other factors adding to our difficulties 

due to the High Velocity Rifle – Increasing slowness of movement in the hills 

due mainly to the same thing – The Permanent Piquet a product of the same 

thing, which will also enforce advance in touch with motorable roadhead.

The greatest change so far in tribal methods and in the s

needed to counter them has been brought about by the high velocity rifle 

and by smokeless powder. The first has, of course, added to the tribesman’s 

power for harm, but it has done more than that. It has made every valley 

into a “Tangi,” or defile, and in place of piquets covering the close vicinity 

of columns on the move or in camp, we now have to hold heights at any 

distance up to fifteen hundred yards and more from it. Longer to reach, 

more loss in taking them, more men to hold them, and harder to get away 

from—the whole meaning slower movement of the force they are posted to 

protect. When I started this game, seizing a piquet position was a simple 

thing, taking the time it took to scale some point overlooking the line of 

march at three hundred yards or so, and when you got to it you hadn’t to 

expect bullets snickering in from far off and from somewhere you couldn’t 

see. And holding it was equally simple, for though sometimes overlooked 

at the then effective range, it was not practically always overlooked, as 

at present. So that direct casualties were few and attack uphill at close 

quarters covered by an accurate long range fire was not known. 

As for smokeless powder—in the old days you knew at once where 

the enemy were, by large and frequent puffs of smoke from anything up 

to elephant rifles, and to hit you, they had to be close enough to be seen 

quite easily. In the fighting against the Mahsuds in 1919 and 1920, I was at 

my command post during twenty-three actions in which at least a brigade 

was employed, with anything from three hundred to five thousand men up 

against us. From the nature of things the command post was inside a semi-
20 Passing 

circle of fighting men, so I saw everything, and during the whole of that 

time I only saw two puffs of black powder.1

This power of remaining unseen in action, increased of course by 

the longer ranges at which hurt can be inflicted, has led to more care in 

keeping out of sight. At the Malakand in ’97, the hillsides were like a field 

of flowers with the standards erected by the enemy. We used to reckon-one 

standard as supported by fifty men. Not quite so many at the Malakand, 

where the looting of the bazaar had made standards about two a penny. 

Now, flags are seldom seen, and the “void of the battlefield” is as marked 

as anywhere else.2

* * * *

There is one difference, however. In modern war the problem is to get 

over beaten zones, and safe passage is for the individual a matter of luck. 

In frontier fighting, you will soon know the difference. No shots are fired 

except at a mark, and in place of the impersonal killing of the Great War3

you will find that you yourself have been picked to be shot at by a most 

persistent enemy, and pretty closely missed, if at all. Quite unpleasant, and 

difficult to get used to, especially as you never know nowadays where the 

marksman is.

* * * *

It is curious how the odds change. At the Umbeyla Pass, in the sixties, 

where the tribes from north of the Kabul River4 combined to hold up a fairsized force for several weeks, the enemy’s weapon, the jezail,5

 with a range 

1. Smokeless powder was invented in 1884 by a French inventor, Paul Vielle and later 

improved by Alfred Nobel in 1887. The first military rifle to use smokeless powder was the 

French Lebel in 1886. In 1895 the smokeless Lee-Metford cartridge was introduced to the 

British forces. 

2. The Malakand battles were a turning point in frontier warfare. After disastrous frontal 

assaults against British Indian Army troops at the Malakand, the Pathan reverted to their 

more successful, ‘hit and run’ tactics. Winston Churchhill documented these actions in his 

book, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (London, 1901). 

3. Great War is used in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth nations and World War I 

is generally used in United States.

4. The Kabul River flows east from the Sanglakh range of mountains, west of Kabul (the 

Afghan capital) and continues for 435 miles until joining the Indus River in Pakistan. The 

Kabul River flows north of Jalalabad, the Khyber Pass, and Peshawar, the provincial capital 

of the North-West Frontier. The Kabul River valley along with the Khyber Pass has been 

an historic invasion route.

5. The Jezail is a locally-manufactured long-barreled, often highly-decorated, curvedstocked firearm of the Pathan. It is usually in excess of .50 caliber and outranged the 

British “Brown Bess” musket. While most jezails were muskets, the jezail rifled-muskets 

were accurate, especially when fired using a horn or metal bipod. The jezail was used until 

the Pathan gained access to modern firearms.
Still General 21

of some three hundred yards or so, completely outmatched the Brown Bess6

of our troops. And the fighting developed into a series of bitter struggles 

for piquet positions, and ceased with the exhaustion of the enemy.

Then the Brown Bess was replaced by the Snider, and we were on 

top.7 Following on came the Martini Henry,8 twice the fellow the Snider 

was. Then came the Lee Metford9 and smokeless powder, used by the 

British battalions in 1897 for the first time, and startling the Bunerwals10

at the Tanga Pass out of their lives. All this time the tribesmen had been 

wallowing along behind with their jezails and odd guns and a sprinkling of 

stolen Sniders and later Martinis, so that as late as 1915 frontier fighting 

remained for us a pleasant enough way of applying peace training with 

enough of danger in it to make it exciting, unpleasantly so when the 

principles of war and the special methods demanded by tribal tactics were 

ignored.

Modern arms had been slowly arriving through the Gulf and 

Afghanistan, though so costly that they were few; but with the war there 

was an increase in the flow, from Mesopotamia11 and elsewhere, and finally 

the defection of parts of the Waziristan Militias armed the Mahsud really 

well.

In the 1919 affair, so fully were the Mahsuds alive to the value of 

their improved armament that no black powder weapons were allowed into 

the fight by day, and their application of fire was carefully organized—

6. Brown Bess was the nickname of the flintlock, muzzle-loading, .75 caliber musket 

issued to British and Colonial troops and in use from 1722 until it was replaced by the 

percussion-cap-ignited 1839 Pattern Musket. The Brown Bess weighed just under 10 

pounds and was accurate only to about 50 yards, and was best fired in volley. Often a 

British euphemism for joining the army was ‘marrying Brown Bess,’ akin to ‘taking the King 

(or Queens) shilling.’

7. The British breech-loading Snider-Enfield, produced at Enfield Arsenal was used from 

1866 into the 1880s. The Snider had an effective range of 1000 yards, weighed about 9 

pounds and had a rate of fire of 10 rounds per minute. It fired a .577 cartridge.

8. The Martini-Henry was a breech-loading, falling-block rifle introduced in 1871. The 

Martini-Henry weighed eight and one half pounds and had an effective range of 600 yards. 

If fired a .45 caliber bullet. The Martini was a favorite ‘knock off’ rifle of Pathan gunsmiths.

9. The Lee-Metford rifle was used from 1886 until replaced by the Lee-Enfield rifle in 

1895. The Metford was the first bolt action rifle and the precursor to the Lee Enfield .303 

caliber service rifle of World War I.

10. This refers to the warlike Yusafzai tribe that live in the Buner valley north of Peshawar 

and came to be called the Bunerwals.

11. Mesopotamia, modern Iraq, was a conduit for arms, ammunition, and other contraband 

smuggled up the Persian Gulf and then transported by camel through Persia, Balochistan 

and Waziristan to the North-West Frontier of India.
22 Passing 

long range sniping and covering fire from all ranges to let the swordsmen 

close. And the lack of musketry training in all but a few units and the 

marksmanship of the Mahsud gave back to the tribesman the superiority 

which they had lost with the arrival of the Snider. Then the wheel came 

full circle, and in the fighting for the piquets at Palosina, in Christmas 

week of 1919, the Umbeyla was reproduced, in its staggering beginning, its 

anxious battling, and its end—in the Mahsud losses on Black Hill, which 

sent them back to lick their wounds till we advanced again.12

But now our powerful pack guns, our machine guns, our small arms 

training, and our ample ammunition supply should have wiped out this 

advantage, and all that remains is to bring your men up to the standard in 

this form of fighting which will counterbalance the many natural advantages 

which the tribesmen possess.

* * * *

In another way our troubles have increased of late, and that is in 

increased unhandiness of forces operating in these hills. In 1860 a move 

from Jandola to Makin took four days. In 1920 it took two months. The 

reasons are many. One, unavoidable, is the increased fighting power of 

the enemy, requiring something stronger than the columns of three or four 

battalions or less which have frequently in the past traversed tribal country 

and smashed opposition. The same factor demands the carriage of vastly 

increased reserves of ammunition, of explosives, of wire, Very lights, tools, 

sandbags, and the thousand and one aids which we never dreamed of asking 

for of old. Then, with the increased grip of the doctors on our medical 

arrangements, ambulance strengths have increased. Excellent, of course, 

and public opinion will never allow less, but none the less hampering, and 

if public opinion demands satisfaction in this direction it must be prepared 

for slower work. And, lastly, the weight of ration carried has doubled for 

the troops, and the wretched non-combatants are at last decently fed and 

clothed. And as it has become impossible to protect grazing animals, the 

camel now has to have some food carried for him. The results more than 

justify it. Sick lists are smaller, work is more efficient, and all that; but it 

all means more transport in proportion to the fighting man, and therefore 

12. Skeen is referring to the fierce fighting at Palosina similar to the hard fights that the 

British experienced in the Umbeyla campaigns in 1858-1863 against the Pathan Bunerwals. 

In the Umbeyla campaign, the British established two fortified piquets that commanded the 

Umbeyla Pass. The piquets were fiercely contested and the British lost and retook the 

sites several times, suffering heavy casualties. For a description of the Umbeyla campaign 

see Mason, A Matter of Honour, 338.
Still General 23

slower work. In short, increased enemy fighting power and increased 

impedimenta combine so to slow down movement that I hold the only 

economical way of dealing with a powerful tribal resistance to be by an 

advance a short distance ahead of motorable roadhead. Any other method 

means vast expense eventually, and many possibilities of disaster all the 

time.

That brings me to another innovation—the Permanent Piquet. Until 

the high velocity rifle imposed the various conditions of delay which I 

have mentioned, columns could be smaller and were less unwieldy, and the 

system of flanking piquets sent out from a force on the move and withdrawn 

with its rearguard was found to be the best form of protection on the march. 

But it has now been shown that if there is likely to be serious opposition, 

ordinary piquet posting becomes a long matter and a march of any length, 

in consequence, an impossibility. A system more economical of time and 

of life had to be devised to meet the changed circumstances which we met 

in the Mahsud campaign.

The Manual*13 says: “Permanent Piquets are more economical and 

secure,” but there are many more and stronger reasons for their employment 

when tackling a well-armed enemy. In the old days putting up a flanking 

piquet was a simple matter, short distances to go and to come back from, and 

remarkably little opposition, generally only sniping from not too accurate 

weapons. In fact, I have only seen three such piquets strongly opposed out 

of the hundreds I must have seen put up. Assault, if it developed later in 

the day, was a scrap between men with swords and pistols without covering 

fire to help them, and troops armed with rifle and bayonet, in possession of 

higher ground. So that the force, whether a fighting column or a convoy, 

was little delayed by the process of flank protection. Now, piquets have to 

go long distances, are far more liable to losses when in position, usually 

require support to their withdrawal, and have a bad time generally. And 

the time taken in posting and withdrawal is immensely increased. 

Further, if this sort of thing has to be undertaken by forces escorting 

transport, apart from the slower movement, they have to be strong out of 

all proportion to the columns in front and even then risk loss and possible 

disaster every day. So I think that wherever a well-armed and tenacious 

enemy has to be tackled you will find that except for foraging expeditions 

or movement of lightly equipped columns ahead of advanced base—in fact, 

13. *Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India, Army Headquarters India, 

1925. [Note, this is the only Skeen footnote.]
24 Passing 

wherever an advance is being made along what is intended to be the main 

line of communications—a system of permanent piquets will be adopted.

This must mean that the campaign takes the form of a series of short 

marches, each followed by halts, during which supplies are filled up, sick 

evacuated, and permanent piquets established behind and in front of the 

halting place, to secure the communications behind and ensure a flying start 

for the next move. This process will naturally be a lengthy one. In 1919-

1920 in Waziristan, though several factors made the initial move slow, at 

the end you still had a very efficient force taking over a day per mile to 

advance up a wide riverbed leaving a securely held passage behind it. On 

this basis it should not be impossible to drive a road traversable by at least 

six-wheeler motor transport behind the troops with no more delay than will 

inevitably occur without it; while the fact that troops will be employed 

rather in covering road construction than in forcing an ill-supported 

entry into undeveloped country will allow of three very desirable things. 

Economy of troops, always to be sought after; economy of camel transport, 

which is necessary if we are not to exhaust a by no means too rich source 

of essential animals; and lastly an enemy compelled by shame to attack on 

ground of our own choosing rather than as in the past on ground of his own 

choosing whenever it suited him to use it.

So if circumstances demand an advance covered by construction and 

occupation of permanent piquets, they should also justify the construction 

of motorable roads immediately behind it, instead of later, after time, 

money, men, and transport have been used up in an attempt to apply the old 

style of operation to present conditions.

In these remarks I have had in mind only an invasion of enemy country, 

contested bitterly as such invasion will usually be until the enemy sees 

the futility of resistance. Such invasions will, I trust, disappear in time if 

the policy which has been so successful in Waziristan is applied to other 

parts of the frontier. That is to say—if tribal areas, once penetrated on due 

occasion, are permanently occupied and opened out by driving roads through 

them. Instead of, as in the past, years of humiliating outrage forcing on us 

a bloody campaign, ending in more or less harried withdrawal, let us have 

occupation and roads. Roads, which, apart from their civilizing effects, 

give lightly equipped columns the power to concentrate and operate within 

a circuit of several days action off good communications. Then the whole 

weary business of communications and unwieldy columns disappears, and 

the problem of military control of the area is simplified as far as such a 

problem can ever be.
Still General 25

* * * *

Other changes are all in our favor. Guns have become immensely more 

powerful. In my early days the only mountain gun was the 7-pdr. “bubble 

and squeak” gun,14 a most useful weapon in support, but of course, with 

nothing like the power or range of the 10-pdr. which followed it.15 Quick 

into action, and throwing a shell sufficiently heavy for ordinary work, this 

still was unable to cause real losses by frontal fire. Then came the 2.75-

inch gun, more powerful and with a longer range, but still without much 

killing power against men behind cover.16 Last came the 3.7-inch howitzer, 

accurate and death-dealing with either shrapnel or high explosive shell, and 

with ample range, and with only two “crabs” as far as I know—the weight 

of the shell to be carried and the weight of some of the gun loads. The one 

adds to the ammunition columns, and the other lowers the gun’s mobility.17

The pack guns can no longer be expected to “climb up the side of a sign 

board and trust to the stick of the paint,”18 but as their power of indirect 

fire makes this no longer necessary, it doesn’t matter. In this respect then, 

we have an immense advantage, speedily recognized by the Mahsuds, who 

sent in to complain that the new gun wasn’t fair; and from their fine oldworld standpoint it wasn’t. It never gave them a chance.

So we have the pull in our guns, and you have only to see a rush of 

tribesman over a crest in pursuit, and the pack guns at work on them, to see 

what a need there is for guns, and, incidentally, for practice in co-operation 

between infantry and pack artillery whenever possible.

The value of machine guns in this sort of fighting is obvious. Gun 

support cannot be done without, but gun ammunition is heavy to carry and 

hard to replace in action, so the infantry cannot expect a constant artillery 

14. The 2.7-pdr ‘bubble and squeak’ gun was the nickname of two mountain guns of the 

42nd Gurkha Light Infantry; one was named bubble and the other squeak. Bubble and 

squeak is a meal of fried leftovers from the traditional Sunday roast dinner, usually made 

from potatoes, cabbage, onions and scraps of ham or beef.

15. The 10-pdr fired a larger shell from a longer barrel than the 2.7-pdr. The gun was 

designed, as were all mountain guns, to be broken down into four loads of two hundred 

pounds for transport by pack mule.

16. The 2.75-pdr replaced the 10-pdr, and was used from 1914 on and became the 

standard mountain gun.

17. The 3.7 inch howitzer with high explosive and shrapnel shells was utilized in the frontier 

wars following World War I, the Third Anglo-Afghan War and the Faqir of Ipi campaign in 

1919.

18. ‘Climb up the side of a sign board, and trust to the stick of the paint’ refers to a guns 

ability to operate in steep terrain; to be transported by pack mules, in near vertical terrain, 

and operate effectively. 
26 Passing 

support; but a section19 of machine guns, well handled, should make it 

impossible for an enemy to hold a ridge against the close approach of 

infantry or to press pursuit beyond the crests or flanks of hills. Handy, 

accurate, and mobile-the machine gun should be all the Manual claims 

for it.

Then the Very light.20 A small thing, but the difference it can make. 

Formerly, we had only the star shell,21 to use which meant rousing the 

whole camp and using up a very valuable thing, or the flares we used to 

place carefully to our front, which once used up could not be replaced till 

daylight, and which often did not work. Now, every small portion of the 

force, piquet or camp, can illuminate danger, and the knowledge is very 

soothing to the nerves. On the other hand, like all good things, it can be 

abused, and later I shall impress this on you. But it is one of the new 

things which have arrived to help us, to the detriment of Brother Pathan.

Then the hand grenade.22 This relic of the past, which came again into 

most effective being in the Great War, has added a lot to our advantages. 

For searching out dead ground, for dealing with attackers closing onto a 

piquet, and for dislodging men in thick cover, it and its cousin the rifle 

grenade are hard to beat. And in clearing out huts and caves it is a lifesaver, or rather a casualty avoider, without equal. A hole in the roof and 

a bomb lobbed in, and all the danger attending a dash into gloom out of 

daylight is gone. Sundry inventors, recognizing this, had already produced 

hair-brush and other guncotton devilments for the same purpose, but never 

anything approaching the Mills grenade23 for this particular task.

The trench mortar has its uses, but I think the pack howitzer fills the 

bill better in any work the trench mortar can do, while supreme for its own 

19. A machine gun section was comparable to a squad and varied from 12 to 18 men. The 

machine gun crew consisted of three men, with three additional ammo bearers in support. 

Three guns to a section, six men to a gun for a total of 18.

20. A Very light is a pyrotechnic signal in a system of signaling using white and colored 

balls fired from a front break flare gun; also capable of firing illumination rounds. The Very 

light system was named after its inventor the American naval officer, Edward W. Very.

21. A star shell is an illumination round fired by a howitzer or cannon. The round held a 

magnesium flare whose descent was slowed by a parachute.

22. The pull-the-pin-and-throw hand grenade replaced the clumsy light-and-throw, handheld bomb of the past.

23. The Mills grenade was the first modern hand grenade used in World War I (1915). The 

Mills grenade was a grooved iron, pineapple-shaped grenade activated by pulling a pin and 

throwing. Prior grenades, used in the American Civil War, were round and exploded when a 

detonator plunger was activated on hitting an object or the ground. Gun-cotton (pyroxyline) 

is a combination of cotton-impregnated nitric acid and sulfuric acid. The hair brush grenade 

had a wooden handle with a gun-cotton or amatol charge embedded with nails.
Still General 27

job as well. Still, the rate of fire of a Stokes Mortar, its shattering noise, 

its lightness and cheapness, are still to the good, and in it we might find 

another aid for the regular soldier.24

I have never seen smoke in action, but have studied it in service 

surroundings. It has its dangers, but its uses should far outweigh these. 

Remember that the enemy has not much in the way of ammunition, and 

what he has he likes to use against something that he can see roll over. So 

he will not loose off unless he can draw a bead, and this being so a flank 

screen of smoke if the wind suits will help in advance or withdrawal. I 

should think twice before laying it down on a crest about to be left—it 

gives too good a screen for pursuers to move behind; unless of course, it 

were possible to use a whiff of gas occasionally with the smoke to inspire 

caution in the pursuit.

The armoured vehicles.25 When I left there were serious objections to 

using the track type, chief being the impossibility of maintaining them in 

the field beyond touch with railhead. But armoured cars were in frequent 

use, and their speed, volume of fire, and security for the crews made them 

a formidable asset in ground where they could be used. And this was far 

more frequent than one would think, particularly among the foothills and 

the tricky ground found there. I should hate to be without armoured vehicle 

anywhere where they could be used.26

And lastly, the air. My only experience of air action was in 1919-

1920. There even the out-of-date planes used were invaluable, especially 

during the bad days. Handled by as gallant a lot of lads as could be wished 

for, they were constantly in the fight, giving help in attack and withdrawal 

which no ground arm could have done. Their actual effect was not great 

but the moral effect was enormous, for they kept the enemy crouching 

while near him, and as they appeared, the tails of the soldiery went up, and 

24. The 3-inch trench Stokes mortar was the standard infantry mortar of World War I. 

Consisting of a barrel a base plate and a tripod, the ‘Stokes’ at 104 pounds was easily 

transported by a two-man crew. The Stokes mortar had a sustained rate of fire of six to 

eight rounds per minute, and an effective range of 750 yards, perfect for use against troops 

in opposing trenches or attacking troops traversing ‘No Mans Land.’ In the Indian frontier, 

the Stokes mortar was especially valuable for its high trajectory fire, and was considered 

more valuable than the pack howitzer. For the weapons of World War I see, Anthony 

Saunders, Weapons of the Trench War 1914-1918 (New York: Sutton, 2000).

25. After World War I, armored cars and light tanks were first used on the frontier. RollsRoyce produced a prototype and the Vickers FT-17 was used in dry river beds and other 

maneuverable terrain.

26. Armored cars and tracked vehicles were best used on the frontier as command, 

reconnaissance, and supporting fire vehicles.
28 Passing 

when they went off to refill, tails went down. So much so that in view of 

the raw and somewhat rattled state of the infantry, I had to strive to have 

one of my few planes in the air all the time. Nowadays their value must be 

far greater.

You may say that one of the main difficulties of mountain operations 

should have disappeared, and that the blind column groping along a valley 

is a thing of the past. I doubt it. In 1919 at least, information was too 

deceptive to be useful, and practice did not improve matters. I remember 

so well after three months’ work and practice getting a report from the 

advanced aerodrome that the two planes up with us at the heaviest day’s 

fighting at Makin27 had reported no sign of the enemy. I sympathized fully 

with their despair, good lads that they were, when ninety casualties were 

reported for the day. It was no fault of theirs—we had repeatedly to exhort 

them not to fly so low, for they were taking risks all the time in their efforts 

to help. But no one could have spotted those ragged grey-clothed fighters 

crouched among rock and grey ilex. From the ground it was hard; from the 

air it must have been impossible.

I will not enter into the bitter controversy which always arises as the 

power of the Air Force to deal with tribal areas on its own. My own view 

is that these people are really so invulnerable in their miserable property, 

and in their persons save from accurate close range use of ground weapons, 

and are moreover so scattered and so adept at cover and concealment that 

I doubt whether any tribe that has the will to resist will ever to be coerced 

by air action alone. I think the Haji of Turangzai and his Mohmand friends 

agree with me.28

27. On July 5, 1921, the Mahsud village of Makin was destroyed by artillery fire.

28. The Haji “Sahib’ of Turangazi, a Mohmand tribal leader led several revolts against the 

British in 1898 and 1915. After his death in 1936, his tomb was turned into a local shrine 

now known as the Haji Babaji Shrine – The Shrine of Father Haji.
Introducing Detail

Chapter II

Introducing Deta

The Manual must be the guide – Bird’s eye view of the

Column on the march, in its various activities.

So far have avoided detail, and you may be feeling that 

junior officer would be better given something of practical use—hints how 

to handle his platoon or company and so forth. I am going to do so, but this 

is delicate ground. It is quite likely that if your company started to train 

on the lines I think sound, your commanding officer might drop on you, for 

when all is said and done he is responsible for the training in his battalion. 

And even if he approved he well might be up against his brigadier. Also, 

when you go to India, you will find stress laid on frontier fighting, and all 

battalions in your brigade will no doubt be trained by your brigadier on 

lines approved if not laid down by his Divisional Commander, and based 

on the Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India, a book 

which I advise you to study. Again, though I hope I was well up-to-date 

when I left India, recent scrapping may have brought fresh lessons, and 

my knowledge, once very full, may now be less useful. But this isn’t very 

likely—I and my generation trained on lines following closely in principle 

those taught by Lumsden of the Guides1 and others who died many years 

before you were born, and except for changes in method due to smokeless 

ammunition and the high velocity rifle, we found the teaching good. So I 

will give you my experience, trusting you to make yourself fully acquainted 

with the principles and practice set down in the Manual. Stick to them 

1. Sir Harry Burnett Lumsden raised and commanded the Corps of Guides, a native 

regiment that was used as scouts, guides and for gathering intelligence. Lumsden served 

in the First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-1842, and fought in 16 separate actions. Lumsden is 

credited with the adoption of khaki as the material for the British Indian Army field uniform. 

For a detailed history, see Colonel George Younghusband, The Story of the Guides: The 

Exploits of the Soldiers of the Famous Indian Army Regiment from the Northwest Frontier, 

1847-1900 (London: MacMillan and Company, 1908). There have been numerous reprints.
30 Passing 

and only use what I am to tell you to amplify where necessary the rather 

compressed information in that book.

One complaint I have heard against the book is that, full and clear 

though it is, it cannot from the nature of it show to the novice what the 

various operations look like. So what I propose to do now is to tell you 

what I have been accustomed to see; to give you, as far as I can, a sort of 

bird’s-eye view of a phase of operations and then deal with the detail of 

the work which may fall to the junior officer in his part of the whole. And 

as the most important, in its frequency and in its chances of danger, is a 

march in the mountains, I have chosen that.

Here the Manual certainly does not give a clear picture, though it deals 

faithfully with the main activities. Nor does peace training even in India 

show it fully, because it is difficult in peace to reproduce fully what is there 

in operations. Let me try.

Suppose yourself to be watching from aloft2

 the slow movement of 

a column in the mountains. It may be moving along a wide, dry river 

bed, and its length may be, say, some four miles in such a case; or it may 

be trailing along a narrow mule path, in which case it may cover twelve 

miles or more. But what you will see first in any case is a couple more 

lines of men leapfrogging and carefully covering each other in the process, 

but stretching only a short distance on each side of the track. These are 

infantry of the advanced guard, the vanguard, and they are not concerning 

themselves with more than clearing the vicinity of the road. To right and 

left of the track you may see possibly as many as four or five small bodies 

of men, each arranging within itself to cover movement by fire, and all 

climbing as rapidly as possible towards points commanding the line of 

march. Flank piquets moving out. Fairly close behind the vanguard is 

a conglomeration of troops. You may see a section of guns, trails on the 

ground, preparing to open fire if any one of the piquets is opposed. If you 

do not see these they are probably a mile or more in the rear, and in that 

case you will see guns moving up fast past the column, leapfrogging their 

other sections in action and coming up, to down trails as far forward as 

possible. You should also see a body of men in some sort of loose fighting 

formation, either moving forward, or, if halted, prepared by its fire to help 

the piquets forward. This is the main guard, never used for flank piquets, 

but kept intact because its job at the end of the march, when it supports the 

vanguard in clearing the ground selected for the night’s halt and its vicinity. 

2. The ‘birds eye view’ is as useful for describing a column on the move today as it was 

in Skeen’s day.
Introducing Detail

There will probably be machine guns in readiness, possibly ranging on the 

various points which the flank piquets are approaching. Altogether a busy 

little scene.

At their head and somewhere off the path will be a small group, 

mainly officers, in earnest confabulation. These are the advanced guard 

commander, his staff officer, the commanding officer of the battalion 

supplying troops for the flank piquets (unless, as most often happens, he 

himself commands the advanced guard) one of his company commanders, 

and one of the latter’s platoon commanders. Close behind is a platoon, 

obviously awaiting orders, while behind them you may see a couple 

of platoons or more moving up past the main guard to take the place of 

the waiting platoon which will shortly move off to take up the piquet or 

piquets entrusted to it. Close behind the troops of the main guard comes 

what is obviously a formed column of infantry, the balance of the piqueting 

troops.

So far you may see these people reproduced in ordinary training, but 

now you strike something out of the usual run. Behind the piqueting troops 

you will see a small body of men with a lot of mules under load, looking 

rather like a pack battery without guns. These are sappers and perhaps 

a company of pioneers, or what is left of them, for they have dropped 

the groups of men you see working like beavers away back on the track, 

improving it for the transport. They may have dropped the greater part of 

their strength if the spot where you came on the column is more than halfway through the intended march. Next to these is a Red Cross flag—just 

a dressing station’s personnel, for no bearers are needed here. Then comes 

a small party with a dozen mules or more under bulky loads, pumps and 

canvas sheets and what not—the water party, ready to develop the water 

supply on reaching camp, and very important people. And then the camp 

colour parties, also very important people, for their job is to get the camp 

laid out and ready for the main body to march in without delay and get on 

with their work, of which more anon. They are generally recognizable by 

their coloured flags, a bright patch in a dull landscape.

Further back along the track you see the main body—the first troops to 

look normal—the column commander’s headquarters with its flag; followed 

by the fighting column closed up as tight as the track will allow, and behind 

them if you can see so far, and perhaps I ought to say, if you can see round 

corners, comes the transport. In the old days this used to be unwieldy 

enough, but as I have already said, what with masses of fully equipped 

ambulances, and increased rations (heaven knows how the human frame 
32 Passing 

can stand the strain of the British ration),3 and heavier gun ammunition, 

larger small-arms reserves, wire, grenades, and so forth, which my younger 

days were not afflicted with, the transport column now is a huge thing and 

a nightmare to a column commander. The immensely improved transport 

organization of the present day has done something to lessen its road space, 

but you will often quote as you suffer from it, Kipling’s “everlasting waitin’ 

on an everlastin’ road for the commissariat camel and ‘is commissariat 

load.”4 However, before you look for the transport, cast your eye along 

the hills flanking the line of march, and you will see small parties crowning 

the more threatening of them, and not, as you might expect, in neat little 

breastworks of stones, but sprinkled along some thirty yards or more of 

crest in groups and generally marked by a small coloured screen. Further 

down the slopes, almost always where the piquets are some distance from 

the road you may see supporting groups, small in most cases, but as large as 

a platoon in others, while occasionally a small group appears, the company 

commander and his satellites moving back along the piquets he has put up, 

studying their lines of withdrawal, and preparing himself for the bad part 

of his day’s work. 

What you have seen is the normal appearance of a force marching 

in the hills without much opposition. The column is moving slowly past 

you; periodical halts and other checks ahead make it a desperately slow 

business. Still, it is moving along. Transport closes up at halts, not much 

help to the animals, but every shortening of the column, even temporarily, 

is to the good. Along the line of transport move little formed groups, six 

or so in each—the baggage guards, and behind each battalion’s baggage a 

dismal group of regimental followers. A sad little push, and small blame to 

them, for they get little enough fun out of these shows, and little sympathy 

from the old soldier in charge of them.

You should by now be seeing occasional formed bodies—a party of 

sappers or pioneers,5

 their road work done, moving up to their heavy work 

3. The British ration consisted of tinned goods along with Indian rice and what could be 

purchased or scrounged. Tinned goods consisted of meat, fish, chicken hash and beans, 

chocolate and cocoa. The British firm named Bovril was the primary purveyor of rations 

to the Commissariat Corps. One troop favorite was called Bovril Paste, or Johnsons Fluid 

Beef – bullion cubes. British rations were referred to irreverently as “mum’s tasty stuff.”

4. ‘Everlasting waitin’ is a line from the Kipling poem ‘Oonts’ subtitled ‘The Northern India 

Transport Train.’ Oonts is a Hindustani word for camel.

5. Sappers were Royal Engineers, responsible for road building, and operations with 

explosives, laying mines and defusing bombs. Sappers were best known in World War 

I for their tunneling operations under German trenches where they placed explosives and 

then detonated them.
Introducing Detail

ahead, or a company of infantry marching as rapidly as possible up to the 

front. These are piquet troops withdrawn and sent up the road by the rear 

guard commander, if he is not pressed. Somewhere you will see a section 

of guns or more, trails on the ground and facing to the rear—these are part 

of the guns detailed to the rear guard, which no rear guard should lack.

By now also, the camel transport carries more regular loads; the 

ammunition column is in front of the ambulances and the troops’ baggage, 

but the supply column in rear forms nearly half the mass and has its guard 

of at least two platoons, marching in formed parties along its length. And 

behind it comes a little body of infantry, a weak company or a couple of 

platoons, closing up the transport column; and guarding all these helpless 

animals, apart from their immediate protectors and helpers, is the network 

of piquets and supports holding the hills from which sniping would 

otherwise be continuous, and the ravines and other lines of approach down 

which rushes in strength are to be feared.

At first sight it seems as if some sniping must be possible. It is, but 

the sniper hates being killed, and with the countryside overlooked by the 

protective parties he is always in fear of it, and that is what makes the 

system effective. I take much pride in the fact that except at the Ahnai 

Tangi where transport had perforce to be brought close to the fighting, no 

transport animal or attendant was killed on the march during the operations 

of the Derajat Column.

Well, the column moves on, a continuous stream of armed men in large 

or tiny groups, passing from rear to front all along its length. Now comes a 

little space, and you see troops in the valley bed and on the flanks, but close 

in to the track and obviously disposed for fighting. A group of ambulance 

ponies, and stretcher-bearers with a Red Cross flag (to distinguish only, for 

the Red Cross, if it does anything, only enrages6

 these sons of the Prophet), 

a line of men in action in a fire position further back, with a section of guns 

perhaps just limbering up for a leap-frogging move of three miles or so; 

machine gun sections at suitable points all prepared to help the piquets off 

and assist the rear guard; and a group of men, officers mostly, somewhere 

close to the supporting troops and watching both the rearmost line in action 

and the piquets on the hills. The group is marked by a large flag, usually 

red, a little distance from them. Watch the group.

One of them is following the movements of a piquet which has 

vacated its position, and is moving fast towards him. This is the company 

6. The Pathan considered the International Red Cross a symbol of Christianity that they 

associated with Infidel (unbeliever) presence in Islamic lands.
34 Passing 

commander with the road sentries of that particular piquet. Near him 

should be more men, company runners, signalers, and escort. You see him 

turn towards the group of officers, acknowledge some order, spring to his 

feet and signal with the large flag towards, say, the left. He is calling up 

the next piquet to withdraw.

Now watch that piquet. If you had been watching half an hour back 

you would have seen part of it moving quietly down the hill to a fire 

position three hundred yards from the piquet or even less, and perhaps 

a mule scrambling down to the road. But now, the signal having been 

acknowledged, there is more stir in the piquet. Men in ones and twos slide 

backward and then nip off down the hill, gathering in little groups as they 

get farther down and making for a pre-arranged point evidently below the 

supporting party already in place. The men keep dribbling over the skyline, 

and it is impossible to tell how many are left, but no supporting fire can 

be given lest a casualty be made, and there is nothing more trying to the 

nerves then this watching men streaming away and not knowing when the 

stream is to end. All of a sudden some three or four men come over the 

skyline and dash down. When will the guns open? And the machine guns?7

Then, half a minute later another group slips over and comes bounding 

down, one of them waving a small flag or his helmet—the piquet is clear, 

and immediately a burst of bullets from the supporting party sweeps the 

crest and flanks of the slopes where the piquet has been. And next moment 

a swish of machine gun fire from the valley and perhaps a burst of firing 

from a near-by piquet or support, and then a couple of crumping shells on 

to the piquet position, and the piquet is safely started on its return. You 

can now look again to where fighting is in progress by the rear guard, but 

a later glance shows you the piquet collected and moving quickly up the 

line of transport after its comrades relieved earlier in the day. Meanwhile, 

the rear guard continues the withdrawal, its moves coordinated with the 

withdrawing piquets and its flanks to a great extent protected by their 

movements. The rearmost line moves back swiftly through its supporting 

lines, and leapfrogs into a position behind them, in turn to take up their 

work as they pass through. And so on and on through the weary day till 

7. The primary machine gun was the Vickers 1912, a tripod-mounted machine gun that 

remained in service until well after World War II. The Vickers .303 was water cooled and 

had an effective range of 4,500 yards, and was capable of firing 600 rounds per minute 

from a fabric ammunition belt fed from an ammunition box. There was a six-man crew, one 

fired the gun, one fed the ammo and one maintained the ammo supply with three ammo 

carriers in reserve.
Introducing Detail

camp is reached, or till, possibly, the rear guard commander sees he cannot 

get in, and so determines, in good time if he is wise, to collect the piquets 

round him and stay out for the night.
36 Passing It O

Chapter 

Aspects of Work Fal

Junior Officers on the Ma

Work with the Vanguard; and with the Transport.

Let us now descend from our ey and take up one by one the 

duties falling to various junior officers with the column we have been 

watching.

* * * *

No need to enlarge on the work of platoon or company commander 

with the main guard or vanguard. The ground has to be cleared, and as soon 

as an enemy is suspected, fire and movement combined to get all forward 

with as little loss as possible, except to the enemy. The pace is really set by 

the flank piquets—by the delays in detailing them, and by the slow process 

of getting into position. But those in the valley must not delay till these 

flank piquets are actually in position and ensuring a safe passage for the 

advanced guard, but must push on as soon as the piquets are launched and 

far enough forward to be able to assist the vanguard by spotting ambushes 

and by fire from above if the vanguard is attacked. Even this may be a 

counsel of perfection, for if the advanced guard checks till it is quite safe 

for it to get ahead it has failed in its job, which is to clear the road as fast 

as possible for the column, not for itself, to move in safety. This, I may 

say, is a principle which I have seen advanced guard commanders forget. 

When they do they have no right to grouse if they suddenly find the column 

commander a few paces to their left rear and looking devilish.

It is a difficult thing to gauge, though; if the vanguard gets ahead it 

may be ambushed as it was at the Ahnai Tangi in 1920, and at Nili Kach 

in 1917, when the vanguard got ahead of two piqueting parties aiming at 

important heights. In this case the move was completely held up, in the 

former the main guard was at hand to help, and get it out, though with 

losses. I can only advise you to watch the piquets going up, and try to keep 

two or three hundred yards ahead of the main guard and in touch with it. 

1. A variation of aerie, the nest of a predatory bird, as an eagle nest built on a high place.
The Vanguard and the Transpor

You will find the main guard halts frequently once piquets begin to go up, 

for minutes at a time, sending bunches of piquets off at each halt. Use these 

minutes to scout the vicinity, and never move in dangerous and intersected 

ground without arranging for close covering fire within the vanguard.

The vanguard will more often than not move without opposition beyond 

sniping, for the enemy are not usually out to spend time and ammunition 

in resisting the vanguard with the whole strength of the column close 

by and the heights overlooking them about to be crowned by piqueting 

parties. And if there is strong opposition, not merely an ambush, the march 

develops into a fight, possibly a dogfight of the worst description, when 

vanguard work is soon at a standstill. I have seen my vanguard, or part 

of it, ambushed at the Ahnai Tangi, and being pulled out by the rest of the 

advanced guard with its guns in action at 250 yards. But there the march 

had checked, and a battle was developing. It was not in the least what a 

vanguard has to expect, provided always that it keeps its eyes open and 

moves in accord with the progress of the flank piquets.

In fact, I cannot teach you much in this job beyond giving a warning 

that on your alertness depends not only on the steady progress of the 

column, but, and very much, your own safety.

One thing—you can help a lot by sending back early word of any 

work needed on the track. Every minute counts if the sappers are not to be 

overrun by the troops, and if this happens the track isn’t likely to be well 

prepared for the transport.

* * * *

The next job of the young officer on his own is with the camp colour 

parties, if he has to take the quarter-master’s place for any reason. We will 

deal with this later, for his work begins at the end of the march. But there 

is another duty which had best be dealt with here before we get on to the 

important ones with piquets and rear guard. And that is the work of the 

Battalion Transport Officer.

Your battalion has animal transport allotted to it for the Mountain 

Warfare scale of operations. Some animals, of course, are always with it—

the machine gun and Lewis gun2

 mules. But with these the transport officer 

should have no dealings—they are battalion animals and the especial charge 

of those they help to make war. The animals which on service concern the 

2. The Lewis gun was a light machine gun introduced in World War I, and later used 

to good advantage on the frontier. Distinctive by its wide tubular cooling shield, and topmounted drum magazine, the Lewis gun was effective to 850 yards, and at only 28 pounds 

was easily carried by its two-man crew, or a pack animal (Saunders, 37).
38 Passing It O

transport officer, who, let us assume, is yourself, are the pack mules of the 

First Line Transport and the animals, mules or camels, of the train.

The first line transport of the battalion carries, usually, company smallarms reserve, grenades, pistols and lights behind each company; and behind 

the battalion signaling equipment, entrenching tools, water, stretchers and 

medical equipment, with the battalion reserve of ammunition. The object 

of this is of course for the companies to be complete with those things 

which are essential for their immediate fighting job. Other mules, what we 

used to call the “B” Echelon of the First Line Transport, carry cooking pots 

and a day’s rations and greatcoats, or blankets if it is cold and the men are 

carrying their coats. These are needed at once on reaching camp, as you 

will see later, and march with the transport column, in front of the camels. 

The balance of unit baggage is taken on the train, usually camel transport.

All these animals are organized in units, with their own supervising 

personnel, but when you are wanted they are drawn by you as transport 

officer of your unit and by your myrmidons3

 the transport staff of the 

battalion, and returned to their own unit at the end of the day’s work. This 

ensures their being looked after by someone whose good name depends on 

their care. Usually the same transport is issued to the same fighting units 

for their daily task, and the same holds within the unit, animals going to the 

same company and the same loads each day. This helps enormously and 

is liked by both the attendants and animals, and particularly by the mules, 

which are fussy beasts. I remember the trouble a certain kilted battalion4

had in loading up for a march with mules which had met them that morning 

for the first time. The mules simply wouldn’t let the kilt near them, and 

in the end, help had to be got from an adjoining Indian Battalion, whose 

clothes the mules could understand. There was a good deal of friction at 

the beginning of the march, but less towards the end, and next day the 

sense of outrage had faded, and all went well.

Your task as transport officer of the battalion is to make friends with the 

transport units which supply you. Be as helpful and tactful as you know 

how, to ease the transport in their weary work; and by careful attendance 

to your own duties on the march and at the end of the day do what you 

3. Myrmidons were the legendary Greek warriors of ancient Thessaly who followed their 

king Achilles on the expedition against Troy. See Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, 

eds., The Oxford Classical Dictionary (Oxford: University Press, 6-7).

4. Kilted battalion, a Highland Scottish unit wearing kilts like the Seaforth Highlanders or 

Gordon Highlanders who served on the frontier.
The Vanguard and the Transpor

can to keep the animals fit.

Your first job on the march is to get your animals, except those the 

battalion has taken with it, properly loaded at the right time and started 

at the right time from their loading places to fit in at the starting point, 

with baggage guards properly distributed and your own staff detailed to 

where they can best supervise on the march. This means, of course, careful 

calculation, reconnaissance of the best way to the starting point, and of the 

tracks from it to the main track; and this again means training and using 

your particular personnel in the same work, for you will not be able to do 

it all yourself.

Well, we have got the transport started. You now have to be on the 

move. In your place, I should ride on past your camels and catch up the 

mules heading the transport column. Yours being a good battalion, you 

will find the mules moving quietly along with two or three N.C.Os, and 

some twenty men marching on both sides of the mules in parties of five 

or six. Why in parties? Because it takes three or four men at least to lift 

and fix a tied-up load, and one to watch their rifles while they are doing it. 

And on both sides? To get at the loads from both sides without having to 

dodge round a string of plunging animals. The regimental followers, poor 

devils, march immediately behind the battalion mules. There should be a 

stout old soldier in charge, using his little brief authority to the full—it will 

be needed.

If the animals can move on a wider front than two abreast, see that 

the baggage guards march inside of the mass of animals as well as on the 

outside, as if there were pairs of columns of two abreast, so that men will be 

ready to help in the centre. If you haven’t parties between the long strings 

of animals, no one will be able to get inside to a shifting load in time to 

get the animal reloaded and on into his place, and your double column will 

gradually string out and the broad front on which your column commander 

has been hugging himself will become the narrow one which means delay 

and all sorts of consequent trouble.

While on this matter of baggage guards, see that it is well rubbed into 

them that their job is not only to guard and adjust their own loads, but to 

help with any loads that are in trouble, the object, again, being to avoid 

delays. Your own men will do this, of course, being well trained in this as 

in all duties, but a bad battalion will be shown up at once by its baggage 

guards. I have seen more than one where help was given neither to other 
40 Passing It O

units nor to other companies of their own battalion, while the officers’ 

batmen,5 joyful brigands all, cared for nothing but getting their own sahib’s 

mule up to the front as far as they were allowed to go. You as transport 

officer must check this sort of thing, under the authority of the brigade 

transport officer, whose man you are for the march.

Having seen your mules, fall back to the camel column. The Indian 

Camel Corps6 organization is, or was at the end of my time, as nearly 

perfect as such a form of transport can be—far different from the mass of 

ill-treated and underfed animals and men which I began with—and you will 

usually find the camels plodding along steadily and well closed up, unless 

they have met their two worst enemies, mud and hairpin bends. Any kind 

of greasy surface, such as occurs after rain in fields, or in the approaches 

to fords, makes the unfortunate camel do the splits, but this can be avoided 

by heavy work—sappers and others throwing reeds or pebbles or gravel 

steadily on to the mucky bit. The hairpin is far worse and is practically 

incurable. Take any hairpin bend you know and in your mind’s eye recall 

its sharp drop on the outside and its small though steep bank on the inside. 

The first camel follows its attendant round, the second, whose nose rope is 

tied to the leader’s saddle, cuts off a bit, and the third one as often as not 

stumbles over the little bank, jerks its head up and breaks the nose rope, 

which has to be easily breakable lest a good tug tear the nostril. The loose 

camel now stands proudly upright, with its load, which stays on mainly by 

balance, slowly slipping off. And that means delay, however alert your 

baggage guards, for there is only one attendant to three camels, and the 

camel requires expert handling if he is to stay quiet. A man with a pole, to 

shove the camel away from the drop, will improve matters somewhat, but 

the camel, unless it knows the pole man, or the pole man knows camel talk, 

will shy off violently and then the nose rope goes. Altogether, a hairpin is 

the devil, and your “Q” Staff7

 and the sappers, who have feverishly made 

roads up into camp and off it even if they have to work after dark, should 

see to it that there are no hair-pin bends in these. But they may forget, 

and in any case an angle in the neighborhood of sixty degrees will do the 

trick, and you may find these anywhere on the march—at fords, round rock 

5. The batman was a soldier assigned as an officer’s personal servant. The batmen were 

in a hurry to get their sahib’s (Indian word for gentleman) mule(s) into camp, unloaded, and 

tent erected before the officer arrived.

6. The Indian Army Camel Corps was a transport unit; later the Indian Army in World War 

II fielded camel mounted troops for operations in the Middle East and North Africa.

7. The “Q” Staff is the Quartermaster Staff.
The Vanguard and the Transpor

corners, at ascents into cultivation—and you have to be ready for them.

I spoke of a string of three camels, but this is seldom seen, as the 

“sarwan”8 goes sick oftener than his camel at the start of a show, and you 

may have one man leading four camels or more. The string will often be 

much longer, for I have found that the best way to keep camels locked up is 

for the men to work in pairs, one leading the camels in charge of both, and 

the other man moving behind and encouraging the camels with the strange 

noises the “sarwan” alone can make. This keeps the laggards moving well, 

and relieves the strain on the nose ropes, and is altogether sound until a 

hair-pin is reached.

By the way, don’t be misled into believing that the camel is an evil 

brute without guts, who lies down and dies just to spite you. I know a lot 

about the camel, and I know him to be a lion-hearted beast who will not lie 

down to die until he knows he is dying.

We will assume after all this that the camels are coming along well. 

Your brigade transport officer, to whom it was usual in my time for 

battalion transport officers to report for orders overnight and again in the 

morning, will have given you instructions, probably of the “carry on”9

 type, 

with a few points of march discipline to be watched, and your job is then 

best done by riding up the line to its head and dismounting to watch the 

animals file past. You may be alone, but there is little danger in this. The 

flanking piquets will keep off individual snipers or draw larger numbers to 

themselves, and the constantly passing baggage guards are there to calm 

down any lad who hopes to creep up and get a free pass to Paradise10—

but don’t stray. Keep close to the column, where your job is. I lost one 

good friend whose modesty forced him to withdraw from the line of march 

without taking an armed guard to watch him.

If there should come an attack on the transport column on the march, in 

any force, you and the baggage guards have an important job—and that is, 

first of all, to be ready to check at once, with bullet and bayonet if needed, 

any sign of stampede on the part of unarmed personnel, of the transport 

and others, which, of course means a stampede of animals. And if there is 

a stampede—and I have seen two—it will hold up the march indefinitely 

and completely upset everything. Ever seen a camel with its neck out, all 

8. The sarwan was the Indian camel attendant. It was a menial job, and not much 

respected.

9. Carry on! The command to continue or, go about your business.

10. A ‘free pass to paradise’, if the Pathan Muslim dies fighting the Infidel (unbeliever) he is 

guaranteed a place in Heaven. 
42 Passing It O

four legs flying and its load under its belly? Upsets the best troops.

And then you have to be ready to repel the attack if it comes on you. 

It will usually come in on the ammunition column, as being more worth 

while, and this should have its special escort, so will have a formed body 

at hand to act at once. But these attacks are less likely to happen now, 

because the tribesman are better armed and in consequence prefer inflicting 

damage at long range to getting to close quarters when there is small chance 

of getting out of them.

* * * *

You are by now getting close to the next halting place. Constant 

checks will occur, but though the animals with the fighting troops should 

be relieved of their loads as often as the probable length of check makes 

it worth while, you with the transport column will never be able to enjoy 

these. Far from off-loading, the baggage guards will hardly have time to 

look over their loads and adjust them. So halts don’t do the animals much 

good, if any. I have seen efforts made by enthusiastic young transport corps 

commanders to park their animals at each check, with two results only—

delay, and cursing from their more experienced seniors. The thing to do 

is to close up as far as possible, adjust loads, change from sick to spare 

animals if necessary, and “shahbash”11 the personnel, who will respond to 

this better than to impatience. And push on again as fast as you can.

These two things—speed without haste and a well closed-up column is 

what the Column Commander wants if he is not to be anxious all day; and 

an anxious Column Commander isn’t a pleasant fellow at all, I assure you.

* * * *

The troops usually enjoy a halt at the end of each clock hour, apart from 

minor checks. The transport get no periodic halts. There is one long halt 

usually provided by the check caused by getting off the main line of march 

up to camp, but which if not so provided is still essential. And that is about 

half a mile from camp, to let the animals stale; the camel in particular—he 

is a smelly, messy beast. And the men too, because, they are not likely 

to be free for some time after getting into camp, what with meeting their 

guides, getting to the unit area, unfastening loads, checking loading ropes, 

getting back to their own standings, reporting, getting orders for watering 

and drawing supplies, getting the animals into their standings—all these 

take time, as you can well imagine; and the wretched transport attendant 

is made like you, and has fewer people to tell him where the latrines are, 

11. Shabash, to congratulate or say ‘well done’ in Urdu.
The Vanguard and the Transpor

even when he can get away. So see that he knows when he must break off 

for the last time before reaching camp. I remember well an incident of 

the bad old days, when the “drabbie”12 had fewer friends then he has now. 

One of them was hauled up before the Provost Marshal (whom the Indians 

more aptly called the “Bum Major”)13 for leaking in a forbidden spot, and 

was promptly given half a dozen.14 I shall never forget that great red-faced 

blighter with an excellent tea inside him, ordering punishment of that sort 

to a wretched devil who, after all, had to make water or burst, and who 

hadn’t been told where he could, and who had to march next day. Apart 

from the first sense of indignation it gave me for all time a sympathy for 

the transport men, which I hope has been some use to them.

As for the animals staling, the later they do it before reaching camp 

the less they will foul the area of the unit they serve, or, and this is the 

unforgivable sin, the area of other units which they should have been led 

around and were not. However, enough of these intimate details. You see 

your own unit’s animals safely into the hands of the guides who should have 

met them some little distance from the fast-forming camp, and yourself get 

off to the mess, have a snack, see that your men are helping the transport 

to collect their loading ropes, and then off to your brigade transport officer 

to see if you can help. Ten to one you can’t, but he will give you an hour 

at which he will wish to see you in connection with the next day’s work; 

and then you are free, if you are not spotted by the adjutant and caught for 

some other fatigue.

12. Drabbie, a British soldier’s term for camel handler.

13. Bum Major—In Skeen’s day the word for a traditional loafer, sitting on his ‘bum’ or 

‘butt’—here a rude reference to the Provost Marshal. Some things never change!

14. Half a dozen lashes of a whip, belt or cane.
44 Passing It O

Chapter 

Aspects of Work Fal

Junior Officers on the March—Contin

Junior Officers’ work with the flank piquets.

Now for the duties connected with the piquets sent out to 

flanks from the line of march, which are the most important and the most 

difficult falling to a young officer in frontier work. For you are quite on 

your own, with no one near to look to for guidance in a task on which in 

the last resort may depend the safety of the entire column, and which in 

any case must be done well if sniping casualties are to be avoided. And 

you have a duty to your immediate command—to do the work with as little 

loss to your men as possible, not only because they trust their lives to you, 

but because casualties, apart from weakening your power, add greatly to 

your difficulties. So you will see that the more you know about this job 

before you take it on, the more useful officer you will be, and the better 

will be your chance of coming alive out of it.

Before I begin, I should like you to compare the Manual with the 

following, which is one of Lumsden’s training notes—I forgot how old, but 

well before 1870.1

“Flanking parties are generally left from the main column at 

commanding points, right and left of a pass, to hold the ground till the 

arrival of the rear guard, and protect the flanks of the baggage. The officer 

in command should have a slip of paper given him with his name, corps, 

and strength of his party noted on it, which he will deliver to the officer 

commanding the rear guard on joining him. These parties should not, 

except on an emergency, be kept with the rear guard, but be ordered on 

1. Notes in General Sir Peter S. Lumsden and George R. Elsmie, Lumsden of the Guides: 

A Sketch of the Life of Lieut-Gen. Sir Harry Burnett Lumsden , K.C.S.I., C.B. with Selections 

from his Correspondence and Occasional Papers (London: John Murray, 1899), 309. See 

also Major H. B. Lumsden, The Mission to Kandahar, with Appendices: With Supplementary 

Report of the Expedition into Upper Meeranzye and Koorrum in 1856 (Calcutta: C.B. Lewis, 

Baptist Mission Press, 1860). 
The Flank Piquets 

making their report to rejoin their own corps. Thus a constant succession of 

parties will be found patrolling the whole length of the column of baggage 

ready to succor any point which may be threatened. The posting of these 

flanking parties requires much practice and judgment so as not to detach 

more than necessary and at the same time to ensure perfect safety along the 

whole line.”

As I hinted before, not much change in sixty years from the system the 

Manual orders now. The only difference is that with the present armament 

of the tribes, practically the entire line of march is under fire, so the work is 

more important, and has to be more thorough.

The Manual deals very fully with the question, and with the method 

in the form of a training exercise, but there are some bits which will bear 

expanding. Before I go into detail, however, I want to rub in the need for 

full peace training. For all movements in the mountains, as I have said 

before, is attended by delays, unavoidable and unforeseeable, and this is 

more true of piqueting work than of any other. So we must do all we can 

to ensure that there are no avoidable delays, and much can be done in this 

way if all are trained to their job.

I am not going into the detail of an advanced guard commander’s work. 

He is a senior officer and should know it, and if he doesn’t he will soon be 

[in] for it. So he will be wise if he speeds things up by looking ahead as 

far as he can, by having a clear-cut method of detailing the piquets, by 

supporting their advance by fire if needed, and by keeping the number of 

piquets down to a minimum. A difficult thing, this last, requiring lots of 

practice, and a good eye for country. And with all this, he has to steel his 

nerves and be ready to push on as he sees his piquets have reached, not 

the points they were directed to, but to where they can give reasonable 

help to the vanguard. It may even fall to the main body to give help to get 

the piquets into position, the advanced guard pushing on ahead; and this 

is certainly to be preferred to the dangerous delay which is certain if the 

advanced guard waits while its piquets get settled and shipshape. 

I think I am right in saying that opposition to piquet posting is not likely 

unless a stand up fight is in the offing, and then the piquets seldom have 

much trouble in getting into position, except to cover camp. The reason is 

of course is that there is no great chance of getting rifles from troops with 

plenty of time at their disposal and with a strong force at hand—at least, 

not one tenth the chance that the withdrawal of the piquets gives. And you 

will find that the tribesman, who after all values his skin, will generally 
46 Passing It O

wait for the better opportunities offered by closing with troops who have to 

get away and who, therefore, cannot turn and overwhelm him.

It is not surprising—with well trained troops you not only have portions 

of the piquet disposed to cover each other, but you have adjacent piquets 

helping with enfilade fire, machine guns in readiness and guns prepared 

to batter the hillsides—enough to breach a Hindenburg Line,2 much less 

scare off a few ragged desperadoes whose heart’s won’t be in it till dusk 

is nearer. But if the piquets neglect precautions, they will meet an enemy 

sure enough, and if your battalion is ever marked down as a careless one, 

you may expect more trouble than most.

* * * *

Let us get on to the detail of the junior officer’s work, and now I must 

ask you to read and re-read the Manual along with what follows.

Two commanders in your unit are directly concerned in a piquet’s 

task—the company commander and the piquet commander. Your company 

will have moved up from its place in the line of march behind the main 

guard and will now be ahead of it, ready to split up into piquets as required. 

It may be that you, with your company, are told to occupy a swelling feature 

or ridge flanking the line of march for a mile or so. In this case you go up 

and distribute your command to hold it to the best advantage, yourself, 

if you are the company commander, organizing the withdrawal along the 

feature to conform with the rear guard commander’s directions. This is a 

fairly simple matter, but it is not usual, and we will assume that the normal 

routine of posting flanking piquets is underway.

As company commander, your duty is to be handy while the advanced 

guard commander points out the position he wants held and gives his 

orders, which will usually be given direct to the piquet commander. Quite 

wrong, of course, to side-step the chain of command, but experience shows 

that it saves time and errors. You will take a sight over his “pointer staff”3

(see Manual) for your own information as well as a check, listen to the 

2. A vast system of World War I German trenches constructed in north-eastern France 

that were named after Field Marshal Paul Von Hindenberg.

3. The officer’s or NCO’s swagger stick, cane, or artillery range pole could be used for 

pointing out objects in the distance. As the officer with the stick looks down the pointer, 

another individual can likewise stand behind that individual and confirm the feature under 

discussion. Some officers and NCOs alternately carried pace sticks that opened like 

dividers; these could be used to measure distances between artillery pieces, troops in 

ranks or to measure pace while marching or to point out objects in the distance.
The Flank Piquets 

orders, and make out the piquet slip4 which the Manual tells you about. 

This saves the piquet commander’s time, and you will see that he has lots 

to do with his. Then you will give the slips to the piquet commander, tell 

him where the piquets nearest him are aiming for, listen to his orders and 

prompt if necessary, see if the next two or three piquets can be provided by 

your company, pass word or signal to the next company if they cannot, and 

then keep a fatherly eye on the piquet as well as on those previously sent 

up from your command.

I suggest a notebook with details of piquets and notes of the best 

way to bring them off. It may be useful to your successor in case you are 

knocked out.

* * * *

Take it that you are a platoon commander. You are likely as not to be 

in command of the next piquet to go up—let us make it so anyway. Your 

men have moved up front to the main guard, and you yourself should be 

close to the company commander and the advanced guard commander so 

as to take your instructions and get off without delay. The latter gives you 

the position to be taken and the number of rifles for the task. You make a 

rapid calculation and pass word to your next in command to move off the 

track on the side the piquet is to be, either the whole platoon, or one, two or 

three sections to cover the number of rifles ordered. The advanced guard 

commander cannot tell you how many sections are needed, for he cannot 

tell how strong your sections are; and you cannot tell how many rifles are 

needed—the advanced guard commander alone can know what you are up 

against, and, also, it is in his own interest not to waste rifles. That is the 

reason for this slightly complicated procedure.

While your men are moving off the track and up to you, you take the 

advanced guard commander’s orders, look over his pointer staff, salute, 

and turn to your men. Pull out your own pointer staff (never be without 

one, for it leaves no room for the personal error as the ordinary ways of 

indicating targets do, and its uses5

 are legion) make up your mind as to the 

best way to advance, rapidly explain the position of the piquet to the men 

and your plan for reaching it, and point out positions aimed at by piquets 

previously sent up.

4. The piquet slip is a short written memo, written in under a minute, dealing with 

specifics—distance, time, place, etc.

5. Meting out corporal punishment and keeping the hands occupied and out of ones 

pockets.
48 Passing It O

Split your command into two portions. As soon as this is done, ground 

scouts from the leading portion should dash out and get ahead, the rest 

of the leading portion following at a good pace. The scouts should not 

get more than about two hundred yards ahead in open or easy country, far 

less in broken ground or steep slopes. Distance is got by the men in front 

putting on pace, not by the rear ones halting, so you have to be quick.

Take two piquet slips from your company commander, keep one and 

give one to your “road sentries,” of whom more anon, and then you follow 

on with the rear party, not more than two or three hundred yards behind the 

front party, and preferably on a parallel spur to the one they are moving 

on; and your piqueting party is fairly launched on its job. The Lewis Gun 

should be with the rear party, and there should be a pick or two, signaling 

flags,6

 a stretcher, and if standing orders lay it down, as they should, a 

small coloured screen on poles, or the artillery screen7

 (khaki on one side 

and white on the other) as used in India, to help those in the valley to spot 

where you are.

The ground scouts are now ahead, but not too far ahead of the front 

portion. When they get fairly close to the position or to any point where 

an enemy may be lying up, they take cover and wait for their friends. 

Somewhere within close range of the final objective the front party takes 

cover and waits for the rest to close up on them, and then moves on under 

cover of the rear party, which should be ready to open fire at once if needed. 

Now, do not forget, I mean at once, and that means not only ranges taken 

and targets distributed, but [safety] catches down and men watching, rifle 

cuddled into shoulder and ready to press the trigger. And you and anyone 

with glasses, have these out and sweep the crest and its flanks, so that the 

moment a grey rag flutters it will be spotted and a bullet reach it. That is 

why close range is insisted on for covering fire. If the enemy attacks all 

you will see is a sudden burst of dirty grey lumps bounding down the hill at 

an incredible speed, while an equally sudden burst of bullets in your midst 

will delay return fire unless you are as ready to open it as I have said. And 

if you are not, probably all you will see after a few moments of unhealthy 

excitement will be one grey figure on the slope, with luck, three or four of 

your men knocked out, and two rifles lost, and no one’s fault but your own.

Another point—the ground scouts must wait for the front party before 

the whole move on to the crest. As witness a famous frontier battalion’s 

experience at Kharappa, in the Mohmand country in 1908. Taking up a 

6. Used for International Semaphore Signaling—a lost art in the army.

7. Used to avoid friendly fire and marking positions in difficult terrain.
The Flank Piquets 

camp piquet—scouts, four of them—were ahead of their platoon by some 

three hundred yards, and all were moving up the hill when the four were 

attacked at the crest, killed, their rifles gone, and the entire move held up 

till an additional half battalion had arrived from camp to take the hill. You 

see, apart from the loss, delay—which is what you have to avoid.

As I have already said, slackness in your dispositions will almost 

certainly be punished. If you show by them that you are prepared, the 

preparations alone are sufficient to frighten off people of the sniper type.

Well, you have not made these mistakes. Your rear party, ready in 

every respect, is covering the final advance. Your front party advances, 

splitting perhaps to move round the flanks if the position is on a well 

defined knoll, and as it nears the crest, the men fix bayonets. Not so much 

for use, though for that in part, but there are few things more visible than a 

sudden flicker of steel, showing the waiting guns and machine guns below 

that the critical moment has arrived, and all will be on the alert. 

No one there, but beware of bunching on the crest. For, almost always, 

another crest rises close by, and from it trouble may come. I remember at 

the Ahnai Tangi six men being dropped with one burst of fire, which could 

not have been from nearer than eight hundred yards, because they bunched 

when leaving a wall they had been building for a night piquet. And a loss 

like this, apart from starting a heavy day badly, will be seriously against 

your getting away safe at the end of it. Train your men to take cover at 

once, cover from which they can see and shoot, leaving dead ground to 

be dealt with by special measures. And now, all being well, your second 

party, with yourself, comes forward, and your work really begins. 

* * * *

But first you have a mental struggle to win. The crest in front looks 

threatening, the advanced guard commander only gave you the approximate 

position, and you have much left to your discretion—what about it? The 

temptation is all to go forward and take it. If you give in and get there, the 

odds are on another crest, and you are no better off with several hundred 

yards further to go when you withdraw; and those yards out of sight of 

all outside support. So be guided by one thing only—does keeping the 

enemy off your present position safeguard the column sufficiently? If it 

does, your job is to make it secure, and not to go farther afield. Cover must 

make up for loss of command8

—nothing will make up for a clear and short 

withdrawal at the end of the day. 

8. Commanding terrain (high ground).
50 Passing It O

* * * *

Now for the holding of the piquet position. First thing is to send out 

a covering party, to protect you while settling in. It goes out with due 

care and preparations for covering fire to where it can watch the immediate 

front and flanks from cover. You may have to push out a party to overlook 

ground from which danger to the column may come—send it out with 

all the precautions you took with your piquet, and later, tell the company 

commander. He ought to know.

Then you distribute your party, all but the road sentries if with you, 

so as to cover as much front as fits with keeping them under your control. 

Each man throws up rough cover, or, better still, improves existing cover, 

which will look more natural to the enemy, who know your hill top better 

than you do. Do not bunch your men—death loves a crowd—and cover 

your flanks, for that is where the tribesman who means business tries to get 

round. Then take ranges, prepare range cards (if those useful things have a 

place in your work), post one of your best men to keep an eye on the road 

and the rear slopes generally, collect some boulders to rock dead ground 

with, and then, the cover completed, man the defences, see that the rifles 

are distributed to the best advantage, explain generally to the men how you 

intend withdrawing, and then break off into groups, each providing a lookout man. Fix a place for the men to leak, etc; wide of the line of withdrawal, 

and then man the cover again, call in the covering party, and after a look 

round, make them break off to rest close to their posts, except for look-out 

men and a special man or two with glasses.9

 And see that they do rest, and 

you don’t have what used to drive me wild at training—the whole piquet 

glaring over their rifles at a panorama of unbroken peace. Rest your men 

as much as you can, for in the very easiest circumstances they have a hell 

of an afternoon in front of them, with a hurried withdrawal, a march up a 

long column of transport, and a series of jobs awaiting them in camp. And 

in the worst case they may have a serious fight to stay and to get away, in 

which their own exertions are the chief factor in getting them out, a part in 

a long and dangerous rear guard action, and at the end, possibly a hurried 

bolt into a village or onto a stony hill for safety during the night. So make 

your men rest. Not that they will require forcing in a few days, but the first 

few days are the ones to weather.

9. Primitive binoculars, or field glasses, were first used by the military in the 1850s, and in 

the American Civil War. By the Skeen era, Karl Zeiss was manufacturing modern prismatic 

field binoculars
The Flank Piquets 

If it is winter, you may have to make them unstrap their warm coats—

men don’t like doing it, but on these hill tops the wind is like a knife, 

especially to the livers of heated men.

* * * *

Then come some more duties before you yourself can rest. Get in 

touch with neighboring piquets, both on the flanks and across the valley. 

Then with your road sentries and a couple of good men reconnoitre the road 

you intend to withdraw by. Send the road sentries down to the track at the 

point whence the piquet started up, after pointing out to them the place you 

expect to come down. If you have to drop a small party for communication 

with the road, these have to sangar themselves and keep a sharp look-out all 

day. After closely studying the ground and your route, return to the piquet. 

This reconnaissance must never be neglected, and the sooner it is done the 

better, for you can then let your men know your detailed plan. They only 

know the way they have come up, say from the east, and you will want to 

withdraw in the direction the column is moving, and that, unless you are 

out for the day and join the column on its return, will be westerly. None of 

you have seen the slopes you are to withdraw over except from a distance, 

and these hills are deceptive things. Remember the Kapurthala piquet in 

’97 in the Khurmana.10 They started to withdraw down a route they had 

not examined, and part of them found themselves with difficult ground in 

front and the Orakzai behind. They were scuppered11 to a man though a 

strong piquet of good fighting stuff. And though other things contributed 

to the disaster, the trouble rose from lack of reconnaissance alone. And 

that isn’t the only case of the sort in the north-west frontier history.

Once your reconnaissance is done you can work out your plan in detail, 

fixing the spots where the first men to go are to stop to give covering fire 

to the rest. See that all know the piquets to left and right and across the 

valley, and then keep your eye lifting for your company commander, and 

you should be ready for anything. But it means heavy work, so when it is 

done, rest all you can, for much heavier is in front of you.

Remember, you are there till told you may come off. To be driven 

off, or worse, to come off without orders, while any portion of the force is 

10. An action against the Orakazi tribe in the Tirah campaign of 1897-1898. In this 

campaign, the Chamkannis, a small Pathan tribe (said to be a distinct race) were also 

attacked by the Orakazi.

11. “Scuppered to a man’ in British military slang means to be massacred, or wiped out. 

From the nautical term, scupper, the openings on the side of a ship at deck level that 

allows water collecting on the deck to run off.
52 Passing It O

trusting to your protection, will almost certainly reproduce the Shin Kamar 

trouble in ’97, with probably far greater losses than occurred then before 

your error has been corrected.

* * * *

I said awhile back, “the road sentries if with you.” We used to call 

these ‘bayonet sentries,” because they always fixed bayonets, partly for 

defence, but much more to mark them, so that the rear guard commander 

could pick them up at once. They are told off12 in pairs because that is 

safer; a single man may get heatstroke or anything, and fail of his purpose. 

Two schools of thought used to exist around these lads. They are first and 

foremost animated signposts, and as the news they carry is wanted by the 

rear guard commander as early as possible, I hold that it follows that they 

should be left at the point whence the piquet started, and that they should 

not go up with it except to make certain where it is. If they go up with 

the piquet and are then sent down to the point where the piquet intends 

to rejoin the road, they cannot point it out till the rear guard reaches the 

place where the piquet is to come down, and then, apart from the delay in 

calling it up, etc., to which we come shortly, the piquet has to arrange its 

withdrawal in a hurry, and even then the rear guard must inevitably halt 

for it. Delay—anathema, maranatha,

13 and more so in a rear guard action 

than at any other time.

Some say the sentries should go up and stay with the piquet during the 

day. The Manual is clear as to the only time when this is necessary.

Some say the danger to these solitary men is too great, and unfair on 

them, and that they should go up and stay with the piquet for their own 

safety. If you have got into your head the appearance of a column on the 

march you will know that, far from being lonely, they are in the way.

Others say it is a waste of two men, and that the company commander 

should know everything, and be at the rear guard commander’s disposal 

to point out his piquets. He will be, if the day is long and the distances 

short, but try to get round a company’s piquets, and you will see that as 

often as not you can’t return in time, and the road sentries are an additional 

safeguard against a piquet being overlooked. And not a safeguard too 

12. Told off means to be given orders or directions.

13. Uttering the oath “anathema mirantha” was like saying “Oh my God, disaster is 

eminent.” From the word anathema, to set apart or banish, or to be made anathema; 

the Biblical term mirantha means, ‘Our Lord has come.’ The saying anathema mirantha

is found in 1 Corinthians 16:22: ‘If any man not love the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be 

Anathema Marantha.’ 
The Flank Piquets 

many, any rear guard commander in war will tell you.

So leave your road sentries (if your brigade training orders permit it) 

as a rule near the point where the piquet went up. Should the piquet’s 

eventual position not be visible, they may have to go up and return, but 

their place is on the road before the rear guard commander gets there. You 

will generally have a man or two a little under the weather who will be 

fully fit for this duty but a hindrance at the top, where you want the men 

as fit as can be. Anyhow, wherever you have them, they keep one copy 

of the piquet slip, and if you are wise you will not let them keep it in 

a pocket where a sweaty hand may overlook it or pull it out with other 

things; or impale it on the bayonet, for a wind may blow it off and down 

the “khud.”14 Make them stick it firmly in the headgear, or on the bayonet, 

but with a twig impaled above it. And warn them to watch the picket and 

at the end to force themselves on the rear guard commander’s attention 

unless the company commander has arrived.

Except just at the end, wounded from the piquet should come down 

early to them as the one fixed spot in a shifting world. This is better than 

making straight for the road, safer, and a known way. It also lessens the 

number of detached parties, for the road sentries can watch the wounded 

and release those who brought them down to return to the piquet.

That seems a lot about two signposts, but it is as well you should know. 

By the way, they do not count among the number of rifles which go up and 

which are noted on the piquet slip. 

14. The line “blow it off and down the Khud,” is taken from Kipling’s 1888 short story, ‘The 

Education of Otis Yeree.’ A khud, is a ravine, or steep cleft in a hillside; Otis Yeree remarks 

on the impermanence of life on the frontier, “we are only little bits of dust on the hillsides 

here one day and blown down the khud on the next.”
54 Passing It O

Chapter 

Aspects of Work Fal

Junior Officers on the March—Conclu

Junior Officers’ work with the flank piquets, 

and with the rear guard.

While piquets are busy on their hill tops, the company commander has his work to do. Get into his skin for a little. He has moved

along with the advanced guard commander, helping to send up piquets and 

perhaps post a supporting piquet, until his command is used up except for 

his own headquarters, stretcher-bearers, and his personal guard. “Personal 

guard”1 sounds strange, with everyone on the alert everywhere. But 

remember that to do his work properly the company commander must be 

free to move within the line of piquets as he wishes, and a guard is needed. 

In my young days it was a battalion standing order that officers in action 

(we were few in the Indian Army and supervising rather than commanding 

companies, and therefore were a little separated from our men, as would be 

the company commander we are with now) should each have two men told 

off to be “on his right hand as shield on shoulder rides” with their bayonets 

fixed. Why? Well, if you had had a wounded man surrender and then leap 

in with a knife as long as your arm, to be bayoneted within three feet of 

you, you would not need to ask. And that is why my standing orders laid 

down that when dealing with a wounded or surrendered enemy, those so 

engaged were always to have an armed man ready to act in their defence 

against treachery.

* * * *

Well, after that the company commander, when his command is used 

up, does as the Manual says. But he also moves along back towards the 

rear guard, calling up piquet by piquet to find out if all is well. He will 

1. Drawn from the headquarters platoon.
The Flank Piquets and the Rear Guar

have to wait a bit to hear from the latest to go up, and he may have to go 

up to piquets which seem to be in ticklish places, to discuss arrangements 

for withdrawal and find out what help may be needed, but finally if he has 

time he lands up beside the first of his road sentries and waits there to help 

the rearguard commander, from whom he takes over the actual work of 

recalling and superintending the withdrawal of his piquets from the time he 

is told to withdraw such-and-such a piquet till he has it under his hand.

And so the day wears on. You, piquet commander, are up in the cool 

on the piquet position. If very quiet you may send out a party (covering 

fire, remember) to look into any dead ground in the close vicinity. If very 

close—for instance, if your party is on the edge of a steep drop—rock 

[heave rocks into] the dead ground, to save your grenades till the end, and 

do not crane over for a peep, or the peeper may take it in the neck from the 

near-by ridges. Meanwhile, you keep an eye on other piquets and watch 

the track. Troops, mules, camels, all slowly creeping past; and when you 

see the camels carrying neat supply loads you know the time is near. You 

begin your dispositions. Send away any animals, occupy alarm posts, and 

then send away the Lewis gun and part of your command on the line you 

have selected for your withdrawal. Send with them the men who went 

with you to reconnoitre the way, with orders to drop men in doubtful places 

to guide the rest. This lot take up a fire position, inside close supporting 

range.

If the enemy is pressing in strength, you may not be strong enough to 

do this. If not, the same dispositions must be made, but at a great pace, 

when you get the permissive signal. If you have been pressed, enemy 

swordsmen are probably lying up just below you in dead ground. Rock 

this. In any case, rock it. 

And then, as you see the rear guard flag approach your road sentries, 

give your piquet number by the age-old range method. Tens to the right, 

units to the left, or vice versa.

2

 I forget which. And keep on giving it. 

You may or may not get it repeated at once from below. If you do, cease, 

but don’t cease to watch. The rear guard moves on, the flag very likely 

disappears behind bluffs and so on, but at last you see it coming more or 

less abreast of you. Then you see someone—it may be your company 

commander, it may be anyone—take the rear guard flag and signal up 

2. Refers to ‘rule of thumb’ range finding, which is better done with an artillery range pole. 

Well-trained soldiers could pick out points at 100 meter ranges out to 500 meters. Piquets, 

if the terrain was traversable, would also be dispatched to pace off the distance to fixed 

points in the terrain.
56 Passing It O

your piquet number again. Return the call and watch. Shortly comes the 

“Washout,”3 or whatever signal is fixed in your Force Orders. It is bound 

to be a simple one. Why? Because anyone through his recruit’s course 

must understand the range signals. But in these days of efficiency, why 

not by semaphore? Quicker and neater, and able to say more? Because 

you are at war, and anything may have happened to the semaphore expert, 

if any, with the piquet. Heat-stroke or a bullet, and no semaphorist. And 

lastly, why a clumsy thing like the rear guard flag when there must be 

dozens of perfectly good flags, signaling, large—and small? For that very 

reason. Signalling4 flags will be fluttering here and there, but the piquet 

commander wants to know what to look for, and when he sees the old rear 

guard flag stagger and halt and then begin to wave, he is really interested.

From now on the Manual is perfectly clear on the procedure. The 

“Wash-out,” or whatever the signal, means “You can clear out now as soon 

as you like, and do it as quickly as you can.” Acknowledge it and then do 

not delay. The rear guard commander cannot tell you when to clear off—

you alone can tell what troubles are facing you. So the responsibility is left 

to you, but so is the obligation not to delay unduly. And do not forget—the 

piquet is not there to put up a fight and get honor and glory. It is there only 

to protect the passage of the column and you have been told to clear—the 

column is satisfied, therefore beat it as soon as you can.

By the way, I have seen in some quarters a tendency to maintain that a 

well trained battalion need not train to the permissive signal, but the piquet 

commanders should be allowed to use their own discretion and come away 

when they see it is time. I am afraid this is an idea which could only have 

birth in the minds of those who have never been in a rear guard action. For, 

firstly, just as the rear guard commander cannot tell what difficulties face 

the piquet, so the piquet cannot possibly read the mind of the rear guard 

commander. He may be intending to stand and fight, to let the transport 

get away a bit; he may be intending to lay an ambush, which itself would 

be nobbled5

 if the piquets covering it were withdrawing, and last, though 

by no means least, the theory does not allow for the bullet. The people in 

the valley may know that Havildar6 Thakur Singh, the best N.C.O. in the 

3. The rapid back and forth over-head waving of a signal flag.

4. British spelling.

5. Nobbled is British slang to tamper with, damage, or incapacitate, usually applied to a 

racehorse. In this case the ambush would be compromised.

6. Havildar is a Sergeant.
The Flank Piquets and the Rear Guar

battalion, who is sure to be the next Jemadar,7 is in charge of the piquet, 

but for all they know he may have been quite recently “sent west,”8 and 

Lance-Naik9 Tara Singh, the boob, may be in charge. And are you going to 

trust him to do what you might—I only say “might”—have trusted Thakur 

Singh to do? The “pros” are clear and may be excellent in theory; the 

“cons” are perhaps not so obvious, but they may all be facts and must be 

allowed for.

This is a long digression, I fear. Let us get back to our piquet. The 

Manual is clear—follow it and you cannot go wrong. But the picture may 

not be distinct to a novice, and without a clear picture in your mind you 

cannot train your men fully.

The first thing to remember is to give no inkling to the enemy that the 

actual withdrawal is beginning. He will know fairly well, for he has seen 

the piquets coming off one by one and if he has not seen the rear guard 

he has certainly heard it. Friends have signaled that the time is near and 

they will almost certainly signal across the valley when they see your men 

moving away. But if you keep your moves dark from him he will miss the 

critical moments, so have no exposure in creeping away. A difficult thing—

the ill-trained soldier creeping looks like nothing so much as a wallowing 

buffalo, and you can spend a lot of care on this training in peace with good 

results in lives saved in war. Then you must try not to reduce the front 

held. At the same time, see that men are not left alone out of reach, for if 

such a one is hit who can get him away? And if the enemy is pressing, the 

men who are left must keep up the volume of fire. But note—if the enemy 

is pressing. At one time it used to be the fashion for the piquet to blaze 

away in any case just before it left. It would have done better to bugle 

the “Retire,”10 yet these quaint ideas crept into peace training after every 

frontier show, ideas which ought never to have been thought of by folk 

who had done the work under fire. 

As the Manual says, you name men to go off one by one. They creep 

backwards, get below the crest, rise and dash off just a little faster than they 

think they can. Then they catch up or slow down a bit and collect in little 

groups, still moving fast and now and now and then glancing behind to see 

7. Jemadar is a Sergeant with Quartermaster responsibilities.

8. The term ‘sent west or gone west’ initially referred to immigrating to America; in British 

military jargon it meant to be killed.

9. Lance-Naik: a Lance-Naik is a lance corporal, a Naik is a corporal; a Sepoy is a private 

soldier.

10. Equivalent to the American bugle call—recall.
58 Passing It O

if all are coming along, through or past the men lying ready to support and 

on to the next point you intend to occupy, to help off the original supporting 

body with fire. Unless the distance to the road is short, in which case they 

take up position there and remain ready to add to the help the rear guard in 

turn is ready to give.

In all these movements the men must dash along as fast as they can, 

individual movement as rapid as possible, collective action deliberate and 

controlled.

Your piquet is now left with possibly three groups, fairly widely 

separated, and it is up to you to call back the most easily spared, and then 

the others. You have by now rolled up the “piquet screen,”11 for there is 

quite enough activity on top for all to be able to see where you are, and no 

one can or will open supporting fire from below until they have seen your 

“All clear” signals. 

As you call back your last group, you dash off with them a yard or 

two ahead, all bounding along like young goats, but always with those 

glances behind you, and yourself with the flag which the commander of 

any piquet must hold, waving it vigorously in front of your body in the 

“Wash-out” signal. If you have lost your flag, then use helmet or headdress or something easily seen. This is what we used to do, and I like it 

better, as more urgently visible, than showing the screen as is now often 

done. In any case you are responsible for giving that signal. If any men 

are left when you give it, no one else can be blamed if they mistake figures 

on the skyline for the enemy, nor will machine guns or guns in the valley 

delay their fire. But, once given, it is up to your own support, some two or 

three hundred yards away, to see that no enemy come round your flank or 

over the top, and to stop this they must be as ready to open fire as they had 

to be in the morning in the same duty. They will not open till they see an 

enemy or the grey flutter which is usually all they will see unless you make 

mistakes, for there is no use in making a noise and wasting ammunition 

from their position; but all must be on the look-out, glasses in use and eyes 

strained, to see that a chance is not seized and that you, who trust to them, 

are not endangered.

The guns and machine guns in the valley, however, cannot be expected 

to be so particular. If there has been trouble on the piquets, they will be 

ready, and as soon as the “All clear” signal is seen, bullets will hiss on to 

the crest and flanks, and shells will come crumping down, so make the 

11. The piquet screen is a panel identifying the piquet position to the column on the road.
The Flank Piquets and the Rear Guar

most of your time and do not check for a moment till well out of the risks 

of short ranging.

Then when you have passed through the supporting line, send on your 

last groups to the next fire position and yourself take charge of the line 

nearest to the enemy.

You may have had casualties and have to hold on to clear them, or a 

counter-attack may be needed. Do not counter-attack for dead men if the 

enemy are in force, but you must get your wounded off. And if you have 

to delay, let the rear guard know. Never forget this—it is not only very 

nerve-racking not to know the cause of delays, but it may be dangerous for 

you and for the rear guard. If you do have to counter-attack, and if you 

have to bring back men already in position to support you, leave the Lewis 

gun, to support and because it is heavy; and, your work done, carry on the 

withdrawal as before, only more quickly if that is possible. 

Let us hope you have not to do it, but just carry on, your new front 

line withdrawing, but not in driblets, for that would now be a waste of 

time unless the enemy has come on and is closing with you. You pass 

through the supporting line and again stay with it while sending the rest 

on, this time probably to the road, and finally reach the road somewhere 

near the rear guard flag. You close to some sensible loose formation, check 

numbers, and report to your company commander or, in his absence, to 

the rear guard commander, who will move you off up the line of transport 

unless he is hard pressed and has to keep you to fight. You clear off up the 

line of transport as fast as you can, taking care not to stay with the little 

party which brings up its rear—it has its special job to do and does not 

need or like any other unit with it.

And so to the nights halt.

* * * *

That is the most important activity which falls to you as a junior officer 

on the march and is the last we need discuss except those of a company 

or platoon commander with the rear guard. Here you are not in such a 

responsible position, as you will be acting under the direct order of the rearguard commander. The enemy may press hard, but all movement must be 

coordinated with the withdrawal of the piquets, or the process may become 

a dog-fight instead of a withdrawal. You may have to counter-attack on 

your own to get wounded off. This is a fruitful source of casualty and 

it may be of sacrifice, but it must be done, for you are fighting with men 

who, however fine their fighting qualities, are evil brutes when it comes to 
60 Passing It O

mauling the wounded and dead. The dead do not matter so much and they 

would be the last to expect others to sacrifice themselves to keep a dead 

body decently intact; but you cannot leave your wounded if it is in any way 

possible to get them off. Otherwise, do not counter-attack unless your rearguard commander so directs. He alone can judge whether it is advisable 

and he will only do it to relieve pressure and never for the joy of a scrap. 

For on him lies the responsibility of not allowing his part of the show to 

hamper the main operation and he cannot afford to waste time, and lives, in 

unnecessary fighting.

And this brings me to the ambush, which you will find advocated so 

freely. A successful ambush has a fine effect, but to be successful it has 

to be carefully laid, and if it is not in turn to get into a mess most careful 

steps must be taken to protect its flanks and to cover its withdrawal. And 

as the flanks can only be protected by the piquets, and as the rear guard 

commander is the man who deals with these, and as arrangements to cover 

the withdrawal directly can only be made by the rear guard commander, 

take care that no ambush is attempted except by his express order.

* * * *

Otherwise the rear guard carries on as in any form of war—alternate 

bodies covering those nearest to the enemy. If the enemy is pressing it will 

seldom be possible for all these bodies to be on the move at once. One 

or more will have to be in position ready to open fire. You can imagine 

that the rear guard has a trying time in any case, and that if there is much 

fighting you and your men will have all you want of movement and of 

strain, and you will be thankful when signs of reaching camp appear, even 

though these consist of prolonged checks ahead and of rising kick in the 

enemy. They will now do their best to get a chance before the helpless 

transport and their defenders are safely concentrated and the rear guard 

fighting may assume more of a back-to-the-wall character, until piquets 

covering the rear of the camp site settle into their positions and the rear 

guard struggles through, leaving parties to close the valley until relieved or 

until ordered to stay in position as camp piquets.

* * * *

Now let us turn to the work of settling into camp.
Taking Up Camp – Layout and Protect

Chapter 

Aspects of Work Fal

Junior Officers in Taking Up Ca

Occupation of protective piquet positions by the advanced guard – 

Work of camp colour parties – Principles of lay-out and protection of a 

perimeter camp – Occupation of camp piquets.

Though there are not so many detached “subalterns dutie

in settling into camp, there are quite enough to try you high if you do not 

know them, and the first falls to the vanguard and main guard. You will 

remember that these were not used for the flank piquets; their job, apart 

from clearing the road, begins at the end of the march. For when the 

column commander thinks the column has reached as far as it is safe to go 

that night (he generally, if he is wise, settles this about noon, to give the 

miles of transport and his rear guard half a chance), he selects as good a 

camp site as he can, and the advanced guard commander, now that no more 

flanking piquets are to be sent up, starts with his advanced guard proper to 

close up the space between the two most advanced flanking piquets, and 

does it thoroughly. He sends parties up to seize any commanding ground 

from which the camp can be seriously sniped. These take up their assigned 

posts with all the precautions needed for flanking piquets, and may have 

more opposition if the enemy have tumbled to it. Say you are in charge 

of one. As soon as covering parties are out and alarm posts occupied and 

tested, ranges taken and so on, start gathering rocks, or if there is only 

shale to build with, filling sandbags with it or at least collecting it into 

heaps. Because these posts will all be held by night piquets, and if the 

occupants are from another unit it will be some time before they can arrive 

and so much nearer the night, when no man worketh—though he has to, as 

often as not, when the tribesman is out to fight.

1. A subaltern in the British Indian Army was a junior officer up to the rank of, but not 

including captain.
62 PassingI

Anyway, all that can be done to help comrades, of your own unit or 

another, must be done. Here you cannot do much more than build the 

piquet front wall, because you do not know what the strength of the piquet 

is or what its commander’s ideas of his needs will be. But this work will 

keep you busy while you wait for troops from the units supplying the night 

piquet or for orders to occupy it yourself. If the former, you get down to 

camp as soon as you can hand over, for there is always plenty waiting for 

you to do there; if the latter, much work still is to be done before nightfall 

and the sooner it is done the safer you will feel at dusk. But leave it for the 

moment till we see what is going on in camp, and in the apparent confusion 

of settling in try to find out what the junior officer has to do.

* * * *

You may have seen a plan of a perimeter camp. A neat square or 

oblong diagram, with the transport ambulances, supply and ordnance parks, 

and all the non-combatant folk massed in little squares and oblongs round 

two central streets. Guns, cavalry, sappers, and possibly pioneers, also in 

neat spaces, and the whole surrounded by equally neat and straight but 

extended oblongs of infantry forming the protective perimeter.

That actually is the picture the “Q”2

 Staff of the column should always 

have in their pockets, and that, in actual practice, is the camp you will 

never see in really broken country. What the Staff officer laying out camp 

does is to take his plan and in imagination pinch and pull it like the guttapercha3

 faces of my childhood till it fits the actual ground; and day after 

day you will find different camps assuming the most quaint shapes, though 

always fulfilling three conditions: 

The non-combatant units and camp reserves surrounded and protected 

by infantry on the perimeter. 

Irregular forces so sited as not to threaten other faces, yet on a suitable 

tactical front. 

Two wide cross-streets, one pointing in the direction of next move.

* * * *

As you suspect, a body of troops and transport disposed for the night 

like this does not in the least resemble troops disposed for the night in 

ordinary war. A column in this sort of war becomes, literally, a beleaguered 

garrison from dusk to dawn. Or perhaps more usually till the small hours 

2. Quartermaster, in charge of establishing the camp.

3. A natural latex substance collected from the Gutta Percha tree of Malaya, once used for 

making figures and decorative mirror frames.
Taking Up Camp – Layout and Protect

of the night, for the tribesman is an individualist and is never prone to take 

on long night watches and possible dawn dangers for other people, and 

so sneaks off well before daylight to a little well-earned sleep and also to 

escape the attentions of the piquets, which will be looking out for intruders 

as soon as they can look out.

Of course your force resembles a beleaguered garrison because it has 

to be concentrated if the mass of transport and defenceless units is to be 

guarded, and it has to be behind protection because the enemy are quite 

able to pass between the night piquets during the darkest night and assault 

without any inkling reaching the camp till the uproar begins. So that the 

method of protection during the night which has been found best up to 

the present is to enclose the whole non combatant mass by a perimeter, 

strengthened as far as time permits and held by armed men.

Normally, the enemy will not assault. He prefers to snipe and creep 

away before dawn. Also, the Pathan hates to fight in the dark.4

 He dislikes 

death, anyhow, and dislikes particularly an unseen death in the dark, mainly 

because he is sure his many enemies will say he was not in the fight at all 

when he does not turn up after it. And yet assaults do occur, and sometimes 

do penetrate—Palosin in ’64 Wana in ’94, Malakand in ’97, and one was 

due at Palosin again in 1919, but was fortunately stopped by the check, and 

losses in the Mahsud assault on the Black Hill piquet.

So we have evolved and stick to the perimeter system of defence at 

night, in varying forms—and this will last till the enemy can use gun-fire 

or aeroplanes and until a suitable antidote to this has been found.

* * * *

But what the young officer is most interested in is the laying out of 

his unit’s part of one of these camps. Take a likely job for a subaltern if 

the quartermaster is ill. You may be told off in charge of the camp colour 

party,5

 linesman from each company, a spare N.C.O. and yourself. A wise 

battalion will not change men on this duty if it can help it, for a well trained 

and accustomed colour party is a great aid to the unit and to the “Q” Staff. 

For, as in all things pertaining to this class of warfare, speed when the 

occasion arises is essential to success. In this case nothing is more wearing 

to the legs and backs of the transport, to say nothing of the nerves of the 

4. While not preferring to fight at night, the Pathan fighters would use the cover of darkness 

to travel and move into position for a daylight attack or sniping.

5. The British Army would carry their colours (Union Jack and regimental flags) in the field; 

however, the ‘colour party’ would routinely be utilized for headquarters duty.
64 PassingI

column commander and of the unfortunate rear guard, then delay at the 

head of the column while camp is being laid out; and it is up to the “Q” 

Staff officer and his henchmen in this activity, the camp colour parties, to 

see that not a moment is lost.

You will move along behind the main guard and the remains of the 

piqueting troops, with the camp colour men and your colleagues from other 

units, drearily enough; but sooner or later you will see signs of intention to 

form camp. The column commander, or a “G”6 officer, or both, ride ahead 

to the advanced guard commander. You should see considerable activity 

of piquets moving out to the front as well as to the sides, and as soon as 

you see the “Q” Staff officer moving up, catch his eye and get after him 

as quickly as possible, telling your colour party to follow at a good pace. 

You will catch him up in a comparatively open piece of ground; report 

to him at once. If he knows you for an old hand he will not waste much 

time in explanations. He will most likely merely show you his sketch and 

say something like “That gurguri bush marks your left. Take from there 

two hundred yards due west and down the west face a hundred and fifty 

to include the west exit, 3/102nd on your left and 5/107th on your right,” 

and off you go to the gurguri bush7

 and start in. Incidentally, it is a good 

business to learn and to teach your men the various local bush forms. No 

better or more common aids to fire direction exist in a country where rocks 

are all the same colour and mostly the same shape.

Your party joins you. You pace one front of your area, dropping 

company colourmen on their sub-area, mark the angle of the camp clearly, 

pace down your 150 yards, marking the exit unmistakably, see you have 

joined up with the unit on your right (it should be the job of the unit on 

your left to join up with you), correct your company fronts if necessary, 

send the N.C.O. to meet and guide your unit to its area (do not forget this), 

and then go off and report to “Q” and see if anything else is needed. You 

take orders about water, fuel, latrine sites, and so on. Most urgent of all are 

the latrine sites. The units behind your area are all dependent on these, and 

if fouling is to be avoided they should be dug and marked at once by men 

of the battalion sanitary detachment, who should be with the camp colour 

party.

Meanwhile the company colourmen have marked out their area, and 

6. “G” officer indicates a graduate of the Army General Staff College, who generally led 

the column, probably a Colonel.

7. The gurguri bush is a wild bush that looks like a cactus.
Taking Up Camp – Layout and Protect

the lines of the necessary perimeter works. If I commanded your battalion, 

colour parties would carry ropes marked to show the front line of a ditch, 

a parapet, a firing-line trench, its parados,8 a support trench, its parados, 

and a two-yard-wide path behind that. A combination of ditch, parapet 

and trenches is usually the quickest cover to throw up, but if stones are 

plentiful a parapet with ditch in front gives better command and is best 

in wet weather. But some shelter against reverse fire is needed, and a 

rope marked as I have suggested will do for all cases. The main thing to 

remember is that if these preliminary markings are not completed at once it 

will be ten times more difficult to do it when the troops with their transport 

comes surging onto the ground and start in to prepare for the next important 

thing—the making of the perimeter defences. 

An area for the headquarter wing will be needed, so this must be 

marked out, and places for the mess and main dressing station, and by the 

time you have done this your battalion, unless it is on rear guard, will be in 

and the company commanders carrying on.

* * * *

Now, before I go on I expect a criticism and a sound one. That you 

have a battalion with a front of possibly over three hundred yards with 

only about twenty-five yards of depth. What about the first principles of 

defence? Well, the extended front is to allow the few available rifles to 

cover the entire perimeter, and the restricted depth is to avoid taking up 

room which is needed by others, and as both these are necessary it only 

remains to mitigate the ill-effects of lack of depth by the best arrangement 

possible, and how? The column commander does his bit by retaining in 

the centre of the camp, close to himself and the cross-roads, a special 

camp reserve with which to expel the enemy if they penetrate, while each 

battalion keeps a small reserve in hand, and we shall see how depth within 

the unit is still further provided for.

I am a little hazy about the present battalion organization, but I take 

it there is little change in the company. In the old days we had eight 

companies each of four sections (really almost platoons, with twenty rifles 

in each) which changed later to four companies each of four platoons, 

each of three rifle sections and one Lewis gun section, which was a very 

convenient organization for this kind of fighting except that the machine 

guns were weak. Now I understand you have three rifle companies made 

8. The parados is the built up rear bank of a trench that provides protection from being 

fired on from the rear.
66 PassingI

up as before and a machinegun company, with a headquarter wing housing 

odds and ends with special jobs. Anyway, you can apply to the present 

day the principles that we used, using machine guns as well as Lewis guns 

to cover the perimeter with interlocking fire, and then with a little loosely 

thrown wire or other obstacles to give the automatics time to get into 

action, a few trip flares,9 your Very lights, and alert inlying piquets in the 

front-line trenches, infantry should hold an extended perimeter far more 

safely than ours could.

We set about it by telling off one company as battalion reserve and 

splitting our perimeter up into three sub-areas, each held by two platoons 

and the Lewis guns in the front trench, protected from direct and reverse 

fire by parapet and parados, and if heavy sniping was expected, by 

bays:10 two platoons being in the support trench, similarly protected and 

communicating with the front line by oblique covered ways. Trenches and 

parapet very shallow and flimsy, for there were never many men for work, 

but they gave protection against sniping, which gives confidence, inducing 

sound sleep. Officers slept with their men, those with no command had 

funk-holes11 made for them and for feeding in, guards were protected, and 

several dressing stations were made, generally in support trenches, for firstaid work and fairly deep, to allow, of course, of lights being used. The need 

for these was vividly impressed on me when our second in command, shot 

through the back at the Malakand, had to be treated in a well used night 

latrine, and when, two days later, a gallant surgeon had to spend part of the 

night under fire in the open holding on to a comrade’s severed artery.

These arrangements give the depth we were looking for. At least all 

the depth which can be arranged within a battalion and it is satisfactory 

except that the battalion reserve may have a longish way to go to reach the 

flanks. And there is no reason why the perimeter should not be fully and 

safely held with a similar arrangement based on crossed fire of Lewis and 

[Vickers] machine guns.

Full earthwork or parapet protection may not be possible except in 

camps held for some time, for a front of some three hundred yards is hard 

to cover with two lines of trench in the short time and with the very few 

9. Trip flares are activated by pulling a taut wire stretched out from the flare. The flare 

can be set to be activated by the defender or tripped over and activated by the enemy. Trip 

flares were used to good effect in World War I, in conjunction with barbed wire strung in 

front of trench lines or positions. Trip flares were also used on the Indian frontier.

10. Trenches were dug in zig-zag lines so that they could not be dominated by enfilade 

fire. A bay was a short section of straight trench.

11. Funk hole is a shallow dugout in the side of a trench.
Taking Up Camp – Layout and Protect

men available. But a series of short section or platoon trenches, provided 

Lewis and machine guns are well arranged and they have supports in close 

touch, trip wires covering the gaps, and alert lookouts, ought to be adequate 

for the first night.

But never omit some cover, however hurried. I remember in the 

Mamund country, the Guides, old timers, were starting, as you should 

start, straight away at making cover. Asked why and told that there was 

no need to harass the men, the C.O. played the idiot boy, said it was a 

regimental custom and it did matter, and went on at it. The other battalions 

thankfully desisted, and within an hour heavy sniping opened and they 

were digging literally for dear life with their bayonets, which in those days 

were triangular, and bad entrenching tools.

In those days an attempt to secure more depth, or at least earlier 

information of an assault, led to outlying night piquets being placed around 

the camp at, I think, Nawagai, with orders to come in if danger threatened, 

“waving the head-dress and shouting ‘Piquet’.” Incidentally, this had been 

tried and failed at Wana, and naturally, seeing the swiftness and silence 

with which the Pathan moves in the dark. However, in this case, the sole 

survivor of the British infantry piquet can be quoted. “Piquet? I’m the 

bloody piquet! Came in, I did calling ‘Piquet! Piquet!’ with an ‘undred 

of those bastards after me, and you sloshed my bloody arm off!” From 

then on the outlying piquet has not been in favor. If you have to use them, 

see that the piquet is sangared12 and wired against assault, and specially 

guarded against fire from the perimeter, and that your men are equipped to 

stick it out, but never let them run in shouting “Piquet! Piquet!”

You may come into camp so late that no perimeter, even a broken one 

is possible. Then you must scrape up what you can or risk a broken night, 

because it requires a very hardened or a very sleepy warrior to hear sniping, 

know himself without cover, and sleep happily. It is as bad as being sniped 

when bathing. But in any case, mark the front line clearly with bushes and 

stones if possible, and if that is not possible see that you and your men 

sleep feet towards the perimeter line. Why? When a man starts out of 

sleep he naturally rises the way his feet are pointing.

* * * *

I said you might have very few men, as they would be wanted for other 

duties. Here are some of them. A well-run column will have called for 

a permanent provost establishment, a permanent supply column guard—

12. Dug in.
68 PassingI

not an escort, but a guard which knows the normal lay-out of the supply 

column in camp, the followers who belong and consequently those who 

do not—and a permanent water piquet, N.C.Os, and men who have the 

important duty of keeping order round the water in the water trough and 

in tanks. Your unit will also be called on for brigade runners, signallers 

with the supply column, the ammunition column, and ambulances, and for 

brigade orderlies (a wise brigade staff will insist on at least one orderly 

sleeping at their office). It may have been detailed as battalion on duty, 

and that generally means, at least, a column headquarter guard, a brigade 

headquarter guard, one for each field ambulance, and probably a waterpumping party.

Then within the battalion your company will have to supply its ration 

parties, water parties, orderlies, and its share of normal daily duties. Again, 

you may have had a platoon told off to escort the ammunition column, or 

the supply column, and you will have baggage guards with the battalion 

transport, and you should have thrown out at once on arrival in camp and 

before any work is begun, a couple of sections from the platoons destined 

for the front line to act as covering party till the defence preparations on 

the perimeter are complete and the alarm posts occupied. And when they 

come in a small piquet must mount till dusk over the day latrines lest any 

of your men be caught with their trousers down.

All this means a big drain on the workers, but worse is to come. As 

soon as your battalion reaches camp, an officer reports for orders as to 

camp piquets. Your battalion will have to find the piquets on its own front 

or most of them, three or four at least. If your C.O. is wise he will do what 

he can to speed up the occupation of these piquets and at the same time do 

what he can for the comfort of the unfortunates composing them, even at the 

expense of an early completion of the perimeter. I have found something 

on the following lines to work well. If there is a reserve company, it has 

less to do than the others, so two of its platoons find the piquets. All who 

are for the duty settle down at once to feed heavily and cook rations for 

the next day, then fill up with water, in bottle and reserve, ammunition, 

tools, waterproof sheets, and blankets if cold, and with Very pistol13 and 

lights, grenades, sandbags and signalling kit, and start off to their posts. 

Meanwhile as many as can be spared from the rest of the company, with 

the company commander and good understudies to select the piquet sites, 

have gone up with full precautions and with ample tools and material, and 

13. Front-break flare gun used for firing illumination rounds and Very-signaling rounds.
Taking Up Camp – Layout and Protect

there collect stones, fill sandbags and build the “sangars” (for these piquets 

have to be well prepared for all-round defence, unlike the day piquets 

you sent up on the march), stake and wire them if the enemy are in force, 

and generally do all they can to lighten the task of the real piquet when 

it comes. They also note the ground and the best way up to the piquet in 

case they have to relieve or reinforce it in the dark, for the work will fall 

to them. Then the real piquet garrison arrives, relieves the covering party 

(never forget that covering party in any act of frontier war), and the workers 

go off down the hill to begin the many bits of work waiting for the reserve 

company, such as their own cover, funk-hole for the mess, cover for guards 

and followers, filling in holes, marking battalion paths, and so on. No rest, 

you see. If there is not a reserve company from which to detail piquets, or 

if it is not strong enough, one of the front-line companies must be drawn 

on, and will only be able to hold a proportionally reduced line.

By the way, in my young days, when the enemy had less offensive 

power, we used to send up small piquets often just with greatcoats and 

ammunition. The wretched devils spent a miserable night, mentally and 

physically—it was most unfair and small blame to them if they were jumpy. 

Now they are generally strong, and should always be well protected and 

well found. It pays.

Now you see what I meant when I said there would be few enough for 

the work to be done; and I wonder if you have seen what it took me some 

time to grasp—and that is the need, before the march begins or at all events 

before arrival in camp, for telling off your command for the work which 

you can foresee will fall to them on arrival. Adjutant14 and quartermaster 

can help hugely in this, so enlist their aid. But if you do not have some 

system in the battalion the confusion and shouting will be awful. Try to 

let every man know before he starts whether he is likely to be for guard, 

covering party, watering party, or piquet or whatever you can foresee; and 

if each on arrival in camp gets ready to tackle his job you will save no end 

of orders, and time, which in camping arrangements means comfort, which 

spells efficiency.

You may be with the companies told off for column reserve. As a rule, 

the infantry escape this; the Sappers and Miners15 (the Indian equivalent of 

the Field Company) being indicated for this work. They are, to begin with, 

heavily officered, and they have had a heavy day’s work on the road, and 

14. The Adjutant “A Officer” generally dealt with administrative and personnel issues.

15. For history of sappers and miners in warfare see, Keith William Nolan, Sappers in the 

Wire (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1995). 15. 
70 PassingI

are probably working till dark or after on exits and so on, and they will need 

all the rest they can get, and should certainly not be on the perimeter. Guns 

have their own job to do, and cavalry, if there are any with the column, 

have enough to do in a night attack in keeping their horses quiet and their 

own area clear. Still, if a body of infantry is needed and you are of it, your 

duties as a platoon or a company commander are easy. Once the camp has 

settled in, patrol it thoroughly with your section leaders, find out where 

everything is camped, and do it again after dark; and, finally warn your 

men what may have to be done and that if called on bayonets, not bullets, 

are to be used in dealing with any enemy met with. The reason is obvious, 

but the order is sometimes forgotten.

* * * *

Back to real work. Let us take it that you are in command of an 

important camp piquet. You have gone up with the advance party, you 

have occupied the position and ground ahead of it with full success, and 

started on the piquet defences. The Manual is very full on this important 

matter, and I can only add that special care must be given to making a 

covered loophole through which to signal, piercing the rear face diagonally 

if possible, otherwise blinded, and aligned on the battalion signal station. 

Without it; your piquet will easily be cut off from help.

Low loopholes are only permissible in a flanking bastion16 and even 

then are a danger; and are in any case hard to provide. The hand grenade 

has solved most of the former difficulty of dealing with a close enemy 

approach, so avoid the low loophole if you can.

If rocks are plentiful, much of the defences will be finished by the time 

the piquet troops arrive with all the impedimenta already mentioned. They 

are all necessary though an infernal nuisance, as in the morning all have 

to be sent away in time to load up. Water is the most necessary. Not only 

must you have water for the night and the early morning, but your men must 

start with full water bottles. To hold all this, most experienced units have 

a canvas tank per platoon, holding twenty gallons or so, called a “diggi.” 

This hangs on a collapsible frame, packs and mends easily, holds a lot of 

water and keeps it clean and cool. In the hottest day beer kept in it is as 

if iced. In bottles, of course. Your unit should get them if they are not by 

now articles of issue. Anyway, with a diggi or without, the piquet arrives. 

It must aim at starting at least two hours before dark to let the workers or 

the relieved piquet get back by dark. It relieves the covering party, puts 

16. Bastion is a catch-all phrase for a fortification.
Taking Up Camp – Layout and Protect

away its impedimenta, and falls to completing the defences. Irregular head 

cover, preferably of sandbags, is really essential, as the sniper then does 

not know what to fire at, and if he has friends using covering fire your 

men can deal with both on even terms. Clear away bushes up to thirty 

yards or so—bushes in the dark have a habit of crawling about and even of 

speaking like Pathans, and your sentries will see all sorts of bogies unless 

you remove them.

The defences finished, call in the covering party, block up the entrance, 

fall in all on their posts, tell off into three reliefs of which one stays on the 

alert and provides sentries, at least one to each face; and the others should 

rest at once, sleeping at their posts, you yourself by a sentry. But before 

the men drop off, warn all that the men in the camp need rest, and that you 

are there to help them get it, and that jumpy sentries and indiscriminate 

loosing off of grenades and lights are not looked on as showing zeal. At 

the same time tell sentries to listen rather than look, and to take action on 

the least sound of stone shifting. A favourite trick with these people is to 

creep up and dislodge an important stone, bringing the parapet down with 

a rumble, an attack being made on top of the confusion inside. Be alert but 

not jumpy, or the object of the piquet is half destroyed. Those who were 

with me at Dakka in 1919 may remember a hideously disturbed night when 

a piquet on the western ridge gave us a Brock’s display17 lasting from ten 

to three, to find at dawn that no enemy could have been massing nearer 

than two hundred yards off. A short calculation showed that in that one 

night the young officer in the piquet had loosed off as much in cost value 

as was spent on his military education. It is a difficult thing to avoid all the 

same, and I can only suggest that you sit up for tiger or panther as soon as 

you can to learn how to give proper value to night noises and sights.18

In any case, the Manual gives wise advice. Do not send up a light till 

you have good reason to suspect an enemy’s close presence and until you 

have made arrangements to loose off at him when the light goes up. You 

may have errors even then, like the Mahrattas19 of a certain good unit who 

obeyed orders like men, and loosed of at the thing which had been forcing 

its way through their wire. Thank goodness it was only a donkey—had it 

been a cow,20 Lord knows what would have had to happen in the way of 

17. Brock’s display in Skeen’s day referred to the London firework manufacturer, Brocks 

Explosives Ltd., known for pyrotechnic displays at fairs and expositions.

18. Skeen’s belief that hunting skills are essential in training good combat officers.

19. Mahratta infantry, a native Infantry unit from the Indian Punjab.

20. The cow is sacred to the Hindu.
72 PassingI

expiation.

While on this matter of noise round piquets, conglomerate hills21 are 

apt to spit out stones during rain, and cause alarm. The heavy rain after 

the Barari Tangi was forced led to a lot of this, and though the day after the 

fighting had been quiet, the night brought rain and slight slippings of the 

hill-sides, which so put the wind up piquets and perimeter that seasoned 

though the troops then were, the noise was trying and the waste of Very 

lights and grenades deplorable.

* * * *

By the way, I might as well tell you that taking up a camp piquet may 

not be such plain sailing as would appear from what I have been saying. 

It may have to be done under heavy sniping and even in face of assaults. 

In such a case, you will be helped by gun-fire and by reinforcements from 

camp, but in the last resort you may have to hang on, pushing up stones 

in front of you to give some sort of cover till dark comes and it may be 

easier to improve your hold. The Barwand piquet in 1917, which I shall 

have to mention again, the Flat Head piquet in the Ahnai Tangi, and the 

Gibraltar piquet beyond the Bari Tangi, both in the fighting of 1920, are 

all examples of what may have to be done to secure a position protecting 

camp. Whatever happens, nothing short of annihilation must loosen your 

grip on it.22

However, let us hope the piquet is well and truly established and that 

the night passes without undue trouble. In the morning you either send 

off your kit23 as soon as it is light to take its place in the line of march, the 

piquet waiting till relieved by the unfortunates who are for rear guard; or, if 

the force is halting, settle down for a rest and clean up, awaiting your relief 

in the afternoon.

21. These are hills of loose, unconsolidated rock and shale. They freeze at night and shift 

during the warming hours of dawn.

22. All these are piquet actions just before and following the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 

1919.

23. Equipment.
Taking Up Camp – Enemy Sniping and Assa

Chapter

Aspects of Work Fa

Junior Officers in Taking Up Camp—Conti

Occupation of perimeter defences and subsequent work – 

Occupation of a village in emergency – Points to be guarded against 

in camp – Sniping – Assault – Daily Routine.

Now take the place of one of your comrades, down in the 

settling camp. Here, more than anywhere, good interior organization tells. 

Ever since the troops came in, except for short breaks for hurried snack or 

drink, they have been hard at it preparing the perimeter defences. Each 

company took up alarm posts before work began, and piled arms close 

behind their alarm posts under sentries who keep an eye lifting towards the 

covering parties. As many men as can work freely concentrate on the front 

line, ditch and parapet and trench, finishing this as speedily as they can, 

and then turn to support trench, dressing stations, and cover against reverse 

sniping. Then they spitlock1 or mark clearly paths within the company area, 

and fill in holes and level lumps—very necessary this for free movement in 

the dark. The reserve company, or what is left of it after supplying various 

fatigues, makes cover for itself and for officers not with companies, marks 

paths, fills holes and levels uneven bits in the battalion area, and runs up 

some sort of obstacle, at the angles of the camp first and then along the 

perimeter if time permits. Bushes and shrub should be cleared for a good 

distance from the perimeter, to lessen cover for snipers and also to make 

the sentries’ work less nerve-racking; but it is not a bad thing to leave a 

few bushes as an attractive screen for snipers to collect behind, to be dealt 

with by rifles in night rests.2

1. British Army slang meaning to mark a position by spitting which is visible on dry dusty 

terrain; also to mark a spot to begin digging a trench, also means to mark a spot with 

another object.

2. Night rests are cradles that support a rifle for more accurate firing. They may be as 

simple as a bipod or forked sticks or as complex as a small wooden cradle. Their function 

is to keep a weapon aimed at a certain point. The night rest is emplaced during the day 

while aiming the weapon at a particular point for accurate night firing. This is considered 

the weapon’s primary engagement point.
74 Passig

Company mules have been off-loaded, and loads collected in rear of 

the company, and the mules have cleared off to their transport unit. In 

the case of all first-line mules, baggage ropes are kept, and loads always 

well roped when not in use. The camels with the train are now sliding in, 

and these are similarly off-loaded handy to their companies, and sent off 

as quickly as possible, for they also have a lot to do before they can settle 

down for the night.

As work proceeds officers have learnt the routine orders which affect 

the men—defence precautions, guards, police bounds, drinking, bathing, 

latrines, when the day latrines close and the night ones have to be used, 

ration hour, and so on.

* * * *

When the defence works are ready, arms are taken up, trenches 

occupied, sections in the front trench take ranges, covering parties come 

in, ammunition is made up, the full complement of company reserve 

ammunition, tools, water “pakhals”3 and filled “diggis” are placed in the 

support trenches, bedding is recovered and distributed, and night latrines 

prepared. Orders are given out, such as have been passed round. Then, a 

third of the men in the front trench are told off for inlying piquet, to provide 

sentries and remain in constant readiness, equipped and accoutered, in the 

firing trench. The remainder place rifles and accoutrements in the section 

trenches, and then prepare bivouacs or pitch tents. Always parallel to, not 

vertical to the perimeter, to let men dash out from both ends in case of 

alarm.

Then all but the inlying piquets break off, some for duties within the 

battalion, and others to wash, clean up, and rest till food is ready. And I 

think that one and all, junior officers as much as any, will agree to call it a 

day.

* * * *

That is more or less how matters go if all has gone well or as well as 

can be expected. Camp has been reached in ample time, piquets have been 

occupied, and the transport has come in, and the normal routine has been 

possible. You can imagine that in proportion as things go wrong, the march 

3. Pakhals are leather Indian water bags usually transported like saddlebags on a pack 

animal.
Taking Up Camp – Enemy Sniping and Assa

delayed, the transport held up, the piquets heavily engaged—by so much 

the preparations have to be hustled and the troops wearied and harassed if 

the essential work of defence and feeding is to be carried out. With good 

interior organization, difficulties will be frequent enough; without it they 

will be insuperable; but the blame will lie and the discomfort and danger 

will mainly fall on the unit which deserves it.

If everything goes wrong and the rear guard cannot get in and has to 

stay out to draw attacks on to itself and away from the transport, then much 

more hurried steps must be taken by it; and for its night’s halt the outer 

line of piquets will in all probability have to be dropped altogether. This is 

one of the occasions the Manual foresees when it speaks of using a village 

for the night. The rear guard will be lucky if it has a village handy to dive 

into, for there it will find not only defilade but a good deal of protection 

from plunging fire. The book lays down, rightly, that troops should not 

occupy the village itself, but rather a perimeter outside it with room for 

movement between perimeter and village walls. Otherwise communication 

becomes difficult. And also, if an attack gets in, the villagers themselves 

are the enemy and know their way blindfold—having the perimeter outside 

denies them this advantage. But the perimeter outside is often a counsel 

of perfection, and many a time small and large parties have had to crowd 

hurriedly at dusk into a deserted village and take shelter within its walls, 

with the enemy pressing close. Then you must widen and straighten the 

main passage-way and make others through the village from hut to hut and 

enclosure to enclosure round the outer wall. This must be done at once, 

and even more urgent is the removal of inflammable stuff. The enemy 

know exactly where this is, and if they have any kick left—and in these 

circumstances of a pressed withdrawal they are bound to have their tails 

well up—they may be counted to creep up and lob a torch or ghi-soaked4

ball of cloth or fibre on to where they know rick or thatch to be. It is 

sure to happen, for the enemy know that in the confusion among men and 

animals following a blaze and alarm of fire on a windy night there is a 

good chance of revenge–and rifles.

So guard against fire, fix alarm posts, make certain the ways to them 

are known, and so on. A useful booby trap can be made by loosening a 

4. Ghi is a type of Indian butter generally made from Water Buffalo milk and is very 

flammable.
76 Passig

foot or so of the top layers of the mud bricks on outside enclosure walls 

over six feet high. The enemy leaps at the wall and grips the top, down 

comes the top with a run on top of the leaper, and it is disconcerting to 

have a few feet of your own garden wall falling on to your chest, to say 

nothing of what the roused defenders may do.

While on this matter of walls, train your men to keep a good grip on 

their rifles when using loopholes—it is an easy matter for a tribesman to 

lie doggo5 near a loop-hole and trust to a sudden grab and pull to give him 

a rifle worth to him some five hundred rupees, which is the equivalent of 

three wives or two really good cows, and so worth taking trouble for. You 

will find all the ground floor loophole plates on permanent frontier posts 

with holes just large enough to hold the rifle and allow of play, but not big 

enough to let the bolt and butt through, for this very reason.

* * * *

Wherever and however you get into camp, there is a most important 

point to keep in mind, that, in an inexperienced push—that is, almost 

invariably at the first entry into hostile country—there will be more than 

a tendency—an irresistible urge—to reply to snipers’ fire and even to 

blaze off at noises or fluttering papers. The Manual is emphatic on the 

idiocy of this, but no matter, your men will do it unless you yourself see 

to it that they do not. We were starting our well-earned evening meal the 

night we settled into camp at Datta Khel in 1919, when one shot came 

sailing in from the west, over a good battalion, good but new to the game. 

Instantly—it said much for their alertness—the whole west face burst into 

fire, and rolling bursts of musketry flew up and down the line and would 

not stop till peremptory orders reached the unit from my headquarters. You 

may ask what the officers were doing. Well, they were also new to the 

game, and to them this appalling outbreak of fire meant only one thing and 

that a night assault; one and all dashed to their alarm posts like lightening 

and battalion control was lost for the moment. I can laugh at it now, but I 

was in a towering passion then.

Sniping, one would have thought, must loose its effect with the highvelocity rifle whose low trajectory might be expected to carry any bullet 

which missed the parapet clean over camp. But the fact that it can be used 

5. Like a dog.
Taking Up Camp – Enemy Sniping and Assa

from farther off produces plunging fire, and camps are also much larger and 

the bullet has time to fall somewhere in among the men or animals, and in 

actual practice it is more damaging than the old sniping, so that we may be 

thankful that cost of ammunition sets a limit to it. In the old days anyone 

with a flask of powder and a percussion musket or “jezail” could have quite 

a cheery evening sniping into camp from a hundred yards off—gave the 

sniper a warm feeling of patriotism and did not worry us much if piquets 

were in the right places. There was a persistent old bird who accompanied 

our brigade up and down the Khar Plain in 1897, who had a duck gun and 

a bullet mould which turned out eight-bore bullets in pairs joined up by a 

little runnel of lead—just like a small dumb-bell, and made a noise like a 

bull roarer.6

 We quite missed him when a chance bullet laid him out. But, 

ancient or modern, sniping must be met by digging down or building up, if 

only to ensure placid sleep; and for the same reason in no case must it be 

answered except by order.

* * * *

If there is an alarm, the perimeter look-outs put up Very lights and if 

flares are used outside the perimeter they actuate them. Nowadays flares 

are useful but not necessary while the better and handier illumination of the 

Very light is available. We found, by the way, that on occasion the lighting 

of these flares brought on the attack if one was preparing, as happened at 

Nawagai in ’97. The inlying piquets open fire if this is needed, as do the 

automatics on the perimeter, and all the front-line troops, if in the trench 

as they will usually be when with the fighting column, rouse and join in 

repelling the attack. If in standing camp, they snatch up their rifles (these 

are never piled, but are kept in the bedding with the man if not buried 

beneath him with the sling round his arm) and dash out of the tents to 

the trench. Supports gets into their trench, guards and reserves fall in, 

attendants and linesman stand to the animals, all lights and fires are dowsed, 

and tents struck, the guns chuck up a star shell, and company messengers 

report at battalion headquarters if not already sleeping there, as battalion 

orderlies are at brigade headquarters; an officer from the column reserve 

reports at column headquarters, and, except for firing or fire orders, silence 

is aimed at, though seldom attained.

6. The bull roarer is a child’s toy consisting of a cord with a flat thin piece of wood attached. 

The cord is spun around vigorously and the wood makes a buzzing “roaring” noise.
78 Passig

If the attack penetrates, no one rushes out of his own area to repel 

it. The reserve spreads along the road, isolates the penetrated area, and 

then begins the bloody business of dealing with the intruders with the 

bayonet by the light of Very light and star shell. A most unpleasant form 

of scrimmage.

* * * *

I do not think that there is any record of an attack on camp breaking 

it up altogether—lack of cohesion on the one side and discipline on the 

other has always saved the situation; but it can be a very nasty show. The 

Malakand camp was entered in ’97, though that was hardly a perimeter 

camp. The attack lost much of its force because the bazaar lay in the path 

of the attackers and drew off a lot, though many came on and had to be 

expelled at the point of the bayonet. At Wana in ’94 the camp was well 

penetrated and we had a hundred and twenty casualties and a number of 

animals killed and wounded before the tribesmen were ejected. A lot of 

rifles were lost and no doubt the force of the attack was largely weakened 

by those who got rifles making off with them.

* * * *

When halted, as must often happen to get up supplies, put up 

permanent piquets, and so on; there is still much camp routine which 

cannot with safety be overlooked. First, alarm posts should always be 

manned by inlying piquets, strength varying with the unrest in the vicinity, 

an hour or so before daylight, or at the “Rouse”7 if the force is moving 

earlier. Dawn patrols are always needed within the piquet line. However 

prone to take care of himself the enemy may be, there are always some, 

generally elderly men, to whom the Prophet’s Paradise8 holds out an allure 

so superior to the miserable life these people know, that they may well 

think it worth while to risk losing their lives, provided they take an infidel 

with them. So it is not uncommon for attack to be made on unsuspecting 

men strolling about beyond the latrine and water sentries and trusting in the 

protection of the camp piquets. And the dawn patrol will rout danger out.

The hundred and one column and battalion fatigues have to be met, 

7. Reveille.

8. Refers to the Prophet Mohammed and the belief in Islam that death against the Infidel 

in battle leads to Paradise.
Taking Up Camp – Enemy Sniping and Assa

inspections done, roll calls held. All should use their alarm posts for falling 

in on, whatever the parade. A good battalion will always have a routine 

for the “Retreat” stand-to, when both trenches will be occupied, guards 

in their defences, Vickers and Lewis-gun detachments standing to their 

weapons, the battalion on reserve in their cover, followers also, and men 

with animals standing to them. All men should be armed and accoutred,9

and all battalion animals saddled, and you should take this opportunity of 

seeing that your men are ready in all respects to move, with rations, water, 

full amount of ammunition and of sandbags and grenades, if carried, and 

first-line loads roped up and placed handy for loading. Then it will not be 

out of place to see that all have their cover adjusted to the fullest effect for 

night firing and protection, and that all have the orders so far as known for 

the following day.

Men should never wander about alone unarmed at any time of the day 

outside the perimeter, and armed men must in any case must always be 

in parties, or the single rifle may be too much of a temptation to the odd 

Pathan risking death within the piquet line or even to the friendly Pathan 

coming in on his lawful occasions to the political officer. If the night 

latrine is outside the perimeter, it should be only just outside, and a sentry 

on the perimeter close by. Folk using the latrine must report to the sentry 

as they go out and come back, and if armed, leave the rifle with him. This 

is, of course to lessen value as a prize and also, where the Indian transfrontier sepoy10 is concerned, to check desertion.11 Officers should, of 

course, always carry a pistol when moving about, and by the way, if it is a 

revolver, never have more than five rounds in it, so that the striker may rest 

opposite an empty chamber. If it does not, as God made little apples, some 

day when you are slipping your belt off, the pistol and holster will slide 

off too, and if the hammer hits the ground first, one of your pals may “go 

west” in the rottenest possible way. In any case, you will get the devil and 

all of a fright and a first-class telling off. This is not far fetched. I have 

had a mule shot within a yard of me and a bullet between my legs another 

time, so be wise.

9. Accoutrements are the full uniform and equipment (kit), ready to move.

10. Indian private soldier.

11. A Pathan sepoy deserting with his weapon, or weapons would be well rewarded by 

his tribe.
80 Passig

* * * *

A well-run column always has orders for keeping natives of the 

country out of camp. Some may have business with the political officer, 

who is always with the column in the capacity of Staff officer for political 

affairs—not as the supreme authority he used to be in the Afghan War days 

and even later. He will have a lot of work with those of the enemy who 

want to be friends, and these must have free access to him. They generally 

have to be seen outside the camp. Indeed it is often advisable to have the 

political officer’s12 following of friendly [sic] headmen, agents, spies, and 

so on in a separate camp or in a distinct wired-off part of the main camp. 

The spy, or “jasoos,” is a quaint institution, whose conception of his duty is 

to take as much news to his friends the enemy as he does to his enemies the 

troops. A friendly sort of show, frontier fighting, till it comes to the actual 

killing. In fact, I have heard a most bitter complaint lodged by hostile 

sections that they had been denied the privilege and the emoluments of 

having some of their own men employed as spies. 

Bar these folk, natives should not be encouraged, except to get them 

within killing range. For the innocent villager who strolls into camp with 

a chicken may be looking for a chance to knife or pistol some sahib, the 

bigger the better, for these people have sporting ideas about the big head; 

and there is no use taking risks. Risks which become greater as the tribes 

become more subdued, for that is the time for restoring hurt honour. It is 

difficult sometimes to spot them with the mass of Indian personnel of all 

kinds in the camp, but if you ever have to search, fall in all men in your 

area, order them to identify each man, the man on his right and left, and 

take them by the arm and step back four paces. If there is a stranger, he will 

be left without an arm-seizing friend, and you can proceed to investigate 

without loss of time.

12. The political officer was a British university graduate who was trained for the position 

while at university. He learned language, customs and culture. After initial posting with a 

regiment, the political officer was assigned to a seasoned political officer who showed him 

the ropes. Some political officers served with their region and tribes for a full twenty-ormore-year career. The political officer would deal with local political and religious leaders 

the Pathan headman—the Malik, the tribal council—the Jirga, and the Mullah.
Permanent Piquets 81

Chapter 

Aspects of Work Fallin

Junior Officers Putting up Permanent Pique

Slow process of putting up permanent piquets – The operation – 

Dispositions to cover the work – The work – Duties after occupation and 

in succeeding days – The value of the system – Convoy escort duty – 

Dangers of the “Raghza” – The floating platoon.

A night has passed, and what is the order for the day  If a

advance has been decided on there is a good deal of work for you, which 

I will take on in the next chapter. But if there is to be a halt, to replenish 

supplies, evacuate sick and wounded, and fill up for a forward move, you 

may be sure it does not mean a rest for you. The first thing a column 

commander will turn to will be securing his communications with his last 

camp, and as I have already suggested, this is best done by establishing 

permanent piquets to link up with those already put up from the former 

camp. And the next thing he will aim at is to put up more piquets as far in 

advance as he can, to ensure a flying start for his next move, and to secure 

his communications when moving forward.

The order for the day may then be what is known as “Putting up 

Piquets,” one or more, the number depending on the troops available, their 

value, and the temper of the enemy.

And a most important and ticklish duty it is, for the troops covering it 

and the troops building the piquet, for the enemy are never in the least doubt 

as to what is to happen. They know that the troops covering the work have 

to get back to camp before dark, and that they must therefore withdraw at a 

known time, when they give attackers the certainty of the chance they are 

always readiest to take—attack on a foe who cannot retaliate beyond the 

most limited counter-attack. On the other hand, it also gives a certainty of 

more or less vicious fighting, in which the main object of the operations or 

what should be the main object—killing tribesmen—can be attained.
82 Passing It 

* * * *

Obviously, with this certainty of fighting, it is unwise to attempt more 

than is within the power of the available troops, and this in turn means that 

only a limited number of piquets can be established in a day. At first the 

number will be very limited—one or two in a day, if as many—but as staff 

and troops become more accustomed to the highly specialized work, and as 

the enemy takes knocks, the rate will rise.

To give an idea of how it can be speeded up, in 1919-1920 after the 

advance to Palosina, which was very ineffectively contested, it took eight 

working (and fighting) days to put up one piquet towards Jandola, and three 

forward towards Kotkai. At Kotkai there was a halt of twelve days, seven 

of which saw heavy fighting and ten piquets established, before the entrance 

to the Ahnai Tangi, only four miles off, was secured and three more piquets 

put up in two days following its capture. A three days’ halt followed in the 

heart of the Tangi, during which time, the enemy having had heavy losses, 

five more piquets were occupied before the advance to Sororogha. Here 

again five working days were needed to establish six piquets and prepare 

the forcing of the Barari Tangi. Thence to Piazha Raghza, only nine miles, 

nine days were required, with three intermediate halts mainly forced on us 

by weather. In that period twenty piquets were put up, six in one day. And 

thence to Makin required ten more days, twenty more piquets going up, 

though while actually moving there, seven piquets were established in one 

day, thanks to the hard work and skill of the men and the grasp of the routine 

of occupation by battalion and column staffs. These figures hardly apply, 

of course, to normal operations employing highly trained troops with all 

our latest aids. With war-weary men, mostly ill-trained and new to frontier 

conditions, air equipment worn out and obsolescent, an inadequate artillery 

and no machine guns, speedier work could not have been expected. But 

the lesson remains—the need for organization on the part of commanders, 

from highest to lowest, and for will and power to work all out on the part 

of the troops.

* * * *

Now let us get ahead, as usual, with the duties of the junior officers 

with the various parts of the troops told off for the most unpleasant duty of 

putting up a piquet.

The troops to cover the operation will consist of a couple of companies 

or more—usually far more while the enemy have fight in them—with 
Permanent Piquets 83

machine guns, probably under brigade control, and guns in readiness to 

support. The infantry will probably be started in the dark, to get a longer 

working day and for surprise, and make for their objective—ridges or crests 

covering the piquet position from some distance to its front and flanks, for 

the builders must have all the protection possible. The advance is not likely 

to be heavily contested unless the enemy means to give battle, in which 

case the day’s plans will have to be altered. But piquet protection gives 

too good chances to the enemy for them to waste their energy on opposing 

an advance when they know the advance must become a withdrawal at the 

end. So at first they will probably only harass both piquet builders and their 

protectors with long range fire, and thus at the first your job as company 

or platoon commander is a simple one—to take up and keep a suitable 

position throughout the day. But no slackness. An enemy may think it 

worthwhile to creep up and rush a part of the line, covered by his friends’ 

fire from far off. It has happened frequently in the past, and slackness has 

always meant casualties, lost rifles, and little return in enemy dead. He 

will certainly begin early to trickle into dead ground as close as possible to 

the front line, to keep it on the jump and to be handy when the time comes. 

So keep your eyes skinned and watch. Groups in dead ground may well be 

missed by the planes, which ought to be freely used on these occasions, but 

lucky ground observation and a message to the guns may discourage them 

badly.

You will have thrown up cover, if in the front line for obvious reasons, 

if in support or reserve still throw it up, for it may be badly needed when 

the withdrawal begins and the withdrawing front line passes through yours. 

Your cover will not be a continuous parapet like that of the piquet rapidly 

growing behind you, but improvement of existing cover. And while on 

this, both on this work and elsewhere, you will find that men if not watched 

or until they have had their lesson, are apt to put up the “sangar” (lit. stone 

wall) of manoeuvres, a sort of little card house of thin slabs of slate, much 

worse than useless. One of the reasons why the covering troops were 

pushed off the Black Hill at Palosina, on December 23, 1919, was the stupid 

sangaring. All along their position were found these idiotic little cairns, so 

small wonder they were blown off by fire almost at once. And you will 

find that at first the men do not grasp the need for haste in improving their 

cover. Twice I found one of my battalions doing its best to lose ground it 

had taken without much opposition, the men loafing round and carrying up 

pebbles instead of rocks. And because its officers seemed to see no crime 
84 Passing It 

in it, it went on to communications defence. But do not imitate them in 

risking the safety of the entire force by such action.

The day passes, with occasional sniping shots wheeping over, and 

enemy pressure gradually increasing. Wounded and dead must be cleared 

off at once. I once watched an Indian doctor hold up a withdrawal for half 

an hour. He got a wounded man away, nestled into a cleft, dressed the 

wound, and then a curl of smoke and great activity round a fire. One of my 

look-out officers told me what was happening, and a swift messenger was 

sent to haul the good Samaritan out. The poor little fellow, his mind full 

of Mesopotamian Commissions1 and what not, had felt it was his duty to 

prepare a nice cup of Oxo2 for the patient before resuming the descent. Just 

shows you what you have to look out for. Get wounded, dead, sun cases, 

everything that is going to hamper you cleared out as they happen—there 

will be more than enough work for the stretcher-bearers at the end. Have 

your plan cut and dried, and communicated to all concerned, including 

those in support of you, and you have done all you can. The rest depends 

on the staunchness of your supports and the surefootnedness of your men. 

And, a great deal, on luck, for an unlucky casualty at the very end may 

upset your plans badly. 

In one way you are fortunate, if your battalion commander is wise. For 

here, if you go out from camp and return there, much of what a man carries 

on a march can be left behind. The towel, spare socks, waterproof sheet, 

toothbrush, emergency ration, etc., etc., can all be left behind, men clad as 

lightly as may be and carrying only a little food, water and ammunition. 

Lightly weighted men have a far better chance in work which, though on 

a larger scale, is carried through on exactly the same lines as a withdrawal 

from a piquet.

At last you are warned that the withdrawal is to begin. If you are 

lucky. Many a piquet covering party has been driven in before the piquet 

was finished, and then not only was the work to do again, but the immense 

advantage of fire from the established piquet was absent. So, for your own 

sake as well as well for the object of the operation, hold on however hard 

the enemy press. Counter-attack may be needed to restore bits of your 

line—costly, yes—but you are killing tribesmen and, at the last, you know 

1. Following World War I, Britain gained the territory of Mesopotamia (Iraq) that had 

been part of the now-defunct Ottoman Empire (Turkey). Administration of this area would 

require bureaucrats, officials and doctors, hence Mesopotamian commissions were offered 

to proven officers in the Indian Army.

2. Oxo is a trademark beverage made from flavored beef cubes and hot water.
Permanent Piquets 85

that an undisturbed supporting line is ready to cover you off.

If you have been able to dribble part of your men away beforehand, 

so much the better—otherwise at the arranged time or signal you clear, 

down into the quiet of some depression between you and the support whose 

bullets are now swishing overhead, through or around them and into the 

dead ground up which you and the piquet workers toiled in the early dawn. 

And so, halting to cover your comrades off, to the valley and to camp, a 

good day’s work done. 

* * * *

Under cover of that work another junior officer has been hard at it—

the piquet builder. He left camp immediately behind the covering troops, 

with a party which, if experience has counted for anything, should be fully 

organized in every particular. It has to be, for the absence of any one thing 

must hold up the whole work. Of first importance is the party of sappers, 

with stakes and wire, whose particular task is to cover at least the front 

and flanks of the piquet with a well established apron of wire. For though 

the small party [left] . . . in one of these piquets may be overwhelmed, 

all that is possible to prevent this must be done. Not only to save men, 

or to economize in them, but to boost the moral of the garrison, and to 

assure them that if they are knocked out it can only be a loss to the enemy 

which will make them careful how they tackle another such problem. 

Wire, then, is the first essential, and wire has to be aproned3

 on well driven 

stakes, and stakes can not be well driven on a bullet-swept hillside, so 

the sappers accompany the infantry party to work early, and quickly, and 

independently at the job. Stakes, coils of barbed wire, concertinas4

 of it, 

jumping irons—you can leave the kit to the sappers. Possibly there will 

be some pioneers—lucky for you if there are—trained workers and stout 

fighters who will bring the expert touch to the wall work. But your own 

men have to work, and work well, if the piquet is to be safe by night. You 

should dispose of, at the least, sandbags, shovels, picks (the last in good 

measure if you are to prize up rocks),5 a jumping bar6 or two, and men 

trained in peace to wall building and hard, quick labour. Behind all comes 

3. Stretched between two stakes like an apron.

4. Concertina is a coiled sharp edged wire used as a barrier, the stretching open and 

closing of concertina wire is named after the concertina, a small hexagonal shaped 

accordion with bellows and button keys, which opens and closes in a like fashion.

5. To pry (British vernacular—prize, prise) up rocks.

6. Jumping iron is slang for a crow bar. Small rocks would ‘jump’ when prized up.
86 Passing It 

a separate party, the piquet garrison with all their requirements, which they 

dump below the site and fall to work with the rest while the mules feed 

and stay handy till progress makes certain that they will not be wanted to 

take all the stuff back again. It may be preferable to let the piquet garrison 

come up later—in this case the mules are sent down as soon as off-loaded.

The requirements are many. Personal baggage, for the piquet garrison 

is to stay there some days, and must have comfort and warmth; ammunition 

reserves, lots of spare sandbags, grenades, Very pistol and lights, a coil or 

two of barbed wire, some spare stakes, a pick and shovel, rabbit wire7

 if the 

enemy has had a chance of acquiring grenades, food for several days, water 

and means of storing it (the “diggi” again), cooking utensils, a lamp or two, 

spare dressings, some latrine pans and tins and disinfectants for them, and 

if the column has tents, the tentage allotment for the garrison, to keep off 

the sun and rain—a lot of stuff, but all necessary.

By the time it is light enough to see a few yards it should be possible 

to see enough to site the work, as its general siting will have been settled 

already, if only by distant reconnaissance. The sooner this is done the 

better, lest bullets interfere. The sappers spring to their job, completing the 

stake work before the wire goes on, and meanwhile the bulk of the other 

workers fan out on the slopes nearest the enemy, and pass up all available 

stones to the wall builders, whose first aim is to raise a well-based wall 

to front and flanks. This done, all come round to the protected side and 

continue, several men filling and carrying up sandbags into the piquet as 

fast as possible while building progresses. Sandbags may be invaluable 

from the start if the enemy starts sniping on the builders, and in any case, 

the wall should be finished off with them to avoid bullet splashes,8

 while of 

course they are best for loopholes and head cover. The wall slowly mounts, 

with a traverse9

 inside if needed; the sappers finish the apron and wreath 

wire round, then complete the circle; the walls are topped with sandbags, 

loopholes are prepared, firesteps10 from which to meet close assault are 

started, spare stones heaped up inside and at the back, spare sandbags filled 

7. Chicken wire.

8. Bullet splashes occur when a bullet hits a stone or armor plate, usually deforming and 

fragmenting the bullet and ricocheting fragments of bullet, stone and metal about.

9. A traverse is a mound of earth or stack of sandbags constructed at right angles to the 

parapet. Its purpose is to prevent enfilade fire and protect personnel from shrapnel.

10. Firesteps are raised steps along the base of the parapet allowing the defender to stand 

tall and to shoot down over the parapet at enemy hugging the parapet wall, then step down 

to concealment – a step up, a step down.
Permanent Piquets 87

and stacked inside, and as soon as the cover is high enough for determined 

men to hang on to, kit is brought into the piquet, and the garrison takes 

post. 

And as soon as there is nothing for any party to do they should clear 

off11—the Sappers when their work is done, the Pioneers12 as soon as the 

stone-walling is finished, the mules as soon as it is seen that the piquet 

can be ready, and the balance of the infantry as soon as the kit is stored. 

The garrison has already been told off to its alarm posts, ranges have been 

taken, sentries posted, and the walls manned. Long before this it should 

have been possible to pass word to the covering troops of the time they will 

be free to withdraw. Any refinements of defence work must be left till the 

covering troops have withdrawn and the enemy cease from troubling; as 

long as the work is complete enough for defence you have no right to keep 

the covering troops out, for each minute as the day grows late adds to their 

losses and difficulties and to the forces they are up against.

You may be sure they will withdraw as soon as they know you are 

ready; and now comes a very important part of the day’s work. Be prepared 

to open fire, heavy and effective, on any point the pursuing enemy is likely 

to appear on, and have your walls fully manned, with several men using 

glasses, alert to spot an enemy. The more effective your fire now, the less 

chance of your being worried after the other troops go, and the greater the 

help you give the men who have been sticking a trying day that you could 

get on with your work in safety.

The covering troops go, passing you in successive lines; the enemy 

will probably clear off after the first few rushes, except for a few snipers, 

and you are left to yourself and the night. Now for a sharp look-out, 

no exposure, and busy completion and improvement of the defences. 

Particularly the head cover. Without it you are always liable to have your 

men’s heads kept down by accurate fire from a few hundred yards off, while 

the others of the enemy creep up and attack by fire and by direct assault 

under its cover. The wire and grenades will save you a lot in such a case, 

but should the wire be penetrated and the walls reached, you must use the 

fire steps and shoot down the attackers at close range. Not till really close, 

when their covering fire must cease, and then you will find that though 

the tribesman is good in a rush, he is by no means so formidable when it 

comes to killing at point blank range. I know of only one instance when a 

11. Get out of the way.

12. Pioneers are engineers and road builders.
88 Passing It 

walled piquet held by determined men has been rushed, and that was due 

to defective head cover. The Mandanna piquet was rushed in 1919, but the 

“determined men” condition was absent once its officer was killed. The 

stand of the unprotected piquet at Barwand in June 1917 shows what is 

possible to men who are prepared to fight it out.

* * * *

You organize your command in the usual way—a third on inlying 

piquet, the rest to work or rest; all sleep by the walls, and you yourself 

lie close to the foot of a sentry on the most exposed side. Reserve 

ammunition handy, filled sandbags also, and water well protected. Signal 

communication established with camp or with the large intermediate piquet 

we used to call the “mother” piquet, a covered loophole being prepared for 

emergency,13 and touch established with other piquets to right and left and 

across the valley.

Avoid panicky firing during the night. An electric torch14 is useful to 

investigate the wire apron from time to time, without the disturbing effect 

on other piquets of the Very Light; and if you can shoot a tiger by the light 

of an electric torch, you can surely drop a man.

The wire, by the way, can’t be so far out as to keep the enemy outside 

bombing [grenade] distance—the weight alone of a circle of wire of 

twenty-five yards radius would be prohibitive. But it will guard against 

men pulling down the wall by stealth, and against close assault. A rabbit 

wire pent roof15 will have to suffice against the bomber.

In the morning, stand to arms,16 before dawn, and again before anyone 

issues from the piquet. This, of course, must happen, for you can’t be 

beleaguered all the time. Also day latrines are needed—usually wise to 

have a little “sangar” built, and use latrine pans.17 A well-run system of 

permanent piquets will budget for visits on convoy days by a sweeper and 

clearing of latrines, just as it will budget for periodical visits to replenish 

water and food, and ammunition when needed. At these times, letters 

13. A covered loophole is a covered hole in the wall visible to the “mother piquet” and 

used for signaling in an emergency. The signaling is Morse code using a flashlight during 

darkness and a colored background during the day.

14. The British call a flashlight an electric torch.

15. A pent roof has a slight overhang, if the rabbit wire roof is ‘pent’ the enemy would have 

difficulty reaching up and over the sangar wall.

16. An order for all to move to their combat positions, check personal kit and weapon, and 

prepare for action or activity. 

17. Generally a bucket to avoid leaving the protection of the sangar at night.
Permanent Piquets 89

luxuries, and anything else you need can arrive, along with your company 

commander, who issues from his lair in the “mother” piquet issues to 

see that his various piquets are happy and properly run, and that nothing 

remains to be done for defence.

These visits must be made on convoy days, when convoy escorts help 

to strengthen the line; and on those days, if quiet reigns, your garrison can 

go off in driblets down to the stream or spring to wash and generally to 

relax, while those left in the piquet remain alert, questing the hills not only 

to their own front and flanks, but whatever an enemy can threaten any part 

of the line.

Your piquet may find it desirable or even necessary to watch ground 

at some distance. A day piquet must then be used. When it goes out, 

remember to take all precautions or the tale of the Tochi piquet may be and 

probably will be repeated.

Cooking, sun bathing, delousing,18 anything which can be done close 

to the piquet should be done under the rear wall, and small wing walls 

protecting the men so engaged are needed. For days may pass without 

any trouble and then one day some devil who is out for mischief may 

loose off at your kitchen, a well defined and accurately ranged target, and 

one or more of your men go west, a loss you could have avoided by a little 

work.

A senior officer, if he is experienced, will form his opinion of a unit 

by its performance of detached duties rather than by its appearance on 

ceremonial parade; and the routine of permanent piquets shows up a bad 

battalion quicker than anything else I know. I used always to look for the 

outer signs of a good piquet. Alert sentries, a clean, well-levelled floor, 

equipment neatly bestowed on pegs driven into the stones, ammunition and 

rations, carefully stacked, water tank standing clear of the floor, and no 

dripping to make puddles and attract flies, bedding out to air, cooking place 

brushed, refuse burnt or burning, wire apron clear of papers, oiled rags, and 

all the debris which accompanying military life, some occupation for the 

men, a useful logbook for the piquet, a cleared space for aircraft message 

strips. And—the signs of a keen unit—some little bit of swank19 in the 

way of pebble-outlined pattern, regimental crest, or the like. But these I 

know we will be sure to find in your piquet. When I was young an eminent 

soldier said that for conscientious performance of unsupervised duty the 

18. Ticks and fleas from the mules and camels and body lice from not bathing.

19. Decoration.
90 Passing It 

British subaltern stood alone in the world. He was right then, and I believe 

I am right in repeating it now.

And it is all necessary, for a stretch of several days on end in the 

cramped quarters of a piquet would be deadly dull, if not bad for health, 

without interest in life and in care of men; go slack20 in this and be sure 

you and your men will grow slack in other things, and then Brother Pathan 

comes into his own.

That is what the system of permanent piquets implies—sharp fighting, 

heavy work, and days of dull but important watching by dozens of little 

detachments along a line of communications. But it saves Heaven knows 

what labour. And time. Convoys can start up the line from any post at 

any time after daylight, and return any time before dark, without the delay 

which putting up daily piquets means. A few intermediate and small daily 

piquets amplifying the control of the permanent ones will suffice, instead 

of the weary and often costly posting of daily piquets all along the line; 

and convoy escorts, instead of being strong and then always on the jump, 

can be reasonably small, move without anxiety. So initial losses and daily 

isolation are well repaid, and I think that you will find that the permanent 

system on the line of communications has come to stay in any but the 

smallest or shortest of operations. I have told you what I can about them; 

and while I am on it, I may as well deal shortly with another frequent 

activity, escort duty.

Here, as I have just said, your work has been much simplified by the 

framework of the permanent piquets, and you have only to do in a very 

small way what the advanced guard to a force on the march has to. The 

little van guard clears the way for the transport, for there may be a few 

men lying up who haven’t been spotted by the piquets. Keep an eye open 

for the routine signal from a piquet which means “Danger in the Offing,”21

usually the displaying of a coloured flag, to attract the attention of all, and 

not only of signalers watching for a message. And as the van guard moves 

along, the troops behind it send up little groups to occupy possible lying-up 

places, small knolls or nullah openings to the left and right out of the reach 

of the van guard.

In all this, never relax precautions. The most difficult thing in the 

world to do is to force care on men who know that no enemy has been 

seen for days—but you must do it. A careless advance to a crest, possibly 

20. Get careless—‘slackness.’

21. Suspected danger ahead or in the near future.
Permanent Piquets 91

a careless supporting party, unready to open fire, and you have taken it in 

the neck once more. The enemy, knowing that in spite of the Manual’s 

warning you must follow practically the same track day after day and 

occupy the same ground, has had ample time to watch your method and to 

work out his plan. And unless you are ready for him he will carry it out 

and trust to escaping through the permanent piquets by the dead ground 

which of necessity exists in places, and you will go back cursing the 

enemy’s “cunning,” when, after all, the fault is yours for giving him the 

opportunity. 

The convoy moves on dropping people who have all to be picked up 

later—a sanitary squad sent to disembowel and burn animals, casualties 

from the last convoy; a cable-repairing party; officers inspecting tracks; 

doctors carrying out inspection of piquets; and so on—and at last meets the 

down convoy—a stray officer or two and leave parties, sick and wounded, 

possibly some prisoners (a sullen lot these, and you had better remove their 

pajama strings22 if they are truculent—it cramps their style), but mainly 

camels without loads, the last marked by a large flag. It passes the last of 

the up convoy, you exchange a last word with the van guard of the other 

escort, and turn about. Baggage escorts take up their place by the returning 

animals, and the whole move as fast as may be to camp and rest. You are 

now the rear guard, and the work of rear guard and piquets with a column 

is reproduced in miniature, but with equal care. The temporary piquets 

come tumbling down from their places, anyone seen in the valley is taken 

along with the convoy or sent scurrying up to the permanent piquets as 

the case may be, an occasional long range shot whines over the strings of 

camels, and the valleys sink back to quiet. Boring, perhaps, and trying, 

yes, but it is all part of war in the mountains, and you have to prepare for it 

or you won’t be able to do it as well as you will be expected to. 

* * * *

There is only one class of terrain where the permanent piquet cannot 

be fully useful and where convoy work becomes in consequence far more 

dangerous, and that is in the intersected and bush-covered “Raghzas” or 

plains fringing the foothills of most mountain areas. Here command23 is 

absent, and therefore the permanent piquet, or indeed any form of piquet, 

loses most of its value. For the enemy can creep up unseen by any of the 

22. The cord to the shalwar kameez, the loose fitting, baggy pants worn by men in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan.

23. Commanding terrain. 
92 Passing It 

many ravines and attack through the scrub with everything on his side. He 

can only be met by movement, and this is just what is denied to convoy 

escorts, which will always be in danger in this type of ground.

The only remedy I can suggest is to clear the vicinity of the track 

to some two or three hundred yards distance on both sides, dragging the 

bushes away to form a knee-high entanglement until such time as it is 

needed for firewood. And in lieu of permanent piquets build a sort of stone 

pulpit every half mile or so, with a good firestep and open towards the road, 

for occupation by little detachments from the daily convoy escort. These 

give command, and unless the enemy reverse the breastworks they cannot 

fire from them, and if they do, it can be spotted at once. While these are 

being made armoured cars are the solution, with command and protection, 

combined with a fire power and speed which gives them surprise properties 

of the greatest value. If there had been armoured cars to intervene at the 

Spinchilla fight in the Tochi, where these conditions obtained, a nasty 

minor disaster would without doubt have been turned into a crushing knock 

for the tribesmen.

There is another possible activity connected with defence of the 

communications, which is very much a junior officer’s job. This is what, 

earlier in this book, I called a “Floating Platoon.” Properly handled, it 

should be possible for such a party to get much of the advantage of surprise 

otherwise mainly enjoyed by the enemy. There is nothing the tribesman 

hates like people getting behind him, and it should be, not easy, but quite 

possible for a handy and lightly equipped body of men to do it, with their 

front and rear and one flank covered by the permanent piquets and thus 

moving with considerable freedom about the hills under their support. 

Only, there must be no slackness in actual movement, and the variation 

of time and direction of march day by day, on which the Manual insists, 

can only be got if the party beds down in a different place every day. It 

may also move in the dark to known points of vantage on the chance of 

finding at dawn gangs which have also trusted to the dark to get unseen 

to the point they have selected for ambush. Such a move must be made 

early, soon after midnight, and must be a short one, for as I have already 

told you, patrolling in the dark is no use unless it is stationary. This sounds 

Irish,24 but has truth in it.

The main point to remember in your arrangements for your men is 

that no one, except the men in charge of your ration and baggage mules, 

24. Difficult to believe or contrary.
Permanent Piquets 93

yourself, and your second in command, should know till you have left your 

night’s halt where you hope to fetch up that evening—for a bird of the 

air may tell the matter. And in your day tactics, alert scouting, constant 

sweeping with glasses and by the eyes of trained observers of the ground to 

be crossed, and on top of all, movement covered by readiness to fire, both 

of near-by piquets and of parts of your own command.
94 Passing It 
When a Column Moves 9

Chapter X

Aspects of Work Falling

Junior Officers   When a Column Mov

Early preparations and start of advanced guard – Preliminary work 

of rear guard – Duties with transport – Rearguard activities.

Now let us see what happens if the force is moving on  In al

probability the route has been protected by permanent piquets for some 

distance ahead, and the camp site itself is similarly covered. In this case 

the object of the day’s move will probably be to carry the column forward, 

perhaps putting up on the way two or three more permanent piquets in 

continuation of those established already, forge ahead a few—generally 

very few—miles, camp, and complete the grip on the communications by 

working back from camp. On the other hand it may be that the opposition 

does not justify this slow process, and that the order of the day is to be what, 

after three weeks of steam-roller advance, the troops in 1920 delightedly 

hailed as “pukka Motan,”1

 or “Real Mountain”—the arrangements as 

practiced of old. In such a case, the intricate work of piquet posting begins 

as soon as the advanced guard has left the circle of camp piquets, and the 

camp piquets themselves have to be withdrawn at the end. So we will take 

this case, as holding more to talk about.

* * * *

All have been warned, and there has been a buzz of preparation 

since an early hour. Inlying piquets have been alert from the moment of 

the “rouse,” to cover the falling in of the advanced guard and of those 

accompanying them. The dawn patrol is not needed in the sector through 

which the column is to advance, but no other precaution can be missed. 

Up in the piquets kit is got ready, and at the first streak of light, mules or 

carrying parties move up and lift the stuff down to camp to be loaded and 

1. Also used as Pukka Sahib – a Real Gentleman.
96 Passing It

take up or catch up its proper place in the transport column.

The rear guard commander may have told the piquets overnight his 

plans for withdrawing them. If not, he sends word now, for on the proper 

order of their withdrawal depends a good start for his trying day.

The troops of the main body, if this heads the transport, may be moving 

shortly after dawn, for the advanced guard, which went out in the dark 

within the ring of camp piquets, has by now started a bunch of the flank 

piquets up the hills to points which its commander has settled on by distant 

reconnaissance the evening before, if he is wise and has had the time.

* * * *

Transport officers of units have drawn the first line mules. These have 

been made over to battalion headquarters and to companies, and those 

moving with the troops are starting. The rest, if they have not already 

fed, do so now. There will be no time to water them even if the animals 

will drink at this early hour, and they will either be in camp soon after 

noon or will have prolonged checks and opportunity to drink on the march. 

But they must not be loaded a minute earlier than necessary for them to 

move to the exit and take their place in the mule transport which heads 

the transport column. So it is the duty of the officers left behind with the 

baggage guards, composed of cooks and employed men as far as possible, 

and of the transport officer, to see that loading is done quickly when it 

begins, and that the baggage guards, whether they are to march with the 

first line or train, work full blast from the start, at whatever loading is to be 

done. Meanwhile the train transport, usually camel, is feeding, resting, and 

if there is time, watering. Their attendants groom and otherwise care for 

the beasts, and themselves get a good meal, for it is unlikely that the bulk 

of the camels will be leaving till well on in the morning, which means that 

they will not get to camp till late; and it is senseless for units to take them 

over and waste the idle hours before the start, when by using these the men 

and animals can start happy on the day’s work, which no one knows the 

end of.

Why all this trouble about a lot of animals, I have been asked. And 

indeed in my early days it was seldom the poor beasts or their attendants 

got any consideration at all. Most of the transport then used was raised for 

the campaign; raw and unfit animals scraped up, and a mass of untrained 

and unwilling transport drivers collected from anywhere. Some never 

met their animals till arrival at detraining stations or later, and most of 
When a Column Moves 9

them funked2 and loathed the mules and camels they had to care for. The 

officers were usually collected from non-mobilized units, and though they 

worked themselves to death, could do little, even with the help of a couple 

of sergeants almost as new to the game as themselves. The cooking and 

clothing arrangements were bad, no food was carried for the camels, and 

little enough for the mules, result—casualties among the men and animals, 

inefficiency, indiscipline, and waste. The wonder is that we got on at all, 

but in those days both enemy resistance and transport need were less. 

Nowadays, anything like the same proportion of casualties among animals 

would lead rapidly to the disappearance of the camel, the most useful of 

our military beasts of burden, and already becoming almost a zoo rarity in 

India,3

 what with canal irrigation, increasing cultivation, and development 

of motor transport. And then where would we be? So we will be wise 

to be more careful of him than of our men, who can be replaced; and if it 

came to a question of sparing the camel or sparing his attendants, baggage 

guards and so on, I know which would go to the wall if I had the ordering 

of it. 

You will find that a well-run column with a transport head who knows 

his job will never allow animals to be drawn before they must be to get 

into their place in time, and you will find that pressure from above compels 

unit commanders to aim at never keeping animals under load before the 

time to start. This meant rapid work by baggage guards and by the escorts 

of ammunition and supply columns, but it pays every time. So you, as 

transport officer, do not draw the transport earlier than you must, and then 

load it swiftly to get to the starting point at the time when your calculations, 

checked by the actual passage of other units’ animals, show you that they 

will be needed there. A little delay is of no consequence, for however good 

the roadway, you can be certain of one thing—that the transport will soon 

check, and you can catch up.

Compare a transport column run on these lines, and the start from 

Shinawari in 1897, where, owing to the check at Dargai, camels were under 

load for twenty hours and more. Simply due to unintelligent staff work 

and units’ desire to get an unpleasant fatigue over early and off to war. But 

the poor brutes of camels! Remember that while a man can sit down or lie 

down to ease his task, the camel seldom and the mule never can lie down 

comfortably under load; and be merciful to your best friends.

2. Feared or shrunk back from facing.

3. The camel has since made a comeback in Pakistan’s Punjab and North West Frontier.
98 Passing It

A lot of talk about the transport animals, but not a word too much. 

* * * *

All this while sanitary detachments, working at half strength because 

half have gone on with the camp colour parties, are clearing up the site, 

filling in latrines and piling litter. No burning can be done because of 

smoke, till the enemy have ceased from troubling.

The baggage from piquets has reached units, loaded up, and gone on to 

catch up unit transport if too late to start with it. You yourself as transport 

officer have gone off with the last of your unit baggage unless called on 

for other transport work; and the camp has slowly cleared, leaving nothing 

there now but the rear guard, possibly a couple of companies, some 

machine guns, and a section of guns either in position near the camp or a 

mile or so up the road.

If the war spirit is strong, the rear guard will have a hot time from the 

start. If very strong, and heavy rear guard fighting is felt to be likely, the 

column commander and the bulk of the fighting troops will move behind 

the transport, ready to intervene or relieve the original rear guard. But this 

is unusual, except when the whole force is withdrawing, when it will be 

normal. Until the enemy is broken he will always oppose an advance into 

his country, and a show of strength in front will draw off opposition from 

behind, whether it be a fighting column or a line of communications or a 

piquet party taking up its position.

But if the country is nominally quiet, the rear guard still has an 

unpleasant task from the very start, and that is keeping tribesmen off 

the camping ground. They come along, unarmed to all appearance, and 

scavenge round for empty bottles, discarded grain, and so on. You cannot 

shoot if there has been peace and they obviously do not mean war, but 

unless kept at a distance by small piquets and loud threats they produce 

much confusion and may be dangerous if others less trusting choose to 

harry the rear guard at the same time. Besides, there is always the chance 

of treacherous attack. So the rear guard, bullets or not, has an anxious time 

from the start.

* * * *

As soon as the transport has got fairly away, the rear guard commander 

begins his real job. If he has been able to make up his plan and tell the 

piquets the night before or before starting so much the better, and better 

still for all concerned if he has been able to relieve the mixed lot of camp 
When a Column Moves 9

piquets at dawn and let them go on to their units. However, the piquets, 

whether his own men or the old piquets, are called down in succession 

according to the tactical situation, each in turn following the same protective 

routine as we have seen followed when drawing down to the line of march. 

And thus the rear guard carries on, sending away surplus troops as they 

come down, first from the camp piquets and then from those sent up by 

the advanced guard, and generally doing its utmost, by co-ordination of 

the work of piquets and rear guard, to withdraw without the serious checks 

which will follow a lapse by either.

I should like you, if you ever have the opportunity and the inclination, 

to read the account of the evacuation of Camp Karamna in the Bazar 

Valley by the First Brigade of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, on December 

29, 1897, which you will find in Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, a 

Government of India publication.4

This and the map accompanying it, will give you a far better idea of 

the ideal evacuation of a camp by a rear guard than anything I can say. It 

was a perfect example of how it should be done in face of considerable 

enemy activity, and holds lessons for all, junior and senior.

If you can do as well in your own part of the work, you are an expert. 

4. Frontier and Overseas Expeditions (1911) is available in a six volume edition from the, 

Naval and Military Press, Ltd, Uckfield, Sussex, UK.
100 Passing It
Attacks and Withdrawal

Chapter

Aspects of Work Falling 

Junior Officers in Attack and Withdra

Opportunity for a “formal” attack seldom offers; and must be taken 

fully when given – Distribution: and points to guard against – Further action 

in case of an advance – Or of a withdrawal – Ravines and other dangers – 

Danger of intersected and bushy country – Night work.

A lot has been said about various activities, but except where i

was inherent in these, we have said nothing about the attack. This is not 

so remiss as it seems, for the formal attack is probably the least frequent 

of all events in this form of war. The first advance may have to overcome 

a stand-up resistance and there may be two or three such stands during the 

campaign, though, of course, the very infrequency of these makes it the 

more necessary to take full advantage of them. The trouble is, it is so hard 

to inflict real loss in an attack unless an enveloping move can be brought 

off, and even this must be limited in its effect.

For these people are firm believers in living to fight another day, 

however often it may mean bolting like rabbits; and it is quite impossible to 

“pin them to their ground.” They may have no communications to defend 

starkly, and their line of retreat is about as traceable as a markhor’s.1

 So, 

though the pursuit is always a desirable thing, it is difficult to carry out 

except by gun-fire or by planes, and the scattered enemy gives few good 

targets for these. It follows that every use must be made of the few chances 

of inflicting loss during the advance, and many of these will be given only 

to the junior officer, so that a lot depends on him.

1. A markhor is a species of antelope found in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The markhor have distinctive screw-shaped horns and live in groups of four to 30. In 

Skeen’s day the markhor was a popular game animal, wily and difficult to hunt. In recent 

times the markhor has become a protected species in Pakistan, and has been designated 

the national animal.
102 Passing I

* * * *

An enemy may be attacked when found in position by a force on the 

march, but this is infrequent, for when a force is on the march the enemy 

prefers harassing from a safe distance and taking the chances which 

infighting with the rear guard and piquets offers him.

* * * *

Usually, he will stand on some well-marked feature covering an 

important part of the country or, more likely, some part to which he attaches 

sentimental importance—some part which has never had its “purdah”2 lifted 

as at Landakai the “purdah” of Upper Swat, the Tanga Pass into Buner, or 

the successive Dargai, Sampagha, and Arhanga ridges covering Orakzai 

holdings and Bagh. In such cases the force can move conveniently close 

and, with special precautions against night assault meanwhile, prepare to 

deliver an attack in form. The column commander need not worry much 

about major tactics—all he has to do is to select his point of attack and 

this enemy will conform. He did so at Chaharasiah, at Kandahar, and in 

all the lesser fights for positions of which frontier history is full. But a 

commander, in the plains at least, can often lay successful traps. Shabkadr 

in ’97 was one example where the tribesmen were drawn out into ground 

suited to cavalry. The Burjina Pass, April 1908, was another, where the 

cavalry concealed movement of guns into close range. I managed to work 

the same thing in a small way beyond the Khurd Khaibar in May, 1919. As 

I have said before, the “cunning” tribesman is very easily had.3

* * * *

But we are getting away from the junior officer’s job. First in 

importance is the distribution of your command. It will generally have to 

be in considerable depth, for the slopes up which you have to advance will 

not allow deployment to any extent. And other folk’s commands will be 

using the spurs4 to right and left, so you cannot spread that way even if it 

did not mean that your command got out of your hands. If you can deploy 

two sections you will be lucky, but it does not matter really, for not only 

do you then have plenty of strength in depth in case you have to repel an 

attack, but, as it is next to impossible to inflict loss on men behind cover 

2. In Islamic culture, Purdah is the separation of women from men. It also refers to the 

covering of the face and head of the woman, or in some cases the covering the entire body 

of the woman with a Burqua. Skeen’s use of “never had its Purdah lifted” means that the 

area is forbidden to foreigners or unbelievers (Infidels).

3. A useful reference for many of these actions is O’Ballance, The Afghan Wars.

4. A spur is a lateral ridge projecting from a mountain or mountain range.
Attacks and Withdrawal

with direct rifle fire, your front of fire does not matter. What does, is the 

power given to a handy formation in depth, of pouring in heavy oblique 

fire on an enemy opposing your comrades on other spurs, and hidden 

from them. Such targets will be more exposed to you, and deeper, and so 

oblique fire does far more damage than the occasional casualty resulting 

from frontal fire. Even these targets do not present themselves till you are 

nearing the enemy’s cover, and your fire is then from a very effective range, 

so do not waste fire in the advance till you can use it really effectively. The 

guns, and to a lesser extent the machine guns, will keep the enemy’s fire 

down, and machine guns and your own fire can deal with them should they 

expose themselves.

Your distribution in depth has another advantage. You are strong 

to resist assault, and this may come. If it does, look out for it coming 

from men lying up a little distance in front of the main position. These 

will be men who have accepted the fact that they will not return and who 

deliberately lie up in front with a view only to effecting a desperate surprise 

dash so that their try for Paradise may have a better chance of taking some 

of the attackers with it. The first time I saw this happen was at Landakai, 

where six Bunerwals, ages from sixteen to sixty, suddenly leapt out as 

the front line was closing and fixing bayonets for the final assault on the 

enemy’s sangars. They came out from a fold in the ground, a mere furrow 

of rock some twenty yards below the crest, and went slap through three of 

our lines before the fourth bayoneted them. Armed only with knives and 

axes too, stout fellows.

In the advance you move forward covered, if necessary, by artillery and 

machine-gun fire, without closing up, but waiting before the final advance 

to the assault till someone fairly close behind is in position to support the 

moving lines with close-range fire. This you must have, for if a charge 

comes in from anywhere it comes in like rolling rocks, and unless someone 

is ready to open on it, the charge will get home unbroken. And though 

your distribution in depth can deal with it, it can only do so after a most 

unpleasant bit of in-fighting. 

To meet such attack, and because of the shape of the ground and the 

comparative lack of volume in the enemy’s fire, your successive lines 

should be well closed up towards the end. Your advance is, of course, 

preceded by ground scouts in groups, never singly, until the enemy’s 

position is neared, when the scouts halt and are taken on by the advancing 

lines. This, of course, to avoid loss from surprise attack and also because it 
104 Passing I

is not sound to give the enemy the idea that you are getting close until you 

are close up in force.

One thing I want to warn you against. I have often seen the Lewis gun 

detachment take the gun and ammunition off the mules, toting the whole 

up hill, with Mr. Mule halting perhaps a mile from any danger. Do not 

do this. It is always possible to get the mule well up with little exposure, 

and I hold that the gun mule is a soldier and has to take a soldier’s chance 

like his comrades the men behind the gun. But to do this you have to train 

both mules and men to move on shaly and pebbly hill-sides. Otherwise the 

mule will slip and perhaps upset, and the man is even more likely to do so 

and haul the mule over with him. You only have to see a mountain battery 

from some plains station its first time on the stony slopes of, say, the Tochi, 

to see at once what I mean. After practice there is no reason why a mule 

with the easy load of a Lewis gun should not go anywhere a man can climb 

without using his hands to steady himself. This was the old rule with the 

mountain guns, and a good one.

Another hint—do not halt your men on tracks or near conspicuous 

rocks, and so forth. These are always known ranging marks. And your 

men will not halt near you. “Officers and white stones”—the old soldier’s 

rule still holds.5

 

This is not a thing to neglect. The accuracy of these people’s shooting 

is sometimes astounding. I have mentioned the case of the Ahnai Tangi, 

when I was warning you not to bunch your men on a crest. This was not 

an isolated fluke. At Makin I saw four men knocked out by one sniper, 

known to have been fifteen hundred yards off; and shortly before that, 

taking up camp at Marobi, one man, who was bagged before he could do 

more damage, got two men and two mules in five shots, at a range of not 

less than five hundred yards.

* * * *

For several years there was a tendency to try to lessen losses by what 

some termed “prophylactic fire,”6

 consisting of bursts of fire loosed off at 

any point where the enemy was suspected to be. It meant a ghastly waste 

of ammunition and on more than one occasion I know that it led to the 150 

rounds carried on the man being exhausted almost before the troops had 

closed with the enemy. In the attack it can be very useful if the enemy 

5. This still holds true today.

6. Probing or protective fire or the “mad minute” seem to be part of every war and produce 

minimal results.
Attacks and Withdrawal

is known to be there, but otherwise it should be most sparingly used. In 

the withdrawal, when one main object is to avoid casualties and their 

hampering effect, it can be more freely used, and should be whenever there 

is reason to suspect that danger threatens from any place within effective 

range. Machine guns, of course, are the weapons par excellence for this.

Casualties in the attack must be cleared off as they occur. You never 

know when it may be impossible to deal with them. On easy ground 

stretchers may be used to give the wounded more chance. But on rough 

ground, where stretchers cannot be used, or when carriers are hard to spare, 

some method of carrying the wounded pick-a-back7 must be used. The 

puttee8 method is taught in India, a puttee being used to keep the man in 

position while his bearer is jolting and slipping down hill. It is the best 

way so far known and saves men, requiring only one carrier and another 

man to carry rifle and equipment of the casualty and of the carrier.

It has been found that the whistle is unsound.9 It gives away the 

whereabouts of the advancing lines to an enemy always a little shy of 

awaiting attack, and it also gives it away to anyone lying up to charge who 

does not want to betray himself by peering over cover. Signals combined 

with low-voiced words of command should be used.

The pace must be steady. For heaven’s sake do not be led by false 

notions of regimental prestige to hurry faster than you can move without 

distress. If you read Hutchinson’s account of the action at the Arhanga 

Pass, in the Tirah show of 1897, you will find an example of the gymkhana10

event which I want you to avoid—two battalions “having a great race up 

the hill-sides,” in “admirable rivalry.” Think what would have been the 

result if a hundred swordsmen had come out on what could have been little 

better than a breathless and disorganized mob. If any further warning is 

7. Piggy-back in America.

8. The Puttee was a strip of cloth that was wound spirally around the lower leg from the 

ankle to just below the knee to keep the trousers tight and free of entanglement. The 

puttee led to the canvas legging that was secured to the leg by laces and eyelets. The 

term puttee is adapted from the Hindi word patti, which means bandage; the military puttee 

was often used as a sling for an injured arm or a bandage.

9. Whistles (like a referee’s) were often used in World War I, for signals such as ‘going (on 

the attack) over the top.’

10. In India, a Gymkhana (Hindu-Urdu) was an equestrian (horseback) sporting contest. 

Often conducted bareback, it was a favorite of British cavalry officers. The most popular 

event was ‘tent-pegging’ where a rider armed with a lance would (at the gallop or full run) 

attempt to spear tent pegs that had been driven into the ground. Tent pegging was also 

good practice for ‘pig sticking’ boar hunting. Skeen was a keen horseman and champion 

polo player. See Byron Farwell, Armies of the Raj: From the Great Indian Mutiny to 

Independence 1858-1947 (Norton: London, 1991, 163). 10. 
106 Passing I

needed—officers are more lightly equipped than men, and if you dash 

ahead you may be first up, but you may well be first off with a Pathan knife 

in your ribs.

Keep your men well in hand, go as quickly as may be consistent with 

arriving at the top in good trim, fix bayonets and close whenever the crest 

or a likely lying-up place is neared, and, arrived at the crest, pursue the 

enemy with fire at once and as long as any are within effective range. 

Hustle with fire orders. I am a heretic, I know, but I have seldom seen 

fire orders terse enough to take up pursuit of this enemy or to deal with his 

sudden attack. Enemy fire or assault, if not dealt with in some speedy way, 

may prevent the perfect fire order from achieving the result it is expected 

to, and I prefer to see fire opened, the emergency being dealt with, and then 

errors corrected and the men got into hand as quickly as may be.

* * * *

Further action depends of course, on the commander’s plan. He may 

be content with giving the enemy a knock; more likely he will have in his 

mind a limited advance to some suitable spot beyond. This will be the 

usual thing and the advance will continue. It is the commander’s business 

to see that there is no delay in pushing on—if there is he and you will pay. 

He, in mental strain while his transport is struggling into camp in the dark; 

you, in hunger and possibly stiff fighting in protection of the animals. But 

the junior officer can help in several ways. He can take steps to push the 

enemy back if not already in full flight; he can make dispositions for a 

fresh flying start; and he can save his commander much worry and his men 

much discomfort if he insists on their having, and carrying, solid food for 

the night and next morning, apart from the emergency ration. This may 

seem superfluous advice, but it is a phenomenon of every campaign in 

which the British soldier takes part that he will throw away his food rather 

than carry it, trusting to a grouse to get more when as a rule there is none 

to be had. Nothing leads to full hospitals more quickly than empty bellies; 

and a commander’s plans may be very much hampered if he knows that 

his men cannot be called on for an effort just because his orders have been 

neglected.

But let us suppose that the commander intends a return to camp after 

the fight. If the enemy have taken a good knock, the return will probably be 

quiet, but I should take all precautions and I advise you to. The commander 

has two great responsibilities. The first is to make his decision to withdraw 

as early as he can. Anything may hold the move up, and in the short days 
Attacks and Withdrawal

of winter in which a campaign usually begins, the day is short enough. It 

was delay in this which brought about the nasty incidents of the Saran Sar 

withdrawal in Bagh in 1897, and it was the memory of that which made me 

move back when the entrance to the Ahnai Tangi was almost in my grip on 

January 7, 1920. 

The second is to direct the main lines of the withdrawal and not leave 

the troops to find their own way. Again, the Saran Sar. 

The rest falls on the air force and the troops, and especially on the 

junior officers, though the unit commanders have a lot to think of.

The moment you learn the orders, fill up pouches if not already done, 

and send all animals back except those needed for actual fighting loads. 

Then dispose for covering fire in the withdrawal, if this has not been 

provided for by other troops, and if the enemy is close push him back. 

At the least bomb him or direct fire on him. I have never used smoke 

grenades or other means of laying a smoke screen in action, but I imagine 

that now they would find their real role. For the tribesman will not waste 

his precious cartridges on a target he cannot draw a bead on, and smoke to 

screen a sudden attack or in a withdrawal to cover the flanks against enemy 

fire may be really useful.11

Thereafter, withdraw on the lines I have already wearied you with. 

Train your men to move fast and to glance behind them from time to 

time, for now is the time this training is going to be useful. The Manual 

gives you one good reason—to see if a comrade has been hit—but there is 

another one, to see if the enemy swords-men are not rushing along behind. 

I have watched, and sickened to see, a couple of men struggling clumsily 

down a steep ravine into the Takki Zam, separated from their comrades 

and others, and behind them two Mahsuds bounding in pursuit from rock 

to rock, nothing in their hands but knives. The first these two men knew of 

their nearness was the knife thrust. Less than a mile off, and powerless to 

help, it was a ghastly thing to see, and yet if those men had been decently 

trained the Mahsuds were easy money.

* * * *

The withdrawal should be easy with proper dispositions, but there is 

one thing to look out for. At the foot of all slopes you will find nullahs. 

11. Smoke, generated by a machine, was, like gas, first used in World War I. Smoke 

and gas were difficult to control due to changes in wind direction and required time to 

reposition their dispensers. The smoke canister grenade and smoke artillery rounds were 

more manageable tools and were valuable in masking a withdrawal.
108 Passing I

Water-worn ravines, small to begin with and tempting cover, later becoming 

deeper and narrow, impossible to keep men closed up in, and hideously 

dangerous. Unless both sides are held as the Manual says, avoid them; 

and remember, if they have to be entered, do not trust to other dispositions 

to make you safe. Ravines wind in the most astounding way, and the 

protection of other troops may disappear at any moment with a turn of the 

nullah, so you must supplement their help with men of your own up in the 

open.

The Manual, in fact, sounds a little casual in its warning, “Ravines 

should be avoided,” etc., because it was written for use by men with some 

experience of India, where the ravine warning will be rubbed into you soon 

enough. In spite of this, it is astounding how often the warning is ignored. 

And how often trouble follows. The reason no doubt is because of the 

feeling of safety which the deep ditch of the ordinary nullah gives, and it is 

only human nature to seek cover from storm or danger. The trouble is that 

in a nullah you cannot see if danger is coming near, exits up the sides are 

usually few and bad, and the farther down the nullah you go, the steeper 

cut and higher the sides. And when an enemy, however few, spots a party 

in such a position, you can be sure that it will be rounded up and shot down 

with a minimum of trouble to the enemy and a minimum of chances for the 

sinners. And the shots being drowned between the cliffs, with little chance 

of assistance being attracted. So follow the book closely, and, in addition, 

if there is any other way out available, side-step the nullah, or you may find 

yourself in the position of the Northamptons’12 party coming back from 

the Saran Sar in ’97, where they lost some good men, the enemy got some 

good rifles, and one of the best friends of my youth went west.

And, remember, in this connection, when advancing to attack watch 

carefully for any such difficult place which you may have to deal with 

when withdrawing and be forewarned.

At the foot of these hills you will often find flat ground cut up by 

nullahs and covered with scrub jungle or grass clumps. Then fix bayonets 

and watch out. I have already warned you about this—“the bush-tufted, 

stony plains and ravines where the dashing tactics of the Mahsud find their 

fullest scope.” Here is where Mountain Warfare fails as a title, for this 

sort of ground cannot be described even as hilly, yet it is by far the most 

dangerous if cleverly used by the tribesman. In mountains it is always 

12. The British Northamptonshire Regiment, fought with distinction in the Tirah Expedition 

of 1897-98. 
Attacks and Withdrawal

possible to get command, whether one has to fight for it or not. Here there 

may be none, just a network of ravines, bewildering to the foreigner, but 

well-known ground to the tribesman, and when you add low clumps of 

bush, all grazed down and consequently dense, for him to approach behind 

and take cover behind, you will see that it is possible to meet much nastier 

propositions in the plains than you do in the hills. The mess-up at Manjhi 

in October in October, 1919, was one, and we found more when preparing 

for the advance to Palosina later in the year. Two bitter little scraps and a 

lot of sniping cost us eighty casualties in three days, with little to show for 

it. Later, a most dashing attack on a strongly guarded convoy in the Tochi, 

near the Spinchilla Pass, showed that the Mahsud had remembered and that 

we had neglected the danger of such ground.

Armoured cars are invaluable here, if they can move, having command, 

protection, fire power, and speed, but without these aids an attack on troops 

in this sort of country can only be dealt with by movement—counter-attack 

or steady withdrawal , with such arrangements for covering fire as can be 

made. They will be few enough, but as long as the troops are not stationary 

the enemy must move, to escape or to follow up, and then only will they 

give targets. Incidentally, command without protection is little use. At this 

Spinchilla affair, part of the escort, very naturally, rushed and seized a little 

bare rocky knoll, from which they were picked off by men in the bushes, 

without hope of retaliation. 

I suppose that I ought to say something about night work, as this will 

always form the first part of a move to attack, whether on an enemy in 

position or to secure a desired point.

In the old days our armament was much superior, an advantage which 

darkness neutralized, and several other factors operated to make night work 

a thing to avoid. We gave up, for instance, all the advantages of discipline 

and fire power to take on men in their own ground and well accustomed to 

night movement on it, so it was seldom done. Climo’s relief of the hardpressed camp piquet at Kharappa in 1908 was a notable instance, the more 

so as such a thing had never been heard of before. But in 1920 the short 

hours of daylight made it obligatory to lengthen the working day, and the 

accuracy of the enemy’s rifle fire made it desirable to blanket its effect by 

moving in darkness. Several moves of large and small forces were begun 

in darkness with great success, which again was partly due to the cold, 

which induced the Mahsud, always an individualist, to prefer the warmth 

of his huts and caves to watching for his cause all night in the wind and 
110 Passing I

wet. And when he took it on he could not resist wrapping his head up. We 

nearly got some on their cots in front of the Barari Tangi, and later, in the 

Tangi itself, a party was surprised and dealt with faithfully. But I am far 

from saying that night work should be under-taken lightly, and would only 

try it if a big advantage offered or necessity compelled me.

If you have to take part, you can best prepare by training your men in 

peace to move in the dark quietly and sure-footedly and to use collected fire 

when ordered, or the bayonet in silence, if they are lucky. Reconnaissance 

is never possible except from a distance, and here sensible use of glasses 

and previous practice in the study of hilly ground will never be wasted. 

These can, I find, be best used in memorizing land-marks for use as distance 

checks on your road. Compass bearings are, of course, necessary, but as 

your route has to be a well-defined one, and is usually a winding one, you 

will find that there is generally something, a stream-bed, a nullah mouth, a 

tree trunk, or a bit of cultivation, which will guide you better, the compass 

bearing being a check and a comfort.

Air photographs13 may be most useful, allowing not only study of routes 

for the approach march, but of probable posting of troops on arrival at the 

objective; and your commander will be well advised to use them freely in 

deciding on your moves, more especially when these are lengthy or have to 

be carried through out of sight of any ground within our occupation.

And if your move is successful, it is a great thing to feel you have 

bamboozled the enemy, saved your men loss and your commander time, 

with possibly a bit of damage done to the enemy, either on the road or as 

he bolts under fire from lairs you have passed.

* * * *

There is one thing I forgot. It seems obvious, and it is often forgotten. 

When advancing to the attack, or when withdrawing, or indeed at any time, 

never set light to anything as you pass unless ordered. A “bhusa” stack 

will put up a dense smoke and in a moment all chance of visual signaling 

is gone. You will often find that a light-hearted man or, and more often, an 

unsupervised follower, puts a light to something, a hut or straw shelter, out 

of pure devilment, and the damage and delay throughout the day will soon 

show you the need for care yourself and for a sharp look-out for possible 

sinners. 

13. First used in World War I to observe and photograph trench complexes on the Western 

Front.
Foraging And Demolition 1

Chapter X

Aspects of Work Falling

Junior Officers in Foraging and Demoli

Foraging equipment – Organization for the work – Points to be watched, 

and methods found safest and best – Constant vigilance needed – Method of 

withdrawal – Demolition, a more serious matter – Organization for the work, 

and methods of destruction – Manner of withdrawal.

We have dealt with marches, camping, permanent piquets,

convoy work, attack and withdrawal. What other activities are left? 

Two, certainly, in which the junior officer has a lot on his shoulders. 

Foraging and demolition.

In these, as much as in any, organization and fighting qualities are 

essential. Organization, for time, always the essence of success, here 

becomes its quintessence; and fighting qualities, because the work is 

always carried out by comparatively small forces. 

Take foraging first. This is usually done when the area searched is 

fairly quiet, and in day trips. Unless it can be done thus, the supplies 

gathered are not worth the labour of gathering and bringing back, for 

they are mostly bulky things, and hard to carry and load, and the stuff 

all needs cleaning before use. But it may be necessary for moral effect 

or because supplies are not coming up the line.

The first thing to see to is that the men have the means of cutting 

and that the transport destined to carry the stuff back take suitable means 

of loading. Sickles, for instance, for the standing corn. A battalion 

has none and the Gurkhas, quite rightly, will not lend their kurkries,1

so the Staff will have to arrange for sickles or something of the sort 

1. The Kurkhi is the curved-blade fighting knife of the Nepalese Gurkhas. The Gurkhas 

believe that the Kurkhi has sacred qualities and is not to be drawn unless it is to be cleaned 

or used for a strictly military purpose, not as a common camp tool.
112 Passing It

if they want green fodder and effective foraging. Nets are needed if 

mule loads are to weigh more than a few pounds, whether green corn 

or bhusa. Sacks will be needed for grain, but all sacks and packing 

material are handed in as emptied to the Supply people, so these will 

have to be drawn. Then some Pushtu-speaking men should be detailed 

to go with you; and while all these things are outside your power to 

procure unaided and should be arranged for you by those ordering the 

foraging, you should see that they are available before you start.

The troops should be organized into several lots, with any of which 

you may be. Troops to cover the move to the area selected, which piquet 

the route and throw out piquets covering the work from a distance. 

Troops which on arrival post protective parties covering the work from 

near by. Troops for the working parties; special troops to move back 

early with live-stock, which moves slowly; troops to assist the transport 

personnel to tie up and load; a reserve, not to be used in any work, for 

you never know what may happen; and a rear guard, which becomes 

the advanced guard for the return journey. Foresight and organization 

are required for all this, which usually falls to a senior officer to see to. 

But you on your side can ensure that your men are trained to work all 

out, and that they do so now. And that you carry food for the day and 

for the night.

In the outer system of defence your work is no different from what 

we have already gone through, with the same precautions in taking up 

positions, in holding them throughout the day, and in the withdrawal. 

On the inner line you only have to keep moving to see that your men 

are fully alert and not interesting themselves in the collection. Your 

least difficult though most tiring work will come if you are in charge of 

the working parties. Here you have several things to look to. First, do 

not let your men work individually—each group must be under control, 

each with their own definite task in their own limited area. They all 

work accoutered, arms slung or close to their hands, because in this 

work men must move about and cannot pile and unpile arms every 

moment. They must work concentrated because the work is done as 

quickly and more safely, and each party must work with at least one 

man ready and on the alert, guarding them closely against assault. It 

was at Nahakki, I think, in the Mohmand show of 1908, where three 

greybeards, ripe for Paradise, dashed from hiding on a few pioneers and 

took five with them as a passport.
Foraging And Demolition 1

Drive your men all the time. Taking other folk’s property is so new 

an activity that they will waste time at it if you do not check them. No 

ragging, no chasing after hens, no looking for souvenirs. Particularly 

drop on taking Korans out of house or mosque. They are holy books 

and family bibles; they are no good to the despoiler and taking them 

is a dirty trick. Set light to nothing and watch followers, who need 

it. And stop looting—by which I mean taking stuff for personal use. 

When all is said and done, looting is only a euphemism for stealing, 

and if that does not make you pause, it also means waste of time and 

leads to indiscipline, so stop it dead.

Any villagers found in the place or its vicinity must be taken to 

the village meeting-place and kept there under guard till someone in 

authority interrogates them and either decides to treat them rough or 

deals with their requests. You often find old, blind, or otherwise useless 

mouths abandoned in the houses. I need not tell you to be kind to these, 

and the troops generally have to be restrained from looking after these 

helpless folk.

* * * *

One area cleared of whatever you were set to collect, move to 

another, piling stuff as gathered in some handy central place for the 

rope and net parties to deal with. But do not straggle, or you may suffer 

as did the foraging parties in Maidan in 1897, November 6th, I think. 

There the entire foraging split up smaller and smaller till the Afridis, 

who were prepared to be good as long as it paid them, found the chances 

too good to be missed, and there was a nasty mix-up, which would have 

been much worse if it had not been impromptu on the Afridi side.

* * * *

Even if friendly arrangements have been made for the late enemy 

to furnish supplies, no precautions can be omitted. He may have the 

supplies ready; if so the work of the foraging parties is less and all 

can concentrate on the roping up and loading. But do not be friendly, 

even if he has souvenirs for sale. Let those whose business it is to talk 

to him do so, and you and your men mind your own business, and not 

the least important part of that is to be alert. For the tribesman with a 

melon in his hand can change into a danger by dropping the melon and 

pulling a rifle or sword out of the roof, and if you are slack you may be 

tempting the poor devil beyond bearing.
114 Passing It

Be particularly alert in the rear guard work on the return journey. 

For the friendly tribesman, having collected payment, is by no means 

above chivvying2

 the rear guard home. He can always blame the bad 

men from the next valley (who may be—probably will be—there also 

on their own), and the rear guard, though it may have an easy time, 

ought to behave as if it expected trouble. If it does not, the odds are on 

getting it. And that is another reason against delay in any part of the 

work. Every moment wasted means a closer approach of evening and 

of increasing numbers of the enemy intent on harrying the withdrawal.

The day wears on. The morning’s rear guard moves off, livestock close behind. Mules are called up and loaded, and move off at 

once with their baggage guards, the late roping parties. The workers 

assemble, close in their protective groups, give the animals a fair 

start, and move off as main body, staying in rear where most likely 

to be needed. The outer line of piquets is then called in, the order of 

their withdrawal carefully thought out by the commander and every 

precaution employed in the actual withdrawal of each. A rear guard 

grows out of the piquets, which move along withdrawing those along 

the route in the usual way. On arrival in camp, loads are taken to the 

appointed place, ropes, loading nets, sickles, sacks, etc., are handed in, 

and a discharge for them taken, and so to a well-earned meal.

* * * *

That is easy enough. A far bigger proposition arises with demolition. 

For here you are not collecting supplies from a comparatively quiet 

locality. You are going out to set your mark on a stubborn enemy, to 

punish him for years of accumulated evil-doing in the only way bar 

killing that has the least effect on him. There is usually an outcry about 

this form of punishment, with good reason. I dislike it intensely, but 

after the enemy’s will to stand and take punishment is broken, there is 

no other way to make him watch his step in the future; or if there is we 

have not found it out in the past eighty years.

And it is a big proposition because, unless the enemy is completely 

crushed, he will rally to defend his property or revenge its loss, and 

you will find him fully as fierce as a wasp in a harried hive. During 

the destruction of Makin in 1920 this was very marked. Makin was 

an Abdullai holding, and, though there could not have been more than 

four or five hundred of them in the field, on the first day the price was 

2. Chivvying is pestering or harassing.
Foraging And Demolition 1

thirty-four killed and twenty-eight wounded, and on the second day 

twenty-seven killed and sixty-three wounded. On the third day the 

sting had gone out of them. We had only twelve casualties that day and 

twenty in the last two days, for it took five working days to lay Makin 

out thoroughly. Fifty-one towers and over four hundred and fifty main 

dwellings in various hamlets in the cultivated area were destroyed, and 

most of the retaining walls in the fields, figures which show how slow 

such work must be when opposed. Here I would say that it is far better 

not to attempt destruction unless it can be vindictively thorough. To 

singe and run away is costly in proportion, has no lasting effect, and the 

enemy is no end cheered at the lightness of his punishment and soon 

forgets it.

* * * *

If a large area has to be dealt with, the commander of the force will 

be well advised to move close up to it, enclose the part with piquets, 

and employ his whole force in covering the work and in destruction. In 

Makin we could only deal with parts of the area at a time, with bitter 

fighting; but we were dealing with the Abdullai, stark fighters with a 

good grasp of collective work, and we had to pull out our full strength 

to make good the area we were going to destroy. Guns in action at 

three hundred yards’ range on one occasion, and so on. If it is a lesser 

locality it may be possible to move there, destroy, and return in the 

day, or to occupy villages for one or more nights and make a job of it. 

In any case, it is unsound to take on more than can be carried through 

thoroughly—we do not want a repetition of the opening days of the 

Mamund country in ’97, where the force split into three and tried to do 

in a day what should have been a four days’ affair; with the result, of 

course, that all three portions were badly hustled, and the job was left 

undone.

But whatever the plan, organization for it follows the lines of 

foraging. That is—a force sufficient to secure and cover the work, 

groups providing inner protection, and strong working parties preparing 

for demolition. The protective arrangements must be thorough, though 

it will seldom be possible to ensure the workers being fully protected 

from fire. It must suffice if the enemy cannot attack without losing 

heavily, and that, of course, is better than all the houses down.

With the troops told off for duty, there will be, or should be, 

sappers to do the more difficult demolitions, and guns for their ordinary 
116 Passing It

work and also to deal with towers and so on which are strongly held, or 

which are in localities too difficult to get to without undue loss of time 

and life. Tools for infantry should include picks, billhooks, crowbars, 

rope, saws, oil, portfires3 and matches. Parties are told off to such jobs 

as can be foreseen, and a reserve of working strength kept handy. The 

sappers should blow down all towers as quickly as possible. After a 

little practice they can gauge to a nicety the charge required, and make 

the tower collapse as gracefully as a lady curtseying, which is the thing 

to aim at, as then the infantry need only to be taken off work from quite 

near the explosion. The infantry start preparing the houses on a broad 

front, and with the mud houses of the frontier this is a pretty strenuous 

job. Some like blowing out the corners and lighting the debris. A 

quicker way is a big draught hole dug in the roof, furniture and firing 

material heaped on the floor, and oil or ghi thrown on. The great thing 

is to produce flame enough to burn the cross-beams if not to ashes at 

least so much as to render them useless for roofing purposes, and to 

weaken the walls so that they must crack and crumble outwards under 

the thrust of a new roof. The walls have then to be rebuilt and new roof 

trees cut, brought from far off, and seasoned, all requiring time during 

which the victims can brood on their sins.

Any helpless inhabitants must be removed to some suitable detached 

huts, and you will find the soldiery doing their best to get the local 

kittens and puppies away. Grain, if not taken away, should be heaved 

into water or, failing water, heaped in the open with a good lacing of oil 

poured on the cone, and left to be lit at the end.

There will be plenty of work in the houses, fairly safe from snipers’ 

attentions. More dangerous and equally necessary work is in the 

open, where parties should be set to work pulling out key-stones in 

the retaining walls which hold up the terraced fields. The Gurkhas are 

particularly good at finding these, for their own fields are built up in 

the same way. But the knack is soon learnt—a few heaves with a pick, 

out comes the stone and a good length of the wall comes down with a 

roar, with earth following. Then before that part of the field can be any 

further good, the earth backing has to be lifted and the wall rebuilt—a 

year’s cropping lost, during which year the sinners pay for their sins.

Another job, still more exposed, but very effective, is finding the 

water channels and destroying them; look for a point where it runs 

3. A portfire is a slow-burning fuse.
Foraging And Demolition 1

along a cliff and blast or pick out several feet. The repair generally 

calls for experts and these often have to be imported, so the labour on 

this is well spent.

I do not like ringing trees4—it seems a crime against Nature; but it 

may have to be done, or the trees done in with guncotton, if large, as 

were once the holly oaks of Marobi.

But all these things require time, so the more saved by previous 

organization and by steady driving, the more successful the result will 

be.

Now we are up against a problem—smoke. The houses have to 

be burnt and that means smoke, and smoke means loss of visual 

communication, and that means difficulty in drawing off the protective 

piquets of the outer line, or the troops in positions covering the work, 

whichever method is adopted. It follows that the covering troops must 

know, and as early as possible, what the procedure of withdrawal is to 

be, and that an unmistakable and simple signal for commencement of 

withdrawal must be fixed. 

Take it that the houses are all ready for lighting. The parties in the 

fields are warned to come in, portfires are lighted, and on a signal, say, 

a Very light followed by another at an interval of half a minute, the 

portfires begin their work, systematically firing the houses at many 

points, but beginning on the leeward side lest any worker be trapped 

in the narrow alleys. Each house should be fired and all oil-soaked 

piles of grain, but if time or the enemy presses, light only the houses on 

the windward side and clear. By the way, look out for bees. A certain 

Highland battalion might still tell you, if decency permitted, of the 

value the men got from their kilts in saving their faces at the expense 

of other parts when the bees of the Maizar resented the burning of their 

homes.5

 Another argument, if one were needed, against indiscriminate 

burning of houses.

* * * *

The two Very lights can well be used by the covering troops as 

a signal to take the preliminary steps for withdrawal, and as soon as 

4. Ringing is destroying a tree by cutting a ring through the bark all the way around the 

trunk (girdling it). This severs the path of the food transporting phloem and the tree will 

starve to death as it cannot get food from the roots. 

5. Scottish Highland Battalions reportedly did not wear underwear (it was cooler) beneath 

their kilts, thus the bee stings were amplified.
118 Passing It

the officer in command of the operation sees that his working parties 

are clear he should send up, say a red Very light or even a star shell 

as a signal for the withdrawal to commence according to plan. The 

working parties and the reserve will have taken up positions to help 

their protectors as soon as these pass through the screen of smoke, 

the flanking parties are withdrawn in due course, and the whole force 

combining fire and movement, as usual, to safe-guard the withdrawal 

and inflict losses where possible, returns to camp or, if out for the night, 

to a hitherto untouched or, if prepared, unlighted village for the night.

Hot, dusty, dangerous work, but frequent, and therefore you should 

be prepared for it, by sound training in the principles and method of 

advance and withdrawal and by thought over the most time-saving 

methods of organizing for work. 
To Sum U

That is all of use I can tell you. But I think I have said enough 

to show that, as the Manual says, while the principles of war remain 

unchanged, “The tactics and characteristics of the inhabitants and 

the nature of the theater of operations may necessitate considerable 

modification in the method” of their application to warfare on the NorthWest Frontier of India. And that unless a good working knowledge of 

the methods indicated by experience is acquired in peace and applied in 

war, trouble if not disaster is bound to be the outcome.

But I also hope I have made it clear that previous training, energetic 

and common-sense application, and unrelaxing care will give you and 

your men complete ascendency over an enemy whose great natural 

advantages at first sight may seem to be unchallengeable. And I trust 

what I been able to pass on of my own experience and of my observation 

of others will help you in this.

If so I have discharged my debt to those who taught me and to 

those who taught them, and to those, my comrades in war, with whom I 

proved the truth of those teachings. 
120 Passig
Conclusions 

Conclusion

In, Passing It On, General Sir Andrew Skeen was writing for junior 

officers of a different time, different technology and different army. 

After a close reading of Skeen, the question must be asked; does his work 

have applicability for the coalition efforts in Afghanistan today? Much 

has changed, but the terrain has not, nor has the culture and mentality 

of the Pathan (Pashtun) fighters.

General Skeen’s army moved slowly, but surely in large columns 

through the hills and mountains of the North-West Frontier and 

Afghanistan. They made bivouac each night, and camp security and 

logistics were key concerns. The coalition moves small forces rapidly 

along the limited road network from city to forward operating base 

(FOB). Unless they are actively patrolling or ambushing, the coalition 

forces sleep in camps, FOBs and outposts. General Skeen’s army trained 

in the mountains; lived in the mountains and knew how to fight in the 

mountains. They did it for years, often for an entire career. British 

troops made India their home, and British officers returned to England 

on leave only occasionally. 

Skeen’s army was well trained for frontier fighting, and after 

years of trial and error had developed well-honed fighting skills. Most 

coalition forces deploy to Afghanistan without even unit mountain 

movement training, or training in firing weapons close to the vertical. 

The troops are in-country for only three months to a year, not enough 

time to elevate their tactical skill to that of the Taliban forces, who 

have inherited their fighting skills, and knowledge of terrain from their 

Pathan forefathers. 

Skeen’s force was legitimately concerned about the new highvelocity smokeless bullet that expanded the battlefield, enabling the 

Pathan tribesmen to engage British forces effectively out to 800 yards. 

Coalition troops, particularly those armed with the M4 carbine, are 
xxvi Passing It O

unable to hit targets beyond 300 meters or incapacitate an enemy 

beyond 200. Skeen’s force viewed the Vickers Machine Gun and Lewis 

Gun as supporting weapons to supplement infantry fire. The coalition 

has reversed this battlefield equation, and utilizes the SAW and heavy 

machine gun as the primary weapons to take the fight to the enemy 

beyond 200 meters. General Skeen’s army transported it’s artillery along 

with the troops and used mountain guns (pack howitzers) and artillery 

weapons specifically designed for mountain fighting. They frequently 

employed direct lay weapons, and supplemented there fire with the 

indirect fire of the Stokes mortar which was also transported by mule. 

Artillery systems are in short supply in the coalition, and are utilized 

almost exclusively for long-range fire support; they are not designed for 

mountain combat and rarely leave the FOB. 

Skeen’s army was not comfortable moving around at night; the 

darkness belonged to the Pathan who often maneuvered at night in 

preparation for a dawn attack. Once the British forces settled into well 

fortified night positions, they usually stayed put. Anything moving was 

probably the Pathan enemy, domestic livestock, or wild animals. Skeen’s 

forces spared no effort in preparing strong night positions, with stone 

walls, fire steps, loop holes for firing, pre-set fields of fire, concertina wire 

as a barrier, and chicken wire for overhead protection from grenades. 

These night positions, with well trained piquet forces forward behind 

sangars, were often made permanent and became part of an extended 

outpost strategy from forward base to the battlefield. The coalition 

forces have utilized the ‘outpost strategy’ with some success, particularly 

in support of Afghan villages. Some coalition units, particularly those 

well-trained in the use of night-vision goggles, fight more effectively at 

night, and have a tactical edge in outpost defense situations. Clearly, 

there are many differences between Skeen’s effort and the coalition 

effort; still, there is much that Skeen can teach the junior officer.

First, be able to read and use terrain. 

Mountains are difficult to operate in, but they also present major 

opportunities for well trained forces. Mountains are full of what 

Skeen referred to repeatedly as dead space where a man or unit can 

move unseen or protected from enemy fire. The varied, rocky ground 

and vegetation also makes it much more difficult to locate and track 

the enemy. The environment is unstable, wind direction and wind 

speed change quickly due to changes in air temperature. The air 

temperature varies considerably, not only at different times of the year, 

but throughout the day, and often in the course of a few hours. In the 

winter months snowy conditions close mountain passes, and mountain 
Conclusions xx

fighting ceases. Depending on the locale, the warriors take a break or 

revert to hill fighting or fighting on the nullah-slashed plains. 

The enemy is a mobile force and prefers not to fight from permanent 

positions. However, in areas that he wishes to defend, the enemy has 

learned to construct integrated, extensive defenses. Where possible they 

will have overlapping fields of vision, overlapping field of fire, obstacles, 

bunkers, trenches and ammunition and ration stockpiles. They are 

built around DShK heavy machine guns and 82mm mortars. Defenses 

are seldom mutually supporting, particularly those in depth and are 

usually isolated strong points. The nature of the rocky soil makes it 

difficult to construct rugged fighting positions with panoramic vision 

and grazing fire is spotty at best. Unless the enemy defense is in a cave 

or constructed of poured concrete or adobe, the defenses are piled shale 

or rock sangars reinforced by sandbags that are vulnerable to mortar 

and heavy-weapons fire. Mountain positions are subject to flank and 

rear attack. The enemy is adept at thinning the lines and employing a 

rear guard to hold positions at long as practical and then set up ambush 

positions close to routes of retreat through nullahs and ravines. 

Land navigation is difficult in the mountains. Maps are vital tools 

but seldom of the right scale or of sufficient accuracy for mountain 

operations. Some of the best maps are modified from old Soviet maps. 

Paper maps become next to useless in inclement weather and should be 

in a map case or covered in acetate. Snow-covered mountains are easy to 

get lost in, since the snow hides and distorts the actual terrain depicted 

on the map. Compasses often fail to work correctly due to large iron 

deposits inside the mountains. Global Positioning Systems (GPS) is a 

useful system, but not infallible. Mountains interfere with, and may 

block or distort GPS signals. Relying on GPS without verifying the 

data against the surveyed map is a recipe for fratricide from friendly fire 

as well as civilian casualties. 

Maps were no better in Skeen’s day. Reconnaissance and local 

guides supplemented map data. Ghurka and Frontier Guides units 

were particularly adept at reconnaissance. These Ghurka Nepalese 

mountaineers were as at home in the Indian-Afghan frontier as they 

were in their native Himalaya Mountains. The Frontier Guides 

were local. These native troops navigated like the Pathan navigated, 

following mountain ridges, using well worn smuggling trails, crossing 

streams at known fords, skirting patches of crop land and noting the 

many small patches of mountain meadows that supported livestock. 

When Pathan homes were encountered they were noted. Pathan homes 

often double as fortifications and are constructed with thick mud brick 
xxviii Passing It O

walls, observation towers and stout wooden doors. They often served as 

enemy strong-points and safe-houses.

Mountain passes are not always the low point between the mountain 

peaks. They may be made impassable or difficult to navigate by the 

presence of snow, scree (small rocks and debris from slides), or mountain 

streams. Mountain passes are where the tribesmen and shepherds 

herding livestock cross the mountains from one grazing site to another. 

In Afghanistan this is often at or near the mountain top. Mountain 

streams can be treacherous with the run-off from spring snow-melt and 

it is essential to find safe fording locations. 

Mountain passes, because they are navigable, are often the sites of 

an enemy ambush. Nullahs and ravines snake across them, thick sheep 

grazed brush provide concealment and orientation is difficult, even with 

the aid of GPS technology. Ranges are difficult to determine, therefore 

calling in close air support or artillery fire is prone to error. Nullahs 

and ravines are easy to get lost in, and provide the enemy superb 

concealment from which to spring an ambush. Movement along a nullah 

or any depression, should be above this topographic feature—not in it.

Second, understand your opponent:

Your adversary can be fooled. He is not adept at security in areas 

that he considers safe. He has difficulty conducting a coordinated attack 

in force at night. Generally, enemy forces move at night spread out with 

flank security, but sometimes they move at night at a jog. Then everyone 

moves in a column and linked to the person in front by holding on to 

his light woolen jacket [patu]. The lead guide may or may not have a 

flashlight. The enemy also has no problems firing mortars and rockets 

at night. The firing positions are set up during the day and include 

aiming stakes or aiming piles of rocks. The weapons and ammunition 

are moved in at night. Often rockets are set up during the day with 

timers attached; when the rockets launch the enemy has gone.

Your opponent is a master at camouflage. When aircraft approach, 

he freezes and throws his grey or light brown patou over himself and 

is invisible. If he shelters under a rug or space blanket, even thermal 

sensors won’t pick him up. And thermal sensors cannot detect inside 

caves, bunkers or covered trenches. Your best chance of detecting him 

is when he moves.

Your opponent is a creature of habit and follows patterns. These 

patterns are set by tradition and by the weather. There is a campaign 

pattern set by the seasons. In November the snows begin to fall and 

people high in the mountains move down into the valleys to winter over. 

In the mountain valleys, nothing much happens until March-April when 
Conclusions x

the Spring thaw sets in. May-June is prime for fighting. July-August is 

too hot and activity slows down. September-October is a prime season for 

fighting, and then the snow returns. Fighting is interrupted by harvest, 

by lambing and occasionally by religious holidays like Ramadan.

Your opponent tends to use the same paths routinely in areas where 

he feels secure. He rehearses his routes into and out of fighting positions. 

After an attack, the enemy may break into small groups and scatterreassembling at a predetermined point – normally near food, water and 

shelter. He uses the same ambush positions and firing positions over and 

over again. His paths to and from these positions seldom change, and 

are used repeatedly. This knowledge allows for setting up an ambush 

that has a good chance for success. Reconnaissance, local intelligence 

and forensics (examination of remaining material) are good ways to 

determine your opponent’s patterns.

Your opponent, as a member of a ‘warrior culture,’ is motivated by 

loot and a tribal tradition of doing what a man should do. The most 

prized loot (as in Skeen’s day) is a weapon. Your enemy can be lured 

into a well-conceived trap. But you need to understand your opponent’s 

culture and mentality to know how to set and spring that trap. Your 

opponent’s mentality is tempered by the Pathan code of conduct – 

Pashtunwali, and hundreds of years of history. His family, tribal and 

personal honor are the most important things in his life. His ability to 

protect his family and his tribe determine his worth as a man and he is 

willing to die for his beliefs. 

Third, understand yourself.

The clock and calendar are much more important to us than to your 

opponent. We organize our lives in segments based on the clock and the 

calendar. We set patterns and your opponents know them. They will use 

your observed patterns to their advantage as their ancestors did against 

the British patterns. SOPs, battle drills and standard organizations are 

an essential part of soldiering, but they enable an opponent to predict 

our behavior. As a troop leader, you must be able to look at your unit 

critically to determine what your patterns are, and then analyze them 

to determine how your opponent may use them against you. You should 

determine:

PDoes your unit routinely conduct an administrative run, convoy, 

or flight on the same time and same day? If you do, then vary these 

activities as these may be the precursor to an ambush.

PDoes your unit have a regular time to rest fire weapons, do 

communications checks, rotate guards and eat? If so vary these 

activities if possible.
xxx Passing It O

PDoes you unit restrict itself to two or three routes to get to a 

certain area? If you do, this may lead to an ambush or driving into an 

IED site. Vary your routes as much as possible, especially if alternate 

‘off road’ routes are available. Remember Skeens’ ‘birds eye view’ of 

the route of march and use it to your advantage.

PDoes your unit have set defensive positions and key weapons 

positions that seldom change? If so, rotate firing positions, or build 

alternate firing positions.

PDoes your unit have duty weapons to answer probing fire that 

then move to their actual defensive positions or does your unit disclose 

the location of its major weapons when it is probed? Once a weapon 

is fired, move that weapon if possible, rotate observers, and use ‘fresh 

eyed’ lookouts.

PDoes your unit have a routine prior to road movementmaintenance checks the night before, vehicles lined up on compound 

the night before, communications checks one-half hour before sunrise? 

Enemy reconnaissance will pick these up.

PDoes your unit have pre-operations rituals such as playing 

“Danger Zone” loudly and repeatedly the night before or head shaving? 

Enemy reconnaissance will also pick this up.

PDoes your unit rotate vehicle gunners every half hour or are 

they left up the entire time despite the natural loss of attentiveness? 

It is important to cross-train gunners, drivers and RTOs and rotate 

positions. 

PDoes your unit use non-standard call signs and vehicle markings 

(unit crests or badges) when moving? Your enemy has English-speaking 

radio interceptors and can identify vehicles and units that are routinely 

used for convoy escort.

PDoes your command vehicle carry more antennas than the 

others? Antennas advertise a command or communications vehicle.

PDoes your commander always ride in the third vehicle back? 

Your commander usually needs to be forward, but not always in the 

same place. 

PDoes your unit have a drill for checking possible IED and ambush 

sites? If so, what will the enemy do to counter this set drill?

PDoes your unit use helicopter sweeps to clear a road 15 minutes 

in front of your column? If the timing or routine is set, you may be 

providing the enemy an early warning service and giving him sufficient 

time to get into position. 
Conclusions x

Fourth, know the basics and do them:

Avoid defending near prominent features that the enemy can easily 

identify and determine the range to. Check communications before you 

prepare the position. You may have to change positions or establish a 

relay site. As you position your unit, physically check your interlocking 

fields of fire. Have your gunners prepare range cards and walk the 

sectors of fire, locating dead space and avenues of approach into your 

position. Cover these since the enemy will also know where they are. 

Use obstacles. If you are occupying a position for any length of time, 

dig in or construct a rampart. If using a rampart, build parapets and 

firing steps to engage the enemy who has closed to the foot of your 

position. Be careful that your men are not silhouetted when they take 

aim to fire or watch for the enemy. Don’t use an adobe wall without 

breaking up the background or “mouse-holing” firing positions into it. 

Register artillery and mortar fire and target reference points. Build 

overhead cover for shelter from enemy mortar fire and friendly artillery 

and close air support. Know how to call in artillery, mortar and close 

air support in case your FO is unable to. Don’t rely on the quick “call 

for fire” lessons learned at Officer Basic Course. Practice doing it so 

it is second nature when you are in contact. Use panels, smoke, IR 

strobes or chemlights to identify your position when needed. Never use 

point-detonating artillery rounds or bombs unless you need to severely 

restrict the blast radius of the rounds. Mountains and hilly terrain 

absorb kinetic energy and point-detonating rounds have little chance of 

killing an enemy. Air burst should be the standard fusing. If you are 

defending a village, place your position away from the village. If you 

must defend inside a village, clear firing lanes and remove obstructions 

that will provide an attacker with cover and concealment. 

When defending or supporting by fire, insure that your machine 

guns are on tripods with T&E devises attached. Even welltrained soldiers fire high at night. Remember that tracers work both 

directions. Illumination should light behind the enemy to silhouette 

him. Night observation devises are great, but hard to determine range 

with and harder to shoot at a distance. Have your men sleep at or 

near their fighting positions with their equipment. Maintain security. 

Watch the weapons and watch your men. Enforce a rest schedule so 

that your men stay as fresh as possible. 

When driving, rotate your gunners, maintain spacing and know 

where the past and probable ambush and IED sites are on your route. 

Keep your vehicle weapons “herringboned.” Develop a primary and 
xxxii Passing It O

several alternate drills for when you encounter an ambush. Rehearse 

them so that you can implement them like a snap-play “audible” in 

football. The leader needs to immediately determine which drill is best—

driving through the ambush, turning and taking it head on or holding its 

nose while rolling it up from the flank. Have your forward party travel 

with local forces if possible. Their behavior may be an indication that 

an IED or ambush is ahead. Make friends with locals and offer rewards 

for information on IED sites, workshops, or possible ambush sites. 

Counter-IED drills should cover road-clearing, driving patterns and 

reaction responses, remembering that an initial IED may be set to draw 

a crowd for the second IED—or to stop a column for a daisy-chain IED 

detonation. Interfere with the enemy line of sight. Use smoke before 

entering trouble areas (entrances and exits to gulleys, bends in the road, 

green zones, areas where the road constricts) and dismount and check 

flanks. Fast driving cannot outrun blast waves, but moving at night or 

behind smoke interferes with the enemy gunner’s ability to engage the 

column. The IED gunner needs to see his target and his aiming stakes 

(pile of rocks). 

Skeen’s Army always moved with artillery accompaniment. 

Coalition forces seldom enjoy this luxury but may be within the range 

fan of a stationary battery. Mortars are responsive and should be part 

of any significant troop movement.

When on foot, keep your force spread out, watch flank security and 

keep your weapons “herring-boned.” Remember that the enemy can 

quickly pick out who is the RTO and who is the commander. Machine 

gunners, RTOs and commanders are priority enemy targets. Enemy 

positions on the plains seldom have any depth. Try to take them from 

the flank or rear. Avoid the nullahs and ravines or move above them.

A rapid response force, Skeen’s ‘floating platoon’, is a valuable asset 

during movement and a good way of keeping the enemy off balance 

when defending.

Fifth, develop and hone your own skills and competence:

Get comfortable with living and functioning outdoors in rugged 

conditions. General Skeen wanted his officers to be enthusiastic big 

game hunters, since hunting sharpens night skills, steadiness and resolve. 

Challenge yourself, stay in good physical shape. Learn to shoot in the 

mountains. Marksmanship ranges are located on flat land. Trajectory 

changes when you shoot in the mountains. First, it is much more difficult 

to determine range in the mountains, second, if you shoot uphill or 

downhill using flat-land marksmanship techniques, you will shoot over 
Conclusions xxx

the target every time. The wind, the temperature and the humidity are 

different in the mountains—and all effect, normal flat-land ballistics. 

Teach your men to fire and maneuver in the mountains. The only way 

to do this is to practice some near-vertical firing and movement in actual 

mountainous terrain.

Know your job and know the jobs of your fellow junior officers. 

General Skeen spent a great deal of time describing the duties of many 

junior officers in addition to those charged with leading platoons and 

companies. Learn how to escort convoys, clear routes, patrol in the 

mountains, conduct ambushes, conduct raids and work with coalition 

forces.

Sixth, control the high ground:

In general Skeen’s day, the column did not move until patrols and 

piquets had physically crowned the heights and established defensive 

positions. It was a slow, difficult, yet necessary practice. Today, many 

coalition forces drive rapidly past high ground, trusting to armor plating 

and hoping not to provide too good a target for the enemy. High ground 

can be controlled by using a variety of methods. These include piquets 

and patrols similar to those of Skeen’s day, but can also include air 

assault landings on key terrain or hiring local forces to hold the high 

ground for you. Key terrain should be held using outposts and fortified 

defenses. Occasionally, the Skeen tactic of probing high ground with 

artillery and machine gun fire is replicated today-using airpower and 

available artillery.

Seventh, understand and co-opt the local population:

The local tribesmen know where the enemy are, what routes they 

use, what ambush positions they use and (most critically) where the 

IEDs are emplaced. The locals also know that cooperation with you can 

be fatal for themselves and their families. The people of Afghanistan 

are pragmatic and will support the side that provides security and 

employment opportunities. Junior officers are important in dealing with 

the local population since it is their patrols and outposts that have daily 

contact with the people. Senior officers usually negotiate with the tribal 

or village elders, but it is often the junior officers who have a better feel 

for “their village.” Learn some local language (Pashtu or Dari) and 

learn their customs and history, as well as the village hierarchy—(the 

tribesmen will be gratified and impressed). In General Skeen’s British 

Indian Army, there were more local regiments than British, Irish or 

Scottish regiments. British lieutenants and captains, posted to a local 

(native) regiment, were expected to learn the regimental language be 
xxxiv Passing It O

it Urdu, Bengali, Pashtu, Punjabi, Nepalese, or whatever. Language 

lessons were part of garrison duty and language examination results 

were an important component of an officer’s file and advancement.

With this, the editors of this reprint of a military classic wish you 

success and hope that the information that the book provides you is 

valuable. 
Conclusions x

General Sir Andrew Skeen (National Portrait Gallery, 1923)

General Skeen and his staff, Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919 (NAM 23849)
xxxvi Passing It O

Tribesman posing in sanger (Sgt Partridge)

Dominating terrain for a march column (NAM 98080)

Mountainous terrain (NAM 96899)
Conclusions xxx

Main body of 48th Regiment moving to Razmak (Sgt Partridge)

48th Regiment takes a short cut (B. R. Tundan & Co, Ltd)
xxxviii Passing It O

Pack mules ready to march with 48th Regiment (Sgt Partridge)

Interior of sanger occupied by picquet (NAM 60338)
Conclusions xx

48th Regiment troops at a halt (RSM James Cass)

Camel s and their handlers in march columns (NAM 99810)
xl Passing It O

Bibliograph

The Army of India

Paddy Docherty, The Khyber Pass (Oxford University Press, 2007).

Major-General J. G. Elliott, The Frontier, 1839-1947, London: Cassell & 

Co. LTD, 1968.

Byron Farwell, Armies of the Raj: From the Great Indian Mutiny to 

Independence: 1858-1947, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1989.

Byron Farwell, Mr. Kipling’s Army: All the Queen’s Men, New York: 

W. W. Norton & Co., 1981.

Byron Farwell, The Gurkhas , New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1990.

Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, 

Its Officers and Men, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd, 1976.

Andrew Roe, Waging War In Waziristan: The British Struggle in the 

Land of Bin Laden, 1849-1947, Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 

2010.

Anthony Saunders, Weapons of the Trench War 1914-1918, New York: 

Sutton, 2000. 

Charles Chenevix Trench, The Frontier Scouts, London: Jonathan Cape, 

1985.

The Great Game

F. M. Bailey, Mission to Tashkent, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1946.

Pierce G. Fredericks, The Sepoy and the Cossack, New York: World 

Publishing Company, 1971.

Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central 

Asia, New York: Kodansha International, 1994.
Bibliography 

Peter Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze: On Secret Service in Bolshevik 

Asia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Paul Nazaroff, Hunted Through Central Asia: On the Run From Lenin’s 

Secret Police, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Anglo-Afghan Wars

Archibald Forbes, The Afghan Wars: 1839-42 and 1878-1880, Elibron 

Classics, 2005 (originally published 1892).

Government of India, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, six volumes, 

Sussex: Naval and Military Press, Ltd, YEAR???

Patrick Macrory, Kabul Catastrophe: The Retreat of 1842, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Edgar O’Ballance, The Afghan Wars, London: Brasseys, 2002.

Brian Robson, Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the 

Campaign in Waziristan 1919-20, London: Spellmount Ltd, 2004. 

Frontier Tribes

H. W. Bellew, A General Report on the Yusufzais, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 

Publications,1994. Originally published in 1864.

John Biddulph, Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh, Lahore: Ali Kamran Publishers, 1986,. Originally published in the 1870s.

Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 550 BC - AD 1 957 , London: St. Martin’s, 

1958. 

India Intelligence Branch, A Dictionary of Pathan Tribes on the North 

- West Frontier of India, Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 

2005. It was originally published in London, 1899. 

Sir George Scott Robertson, The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush, Lahore: 

Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1987. Originally published in 1896.
xlii Passing It O

Inde

advanced guard commander at work, 31, 

47-48; duties of, 45, 61; duties on 

march, 30, 36-37; on reaching camp, 

31, 61-62

aeroplanes, air photos, 110; co-operation

in flight, 83, 107; reconnaissance 

needs confirmation, 28

Ahnai Tangi, enemy marksmanship, 49, 

104; Flathead Piquet contested, 72; 

vanguard ambushed, 36

alarm posts, 55, 73-75, 78

alarm, action in perimeter camp, 78

alertness constantly needed, 14, 37, 89-

91, 113-114

ambush, enemy, well equipped for, 15;

examples of enemy, and our own, 15-

16, 37, 102; in rear guard action, 56, 

60

animals, care of, 96-98; in night attack,

77; in withdrawal, 55, 107

Arhanga Pass, undue pace in advance, 105

armament, tribal improvement traced,

20-22

armoured cars, 27, 92, 109

artillery “screen,” 48

assault on attacking troops, 102-103

attack, covering fire in final stage, 103; 

distribution in, 101-104; enemy, 

rapidity of, 48, 104; Ghazi, dangers of,

78, 80, 112; oblique fire in, 103; on 

camp, action during, 78, (always 

possible) 77, (reserve’s duty) 70, 78; on 

transport, work of guards, 42; pace 

uphill, 104

B

baggage guards, distribution and duties, 

32, 39-40, 96-97

Barari Tangi, enemy misled, 17; night 

surprise, 110

Barwand Piquet’s stout stand, 72, 88

battalion equipment animals, transport,

37; personnel duties, 39-40, 96

bayonets, when and why fixed, 49, 52,

78, 106, 108

bivouac shelters pitched parallel to

perimeter, 74

Black Hill, bad sangaring, 83

booby traps, suggestions for, 16-17

bunching punished, 49

Burjina Pass, example of ruse, 102

burning, smoke of, stops signals, start 

systematically, 110 

bushes, best cleared near defences and 

track, 71, 73, 94

bush forms, learn names of, 64

C

cable cutting, suggested deterrent, 17

camels, difficulties with, 40; reasons for 

sparing 24, 97

camp colour parties, 31, 64-65; defence (see

perimeter camp); defences, types, 64;
BIndex ibliography x

duties (see Chapters VII and VIII), 60-

80; laying out, 63-66; natives barred 

from, 85; piquets (see piquets, camp); 

reserve, 69, 79; routine in, 84, 85; 

work on arrival in, 63, 70, 73-74

careless battalion asks for punishment, 

15, 46

casualties, clear early, 53, 84, 105

close assault on piquet, use firestep, 87

coats, warm, 51

column on the march, 30-35; size of, 

cause of increase, 22, 31-32; work on 

starting, 95-99

communications in camp, 73; in defence 

of village, 75

company commander in piqueting duties, 

32-34, 46-47, 54, 56, 89

control of Frontier areas, ideal military 

evolution, 24

convoy escort duty, 90-91

counter-attack, to relieve pressure, 60; 

to remove casualties, 59-60

cover must be bullet proof, 83

covering parties, 50, 61, 71, 73; troops, 

work of, in piquet building, 82-85

crests, avoid exposure on, 49

cunning of tribesmen, and counter 

thereto, 10, 12-18

Dakka, noisy piquet, 71

Datta Khel, wild firing incident, 76

dawn patrols, 78

dead ground, 26, 49, 55

defence of perimeter camp, 65-67, 73-74; 

of piquets, 71-72, 87-88; of village, 75

demolition, 114-118; covering the work, 

115; Makin as example of, 114; 

organization for, 115-116; steps 

described, 115-117

depth in attack, 102

detached bodies for flank protection, 45; 

posts from piquets, 50, 51, 88

deterrent fire, 104-105

“diggi,” a useful equipment, 70, 74, 86

distribution for depth, 115; for foraging, 

112; in attack, 102-103; on perimeter, 

66

dressing stations, 66

duties in a battalion, 68

equipment, special, and foraging, 111; 

for demolitions, 116; for piquets, 68, 

86; occasion for reducing, 84

escorting convoys, 90; 92

examples of defence of piquets: neglect 

of principles, 48, 51, 104; night 

assault, 63; of tribal cunning, 12-15

F

fields, destruction of, 116

fighting qualities of tribesmen, 10-11

fire, oblique, value of, 103

fires, dowsed in attack on camp, 77; 

precautions against, 75

firesteps in piquets, 86-87, 92

firing at night, must be controlled, 76

first line transport, 38

flank piquets (see piquets, flank)

flares, 26, 66, 77

Flat Head piquet, 72

floating platoon, 14, 92

followers, position on march, 32, 39

food, must be on person, 106, 112

foraging, 111, 114; distribution for, 112; 

equipment, 111-112; organization, 

111; precautions, 112-113; 

withdrawal from, 114

garrison of camp piquets, 69

Ghazi attack, 54, 78, 80, 103, 112-113

Gibraltar piquet contested, 72

grain, destruction of, 116-117

grenades, 26, 55, 70

guard, personal, against treachery, 54

guides into camp, 43, 64

guns, action of, 27, 30, 33, 46, 58, 83; 

improvements, 25

hairpin bends, and effect on camels, 40

head cover, 71, 87-88

high velocity rifle main factor in 

changes, 19

historical review of changes in 

armament, 20-21

huts, grenades for clearing, 26; 

preparation for burning, 117

identification of strangers, 80; 

infantry in attack, 102-104; on 

perimeter, 62
xliv Passing It O

inhabitants barred from camp, 80; in 

foraging and demolition, 113, 116 

inlying piquets, 74, 77, 95

intelligence agents, 80

invisibility increasing, 20, 21

irrigation, destruction of, 116

K

Kapurthala piquet disaster, 51

Karamna camp, good rear guard work, 99

Kharappa piquet, its losses, 48, 109

Khurd Khaibar, ruse, 102

Khuzma Nullah incident, 15

Korans, respect while foraging, 113

Landaki, attack on advancing 

infantry, 102

landmarks in night work, 110

latrines, bad dressing stations, 66; night,

sentry over, 7-9; provide early, 64

laying out camp, unit’s allotment, 64

leapfrogging, 30, 33-34

Lewis Gun, in camp defence, 66-67; in 

support, 48, 55, 59

L of C protection, by permanent, 

piquets, 23-24, 89; convoy work, 90-

91; in bush and scrub, 91-92

loads, first line, keep roped up, 74, 79

look behind you, reasons, 57-58, 107

loopholes, low sited, 70; signaling, 70, 

88; beware rifle snatching from, 76

looting, 113

Lumsden’s teaching not altered, 29; 

training notes, 44

M

machine guns, advantage in armament, 

25-26; covering movement, 25, 31, 33, 

in perimeter defence, 66-67

Mahsuds, fighting value, 10

Maidan, foraging incident, 113

Makin, deluding enemy, 18; faulty air 

information, 22; opposition to 

demolition, 114

Malakand, attack on, 63, 78; visibility of 

enemy at, 20

Manjhi, disaster in broken ground, 109

Manual of Operations, North West Frontier 

of India, 23, 26, 29-30, 44-47, 52, 70, 

107-108

marches, length of, 23

methods on frontier little altered, 29

misleading enemy, examples, 17-18, 102

mobility of tribesmen, 10, 49, 103

motorable roads, case for in future, 23-24

movement of a column in mountains, 

30-35

mule must be trained to hills, 104

Nahakki, ghazis at work, 112; scouts 

caught, 48

natives of country, keep out of camp, 80

Nawagai, outlying piquets, 67

night assaults, action in case of, 77-78; 

always a possibility, 63, 78

night movement, reconnaissance for, 110; 

value of air photographs for, 110; 

noises, caution, 71; occupation of 

villages, 75-76; work and preparation 

for, 75; recognition signals in, 17; 

reason for, in 1920, 109

Nili Kach, vanguard ambushed, 36

North West Frontier in brief, 9; 

inhabitants, 10; Manual of Operations, 

23, 26, 29-30, 44-47, 52, 70, 107-108

nullahs and their dangers, 107-108

oblique fire, opportunities in attack, 103

observers, training essential, 11

outlying piquets are “wash out,” 56

outwitting the Pathan, examples, 17-18, 

102

pace in withdrawal, 58, 107; uphill must 

be steady, 105

Palosina and Umbeyla compared, 21-22; 

scene of night assault, 63

patience of tribesmen, examples of, 12-15;

how countered, 15-18 

peacetime training in various activities 

needed, 10-11, 45, 52, 85

perimeter camp, cover first need, 65; 

defence in, 65-66, 73-76; depth, how 

provided, 65-66; principles of layout, 62; reasons for, 63; routine in, 71; 

reserves in, 65-66, 69

permanent piquets, 23-24, 82-91; action 

of troops covering building, 82-85; 

cover for men outside, 89; firesteps, 

86-87; garrison assist covering troops, 
BIndex ibliography

86; garrison signs of good, 89; head 

cover in, 87; mother piquet, 88; 

organization for building, 85-86; 

requirements in, 87; routine in, 88; 

sanitation, 88; signaling, 88; time 

needed to establish, 82; value, 23, 90

“permissive signal,” 56

pioneers, 31-32, 85

piquets, camp, advanced guard take up 

and help in erecting, 61; detailing, 

suggested method, 68-69; garrison, 69; 

infantry occupy, on own front, 69; 

must be held to the last, 72; reinforcement at night, 69, 109; relief of

when 98-99; marching, requirements 

in, 68; signalling, 69; Very lights, use 

of, in, 72; flank (Chapters V and VI), 

44-60; advance to, 47-48; “all clear” 

signal, 34, 56; bird’s eye view of work, 

30-35; casualties, 53, 59;company 

commander’s duties, 34, 46, 54-55; 

counterattack, 59; crest line, caution, 

49; dead ground, 50, 55; detached 

posts from, 50; effectiveness of 

system, 33; Lumsden on, 44; must 

be held on to, 51; opposition to posting 

unusual, 45; piquet commander’s 

duties, 50-52, 55-58; piquet slip, 44, 

47,-48, 53; plan for withdrawal made 

known, 50-51; rear guard commander 

recalls, 56; rear guard flag, when used 

and why, 55; reconnaissance of withdrawal, 51; road sentries, 48, 50-52; 

screen, 48, 58; withdrawal, 55-59

piquets inlying, 74, 77, 95; outlying, 67

pointer staff, 46-47

precautions, never relax, 14, 78, 81, 83, 

90-91, 112-113, 119

prisoners, 91

“prophylactic” fire, 104

protective colouring of tribesmen, 15

punishment awaits slack unit, 16, 46, 

48-49, 83, 90-91

pursuit, great difficulty of, 101

“puttee” method of carrying wounded, 105

“raghza” dangers, 91, 108

rain and slipping hillsides cause alarm, 72

ranging marks, avoid, 104

ravine and scrub, dangers of, 91, 108

readiness to fire, interpretation, 48

rear guard, 33-34, 55-60

recognition signals for night work, 17

reconnaissance for various purposes, 37, 

39, 51, 108

reserves in camp, 65, 68, 78

reverse fire, protection from, 65-66

revolvers, precaution advised, 79

roads, case for, in future, 22-24

road sentries, 48, 50-52

routine in camp, 78-79

ruses, 15-18, 102

S

sandbags in piquet building, 69, 86

“sangar” cover must be bullet proof, 83

sanitary detachment, 64, 98

sappers, 31-32, 40, 85-86; usually in 

camp reserve, 69

Saran Sar, trouble in nullahs, 107-108

scouts, precautions in advance, 48, 103

scrub and ravine, dangers, 91, 108

Shabkadr, scene of successful ruse, 102

Shin Kamar, result of leaving piquet 

position, 52

signalling from piquets, 70, 88

signals, recognition for night work, 17; 

Very lights as, 117

size of columns, causes of increase, 22, 

31-32

skyline, don’t bunch on, 49

slackness risks early punishment, 16, 46, 

48-49, 83, 90-91

smoke equipment, its uses, 27, 107; of 

burning, complicates withdrawal, 

110, 117

snipers, controlled by flank piquets, 33; 

firing at, to be checked, 76

spies, 80

Spinchilla, armoured cars needed, 109; 

example of scrub and ravines, 92, 

109

spurs, use in advance, 46, 102

stalking at night unsound, 16

stampede, action of baggage guards, 41

star shell, 22, 77, 118

strangers, identification of, 85

supports to flank piquet, 33, 54

supporting lines, 55, 58, 60, 84, 103
xlvi Passing It O

T

tents, pitch parallel to perimeter, 74; 

strike if enemy assaults, 77

Tochi piquet, shows enemy’s patience, 12; 

floating platoon caught, 14

towers, destruction of, 116

training, special, in various work, 11, 22, 

45, 85, 112

transport column, increase of, 31-32; 

drawing and return of, 38; importance 

of care for, 95-98; must not be kept 

under load, 97; must not park on 

march, 42; officer, duties, 37-43; 

organization for frontier war, 37-38; 

routine for, when force moves, 96-97; 

staling halt, 43

treachery always possible, 54, 80, 98, 113

trees in demolition, 117

trench mortar, 26

tribal armament, improvements, 20-21

tribesmen, their cunning, 11; their 

fighting qualities, 10-11

U

Umbeyla situation reproduced at 

Palosina, 22

V

vanguard, action of, 30, 36-37; 

ambushed, examples of, 37; opposed 

seldom, 37; reports, road work 

needed, 37

Very light as a signal, 117; a valuable 

new aid, 26

villagers, treatment of, 80, 113, 116

villages, demolition of, 115-117; 

occupation for night, 75

visual training, 10

W

wall, retaining, destruction of, 116; 

village, preparation of, 75-76

Wana, night assault penetrates, 63

water channels, useful punitive 

demolition, 116-117; party, 31; reserve in 

piquets, 70, 86

whistle, use sparingly, 105

wire for protection, 66-67, 69, 85, 87

withdrawal after various activities, 34, 

56-59, 84, 106-109, 114, 117; 

ambuscades during, 60; position of 

main body, 98

wounded, 53, 59-60, 84, 105