U.S. Department 

of Transportation

Research and

Special Programs

Administration

EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS ON 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 

AND OPERATIONS

CROSS CUTTING STUDY

U.S. Department of Transportation

John A. Volpe National 

Transportation Systems Center

Cambridge, MA

January 2003

Prepared for

U.S. Department of Transportation

ITS Joint Program Office 

U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER i

Foreword 

This report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Transportation's (U.S. DOT) John A. 

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) for the U.S. DOT's 

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Joint Program Office (JPO) and the Federal 

Highway Administration Office of Operations. The Volpe Center study team consisted of 

Allan J. DeBlasio, the project manager; Robert Brodesky from EG&G Technical Services; 

Margaret E. Zirker from Cambridge Systematics Inc.; and Terrance J. Regan from Planners 

Collaborative. 

This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to 

catastrophic events as an overall effort to examine the impacts of different types of events 

on transportation system facilities and services. The findings and conclusions documented 

in this report are a result of the creation of a detailed chronology of events, a literature 

search, and interviews of key personnel involved in transportation operations decisionmaking for four events:

·New York City, September 11, 2001 – terrorist attack

·Washington, D.C., September 11, 2001 – terrorist attack

·Baltimore, Maryland, July 18, 2001 – rail tunnel fire

·Northridge, California, January 17, 1994 – earthquake

The event summaries and findings for New York City and Northridge, Calif., are adapted 

from the case studies prepared by the Volpe Center study team consisting of Allan J. 

DeBlasio, the project manager; Robert Brodesky, Amanda Zamora, and Fred Mottley from 

EG&G Technical Services; Margaret E. Zirker and Michelle Crowder from Cambridge 

Systematics Inc.; and Terrance J. Regan, Kathleen Bagdonas, and Dan Morin from 

Planners Collaborative. The summaries and findings of Washington, D.C., and Baltimore 

are adapted from case studies done by Science Applications International Corporation 

(SAIC). The SAIC study team consisted of Mark Carter, the project manager; Mark P. 

Howard; Nicholas Owens; David Register; Jason Kennedy; Aaron Newton; and Kelley 

Pecheux. Vince Pearce is the U.S. DOT task manager of both the cross-cutting study and 

the case studies review.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER ii

Table of Contents

Foreword................................................................................................................................... i

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... iii

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1

New York City......................................................................................................................... 2

Transportation System: Description of the Affected Area ................................................... 3

Taking Action ....................................................................................................................... 5

Key Decisions by Agency..................................................................................................... 7

Transportation Conditions After September 11.................................................................... 8

Washington.............................................................................................................................. 9

Transportation System: Description of the Affected Area ................................................. 10

Taking Action ..................................................................................................................... 11

Key Decisions by Agency................................................................................................... 14

Transportation Conditions After September 11.................................................................. 15

Baltimore, Maryland ............................................................................................................ 16

Transportation System: Description of the Affected Area ................................................. 18

Taking Action ..................................................................................................................... 20

Key Decisions by Agency................................................................................................... 22

Transportation Conditions After the July 18 Incident ........................................................ 22

Northridge, California.......................................................................................................... 24

Transportation System: Description of the Affected Area ................................................. 26

Taking Action ..................................................................................................................... 28

Key Decisions by Agency................................................................................................... 30

Transportation Conditions After the Earthquake ................................................................ 31

Findings.................................................................................................................................. 33

Guiding Priority .................................................................................................................. 33

Plan of Action ..................................................................................................................... 35

Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 52
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER iii

Executive Summary 

Reason for the case studies and cross cutting study

In order to provide a better understanding of how transportation is both affected and utilized in an 

emergency situation, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) commissioned a series of four 

case studies examining the effects of catastrophic events on transportation system management and 

operations. Each of the case studies examined a specific event and the regional response. The 

events included terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001; 

an earthquake in the Los Angeles region; and a rail tunnel fire in Baltimore. 

This cross cutting study summarizes the surface transportation activities associated with four 

catastrophic events and the lessons learned from each. Each of the events resulted in substantial, 

immediate, and adverse impacts on the transportation system, and each has had a varying degree of 

influence on the longer-term operation of transportation facilities and services in its respective 

region. 

The case studies have provided material for a series of Transportation Response and Recovery 

Workshops developed by the FHWA and held in major metropolitan areas around the country. 

Organization of the cross cutting study

This document has two main sections. The first section provides an overview of each of the four case 

studies. This overview includes a chronology of key events on the day of and days after the disaster, 

a description of the affected area, a description of key decisions taken by agencies, and a brief 

description of conditions in the months following the event. The four case studies are: 

1. New York City terrorist attack on September 11, 2001

2. Washington, D.C. terrorist attack on September 11, 2001

3. Baltimore, Maryland Howard Street rail tunnel fire on July 18, 2001

4. Northridge, California earthquake on January 18, 1994

The second section discusses findings that cut across the four case studies. Each of the four events 

presented transportation and emergency response agencies with a different set of challenges in 

dealing with response and recovery. This section includes an assessment of the following key 

questions: 

• How well were the key participants prepared?

• What happened and who took action? 

• What aspects of the emergency response worked well and why, and what aspects did not 

work well and why? 

• What role did technology play in these aspects with respect to transportation emergency 

response and recovery? 

• What was learned, what could be done differently, and what can be incorporated into the 

disaster planning process? 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER iv

Summary of the four events

New York City: 

On September 11, 2001, New York City was the target of the largest terrorist attack in the history of 

the nation. Both World Trade Center towers were hit and destroyed by hijacked passenger jets. 

These attacks occurred during the morning rush hour and the transportation network was 

immediately and dramatically affected. New York City Transit and PATH stations and rail lines 

were destroyed during the collapse of the towers. Transportation officials were immediately faced 

with the need to make critical decisions to protect the safety of residents and workers and the critical 

transportation infrastructure. This task was complicated by the lack of clear information about the 

scope of the damage to the system and the uncertainty of future attacks.

Within minutes of the first attack, transportation officials were confronted with the need to respond 

on three critical levels. First, the agencies began the process of closing all of the bridge and tunnel 

crossings into Manhattan, suspended subway service to Lower Manhattan, and closed the three 

international airports in the metropolitan area. Second, officials were confronted with the daunting 

task of evacuating the 1.2 million workers and residents of Lower Manhattan. Third, transportation 

agencies were mobilizing workers and resources to aid in the response and recovery effort at the 

World Trade Center site. 

Washington, D.C. 

A third hijacked passenger jet also attacked the Pentagon, located in Arlington, Virginia, on the 

morning of September 11, 2001. This event required a coordinated response from multiple agencies 

within multiple jurisdictions. Jurisdictions involved included those from the states of Virginia and 

Maryland, the District of Columbia, local and county governments, the United States Department of 

Defense, and other numerous federal agencies. As with New York City, the lack of clear 

information about subsequent attacks led to a series of independent public and private decisions to 

evacuate the city during the end of the morning rush hour. 

The transportation agencies had to respond to the attack and subsequent partial evacuation by closing 

certain key transportation facilities near the Pentagon and other strategic locations in the nation’s 

capital, redirecting transit assets, and coordinating these closing and changes with other agencies. 

This was all happening during a time when the voice communications networks were overwhelmed 

with demand and accurate information on closings and redeployments was scarce. 

Baltimore, Maryland

On the afternoon of July 18, 2001, a fire broke out inside the 1.7-mile long freight rail tunnel 

running under Howard Street. A 60-car CSX freight train carrying various potentially hazardous 

materials had derailed inside the tunnel and some of the rail cars were on fire. Smoke was billowing 

out of the train portals as local fire, police, and emergency response personnel reported to the scene. 

Howard Street is a major arterial that runs through the heart of Baltimore’s business and cultural 

districts. A light rail and commuter rail line operated along the Howard Street right-of-way above

the rail tunnel.

Officials were confronted with major disruption to the roadway, transit, and freight networks in the 

central city just as the afternoon rush hour was about to begin. City officials were faced with 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER v

multiple challenges once the fire was detected. First, there was the need to determine the exact 

location of the fire in the tunnel. Second, it was crucial to determine the potential environmental 

impact from the cargo on the 60 rail cars. Third, a major water main located above the tunnel had 

ruptured and was flooding sections of the tunnel. Fourth, they needed to quickly determine to what 

extend an evacuation of the surrounding area would need to occur. 

Coordination issues were complicated because of the numerous parts of the infrastructure involved, 

the uncertainty of the extent of threat, and the freight rail line is owned by a private company, CSX. 

Also, different Baltimore city agencies maintain the roadway and the water infrastructure, and the 

Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) operates the light rail and commuter rail lines. When the 

fire department initially responded, its primary focus was on fire suppression. This focus later 

shifted to environmental safety once it was realized that hazardous materials might be involved. 

Northridge, California

On January 17, 1994, a 6.8 magnitude earthquake shook the Los Angeles region. The actual 

earthquake only lasted about 1 minute, but caused an estimated $25 billion in property damage. In 

addition to the numerous disruptions of local roads, sections of four major freeways were severely 

damaged. These damaged sections of freeway served an average of 1 million travelers on a daily 

basis. The local and state transportation officials were confronted with a two-fold problem. The 

first was to inspect the vast infrastructure network for damage, and the second was to begin and 

complete the reconstruction effort as quickly as possible. 

The Southern California region had dealt with numerous catastrophic events over the past several 

decades. This included previous earthquakes, mudslides, forest fires, and civil unrest. Because of 

this history, the region had in place a coordinated strategy for response to and recovery from 

disasters. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) immediately began the inspection 

of its infrastructure and had agreements with private contractors to begin the removal of debris by 

the evening of the first day. Detours around the affected areas were in place by the first afternoon. 

These detours would undergo constant refinement over the next several months. Through innovative 

design and construction methods, the state was able to reconstruct and reopen some of the damaged 

sections of the freeway within three months. All of the sections were reopened within 10 months of 

the earthquake. 

Summary of the Findings 

Each of the events presented officials with a different set of challenges in the response and recovery 

effort. There were several key themes that cut across the four events. 

Guiding Priority: 

The initial guiding priority in every emergency is the protection of life. Transportation officials must 

begin almost immediately to implement evacuation plans and institute recovery procedures. In each 

of these cases, officials were charged with making decisions without full knowledge of the rapidly 

changing existing conditions and uncertainty of what future events might occur to change the 

situation. Because of this, safety and security took priority over mobility. As time passed and more 

information was available, officials began to restore mobility. This restoration of mobility varied 

with each of the events. Within days, mobility was restored to the Washington and Baltimore areas. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER vi

Because of the physical damage in Los Angeles and New York, it was months before key pieces of 

the transportation infrastructure could be reopened to the general traveling public at normal levels. 

Plan of Action: 

In order to respond to a catastrophic event, agencies need to have a plan of action in place to handle 

emergency situations and to begin the process of restoring mobility. This plan of action includes 

both planning and investment in infrastructure and personnel. The plan of action is organized 

around five categories: 

1. Advanced preparation

2. Institutional coordination

3. Technical communications

4. Advance technologies

5. System redundancy and resiliency

Advance preparation:

The need for advance preparation and planning by agencies is crucial in dealing with a range of 

mishaps and disasters. Several key themes emerged from the four case studies. First, an agency 

needs to learn from previous events and incorporate that learning into an agency’s response plans. 

The events of September 11 have served as a wake up call to cities and towns across the country 

about the need to prepare for the unexpected. Second, there is a need to rely on agency staff at all 

levels to make good and timely decisions, often without complete knowledge of all the mitigating 

circumstances. Emergencies do not occur at convenient times and it is important that staff at all 

levels are able to respond to situations and make decisions, often without immediate input from 

headquarters. Third, there is a need to practice for the expected and the unexpected. Knowledge 

gained and relationships developed through day-to-day contact are extremely useful when 

catastrophes strike. In both New York and Los Angeles, existing traffic control centers and 

organizations whose main function was coordinating daily transportation operations were able to 

quickly implement emergency procedures. 

Institutional coordination: 

By their very nature, catastrophes require a coordinated response among multiple federal, state, 

regional, and local jurisdictions. This coordination needs to occur at several layers simultaneously. 

Each agency needs to have a pre-established internal coordination plan as well as a system for 

external coordination with other agencies, the press, and the public. Transportation agencies 

typically have staff at multiple locations with multitudes of varying responsibilities. The Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey, for example, operates bridges, tunnels, transit lines, 

airports, and water ports within the metropolitan area. Caltrans oversees a highway system of 

25,000 kilometers in length and a staff of over 23,000. A requirement for ensuring this institutional 

coordination is to have an established chain of command through a pre-existing command system. 

The Incident Command System (ICS), developed in California during the 1970s, is one example of a 

structure that a region can adopt to help ensure a coordinated response among the various agencies. 

Technical communications: 

The demand for accurate, timely information increases dramatically after an emergency. Often this 

increased demand comes at a time when the technology needed to provide that information is most 

compromised. Agency officials need accurate information to be able to best allocate resources and 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER vii

set agency priorities in responding to an emergency. There is also a heightened interest by the public 

at large for information about the event. In the New York, Washington, and Los Angeles events, 

immediate communication with agency field staff and emergency responders was difficult because 

telephone landlines were damaged and cellular communications systems were overloaded or did not 

provide adequate coverage. 

On September 11, new technologies proved successful in supplementing communications during the 

emergency response efforts when landline telephones were either damaged or overwhelmed with 

demand. Data transmissions using fax machines, e-mails, and interactive pagers that use “push” 

technology were effective in supplementing communications. On September 11, several 

transportation agencies activated their “mobile communications centers,” which are buses equipped 

with satellite and computer technology to allow multiple forms of communications. 

Advance technologies:

Once a catastrophic event has occurred, advanced technologies can aid in providing information on 

existing conditions to decision makers. This information can then be used to make better-informed 

decisions on when and how to open or restrict facilities. Examples of this included the use of closed 

circuit television cameras and traffic monitors to gauge traffic volumes on key facilities. It can 

facilitate better communications with other agencies involved in the emergency response. Traffic 

management centers were able to share information on current conditions with other agencies. It can 

also assist in communicating with the public by providing accurate information on the status of the 

transportation system. This included variable message signs, highway advisory radio broadcasts, 1-

800 telephone lines, and web based video feeds of traffic. Through the coordination of 

TRANSCOM and the I-95 Corridor Coalition, variable message signs all along the East Coast were 

displaying warnings to the traveling public about avoiding New York City and the Pentagon area. 

System redundancy and resiliency: 

Redundancy, the ability to utilize backup systems for critical parts of the system that fail, is 

extremely important to consider in the development of a process or plan for emergency response and 

recovery. In each of the four cases, the portions of the system that failed or required backup were 

dependent upon the specific nature and scope of the emergency. At a minimum, emergency 

response planners should consider designing redundancy into the system in several areas: 

• The regional transportation network

• Agency personnel

• Communications and utilities

• Control centers

• Equipment and supplies 

In each of the four cases, transportation agencies had to work together to provide alternative travel 

options to the public. These alternatives shifted over time in response to changes in travel behaviors 

of the public. Because emergencies can occur at any time, it is crucial to have a redundant system of 

trained personnel in place who are able to make good, accurate, and timely decisions. With the New 

York and Los Angeles cases, the recovery effort lasted for several months. Maintaining staff on 

emergency status for this length of time can take a toll on personnel and highlights the need to have 

multiple people trained for each job. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER viii

As noted before, it is important that agencies be able to utilize multiple technologies to communicate 

with staff and the public. This allows an agency to shift among technologies depending on the 

demands on the system, the topography of the land, or the amount of destruction to any one type of 

technology. In New York, the loss of electricity hampered operations and recovery efforts. 

Redundant mobile generators allowed for the restoration of power to command centers and to 

emergency responders. Redundant control centers were needed in New York City when existing 

centers were destroyed. Los Angeles had to build a new center to increase its capacity to respond to 

the recovery effort. In both Baltimore and New York, agency officials spoke of the need to have 

redundant supplies of equipment. It was also important to maintain a good inventory of where 

supplies are kept or could be readily purchased when needed. 

Audience for the case studies

The intended audience for the case studies and the cross cutting study extends beyond the traditional 

transportation community. These works are intended to help various federal, state, regional, and 

county and municipal officials at emergency response and management agencies, health and human 

services agencies, public works agencies, and public safety agencies better understand the ability of 

the transportation agencies to aid in the response and recovery from catastrophic events. As is seen 

in the case studies, coordinated and advanced planning across agencies and jurisdictions can lead to 

better response in times of emergency. The primary purpose of the FHWA Transportation Response 

and Recovery Workshops was to bring together representatives of these various agencies to better 

understand the issues and understand the importance of planning and coordination before, during, 

and after events. These case studies help document the value in planning, coordinating, and 

investing in infrastructure and technology that can help in times of crisis. 

Additional information

This cross cutting study, the Baltimore rail tunnel fire case study, and the Northridge earthquake 

case studies can be found on the FHWA ITS Electronic Data Library (EDL) site at 

http://www.its.fhwa.dot.gov/cyberdocs. Additional information on the New York City and 

Washington, D.C., case studies can be obtained by contacting Vincent Pearce at 

vince.pearce@fhwa.dot.gov. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 1

Introduction

This cross cutting study summarizes the events associated with four case studies looking at how 

transportation agencies responded to the events of unforeseen disasters. 

Each of the four events studied provide useful lessons to be learned for transportation officials 

across the country: 

• New York City terrorist attack on September 11, 2001

• Washington, D.C., terrorist attack on September 11, 2001

• Baltimore, Maryland, rail tunnel fire on July 18, 2001

• Northridge, California, earthquake on January 17, 1994

Each of these events resulted in substantial, immediate, and adverse impacts on the 

transportation system, and each has had varying degrees of influence on the longer-term 

operation of transportation facilities and services in their respective region. Each event revealed 

important information about the response of the transportation system to major stress and the 

ability of operating agencies and their public safety and emergency management partners to 

respond effectively to a crisis. This cross cutting report emphasizes the transportation aspects of 

these catastrophic events and lessons learned that could be incorporated into future emergency 

response planning.

The document first gives an overview of each of the four areas affected, the sequence of the 

events that occurred on the day of and weeks or months after and describes the actions taken by 

transportation agencies in response to the events. The second section, Findings, details lessons to 

be learned from the events. The findings are grouped into two main sections:

• Guiding priority

• Plan of action
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 2

New York City

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001 at 8:45 a.m., a hijacked commercial passenger jet, American 

Airlines Flight 11 out of Boston, Mass. crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. 

At 9:03 a.m., a second hijacked airliner, United Airlines Flight 175, also from Boston, crashed 

into the south tower of the World Trade Center. These airplane attacks occurred during the 

morning rush hour when the city’s roads, bridges, and transit system were operating at peak 

capacity. Transportation officials were immediately faced with the need to make critical 

decisions to protect the safety of the traveling public. In the chaos and devastation of the 

September 11 disaster, the New York City regional transportation network remained the primary 

support system, both for those evacuating New York’s lower Manhattan as well as for those 

headed to the area for emergency response activities. 

By the second hour, the two towers began collapsing. Thousands of tons of debris and ash were 

spread over Lower Manhattan. Emergency response coordination was hampered because of the 

destruction of a number of emergency control centers and communications failures that spread 

throughout Lower Manhattan. At 11:02, Mayor Rudy Giuliani instructed the 280,000 residents 

and 1 million workers in Lower Manhattan to evacuate the area. For the next several hours, the 

1.2 million people who live and work in lower Manhattan fled. 

The following table shows a brief chronology of the events the first day of September 11, 2002 

in New York City:

September 11, 2001 ChronologyTime of Elapsed

Day Time Event/Actions Taken

8:46 a.m.: First plane crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC). 

8:47 a.m.: [1 min.] An MTA subway operator alerts MTA Subway Control Center of an explosion in 

the WTC and begins emergency procedures. 

8:52 a.m.: [6 min.] PATH trains begin emergency procedures and proceed to evacuate WTC station 

and express Manhattan trains to New Jersey.

9:03 a.m.: [17 min.] Second plane crashes into south tower of WTC.

9:10 a.m.: [24 min.] Port Authority of NY and NJ closes all their bridges and tunnels.

9:12 a.m.: [26 min.] George Washington Bridge VMS flash “Bridge Closed.”

9:17 a.m.: [31 min.] FAA shuts down all NYC airports.

morning: Amtrak suspends all nationwide train service; Greyhound cancels Northeast US 

operations. 

morning: NYC DOT reports that police ordered highways shut down.

9:40 a.m.: [54 min.] FAA halts all US flights.

9:43 a.m.: [57 min.] Third plane crashes into the Pentagon.

9:59 a.m.: [1 hr. 13 min.] South tower of WTC collapses. Impact measures 2.1 on the Richter scale.

morning: NY state activates its Emergency Operations Center in Albany. Governor activates 

the National Guard.

10:20 a.m.: [1 hr. 34 min.] NYC Transit suspends all subway service.

10:29 a.m.: [1 hr. 43 min.] North tower of WTC collapses. Imp act measures 2.3 on the Richter scale. Port 

Authority headquarters destroyed in the collapse.

10:30 a.m.: [1 hr. 44 min.] NJ Transit stops rail service into Manhattan’s Penn Station.

10:45 a.m.: [1 hr. 59 min.] PATH operations were suspended.

10:53 a.m.: [2 hr. 7 min.] NY primary elections are postponed.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 3

11:02 a.m.: [2 hr. 16 min.] As tens of thousands abandon cars and subway to stream across Manhattan bridges 

on foot, Mayor Giuliani urges, “Stay calm, stay at home... If you are south of Canal 

Street, get out. Walk slowly and carefully. If you can’t figure what else to do, just 

walk north.”

~ Noon: [3 hr. 14 min.] A NYC Transit employee stands in front of Grand Central Terminal with a 

megaphone to try to dispense advice to travelers. 

12:48 p.m.: [4 hr. 2 min.] Partial NYC Transit subway service resumes, with many routes truncated or 

diverted to avoid Lower Manhattan.

1:15 p.m.: [4 hr. 29 min.] Long Island RR runs limited service eastbound only from Penn Station.

2:30 p.m.: [5 hr. 44 min.] Subway system begins to return to normal except for trains under Lower 

Manhattan.

3:50 p.m.: [7 hr. 4 min.] FEMA activates four urban search and rescue teams in New York.

4:12 p.m.: [7 hr. 26 min] PATH service between Newark and Journal Square resumed. 

4:40 p.m.: [7 hr 54 min.] PATH uptown New York line to New Jersey resumes service.

afternoon: By evening rush, several public and private water ferry companies are providing 

additional ferry service to New Jersey, Queens, and Brooklyn, evacuating about 

160,000 people from Manhattan.

afternoon: 200,000 phone lines in Lower Manhattan are crippled, telephone and cellular 

service is overloaded when Verizon central hub at WTC damaged.

5:20 p.m.: [ 8 hr. 34 min.] WTC Building 7, headquarters of NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM), 

collapses.

6:00 p.m.: [ 9 hr. 14 min.] Amtrak resumes passenger rail service.

7:02 p.m.: [10 hr. 16 min.] Some NY bridges open to outbound traffic.

7:30 p.m.: [10 hr. 44 min.] Long Island Rail Road restores full schedule east and westbound.

Nightfall: 750 National Guard troops are in NYC to assist police. 

End of day: 65% of subway service is back in operation. Throughout the day, MTA bus 

service continues running north of Lower Manhattan.

AT&T reports that it has handled the largest one-day volume of calls in its history

Transportation System: Description of the Affected Area

The 2,440-square-mile region of the New York Metropolitan area has one of the most complex 

and extensive transportation networks in the world. There are 

500 route miles of commuter rail, 225 route miles of rail rapid 

transit, nearly 23,000 centerline miles of roads, streets, and 

highways, three major commercial airports, and maritime 

facilities for passengers and goods. The network is operated by 

a multitude of state, local, and regional authorities as well as 

private companies. Figure 2, Transportation conditions before 

September 11, gives an overview of traffic volumes on major 

crossings and transit boardings. The following list demonstrates 

the level of interdependence involved:

• The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 

operates 3 major airports, 2 tunnels, 4 bridges, the 

PATH interstate rail system, 2 bus terminals, 2 ferry 

services, and 7 marine cargo terminals in the Port 

District, comprising a 25-mile radius of the Statue of 

Liberty. 

• The NYC Department of Transportation (DOT) 

manages city streets, highways, and parking facilities, 4 Figure 1. VMS sign on Sept. 11 

Source: Port Authority of 

NYNJ
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 4

major bridges, 6 tunnels, 1 ferry service, and oversees 5 private ferry and 7 private bus 

companies serving New York City. 

• The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) runs the NYC subway and bus system 

(the largest subway and bus systems in the country), 2 commuter rail systems, a Long 

Island bus service, 7 bridges, and 2 tunnels.

Additionally, New York City is the most densely populated urban area in the nation. The 

region is heavily dependent upon its transit system and has the most widely used public 

278 

278 

278 

278 

278 

87 

87 

87 

95 

95 

95 

95 

80 

678 

495 

495 

678 

878 

878 

495 

95 

MANHATTAN 

QUEENS 

BROOKLYN 

STATEN ISLAND 

NEW JERSEY 

BRONX 

Lincoln 

Tunnel 

125,000

PATH WTC

commuter rail

station serves

136,000 passengers

per day

Queens 

Midtown 

Tunnel 81,000

Queensboro Bridge 

Holland 

Tunnel

99,000 

Brooklyn 

Battery 

Tunnel

64,000 

Williamsburg 

Bridge 76,000 

Verrazano-Narrows 

Bridge 186,000 

Manhattan 

Bridge

67,000 

Staten Island Ferry

63,000 passengers/day

Brooklyn 

Bridge 

130,000

Henry HudsonPkwy

West St

Roosevelt Dr

Northern Blvd

Triborough Bridge 

Bronx-Whitestone

Bridge 

182,000

110,000

144,000

W. 155th St. Bridge 

W. 145th St. Bridge 

25,000

W. 138th St. 

Bridge 36,000 

W. 181th St. Bridge George Washington

Bridge 307,00 vehicles/day

PalisadesPkwy

Grand Central Pkwy

World 

Trade 

Center 

Canal St

14thSt

La Guardia Airport 

JFK Airport 

Newark Airport 

PANYNJ

PANYNJ

PANYNJ

PANYNJ

PANYNJ

PANYNJ

PANYNJ

NYC DOT

NYC DOT

NYC DOT

NYC DOT

NYC DOT

MTA

NYC DOT

NYC DOT

NYC DOT

NYC DOT

MTA

MTA

MTA

MTA

NYC Transit subway

Bayonne Bridge

Goethals Bridge

Outerbridge Crossing

NYC Transit buses

Private buses

MTA Long Island Bus

MTA Long Island Railroad

MTA Metro North Railroad

Port Authority PATH

Public and private ferries

Transit

PANYNJ Staten Island Bridges

Total 7,662,400

Passengers

per weekday

4,226,600

21,000

2,169,800

76,000

288,900

79,000

99,100

296,800

231,600

258,400

91,600

Figure 2. Transportation conditions before September 11
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 5

transportation network in the nation. The typical weekday transit ridership for all the transit 

modes in New York City is 7.6 million riders per day.

Taking Action

Within six minutes after the first plane struck, New York City Transit began emergency 

procedures from its Cortlandt Station transporting its passengers to City Hall Station before the

station collapsed. The Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) train master gave orders to stop 

service of PATH trains to the World Train Center. Twenty-four minutes after the initial attack, 

the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey closed all bridges and tunnels. At 9:12 a.m., the 

George Washington Bridge variable message sign (VMS) flashed, “Bridge Closed.” Around 11 

a.m. the VMS on highways leading into the city flashed “New York City Closed To All Traffic.”

TRANSCOM, a coalition of 16 transportation and public safety agencies in the New York 

metropolitan region, began the process of alerting other agencies of the status of facilities and 

providing updated transportation information to agencies all along the Northeast Corridor. As 

facilities were closed, agency personnel began performing vulnerability assessments of their own 

facilities. 

While NYC transportation agencies had individual and regional emergency response plans in 

place, no one had planned for an attack of the magnitude of September 11. In addition to the loss 

of key emergency response and transportation personnel who worked in the command center, the 

transportation and communications networks in Lower Manhattan sustained substantial damage. 

The World Trade Center served as the major intermodal transportation hub for Lower 

Manhattan. The Cortlandt subway station and the PATH World Trade Center station were both 

severely damaged during the collapse of the Twin Towers. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), the NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM), and the Port Authority 

emergency control centers were all located in the World Trade Center complex and were not able 

to be used for emergency response that day. Communications hubs for Verizon, TRANSCOM, 

and the Port Authority as well as the MTA’s fiber-optic network were all located either within or 

in close proximity to the World Trade Center. All of these were totally or partially destroyed, 

severing communications during the first few hours after the attack. This hindered the ability to 

communicate internally and externally during the first few critical hours. 

With the closing of the subway and rail service approximately an hour and a half after the attack, 

transit options were limited. With most New York City businesses closing mid-morning for the 

day, the remaining 2.6 million New York City workers outside Lower Manhattan were forced to 

improvise whatever sequence of trip routes would get them home. For many, the trip home took 

several hours longer than normal. Intercity travel ground to a halt as the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) shut down the commercial air network and Amtrak and bus lines halted 

service. To facilitate evacuation and emergency response the bridges along the East River were 

open for pedestrians leaving Manhattan and for emergency vehicles entering Manhattan. The 

Coast Guard began the process of overseeing a makeshift flotilla of water ferries and private 

boats to help evacuate people from Lower Manhattan. Figure 3, Transportation Conditions on 

September 11, gives an overview of the facilities closed leading into and around Manhattan. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 6

Within hours of these events, federal, state, and local agencies had begun internal emergency 

procedures and coordination with other agencies. The table below indicates key decisions, 

coordination, and communication by agency.

278 

278 

278 

278 

278 

87 

87 

87 

95 

95 

95 

95 

80 

678 

495 

495 

678 

878 

878 

495 

95 

MANHATTAN 

QUEENS 

BROOKLYN 

STATEN ISLAND 

NEW JERSEY 

BRONX 

Lincoln 

Tunnel 

Queens 

Midtown 

Tunnel 

Queensboro Bridge 

Holland 

Tunnel

Brooklyn 

Battery 

Tunnel

Williamsburg 

Bridge 

Verrazano-Narrows 

Bridge 

Manhattan 

Bridge

Staten Island 

Ferry

Brooklyn 

Bridge 

Henry HudsonPkwy

West St

RooseveltDr

Northern Blvd

Triborough 

Bridge 

Bronx-Whitestone

Bridge 

W. 155th St. Bridge 

W. 145th St. 

Bridge 

W. 138th St. 

Bridge 

W. 181th St. Bridge George Washington

Bridge 

September 11 Closings

PalisadesPkwy

Grand Central Pkwy

World 

Trade 

Center 

Canal St

14th St

La Guardia Airport 

JFK Airport 

Newark Airport 

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

Figure 3. Transportation Conditions on September 11
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 7

Key Decisions by Agency

Agency Key Decisions. Coordination, and Communication

U.S. Coast Guard Began process of getting boats to Manhattan to aid in the water evacuation of 

Manhattan.

Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA)

Ordered the closing of the three NYC-area airports. Later, ordered the halt of 

all aviation traffic across the country. 

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 

(FEMA)

Began the process of implementing response to the “federally declared 

disaster.”

Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA)

Implemented “quick release” option for Emergency Relief (ER) funds 

enabling state and local agencies to send emergency response teams; helped 

coordinate relationships between state and local agencies.

Information FOR 

Motorists (INFORM)

Immediately coordinated with police to open up Long Island Expressway for 

EMS vehicles; displayed traffic information on regional VMS and deployed 

portable VMS to NYC bridge and tunnel entrances; disseminated traffic 

reports to local agencies, media, and the public; sent all spare resources to 

WTC.

Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority 

(MTA)

Coordinated transit closures and re-routed subway trains by maintaining 

operations staff round-the-clock at the Mayor’s OEM who interfaced with 

Subway Control and Bus Command Centers. Several bus drivers were forced 

to make “ad hoc” decisions in Manhattan after communications were cut off, 

buses sustained damage from debris, and hazards blocked roadways.

New Jersey Transit Coordinated trains and closures through OEM at mobile command center.

New York State 

Department of 

Transportation 

(NYSDOT)

Supplied portable VMS, barriers, and backhoes to NYC region with promise 

of FHWA ER funds; coordinated with INFORM (a NY State DOT facility) for 

information dissemination; provided temporary offices for New York 

Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC) employees.

New York State Police 

(NYSP)

Deployed 23 Highway Emergency Local Patrol (HELP) vehicles to locations 

in Rockland and Westchester Counties; deployed 500 troopers to NYC region 

(to NYC limits) who cleared highways for EMS vehicles; helped direct EMS 

vehicles to WTC.

New York City 

Department of 

Transportation 

(NYCDOT)

Worked with police to coordinate closing every road, bridge, and tunnel in 

Lower Manhattan and show closures on regional VMS; coordinated with NY 

State DOT out of Queens TMC.

NYC Office of 

Emergency Management 

(OEM)

Coordinated regional response by issuing general “directives” to agency 

liaisons (police, fire, transportation, etc.) on-site at OEM; coordinated with 

Governor and FEMA for disaster declaration.

NY Police Department 

(NYPD)

Evacuated lower Manhattan by evacuation protocol, tallest buildings first; 

directed people and traffic from “high threat areas” (bridges and tunnels); 

secured bridges and tunnels for EMS vehicles.

Port Authority of New 

York and New Jersey 

(PANYNJ)

Coordinated with FAA to close three major airports: Kennedy, LaGuardia and 

Newark. Ferry division oversaw ferry operator, NY Waterway; contacted NY 

Waterway to make sure that vessels were at Battery Park for evacuation; 

coordinated with Coast Guard and Coast Guard security zone. Coordinated 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 8

with police for closures of bridges and tunnels, and for EMS access. Closed 

the water port to freight activity.

Transportation 

Operations Coordinating 

Committee 

(TRANSCOM)

Issued reports of member agency operating decisions via fax; 800 reports 

issued in total, terminating on Jan. 21, 2002.

Transportation Conditions After September 11

In the three months after September 11, the transportation network was slowly returning to 

normal as mobility was increased and security checkpoints were reduced. The airports and water 

freight port are back in full operations. Certain segments of the transit infrastructure within the

World Trade Center area are still out of service and motor vehicle restrictions are still in place 

for Midtown and Lower Manhattan. Figure 4, below, shows the destruction at the World Trade 

Center site as of late September 2001. As of September 2002, the SOV ban remains on crossings 

into Lower Manhattan, vehicles are still being checked at key crossings, commercial vehicles 

restrictions are in place for the Holland Tunnel, and PATH subway service only operates to 

Midtown Manhattan. 

The New York City subway system was 

able to restore service to all but four 

stations in Lower Manhattan but has seen 

security-related service delays increase 

markedly since September 11. With 

significant job relocation to Midtown 

Manhattan, transit services in that area 

have become extremely congested. 

Meanwhile, combined public and private 

ferry service has seen a 91% overall 

growth in their use after September 11, 

the highest since the 1940s. To respond 

to the increased demand for ferry 

services, the Port Authority concentrated 

on building more facilities in Lower 

Manhattan. 

Figure 4. World Trade Center, late September, 2001 

Source: FEMA
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 9

Washington

On Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001 at 9:43 am, a hijacked commercial airline jet, 

American Airlines Flight 77 from Washington Dulles International Airport, deliberately crashed 

into the Pentagon. The airliner crashed low and diagonally into the Pentagon's outside "E" ring 

limestone wall. The impact with the Pentagon, and the conflagration caused by the fuel, created a 

catastrophic structural failure of the hit section. Within minutes, the upper floors collapsed into 

the 100-foot-wide gap, which extended most of the way through the office rings to the central 

courtyard. Staff at the Arlington County Virginia Fire Department actually saw the plane fly 

overhead at a dangerously low altitude. When they heard a crash and saw the thick smoke, they 

headed toward the site. In minutes, they were joined by other firefighters as well as the 

Arlington police, providing aid to the wounded and working to put out the blaze. 

In comparison with the extensive impacts of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 

New York, the attack on the Pentagon was relatively circumscribed. Even so, the tragic loss of 

life, the psychological impact, and the actions taken in response to the attack by local, state, and 

federal agencies had major impacts on the transportation system in the Washington, D.C., region. 

The following is a brief chronology of the events of September 11, 2001 involving the terrorist 

attack and transportation responses. 

September 11, 2001 – the first day

Time of 

Day

Elapsed Time Event/Action Taken

8:46 a.m. First plane crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC). 

MDOT activated the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) (between the first 

and second attacks at the World Trade Center) and readied emergency 

operations plans. In addition, MDOT directed the Maryland State Highway 

Administration (SHA) and the Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA) to 

keep as many people and as much equipment as possible on the roads.

8:50 a.m.: [4 min.] Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) telephoned FBI Terrorism Task 

Force, Washington, D.C., Field Office, to determine if any threats had been 

received for the District of Columbia. The response was negative.

9:03 a.m.: [17 min.] Second plane crashes into south tower of WTC.

9:40 a.m.: [54 min.] FAA halts all US flights.

Metrorail Operations on heightened state of alert.

Soon after 

9:40 a.m.:

[54 min.] WMATA Transit Police receive a call from a representative with D.C. Police 

about a threat to Metro and that closing the system should be considered.

9:43 a.m.: [57 min.] American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. Evacuation of 

building begins immediately. VDOT Statewide Transportation Emergency 

Operations Center (TEOC) is already in the process of implementing a 

statewide terrorism alert.

9:53 a.m.: [1 hrs. 7 min.] MTPD notified of Pentagon blast.

9:55 a.m.: [1 hrs. 9 min.] Metrorail and Metrobus notified that Command Post is established by Chief 

McDevitt of MTPD.

All track maintenance canceled on entire railroad.

10:00 am: [1 hrs. 14 min.] America's military put on high alert status.

Metrorail Yellow Line trains re-routed to segments of Blue Line still in 

operation. This effectively closes Yellow Line bridge over Potomac River.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 10

Time of 

Day

Elapsed Time Event/Action Taken

10:30 a.m.: [1 hrs. 44 min.] Federal Office of Personnel Management decided that 260,000 federal 

workers could be released from work.

10:32 a.m.: [1 hrs. 46 min.] Amtrak, Virginia Railway Express commuter rail, and the Maryland Transit 

Administration’s MARC commuter rail shut down rail service.

10:41 a.m.: [1 hrs. 55 min.] Metrorail Blue Line trains run through Pentagon station without stopping.

10:45 a.m.: [1 hrs. 59 min.] Blue Line restored - No station stops at Pentagon and Reagan National 

Airport stations.

10:46 a.m.: [2 hrs. 0 min.] MPD Command Center requests Metrorail to cease operations due to 

perceived threat. Metrorail determined that threat was not credible and 

continued operations.

10:59 a.m.: [2 hrs. 13 min.] National Airport closed.

11:05 a.m.: [2 hrs. 19 min.] Metrorail notified to run trains through Union Station without station stop.

11:31 a.m.: [2 hrs. 45 min.] Blue Line train service suspended due to warning of unidentified aircraft. 

Blue Line trains to keep underground in area of Pentagon.

11:39 a.m.: [2 hrs. 53 min.] Arlington County Manager declared a local state of emergency

11:43 a.m.: [2 hrs. 57 min.] Service restored to Blue Line.

11:44 a.m.: [2 hrs. 58 min.] All above ground trains in Virginia suspended.

12:00 p.m.: [3 hrs. 14 min.] Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia declares a statewide emergency. 

12:22 p.m.: [3 hrs. 36 min.] State of Maryland EOC established.

12:45 p.m.: [3 hrs. 59 min.] Union Station / Amtrak reports partial service restoration to Union Station -

one route will open at 1:00 p.m. from Washington to Baltimore only.

1:15 p.m.: [4 hrs. 29 min.] The Maryland Transportation Authority states that all facilities are under 

heightened security and remain open.

1:27 p.m.: [4 hrs. 41 min.] A state of emergency is declared by the city of Washington.

2:30 p.m.: [5 hrs. 44 min.] The FAA announces there will be no U.S. commercial air traffic until noon 

EDT Wednesday at the earliest.

4:00 p.m.: [7 hrs. 14 min.] Virginia Department of Emergency Management announces that all 

northbound lanes on I-395 have been closed from the Beltway to Washington, 

D.C.

6:00 p.m.: [9 hrs. 14 min.] Amtrak resumes passenger rail service.

6:30 p.m.: [9 hrs. 44 min.] George Washington Memorial Parkway reopened

6:42 p.m.: [9 hrs. 56 min.] Roadway traffic is slowly returning to normal. U.S. Park Police have 

reopened the southbound GW Parkway and traffic on the Clara Barton and 

Rock Creek parkways is now moving in both directions. Northbound I-395 is 

closed. Pentagon and National Airport Metro stations are closed. 

7:09 p.m.: [10 hrs. 23 min.] Normal Metrorail service restored. No station stops at Pentagon and National 

Airport stations.

7:15 p.m.: [10 hrs. 29 min.] Yellow Line bridge service restored.

7:20 p.m.: [10 hrs. 34 min.] WMATA Command Center secured.

Transportation System: Description of the Affected Area

The Washington, D.C., metropolitan area is among the most complex multi-jurisdictional 

environments in the United States. The profusion of state and local governments, along with 

federal agencies and regional transportation operating agencies, gives rise to significant 

challenges in coordination and cooperation. Aside from the challenge of coordination across 

political boundaries, the events of September 11 and the aftermath required coordination and 

cooperation from agencies with different jargons, command and control structures, and 

philosophies – the transportation, law enforcement, emergency management, and public safety 

communities that had to respond to the crisis. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 11

The Washington, D.C., metropolitan area is also one of the most congested in the nation. While 

it has one of the highest proportions of transit use in the nation – 16 percent of commuters use 

transit to get to work – the D.C. region ranks high in measures of traffic congestion and travel 

delay. Metropolitan Washington, D.C., is in the top five among the nation’s 68 largest urbanized 

areas in five of the Texas Transportation Institute’s indices of congestion, and is in the top ten for 

all ten measures. 

A complex structure of agencies and 

organizations shares control of the 

transportation network. Figure 5 shows the 

political boundaries of the Capital region. 

Operating agencies with responsibility for 

major highways in the area include the 

Maryland Department of Transportation 

(MDOT), the District of Columbia 

Department of Public Works 

(Transportation Division) (DCDPW), and 

the Virginia Department of Transportation 

(VDOT), as well as the National Park 

Service (NPS) for the region’s parkways 

and the Arlington Memorial Bridge. The 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA) operates the Metro 

rapid transit system and the bulk of surface 

bus service in the region, but local 

jurisdictions also run some transit service, 

including routes that utilize the newly 

redesigned Transit Center at the Pentagon. 

Federal agencies often exercise control over the 

transportation network of the region. This 

became especially clear on September 11, as streets were closed at the direction of the Secret 

Service and the Capitol Police to establish secure perimeters around critical governmental sites. 

Taking Action

Washington, D.C.

In Washington, D.C., traffic into the city was detoured, as Washington declared a state of 

emergency. Ramps were closed from interstates and variable message signs (VMS) alerted 

motorists to avoid the area. Retiming traffic signals for very heavy peak-period outbound traffic 

facilitated traffic flow out of Washington. HOV restrictions were removed, and overhead sign 

changes, travelers advisory radio (TAR), and the media alerted motorists to changes in traffic 

patterns. The District of Columbia Division of Transportation (DDOT), which is part of the 

District’s DPW, had D.C.’s signal system changed to “PM mode” at around 10:30 AM. 

Figure 5. National Capital Region
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 12

The Secret Service contributed to downtown traffic problems by expanding the White House 

perimeter and closing streets. As quickly as possible, DDOT deployed portable VMS signs and 

traffic cones to redirect traffic away from street closings. As in many other jurisdictions, rumor 

control was a significant problem; erroneous reports about the transportation system status 

(including reports that Metrorail had closed) had to be verified or discounted. Figure 6 displays 

the major closing that occurred in the Washington, D.C. area on the morning of September 11. 

WMATA reported that Metrorail’s ridership was 445,038 between opening and 6 p.m. on 

September 11, about 40,000 fewer rides than the previous Tuesday. WMATA closed its stations 

at the Pentagon and Reagan National Airport, and rerouted the Yellow Line away from the 

bridge across the Potomac River. WMATA also provided buses to help transport the injured, and 

provided several Metrobuses to assist D.C. Metropolitan Police in moving personnel to various 

locations throughout the District. Traveler information was also valued highly during the crisis. 

Local and state government traveler information Web sites saw a significant spike in activity. 

Figure 7, below, shows a snapshot of the congestion on the morning of September 11 as people 

tried to leave the D.C. area. 

Northern Virginia

The statewide Transportation Emergency Operations Center (TEOC) was in the process of 

implementing a terrorism alert via the Virginia Operational Information System (VOIS) in 

response to the New York events when the third hijacked aircraft flew directly over the Smart 

Traffic Center (STC) in Northern Virginia. After the plane hit the Pentagon, VDOT went to the 

highest state of readiness, invoking existing emergency plans, activating its Statewide TEOC, 

and implementing disaster response protocols at the Northern Virginia STC. 

Figure 6. Transportation facility closi ngs on September 11
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 13

The Pentagon is located in Arlington County and is served by the Arlington Fire Department. 

Because of a prior formal agreement, the department assumed incident command. Arlington's 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which coordinates all of the County's disaster response 

efforts, was activated, and employees on the County's emergency response teams made their way 

to the center. Less than two hours later, a local state of emergency was declared. 

The Northern Virginia STC made itself available to the military as a command post for dealing 

with the Pentagon incident. The Northern Virginia District of VDOT augmented STC, Safety

Service Patrol (SSP), and traffic control assets to facilitate clearance of the D.C. area. Signal 

coordination, suspension of construction lane closures statewide, and reversing and opening of 

high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes in the outbound direction were immediately implemented. 

Tiger teams were deployed to assist the Northern Virginia District. (Tiger teams are VDOT 

crewmembers who are deployed to regions in the state that need additional assistance in 

preparing for and responding to severe weather events or any other emergencies involving the 

roads and highways.) VDOT’s representative to the Governor’s Terrorism Task Force met with 

other members of the Task Force to provide transportation input to actions recommended to the 

Governor.

Maryland

In Maryland, the first concern was to make sure there were no imminent threats to infrastructure 

and to secure the bridges, tunnels, and miles of roadway against future threats. After that was 

accomplished, the focus became getting the traffic exiting from downtown Washington, 

Baltimore, and Annapolis safely home. Although there was near-gridlock as many employers 

(including the Federal and state governments) allowed employees to leave early, there were no 

formal evacuations. 

Figure 7. Traffic congestion on September 11.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 14

MDOT activated their EOC between the first and second attacks on the World Trade Center and 

readied their emergency operations plans. In addition, they directed the Maryland State 

Highway Administration (SHA) and the Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA) to keep as 

many people and as much equipment as possible on the roads. Maryland transportation 

authorities implemented a number of specific actions statewide in response to the situation. 

Stranded or abandoned vehicles, especially under bridges, were moved. All video surveillance 

cameras at high-profile locations, including major bridges and tunnels, were activated and 

monitored. Retiming traffic signals for very heavy peak-period outbound traffic facilitated traffic 

flow through suburban Montgomery County. All construction work zones involving lane 

closures were terminated. State troopers and MdTA Police worked on clearing fender-benders 

and disabled vehicles more aggressively. Physical barriers were placed in front of facilities that 

housed command centers, and heightened security measures were instituted at all facilities. SHA 

helped the National Security Agency (NSA) to evacuate non-essential personnel. They also sent 

a technician to manually reset and operate the traffic lights to improve flows. 

The table below indicates key decisions, coordination, and communication by agency.

Key Decisions by Agency

Agency Key Decisions, Coordination and Communication

FAA Ordered halt of all flights across the country.

Maryland Department of 

Transportation(MDOT)

Activated the Statewide Transportation Emergency Operations Center (TEOC). 

Directed Maryland State Highway Administration and Maryland Transportation 

Authority to keep as many people and equipment as possible on roads. Coordinated 

with VDOT command center. Maryland Transit Administration shut down commuter 

rail operation (MARC).

Maryland Transportation 

Authority (MdTA)

Inspected highways, land bridges, overpasses under its jurisdiction and monitored 

video cameras at high-profile locations. Also towed suspicious and abandoned cars 

from the roadway.

Maryland State Highway 

Administration (SHA)

District engineers provided regular patrols of high risk structures, and also 

dispatched bridge inspectors to high risk bridges for observation. These are now part 

of their routine duties. Also set traffic controls manually to improve flow.

Maryland State Police Directed traffic, and investigated and towed abandoned vehicles.

Metrorail Initiated operations on high alert. Rerouted trains to avoid the Potomac River Bridge. 

Virginia Department of

Transportation (VDOT)

Statewide Transportation Emergency Operations Center (TEOC) implemented a 

statewide terrorism alert. Augmented STC, Safety Service Patrol and traffic control 

assets to facilitate clearance of the D.C. area in terms of traffic management. 

Provided essential rescue and recovery equipment requested by authorities at the 

Pentagon site.

Governor’s Terrorism Task 

Force

Recommended actions to the Governor of Virginia. VDOT representative a part of 

the task force providing transportation input.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 15

Metro Transit Police 

Department (MTPD)

Established command post, monitoring system surveillance, alerting tactical police, 

and sent bomb -sniffing dogs to stations. Kept in close contact with the FBI, fire 

departments, and other law enforcement agencies in the region. 

Arlington Fire Department Assumed incident command and carried out fire-fighting and emergency medical 

services. 

Arlington Police 

Department

Performed traffic and crowd control at the Pentagon, as well as securing the 

perimeter. Also investigated and towed abandoned vehicles.

State Highway 

Administration (Maryland)

Inspected high-risk bridges for irregularities. Reset traffic signals to improve traffic 

flow. Rerouted traffic to control access to Andrews Air Force Base and provided 

concrete barriers to secure access to the base.

Motor Carrier Division Stepped up vehicle inspections with special emphasis on hazardous material loads 

and drivers. 

D.C. Division of 

Transportation (DDOT)

Kept in close contact with Northern Virginia STC to check on status of roads in that 

region. Changed signal system in the D.C. area to PM mode. Redirected traffic away 

from closed streets. 

Secret Service Expanded White House perimeter and closed streets.

WMATA Set up command center and kept close contact with FBI, fire departments and other 

law enforcement agencies in the region. Closed station and rerouted the yellow line 

away from the bridge across the Potomac River. Provided buses to transport injured 

and D.C. Metropolitan Police personnel. Also heightened system surveillance and 

alerted tactical police. 

National Park Service Closed and monitored parkway roadway in and around Washington and Maryland.

Transportation Conditions After September 11

In the Washington metropolitan area, congestion around federal facilities and military bases 

caused by new security procedures has continued to present transportation-related problems. 

These problems range from relatively minor closures and restrictions, such as the street closings 

near the White House and truck restrictions around the Capitol, to significant issues such as the 

closure of a major commuter route that passes through a Northern Virginia military base. 

WMATA made several changes in response to the events of September 11. The new Pentagon 

bus terminal and transfer facility was completed and opened for business on December 16, 2001, 

restoring full service to the Pentagon and eliminating the temporary transfer facility at Pentagon 

City. 

However, heightened security continues to cause problems for transit and highway operations 

alike. Portable VMS are used to advise commuters about changing traffic patterns at these 

security choke points. Transportation agencies have experienced mixed results in terms of travel 

demand and ridership levels following the events of September 11 and subsequent terrorist acts, 

security alerts, hoaxes, and scares. Complicating the recovery of the transportation system has 

been the anthrax attack on various agencies and institutions of the Federal Government. 

Metrorail patronage, which had started to recover after September 11, dropped off again after the 

anthrax scares. Since then, while Metrobus ridership has begun to rise and peak period ridership 

on Metrorail is approaching normal levels, discretionary off-peak travel is substantially lower 

than pre-September 11 levels. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 16

Baltimore, Maryland

At 3:04 PM on Wednesday, July 18, 2001, the 60-car CSX freight train L412-16 entered 

the Howard Street Tunnel in downtown Baltimore. The train, being pulled by three 

engines, carried 31 loaded and 29 empty cars, with a mix of freight that included empty 

trash containers, paper products, plywood, soy oil, and several tanker cars. The engineers 

felt the train lurch and come to a rough stop. They tried to radio the CSX dispatcher to 

give notice, but they were in a dead zone in the tunnel. A few minutes later, one of the 

engineers was able to reach the train master on his cell phone.

As the fumes from the diesel engines got worse (the engineers did not know at that point 

that several cars had derailed and a fire had broken out), the engineers exited the tunnel. 

They were then able to notify the CSX dispatcher in Jacksonville, Florida. The engineers 

noticed that the smoke from the tunnel was increasing, evidence of a fire somewhere 

among the cars. After reviewing the bill of lading, and seeing the words “hazardous 

materials” they radioed Jacksonville again, asking the dispatcher to notify Baltimore City 

that not only had a train derailed in the tunnel and caught fire, but that the load carried 

hazardous materials. Whether these were also on fire was unknown. Figure 8 shows the 

smoke billowing out of the Howard Street tunnel the afternoon of July 18, 2001. 

Baltimore City firefighters received notification of the event somewhere between 3:35 

PM and 4:15 PM1. The Fire Department crew also reviewed the bill of lading and 

 

1

 Published reports have listed two different times regarding when the Fire Department was notified. CSX 

records indicate that notification was provided at 3:35 PM, while Fire Department records indicate that 

notification was received at 4:15 PM. See RailFan and Railroad, November 2001, “Fire in the Hole”, p. 44.

Figure 8. Smoke from the south portal of the Howard Street Tunnel
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 17

assessing the scene, realized that the freight train was carrying a variety of hazardous 

materials (including tripropylene and hydrochloric acid). Emergency response efforts 

were further complicated when a break in a forty-inch water main located under the 

intersection of Howard and Lombard Streets, almost directly above the site of the 

derailment, spilled water into the tunnel and onto the street. These events occurred as the 

City of Baltimore was preparing for both the evening rush hour and the second game of a 

baseball doubleheader at Oriole Park at Camden Yards. The City thus found itself facing 

a potentially catastrophic situation at peak demand hours for transportation services.

The following chronology presents a brief summary of the events of July 18, 2001, 

involving the Howard Street tunnel train derailment and transportation and emergency 

management responses. 

July 18, 2001 Chronology

Time of 

Day

Elapsed Time Event/Action Taken

3:07 p.m. 60-car CSX freight train carrying hazardous materials derails in the 

Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland

3:15 p.m. [8 mins.] Engineers detect fire in 1.7 mile-long tunnel.

3:25 p.m. [18 mins.] Engineers decouple engines from burning train, exit from tunnel

4:15 p.m. [1 hrs. 8 mins.] Baltimore City Fire Department arrives as first responder, assumes 

incident command responsibilities. CSX Engineers provide bill of 

lading indicating derailed train is carrying hazardous materials.

4:15 p.m. [1 hrs. 8 mins.] CSX Transportation notifies Maryland Department of the 

Environment-Emergency Response Division (MDE ERD) of the 

derailment of train cars carrying hazardous materials.

4:20 p.m. [1 hrs. 13 mins.] MDE ERD personnel arrive on scene, contact National 

Transportation Safety Board, Baltimore City Fire Department 

Battalion Chief 6, and Baltimore City Fire Department hazardous 

materials (HazMat) coordinator. Units begin assisting city personnel 

with analysis of train documentation and potential hazardous 

products.

MARC commuter rail, MTA’s Central Light Rail Line, and rail 

freight movement are disrupted by tunnel street fire. MTA initiates 

bus bridge to bring MARC passengers from Dorsey Station south of 

Baltimore to the City.

TBD Chief of the City Fire Department requests that all major roads (I395, I-83, US-40) into Baltimore City be closed

4:30 p.m. [1 hrs. 23 mins.] Baltimore City Police Department and Department of Public Works 

start rerouting downtown traffic away from the scene using signs and 

physical barriers; Howard Street and all streets crossing over the 

Howard Street tunnel are closed.

Interstate highways I-395 northbound and I-83 southbound are closed 

to traffic trying to get into the City.

4:35 p.m. [1 hrs. 28 mins.] MDE requests consulting chemist assistance through South Baltimore 

Industrial Mutual Aid Plan (SBIMAP). MDE advises Baltimore City 

HazMat of potential hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor hazard due to 

thermal degradation of fluorosilicic acid; identifies specialized 

treatment needed for HF exposures.

4:45 p.m. [1 hrs. 38 mins.] Baltimore City Emergency Management contacts MDE to report that 

city officials are preparing to sound siren system to notify nearby 

residents to shelter in place. MDE concurs with shelter order.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 18

Time of 

Day

Elapsed Time Event/Action Taken

4:53 p.m. [1 hrs. 46 mins.] MDE contacts U.S. Coast Guard and requests assistance. MDE and 

SBIMAP personnel conduct air quality monitoring along Howard 

Street Corridor and in the vicinity of the Mt. Royal Station.

5:00 p.m. [1 hrs. 53 mins.] U.S. Coast Guard closes Inner Harbor to boat traffic.

Orioles’ office workers are told to leave B & O Warehouse.

5:45 p.m. [2 hrs. 38 mins.] Civil Defense warning sirens sound.

6:15 p.m. [3 hrs. 8 mins.] Water from the broken water main located under the Howard and 

Lombard Street intersections surfaces and floods the street. 

MTA closes Metro’s State Center station due to smoke entering the 

station via subway tunnel and station ventilation fans.

8-9:00 p.m. [4 hrs. 53 mins.] Roads and entrance/exit ramps on major thoroughfares into the City 

reopen sporadically.

11:00 p.m. [7 hrs. 53 mins.] Baltimore City Fire Department Command Staff direct primary 

Command Post operations to be relocated to the vicinity of Camden 

Yards stadium complex.

Water is cut off by BCDPW at the point of the water main break.

Transportation System: Description of the Affected Area

The City of Baltimore is the principal metropolitan area in the State of Maryland. The 

City is located in the heart of the state and is a central transportation hub for the 

Northeast Corridor. Figure 9 gives an overview of the Baltimore region with road 

closures shown in red and yellow. I-95, the main north-south interstate along the east 

Figure 9. Baltimore regional highway system with closures on July 18
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 19

coast, runs through the heart of the City, connecting to the Inner Harbor and downtown 

Baltimore via I-395. I-695, the Baltimore beltway, links I-95 with I-70, a major interstate 

route that connects the mid-Atlantic region with the Midwest, and I-83, which links 

Baltimore with York, Pa., Harrisburg, Pa., and points north. In addition to the above 

roads, there are two tunnels passing under the Port that connect the interstate system. 

These are the Fort McHenry Tunnel, which is part of I-95, and the Baltimore Harbor 

Tunnel, which part of I-895 connecting with I-95. 

Baltimore City and the State of Maryland share responsibility for the operation of 

transportation facilities located within the City. The Baltimore Department of Public 

Works has responsibility for all surface roads within the City, including non-interstate 

routes and I-83, I-295, and MD Highway 40, while the Maryland Department of 

Transportation (MDOT) modal administrations are responsible for most of the Interstate 

network, transit, and the Port of Baltimore. The Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) 

operates all transit services in the City, including bus, light rail, heavy rail (Metro), and 

commuter rail (MARC). The Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA) owns and 

maintains parts of I-95 and I-395. In addition, regional and district offices of federal 

transportation agencies are also located in Baltimore and at BWI. The City’s Office of 

Emergency Management is responsible for handling emergencies and incident 

management within Baltimore. 

Maryland’s CHART system is a state-of-the-art transportation management center. The 

system includes cameras located along the interstate system, HAR, DMS/VMS, and a 

Web Site. The State Operations Center responsible for the operation of CHART is 

located south of Baltimore City near BWI Airport. The CHART system offers multiple 

capabilities, including traveler information services, incident management, and 

congestion management.

Baltimore is also a major transit point for the movement of freight, served by two major 

railroads, Norfolk Southern and CSX. The Howard Street Tunnel, which is owned and 

operated by CSX, represents the only direct rail link between the northeast, southeast, and 

mid-Atlantic region. The Port of Baltimore is one of the largest container ports on the 

East Coast, and is also one of the leading ports for RO/RO traffic (roll-on/roll-off, 

including automobile imports into the United States). The Port generates significant 

freight traffic, with approximately 80,000 truck trips on an annual basis.

The Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) operates an extensive mass transit system 

within the City and the surrounding region. The Central Light Rail Line travels a 29-mile 

corridor, with an average daily light rail ridership of about 30,000 passengers. MTA also 

operates the Baltimore Metro subway system, with daily ridership of 45,000 passengers, 

and a city-wide bus service, with daily ridership of approximately 250,000 people. 

Commuter rail service (MARC) is operated between Baltimore and Washington, DC. The 

Camden Line, with daily ridership of 3,500 passengers and a terminus at the Camden 

Yards Station near the stadiums, was the only one of the three MARC services impacted 

by the event on July 18.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 20

In 2000, Baltimore ranked in the top thirty out of 75 U.S. urban areas in each of the ten 

congestion indices developed by the Texas Transportation Institute, and in the top twenty 

for annual person hour delays, annual excess fuel consumption, and congestion cost. 

Even so, Baltimore does have a relatively high proportion of mass transit use, with 16% 

of commuters using transit to get to work.

Howard Street and the Howard Street Tunnel are located in the heart of Baltimore City’s 

business and cultural districts, and are adjacent to the core of the City’s tourist and sports 

attractions and the Inner Harbor. Howard Street is the extension of I-395, serves as a 

major north-south arterial for the city and runs adjacent to Oriole Park at Camden Yards 

and the Baltimore Ravens’ football stadium. It is also close to the Inner Harbor and the 

National Aquarium, the heart of Baltimore’s tourist area. 

The Howard Street Tunnel is along CSX’s major freight through-route on the Northeast 

corridor, from the southern states through Washington, DC and Baltimore and on to New 

York and Philadelphia. The tunnel, constructed in 1895 out of brick, runs for 1.7 miles 

through the heart of Baltimore and is said to be the longest underground conduit of 

freight on the Atlantic seaboard. The tunnel ranges from 60 feet underground at its 

deepest and rises to three feet underground at its shallowest. Before the accident, there 

were an estimated 28 to 32 freight rail trains passing through the tunnel daily. Figure 10, 

below, shows the Howard Street Corridor diagram.

Taking Action

City officials faced three challenges once the fire was detected:

• Identify the exact location of the fire in the tunnel.

• Determine the potential environmental impact from the burning cars containing 

hazardous materials.

• Determine whether downtown Baltimore would need to be evacuated.

The problem of identifying the potential environmental impact was resolved by the 

Maryland Department of the Environment’s (MDE) Emergency Response Division 

(ERD). Following a review of the bill of lading provided by the CSX engineers, the ERD 

personnel contacted members of the South Baltimore Industrial Mutual Aid Plan. 

SBIMAP is a voluntary consortium of manufacturers, emergency response personnel, 

Baltimore City environmental and emergency management personnel, and MDE, focused 

on the South Baltimore industrial area. The consortium’s purpose is to plan for and 

respond to incidents such as the Howard Street Tunnel fire where hazardous materials 

and potential environmental incidents are involved. SBIMAP was established in 1982 

and is largely funded by industry. SBIMAP member companies provided two chemists, 

who quickly determined that the hazardous materials involved in the fire would not, in 

fact, either individually or in combination, present a serious environmental hazard. 

The tunnel fire had an immediate impact on transportation services in Baltimore City. 

Several specific actions were taken, and specific short-term transportation impacts 

resulted from the tunnel fire and water main break. The first was a request by the Incident 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 21

Commander to close the major roadways 

into the City. The roadway system was 

opened to traffic the following morning. The 

closing of city streets in the vicinity of the 

tunnel, and the rerouting of passenger, bus, 

and commercial vehicle traffic followed that 

action. The day of the incident, drivers were 

trapped on gridlocked streets, and people 

waited at curbs for buses diverted from their 

regular routes. However, once traffic 

management procedures were put in place, 

the City was cleared of traffic within two 

hours of normal rush hour times (8:00 pm as 

compared to 6:00 pm). Figure 10 is a map 

from the Baltimore Sun detailing road and 

transit closing. 

During initial response to the fire, the Metro 

subway’s State Center station (the station 

closest to fire) was closed due to smoke 

accumulation. Light rail service in the 

vicinity of the water main break was 

disrupted, as was the MARC commuter rail 

and Oriole game day service. MARC trains 

were stopped at the Dorsey Station near 

BWI Airport, and a bus bridge was set up by 

the MTA to bring passengers into the City. 

The closing of the Inner Harbor to boat 

traffic by the U.S. Coast Guard occurred at 

5:00 PM. The disruption of rail freight 

movement along the East Coast resulted in 

reported delays of 18-24 hours for rail 

freight from Chicago to 

Baltimore/Philadelphia, and delays of 24-36 

hours for north-south movements resulted 

from the tunnel being closed due to the fire.

One other major impact of the accident was on the telecommunications front. Keynote 

Systems, an Internet performance company, had significant Internet backbone 

slowdowns. The Howard Street Tunnel houses an Internet pipe serving seven of the 

biggest U.S. Internet information service providers (ISPs). The fire burned and severed 

fiber optic cable, causing backbone slowdowns for Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 

WorldCom, Inc., and PSINet, Inc. Reports were received from the whole East Coast on 

service disruptions and delays (for example, the Hearst Corporation lost e-mail and its 

main links to its Web pages on the Internet), and even the U.S. embassy in Lusaka, 

Figure 10. Howard Street Corridor 

diagram in the Baltimore Sun, July 20
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 22

Zambia, experienced problems with e-mail. Both WorldCom and MFN had fully 

redundant service restored by July 20. 

The table below indicates key decisions, coordination, and communication by agency.

Key Decisions by Agency

Agency Key Decisions. Coordination, and Communication

Baltimore City Fire 

Department

Fire suppression

Baltimore City Police 

Department

Closing of streets crossing over the Howard Street Tunnel.

Baltimore City 

Department of Public 

Works

Repairs to water main and street surface at Howard and Lombard Streets. 

Traffic control in Baltimore City.

Baltimore City Office 

of Emergency 

Management

Media Information

Maryland Department 

of Transportation

Worked with Baltimore Department of Public Works (DPW) to establish a plan 

on how to repair the infrastructure damage once the fire was extinguished 

(procurement issues – having a contractor in place to do repairs, developing a 

plan on how repair work would be implemented once the “green light” would be 

received, plans for site survey, traffic diversion plan, etc.).

Maryland State 

Highway 

Administration

Through CHART system, posted notices on fixed and mobile DMS advising 

that major routes into the City were closed.

Mass Transit 

Administration

Light rail and bus operations. 

Establishing bus bridge between north and south segments of light rail.

MARC operations.

METRO subway operations – tunnel inspection.

Maryland 

Transportation 

Authority

Responsible for ensuring I-395 route into Baltimore was closed off during initial 

incident response activities.

Maryland Dept. of the 

Environment, 

Emergency Response 

Division

Obtained information on possible environmental impact of train fire (hazardous 

materials).

Monitored air and water quality in area around the tunnel and the Inner Harbor. 

Worked with Coast Guard to contain leakage into Inner Harbor.

Checked rail cars pulled from tunnel for structural integrity.

Coordinated removal and disposal of hazardous materials from the train.

Maryland Emergency 

Management Agency

Coordinating activities of state agencies.

Media relations and rumor control.

US DOT, U.S. Coast 

Guard

Implemented waterway safety measures, including closing of Inner Harbor.

Supported hazardous material detection and containment.

U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency

Assisted with monitoring of air and water quality.

Transportation Conditions After the July 18 Incident

Suppression of and initial clean up from the tunnel fire took approximately five days. 

The tunnel was reopened to rail traffic on July 23. For five days following the incident, 

streets in the vicinity of the tunnel and the water main break remained closed, and all 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 23

vehicle traffic was diverted. On July 24, nearly all streets were opened to traffic. Only a 

two-block stretch of Howard Street (around the intersection with Lombard Street) and a 

portion of Lombard Street from Sharp Street to Eutaw Street remained closed. 

The major long-term impact from the tunnel fire was on the Central Light Rail Line. The 

light rail track in downtown Baltimore runs directly over the Howard Street Tunnel and 

the water main. When the water main broke and the area around the break collapsed, 

much of the foundation support for this section of the light rail track was removed. The 

light rail track is embedded on a concrete slab, but much of the fill underneath the slab 

was washed away or collapsed. Completing repairs to the water main required twelve 

days while reconstruction of the light rail bed and tracks took a total of 53 days. The slab 

is still being monitored monthly to determine whether there is any shifting or movement 

of the rail now that service has been restored. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 24

Northridge, California

On Monday, January 17, 1994, at 4:30 a.m., an earthquake of a magnitude of 6.8 shook 

Los Angeles, California. The actual earthquake (and its subsequent aftershocks) lasted 

only about 1 minute. But it damaged 114,000 residential and commercial structures 

spread over 2,100 square miles, took 72 lives, and significantly impaired the Los Angeles 

regional transportation system. January 17th was also Martin Luther King Day, a national 

holiday, and so roadway volumes throughout the day were lower than on a typical 

workday. The earthquake’s aftermath generated a year’s worth of highway work in a 

single event. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported the 

Northridge earthquake as one of the largest and most costly federal disasters, with initial 

cost estimates of total damages at $25 billion. 

The most severe damage caused by the Northridge earthquake was on I-5. I-5, the main 

north/south artery in Southern California connecting the Los Angeles basin to Northern 

California, had collapsed at both the interchange with SR-14 (which connects the cities of 

Lancaster and Palmdale with Los Angeles) and on top of Old Road at the Gavin Canyon 

underpasses. I-5 also suffered damage north of the I-5/SR-14 interchange, effectively 

closing the main highway link over the mountains. Figure 11 shows some of the 

damaged sustained on the I-5. 

Figure 11. I-5 damage at Gavin Canyon
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 25

The connector at the I-5/14 interchange in Sylmar collapsed. This connector was the 

only freeway link over the mountains to Lancaster and Palmdale. Except for the 

extensive damage at the interchange, Route 14 to the north was unaffected. 

The major east/west freight corridor (the highly traveled Santa Monica freeway) was 

destroyed at four overpasses. Structural damage to buildings, roads, and utilities also 

occurred in the I-10 corridor connecting Los Angeles and Santa Monica, with the most 

severe damage in Northridge. Figure 12 shows the damaged sections of the interstate. 

SR-118, just north of Northridge (the earthquake epicenter), had sustained extensive 

damage. The eastbound roadway had collapsed completely at two separate places. 

Additional damage over other areas along SR-118 closed the entire section of highway 

between I-405 and I-210 in both directions. 

14

126

118

2

134

110

60

90

27

23

1

170

2

23

126

14

138

138

710

101

101

Castaic

Santa 

Clarita

Lancaster

Palmdale

Los Angeles

County Ventura

County

Simi Valley

Thousand Oaks

Northridge

Woodland Hills

Hollywood

Basemap source: Caltrans

Pasadena

Los 

Angeles

Moorpark

Freeways

Earthquake 

Epicenter

Metrolink Transit

Freeway Quake 

Damage Locations

101

118

495 5 

495 5 

495 5 

495 10 

495 10 

4950 

4950 

495 605 

495 710 

495 110

495 210 

495 105 

495 210 

I-5 at Gavin Canyon I-5/SR14 Interchange

SR 118 Mission/Gothic

I-10 Fairfax

Figure 12. Transportation conditions on January 17, 1994
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 26

Chronology of Events

January 17, 1994

Time of Day Elapsed Time Event/Actions Taken

4:30 a.m.: 0 minutes An earthquake of a magnitude of 6.8 occurred in the Los Angeles area, 

centered in Northridge. Damage spread over 2100 square miles and 

through three different counties.

4:31 a.m.: [1 min.] 5.9 aftershock.

4:35 a.m.: [5 min.] Los Angeles City and County Emergency Operations Centers are 

activated.

4:45 a.m.: [15 min.] FEMA Response began.

5:45 a.m.: [1 hr. 15 min.] Los Angeles Mayor Riordan declared a state of emergency.

6:00 a.m.: [1 hr. 30 min.] FEMA Headquarters Emergency Support Team was activated.

6:45 a.m.: [1 hr. 45 min.] As many as 50 structural fires were reported, in addition to numerous 

ruptures in water and natural gas mains. Power outages reported citywide.

9:05 a.m.: [4 hr. 35 min.] California Governor Pete Wilson declared a State of Emergency.

 9:45 a.m.: [4 hr. 45 min.] All active fires were under control.

2:08 p.m.: [9 hr. 38 min.] President Clinton declared a national disaster for Los Angeles County.

7:00 p.m.: [14 hr. 30 min.] First of several contracts put in place and crews began work on debris 

clearance and highway demolition.

Transportation System: Description of the Affected Area

Southern California is a 6-county region spanning 38,000 square miles. In Southern 

California, Los Angeles County is both one of the region’s and the nation's largest 

counties with 4,081 square miles, an area approximately 800 square miles larger than the 

combined area of Delaware and Rhode Island. Southern California has more than 200 

faults long enough to produce earthquakes as large as magnitude 6 on the Richter scale. 

Between 1980 and January 16, 1994, these faults produced 19 minor earthquakes. 

Considered the most extensive highway network in the world, the Los Angeles region has 

27 freeways and over 882 centerline miles of highways. There are over 6 million 

registered vehicles in Los Angeles County alone, and about 90 percent of all regional 

households have access to a vehicle. The Los Angeles metropolitan area is also one of 

the most congested in the nation. In 1994, it ranked first among the nation’s 68 largest 

urbanized areas in all ten measures of the Texas Transportation Institute’s indices of 

congestion. The region ranked number one in delays caused by heavy traffic flow and 

incidents, and number one in annual delays in person-hours per capita. 

In Los Angeles County, driving is the overwhelming mode of choice for commuting. 

Approximately 85 percent of workers commute by personal automobiles, while less than 

10% rely on public transportation. Motorists make about 23 million vehicle trips daily. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 27

Geographically, Los Angeles is separated from central and northern California by the San 

Gabriel Mountains to the north and San Bernardino Mountains to the northeast. Access 

over the mountains is limited to two major freeways: I-5, which runs the length of the 

state and SR-14, which provides access to the Antelope Valley. The I-5 corridor is 

especially important to Northern Californians who depend on I-5 freight movements 

originating at the Port of Los Angeles destined for the Sacramento area and other cities in 

northern California. East-west traffic is mainly dependent on I-10. 

Freeways, highways, and traffic management are handled by both state and local agencies 

as a cooperative venture. The California Department of Transportation, better known as 

Caltrans, has run the Los Angeles Traffic Management Center (TMC) from the Caltrans 

District 7 Office building in downtown Los Angeles since its inception in 1971. At the 

time of the earthquake, the TMC was being staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year with 

Caltrans and California Highway Patrol (CHP) personnel. Extensive traffic management 

14

126

118

2

134

110

60

90

27 23

1

170

2

23

126

14

138

138

710

101

101

Castaic

Santa 

Clarita

Lancaster

Palmdale

Los Angeles

County Ventura

County

Simi Valley

Thousand Oaks

Northridge

Woodland Hills

Hollywood

Basemap source: Caltrans

Pasadena

Los 

Angeles

Moorpark

Freeways

Metrolink Transit

101

118

495 5 

495 5 

495 5 

495 10 

495 10 

4950 

495 405 

495 60

495 710 

495 110

495 210

495 105 

495 210 

SR 118 Mission/Gothic

Metrolink daily ridership

Santa Clarita line 1,000

Systemwide 9,500

SR 118 

349,000

264,000

197,000

156,000

78,000

198,000

303,000

272,000

127,000

322,000

260,000

380,000

123,000

310,000

257,000

171,000

Figure 13. Pre-event transportation conditions and traffic volumes
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 28

capabilities were already in place on most of the major freeways well before the 

earthquake, including speed monitoring loop detectors, closed circuit television (CCTV), 

on-ramp meters, and permanently mounted VMS. In an emergency, the Caltrans TMC 

serves as the regional communications hub, providing up-to-date information on closures, 

detours, and reconstruction activities. This information is distributed through the TMC to 

public officials, media, and other agencies.

Traffic intersections within the City of Los Angeles are monitored by the LADOT 

Automated Traffic Surveillance and Control System (ATSAC) in the ATSAC control 

center located in the Los Angeles City Hall. Constructed for the Olympics in 1984, this 

system has the ability to adjust signal timing in response to real-time traffic data and 

monitor key intersections throughout the city. Los Angeles itself has a commuting 

population of over 2 million people daily. 

The CHP also deploys a Freeway Service Patrol (FSP), comprised of both tow truck 

crews and police officers, which is operated jointly by CHP, Caltrans, and the 

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the regional transit agency, from the 

Caltrans TMC. The goal of the FSP is to reduce travel delays through early detection and 

clearance of incidents during peak commute hours. On January 16, the FSP was 

operating 144 tow trucks on 40 freeway sections covering 381.3 centerline miles of 

freeways in Los Angeles County. The FSP makes about 220,000 freeway assists 

annually. 

The MTA and the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) provide the 

majority of public transportation in the Los Angeles region. On a typical workday, less 

than 10% percent of all commuters utilize public transportation services. 

The Los Angeles area is a critical intermodal transfer point for the west-to-east 

movement of goods across the United States. The Port of Los Angeles is the busiest 

intermodal freight port in the United States and among the 10 busiest ports in the world, 

with over 3,000 vessels arriving per year. Trucks leaving the port are typically headed for 

the major Southern California interstates I-5 and I-10 for distribution throughout the 

country.

Taking Action

At 4:31 a.m. on the morning of the Northridge earthquake, the “event” itself was already 

over. Fourteen minutes later, after both the City and the County of Los Angeles’s 

Emergency Operations Centers were activated, FEMA responded, and government 

officials began making decisions on what should happen next. By 5:45 a.m., the mayor 

of Los Angeles had declared a state of emergency in the city while Caltrans began 

sending out its own traffic management teams to assess the damage to the regional 

transportation system. Power outages were widespread, communications were impaired, 

structures were damaged, water and gas mains were ruptured, and four critical Southern 

California freeways (I-5, SR-14, I-10, and SR-118) were severely crippled. For the 

motorists that were driving that day, initial detours allowed the regional highway network 

to continue to function while decisions about alternative transportation routes were being 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 29

made. Recommended detours, however, added as much as 50 miles to trips. The media 

played a large role in both disseminating detour information on the day of the earthquake 

and discouraging motorists from driving if at all possible. 

Caltrans sent traffic management teams to inspect recognizable hazards and implement 

initial closures and detours on local streets. These teams were in the field on January 17 

directing traffic, but because the earthquake occurred early in the morning, there was 

very little traffic on the roadways. By 2:08 p.m., Caltrans had completed an initial 

damage assessment, hazards such as earthquake-related fires were extinguished, and 

President Clinton had declared a national disaster in Los Angeles County. 

On the transit side, the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) had 

expanded Metrolink commuter rail service north and west within three days. Bus 

services were changed, shuttle services were implemented, detours were put in place, and 

employers offered free shuttle services while federal, state, and local governments 

partnered to reconstruct the highway system in record time. According to the California 

Department of Transportation (Caltrans)/Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) The 

Lessons Learned from the Northridge Earthquake, “Everyone involved was driven by 

the desire to ‘be part of the recovery effort,’ and ‘take pride in showing what we could 

do.’” Figure 14, below, shows the reconstruction effort underway. 

FHWA reacted immediately to the declaration by releasing Emergency Relief (ER) funds 

to Caltrans. The ER program funds are available for use by the FHWA to help with the 

repair or reconstruction of federally funded roadways that are damaged as a result of a 

natural disaster or catastrophic failure from an external cause. Within hours, FHWA field 

representatives were working with Caltrans on reviewing and approving all 

Figure 14. Reconstruction after the Northridge eart hquake
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 30

reconstruction efforts. At the same time, several contractors who had prior experience 

with disaster recovery began to mobilize manpower, equipment, and demolition supplies 

directly to the damaged freeway locations, where they were prepared to work around the 

clock. Using emergency contracting procedures, under orders to immediately begin 

debris removal and demolition activities, Caltrans paid the demolition contractors for 

actual costs of materials, labor, and equipment with an agreed profit. The contractors 

started work based on these informal contracts. And, by 7:00 p.m. that first night, the first 

contracts were in place and work had already begun on I-5 and I-10 demolition. 

The Caltrans TMC served as the center of initial decision-making efforts by the traffic 

management teams, and on the day of the earthquake, all coordination of traffic 

operations was handled there. The TMC used backup electrical generators for power and 

relied on landline telephones for primary communications. The FSP also was run out of 

the Caltrans TMC. While the TMC was very functional, its technological capabilities 

were limited for real-time decision-making purposes. Many of the areas affected by the 

earthquake did not have ITS technologies in place in 1994. On the day of the earthquake, 

Caltrans and the LADOT immediately began strategizing about ways to upgrade facilities 

to handle the overload on the Caltrans TMC and ATSAC.

The table below indicates key decisions, coordination, and communication by agency.

Key Decisions by Agency

Agency Key Decisions, Coordination and Communication

Caltrans Assessed damage to the regional transportation system. Used emergency 

contracting procedures to start work on rebuilding the network 

immediately. Established detours. Caltrans Traffic Management Center 

(TMC) provided information on closures, detours and reconstruction 

activities. Later, also developed a Traffic Management Plan. Established 

the Emergency Detour Management center along with LADOT, SCRRA 

and other agencies.

Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA)

Released Emergency relief funds to Caltrans and good faith agreements 

to completely fund the rebuilding of the highway network. 

Los Angeles DOT Along with Caltrans, retimed traffic signals and installed informational 

signage. Monitored traffic intersections from the ATSAC control center.

Southern California Regional 

Rail Authority (SCRRA) 

Metrolink

Expanded Metrolink commuter rail service. Purchased new cars and 

decreased ticket prices.

Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority (MTA)

Changed bus services adding new emergency services including new 

routes and service revisions. New park and ride lots were created. With 

Caltrans, Metrolink and LADOT, among others, developed multi-faceted 

public awareness campaign on traveler information.

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA)

Coordinated response of 27 federal agencies involved using FEMA ICS 

to provide quick services, expedite decisions, and overcome financial 

challenges. Opened an earthquake service center to aid victims.

California Highway 

Patrol(CHP)

Using the Freeway Service Patrol (FSP) covered strategic highways and 

provided extra trucks, extended peak schedules to earthquake affected 

areas. This is operated jointed with Caltrans, LADOT and the MTA.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 31

Transportation Conditions After the Earthquake

Rebuilding the Los Angeles regional freeway network required a sustained effort by 

Caltrans and unprecedented cooperation between local, state, and Federal Government 

agencies. Through demolition, construction bidding, and reconstruction, the agencies 

involved exercised innovative solutions to existing “red tape” problems to restore the 

highway network. The use of ER funds and innovative contracting procedures allowed 

for the expedited rebuilding of the Los Angeles regional transportation network. 

In the first days following the earthquake, Caltrans and FHWA discussed bidding, and 

eventually signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on January 26, 1994, which 

outlined the three bidding procedures:

1. A+B bidding.

2. Invitation to bid procedures.

3. Design-build bidding.

A+B Bidding is a “cost-plus-time” bidding procedure that selects the lowest bidder based 

on a combination of the contract bid items (A) and the amount time (B) needed to 

complete the project or a critical portion of the project. A+B Bidding is used to motivate 

the contractor to minimize the overall time on high priority and high usage projects. This 

encourages contractors to finish early by offering bonuses (incentives) for early 

completion and assessing fines (disincentives) for late completion.

Invitational bidding was another procedure used to expedite contract administration by 

FHWA and Caltrans. This concept was used for those projects that had high user delay 

costs and an urgent need for early completion. These projects were expected to have 

short time frames for Caltrans to prepare the bid packages, greatly expedited advertising 

periods for the contractors to submit bids, and one-day bid openings and awards. 

Limiting the number of bidders on these critical projects allowed Caltrans to provide 

packages to the contractors quickly and answer questions. The MOU, signed on January 

26, 1994 between Caltrans and FHWA, outlined the criteria to be used for the invitationto-bid approach. Caltrans Headquarters Structures Division identified contractors to be 

on a “short list” for the invitational bidding based on internal criteria. Caltrans used the 

invitation-to-bid approach on 8 of the 10 A+B earthquake reconstruction contracts. 

Design-build construction is another contracting mechanism that allows initial 

construction to begin before final drawings for design are approved. Following the 

Northridge earthquake, Caltrans had 70 design engineers in place and ready to being 

work on plans for the damaged freeway sections. Contractors submitted technical 

proposals for construction work, and those proposals that met the minimum technical 

guidelines were allowed to participate in the price proposal section of the bidding. In 

order to keep the public informed, Caltrans embarked on an extensive public relations 

effort. Figure 15 is one example of the agency’s efforts to keep the public informed. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 32

The following chart shows a summary of the freeway reconstruction and incentive 

efforts:

Freeway Reconstruction Incentives

Freeway Segment

Work 

began

Work Finished IncentiveDisincentive Bonus

I-10

February 5, 

1994

April 11, 1994 –

74 days early $200,000/day $14.8 million

SR-14/I-5 

Interchange*

March 19, 

1994

July 8, 1994 – 35 

days early $100,000/day $3.5 million

SR-14/I-5 

Interchange** July 9, 1994

November 4, 1994 

– on schedule $20,000/day N/A

I-5 at Gavin 

Canyon 

January 29, 

1994

May 17, 1994 

Southbound;

May 18, 1994 

Northbound – 33 

days early $150,000/day $4.95 million

SR-118 Eastbound

February 

10, 1994

May 13, 1994 – 8 

days early $50,000/day $400,000

Following the earthquake, a $12.64 million design/build contract was put into place to 

install new traffic monitoring and commuter information equipment to areas that were 

affected by freeway damage but were not covered by the existing traffic operations 

equipment. The contract between Caltrans and National Engineering Technology was 

signed on January 20, 1994. The establishment of the Emergency Detour Management 

Center, which was later re-named the Earthquake Planning and Implementation Center 

(EPI-Center), was also part 

of this contract. Housed 

within the Caltrans district 

office in Los Angeles, it 

was built in order to 

maintain and monitor the 

new field equipment. The 

Emergency Detour 

Management Center also 

took some of the burden off 

of the existing Caltrans 

TMC by solely focusing on 

the earthquake affected 

areas and detour routes.

Figure 15. Caltrans reconstruction public outreach 

product 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 33

Findings

Each of the events from the four case studies presented transportation officials with a 

different set of challenges in dealing with response and recovery. The findings section of 

the case studies attempted to answer questions about how transportation agencies 

responded to the events presented to them and what lessons were learned. This included 

an assessment of the following questions: 

• Were the key players prepared? 

• What happened?

• Who took action?

• What aspects of emergency response worked well and why, and what aspects did 

not work well and why? 

• What role did technology play in these aspects with respect to emergency 

response and recovery? 

• What was learned, what could be done differently, and what can be incorporated 

into the planning process. 

Guiding Priority 

The initial guiding priority in every emergency is the protection of life. While police, fire, 

and other emergency responders have the primary task of ensuring public safety and 

resolving the dangerous conditions, transportation officials must begin almost 

immediately to implement evacuation plans and institute recovery procedures. A major 

concern with each event is the level of uncertainty of what exactly is involved. This 

uncertainty ranges from the concern over the potential for additional terrorist actions to 

the possible presence of hazardous materials to the uncertainty of the structural integrity 

of the transportation infrastructure. 

One of the major goals of transportation agencies is to provide mobility for the efficient 

movement people and freight on a daily basis. The challenge that transportation officials 

face during an emergency is how and when to begin restoring the level of mobility to the 

surrounding area that existed before the event took place. The level of damage and 

impact on the transportation system was different in each of the four cases studied. In 

each case transportation officials had to respond in a different manner as events unfolded. 

The 1994 earthquake centered in Northridge, California, produced a massive amount of 

physical damage to the Los Angeles area. Four major interstate connections were 

destroyed. Approximately 800,000 commuters used these four interstates daily. Because 

the earthquake occurred in the early morning hours of the Martin Luther King holiday 

when traffic volume was extremely light, emergency response needs were limited to 

putting out scattered fires. The state reported that all active fires in the region were under 

control by 9:45 a.m. the same morning. Because of this, transportation agencies were able 

to shift their overriding focus rather quickly from safety and security to restoring 

mobility. Debris removal at the affected interchanges began that night and work to repair 

the structures was expedited through innovative design build techniques. A TRB report 

on the aftermath of the event reported several findings: 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 34

o Providing immediate transportation solutions took precedence over the 

opportunity to change motorist’s behavior.

o Stabilization of traffic conditions took several weeks to several months.

o Where sufficient alternative routes existed, motorists continued driving; 

where convenient detours were not available, transit options became 

much more attractive. 

o Availability of accurate traffic data was critical in developing emergency 

detours.

o Areas with well-developed traffic management centers were able to 

accommodate sudden traffic changes more easily. 

Because Caltrans was able to focus on the reconstruction of the interstate from the first 

day, it was able to meet an aggressive schedule for reopening the damaged interstate 

connections to restore mobility to the region as quickly as possible. Work was completed 

on the I-10 in less than 3 months, the I-5 and SR-118 in less than 4 months and the 

complicated work involved in the SR-14/I-5 interchange in 9 months. 

First responders to the Baltimore rail tunnel fire believed that they were initially 

concerned only with the need to put out a particularly difficult fire. But once officials 

learned more from the manifests about the cargo on the train, a main priority was to 

ensure the containment of a potential environmental hazard. Because of the location of 

the fire beneath a corridor that contained a light rail line, a commuter rail line, and a 

major north-south arterial, mobility for the area was severely compromised. 

This incident demonstrates the changing nature of incident response. First responders 

initially moved into the tunnel, but then had to delay response until MDE, EPA and CSX 

identified the chemical contents of each rail car and determine the appropriate response. 

The prompt response by MDE in identifying the potential environmental impact of the 

fire in the cars containing hazardous materials helped to resolve the differences between 

this priority and the transportation and fire suppression priorities. 

Suppression of and initial clean up from the tunnel fire took approximately five days and 

the rail tunnel was opened to freight traffic on July 23. Within six days, nearly all the 

streets in the affected area were reopened to traffic. Repairs to the Central Light Rail Line 

were completed within 53 days, and MTA reported that ridership on the line was back to 

normal within two months of the reopening of service. 

In Washington, D.C., there was no significant physical damage done to the major 

components of the transportation infrastructure. The challenges facing transportation 

officials revolved around how to best facilitate the evacuation of the D.C. area on 

September 11. The uncertainty of what might happen next introduced a high degree of 

uncertainty into the decision-making process. 

The fact that there are so many various actors who control different portions of the 

transportation system highlighted a real need for coordination. Actions to close access to 

portions of the system were taken by officials for Washington Metro, the City of 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 35

Washington, DC, Arlington County, the Secret Service, the National Park Service, the 

military, the states of Maryland and Virginia. While there was no physical damage done, 

security was a top priority in the weeks following the attack as officials were on high 

alert for another attack. 

New York City officials were presented with the greatest degree of difficulty in shifting 

from security to mobility. The physical damage done in Lower Manhattan was 

unprecedented. The need to maintain high security enforcement and give primary access 

for rescue and recovery operations took priority over the need for restoring mobility to 

the general public for several months. The transportation officials responded to the needs 

of emergency personnel in deciding what facilities to open and close. Their primary goal 

was to support the needs of the police, fire, and emergency rescue agencies, which 

included two actions: 

1.Allow priority access for emergency vehicles and personnel to and from the 

scene

2.Give transportation agencies time to inspect their own facilities to ensure the 

safety of the facility from further attack

Within two hours of the first plane crash, most of the major transportation facilities in 

Manhattan were closed. This included all the major bridges and tunnels into and out of 

Manhattan, most local streets below Canal Street and all airports in the region. While 

restrictions were in place for the general public, these facilities remained open to provide 

mobility for the emergency response efforts in the months following. Even one year later, 

there remain certain restrictions in place such as the ban on single occupancy vehicles 

entering Southern Manhattan, truck restrictions in the Holland Tunnel, and vehicles 

restricted from the Staten Island ferry. It will be several years, and cost several billion 

dollars, before subway service will be restored on the PATH corridor to Lower 

Manhattan or on NYC Transit service to the World Trade Center area. 

Plan of Action 

In order to properly respond to a catastrophic event, agencies need to have in place a plan 

of action to handle emergency situations and to begin the process of restoring mobility. 

This section groups the actions needed into four sections: 

• Advanced preparation

• Institutional coordination (both internal and external)

• Technical communications

• Advance technology

• System redundancy and resiliency

Advance Preparation and Planning 

The need for advance preparation and planning by agencies is crucial in dealing with a 

range of mishaps or disasters. Several key themes emerged from the four cases in regards 

to advance preparation and planning. One is the need to learn from previous events and 

incorporate that learning into an agency’s response plans. The events of September 11 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 36

have served as a wake up call to cities and towns across the country about the need to 

prepare for the unexpected. Cities and towns across the nation need to prepare for natural 

and manmade catastrophes that can strike with little warning. In 2001, there were at total 

of 45 federally declared disasters within the United States, an average of one every eight 

days. These disasters were located in 29 different states and included fires, terrorist 

attack, tropical storms, and earthquakes.

Two, there is a need to be able to rely on agency staff at all levels to make good and 

timely decisions, often without complete knowledge of all of the mitigating circumstances. 

It is critical that staff at all levels be able to respond to situations and make decisions. As 

one public official commented “emergencies do not happen at convenient times, therefore 

it is important to train not just your first string but also your second and third string for 

emergencies.” The Northridge earthquake occurred at 4:00 a.m. when most of the 

residents of Southern California were asleep. The events in New York City and 

Washington, D.C., occurred during the morning rush hour. The Baltimore fire occurred at 

the beginning of the evening rush hour. Often these decisions have to be made without 

the luxury of obtaining detailed guidance from headquarters. In New York City, an 

official at one of the Port Authority’s tunnels responded that he was not able to check 

with headquarters because “it was not there.” The Port Authorities headquarters were 

located in the WTC and were destroyed in the attack. 

Three, there is a need to practice for the expected and unexpected. Knowledge gained 

and relationships developed through day-to-day contact are extremely useful when 

catastrophes strike. The events of September 11 were beyond the scope of what agencies 

had ever prepared for. Simultaneously, communications technologies were lost or 

overwhelmed, accurate information about the scope of the attacks was limited, and the 

loss of electricity compounded the ability of first responders to perform their jobs. But 

many of the actions that helped in the response were the result of years of day-to-day 

contact among transportation and police agencies. In New York, TRANSCOM had 

served as the collector and disseminator of daily traffic and travel information. During a 

crisis, it was able to expand upon its daily operations structure to provide accurate, timely 

information to the public and agencies involved in the response and recovery efforts. The 

I-95 Corridor Coalition was able to help its member agencies disseminate information on 

roadway conditions all along the Eastern Seaboard. 

New York City had dealt with previous emergencies including the 1993 World Trade 

Center bombing, a blackout in Queens in 1999 and a threatened subway strike during the 

1980s. The 1999 blackout forced a number of city agencies to increase it ownership of 

emergency generators which were invaluable on September 11 in providing power to the 

recovery effort and powering pumps to alleviate the flooding of the underground utilities 

and subways in Lower Manhattan. During the 1980s, the City prepared a draft single 

occupancy vehicle (SOV) ban on automobiles in case of the subway strike. This SOV ban 

was not needed at the time but served as the basis for the SOV ban 20 years later, when 

New York City began to experience debilitating traffic jams as security checks were put 

in place at key points. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 37

As a result of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, New York City began the process 

of upgrading its response to emergencies. In 1996, the Mayor’s Office of Emergency 

Management was established to be responsible for providing interagency coordination in 

the event of a natural, technological, biological, chemical, terrorist or other emergency in 

the City. A new, state-of-the-art control center was built and opened in 1999 so that 

various agencies had command desks located in close proximity to one another to 

facilitate interagency coordination. Unfortunately, the command center was located 

within the World Trade Center complex and was destroyed that morning forcing the 

OEM to move to three different temporary headquarters the first day.

Due to prior training and relying on personnel in the field to take action, NYC Transit 

was able to begin emergency operations of its subway system within 1 minute of the 

attack because a subway train operator stopped at Courtlandt Station felt the vibrations 

below ground from the plane crashing into the towers and reported that something was 

wrong. The PATH system began similar procedures six minutes after the first attack as an 

employee at the train control center in New Jersey ordered the trains to evacuate people 

at the World Trade Center station and express to safety in New Jersey. 

The crash of an Air Florida flight into the Potomac River in 1982, which coincided with a 

major snowfall and an unrelated Metrorail subway crash, pointed out the inability of 

agencies within the Capital District to communicate with each other. Each of the various 

state, county and municipal emergency response agencies communicated internally over 

a different radio frequency. While several of the jurisdictions had updated their 

communications to be interoperable in 2001, not all had. On September 11, local, state 

and federal agencies once again had trouble communicating with each other because of 

differing technological standards and equipment. 

As a result of September 11, officials from the states of Maryland and Virginia, the 

District of Columbia and the Federal Government signed an agreement on June 20, 2002 

to improve the region’s handling of transportation emergencies. The agreement commits 

the agencies to updating evacuation plans, integrating emergency operations centers, 

developing a regional data sharing network and performing inventories of resources. 

Southern California had taken several steps to improve its regional response to a 

catastrophe. In response to a series major forest fires during the 1970s in Southern 

California, a consortium of local fire officials developed the Incident Command System 

(ICS). ICS helped local and regional agencies better plan and confront issues such as 

non-standard technology and a lack of integrated communications systems. 

Minutes after the Northridge earthquake, the City and County of Los Angeles was able to 

activate its Emergency Operations Center and begin emergency response procedures. 

This center was built in response to the events associated with the 1992 Los Angeles 

riots. State and local officials realized that they needed a regional operations center to 

handle large-scale events that required the coordination among emergency response and 

other related agencies, such as transportation. In addition, the numerous state and local 

transportation and safety agencies within the region had coordinated on safely moving 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 38

large numbers of people on the transportation network for numerous large-scale events 

like the 1984 Olympics, political conventions and special sporting and entertainment 

events. 

The earthquake in the Los Angeles region created damage over a 2,100 square mile area. 

Transportation officials had to quickly assess damage to the system and prioritize where 

to immediately place its resources. Caltrans immediately mobilized technical experts 

among its staff of 23,000 workers spread across the state to descend upon the Los 

Angeles region to begin the response and recovery efforts. By the late morning of the first 

day, engineers were assigned the task of evaluating the structural integrity of the portions 

of the system and setting up temporary detours. To expedite the clean up process, 

Caltrans officials in the field were able to quickly enter into “handshake agreements” 

with private contractors to begin demolition and debris removal within 16 hours of the 

earthquake. This initial day-1 response occurred on a state holiday, Martin Luther King 

Day. 

Learning from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake near San Francisco, Caltrans began a 

statewide retrofit program for bridges judged to be at risk to damage from an earthquake. 

The retrofit program was underway in the Los Angeles area and not one of the 122 state 

bridges that were retrofitted in Los Angeles County as a result of the program sustained 

severe damage. 

While the City of Baltimore was prepared to fight a fire and to deal with a hazardous 

materials incident, it had not planned for a situation where both a hazardous materials 

spill and a fire occurred in the same incident. The rail tunnel fire presented emergency 

response officials with numerous uncertainties and only cursory information about the 

potential hazards. Because the fire was in a tunnel, it was difficult to know which boxcars 

were on fire and exactly which chemicals or combinations of chemicals were affected. At 

the same time a major water main ruptured pouring thousands of gallons of water into the 

tunnel. In response to the problems presented by the complexity of the tunnel fire, the 

Mayor of Baltimore has instructed local emergency planners to conduct a comprehensive 

review of the City’s emergency response plan. 

The train engineers in Baltimore were not able to immediately contact their supervisors to 

alert them of the situation because their radio was inoperable because of their location 

within the tunnel. One of the engineers eventually was able to establish communication 

with his cellular telephone after decoupling the engines and exiting the tunnel. 

Agency officials involved in each of the case studies repeatedly stressed the need and 

value of practicing for emergency response. In the words of one transit official from New 

Jersey, the most important thing is “practice, practice, practice.” The practice of 

emergency procedures can teach and reinforce lessons first learned in classroom training. 

A practice exercise is most useful when it involves representatives from multiple 

transportation and emergency response agencies and results in relationship-building 

among these agencies in how best to respond to a crisis. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 39

Institutional Coordination 

By their very nature, disasters require a coordinated response among multiple federal, 

state, regional and local jurisdictions. This coordination needs to occur at several layers 

simultaneously: 

• Internal agency coordination

• External coordination with other agencies as well as the public

A requirement for ensuring institutional coordination is to have an established chain of 

command. In New York City, the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management was in 

charge of emergency response measures. After the September 11 attacks, OEM made 

general command decisions, such as closing access to Lower Manhattan. Those orders 

were communicated to the individual transportation agencies and they would coordinate 

among themselves on how best to carry out the directives. In California, the preestablished structure of the ICS in Southern California helped with establishing areas of 

responsibility among multiple agencies after the Northridge earthquake. 

In Baltimore, the various local, state and federal agencies did not typically work together 

on a single incident and had not established a pre-existing chain of command. But the 

Governor did arrive on the scene and helped direct the response and recovery efforts. In 

Washington, the lack of formal coordination has led to a June 20, 2002 regional 

agreement among federal, state and local officials on how to coordinate response to 

transportation emergencies. At the federal level, FEMA coordinates the response of 26 

federal agencies involved in post-event recovery. This coordination of federal efforts 

through one federal agency allows local officials to be able to rely on one point of contact 

in obtaining assistance. 

Transportation agencies typically have staff at multiple locations with multitudes of 

varying responsibilities. The Port Authority of New York New Jersey, for example, 

operates tunnels, bridges, transit lines, airports and water ports within the New York/New 

Jersey region. The California Department of Transportation, Caltrans, oversees a state 

highway system of 25,000 kilometers in length and has a staff of over 23,000 employees 

with 12 district offices located throughout the state. It is important that each of the 

different parts of an agency understand the scope of an emergency involving 

transportation and the agency’s intended coordinated response.

Just as important as being able to communicate an agency’s coordinated response 

internally, is the need to be able to communicate with outside agencies, both public and 

private. As stated before, a finding that is present in each of the four cases is the 

importance of how day-to-day routine operations coordination helped in times of crisis. 

Numerous times, agency personnel relayed stories of how beneficial it was to be able to 

pick up the phone and communicate with someone at another agency in which there was 

a pre-established working relationship. The pre-existence of well-established interagency 

relationships among the many transportation and emergency personnel in New York City 

was one of the most important success factors in managing the post-event situation. The 

agencies built working relationships through their day-to-day coordination. As one 

official remarked, they view the management of each daily commute as an event that 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 40

relies on the coordination of officials from transportation agencies, fire, police, and the 

news media. 

In New York City, TRANSCOM set up a fax broadcast list that grew to 400 public and 

private agencies. The faxes contained updated transportation information from the city 

and regional transportation agencies and were distributed as frequently as once every 

hour during the first few days after September 11. The New York City Office of 

Emergency Management helped coordinate information disseminate among 

transportation agencies as well as with other outside agencies such as health and human 

resource agencies that have a vital interest in the state of the transportation network. 

In Montgomery County, Maryland, the county’s emergency operations center was able to 

serve as a mini-clearinghouse for information to other local governments and emergency 

response personnel. It quickly added additional phone lines to hand the increased call 

volume and also relied on cell phones, two-way pagers, and laptop computers connected 

to a local area network. 

The lack of existing institutional coordination was evident in several cases in 

Washington, D.C. These examples of poor emergency coordination might be the result of 

the lack of day-to-day coordination among the agencies. As an example, at 10:46 a.m. on 

September 11, the Metropolitan Police Department requested that Metrorail cease 

operations due to the uncertainty of events. But Metrorail officials declined the request 

and decided to continue operations to aid in the evacuation of people leaving the city. At 

about the same time both the Secret Service and the military were closing roads 

considered at risk, but the closures were not announced through any central coordinating 

agency like TRANSCOM in New York. In addition, the failure to coordinate the release 

of federal workers, such as would occur during a weather related incident, resulted in an 

unanticipated rush of commuters just as the region’s transportation system was ending its 

morning peak rush service patterns. 

Washington, D.C., had additional communication problems. There was no 

communication to Virginia DOT (VDOT) from agencies in D.C., including the National 

Park Service and DDOT, regarding transportation facility closures that affected traffic 

volumes into Virginia, although requests were made. This put VDOT in a reactive mode. 

As one example, there was no communication between the VDOT center in Northern 

Virginia responsible for traffic operations in the area and WMATA, the region’s transit 

provider. So in Northern Virginia, the local STC reversed HOV lanes to facilitate 

movement of southbound traffic out of the District, thus preventing the use of these 

facilities as a route for Metrobuses to return to the District to pick up more transitdependent travelers.

With Baltimore, communications between responding agencies were not as effective as 

might be desired. This was due in large part to the differences in guiding priorities as well 

as the fact that the Incident Commander was initially only concerned about fire 

suppression. It was only later that officials realized that the potential for a hazardous 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 41

chemical event would require a different level of response, including the possible 

evacuation of a section of the downtown area. 

While every emergency requires some level of coordination between the public and the 

private sector, the Baltimore fire tunnel was unique among the four cases in that it 

involved a private freight rail train operating within a private-sector rail tunnel with a 

public-sector light rail line operating above it. This situation required an additional layer 

of coordination. In order to help the media disseminate accurate information about the 

status of the Baltimore rail tunnel fire and its associated impacts, public officials held a 

series of daily press conferences. The press conferences included the Governor of 

Maryland, and representatives from various Maryland state offices, the City of Baltimore, 

and CSX. 

Communicating with the public about the impacts and consequences of an emergency can 

be an on-going process. The Interstate highway reconstruction effort after the Northridge 

earthquake lasted for nine months. It was approximately two months after the Baltimore 

rail tunnel fire that the light rail system was restored. Restrictions on certain bridge and 

tunnel crossings are still in effect a year later in New York City. 

In order to disseminate information, agencies can rely on the traditional print, television 

and radio media, but also increasingly, their own web sites. Although the Internet is an 

increasingly important means of communications, USA Today reported that during the 

week of September 11, 80% of Americans got their information from TV, 11% from 

radio and 3% from the Internet. 

To better disseminate updates and status reports on the transportation impacts of the 

Northridge earthquake, Caltrans implemented an extensive campaign to keep the public 

informed. Cooperating with LADOT and the California Highway Patrol, they produced 

about 200 each of Los Angeles County Road Closure Reports and Special Bulletins. In 

addition, it distributed over 2.6 million copies of Accelerate, Caltrans’ Action Plan to Get 

All our Freeways Moving Again. To deal with daily changes, officials held daily news 

conferences each day at 2:00 p.m. to ensure that the information would be available for 

the evening news. Representatives from the Governor’s office, Caltrans, FHWA, and 

other state agencies were present to give status reports and answer questions from the 

press. Caltrans made a point of having both policy makers and technical experts to handle 

a wide range of questions. 

Transportation officials in New York City implemented a similar multiple action strategy 

to disseminate information. Agencies used maps, handouts, and personnel to disseminate 

public information on the street. The MTA reported printing and distributing 1.5 million 

each of “take-ones” (one page handouts noting changes in service) and black and white 

maps in two 12-hour shifts after September 11. Figure 16 is an example of a take-one 

produced by NYC Transit showing the changes in subway service the week after the 

attacks. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 42

Figure 16- NYC Take One
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 43

The Mayor’s office coordinated press conferences, which included transportation 

updates. Agencies utilized radio, TV, and newspapers to relay information on the 

changing conditions. Highway Advisory Radio (HAR) broadcasts by INFORM and other 

transportation agencies in the NYC area gave up-to-date traveler information, and news 

stations ran INFORM and TRANSCOM reports on the morning and afternoon news 

shows. MTA reported 10 million hits on its web site in one day, five times the normal 

volume, one day after September 11 as people tried to obtain up to date information on 

conditions. 

With the Baltimore rail fire, the Maryland Governor coordinated daily press conferences 

from Camden Yards. The briefings had representatives from both public agencies as well 

as CSX, a private freight rail company. The City of Baltimore and state of Maryland each 

assigned public information officers to handle all press inquiries. This proved particularly 

effective in providing information to the public about the absence of a severe 

environmental hazard and helped to control rumors.

Rumor control can be a real problem when trying to assure the public of the safety of 

facilities or the need to close certain facilities. This was certainly a problem across the 

country on September 11 as people were uncertain if there would be additional terrorist 

attacks. In Washington, D.C., rumors of the closing of the Metrorail service kept many 

people out of the subway and instead on the street, which were congested by motorists 

trying to leave the city. MDOT experienced problems with judging the reliability of 

information it had at its disposal. On September 11, there was a fair amount of 

information, particularly disseminated by the media that turned out to be false. Examples 

include bombing of the State Department and other federal buildings causing undue 

alarm in the Capital area. The lack of accurate information could result in the wrong 

deployment of resources by officials working under the pressure of making decisions 

without a full knowledge of the events. 

Technical Communications 

The demand for accurate, timely information increases dramatically after an emergency. 

Often this increased demand comes at a time when the technology needed to provide that 

information is most compromised. Accurate information is needed by agency officials to 

allow them to make good decisions as to allocation of resources and setting of priorities 

in responding to an emergency. There is also a heightened interest by the public at large 

in gathering information about the emergency to be able to make decisions that might 

change their daily routine. While good communications depends upon human response to 

make the decisions, it is important to have the proper technology to disseminate the 

information. 

In New York City, and to a lesser extent Washington, D.C., immediate communication 

with agency field staff and emergency responders was difficult because telephone 

landlines were damaged and cellular communications systems were overloaded. Radio 

communications for the NYC Fire and Police departments were compromised because of 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 44

the use of outdated equipment and the destruction of radio towers and repeaters located 

on or in the buildings in the World Trade Center complex. Two-way radios helped field 

personnel communicate during the evacuation; however, field personnel without radios 

were out of touch. 

New technologies provided communication alternatives that proved successful in the 

emergency response efforts for internal agency decisions. The central telephoneswitching center for all the Port Authority divisions was located in the World Trade 

Center and ceased working soon after the attack. In both cities, agencies reported that 

interactive pagers that use push technology, such as the Blackberry pager, were extremely 

useful on September 11 when other forms of communication were unavailable. Internal 

e-mail, for example, helped Port Authority staff communicate internal decisions to the 

various divisions of the agency when telephone communications were difficult. Both 

NYC Transit and New Jersey Transit had “mobile” communications centers (transit buses 

equipped with satellite and computer technology), which were used as command posts 

for communications and decision-making. 

Communications immediately after the Northridge earthquake was difficult for both 

emergency workers and residents. Power was out for most of the area, which affected the 

operation of the central phone system. There were numerous fires at electrical stations 

and telephone switching stations. In addition, switching stations shut down because they 

are programmed to shut down if a certain percentage of telephones are off the hook at one 

time. This occurred on the morning of January 17 as the vibrations from the earthquake 

knocked a large percentage of telephone receivers off the hook. 

During a previous disaster, the1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco, 

transportation officials found that cell phones proved to be invaluable as radio 

communications were damaged. As a result California officials came to rely more on cell 

phone technology over radio. But because of the location of the Northridge earthquake, 

cell phone communications in the canyon areas was intermittent due to terrain and 

limited coverage and Caltrans has now also incorporated satellite and radio 

communications to its system.

Role of Advanced Technologies 

Once a catastrophic event has occurred, advanced technologies and intelligent 

transportation systems (ITS) can aid in providing information and assisting decisionmakers in these ways:

• Help make better informed decisions on when and how to open or restrict

facilities.

• Aid better communications with other public and private agencies involved in the 

response.

• Assist in communicating with the public about the status of the transportation 

system.
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 45

ITS technologies aided both agencies and travelers 

on September 11 in several ways. It was able to 

alter motorists of problems long before they reached 

the Manhattan area was critical. Both customers 

and facility operators benefited in having traffic 

diverted before it reached the bridges or tunnels. 

After TRANSCOM alerted I-95 Corridor member 

agencies of problems in the New York City region, 

these agencies used HAR and VMS on I-95 as far 

south as Delaware and as far north as New Haven, 

Conn., to alert travelers to avoid the New York City 

region. Figure 17 shows one such VMS altering 

motorists about the traffic restrictions into 

Manhattan. 

Traffic along key sections of the roadway system 

including bridges and tunnels leading to 

Manhattan was measured, and the information 

was used to help determine changes in the hours 

of the lower Manhattan crossings SOV ban. 

VMS were used to communicate real-time information to travelers. Within two minutes 

of the decision to close the George Washington Bridge, the VMS alerted motorists ten 

miles away. The information provided by its 1-800 telephone lines was simultaneously 

updated and the information was electronically transmitted for broader dissemination.

Transportation/Traffic Management Centers (TMC) functioned as focal points for 

emergency management. New York City’s TMC located outside of Lower Manhattan 

proved to be successful in communicating and disseminating agency decisions both 

internally and with the public. Both the multi-agency TMC in Queens (covering New 

York City streets) and the NY State DOT’s INFORM TMC in Long Island (covering 

Long Island highways) served as command centers for state DOT personnel and local 

liaisons from NYC DOT, NYPD, and NY State Police, as well as sites of public 

information dissemination via their ITS applications. NYC DOT’s TMC in Long Island 

City, Queens, has 55 CCTVs trained on major arteries. It also controls 6,000 of the 

11,000 traffic signals in NYC via computer. All 2,650 traffic signals in Manhattan are 

computerized. Communications at both centers were working properly on September 11 

allowing for automated dissemination of traveler information. In addition, the 

Interregion Video Network (IRVN) operated by TRANSCOM allows 13 traffic 

management centers in the New York region to share video feeds of its network. This 

allows other agencies to better understand what is happening outside of its purview but 

that might have a significant impact on its operations. Figure 18 is a screen shot of the 

IRVN network. This system is available on a more limited basis to the general public 

through the MetroCommute web site, giving motorists real-time information through the 

web. 

Figure 17. VMS on evening of Sept. 11 

Source: Port Authority
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 46

The Caltrans TMC served as the center of decision-making efforts by the traffic 

management teams after the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Extensive traffic management 

capabilities were already in place on most of the major freeways well before the 

earthquake, including speed monitoring loop detectors, CCTV, on-ramp meters, and 

permanently mounted VMS. The TMC used backup electrical generators for power and 

relied on landline telephones for primary communications. Since the 1994 Northridge 

earthquake, the TMC has updated the means by which they relay traffic information. 

Cable TV is now being used, real-time traffic information is available on the Internet, and 

Teletext, a scrolling sign placed at key points in the freeway system, updates commuters 

to potential back-ups.

Communication complimented the ITS capability of the agencies during the events. ITS 

technologies employed in Virginia included advanced traffic management center, VMS, 

and CCTV. According to VDOT, imagery from the CCTV network was extremely 

useful in assessing the progress and effect of traffic management operations. However, 

VDOT personnel perceived the telephone as one of the most important items of 

technology in use on September 11. Maryland made use of many of the same 

technologies, finding CCTV surveillance of particular utility. Dynamic message signs 

(DMS) and highway advisory radio(HAR) were used for traveler information, along with 

websites advising travelers of road closings and transit disruptions. 

In Baltimore and Washington, D.C., the most significant contribution from advanced 

technology came in the use of DMS/VMS and HAR to provide information to travelers 

on the closing of roadways into Baltimore on the day of the event. Maryland’s CHART 

system is state-of-the-art, and the State was able to post messages that covered the 

portions of the Interstate system impacted by the incident.

Figure 18. IRVN screen shot Source: TRANSCOM
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 47

ITS technologies enabled active management of the transportation network. In 

Washington, D.C., and in neighboring Montgomery County, computerized traffic signal 

systems enabled these jurisdictions to handle the “early rush hour” as District workers 

self-evacuated. Montgomery County in particular made effective use of traffic 

surveillance systems, which were largely unavailable in the District. 

In response to the attacks, at least one transportation authority is looking at how security 

components can be integrated with existing ITS and added to the proposed ITS 

extensions. Prior ITS installation was done mainly for operations but is flexible enough to 

be adapted for security applications. Television monitors can be modified to provide 

station emergency evacuation procedures and other security notices. The existing series 

of traffic operations cameras throughout the region can be used for security monitoring as 

well as traffic operations. The existing weather monitoring system on the George 

Washington Bridge could be used to help with hazardous material incidents by providing 

accurate weather information such as wind direction. 

While these useful forms of ITS are provided by the public sector, the private sector 

plays a significant role in providing other forms of traveler information including invehicle communications and navigations that could be used in emergency situations. On 

September 30, OnStar Communications, for example, added real-time traffic reports to its 

in-vehicle navigation services in a dozen cities, including New York City. 

Although the Caltrans TMC was able to initially deploy the Freeway Service Patrol and 

serve as an emergency command center for the regional highway network, it quickly 

became evident that the existing TMC could not handle all the unprecedented congestion 

generated by an earthquake, as it was already operating at capacity. The TMP recognized 

this, and with federal emergency relief funding of $12.64 million, implemented the 

Earthquake Planning and Implementation center (EPI-center). The 2000-square-foot 

EPI-center opened on April 17, 1994, and acted as a hub for many advanced technologies 

that facilitated the traffic management in the disaster areas. Connected with the TMC, 

the EPI-Center is used only when an earthquake occurs to relieve some of the burden on 

the TMC. The goal of the EPI-center was to focus on communication between 

transportation and emergency officials and commuters, relaying important information 

directly to those affected. The EPI-center was vital in coordinating the traffic 

management deployments and giving traffic engineers accurate and immediate 

information. This allowed them to make better decisions and to collect information about 

the changes in the traffic behavior during a disaster.

 

System Redundancy and Resiliency 

The ability to respond to an emergency in an effective way is significantly enhanced 

through advance preparation and planning. This includes taking action to assure that 

backup systems are in place for a variety of critical elements that support rescue, 

evacuation, and restoration of mobility. In the event of an emergency that compromises 

the quality or timing of the response due to a failure in any of these areas, public safety 

and welfare are jeopardized and lives may be lost as a result. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 48

Redundancy, the ability to utilize backup systems for critical parts of the system that fail, 

is extremely important to consider in the development of a process or plan for emergency 

response and recovery. The backup systems needed in any one emergency are determined 

by the nature and scope of the particular emergency. In each of the four cases, the 

portions of the system that failed and needed backup were dependent upon the specific 

characteristics of the emergency. At a minimum, emergency response planners should 

consider designing redundancy into emergency response and recovery plans in several 

areas: 

o The regional transportation network

o Agency personnel

o Communications

o Utilities

o Control Centers

o Equipment and supplies

It should be noted that building redundancy into the system can be expensive and be seen 

as “wasteful spending” in ordinary times. It is always cheaper to have only one of a 

particular type of infrastructure, but when that item fails during a crisis, it can have a 

domino effect on hampering response and recovery efforts. But as can be seen from 

examples from each of the four studies, the existence of parallel systems or the rapid 

implementation of additional service was extremely helpful in restoring the system’s 

capacity to move people and goods. 

Regional transportation network: In each of the four cases, transportation agencies, both 

public and private, had to work together to provide alternative travel options to the 

public. But the level of complexity and the alternatives used varied in each of the four 

cases. The solutions depended on the circumstances presented to decision makers. And 

the solutions shifted over time in response to changes in travel behaviors of the public to 

the options presented to them. 

In the case of New York City, Lower Manhattan has a dense set of redundant 

transportation infrastructure. The infrastructure consists of a pattern of local streets 

connected to arterials along the perimeter, a multitude of subway lines, on-street bus 

service, water ferries, and pedestrian accommodations. Because of that, people have 

multiple options for getting around on a daily basis. On September 11, when the tunnels, 

bridges, roadways, and subways were temporarily closed, local MTA buses continued 

running north of Canal Street. Public and private boats were pressed into emergency 

water ferries service. And the major form of transportation that day: people walked. 

Subway service was restored between Manhattan and Brooklyn by 6:00 p.m. that night as 

trains were rerouted away from the World Trade Center area through NYC Transit 

systems redundant set of subway tunnels. 

The Los Angeles highway system in the urban area has a fairly extensive set of redundant 

arterial and local streets. At the time of the earthquake, the Los Angeles DOT was 

implementing a “Smart Corridor” project that had identified parallel arterials as an 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 49

important option for commuter traffic. This system has the ability to divert freeway 

traffic onto the arterial streets during times of heavy congestion. Being able to implement 

this after the earthquake allowed the agencies to minimize some of the traffic congestion 

that occurred as a result of the closing of the damaged interstate segments. But to the 

north, the canyons and valleys restricted the number of alternative roads that are feasible. 

Because of this officials were presented with fewer options for rerouting traffic and these 

areas experienced the heaviest traffic backups in the weeks and months after the 

earthquake. 

In addition to roadway redundancy, the transit system helped alleviate some of the initial 

congestion caused by reconstruction. With an already extensive bus system, the 

LACMTA increased Metrobus service following the earthquake to respond to the 

demands of commuters. Metrolink, though still in its infancy, was able to extend its 

commuter rail lines into northern Los Angeles County and into neighboring Ventura and 

Orange counties within a matter of weeks. During interstate reconstruction, transit usage 

tripled on selective MTA and Metrolink rail and bus lines; however, transit usage fell to 

pre-earthquake ridership levels one year later. 

In Washington, the highway departments were able to take advantage of reversible lanes 

to help increase the volume of traffic that could exit the Washington, D.C., area that 

morning. WMATA had the ability to reroute its subway lines to avoid crossing the 

Potomac River bridge. One of the major infrastructure improvements that WMATA has 

considered is the construction of a second rail tunnel through the central rail system to 

provide redundancy in case of problems to the main line. 

In Baltimore, Howard Street and the tunnel below it are located in the heart of 

Baltimore’s business, cultural, and sports districts. Howard Street serves as a major 

north-south artery with I-395 feeding directly into it. The day of the incident, drivers 

were trapped on grid locked streets and buses had to be rerouted around the closures. 

However, once traffic management procedures were put in place, the city was cleared of 

traffic within two hours of normal rush hour times (8:00 p.m. compared to 6:00 p.m. 

normally). In response to the disruption of light rail and commuter rail service, MTA 

quickly instituted a “bus bridge” to supplement service. Because the freight tunnel serves 

as CSX’s main route along the Eastern Seaboard, freight movement became a problem. 

Working cooperatively with its main competitor, CSX was able to reroute its freight 

traffic onto Norfolk Southern tracks to help alleviate some of the freight congestion. 

Agency personnel: As stated earlier, emergencies can occur at any time. Therefore it is 

crucial to have a redundant system of trained personnel in place who are able to make 

good, accurate, and timely decisions in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. With 

two of the cases (New York City and Northridge), the recovery response effort lasted for 

several months. Maintaining staff on emergency status for this length of time can take a 

toll on personnel and highlights the need to have multiple people trained for each job. 

With New York City, the need for redundancy in personnel was highlighted when a 

number of key transportation decision makers were lost or temporarily missing in the 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 50

attack. Critical decisions were made by personnel in the field who, at times, were cut off 

from communications with headquarters. 

With Northridge, the reconstruction effort lasted for 10 months. On several of the major 

interchange reconstruction projects, crews were working 24 hours a day, seven days a 

week. The incentive/disincentives built into the construction contracts were as high as 

$200,000 a day, requiring Caltrans and FHWA to ensure that it had staff members who 

could settle disputes on call 24 hours a day for months on end. 

Communications: As noted before in the section on Communications, it is crucial that 

agencies be able to utilize multiple technologies to communicate with staff and the 

public. By having a redundant set of communications technologies available, agency 

personnel can shift from one technology to another depending upon the emergency 

scenario, geography of the land, or other unforeseen outside forces. Technologies used in 

the four areas included landline telephones, wireless telephones, two-way radio, satellite 

link ups and e-mail. As seen in the four case studies, landline telephone communications 

were disrupted by the vibrations of the California earthquake and severely affected in 

New York City because of the location of a Verizon substation in the World Trade Center 

area. Overwhelming customer demand on September 11 also taxed the portions of the 

system that were not destroyed. The Baltimore rail tunnel contained major trunk lines of 

fiber optic cable, disrupting Internet communications across the country when the fire 

spread. 

Agencies must also utilize multiple outlets to reach the public with information. The 

public is now used to getting its information from a number of different sources: print 

media, radio, television and increasingly the Internet and e-mail. 

Utilities: In New York City the loss of electricity severely hampered operations and

recovery efforts. When the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel lost electrical power, its lights and 

ventilation systems failed forcing hundreds of motorists to abandon their vehicles in the 

tunnel and run towards Brooklyn as smoke and debris filled the tunnel. Redundant mobile 

generators allowed for the restoration of power to emergency control centers and allowed 

agencies to begin flood prevention efforts to preserve subway tunnels and 

communications networks from extensive water damage. 

Control centers: Redundant control centers helped when the NYC OEM Command 

Center was destroyed. The Port Authority was able to move to a backup control center in 

New Jersey. Both New Jersey Transit and NYC Transit were able to deploy mobile 

command centers. In response to the events of September 11, Mayor Bloomberg has 

proposed constructing and opening five “Help Centers”, with one in each borough, that 

brings together representatives from city, state, and federal agencies. 

Equipment and supplies: In both Baltimore and New York, agency officials spoke of the 

need to have redundant supplies of equipment. But even more important is maintaining a 

good inventory of where supplies are kept or could be readily purchased. Bridge and 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 51

tunnel officials talked about the heavy volume of filters, batteries, and other routine 

supplies the agencies used in the days after September 11. 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 52

Conclusion 

In conclusion, each of these catastrophic events has produced lessons to be learned that 

are applicable to every region within the country. 

The need for advance preparation and planning was evident in each of the four case 

studies. New York and Los Angeles were somewhat better prepared to handle its disaster 

because of their reaction, and response to past events. New York City learned valuable 

lessons from such varied events as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1999 

Queens electrical blackout and the threatened 1980s transit subway strike. The Los 

Angeles region had been subject to numerous natural disasters- earthquakes, forest fires, 

and mud slides- as well as human events such as the riots following the Rodney King 

verdict. The Washington, D.C., region has identified shortcomings in its advance 

preparations for the region and has produced an inter-governmental agreement to 

improve the Washington region’s handing of transportation emergencies. 

Catastrophic events require a coordinated response among various state, local, and 

federal agencies. It is important to have an established chain of command in place and 

framework for response such as the Incident Command System (ICS) developed in 

California in the 1970s. The events of September 11 pointed out a number of weak links 

in the institutional coordination structure in both New York City and Washington, D.C. It 

is important that this serves as a wake up call to regions across the country to better 

integrate safety, health, and transportation agencies into a coordinated response plan. 

The Baltimore event showed the need to ensure that those response plans incorporate 

private industry. Private carriers transport the overwhelming majority of the freight 

shipped throughout the country on rail, water, and roadway. It is important to include 

these major shippers in designing response and communications plans. 

Communications has both a personal and technical aspect to it. It is important for 

decisions made by officials to be clearly and quickly disseminated within an agency and 

to the general public. The press plays a crucial role in this dissemination of information 

as shown in each of these four case studies. One area of communications failure that 

occurred in each of the four cases involved working with a technology that failed at 

crucial times. In California, landline telephones were knocked out by the earthquake and 

cell phones failed to work in the canyons north of the city. In New York City and 

Washington, communications networks were overwhelmed by demand and the failure of 

interoperability among emergency responders hampered relief efforts. 

Technology can play a crucial supporting role in aiding transportation decision-makers. It 

can help agency personnel make better-informed decisions as events unfold. It allows 

agencies to better coordinate responses with other agencies. And it allows agencies to 

distribute real-time information to people so that they can make individual decisions on 

when and how to travel. A prime example of this is the IRVN network that allows 13 

transportation control centers within the New York region to share live video feeds 
U.S. DOT/VOLPE CENTER 53

among the member agencies and the public to view video feeds of major transportation 

nodes to aid in individual decision-making. 

Redundancy within the system allows for parts to be disabled and the whole to still 

function. The four case studies pointed out the need for redundancy in the regional 

transportation network, in personnel, in communications technology, in utilities and in 

control centers. 

Building redundancy into a system costs money. Money that at times can be seen as an 

inefficient use of resources, until it is called upon in an emergency. There is a need to 

educate the public and policy makers that expenditures to ensure redundancy are 

worthwhile and even necessary in preparing for emergency response.