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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48195

CHRIS MANNING, individually; DENNIS 

PIATT, individually; ENRIQUE 

QUILANTAN, individually; LISA LOPEZ, 

individually; and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Delaware 

corporation,

 Defendant-Respondent.

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Boise, December 2021 Term

Opinion Filed: March 9, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. 

Melissa Moody, District Judge. 

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Rossman Law Group, PLLC, Boise, for appellants Chris Manning, Dennis Piatt, 

Enrique Quilantan and Lisa Lopez. Eric S. Rossman argued. 

Stoel Rives LLP, Boise, for respondent, Micron Technology, Inc. W. Christopher 

Pooser argued. 

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STEGNER, Justice.

This appeal arises from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Micron 

Technology, Inc. (Micron). The case arose when four Micron employees (the Employees) filed a 

class action complaint against Micron on June 13, 2019, asserting violations of the Idaho Wage 

Claim Act. At the time, Micron had in place a compensation plan called the Incentive Pay Plan 

(IPP), in which eligible employees could earn yearly bonuses based on a number of performance 

metrics. The Employees alleged that the bonuses they received on November 23, 2018, for 

Micron’s 2018 fiscal year should have been greater.

Micron filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Employees’ complaint was 

time-barred by Idaho Code section 45-614. Micron argued that section 45-614’s six-month statute 
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of limitations applied to the Employees’ complaint because they sought “additional wages,” as 

opposed to “unpaid wages.” The district court granted Micron’s motion for summary judgment. 

The Employees timely appealed, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations applies. We affirm 

the decision of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Chris Manning, Dennis Piatt, Enrique Quilantan, and Lisa Lopez (the Employees) are 

current employees of Micron and were employees during the entirety of Micron’s 2018 fiscal year. 

Micron employed a performance-based annual bonus plan, the Incentive Pay Plan (IPP or the 

Plan), which provided additional compensation for employees following the end of the fiscal year 

based on several performance metrics including the company’s annual performance goals as well 

as each individual employee’s performance. Micron also compensated its employees regularly 

every two weeks throughout the year at a rate that exceeded the federal minimum wage.

According to the IPP in effect for Micron’s 2018 fiscal year, the Plan was “designed to (1) 

improve overall Company performance through the establishment of goals and reward 

appropriately for attainment of those goals; and (2) attract, retain, and reward eligible Team 

Members by providing incentives that drive financial performance and business objectives critical 

to the Company’s overall success.” Under the “Performance Periods” heading, the IPP states: 

Awards under the Plan are based on the attainment of applicable corporate, 

shared[,] and individual goals for specified performance periods, which typically 

follow the Company’s fiscal year (quarter, half-year, or annual). Different goals 

and different individuals may have different performance periods. The performance 

period is specified in your goal communication. Any performance periods may be 

altered by the CEO in his or her sole and absolute discretion at any time, including 

after the applicable period has started.

The “payment date” for the IPP bonus was “the first practical payroll date following certification 

of results.”

Jill Chris, Micron’s corporate representative, stated during her deposition that the 

performance period for “all IPP participants” was Micron’s “fiscal year [20]18,” which ran from 

September 1, 2017, through August 31, 2018.1 Chris also clarified that “[p]erformance outside of 

the fiscal year [2018] was not considered for FY 18 IPP.” It is undisputed that the fiscal year 2018 

 1 Chris repeatedly referred to the last day of Micron’s fiscal year as August 30, 2018. However, it appears this was a 

misstatement as several documents in the record confirm that the last day of the fiscal year was August 31, 2018. 
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IPP bonuses were paid out on November 23, 2018, roughly three months after the end of fiscal 

year 2018.

The Employees alleged in their complaint that because Micron enforced a “mandatory 

distribution quota” in awarding bonuses for fiscal year 2018, in contravention of Micron’s usual 

policy, their annual performance ratings were improperly decreased, leading to smaller IPP 

bonuses than were due. Manning received an annual performance rating of “3” out of a possible 

“5.” As a result, his IPP payout totaled $33,158.83. Manning alleges that his bonus should have 

been $18,000 greater than what he received due to the decreased performance rating. Piatt received 

a “2” rating, and his IPP payout totaled $4,853.71. Piatt alleges that his bonus should have been 

$8,500 greater than what he received. Quilantan received a “3” and his IPP payout totaled 

$11,123.13. Quilantan alleges that his bonus should have been $4,400 greater than what he 

received. Finally, Lopez received a “2” and her IPP payout totaled $1,826.98. Lopez alleges that 

her bonus should have been $3,392.96 greater than what she received.

B. Procedural History

On June 13, 2019, Manning filed a class action complaint against Micron. The complaint 

alleged that Micron violated the Idaho Wage Claim Act by (1) breaching the covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing, and (2) committing fraud. 

In response, Micron filed an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 

Employees’ complaint and a Rule 12(f) motion to strike the class allegations. Micron first argued 

that Manning did not have standing to represent employees who received a rating of “2,” because 

Manning himself had received a “3.” Micron also argued that Idaho Code section 45-614 barred 

Manning’s complaint because the six-month statute of limitations had run. Micron next contended 

that Manning failed to plead fraud with particularity, as required by Idaho law. Before a hearing 

on Micron’s motion, Manning filed an amended complaint, this time additionally naming the three 

other employees (Piatt, Quilantan, and Lopez) who were rated either a “2” or “3.” The district 

court denied Micron’s motion to strike and motion to dismiss. Micron subsequently filed an answer 

to the Employees’ complaint on September 23, 2019, which also included several affirmative 

defenses.

In the interim, the parties filed a proposed joint scheduling order, agreeing to conduct 

limited discovery on the statute of limitations issue. The parties also agreed that this “phase one” 

of discovery would “culminate with the filing of Micron’s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
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Statute of Limitations.” If the district court granted Micron’s motion for summary judgment on 

that issue, the parties stipulated that the Employees’ “entire action will be dismissed with 

prejudice.” The district court adopted the parties’ proposed order.

After limited discovery was conducted on the statute of limitations issue, Micron moved 

for summary judgment, again alleging that the Employees’ complaint was time-barred by Idaho 

Code section 45-614. Micron filed several exhibits with its motion, including declarations from 

(1) Rick Bergstrom (counsel for Micron), (2) Jill Chris (Micron’s corporate representative), (3) 

Lance Harris (Manning’s supervisor), (4) Ping Digaum (Piatt’s supervisor), (5) Jim Miller 

(Quilantan’s supervisor), and (6) Carolyn Meador (Lopez’s supervisor). A copy of Chris’s

deposition transcript was also attached, as well as the IPP in effect for fiscal year 2018, reward 

letters, pay stubs, and performance reviews for each named employee-plaintiff. Each of the 

Employees’ supervisors declared that their performance review of each respective employee was 

based solely on work performed during the 2018 fiscal year. 

In its motion, Micron argued that because the Employees sought “additional wages,” the 

six-month statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code section 45-614 barred their claims. Micron 

asserted that the Employees had not raised a genuine issue of material fact during the limited 

discovery phase, and, as such, their complaint should be dismissed. The Employees opposed

Micron’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that the “default” statute of limitations for wage 

claims was two years, and unless Micron could “demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the six-month 

statute of limitations applie[d],” the default two-year limitation period was applicable.

The parties argued the motion on June 22, 2020. The district court issued an order granting 

Micron’s motion for summary judgment on June 24, 2020. The district court concluded that the 

Employees’ cause of action accrued when they were paid their IPP bonuses on November 23, 

2018. The district court also concluded that the six-month statute of limitations set forth in Idaho 

Code section 45-614 applied to the Employees’ claims because they sought “additional wages” in 

the form of greater IPP bonus payouts. The district court further concluded that the IPP bonuses 

were attributable to the 2018 fiscal year, which is a pay period.

The Employees timely appealed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court’s standard of 

review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 445, 65 
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P.3d 184, 186 (2003). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the 

non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 

are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is 

appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the evidence 

reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, 

over which this Court exercises free review. Id.

Ware v. City of Kendrick, 168 Idaho 795, 798, 487 P.3d 730, 733 (2021) (quoting Estate of Becker 

v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004)).

This Court freely reviews questions of statutory interpretation. Florer v. Walizada, 168 

Idaho 932, 935, 489 P.3d 843, 846 (2021).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Micron 

because the Employees are seeking “additional wages.”

This case primarily turns on the application of Idaho Code section 45-614, which sets the 

statute of limitations on wage claims under the Idaho Wage Claim Act. See I.C. §§ 45-601–621. 

The Employees claim that the two-year statute of limitations applies because they are claiming 

wages “not attributable to any particular pay period.” Alternatively, Employees contend that they 

claim “unpaid wages due fifteen days after the end of Fiscal Year 2018 and the November 2018 

payments were merely late partial payments of amounts owed.” Micron, in response, argues that 

the six-month statute of limitations applies because “each Appellant was paid a [fiscal year 20]18 

IPP bonus but claims a larger bonus amount and thus seeks additional wages, not unpaid wages.”

The Idaho Wage Claim Act defines “wages” as “compensation for labor or services 

rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece[,] or 

commission basis.” I.C. § 45-601(7). “Wages earned over a longer period of time [than one month], 

such as an annual bonus based upon net profits, will come due during a specific calendar month 

and are covered by the statute.” Paolini v. Albertson’s Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 

(2006); see also Savage v. Scandit Inc., 163 Idaho 637, 642, 417 P.3d 234, 239 (2018) (“Bonuses 

fall under the definition of wages and are subject to the mandatory trebling statute if they are not 

paid when they are due.”). Furthermore, so long as an employer pays its employees a minimum 

wage for all hours worked at least once a month, the terms of any additional compensation may be 

negotiated between the employer and the employee. Smith v. Kount, Inc., 169 Idaho 460, 463, 497 

P.3d 534, 537 (2021).
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Idaho Code section 45-614 sets forth a two-year statute of limitations for claims of 

“unpaid” wages, but if an employee seeks “additional” wages, a claim must be brought within six 

months: 

Any person shall have the right to collect wages, penalties and liquidated damages 

provided by any law or pursuant to a contract of employment, but any action 

thereon shall be filed either with the department or commenced in a court of 

competent jurisdiction within two (2) years after the cause of action accrued, 

provided, however, that in the event salary or wages have been paid to any 

employee and such employee claims additional salary, wages, penalties or 

liquidated damages, because of work done or services performed during his 

employment for the pay period covered by said payment, any action therefor shall 

be commenced within six (6) months from the accrual of the cause of action. It is 

further provided that if any such cause of action has accrued prior to the effective 

date of this act, and is not barred by existing law, action thereon may be commenced 

within six (6) months from the effective date of this act. In the event an action is 

not commenced as herein provided, any remedy on the cause of action shall be 

forever barred.

I.C. § 45-614 (2018) (italics added).

2 “A cause of action for the collection of wages accrues when 

an employee has a right to collect the wages that are allegedly owed to him.” Callenders, Inc. v. 

Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174, 814 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct. App. 1991).

1. Micron’s 2018 fiscal year is the pay period for the 2018 IPP bonus.

The district court concluded that the “undisputed facts indicate that the IPP bonus was 

based on work performed in the 2018 fiscal year; the pay period is the 2018 fiscal year.” In doing 

so, the district court noted that Micron’s annual bonus program was distinguishable from the

severance pay package described in Johnson v. Allied Stores, Inc., 106 Idaho 363, 368, 679 P.2d 

640, 644 (1984), or the retirement benefits package discussed in Latham v. Haney Seed Co., 119 

Idaho 412, 414, 807 P.2d 630, 632 (1991), because Micron’s fiscal year IPP bonus was not earned 

over the “entire course of the employment relationship.”

On appeal, the Employees first argue that the IPP payout was not attributable to a specific 

pay period: “Nothing in the way in which [Micron] established, calculated, and paid the IPP bonus 

is consistent with the bonus being paid for a specific ‘pay period’ as that term is used in the Idaho 

Wage Claim Act.” Because there was no “pay period” for the IPP payment, Employees contend 

 2 During this litigation, Idaho Code section 45-614 was amended. See H.B. 113, 65th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho

2019). The amendment, which went into effect on July 1, 2019, changed the six-month statute of limitations for 

additional wages to twelve months. See id.; I.C. § 45-614 (2021). It is undisputed that at the time the Employees filed 

their complaint on June 13, 2019, the six-month statute of limitations was in effect.
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that their claims are for “unpaid wages,” and the two-year statute of limitations applies. The 

Employees assert that the IPP bonus was “earned over multiple established pay periods,” and, as 

such, “falls clearly within the general” two-year statute of limitations.

In response, Micron asserts that the pay period for the 2018 IPP was the 2018 fiscal year. 

Micron notes that the Employees concede this point by admitting that “the IPP bonus payments 

made on November 23, 2018, exclusively compensated work performed during FY 18.” (Italics in 

original.) Micron points to Chris’s deposition testimony as well as the declarations of the 

Employees’ respective supervisors acknowledging that the performance reviews and IPP payouts 

for 2018 compensated only work performed during the 2018 fiscal year.

The six-month statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 45-614, which was in effect at 

the time, applies when an employee claims additional wages “for a specific pay period from which 

an employee has already received some payment of salary or wages.” Johnson, 106 Idaho at 367, 

679 P.2d at 644 (italics in original). “Any person has the right to collect wages provided by law or 

pursuant to an employment contract, but the action to collect those wages must be commenced 

within six months after the cause of action accrues if the claim is for wages additional to those 

already paid.” Callenders, Inc., 120 Idaho at 173–74, 814 P.2d at 433–34 (italics added).

“Under I.C. § 45-608, an employer is required to adhere to a schedule paying its employees 

at least once a month.” Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 

332, 337 (2005). “Beyond that, the Wage Claim Act does not place any limitations on the ability 

of the employer and employee to contract for the terms of the employee’s compensation.” Id. 

Employees contend that their IPP payouts are like severance packages and retirement 

benefits. In Johnson, this Court concluded that severance pay packages are “not attributed to, or 

earned in a specific pay period,” but are instead “earned over the entire course of the employment 

relationship.” 106 Idaho at 367, 679 P.2d at 644. Similarly, in Latham, this Court held that 

retirement benefits “were not attributed to nor earned in a specific pay period” because the “cash 

value of the policies increased each year, but the benefits to which Latham was entitled were 

earned over the entire course of the employment relationship[.]”119 Idaho at 414, 807 P.2d at 632. 

Because the IPP bonus was earned over a specific period, i.e., Micron’s 2018 fiscal year, 

the wages due were attributable to a specific pay period. It is undisputed that the Employees 

received their IPP bonuses on November 23, 2018, in addition to their regular, bi-weekly wages 

for that regular pay period. It is also undisputed that the 2018 IPP bonus only compensated the 
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Employees for work done during the 2018 fiscal year; the IPP bonus was paid out approximately 

three months after the conclusion of the 2018 fiscal year (which ended August 31, 2018). Chris 

testified, and the IPP document itself corroborates, that this delay was due to the time needed for 

the company to calculate and certify individual awards based on both the company’s profitability

as well as the individual employee’s performance rating. 

The Employees even concede in their opening brief that the IPP bonus compensated only 

work done during the 2018 fiscal year. They state: “Consistent with the plan, the IPP bonus 

payments made on November 23, 2018 exclusively compensated work performed during FY 18, 

which concluded on August 3[1], 2018[.]” The Employees have not shown that there is a genuine 

question of material fact that the 2018 IPP bonus payout was not attributed to a particular pay 

period. See I.R.C.P. 56(a). As such, the applicable pay period for the 2018 IPP bonus was Micron’s 

2018 fiscal year.

2. The Employees’ claims are time-barred by Idaho Code section 45-614.

The Employees are seeking “additional wages” within the meaning of the six-month statute 

of limitations contained in Idaho Code section 45-614. The plain language of the statute supports 

this outcome: 

[I]n the event that salary or wages have been paid to any employee and such 

employee claims additional, salary, wages, penalties, or liquidated damages, 

because of work done or services performed during his employment for the pay 

period covered by said payment, any action therefor shall be commenced within six 

(6) months from the accrual of the cause of action.

I.C. § 45-614 (2018) (italics added); see also Elsaesser v. Gibson, 168 Idaho 585, 593, 484 P.3d 

866, 874 (2021). “Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 

the legislature must be given effect; the Court need not go beyond the plain meaning of the statute.” 

Elsaesser, 168 Idaho at 593, 484 P.3d at 874. Idaho Code section 45-614 is unambiguous; it clearly 

defines instances where the six-month statute of limitations applies as opposed to the two-year 

statute of limitations. If a portion of the disputed wages have already been paid, and an employee 

claims an additional amount to what has already been paid, the six-month limitations period 

applies. Accordingly, we will look no further than the statute’s plain language in order to conclude 

that the Employees seek “additional” wages within the meaning of section 45-614. 

Here, the Employees each received IPP bonus payouts on November 23, 2018, for work 

performed exclusively during the 2018 fiscal year. Therefore, it is undisputed that each employee 

“ha[d] been paid” wages attributable to the pay period. I.C. § 45-614. Now, on appeal, each 
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employee alleges that they should have received greater bonus payouts. If such an “employee

claims additionalsalary, wages, penalties, or liquidated damages, because of work done or services 

performed during his employment for the pay period covered by said payment,” then an action for 

those additional wages must be brought within six months. Id. (italics added). The Employees are 

seeking wages in addition to those they already received. Consequently, the six-month statute of 

limitations applies to their claims.

Because the six-month statute of limitations applies to Employees’ claims, the Employees’ 

claims are time-barred. The Employees’ cause of action accrued when they received their 2018 

IPP bonus on November 23, 2018. See Callenders, Inc., 120 Idaho at 174, 814 P.2d at 434. There 

is no dispute that if the six-month statute of limitations applies, the Employees’ claims are too late 

to afford them a recovery. Accordingly, the Employees’ claims are time-barred by Idaho Code 

section 45-614. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Micron. 

Because we conclude that the district court properly held that the Employees’ claims were timebarred, we need not consider the Employees’ additional arguments.

B. The Employees are not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.

The Employees argue that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 

Idaho Code section 45-615(2). Section 45-615(2) requires that a “judgment [be] rendered. . . for 

the plaintiff.” I.C. § 45-615(2). Because the Employees have not prevailed, they are not entitled to 

attorney fees or costs.

Micron is entitled to costs on appeal as a matter of right. I.A.R. 40(a).

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Micron is affirmed. Costs 

are awarded to Micron.

Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.