U.S. ARMY FIELD SUPPORT COMMAND 

 U.S. ARMY JOINT MUNITIONS COMMAND

March 2005 

 Command Historian 

 Headquarters, U.S. Army Field Support Command 

 U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command 

 Rock Island, Illinois 61299-6000 

 
Pictures Captions from Title Page identifying from left to right, top to Bottom: 

 

1. Brigadier General Vincent E. Boles, the previous CFLCC-C4and CG AMC units in SWA 

consults with co-worker during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

2. Left to Right: Command Sergeant Major Ty Walker, Brigadier General Larry Newman, 

Colonel Carl Cartwright, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Fletcher, General Paul C. Kern, and 

Major General Wade H. McManus, Jr. pose in front of a line of equipment waiting to be 

repositioned in theater. 

3. AFSC/JMC Command Historian, George Eaton at HQ AMC LSE – 1AD, Baghdad 

International Airport, Iraq. 

4. Mr. Keith Brailsford, DA Civilian, inspects a box of ammunition at AMC-LSE-SWA. 

5. Equipment waiting Reset in the desert at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. 

6. Equipment waiting Reset in the desert at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. 

7. Ammo offload operations; container being lifted off cargo ship in Kuwait. 

8. Camp Arifjan, Kuwait – Zone 2. 

9. Major General Wade H. McManus, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Field Support 

Command is greeted by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Fletcher at Combat Equipment 

Battalion-Kuwait. AFSC manages prepositioned stock in Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. 

 10. Download of ammunition containers overshore in Kuwait logistics operation. 

Table of Contents

Preface ii

Chapter 1 

Introduction and Command Overview 1

Operations Support Command’s Immediate Response 3 

Chapter 2 

Army Prepositioned Stock 

 Background 6 

 Overview of APS Phase I-III 8 

 Increased Funding to Fill Stocks 8 

Push of Stocks to Theater 9 

 Combat Equipment Group-Europe Contributions 9 

Three Camps of Equipment 11 

Combat Equipment Battalion-Qatar 12 

Combat Equipment Battalion-Kuwait 14 

CEB-Afloat/APS-3 and Camp Arifjan 15 

Using Contractors to Download APS 16 

Class IX Supply Shortages 21 

APS Issue 24 

Issues/Concerns 25 

Accomplishments 27 

Conclusions 27 

Chapter 3 

Ammunition Management 

Evolution of the Munitions Readiness Review 28 

Centralized Ammunition Management 34 

Other Ammunition Contributions 38 

Operation Noble Eagle and the Resulting National Guard 

 And Army Reserve Deployments 41 

Epilogue 47 

Acronyms 49

 

 

 

 

i

U.S. Army Field Support Command

and U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Support to

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Phases I-III

Preface

The US Army Field Support Command (AFSC) and US Army Joint Munitions 

Command (JMC) were key players in logistics support to the warfighter during the Global War 

on Terrorism. Our support began within hours of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 

States. The Operations Center was on round-the-clock operations in minutes and ammunition 

was shipped to customers within 11 hours. AFSC and JMC have continued their critical support 

ever since to include work in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Kuwait, Iraq and other 

Middle Eastern countries. The commands have provided ammunition support, Army

Prepositioned Stocks (APS), Logistics Support Elements (LSEs), Logistics Civil Augmentation 

Program (LOGCAP) contracting, and logistics horizontal integration within AMC and with the 

warfighters. That support continues to this day. 

Major General Wade H. McManus, Jr., had been the Commander of AFSC and JMC 

since October 2000 and led the commands through the initial stages of the Global War on 

Terrorism (GWOT) and Phases I-III of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He guided the commands as 

they ramped up to support combat operations. The ramp-up periods are critical to the success 

experienced in combat. During the Korean War and Vietnam War it took the Army 18 to 24 

months to get the ammunition production system on line at rates that met requirements. In those 

cases the ramp-up occurred after our Soldiers were already in combat. During Operation Iraqi 

Freedom most of the production increases were in place before our troops were in combat. 

During Desert Storm it took the Army almost six months to ship all its combat equipment to the 

desert. This time, AFSC was able to methodically prepare equipment already in Southwest Asia, 

reposition stocks in theater, and download prepositioned ships. The equipment was in place 

when the warfighters arrived and needed it. LOGCAP planners had gone through different 

scenarios and cut their teeth in Afghanistan and the Philippines. By the time services were 

needed in Kuwait and Iraq, the process was known and the people experienced. 

In the middle of supporting combat operations, the AFSC and JMC under went a series of 

organizational changes. The name was changed from Operations Support Command to the Joint 

Munitions Command. This was done to reflect the command’s joint mission in the supply of 

conventional munitions to all the Services. Then, as part of AMC and Army Transformation, the 

AFSC became a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) of AMC and JMC became a subordinate 

command of AFSC. This was done to reflect the evolving missions of the two commands and 

the increased importance of the AFSC missions to logistics transformation and the management 

of logistics to the warfighter. 

ii

Chapter 1: Intro and Command Overview 

On September 11, 2001 employees of the US Army Operations Support Command 

(OSC) were as stunned as any American by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 

the Pentagon. People huddled around TVs and radios and searched the internet for information, 

updates, and answers. At that moment, Rock Island Illinois did not seem like the potential 

logistics heartbeat of a Global War on Terror (GWOT), but OSC leaders had already been 

positioning the command for that very role. They had recently instituted structural changes and 

were in the process of training and preparing the command for a new logistics leadership role. 

As noted by COL (Ret) Redding Hobby, OSC Chief of Staff in September 2001: “The 

formative month of September changed our focus when we were attacked. Prior to that we were 

transforming ourselves anyway to more clearly focus on our responsibilities. The operation 

center was a good example. We initiated the operations center in the summer of 2001, well 

before September 11th... And then just coincidentally when September came we were already in 

a mode to be able to operate that way. So all we did was just increase the intensity and refine our 

processes to meet a war on terrorism instead of the global Army preposition mission that we 

had.”1

In fact, on September 11, 2001 the OSC Operations Center was just standing down from

24/7 hour operations in support of Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens, an annual Reception, Staging, 

Onward-movement & Integration (RSO&I) exercise in Korea. On hand was a complement of 

Reservists from the 19th TAACOM out of Des Moines. The 19th TAACOM was a round out to 

OSC and had been working the operations center in support of Ulchi Focus Lens. They 

immediately resumed 24/7 hour operations, augmented the staff, and assumed a key role in 

managing OSC missions.2

An effective, continuing Operations Center was one of the keys to AFSC support to OIF. 

It is also key to understanding the kinds of transformation and new missions AFSC has 

developed and streamlined over the past several years. MG McManus recognized the need for a 

24/7 operation as the command transformed as the Operations Support Command. He stated in 

his oral history interview, “The issue was if we're global, and we're operation support, we have to 

be prepared to take these phone calls. So we began with a 24/7 operation a big part of our 

continuing transformation efforts put us now into this operation center review, and redesign and 

buildup here so that we can be more effective in the global domain for corresponding with our 

forward deployed forces, processing their requirements for support, providing them a round-theclock capability here to tie into for any issues they may have.”3

 

AFSC has evolved from the old Industrial Operations Command (IOC) as the manager of 

the Army’s industrial base and also responsible for War Reserve stocks, to a more complex 

command directly involved in the logistics readiness of every warfighting unit as well as a 

 

1

 AFSC/JMC History Office. Colonel Redding C. Hobby, Chief of Staff, US Army Operations Support Command, 

End of Career Interview, August 2002, pp. 21. 2 FY01 OSC Annual Command History, pp. 1, 175. 3

 AFSC/JMC History Office, Oral History Interview MG Wade H. McManus, Jr., AFSC and JMC Support to OIF 

Phases I-III. February 2004, pp 1.

1
coordinator of support among the AMC MSCs. We got there through a series of steps that 

reveal the role of AFSC in Army logistics transformation. The command transitioned from IOC 

to OSC, and then from OSC to an OSC with a Munitions and Armaments Command (MAC) and 

Field Support Command (FSC) that included missions of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and 

horizontal logistics integration. Later the command changed into the Joint Munitions Command 

with the FSC, and finally AFSC became the AMC Major Subordinate Command with the JMC 

as the subordinate. In these steps, AFSC has paralleled the transformation of Army and AMC 

logistics provide to faster, more responsive, predictive, and joint warfighter oriented support. 

Today AFSC and JMC have four primary missions. These are Army Prepositioned 

Stocks, ammunition supply management for the joint force, the Logistics Civil Augmentation 

Program (LOGCAP), and horizontal logistics integration. The missions can be summarized as: 

-- Army Prepositioned Stock (APS): The AFSC maintains the readiness and 

accountability of the Army’s globally prepositioned equipment and materiel; this includes 

prepositioned sets, operational project stocks, and sustainment stocks. AFSC is responsible for 

transferring equipment and materiel to warfighters whenever and wherever required in support of 

the Army’s global power projection mission. During training and combat operations, AFSC 

leverages the capabilities of the Army’s prepositioned stocks located ashore and afloat to 

enhance rapid deployment and sustainment.4

-- Munitions: The JMC serves as the Department of Defense’s field operating agency for 

the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) mission. The JMC will manage the 

production, storage, issue and demilitarization of conventional ammunition for all U.S. military 

services. “Joint” is part of the JMC’s name because the command supports all U.S. military 

services – the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard. To meet the diverse 

needs of these customers, the command remains in close contact with leaders from the Army and 

the other services. JMC also acts in partnership with private industry when contracting for 

munitions production and shipment.5

-- Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP): AFSC manages the Logistics 

Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), which uses contractor assets to augment support to 

units in the field. AFSC contracting officers arrange for contractors to provide life support, 

logistics services such as transportation and warehouse management, and a variety of other 

services to support Soldiers in the field.6

-- Logistics Horizontal Integration: AFSC manages the Army’s Logistics Assistance 

Program (LAP) that includes Logistics Assistance Offices (LAO) and Logistics Assistance 

Representatives (LAR) on every major Army installation and with all combat units. During 

deployments and exercises, elements of the LAP provide direct support to combat units deployed 

to the front lines, and operates sites such as Logistics Support Elements (LSEs) near forward 

areas. In addition, AFSC receives logistics information from the LSEs and ensures data, requests 

for solutions, and readiness reports are coordinated among the AMC MSCs and with other 

 

4

 AFSC PAO, “Fact Sheet: US Army Field Support Command,” September 2003. 5

 AFSC PAO, “Fact Sheet: US Army Joint Munitions Command,” September 2003. 6

 AFSC PAO, “Fact Sheet: US Army Field Support Command,” September 2003.

2
logistics support commands. This horizontal integration and coordination provides speedy and 

coordinated response to units in the field and ensures that AFSC and AMC maintain logistics 

information dominance. 

While the continuing missions of ammunition and prepositioned stocks were critical to 

preparing the force for combat operations, LOGCAP and horizontal integration were the key 

drivers in the transformation of AFSC from its IOC and OSC roots. The Army needed faster, 

more integrated logistics support and a readiness focus to implement the Revolution in Military 

Logistics (RML). Information flow and a reduced uniformed logistics footprint were the 

elements provided by AFSC. AFSC’s rapid growth into the LOGCAP and integration mission 

areas, coupled with its honed competency in ammunition and prepositioned stocks support, were 

critical drivers in the logistics success of combat operations in Iraq. The details of AFSC support 

to OIF are discussed below, and the story begins on September 11, 2001. 

Operations Support Command’s Immediate Response 

As in most other commands, OSC leadership watched the events of 9/11 unfold on their 

TV sets. The initial plans at transformation were to be rapidly tested. In minutes the operations 

center was fully staffed. In eleven hours the first shipments of ammunition were on their way to 

customers, especially the Air Force. 

Two days later, MG McManus was flown to Washington DC to brief the Chief of Staff of 

the Army on the readiness of the ammunition stockpile. It was not a good visit. For years the 

Army had tracked ammunition by the number of tons available and location. However, funding 

gaps since 1990 had reduced the amount of surveillance and maintenance required to keep stocks 

fully ready. The OSC and it predecessors had warned about the issue, but tightening budgets had 

made it impossible to keep up with slowly deteriorating ammunition. While on hand, many 

stocks required maintenance and the current reporting systems did not reflect that. We needed 

time and funds to keep shipping ammunition to the joint forces. This was an immediate problem. 

As COL Hobby noted: 

“The biggest change it showed for us is that as we plan war and as we plan 

military operations we think we’ll have some ‘getting ready’ time. We’ll have a 

time to build up and think about it. We’ll have a phase that we go through, a 

planning phase and then an execution phase and during the execution we’ll build 

up, we’ll be ready and then we’ll launch our operations. The terrorist attacks 

showed us that there was no thinking, no planning, we’ve got to be ready on a 

moment’s notice with Air Force bombs and Marine small arms ammunition as 

well as Army ammunition. So for the ammunition for the joint services, all the 

services combined, showed us that we’ve got to be ready. So, ready today with 

the ability to provide ammunition immediately and ready tomorrow with the 

ability to surge or replenish what we use up today and again, a renewed awareness 

of it because it’s real, it’s not just a plan, it’s a reality now.”7

 

7 AFSC/JMC History Office. End of Career Oral History Interview, Colonel C. Redding Hobby. November 2002, 

pp. 14-15.

3
OSC immediately began the development of the Munitions Readiness Report (MRR) as 

part of the Strategic Readiness System. The MRR has significantly altered how the command 

manages ammunition and how DA calculates ammunition readiness. While the program is 

explained in detail below, in brief, the MRR mirrors other Army readiness reporting. It 

calculates ammunition readiness, production, quality, and serviceability for each ammunition 

item and family and it projects readiness for 12 months into the future. In addition, the system

highlights which ammunition items are used by the joint forces. The system can be used by DA 

to prioritize funding and effort. This should ensure DA is never again surprised by such difficult 

news as MG McManus gave them on 14 September 2001. Ammunition shipments proceeded at 

a rapid pace and OSC began to alter contracts in order to ensure ammunition production would 

meet warfighter requirements. AFSC/JMC ammunition operations in support of Phases I-III are 

discussed in Chapter 3. 

The APS offices also rapidly reacted to events of 11 September 2001. The Army had 

been improving APS facilities and rounding out stocks in the Mid East since the mid-1990s. 

Modern bases had been built in Kuwait and Qatar. Stocks had been shifted out of Europe to 

populate the APS stocks at those locations. The Kuwaiti stocks were exercised on a regular basis 

through the Intrinsic Action exercises. However, funding had always lagged behind. Repair 

parts fill levels were low and sustainment stocks were not up to the required days of supply. 

Army-wide budget constraints impacted progress of filling out APS. However, the Army 

responded rapidly after September 11, 2001. On September 25, 2001 Combat Equipment 

Group-Europe (CEG-E) received over $30 million to execute what became known as “Version 6, 

Enduring Freedom-1”.8

 APS commands immediately began preparing the equipment that would 

be used to execute OIF. In FY02 other APS funding streams were increased. By the end of 

FY02, repair parts and sustainment stocks were in the 85-90% fill range. Items short since 

FY95, such as steam cleaners, were procured and shipped to the in-theater storage points.9

 FY02 

was spent preparing for contingency operations. APS operations are discussed in Chapter 2. 

LOGCAP operations were a bit slower to spin up as other plans and initial deployments 

had to begin prior to executing contingency contracts for life support and logistics services. 

However, LOGCAP did react rapidly to provide life support services in support of Operation 

Noble Eagle, and then moved into operations in support of OEF. On 14 December 2001, after a 

lengthy and deliberate open competition, the LOGCAP contract was awarded to Kellogg, Brown 

and Root, Inc (KBR). LOGCAP and KBR rapidly shifted from deliberate planning to current 

event operations.10

Like LOGCAP, the push forward of the LSEs was slower to develop than ammunition 

and APS. However, OSC rapidly increased direct communications with the Logistics Assistance

Offices and moved the Logistics Assistance Program (LAP) into high speed. The immediate 

response of the Operations Center is just one example. In addition OSC began to track all AMC 

personnel deployed around the world and served as the Deployment Coordinator for the 

command.11 Part of the manpower for increased Operations Center mission was garnered 

 

8 OSC FY01 Annual Command History, p. 158. 9 OSC FY02 Annual Command History, pp. 162-64. 10 Ibid., pp. 171-74. 11 OSC FY01 Annual Command History, p. 174.

4
through the near immediate activation of 53 Reserve officer and enlisted personnel. In addition, 

though less directly related to support of OEF and OIF, was management of the OSC portion of 

Operation Noble Eagle. In addition to deployment of active duty forces to our most sensitive 

installations, approximately 750 National Guard soldiers were called to active duty to provide 

force protection at various arsenals, depots and ammunition plants.12 

The following chapters explain in detail the APS and ammunition support missions 

executed by AFSC during Phase I-III of OIF. As noted before, each story goes back to

September 2001 as the preparation work and execution in support of GWOT and OEF were 

important to understanding the entire support story. As the short summaries above indicate, OSC 

was ready to go on 11 September 2001. The command reacted immediately. As COL Hobby 

noted: “We reacted from September the 12th for about 30 days until the middle of October. By 

the middle of October we knew exactly what we were doing. We had the operation center set up, 

we had reports coming in, we had daily briefings to the Commanding General.... It didn’t take 

us a month to get ready; it took us a month to get in a rhythm and in a process. We were moving 

within hours or within minutes actually of things happening.... Our gathering of intelligence 

information and analyzing it was probably second to none, I’ve never seen it any better.”13

 

12 Ibid., p. 1. 13 AFSC/JMC History Office. End of Career Oral History Interview, Colonel C. Redding Hobby. November 2002,

pp.. 15, 16. 

5

Chapter 2: Army Prepositioned Stock 

On 11 September 2001 at about 0900, members of the OSC staff gathered around their 

TV sets and watched the US be attacked by terrorists. As noted by COL Redding Hobby, 

“within minutes, literally minutes, I think that was at 9:15 in the morning, within minutes we 

were reacting to what was going on...The terrorist attacks showed us that there was no thinking, 

no planning, we’ve got to be ready on a moment’s notice with Air Force bombs and Marine 

small arms ammunition as well as Army ammunition. So for the ammunition for the joint 

services, all the services combined, showed us that we’ve got to be ready.”14 Even if the 

command was not ready, they reacted as if they were. OSC and the Field Support Command 

(FSC) immediately began to prepare the Army’s war reserve stocks, prepositioned equipment, 

and Combat Equipment Groups for a rapid transition to contingency operations. 

The Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) program is the military instrument that allows 

AFSC to meet a contingency immediately with the necessary equipment and supplies to support 

the warfighter requirements. APS creates readiness by positioning combat support equipment, 

operational project stocks, and sustainment stocks in theater so troops may draw equipment upon 

arrival versus bringing home-stationed equipment.15 Stocks are managed by Combat Equipment 

Groups (CEG) and Combat Equipment Battalions (CEB). Prepositioning afloat on Military 

Sealift Command ships allows for forward placement of sustainment stocks, unit equipment, and 

port opening capability from seaward positions. Upon notice, the vessels sail to operation areas 

and begin downloading stocks into theater. Prepositioning ashore consists of land based storage 

sites near possible threats and conflict areas. 

The following summary will discuss how AFSC accomplished the mission of providing 

fully operational prepositioned equipment to soldiers for combat in OIF. Content will emphasize 

how AFSC managed large increases in funding to fill out the prepo stocks in theater and handled 

challenges with the Class IX supply line. The summary will speak to the push of stocks to 

theater, movement of stocks from CEG-Afloat, CEG-Europe to CEB-Qatar, and then CEB-Qatar 

to CEB-Kuwait. The changes in process due to admin download with contractors will also be 

explained, along with significant accomplishments and issues that have to be evaluated and acted 

on before future crises. 

Background 

AFSC manages the complex APS mission that involves the cooperation of many 

organizations and contractors. This mission dramatically reduces time constraints during the 

critical “Early Entry” phase of war. When AFSC Commander, Major General Wade H. 

McManus, Jr., was asked how he managed the GWOT mission, he responded by saying: “It’s 

 

14 AFSC/JMC History Office. End of Career Oral History Interview, Colonel C. Redding Hobby. November 2002,

pp. 20-21. 15 Note: APS stocks are located worldwide in CONUS, (APS-1), Europe (APS-2), Afloat (APS-3), Northeast Asia 

 (APS-4), and in Southwest Asia (APS-5). Prepositioned stocks can be broken down into two categories which 

 project military power: APS afloat (3) and APS ashore (2, 4, and 5). APS 1 is operation project stocks.

6
almost like we were thrust into the operation naturally,” because of our initiatives to support such 

logistic missions rapidly and responsively. 16 

 The build up and use of prepositioned equipment started increasing after Operation 

Desert Shield/Storm. After the Gulf War there was a pressing motivation to reduce the timeframe

it takes to deploy and equip soldiers on the battlefield. The Army shifted to Force Projection and 

made the equipment available in probable hot spots to reduce the transportation requirements for 

rapid deployment. The Joint Chief of Staff’s (JCS) answer was to place prepositioned stocks of 

heavy equipment and combat support units afloat at sea close to potential conflict areas. In 

October 1993 DA directed AMC to take the Third Army mission of the Army War Reserve 

Program (AWR) and provide central management for the war reserve stocks. There followed 

some organizational changes that resulted in the FY 1996 activation of the Army War Reserve 

Support Command (AWRSC) as a subordinate of the IOC at Rock Island, Illinois. 

 Since 1995, AWRSC has transitioned into a MSC and has been re-named the Army Field 

Support Command (AFSC). The management and use of APS has made great strides to meet the 

demands of the Army’s global power projection mission. The chart below is a chronological 

graph representing how AFSC arrived at the fight for Iraqi democracy through the evolution of 

APS from 1990 to 2003.17

“The ForceBehind the Force” 1/15/2004 4 of 39

1990 1992 1994 1995 1996 2003

Events

How AFSC Arrived At The Fight

AWRSC

Establishes worldwide

management of APS

Establish -

APS- 4 Korea, APS-5 Qatar,

APS- 2 Europe

APS-3

RORO/Conversion LMSRs

APS-3 Afloat Program

established

APS-3

First new built

LMSR

APS-5

Kuwait

“Mobility Requirements Study”

CSA directed Worldwide

Management of APS to AMC

Desert Shield/Storm

18 to 10 Divisions

Projecting Global Power

When and Where Needed

APS 2x2s

Afloat, Kuwait, Qatar

APS 2x1, Korea

APS was a POMCUS-based sourcing

FSC

Expanded missions to include –

AMC in-Theater FWD CMDs,

i.e., LSE, LOGCAP

Take Away:

A Structured Flow

Program 8 to 10 years

 

16 AFSC History Office. AFSC/JMC Support to OIF Phase I-III Oral History Interview with MG McManus, 

 December 2003, pp. 2. 17 Morretta, Sal and Pagano, David (Logistics Management Institute). “AMC SWA Support of Operation Iraqi 

 Freedom,” 21 August 2003. AFSC Briefing, Chart 4. NOTE: APS is coded based on the storage location. 

 APS-1 is in CONUS; APS-2 Europe; APS-3 Afloat; APS-4 Pacific; APS-5 SWA.

7
Overview of APS Phase I-III 18

Several events and policy decisions moved the Army into action. On 11 September 2001 

the attacks on American soil brought forth a true test of the Army’s readied stance. The 24-hour 

Operations Center here at AFSC answered the call to prepare for defense right away. MG 

McManus stated that within hours we were shipping bombs which arrived at destination within 

11 hours and Combat Equipment Group-Europe (CEG-E) began preparation to ship 6,500 items

to CEB-Qatar. This immediate request and response revealed the start of what was to become

an intense operation and the world’s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). MG McManus briefed 

the Chief of Staff of the Army only a few days after the attacks on AFSC/JMC capability to 

support our responsibilities to the Army, specifically the APS Program.

19 

With each political outcome, steps to move equipment into theater were taken by the APS 

program. On 29 Jan 2002 the State of the Union labeled Iraq part of the “axis of evil” group. At 

this point APS planners were sent to Southwest Asia (SWA) and APS Qatar started to ship a 

brigade set and division base to Kuwait. CEG-Europe also began realigning stocks to theater. 

On 14 May 2002, the UN Security Council approved more sanctions on trade with Iraq. With 

these sanctions Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) containers were shipped from

Qatar to Kuwait. A few months later, on 5 July 2002, Iraq rejected the UN request for weapons 

inspections. In the same month preposition ship USNS Watkins was downloaded, the Qatar 

BDE was moved to Kuwait, and Exercise Vigilant Hammer began. President Bush signed a 

congressional resolution allowing the use of military force against Iraq and on 16 October 2002 

APS-3 downloaded the USNS Watson. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was issued and 

the Combat Equipment Battalion-Arifjan (CEB-AJ) Provisional (P) was created. 

On 8 November 2002 the UN Security Council approved the order to make Iraq disarm

or face serious consequences. USNS Red Cloud and USNS Charlton downloaded two battalion

task forces. Maintenance cycles were accelerated on APS hospitals during this timeframe. 

Elements of AMC LSE Europe/Korea/CONUS prepared and deployed to AMC LSE SWA. 

Further into the war additional downloads were completed and four APS hospitals were issued. 

On 20 March 2003 CEG-E issued their Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) to deploy with the 173rd

Infantry Brigade (Airborne). The Northern Front opened with the airlift of the 173rd Brigade on 

26 March 2003. In January 2003 momentum was really gaining and APS-3 downloaded several 

ships of equipment into theater. A few months later the world witnessed Saddam Hussein’s 

regime fall to US coalition forces, 14 April 2003. 

Increased Funding to Fill Stocks 

Several things occurred at FSC that enhanced readiness at APS locations in theater before 

OIF Phase I began. In FY 2001 FSC had already made progress within DA to obtain adequate 

 

18 Pagano, David & Morretta, Sal. “AMC-SWA Support Of Operation Iraqi Freedom.” 19 August 

 2003, Charts 5-7. 

19 AFSC History Office. AFSC/ JMC Support to OIF Phase I-III, Oral History Interview with MG McManus. 

 December 2003, pp. 3-4. 

8
secondary item funding to increase readiness of force sustainment. ASL/PLL (Authorized 

Stockage List/Prescribed Load List) funding was allocated to buy-out 100% of requirements for 

all APS by the end of FY03. The operating budget in FY 01 for APS-Afloat was $128.3 M. 

APS-Land was obligated at $93.1M. In FY02 the operating budget for APS afloat was $104.8M 

afloat and $121.8M for APS - Ashore. 

After 11 Sept. 2001, there was a more immediate need for increased funding to fill out 

the stocks. In support of the GWOT, the FSC Material Management and Readiness Integration 

(MMRI) section planned and coordinated a DA-mandated buyout of ASL/PLL for key brigades 

in APS-3 and APS-5. During OIF, funding levels rose to 250% over the original planned FY 

budget.20 Because AFSC had already planned for fill by FY03, they knew what items from the 

ASL/PLL needed filled and they were able to immediately apply the additional money towards 

filling APS shortages. Fill rates for the units ASL/PLL improved to 85-95 percent. In addition, 

MMRI successfully developed operational plans to source equipment for the new APS-2 end 

state and redistribute equipment no longer needed in Europe to improve the readiness of units in 

APS-3 and APS-5. 

MMRI planned and coordinated an HQDA-mandated buyout of the APS-5 Operational 

Projects for Special Operations Forces, Enemy Prisoner of War sets, and Mortuary Affairs. The 

equipment was consolidated at Defense Distribution Deport Susquehanna, PA. Fill rates 

improved to over 90 percent for the projects. MMRI was also responsible for execution of a 

$3.0M buy of key Petroleum and Water Supply items for APS-3 and APS-5. The Coalition 

Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) declared critical shortages of petroleum and water 

and these items were immediately shipped to APS-5 for use. MMRI also executed a $1.0M buy 

of steam cleaners, a commodity considered short in supply in APS brigades since 1995. 

 The readiness rate and percent fills for APS-5 units and a variety of APS-3 unit uploads 

were improved in FY02. The APS Class II Brigade Set equipment inventory stored at Rock 

Island Arsenal was reduced by $4.5M to fill shortages. MMRI developed the requirements, 

coordinated testing and fielded a web site to provide visibility of APS assets, Radio Installation 

Kits requirements, and force modernization fielding schedules that impact APS equipment. 

MMRI also developed new processes for the Service Item Control Division to ensure that free 

issue and funded requisitions are truly “fill or kill” to eliminate excess resulting from late arrivals 

for APS ship uploads. 

Push of Stocks to the Theater

Combat Equipment Group-Europe Contributions 

As threats shift, APS stock position is re-evaluated and forward stationing areas are 

subject to movement. When our greatest threat was Russia in the 1980’s, most efforts at 

prepositioning equipment were focused in Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and reduced 

threat from Russia, the Army began to reduce size of combat forces and supporting war reserve 

 

20 AFSC History Office. AFSC/JMC Support to OIF Phase I-III, Oral History Interview with MG McManus. 

 December 2003, pp. 5. 

9
stocks in Europe. CEG-E became a final resting home for excess equipment. Much equipment 

was sent to, and returned from Desert Storm. CEG-E was also responsible for equipping the 

forces throughout the Balkans deployments. With the draw down of the three brigade sets in 

Europe, CEG-E redistributed APS-2 Europe equipment to increase readiness of the other APS 

sets. The Commander of CEG-E, Colonel Robert D. Cox, confirmed that APS Europe was well 

into the redistribution mission prior to September 11, 2001. Since 1995 CEG-E has distributed 

between 250,000 and 300,000 pieces of equipment. Colonel Cox noted that the roots of today’s 

APS-3, 4 and 5 were planted by equipment originally placed in Europe.21 

Because of the large volume of equipment stored in Europe and the corresponding needs 

in SWA, Europe sent the majority of its remaining stock to APS-5 in support of OEF/OIF. The 

surge mission was the most complex, time-sensitive, and important redistribution effort ever 

undertaken by the command and over $50M of funding was allocated to support the mission. In 

FY02 CEG-E’s operating budget was around $55M. That doubled in FY02 to $97M and $98M 

in FY03.22 Soon after September 11th, CEG-E prepared and shipped around 9,000 items to 

Qatar. Between Oct 01 and Sep 02, CEG-E repaired an additional 18,948 pieces of equipment to 

TM 10/20 standards and shipped this equipment to APS-3 and APS-5 to fill the remaining 

shortages, as well as to support OEF and the Southern European Task Force (SETAF). Colonel 

Cox said, “Shortly after September 11th, we began planning here in CEG-E. The long and short 

of it was that basically we did 12 months worth of redistribution work in three months.” The 

sudden influx of work required the employment of 520 contractors on top of the established 

workforce of 1300 personnel. Much of the equipment used to support SWA was in deployable 

condition. The best items had been used in the sustained redistribution effort since 1995. FSC 

and DA allowed CEG-E to spend what was required to get equipment back to fightable 

condition. Only the very worst items were passed over and sent to the disposal yards. 

When the 173rd Brigade moved into Northern Iraq, CEG-E also issued the Immediate 

Reaction Force (IRF) as brigade reinforcement.23 The 173rd Brigade is a light airborne infantry 

brigade with no heavy weapons. USAREUR requested issue of the IRF to support the 173rd with 

tanks, Bradleys, and artillery. The plan worked as smoothly as exercised with all equipment 

issued and ready to go long before transportation was available. What was not planned for was 

the continuing support to the IRF after it arrived in Iraq. The 173rd Brigade did not have 

mechanics or repair parts to support the equipment. Repair parts and technical assistance 

requests flowed into CEB-Rhine Ordnance Barracks (CEB-ROB) via email, fax and cell phone. 

They shipped parts and advised. Some CEG-E employees actually deployed to Iraq to support 

the force.24 

While the shipment of the combat equipment out of CEB-ROB is fairly well known, the 

efforts of CEG-E’s CEB-Livorno (CEB-LI) are less noted. In 2001 CEB-LI had issued wheeled 

vehicles to the 173rd Infantry Brigade (Airborne). During the intervening years the 173rd

 

21 AFSC History Office. Oral history Interview with Colonel Robert D. Cox on CEG-E Contributions to OIF 

 Phase I-III. 7 January 2004. 22 AFSC History Office. Oral history Interview with Colonel Robert D. Cox on CEG-E Contributions to OIF 

 Phase I-III. 7 January 2004. 23 AMC Pamphlet on APS. 24 FY02 OSC Annual History, p. 176. See also oral history interviews between George Eaton and CPT Ted West 

 and Mr. Dennis Monzingo, CEB-ROB, 10 September 2003, not yet transcribed.

10
Brigade’s TOE had not caught up and wheeled vehicle mechanics were still not fully authorized 

in strength to meet the increased vehicle density. The 173rd Brigade’s equipment was not ready 

for deployment to Northern Iraq. Based on the request of the SETAF CG, CEB-LI received the 

equipment at Livorno and brought every item back to 10/20 or Fully Mission Capable status. 

The effort took weeks of round-the-clock effort. The Italian workforce, at a time when Italy saw 

massive anti-war protests, focused on the equipment and the American soldiers who would soon 

be using it in combat. When the equipment was to be loaded onto ships the local stevedores 

were on strike to protest the potential war in Iraq. CEB-LI’s Italian employees did not miss a 

beat. They convoyed the vehicles to the port and then loaded the ships themselves. Without the 

efforts of CEB-LI, the 173rd Brigade would not have made it to Iraq as a combat ready force.25

 The rest of CEG-E’s redistribution efforts were a combination of it’s subordinate 

battalions significant roles in the redistribution process. In FY 02 Combat Equipment BattalionLuxembourg (CEB-LU) repaired and distributed 1,145 pieces of equipment that were shipped to 

APS-3 and 5 in support of the surge mission. From October through November 2001, CEB-LU 

provided three Force Protection (FP) Modules and three Prime Power Kits (PPK) in support of 

OEF. Each module provides life support facilities for 550 soldiers. CEB-LU served as AMC’s 

agent in coordinating the mission with Air Mobility Command, US European Command, and 

USAREUR. This mission required 90 trucks with 40-ft trailers and 37 C-17 aircraft to transport 

the equipment to Uzbekistan. Thirty-two days of 24-hour operations were needed to complete 

the mission. CEB-LU also repaired 14 light utility vehicles that were transported aboard an Air 

Force C-5 Galaxy from Luxembourg International Airport to support the global war on 

terrorism.

26

CEB-Vriezenveen (VR) delivered over 1,800 pieces of equipment for redistribution to 

APS-3, APS-5, and OEF in combat-ready condition. Additionally, several hundred other pieces 

were prepared before mission changes or shipping delays. CEB-VR took dramatic steps to 

reduce excess CL IX inventories and return these parts to the supply and maintenance systems. 

Over 36,000 items were shipped to their supporting Supply Support Activity, US Army Forces 

Command (FORSCOM), and APS-3. Additionally, CEG-E brought all excess repair parts on 

site to Item Manager visibility in order to continue the excess reduction process. In all, over 

$6M worth of repair parts were returned to the supply system or to using units. CEG-E was the 

source of a vast majority of the additional vehicles required in SWA. With this push, which 

continued into 2004, CEG-E processed almost all of the remaining repairable stocks in Europe—

the Cold War may finally be over. 

Three Camps of Equipment

At the height of preparations for OIF AFSC maintained three sets of equipment 

positioned in the SWA theater -- CEBs - Qatar, Kuwait, and Arifjan. The APS–5 Qatar fleet was

maintained by CEB-Qatar stationed at Camp As Saliyah in the outskirts of Doha, Qatar. The 

APS-5 Kuwait fleet was maintained by CEB-Kuwait located in Camp Doha, Kuwait. CEG-

 

25 See AFN Livorno video recording “SETAF at CEB-LI: Interview with LTC Pogue and Mr. Chidini,” 17 March

2003; see also oral history interviews George Eaton and various members of the CEB-LI staff, Sept 2003, not yet 

transcribed. 26 FY02 OSC Annual History. p. 176. 

11
Afloat (CEG-A) stocks were also pushed to the theater and received and maintained by CEBArifjan (Prov) at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.27 AMC Forward SWA in Doha Qatar coordinates, 

integrates and synchronizes all AMC activities in CENTCOM. It is the central point of 

command for CENTCOM and ARCENT commanders and directs the activities of CEB-Kuwait 

and CEB-Qatar. AMC Logistics Support Element SWA, manned with AMC FWD SWA and 

additional personnel, was activated at Camp Doha Kuwait 1 December 2001 and later moved to 

Camp Arifjan. From there, AMC LSE SWA managed AMC logistics efforts for OIF Phases IIII.28

CEB-Qatar 29

 In 1995 CENTCOM began work on the Qatar based location, named Camp As Saliyah. 

The camp was completed in 2000 with a price tag of $110M. It is the largest prepositioned site 

in the world and houses a large amount of equipment and support units that can be stood up 

quickly in response to conflict. Initial plans required units to fly into Qatar, draw equipment, 

road march it to the nearest port, load the ships, and sail to the area of operation. The plan was 

modified to send 90% of stocks to CEB-Kuwait via ship prior to issuing to Soldiers. This placed 

the equipment much closer to the area of operations and line of departure.30 

Throughout FY 02, equipment and supplies moved into and out of CEB-QA at a constant 

pace. Early in FY 02, CEB-QA received 871 containers of Inland Petroleum Distribution Sets 

(IPDS) Operational Project stocks bringing the total containers at CEB-QA to 1035. In Mar 02, 

IPDS stocks were relocated from CEB-QA to CEB-KU. Fill of other Operational Projects 

authorized for APS-5 increased dramatically. CEB-QA received, inventoried, and stored stocks 

associated with Special Operations Forces, Water Support Systems, and Containerized Systems 

Operational Projects. In addition to IPDS, CEB-QA loaned, issued, or forward positioned nearly 

1,000 pieces of equipment from Qatar to Al Udeid Air Base, CEB-KU, and elements in 

Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Qatar. 

 In Jan 02, CEB-QA was directed to clear the first of what would ultimately become eight 

Controlled Humidity Warehouses (CHWs) vacated over the course of FY 02. Three more 

CHWs were cleared in Mar 02 and four additional CHWs were cleared in Sep 02. Storage space 

was reconfigured as warehouses were emptied and turned over to US Army Forces, CENTCOM. 

In preparation for OIF, CENTCOM moved much of its operations staff to Qatar. They converted 

the warehouses to office space, quarters, and dining facilities.

 Readiness within APS-5 was improved through redistribution of equipment from APS-2 

(Europe). In FY 02, CEB-QA received significant influxes of equipment in two increments. The 

first increment consisted of 3,490 pieces of equipment that arrived in Mar 02 and was integrated 

into the APS-5 Qatar equipment sets. An additional 834 pieces of equipment arrived in the SWA 

 

27 CEB Arifjan was a temporary organization to assist in the receipt of equipment before combat operations. CEB- 

 Arifjan has since been deactivated. CEB-KU has moved to Camp Arifjan and is the sole CEB in Kuwait. 28 See the AMC LSE SWA Phase I-III History for details. Talbot, Randy ed. AMC-LSE-SWA OIF Phase I-III 

 History. September 2003, Chapter 2. 

29 FY02 OSC Annual History. p. 180. 30 Talbot, Randy ed. AMC-LSE-SWA OIF Phase I-III History. September 2003, Chapter 2.

12
area of operation (AOR) in Sep 02. CEB-QA prepared and moved the entire Class V stockpile, 

consisting of 119 20-foot containers each, from Qatar to Kuwait. The timeline below represents 

receptions from CEG-E and all shipments made into Kuwait through Phase III. 

The CEB-QA 2x1 Brigade Set (1,550 pieces of equipment including tracks, wheels and 

trailers) was prepared and forward positioned in Kuwait. This equipment move required CEBQA to load 24 Logistics Support Vessels, 5 High Speed Vessels and 1 Large Medium Speed 

Roll-On/Roll Off ship. In October 2002 the 2x1 Brigade was transformed into a 2x2 Brigade.

APS TIMELINE APS5 Qatar

Nov 02 Dec 02 Jan 03 Feb 03 Mar 03 Apr/May 03

-Deployment of

Susutainment

stocks

-Deployment of

(SST/MST)

personnel ISO 

APS turn in at

Arifjan

-Provided CL V

storage support

for SOCCENT

- Provided maint

services ISO ISB

Ops

-Re-deployment

of the TMDE Van

to Qatar

- Shipment of the 

FSSP ISO OIF

-Execution of Tire

Assembly

Initiative ISO OIF

• Deployment of the

Laundry OPROJ

Stock ISO OIF

• Stand Up of the 

CEB-QA EOC ISO

OIF

• Deployment of

Sustainment Stocks 

ISO OIF

• Issue of APS

assets to SOCCENT

ISO OIF

• Shipment of the 

LAMS ISO OIF

• Contract MOD 

completed for DS

Maint Spt CEB-AR

• Contract MOD for

the 4ID ship

download 

completed

• Deployment of

personnel to Kuwait

ISO RSO&I 

• Download of

Medical Theater

Stock via LSVs

(152 containers)

• Handoff of the 

FSH to deployed 

Units

• Deployment of the 

TMDE Van to

Kuwait via LSV

• Deployment of the 

WSS OPROJ Stock

to Kuwait 

• Provided Arms

Room support for

tent units

• Deployment of

MST team ISO

IPDS de-processing

in Kuwait

• Deployment of

SST/MST ISO FSH 

movement from

Bahrain to Kuwait34 RS & 66 

containers; 3 LSV 

missions

• Prep/Shipment of

Sustainment Stock

ISO OEF

• Shipment of the

AOAP Lab/CDP

equipment to

Kuwait via LSV

• Shipment of the

APS3 ASL/PLL to

Kuwait

• Shipment of the

Division Base 

PLLs/ASL to

Kuwait

• Prep of the

SOF/CSSL OPROJ

stock

• Issued a LTP 

Contract MOD for 

DS maint spt CEBAR

• Shipment of MES

(289) ISO OEF/OIF

• Prep of the 

Sustainment Stock

for shipment to

Kuwait

• Shipment of the 

Bde PLLs/ASL to

Kuwait

• Contract Spt

(Maint/Supply Ops)

for Deployed units

at Qatar ISO 

OEF/OIF

• Contract MOD 

completed for plant

facility maint &

custodian services

completed for CEBAR

•Watson II

(APS 5Q U/L)

646 RS / 58 C

• Equipment

Download (Green

Cove)- 221RS

• Deployment of

contract personnel

& Equip ISO stand 

up of CEB-AR

• Contract MOD 

completed ISO APS

Ops at Arifjan

• Provided Maint

services ISO ISB

Ops for MEF at

Qatar

• Configuration of

PLLs/ASLs by

UICs

APS TIMELINE APS5 Qatar

Feb /Mar 02 Apr 02 May/Jun 02 Jul 02 Sep 02 Oct 02

- WATSON 

Upload (approx 

460 RS

- Shipment of CL V

to Kuwait (66

DODICs/4

million Rds)

-Issued letter of

Intent (LOI) for

OY3 contract

-Receipt of

Division

Base PLLs/ASL

- Deployment of

Contract personnel

to Arifjan ISO

CEB-AR stand 

up ISO OEF

•Ammunition Prep

for shipment to

Kuwait

• Reception of the

MOADS Platoon

ISO CL V outload 

support

• QASAS inspection

of all CL V ISO

outload Ops & OEF

• Contract MOD for

deployment of

personnel ISO CEBAR stand up

• Contract MOD

completed for Surge 

Battle Roster

• Contract MOD for

Version 8 assets

redistribution

completed

• WATKIN Upload

(250 RS)

• Installation of

Radio Kit (Vic1 vs

Vic 2)

• Continue shipment

of the Bde Set (-) of

Equipment

• Contract MOD for 

WSS OPROJ Stock

completed

•Deployment of the 

Bde Set (-) via 

LSV/HSV to

Kuwait

• Deployment of

APS assets via TSV

to Kuwait

• Contract MOD for

the SOF OPROJ

Stock completed

• Contract MOD for

CSSL OPROJ Stock

completed

• Deployment of the

Bde Set (-) via HSV

& LSV to Kuwait

• Issued the LTP to

the contractor for

the reception of the 

version 8 - APS

redistribution assets

•APS Redistribution

Version 8 (Green

Cove 236 RS)

•Contract Workshop

ISO planning for

CONOPS

• APS

RedistributionVersion 6 D/L

(Green Cove- 250

RS)

• Contract MOD

ISO APS Equip

deployment to

Kuwait

• Contract MOD for 

Version 6 (Incr

1&2) completed

13
CEB-Kuwait 31

When units were flown into APS-5, CEB-Kuwait, equipment sets were already 

operationalized on the concrete storage lots at Camp Doha. Unlike APS stored at other locations 

equipment at Camp Doha was being used steadily during exercises commanded by the 

CFLCC/ARCENT. Every six months the equipment had been issued to units rotating in and out 

of desert camps to show U.S. presence in defense of Kuwait. While issuing and receiving to 

support the continuing Exercise Intrinsic Action rotations, CEB-KU managed the dramatic 

increase of equipment and supplies brought into Camp Doha for OIF. 

 

During FY 02, fill of the Mortuary Affairs Operational Project authorized for APS-5 

increased significantly. In addition, CEB-KU received and configured for storage stocks 

associated with the Enemy Prisoner of War Op Project as they were forward positioned in 

Kuwait. In May 02, CEB-KU issued 165 miles of IPDS, which had been forward positioned 

from CEB-QA, to US Army Central Command (ARCENT)-KU. The 2x1 Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) garrisoned to CEB - Kuwait was transformed into a 2x2 BCT in October 2002. 

Kuwait also stored a Combat Support hospital, an MLRS battalion, a newly formed Cargo 

Transfer Company, (CTC) and several operational stocks. 

APS TIME APS TIMELINE APS5 Kuwait LINE APS5 Kuwait

May 02 Jun 02 Jul 02 Aug 02 Sep 02 Oct 02

• 2 BCT (3ID)

1-64 Ar

4-64 Ar

3-15 In

1-9 FA

1-10 En

26th FSB

• Receipt of Qatar

2x2 Bde Set

• LSV Download

• Medea

Download 400

pieces of

equipment

• Receipt of

Strong American

1800 items

• Watson

Download 250

items

• Receipt of Qatar

2x2 Bde Set

• Medea 

Download 400 

pieces of

equipment

•Watkins

Download 250 

items

• Receipt of

Strong American

1800 items

• Watson

Download 250 

items

• Receipt of Qatar

2x2 Bde Set

• VIGILANT

HAMMER –

• Watkins

Download 250

items

• Receipt

Equipment Camp

Doha

• LTC Snead

Change of

Command

• Receipt of Qatar

2x2 Bde Set

•Receipt of Qatar

2x2 Bde Set

• LSV Download

• Operation

Desert Spring 02

• Receipt of Qatar

2x2 Bde Set

• LSV Download

• Operation

Desert Spring 02

 

31 FY02 OSC Annual History. p. 180. 

14
APS TIMELI APS TIMELINE APS5 Kuwait

Nov 02 Dec 02 Jan 03 Feb 03 Mar 03 Apr 03

• Operation Iraqi

Freedom

• Plan for APS

• Redeployment / 

Reconstitution

• Sustainment

Issue to Various 

Units (20 Units)

• Plan transition

of CEB-KU to

Arifjan

• Phase I of CEBKU transition to

Arifjan

• TSV Download

• HSV Download

• LSV Download

• 114 UIC to

units in support

of Operation Iraqi

Freedom

• Sustainment

Issue to Various 

Units (40 Units)

• Receipt of

Transfer Cases

• Issue Mortuary

Affairs Op

Projects Stocks

• Issue of

Transfer Cases

• Supplemental

Issue 3ID

• Sustainment

Issue 3ID

• Sustainment

Issue Various

Units

• TSV Download

• LSV Download

• Containazation

of EPW Op

Projects Stocks

• Issue EPW Op

Projects Stocks

• Receipt of

Transfer Cases

• Dahl Download

1469 RS / 218 C

• Sisler

Download

1030 RS / 216 C

• 3 BCT (3ID)

1-30 In

1-15 In

2-69 Ar

1-39 MLRS

• 1 BCT (3ID)

3-7 In

2-7 In

3-69 Ar

11 Eng

3-7 Cav

1-41 FA

• Div Base Issue

DISCOM

DIVARTY

ENG BDE

FSB, MSB, SIG

•Receipt of Qatar

2x2 Bde Set

•Red Cloud D/L

• Receipt Div

Base equipment

• Charlton D/L

• Receipt of 289 

MES sets

• Receipt of EPW

Op Projects

• LSV Download

from Qatar

• Receipt of Div

Cav Sqdn 221 

pieces on 8 LSV

• Green Cove

Download 400 

pieces of

equipment

• Receipt of EPW

Op Projects

• Receipt of Div

Base equipment

• Receipt of Div

Cav Sqdn 221 

pieces on 8 LSV

• Receipt of Qatar

2x2 Bde Set

 

Brigade Set readiness improved with receipt of equipment redistributed from APS-2 (1,175 total 

pieces of equipment -- 186 pieces rolling stock, 989 pieces non rolling stock), and equipment 

transferred from Qatar to Kuwait. Other AMC MSCs also contributed to improved APS-5K 

readiness by expediting shipment of equipment to fill specific APS-5K shortages. The charts 

above are a timeline of actions taken by APS 5 Kuwait May 2002 to May 2003.32

CEG-Afloat/APS-3 and Camp Arifjan 

The other prepositioned set of equipment is known as CEG-Afloat (APS-3). When the 

threat of wartime operation is low, the fleet of APS-3 ships is positioned with equipment at sea 

near possible areas of threat. The ship locations are carefully planned. For example, ships were 

placed in the Indian Ocean, where they could travel equal amount of days to either Iraq or North 

Korea where opposition has surmounted. Upon notice the vessels can move anywhere in the 

world to download equipment in support of an operation. APS-3 also has the ability to open 

ports in the absence of existing structures. Below are some pictures of download operations 

and the afloat vessels. 

 

32 Talbot, Randy, ed. AMC LSE SWA Operation Iraqi Freedom Phases I-III. September 2003. p. 36.

15
From the spring of 2002 until January 2003 JCS, DA and CENTCOM directed APS-3

stocks to begin downloading into Camp Doha. Operation Vigilant Hammer I conducted in July 

2002, was the first mission to begin download of APS stock into Kuwait. The download of 

USNS Watkins was intended to be a clear signal to Saddam Hussein of our seriousness. In 

retrospect, increasing the stockpiles was a clear signal of the approaching conflict. Operation 

Vigilant Hammer II followed shortly afterwards taking up the remaining storage space at Camp

Doha. Future downloads of equipment were transported to and stored in Camp Arifjan, a 

provisionally established location in Kuwait created to compensate for storage areas at Camp

Doha being used to full capacity. Therefore, the plan to immediately prepare unit sets and hand 

off was not plausible in this case. 

In the AMC-LSE-SWA OIF I-III History, Randy Talbot states “the plan for APS-3 was 

simple in concept. Sail the vessel to the location where the contingency exists, download it, 

configure the equipment to unit sets and hand the equipment off to a deploying unit.” 33 In 

original plans of APS-3 operation it was thought that when APS was utilized, equipment would 

be downloaded, prepared, and handed off to units immediately near the port. However, units 

arrived later than plans anticipated and storage for equipment was needed. Camp Arifjan was 

established in October 2002. Camp Arifjan stored and prepared equipment for issue for six of 

the seven Large Medium Speed Roll On/Roll Off Vessels (LMSRs), two CL V ships, and two 

sustainment vessels that downloaded into theater. Camp Arifjan, Zone 2 is pictured below. 

Using Contractors to Download APS 

The AFSC History Office has conducted many oral history interviews with key personnel 

at CEG-Europe to capture their experiences and expertise with APS push to the theater. Staff 

 

33 Talbot, Randy, ed. AMC LSE SWA Operation Iraqi Freedom Phases I-III.. September 2003. p. 38-39. 

 Information from this section also comes from the FY 2002 OSC Annual History.

16
Sergeant Anthony Magiera, QA officer at CEB-Brunssom, worked to make sure the contractors 

were performing their jobs to standards. Contractors come in with their own employees and 

quality control. SSG Magiera was essentially overseeing the contractor’s work to make sure 

they met Army standards. When asked how he coordinated with the contractors performing 

maintenance, SSG Magiera stated, “ It's a lot harder. In a regular unit, soldiers are doing the 

work and it's a lot easier to say I don't care what you say, you're going to fix it, whereas working 

with a host nation contractor, you can't say that. It takes a lot more charisma, I guess, to achieve 

your goals and to basically lead people who don't have to listen to you.”34 One of the contractors 

he worked with at CEB-Brunssom is ITT. ITT is responsible for fixing any deadline functions 

on the vehicle. They are not required to meet the 10/20 standard, this is accomplished later. But 

SSG Magiera recognized their work on the ground and said they produced high quality 

equipment. 

APS was designed with some specific assumptions. Planning implied equipment would 

be downloaded/uploaded in benign environments. It was also assumed maintenance capabilities 

and time to complete the maintenance would account for an essential element to the program. 

The assumptions motivated several of the policies enacted today. However, it is apparent that 

these preliminary assumptions do not align with the types of operations we fight today. As the 

program evolved, realization of the time limitations that a wartime endeavor could bring meant 

improvisation and finding ways to complete on the ground maintenance before issuing 

equipment to combat units. AWRSC began looking at ways of completing maintenance on the 

ships by taking vehicle doors off or creating enough space between vehicles to be able to get at

them. SSG Magiera went into detail on what happens to some of the heavy equipment placed on 

ships for lengthy periods of time: 

“Stuff's parked too close. They start the vehicles, but because they're in a ship 

and they have the ventilation system, it may not work to the capacity of the 

carbon monoxide that's building up, so they're not allowed to rev the engines. For 

example, with a deuce-and-a-half, you have a problem that entails if you start it 

up and let it idle, in any diesel. It's called wax-stacking, and what happens is oil 

leaks past the rings and valve seals and it builds up in the head and it comes out 

through the exhaust. Well, if oil's leaking class three from an engine, that's a 

deadline. When it comes off the boat, you have an inherent problem with stuff 

that's been on a boat for two years, wax stacking. Any diesel engine is going to 

wax-stack if all you can do is idle it. So you have an inherent problem, that's

number one. Two, this stuff can't move, so seals dry-rot. So you get axle leaks 

and you get wheel seal leaks. You get, for hydraulic braking systems you get 

massive cylinder leaks. All this stuff needs to be fixed prior to giving it to the war 

fighter.” 35

When stocks were downloaded into SWA for OIF, receiving units were not present. This 

required contracting companies to perform the download and movement of equipment. This 

element came as a sort of surprise, although AFSC was able to adapt to the circumstances. In an 

oral history interview MG McManus, CG of the AFSC and JMC during OIF, and in 1996-1998 

 

34 Oral History Interview, George Eaton and SSG Anthony Magiera, September 2003, not yet transcribed. 35 Ibid

17
CG of Army War Reserve Support Command, gave a more detailed explanation of the offload 

procedures, how they were different from what was envisioned, and how this may change future 

plans. This excerpt is long, but summarizes the issues. 

MCMANUS: When the prepo program was initially envisioned, there were two key assumptions, 

and that drove how we structured the program at the time. The first is that it was 

envisioned that we'd only offload the equipment in what was termed a relatively benign

environment, and two, there would be some maintenance time required and would be

built from the plan. So we combined the benign environment here and the maintenance 

requirement. That drove several different policy decisions, not the least of which was the 

stow factor because we were going back -- I think at the time the number was 17 LMSRs 

to support the afloat program here that was based on an 80% stow factor. It wasn't built 

in. When I got here in the War Reserve Support Command, that's when we began 

looking at the issue of onboard maintenance crews, and we began parking vehicles with

doors open or doors removed to facilitate the crawl space to go through to do checks and 

things like that. Even then it was limited. And the objective there was to gain as much

maintenance visibility as possible so you could plan your download work still working

against those initial planning assumptions. The fact is in the program today and the 

program of the future, those two assumptions no longer can apply.

EATON: I thought that the doctrine had always been though that the ship would pull up, benign

environment, like it was in Kuwait. However, the using unit would be there on the docks 

basically helping to pull the stuff off. 

MCMANUS: That's exactly right. 

EATON: When I was asking about admin download, I was thinking of the fact that the troops 

weren't even there for most of this. And was that a real surprise to us that suddenly we

had to bring in contractors to process a bunch of [equipment], and that's what I was

trying to get at when I mentioned the word admin download. 

MCMANUS: The whole planning scenario has changed because, when you look at the benign

environment here -- I always envisioned at some point in time, we thought this would be

part of RSO&I. We had these elaborate plan-o-graphs, unit parking areas, and so forth. 

You still had to require that when you had your supercargo and you had your hand-off 

team, all you had were enough people to work with the port authority to download the 

stuff, get the stuff parked, and then you began the hand-off piece. But we had not 

envisioned this large contractor operation and actually replacing units because of the 

RSO piece. The RSO piece is the piece we had to go back and refigure how prepo will 

play in RSO. 

EATON: Do you see that sort of contractor download as the future, or, if we're going to go into

less benign environments, do you think we're going to have to adjust back to the troops 

again?

MCMANUS: Where I see this thing going here is almost like [considering] ambiguous versus 

unambiguous warning times. I think we may have to find that as we look to the future to 

structure prepo, we need to take into account that your load is going to define your

offload and your employment. So, in this regard, if we take a look at some scenario,

some lesser contingencies where there will be ambiguous warning times, I would 

configure that ship for rapid offload-rapid employment. You may only take maybe a 

battalion task force and do it that way here. I think the bulk is going to be based upon the 

model we saw unfold here with OIF which is a large contractor presence was required to

facilitate that. Because as you get into it, [there’s] one thing that we will never control, 

and that's the trigger point for crossing the line of departure, and we saw that in fault here 

18
within this last operation. The trigger point actually was delayed versus where I think the 

National Command Authority wanted it to be. In this whole process the issue becomes

the generation of combat power, and that combat power is manned equipment and units

to be able to go forth and do the mission. So, in this case, we can take a look at the 3ID, 

which is primarily prepo, and some home-stationed equipment here. We have to be

flexible to go on both dimensions. And if we are going to a future scenario like SWA, I 

think we can tend to plan for a larger contractor requirement here. For example, we 

didn't do Liberia, but if we go and we looked at Liberia, I'd see they're a battalion task 

force with a loose stow. You can drive off the ramp. 

EATON: Over the shore.

MCMANUS: Over the shore. Exactly right. And, you know what we got into when we actually 

went through some of the test on this when I had the War Reserve Support Command. 

We actually went through one cycle, and we had actually loaded fuel tankers. I mean, we 

put those in there to see how that was going to work too. Because the issue was having 

some sustainment when you got there you need to rapidly employ. Because even then, 

back in the '97, '98 time frame when I was here, we began to see the employment 

scenarios changing versus the planning scenarios against which the program was 

developed.36

In the future MG McManus sees AFSC re-examining APS download and reception. The 

structure of APS will have to be flexible and able to adapt to different dimensions. If we run into 

another situation like SWA, it is likely a large contractor presence would be needed for 

download and maintenance. There may be other downloads where combat units are on the 

ground, the battalion is fully capable, and the soldiers can “drive off the ramp and over the 

shore” with prepositioned equipment. McManus’s view expresses the fact that the issue comes 

down to the generation of combat power. That power is manned equipment being able to cross 

the line of departure to complete their mission. AFSC completed the mission of providing very 

well maintained equipment to the warfighters and that represents a logistical achievement.37 

Because missions of wartime operations will never be truly identical it is necessary to see this 

type of flexibility and reaction built into the program. 

The LMSRs discussed above, contained a 2x2 BCT and over 100 echelons above division 

UICs. The CL V ships had 5,000 containers of ammunition and the sustainment vessels had 15 

days of supply for a Corps, equaling 3000 containers of CL I, II, IIIp, IV, IX, an VIII supplies. 

The charts represent the workload completed in Phase I-III at APS-3 Afloat and at Camp Arifjan. 

APS-3 downloaded the USNS Watson in October of 2002 and then several more vessels in 

December 2002 through February 2003. 

 

36 AFSC History Office. Oral History Interview MG Wade H. McManus, Jr., AFSC/ JMC and Support to OIF 

Phases I-III, February 2004, pp 17-18. 37 AFSC History Office. Oral History Interview MG Wade H. McManus, Jr., AFSC/ JMC and Support to OIF 

Phases I-III, February 2004, pp 16-18.

19
APS TIMELINE APS3

Feb 02 Apr 02 Jun 02 Jul 02 Sep 02 Oct 02

- Camp Arifjan

Opened

- CEB- AR

Established

- Div to Doha

EAD to Arifjan

- ITT Contract

Modification

- Watson

Download

1142 RS / 137 C

- 2BCT (3ID)

Issue (APS5Q)

- CEB-AR

64 Personnel

• VH Return

• CEG-A &

Planning Team

sent to SWA for

Recon and

Planning Session

• Develop Task

Organization &

Troop to Task

• VIGILANT

HAMMER –

Watkins

Download

999 RS / 437 C

(Dyncorp to 

CSA)

•CEG-A SOP 

Completed

• Rock Drill 

Conducted

CEG-A Cdr & 

Planners conduct

Recon of Kuwait 

port, ECHA &

Camps

APS3 Planner

Sent to SWA

APS TIMELINE APS3 APS TIMELINE APS3

Nov 02 Dec 02 Jan 03 Feb 03 Mar 03 Apr 03

- 4ID Download

Support Begins

(41 Ships)

- 183d Maint

Deploys Forward

CEB-AR assumes

DS Maint &

Recovery Spt

For Southern

Kuwait

- Plan for APS

Redeployment /

Reconstitution

- Revise ITT

SOW

• Gibson

Download

(Sustainment)

1543 Containers

• Anna/Gilland

Download

(ASL/PLL)

60 Containers

• 1st Sustainment

Stocks Issued

• CEB-AR

432 Personnel

• Titus Download

(Sustainment)

100 RS / 1607 C

• Pomeroy 

Download

730 RS / 272 C

• Carter

Download

(Ammo) 861 C

• Gordon

Download (ASL)

50 Containers

• Supplemental

Issues (3ID)

• Dahl Download

1469 RS / 218 C

• Sisler

Download

1030 RS / 216 C

• 3BCT (3ID) 

Issue (APS5K)

• 1BCT (3ID) 

Issue (APS3)

• Div Base Issue

(APS5Q)

• CEB-AR

438 Personnel

• Red Cloud D/L

1152 RS / 214 C

• Charlton D/L

1163 RS / 154 C

• CEB-AR

Begins DS Maint

Area Spt Mission

• 53d MCB Unit

Issue (1st EAD

Unit Issue-APS3)

• ITT SOW

Revised

• Decision to

Issue 1BCT from

Arifjan

• Move Div Base

to Doha / EAD to

Arifjan

• CSA Visit

• Watson II

(APS 5Q D/L)

646 RS / 58 C

• Strong 

American (APS2)

Download

282 RS

• Fisher D/L

42 RS

 CEG-A successfully conducted the first download of a 2x1 Armored Battalion Task 

Force consisting of 150 tracked items, 511 wheeled items, and 240 trailers from a Large 

Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) vessel as part of Vigilant Hammer 02 in the SWA 

AOR. Ninety-nine percent of the equipment disembarked from the ship under its own power. 

Ninety-six percent of the equipment convoyed to the Equipment Configuration Holding Area 

(ECHA) with less than .5 percent requiring recovery enroute. Ship download operations and 

20
equipment hand-offs occurred within the preplanned allotted timeframes. The preceding charts 

provide another representation of APS-3 actions during Phase I-III.

Class IX Supply Shortages (ASL/PLL) 38

Class IX stockage39 had been an APS issue ever since the program was established in 

AMC. Funding priorities had not included the purchase of Class IX. There was both a lack of 

funding and when funding was received it came late. As the road to OIF progressed, several of 

these challenges resurfaced with Class IX supply shortages. AFSC re-identified to AMC and 

DA requirements and order shortage deficiencies needed to fill ASL/PLLs (Authorized Stockage 

Lists/Prescribed Load Lists). Some problems contributing to the complexity of repair part 

shortages were a lack of early resourcing of ASL/PLLs and that units were maintaining readiness

by using PLLs on hand. In addition, because of the mixed fleet within the APS system, repair 

parts were required for a far larger number of equipment types than in any active Army unit. 

The variety of parts needed to support the assortment of equipment models stored in the APS 

made the need for more parts a very involved process. Reviews conducted by DA, AMC and 

3ID identified required changes to Class IX ASL/PLL. As the phases of the operation unfolded, 

improvements were made to the ASL/PLLs for Class IX. 

The Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, Optimum Stock Requirements Analysis 

Program (AMSAA OSRAP) was used to determine the CL IX requirements. Using generated 

outputs based on actual equipment on hand data, AFSC and the Integrated Materiel Management 

Center (IMMC) directed the redistribution of APS-2 internal assets of Class IX to fill shortages. 

Items were procured by the IMMC using War Reserve Secondary Item Money. APS-3 parts 

were shipped to Charleston to be loaded onto ships and APS-5 parts were shipped to Qatar for 

storage. The percent fills and dollars completed after this fill are indicated in the below chart 

titled “PLL/ASL Status.” 

The responsibility to make the necessary improvements was a large undertaking with five 

ASLs and over 250 PLLs needing immediate attention. In December 2002 CFLCC allocated 

funding for the Class IX supply fill with $28M of preparatory money at the AMC level. During 

Phase I, AMSAA OSRAP generated the using equipment on hand requirement, limited to line 

replaceable units only (APS-3 2x2, Qatar 2x2, QDB Armor). Funding for this fill came from HQ 

DA. Parts were shipped to the Distribution Depot Susquehanna, PA (DDSP) for consolidation 

and forwarding to theater. The chart below reflects fill requirements by location. During Phase 

I the PLL and ASL lists were closer to being filled but still lacked appropriate funding to bring 

fill levels to 100%. 

 

38 Information for this section derived from AMC LSE SWA OIF Phase I-III History and ASL/PLL History.

39 Class IX consists of repair parts. 

21
1 of 24

$60.9M

Total Short

15 Days of SC IX Supply

APS-5 2x1 ASL

PLL

Div Base

APS-3 2x2 ASL

PLL

1x1 ASL

PLL

CSG ASL

PLL

CT1 ASL

PLL

CT2 ASL

PLL

APS-4 2x1 ASL

PLL

%

Fill

13

19

0

63

60

0

0

0

30

18

15

0

6

40

45

$ Value

Short

8.9M

1.8M

7.8M

4.6M

5.3M

9.8M

1.8M

4.4M

.7M

6.7M

.6M

3.6M

1.0M

3.3M

.6M

$ Value

Auth

12.5M

2.6M

7.8M

10.9M

7.0M

9.8M

1.8M

4.4M

1.6M

7.6M

1.3M

3.6M

1.0M

11.7M

1.6M

PLL/ASL Status

In OIF Phase II HQ DA ordered the ARCENT/3ID review Phase I requirements for 

additional sourcing. ARCENT 3ID reviewed the earlier AMSAA OSRAP LRU findings. The 

review resulted in elimination of hundreds of lines already packed into containers and they were 

able to ship added new NSNs and thousands of eaches that needed to be packed into boxes at 

DDSP and then be shipped to theater in 20 foot containers. Empty Quadcons were sent to house 

the additional parts, although the parts were not repacked. The final percent fills of Phase II (see 

chart below) were the combination of parts loaded on ships and stored in Qatar sustainment 

“The ForceBehind the Force”

Lines % Fill M$

UICs Req’d Filled Partial Empty Current Start Short

Qatar PLL 31 1910 1598 148 164 91% 31% 1.1

Qatar ASL 1 2080 1713 37 330 84% 31% 2.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

APS-3 PLL 36 1958 1633 152 173 91% 60% 1.4

APS-3 ASL 1 2595 2020 65 510 80% 63% 2.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

QDB PLL 26 1602 1205 64 333 79% 0% .4

QDB ASL 1 2132 1594 48 490 77% 0% 2.6

Note: Percent fill is based on l sed on linesfilled and partially filled. 

APS Execution Status (AMSAA Rqmts)

22
before Phase I, parts shipped to theater during Phase I, and Phase II additions. Because of a lack 

of manpower and time, all lines were in theater but were not combined into transportable load 

and most of the material (including PLLs) was placed in theater stocks. 

“Scrubbed” ASL/PLL Status (Line Items)

Lines $

UICs Req’d Filled Partial Fill Empty % FILL $ Val Req Short

Qatar PLL 31 1727 1589 29 109 94% 7.9M 2.5

Qatar ASL 1 2401 2192 73 136 94% 12.0M 1.6 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

APS-3 PLL 36 1819 1672 31 116 93% 8.1M 3.0 

APS-3 ASL 1 2773 2539 47 187 93% 11.0M 4.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

QDB PLL 26 1538 1472 7 59 96% 1.0M .2 

QDB ASL 1 2498 2313 28 157 94% 12.2M 2.3 

Note: Projected percent fill based on based on lines filled and partially filled by IMMC

requisi requisitions. ARCENT/3ID scrubbed all ASLs and Arm and Armor, Infantry and Engineer

Battalion PLLs. 91 containers schedul scheduled to arrive in Kuwait 8 Feb 03. Additional

60cntrs arriving 22Feb 03. 20 containers in-process process at DDSP. Remaining

shortages prim tages primarily due to non-availability of parts.

As of 29 January January 2003

APS-3 non-divisional unit CL IX fills were much more organized because they were 

sourced after the ARCENT/3ID review. The main problem that manifested here was the 

calculations for current fill levels were based on valid, active requisitions. It was later 

discovered that DLA cancelled hundreds of these requisitions and material was still coming into 

DDSP or the projects. In sum, while the new calculations deleted some items and added others, 

the calculations and changes could not keep up with requisitions from the using units. To date 

analysis is not complete on the non-divisional PLLs to determine if repair parts ordered by the 

units were not in the requirement; or were in their requirements but in short in supply. 

Once the fill made it across the ocean to the SWA theater, there were additional 

obstacles. Equipment models had changed during the draw process and mismatches were 

created between PLL and organizational sets. Because of the variety of equipment in each UIC, 

it doubled or tripled the sizes of ASLs and PLLs. In many cases, units had not been issued 

equipment, and parts were pushed out to their desert camp. In these situations the ASL/PLLs 

were issued as part of subsequent prepositioned draws. A Single Stock Fund (SSF) blackout 

affected requisitioning ability of 2nd BCTs ASL/PLL build. False cancellations occurred, and 

resulted in poor reconciliation and generating reorders. ARCENT-DOL had used the APS 

Department of Defense Activity Address Codes (DODAACs) for daily peacetime and exercise 

operations versus the DA directed APS DODAAC codes for contingency operations. With 

incorrect DODAACs loaded in the parameter files of the supporting Supply Support Activity 

(SSA), many repair parts never reached the intended unit. This further increased a repair parts 

23
bottleneck in the theater as the receiving units could not deliver the parts and using units would 

reorder parts they did not receive. Finally, at the time of draw, Standard Army Automation 

Management System (STAMIS) equipment was not available for handoff to the using units. 

This further complicated the timely order of required parts and the tracking of parts inbound. 

Problems with CL IX during Phases I and II were unfixable in Phase III. Units jumped 

off into the attack with what they could carry in their vehicles. Many CL IX stocks were left 

behind because units did not have enough transport. This may have been due to a variety of 

circumstances such as lack of drivers or desire to move faster, but a common problem was the 

simple number of PLL and ASL lines. As mentioned earlier, due to the larger than normal 

number of types of vehicles, the PLL and ASLs had to be larger. However, DA never matched 

this increased number of parts to be moved with more vehicles to move them. That would have 

created a plethora of other issues, not the least of which was more drivers. 

Once on the move, logistics systems could not keep up with the attack. The speed and 

distances covered precluded the types of logistics resupply operations the using units had 

expected. Combat units never stopped long enough to send back daily situation reports. 

Logistics units were fielding high priority requests through any means available but, until forces 

reached Baghdad, they did not have the time to set up their communications systems back to the 

logistics base. CL IX resupply was done on the fly or by stripping other broken vehicles. This 

problem was touched on during an interview with MG McManus: 

EATON: Does AMC have a mission to the combat troops when the combat's going on and it only

lasts for five weeks? And the reason I say this is, on day five of the combat operation,

3ID could call back and ask for a widget for a tank, and we could never get it to him on 

time. So, does AMC really have a role in a short duration, high-intensity combat, or is 

our role to be looking forward into the next phase?

MCMANUS: That's the issue. When you take a look at the tactical, operational, strategic realms

of operations, there is very little that AMC can do to influence the tactical fight. About

the only thing it can do is, through either assemblies or repair parts provisioning, is being

a pull through something in the clutch. It's almost like using the NTC model. When you

cross the line of departure, I mean, how much can you have in the fight? Now, where

AMC does have a role to play your tactical realm here is making sure we keep things

moving, or at least making available those things that need to be made available to

support the force.40 

APS Issue

Issue from Kuwait began with previously planned defense operations in support of 

Kuwait to display a show of force. These missions were designed as BCT operations. The BCT 

was sourced from 3 ID and rotated through the field on a two-year cycle. In August 2002, the 

1st BCT was relieved by the 2nd BCT who began RSO&I in August 2002. The last 1st BCT task 

force rotated back to CONUS in December 2002. Simultaneously, APS-5 (Q) continued to ship 

their equipment from Qatar to Kuwait through Spring 2003. The final Qatar LSV load was 

 

40 AFSC History Office. AFSC/JMC Support to OIF Phase I-III, Oral History Interview with MG McManus. 

 December 2003, pp. 18. 

24
shipped to Kuwait in May 2003. After the final issue to the 2nd BCT task force in December 

2002, CEB-Q experienced a break in their issue responsibility. 

January 6, 2003 the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) began deploying their Division. Camps 

Doha and Arifjan continued issuing stocks to the 3ID through the first week of February. They 

accomplished the issue of a complete brigade and some specialty equipment, consisting mostly 

of signal Air and Defense assets. At the same time, Camp Arijfan was issuing Echelon Above 

Division (EAD) and Echelon Above Corps (EAC) units. At the end of this period 218 of 259 

available UICs were issued. 41 The following chart provides a picture of how many rolling stock 

and containers were downloaded into theater. 42

“The Force Behind the Force” 1/21/2004 9 of 39

Feb Jul Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr

02 03

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

Eaches

Generating the Power

APS-3

Planning Cell

in AO

RS = Rolling Stock

C = Containers

999 total

15 - 6 Aug

Vigilant Hammer

USNS Walkins

999 RS / 437 C

COCOM – Decision

Deliberate Build of Combat Power

Over Time in AOR

LMI Supporting 7 Jul – 3 Aug

Visits

USNS Fisher

42 RS (APS-2)

Strong American

282 RS (APS-2)

CCSSAAvvisit isit 

Vigilant Spartan

USNS Watson (II)

646 RS / 56 C

1 - 18

2,927 total

Vigilant Python

USNS Watson (I)

1142 RS / 137 C

26-28

2,141 total

9 Nov – 18 Nov

UNSN Charlton

1163 RS / 154 C 

USNS Red Cloud

1152 RS / 214 C

Begin Area

Support Mission 

Begin Area

Support Mission 

5,241 total

16 - 26

9 Dec – 24 Dec

USNS Dahl 

1469 RS / 216 C

USNS Sisler

1030 RS / 216 C 

12 - 16

7,750 total

8 Jan – 31 Jan

8,580 total

MV Gibson

1543 Containers 

MV Carter

861 AMMO

MV Gordon

60 Containers

MV Titus 

100 RS / 1607 C 

USNS Pomeroy 

730 RS / 272 C

3 - 4

G - Day

24 Feb – 17 Mar 28 Apr – 26 Jun

The story of APS in OIF is not one simply of numbers. The stocks issued were also of 

high quality and ready to fight. The impact of numbers is set in context by the comments of the 

Soldiers using the equipment. The fact that most commanders wanted to take this equipment 

home with them to replace home-stationed equipment clearly shows the efforts taken to keep the 

equipment properly maintained. Soldiers have commended the shape, quality, and performance 

of the equipment over and over again.43

Issues/Concerns 44

 

41 Talbot, Randy, ed. AMC LSE SWA Operation Iraqi Freedom Phases I-III. September 2003. p. 37. 42 Morretta, Sal and Pagano, David. “AMC SWA Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 21 August 2003. 

 AFSC Briefing Chart 9. 43 See AMC LSE SWA OIF Phase I-III History, Appendices 2 and 3 for comments on the quality of APS stocks 

 from the using units. 44 Lessons Learned derived from AMC-LSE-SWA OIF Phases I-III History and Morretta, Sal and Pagano, David. 

 “AMC SWA Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 21 August 2003. AFSC Briefing Chart 34. 

25
There are several opportunities to use the lessons this war is providing to better APS for 

future contingencies. There were no shortcomings that weren’t suspected or anticipated because 

APS managers immediately saw where we had experienced problems in Operation Desert Storm

and because in previous years we had been planning to fill the stocks. LOGCAP has made our 

Army fully capable of using contractors to augment capabilities and we were able to pull 

contractor resources to respond to fast shipment, download, and maintenance of stocks. The 

major problem was the surge of resources, which arrived too soon before the fight to allow 

sufficient time to integrate them into the assets into combat loads. 

Completely filling units will make APS even more viable. Through 2002 there was an 

influx of fill for APS 3/5 units which allowed units to cross the line of departure at S1 for ERC 

P/A LINs. However, this fill was not sufficient and units had to bring home stationed equipment 

to fill their MTOEs. 

Electronic Technical Manuals (ETM) must be included in APS. Adding TM libraries to 

APS could prevent future mismatches in information. Mismatches occurred because of the 

differences in age of the equipment brought from home station and the equipment issued by 

APS. Although deploying ETMs may save money, APS is not authorized funding for the 

hardware to utilize ETMs. 

STAMIS automation found in the APS fleet was old, and dated versions of software were 

used to run it. In the Fall of 2002 CFLCC decided to buy 500+ systems to update the APS set. 

This should have been an APS responsibility and future efforts to make equipment/units 10/20 

should ensure new automation and current software is available for the STAMIS system. Efforts 

should also be taken to standardize STAMIS systems. One type of system should be 

administered to feed readiness reporting to combatant commanders. 

As the Army resets stocks, the notion of theater opening package needs to be addressed. 

We need to have a more rapid method of sustaining the theater. APS can provide this if a theater 

opening package is added and resourced. 

Maintaining equipment on board vessels remains to be a struggle. Shorter shipboard 

cycles need to be considered. The longer an APS-3 ship is at sea, the longer it will take for 

maintenance efforts to achieve operational readiness once it is downloaded. Another option 

would be to add a download exercise into its rotations at sea. 

 In order to be ready, stocks should be reset with fully funded sets (sustainment ships, 

OPS, ASL/PLL). Equipment must be modernized to the deploying force. In many instances 

when the equipment was issued to soldiers, mini-lessons were needed in order to “dumb down” 

their skill sets. The equipment is in great condition and in excellent repair with fewer miles than 

home-stationed equipment. However, it is older, and soldiers are not trained to drive manual 

transmissions. It should be a prioritized goal to build complete sets of equipment to be stored at 

the forward locations. In future cases we should strive to use minimal airlift and zero sealift to 

fill in sets of equipment. 

26
Creating a single maintenance contactor for flexibility and speed will improve readiness 

upon entrance of the next war. APS needs to be balanced for independent combat operations. 

Accomplishments 

The APS program worked very well in this mission and, despite problems incurred, 

accomplished the goal of supplying the warfighter with his equipment needs quickly. The 3rd ID 

was above 90% supplied when they attacked into Baghdad. Soldiers were very pleased with the 

condition of the equipment they were issued and were jokingly more than willing to take it off 

the theater’s hands and send it to their home stations. By the time the conflict began, over 9,000 

personnel powered AMC LSE SWA, the majority of them civilians and contractors who 

volunteer to take part and support the soldiers. One of the most significant accomplishments for 

APS was the provisional establishment of Camp Arifjan to handle the influx of equipment placed 

in theater. Although initial planning wasn’t fully executable, AMC LSE SWA troops on the 

ground worked with home commands to make the APS program work. Looking at the roll up 

numbers of issue you can see the success of APS.45 APS issued: 

218 APS UIC sets 

17,655 Pieces of Rolling Stock 

124,400 sets, Kits and Outfits (SKO) 

119,194 medical Supply class VIII items

482,993 Repair Parts Supply Class IX items

 5,986 containers 

1,911 Supplemental and Sustaining Issues 

Operational Projects, IPDS, WPS, 

 EPW TWSS, Mortuary Affairs, Special Operations, 

 Airfield Matting, LAMS, Bridging 

The numbers are magnified by the comments of the soldiers using the equipment. Soldiers have 

commended the shape, quality, and performance of the equipment over and over again. 

Conclusion 

The way ahead for APS involves ongoing support of Phase IV and OIF 2, OIF 3, and 

future rotations. AFSC continues to support by preparing equipment using APS infrastructure, 

contracts, and equipment. Phase IV will prove to be challenging as long lines of equipment 

currently wait for attention in the middle of desert.

 

45 Morretta, Sal and Pagano, David. “AMC SWA Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 21 August 2003. 

 AFSC Briefing Chart 12.

27
Chapter 3: Ammunition Management 

At about 0900 hours on 11 September 2001, members of the OSC staff gathered around 

their TV sets and watched the US be attacked by terrorists. As noted by COL Redding Hobby, 

“within minutes, literally minutes, I think that was at 9:15 in the morning, within minutes we 

were reacting to what was going on....The terrorist attacks showed us that there was no thinking, 

no planning, we’ve got to be ready on a moment’s notice with Air Force bombs and Marine 

small arms ammunition as well as Army ammunition. So for the ammunition for the joint 

services, all the services combined, it showed us that we’ve got to be ready.”46 Even if the 

command was not ready, they reacted as if they were. Within 11 hours ammunition was being 

shipped from our depots to our joint Service customers. That pace of support continued through 

the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom Phase III and beyond. OSC, now AFSC and JMC, made 

many significant changes in ammunition management to include the Munitions Readiness Report 

(MRR) and Centralized Ammunition Management (CAM). The story below traces those major 

changes and the support OSC and JMC made to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 

Freedom. 

Evolution of the Munitions Readiness Report 

 Two days after the 9/11 attacks, MG McManus was called to Washington, DC to report 

to the Chief of Staff of the Army on the state of the ammunition stockpile. His news was not 

good and revealed longstanding issues in the funding and reporting of the stockpile. In the past 

DA tracked the stockpile based primarily on the number of tons. However, this metric did not 

accurately reflect the amount of ammunition that was not in a readily issuable condition. Much 

of the ammunition stockpile in 2001 was either in poor or unknown condition because funding 

shortfalls throughout the 1990s had precluded surveillance inspections and maintenance. 

Reporting systems assumed that if items were in the stockpile, and not coded for 

demilitarization, they could be issued. OSC and its predecessor commands had been warning 

about the condition of the stockpile for many years. However, when prioritization decisions 

were made, in an environment of constrained DA budgets, ammunition had generally been the 

loser. 

A surveillance backlog grew in the 1980s and then became significantly larger with the 

return of stocks from SWA after Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Most of the stocks 

returned from SWA were not given final inspections. Temporary Desert Storm condition codes, 

which were slated to be changed to standard codes after the ammunition had been inspected, 

were still in the database in 2001. The following excerpt from the Industrial Operations 

Command FY1998 Annual History indicated that the command recognized the problem: 

 

“The backlog of surveillance inspections over the last three years was due 

to shortfall in operations and maintenance funding for ammunition. At the end of 

 

46 History Office, Joint Munitions Command (Prov), Eaton, George, ed , Colonel Redding C. Hobby, Chief of Staff,

US Army Operations Support Command, End of Career Interview. August 2002, pp. 20-21 

28
the Cold War the ammunition budget was approximately $400 million annually. 

Today, the ammunition program is funded at $230 to $260 million annually. The 

SMCA had to allocate their reduced resources for ammunition stockpile based on 

priorities. Surveillance was not a top priority. It was a conscious business 

decision to assume a level of risk and not to fund ammunition surveillance at 

100% percent. The IOC was willing to temporarily risk not knowing the condition 

of our total ammunition stockpile.”47

The situation did not significantly improve from 1998-2000, but senior Army leadership did not 

seem to understand the implications. All they saw was that there was a lot of ammunition in the 

system and they believed it could be rapidly prepared for issue. 

In addition to surveillance issues, ammunition maintenance was chronically under funded 

in the 1990s. This condition continued even after the World Trade Center attacks. The 

following excerpt from the OSC FY2002 Annual Historical Report illustrates the point: 

 “In FY 02, there was an established Army Ammunition Maintenance 

requirement of $48M. We received $4.78M in OMA budgeting, and $10.26M in 

Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) funding. At year-end, we received 

$12.1M in OMA funding, for a total of $27.13M. This funded the renovation of 

40mm Grenades, 105mm Howitzer, 120mm Tank, 84mm AT4, APERS Mines, 

Comp C4 Demo Blocks. The funded rounds have a replacement value of 

$254.98M, and a total tonnage of 12.3K. All rounds renovated were on CSA 

shortfall list, and supported the Global War on Terrorism.”48

FY2002 funding was in place prior to the September 11, 2001 attack and the numbers 

above may appear to be overly critical in the face of extreme pressure and competition 

for funding ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan. However, the trend is clear. 

Maintenance was under funded. Late year plus ups are difficult to implement. In the 

GOGO installations last minute funding may come after it is too late to execute manyears in the FY. For GOCO operations, it takes time to modify contracts, but the work 

can be executed the following year. However, most of the Army’s depot maintenance is 

executed in GOGO operations. 

On 13 September 2001 MG McManus briefed the senior army leadership on the 

readiness of the ammunition stockpile. The old reporting method had shown the entire 

stockpile. However, as the briefing was refined to focus specifically on events in SWA, it 

became clear that the data was indicating shortfalls in the available stocks. The stockpile was 

intended to support two major regional contingencies (MRC). However, it was questionable if 

the inspected and maintained stockpile could support even one MRC plus multiple small scale 

contingencies. In addition, with the negligence of the Time Phased Force Deployment system in 

the 1990’s, ammunition managers did not have visibility of the full requirements. Many 

unforecast or undocumented requirements were not included. Theater OPLANS, Presidential 

drawdowns, special Congressional interests, etc left a void in the requirements and budget 

 

47 Industrial Operations Command, Annual Historical Report, FY 1998, p. 240. 48 Operations Support Command, Annual Historical Report, FY2002, p. 268.

29
process. What was not readily apparent prior to focusing specifically on SWA operations was 

that the wartime stocks for SWA were approximately 25% short of requirements. The 

ammunition base was unable to ramp up in a short period of time to make up those shortfalls. 

Finally, approximately 45% of the wartime stocks were stored in the Pacific, not in SWA or 

CONUS. 49

In addition to not clearly indicating that many stocks had competing demands, the old 

methods of reporting the stockpile focused on funding and training ammunition rather than 

 

Old System of Reporting the Ammunition Stockpile50

actual readiness of the stockpile or the relationship between stockpile and the warfighter. We

knew that each year the POM did not make up shortfalls. However, the POM did meet most 

training needs, so the combat commanders did not broadly feel the potential warfighting impact. 

In a period where budgets were being cut and ammunition was a lower priority issue, the 

stockpile never improved. Decision makers never were forced to make hard, painful decisions 

 

49 Briefing, MG McManus, “Ammunition Support Issues and Challenges” (also listed as AtlantaXXVIII 

Briefing.ppt), undated, but ca May 02, slides3-4. 50 Ibid, slide 18. 

30
about ammunition like they did about training, or personnel costs, or the procurement of new 

weapons systems. 

Suddenly, immediately after 11 September 2001, DA decision makers did have to 

contend with potential ammunition shortages. The true impact of Condition Codes E, F, K, and 

N was that ammunition the DA leadership thought was available could not be used for combat 

Sample of MRR Reports51

without inspection and maintenance.52 Resources in the POM could buy about 45% of the 

shortfall items. Due to the atrophying of the ammunition base in the 1880s and 1990s, surge 

operations could affect only 10% of the go-to-war shortfalls. To activate laid-away plants would 

take between seven and thirteen months.53 Army decision makers would make hard decisions 

 

51 Briefing, MGMcManus, “AFSC/JMC Overview Brief VCSA,” December 2003, slide 10. 52 Condition Codes represent the availability of stock for issue, not just on hand. CC A, B, and C can be issued. 

However, CCs E and F need light or extensive maintenance; CC J is suspended either due to a known problem or

simply because two or more scheduled inspections have been missed; CC K means that items have been returned but 

never inspected to determine serviceability (many Desert Storm returns remain in this category); and CC N means 

items can be issued for emergency combat use only. See FM 4-30.13 Ammunition Handbook: Techniques, Tactics 

and Procedures for Munitions Handlers. Appendix E 53 Op cit, slides 4 and 16.

31
now, but they needed to never again be in the position of being ignorant to the true status of the 

ammunition stockpile. 

MG McManus returned from that meeting with the idea of creating a munitions reporting 

system that focused on readiness and the warfighter, not the POM and budget. He wanted a 

system that would show decision makers their options and choices framed in a familiar looking 

system. From this meeting came the Munitions Readiness Report (MRR). Within six months 

ammunition managers at the Operations Support Command were able to develop new system

that presented ammunition readiness in terms all Army decision makers understand.54 The Army

is now measuring munitions readiness using the standard methodology for measuring unit 

readiness. AR 220-1 measures readiness of Army units and defines four resource areas for Unit 

Status Reporting—Personnel, Training, Equipment On-Hand, and Equipment Serviceability. 

These resource areas have been modified to fit munitions readiness reporting. The MRR uses 

On-Hand, Serviceability, Quality, and Production Base to quantify the status of the stockpile and 

the ammunition base. Readiness ratings are assigned based on the worst readiness rating among 

these four areas after using standardized computations. 

The MRR measures Army worldwide capability in specific munitions categories, such as 

Small Arms, Mortars, Tank Main Gun, or Cannon Artillery. In each category each specific 

ammunition item is tracked. For example, in the Small Arms category the MRR tracks 5.56mm, 

7.52mm, .50 cal, etc in every configuration. Finally, the MRR ratings are projected out to 

predict the ratings in six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months. Rather than applying the 

ratings to a particular Army unit, worldwide requirements and assets as well as the entire 

industrial base are considered. The data in the Munitions Readiness Report includes both 

missiles and conventional ammunition. Newer items of munitions, not yet transitioned to 

National Inventory Control Point (NICP) Management, are included as well. The data included is 

the result of a collaboration involving input from many agencies. All of the MRR data resides in 

a secure database that uses calculations patterned after those found in AR 220-1. The on-line 

database provides the ability to “drill down” to individual munitions categories to explore the 

key issues driving readiness.55 

 

54 See MG McManus Oral History Interview for more details. 55 OSC, “Annual Historical Report, FY2002,” pp. 4, 262. See also Jamieson, Edward, OSC briefing, “Army 

Munitions Readiness,” 9 August 2002.

32
Drill Down Concept in Current MRR56

While the immediate impact of the MRR on OIF may not be readily apparent, the system 

is helping highlight and prioritize funding for specific ammunition pacing items and other 

shortages. The ability to project ratings into the future has already assisted the OSC/JMC in 

funding maintenance programs to get more on-hand stocks into issuable condition codes. In 

addition, visibility from the MRR allows decisions on shifting of stock from one theater to 

another. MRR impacts far more than deployment and decisive operations phases of OIF. 

However, it took the pressures of the predeployment phase to force a major and significant 

improvement in munitions readiness reporting. 

 

56 Briefing, MG McManus, “State of Army Ammunition” (Presentation at OD Week, APG), 9 May 2003, slide 32. 

33
Sample drilldown for specific item57

Centralized Ammunition Management (CAM) 

Another significant accomplishment of the AFSC/JMC that directly led to success in OIF 

was development of the Centralized Ammunition Management (CAM) system. This system

allowed for more efficient distribution of training ammunition to deploying and mobilizing units. 

A 1993 study concluded that ammunition distribution needed to be revamped to provide 

for more efficient distribution of ammunition. A plan implemented in 1993 and 1994 divided the 

continental United States into east, central and west regions. Each region received a Tier I 

facility to reduce transportation costs for training ammunition. Due to the large number of 

military units in the eastern US, that region had two Tier I facilities. Factors considered in 

ranking the installations were: the capabilities to outload, inspect and test, ship, store, maintain 

and demilitarize ammunition; the costs of operations; and location relative to training sites and 

ports. The prime determinant on volume was training ammunition, as that was the primary 

peacetime use of conventional ammunition. However, Tiering was also expected to ensure that 

the more critical ammunition was stored in depots capable of providing the quickest response to 

mobilization.

58 

 

57 “AFSC/JMC Overview Brief VCSA,” slide 12. 58 Tooele Army Depot, “Ammunition Tiering,” http://www.tead.army.mil/tiering.htm.

34
Four Tier I depots mainly contained required items needed in the first 30 days of 

mobilization, items needed for training, and items needed beyond 30 days to augment Tier II and 

III depots’ war reserve stocks. Tier I depots would receive all support necessary for storage, 

surveillance, inventories, maintenance, and disposal. Tier II depots would normally store war 

reserves needed more than 30 days after mobilization, production offset items, and some nonrequired stocks awaiting disposal. Tier III depots would be caretakers for items awaiting 

disposal or relocation.59 The four Tier I, ammunition facilities were: 

East - Blue Grass Army Depot, KY 

East - Crane Army Ammunition Activity, IN 

Central - McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK 

West - Tooele Army Depot, UT 

Into the late 1990s funding was funneled to the Tier I and Tier II locations to improve 

outload facilities. However, money still lagged for maintenance and surveillance. Additionally, 

the Golden Cargo series of exercises were a means of transferring ammunition into the Tier I and 

Tier II depots as required. The transfer process went on into 2000 and 2001. 

Despite working into the new millennium, Tiering may have been obsolete before it 

began. Tiering worked well in the old style Time Phased Force Deployment planning process. 

When the combatant commands developed their war plan and specific units were identified to 

execute those plans, the ammunition community could place required stocks for those identified 

units into the Tier I depots. However, by the late 1990’s the Army was deploying differently 

using call forwards and flexible plans. In the words of MG McManus: 

Probably the biggest area we learned on the ammunition side was we had 

stocks malpositioned. As we went from a time phased force deployment, databased approach to a deployment order kind of structure, we had leveraged an 

arcane concept called Tiering. Tiering was not effective for what we had to do in 

today’s warfare... [W]e went through and we realized what was going to be 

required of us, that we had to rethink how we could be responsive to our 

warfighter's requirements.60 

The concept of stocks flowing to units from specific depots would, in a flexible 

deployment, lead to malpositioned stocks and additional time and transportation requirements to 

get items to required locations. Installations help unit basic loads while AMC held sustainment 

stock. Even within AMC different MSC managed different ammunition items. Thus, a central 

control agency for ammunition readiness did not exist. Some ammunition items were in shortage 

position against requirements. In addition, spot shortages often occurred because of systemic 

levels management and location issues.61

 

59 Government Accounting Office, GAO Report 96-129, “Defense Ammunition: Significant Problems if Left 

Unattended Will Get Worse,” June 1996, p. 61. 60 MG McManus interview, p. 9. 61 DA G4, Logistics Transformation Task Force, “Logistics Transformation: The Findings and Recommendations of

the Logistics Transformation Task Force,” August 2002, pp. 48-49. See also Annex D, pp 238-240.

35
In July 2001 General Ellis, FORSCOM CG, challenged MG McManus to develop a plan 

to manage all FORSCOM ammunition stocks. He wanted OSC to leverage its ammunition 

management expertise and automation to control all training ammunition stocks as well as 

deployment and mobilization stocks. This would eventually lead to OSC management of unit 

ammunition basic loads (ABL). Part of the intent was to reduce the level of ammunition held in 

installation ASPs and increase visibility of the entire ammunition stockpile. Prior to this, OSC 

lost visibility of ammunition once it was issued to the installation level.62 

The events leading up to OIF highlighted the concerns noted above and the limitations of 

the Tiering concept. As OSC began to distribute sustainment stocks, deploying units were also 

requesting items to complete their ABLs. Because OSC had no visibility over the retail 

ammunition supply system, each request was unexpected. Within a short period of time, Army

Reserve and Army National Guard units were also mobilizing. In addition to their UBL, they 

also required additional training ammunition. Finally, because OSC did not have visibility over 

the ammunition requirements of the other Services, they had not been able to adequately plan the 

automation and infrastructure at the Tier I depots to handle simultaneous Army, Marine, Navy, 

and Air Force outloads. In particular, Crane Army Ammunition Activity failed to meet some

shipments deadlines when Army and Marine units required ammunition at the same time.63

While extremely painful at the time, these issues were an important catalyst to create 

CAM and accelerate implementation. CAM is today fully deployed in CONUS for FORSCOM 

ASPs and is managing ABL as well as training ammunition. CAM allowed for more effective 

and cost efficient distribution of stocks by shipping in more complete loads, shipping from the 

most efficient source instead of just the assigned regional depot, and shipping direct from the 

plants when needed. Management of the installation-based stocks is done from Rock Island and 

has resulted in better inventory and quality control. The fact that such a change has been made 

while the Army was at war cannot be downplayed. This amounted to trust, cooperation, and 

integration between FORSCOM, IMA, ACSIM, and JMC. CAM is Chief of Staff Army Critical

Logistics Transformation Task Force Initiative #22, Class V Ammo Management. JMC has 

visibility of all ammunition stocks in CONUS. On hand stocks at the installation ASPs have 

been significantly reduced. JMC is planning the inclusion of OCONUS stocks.64

 

62 Briefing, MG McManus, “Ammo Laydown for CG FORSCOM, 10 July 2001.” See also Memo, LTG McNeill, 

DCG FORSCOM, Subject: Centralized Ammunition Management (CAM), ca 15 Oct 2003. The LTG McNeill 

memo says that GEN Ellis challenged OSC/JMC in March 2001, but the briefing is dated July 2001 and makes no

mention of OSC taking on the ASP mission. The July 2001 briefing would be the correct venue for GEN Ellis to

ask OSC to take on the mission. Complicating the issue was the creation of the Installation Management Agency 

and their ownership of posts, camps, and stations. 63 Email from MG McManus, Subject: Supporting Our Customers—Why We Exist, 22 April 2003. 64 Briefing, Jane White, “Centralized Ammunition Management (CAM),” 12 February 2004, slide 3.

36
CAM Concept of Operations65

During OIF Phases I-III, CAM assisted in the rapid and efficient deployment of 

ammunition to active, reserve and National Guard, and joint forces. Over 99% of all shipments 

were on time. Specifically, CAM supported the mobilization of over 150,000 people on 30 

different sites. Even as Phase III was ongoing, the CAM system was already planning the 

retrograde of ammunition to ensure that stocks returning from theater went to the best location, 

not just the old Tier I depots. In one example, CAM met unforecast requirements from the 2nd

Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) Task Force and delivered all stocks in just 48 hours.66

 

65 Ibid, Slide 4. 66 Briefing, Cindy Lenger, “Centralized Ammunition Management (CAM) Update to COL (P) Radin,” 11

September 2003, slide 8.

37
CAM Accomplishments as of late-2003.

67

Other Ammunition Contributions 

Throughout Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, AMC’s 

Joint Munitions Command (JMC) shipped a total of 115,250 short tons of conventional 

ammunition, including 51,000 tons that was shipped directly to Southwest Asia between 

December 2002 and March 2003. Of the remainder, most went to units that later deployed to 

Southwest Asia, sometimes in response to “short fuse” requirements. For example, JMC 

arranged for the shipment of 33 tons of ammunition from eight different storage sites to Fort 

Polk, Louisiana, in less than two days, after receiving an urgent request from 2nd Armored 

Cavalry Regiment Task Force.68 

The JMC supported all Services. By January 2002, the command shipped over 18,000 

tons of ammunition to support Operation Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom and met all required 

delivery dates. During this time, we were able to support critical needs such as the 105mm

artillery rounds used on the AC-130U gunship for the Air Force Special Operations Command.69 

From 11 September 2001 to April 2003 JMC shipped 40,400 Air Force General Purpose bombs 

 

67 Jane White briefing, slide 8. 68 JMC PAO Office, Input to Army Green Book, 15 May 2003. 69 OSC FY2002 ACH, p. 253 

38
and penetrators. During the same time frame the command shipped 13,847 Navy bombs and 

penetrators.70

JMC managed mobilization training ammunition at the same time as they were pushing 

ammunition overseas and downloading ammunition in theater. While units were requesting and 

OSC was supporting the issue of basic loads, training ammunition remained a high priority. 

Mobilization of National Guard and Reserve units requires significant amounts of training. Lisa 

Swanson, an ammunition manager, stated: “I think one of the things that I’ve learned from being 

in [the Commodities Management structure] is that, so many times people think in terms of what 

ammunition is required strictly for what it takes to go to war. But there’s a tremendous amount 

of ammunition that’s needed to train the troops before they go over there and go to war.”71 In 

CONUS mobilization training ammunition alone for the period December 2002 – April 2003 

was 1,900 tons of small arms and 40mm. 72 

In both CONUS and SWA JMC ammunition managers and QASAS played critical roles. 

In CONUS, JMC was short personnel and rapidly recalled retired QASAS. The command 

believes that this was the first time we had ever taken such a step—it did not happen during 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In SWA, ammunition safety managers were critical to the 

download of APS ammunition ships. In Kuwait, ammunition managers also assisted in the 

development of new ammunition storage areas. The operating ASP in Kuwait was not large 

enough to handle the download of ammunition ships. JMC QASAS developed a site plan and 

supervised the creation of berms and gravel areas to download containers.73 QASAS assisted the 

warfighter in their assembly areas and some moved forward in Iraq as the war started and 

continued to advise and support the warfighters. Most QASAS considered this effort “all in a 

days work.”74

In addition to QASAS, the OSC/JMC Ammunition Support Team (AST) deployed four 

times to SWA in support of OEF and OIF. The team, comprised of military and QASAS 

personnel, provided Class V ammunition management and explosive safety support to Army

Prepositioned Stocks-Set 3 (APS-3) LMSR (light medium speed roll-in roll-out) and sustainment 

vessels. All six LMSRs were downloaded in Kuwait with accountability of assets transferred 

from AMC to theater ammunition units for further distribution to the Warfighter. Similar 

download operations were supported during peacetime maintenance cycle operations, where 

soldiers perform an array of functions to include ammunition management, inventory, 

surveillance inspections, and some limited maintenance. The AST was a key player in the APS3 conversion from October 2000 to August 2001, when 60,000 short tons of ammunitions were 

reconfigured from breakbulk to containerized strategic configured loads. This logistical 

enhancement proved invaluable during the download of the MV Carter during OIF. This was the 

team’s most visible work since it’s creation following the 1991 Gulf War. A total of 861 of 

2,500 containers were expeditiously downloaded from Kuwaiti waters and processed for line-

 

70 Adrienne Johnson, Email to Dan Carlson, Subject: Re: MSC Input f/Article for Army Green Book (2003-2004), 

12 May 2003. 71 Lisa Swanson, Oral History Interview, 28 August 2003, pp 1-2. 72 Mark Schneider, Email to Andrew Lute, Subject: Ammo Stockpile Review to MG Bond, 25 April 2003. 73 Dan Brown, Oral History Interview, 7 October, 2003, p. 5. 74 For a more detailed explanation of ammunition support in theater see Randy Talbot, “AMC LSE SWA OIF Phase

I-III” September 2003. All backup files for the AMC LSE SWA history are archived at the AFSC History Office.

39
haul movement to receiving ammunition storage areas. The MV Carter was anchored two miles 

off shore, and containers were transferred onto small watercraft for transfer to shore. Following 

offloading at pier side, the containers were loaded onto trailers for line-haul movement to a 

container holding area. AST planners aided the CFLCC staff in identifying the least number of

containers that could be downloaded to sustain land forces through combat. The AST was 

critical in ensuring that the combat forces had the right ammunition on hand when combat 

operations commenced. 

Additionally, Ammunition Logistics Assistance Representatives (Ammo LARs) were 

deployed to SWA in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom. The Ammo LAR 

program expanded greatly between 2000 and 2003, growing from only two Ammo LARs to an 

authorized strength of twenty. Ammo LARs provide JMC support to the warfighter and are 

assigned to Logistics Assistance Offices throughout the world. Since 11 September 2001, 22 

Ammo LARs deployed to Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq and Afghanistan in direct support of deployed 

combat units. Several LARs have deployed three times each. The Ammo LARs worked closely 

with supported units on a wide range of ammunition logistics issues to include requirements 

determination, storage, transportation, explosives safety, ammunition functioning characteristics, 

and quality assurance. 

A final critical contribution of AFSC/JMC to the war effort was in the management of 

ammunition production. Several contracts had to be accelerated and production numbers 

increased. This required coordination across many members of the OSC/JMC staff. During FY 

02 the services increased our workload by 25%. The FY02 budget was programmed for $520 

million, but after the 9/11 attack this was increased by over $120 Million, primarily through the 

addition of Defense Emergency Relief Funds. During this timeframe the stockpile management 

section processed over 889 basic customer orders with 261 amendments to orders. This was up 

from FY01 by 100 orders.75 

As a result of the Operation Enduring Freedom, JMC received a plus-up requirement for 

Air Force BLU-109 Penetrator bombs. The command reacted quickly and awarded additional 

quantities to the current producer, National Forge Company. This expedient effort was 

appreciated by the Air Force and prepared the command for more accelerated production in 

support of OIF. In other examples JMC entered into an incentive arrangement with American 

Ordnance (AO) to increase M107 High Explosive Projectile production capacity to meet Army

training needs, USMC orders, and FMS orders. AO opened Line 3 at Iowa AAP to increase 

M107 capacity and provide dedicated capacity for Comp B fill for out year requirements. AO 

opened a Comp B M107 facility at Milan AAP, providing a second source for Comp B M107 

rounds. In a final example, the command also expedited production of CXM-7 (the explosive 

used for bombs).76

 

75 OSC FY2002 ACH, p. 263. 76 OSC FY2002 ACH, pp. 253, 270, 277. 

40
Operation Noble Eagle and the Resulting National Guard and Army Reserve 

Deployments77

Ammunition operations in support of OIF did not include just the production and 

shipping of rounds. Due to the terrorist threat the ammunition plants had to increase force 

protection. As most protection at the plants is tied to the facilities use contracts or other funding 

streams, increasing security was not a routine matter. The issue was resolved through the 

assignment of National Guard and Reserve units to protect our plant structure. The paragraphs 

below explain the process, results, and some lessons learned. 

After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the President established a new office of 

Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President. This new agency is intended to 

coordinate efforts across multiple functions to accomplish tasks such as upgrading intelligence 

and security to protect Americans on U.S. soil, providing recovery assistance to disaster sites, 

helping victims’ families, increasing number of law enforcement personnel, and providing health 

care for displaced citizens. The President and Congress moved to implement tough new airline 

security measures that tightened background checks for airline screeners and workers, 

dramatically expanded the Federal Air Marshall Program, created strict new baggage security 

requirements, and tightened security in all airport areas. The President also established an 

advisory committee for cyber security to ensure that America’s key infrastructures are protected. 

During a Pentagon press briefing on 25 Sept. 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald H. 

Rumsfeld announced that the war against terrorism would be known as Operation Noble Eagle. 

Operation Noble Eagle refers to U.S. military operations in homeland defense and civil support 

to U.S. federal, state and local agencies. Veterans say that in the modern military world, names 

such as this evoke a confident, predatory force overhead, and are selected with great calculation. 

The name for the operation initially referred to the air patrols launched by the Air Force after the 

attacks but was expanded to cover all defensive measures. A computer produced several names

that hadn’t been used before, and the director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff selected 

the official name of the operations. 

One of the first actions taken by Operation Noble Eagle activated Air National Guard and 

Air Force Reserve Units to patrol U.S. airspace. These forces were prepared to shoot down any 

airliner that terrorists might hijack and use as flying bombs, as was done on Sept. 11, 2001. By 

mid-January, 2002, more than 13,000 fighter-jet patrols had flown round-the-clock, at a cost of 

more than $324 million to taxpayers. The majority of these missions were over New York and 

Washington, D.C., but some other cities also received air cover. It was the first time since the 

Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 that constant combat air patrols protected the skies over the United 

States. 

Under Operation Noble Eagle, more that 35,000 service men and women were quickly 

called up to serve in homeland defense and civil service. National Guard troops were called in to 

assist in the New York City recovery effort on that very same day that the two jetliners crashed 

into the twin towers of the World Trade Center. National Guard support teams were 

among the first on the scene to check for chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. 

Secretary Rumsfeld requested and President Bush approved an order to call more than 50,000 

 

77 This section is taken from the OSC FY2002 Annual Command History, pp 15-20.

41
Reservists to active duty. Each service reviewed it’s mission and identified personnel 

requirements up to 35,000 reservists as follows: Army, 10,000; Air Force, 10,000; Navy, 3,000; 

Marines, 7,500; and Coast Guard, 2,000. 

Within hours of the terrorist attacks, several National Guard units were called to state 

active duty (SAD). Shortly after being released from two weeks of SAD, several of these units 

were federally mobilized in support of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom. 

The President has the authority to mobilize up to one million reservists (units and individuals 

from all branches) for a period of up to two years. There are multiple levels of mobilization. 

Mobilizations of this scope are referred to as ‘partial.’ The President’s authority under a partial 

mobilization includes the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of war or 

other national emergencies involving a threat to national security. Congress must declare a state 

of emergency in order for there to be a ‘full mobilization.’ Once a state of national emergency 

exists, Congress can extend full mobilization to ‘total mobilization’ by activating and organizing 

additional units beyond the currently approved force structure. Total mobilization brings the 

industrial base up to full capacity. Due to the nature of the emergency of September 11, these 

units had virtually no notice before being ordered to provide immediate support to civil 

authorities and then federal mobilization. 

Mobilizing National Guard troops also has a strong symbolic value. Just after Sept. 11, 

President Bush was quoted as saying, “You understand what I’m facing. I have to alert the 

American people to the ongoing dangers without creating alarm and irrational fear.” President 

Bush decided to send National Guard troops to assist with security at airports, bus stations, 

bridges, and the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico, in addition to flying combat air patrols. 

In reference to these deployments, Craig W. Duehring, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Reserve Affairs, stated, “No other single action more clearly demonstrates the national resolve 

than to mobilize the National Guard and Reserve Forces of America.” In a statement before the 

Military Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Duehring 

stated, “Because the Reserve Components now comprise almost 50 percent of the Total Force, 

they are a key part of America’s Total Force Defense and an essential partner in military 

operations ranging from homeland defense, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and small-scale 

contingencies to major theater war.” 

The Pentagon refused to say how many aircraft, ships, and troops are defending U.S. 

territory or where they were, even after TV cameras showed the carrier U.S.S. George 

Washington off the coast of New York. Only the Coast Guard, which in peacetime fell under the 

authority of the Department of Transportation (now the Coast Guard is under the authority of the 

Department of Homeland Defense), has released detailed information about the number and 

location of its ships and personnel involved in port security across the nation. Total Reserve 

Force strength was disclosed once the call-ups were complete and the numbers were as follows: 

Army National Guard, 350,000; Army Reserve, 205,000; Naval Reserve, 87,800; Marine Corps 

Reserve, 39,558; Air National Guard, 106,600; and Air Force Reserve, 75,600. The Total Ready 

Reserve, which also includes the Coast Guard Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive 

National Guard consists of 1,240,008 personnel. In order to maintain the numbers at these 

levels, a number of stop-loss measures have been implemented. 

42
Mr. Duehring also refers to the readiness of the Reserve Force in his statement to the 

subcommittee. He said, in part, “By noon on Sept.12th, more than 6,000 Guard and Reservists 

were providing medical and technical assistance, patrolling streets, flying combat air patrols, and 

providing security at numerous critical sites across the country. By the end of the week, the 

Coast Guard was engaged in its largest mobilization since World War II. On Sept. 14th, three 

days after the attacks, when President Bush authorized a partial mobilization of up to 50,000 

Guard and Reserve members, there were already 10,331 National Guard and Reserve filling 

critical positions in a voluntary status. A review of events show that Reservists were among the 

first on the scene in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, in addition to the large 

numbers of civilians who were already serving as police, firefighters, or EMTs.” 

The National Guard, under Operation Noble Eagle, will also play a prominent role 

supporting local and state authorities in terrorism consequence management. At its core is the 

establishment of 32 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD CSTs) 

comprised of 22 highly skilled full time, well-trained and equipped Army and Air National 

Guard Personnel. The WMD CSTs will deploy to support civil authorities at domestic chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive sites. These strategically placed teams 

will support our nation’s first responders as a state response in dealing with domestic WMD 

incidents. 

Potential terrorist targets that get the most attention are national landmarks like the Statue 

of Liberty and the Golden Gate Bridge, and high-profile events such as the Olympics and the 

Super Bowl. However, military installations are equally considered as potential terrorist targets. 

In light of this, the Operations Support Command (OSC) Command Group visited its 

installations to review and access the status of force protection and security programs. 

Installation commanders were asked to address their implementation of, and compliance with 

policies governing such measures as verification of the identity of all personnel entering U.S. 

installations, vehicle inspections, and inspection of identification cards and security badges, etc. 

Each installation was accessed on such matters as mission(s), numbers of civilian and military 

personnel, current size of security staff, and number of mission essential vulnerable areas 

(MEVAs). 

These assessments were necessary for the Command Group to determine how to allot 

National Guard troops assigned to augment security at OSC installations. Another important 

issue that needed to be assessed was the accommodations and quality of life issues such as 

housing, food, laundry, and bathing facilities, and materiel concerns such as maintenance support 

and petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) support for deployed troops. If these facilities and 

services were not available internally, the availability of commercial sources had to be assessed. 

There were also safety issues to be addressed such as fire protection and medical emergency 

response. Each installation had its potential strengths as well as challenges. 

The OSC directed the formation of the Homeland Defense Office (HDO) as part of the 

Emergency Operations Center. Teams were created to better address matters of concern and to 

initiate corrective action when needed. These installation team advocates would attend meetings, 

teleconferences, etc. when force protection issues were discussed. They served as points of 

contact (POCs) when concerns were raised. Also, they disseminated security related information 

43
to leadership and the workforce. For particular security and deployment subjects, some team

members were assigned as subject matter experts. 

Among those units of distinction assigned to augment security at OSC installations under 

Operation Noble Eagle was the 1st Battalion – 185th Infantry Regiment of the California National 

Guard. This unit was originally constituted on July 22, 1885, as the 6th Infantry Battalion of the 

California National Guard with its headquarters in Stockton. In the following years, the unit has 

gone through many changes including expansions, consolidations, reorganizations, 

redesignations, and physical moves of its HQ. They have been activated and inducted into 

Federal service during most of our major conflicts. During Operation Noble Eagle, they 

augmented security at Hawthorne Army Depot and Sierra Army Depot. 

Company A, 268th Military Police Company of the Tennessee National Guard, based in 

Ripley, Tennessee, helped to secure the Milan AAP along side the existing Ordnance Ground 

Force. They also augmented security at Holston AAP. Since being deployed, the soldiers 

proudly refer to themselves as Team Milan. 

3/268th Military Police Company based in Ripley, Tennessee 

Assigned to Holston AAP 23 November 2001 – 22 August 2002

37 members

The 181st (Light) Infantry Regiment of the Massachusetts National Guard helped secure 

Watervliet Arsenal. An element of Company A, based in Worcester, was mobilized to help 

secure Natick Lab’s Installation Defense Force. The 1st Battalion of the 181st has also been 

deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the command Task Force in support of the ongoing 

rotation of active Army and Guard divisions in support of Operation Joint Forge. The 181st is 

one of the oldest unit in the U.S. military with roots tracing back to 1632. 

The 88th Military Police Company of the U.S. Army Reserve, based in Newport News, 

Virginia, was tasked to provide additional security at the Devens Reserve Forces Training Center 

about 40 miles outside Boston. They have also augmented security at the Barnes Federal 

Building in Boston. Prior to this latest deployment, they had served for eight months in 

Germany. 

44
The 1st Battalion of the 148th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) of the Ohio National 

Guard, also known as the “VooDoo” Battalion, was assigned to protect Ravenna AAP and Rock

Island Arsenal. The State Mission of the battalion is to provide units trained and equipped for 

immediate deployment in support of natural disasters and civil disturbances and to aid to civil 

authorities for domestic disaster preparedness and emergency response. The unit was designated 

in 1846 at Camp Washington, OH. The battalion has participated in many military actions 

including the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War and both World Wars. 

Eight individuals in the 148th have been distinguished with the Congressional Medal of Honor. 

The 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) of the Texas National 

Guard, based in San Antonio was tasked to augment security at Lone Star AAP and McAlester 

AAP. The origins of segments of the battalion can be traced back to the Texas Revolution, such 

as Company A, First Texas in 1836, and other infantry companies formed in the 1870s and 

1880s. The unit also served in Europe during World War II. Other units serving with distinction 

include the 363rd Military Police Company of the Pennsylvania/West Virginia National Guard 

which protected Scranton AAP, and 268th Military Police Company of the Missouri National 

Guard which protected Iowa AAP, Kansas AAP, and Lake City AAP. 

A team of force protection planners from OSC conducted an extensive mission analysis 

of these sites. Recommendations were made on how to enhance security. Recommendations 

were first made based on ideal conditions and then on the availability of assets and funds. 

Among the suggestions made were for installation of better barriers, improved lighting, and 

videotaping for surveillance. Each site’s force protection plan was put on CD for use in possible 

future missions. This evaluation concluded that, overall, the deployments went very well. This 

can be attributed to several factors. These types of missions are often part of the state’s 

Emergency Operations Plan (EROP). Also, 31 percent of the MPs are civilian law 

enforcement officers. This made their transition to MPs especially smooth. 

Important lessons were learned by conducting this mission analysis. One of these lessons 

was “deploy units, not numbers.” By calling entire units to active duty, the soldiers have the 

support they need in areas such as personnel, communications, operations, supply, etc. This is 

cited as “essential” in environments like AMC sites where there is no life-sustaining 

infrastructure. Another lesson learned was to “activate and establish the chain of command.” In 

these missions, the individual AMC sites operationally controlled each platoon. Although this 

worked, it was cumbersome. It was suggested that the typical battalion and brigade structure be 

implemented to support company-level units. 

One example of the success of the deployments under Operation Noble Eagle was the 

welcome and hospitality received by the members of Charlie Company of the 1-148th Infantry of 

the Ohio National Guard. They were sent to augment security at Rock Island Arsenal, where 

HQ, OSC is located. Upon their arrival, employees at the Arsenal felt much more secure and the 

appreciation showed. Employees, local businesses, and radio stations donated items in an effort 

to boost the soldiers’ morale. They were also given free tickets to sporting events. The Guard 

members were very pleased with their treatment, food, and facilities. To show the Arsenal’s 

appreciation, the soldiers were given an Operation Noble Eagle coin, a commander’s coin, and 

nicely framed aerial photos of the Arsenal. To show their appreciation, they gave the Arsenal a 

45
flag from their home city of Delaware, Ohio.

Conclusions 

Whatever its name—OSC or JMC—the ammunition command responded to events in 

SWA in a coordinated variety of roles. Despite some initial glitches in our ability to present 

stockpile readiness information to DA, the command was uniformly successful in supporting the 

warfighter. Through the downloading of APS ammunition ships, creation of in-theater 

ammunition storage areas, issue of both training and UBL ammunition, and the management of 

increased demands on the production base, JMC supported the ammunition requirements of 

DoD. The command continues to do so in Phase IV of OIF and has added on more missions. 

That story remains to be told. 

46

EPILOGUE 

As OIF shifted out of decisive combat operations and into Phase IV, AFSC continued its 

support. The Army leadership, who had expected a relatively light force would remain in Iraq 

after Phase III, did not forecast the extent and length of Phase IV. AFSC took the changes in 

stride. LOGCAP has continued to grow and support forces throughout the theater. APS units 

have prepared significant amounts of materiel for continuing operations. Meanwhile, the reset 

mission and preparing equipment for return to long-term storage has lagged. Ammunition 

managers have been retrograding stocks to CONUS, but have also continued to support combat 

in Iraq. The AMC LSE-SWA remains in place and AMC LSE-Iraq was formed to facilitate 

command and control of the unit Logistics Support Elements in Iraq. We have continued to 

mobilize installation and unit Logistics Assistance Offices to form LSEs and deploy. In addition, 

we have used many individuals from the LAOs and the commodity command LAR programs to 

sustain support to the Soldiers and units in theater. In addition a large number of Army civilians 

have volunteered to deploy to SWA to serve in a wide variety of other support functions. 

The long-term nature of Phase IV illustrates a point made by MG McManus about the use 

of Phases to frame combat operations. The use of Phases assumes a sense of linear operations, 

which was not the case in OIF. This was non-linear and non-contiguous operations. AFSC was 

supporting several phases simultaneously. 

EATON: As we already mentioned everyone wants to see clean phases, we 

prepped, we did this, we fought, then we did that. But AMC was 

continuous. We were pushing the 4th ID forward, arming them, while the 

fight was going on up forward. So, it was... 

MCMANUS: That's exactly right. [O]ne thing you could say, you've got a 

Phase III for this 3ID, a Phase III for the 4th Division, a Phase III from a 

different thing. All of the guys that are out watching the combat plan, the 

theater campaign plan, but each with its own scope because of the nonlinearity of the battlefield....78

AFSC/JMC remains in support of ongoing predeploying, deploying, and redeploying 

forces. We provide the sustainment support we can to the forces deployed and executing 

continuing operations. While we are focused on that support, the command looks forward to the 

future. As MG McManus noted when discussing support in Phase III, Decisive Combat 

Operations: 

“When you take a look at the tactical, operational, strategic realms of operations, there is 

very little that AMC can do to influence the tactical fight. About the only thing it can do is, 

through either assemblies or repair parts provisioning, is being a pull through something in the 

clutch.... But the bigger mission for AMC is looking at the next phase because now, as you go 

 

78 MG McManus Interview, pp. 22-23. 

47
from Phase III to Phase IV it's like all the operations we’ve trained for. Once you complete your 

Phase III, now you've got to consolidate, redistribute ammunitions, regroup, reconstitute. All 

these things we should be thinking about in terms of how are we marshaling and prepositioning 

the capability here so we can help reset the force in theater for the next big operation.”79

AFSC/JMC is currently preparing the force for the “next big operation.” 

AFSC/JMC “On the Line”

 

79 Ibid, p. 23.

48
ACRONYMS 

AFSC US Army Field Support Command 

AMC US Army Materiel Command 

AMSAA Army Material Systems Analysis Activity 

AO American Ordnance, Inc 

APS Army Prepositioned Stocks 

ASL/PLL Authorized Stockage List/Prescribed Load List 

AST Ammunition Support Team

AWR Army War Reserve 

AWRSC Army War Reserve Support Command 

BCT Brigade Combat Team

CEB Combat Equipment Battalion 

CEB-ROB CEB-Rhine Ordnance Barracks 

CEG Combat Equipment Group 

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Command 

CHW Controlled Humidity Warehouse 

DDSP Distribution Depot Susquehanna, PA 

DODAAC Department of Defense Activity Address Code 

EAC Echelon Above Corps 

EAD Echelon Above Division 

GOCO Government Owned-Contractor Operated 

GOGO Government Owned-Government Operated 

GWOT Global War on Terrorism 

IMMC Integrated Materiel Management Center 

IPDS Inland Petroleum Distribution System 

IRF Immediate Reaction Force 

JMC US Army Joint Munitions Command 

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

LSE Logistics Support Element 

LSV Landing Ship, Vehicle 

MMRI Material Management and Readiness Integration 

MRC Major Regional Contingency 

MRR Munitions Readiness Report 

MSC Major Subordinate Command 

NICP National Inventory Control Point 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OSC US Army Operations Support Command (Later became AFSC) 

OSRAP Optimum Stock Requirements Analysis Program 

RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration 

SAD State Active Duty 

SSA Supply Support Activity 

SSF Single Stock Fund 

STAMIS Standard Army Automation Management System 

SWA Southwest Asia 

TAACOM Theater Army Area Support Command 

USAREUR United States Army Europe

49