Security Transformation

Compiled by

Dr. Steven Metz

Key Insights:

• The Global War on Terrorism and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are diverting resources 

and energy from security transformation. The ultimate effect of this is unclear.

• Experts do not agree on the amount of budgetary support that will be available for security 

transformation over the long term.

• The human capital to sustain security transformation exists, but may become more expensive 

and harder to maintain.

• While the United States has been successful at transforming to attain battlefi eld success 

against conventional enemies and for defense management, there is a great need for a second 

generation of transformation focused on stabilization operations, intelligence, and homeland 

security.

• Making America’s security transformation compatible with key allies remains an unresolved 

problem.

• The “strategic pause” that gave birth to security transformation is over; now the United States 

must fi nd a way to transform while “under fi re.”

For the past 5 years, the United States has sought to transform its defense capabilities to refl ect 

ongoing changes in technology, management techniques, the American political and economic 

landscapes, and the global security environment. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the ensuing 

Global War on Terrorism provided stark and tragic reminders of the need for the such an adjustment. 

With American military forces engaged around the world in both combat and stabilization operations, 

the need for rigorous and critical analysis of security transformation has never been greater. Toward this 

end, The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of 

Government, the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and the Eisenhower National 

Security Series co-sponsored a conference on security transformation on November 14-15, 2003, which 

brought together top thinkers to assess this topic. 

The Major Themes. The wide range of discussions at the conference refl ected the breadth of 

transformation which, by defi nition, encompasses a fundamental change in nearly every dimension 

of American security. To fully assess something that complex would require weeks of discussion. In 

a very broad sense, though, two themes did appear on a regular basis throughout the conference: the 

diffi culty of sustaining transformation and the need for adjusting the trajectory of transformation. These 

encapsulate the state of the security transformation debate today. 

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College,

The Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University Harvard University, and

The Eisenhower Conference Series
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Sustaining Transformation. Much energy and 

money has been devoted to security transformation 

since the congressionally-commissioned National 

Defense Panel concluded in 1997 that the United 

States should undertake “a broad transformation 

of its military and national security structures, 

operational concepts and equipment.” In many 

ways, though, the world of 2003 is not the world 

of 1997. Ironically, the global war on terrorism, 

particularly the ongoing operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, divert money and, more importantly, 

people and energy from transformation even 

while they demonstrate the need for it. The 

question is whether these distractions will derail 

transformation.

One area of intense discussion at the conference 

was the money for sustaining transformation. One 

participant suggested that recent increases in 

defense budgets have allowed a clearing up of 

a backlog in readiness and maintenance which 

could, in turn, allow an increase in transformation 

spending in coming years, but only if there is no 

signifi cant decline in the defense budget and no 

unforeseen increase in major system or personnel 

costs. Many other participants considered a major 

increase in transformation-related spending over 

current levels unlikely, particularly with no end 

in sight to the war on terrorism and many major 

systems approaching the point of total failure 

or obsolescence. Few participants expected a 

windfall in transformation spending, thus forcing 

its architects to be selective in the programs they 

pursue.

A second dimension of sustaining transformation that the conference participants discussed in detail concerned people. There was 

a general sense of satisfaction with the quality 

of the people leading security transformation, 

both civilian and military. The human “raw 

material,” as one participant phrased it, is there. 

The discussion did not, though, push beyond the 

idea of sustaining this existing level of quality. In 

other words, the Department of Defense (DoD) 

and the military compete for quality people with 

corporations and other organizations which are 

themselves transforming and thus need people 

with similar skills sets―creativity, comfort with 

emerging technology, an ability to think in 

nonlinear ways, the ability to work across cultural 

boundaries, whether national or organizational 

ones, and so forth. The question is how to draw 

transformative people to the defense establishment, 

empower them, educate them, network them, and 

keep them―a pressing one that needs additional 

exploration.

A third dimension of sustaining transformation 

is “harvesting” research and turning it into new 

technology. General agreement existed that the 

present system based on defense laboratories is 

not adequate for transformation. While no one 

advocated abolishing the defense labs, all agreed 

that signifi cant changes are needed.

At least one dimension of sustaining transformation was not discussed at the conference: the discussed at the conference: the 

energy and impetus driving the process. The 

assumption among the participants seemed 

to be that transformation has taken root or 

reached critical mass, at least within the defense 

establishment. Only a few years ago, though, 

the general wisdom was that organizational and 

psychological impediments to transformation 

were so great that only a committed and powerful 

Secretary of Defense with the full support of 

the President could burst through them. We 

sometimes forget that rumors before the terrorist 

attacks of September 2001 were that Secretary 

of Defense Rumsfeld was on his way out, and 

the changes he was attempting would go with 

him. The question of whether the impetus for 

transformation has been institutionalized or is 

specifi c to the current leadership probably merits 

further consideration.

Adjusting Transformation. The participants 

at the conference agreed that great strides have 

been made during 5 years of transformation. This 

is most obvious in the battlefi eld skill of the U.S. 

military, particularly when facing a conventional 

opponent. Jointness, speed, precision, and 

knowledge have combined to give the American 

armed forces a signifi cant advantage that shows 

no sign of diminishing. While perhaps not as 

stark, the transformation of defense management 

has led to equally profound change in the way 

that defense resources are used. But these may 

represent the “low hanging fruit” of security 

transformation. The conference participants 

identifi ed several “second generation” arenas for 

transformation while noting the diffi culty it will 

face in these venues.

One―and perhaps the most pressing―involves 

stabilization and support operations. The major 

idea is that in an era when states may ally with 

terrorists and terrorists may use weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD), simply restoring the status 
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quo when attacked, then relying on international 

and multinational forces to address the conditions 

that generate confl ict and aggression is no longer 

adequate. This suggests that the United States 

requires a comprehensive strategy which allows 

it to both defeat an identifi ed threat on the 

battlefi eld and then transform that threat, whether 

it is a state, a nonstate actor, or a region, so that it 

no longer poses a danger. Decisiveness in the new 

security environment thus means permanently 

transforming a threat rather than simply reversing 

overt aggression. Part of the “second generation” 

of transformation is building the capabilities to 

implement such a strategy.

The conference participants agreed that 

such a transformation is more complex, wideranging, and holistic than simply changing the 

military for battlefi eld success. Stabilization and 

the amelioration of the root causes of confl ict 

and aggression are not solely military missions. 

In some cases they may not be predominantly 

military tasks. Instead, they involve all elements 

of national power and many agencies of the U.S. 

Government―to transform an aggressor or state 

in confl ict often entails changing its political, 

economic, legal, social, and cultural structures. 

Stabilization operations and the ensuing 

transformation or reconstruction often involves 

partner nations. None of America’s have the same 

extensive defense resources that the United States 

does. Thus those which attempt transformation 

at all must take a very different path. This is an 

enduring problem leading to growing issues of 

incompatibility between the United States and its 

partners. Several solutions have been attempted, 

but all have fl aws. For instance, the “division of 

labor” in which the United States undertakes largescale combat and allies undertake stabilization 

and reconstruction, as one participant pointed 

out, is not sustainable. America’s allies need 

security transformation as much as does the 

United States. At the same time, that participant 

argued, a strategy built on “coalitions of the 

willing” is equally weak. These should be seen as 

the exception rather than the norm, with alliances 

based on a shared threat perception serving as the 

bedrock of common defense.

The conference participants also identifi ed two 

new but diffi cult venues for transformation: intelligence and homeland security. On intelligence, 

one participant suggested signifi cant change 

has been undertaken in terms of the ability to 

collect, assess, and disseminate information for 

conventional, force-on-force warfi ghting. This 

is the key to the emerging dominant battlespace awareness of American forces. A similar 

transformation is needed for WMD and stabilization operations. In the latter, this participant 

did not follow the common argument that 

only more human intelligence could solve the 

problem, but suggested that technology did offer 

at least some solutions if it was tailored “close in” 

technology rather than the long-range sort used 

for conventional warfi ghting.

The conference participants noted that intelligence and homeland security still need additional 

reorganization. In the intelligence community, 

for instance, the Director of Central Intelligence 

has overall responsibility but not overall control, 

particularly budgetary control. Homeland 

security is still more in the process of coordinating 

capabilities than building new ones, so it is probably 

too soon to talk of transformation.

The Way Ahead. From the time transformation 

fi rst entered the American strategic vocabulary, 

it was not clear whether it was a fi nite process 

which would be fi nished at some point in time, 

or a process of “permanent revolution” through 

which constant change would be institutionalized. 

If the November 2003 conference is an accurate 

barometer, the truth probably lies somewhere 

in between. On one hand, the participants at the 

conference―like the U.S. military and DoD―have 

ingrained the need for transformation. What 

was once open to debate now passes without 

question. That is unlikely to change. It will remain 

a fundamental source of American strength for 

decades. On the other hand, the fact that so much 

of the discussion at the conference dealt with Iraq, 

Afghanistan, the defense budget and other nearterm issues showed that some of the attention 

on long-term transformation that was possible a 

few years ago has been diverted. In all likelihood, 

this situation will continue―transformation will 

remain important but often be pushed aside by 

immediate challenges. The “strategic pause” that 

gave birth to security transformation is over. Now 

the United States must fi nd a way to transform 

while “under fi re.”
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William Lynn

Montgomery Meigs

Steven Metz

Bruce Nardulli

Tad Oelstrom

Robert Orr

John Riggs

Tjarck Roessler

Frank Tempesta

Lawrence Welch

John White

Cindy Williams

Herbert Winokur

Robert Mathers

Kevin Smith

Ernest Szabo

Conference Participants.

Hans Binnendijk

Ashton Carter

James Craig

Rudy DeLeon

John Deutch

Michael Dunn

Richard Falkenrath

Martin Feldstein

John Hamre

John Hanley

Scott Harris

William Hartzog

Robert Hermann

Paul Kern

James Kurtz

Douglas Lovelace

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The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy 

or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

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at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ or by calling (717) 245-4212.