SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3446-19

BLITEI, LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JANET COVINGTON-HICKS,

Defendant-Appellant.1

__________________________

Submitted October 4, 2021 – Decided October 14, 2021

Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Mercer County, Docket No. F021299-18.

Law Offices of Sklar Smith-Sklar, LLC, attorneys for 

appellant (Keith D. Sklar, on the brief). 

Goldenberg, Mackler, Sayegh, Mintz and Pfeffer, 

1 Numerous other parties were named as defendants in this tax foreclosure case. 

We do not list them here because they did not participate in the trial court 

proceedings or on the present appeal.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Bonchi & Gill, attorneys for respondent (Keith A. 

Bonchi, of counsel and on the brief; Elliott J. Almanza, 

on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Defendant Janet Covington-Hicks, a residential property owner, appeals 

the trial court's April 9, 2020 order denying her motion to vacate a final 

judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Blitei, LLC ("Blitei") in this tax 

foreclosure case. Defendant's essential argument is that she was not properly 

served with the foreclosure complaint and therefore she should be excused for 

not responding to the complaint or plaintiff's motion for default judgment.

We affirm, substantially for the sound reasons set forth in Judge Robert 

Lougy's written statement of reasons appended to his order.

The following background informs our decision. Defendant was the

record owner of a residential property located at 314 Gardner Avenue in 

Trenton. Defendant bought the property in 2000 and lived there with her family.

During the twelve years in which defendant owned the property, she failed to 

satisfy her local property tax obligations at least four times. 

This foreclosure action concerns defendant’s unpaid local property taxes 

for calendar year 2016. After the account became delinquent, the City of 
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Trenton issued a tax sale certificate. The City then sold the certificate to a 

private party, which eventually assigned the certificate to Blitei.

2

In September 2018, Blitei's assignor sent defendant a notice of intent to 

foreclose on her property, serving it by both regular and certified mail.

Defendant took no action, and on October 23, 2018, the assignor filed a tax 

foreclosure complaint in the Chancery Division. 

To confirm defendant’s address, the process server: (1) reviewed the 

vesting deed to the property; (2) submitted a postal inquiry to the United States 

Postal Service ("USPS"); (3) ran a LexisNexis account search on defendant; (4) 

checked municipal tax records; and (5) reviewed the address that defendant had 

listed on her bankruptcy filings. All of the server’s inquiries identified the 

Trenton address as the place where defendant resided. The USPS also reported 

that there was “[n]o change of address order on file.” 

The server made three attempts to serve the complaint personally at the 

Trenton address. The third attempt, which took place on November 7, 2018, 

was successful. According to his Affidavit of Service, the server left the 

complaint with an adult male at the Trenton address who identified himself as 

defendant’s son. The affidavit states that "Kaywon Hicks" was served, 

2 Defendant has not alleged any impropriety in the assignment or chain of title.
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describing him as a bearded, black-haired, black-skinned male between the ages 

of thirty-six to fifty. The server estimated that the son was between five feet, 

nine inches and six feet tall, and weighed over two hundred pounds. 

In addition to personal service, plaintiff also conducted service through 

sending the summons and complaint simultaneously by regular and certified 

mail. Although the certified mail was not signed and returned, the Post Office 

did not report the regular mail’s return. 

After receiving no answer from defendant and entering a default on the 

docket, plaintiff moved for default and served the papers again by regular and 

certified mail. 

Defendant did not file opposition and a default judgment of foreclosure 

was entered on September 16, 2019. Four days later, defendant attempted to

convey the property to her son Dawoyne Covington for the nominal sum of one 

dollar. As the trial court correctly pointed out, this attempted conveyance was 

unsuccessful, since default judgment had already been entered and thus 

defendant no longer owned the property. 
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In September 2019, Dawoyne Covington filed a motion to vacate the final 

judgment. His motion was denied on February 28, 2020 because of his lack of 

standing concerning the foreclosed premises.

3

Represented by the same law firm as her son, defendant then filed a similar 

motion to vacate the final judgment, alleging lack of service upon her. In 

support of her motion, defendant submitted a certification asserting that she 

moved from New Jersey to Texas in November 2017. She certified she never 

received notice, nor did she have any knowledge of, any pending foreclosure 

action against her property. 

In addition, defendant maintained that her son’s name is "Dawoyne 

Covington," not "Kaywon Hicks," and that no one named "Kaywon Hicks" has 

resided at the Trenton address. Plaintiff countered that the person served was in 

fact defendant's son, but that the process server simply misheard the name and 

wrote it down incorrectly. 

After hearing oral argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion to 

vacate the final judgment.

Defendant now appeals. She argues the judgment is void under Rule 4:50-

1(d) for lack of valid service of process. She further argues plaintiff did not 

3 This order was not appealed.
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exercise due diligence in ascertaining her current address and that the trial court 

erred in finding that service of process was adequate. 

Plaintiff responds that it satisfied its diligence requirement, and that 

service was proper. Further, plaintiff argues that even if defendant shows a basis 

to excuse her failure to respond timely to the complaint and the motion for 

default judgment, that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed for her lack 

of a meritorious defense. 

The applicable Rules of Court and legal standards are well established. 

"Generally, a decision to vacate a default judgment lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, guided by principles of equity." Coryell, L.L.C. v. 

Curry, 391 N.J. Super. 72, 79 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Hous. Auth. of Town of 

Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)). "The decision to grant or deny 

a motion to vacate the entry of judgment 'will be left undisturbed unless it 

represents a clear abuse of discretion.'" Ibid. (quoting Little, 135 N.J. at 283). 

Here, defendant contends she should be excused for failing to answer the 

complaint or respond to plaintiff's motion for default judgment because she 

allegedly was never served. This argument implicates the approved mechanisms 

for service under Rules 4:4-3 and 4:4-4. We concur with the trial court that 

proper service, both by personal means and by mail, was effectuated in this case.
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Personal service in accordance with Rule 4:4-4(a)(1) was duly effectuated 

by the process server leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at 

defendant's apparent "usual place of abode" with a person who appeared to be a 

household member well over the age of fourteen and who identified himself as 

defendant's son. Defendant did not meet her burden of demonstrating that the 

Affidavit of Service was incorrect or materially deficient. 

A server’s filing of such an affidavit creates a "presumption that the facts 

recited therein are true." Garley v. Waddington, 177 N.J. Super. 173, 180 (App. 

Div. 1981). The moving party may overcome this presumption "only by clear 

and convincing evidence that the return is false." Id. at 181; accord Jameson v. 

Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 426 (App. Div. 2003) ("[i]n 

order for the sheriff's return to be established as false, clear and convincing 

evidence must be submitted[]"). No such "clear and convincing evidence" was 

advanced by defendant here. Her opposing certification does not explain why 

she did not file a change of address form with the post office to forward her mail

after she allegedly moved to Texas. Nor does it explain why defendant 

continued to use the Trenton address on her bankruptcy filings. 

Defendant claims that the name written down by the process server on his 

form is not the name of her son. The apparent phonetic similarity between 
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"Dawoyne Covington (Hicks)" and "Kaywon Hicks" is consistent with plaintiff's 

explanation that the server may have misheard or mis-transcribed the name of 

the person he encountered on the premises—who identified himself as 

defendant's son. Moreover, defendant has not certified that the server's 

description of "Kaywon" on the affidavit is contrary to her son's actual physical 

characteristics. Nor did defendant submit a certification by her son (who, 

notably, had recently been represented by the same law firm) denying that he 

had been served with process at the Trenton premises.

In this case, the record indicates plaintiff reasonably relied on numerous 

sources that consistently reflected her residency at the Trenton address. The 

internet search presented by defendant's attorney reflecting that she has had 

addresses in Texas, New Jersey, and other states is not "clear and convincing" 

proof that she was not continuing to maintain the Trenton address as a residence. 

The trial court also correctly found that service by mail was properly 

accomplished in this case. After an unsuccessful yet "reasonable and good faith 

attempt" to serve a defendant, a plaintiff may effect service by "mailing a copy 

of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt 

requested, to the usual place of abode of the defendant[.]" R. 4:4-3(a). If the 

mailing is properly addressed, stamped, and posted without return, there is a 
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presumption that it was received by the intended recipient. See SSI Med. Servs. 

v. HHS, Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996). 

Defendant failed to overcome that presumption in this case. Although she did 

not acknowledge various certified mailings sent to her at the Trenton address, 

the companion regular mailings were never returned as undeliverable. Apart 

from her certification, defendant failed to offer any other corroborating proof

"'that the notice was never in fact received[]'" to rebut the presumption of 

effective mailed service. Id. at 625. In addition, defendant's unexplained failure 

to provide the Post Office with a forwarding address should not enable her to 

overcome the presumption of effective mailed service.

Because defendant has failed to show the judgment was void for lack of 

valid service, we need not reach whether she also has failed to present a 

meritorious defense to the tax foreclosure action. See Jameson, 363 N.J. Super. 

at 425 (noting that if a defendant establishes defective service, a meritorious 

defense is not needed to vacate the judgment under R. 4:50-1(d)).

Affirmed.