CLIMATE CHANGE: CONSIDERATIONS

FOR GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT 

COMMANDS

Colonel Jason A. Kirk

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS
Climate Change: Considerations for Geographic 

Combatant Commands

by

Colonel Jason A. Kirk

United States Army

Ms. Carol Horning

Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute

 (PKSOI)

Project Adviser

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

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academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes 

controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on 

key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

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FOREWORD

Global changes to the environment are having a 

dire impact on the stability and security of nations and 

regions within Geographic Combatant Commands. 

GCCs must focus more attention on emerging threats 

which impinge on U.S. interests and develop innovative approaches to assist partner nations in planning 

preventing, and mitigating potential catastrophes.

 Recent published documents such as the President’s 2015 National Security Strategy and DoD’s 2014 

Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap provide GCCs 

with initial broad climate change risk information and 

mission effects assessment. Recent senior leader policy speeches such as former Defense Secretary Hagel’s 

October 2014 address to the Conference of Defense 

Ministers of the Americas and President Obama’s 

May 2015 commencement address at the U.S. Coast 

Guard Academy further amplify the national security 

implications of climate change.

The imperative to address climate change risks 

across a GCC’s area of operations provides an opportunity to embrace the interagency approach long seen 

as crucial to stability operations. With the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) already moving out on its Global Climate Change Initiative, GCCs 

can support and expand these programmatic efforts to 

use climate change adaptation as a point of dialogue 

and cooperation with partner or prospective partner 

nations. Climate change will only increase as part of 

the U.S. Government’s mutually supporting “3Ds” 

portfolio of defense, diplomacy and development.

As GCC’s anticipate receiving more directive DoD 

guidance that builds upon the 2014 Adaptation Roadmap, this monograph provides a useful case-study 
for approaching initial analysis of climate change 

risks. Through analysis of current-state conditions in 

SOUTHCOM, Colonel Kirk recommends that GCC’s 

employ a combination of leader engagement, technical water resources advising along with recommendations to partner nations on the multiple sources of 

climate change adaptation funding. In all cases, these 

efforts must proceed with interagency unity of effort 

foremost in mind.

This monograph is a timely and thorough work 

that will serve as a ready reference for senior leaders 

and joint staff officers charged with assessing climate 

change implications to theater campaign plans. Efforts to reduce the destabilizing impacts of projected 

climate change will support long-term humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) readiness 

as well as aid the GCC’s efforts to be the Partner of 

Choice with nations in their area of operations.

Daniel A. Pinnell

COL, U.S. Army

Director

Peacekeeping and Stability

Operations Institute

iv
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

COLONEL JASON A. KIRK is an Army Corps of Engineers officer who has served with combat mechanized 

engineer units in Georgia (3rd Infantry Division), 

Texas (4th Infantry Division) and Germany/Iraq (1st 

Armored Division). Col Kirk served tours in Iraq as 

a major/lieutenant colonel working at battalion and 

brigade combat team-level—one tour prior to “the 

Surge” 2005-2006, and one tour “post-Surge” 2008-

2009, serving in and around Baghdad both times. Col 

Kirk also served with two of the US Army’s Corps of 

Engineers districts—in New Orleans working on Louisiana Coastal Area Restoration (pre-Katrina) and in 

South Carolina as the District Commander executing 

a broad portfolio that included civil works (including 

dredging and hydropower), environmental protection 

(wetlands regulation), disaster response and military 

and Dept. of Energy facilities construction. Col Kirk 

earned a B.S. from West Point in Environmental Engineering, an M.S. from Missouri Univ of S&T in Engineering Management, a M.Engr. from Univ of Florida 

in Environmental Engineering and a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. Col 

Kirk has completed the Army’s Sapper and Airborne 

schools and he is a registered Professional Engineer 

(in the state of Missouri). Currently, Col Kirk is serving as the Commander of the Corps of Engineers Jacksonville District with programmatic responsibilities 

for Florida, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

This manuscript represents a way-point, not an 

end-point—in my professional service journey as a 

U.S. Army Engineer officer. Just as throughout the 

many years prior, I benefited from the support of many 

during this “sabbatical” year of professional education 

and research at the U.S. Army War College. As has 

been the case for the past 18 years, first-most among 

those supporters has been my wife Amy to whom I 

owe much gratitude. Likewise, my children Andrew 

and Katie who understood that many weekend days 

Dad would be pulling “duty” in Carlisle’s Root Hall 

Library vice engaging in other leisure pursuits.

My thanks also goes to my War College Strategic 

Research Paper advisor Ms. Carol Horning who provided much assistance in our working towards a research topic that would help me gain knowledge [and 

aspirationally add to the established knowledge] on 

the Joint, Interagency community at work within the 

Development arena in the South Atlantic region where 

I’ll soon be posted with our Army Corps of Engineers.

For fulfilling specific “second reader” duties and 

being a trusted formal and informal faculty advisor 

throughout the War College year, thanks to Colonel 

Dale Watson.

As noted in the extensive end-notes—a large number of professionals within the Department of Defense 

and US Agency for International Development were 

generous of their time and expertise in phone and 

electronic correspondence that contributed to this 

manuscript. We can all have confidence that a talented 

group is engaged in near and long-term programmatic responses to the risks posed by climate change. All 

errors and omissions are clearly of my doing.
I am eager to correspond with and work with others engaged in addressing this and other national security concerns long into the future.

viii
1

CLIMATE CHANGE: CONSIDERATIONS 

FOR GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT 

COMMANDS

We [the Joint Force] must better identify opportunities that generate the greatest advantages and results 

using the right tools, in the right places, and with the 

right partners.

—Gen. Martin E. Dempsey

18th Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff1

Climate change is a national security issue that 

all geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) must 

consider as a challenge, and in some cases, an opportunity as they continuously assess risks and update their 

theater campaign plans to gain advantage in achieving their desired end-states. Not only must GCCs assess climate change impacts to U.S. operations from 

specific risks to force-employment supporting infrastructure; but, they should also assess the opportunities that exist to further international partnerships by 

supporting and coordinating with the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) as it carries 

out specific development mandates within its Global 

Climate Change Initiative. By doing so, GCCs will 

follow CJCS Dempsey’s guidance by turning climate 

change risk into an “opportunity” to leverage the 

“right tools” to enhance relationships with “the right 

partners.” This paper will focus on the risks and opportunities for action specific to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) as a “case-study” useful for any 

GCC addressing Department of Defense’s recent climate change adaptation guidance and for advancing 

the dialogue that took place during DoD’s September 

2014 Combatant Command Climate Security Information 

Exchange.

2
2

Higher Level Guidance 

Recent climate change adaptation guidance relevant to all GCCs includes several presidential statements and policy directives as well as Department of 

Defense (DoD) guidance. In his 2015 State of the Union 

address, President Obama stated that “no challenge 

poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change....I am determined to make sure American leadership drives international action.”3

 The 

President reinforced these remarks with inclusion 

of climate change as one of the top national security 

threats in his 2015 National Security Strategy. Important for DoD and the GCCs is his statement that “the 

United States has a unique capability to mobilize 

and lead the international community to meet [these 

threats].”4 DoD’s recent guidance relevant for review 

by GCCs is found in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. 

The former document offers a summary of increased 

risks as “climate change may increase the frequency, 

scale and complexity of future missions,” while the latter includes the requirement for GCCs to review and 

prioritize climate change resiliency measures.5 Within 

the next year, DoD plans to publish a DoD Directive 

that will have prescriptive requirements for GCCs, 

expanding on the somewhat descriptive Roadmap.

6

Taken together, these published documents provide 

ample initial guidance to drive formal consideration 

of climate impacts within a GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR) and updates to theater strategic estimates, 

theater campaign plans, theater security cooperation 

plans, etc.

Following the introductory discussion highlighting higher-level climate change guidance, this paper 
3

will detail “who” comprises the partners necessary in 

addressing climate change, “where” to address climate 

change, “what” the scientific community defines as the 

risks of climate change—the GCC’s “problem statement”—followed by recommendations for “how” a 

GCC and its partners can address climate change, concluding with discussion of “why” these efforts matter 

in the context of a GCC’s primary security mandate.

GCC’s Partners in Addressing Climate Change

GCCs will do well to consider the CJCS’s citation 

above to work with “the right partners” as they consider the risks associated with climate change. DoD’s 

partners will include both the nations facing climate 

change risks to their security and stability and the interagency (IA) community. It is important for GCCs to 

consider the President’s charge for collaboration between DoD, Department of State (DoS) and USAID in 

approaching defense, diplomacy and development—

the 3 D’s—as mutually reinforcing elements of the 

U.S. Government’s (USG’s) comprehensive approach 

to national security.7 GCCs need to work closely with 

DoS and USAID to explore the range of whole-ofgovernment mechanisms that can add value to their 

overall theater security campaign plan. To successfully achieve unity of effort between the USG’s 3 D’s, 

GCC’s must understand the importance of climate 

change within USAID’s programs. “Climate Change” 

is USAID’s #2 Agency Priority Goal and the Global 

Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) is one of three signature initiatives of the Agency.8

 Collaboration with 

USAID in approaching the complex problem of assessing climate change impacts will also ensure that a 

GCC supports several of the pillars of the President’s 

Global Development Policy:9
4

• A new operational model that positions the 

United States to be a more effective partner and 

to leverage our leadership; and

• A modern architecture that elevates development and harnesses development capabilities 

spread across government in support of common objectives. 

This paper will further explain USAID’s capabilities to help GCCs follow the President’s guidance to 

“invest in game-changing innovations” and to “balance our civilian and military power” in response to 

climate change. The “right partners” for a DoD GCC 

to engage in addressing climate change include USAID, DoS and the nations within a GCC’s AOR.

Further Defining “Who” Will Work with GCCs to 

Address Climate Change Risks

GCCs must work closely with the interagency (IA) 

and partner nations to determine specific vulnerabilities in military and economic sector infrastructure, 

as well as which populations are vulnerable to the 

adverse effects of climate change. SOUTHCOM has 

established formal interagency memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, Energy, Transportation, Health and 

Human Services, Homeland Security (DHS), Justice as 

well as USAID and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Drug Enforcement Agency and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (both within DoJ) 

and with the office of the Director of National Intelligence.10 Usually coordinated by the GCC staff’s “J9,” 

this IA team is critical to developing comprehensive 

near and long-term risk assessments and a “whole of 
5

government” unity of effort approach that maximizes 

the contribution of each agency working under their 

specific programmatic mandates. SOUTHCOM’s IA 

construct follows the President’s specific guidance to 

“seek an enhanced level of interagency cooperation in 

complex security environments by ... common analysis, planning, and programs that draw upon the distinct perspectives and expertise of different U.S. agencies.”11 SOUTHCOM’s coordination with USAID’s 

Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 

should be informed by knowledge of the central role 

of climate change within the LAC Bureau’s mission 

statement.12 USAID will also bring inputs from its 

partnerships with private voluntary organizations, 

indigenous organizations, universities, and American 

businesses.13 In assessing and later responding to climate change risks, SOUTHCOM can build upon the 

IA partnerships developed during on-going efforts to 

counter transnational organized crime and past humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) responses to ensure a “whole of government” approach 

to climate change adaptation.14

“Where” to Focus Climate Change Adaptation 

Efforts

In the opening epigraph above, the CJCS instructs 

the Joint Force to operate in “the right places.” In his 

2013 Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21), the President 

tells DoD and other USG agencies that the scope of 

the climate change adaptation endeavor includes “engaging with international partners to strengthen the 

security and resilience of...critical infrastructure located outside of the United States on which the Nation 
6

depends.”15 The USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 provides 

the definition of “critical infrastructure” as “the systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital 

to the United States that the incapacity or destruction 

of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 

impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of 

those matters.”16 Secretary of Defense Hagel advised 

his subordinate GCCs: “We must also work with other 

nations to share tools for assessing and managing climate change impacts, and help build their capacity to 

respond.”17 Across a given AOR, DoD will have critical infrastructure vital to its own interests while also 

assisting partner nations to assess their intrastate vulnerabilities to climate change impacts and their particular nation’s most important critical infrastructure. 

This paper uses SOUTHCOM’s Caribbean Basin 

as a “case-study” location from which any GCC can 

extrapolate in considering the implications of climate 

change risks within their AOR. Among the many geographic options for study, this paper addresses the 

Caribbean Basin for the following reasons:

• SOUTHCOM’s recent experience sharing water 

resources management expertise with the nation of Brazil can be expanded to more broadly 

address climate change risks with other partner 

nations;

• on-going risk analysis by DoD and DHS focused on the Southeastern U.S. coastline's susceptibility to sea-level rise and storm damage 

can be extrapolated to the nearby Caribbean 

islands 

• this “soft power” effort to support Caribbean 

nation’s preparations for climate change impacts reinforces U.S. security interests in the 

southern Western Hemisphere.18
7

 Owing to USAID having the lead role in U.S. government climate change policy, all GCCs need to be familiar with USAID’s criteria for prioritizing its climate 

change funds: 1) clean energy criteria tied to partners 

most able and ready to demonstrate leadership in 

clean energy development, 2) sustainable landscapes 

criteria, and 3) adaptation criteria.19 After a GCC and 

their interagency partners review the climate change 

risk throughout their AOR, they can refine the critical areas that merit responses as part of their theater 

campaign plan and related DoS/USAID development 

plans. GCC’s should identify synergistic outcomes 

in this unity of effort approach; e.g. a USAID development program to support crop diversification in a 

climate-change impacted area may support the GCC’s 

security end-states by increasing the prosperity of a 

population otherwise subject to cooption by transnational organized crime or other violent extremist organizations.20

Defining “What” the Problem is: Risks of Climate 

Change

This paper looks at “risk” in terms of the destabilizing human security effects tied to the causes which 

are the various physical manifestations of climate 

change. The destabilizing effects on humans are potential hunger, economic decline including coastal/

low-lying infrastructure destruction/degradation and 

conflict over diminished food and water resources 

with sporadic population migrations.21 The causes

are the combination of “rising global temperatures, 

changing precipitation patterns, climbing sea levels, 

and more extreme weather events.”22 The 2014 U.S. 

Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) publi-
8

cation titled “Climate Change Impacts in the United 

States,” specifically addresses physical causes and 

human security effects relevant to much of the Caribbean.23 The physical manifestations of climate change 

most important for consideration in the Caribbean 

are sea level rise, increased storm intensity, and temperature increases (which drive the aforementioned 

storms). The USGCRP reports that precipitation 

trends are “unclear” with predictions that some regions will receive smaller annual amounts and some 

larger amounts of precipitation.24 Existing National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) 

gauges around Puerto Rico are useful data points for 

SOUTHCOM’s initial consideration of sea level rise. 

At Magueyes Island, Puerto Rico, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineer’s (USACE’s) “intermediate” / mid-range sea 

level rise projection by the year 2100 is 0.46m (1.52 ft).25

For informing risk assessments, both USACE and the 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 

highlight the importance of evaluating the widest possible range of impacts.26 In a recent forum addressing 

Defense Ministers of the Americas, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel summarized an initial assessment 

of a 50-year horizon of sea level rise risks in the Caribbean as having the potential to “claim 1,200 square 

miles of coastal land” and causing some islands “to be 

completely evacuated.”27

In addition to sea level rise and the expected 

global temperature change of 2-5oF in the Caribbean, 

SOUTHCOM planners will need to consider the predictions by USGCRP and other scientific bodies that 

warming temperatures will cause tropical storms to 

be fewer in number, but stronger in force, with more 

Category 4 and 5 storms.28 SOUTHCOM planners will 

need to leverage the technical resources detailed later 
9

in this paper to further develop country-by-country 

risks within the Caribbean Basin, refining the IPCC’s 

“high confidence” conclusion that key risks to “Small 

Islands” are “major contributions” to changes in marine and terrestrial ecosystems and “minor contributions” to livelihoods, health and/or economics.29 All 

GCC planners must take care not to assign overly specific predictions to localized areas through extrapolation of data collected elsewhere. In a latter section this 

paper will expand on “what” a GCC can do to support 

development of more robust predictive datasets and 

regional-scaled modeling to inform more specific, i.e. 

more useful, risk estimates.

Addressing Risks within the Theater Campaign 

Plan

“One of the most critical steps in developing strategy is to conduct a thorough theater estimate, which is 

“the process by which a theater commander assesses 

the broad strategic factors that influence the theater 

strategic environment, thus further determining the 

missions, objectives, and courses of action throughout 

their theaters.”30 The predicted increases in the intensity of Category 4/5 storms will in turn increase the 

scale of the disaster relief efforts that SOUTHCOM 

will find itself supporting. Beyond ensuring that the 

GCC remains ready to execute the standing responsibilities of HA/DR, the GCC planners need to identify 

specific elements of national security-related critical 

infrastructure within their AOR. Examples of critical 

infrastructure with projected impacts from sea level 

rise within the Caribbean are port facilities at the Naval Station Guantanamo from a military perspective 

and 28% of the Caribbean airports, 80% of commercial 
10

seaports from a regional economic perspective.31 Taylor et. al., provides one of the most comprehensive assessments of expected impacts in the Caribbean along 

with suggestions for adaptation responses—one illustrative adaptation example is “increase water storage 

capacity to mitigate the effects of drought.”32 In addition to Taylor’s Caribbean-specific review, the recent 

2014 IPCC report, and the 2014 USGCRP report, several recent scholarly works address the relationship 

between climate change and security [Nordas and 

Gleditsch 2007; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Campbell et 

al. 2007; Hsiang et al. 2013; Kelley 2014].33 One example is Kelley’s discussion of the relationship of Syria’s persistent drought as a contributory factor to the 

popular uprising and Civil War that began in 2011.34

DoD’s CCAR organizes into four areas “high-level potential effects of climate change: Plans & Operations, 

Training & Testing, Built & Natural Infrastructure, 

and Acquisition & Supply Chain.”35 Together, these 

impact assessments provide useful context for future 

SOUTHCOM theater estimates and they inform possible inclusion of climate change security implications 

in the GCC’s theater campaign plan risk assessment, 

science and technology (S&T) priorities, and the Integrated Priority List (IPL). This IPL communicated 

from the Commander, SOUTHCOM to the Chairmen 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be used to create a 

“demand signal” for joint engineer forces or contract 

capacity to address high-risk infrastructure in need of 

adaptation to account for sea level rise impacts.36 The 

DoD CCAR provides a useful framework for a GCC to 

categorize mission-relevant risks within their theater 

estimates.
11

USSOUTHCOM Response to Climate 

Change Risks

Secretary of Defense Hagel invokes Clausewitz’s 

assertion that though some uncertainty remains with 

the state of current climate change predictions, planners must move forward “in a mere twilight.” 37 The 

IPCC’s latest Summary for Policymakers (SPM) report 

sheds additional light on evaluating the “climatic drivers” as causes for the resultant risk effects of interest to 

a GCC evaluating the overall AOR risk. As discussed 

above, the SPM and Taylor’s Caribbean-specific study 

detail “adaptation issues and prospects” that offer options for increasing the resiliency of potentially affected areas.38 The work of a GCC to evaluate a range of 

options as to “how” to support partner nations in their 

efforts to increase climate change resiliency needs to 

be informed by the White House’s Presidential Policy 

on Development (PPD6) that “raise[s] the importance 

of development in national security policy decisionmaking.”39 While USAID is the USG lead for development, climate change adaptation initiatives are one 

area where DoD has the opportunity to support this 

whole of government effort. Incorporation of this guidance will widen the aperture beyond reactive disaster 

relief and foster greater GCC involvement in the proactive elements of development while adhering to the 

PPD6 guidance that the U.S. government “elevate[s] 

development as a central pillar of our national security policy, equal to diplomacy and defense.”40 GCCs 

should work with DoS/USAID experts to focus on resiliency measures most useful to particular nations in 

terms of their population and economic security. The 

National Intelligence Community’s (IC’s) assessment 

on “Water Threats” concluded that “states with water 
12

problems will require integrated water, land use, and 

economic data to achieve sound policymaking and 

management.41 Provision of data is just one example 

of the assistance that the USG may provide to a partner nation after the GCC has worked with these nations and the IA to build an AOR-wide threat assessment to guide both near and long-term efforts aimed 

at the highest payoff targets linked to military and/

or economic security. While DoD will not be directly 

involved in addressing “economic security” issues, 

GCC planners will incorporate relevant operating environment threats into their overall theater estimates. 

The section below will further detail the options available to GCCs and their IA partners as they support 

partner nations’ climate change resiliency measures.

This section will primarily address the capabilities 

resident within or available to DoD if applied as part 

of DoD-led Title 10 theater strategic cooperation initiatives and/or as DoS Title 22 Security Assistance authorities that assist partner nations in becoming more 

resilient in the face of climate change-induced sea 

level rise and increased intensity storm/precipitation 

events.42 Just as the specific risks are variable between 

geographic locales, human population concentrations, 

etc., the measures that add to a nation’s resiliency will 

vary.43 This paper will highlight measures such as leader engagement, technical support and funding sources 

that are within existing or emerging capabilities and 

that in varying degrees address near-term storm damage risk reduction and longer-term sea-level rise risk 

reduction. Except in cases where the resiliency target 

is U.S.-owned infrastructure, the support to a regional 

partner’s climate change resiliency should be undertaken with an eye to building sustainable partner capacity.44 The section below will recommend the ways 
13

and means—the “how”—to support increasing a partner nation’s climate change resiliency.

Leader Engagement

Through engagement with selected partner nation 

military and public and private sector leaders, GCC, 

DoS and USAID development personnel have the opportunity to reinforce the importance of immediateterm disaster response planning and preparation, 

shorter-term Hurricane Storm Damage Reduction 

(HSDR) projects and longer-term water resources and 

land use planning. Leaders can discuss the feasibility 

of these various means as proactive measures that reduce risk and protect lives and property from the effects of climate change. Secretary of Defense Hagel led 

the way in this dialogue as he used the venue of the 

Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas hosted in Peru in October 2014, to not only emphasize the 

shared interests between defense leaders in addressing 

climate change; but, to announce the release of DoD’s 

CCAR the very day of the Conference.45 Leaders accomplish these dialogues during recurring staff talks,

during disaster response exercises, and during periodic 

strategic-leader visits by the SOUTHCOM Commander, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding 

General, etc. Leaders from SOUTHCOM’s Miamibased headquarters as well as the service component 

commands (Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force) 

and especially from the regionally-aligned combatant 

command-supporting engineers from Army Corps of 

Engineers South Atlantic Division (USACE-SAD) and 

Naval Facilities Engineers-Southeast (NAVFAC-SE) 

also have a role in supporting USAID’s development 

expert’s efforts to convey the value and opportunity 
14

that proactive responses to climate change will have 

for population security and stability. Both USACESAD and NAVFAC-SE have project planning and 

management personnel forward stationed in the Caribbean, and in Central and South America.46 It is critical that all DoD engagements nest with USG policylevel officials that also conduct strategic engagements 

as part of the United Nations Framework Convention 

on Climate Change and IPCC sessions.

Technical Support

Once the combined efforts of DoS, USAID and the 

SOUTHCOM staff determine that the USG will support a particular country’s climate change adaptation 

efforts, together they will work with the partner nation 

to tailor support actions based on if the resiliency target 

is a specific localized infrastructure or broader basinwide water resources system. Examples of localized 

infrastructure would be Trinidad and Tobago’s oceanside Point Fortin natural gas liquefaction and transfer 

facilities or Jamaica’s Goat Island port. An example of 

a basin-wide target would be Haiti’s low-lying Cul de 

Sac flood basin. DoD and USAID can leverage a fast 

growing body of knowledge in support of partner nations. Among the open-source technical resources are 

several DoD/USACE technical publications that address climate change considerations and provide both 

qualitative and quantitative methods for evaluating 

current projects and systems and for planning future 

projects and systems to increase their resiliency.47 In 

addition to these references, DoD’s Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) is 

charged with ensuring DoD has the necessary science 

and tools to support climate change-related vulner-
15

ability assessments.48 Though USAID’s Development 

Laboratory (DevLab) has a scope broader than climate 

change considerations, GCCs can also work with and 

leverage innovations from DevLab’s work in support 

of U.S. development goals.49 The body of knowledge 

and tools being developed by SERDP, DevLab and 

the various technical publications detailed above are 

available to GCCs in support of their adaptation efforts with the GCC’s IA and multinational partners.50

The IC “Water Threats” assessment concluded that 

“neglecting infrastructure investments (e.g., dams, canals, and water management sensors) can also increase 

vulnerability to extreme weather events.”51 The IC 

addressed studies that have shown that water investments reduce damage from extreme weather events 

from 25-30 percent of GDP to around 5 percent making these investments a crucial element in achieving 

social stability.52 USACE and SOUTHCOM’s on-going 

advisory role to Brazil’s CODEVASF water planning 

authority and SOUTHCOM’s recently completed Joint 

Assessment of climate change risks conducted with 

Trinidad and Tobago are two examples of partner nation assistance that GCC’s can apply to other nations 

specifically to address climate change-induced negative effects.53

Above, this paper addressed a brief review of 

projected climate change effects expected within the 

Caribbean Basin. As part of development assistance 

initiatives, a GCC could leverage their Joint Plans and 

Exercises Staff (J3/5/7) expertise in scenario planning 

and development to “war game” the wide range of 

effects of climate change related to security within a 

particular partner nation. Read’s dissertation expands 

upon existing scenario planning research to offer methodologies specific to evaluating long-term security-
16

relevant “socio-environmental” consequences of climate change.54 The coordination and collaboration 

with the various unified action partners – especially 

interagency players at which SOUTHCOM has excelled—would be particularly useful if leveraged 

in a scenario planning exercise to better determine 

risk-based priorities for climate change resiliency 

investments.55 

In addition to technical support that aids a partner nation’s building long-term resilience to climate 

change impacts, a GCC can benefit from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to share 

methods and tools useful in HA/DR.56 Assigned 

OFDA representatives proved extremely helpful to 

the SOUTHCOM Commander during the January 

2010 Haiti earthquake crisis by providing daily updates on USAID activities and facilitating coordination and decision-making to achieve unity of effort between USAID and SOUTHCOM during this disaster 

relief effort.57 Technical exchanges tied to the funding 

sources discussed below can enable partner nations 

to employ well-developed U.S. technologies for early 

warning communication systems integrated with 

standard operating procedures to execute evacuation 

plans from population centers to reduce the scope of 

human casualties [the risk of which increases as climate change induces more intense storms]. USAID’s 

“Thomazeau’s Disaster Contingency and Mitigation 

Plan”—part of a larger USAID strategy to support the 

Cul-de-Sac floodplain communities—is an example of 

a proactive development initiative developed in collaboration with Haitian Civil Protection Committee 

members, the private sector, state institutions, local 

assemblies, and community-based associations.58 The 

extent to which a GCC and USAID can assist a partner 
17

nation in becoming more prepared and resilient before 

a storm event reduces the scope of possible HA/DR 

required after a storm.

Funding Sources 

In today’s highly competitive resource-constrained 

environment, a GCC’s J9 and the USAID LNO can be 

a conduit for a partner nation to connect with a variety of governmental and non-governmental funding 

sources. While DoD receives recurring annual HA/

DR funding for preparedness and upon request, response activities, USAID is the principal USG agency 

that manages development assistance funds—at an 

approximate annual level between $20-$30 billion 

across all its program activities.59 While the U.S. leads 

the international donor community in contributions, 

more than 56 nations and 260 multilateral aid organizations contribute development resources—World 

Bank administered trust funds totaled almost $9 billion in 2008 and private donors such as foundations 

and NGOs contributed more than $52 billion in 2008.

60 New donor nations are emerging with China, India, 

Brazil, Taiwan, and Russia collectively contributing 

over $8 billion annually.61 The Inter-American Development Bank, the Pan American Health Organization, 

the Organization for American States Inter-American 

Fund for Assistance in Emergency Situations (FONDEM), UN-administered Green Climate Fund and the 

DoD’s Defense Environmental International Cooperation Program (DEIC) are all sources of funding for 

HA/DR and/or proactive climate change resiliency 

measures.62 Within the USAID-administered Global 

Climate Change Initiative, the U.S. Treasury Department leads the multilateral finance component.63 It 
18

is important for a GCC to be knowledgeable of these 

funding sources and their various motivations—from 

religious, to political, to commercial—and where possible support alignment in both short-term HA/DR 

operations and long-term strategic climate change resiliency efforts.

The GCC also has a role in collaborating with USAID in prioritizing risk and focusing the USAID’s 

Global Climate Change Initiative’s strategic investments.64 Specific to Haiti and the Cul-de-Sac Basin (and 

the Matheux Basin) addressed in the section above, 

USAID administers the Watershed Investment Fund 

(WIF) to provide grants, subcontracts, direct procurement, training and short-term technical assistance to 

selected beneficiaries.65 To fully realize the intent of the 

President’s call for “an enhanced level of interagency 

cooperation in complex security environments” GCCs 

and USAID’s Senior Development Advisor should 

work together with the partner nation to determine if 

the development goals can best be achieved by DoDTitle 10 authority, a DoS-Title 22 authority (e.g. foreign military sales (FMS) case), a USAID-only funding 

mechanism, a foreign non-governmental development 

bank, or a wholly private enterprise.66 Considerations 

for determining the appropriate funding source include the local nation’s ability to contribute, the riskbased prioritization from both the security/access and 

the humanitarian risk perspective, and finally availability of other non-governmental or private funds.

The President’s Global Development Policy and 

the USAID Forward transformation initiative seek to 

strengthen “monitoring and evaluation” of all development efforts.67 This guidance regarding monitoring 

and evaluation may present specific opportunities for 

a GCC to plan for and incorporate the use of joint force 
19

engineers including professional construction quality assurance personnel from the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers or the Naval Facilities Engineering Command to provide the transparency and accountability 

increasingly demanded by the development interests 

prior to their contribution of funds.68 In concert with 

or in lieu of USAID quality assurance professionals, 

these DoD personnel could work on a specific “pilot 

model” project to demonstrate to-standard monitoring and evaluation practices—transitioning from 

serving as the lead quality assurance representatives 

to an advisory role for a host nation’s military or public works professionals. This approach would leverage DoD’s unique water resources technical expertise 

and particularly their training capabilities in the near 

term with a long-term objective of building the partner nation’s internal capacity to provide the “rigorous and high-quality impact evaluations” directed 

by the President’s Development Policy and included 

as a critical component of USAID’s and prospective 

donor’s climate change project selection criteria.69 For 

DoD to execute these efforts funded by a development 

bank such as the World Bank or the Inter-American 

Development Bank, the two parties would need to 

develop a unique legal framework enabling that funding mechanism.70 USAID could fund DoD directly 

through the “Economy Act” (31 U.S. Code §1535) that 

facilitates transfer of appropriated dollars between 

federal agencies when the interagency action “is in the 

best interest of the USG.”71 USAID would make the 

“best interest of the USG” determination guided by 

very specific criteria including authorized and appropriated funding being on-hand for the express project 

purpose, and USAID determining that the technical 

services “cannot be provided by contract as conve-
20

niently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise.”72 It 

is this combination of technical knowledge, training 

ability, transparency and existing military-to-military 

contacts that may make use of the DoD personnel in 

a “pilot model” for this evaluation and monitoring 

work advantageous over the standard practice of contracting commercial providers.

Besides the back end project oversight and accountability, the front end project purpose is critical 

to making a particular development project attractive 

to funding sponsors. The Intelligence Community’s 

Assessment on Water makes the judgment that developing countries forego considerable donor funding 

because they focus on single-purpose water infrastructure projects that do not provide for sufficient 

environmental considerations and preservation of 

ecosystem services which are becoming more valued 

by the NGO funding sources.73 As a result, the developing countries work bilaterally with private interests 

or nation-states such as China that historically do not 

attach environmental consideration “strings” to their 

project support.74 As part of an ongoing dialogue with 

developing countries regarding the natural system 

climate change effects, the U.S. senior civilian or military official; e.g. U.S. Army Chief of Engineers, may 

be able to reinforce to these nations the importance of 

considering the natural ecosystem values in all water 

resources-related projects. By seeking this higher order approach, the developing nation would be better 

able to access funds from donors that demand consideration of overall ecosystem resources.75 Though 

not yet supported by empirical evidence, this effort 

may provide the GCC a positional advantage as the 

“partner of choice” vis-à-vis competing nations such 

as China or Russia in helping the developing nation 

address their long-term water resources concerns.
21

Additional “How to Assist” Recommendations:

The IPCC’s Summary for Policymakers speaks to the 

Caribbean and other island nations in their summary 

comments on “adaptation issues and prospects,” stating “additional external resources and technologies 

will enhance response.”76 Beyond those technologies 

and funding sources already addressed, this paper 

recommends:

• USSOUTHCOM request/coordinate for USACE to host an AOR-wide or Caribbean-specific “water and security conference” to further 

refine identification of high-risk areas and highpayoff investments for security-related climate 

change resilience. Expanding upon hosting a 

conference, the GCC would benefit from the results of a scenario planning exercise that develops the complex evolving socio-environmental 

security implications of climate change.77

• All DoD elements operating within a CCMD’s 

AOR must work to achieve strategic communications integration and thus prevent messaging 

“fratricide.” A specific measure of performance 

is disciplined input of all Theater Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Support to Others activities into the Global Theater Security 

Cooperation Management Information System 

(GTSCMIS) in accordance with the Joint Staff’s 

annual suspense.78

• CCMD J4 Director integrates the Army and 

Joint Engineer force enabling capabilities in 

support of the HA/DR and “Partner Nation of 

Choice” LOEs with the caveat that funding will 

be through a variety of sources; e.g. Title 10, Ti-
22

tle 22 FMS, Donor Development Bank, USAID 

through Economy Act, etc.79

• Expeditionary “Troop Labor” on select 

projects

• Disaster Preparedness and Response Exercises 

• Military-to-Military Counterpart Engagements as discussed in “Leader Engagement” section above

• Integrated Water Resource Management 

and hydrological modeling tools from 

USACE’s Institute for Water Resources 

(IWR)

• Science and Technology Applications especially from USACE’s Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC); 

e.g. technical assistance in locating additional sea stage gauges to increase sitespecific change estimations.

• GCC may find value in convening a “Task 

Force Climate” committee that ensures broad 

consideration of climate change-induced risks 

across the joint warfighting functions and provides holistic inputs to DoD’s Climate Change 

Adaptation Working Group. The J3 or a member 

of the operations and planning staff should 

co-chair this committee alongside the GCC’s 

USAID Senior Development Advisor to ensure 

unity of interagency effort and consideration 

of both near and far-horizon planning considerations. The “Task Force Climate” should 

include the CCMD’s engineer director, the Science & Technology advisor and other subject 

matter experts.
23

Thus far, this paper has sought to present “what” the 

problem is, i.e. higher-level Administration and DoDlevel guidance and initial estimate of climate change 

risks; “who” ought to be engaged in addressing the 

problem of security-related climate change effects; 

“where” within a given region with this paper’s focus 

on the near-shore Caribbean Basin part of USSOUTHCOM’s AOR; and finally “how” a GCC can assist a 

partner nation with developing responses to climate 

change that increase that nation’s resiliency and security. With the ways and means attended to through the 

discussion above, this paper will now summarize the 

“why” or ends that a GCC achieves through consideration of climate change.

“Why” Support to Climate Change Adaptation Matters to a GCC

GCCs should incorporate projected adverse climate change effects into their threat estimates and 

their risk assessments that inform their annual integrated priority list (IPL) submission to the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the case of SOUTHCOM, 

while climate change adaptation may not out-rank countering transnational organized crime as a stand-alone 

priority, the risks from climate change will effect accomplishment of the CCMD’s priority missions. Examples of increased risk from climate change effects 

include the scale of required prepositioned humanitarian/disaster relief supplies, impeded access to 

specific port facilities, increased littoral (underwater) 

areas, and mass evacuation/migration requirements 

from affected populations, etc. While some aspects of 

climate change risk will fall outside the scope of a fiveyear Theater Campaign Plan, and other specific risks 
24

may be addressed by the Armed Services under their 

Title 10 responsibilities, the GCC will focus on those 

identified issues relevant for inclusion as updates to 

the Campaign Plan and contingency plans while documenting longer-term risks within the GCC’s operational environment assessment. They will account for 

the adjusted resource requirements and capability gap 

assessments that merit inclusion in the overall IPL; e.g. 

additional littoral combat ship or riverine patrol boat 

missions in the AOR. Climate change as a risk driver is 

the first reason why GCCs must attend to this environmental variable and its effects across the breadth of 

their assigned missions.

Beyond the Theater Campaign Plan line of effort 

(LOE) “Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief” 

which is made more complex by climate changes in 

temperature, precipitation, sea level and storm intensity, the LOE “Critical Access and Relations” is another reason why GCCs should consider climate change 

adaptation within their theater campaign plans. Helping build a partner nation’s capacity to prepare for 

and respond to a disaster and supporting that nation 

in the aftermath of a disaster provides a neutral forum 

that can be used to build governance capacity and 

strengthen relations. The connection between these 

LOEs also manifests if the combination of an intense 

storm with wave surge upon a higher sea level prevents safe dockside access into port facilities for delivering humanitarian supplies or evacuating displaced 

persons escaping inland floods. USSOUTHCOMs two 

LOEs detailed above support accomplishment of two 

of their military end-states:

• “Partner Nations capable of conducting HA/

DR operations to mitigate effects of disasters,” 

and
25

• “USSOUTHCOM is partner of choice in the 

AOR.”

While the HA/DR end-state is directly correlated 

to USSOUTHCOM’s LOE “Humanitarian Assistance/

Disaster Relief,” the correlation to the latter end-state 

and USSOUTHCOM’s LOE “Critical Access and Relations” is more nuanced. The “choice” word suggests 

competition that exists as potential partner nations 

establish bilateral relations between the United States 

and/or/in combination with other nations such as 

China or Venezuela. Leader engagement with partner and potential partner nations, provision of technical expertise, and enabling or in some cases providing 

funds are the main three ways that GCCs with the IA 

community can aid nations in increasing their climate 

change resiliency. These are all long-term investments 

with the purpose of strengthening bilateral countryto-country relationships. SOUTHCOM’s commander 

General Kelly states that “trust must be built, nurtured, and sustained through regular contact.”80 Senior 

leader and technical-level climate change discussions 

create another venue for this “regular contact” and 

trust-building effort in support of USSOUTHCOM’s 

LOE for “critical access and relations” to achieve their 

end-state of “USSOUTHCOM as partner of choice in 

the AOR.”

There is a confluence of events that create an increased opportunity for discussions between USG 

and partner or potential partner nations regarding the 

mutually beneficial long-term effort of climate change 

resiliency. For SOUTHCOM in its Latin America 

Caribbean AOR the strategic environment includes 

cross-cutting diplomatic, informational, military and 

economic issues.
26

One example of the cross-cutting factors relates to 

the competing Caribbean-nation partner Venezuela 

which is in decline due to their economy’s almost singular reliance on reduced export income from petroleum.81 Their “PetroCaribe” arrangement of providing 

bargain oil supplies to ten members of the Caribbean 

Community along with the Dominican Republic and 

Cuba is faltering. This energy instability leads to an 

opening for these nations to seek alternative sources 

of oil or alternative sources of energy altogether—in 

line with U.S promotion of non-carbon [non-climate 

change-causing] fuel sources as a part of the overall 

Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI).82 The 

CESI seeks to provide a market for energy, especially 

U.S. liquid natural gas, as an alternative to the Venezuelan’s “Petrocaribe” construct which continues 

to be propped up by Chinese financing.83 Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico have already “made 

the switch” from Venezuelan diesel and fuel oil for 

their electricity generation requirements.84 These intertwined economic-security-energy issues certainly 

merit continued monitoring as a part of SOUTHCOM’s overall theater estimate and consideration of 

significant “at-risk” oil infrastructure tied to sea level 

rise projections.

A second example is Cuba. The recent U.S. rapproachment with Cuba creates the opportunity to use 

the shared interest of climate change resiliency as a 

vehicle for cooperative efforts. The methods the U.S. 

uses for infrastructure hardening or other climate 

change adaptation measures within the Caribbean 

could in time be shared with the Cuban government 

just as with other [potential] partner nations. As the 

largest by population of the Caribbean nations, any 

forward steps toward climate change resiliency tak-
27

en by Cuba will be an influencer to other Caribbean 

nations.

Conclusion

Within recent guidance documents including the 

2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, DoD addresses the Department’s measures to review Geographic 

Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans to 

address the security implications of climate change 

within their area of operations. Beyond attention to 

the more objective expected risks to U.S. owned or utilized infrastructure and the assessed increased risks to 

the scale of potential humanitarian assistance / disaster relief mission, GCCs can utilize this emerging issue 

as a point of dialogue and cooperation with partner or 

prospective partner nations as part of the U.S. Government’s mutually supporting 3D portfolios. These 

efforts to reduce destabilizing impacts of projected 

climate change will support long-term HA/DR readiness as well as aid the U.S.’s efforts to be the Partner of 

Choice on the global stage. While each GCC’s strategic 

environment and the nations within their AOR have 

different risks and current approaches with respect 

to climate change, review of SOUTHCOM as a “casestudy” shows the cross-cutting nature of the stability 

and security threats and opportunities emerging from 

the phenomenon of climate change.

Endnotes

1. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, USA, “From the Chairman: The 

Posture Paradigm,” Joint Force Quarterly 76 (December 30, 2014), 

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/

Article/12354/jfq-76-from-the-chairman-the-posture-paradigm.aspx

(accessed February 9, 2015).
28

2. Ms. Patton coordinated and served as a moderator during 

the September 23-24, 2014, Combatant Command Climate Security 

Information Exchange. E. Rebecca Patton, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, 

telephone interview by author, March 2, 2015. 

3. Barack H. Obama, State of the Union Address January 20, 

2015, (Washington, D.C.: The White House Office of the Press Secretary January 20, 2015), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/

the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 (accessed February 9, 2015).

4. Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, 

DC: The White House, February 2015), i.

5. Chuck Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 4, 2014), IV; Chuck Hagel, Department of Defense 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2014), i.

6. DoD’s Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap serves as DoD’s 

strategic department-level Adaptation Plan developed in response to two Presidential Executive Orders (EOs), 2009’s EO 

13514 Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic 

Performance and 2013’s EO 13653 Preparing the United States for the 

Impacts of Climate Change. The in-development DoD Directive will 

further operationalize the Adaptation Roadmap strategy. Important 

to note that the Roadmap focuses on one of the two ways DoD is 

addressing climate change, specifically “adaptation,” versus “mitigation.” Adaptation includes efforts to plan for the changes that are 

occurring or expected to occur; while mitigation includes those efforts that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. DoD’s overall Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan (SSPP) addresses the mitigation 

activities related to emissions reductions. Patton, OASD (EIE), 

telephone interview by author, March 2, 2015.

7. Barack H. Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 6 (PPD6): 

US Global Development Policy Fact Sheet, (Washington, DC: 

White House Press Office, September 22, 2010), https://www.hsdl.

org/?view&did=7154 (accessed January 24, 2015).
29

8. U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID Policy 

Framework 2011-2015, (Washington, DC: USAID, September 2011), 

20; U.S. Government webpage Performance.gov, “Department of 

State and USAID Agency Page” http://www.performance.gov/agency/department-state-and-usaid?view=public#apg (accessed February 

12, 2015).

9. Obama, PPD6 Development Policy Fact Sheet, 1.

10. Vic Ramdass, SOUTHCOM J9 Director, “Annex V (Interagency Collaboration) to Update 1 USSOUTHCOM FY15-19 Theater Campaign Plan, September 22, 2014, V-2.

11. Obama, PPD6 Development Policy Fact Sheet, 4.

12. USAID Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean Home 

Page, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureaulatin-america-and-caribbean (accessed February 13, 2015).

13. Ramdass, Annex V, V-4.

14. John F. Kelly, Posture Statement of the Commander, US 

Southern Command, presented to the 113th Cong., House Armed 

Services Committee, (Washington, DC: U.S. Southern Command, 26 February 2014), www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/

2014_SOUTHCOM_Posture_Statement_HASC_FINAL_PDF.pdf

(accessed January 3, 2015), 17.

15. Barack H. Obama, Pres Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21), (Washington, D.C.: The 

White House, Feb 12, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.

gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-criticalinfrastructure-security-and-resil

16. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e), Sn. 1016(e).

17. Hagel, DoD 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, i.

18. Marcelo Salles, USACE, SAD, LNO to USSOUTHCOM, 

telephone interview by author, February 6, 2015; R. Evan Ellis, 

“The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin 

America,” Perry Paper Series, No. 1, 2013 (Washington, DC: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies), 1.
30

19. The second two sets of criteria are most applicable to DoD 

in the security-to-development connection and the third criteria 

which addresses “small island developing states” is most applicable to SOUTHCOM and the Caribbean. From USAID: Criteria 

2, “Sustainable Landscapes Criteria: USAID prioritizes partner 

countries with globally important forest landscapes (e.g. the 

Amazon basin and the Congo basin which have high current and 

future carbon storage potential); high demonstration potential 

(e.g. early movers able to demonstrate credible resultsbased payments for carbon storage under Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) programs); commitments to 

developing monitoring, reporting, and verification systems, and 

enabling policy structures such as land and resource tenure;” Criteria 3, “Adaptation Criteria: USAID prioritizes work with countries, both in terms of exposure to physical impacts of climate 

change and socioeconomic sensitivity to those impacts. These include the likelihood of significant physical changes, dependence 

of population on climatesensitive sectors, percentage of population in highrisk areas (e.g. lowlying coastal areas), and the ability of a country’s economy to respond to climate changes. Thus, 

USAID is prioritizing working with least developed countries 

(especially in subSaharan Africa), small island developing states 

(SIDS), and glacier dependent countries. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Climate Change and Development 

Strategy 2012-2016, (Washington, DC: USAID, January 2012), 1.

20. Sarah Wines, U.S. Agency for International Development 

LNO to U.S. Southern Command, telephone interview by author, 

March 6, 2015.

21. Ole Magnus Theisen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Halvard 

Buhaug. “Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed Conflict?” Climatic Change117, no. 3 (04, 2013): 613-25, http://search.proquest.

com/docview/1315961094?accountid=4444 (accessed November 30, 

2014), 615.

22. Hagel, DoD 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, i.

23. Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. 

Yohe, eds., 2014: Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The 

Third National Climate Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. Global 
31

Change Research Program, October 2014), http://s3.amazonaws.

com/nca2014/high/NCA3_Climate_Change_Impacts_in_the_United%20States_HighRes.pdf (accessed February 12, 2015), 396.

24. Ibid., 398.

25. USACE has developed an open-source on-line “sea level 

calculator” to aid in obtaining low, intermediate and high-end 

scenarios for sea level change based upon the National Research 

Councils’ “Curves I, II and III; for this paper projections at both 

Amalie, US Virgin Islands and Mayaguez, PR were checked. 

Another Caribbean-specific data point is USGCRP’s notation of 

current sea level rise causing the coastline of Puerto Rico around 

Rincon being eroded at a rate of 3.3 feet per year. Though P.R. is 

in U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND’s AOR, this data point is useful for SOUTHCOM planners considering risks in the Dominican 

Republic, Cuba, Jamaica, etc., until NOAA or national weather 

agencies emplace additional gauges and develop additional datasets. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Responses to Climate Change 

Home page, “Sea level calculator,” http://www.corpsclimate.us/

ccaceslcurves.cfm (accessed January 31, 2015).

26. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reported in 2014 that 

the range of expected global mean sea level rise between now and 

2100 is estimated from a low-end .2m (8 in) to a high end 2.0m (6.6 

ft). U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Procedures to Evaluate Sea Level Change: Impacts, Responses, and Adaptation, Engineer 

Technical Letter (ETL) 1100-2-1 (Washington, DC: USACE HQs, 

June 30, 2014) http://www.publications.usace.army.mil/Portals/76/

Publications/EngineerTechnicalLetters/ETL_1100-2-1.pdf (accessed 

January 31, 2015), 2-1; Rajendra K. Pachauri and Leo Meyer, eds., 

“Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2014 Synthesis 

Report (Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014) https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/

syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr1.pdf (accessed February 13, 2015), 17. 

27. Chuck Hagel, “Prepared Remarks for Delivery to the 

Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas,” Arequipa, 

Peru, October 13, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.

aspx?SpeechID=1893 (accessed March 7, 2015).

28. Melillo, et al., 2014: Climate Change Impacts, 399.
32

29. Pachauri and Meyer, “Summary for Policymakers,” 7.

30. Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook, “From National to 

Theater Developing Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly 70, (3Q, 2013), 

117.

31. Michael A. Taylor, Tannecia S. Stephenson, A. Anthony 

Chen, and Kimberly A. Stephenson, “Climate Change and the Caribbean: Review and Response,” Caribbean Studies, 40, no. 2 (JulyDecember 2012): 185.

32. Ibid., 187.

33. Mark Read, Embracing Uncertainty: Scenario Planning for 

Climate Change-Security Challenges and Opportunities, Dissertation 

for PhD (State College, PA: The Pennsylvania State University 

Graduate School Dept. of Geography, August, 2014), 5. 

34. Colin P. Kelley, “Recent and Future Drying of the Mediterranean Region: Anthropogenic Forcing, Natural Variability 

and Social Impacts,” Order No. 3612184 (New York, NY: Columbia University, 2014) http://search.proquest.com/docview/1506156388

?accountid=4444 (accessed March 7, 2015), iii. 

35. Hagel, DoD 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, “Annex 2,” 16. 

36. Reveron and Cook, “From National to Theater Developing Strategy,” 115.

37. Hagel, DoD 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, i. 

38. Pachauri and Meyer, “Summary for Policymakers,” 30; 

Taylor, et.al. “Climate Change and the Caribbean,” 185-187.

39. Obama, PPD6 Development Policy Fact Sheet, 1.

40. Ibid.

41. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 

Global Water Security Intelligence Community Assessment, ICA 
33

2012-8, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2012), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/

Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf

(accessed February 4, 2015), 6.

42. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Home Page, “Foreign 

Military Sales,” http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-salesfms; and Marcelo Salles, “LATAM Program Management Plan,” 

briefing slides from email correspondence to author, October 10, 

2014. 

43. Ed King, “What does it mean to be climate resilient?” Responding to Climate Change website, http://www.rtcc.org/2014/11/10/

what-does-it-mean-to-be-climate-resilient/ (accessed January 31, 

2015).

44. U.S. Department of State, The First Quadrennial Diplomacy 

and Development Review (QDDR): Leading Through Civilian Power

(Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of State, 2010), http://ww.state.gov/

documents/organization/153108.pdf (accessed June 20, 2014), 76; 

U.S. Agency for International Development, “CDCS Guidance, 

Version 3,” (Washington, DC: USAID, August 8, 2012) http://www.

usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/CDCS_Guidance_V3.pdf

(accessed June 20, 2014), 8.

45. Hagel, “Prepared Remarks for Delivery to the Conference 

of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA),” Arequipa, Peru, 

October 13, 2014. 

46. USACE South Atlantic Division, SOUTHCOM Program 

Management Plan (PgMP), December 1, 2014, 12.

47. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Procedures to 

Evaluate Sea Level Change: Impacts, Responses, and Adaptation, Engineer Technical Letter (ETL) 1100-2-1 (Washington, DC: USACE HQs, June 30, 2014) http://www.publications.usace.army.mil/

Portals/76/Publications/EngineerTechnicalLetters/ETL_1100-2-1.pdf

(accessed January 31, 2015); USACE, Guidance for Climate Change 

Adaptation Engineering Inputs to Inland Hydrology for Civil Works 

Studies, Designs, and Projects, Engineering Construction Bulletin 

(ECB) 2014-10 (Washington, DC: USACE HQs, May 2, 2014), http://

www.wbdg.org/ccb/ARMYCOE/COEECB/ecb_2014_10.pdf (accessed 
34

January 31, 2015); USACE, Incorporating Sea Level Change in Civil 

Works Programs, Engineering Regulation (ER) 1100-2-8162 (Washington, DC: USACE Civil Works Directorate, December 31, 2013),

http://www.publications.usace.army.mil/Portals/76/Publications/EngineerRegulations/ER_1100-2-8162.pdf (accessed February 8, 2015); 

DoD, Unified Facilities Criteria for High Performance and Sustainable 

Building Requirements (UFC 1-200-02), (Washington, DC: Dept. of 

Defense, November 7, 2014) http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/DOD/UFC/

ufc_1_200_02.pdf (accessed March 1, 2015); DoD, Manual Number 

4715.03: Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan Implementation Manual, (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, November 25, 

2013) http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471503m.pdf (accessed March 8, 2015).

48. U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Environmental Research 

and Development Program and Environmental Security Technology 

Certification Program Home Page, “Climate Change and Impacts 

of Sea Level Rise,” https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Featured-Initiatives/

Climate-Change-and-Impacts-of-Sea-Level-Rise (accessed March 7, 

2015).

49. U.S. Department of State, QDDR, 100.

50. Patton, OASD (EIE), telephone interview. 

51. ODNI, Global Water Security Intelligence Community Assessment, 8. 

52. Ibid.

53. While the technical expertise sharing USG has done with 

Brazil’s water authority CODEVASF [in Portuguese: Companhia 

de Desenvolvimento dos Vales do Sao Francisco e do Parnaiba] could 

be parlayed to other nations, the funding structure would likely 

be different. Brazil is able to fund/reimburse the USG efforts, 

whereas the funding scheme to provide technical support in 

less developed economies in the Caribbean would require USG 

or other development bank contributions. Marcelo Salles, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, South Atlantic Division, Liaison Officer to USSOUTHCOM, telephone interview by author, February 

6, 2015; Hagel, Remarks for CDMA.
35

54. Read, Embracing Uncertainty, 4.

55. Joanna Gutierrez Winters, Establishing a Conceptual Framework for Interagency Coordination at U.S. Southern Command, PRISM 

5, no. 1, 144.

56. “SOUTHCOM has three representatives from OFDA detailed to its J7 staff directorate.” Wines, USAID LNO to SOUTHCOM, phone interview, March 6, 2015.

57. Winters, Establishing a Conceptual Framework, 144.

58. U.S. Agency for International Development Haiti homepage, “Official Presentation of the Thomazeau Contingency Plan 

and Flood Warning Sirens,” http://www.winnerhaiti.com/index.php/

en/videos/news-flash/93-official-presentation-of-the-thomazeau-contingency-plan-and-flood-warning-sirens (accessed February 8, 2015).

59. Curt Tarnoff, Marian Leonardo Lawson, Foreign Aid: U.S. 

Programs and Policy (Washington, DC: US Library of Congress, 

Congressional Research Service Report, February 10, 2011) http://

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40213.pdf (accessed March 4, 2015), 19.

60. U.S. Department of State, QDDR, 96.

61. Ibid.

62. Susan L. Clark-Sestak, Analysis to Support Execution of the 

Defense Environmental International Cooperation (DEIC) Program,” 

(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2012) http://

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a564901.pdf (accessed March 7, 

2015), 1; Hagel, Remarks for CDMA; Obama, NSS, 12. 

63. U.S. Department of State, QDDR, 85.

64. The GCCI provides “fast start” climate financial support 

that totaled nearly $30billion during 2010-2012 intended to build 

lasting resilience to unavoidable climate impacts. Obama, PPD6 

Development Policy Fact Sheet, 4.

65. U.S. Agency for International Development Homepage, “Watershed Investment Fund,” http://www.winnerhaiti.com/index.php/

en/investment-funds (accessed February 8, 2015).
36

66. Obama, PPD6 Development Policy Fact Sheet, 4. 

67. Obama, PPD6 Development Policy Fact Sheet, 3; U.S. 

Agency for International Development, USAID Policy Framework 

2011-2015, (Washington, DC: USAID, September 2011), iv. 

68. As of this writing, Department of the Army Staff Judge 

Advocate is reviewing a draft memorandum of understanding 

that would allow the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to directly fund USG/military planners and 

quality assurance professionals to provide services in support of 

World Bank or IADB-funded water resources projects. Marcelo 

Salles, USACE, SAD, LNO to USSOUTHCOM, telephone interview by author, February 6, 2015.

69. Obama, PPD6 Development Policy Fact Sheet, 3; U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), Climate Change 

and Development Strategy 2012-2016, (Washington, DC: USAID, 

January 2012), 1.

70. Marcelo Salles, telephone interview by author, February 

6, 2015.

71. Cornell University Law School Legal Reference Web Site, 

“31 U.S. Code § 1535, para (a)” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1535 (accessed March 31, 2015).

72. Ibid.

73. ODNI, Global Water Security Intelligence Community Assessment, 8.

74. Richard L. Bernal, Dragon in the Caribbean: China’s global 

Re-Dimensioning, Challenges and Opportunities for the Caribbean, 

(Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2014), 50.

75. Mark R. Tercek, Jonathan S. Adams, Nature’s Fortune: How 

Business and Society Thrive by Investing in Nature, (New York: Basic 

Books, 2013) 144.

76. IPCC SPM, 2014, p.24
37

77. Read, Embracing Uncertainty, 4.

78. Ramdass, Annex V, V-17.

79. USACE South Atlantic Division, SOUTHCOM PgMP, 17.

80. Kelly, John F. Kelly, Posture Statement of the Commander, US 

Southern Command, 20. 

81. Author Not Provided, “Venezuela: Empty Shelves and 

Rhetoric,” The Economist, January 24, 2015, 30.

82. Author Not Provided, “PetroCaribe and the Caribbean: 

Single Point of Failure,” The Economist, October 4, 2014, http://

www.economist.com/news/americas/21621845-venezuelas-financingprogramme-leaves-many-caribbean-countries-vulnerable-single-point

(accessed February 9, 2015); Alexis Arthur, “Beyond Petrocaribe: 

An Alternative Energy Future for Central America and the Caribbean,” paper and comments delivered as part of the Florida 

International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center/Applied Research Center/U.S. Southern Command Policy 

Roundtable Series, Miami, Florida, June 16, 2014, 6.

83. Ibid.

84. Arthur, “Beyond Petrocaribe...,” 6.
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