United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 15, 2021*

Decided December 17, 2021 

Before

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2025 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JASON AUSTIN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 10 CR 971 

Joan H. Lefkow, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Nearly a decade after he was convicted of heroin and crack cocaine offenses, 

Jason Austin moved under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-2025 Page 2 

Stat. 5194, to reduce his sentence. The district court concluded that he was ineligible for 

relief under the act. We affirm. 

Austin was convicted in 2012 of six counts: one for conspiracy to distribute 

controlled substances, namely heroin and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C § 846, and five for 

distribution of crack cocaine. Id. § 841(a)(1). The jury made no specific drug-quantity 

finding other than attributing less than 100 grams of heroin to the conspiracy, subjecting 

Austin to the statutory penalties enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). In 2014, the 

court sentenced Austin to 420 months’ imprisonment (360 months for the conspiracy 

count and 60 months for each distribution count to run concurrent to one another and 

consecutive to the conspiracy count). We upheld Austin’s sentence on appeal. 

United States v. Austin, 806 F.3d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Austin moved in 2020 for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act, which 

made provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive for certain defendants 

convicted of crack-related offenses. See United States v. Shaw, 957 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 

2020). The Fair Sentencing Act, in relevant part, modified § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) by 

increasing the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger the subsections’ statutory 

minimum penalties. Id. 

The court denied Austin’s motion, concluding that the Fair Sentencing Act did 

not apply to him because his counts of conviction did not carry statutory minimum

penalties. The court added that if Austin wished to contest the guideline calculations, he 

needed to do so on direct appeal. 

On appeal, Austin generally challenges the denial of his motion for a reduced 

sentence. But for Austin to be eligible for a possible sentence reduction under the First 

Step Act, the Fair Sentencing Act must have modified the statutory penalties for his

offense of conviction. First Step Act § 404(a)–(b). As the Supreme Court recently held, 

however, the relevant Fair Sentencing Act provision modified the statutory penalties 

only for § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 841(b)(1)(B), but not for § 841(b)(1)(C). Terry v. 

United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1862 (2021). Because Austin’s conviction was under 

§ 841(b)(1)(C), Terry makes plain that the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the 

statutory penalties for his conviction. Id. at 1863–64. As such, he is ineligible for a 

sentence reduction under the First Step Act. 

AFFIRMED