The Acting Secretary of the Army’s

TASK FORCE REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT

POLICIES

May 27, 2004
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TASK FORCE REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT POLICIES

Executive Summary

GENERAL

The Task Force’s mission was to conduct a detailed review of Army policies on

reporting and addressing allegations of sexual assault. We examined existing Army

policies, programs, and procedures, as well as survey, case, and other available

statistical data. We also reviewed and analyzed other Department of Defense (DoD)

and university sexual assault programs. Our recommendations are broad based. They

cover Army policies, programs, and procedures, unit and institutional training, command

climate, and oversight. As we proceeded with our review, we became convinced that

proactive involvement by leaders at all levels will be the key to successfully addressing

sexual assault in the Army.

PURPOSE

The Acting Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army jointly stated

in a recent memorandum—

“Sexual assault is a crime that cannot and will not be tolerated in

the United States Army. It has a devastating and often lasting impact on

the victim, a fellow Soldier. Moreover, sexual assault tears at the moral

fiber of our unit formations, degrading our readiness. Sexual assault has

no place in the Army.... We’re a values-based organization; we take care

of our fellow Soldiers ... and treat all Soldiers with dignity and respect.”

1

In recent months, media reports regarding sexual assaults committed against

Soldiers in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Theater of Operations criticized the

Army “...for failing to appropriately deal with this serious issue.”

2 On February 6, 2004,

the Acting Secretary of the Army directed the establishment of an Army Task Force on

Sexual Assault Policies (Task Force) to take on the following missions:

3

• Conduct a detailed review of the effectiveness of the Army’s policies on

reporting and addressing allegations of sexual assault

• Review the current processes to ensure a climate in which victims feel free to

report allegations and in which leaders understand their responsibilities to

support victims and to investigate allegations

1 Department of the Army memo, Subject: Army Policy on Sexual Assault, April 7, 2004.

2 Denver Post, “Military Justice Probed; Congress to Investigate Problems Found by Post,” November 20, 2003.

3 Acting Secretary of the Army memo, Subject: Task Force on Sexual Assault Policies, February 6, 2004.
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• Recommend changes or additions to current policies, programs, and

procedures to provide clear guidance for reporting and addressing sexual

assault allegations and establishing effective protocols for victim support.

APPROACH

The Task Force assessed current Army policies, programs, and procedures, as

well as available data pertaining to offenses, adjudication, victim services, and

command climate. We also examined Army functional organizations that deal with

sexual assault, including those concerned with law enforcement/criminal investigation,

legal, medical, chaplain, training, and family advocacy matters. The Task Force

analyzed information and data that were provided by numerous sources within and

outside the Army. A team of contract professionals supported the Task Force in

collecting, analyzing, and interpreting the data.

FINDINGS

Our findings center on five key areas: 1) policy, program, proponent, and

integration; 2) education, prevention, training, communication, and command climate;

3) incident response, investigation, and action taken; 4) victim services; 5) data

collection, reporting, evaluation, and program improvement. Findings are—

• Current sexual assault prevention and response policies and programs are not

integrated among supporting organizations.

• Privileged and confidential avenues of communication exist; however, they are

not widely recognized throughout the Army as confidential avenues for victims

of sexual assault.

• Current human relations training programs include prevention of sexual

harassment but only address sexual assault prevention and response to a

limited extent.

• Response and actions taken when a sexual assault is reported vary among

commanders.

• Timing of actions taken against victims for minor offenses related to a sexual

assault can have a negative impact on victim reporting.

• A backlog of DNA evidence is waiting for processing at the United States Army

Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL).

• Commanders are not aware of the multiple options they have to protect victims.

• The Army lacks an integrated, synergistic approach for delivering support and

services to sexual assault victims.

• The Army lacks an integrated approach for collecting, analyzing, and evaluating

sexual assault cases.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

Key Task Force recommendations are summarized as follows—

• Create a policy focused on education, prevention, integrated victim support,

thorough investigation, appropriate action, timely reporting, follow-up, and

feedback

• Create sustained, comprehensive, progressive, and sequential training that

integrates sexual assault topics into Army values and include the Army values

in all leadership and human relations training

• Establish a program structure to provide support to sexual assault victims

through Victim Advocates (VA) and Victim Advocate Coordinators (VAC)

• Establish a structured system for documentation, quarterly assessment,

reporting, and program improvement at the installation, major command, and

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), levels.

Detailed findings and recommendations are contained in the body of this report.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 3

General........................................................................................................................ 3

Purpose ....................................................................................................................... 3

Approach ..................................................................................................................... 4

Findings ....................................................................................................................... 4

Recommendations....................................................................................................... 5

Section 1—Introduction, Task Force Charter, and Approach........................................ 11

Introduction................................................................................................................ 11

Task Force Charter.................................................................................................... 11

Approach ................................................................................................................... 11

Strategy ..................................................................................................................... 12

Collection and Analysis of Data and Information ....................................................... 12

Findings and Recommendations ............................................................................... 13

Section 2—Findings and Recommendations ................................................................ 15

AREA 1: Policy, Program, Proponent, and Integration ............................................. 15

AREA 2: Education, Prevention, Training, Communications, and Command Climate

................................................................................................................................... 19

AREA 3: Incident Response, Investigation, and Action Taken ................................. 21

AREA 4: Victim Services .......................................................................................... 25

AREA 5: Data Collection, Reporting, Evaluation, and Program Improvement.......... 28

Section 3—Overview of Army Data............................................................................... 29

Introduction................................................................................................................ 29

Overview of the Problem ........................................................................................... 29

Army Victim and Perpetrator Demographics (Without Distinguishing Among

Founded, Unfounded, Insufficient Evidence, and Open Cases, 2002 and 2003)... 31

Risk Factors ........................................................................................................... 36

Medical Treatment Facilities ...................................................................................... 37

Resolution of Allegations ........................................................................................... 38

Commander’s Responsibilities............................................................................... 39

Commander’s Pretrial Options ............................................................................... 39

Commander’s Options/Other Actions After Conviction........................................... 39

Commander’s Acquittal Options............................................................................. 40

US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Data.... 40

Limitations of Army Data............................................................................................ 41

Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 42

Section 4—Program Information and Analysis.............................................................. 43

Program Reviews ...................................................................................................... 43

Army G-3/US Army Training and Doctrine Command............................................ 44
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Provost Marshal General and Criminal Investigation Command............................ 46

Office of The Judge Advocate General .................................................................. 47

Office of The Surgeon General .............................................................................. 48

Office of the Chief of Chaplains ............................................................................. 49

Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management.............................................. 50

Current Practices....................................................................................................... 51

United States Military Academy (USMA)................................................................ 52

United States Navy ................................................................................................ 54

United States Coast Guard .................................................................................... 55

University Programs............................................................................................... 56

Summary of Program Analysis .................................................................................. 57

Section 5—Report Summary......................................................................................... 59

ANNEXES..................................................................................................................... 61

A: Task Force Charter ............................................................................................... 63

B. Review of CENTCOM Theater of Operations Sexual Assault CID Files .............. 65

C. Medical Treatment Facilities and Services Available for Sexual Assault Victims . 71

D. Professional Military Education Recommendations ............................................. 77

E. Glossary ............................................................................................................... 81

F. Acronyms ............................................................................................................. 83

G. References, Resources, Bibliography.................................................................. 85
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TASK FORCE REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT POLICIES

On February 6, 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army directed the Assistant

Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA M&RA) to form a Task

Force. The Task Force members were—

Mr. John P. McLaurin III, Task Force Chair, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the

Army (Human Resources)

Mrs. Darlene Sullivan, Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Human Resources)

Colonel Denise Anderson, Office of The Surgeon General

Ms. Loretta Averna, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

Sergeant Major Frances Burke, National Guard Bureau

Lieutenant Colonel LaVerne Chester, Office of The Army Inspector General

Colonel William F. Condron, Office of The Judge Advocate General

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Einwechter, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison

Mr. Nate Evans, Contractor, Office of the Provost Marshal General

Mr. David Germain, Office of the G-3

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Jones, Office of the General Counsel

Lieutenant Colonel John McPhaul, Office of the G-1

Mr. James Northcutt, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

Mr. Jeffrey Porter, Office of the Provost Marshal General

Dr. Bonita J. Soley, Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences

Mr. Rick Spearman, Office of Strategic Communications

Mr. Guy Surian, Criminal Investigation Command

Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Ronald Thomas, Office of the Chief of Chaplains

Colonel Yvonne Tucker-Harris, Office of the US Army Community and Family

Support Center.
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Acknowledgments

The Task Force could not have accomplished its mission without the hard work of more

than 20 officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian employees who provided valuable

expertise. We appreciate the high priority and leadership support these key leaders provided.

Members of the Task Force brought vast personal and professional experience to bear in

reviewing and analyzing current Army policies and regulations regarding sexual assault.

The Task Force was aided by contractors from Booz Allen Hamilton who provided

invaluable contributions to the overall effort. These individuals provided support in developing

data collection tools, collecting and analyzing data, and providing detailed policy research and

editorial support:

Ms. Tanya Hilton COL (Ret.) Anthony Stamilio, USA

Dr. Timothy Tobin COL (Ret.) Bill McCloskey, USA

LTC (Ret.) Pauline Cilladi, USA Ms. Verena Souw

MSG (Ret.) Laura Cottingham, USA Ms. Elaine Brenner

The Task Force would like to thank the following organizations and personnel for their

support and advice:

CONNIE L. BEST, PH.D.

Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Medical University of South Carolina

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

LTC Sally Harvey, Chief, Psychology Service, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

Irene Trowell-Harris, R.N., Ed.D., Director, Center for Women Veterans

Carole L. Turner, R.N., M.N., Director, Women Veterans Health Program

DAVID LISAK, PH.D.

Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts Boston

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE®

Ms. Cheryl Guidry Tyiska, Director of Victim Services

RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK (RAINN)

Scott Berkowitz, President & Founder

Monica A. Taylor, Director of Development

Eugene F. Patrone III, Senior Vice President of The Washington Group

SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER

Patricia F. Dean, R.N., Forensic Nurse Examiner

THE MILES FOUNDATION

Christine Hansen, Executive Director

WOMEN’S RESEARCH AND EDUCATION INSTITUTE (WREI)

Lory Manning, CAPT, USN, Retired, Director, Women in the Military
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Section 1—Introduction, Task Force Charter, and Approach

INTRODUCTION

Discipline, morale, and values have always been the foundation upon which

Army units build and maintain readiness. Nowhere is this foundation more important

than in a deployed environment. Trust and confidence Soldiers have in each other and

their chain of command is fundamental to success on the battlefield. Criminal incidents

such as sexual assault erode this trust and confidence.

Because it has always sought to preserve and strengthen the foundation of

discipline, morale, and values, the Army leadership was concerned by recent reports of

sexual assault in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Theater of Operations. The

media reports outlined allegations of insufficient criminal investigations, unresponsive

systems to support victims, and inappropriate actions by the chain of command. Media

and victim advocate organizations reported that Soldier sexual assault victims were

forced to seek confidential support from organizations outside the Army because, in

some cases, members of the chain of command were allegedly involved in the

incident.

4 Reports also indicated that sexual assaults were occurring in garrison

environments and that chain of command involvement and response were insufficient.

At a minimum, these reports were troubling because of their obvious implications for

Soldier and unit effectiveness.

TASK FORCE CHARTER

The Acting Secretary of the Army directed the establishment of a task force with

an aggressive timeline, under the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and

Reserve Affairs (ASA M&RA), and with support from 14 organizations across the

Department of the Army (see Annex A). His February 6, 2004, directive required that

the Task Force be established to—

• Conduct a detailed review of the effectiveness of the Army’s policies on

reporting and addressing allegations of sexual assault

• Review the current processes to ensure a climate in which victims feel free to

report allegations and in which leaders understand their responsibilities to

support victims and to investigate allegations

• Recommend changes or additions to current policies, programs, and

procedures to provide clear guidance for reporting and addressing sexual

assault allegations and protocols for victim support.

APPROACH

For the purposes of its review, the Task Force included in its working definition of

sexual assault the offenses of rape, forcible sodomy, indecent assault, and any attempt

4 Denver Post, “Military Justice Probed; Congress to Investigate Problems Found by Post,” November 20, 2003.
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to commit these crimes as defined by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

5

We adopted the following three-phased approach to ensure a comprehensive

examination of Army policies on reporting sexual assault incidents and dealing with

allegations of sexual assault:

Phase I: Strategy

Phase II: Collection and Analysis of Data and Information

Phase III: Findings and Recommendations.

Each of the three phases is discussed below. Although time constraints

prohibited the Task Force from conducting field investigations and personal interviews,

we examined available data and program information at the Headquarters Department

of the Army (HQDA) level and conducted comparative analyses of selected Department

of Defense (DoD) and university sexual assault programs.

STRATEGY

A comprehensive sexual assault program includes prevention, immediate

response, and long-term support.

6 For the purposes of this study, the Task Force

formulated a strategic approach to ensure that our recommendations covered these

components. This strategic approach consisted of the following:

• Prevention—Education, training, and awareness initiatives to prevent sexual

assault

• Immediate Response—Timely, appropriate responses by commanders, law

enforcement personnel, criminal investigators, and legal and medical services

• Long-Term Support—Long-term support services to minimize physical and/or

psychological effects

• Evaluation process—Data collection and tracking processes, including metrics,

methods, and procedures for centralized analysis and reporting, supporting

technology, and program improvement.

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA AND INFORMATION

With a strategic approach in place, the Task Force reviewed relevant Army

policies and regulations, including AR 600-20, Army Command Policy; AR 350-1, Army

Training and Education; DODD 1030.1, Victim and Witness Assistance; and AR 608-18,

Family Advocacy Program, among others (see Annex G). We gathered and analyzed

sexual misconduct and unit command climate data from the US Army Criminal

5 For the purpose of the data review, attempts to commit the offenses of rape or forcible sodomy under Article 80,

UCMJ, and the offenses of, or assaults with intent to commit, rape or sodomy under Article 134, UCMJ, were

also considered sexual assaults.

6 The Report of The Michigan Sexual Assault Systems Response Task Force, The Response to Sexual Assault:

Removing Barriers to Services and Justice, 2001.
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Investigation Command (CID),

7 Office of The Judge Advocate General (OTJAG); and

the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI).

The Task Force reviewed various US Army programs and functional areas that

play a role in responding to sexual assault, i.e., military police; legal, medical, and

chaplain departments; and the Family Advocacy Program (FAP). The review included

analysis of the quality and appropriateness of their response to sexual assault. We also

reviewed current training offerings, including enlisted initial entry training (IET),

professional military education (PME), and human relations training, to determine where

training gaps exist.

Finally, the Task Force identified, gathered, and analyzed information about the

current procedures of sexual assault and victim service programs within and beyond the

DoD, including programs at the US Military Academy (USMA), US Navy (USN), US

Coast Guard (USCG), University of Arizona, and Purdue University. The Task Force

also met with representatives from the Virginia Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners

(SANE) program and the Navy Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program, and

studied their approaches, including materials, to determine processes that would be

relevant and effective in the Army.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

An analysis of the available data led to findings and recommendations in five key

areas—

• Policy, program, proponent, and integration

• Education, prevention, training, communication, and command climate

• Incident response, investigation, and action taken

• Victim services

• Data collection, reporting and evaluation, and program improvement.

7

The US Army Criminal Investigation Command was formerly known as the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and

has retained “CID” as its official acronym.
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Section 2—Findings and Recommendations

AREA 1: POLICY, PROGRAM, PROPONENT, AND INTEGRATION

FINDING: Current sexual assault prevention and response policies and

programs are not integrated among supporting organizations. The Surgeon

General, Provost Marshal General, Judge Advocate General, and CID have policies and

programs in place that address reporting, investigation, victim support, and data

collection related to sexual assault cases that come to the attention of the chain of

command, the military police (MP), or CID. However, the Army lacks an overarching

policy that identifies a proponent or a clear set of responsibilities directing the various

organizations involved to coordinate with each other. Without an overarching policy, the

Army does not have a clear picture of sexual assault issues, which results in a

piecemeal rather than integrated approach to handling sexual assault.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Publish a sexual assault prevention and response policy, and incorporate it

as a separate provision in Army Regulation (AR), 600-20, Army Command Policy.

Elements of the policy should include but not be limited to—

• A concise statement communicating the Army leadership’s position on sexual

assault

• Guidelines for prevention and education

• Roles and responsibilities of the chain of command

• Guidelines for a formal victim advocacy program that includes Victim Advocates

(VA) and Victim Advocate Coordinators (VAC) (see also Area 4

recommendations later in this section for roles and responsibilities)

• Existing avenues for confidential communication

• Oversight and responsibilities of sexual assault review boards (SARB)

• Appropriate actions to respond to allegations of a sexual assault and

requirements to document administrative and disciplinary actions taken in all

cases (whether or not any were imposed)

• Process for program assessment (e.g., reporting procedures, metrics, data

sources) that enables installation commanders, major commands (MACOM),

and Army-level leaders to assess program performance

• Procedures for notification to the installation Provost Marshal and CID.
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Assign one Army staff organization the primary responsibility for doctrine,

policy, program design, coordination, and training for the Army’s sexual assault

prevention and response program. The primary purpose of establishing a single

proponent would be oversight of all aspects of the Army’s program for dealing with

sexual assault. This staff organization would—

• Be responsible for Army-wide policies, doctrine, plans, and initiatives pertaining

to the Army’s sexual assault prevention and response program

• Be responsible for overall evaluation and assessment of the Army’s sexual

assault prevention and response program

• Coordinate training requirements and develop programs of instruction and other

support materials necessary for sexual assault awareness and prevention

training

• Ensure that sexual assault awareness and prevention training is incorporated

into all applicable human relations training (e.g., alcohol/drug abuse prevention

education and prevention of sexual harassment training)

• Develop and maintain an integrated sexual assault data management system.

The Task Force recommends that the G-1 be designated as the responsible staff

organization (see page 24).
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FINDING: Privileged and confidential avenues of communication exist;

however, they are not widely recognized throughout the Army as confidential

avenues for victims of sexual assault. Media reports and victim advocate

organizations have expressed concerns that some victims are reluctant to report

allegations of sexual assault to their chain of command and that there is a lack of

confidential reporting mechanisms available for Soldiers seeking assistance and

guidance. However, the Task Force found that there were several confidential avenues

of communication that Soldiers could use to seek assistance and guidance without

informing their chain of command, i.e., military chaplains, legal assistance attorneys,

psychotherapists, and the Army’s One Source Program.

8

The Task Force examined at length whether additional confidential or privileged

avenues of communication would be appropriate within the Army for victims of sexual

assault. We conclude that existing confidential avenues of communication are

sufficient, but they need to be well advertised to ensure victims are aware they exist.

Hopefully, victims will have enough confidence in the chain of command and law

enforcement personnel to come forward and report incidents of sexual assault.

The Task Force is aware of concerns expressed by victims’ advocacy

nongovernmental organizations that believe anonymous reporting mechanisms are

necessary to encourage victims to report incidents of sexual assault. We seriously

considered these concerns but conclude that publicizing existing avenues of confidential

communication will help encourage victims to seek help and report allegations and that

a separate anonymous reporting mechanism is not a recommended course of action.

The Army must balance the need for a thorough investigation of allegations against the

need for victim privacy. The Task Force is concerned that a mechanism of anonymous

reporting that fails to inform the chain of command or law enforcement personnel of the

facts and circumstances of sexual assault could be detrimental to maintaining unit

effectiveness, morale, and safety. The following example illustrates one of the many

concerns of the Task Force. In a deployed combat environment, a commander or

supervisor without knowledge of an allegation of sexual assault may unknowingly

assign a victim and the alleged perpetrator to patrol the same area or guard the same

installation. A commander needs to know of an incident not only to provide for the

safety of each unit member, but also to ensure mission accomplishment. Without

knowledge of a sexual assault incident and a follow-on thorough criminal investigation

conducted by trained and experienced personnel, commanders cannot take appropriate

action to maintain unit discipline, protect the victim, and prevent future sexual assaults.

8 Army One Source is a 24-hour, toll-free information and referral telephone service available worldwide to active

duty, National Guard, and Reserve Soldiers, and their families.
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RECOMMENDATION

Ensure information regarding the Army’s sexual assault prevention

program includes a thorough and appropriate discussion of the issues regarding

privileged communications and confidentiality, who can provide such

confidentiality, and when such information may be released to other individuals.

All Soldiers must fully understand the avenues of confidential and privileged

communication available and the responsibilities and limitations of each avenue. The

Task Force recommends that VAs and VACs be prepared to provide information

regarding avenues of confidential and privileged communication to victims or anyone

seeking such information on behalf of a victim. This information would help victims who

are reluctant to report an allegation find confidential advice and assistance.

Sexual assault prevention and response training should include information

regarding avenues of confidential communication. Such training should be tailored to

the audience and be made available in a variety of venues (i.e., Web-based information

and annual training). The training and information should include examples of the

potential consequences of delayed reporting. Such consequences could include the

inability of authorities to conduct a timely and thorough investigation; the inability of the

chain of command to appropriately care for victims or discipline perpetrators; and the

possibility that without a report to a commander or law enforcement personnel, the

perpetrator may assault others.

Within the recommended victim advocacy program, VACs and VAs should

receive training regarding avenues of privileged and confidential communications, as

well as training regarding the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act, to

understand how these laws apply to their duties. Training should include specific

examples to illustrate that although communications to a VAC or VA are not privileged

or confidential, any information provided by the victim to the VAC or VA would be

released only to those within the DoD with an “official need to know.” The VAC or VA

would not disclose information to the victim’s family, friends, colleagues, co-workers, or

others without the victim’s consent. VACs and VAs must understand that improper

disclosures, in addition to potentially violating the victim’s privacy interests, could

impede the criminal investigation and the victim’s healing process.
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AREA 2: EDUCATION, PREVENTION, TRAINING, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMMAND

CLIMATE

FINDING: Current human relations training programs include prevention of

sexual harassment but only address sexual assault prevention and response to a

limited extent. Training related to sexual assault is taught only in IET, Drill Sergeant

School, and the Senior Officer Legal Orientation Course. Required “Prevention of

Sexual Harassment” training and other human relations classes do not cover sexual

assault prevention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop a comprehensive, progressive, and sequential program to train

Soldiers and leaders in the prevention of and response to sexual assault. The

effort should be devoted to providing all ranks with information on Army policy and

programs. Unit refresher training should include sexual assault prevention and

response for application in garrison and deployed environments. Training should

educate all Soldiers on their rights and responsibilities in preventing sexual assault and

in dealing with sexual assault, if they or someone they know becomes a victim. It

should educate leaders on the protocol to follow in response to a reported incident.

Training for law enforcement personnel, care providers, legal personnel, and chaplains

should be reviewed and updated as necessary. A training support package for Reserve

Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) should be developed and implemented.

Include sexual assault prevention and response programs as part of all

PME courses. The Army should develop comprehensive, progressive, and sequential

training support packages for all PME courses. A specific package should be tailored to

each level of enlisted and officer career (i.e., Officer Basic Course, Primary Leadership

Development Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, and Officer Advanced

School through appropriate senior leadership training). Content and methods to deliver

the training should be improved as the training program is refined.

Integrate sexual assault as a danger into the Commander’s Safety Course,

unit risk assessments, and unit safety briefs. This action would enable leaders and

Soldiers to see sexual assault in the context of a key operational and Soldier welfare

program—safety. Sexual assault risk factors, prevention, and impact on unit readiness

should be included in unit safety briefings before high-risk periods, such as pre- and

post-deployment, and leisure time, such as training holidays and holiday weekends.

For example, during a weekend safety briefing, leaders could reiterate use of the buddy

system as a preventive measure.

Maximize education by using resources familiar to Soldiers and by

updating resources already in place. Training, education, and awareness venues

already exist. The Army could easily expand these to include prevention of sexual

assault training and information. Some possible examples could include—
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• Create and distribute an interactive video similar to the Army’s “Saving SGT

Pabletti”

• Add sexual assault vignettes to the Consideration of Others Handbook

• Use Web-enabled information such as Army Knowledge Online

(https://www.us.army.mil), the Army’s public Web site (www.army.mil), or the

Army’s (www.hooah4health.com).

Ensure that law enforcement, medical, and legal personnel are provided

with additional skills to deal with the psychological and sociological dynamics

involved with handling sexual assault cases. It is important to have an

understanding of the complexities and myths that are associated with the crime of

sexual assault. Law enforcement, medical and legal personnel should be aware of the

special needs of the victim. Additional skills and training should help minimize further

victimization.

Revamp human relations training to incorporate all applicable topics (e.g.,

equal opportunity, sexual assault, sexual harassment) into a broader context of

Army Values, Soldier’s Creed, and Warrior Ethos. Human relations training should

be expanded to cover all relevant topics related to unit cohesion and effective working

relationships. Sexual assault, sexual harassment, discrimination, drug and alcohol

abuse, and other similar behavior are barriers to good order, discipline, and unit

readiness. Human relations training at all stages of a Soldier’s career is critical to

prevention of human relations problems and speedy resolution of these problems if they

occur. Integrating the human relations training with Army Values, the Soldier’s Creed,

and Warrior Ethos would ensure that Soldiers know such training is an important

component of war-fighting and unit development.
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AREA 3: INCIDENT RESPONSE, INVESTIGATION, AND ACTION TAKEN

FINDING: Response and actions taken when a sexual assault is reported

vary among commanders. Army regulations require that all serious crimes be

reported to CID.

9 Although CID receives reports on incidents of rape and forcible

sodomy, less severe forms of indecent assaults are often investigated only at the unit

level. The Task Force, through the Staff Judge Advocates (SJA) in the CENTCOM

Theater of Operations, went to all commanders to determine whether all reported

incidents of sexual assault had been dealt with in accordance with existing rules and

regulations. We were able to determine that commanders took action but did not

always report the offenses to the MP or CID, nor did they complete DA Form 4833,

Commander’s Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action. Even in those cases

reported to CID, the Task Force found that commanders sometimes failed to thoroughly

complete DA Form 4833. Because of the failure to report the disposition of cases, the

Provost Marshal General (PMG) and CID do not have complete information in their

databases. This in turn, may contribute to an impression of a commander’s

“...indifference to sexual assaults.”

10

RECOMMENDATIONS

Reemphasize the requirement that commanders must report all sexual

assault incidents to the CID. Include a provision in the new sexual assault prevention

and response policy section in AR 600-20, Army Command Policy. Army Regulation

195-1 (Paragraph 6) states commanders must report all serious crimes to CID. The

new policy in AR 600-20 should reflect this existing provision.

Require battalion-level commanders (Summary Courts-Martial Convening

Authorities) to sign the Commander's Report of Disciplinary and Administrative

Action taken (DA 4833) for all sexual assault cases. Installation CID Field Activities

and SJAs should assist Special and General Courts-Martial Convening Authorities in

establishing local procedures to ensure that all DA 4833s are completed. Accurate and

timely reporting should ensure accurate statistical data upon which to base future

program assessments.

Revise DA Form 4833, Commander’s Report of Disciplinary or

Administrative Action (and counterpart actions under state military codes for

Army National Guard personnel not on active duty), to expand upon the term

“administrative.” The report should use specific language to describe action taken

such as discharge, suspension, or removal of security clearances, and/or permanent

adverse documents filed in the Soldier’s military personnel file.

9 Army Regulation 195-1 (Paragraph 6), Army Criminal Investigation Program, August 12, 1974.

10 USA Today, “Report in the Military: Female Troops Deserve Much Better,” February 6, 2004.
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FINDING: Timing of actions taken against victims for minor offenses

related to a sexual assault can have a negative impact on victim reporting. The

review of the USMA’s sexual assault prevention and response program indicated that

the possibility of adverse action against sexual assault victims for acts such as

fraternization, underage drinking, or drunk and disorderly conduct may adversely impact

victims’ decisions to report sexual assault. If a sexual assault is reported and action is

taken against the victim for the minor misconduct before action is taken against the

alleged perpetrator of the sexual assault, a victim may feel unfairly treated by the

criminal justice system. Perception of such unfair treatment can adversely affect future

victims’ willingness to report.

RECOMMENDATION

Ensure commanders are aware that they have discretion to delay action

against a victim for his or her alleged minor misconduct related to the sexual

assault allegation. In some cases, it could be appropriate to delay a decision on

whether or not to take action against a victim for minor misconduct until the final

disposition of the case against the alleged perpetrator is complete. This could reduce

the reluctance of victims to report. It also would give law enforcement personnel

necessary time to properly investigate cases.
23

FINDING: A backlog of DNA evidence is waiting for processing at the

United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL). The USACIL is

the only laboratory authorized to conduct DNA forensic testing for the DoD. The

demand for DNA testing in a wide variety of criminal, operational, and administrative

cases has more than doubled in the last 4 years and is expected to continue to

increase. Current laboratory resources are not sufficient to meet increased demand.

RECOMMENDATION

Implement a Process Action Team (PAT), coordinated by CID, to review

practices and procedures related to the processing of DNA evidence. Following a

review of practices and procedures related to DNA analysis, the PAT should make

appropriate recommendations designed to reduce backlog and processing time for all

DNA cases.
24

FINDING: Commanders are not aware of the multiple options they have to

protect victims. Existing legal options include imposition of pretrial confinement or

restriction and a Military Protective Order (MPO) (DD Form 2873) on the alleged

perpetrator, and relocation or reassignment of the alleged perpetrator or victim.

Temporary relocation of the victim or alleged perpetrator lowers the chances of incidental

contact prior to resolution of the case.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Adopt a policy that provides for consideration of geographical separation

of the victim and alleged perpetrator. Commanders should determine whether the

victim desires to be transferred to another unit. By considering the victim’s preferences

and all relevant facts and circumstances of the case, commanders potentially could

avoid subjecting the victim to “double victimization” that is sometimes perceived when a

victim is transferred from the unit.

Ensure commanders are aware of the option to use Military Protective Order

(MPO). The MPO, referred to as a “no contact order,” is an effective tool for

commanders to maintain the safety of the victim. Commanders should be made aware

of their option to use MPOs (DD Form 2873) as means to ensure the safety of victims

and witnesses of sexual assault.
25

AREA 4: VICTIM SERVICES

FINDING: The Army lacks an integrated, synergistic approach for

delivering support and services to sexual assault victims. Despite the availability

of services for victims in garrison and deployed environments, no single entity integrates

these services. The Army needs a proponent to act on behalf of the chain of command

and the victim to ensure that appropriate services are offered and provided, and that

necessary follow-up is conducted for the victim and the program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Establish a victim advocacy component as part of the sexual assault

prevention and response program that focuses on prevention, awareness,

education, and immediate and long-term victim support. The program should

provide integrated victim services and ensure that the availability of services is

effectively communicated throughout the Army. The Army should establish victimcentered procedures informing commanders, Soldiers, and staff of the location and

availability of military and civilian resources for both the garrison and deployed

environments. Crucial to the success of the program would be 1) a dynamic leadership

effort to foster a positive command climate in which victims feel free to report, and 2) a

media campaign to announce and identify victim services. The program should consist

of the following elements:

• Trained, collateral duty VAs at the battalion or equivalent level.

• An integrated, division-level command/installation level VAC with responsibility

to integrate and coordinate victim services. Variations may be required for

Reserve Component (RC) organizations and installations.

• Program management at Army, MACOM, and intermediate command levels.

VAs should be appointed at battalion, or equivalent, level (minimum grade Staff

Sergeant) and have clearly defined roles and responsibilities. VAs would not provide

counseling services but would assist victims in securing basic needs and serve as a

companion throughout the medical, investigative, and judicial process. Using an

integrated approach and existing resources, VAs would be fully trained in victim support

intervention. The duties of the VAs should include providing initial information to the

victim, including information regarding privacy and confidentiality. In their initial

consultation with the victim, VAs must explain the scope and limitations of their role as

victim advocates. The VA must also explain a victim’s options concerning, among other

subjects, his or her involvement with investigative or legal personnel. The victim would

decide to what extent the VA’s services were desired within program limits. VAs should

maintain contact with the victim throughout the medical, investigative, counseling, and

judicial process. As with the procedures for Equal Opportunity Representatives, names

of VAs should be published as the unit’s point of contact (POC) to provide information

on all available victim services. A VA should be designated for every sexual assault
26

crime victim. In the future, VAs could be used to assist victims of other violent crimes

as well.

The VAC would serve as the primary POC (integrated within the existing FAP) to

ensure timely and complete care was provided to sexual assault victims. A VAC, with

local policy and program oversight responsibility, should be established at each

installation or major RC headquarters to serve as the coordinating official for service

providers and VAs. The VAC should provide appropriate training to all VAs. A

deployable VAC should be appointed at the senior mission commander level to

coordinate these same actions in a deployed environment. The VAC would be directly

responsible to ensure that programs provide sexual assault awareness, prevention and

education training, identification of confidential sources of information, victim advocacy

services, data collection, and effective command review and proper response to each

case using the SARB. (The SARB is an existing mechanism of review to ensure that

the involved organizations (e.g., medical, legal, law enforcement, social work) have

taken appropriate steps to care for the victim and to investigate the case.

11)

Program management should be established at all levels—from installation to

HQDA. Dedicated manpower should be provided to manage the overall Army program,

prescribing goals, objectives, metrics, reporting, and management procedures. The

Deputy Chief of Staff, G1, should be the HQDA proponent, supported by the Assistant

Chief of Staff, Installation Management (ACSIM). Figure 2.A depicts the Task Force’s

proposed Installation Victim Advocacy Program.

Potential Points of

Victim Contact

Program/Policy Oversight

Victim Advocacy Services

Incident Response

Education/Communication/Training

Data Management and Reporting

E

O

Advocate

Medical

Services

Family

Advocacy

Program

Law

Enforcement

Legal Services

Chain of

C

o

m

mand

Create an integrated command/installation victim advocate coordinator (VAC) position with responsibility

for integration and coordination of victim services

Identify, select, train, and provide victim advocates

Develop metrics to track, evaluate, and improve program

Define and monitor timely victim support services

Web/Phone

Chaplains

Civilian

Agency

Potential Points of

Victim Contact

Program/Policy Oversight

Victim Advocacy Services

Incident Response

Education/Communication/Training

Data Management and Reporting

E

O

Advocate

Medical

Services

Family

Advocacy

Program

Law

Enforcement

Legal Services

Chain of

C

o

m

mand

Create an integrated command/installation victim advocate coordinator (VAC) position with responsibility

for integration and coordination of victim services

Identify, select, train, and provide victim advocates

Develop metrics to track, evaluate, and improve program

Define and monitor timely victim support services

Web/Phone

Chaplains

Civilian

Agency

Figure 2.A. Proposed Installation Victim Advocacy Program

11 MEDCOM Regulation 40-36.
27

Develop an equivalent, comprehensive program of victim support for the

RC. RC units should be able to provide services for any RC Soldier who is a victim of

sexual assault if the assault occurred while on active duty. Developing this program

would include establishing standards for services to ensure coordinated and effective

management of sexual assault cases, including access to a VA and appropriate

counseling at the installation or in the local communities.

Develop and implement memoranda of understanding (MOU) with

appropriate off-post support organizations (e.g., law enforcement, medical

facilities, and rape crisis centers). Not all sexual assaults that involve Soldiers occur

on installations, and some victims choose to report directly to civilian authorities. The

majority of Army medical treatment facilities (MTF) in the United States refer victims to

local medical facilities that have subject matter experts for collection of forensic

evidence. (See Annex C for a complete listing of MTFs and their procedures for

handling victims.) The Task Force recommends that practices be established to

manage and assist victims who choose to report to civilian medical facilities or to

receive help without reporting through military channels. Installation commanders

should establish agreements with civilian organizations to facilitate victim support or to

augment installation programs. MOUs would help to ensure that Army leaders, law

enforcement, and victim service providers were aware of and could appropriately

respond to sexual assault incidents that occur off post. MOUs would be especially

critical to the community-based RC units.

Establish standard medical protocols and tracking systems, and ensure

coordination with state and local jurisdictions to ensure that the Army has a

coordinated approach to victim services. Medical treatment facilities should track

victims to ensure they receive the healthcare treatment they need. Because each

individual has different needs and different recovery timelines, treatment varies by

patient. The existing Army One Source contract should be incorporated into the array of

available services because it would provide confidential counseling services to

accommodate sexual assault victims.

Move the responsibility for conducting SARBs from the MTF to the

installation commander. Currently, SARBs are the responsibility of the MTF

commander. This responsibility should be reassigned to the installation commander,

senior mission level commander, Regional Readiness commander, or State Joint

Forces headquarters level commander, as appropriate. SARBs should be convened

quarterly, or more frequently as required, to oversee the local sexual assault prevention

and response program, conduct case reviews, evaluate performance against stated

metrics, and make necessary adjustments. The SARB membership should include

representatives of all Army elements that can positively influence sexual assault

prevention and/or response. It is critical that SARBs establish rules and guidelines that

ensure victim privacy is protected.
28

AREA 5: DATA COLLECTION, REPORTING, EVALUATION, AND PROGRAM

IMPROVEMENT

FINDING: The Army lacks an integrated approach for collecting, analyzing,

and evaluating sexual assault cases. The Army lacks a centralized system to

document all relevant data regarding sexual assault cases, including care provided to

the victim, resolution of the investigation, and disciplinary action, if any. The Task Force

realizes that important information that could provide greater understanding about how

well the Army sexual assault prevention and response policies and procedures are

working is not being collected. Currently all available Army data on sexual assaults,

victims, and alleged perpetrators reside in disparate systems across several Army

organizations. This decentralization makes it difficult to follow victims, alleged

perpetrators, and cases between services, components, and organizations. The Army

does not possess a full set of assessment tools to ascertain sexual assault rates,

reporting rates, and victims’ perceptions of their treatment and the support services

available to them. Although some useful data on sexual assault are collected, there is

no Army-wide, standard set of metrics and procedures to track cases, to evaluate

programs and services, or to account for those victims who do not report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop an integrated approach to case management and program

assessment to facilitate data analysis and improvement of the recommended

sexual assault prevention program. As part of this approach, the Task Force

recommends development of program performance objectives, metrics, and data

collection tools. Once the program objectives are determined and performance

measurement system established, the Task Force recommends the development of a

comprehensive policy that outlines processes and procedures for data collection,

analysis, and feedback reports, including data sources and information requirements.

Publish a comprehensive program assessment policy that outlines

processes and procedures for collecting, reporting, and evaluating data,

including data sources and information requirements. This policy would help

ensure that Army data sources provide the specific data necessary to evaluate the

Army’s sexual assault environment and the program’s effectiveness. As part of this

recommendation, the Army should adopt a state-of-the-art social science survey

method to facilitate an ongoing assessment of the incidents and prevalence of sexual

assault in the Army.

Evaluate existing, connected system capabilities to track and report sexual

assault data and victim support. The Task Force found numerous systems that track

individual functional areas but do not provide a holistic depiction of sexual assault

cases. The Army should identify and review existing systems to determine whether any

system has the potential to serve as an integrated sexual assault data management

system. If no appropriate system currently exists, the Army might need to develop a

new system to meet the sexual assault data tracking needs.
29

Section 3—Overview of Army Data

INTRODUCTION

The Task Force reviewed Army sexual assault data to better understand the

scope of the problem. This section summarizes data on sexual assault offenses, ARI

survey information, limitations of Army data, and conclusions.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

The Task Force examined sexual assault data on the offenses of rape, forcible

sodomy, indecent assault attempts, and assaults to commit these offenses as defined

by the UCMJ.

12 Our review was limited to crime statistics derived from the Army Crime

Records Center’s (CRC) database 1999–2004 with 2002 and 2003 analyzed in detail.

13

However, some sexual assault cases may go unreported. There is no Army survey of

record that has addressed the extent of unreported sexual assault cases, and the Task

Force was unable to determine either the existence or the extent of underreporting.

The CRC stores records of all criminal allegations investigated by CID, offenses

that carry 6 months or more confinement, and cases that are investigated by installation

provost marshals. We examined criminal data that included cases involving Soldiers,

family members, civilians, contractors, and members of other services, as well as cases

that occurred on and off military installations. Records of criminal allegations include

cases determined to be founded, unfounded, or of insufficient evidence (see Annex E

for glossary). Figure 3.A depicts the total numbers of alleged sexual assault cases

during the past 5 years (1999–2003) as contained in the CRC records.

The Task Force also examined allegations of sexual assault to gain a broader

perspective of reported sexual assault in the Army. Note that the analysis and data

contained in subsequent sections do not distinguish between founded, unfounded,

insufficient evidence, and open cases.

12 For the purpose of the data review, attempts to commit these offenses, or assaults with intent to commit these

offenses, are included in these data.

13 US Army Crime Records Center, 2004.
30

N u m b e r o f A lle g e d R a p e , S o d o m y , a n d In d e c e n t A s s a u lt C a s e s

0

1 0 0

2 0 0

3 0 0

4 0 0

5 0 0

6 0 0

7 0 0

8 0 0

9 0 0

T o ta l 6 5 8 7 4 3 7 6 2 7 8 3 8 2 2

R a p e 3 5 6 3 7 3 4 2 5 4 4 5 4 6 9

I n d e c e n t A s s a u lt 2 1 1 2 5 1 2 3 9 2 4 5 2 5 5

S o d o m y 9 1 1 1 9 9 8 9 3 9 8

C Y 1 9 9 9 C Y 2 0 0 0 C Y 2 0 0 1 C Y 2 0 0 2 C Y 2 0 0 3

Unknown

473,879

Others Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown

Soldiers on active 482,176 479,591 518,320 620,812

Federal service

Unknown

473,879

Others Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown

Soldiers on active 482,176 479,591 518,320 620,812

Federal service

Figure 3.A. Alleged Rape, Sodomy, and Indecent Assault Cases (1999−2003)

14

As depicted in Table 3.A below, 536 of the 783 cases (69 percent) were

determined to be founded. Founded cases are those in which investigators find

probable cause for the alleged offense(s). One hundred and twenty-seven (16 percent)

were determined to be unfounded, i.e., investigators established probable cause that

the alleged incidents reported did not occur. During the same year, for 118 (15 percent)

of the cases, investigators did not develop sufficient evidence or probable cause to

prove or disprove the allegations; these cases were determined to have insufficient

evidence.

15 Two calendar year (CY) 2002 cases remain under investigation. As of

April 1, 2004, 67 of the CY 2003 cases (8 percent) remain under investigation.

2002 2003

Percentage

Increase/Decrease

Total Cases 783 822 +5%

Founded 536 492 -9%

Unfounded 127 157 +24%

Insufficient Evidence 118 106 -10%

Open 2 67 NA

Table 3.A. Sexual Assault Cases 2002 and 2003

14The number of cases for each year includes founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open cases. It

includes active duty end strength plus mobilized reserve numbers. Data were provided by G1, DAPE-PRS, for

1999−2003. The category “Others” includes family members, civilians, contractors, and members of other

services. Soldiers on active federal service (AFS) and others are provided for comparison with the number of

assault cases.

15 See Annex E, Glossary, for definitions of founded, unfounded, and insufficient evidence.
31

ARMY VICTIM AND PERPETRATOR DEMOGRAPHICS (WITHOUT DISTINGUISHING AMONG

FOUNDED, UNFOUNDED, INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND OPEN CASES, 2002 AND 2003)

• In 2002, 353 of the 783 sexual assault cases (45 percent) involved 1 or more

Soldier victims.

• In 2003, 407 of the 822 sexual assault cases (50 percent) involved 1 or more

Soldier victims.

Because a single sexual assault case can involve multiple victims and/or

perpetrators, the actual number of victims is higher than the number of cases.

16 Table

3.B below identifies the number of victims and alleged perpetrators for these cases and

the total number of victims and alleged perpetrators.

17

2002 2003

Soldiers on Active Duty

(Including Mobilized Army Reserve/National Guard)

518,320 620,812

Total Cases (from Table 3.A) 783 822

Cases Involving Soldier Victims 353 407

Total Number of Victims 894 909

Number of Soldier Victims 422 459

Female Soldier Victims 372 405

Male Soldier Victims 50 54

Total Number of Alleged Perpetrators 870 894

Number of Alleged Soldier Perpetrators 688 611

Number of Alleged Soldier Perpetrators

(in Cases With Soldier Victims)

375 295

Table 3.B. Number of Sexual Assault Cases, Victims, and Alleged Perpetrators18

16 Sexual assault case numbers may not add up because a single case can have multiple victims, perpetrators, or

offenses. A Soldier may be charged with multiple specifications of rape (different victims or different times), but

all offenses are investigated in one case.

17 The number of cases for each year includes founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open cases. The

Task Force research required combining information from three disparate systems and hand searches or sorting

of the data. The current Army system for tracking is insufficient to determine all aspects of what occurred in

these cases. Task Force recommendations are designed to establish procedures to better capture more detailed

information on victim care and disposition of cases in the future.

18 Based on additional research and receipt of updates to existing cases, more accurate and recent data were

incorporated into this report subsequent to the initial submission of data to the Task Force. This resulted in slight

variations in the numbers of victims reported in this report from those contained the initial data submission.

Future updates to existing cases may also slightly alter the data and statistical analysis.
32

In 2002, 79 percent of total alleged perpetrators were Soldiers. Of these,

55 percent were involved in cases with Soldier victims. In 2003, 68 percent of alleged

perpetrators were Soldiers. Of these, 48 percent were involved in cases with Soldier

victims. Alleged Soldier perpetrators decreased from 2002 to 2003.

The overall Soldier victim rate for sexual assault was 0.8 per 1,000 in 2002 and

0.7 in 2003. Rates in Table 3.C below were calculated using active Army end strength

plus mobilized reservists.

19

2002 2003

Victim Rate Per 1,000 Soldiers 0.8 0.7

Female Victim Rate 4.8 4.4

Male Victim Rate 0.1 0.1

Alleged Perpetrator Rate Per 1,000 Soldiers 1.3 1.0

Table 3.C. Sexual Assault Soldier Victims and Alleged Soldier Perpetrators—

Rates Per 1,000

19 Active end strength plus mobilized reserve numbers were provided by G1, DAPE-PRS: 2002: 518,320 and 2003:

620,812.
33

The highest number of victims is concentrated in the junior enlisted ranks.

20 As

shown in Table 3.D below, the victim rate for junior enlisted Soldiers was 1.7 per 1,000

in 2002 and 2003, compared with an NCO victim rate of 0.3 and 0.2 per 1,000,

respectively, for the same years.

21 Sexual assault victim rates for officers were 0.1 in

2002 and 0.2 in 2003.

2002 2003

Rank

Number Rate/1,000 Number Rate/1,000

Victims

Junior Enlisted 372 1.7 401 1.7

Noncommissioned Officer 45 0.3 45 0.2

Officer 5 0.1 13 0.2

Alleged Perpetrators

Junior Enlisted 410 1.7 356 1.2

Noncommissioned Officer 253 1.3 227 1.0

Officer 25 0.3 28 0.3

Table 3.D. Victim and Alleged Perpetrator Rank Distribution22

20 Junior enlisted Soldiers are those in grades Corporal/Specialist and below; NCOs comprise grades Sergeant

through Sergeant Major. Officer grades consist of Warrant Officers and Second Lieutenants and above.

21 Rank distribution rates contained in Table 3.D were calculated using the rank profile of the Army active end

strength provided by G1, DAPE-PRS.

 The number of cases for each year includes founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open cases.
34

Perpetrator sexual assault rates also differed by rank (although the difference

across rank for perpetrators varied less than the difference across rank for victims). In

2002, the perpetrator rates for junior enlisted Soldiers, NCOs, and officers were 1.7, 1.3,

and 0.3, respectively. In 2003, the perpetrator rates for junior enlisted Soldiers, NCOs,

and officers were 1.2, 1.0, and 0.3, respectively.

The highest rate of allegations of sexual assaults involved female junior enlisted

Soldiers victims. Numbers of victims and alleged perpetrators, by rank, for 2002 and

2003, are depicted in Table 3.E below.

2002 2003

Rank

Male Female Male Female

Victims

Junior Enlisted 41 331 48 353

Noncommissioned Officer 8 37 6 39

Officer 1 4 0 13

Alleged Perpetrators

Junior Enlisted 407 3 351 5

Noncommissioned Officer 252 1 226 1

Officer 24 1 28 0

Table 3.E. Male and Female Victims and Alleged Perpetrators by Rank23

The number of cases for each year includes founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open cases.
35

Using calculated population figures based on active end strength gender

distributions, the 2002 and 2003 rates for victims and alleged perpetrators per 1,000

Soldiers are listed below.

24

Victim Rates25

Of every 1,000—

• Female junior enlisted Soldiers—6.8 reported being sexual assault victims in

2002. In 2003, this rate rose to 7.3.

• Female NCOs—1.2 reported being sexual assault victims in 2002. In 2003,

this rate rose to 1.3.

• Female officers—0.3 reported being sexual assault victims in 2002. In 2003,

this rate rose to 0.9.

• Male junior enlisted Soldiers—0.2 reported being victims of sexual assault in

2002 and 2003.

• Male NCOs—fewer than 0.1 reported being victims of sexual assault in 2002

and 2003.

• Male officers—fewer than 0.1 reported being victims of sexual assault in

2002. In 2003, there were no reports of male officer victims.

Alleged Perpetrator Rates26

Of every 1,000—

• Female junior enlisted Soldiers—0.1 were reported as perpetrators in 2002

and 2003.

• Female NCOs—fewer than 0.1 were reported as perpetrators in 2002 and

2003.

• Female officers—fewer than 0.1 were reported as perpetrators in 2002. No

female officers were reported as perpetrators in 2003.

• Male junior enlisted Soldiers—in 2002, 2.2 were reported as perpetrators. In

2003 this rate decreased to 1.8.

• Male NCOs—in 2002, 1.5 were reported as perpetrators. In 2003, this rate

decreased to 1.3.

• Male officers—in 2002, 0.3 were reported as perpetrators. In 2003, this rate

increased to 0.4.

24

Active Army end strength figures were provided by the Army G-1 Strength Forecasting Division (DAPE-PRS).

Reliable gender and rank distributions of the mobilized reservists were not available. Active component gender and

rank compositions were used to estimate the gender and rank distribution of the combined active end strength plus

the mobilized reserve. This distribution was used to calculate rates per 1,000 among female and male junior

enlisted, NCOs, and officers.

25 The number of cases for each year includes founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open cases.

26 The number of cases for each year includes founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open cases.
36

The Task Force also studied the ages of male and female alleged perpetrators

and victims. Results are displayed in Table 3.F below.

2002 2003

Female Male Female Male

Average Age

Victim 21.8 22.5 22.4 22.9

Alleged Perpetrator 24 26.3 20.3 29.5

Median Age

Victim 21 21 21 21

Alleged Perpetrator 21 24 21 28

Table 3.F. Male and Female Alleged Perpetrators and Victims by Age

(2002 and 2003)

27

RISK FACTORS

The Task Force examined possible risk factors for sexual assaults including

alcohol, drugs, and location. Alcohol was found to be a significant risk factor. Of the

353 cases that involved Soldier victims in 2002, the available data indicated more than

half (57 percent, or 202) involved alcohol. In 2003, available data indicated that the

percentage decreased to 52 percent (215 of 407 cases; refer to Table 3.B). Drugs were

a far less significant factor; the available data indicated that drugs were involved in only

14 cases (4 percent) in 2002 and 10 cases (less than 3 percent) in 2003.

27 The number of cases for each year includes founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open cases. Average

age of victims and perpetrators is the arithmetic mean, i.e., the sum of victims’ ages divided by the number of

victims. Median ages were determined by identifying the middle value in the distribution of victims’ and

perpetrators’ ages, above and below which lie an equal number of values.
37

For location, we examined types of environments and living quarters associated

with cases that involved Soldier victims. We studied barracks, dormitories, billeting, and

tents as living quarters; and training, permanent duty, and Theater of Operations as

environments. Some sexual assault cases did not occur in any of the selected living

quarters listed in Table 3.G below; therefore, the number of cases and percentages

shown may not total 100.

2002 2003

Total Number of Cases 353 407

No. of

Cases

Percentage

No. of

Cases

Percentage

Type of Environment

Training 73 21.0 61 15.0

Permanent Duty Station 268 76.0 272 67.0

Theater of Operations 10 3.0 74 18.0

Type of Living Quarters

Barracks 173 49.0 190 47.0

Dormitories 0 0.0 2 0.5

Billeting 5 1.4 2 0.5

Tents 6 1.7 19 5.0

Table 3.G. Sexual Assault Cases by Type of Environment and Type of Living Quarters

The largest percentage of cases that involved a Soldier victim occurred in

barracks in a permanent duty environment. The training environment was the second

most common environment in 2002. Sexual assault cases in the CENTCOM Theater of

Operations increased from 10 in 2002 to 74 in 2003; during this time, active duty

strength in the CENTCOM Theater of Operations increased from 20,284 Soldiers to

165,085 Soldiers.

28 Details on these cases can be found in Annex B of this report.

MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES

MTFs provide medical care to sexual assault victims and collect forensic

evidence. Fifty-four MTFs, comprising approximately 90 percent of the fixed-facility

MTFs worldwide, provided information to the Task Force. These 54 MTFs, ranging in

size from medical centers (MEDCEN) to health clinics, provided information on hours of

operation, range of treatment available for sexual assault victims, agreements with local

civilian hospitals, availability of sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), and status of

SARBs (see Annex C).

28 The G-1 PCC provided active duty strength for the CENTCOM Theater of Operations in 2002 and 2003.
38

The SANE program offers a multidisciplinary, victim-centered method to respond

to sexual assault victims.

29 To be SANE certified, nurses are trained to care for sexual

assault victims and learn procedures for the collection of evidence. The SANE program

is rapidly becoming the preferred industry standard because “the services of trained,

experienced SANE practitioners help to preserve victim dignity, enhance medical

evidence collection for better prosecution, and promote community involvement and

concern with crime victims and their families.”

30 Seventy percent, or 46 of the MTFs,

have agreements with and use local medical facilities to collect forensic evidence.

Forty-six percent, or 25 of the MTFs surveyed, have SANE-certified nurses on staff or

available in the local community. Social work services or other counseling access is

provided at all Army MTFs. Access includes contracted services and treatment at local

civilian facilities.

As noted in Section 2 of this report, the SARB is convened to ensure that all

involved organizations (e.g., medical, legal, law enforcement, social work) have taken

all steps to care for the victim and to investigate the case.

31 Sixty-one percent or 33

MTFs currently conduct SARBs or are developing policies to do so.

RESOLUTION OF ALLEGATIONS

Commanders have tools to maintain discipline within their unit. With the advice

of a trial counsel (military prosecutor), a commander may decide whether to recommend

that an allegation merits trial by court-martial based on the facts, severity of the offense,

admissible evidence, and input from the victim. Commanders may also resort to a

variety of adverse administrative actions, including verbal and written reprimands,

administrative reductions in grade, discharge from the Army, and administrative

punishment under Article 15, UCMJ. Additionally, commanders have sufficient flexibility

to impose an administrative action for certain cases in which the available evidence

clearly supports the allegation, but the admissible evidence is insufficient to establish

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Adverse administrative actions may also be used for

cases in which the victim is reluctant to endure the testimonial aspects associated with

a public trial.

For cases in which a commander prefers charges with a view toward courtmartial, military law provides great flexibility at trial for the finder of fact. A military judge

or panel (jury) may find the accused not guilty, guilty of the charged offense, or guilty of

a lesser-included offense. Lesser-included offenses for the offense of rape under

Article 120 include indecent assault, assault consummated by a battery, assault, and

attempted rape.

The conviction rate for the offense, when combined with the conviction rate for

the lesser-included offense, identifies how many of the charged offenses resulted in a

29 Ledray, L.E., Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE): Development and Operation Guide. U.S. Department of

Justice, Office for Victims of Crime, 1999.

30 Ibid.

31 MEDCOM Regulation 40-36.
39

full or partial conviction. Thus, for the Article 120 rape data, in fiscal year (FY) 1999 a

full or partial conviction for the offense of rape occurred in 56 percent of cases (42

percent + 14 percent). The full or partial conviction rates for the offense of rape in FY

2000 through FY 2003 were 63 percent, 51 percent, 58 percent, and 60 percent,

respectively.

The statistics do not reflect or account for conviction for another offense in the

same trial. For example, a Soldier could be acquitted of a rape offense (and lesserincluded offenses) but could have been convicted of violating an Army-wide training

regulation that prohibits consensual sexual relationships between drill sergeants

(instructors) and trainees, charged under Article 92, failure to obey a regulation.

COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITIES

Reports of misconduct are ordinarily referred to the suspect’s immediate

commander.

32 Upon receipt of information that a member of the command is accused

or suspected of committing an offense or offenses triable by court-martial, the

immediate commander makes or causes to be made a preliminary inquiry into the

charges or suspected offenses. Rape and other serious offenses must be reported to

CID for investigation.

33 Judge Advocates normally assist commanders to determine

disposition of serious misconduct cases.

COMMANDER’S PRETRIAL OPTIONS

Pretrial confinement (PTC) is authorized by Rules for Courts-Martial 305. It

requires a reasonable belief that an offense under the UCMJ was committed, that the

Soldier committed the offense, that PTC is necessary to prevent flight or to prevent

serious misconduct, and that lesser forms of restraint are inadequate.

Conditions on liberty (e.g., restriction to post) may be imposed instead of PTC.

An MPO, also called a “no contact” order, may also be issued. The command may

permanently or temporarily transfer the alleged perpetrator to another unit pending

prosecution or may retain the alleged perpetrator in the unit but temporarily detail the

alleged perpetrator to other duties. Commanders, with the advice of their supporting

judge advocates, make these case-unique decisions on pretrial options seeking to

balance protection of the victim with presumption of innocence of the alleged

perpetrator.

COMMANDER’S OPTIONS/OTHER ACTIONS AFTER CONVICTION

If there is no confinement adjudged by a court-martial, the command may retain

or transfer the Soldier to another unit. If the Soldier is convicted but no bad conduct

discharge or dishonorable discharge is adjudged, the local commander or applicable

commander at a confinement facility may initiate separation.

34

32 Rules for Courts-Martial 301 and 303, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2002 ed.).

33 Army Regulation (AR) 195-1.

34 AR 635-200, chapters 13, 14, and 15.
40

Upon conviction of violent sexual offenses, the Soldier is notified of the

requirement to register as a sexual offender with the installation Provost Marshal’s office

and with the state in which the Soldier resides. Convicted Soldiers are also entered into

the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Sex Offenders Registry. The

Soldier must provide a DNA sample for registration in the FBI DNA database. If the

Soldier is confined, DD Form 2704 enables victims and witnesses to request notification

of any change in the inmate’s confinement status (e.g., parole or release from

confinement).

COMMANDER’S ACQUITTAL OPTIONS

If acquitted at a court-martial, the Soldier returns to the unit for resumption of all

normal duties. The command may transfer the Soldier if such transfer is in the best

interests of good order and discipline or if it is appropriate to give the acquitted Soldier a

fresh start. It is lawful to maintain previous “no contact” orders. The commander may

consult with the unit’s servicing judge advocate to determine whether to impose any

adverse administrative action, depending on the facts and circumstances of the

incident.

US ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

SURVEY DATA

ARI provided data to the Task Force from surveys conducted in 2000 and 2003.

The Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP), an Army-wide survey administered

by ARI every spring and fall (with the exception of spring 2003 and 2004 because of

war-related deployments), collects information on a wide range of issues important to

the Army, active component Soldiers, and their dependent family members. Army

policy makers use the survey results to assess Soldier and family well-being, develop

plans, assess policies, and evaluate program operations and outcomes.

The SSMP population consists of all permanent party, active component Army

personnel (excluding all Privates in Europe and Korea). Samples of about 10 percent of

officers and 2–3 percent of enlisted personnel are drawn using the final one or two digits

of Soldiers’ social security numbers. Since the spring of 1992, approximately 4,000

officers and 4,000 enlisted personnel have responded to each survey. Data were

collected and weighted based on Army strength levels at the time each survey was

conducted. Most recently, sexual harassment and sexual assault questions were

included in the spring 2000 SSMP, and human relations questions were included in the

fall 2003 SSMP. (Because of deployments to the Theater of Operations, the fall 2003

administration differed from previous years because the population included only those

Soldiers in garrison who were not recently or currently deployed and not preparing to

deploy.)

Although most of the questions involved sexual harassment, each survey

included one question that dealt specifically with sexual assault. In the 2000 survey, 3.2

percent of male and 6.3 percent of female Soldiers reported that within the previous 12

months, military personnel or civilian personnel in their workplace “had sex with them
41

without their consent or against their will.” In the 2003 survey, a new question indicated

that 0.1 percent of male and 4 percent of female Soldiers responded that they “have

been subjected to sexual abuse/assault within the last 12 months.”

The biannual SSMP and the Human Relations Update, conducted every 3 years,

are intended to ensure that senior leaders can keep their fingers on the pulse of the

operational Army—Soldiers and leaders in the field—on important human relations

issues that impact unit cohesion, unit performance, and readiness. As a result of the

Task Force’s recommendations, additional questions on sexual assault will be added to

these survey instruments to more fully assess Soldier experiences and their attitudes

and opinions concerning Army policies, programs, and services related to sexual

assault and victim support.

LIMITATIONS OF ARMY DATA

The Task Force encountered several challenges related to automated data in

current Army systems that often make in-depth analyses difficult. For example,

although information is available and contained in the database, in some instances, it

must be manually retrieved. Although the CID is currently transferring its automated

data from an old, outdated system to a new system, migration and validation of the data

transfer were not complete at the time of this study, so the relevant data were spread

across three different systems in different formats. In some cases, we were not able to

determine whether the data field information was entered or failed to migrate from

archival systems. In those instances, information had to be manually sorted. Analysis

of incident data revealed that, on average over the last 5 years, 67 percent of sexual

assault incidents occurred on post, and off-post incidents represented approximately 3

percent of occurrences. (Thirty percent of the incident records did not contain the onpost/off-post information.) A large amount of automated data was also missing on drug

and alcohol involvement and perpetrators’ adjudications.

Similarly, there were challenges in tracking medical data. Centralized medical

records are limited in how they track victim data. They do not track the type of medical

treatments or services victims receive. The collected data are sufficient for the medical

community. However, a more detailed case management system, run by the

installation VAC, would enable the Army to track a victim from initial contact through all

services.

Another challenge was the complexity and volume of data for each reported

incident. Because there is no single, integrated automated system to report and track

sexual assault incidents, it was difficult to gather complete data on all aspects of sexual

assault.
42

CONCLUSIONS

The Task Force’s working definition of sexual assault includes offenses of rape,

forcible sodomy, and indecent assault.

35 Data analyzed by the Task Force revealed the

following about sexual assault cases in the Army:

• More than half of sexual assault offenses involve alcohol and/or drugs.

• Almost half of sexual assault offenses occur in barracks.

• The majority of alleged victims are junior enlisted Soldiers.

• The majority of alleged perpetrators are junior enlisted Soldiers or NCOs.

• Current databases do not collect and integrate a full set of data on sexual assault

cases to enable the Army to assess the magnitude of sexual assault, the

resolution across all cases, or the causal indicators that could be used to stop

sexual assaults in the Army.

• High standards exist to provide quality care but they are not integrated.

• Sufficient data do not exist to quantify the timeliness or quality of victim support.

Despite the fact that few quantitatively supported conclusions can be drawn from

available data, two themes do emerge from the efforts to analyze these data—

The need exists to create a single data tracking system, which would facilitate

better analysis and reporting.

Effective data management techniques will be vital for ensuring the quality of

collected data.

35 For the purpose of the data review, sexual assault includes attempts to commit these offenses or assaults with

intent to commit rape or sodomy as under the UCMJ Article 80, Article 120, Article 125, and Article 134.
43

Section 4—Program Information and Analysis

PROGRAM REVIEWS

The Task Force’s review of the Army’s sexual assault policies began with a

comprehensive review of specific programs and procedures and concluded with an

assessment of how well these programs and procedures serve the individual Soldier

and Army in practice. In this section, we acknowledge some organizations that have

taken a proactive approach to improve their policies and procedures in conjunction with

the Task Force’s ongoing review and developing recommendations. We endorse these

actions because they will help ensure a timely and aggressive response to our

conclusions and recommendations. The actions that arise from the Task Force’s

recommendations represent a positive response to the need for change.

The following six Army organizations were identified as having a role in dealing

with sexual assault:

• Army G-3/ US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (Training)

• Provost Marshal General and Criminal Investigation Command (CID) (Law

Enforcement and Investigation)

• Office of The Judge Advocate General (Victim Witness Liaison)

• Office of The Surgeon General (Victim Medical Services)

• Office of the Chief of Chaplains (Pastoral Care and Counseling)

• Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (Family Advocacy

Program).
44

ARMY G-3/US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

Training in the Army is more than preventive maintenance; it is the method by

which Army doctrine is embedded into Army operations and into the hearts and minds

of Soldiers. However, the Army provides relatively little training on the prevention of

sexual assault or leadership roles and responsibilities pertaining to sexual assault.

Although the requirement to conduct sexual assault prevention training is not

specifically stated in Army regulations, it is an integral part of the Army’s training and

education objective to treat Soldiers with dignity and respect.

The Army trains its enlisted Soldiers during IET in rape prevention and use of the

buddy system for safety. Drill sergeants and other IET leaders are trained in rape

prevention and response. However, officers do not receive the same training in officer

basic courses. Cadets at the USMA receive training in leadership roles and

responsibilities pertaining to sexual assault; however, cadets in ROTC do not. Sexual

assault training is not included in all phases of PME, nor is it mandated in unit refresher

training.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, values-based human relations training, using the

Consideration of Others training methodology, became the standard across the Army as

part of unit refresher training. This training is conducted at least annually and covers a

variety of subjects, including prevention of sexual harassment, equal opportunity

complaint processing, drug and alcohol abuse, reprisal prevention and detection, and

command climate assessment—but not sexual assault. Throughout the Army, human

relations training is approached differently in garrison than it is in a deployed

environment. In a deployed environment, units respond to problems identified in the

unit and train as combat conditions permit. Although commanders are required in

garrison and in deployed environments to conduct safety briefings during periods of

increased risk to ensure Soldier awareness, sexual assault is not currently included, nor

is sexual assault included as part of pre-deployment briefings.

The G-3 has initiated the following five actions as part of its internal improvement

plan:

• Develop and implement a training program that strongly emphasizes sexual

assault as a crime that goes against the tenets of Warrior Ethos and that

directly, negatively impacts readiness across the force. The newly created

Army training program must be integrated into proponent school functional

courses.

• Update existing sexual assault prevention training modules. Modules will—

– Include definitions of all types of sexual assault

– Provide victim services information

– Present multiple reporting methods

– Present dangers of acquaintance rape

– Present dangers inherent to deployments.
45

• Develop and implement a leader’s module and incorporate it into PMEs

including pre-command, first sergeant, and command sergeant major courses.

The module should include actions that leaders should take for prevention and

response to sexual assault (see Annex D).

• Provide training support packages for unit refresher training and Consideration

of Others materials.

• Develop IET and PME human relations courses that will transition to support

the current operating environment. Sequential human relations training that

captures the interest of the audience should be developed for all PME levels.

The training must integrate command climate, Army values, and Warrior Ethos

across all human relations subjects necessary to maintain unit cohesion and

readiness.
46

PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

The mission of PMG and CID is to thoroughly investigate all allegations of

crimes, including sexual assault. Once a call is received regarding a sexual assault, law

enforcement and criminal investigative personnel respond to the scene to render

assistance to the victim, request medical assistance, and arrange transportation to a

MTF when necessary. Once the victim is escorted to the MTF, female law enforcement

personnel (when available) are dispatched to support a female victim, physical evidence

is collected, and support services information is provided to the victim.

Once the victim and crime scene have been secured, coordination is completed

with the Soldier’s (victim and/or alleged perpetrator) chain of command and legal

personnel in the investigative process. Law enforcement and investigation protocol are

the same in garrison and the deployed environments, but timeliness in a deployed

environment is impacted by notification, the immediate availability of witnesses,

environment, distance, and force protection considerations. Rapid notification from the

victim, his or her chain of command, or knowledgeable sources is critical in order to

initiate a thorough investigation. Training programs, investigative procedures, and law

enforcement protocols are consistent with similar programs in the civilian community.

The processing time for sexual assault forensic evidence examined by the

USACIL can be longer because USACIL supports DNA processing for all branches of

the US Armed Forces throughout the world. Currently USACIL has a 4- to 6-month

backlog of DNA samples for processing. Technicians are frequently required to testify

in court-martial proceedings, contributing to the backlog.

Improvement plans for the PMG/CID areas of responsibility include—

• Revise Army command policy (AR 600-20) to require commanders to report

criminal assaults to the installation provost marshal and CID special agents

• Revise reporting procedures to make the first lieutenant colonel in the chain of

command responsible for reviewing and signing the Report on the Action Taken

Against Subject (i.e., alleged perpetrator) (DA Form 4833)

• Expand specialized investigator training on victim interaction and investigation.

Specialized training will help meet the unique requirements of military

investigations and special needs of sexual assault victims36

• Request funding to hire additional USACIL laboratory technicians to reduce

backlog

• Conduct an analysis of USACIL practices and procedures using the best

practices of civilian crime laboratories to identify actions or practices that can

be implemented immediately to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and

timelines of DNA processing.

36 International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Advisory Committee, Guidelines and Standards for Victim

Oriented Policing.
47

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

The Office of The Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) is the proponent for the

victim/witness liaison (VWL) program that is designed to—

• Foster full cooperation of victims and witnesses within the military criminal

justice system

• Mitigate physical, psychological, and financial hardships suffered by victims and

witnesses of offenses

• Ensure that crime victims and witnesses are advised of their rights as

described in AR 27-10, Chapter 18.

The SJA appoints the VWLs. VWLs are not victim crisis responders—they are

employed to assist prosecutors and crime victims with the legal process. The majority

of VWLs are Army civilian employees, and their duties are normally collateral.

The VWL program does function in the deployed environment. Deployed VWLs

are typically Judge Advocate officers with the rank of captain who are new to the job

and have little or no experience as VWLs. VWL duties are always collateral duties in a

deployed environment.

Improvement plans for the OTJAG (VWL program) area of responsibility

include—

• Conduct Department of Justice (DOJ) funded regional training (sponsored by

the OTJAG and the HQDA VWL program manager) to ensure consistent

information is disseminated to the field VWLs

• Post materials from regional training conferences on the DoD Victim and

Witness Council Web site at http://www.dod.mil/vwac/

• Develop, with assistance from ARI, a VWL client satisfaction survey to gauge

program effectiveness and potential areas of improvement

• Develop a training program for new VWLs on a CD, DVD, or the Web.
48

OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

The mission of the Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG) with regard to sexual

assault is to provide medical services to sexual assault victims. In garrison, the OTSG

sexual assault program is governed by MEDCOM Regulation 40-36, which guides all

MTFs and governs the SARB process. In a deployed environment, MEDCOM

Regulation 40-36 serves as a sexual assault management guide for medical treatment

and services. Combat Support Hospitals (CSH) and Field Hospitals (FH) provide

medical care for sexual assault victims at the division level.

An overall OTSG program assessment shows that MEDCOM Regulation 40-36

provides the appropriate guidance to MTFs, but there is no uniform implementation.

Only 50 percent of facilities have functional SARBs. In the CENTCOM area of

responsibility, policies and trained staff are in place at the CSH and FH level, but there

is limited medical expertise at the division level and below.

The OTSG has identified several internal improvement plans to assist in

accomplishing its mission—

• Ensure all SARBs are established and functional according to policy.

• Develop Army Medical Department (AMEDD)-wide policy, rape kit, and rape kit

collection training. The OTSG will ensure that procedures in garrison and in

deployed environments are standardized. The OTSG will also institute formal

sexual assault training in the AMEDD Center and School. On March 1, 2004,

the Surgeon General directed the development of the Standardization of

Guidelines for the Management of Sexual Assault Victims. Included in this

directive was the development of an exportable training packet, “Sexual Assault

Responder Training,” for use by all AMEDD Soldiers in garrison or in a

deployed environment. The training includes myths and facts about sexual

assault, sexual assault definitions, areas of sensitivity regarding a victim’s

mental health, and how to help the victim. Additionally, the training will include

specific sections for the commander, counselor, physician, and concerned

friends, and lists applicable military regulations/UCMJ provisions.

• Revise procedures for social work services to contact victims who present

themselves at civilian hospitals in order to offer follow-up services provided by

the Army.
49

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS

One of the chaplaincy missions is to provide religious and spiritual support to the

sexual assault victim. The ability to engage in privileged communication with military

clergy provides the victim a confidential means to seek assistance and guidance. In the

course of providing pastoral care and counseling, chaplains encourage victims to report

sexual assault incidents and to seek medical services.

Services are different in garrison and in deployed environments. Installations

typically have a family life chaplain (FLC) with a master’s degree in counseling

psychology who provides pastoral counseling training and case consultation.

Installations with medical centers have chaplains with clinical pastoral education

training, which includes Level 3 trauma experience and crisis intervention training.

In a deployed environment, every CSH and FH is authorized one chaplain with

clinical pastoral education training. FLCs are scattered throughout the Theater of

Operations and serve in units after their family life utilization tour of duty. Chaplains

train in critical stress care at the Chaplain Officer Basic Course and receive 30 hours of

training in pastoral counseling.

Improvement plans for the Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) area of

responsibility include—

• Coordinate with the DoD Domestic Violence Task Force to incorporate sexual

assault services training into the DoD-mandated domestic violence training at

all military departments’ chaplain basic courses

• Explore ways to identify chaplains in deployed environments with appropriate

counseling and trauma experience

• Pursue certification of FLCs as trauma responders in association with traumatic

stress specialists.
50

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

The mission of the FAP is to provide training in the prevention of domestic

violence and services to family members who are victims of domestic violence,

including sexual assault. The FAP works with military law enforcement, medical, and

legal personnel, and chaplains on the installation, as well as counterpart civilian

organizations, to provide victim support. Victim advocacy is an integral part of the

Army’s FAP. The FAP is funded to provide services for domestic violence but not

sexual assaults that are not included in domestic violence. The FAP VAs provide crisis

support, information, and referral to civilian and military resources.

Army Community Services (ACS) manages the FAP, and the ACS Family

Advocacy Program Manager (FAPM) is the installation commander’s principal

coordinator for the FAP. Currently, 46 of the installations that serve medium to large

populations have established FAP VA positions. At smaller installations, victim

advocacy services are provided directly by the FAPM, memoranda of agreement, or

contracts with local organizations.

Because of FAP functions and organizational structure, potential exists for

resource sharing so that support can be provided to all sexual assault victims.

Accordingly, the Task Force recommends integrating the sexual assault VAC within the

existing FAP structure.
51

CURRENT PRACTICES

In combination with an assessment of individual Army programs, the Task Force

reviewed current practices of the USMA, USN, and USCG, and two university

programs—University of Arizona and Purdue University—that had received a DOJ grant

to combat campus sexual assault.

37

The Task Force examined the advantages and

disadvantages of each program relative to Army policies, programs, and procedures.

To fully analyze these programs with the goal of determining each program’s strengths

and applicability to the Army, the Task Force developed the following framework:

• Education/prevention: proactive approaches to educate and prevent and

reactive approaches to address victim advocacy, treatment, and counseling

• Immediate support: programs and practices available immediately following an

incident, such as medical, psychological, and legal services

• Sustained support: programs and practices available long term for ongoing

victim support throughout the process.

We reviewed the following elements in each program:

• Program demographics

• Vision and mission

• Risk management/prevention

• Services and support

• Organizational infrastructure

• Program response/treatment

• Program measures and continuous improvement.

37 Department of Justice, Violence Against Women Office, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawgo.htm..
52

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY (USMA)

The Academy’s mission is to educate, train, and inspire the corps of cadets so

that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of

duty, honor, and country; that each graduate experiences professional growth

throughout a career as an officer in the US Army; and that each graduate serves a

lifetime of selfless service to the nation. In dealing with the issue of sexual assault at

the USMA, the superintendent has articulated four goals that have been published to

the Academy at large. They are—

• Eliminate illegal behavior and provide a safe environment for cadets, staff, and

faculty

• Provide caring support for victims

• Build confidence in our system to encourage reporting of incidents

• Resolve incidents in a fair and timely manner.

38

Character development is a central theme of a cadet’s overall developmental

process at USMA; it is embedded throughout all aspects of cadet life and is anchored to

the Cadet Honor Code. Although all staff and faculty are responsible for character

development, the Commandant of Cadets is the USMA proponent. Cadets receive 64

hours of values education in their 47-month experience. Of these, 28 hours are

dedicated to elements of respect, and 15 hours are devoted to gender issues, which

include sexual harassment, date rape, sexism, gender relations, and sexual assault in

the military.

Cadets have 14 different venues for reporting incidents of sexual harassment or

assault. These range from the formal chain of command to peers and officer sponsors.

Reporting is a central component of cadet education, and reporting procedures are

posted in every cadet company area.

Although its sexual assault prevention program is fundamentally sound, over the

last 2 years the USMA has identified actions that can improve its sexual assault

program, including the following:

• Revise the United States Corps of Cadets (USCC) Sexual Assault Response

Program (SARP)

• Issue a no-contact order between alleged perpetrator and victim

• Inform the victim of proceedings and outcomes through the VWL

• Provide flexible sequencing of punishments

• Inform cadets of obligation to report incidents

• Employ a licensed female mental health care provider in the Center for

Personal Development (CPD)

38 USMA Information Paper, Sexual Assault Policies at USMA, August 2003.
53

• Ensure confidentiality of the victim’s communication with CPD

• Implement a superintendent-level Wellness Council to foster program

improvements

• Review alcohol policies and wellness programs through a PAT

• Create an integrated values survey that includes a comprehensive assessment

of cadet attitudes regarding sexual harassment and sexual assault

• Improve the Tactical Officer Education Program curriculum

• Review procedures for regulations and USMA hearings

• Add the topic of sexual assault to staff and faculty orientation

• Enhance victim assistance through the SJA.
54

UNITED STATES NAVY

The US Navy is the only service with a defined sexual assault program with

dedicated staff and funding at the headquarters and installation levels. The Sexual

Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program is a comprehensive, standardized, victimfocused program to prevent and respond to sexual assault throughout the Navy. Its

mission is to be victim-centered with regard to advocacy, response, and confidentiality.

SAVI focuses on three primary objectives—

• Awareness and prevention education

• Victim advocacy and intervention/direct services

• Data collection.

The Navy’s SAVI program includes a program manager, assistant, and 26

funded part-time or full-time fleet program coordinators. Other program highlights

include—

• Centralized department-wide reporting and tracking system, response, and

coordination; locally managed program components

• Command designation of a SAVI program POC and SAVI command

representative, acknowledging the role of leaders to “set the tone of command”

• Distinct responsibilities and purposes for command-level SAVI responders, who

can serve in multiple roles (i.e., POC, representative, data collection

coordinator)

• Integration with FAP for short-term assistance.

The SAVI program offers immediate, 24-hour response, services, and resources to

victims who report an assault.
55

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

The United States Coast Guard Rape/Sexual Assault Program is designed to

establish procedures to respond to sexual assault victims, reporting requirements to

ensure initiation and continuity of care, and geographic separation of alleged perpetrator

and victim, if required. Key elements of the USCG program include—

• Mandatory annual training for all USCG personnel

• Policy to report allegations of rape or sexual assault for investigation

• Protocols to ensure victims are not further traumatized by the investigation

• Trained victim support person for each unit

• Clarification of roles and responsibilities.

39

The USCG has volunteer, collateral duty, “victim support persons” who assist

victims in securing basic needs and serve as a companion throughout the medical,

legal, and judicial processes. Using an integrated approach and existing resources,

victim support personnel are fully trained in victim support intervention.

Because USCG is a much smaller service branch, with only 36,000 active duty

members, it has no military medical or mental health treatment centers, no crisis centers

in remote locations, and limited funds. In accordance with USCG regulation,

40 medical

personnel are not trained or equipped to provide forensic rape examinations or analysis.

These services must be obtained from trained forensic rape medical teams in the local

community within 24 hours of the alleged incident. In the event that appropriate local

community medical resources do not exist, the local commander must ensure that

selected medical personnel are trained as sexual assault forensic examiners (SAFE) in

accordance with DOJ Office for Victims of Crime SANE criteria.

39

HTTP://CGWEB.USCG.MIL/G-C/G-CCS/G-CIT/G-CIM/DIRECTIVES/WELCOME.HTM.

40

Commandant Instruction 1754.10B, Subject: Reporting and Responding to Rape and Sexual Assault Allegations,

April 2, 2004.
56

UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS

We examined two university programs that received DOJ grants to combat

sexual assault on campus—University of Arizona and Purdue University. Highlights of

their programs are listed below.

• University of Arizona

– Includes information on how to identify harassment and stalking

– Offers walk-in, telephone, referral, and crisis hotline options

– Supports victims’ rights to release information and/or pursue litigation

– Has available formal on-site and online training on prevention and

awareness for students and university departments

– Allows the victim to request confidentiality, except when the victim needs

hospital emergency room services.

• Purdue University

– Established coordinated partnership among 5 statewide programs, 8

universities and colleges, and 30 local communities to provide

comprehensive services for sexual assault victims

– Focuses on training curriculum, resources, and prevention activities to

educate and reduce future occurrences of sexual assault.

An analysis of these programs provides insights into efficient methods of

prevention, treatment, and tracking. Formal tracking of sexual assault data facilitates

program improvements based on quantifiable data.
57

SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ANALYSIS

The chart below summarizes the program elements that the Task Force identified as

helpful in developing an Army program (Figure 4.A).

Centralized tracking,

response, and

coordination

Maintains departmentwide reporting and

tracking system; track

numerous data and

trends, including victim

separation rates

Local management of

program components

Victim-centered

Dedicated funding and

staff

24-hour notification to

CNO on reports of

sexual assault

Victim Advocates

provided

Focus on prevention

education; victim

advocacy and

intervention/services;

and data collection

Navy (SAVI)

Programs should be

needs-based and

data-driven

Collect and analyze

metrics

Track satisfaction

with process

Victim Witness Liaison Tracks trends

(VWL) provides longterm support

Sustained

Support

Multiple reporting

venues

Consider unique

environmental factors

Focus on victim

support

Use civilian treatment

facilities and counselors

Dedicated structure for

coordinated approach

Focus on providing

support to victims and

protecting their rights

Victim Support Persons

serve as companion

throughout the process

Chaplains provide an

avenue of confidentiality

No-contact order

between subject and

victim

With victim consent,

informs Corps of

incidents to quell rumors

Female medical health

care provider

Immediate

Support

Focus on prevention

through education

and communication

Available formal

and/or online training

Mandatory annual

training

Values-based education

via Web site and

classroom

Education /

Prevention

USMA Coast Guard University*

Centralized tracking,

response, and

coordination

Maintains departmentwide reporting and

tracking system; track

numerous data and

trends, including victim

separation rates

Local management of

program components

Victim-centered

Dedicated funding and

staff

24-hour notification to

CNO on reports of

sexual assault

Victim Advocates

provided

Focus on prevention

education; victim

advocacy and

intervention/services;

and data collection

Navy (SAVI)

Programs should be

needs-based and

data-driven

Collect and analyze

metrics

Track satisfaction

with process

Victim Witness Liaison Tracks trends

(VWL) provides longterm support

Sustained

Support

Multiple reporting

venues

Consider unique

environmental factors

Focus on victim

support

Use civilian treatment

facilities and counselors

Dedicated structure for

coordinated approach

Focus on providing

support to victims and

protecting their rights

Victim Support Persons

serve as companion

throughout the process

Chaplains provide an

avenue of confidentiality

No-contact order

between subject and

victim

With victim consent,

informs Corps of

incidents to quell rumors

Female medical health

care provider

Immediate

Support

Focus on prevention

through education

and communication

Available formal

and/or online training

Mandatory annual

training

Values-based education

via Web site and

classroom

Education /

Prevention

USMA Coast Guard University*

* University practice s represent a compilation of good program components from the University of Arizona and Purdue University. These

programs meet the approval of the Violence Against Women Office (VAWO), Office of Justice Programs (OJP), US Department of Justice (DOJ)

final regulations governing the implementation of Grants to Combat Violent Crimes Against Women on Campuse s.

Figure 4.A. Summary Data for DoD and University Sexual Assault Programs
58

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59

Section 5—Report Summary

This report represents the Task Force’s review of the effectiveness of the Army’s

policies, programs, and procedures as they pertain to prevention, response, and care

for victims of sexual assault. Findings reinforced the Task Force’s belief that proactive

involvement by leaders at all levels is the key to successfully addressing sexual assault

in the Army.

As outlined in our recommendations, the Task Force recommends that the Army —

• Create a policy focused on education, prevention, integrated victim support,

thorough investigation, appropriate action, timely reporting, follow-up, and

feedback

• Create sustained, comprehensive, progressive, and sequential training that

integrates prevention of sexual assault with Army values

• Establish a program structure to provide support to sexual assault victims

through VAs and VACs

• Establish a structured system for documentation, reporting, quarterly

assessment, and program improvement at the installation, MACOM, and HQDA

levels.

The Army senior leadership’s establishment of the Task Force emphasizes its

commitment to Soldiers. The recommendations of the Task Force are important first

steps toward increasing the awareness and prevention of sexual assault, improving the

command climate in which Soldiers feel safe to report assaults, and in providing support

and care for victims.
60

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61

ANNEXES

A. TASK FORCE CHARTER

B. REVIEW OF CENTCOM THEATER OF OPERATIONS SEXUAL ASSAULT CID FILES

C. MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES AND SERVICES AVAILABLE FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT

VICTIMS

D. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION RECOMMENDATIONS

E. GLOSSARY

F. ACRONYMS

G. REFERENCES, RESOURCES, BIBLIOGRAPHY
62

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63

A: TASK FORCE CHARTER
64

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65

B. REVIEW OF CENTCOM THEATER OF OPERATIONS SEXUAL ASSAULT CID FILES

(Information as of March 5, 2004)

The Task Force reviewed 91 sexual assault cases in the CENTCOM Theater of

Operations. The cases included founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open

cases. The goals of the review were to 1) gather information and data for further

analysis of sexual assault in the Theater of Operations, 2) review data for trends, and

3) identify programs, practices, and support services available for Soldier victims in the

Theater of Operations. The majority of alleged perpetrators and victims were US

military personnel, but some alleged perpetrators were foreign nationals and coalition

forces (Figure B.1).

Civilian Coalition Forces

Egypt 1 Italy (CPT) 1

Kuwait 1 UK (RSGM) 1

India 1 Egypt 1

Afghanistan 1

Other 2

Figure B.1. Foreign National and Coalition Alleged Perpetrators for January 2003

through March 5, 2004

The cases reviewed included initial, subsequent, and final reports of 107 total offenses

of rape, forcible sodomy, and/or indecent assault (Figure B.2).

Offenses (107)

Closed Open

Rapes 28 13

Sodomy 13 5

Indecent Assault 42 6

Location of Offenses

Iraq 82

Kuwait 15

Afghanistan 10

Figure B.2. Total Number of CENTCOM Offenses and Location of Offenses for January

2003 through March 5, 200441

The number of cases for each year includes founded, unfounded, insufficient evidence, and open cases.
66

The analysis revealed several possible scenarios of alleged perpetrator and

victim involvement (Figure B.3). For example, in some cases, more than one type of

offense occurred, such as rape and forcible sodomy. In addition, in some cases, there

was one alleged perpetrator and one victim, while in others there was more than one of

either.

Case Party

Incident #1

Victim A

Perpetrator A

Victim A

Perpetrator B

Victim A

Perpetrator C

Indecent

Assault

Offense #1

Rape

Offense #2

Sodomy

Offense #3

3 Perpetrators

1 Victim

Case

In a Vehicle

Incident #1

In a Hotel

Incident #2

In the

Barracks

Shower

Incident #3

Indecent

Assault

Offense #2

Victim A

Perpetrator A

Victim B

Perpetrator A

Indecent

Assault

Offense #1

Indecent

Assault

Offense #3

Victim C

Perpetrator A

1 Perpetrator

3 Victims

Case Party

Incident #1

Victim A

Perpetrator A

Victim A

Perpetrator B

Victim A

Perpetrator C

Indecent

Assault

Offense #1

Rape

Offense #2

Sodomy

Offense #3

Case Party

Incident #1

Party

Incident #1

Victim A

Perpetrator A

Victim A

Perpetrator B

Victim A

Perpetrator C

Indecent

Assault

Offense #1

Rape

Offense #2

Sodomy

Offense #3

3 Perpetrators

1 Victim

Case

In a Vehicle

Incident #1

In a Vehicle

Incident #1

In a Hotel

Incident #2

In a Hotel

Incident #2

In the

Barracks

Shower

Incident #3

Indecent

Assault

Offense #2

Victim A

Perpetrator A

Victim B

Perpetrator A

Indecent

Assault

Offense #1

Indecent

Assault

Offense #3

Victim C

Perpetrator A

1 Perpetrator

3 Victims

Figure B.3. Illustrative Example of What Constitutes a Case

Although the review did not establish assault patterns, it did indicate that a high

number of junior enlisted Soldiers were alleged perpetrators and victims. Of the

188 military personnel involved, nearly 84 percent of alleged perpetrators were

identified as junior enlisted Soldiers or noncommissioned officers with the rank of

Sergeant and Staff Sergeant (SSG). When the numbers of victims were examined, we

determined that 95 percent were SSG or below. In 43 percent of these cases, the

alleged perpetrators and victims were members of the same unit. No cases involved an

alleged perpetrator or victim above the rank of major. Two victims were from other

services, the US Air Force and the US Marine Corps, and are included because the

assaults occurred within Army jurisdiction. The rank distribution for alleged perpetrator

and victim is provided in Figure B.4.

The Task Force was unable to determine the rank of all Soldiers involved

because identifying factors were not completely entered into some CID reports.
67

Alleged Perpetrators Victims

Rank No. of Soldiers Rank No. of Soldiers

PVT 2 PVT 4

PV2 3 PV2 3

PFC 6 PFC 27

SPC 24 A1C 1 *

SGT 17 LCpl 1**

SSG 19 SPC 47

SFC 7 SGT 13

MSG 3 SSG 5

CPT 2 SFC 1

1LT 2

MAJ 1

UNK 15 UNK 3

* USAF

** USMC

Figure B.4. Rank Distribution for Alleged Perpetrators and Victims in CENTCOM
68

One of the primary goals of the Task Force review was to analyze data to

determine patterns and identify trends. This included determining whether more

assaults occurred in combat, combat support, or combat service support type units and

Active Component (AC) or Reserve Component (RC) (Figure B.5). The review noted

that 65 percent of victims and 51 percent of perpetrators were assigned to Active

Combat Service Support units. Given the incomplete data and random occurrences of

assaults, the Task Force could identify no conclusions or patterns. In some cases, the

components of the alleged perpetrators and victims were difficult to determine because

of a significant number of AC and RC Soldiers assigned to multi-component units.

Unit Type by Victim

Active Army Army National Guard Army Reserve

Combat 11 0 0

Combat Support 10 3 6

Combat Service Support 36 8 12

Unit Type by Perpetrator

Active Army Army National Guard Army Reserve

Combat 14 2 1

Combat Support 9 2 5

Combat Service Support 26 3 6

Unknown −12

Foreign National − 9

Figure B.5. Unit Type by Victim and Perpetrator

Determining which victim support programs and services were available in the

Theater of Operations was difficult. The CID report files did not provide information

about victim treatment or the legal disposition of alleged perpetrators, especially in

cases involving non-US Soldiers or foreign nationals, because these cases were

referred back to respective country authorities. Subsequent and final reports did not

always report victim disposition data. This was partly because follow-on information is

not available to the CID agent and because the CID report focuses on the investigation

of the crime rather than ongoing care provided to the victim. A few agents were able to

capture some victim service information when the victim did not delay reporting the

incident and when follow-on actions occurred immediately after the assault (i.e., use of

rape kit, treatment at medical facility). In these cases, the CID agent escorted the victim

to the medical treatment facility (MTF).

In the cases in which the victim decided not to cooperate, recanted his or her

story, or there was lack of evidence, the investigation was often terminated, and little

useful data or lessons learned could be gleaned from the report. Termination of an

investigation did not mean that a sexual assault did not occur. It only meant the
69

investigator could go no further to determine probable cause or prove or disprove an

allegation.

After completing the files review and analyzing the data, the Task Force

concluded that the CID’s responses to sexual assault allegations were usually

immediate. It also found that investigations were initiated quickly after a report was

received and were completed as meticulously as possible.
70

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71

C. MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES AND SERVICES AVAILABLE FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS

Name of MTF

Hours of

Operation

Full Medical

Care for SA

Victims?

Notifies

MPs ?

Refers to

Civilian

Facilities?

Name of Civilian

Facility

Transports

to Civilian

Hospital?

Alerts

Civilian

Hospital?

MOA With

Civilian

Hospital?

SANE at

Civilian

Hospital?

Social 

Coun

Prov

USFK,18th MEDCOM, Korea

24/7 ER at 121stGeneral Hospital Y Y NA NA NA NA NA NA 

PACIFIC REGION*USA MEDDAC, Japan 0700-1630 N Y N NA NA NA NA NA Tripler Army Medical Center,Hawaii 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA NA WESTERN REGIONMadigan Army Medical Center, FtLewis, WA 24/7 ER Y Y If Needed NA NA NA NA Y Weed Army Community Hosp, FtIrwin, CA 24/7 ER Y Y If Needed NA NA NA NA Y California Medical Detachment,

Monterrary, CA 0730-1600 N Y Y

Community

Hospital of

Monterray N N Y Y 

Troop Medical Clinic,

Ft Richardson, AK 0730-1600

Y

(Elmendorf

AFB) Y Y

Alaska Regional

Hospital,

Anchorage, AK N Y Y Y 

Bassett Army Community Hosp,

Ft Wainwright, AK 0730-1630 Y Y If Needed

Fairbanks

Memorial

Hospital Y Y

Under

Discussion Y

O

Req

EUROPEAN REGIONLandstuhl Army Regional MedicalCenter, Germany 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA NA 

- Subordinate Clinics include:

NATO and SHAPE (Belgium);

Baumholder, Dexheim, Kleber,

and Wiesbaden (Germany);

Livorno and Vicenza (Italy).

Various hours, no

24 Hour service N Y Y Local hospitals

Y (MTF or

via local

service) Y Y NA 
72

C. Medical Treatment Facilities and Services Available for Sexual Assault Victims (CONTINUED)

Name of MTF

Hours of

Operation

Full Medical

Care for SA

Victims?

Notifies

MPs ?

Refers to

Civilian

Facilities?

Name of Civilian

Facility

Transports

to Civilian

Hospital?

Alerts

Civilian

Hospital?

MOA With

Civilian

Hospital?

SANE at

Civilian

Hospital?

Social 

Coun

Prov

Wuerzburg Army Hospital,Germany 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA NA 

- Subordinate Clinics include:

Bamberg, Giebelstadt,

Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels,

Illsheim, Katterbach, Kitzingen,

Schweinfurt, and Vilseck

(Germany)

Various hours, no

24 Hour service N Y Y Local hospitals

Y (MTF or

via local

service) Y Y NA 

Heidelberg Army Medical

Department Activity, Germany 24/7 ER Y Y Y

Heidelberg

University

Frauen Klinik Y Varies N NA 

- Subordinate Clinics include:

Babehausen, Buedingen,

Butzbach, Coleman, Darmstadt,

Friedberg, Hanau, Mannheim,

and Stuttgart (Germany)

Various hours, no

24 Hour service N Y Y Local hospitals

Y (MTF or

via local

service) Y Y NA 
73

C. Medical Treatment Facilities and Services Available for Sexual Assault Victims (CONTINUED)

Name of MTF

Hours of

Operation

Full Medical

Care for SA

Victims?

Notifies

MPs?

Refers to

Civilian

Hospital?

Name of

Civilian

Hospital?

Transports

to Civilian

Hospital?

Alerts

Civilian

Hospital?

MOA With

Civilian

Hospital?

SANE at

Civilian

Hospital?

Social 

Coun

Prov

GREAT PLAINS REGIONWilliam Beaumont Army Medical

Center, Ft Bliss, TX 24/7 ER Y Y If Needed

Sierra Vista

Regional

Medical Center Y Y Y

Y (and MTF

has 3) 

Brooke Army Medical Center, Ft

Sam Houston, TX 24/7 ER N Y Y

Methodist

Specialty and

Transplant Y Y Y Y 

Evans Army CommunityHospital, Ft Carson, CO 24/7 ER N Y Y

Memorial

Hospital Y Y Y Y 

Darnell Army Community

Hospital, Ft Hood, TX 24/7 ER Y Y Y

Scott and

White

Memorial

Hospital N Y N Y 

Raymond J. Bliss Army Health

Center, Fort Huachuca, AZ 0730-1630 N Y Y

Sierra Vista

Regional

Medical Center N Y Y

N (One is in

training; goal

is Oct 04) 

Munson Army Health Center,

Fort Leavenworth, KS 24/7 ER N Y Y

Cushing

Hospital,

Leavenworth,

KS Y Y Under review Y 

Gen Leonard Wood Army

Community Hospital, Ft Leonard

Wood, MO 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA NA 

Bayne Jones Army CommunityHospital, Ft Polk, LA 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA NA Irwin Army Community Hospital,Ft Riley, KS 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA NA 

Reynolds Army Community

Hospital, Ft Sill, OK 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA NA 
74

C. Medical Treatment Facilities and Services Available for Sexual Assault Victims (CONTINUED)

Name of MTF

Hours of

Operation

Full Medical

Care for SA

Victims?

Notifies

MPs?

Refers to

Civilian

Hospital?

Name of

Civilian

Hospital?

Transports

to Civilian

Hospital?

Alerts

Civilian

Hospital?

MOA With

Civilian

Hospital?

SANE at

Civilian

Hospital?

Social 

Coun

Prov

SOUTHEAST REGIONDwight David Eisehower ArmyMedical Center, Ft Gordon, GA 24/7 ER Y Y If Needed

Rape Crisis

Center N NA N Y 

Blanchfield Army CommunityHospital, Ft Campbell, KY 24/7 ER Y Y If Needed

Vanderbilt,

Nashville, TN If Needed Y N N 

Fox Army Community Hospital,

Redstone Arsenal, AL 0730-1800 N Y Y

Huntsville

Hospital N Y Y N 

Lawrence Joel Army Health

Clinic, Ft McPherson, GA 0730-1630 N Y Y

Grady Health

System, Rape

Crisis Unit Y N N N 

Lawrence Joel Army Health

Clinic, Ft Gillem, GA 0700-1800 N Y Y

Grady Health

System, Rape

Crisis Unit Y N N N 

Lyster Army Community Hospital,Ft Rucker, AL 0730-1600 N Y Y

Flowers

Hospital or

Dale Medical

Center Y Y Y N 

Martin Army Community

Hospital, Ft Benning, GA 24/7 ER Y Y Y

St Francis

Bradley N Y N N 

Moncrief Army Community

Hospital, Ft Jackson, SC 24/7 UCC N Y Y

Palmetto

Richland

Memorial

Hospital Y Y Y Y 

Rodriguez Army Health Clinic, FtBuchanan, PR 0730-1600 N Y Y

San Pablo

Hospital N Y Y N 

Tuttle Army Health Clinic, Ft

Stewart, GA 0700-1800 N Y Y

Memorial

Hospital or

Winn Army

Community

Hospital Y Y Y Y 

Winn Army Community Hospital,

Ft Stewart, GA 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA Y N
75

C. Medical Treatment Facilities and Services Available for Sexual Assault Victims (CONTINUED)

Name of MTF

Hours of

Operation

Full Medical

Care for SA

Victims?

Notifies

MPs?

Refers to

Civilian

Hospital?

Name of Civilian

Hospital?

Transports to

Civilian

Hospital?

Alerts

Civilian

Hospital?

MOA With

Civilian

Hospital?

SANE at MTF

and/or Civilian

Hospital?

Social W

Couns

Provid

NORTH ATLANTIC REGIONWalter Reed Army Medical

Center, Washington, DC 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA N Y 

Womack Army MedicalCenter, Ft Bragg, NC 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA Y Y Ainsworth Army HealthClinic, Ft Hamilton, NY 0730-1630 N Y Y Victory Y (Civ EMS) Y N Unknown Y 

Barquist Army Health Clinic,

Ft Detrick, MD 0730-1600 N Y Y

Frederick Memorial

Hospital Y Y N Unknown Contra

Craven Army Health Clinic,Ft Monroe, VA 0730-1630 N Y Y

Riverside Regional

MEDCEN N Y N N Y 

DiLorenzo Health Clinic, The

Pentagon, Washington, DC 0700-1600 N Y Y

WRAMC or

Arlington County

Hospital N Y N Unknown Y 

DeWitt Army CommunityHospital, Ft Belvoir, VA 24/7 ER N Y Y Fairfax INOVA Y Y N Y N 

Dunham Army Health Clinic,

Carlisle Barracks, PA 0730-1600 N Y Y Carlisle Hospital

Y (arranged

locally) Y N N Y 

Guthrie Medical Department

Activity, Ft Drum, NY 0730-2300 N Y Y

Samaritan Medical

Center Y Y N Y Y 

Ireland Army Community

Hospital, Ft Knox, KY 24/7 ER N Y

Y

(working)

Advocacy & Support

Center,

Elizabethtown Y (CID escort) Y Working Y Y 

Keller Army CommunityHospital, West Point, NY 24/7 ER Y Y N NA NA NA NA N Y 

Kenner Army Health Clinic,

Ft Lee, VA

0730-2000 M-F0800-1200 Sat N Y Y

Medical Colege of

VA Y (MPs) Y N Y Y 
76

C. Medical Treatment Facilities and Services Available for Sexual Assault Victims (CONTINUED)

Name of MTF

Hours of

Operation

Full Medical

Care for SA

Victims?

Notifies

MPs?

Refers to

Civilian

Hospital?

Name of Civilian

Hospital?

Transports to

Civilian

Hospital?

Alerts

Civilian

Hospital?

MOA With

Civilian

Hospital?

SANE at MTF

and/or Civilian

Hospital?

Social W

Couns

Provid

Kimbrough Ambulatory

Health Clinic, Ft Meade, MD 0730-1600 N Y Y

(National Naval

Medical Center if

medically stable.)

Laurel Regional

Hospital & North

Arundel Regional

Hospital Y Y

Y

(Requires

Updating)

NNMC - Y

Nr Arundel - Y

Laurel - N

Both in-

and purc

car

Kirk AHC, Aberdeen ProvingGround, MD 0530-1630 N Y Y

Franklin Square,

Upper Chesapeake

MEDCEN, Harford

Memorial Hospital N Y Y Y N 

McDonald Army Community

Hospital, Ft Eustis, VA 0700-2200 N Y Y

Riverside Regional

Medical Center Y Y N Y Y 

Patterson Army Health Clinic,Ft Monmouth, NJ

0730-1630,2000 W/TH,0900-1400 Sat N Y Y

Riverview Medical

Center, Red Bank,

NJ

Post EMS or

Clinic

Transport Y Y Y Y 

Rader Army Health Clinic, FtMyer, VA 0730-1600 N Y Y INOVA Fairfax, VA N Y Y Y Y Troop Medical Clinic andWalson Air Force Clinic, Ft

Dix, NJ

0730-1630 M-F0730-0930Weekend N Y Y Virtua Y (EMS) Y N N Y 

USAHC, Ft Story, VA 0730-1600 N Y Y

Portsmouth Naval

Hospital Y Y 
77

D. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION RECOMMENDATIONS

The following three figures (Figure D.1–Figure D.3) depict the complete

progression of a Soldier’s training. Sexual assault training should be included at all

levels and throughout a Soldier’s career (enlisted, warrant officer, and commissioned

officer). Currently, training on prevention of sexual assault for enlisted Soldiers exists

only at the initial entry training (IET) and Drill Sergeant School. Training modules

should be added that are sequential and progressive, and that include actions leaders

should take for prevention and response to sexual assault, as well as to handle its

impact on readiness across the force.

Figure D.1. Recommended Enlisted Soldier and NCO Education

Basic Combat Training (IET)* Soldier Level

Leader

Response;

Active Victim

Intervention

Education;

Risk

Mitigation;

Prevention

Soldier Level

Soldier Level

Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)

Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course*

Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course

Team Level

Squad Level

IET Environment

Platoon Level

Company Level

Battalion Level

Senior Leader Level

* Some rape prevention/sexual assault training currently existrse;commend revision to incorporate program

Sergeant Major Academy

First Sergeant Course

Drill Sergeant School*

Unit Consideration of Others Programs (CO2)

Basic Combat Training (IET)* Soldier Level

Leader

Response;

Active Victim

Intervention

Education;

Risk

Mitigation;

Prevention

Soldier Level

Soldier Level

Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)

Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course*

Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course

Team Level

Squad Level

IET Environment

Platoon Level

Company Level

Battalion Level

Senior Leader Level

* Some rape prevention/sexual assault training currently existrse;commend revision to incorporate program

Sergeant Major Academy

First Sergeant Course

Drill Sergeant School*

Unit Consideration of Others Programs (CO2)

Command Sergeant Major

Course

Unit Refresher Training (AR 600-20/AR 350-1)
78

Basic Combat Training (IET)* Soldier Level

Leader

Response;

Active Victim

Intervention

Education;

Risk

Mitigation;

Prevention

Unit Refresher Training (AR 600-20/AR 350-1) Soldier Level

Soldier Level

Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)

Warrant Officer Candidate

Warrant Officer Advanced

Team Level

Company Level

Battalion Level

* Some rape prevention/sexual assault training currently exists; recommend revision to incorporate program

Warrant Officer Staff Course

Warrant Officer Basic Course

Unit Consideration of Others Programs (CO2)

Platoon Level

Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course Senior Leader Level

Squad Level

Basic Combat Training (IET)* Soldier Level

Leader

Response;

Active Victim

Intervention

Education;

Risk

Mitigation;

Prevention

Unit Refresher Training (AR 600-20/AR 350-1) Soldier Level

Soldier Level

Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)

Warrant Officer Candidate

Warrant Officer Advanced

Team Level

Company Level

Battalion Level

* Some rape prevention/sexual assault training currently exists; recommend revision to incorporate program

Warrant Officer Staff Course

Warrant Officer Basic Course

Unit Consideration of Others Programs (CO2)

Platoon Level

Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course Senior Leader Level

Squad Level

Figure D.2. Recommended Warrant Officer Education
79

Figure D.3. Recommended Commissioned Officer Education

Basic Officer Leader Course I

(Pre-commissioning – ROTC/OCS/USMA)

Soldier Level

Leader

Response;

Active Victim

Intervention

Education;

Risk

Mitigation;

Prevention

Unit Refresher Training (AR 600-20/AR 350-1) Soldier Level

Soldier Level

Basic Officer Leader Course II

Captain’s Career Course

Intermediate Level Education

IET Environment

Platoon Level

Company Level

Battalion Level

Senior Leader Level

* Some rape prevention/sexual assault training currently exists; recommend revision to incorporate program

Senior Service College

Battalion Pre-Command Course

IET Pre-Command/Cadre Course*

Unit Consideration of Others Programs (CO2)

Brigade Pre-Command Course* Senior Officer Legal Orientation

Basic Officer Leader Course I

(Pre-commissioning – ROTC/OCS/USMA)

Soldier Level

Leader

Response;

Active Victim

Intervention

Education;

Risk

Mitigation;

Prevention

Unit Refresher Training (AR 600-20/AR 350-1) Soldier Level

Soldier Level

Basic Officer Leader Course II

Captain’s Career Course

Intermediate Level Education

IET Environment

Platoon Level

Company Level

Battalion Level

Senior Leader Level

* Some rape prevention/sexual assault training currently exists; recommend revision to incorporate program

Senior Service College

Battalion Pre-Command Course

IET Pre-Command/Cadre Course*

Unit Consideration of Others Programs (CO2)

Brigade Pre-Command Course* Senior Officer Legal Orientation
80

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81

E. GLOSSARY

Alleged Perpetrator—One who has been accused of committing a crime, including

any report of a crime to police authorities of a known or unknown person.

Army Values—Loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal

courage (leadership).

Case—A formal investigative file that may contain multiple incidents, offenses,

victims, and offenders (i.e., perpetrators).

CENTCOM Theater of Operations—Includes Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait.

Confidentiality—The term used in this report to describe the general principle that

the Privacy Act prohibits the unauthorized release of personal information except to

those who have an "official need to know" or if such release furthers a lawful exercise

of public office (e.g., the release of certain information by a law enforcement official in

the course of an investigation when release is necessary to carry out an

investigation).

42

Founded Case—A determination made by the CID that a criminal offense has been

committed. The determination that a founded offense exists is an investigative

decision independent of any judicial opinion or disciplinary action.

43

Incident—One or more offenses committed by the same offender (perpetrator), or

group of offenders, acting in concert at the same time and place.

Insufficient Evidence—1) The inability of an investigation to determine that a

reported or alleged criminal offense did or did not occur, or 2) the inability to establish

probable cause to believe that an alleged offender did or did not commit an offense.

44

Perpetrator—One who has committed a crime; offender.

Privilege or Claim of Privilege—The assertion by any person of a privilege to

1) refuse to be a witness; 2) refuse to disclose any matter; 3) refuse to produce any

object or writing; or 4) prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter

or producing any object or writing.

45

Sexual Assault—Offenses of rape, forcible sodomy, and indecent assault, or

attempts to commit these crimes.

46

42 AR 25-55, Department of Army, Freedom of Information Act Program, AR 340-21, The Army Privacy Program.

43 CIDR 195-1, Paragraph 7-6c.

44 Ibid.

45 Military Rules of Evidence (MRE) 501(b).

46 For the purpose of the data review, attempts to commit these offenses or assaults with intent to commit rape or

sodomy as under UCMJ Article 80, Article 120, Article 125, and Article 134.
82

Sexual Harassment—A form of gender discrimination that involves unwelcome

sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a

sexual nature when—

– Submission to or rejection of such conduct is made either explicitly or

implicitly a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, career.

– Submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for career or

personal decisions affecting that person.

– Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an

individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

working environment.

– Any person in a supervisory or command position uses or condones implicit

or explicit sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or

job of a Soldier or civilian employee.

– Any Soldier or civilian employee makes deliberate or repeated unwelcome

verbal comments, gestures, or physical contact of a sexual nature.

47

Unfounded Case—A determination made by the CID that a criminal offense did not

occur. This determination must be based on demonstrative evidence. A lack of

evidence to support a complaint or questioning of certain elements of a complaint is

not sufficient to categorize an incident as unfounded. A finding of insufficient evidence

is not a basis for labeling an offense as unfounded.

48

Victim Advocate—Trained Soldiers who provide support to sexual assault victims.

Victim Advocate Coordinator—The single POC who 1) ensures that timely and

complete care is provided for sexual assault victims; 2) provides essential

coordination and is the focal point for service providers and Victim Advocates (VA);

3) provides for the training of all VAs; 4) is responsible to ensure that programs are in

place that provide sexual assault awareness, prevention and education training,

identification of confidential sources of information, victim advocacy services, data

collection, data reporting, and effective command review and proper response to each

case using the SARB.

Warrior Ethos—The desire to accomplish the mission despite all.

49

47 Army Regulation 600-20, Prevention of Sexual Harassment, May 13, 2002.

48 CIDR 195-1, Paragraph 7-6c.

49 Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, August 1999.
83

F. ACRONYMS

AC Active Component

ACS Army Community Services

AMEDD Army Medical Department

AR Army Regulation

ARI Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

ASA (M&RA) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

ACSIM Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management

CENTCOM Central Command

CID Criminal Investigation Division

CPD Center for Personal Development

CRC Crime Records Center

CSH Combat Support Hospital

CY Calendar Year

DA Department of the Army

DoD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

DIBRS Defense Incident Based Reporting System

DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid

FAP Family Advocacy Program

FAPM Family Advocacy Program Manager

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FH Field Hospital

FLC Family Life Chaplain

FY Fiscal Year

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army

IET Initial Entry Training

MACOM Major Command

MEDCEN Medical Center

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MP Military Police

MPO Military Protective Order

MTF Medical Treatment Facility

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

OCCH Office of the Chief of Chaplains

OTJAG Office of The Judge Advocate General

OTSG Office of The Surgeon General

PAT Process Action Team

PCC Personnel Contingency Cell

PME Professional Military Education

PMG Provost Marshal General

POC Point of Contact

PTC Pretrial Confinement

RC Reserve Component (Army National Guard and Army Reserve)
84

ROTC Reserve Officers Training Corps

SAFE Sexual Assault Forensic Examiner

SANE Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner

SARB Sexual Assault Review Board

SARP Sexual Assault Response Program

SAVI Sexual Assault Victim Intervention

SGT Sergeant

SJA Staff Judge Advocate

SSG Staff Sergeant

SSMP Sample Survey of Military Personnel

STRATCOM Strategic Communications

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TSP Training Support Package

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

USACIL United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory

USCC United States Corps of Cadets

USMA United States Military Academy

USN United States Navy

USCG United States Coast Guard

VA Victim Advocate

VAC Victim Advocate Coordinator

VWL Victim/Witness Liaison

WWW World Wide Web
85

G. REFERENCES, RESOURCES, BIBLIOGRAPHY

Army Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, August 1999

Acting Secretary of the Army memo, Subject: Task Force on Sexual Assault Policies,

February 6, 2004

Army G-1, Human Resources Directorate (DAPE-HR)

Army G-3 Training Recommendations, March 22, 2004

Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (https://www.us.army.mil)

Army Public Web Site (www.army.mil)

Army Regulation 25-55, The Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act

Program, November 1, 1997

Army Regulation 27-10, Military Justice, September 6, 2002

Army Regulation 190-45, Law Enforcement Reporting, October 20, 2000

Army Regulation 195-1, Army Criminal Investigation Program, August 12, 1974

Army Regulation 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, October 30, 1985

Army Regulation 340-21, The Army Privacy Program, July 5, 1985

Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Education, April 9, 2003

Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, May 13, 2002

Army Regulation 608-18, The Army Family Advocacy Program, October 20, 2003

Army Regulation 635-200, Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations, December

19, 2003

Army Sexual Assault—Prevention and Response. An Army Handbook. Channing L.

Bete Co., Inc., 1998

BCT POI 21-114 TSP AB1 Appropriate Behavior, June 1, 2003

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Violence Against Women Report. National Crime

Victimization Survey, 1995
86

CIDR 195-1, Special Agent Operations Manual, October 1994, Paragraph 7-6c

Commandant Instruction 1754.10B, Subject: Reporting and Responding to Rape and

Sexual Assault Allegations, April 2, 2004

Computerized Criminal History, February 1998

Consideration of Others Handbook, 1998

DIBRS Manual, DoD Manual 7730.47-M, 25 Jul 03, Manual for Defense Incident-Based

Reporting System, Appendices 1 and 3

Denver Post, “For Crime Victims, Punishment Women Who Were Raped in the Military

Say They Were Isolated and Blamed for the Attacks,” November 16, 2003

Denver Post, “Military Justice Probed; Congress to Investigate Problems Found by

Post,” November 20, 2003

Department of Justice, Violence Against Women Office,

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawgo.htm

DODD 1030.1, Victim and Witness Assistance, April 13, 2004

DODD 6400.1, Family Advocacy Program, (FAP), June 23, 1992

DODI 1030.2, Victim and Witness Assistance Procedures, December 23, 1994

DODI 6400.2 Child and Spouse Abuse Report, July 10, 1987

Drill Sergeant School POI, TATS DSS POI 012-SQIX (F)/615-SQIX (F) Drill Sergeant

School Common Core A01-07, Rape Prevention

Greenfeld, Lawrence. Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of Data on Rape and

Sexual Assault. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, 1997

Holmes, Melissa; Heidi A. Resnick, Dean G. Kirkpatrick, and Connie L. Best, “RapeRelated Pregnancy: Estimates and Descriptive Characteristics from a National

Sample of Women.” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Vol. 175, 2,

1996, pp. 320−325

Hooah 4 Health Web Site:

http://www.hooah4health.com/prevention/injurytrauma/sexualassault.htm

HQ CID Sexual Assault Case Summaries
87

HQ CID Database

Human Dignity—The Prevention of Sexual Harassment. Leader’s Handbook.

Channing L. Bete Co., Inc., 1998

Human Dignity—The Prevention of Sexual Harassment. Soldier’s Handbook.

Channing L. Bete Co., Inc., 1998

International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Advisory Committee, Guidelines

and Standards for Victim Oriented Policing

Kilpatrick, Dean G. (2000). "Rape and Sexual Assault," National Violence Against

Women Prevention Research Center, Medical University of South Carolina

Kilpatrick, D.G., Edmunds, C.N., & Seymour, A.K. (1992). Rape in America: A Report to

the Nation. Arlington, VA. National Victim Center and the Medical University of

South Carolina

Ledray, L.E., (1999) Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE): Development and

Operation Guide, US Department of Justice, Office for Victims of Crime

Lisak, David (2004), Reviewer Form: (Draft) Report for the Army Task Force on Sexual

Assault Policies

Lisak, D. (1999) Understanding Sexual Violence: The Judge’s Role in Stranger and

Nonstranger Rape and Sexual Assault Cases. National Judicial Education

Program

Lisak, D. (1999) The Undetected Rapist. National Judicial Education Program

MEDCOM Regulation 40-36, Medical Facility Management of Sexual Assault,

February 2, 1995

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2002 ed.); reference UCMJ Article 120, Article

134, Article 80

Military Rules of Evidence (MRE 501 [b], 502, 503, and 513)

Miller, T., Cohen, M. & Wiersema, B. (1996). Victim Costs & Consequences: A New

Look. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice Report, US Department of

Justice

National Crime Victimization Survey, 1997

National Violence Against Women Survey, November 1998
88

Navy Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program video

Public Law 97-291

OPNAVINST 1752.1A CH-1. May 2000. Department of Navy, Office of the Chief of

Naval Operations

Reasons for Non-Reporting, Delayed Reporting, and Withdrawal of Complaint from the

following Web Site:

http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/policeresponse/policeresponse.html

San Diego Police Department. Sexual Assault Risk Reduction Curriculum

Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Sexual Assault Task Force Engagement Plan,

March 17, 2004

Strategies for the Treatment and Sexual Assault Prevention, 1995

The Report of the Michigan Sexual Assault Systems Response Task Force, “The

Response to Sexual Assault: Removing Barriers to Services and Justice,” 2001

Understanding and anticipating possible victim responses from the following Web Site:

http://www.csom.org/train/supervision/medium/01_01.html

Uniform Crime Report, 1997

Uniform Crime Report, 2002, Section II - Crime Index, page 29

US Army Crime Records Center

US Army Europe Rape Prevention Briefing

USA Today, “Report in the Military: Female Troops Deserve Much Better,” February 6,

2004

US Congress. “The Response to Rape: Detours on the Road to Equal Justice,” report

prepared by the Majority Staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1993

US Department of Justice. “Violence Against Women.” Rockville, Maryland: Bureau of

Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, 1994

US Department of Justice. “Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence

Against Women,” 1998

USMA Information Paper, Sexual Assault Policies at USMA, August 2003
89

US Senate Judiciary Committee: “Conviction and Imprisonment Statistics,” 1993