STABILITY OPERATIONS IN HAITI 2010:

A CASE STUDY

Emma Vialpando 
Stability Operations in Haiti 2010:

A Case Study

Emma Vialpando

Defense Consultant

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute

October 2016

Raymond A. Millen

Senior Editor

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute (PKSOI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize 

operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such 

academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes 

controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on 

key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 22 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 

17013-5054. 

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(PKSOI) publications are available on the PKSOI homepage for 

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The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute publishes a quarterly journal to update the peace and stability operations community on the research of our analysts, recent and 

forthcoming publications and upcoming conferences sponsored 

by PKSOI. Each quarterly journal has a specific theme related to 

peace and stability operations and a commentary by the Director of PKSOI entitled The Director's Corner. If you are interested 

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ISBN: 978-0-9981473-3-8
iii

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ii

Foreword iii

About the Author iv

Introduction 1

Background and Strategic Conditions 

for the Operation 4

Operational Environment 19

Strategic Guidance 32

Design and Planning 34

Deployment and Intervention 50

Assessment and Insights 72

Conclusion 83

Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms 87

Appendix B: Chronology 94

Appendix C: Biographical Sketches 

of Key Leaders 99

Appendix D: Key U.S. Actors and Roles in 

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

/Disaster Relief 106

Appendix E: Units Assigned to or 

Supporting JTF-Haiti 112

Appendix F: References 119

End Notes 124

v

FOREWORD

This stability operations case study project emerged 

from a Joint Requirements Oversight Council task to 

examine how Joint Professional Military Education 

(JPME) institutions teach operational planning for 

steady-state peacekeeping and stability operations. 

The Joint Staff J-7 requested the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the 

Joint Proponent for Peace and Stability Operations, 

accomplish a number of tasks to improve JPME curricula. As part of this effort, PKSOI is developing a 

series of professionally focused, historical case studies 

of successful joint peacekeeping and stability operations. The purpose of these case studies is to provide 

balanced analyses of the strategic conditions and 

guidance underlying each selected operation, and describe how military leaders successfully interpreted 

and implemented this guidance during the conduct 

of joint operations. The case studies provide current 

and future military leaders with insights into the principles and challenges of stability operations, and describe practical approaches for designing, planning, 

and conducting joint operations in a complex environment, particularly in situations when the Department 

of Defense does not lead the U.S. Government effort. 

Each case study will focus on answering the question: 

“Did the joint force commander and staff effectively 

design, plan, and establish the mission in a way that 

provided for initial operational success, while establishing the basis for long-term operational and strategic success?”

Gregory P. Dewitt

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director

Peacekeeping and Stability

 Operations Institute

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Emma Vialpando is a defense consultant in Washington, DC. She has 14 years of experience working 

within the Department of Defense, the Department 

of Homeland Security, Congress, and the think tank 

community. She specializes in design and strategy development, and assists clients to develop and implement new ideas and solutions to keep up with their 

changing environments. Ms. Vialpando holds a Master in International Relations from the John Hopkins 

School of Advanced International Studies.

While at Booz Allen, Ms. Vialpando has worked 

with the Department of Defense to develop transformational concepts. She was the lead author of the 2010 

Joint Security Concept for the former U.S. Joint Forces 

Command. She was also the co-author for the revision to the 2006 Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Joint Operating 

Concept. 

 From 2007-2008, Ms. Vialpando was an Associate Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a national-security think tank in Washington 

D.C. During this time, she contributed as drafter and 

editor to multiple policy reports to include: Shaping 

U.S. Ground Forces for the Future: Getting Expansion 

Right and Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq. Ms. Vialpando also worked as a 

staffer to a Member of Congress on the House Armed 

Services Committee, where she provided analysis and 

recommendations for key issues. 
viii
1

INTRODUCTION

The stability operation in Haiti from January 14 to 

June 1, 2010 demonstrated how over a dozen U.S. Government departments and agencies worked together 

effectively in an unprecedented large-scale foreign 

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (FHA/DR) effort. The 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Haiti 

on January 12, 2010, precipitated the operation. The 

Haiti action, known within the U.S. military as Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, was not only a wholeof-government, but also a whole-of-nation and global 

undertaking. The United States played a significant 

role in the Haiti earthquake relief effort in collaboration with more than 140 countries and over 1,000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).1

 Its objective 

was to alleviate human suffering in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, establish a safe and secure 

environment for humanitarian aid distribution, and 

set the conditions for a transition to a longer-term recovery effort by the Haitian Government, the United 

Nations (UN), and the NGOs. 

One day after the earthquake, President Barack 

Obama appointed the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as the lead federal 

agency for the U.S. response effort, in charge of coordinating the activities of 14 federal departments and 

agencies, many of which had never participated in 

an overseas disaster relief operation. As a supporting 

entity, the Joint Force facilitated the broader humanitarian effort by conducting a wide range of activities, 

such as re-opening the damaged Port-au-Prince airport and seaport, creating logistical hubs to support 

the delivery of humanitarian aid, managing the arrival 
2

and departure of planes and ships in and out of Haiti, 

providing security for aid distribution sites and convoys, dispensing emergency medical care, removing 

rubble, and transporting internally displaced persons 

(IDPs) to safer areas.

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE demonstrated 

how the Joint Force can apply its unique capabilities 

and expertise, such as in logistics and transportation, 

assessments, security, engineering, and medical care 

to an FHA/DR effort. This study examines Operation 

UNIFIED RESPONSE to provide insight and lessons 

on how the Joint Force can plan and coordinate with a 

non-Defense lead federal agency, the UN, and NGOs 

during a large-scale international crisis. UNIFIED RESPONSE highlights how the Joint Force can not only 

support the immediate activities to relieve human suffering, but also help set the conditions for long-term 

recovery and reconstruction efforts. 

This case study includes eight sections. “Background and Strategic Conditions for the Operation” 

describes the legacy of colonial rule in Haiti, the U.S. 

Marine Corps occupation from 1915-1932, and also 

the government, society, economy, and geography 

of the country. In many respects, Haiti’s history and 

culture help to explain the difficult circumstances that 

confronted the Haitian Government in providing an 

adequate response to the earthquake. “Operational 

Environment” describes conditions in Haiti after the 

earthquake and the operational challenges the Joint 

Force faced (e.g., lack of host nation infrastructure, 

limited situational awareness, etc.). This section introduces the principal Joint Force partners during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, and describes the response 

architecture of both the U.S. Government and the UN. 

“Strategic Guidance” provides an overview of U.S. 
3

interests and policies in Haiti, which shaped the operational direction given to commanders. “Design and 

Planning” examines the formation of Joint Task Force 

(JTF) Haiti and assesses its mission, task organization, 

and desired end state for the operation. This section 

also discusses how JTF-Haiti conducted joint planning 

as well as planning with U.S. and multinational partners. It also addresses how the JTF engaged the media 

and conducted public communication. “Deployment 

and Intervention” describes the unfolding of events 

across the four phases of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. This section discusses how the Joint Force 

provided support across key activities, such as search 

and rescue, humanitarian assistance, logistics, assessments, security, and medical care. “Assessment and 

Insights” examines Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE 

through the prism of the eight principles of stability 

operations. The “Conclusion” provides overarching 

observations and distills a series of best practices derived from this study. The case study includes six appendices with supplemental materials to aid in a more 

detailed study of the operation.

The examination of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE is important to the education of military 

and civilian national security leaders. Arguably, the 

operation marks the first time the U.S. Government 

conducted a comprehensive response of this scale and 

sophistication to an international emergency as severe 

as the Haitian earthquake. This case study assesses 

the Joint Force’s supporting role to USAID as the lead 

federal agency and discusses innovations (e.g., new 

organizations, processes, procedures) developed as a 

part of the operation. The case study examines how 

best to employ the Joint Force as part of an FHA/DR 

effort and identifies potential areas of activity during 
4

the conduct of operations in the future. The case study 

also assesses the lessons of building a JTF in the midst 

of on-going deployments and operations. The nation’s 

civilian leaders are likely to call upon the Joint Force 

again to participate in large-scale FHA/DR efforts. 
5

BACKGROUND AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS 

FOR THE OPERATION

Due to its geographic proximity and strategic 

position astride important shipping lanes, Haiti has 

long had strategic importance to the United States. 

Instability on the island nation has had a history of 

affecting the U.S. mainland, and the United States 

has intervened militarily in Haiti on a number of occasions. The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 

12, 2010 was one of the deadliest natural disasters to 

have impacted the area in modern times, and it was an 

unprecedented human tragedy. There was little doubt 

that the United States would play a leading role as 

part of the international humanitarian response. 

Geography

Haiti spans about 28,000 square kilometers, about 

the size of the state of Maryland. It occupies the western third of the Caribbean Island of Hispaniola, with 

the Dominican Republic taking up the eastern twothirds of the island. Shaped like a horseshoe, Haiti 

has two main peninsulas, one in the north and one in 

the south. In addition to the mainland, Haiti controls 

several nearby islands. Four islands of notable size 

in Haitian territorial waters are Ile de la Gonâve, Ile de 

la Tortue (Tortuga Island), Grande Cayemite, and Ile à 

Vache. About 55 miles northwest of the northern peninsula is the Windward Passage, a strip of water that 

separates Haiti from Cuba.2 

The mainland of Haiti has three regions: the northern region, the central region, and the southern region. 

Each of these regions contains a tapestry of moun-
6

tains, plateaus, 

and rivers. 

In the north, 

the Massif du 

Nord (Northern Massif) is 

a mountain 

range that also 

extends into 

the Dominican 

Republic and 

ranges in elevation from 600 

to 1,000 meters. 

The Plaine du 

Nord (Northern 

Plain) lies along 

the northern border with the Dominican Republic, 

between the Massif du Nord and the North Atlantic 

Ocean. The main river in the northern region is Les 

Trois Rivières, or The Three Rivers, which is 90 miles 

long and averages 200 feet wide.3 

In the central region, the Plaine de l’Artibonite surrounds Haiti’s longest and most important river: the 

Artibonite. This 250-mile river provides the largest 

drainage system in the country. During the dry season (November–January), the Artibonite River is only 

about three feet deep, and it may even dry up completely in certain spots. During the wet season (February–May), the river can reach depths of more than 30 

feet and produce flooding in surrounding areas. This 

pattern of slowing to a trickle during the dry season 

and carrying torrential flows during the wet season is 

common among many of Haiti’s other rivers. 
7

Another key geographical feature in the central 

region is the Plateau Central (Central Plateau), which 

extends along both sides of the Guayamouc River, one 

of the principal tributaries of the Artibonite River. To 

the southwest of the Plateau Central is the Montagnes 

Noires, a mountain range with elevations that reach 

600 meters. The Chaîne des Matheux and the Montagnes 

du Trou d’Eau are two other mountain ranges in the 

central region, which are an extension of the Sierra de 

Neiba range of the Dominican Republic. 

The southern region contains the Plaine du Cul-deSac depression and the mountainous southern peninsula. The Plaine du Cul-de-Sac is a sunken area, about 

seven miles wide, that extends 20 miles from the border with the Dominican Republic to the coast on the 

Port-au-Prince bay. The mountains of the southern 

peninsula are an extension of the Sierra de Baoruco in 

the Dominican Republic. The range’s highest peak, 

the Morne de la Selle, has the utmost elevation in Haiti, 

rising to an altitude of about one-and-a-half miles. The 

most prominent body of water in the southern region 

is the salt-water lake, Etang Saumâtre, located at the 

eastern end of the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac depression. 

Haiti has a generally hot and humid tropical climate with temperatures ranging from 59° Fahrenheit 

in the winter to 95° Fahrenheit during the summer. The 

average annual rainfall ranges from 55 to 80 inches, 

but it is unevenly distributed throughout the country. 

Generally, heavier rainfall occurs in the southern peninsula and in the northern plains and mountains. The 

western coast from the northern peninsula to Port-auPrince, the capital, is relatively dry.4
8

Society

Haiti has a population of approximately 10 million 

people, with an annual growth rate of about 1.17 percent. The median age is 22.5 years old, and the majority of the population is under 25 (Figure 1). Ninetyfive percent of Haiti’s population is black, with the 

remaining being mulatto and white. Haiti has two official languages: French and Creole.5

Figure 1 - Haiti’s Population Structure

With a 70 percent unemployment rate, approximately four-fifths of Haitians live in extreme poverty 

and more than half suffer from malnutrition. Each 

year, tens of thousands of people die from preventable 

disease related to a lack of clean water. The average 

life expectancy is only 50 years.6

Currently, 60 percent of the population resides 

in urban areas, and the annual rate of urbanization 

is about three percent. The principal city is Port-auPrince, which in 2015 had approximately 2.4 million 
9

people.7 Since the 1950s, there has been significant 

migration from rural to urban areas, due in part to 

environmental degradation (e.g., soil erosion, deforestation), decreasing farm plot sizes, outdated farming 

techniques and means of production, and unsuccessful agricultural policies. In Port-au-Prince, the influx 

of migrants from the countryside has increased the 

pressure on the limited infrastructure. Authorities 

have been unable to provide adequate urban planning 

and facilitate development to address the needs of an 

expanding population. The steady and uncontrolled 

movement of migrants to the outskirts of the capital 

has created an ever widening belt of slums. As a consequence of shoddy construction practices, many of 

the buildings in Port-au-Prince did not withstand the 

2010 earthquake and were completely destroyed. 

Government 

Haiti is a republic with three branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislature has two chambers, the House of Deputies and the 

Senate. Deputies and senators are selected via direct 

elections. Deputies represent municipalities (or communes), and senators represent geographic regions. In 

the executive branch, the president serves as head of 

state. He is responsible for choosing a prime minister, 

from the majority party in the legislature, to head the 

government. The executive branch includes a number of cabinet ministers (e.g., Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Minister of Economy and 

Finance). The judiciary consists of the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court), courts of appeal, and other 

smaller, local courts. The president appoints judges, 

who are drawn from a list of possible candidates sub-
10

mitted by various elected bodies, including the Senate 

as well as the departmental and municipal assemblies.

Economy

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with 80 percent of the population living in 

poverty. About two-fifths of all Haitians depend on 

the agricultural sector, with many individuals taking 

part in small-scale subsistence farming. A lack of resources, corruption, a vulnerability to natural disasters, and low levels of education are among Haiti’s 

most serious impediments to economic growth. The 

country also has a poor infrastructure, including unreliable access to electricity. Remittances from expatriates are the primary source of foreign exchange, totaling one-fifth of Haiti’s gross domestic product (GDP) 

in 2012, which was more than five times the earnings 

from exports. Haiti suffers from a chronic lack of both 

private and public investment. The government relies on international economic assistance to sustain its 

finances, with over half of its annual budget coming 

from outside sources.8

Colonization and Independence

The modern history of Haiti began when Christopher Columbus discovered the Island of Hispaniola 

in 1492. After 200 years of Spanish colonial rule, the 

western third of the island was ceded to France as part 

of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. Under the French, St. 

Domingue—as Haiti was then known—became one 

of the richest colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 

due to sugar, coffee, indigo, and cotton production. 

This economic boom was fueled by inexpensive labor, 
11

made possible by the large-scale importation of West 

African slaves—who were brought to Haiti because of 

their immunity to the diseases introduced by Europeans to the New World.9

In 1791, inspired by the French and American Revolutions, Haitian slaves, led by Toussaint l’Ouverture, 

began what became known as the Haitian Revolution. 

At the peak of the struggle, Toussaint amassed an army 

of more than 20,000 slaves, and over the course of the 

next thirteen years, the Haitians fought the French to 

a standstill. In 1802, Napoleon Bonaparte sent 17,000 

soldiers under the command of General Victor-Emmanuel Leclerc to restore French authority in Haiti. 

Leclerc made several gains initially, as coastal cities 

and towns succumbed to his conventional tactics and 

superior firepower. The French were also successful in 

capturing Toussaint and imprisoning him in France. 

However, the Haitian resistance remained resolute 

and eventually French forces, worn down by combat, 

the severe environment, and yellow fever, withdrew 

in 1803. On January 1, 1804, the Haitians proclaimed 

their independence and established the Republic of 

Haiti.10

Although free from Spanish and French colonial 

rule, Haitians lacked experience in self-government 

and were unable to develop a political agreement on a 

way forward for the country. The racial caste system, 

a pre-revolution legacy, created obstacles to achieving a civic consensus. Those who led the early state 

were predominantly mulattos, who had been free before the revolution and believed in the continuation 

of a plantation economy with West African blacks as 

the primary laborers. Although the slave labors won 

their freedom in the revolution and outnumbered the 

ruling class, their lack of leadership, education, and 
12

organization made it difficult to turn their numerical superiority to political advantage. Consequently, 

Haiti’s independence did not end the exploitation of 

agricultural laborers.11

After the revolution, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, a 

general who had served with Toussaint, named himself governor-general for life. Opposed by the mulatto 

elite for his intention to nationalize land, Dessalines 

was murdered in 1806. During the ensuing political 

struggle, Haiti splintered into a northern and a southern state, each with its own president. In 1820, JeanPierre Boyer reunited Haiti and served as president 

until 1843, when he fled to Jamaica because of a popular uprising. With his departure, Haiti plunged into 

a prolonged period of political chaos, assassinations, 

and social upheaval.12

U.S. Military Occupation of Haiti

The 1823 Monroe Doctrine indicated that the United States would view European efforts to colonize 

land or interfere with states in North or South America 

as acts of aggression, requiring a U.S. response. Since 

this policy pronouncement, a series of U.S. administrations were keen on limiting European influence and 

control in the Americas. In the 1824 Franco-Haitian 

Agreement, France agreed to recognize Haitian independence, if Haiti paid a large sum as compensation. 

This provision kept Haiti in a state of indebtedness 

and placed France in a position of power over Haiti’s 

trade and finances. 

The United States did not officially recognize 

Haiti until 1862, decades after the Caribbean country 

achieved its independence. Washington was slow to 

acknowledge Haiti’s status as an independent state, in 
13

large part due 

to pressure 

from the 

southern U.S. 

states, who 

were leery of 

r e c o g n i z i n g 

the legitimacy 

of the Haitian 

slave revolt. 

The U.S. policy towards 

Haiti focused 

initially on 

maintaining a 

positive economic relationship and 

limiting foreign influence in the country. However, 

France, as the former colonial power, retained strong 

economic and diplomatic ties with the Haitian Government. In response, U.S. President Andrew Johnson 

briefly considered annexing Hispaniola in 1868. From 

1889 to 1891, the U.S. Department of State sought unsuccessfully to lease the northern Haitian city of MoleSaint Nicolas to establish a naval base. In 1910, President William Howard Taft granted Haiti a large loan 

in hopes the Caribbean country could pay off its international debt, thus lessening European influence.13

Washington became increasingly concerned with German activity and influence in Haiti during this period, 

as German merchants dominated commercial businesses in the country. The United States considered 

Germany its chief rival in the Caribbean, and Washington feared that control over Haiti would give the 

Germans a powerful advantage in the region.14

U.S. Marines and guide in search of bandits. 

Haiti, circa 1919. 

Source: echodesmontaes.blogspot.com
14

Internal instability in Haiti was also a concern 

for the United States. Between 1911 and 1915, seven 

presidents were assassinated or overthrown in Haiti, 

increasing U.S. policymakers’ fear of foreign intervention. On July 28, 1915, Haitian President Guillaume 

Sam was murdered by a street mob in Port-au-Prince. 

President Woodrow Wilson ordered the U.S. Navy to 

land a battalion of U.S. Marines that same day in an 

effort to reestablish order in the capital. The Marines 

reinforced the initial landing force with a brigade and 

fought a three-month counterinsurgency campaign. 

The U.S. Marine presence was formalized with the 

Haitian-American Treaty of 1915, leading to a 19-year 

U.S. military occupation of the country. The agreement created the Haitian Gendarmerie, which was a 

paramilitary force made up of U.S. citizens and Haitians under the control of the U.S. Marines. The United States also gained complete control over Haitian 

finances and the right to intervene in Haiti, whenever 

the U.S. Government deemed it necessary to protect 

its interests in the region. As part of his anti-imperialism policy, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ended the 

U.S. occupation on August 15, 1934.15

The Duvalier Family Rule

The Duvalier family would come to dominate 

Haiti’s political life from 1957 to 1986. First Francois 

Duvalier (“Papa Doc”) and then his son Jean-Claude 

(“Baby Doc”) ruled Haiti and appointed themselves 

“president for life.” Bent on retaining power at all 

costs, the Duvaliers levied heavy taxes to finance the 

military, the paramilitary security forces, and their 

family’s vast personal expenses. Under their rule, Haiti suffered from human rights violations that included 
15

the imprisonment and torture of the regime’s political 

opponents, media censorship, extrajudicial killings, 

and embezzlement. While the anti-communist stance 

of the Duvalier family protected the regime from foreign intervention, a popular revolt finally ended the 

30-year rule in 1986.

In an effort to prevent this type of dictatorship from 

reemerging, the 1987 Constitution reduced the president’s powers, decentralized governmental authority, 

and established elected councils to fulfill local government responsibilities. In addition, the new constitution separated police and army functions, which the 

Duvaliers had previously combined, and established 

the government structure that exists today.16

The United Nations Mission in Haiti

Following the departure of the Duvaliers, Haiti experienced a series of coups d’états and provisional governments until December 1990, when Jean-Bertrand 

Aristide became Haiti’s first democratically elected 

president. President Aristide took office in February 

1991 but was overthrown in yet another coup d’état

and forced to leave the country a few months later. Although a provisional government was established following Aristide’s departure, the true power remained 

with the Haitian military. 

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

In 1991, in an attempt to restore democratic governance in Haiti, the George H.W. Bush Administration worked with the Organization of American States 

(OAS) to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, affecting 

all goods except medicine and food. President William 
16

J. Clinton continued this policy, increasing economic 

and diplomatic pressure on the military junta. In addition, the UN imposed a ban on petroleum sales to 

Haiti.17 In September 1993, UN Security Council Resolution 867 established the United Nations Mission in 

Haiti (UNMIH) to assist in democratizing the government, professionalizing the armed forces, creating 

and training a separate police force, and establishing 

an environment conducive to free and fair elections.18

However, the UN and other international agencies left 

Haiti a month later in October 1993, due to the continued instability created by the transitional government 

and the inability to move forward with the UN goal of 

reestablishing Haiti’s fledgling democracy.19

Neither economic sanctions nor diplomacy had 

any effect. By September 1994, the United States saw 

no other option than to initiate military action to reinstate President Aristide. To this end, the United 

States led a UN-authorized mission, known as Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (September 19, 1994 – 

March 31, 1995). Originally, the U.S. military planned 

a forced entry into Haiti to compel the Haitian Armed 

Forces and police to stand aside, while the legitimate 

government reassumed control of the country. Under 

the direction of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), 

an airborne invasion was planned, spearheaded by 

the 82nd Airborne Division and a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). In addition, U.S. Navy and 

Air Force elements would deploy from staging bases 

in Puerto Rico and southern Florida. However, on the 

eve of the invasion, former President Jimmy Carter 

and a U.S. delegation persuaded the Haitian military 

leaders to step down and allow Aristide to return to 

power. The political settlement was successful partly 

because the Haitian military understood a massive in-
17

vasion force was poised to enter the country. At this 

point, having reached an agreement, the U.S. military 

mission changed from a combat operation to a stabilizing and nation building effort, spearheaded by 

a U.S.-led multinational force. On October 15, 1994, 

Aristide returned to Haiti to complete his term in office. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY officially 

ended on March 31, 1995 when UNMIH replaced U.S. 

forces and resumed stability operations and nationbuilding efforts.20

Operation SECURE TOMORROW

After Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, UNMIH remained in Haiti to maintain a secure and stable 

environment and promote the rule of law. The UN Security Council authorized this presence through a series of mandate renewals until 2004. There were some 

positive developments during this period, including 

the strengthening of a multifaceted civil society and a 

political culture based on democratic values. The period included the first peaceful handover of power between two democratically elected presidents in 1996. 

The 2000 elections brought Aristide back to power for 

a second non-consecutive term as president. Many 

voters viewed the election as rigged and, subsequently, in 2001 a three-year violent confrontation began 

between Aristide supporters and the Revolutionary 

Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress (Front 

pour l’Avancement et le Progrès Haitien, FRAPH), an opposition paramilitary group. The struggle for power 

created an environment of intimidation, political assassinations, and human rights abuses.21

In February 2004, the United States, along with 

Canada, France, the OAS, the Caribbean Community 
18

(CARICOM), and the UN developed a peace plan, but 

the FRAPH rejected it. The situation continued to deteriorate as the FRAPH continued to escalate the violence and expand its territorial control. The Haitian 

National Police was incapable of reestablishing order 

among the competing factions.22 When it became clear 

to President Aristide that he could not regain power, 

he requested U.S. assistance to depart the country.23a

In accordance with the Haitian constitution, Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre succeeded Aristide as interim president and petitioned 

the United Nations Security Council for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. On 

February 29, 2004, the UN passed Security Council 

Resolution 1529 authorizing the deployment of a 

Multinational Interim Force to Haiti to stabilize the 

country for 90 days and create conditions for a followon U.N. Stabilization Force. The UN mandate was to 

support the constitutional political process in Haiti, 

enable the provision of humanitarian aid, facilitate international assistance to the Haitian police and Coast 

Guard to establish and maintain public safety and law 

and order and to protect human rights, and support 

the establishment of conditions for international and 

regional organizations to assist the Haitian people.23

On the same day the UN resolution was passed, 

President George W. Bush ordered U.S. Marines into 

Haiti to help quell civil unrest throughout Port-auPrince following Aristide’s departure. Later that evening, the first elements of a Marine Air Ground Task 

Force (MAGTF) began arriving in Port-au-Prince. The 

MAGTF deployment was the first contingent of troops 

assigned to Operation SECURE TOMORROW (February 29 -June 25, 2004), a U.S-led and UN-authorized 

military effort that included troop contributions from 

France, Canada, and Chile.24
19

The U.S.-led operation included the formation of 

Combined Joint Task Force Haiti (CJTF-Haiti), which 

consisted of U.S., French, Canadian, and Chilean 

forces. CJTF-Haiti was under the command of U.S. 

Marine Brigadier General Ronald Coleman, and it 

had a French Colonel as its Deputy Commander. The 

CJTF-Haiti forces included a French contingent with 

an infantry battalion, a support battalion, and special 

operations forces contingent; a Chilean infantry battalion; U.S. and Canadian forces under the command 

of MAGTF 8; a U.S. aviation element; a Canadian aviation contingent; and maritime forces under the command of the U.S. Coast Guard.25

By the end of March 2004, CJTF-Haiti had more 

than 3,000 personnel. Its mission was to create a secure and stable environment in the Haitian capital and 

promote the constitutional political process by: 

• Securing key sites in Port-au-Prince 

• Facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance

• Protecting U.S. citizens, as required

• Assisting in the repatriation of Haitian migrants interdicted at sea26

The UN Security Council passed resolution 1542 

on April 30, 2004, establishing the U.N. Stabilization 

Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti, MINUSTAH) under Chapter VII of 

the U.N. Charter. On June 25, the United States transferred responsibility for the continued peacekeeping 

effort to the follow-on U.N. stabilization force led by 

Brazil.27 Within MINUSTAH, the first Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) was Chilean 

diplomat Juan Gabriel Valdés; the first Force Commander was Major General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro 

Pereira of Brazil. 
20

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MINUSTAH’s mandate was to “ensure a secure 

and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place.”28

MINUSTAH was under the leadership of a special 

representative to UN Secretary General Kofi Atta Annan and included two deputies to oversee different 

aspects of the UN mission. The principal deputy was 

primarily responsible for the UN civilian police, human rights, justice, civil affairs, and electoral issues. 

The other deputy was responsible for humanitarian 

efforts, including gender equality; children’s rights; 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; 

HIV/AIDS issues; and other activities of the various 

UN agencies present in Haiti. MINUSTAH included a 

military contingent of up to 6,700 military troops.29 The 

military force commander, who worked directly for 

the UN special representative, exercised operational 

control over ten infantry battalions, two separate infantry companies, and eight specialized detachments 

(military police, engineers, aviation, medical, and logistics). Eighteen countries provided military personnel and 41 countries contributed police officers. When 

the 2010 earthquake struck, MINUSTAH had been in 

Haiti for six years and had over 11,000 uniformed and 

civilian personnel.30
21

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The Earthquake

On January 12, 2010, Haiti experienced the worst 

natural disaster in its recorded history. The earthquake was also the deadliest global natural catastrophe, causing the greatest number of deaths per capita 

because of its proximity to the densely populated city 

of Port-au-Prince (Figure 2).31 The epicenter was about 

15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, but the shallow depth of the quake made the shock waves more 

pronounced and caused immense damage in the overcrowded and impoverished city. The 7.0 magnitude 

earthquake affected over 2 million people, displaced 

1.6 million, injured 300,000, and killed 230,000. According to USAID, damages from the earthquake 

amounted to over 115 percent of Haiti’s annual GDP.32

The levels of destruction and suffering in the earthquake’s aftermath prompted an overwhelming response from organizations across the globe, as over 

140 countries offered government assistance and over 

1,000 charities, private foundations, and other NGOs 

provided humanitarian relief.33

Figure 2. Comparison of Global Natural Disasters
22

In most situations involving large-scale natural 

disasters, the affected country has principal responsibility for responding to the crisis in partnership 

with the UN and other international relief organizations.34 However, in the immediate aftermath of the 

quake, it was impossible for the Haitian government 

to provide a response that was commensurate with 

the scale of the calamity. The government was largely 

incapacitated as 14 out of 16 ministerial and executive 

buildings were destroyed or severely damaged, to 

include the Presidential Palace and Parliament building. Further, the bodies of numerous government officials and employees remained within the rubble of 

these structures. The head of MINUSTAH and his 

principal deputy were killed when their headquarters 

collapsed, and about 150 of the organization’s personnel were missing immediately following the seismic event.35 Within hours of the earthquake, Haitian 

President René Préval issued a disaster declaration 

and requested U.S. assistance. President Préval’s top 

priorities were to conduct search and rescue operations, provide medical and humanitarian assistance, 

and ensure political stability.36

Operational Challenges

The Haitian earthquake created difficult conditions for the international relief effort, severely damaging the transportation infrastructure, impairing 

communications throughout much of the country, 

and disrupting food and water distribution. In Portau-Prince, the quake damaged or destroyed over 50 

percent of the city’s dwellings, and thousands of inhabitants were trapped within the rubble of buildings. 

Debris blocked traffic in the streets, making it difficult 
23

to conduct search and rescue activities and deliver 

immediate humanitarian assistance. Power was out 

throughout Port-au-Prince and most communications were disrupted, complicating efforts to develop 

a clear understanding of the situation and the needs 

of the survivors. The earthquake also destroyed the 

country’s principal air and sea ports, impeding the 

delivery of much-needed relief supplies. There was a 

potential for an outbreak of violence and lawlessness, 

in particular since thousands of prisoners had escaped 

from custody in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Further complicating relief efforts, a series of 

aftershocks caused further damage—with 14 significant reverberations occurring within the first day following the main earthquake.37 

Thousands of Haitians who survived the earthquake began migrating away from Port-au-Prince to 

various rural communities across the country. While 

this movement of displaced persons helped to alleviate 

some of the pressure on rescue and assistance efforts 

in the capital, it posed a challenge to relief activities 

in parts of Haiti’s interior. The humanitarian response 

would need to reach numerous isolated communities 

across the country. In many cases, people in need of 

assistance were in locations that did not have a preexisting UN or NGO presence.38

The U.S. Response

USAID, as indicated previously, was the lead 

federal agency for the U.S. response effort in Haiti. 

Within USAID, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) assumed primary responsibility for 

coordinating and managing the FHA/DR effort. Less 

than 24 hours after the earthquake, USAID set up its 
24

normal disaster response structure, which consisted 

of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and 

a Response Management Team (RMT). The DART 

deployed into Haiti to manage the U.S. Government 

response. Typical DART activities include making assessments, recommending response options, coordinating the distribution of relief supplies, and providing liaison with local government officials and NGOs. 

During FHA/DR operations, the DART coordinates 

efforts with the U.S. military and other participating 

federal departments and agencies. Following the Haitian earthquake, USAID stood up the RMT in Washington D.C. to provide leadership and operational 

support to the DART, focusing on the strategic planning for the response effort and coordinating with 

other U.S. Government departments/agencies in the 

National Capital Region (NCR). In this manner, the 

RMT enabled the DART to focus on providing assistance in the field.39

Although USAID moved quickly, it faced capacity issues from the start, and its staff quickly became 

overstretched. The RMT/DART structure had difficulty coping with the crisis, due to the scale of the 

Haitian disaster and the involvement of U.S. Government departments and agencies that did not normally 

participate in FHA/DR efforts. Compounding these 

difficulties, the USAID Administrator, Dr. Rajiv Shah, 

had assumed office only five days prior to the earthquake; many USAID leadership positions important 

to the Haiti response were vacant; and the new USAID 

Haiti Mission Director had just arrived one day before 

the disaster.40

USAID created new organizations—including 

the Office of the Response Coordinator (ORC) in 

Haiti and an Interagency Task Force in Washington 
25

D.C.—to address coordination challenges. However, 

these new organizations deviated from the traditional 

FHA/DR protocols, functioned in parallel with preexisting entities, and caused confusion regarding roles 

and responsibilities during the early days of the response effort. The role of the ORC, which was headed 

by the Coordinator for Disaster Response and Reconstruction, was to synchronize USAID management efforts in Haiti and Washington and to coordinate with 

the Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal 

departments/agencies on the ground. This was normally the DART’s responsibility, and it was unclear 

initially how the ORC and the DART should work together to coordinate efforts in Haiti. The newly created 

ORC reported directly to the U.S. Ambassador and the 

USAID Administrator in Washington D.C. However, 

the introduction of the ORC added to the complexity 

of decision-making in Haiti, where the U.S. Ambassador, the USAID Mission Director, and the DART team 

leader were already fulfilling roles that were defined 

in preexisting operating procedures.41

In Washington, the USAID Bureau of Democracy, 

Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) set up 

an Interagency Task Force to coordinate efforts across 

federal departments and agencies in the NCR. Friction 

soon developed between the Interagency Task Force 

and the RMT due to their parallel roles and responsibilities. The White House was also actively involved 

in the crisis and the National Security Council (NSC) 

Principals Committee, ultimately led the organization 

of the response effort in Washington. The Deputies 

Committee and an Interagency Policy Committee conducted strategic planning and policy articulation. Daily meetings among the Principals and Deputies Committee members were critical during the initial stages 
26

of the FHA/DR effort. Video teleconferences and telephone calls complemented the daily meetings.42

Although the USAID response structure took some 

time to solidify, the Joint Staff made sure it communicated regularly by establishing a cell within the RMT. 

The Joint Staff cell included representatives from the 

J-2, J-3, J-4, and J-5 directorates and became the key 

point of interface between the RMT and the Joint Staff. 

The Joint Staff cell operated on a 24-hour schedule, 

synchronizing current and future operations as well 

as developing plans. The Joint Staff also enabled connectivity for USAID and the RMT representatives, enabling them to have visibility of DoD planning and 

execution efforts. USAID officials relied on the Joint 

Staff cell to communicate many of their priorities for 

the Haitian FHA/DR effort.43

A unique aspect of the U.S. response centered on 

the range of organizations taking part in the operation, which included the participation of over a dozen 

federal departments and agencies. This was the first 

time the United States involved so many departments 

and agencies as part of an international relief effort of 

this type. In addition to the usual organizations that 

took part in FHA/DR efforts —USAID, the Department of State, and DoD—11 other departments and 

agencies joined in the Haiti response, many of which 

had never before been involved in a FHA/DR operation (Figure 3), including:

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

• Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS)

• Department of Transportation (DOT)

• U.S. Department of the Treasury (US Treasury)

• Department of Justice (DOJ)

• Department of Commerce (DOC)
27

• Department of the Interior (DOI)

• U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

• Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

• National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Figure 3 - The U.S. Government Response Structure

The United Nations Response

On January 13, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 

sent Assistant Secretary General Edmond Mulet to 

Haiti to direct the U.N.’s response operation. Under 

Secretary Mulet’s leadership, the UN organized and 
28

coordinated the Haiti relief effort through its cluster 

system, which consists of groups of humanitarian organizations—both UN and non-UN—working in the 

various humanitarian sectors (e.g., shelter, logistics, 

health, etc.). Clusters are a standard aspect of UN 

operations, providing a clear point of contact when 

dealing with humanitarian efforts that involve a number of different organizations. The UN coordinated 

its clusters through the Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), standing up 12 

clusters in Haiti:44

• Camp Coordination and Camp Management, 

led by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

• Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items, led by 

IOM

• Education, led by the United Nations Children 

Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

• Nutrition, led by UNICEF

• Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene, led by UNICEF

• Food, led by the UN World Food Programme 

(WFP)

• Logistics, led by WFP

• Emergency Telecommunications, led by WFP

• Protection, led by The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 

(OHCHR)

• Agriculture, led by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

• Early Recovery, led by the UN Development 

Programme (UNDP)

• Health, led by the World Health Organization 

(WHO)
29

Initially, the UN clusters concentrated in Port-auPrince, but after the first week following the earthquake, OCHA deployed staff in Jacmal and Leogane 

to work with the NGOs in providing assistance to the 

affected population southwest of Port-au-Prince.45

The UN cluster system (Figure 4) was designed 

to coordinate a couple hundred organizations, but in 

Haiti the system had to work with over 1,000 international organizations that were looking to the UN for 

leadership and strategic direction.46 Although the UN 

activated many clusters within the first three days of 

the crisis, it took two weeks for all clusters to become 

functional. One reason for the slow operational start 

was that many UN and cluster lead agencies were 

severely affected by the earthquake. Not only had 

they lost family members, friends, and colleagues, but 

their offices were damaged, and many personnel were 

forced to move into makeshift shelters at the MINUSTAH logistics base. In addition, many clusters were 

unable to identify and deploy senior and experienced 

coordinators rapidly, leading to a leadership gap—

and a resulting lack of coordination—in some critical 

sectors.47
30

Figure 4. The UN Cluster System

Initially, the UN clusters were uncertain of how 

to integrate MINUSTAH and other military forces 

into the response effort. There was no clear guidance 

explaining how OCHA and the clusters should interface with the integrated civil-military MINUSTAH 

organization. MINUSTAH had taken on humanitarian assistance responsibilities during its previous six 

years in Haiti, and at the onset of the 2010 relief effort, 

there was an unclear division of roles and responsibilities between MINUSTAH and OCHA. These factors slowed international coordination in Haiti, as the 

clusters waited too long to engage MINUSTAH and 

the other foreign military forces that responded to the 

disaster. For instance, the OCHA field offices did not 

take advantage of the presence of MINUSTAH Civil 

Source: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of humanitarian Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.unocha.org/

what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination.
31

Affairs Officers, who had good local knowledge and 

long-standing relations with Haitian authorities. Consequently, there were lost opportunities in developing 

a unified international approach.48 

Eventually, OCHA worked with MINUSTAH to 

set up the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC), 

as a single point of contact for requests for military 

or police assistance. This venue ensured the MINUSTAH military and police forces received validated and 

prioritized requests from humanitarian organizations 

through a single source. The JOTC became operational 

on January 26, working in close partnership with the 

Haitian government and the humanitarian relief community.49

In addition to the JOTC, the international coordination architecture involved a number of committees 

and forums. Initially, the Haitian Government established the Presidential Commission on Recovery and 

Reconstruction to work with the UN cluster groups 

in prioritizing and coordinating humanitarian needs. 

Eventually, a multi-tiered structure evolved with the 

High Level Coordination Committee (HLCC) leading 

the international relief effort (Figure 5). The HLCC 

was co-chaired by the Haitian Prime Minister and the 

Acting UN SRSG and included key ambassadors and 

mission heads. The HLCC facilitated policy development for the relief effort and played a critical role 

in validating decisions by officials at the operational 

level.50

The HLCC was supplemented with a Coordination Support Committee (CSC) chaired by the Haitian 

Minister of Tourism, the UN Principal Deputy SRSG, 

and the Deputy SRSG/Resident Coordinator (RC)/ 

Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) of MINUSTAH. The 

CSC was comprised of the in-country heads of the 
32

military and political organizations responding to the 

crisis and of the major bilateral and multilateral aid 

donors in Haiti. The CSC considered various public 

health challenges (e.g., sanitation, shelter, debris management) and geographic concerns (assessing the situation in areas beyond Port-au-Prince), enabling a coherent determination of priorities and helping to focus 

donor and military operational support. The selection 

of CSC issues was based on: priority, complexity, and 

the involvement of multiple actors. The CSC also established subsidiary planning and working groups, to 

address issues such as debris management and camp 

planning.51

A key component of the CSC was the Project Management Coordination Cell (PMCC), which facilitated an integrated approach to the development and 

implementation of project plans between the Haitian 

government, donors, NGOs, UN agencies, MINUSTAH, and the U.S. military. The PMCC’s main areas of 

focus included: debris management, the improvement 

of canals and drainage, preparation of temporary sites 

for displaced persons, and registration and movement 

of IDPs to safe sites. The U.S. military, especially staff 

from the Army Corps of Engineers, and MINUSTAH 

provided critical technical assistance to the PMCC.52
33

Figure 5. International Coordination Architecture

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Haiti’s security and stability have long been of strategic importance to the United States. The Caribbean 

country’s close proximity to U.S. territory has frequently meant that disturbances on the island nation 

can spillover and affect U.S. national security interests. 
34

For instance, from the late 1970s to the early 21st century, hundreds of thousands of Haitians attempted to 

immigrate to the United States to escape the political 

chaos and poor economic conditions in Haiti. The U.S. 

Government returned a majority of the “Haitian Boat 

People” to Haiti because it regarded them as economic 

migrants, who were not eligible for political asylum.53

Rather, U.S. policy focused on helping the Haitian 

people to develop a more prosperous, secure, and 

democratic Haiti. In the years before the earthquake, 

both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations provided significant resources to promote 

the stability and development of Haiti. From 2004 

through 2006, Washington contributed more than $640 

million in assistance to Haiti. In 2007, DoD provided 

$20 million to the Department of State to support the 

Haiti Stabilization Initiative, an interagency program 

with the goal of improving stability, security, and the 

economy in one of the most volatile areas of Port-auPrince.54 Ten months before the earthquake, Secretary 

of State Hillary Clinton declared Haiti a foreign policy 

priority for the United States and worked closely with 

the Government of Haiti to strengthen diplomatic and 

humanitarian relationships.55

In addition to the strategic importance of Haiti, 

the 2010 earthquake was a tragedy that, in President 

Obama’s words, reminded the world of its “common 

humanity.”56 He indicated the United States stood in 

solidarity with Haiti and would come to the assistance 

of its neighbors in their hour of need. The president 

understood the situation called for swift action and 

pledged U.S. support through a “whole-of-government” effort. On January 13, a day after the earthquake, President Obama gave guidance for how the 

U.S. Government would respond:
35

I have directed my administration to respond with a 

swift, coordinated, and aggressive effort to save lives. 

. . . I have directed my teams to be as forward-leaning 

as possible in getting the help on the ground and coordinating with our international partners as well. . . 

. Given the many different resources that are needed, 

we are taking steps to ensure that our Government acts 

in a unified way. My national security team has led an 

interagency effort overnight. And to ensure that we 

coordinate our effort going forward, I’ve designated 

the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, Dr. Rajiv Shah, to be our Government’s 

unified disaster coordinator.57

President Obama called for cooperation and partnership with other countries, international bodies, 

and NGOs. This was a crisis that not one single entity 

or country could address alone. The devastation required a strong network of individuals, organizations 

and countries to marshal their collective resources. 

The range of international relief activities would extend from search and rescue efforts—to the provision 

of emergency shelter, medical care, food and water, 

and sanitation—and would eventually include initiatives to enable the long-term institutional and societal 

recovery of Haiti.

The early expression of U.S. national commitment by President Obama provided the strategic intent, which focused on having a speedy response. As 

the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating 

the U.S. effort, USAID would be supported by other 

U.S. Government departments and agencies, including DoD. The President’s declaration signaled that 

Haiti was a priority for the administration and that 

resources should be diverted from other undertakings to assist in the relief effort. One area that required 
36

additional fidelity, however, was how and when the 

military should transition out of Haiti. Military planners in U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and 

Washington D. C. repeatedly requested guidance from 

policymakers to plan for the return of military forces 

to the United States. Many key political leaders felt 

that U.S. forces should remain as a “safety blanket,” 

but there was no clear articulation of the U.S. military 

mission by senior civilian decision-makers.58

Design and Planning

On January 13, in response to the President’s direction, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS), Admiral Michael Mullen, issued Execute Order (EXORD) 2236 authorizing U.S. military forces to 

commence Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. Shortly 

thereafter, SOUTHCOM stood up JTF Haiti to provide 

foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in 

support of USAID. SOUTHCOM Commander General Douglas Fraser selected Lieutenant General (LTG) 

Ken Keen, the SOUTHCOM Deputy Commander, as 

the JTF Commander, since he was already in Port-auPrince as part of a routine theater security cooperation 

visit and familiar with Haiti. Another key reason for 

LTG Keen’s selection was his extensive relationships 

with key actors that would participate in the humanitarian response effort, including individuals in the 

U.S. Embassy, MINUSTAH, and several NGOs. One 

of the most important of these relationships was with 

Major General Floriano Peixoto, the Brazilian commander of the MINUSTAH military contingent. Their 

partnership extended back to an exchange program in 

the 1980s in which the two established a friendship 

that would continue for many years. Their close re-
37

lationship was critical to addressing a number of operational issues, which included the delineating of security responsibilities between U.S. and MINUSTAH 

forces.59

During the initial organization and planning for 

JTF-Haiti, LTG Keen faced a number of challenges 

that included:

• “Building the plane in flight”; JTF-Haiti had to 

develop its organization, while simultaneously 

executing its mission

• A lack of situational awareness in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, which made it 

difficult to understand requirements and conduct force planning

• Ensuring non-JTF partners (e.g., international 

relief organizations and the NGOs) were integrated into planning and daily activities

• Speaking with one voice to the hundreds of media organizations that arrived in Haiti within 

hours of the earthquake.
38

JTF-Haiti Mission

JTF-Haiti’s mission was to support USAID with the 

aim of accelerating international HA/DR activities. 

A key goal would be to transition responsibility and 

control of the mid- and long-term activities to civilian 

partners.60 The military mission would end when USAID, UN/MINUSTAH, and the Government of Haiti 

no longer required U.S. military HA/DR support.61

One aspect missing from the JTF-Haiti mission 

statement regarded the need to provide security. Since 

MINUSTAH already had thousands of soldiers and 

police officers from various countries conducting stability operations in Haiti, U.S. and UN officials decided not to establish a combined task force. LTG Keen, 

the Haitian Government, SOUTHCOM, and UN representatives agreed that MINUSTAH would continue 

its mission of providing security and stability in Haiti. 

JTF-Haiti would focus on HA/DR. However, JTF-Haiti did assume a limited security role that centered on 

safeguarding personnel who participated in HA/DR 

activities, including food distribution and the conduct 

of relief convoys.62 LTG Keen worked closely with 

Major General Peixoto to ensure military unity of efJTF-Haiti Mission Statement

JTF-Haiti conducts Humanitarian Assistance/Foreign Disaster Response operations in support of 

USAID in Haiti to save lives, mitigate near-term 

human suffering, and accelerate relief efforts to 

facilitate transition to Government of Haiti, UN, 

and USAID.
39

fort. Together, Keen and Peixoto clearly defined their 

respective roles to avoid confusion or unnecessary duplication. The two commanders agreed that the most 

effective way to operate would be to collaborate whenever possible. Early cooperation and dialogue set the 

tone for the operations that followed, including efforts 

to administer food distribution points and conduct a 

show of force in the opening days of the operation. To 

increase communications between their staffs, Major 

General Peixoto and LTG Keen established liaison officers in each other’s headquarters.63

JTF-Haiti Organization

JTF-Haiti would be under the operational control 

of SOUTHCOM. With few military units assigned to 

it, SOUTHCOM had to build JTF-Haiti largely from 

scratch, requesting many units from across the United 

States.64 Early on, one of the major decisions was identifying the command and control element that would 

form the nucleus of the JTF staff. LTG Keen considered three courses of action:

• Designate a subordinate Service component 

command (e.g., U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH), 

U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, or 12th 

Air Force, Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH))

• Build around the SOUTHCOM Standing Joint 

Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)

• Use an external organization that was JTF-capable.65

LTG Keen believed it was important for at least 

part, if not all, of the JTF-Haiti headquarters to be 

physically present in Haiti. He required continuous 

dialogue and communications with the U.S. Embassy, 
40

the Haitian Government, the UN, other relief organizations, and most importantly, the Haitian people 

on the ground. LTG Keen wanted a highly visible 

presence on land to reassure the traumatized Haitian 

population. The requirement for a land-based JTF narrowed the prospective headquarters that could form 

the nucleus for JTF-Haiti down to the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and ARSOUTH. However, 

both organizations were unavailable. SOUTHCOM 

had already designated ARSOUTH as the lead for JTFMigrant Operations (MIGOPS) in the event there was 

a mass exodus of Haitians toward Cuba or the United 

States, and II MEF had commitments in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility (AOR) that could 

not be postponed.66

The next option was to build JTF-Haiti around 

SOUTHCOM’s Standing Joint Force Headquarters. 

Elements of the SJFHQ were already in Haiti, having 

arrived in Port-au-Prince within 24 hours of the earthquake. However, the SJFHQ could not form the core 

of the JTF-Haiti headquarters without significant personnel augmentation, since half of its members had 

been integrated into the SOUTHCOM staff to make 

up for manning shortfalls. Although the SJFHQ personnel brought valuable understanding of the country 

and the broader SOUTHCOM AOR, they were too few 

to provide a viable headquarters staff for 24/7 operations.67 

By default, the XVIII Airborne Corps Assault Command Post (ACP), out of Fort Bragg, N.C., provided 

JTF-Haiti’s core headquarters staff. The ACP, part of 

the Global Response Force (GRF), was packed and 

ready to deploy for a training exercise and could be 

easily redirected to Haiti. In addition, the 2nd Brigade 

Combat Team (BCT) from the 82nd Airborne Divi-
41

sion—also at Fort Bragg and part of the GRF—was 

already tasked for deployment to Haiti. The decision 

was made. Yet, the ACP did not have the command 

and control (C2) capacity of a JTF-capable headquarters. Among other deficiencies, the ACP lacked a joint 

logistics C2 element. Efforts to identify and deploy 

forces to address these capability gaps in a time-sensitive manner strained the SOUTHCOM staff, which 

itself had little force deployment planning capacity 

(see Joint Planning section below). Many of the needed enabling capabilities, such as engineering, civil affairs (CA), Military Information Support Operations 

(MISO), public affairs, and medical services would 

need to come from various units and locations. As is 

often the case during crisis response operations, JTFHaiti consisted of a patchwork of organizations from 

across the United States, with units that possessed 

varying levels of readiness and dissimilar deployment 

timelines. Consequently, it took about six weeks for 

the JTF to assemble and become fully operational.68

As depicted in Figure 6, the initial force list for JTFHaiti included: 

• XVIII Airborne Corps Assault Command Post 

(ACP)

• Army Forces (ARFOR): 2nd Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division

• 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry (1-

325)

• 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry (2-

325)

• 1st Squadron, 73rd Cavalry (1-73) 

• 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery (2-319)

• Joint Force Maritime Component Command 

(JFMCC)
42

• USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group 

(ARG)/22nd (MEU)

• USS Nassau ARG/24th MEU 

• Joint Force Special Operations Component 

Command (JFSOCC)

• Joint Logistics Command: 377th Theater Sustain Command (TSC)

• 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command 

(ESC)

• JTF Port Opening (PO)

• Air Force Forces (AFFOR)

Figure 6 – JTF-Haiti Organizational Structure

JTF-Haiti received a range of specialized capabilities from a number of organizations, including: U.S. 

Joint Forces Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

European Command, U.S. Transportation Command, 

U.S. Special Operations Command, and other organizations. Outside of Haiti, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 

U.S. Army personnel from ARSOUTH prepared for 

potential migrant operations69
43

Rules of Engagement

SOUTHCOM 

provided intial guidance 

for the rules 

of engagment 

(ROE). The 

ROE directed 

military commanders to 

minimize the 

use of force 

but also ensure the right 

of self defense 

in response to 

hostile acts or 

demonstrated hostile intent. SOUTHCOM directed 

JTF-Haiti to develop escalation of force (EOF) procedures. 

JTF-Haiti established an EOF approach that emphasized de-escalation of the situation and restraint. 

The first step called for an evaluation of the situation. JTF members should assess circumstances on the 

ground within the larger context in Haiti and understand that violence could likely be the result of hunger 

and desperation. The second step was disengagement. 

JTF-Haiti personnel should allow hostile—or potentially hostile—elements the opportunity to withdraw 

or cease aggressive acts. By allowing antagonistic individuals and groups the opportunity to disengage, 

JTF-Haiti could de-escalate a potentially dangerous 

situation. The third step in JTF-Haiti’s EOF process 

Rules of Engagement for 

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

JTF-Haiti’s ROE centered on the 

need to minimize the use of force. 

Supplemental to the ROE were four 

steps for the escalation of force: 

• Evaluation of the situation 

• Disengagement through withdrawal or breaking contact

• Use of non-lethal measures to deescalate situations

• As a last resort, use of lethal measures
44

was the use of non-lethal measures, such as audible 

signals, visual signs, and physical manipulation. The 

final step involved the use of lethal force. Given the 

humanitarian nature of the operation, the JTF-Haiti 

Commander felt it was particularly important to employ deadly force only as a last resort. In addition, 

LTG Keen did not authorize the use of deadly force 

to protect food, water, medical aid, or other relief supplies. While recognizing that the theft of humanitarian 

supplies could deny aid to needy Haitians, he also assessed that using lethal force could result in a loss of 

support for JTF-Haiti among the local inhabitants and 

the international community.70

Joint Planning

SOUTHCOM began crisis action planning (CAP) 

on the evening of January 12—before receiving an official tasking from the Joint Staff. Immediate tasks focused on making an estimate of the situation regarding the extent of the damage in Haiti and determining 

what the DoD contribution to the whole-of-government response should be. 

Three significant planning challenges surfaced in 

the immediate aftermath of the Haitian earthquake:

• SOUTHCOM did not have an adequate standing Operational Plan (OPLAN), with associated 

force flow information, to deal with the crisis

• The nontraditional organization of the SOUTHCOM headquarters would hinder crisis action 

planning and coordination with personnel 

from external organizations who were not familiar with the SOUTHCOM structure

• An on-the-ground assessment of the situation 

was needed to identify requirements and in-
45

form any request for forces to conduct FHA/

DR operations

SOUTHCOM did not have a standing Concept of 

Operations (CONOP) or OPLAN that the staff could 

use to begin force flow planning. While SOUTHCOM 

had a functional plan (FUNCPLAN 6150-06) for HA/

DR operations, it was outdated and did not correspond 

with nature and magnitude of the Haitian earthquake. 

SOUTHCOM’s unorthodox organizational structure contributed to additional planning challenges. 

In 2008, SOUTHCOM replaced its traditional J-code 

staff structure with functionally aligned directorates 

so the command could enhance integration with interagency partners, NGOs, and private organizations.71

As a result, the traditional primary and special staff 

organization necessary to deal with the situation in 

Haiti—and conduct crisis action planning—was not 

in place in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. 

For example, SOUTHCOM’s logistics and deployment experts were distributed across the headquarters, making it difficult to combine their expertise in 

a thoughtful manner. The staff was manned only to 

about 85 percent of its authorized capacity. To make 

up for this gap, SOUTHCOM received augmentees 

from the military services and other combatant commands. Again, SOUTHCOM’s nontraditional organizational structure created problems, complicating efforts to absorb some 250-plus augmentees within the 

headquarters quickly. Consequently, five days into 

the crisis, SOUTHCOM conducted a reorganization to 

a traditional J-code staff structure.72

A lack of an accurate on-the-ground assessment of 

the situation delayed any real appreciation of requirements and the identification of necessary forces for 
46

FHA/DR operations. Developing a detailed understanding of conditions on the ground in Haiti was a 

key priority.

Planning With U.S. and Multinational Partners

JTF-Haiti had to develop effective planning and 

coordination processes and mechanisms to ensure it 

could support USAID’s priorities. JTF-Haiti also needed to understand what various U.S. and international 

partners would contribute to the humanitarian effort, 

to avoid gaps or unnecessary duplication. From the 

start, JTF-Haiti planning with the U.S. and international partners emphasized daily coordination, open 

and unclassified communications, and the fostering of 

trust-based relationships.

JTF-Haiti initially located its headquarters at the 

U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince. Although struggling 

with its own manpower issues, JTF-Haiti provided 

planners to USAID to help address its personnel shortfalls.73 Having military and civilians working side-byside strengthened relationships among JTF-Haiti, the 

U.S. diplomatic mission, and a range of other organizations. As the operation matured, JTF-Haiti relocated 

its headquarters to its own facility, but it continued to 

stay in ongoing contact with mission partners through 

the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center 

(HACC)—an internal JTF organization that functioned 

as a hub for collaboration.74

The HACC served to (1) coordinate, synchronize, 

track and assess the FHA/DR operation; (2) create 

and maintain a common operational picture; (3) coordinate with all stakeholders to develop prioritized 

lists of support requirements; and (4) serve as the primary JTF interface with UN, NGO, and interagency 
47

partners. About half of the HACC’s members operated from the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, acting 

as DoD’s interface with OFDA. The HACC’s other 

members worked at the UN Logistics Base, partnering 

with OCHA, MINUSTAH, international military forces, and various aid organizations. Figure 7 illustrates 

how the HACC integrated with the major players in 

the Haiti relief effort, including the U.S. Embassy and 

the UN’s JOTC, which served as a focal point for requests for assistance (RFAs) from humanitarian organizations.75 The continual dialogue within the HACC 

was crucial because of the overlap of operational areas 

among many partners. For example, in some places 

MINUSTAH and JTF-Haiti both operated in the same 

areas and needed to synchronize their activities properly. Working through the HACC, JTF-Haiti personnel 

familiarized themselves with the IDP camps, enabling 

them to better understand how to assist their civilian 

counterparts.76

Figure 7. The Humanitarian Assistance 

Coordination Center
48

Having a HACC representative in the JOTC was 

beneficial to obtain awareness of the various requests 

for assistance from the NGO community. As a need 

arose to support an NGO, the UN validated the request in cluster meetings and sent an official request 

to MINUSTAH through the JOTC. If MINUSTAH was 

unable to provide the assistance requested, JTF-Haiti 

or another organization could volunteer to respond to 

the request. USAID would then log the request into 

a spreadsheet called a Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM). JTF-Haiti then received the MITAM and produced a fragmentary order (FRAGO), which tasked 

an organization to provide the support requested.77

Figure 8 outlines the RFA process.

Figure 8. The Request for Assistance Process
49

Another key aspect of the coordination and communication process with non-DoD partners involved 

the use of an unclassified information-sharing network. Early on, the JTF Commander directed that all 

planning and work associated with Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE would be at the unclassified level. 

This decision was pivotal to expanding coordination 

and collaboration to include the widest possible range 

of stakeholders. Using unclassified systems and generally available tools, such as Google imagery and 

maps, provided the basis for an interactive and userdefined common operational picture (COP). Through 

an All Partners Access Network (APAN), JTF-Haiti 

and its partners were able to access multiple websites 

and data sources to further collaborate and share information. The ease of information sharing facilitated 

SOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti efforts to disseminate 

controlled, unclassified information to international 

relief organizations, NGOs, foreign embassies, and 

non-U.S. military forces.78

Media and Public Communication

The 24-hour news cycle became another key element that JTF-Haiti needed to consider during the 

design and planning of operations. One day after the 

earthquake, there were more media representatives 

on the ground in Haiti than U.S. military personnel. 

Images broadcast out to the world heightened the 

international community’s sense of urgency, as governments and relief organizations determined how 

best to respond. The news media often drove information requests. Senior officials from Washington called 

SOUTHCOM, JTF-Haiti, and the U.S. Embassy asking 

about what was being done in response to the issues 

they had seen on television.79
50

D u r i n g 

the first days 

of the crisis, 

CJCS Admiral 

Mullen sent 

his public affairs officer 

(PAO) to serve 

with the JTF 

Commander. 

LTG Keen remarked on 

numerous occasions that 

having the 

PAO was one 

of his most 

valuable assets during the initial days of the operation.80 For the longer-term, however, JTF-Haiti required 

a comprehensive communications effort that enabled 

all U.S. government personnel in Haiti to speak with 

one voice and provide timely and accurate information. To accomplish this, JTF-Haiti helped to establish 

the Joint Interagency Information Cell (JIIC). 

JIIC operations involved a whole-of-government 

effort, and the cell provided a hub for synchronizing communications from the strategic to the tactical 

level. The Department of State headed the JIIC, supported by the U.S. Embassy Public Diplomacy Office. 

DoD provided the JIIC deputy lead and USAID, DHS, 

and HHS were participating departments/agencies 

(Figure 9).81

Centrality of Media and Public 

Communication

On 14 January, about 36 hours after the 

earthquake, the ramp of the Toussaint 

Louverture International Airport was occupied by hundreds of journalists and camera 

crews from all over the world.

The tragic circumstances surrounding the 

earthquake had focused the eyes of the 

world on Haiti. We recognized that the JTF 

must be transparent, approachable, and responsive to the public—Haitian and U.S. as 

well as international audiences.

 LTG Keen

 JTF-Haiti Commander
51

Figure 9. The Joint Interagency Information Cell

The JIIC communications goals focused on three 

areas:

• Establishing an accurate understanding of the 

U.S. military’s relief efforts

• Dispelling the notion that the U.S. military was 

the primary relief provider

• Building awareness that the Haitian government, MINUSTAH, USAID, and NGOs were 

meeting critical needs

A key message in support of these goals was that 

the U.S. military would transition its role to other organizations, as these partners increased their ability to 
52

address critical needs, and then U.S. forces would remain in Haiti only as an asset of last resort. This message was important, because it emphasized that the 

United States was not an occupying force—nor would 

the U.S. military rebuild Haiti the way it was before 

the earthquake. In addition, to ensure the legitimacy 

of the operation, it was critical to emphasize the role 

of the Haitian government in all aspects of the relief 

effort.82

One of the JIIC’s products was a set of daily talking 

points that provided the overall communication goal, 

core themes, target audiences, and top-line messages. 

This product evolved into the “JTF Two Pager” that 

included Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE themes, 

priorities, talking points, facts, and figures. It was 

distributed throughout JTF-Haiti, the SOUTHCOM 

headquarters, and the U.S. Mission. JTF-Haiti also 

used social media to broadcast its messages through 

Facebook and Twitter.83 For example, during the 

movement of IDPs from a temporary camp to a new 

site, JTF-Haiti personnel used their cell phone cameras 

to “Twitpic” Haiti’s president visiting the new resettlement location.84 Utilizing social media in this way 

enabled JTF-Haiti to create a transparent environment 

and emphasize the central role of the Haitian Government in response efforts. 
53

DEPLOYMENT AND INTERVENTION

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE was the largest 

FHA/DR effort in U.S. history, and the U.S. military 

was the single largest contributor to the overall effort.85 At the height of the operation, there were over 

22,000 servicemen and servicewomen deployed in 

theater with 23 ships and more than 58 aircraft supporting relief efforts.86 The urgency and magnitude of 

the disaster resulted in the deployment of forces even 

before the standup of JTF-Haiti had been completed. 

JTF-Haiti had to manage simultaneously the deployment of forces and provide immediate humanitarian 

assistance, while efforts to establish the command 

were still underway. 

JTF-Haiti executed Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in four phases:87

• Phase I – Initial Response (January 14-February 4). This initial phase focused on forming 

JTF-Haiti, deploying troops into theater, supporting immediate lifesaving actions (e.g., conducting search and rescue; facilitating medical 

care; and providing emergency food, water, 

and shelter), enhancing situational awareness, 

reopening the air and sea ports, and evacuating 

American citizens. 

• Phase II – Relief (February 5 – mid-March). 

The second phase centered on mitigating nearterm suffering through the sustained delivery 

of humanitarian aid via distribution sites. Key 

activities included providing planning, logistical, and security support to the World Food 

Programme at 16 distribution sites and working to clear the rubble in and around Port-auPrince. 
54

• Phase III – Restoration (mid-March – midApril). During this phase, JTF-Haiti planned 

and implemented safety precautions and countermeasures at IDP camps to prepare for potential floods and mudslides that were likely 

to occur during the upcoming rainy season. As 

the need for humanitarian relief decreased, the 

bulk of U.S. military forces in Haiti began deploying back to the United States. 

• Phase IV – Recovery (mid-April – June 1). 

During this last phase, JTF-Haiti finalized the 

transition of its activities to the Haitian Government, USAID, UN, and MINUSTAH. To help 

with the longer term recovery, SOUTHCOM 

redirected many of its theater security cooperation activities to support Haitian reconstruction 

efforts.

The plan was that transition between these phases 

would be conditions based, rather than dictated by 

arbitrary timelines. The general approach envisioned 

that with each subsequent phase, JTF-Haiti’s footprint 

would decrease as the Joint Force transitioned its responsibilities to other entities. LTG Keen would work 

closely with the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, USAID, 

and the Haitian Government to identify specific tasks 

and conditions to enable transitions across various areas of activity (e.g., security, medical assistance, engineering support).88

Originally, an additional phase focused on stabilization was planned; however, JTF-Haiti did not 

execute this phase. LTG Keen envisioned executing a 

stabilization phase if there was no functioning Haitian 

Government in place to coordinate relief efforts. If this 

had been the case, JTF-Haiti would have supported 
55

a non-Defense U.S. Government department/agency 

or the UN in providing transitional governance until 

the Haitian people could establish a legitimate, functioning government. SOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti, in 

coordination with MINUSTAH and the Haitian Government, determined that these activities were not 

necessary.89

Phase I: Initial Response

Phase I began on January 14, when SOUTHCOM 

formally established JTF-Haiti. Within hours of the 

quake, the Haitian Government issued a disaster declaration and requested immediate humanitarian assistance. One of the initial requests was for assistance to 

re-open the Toussaint Louverture Airport. The tower 

was damaged and could not function without electrical power. On the airfield, dozens of damaged aircraft cluttered the single runway. Through the night 

of January 12, the 623rd Air and Space Operations 

Center (AOC) of the Air Force’s Special Operations 

Command (AFSOC) facilitated unit planning and the 

development of load plans across the four AFSOC 

wings—two active-duty, one reserve, and one National Guard. Ultimately, the 623rd AOC sent 16 aircraft and a Joint Special Operations Air Detachment 

(JSOAD) to Haiti. The JSOAD is rapidly deployable 

and provides command and control, communications, 

air traffic control, emergency medical, aerial port operations, security, and cargo-handling capabilities.

90

General Keen arranged for combat control teams 

(CCTs) from AFSOC’s 1st Special Operations Wing 

(1st SOW) to arrive 26 hours after the earthquake. 

These teams provided air traffic control, and they reestablished flight operations 28 minutes after reaching 

the scene.91
56

Other SOF elements that were part of the initial 

force included a nine-person Situational Awareness 

Team that worked with the U.S. Embassy to develop an improved understanding of conditions on the 

ground.92 A four-person Military Information Support 

Team (MIST) from the 4th PSYOPS Group (Airborne) 

also arrived on January 14 and provided a variety of 

media resources to help advance strategic communications goals and themes.93

Deploying Initial Forces into Haiti

Under the direction of SOUTHCOM, military 

forces and assets continued to arrive in Haiti; many 

elements reached the country even before Operation 

UNIFIED RESPONSE and JTF-Haiti were officially established.94 On January 14, the Air Force’s 817th Contingency Response Group (CRG)—part of JTF-PO—

arrived in Port-au-Prince and took over air operations 

from AFSOC. On that same day, an Air Force Joint Assessment Team from the 621st Contingency Response 

Wing arrived in Port-au-Prince to conduct further assessments of the airfield.95 The aircraft carrier USS Carl 

Vinson, which arrived offshore from Port-au-Prince on 

January 15, supported the initial response operation 

by delivering relief supplies and providing 19 helicopters for airlift. DoD immediately ordered the USS

Bataan, USS Nassau, and USS Carter Hall to Haiti along 

with additional forces from the 82nd Airborne Division and XVIII Airborne Corps assigned to the Global Response Force. The United States Coast Guard 

(USCG) was also among the first to respond. At the 

time of the quake, USCG Cutter (USCGC) Forward and 

USCGC Mohawk were near Port-au-Prince, and four 

more Coast Guard ships joined within a few days to 
57

provide initial damage assessments, assist in medical 

evacuations, help open Haiti’s ports, and coordinate 

the arrival of seaborne relief supplies.96

Most of the major force deployment decisions were 

made within the first 72-96 hours following the seismic event, when the situation was still very unclear. 

For the first several days after the earthquake, with 

most communication systems down, there was little 

information coming out of Haiti to enable decision 

making. SOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti conducted parallel assessments and planning to identify requirements. 

LTG Keen issued verbal orders of commanding officer 

(VOCO) to expedite requests for military forces. He 

initially “asked for everything” to enable JTF operations. As his understanding of conditions improved, 

LTG Keen was able to tailor his requests accordingly.97

The extensive use of VOCOs in place of written requests for forces (RFFs) fast-tracked DoD’s response. 

However, there were also complications. Units arrived 

without the situational awareness and direction that 

a more conventional planning approach would have 

provided. This situation created gaps in the reception, 

staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of 

forces, equipment, and supplies.98 Because JTF planners and leaders felt they did not have adequate visibility of “what they had, where it was, and what was 

coming,” JTF-Haiti created the Force Flow Working 

Group consisting of personnel from SOUTHCOM’s 

J-3 and J-4 Directorates, who met daily to de-conflict 

issues and apprise the commander.99

During the initial emergency response, units deployed to the Haiti theater supported search and 

rescue (SAR), provided emergency medical care, and 

distributed humanitarian aid, including food and water.100 Other critical tasks included improving situa-
58

tional awareness and developing a sustained logistics 

flow to enable the larger relief effort. Concurrently, as 

the Operation UNIFED RESPONSE military effort was 

underway, the Department of State laid the diplomatic groundwork. On January 22, U.S. Ambassador Ken 

Merten signed a Statement of Principles between the 

U.S. Government and the United Nations, recognizing 

the primary responsibility of the Haitian Government 

for leading the response effort and the supporting role 

of the UN and United States.101

A Closer Look: Deploying the Army’s 3rd 

Expeditionary Sustainment Command

One challenge to the rapid influx of forces in Haiti centered 

on conducting a deployment into an immature theater without prior warning or preparation. For many units—such as the 

Army’s 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command—it was the 

first time they had deployed on short notice in a contingency 

or expeditionary situation. Compared with deployments to 

Iraq and Afghanistan, where many factors were well-known, 

there was limited information on the overall security situation and infrastructure in Haiti. For instance, would there be 

any theater-provided equipment units could use? Without 

knowing the specific requirements of the mission, unit leaders determined as best they could what equipment would 

most likely be needed. Haiti also proved to be a test of field 

craft skills for many soldiers. Many had to build field showers, wash clothes in the field, and practice the essentials of 

field sanitation. The knowledge gained through this deployment reinforced the importance of basic Army field craft and 

its criticality to developing adaptive troops.

Source: Hayes, Major Paul R, “Deploying an Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command to Support Disaster Relief,” Army Sustainment: The 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command Supports Disaster Relief, November December 2010.
59

Developing Situational Awareness

During the initial days following the earthquake, 

LTG Keen indicated he had little knowledge of conditions outside of Port-au-Prince. To address this problem, Special Operations Command South organized 

multi-functional teams consisting of Special Forces, 

MISO, and CA personnel to survey areas outside of 

the capital, examining roads and bridges, talking to 

the local inhabitants, and providing critical early information of conditions on the ground. The special 

operations forces (SOF) multi-functional teams developed assessments on six principle areas outside of 

Port au Prince.102

Difficulties in developing initial situational awareness impeded the determination of requirements and 

priorities, complicating the transportation of manpower and supplies. In addition to the use of the 

SOF multifunctional teams, JTF-Haiti improved its 

situational awareness through a combination of aerial 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); 

human intelligence (HUMINT) and engagement with 

the population; and the use of non-traditional tools 

on commercial internet sites.103 A Global Hawk Unmanned Ariel Vehicle (UAV) snapped the first pictures 

of critical infrastructure within two days of the earthquake, marking the first time that this strategic asset 

had supported a humanitarian operation. The Joint 

Force also used a P-3 Orion aircraft to gather visual 

information and released ground imagery and videos 

from the aerial sorties to the humanitarian community. 

This process, however, took several days—consuming time that was precious to the search and rescue 

efforts.104 Other aerial ISR platforms (e.g., Predators, 

U2s, RC-26s) were high-demand, low-density assets 
60

and were not immediately available during the initial 

days of the crisis. When the Predators did arrive, they 

operated with multiple restrictions out of a concern 

they could endanger commercial and private air traffic over Haiti. Therefore, during the opening phase of 

the operation, JTF-Haiti continued to gain an appreciation of the situation the old fashioned way—with 

boots on the ground.

SOUTHCOM deployed HUMINT teams to obtain information on the Haitian population. By using social networking sites and blogs—and engaging 

clergy, NGOs, and the Haitian people—SOUTHCOM 

supplemented its aerial ISR capabilities with sources 

that could provide first-hand accounts of the situation 

and help focus humanitarian efforts within the country. The arriving troops from the 22nd MEU and the 

82nd Airborne conducted detailed ground reconnaissance to assess conditions on the ground, reporting on 

the state of critical infrastructure and identifying local leaders who could facilitate relief efforts. Soldiers 

from the 82nd Airborne also supported the improvement of situational awareness by using Google Earth 

to overlay the details of the air and ground reconnaissance on a commercial map background. These maps 

later became the basis for a viable FHA/DR COP.105

In Washington, a number of factors hindered officials from developing an early understanding of the 

situation in Haiti. The initial lack of a COP prevented 

U.S. Government departments and agencies from accurately visualizing the situation on the ground and 

later assessing the overall efficacy of the U.S. response. 

A primary obstacle in creating a whole-of-government 

COP was not the quantity but rather the quality of the 

data. In fact, a range of NGOs, the UN, USAID, international donors, and even private citizens generated 
61

a robust amount of information. These diverse entities did not have standard guidelines for conducting 

disaster assessments (e.g., methodology, indicators, 

reporting templates, data criteria). Furthermore, these 

organizations and individuals often worked in isolation while conducting surveys on the ground—with 

little collaboration among them. USAID’s Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC) in Washington did not have 

a dedicated staff to collect, centralize, validate, and 

report findings to its partners and U.S. Government 

leaders. The EOC initially lacked the office space for 

surge personnel and did not have large-scale teleconference capabilities. Eventually, the use of interagency 

liaison offices helped to improve communications and 

coordination.106

Search and Rescue 

The overall search and rescue effort largely consisted of 43 international SAR teams.107 While the majority of these teams came from civilian and international organizations, JTF-Haiti contributed two urban 

search and rescue teams: the California Task Force 2 

and New York Task Force 1 from Air Mobility Command.108 Initial AFSOC forces on the ground from the 

720th Special Tactics Group also participated in the 

SAR effort.109 One of the most valuable capabilities 

JTF-Haiti brought to the SAR effort was its technical expertise for conducting assessments of damaged 

buildings. Within the Port-au-Prince area, the massive 

amounts of debris throughout the city complicated 

rescue efforts. Collapsed buildings were extremely 

perilous because removing the wrong beam or section 

of concrete could cause the entire remaining structure 

to fall down. Army engineers from the 82nd Airborne 
62

Division worked with civilian structural experts from 

the Army Corps of Engineers to conduct site assessments that helped determine the best way to organize 

and sequence rubble removal.110 Other critical SAR capabilities provided by JTF-Haiti included vertical lift 

aircraft for rescuing survivors and transporting them 

to medical facilities and earth-moving equipment for 

removing rubble. By January 26, the Haitian Government called off search and rescue efforts.

Emergency Medical Care

After the earthquake, the Ministry of Health building and many of the hospitals in Port-au-Prince were 

destroyed. Hundreds of health care workers had perished, and the limited remaining staff in many hospitals were quickly overwhelmed with an estimated 

300,000 injured in the Port-au-Prince area alone.111

Initial medical capabilities from JTF-Haiti included 

those onboard USS Carl Vinson and USS Bataan. Each 

ship functioned as a “sea base,” using its helicopters 

to airlift casualties from land to onboard medical facilities.112 USS Carl Vinson operated offshore from 

Port-au-Prince, and USS Bataan, off the southern peninsula of Haiti, employed its helicopters and landing craft air cushion (LCACs) to deliver nearly 1,000 

pallets of relief supplies and medically evacuate over 

500 patients.113 Medical and dental personnel from the 

24th MEU, aboard USS Nassau, treated more than 100 

Haitians on the island of Gonave.114 Within the Portau-Prince area, infantry units from the 82nd Airborne 

helped facilitate emergency medical services by establishing trauma care facilities, delivering critical medical supplies, providing security at aid stations, and 

facilitating the transfer of injured patients to facilities 
63

outside of Haiti.115 Twenty-three medical personnel 

from SOUTHCOM’s JTF-Bravo deployed from Honduras on January 17 in support of JTF-Haiti, providing 

urgent medical care in and around the town of Killick 

on the coast west of Port-au-Prince.116

On January 20, the hospital ship USNS Comfort arrived and joined the relief efforts, serving as a referral 

hospital for the most severely injured.117 USNS Comfort had 1,000 patient beds, 20 operating rooms, and 

a dedicated staff of almost 400 doctors, nurses, and 

corpsmen.118 Upon arrival, one of the first challenges 

involved establishing a civil-military patient referral 

system. Medical personnel had to decide which cases 

the hospital ship should handle, determine how many 

patients to transfer to the vessel, and arrange helicopter and other transportation as necessary. Initially, 

most of the civilian partner organizations in Haiti 

were not familiar with requesting helicopter medical 

evacuations and had to learn how to obtain and report 

the necessary information. Eventually, the patient 

referral process would include physicians onboard 

USNS Comfort speaking directly with civilian coordinators ashore. The main means of communication was 

initially through text messages using a free plan from 

AT&T. Each day, the civilian coordinators assessed 

which services were available on land and which 

were needed from the hospital ship. They would then 

upload their assessment into a database. Medical personnel onboard USNS Comfort and elsewhere used the 

database to match requirements with their available 

resources—and later to track the patients themselves 

within the treatment system.119

Prior to the earthquake, USNS Comfort had supported SOUTHCOM by conducting several shortterm medical missions in Haiti, the most recent in 
64

2009. Over the course of these deployments, many 

individuals on USNS Comfort developed personal relationships with Haitian officials and knowledge of 

trusted organizations in Haiti, such as the Ministry 

of Public Health and Population. Personnel on USNS 

Comfort had the email addresses and phone numbers 

for key Haitian contacts; this allowed healthcare professionals on USNS Comfort to integrate and respond 

quickly as part of the larger medical effort.120

One of the lingering challenges throughout the 

medical response effort was maintaining accurate 

patient logs, especially information on individuals 

requiring acute surgical procedures. Although some 

patient logs were maintained, there was no systematic 

monitoring on a daily or weekly basis to allow for adequate follow-up. As a result, it was difficult for medical practitioners to conduct longer-term medical planning, especially for post-operative care. In addition, 

guidance on the standards of local care and processes 

for making decisions about the standards of care were 

not provided consistently to U.S. medical personnel. 

Consequently, medical teams conducted a number of 

complex operative procedures that sometimes created 

problems for the Haitian health care system, which 

could not always provide follow-on care in specialized areas.121

Humanitarian Assistance

While civilian and international organizations 

held the primary responsibility of delivering humanitarian aid, JTF-Haiti worked to facilitate their efforts 

throughout the country. On the mainland, soldiers 

from the 82nd Airborne Division provided security 

at the airport, aid distribution sites, and the U.S. Em-
65

bassy—and along transportation routes. Military engineers helped to establish and fortify base camps for 

distributing food and water, and constructed temporary shelters.122 In the initial days of the relief effort, 

there were few incidents involving violence and looting, most of these were in areas known for lawlessness 

prior to the earthquake. Working with MINUSTAH 

personnel, who had overall responsibility for security 

in Haiti, JTF units augmented the UN force and more 

than doubled the troop presence in volatile neighborhoods. This united show of force helped to increase 

the sense of security for the local Haitians and facilitated the continued delivery of aid in a secure environment.123

The 22nd and 24th MEUs supported the humanitarian aid missions outside Port-au-Prince to the west 

and north.124 Their presence in the outlying regions enabled emergency aid to reach thousands of Haitians, 

who had fled Port-au-Prince following the earthquake. 

This sea-based force brought a variety capabilities to 

aid the relief efforts—such as heavy lift and utility helicopters, logistical assets, water purification systems, 

and limited medical support—without taxing the already strained sustainment infrastructure ashore. 125

By January 18, the 22nd MEU began conducting 

FHA/DR activities, operating from ARG ships off the 

western shore of Haiti. One exception was a ground 

combat element (GCE) tactical command center that 

operated ashore and the Combat Logistics Battalion-22 (CLB-22) that established a presence in the 

town of Petit Goave on the western flank, commonly 

referred to as Haiti’s southern claw. The 22nd MEU 

conducted its mission (e.g., providing food and water, 

temporary shelter, security), while moving from west 

to east, starting in Petit Goave and ending in Carrefour, a suburb of Port-au-Prince.126
66

On January 19, four days after the USS Bataan ARG 

and 22nd MEU arrived in Haiti, the Marines set up a 

major supply distribution point in the town of Leogane, west of Port-au-Prince, which became a primary 

area of operations. Working with MINUSTAH forces, 

the Marines distributed over 1,200 humanitarian rations to earthquake survivors in the area. In addition, 

the 22nd MEU dispatched reconnaissance patrols to 

survey the surrounding areas for future operations.127

The USS Bataan crew conducted “Sailors Ashore Missions,” during which they removed 150 tons of rubble, 

built shelters for over 100 families, and distributed 

more than 500,000 meals.128

The Security Cooperation-Marine Air Ground 

Task Force (SC-MAGTF) Africa Partnership Station 

2010 (APS-10) also deployed as part of the 22nd MEU. 

It was diverted from a planned set of exercises in Africa and directed to deploy aboard the USS Gunston 

Hall as an afloat quick reaction force. The APS-10 operated on land from Carrefour. One valuable capability APS-10 provided were unarmored high-mobility, 

multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) that could carry 

more cargo than the up-armored versions and were 

less likely to damage the unstable Haitian roads.129

The 24th MEU, for its part, was diverted from a 

Middle East deployment and arrived in theater on 

January 24 on the USS Nassau (LHA-4) ARG. During the first week of its deployment in Haiti, the 24th 

MEU distributed humanitarian aid, conducted assessments, and provided medical assistance along the 

northern peninsula of Haiti (the “northern claw”). The 

24th MEU used Landing Craft Utility (LCU) to conduct amphibious landings on the northern shore of La 

Gonave Island, northwest of Port-au-Prince, enabling 

relief efforts for the local inhabitants.
67

To establish rapport with the Haitian people, the 

Marines involved local residents in the delivery of humanitarian aid. The Marines liaised with local leaders 

and included Haitian workers in the task of off-loading food and medical supplies. The Marines helped to 

manage the people’s expectations by announcing the 

exact time and location that local authorities would 

distribute aid, and the amount that would be available. 

Haitian officials could then organize the food distribution effort and keep local inhabitants informed, while 

concurrently strengthening their legitimacy in the eyes 

of the people. Where possible, the Marines also used 

Haitian security personnel to provide an inner cordon 

for crowd control at aid distribution sites, while the 

U.S. military units maintained the outer security. Not 

only did the use of local forces put a Haitian face on 

the delivery of aid, but it also empowered locals who 

were more adept at handling their own people.130 The 

payment of local personnel who contribute services 

to the assistance effort is critical, to avoid any perceptions the relief community is acting in an exploitative 

manner. In some cases, the Haitians supporting aid 

delivery received meager payment—and sometimes 

none at all.131

The 24th MEU used its MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft to assess towns in northern Haiti, determine the 

extent of earthquake damage, and identify the type 

of aid that was most needed. The Marines chose the 

Osprey because it had a longer range and greater payload and speed than either the UH-1 Huey Helicopter 

or the CH-46 Sea Knight Medium Utility Helicopter, 

enabling them to assess more sites in less time. The 

24th MEU would eventually move south to continue 

delivering aid outside of Port-au-Prince.132
68

Logistics 

For the first week following the earthquake, the 

CCTs managed the air traffic coming in and out of the 

Toussaint Louverture International Airport, while the 

Air Force’s 817th CRG operated the ramp and airfield. 

By the second week of the operation, Air Force air traffic controllers arrived and took over air operations.133

AFSOUTH worked closely with First Air Force (Air 

Forces Northern) (AFNORTH) because of the latter’s 

humanitarian operations experience in the continental United States. AFNORTH benefited from several 

preexisting relationships, including with various government and non-governmental organizations. AFNORTH played a key role enabling the evacuation of 

American citizens from Haiti to the United States, as 

part of Operation SAFE RETURN.134

The 612th AOC, located at Davis-Monthan Air 

Force Base in Arizona, was the Air Force’s primary 

command and control element for 

Haiti operations. 

In the initial days 

of the FHA/DR effort, the 612th AOC 

worked to develop 

a longer-term solution for organizing 

and prioritizing 

flights in and out 

of Haiti. This was 

especially critical 

because operations relied heavily on the airlifting of 

supplies and equipment into the country until the seaport could be repaired. With more planes coming in 

Command and

Control of the Airport

When the earthquake happened, relief agencies from around the world 

headed to Toussaint Louverture International Airport. It was “...like 

Larry, Curly, and Moe all trying to get 

through the door at the same time.” 

Civilian, assigned to the 612th 

Air and Space Operations Center
69

on a daily basis, developing, assigning, and controlling slot times for the incoming aircraft was a singular 

challenge. “Slot times” indicated when each aircraft 

would arrive, the maximum time it could stay on the 

ground in Haiti, and its departure time. Working with 

the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), JTFHaiti personnel coordinated with the Haitian government to assume temporary control of Haiti’s airspace, 

beginning on 15 January 2010. Reaching an agreement 

was a delicate process because it involved a concession regarding Haiti’s national sovereignty. U.S. officials were careful to emphasize this was a temporary 

arrangement. With control of the airspace, the U.S. 

Air Force drew on AFNORTH’s previous HA/DR 

experience to establish the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center (HFOCC)—under the direction of 

the 601st AOC at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. The 

HFOCC assumed responsibility for managing Haiti’s 

airspace.135

The established slot system facilitated the initial 

delivery of food, water, and medical supplies. Before 

the earthquake, the airport handled about 25 flights 

per day on its single runway. By January 19—one 

week after the earthquake—the airport had the ability 

to schedule 126 sorties daily. Demand for slot times, 

however, created a schedule that was booked two-tothree weeks in advance. As the volume of air cargo 

flights to the Toussaint Louverture International Airport increased, the issues of slot times and the offloading of supplies continued to receive a great deal of 

attention. In administering the airspace, the HFOCC 

had to manage the expectations of the various organizations operating in Haiti, each of which believed its 

cargo was a priority. The HFOCC tried not to turn anyone away, but it could not always provide the desired 
70

slot times. In some cases, this prompted accusations of 

favoritism in the scheduling of flights. Eventually, as 

the operation shifted from emergency relief to sustainment, air operations became more predictable.

JTF-Haiti leaders soon realized that the airport 

was impractical to sustain long-term relief and reconstruction efforts. It had many limitations (e.g., single 

runway, limited parking space, non-existent personnel support facilities) that would impede operations.136

The bulk of humanitarian assistance supplies would 

need to be delivered by sea. This was problematic 

because the earthquake had made Port-au-Prince’s 

seaport inoperable.137 Rehabilitating the port was a 

clear priority during the opening days of the operation. JTF-Port Opening (PO) and the Joint Logistics 

Command (JLC) worked to reestablish the docking facilities in Port-au-Prince.138 By January 22, a U.S. Navy 

underwater construction team re-opened the seaport, 

and the delivery of emergency materials and supplies 

soon followed.

As the crisis unfolded, the SOUTHCOM Washington Office received offers of humanitarian relief 

supplies and rescue equipment in support of the Haiti 

FHA/DR effort. At first, all offers were sent to the 

SOUTHCOM Partnership for the Americas Collaboration Center (PFACC) or the SCJ9. However, these organizations were consumed with current operations. 

Rather than giving potential donors PFACC or SCJ9 

phone numbers (adding to the workload of these offices and potentially resulting in donor frustration), 

the SCWO started referring individuals to the All Partners Access Network or APAN website where donors 

could be more easily matched with aid recipients.139
71

Phase II: Relief

On February 5, JTF-Haiti transitioned from initial response operations to relief operations. During 

Phase II, the focus of operations shifted from search 

and rescue and immediate emergency relief to mitigating near-term human suffering by the continued 

provision of basic humanitarian aid (e.g., water, food, 

medical assistance, shelter, etc.). While delivery of humanitarian aid began in the previous phase; it reached 

its peak in the relief phase. As in Phase I, the success of 

the FHA/DR mission was directly connected to JTFHaiti’s ability to provide security for the distribution 

of aid. Medical activities began to shift from meeting 

life-saving needs to preventative medicine and trauma 

follow-up.140 An emergent priority during this phase 

was providing assistance and resources for IDPs. During Phase II, JTF-Haiti also started to plan, coordinate, 

and prepare for a phased transition of selected efforts 

to capable partners, as they became ready to assume 

responsibilities for key relief and reconstruction activities.141

Humanitarian Assistance

Initial limitations on the amount of inbound relief 

supplies that reached Haiti fueled a sense of desperation among many of the Haitian people, and as a result, 

street violence erupted in parts of Port-au-Prince. JTFHaiti attempted several food airdrops, but stopped 

when it became clear these delivery efforts were triggering more violence on the ground as people fought 

over parachute bundles.142 The situation gradually stabilized as the World Food Programme, in collaboration with MINUSTAH and JTF-Haiti, launched a fixed-
72

point food distribution system. Structured around 16 

delivery sites in Port-au-Prince and Carrefour, the system created a civil-military division of labor, with the 

WFP partners distributing aide and MINUSTAH and 

JTF-Haiti units providing logistical support and security. The WFP food distribution program transitioned 

the delivery of humanitarian aid from the provision of 

emergency rations (i.e., daily rations) to a more sustained effort that provided 15-days’ worth of rations 

to aid recipients. The food distribution system was a 

notable example of successful planning and coordination, which resulted in more than two million Haitians 

receiving much-needed food and water.143

The distribution of humanitarian aid required another crucial activity: the clearing of rubble from the 

streets. The earthquake generated 20 to 25 million tons 

of rubble, and much of the debris needed to be cleared 

before reconstruction could begin. The Haitian Government and the UN, with the assistance of JTF-Haiti 

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, created the 

PMCC to organize and coordinate rubble removal 

in Port-au-Prince. The impending hurricane season 

made the removal of rubble—especially to help improve drainage—critical to mitigate storm damage. 

JTF-Haiti made a key contribution by clearing a number of roads of debris. The PMCC worked well during the first three months of the response effort, coordinating rubble removal and designating disposal 

sites. As responsibility for providing support to the 

PMCC shifted from MINUSTAH and JTF-Haiti to the 

Haitian Government, rubble removal became less effective. Complications arose as many property owners 

objected to their land being used for the disposal of 

debris. As a result, one year after the earthquake, the 

PMCC estimated that less than one percent of the total 
73

rubble had been cleared from the city. Future plans for 

continued rubble removal were estimated to require 

years to complete.144

Phase III: Restoration

Phase III lasted roughly from mid-March through 

mid-April. During this phase, a major challenge facing 

the Haitian Government was addressing the plight of 

an estimated one-to-two million IDPs. Many IDPs established spontaneous settlements in Port-au-Prince 

and were living in close quarters, increasing the potential for an outbreak of disease. In response, JTFHaiti, along with USAID and the Haitian Government, 

developed a public information campaign focused on 

emphasizing personal hygiene and encouraging Haitians to only drink water from safe, clean sources.145

Some IDP camps materialized in areas prone to 

flooding and mud slides. Many families only had 

sheets or tarps to protect them from the severe weather. Therefore, JTF-Haiti focused extensively on ameliorating the danger of the impending heavy rains at the 

nine priority IDP camps in Port-au-Prince. U.S. troops 

helped to safeguard the IDP camps from flash-flooding and landslides by providing engineering support 

to improve drainage, transportation to move people 

and material, and civil affairs teams to enable the Haitians to help themselves. A Japanese contingent and 

U.S. Navy construction units (“Seabees”) improved 

the drainage system and reinforced walls inside several IDP encampments. JTF-Haiti also supported the 

UN in the building of IDP camps north of Port-auPrince and helped to relocate displaced people to new 

shelters and camps. At the strategic level, the JTF and 

USAID worked with the UN and the Government of 

Haiti to develop and implement an IDP strategy.146
74

Initial Transitions

During the restoration phase, JTF-Haiti activities 

also focused on turning over responsibility for many 

support functions to civilian partners. One of these 

hand-overs included the resumption of Haitian Government control of the Toussaint Louverture Airport 

on March 16. Transitions also occurred at the seaport. 

Navy and Army divers had repaired the damaged 

pier in record time and by mid-March the port was 

turned over to Haitian authorities. By April, JTF-Haiti 

efforts had doubled the port’s capacity, allowing the 

offload of over 8,500 containers totaling over 10.2 million short tons of cargo. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 

operations, led by the JLC, brought supplies from 

ships anchored offshore to the beaches via landing 

craft, amphibious vehicles, and hovercraft. JTF-Haiti 

helicopters from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps 

flew every day, bringing in supplies from ships and 

transporting patients to treatment facilities.147

The JTF-Haiti Headquarters also conducted a relief-in-place as ARSOUTH Headquarters replaced the 

XVIII Airborne Corps ACP, and LTG Keen handed 

over command to Major General (MG) Simeon Trombitas, who had been serving as the deputy commanding general of JTF-Haiti. In addition, JTF-Haiti began 

to stage and redeploy forces.148 On March 24—ten 

weeks into the crisis—the 24th MEU redeployed. As 

the Marines departed Haiti, international partners 

took over responsibility for food and water distribution in the respective areas of operation.149
75

Phase IV: Recovery 

In late May, during the last days of Operation 

UNIFIED RESPONSE, JTF-Haiti further drew-down 

its forces in preparation for the full transition of its 

responsibilities to the Haitian Government. By this 

time, the JTF had distributed over 4.9 million meals, 

17 million pounds of bulk food, and 2.6 million bottles 

of water. Over one million people received emergency 

shelter, while more than 80 blocks of debris-covered 

streets were cleared and over 40,000 buildings were 

assessed for their structural safety by JTF engineers.150

Although the Joint Force continued to contribute 

to USAID and UN efforts, only a small contingent 

of U.S. military police and engineers remained with 

the headquarters on June 1, 2010 when the mission 

was declared complete. Moving forward, the Joint 

Force’s contribution to the longer-term recovery and 

restoration of Haiti would be undertaken as part of 

SOUTHCOM’s theater campaign plan. A central aspect of the SOUTHCOM effort were the NEW HORIZON exercises, which included medical, dental, and 

veterinarian readiness exercises as well as the conduct 

of civil affairs and engineering projects (e.g., digging 

wells, site assessments, refurbishing schools) in Portau-Prince and interior rural areas.151 Military projects 

provided training for U.S. medical and engineering 

personnel and employed Haitian citizens to improve 

the infrastructure in several cities. As part of NEW 

HORIZON, JTF-Haiti conducted 12 medical exercises 

and administered 35 humanitarian programs in the 

cities of Gonaives, Les Cayes, and Jeremie. JTF-Haiti 

targeted these cities because they had experienced a 

large influx of displaced Haitians from Port-au-Prince 

after the earthquake. In addition, JTF-Haiti planners 
76

met with community leaders to discuss their most 

pressing assistance needs. The objective was that the 

Joint Force’s assistance programs, managed in cooperation with the UN, NGOs, and non-DoD departments/agencies, would provide support to communities and encourage displaced Haitians not to return to 

Port-au-Prince, where camps were overburdened.152

As JTF-Haiti wrapped up its efforts, the Department of State and USAID continued working closely 

with the Haitian Government to ensure a successful 

transition from relief to reconstruction and development. U.S. Government officials worked closely with 

President Préval and the UN to establish the Interim 

Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), which oversaw 

the implementation of the Haitian Government’s Action Plan for National Recovery and Development. 

The goal was to verify that international assistance 

was aligned with the priorities of the Haitian people 

and their government, as well as to promote accountability and transparency. The U.S. Government also 

worked closely with the Haitian Government to establish the Bureau for the Resettlement of IDPs. On May 

20, President Préval directed the development of a 

more robust and permanent Bureau for Resettlement 

of IDPs to plan for large-scale IDP relocation. USAID 

worked to support the design and staffing of the new 

bureau.153
77

ASSESSMENT AND INSIGHTS

Stability operations are various military missions, 

tasks, and activities conducted outside the United 

States as part of the application of the instruments of 

national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and 

secure environment, provide essential governmental 

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, 

and humanitarian relief.154 Building on this definition, 

Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, outlines 

eight stability operations principles that should guide 

design, planning, and execution. 

Objective - Direct every military operation toward a 

clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE had a clear objective, laid out by presidential strategic guidance: support the FHA/DR effort led by USAID. As a result, 

JTF-Haiti could drive forward with its initial activities, even within an uncertain environment during the 

first days of the operation. JTF-Haiti’s subsequent 

mission statement was well scoped and achievable. It 

was not the JTF’s responsibility to restore Haiti to its 

pre-earthquake condition; rather, its mission was to 

mitigate near-term suffering and accelerate relief efforts. 

Underlying JTF-Haiti’s mission was the objective 

of transitioning tasks and activities, as soon as feasible, to the Haitian Government, USAID, the UN, 

and MINUSTAH. Strategic guidance, however, did 

not articulate requirements or conditions for standing 

down the JTF. Rather, JTF-Haiti developed its own individual transition criteria for various activities.155 For 

example, in the case of the USS Bataan ARG and the 
78

22nd MEU, as the Marines and ships completed their 

missions and the JTF-Haiti commander deemed they 

were no longer needed, these forces transitioned, and 

SOUTHCOM approved their sequential redeployment.156 JTF-Haiti transitioned its activities in close 

collaboration with the U.S. Embassy, USAID, the UN, 

and the Haitian Government. Some participants in the 

operation assessed that clearer policy guidance and 

conditions-based milestones would have been helpful. The lack of articulated guidance regarding the 

disbanding of the JTF needlessly prolonged the Joint 

Force mission in Haiti. In after action interviews, several military and civilian officials stated the JTF could 

have stood down much earlier without negatively affecting the situation in Haiti.157

An inherent aspect of JTF-Haiti’s mission was to 

ensure that its efforts contributed positively to the 

longer-term recovery of the Caribbean country. This 

required an understanding of the U.S. development 

and assistance goals for Haiti and an appreciation of 

the host nation’s ability to sustain long-term recovery 

efforts. For example, the deployment of specialized 

medical assets, such as the USNS Comfort and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) from HHS, 

often provided a higher standard of care than what 

was available in Haiti before the earthquake. Guidance on the standards of local care and processes for 

making decisions about the standards of care were 

not provided consistently to U.S. medical personnel. 

Therefore, U.S. medical teams conducted a number of 

complex surgical procedures, even though the Haitian 

health care system could not provide adequate postoperative care for many patients over the long term.158

In many cases, if assistance during an FHA/DR effort 

is not sustainable by the host nation or relief orga-
79

nizations over the long term, beneficial results may 

be short-lived and could produce potentially counterproductive outcomes after the U.S. scales back its 

presence. 

Offensive - Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

In stability operations, “failing to act quickly to 

gain and maintain the initiative in stabilization efforts 

may create a breeding ground for dissent and possible exploitation opportunities for enemies or adversaries.”159 Although Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE 

occurred in a permissive environment, there was the 

potential that JTF-Haiti and its partners could lose 

the initiative to nefarious actors, possibly resulting in 

civil unrest and criminal activity. In the initial days 

after the earthquake, there were incidents of looting 

in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas. In addition, 

after the earthquake, thousands of convicts escaped 

from prisons and congregated in Cité Soleil, a traditionally violent neighborhood in Port-au-Prince. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division acted quickly 

to augment MINUSTAH in highly volatile areas, providing a united show of force that helped to increase 

the sense of security among local Haitians. Furthermore, JTF-Haiti’s coordination with the UN allowed 

MINUSTAH to focus its efforts on capturing the escaped prisoners, while U.S. forces concentrated on 

providing humanitarian assistance.160 By understanding the need to retain the initiative, JTF-Haiti helped 

preempt potential threats and set the foundation for 

a secure and stable environment, where civilian and 

military organizations could work together to relieve 

the suffering of the Haitian people. 
80

Mass - Concentrate power at the decisive time and 

place.

Conducting stability operations in a hostile environment necessitates the deployment of a military 

force that has the capability to both protect the population and neutralize hostile groups. The Joint Force 

must concentrate power at the right centers of gravity.161 During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, the 

population was the “center of gravity” and ensuring 

it received immediate assistance was essential to alleviate suffering and accomplish the JTF-Haiti mission. 

Key activities that required the concentrated application of JTF resources where those that facilitated the 

overall humanitarian effort, such as the restoration of 

air and sea ports and the security of aid distribution 

sites. Even before JTF-Haiti stood up, AFSOC provided key capabilities to resume flights in and out of 

the International Toussaint Louverture Airport. The 

U.S. Air Force, with the FAA, enabled long-term flight 

operations via the HFOCC. The U.S. Navy provided 

underwater construction teams to reopen the seaport, 

increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into Haiti. The 

82nd Airborne Division provided security to ensure 

aid distribution points and transportation routes were 

safe and secure for both the Haitians and the relief organizations.

During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, there 

was one question regarding mass that was not fully 

considered upfront: how much military capacity 

would be enough? In the absence of a formal requirements assessment or OPLAN, LTG Keen relied on his 

professional judgment to request forces and resources 

through VOCOs. Many of the early assessments were 

intuitive estimates regarding what capabilities and 
81

how much capacity JTF-Haiti needed. The Joint Force 

provided capabilities and resources, often without a 

formal request from USAID.162 While the rapid influx 

of U.S. forces into Haiti was effective, there was a 

trade-off regarding efficiency. LTG Keen believed that 

under the circumstances this trade-off was warranted, 

as SOUTHCOM deployed troops and resources into 

Haiti even without an exact understanding of requirements. U.S. troops were needed in Haiti to facilitate 

the distribution of humanitarian aid and create a safe 

and secure environment for the international relief 

effort.163 By the end of January, about three weeks 

into the operation, JTF-Haiti consisted of over 22,200 

troops both on the ground and offshore.164

In FHA/DR efforts, “more is not always better.”

The proper sequencing of resources is critical to effective response management in the field. The influx of civilian and 

military resources during the early days of the crisis 

overwhelmed the logistics infrastructure in Haiti and 

complicated response efforts. In some cases, the Joint 

Force sent too much equipment that could not be used 

and had to be sent back, wasting time and logistical 

resources.165 For future FHA/DR efforts, USAID has 

suggested the development of a menu of DoD capability packages that could respond to a humanitarian 

emergency within 24 hours of an incident (e.g., such as 

airlift, logistics, security, medical, engineering, intelligence). Each package could be scalable and tailored to 

the needs on the ground, depending on the magnitude 

and characteristics of a particular disaster. Similarly, 

other federal agencies that have special capabilities 

could develop pre-defined packages and agreements 

with USAID to outline their employment.166
82

Economy of force—Allocate minimum essential 

combat power to secondary efforts.

According to this principle, personnel should not 

presume that stability operations are “secondary” 

efforts, especially during major operations and campaigns. Rather, stability operations should be considered across all phases of a joint operation.167 In many 

ways, economy of force is the inverse of the “mass” 

principle, requiring the acceptance of risk in selected 

areas to achieve superiority in more decisive aspects 

of the operation. 

One area that JTF-Haiti applied economy of force 

was in the distribution of humanitarian aid. Initially, 

many JTF units passed out humanitarian aid directly 

to local inhabitants; however, this was not the best use 

of the JTF’s capabilities. JTF members learned that it 

was more effective to facilitate delivery by civilian 

and local organizations with the Joint Force providing 

logistics, engineering, and security support. As a result, JTF-Haiti focused on transporting humanitarian 

supplies in bulk, rather than participating directly in 

the distribution of aid to the population. NGOs and 

local civic and religious groups were fully capable of 

distributing items to the public in a manner consistent 

with local cultural norms. Similarly, rather than passing out individual plastic water bottles, JTF-Haiti contracted local companies to provide water from cistern 

trucks. This commercial solution helped to eliminate 

piles of trash, provided wages to local workers, and 

put a “Haitian face” on distribution efforts.168 In addition, Marines utilized reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPU) to produce clean water that local 

volunteers and workers could provide to the people 

at distribution sites. The use of the ROWPU released 
83

Marines to conduct other essential missions, such as 

security, assessments, and logistics support.169

Unity of Command—Seek unity of effort in every 

operation. 

Unity of command ensures that all forces operate 

under a single commander, who directs forces toward 

a common objective. While there was a single Joint 

Force Commander on the ground during Operation 

UNIFIED RESPONSE, he did not have the authority or 

responsibility to direct the actions of non-U.S. military 

personnel. The key was to enable unified action across 

U.S. departments and agencies, and with the range of 

other mission partners. Coordination and collaboration with the Haitian Government, the interagency 

community, MINUSTAH, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and the private sector were critical to 

ensure a shared understanding of the operational environment, objectives, and mission.170 LTG Keen often 

said that during the Haiti earthquake response “C2” 

more often meant coordinate and collaborate rather 

than command and control.171

One of the difficulties of working with numerous 

entities was in determining the appropriate counterparts in these organizations to coordinate specific activities.172 Unified action requires partnerships built 

on trust from the strategic through the tactical level. 

During the Haiti FHA/DR effort, a catalyst to unified action was the relationship between the JTF-Haiti 

and MINUSTAH Commanders, LTG Keen and Major 

General Peixoto. With a friendship dating back to the 

1980s, their camaraderie set the tone for their staffs to 

work closely together in Haiti. The two commanders 

aligned priorities, de-conflicted mission parameters, 
84

and worked collaboratively toward common objectives. 

The unity of effort within the U.S. response structure took a few weeks to solidify. In 2010, the wholeof-government approach applied in Haiti benefited 

from many of the recommendations in the 2008 Project on National Security Reform, which emphasized integrated efforts, collaboration, and agility. The U.S. 

response to the Haiti earthquake was the first time 

the updated whole-of-government approach was employed in a large-scale overseas effort.173 While there 

was an established framework for how U.S. Government departments and agencies would work together, 

many details had to be resolved on the ground. Leaders had to determine how supporting departments 

and agencies would contribute to the relief effort and 

develop processes and procedures for assigning initial tasks. Furthermore, they had to coordinate staff 

deployments, establish reporting relationships and 

liaison structures, and mobilize necessary assets.174

Amidst the commotion of the initial days, USAID created new organizations to help organize and manage 

the response effort: the ORC and Interagency Task 

Force. These new organizations operated in parallel 

with the traditional, and well understood, FHA/DR 

entities—the RMT in Washington D.C. and the DART 

in Haiti—generating confusion regarding roles, responsibilities, and reporting structures.175 Despite 

these initial challenges, LTG Keen ensured that he 

was in lock-step with his civilian partners. Through 

daily meetings with the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti and 

the USAID representatives, LTG Keen ensured that 

JTF-Haiti personnel understood how they could best 

support the relief effort, while working in partnership 

with the Haitians and various U.S. and international 

relief organizations. 
85

The HACC functioned as a key enabler of unified 

action. Through the HACC, JTF-Haiti placed liaison 

personnel in all of the key response organizations, 

enabling the Joint Force to work side-by-side with its 

mission partners. Within the HACC, the Joint Force 

provided the majority of the personnel to conduct 

many of the administrative and support tasks (e.g., 

setting up computer networks, developing map overlays, creating presentations, sharing notes from various meetings) to facilitate a unified effort. Since most 

civilian organizations were overstretched, the manpower and know-how that JTF-Haiti provided to the 

HACC were indispensable, allowing stakeholders to 

share information and move forward in a common direction.176

Restraint—Apply appropriate combat capability 

prudently.

During stability operations, defending and protecting the population is paramount. Restraint requires a 

disciplined balance between safeguarding the people 

and infrastructure, conducting military operations, 

protecting the Joint Force, and achieving the overarching objectives of the operation. Using force in pursuit 

of stability operation objectives can antagonize the 

population and damage the legitimacy of the host nation government as well as the Joint Force. When force 

is used, it must be lawful and measured.177 

A key priority during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE was to closely supervise the use of force. The 

ROE and escalation of force procedures played a key 

role. JTF-Haiti went to great lengths to describe nonlethal measures, particularly techniques that could 

help to diffuse volatile situations. For instance, JTF-
86

Haiti developed distribution point tactics, tactics and 

procedures (TTPs) to help mitigate the possiblity of 

looting. The TTPs highlighed actions that troops could 

use to attract the attention of rowdy crowds, including 

the use of horns, sirens, bull horns, vehicle mounted 

PA systems, and flares. Anything that might cause a 

mob to stop rioting, even for a moment, was viewed 

as a potentially effective way to divert attention and 

cause individuals and groups to reconsider their actions. Ultimately, JTF-Haiti wanted to show it was not 

there to deliver aid through the barrel of a gun but by 

reaching out with a hand of friendship.178

Perseverance—Prepare for the measured, protracted 

application of military capability in support of 

strategic aims.

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE was the largest 

and longest FHA/DR operation conducted by the U.S. 

military, lasting six months, from January 14 to June 

1, 2010.179 Yet, the long-term recovery of Haiti would 

require an even more prolonged effort. It was not 

JTF-Haiti’s responsibility to restore Haiti to its preearthquake conditions or rebuild the country to a new 

and better standard than before the disaster. According to doctrine, when “military forces conduct initial 

response activities to fill immediate gaps in assistance, 

military objectives should be to enable civilian control 

of stabilization efforts.”180 The Joint Force must exercise 

caution not to turn over stabilization activities before 

other institutions are prepared. JTF-Haiti worked to 

hand-over its various mission responsibilities to either 

the Government of Haiti, the UN, USAID, or other civilian entities, as appropriate. Transition criteria were 

based on the conditions on the ground and established 
87

on a case-by-case basis in consultation with SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Embassy, USAID, MINUSTAH/UN, 

and the Haitian Government. This approach facilitated a gradual withdrawal of U.S. military forces, while 

enabling the long-term conduct of international relief 

and reconstruction efforts. 

Legitimacy—Sustain the legitimacy of the operation 

and of the host government. 

When conducting stability operations, the credibility of the host nation government and its ability to generate support and the consent of its people are critical 

to the success of the effort.181 For stability operations 

in a post-disaster situation, host nation government 

leaders need to get out among the people and communicate with citizens. They should also be involved 

in all aspects of planning and decision making. 

For the Haitian Government to have legitimacy 

with its citizens, it needed to provide early, consistent, 

and visible leadership of all aspects of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief effort. It was important to reassure the people that their government 

was in charge and working to address their needs. 

The earthquake significantly impaired the Haitian 

Government, and many individuals who survived 

the seismic event were understandably traumatized 

by the catastrophe. Therefore, at the beginning of the 

operation, it proved challenging to highlight the host 

nation’s leadership role. Haitians initially complained 

about the lack of visible national leadership. Over 

time, however, JTF-Haiti found ways to highlight and 

emphasize the Haitian Government’s role in directing 

and managing relief efforts via a concerted information and public relations campaign. Key efforts in-
88

cluded: involving local authorities in the distribution 

of humanitarian aid, posting social media pictures of 

national leaders visiting IDP camps, and transitioning 

control of the airport back to the Government of Haiti 

two months after the earthquake, which provided a 

visible symbol of progress. 

Conclusion

Natural disasters never occur when it is convenient, nor do any two of them unfold in the same manner. Each natural disaster brings new challenges and 

complications that must be addressed as best as possible in each situation. However, there are best practices that can be learned from Operation UNIFIED 

RESPONSE and applied to future FHA/DR efforts:

• Respond quickly and effectively. In the first 

days of an FHA/DR effort, providing an immediate response—via the delivery medical care, 

food, and water and the provision of shelter—is 

critical. It is equally important to establish and 

maintain the flow of logistics via air, sea, and 

land to facilitate the relief effort. There should 

be a balanced approach to the deployment of 

forces. While military commanders will want 

to have robust capabilities to assist in alleviating human suffering, the Joint Force should not 

overburden the logistics system with its own 

sustainment needs at the expense of the relief 

effort or create an unnecessary duplication of 

capabilities with other responding entities.

• Protect the people. During FHA/DR, the people are the center of gravity and ensuring their 

safety and protection is paramount. Even in a 
89

permissive environment, an FHA/DR effort 

can encounter violent and/or volatile situations 

(e.g., looting, criminal activities, factional fighting) that require both preemptive and reactive 

Joint Force actions. A show of force can help to 

arrest an escalating situation and provide both 

physical security and psychological comfort 

to the population. In addition, the Joint Force 

must have a longer-term view of the population’s needs and pay particular attention to the 

plight of IDPs. Planning should begin early and 

identify measures to protect IDPs from various 

threats and hazards (e.g., severe weather, lack 

of adequate shelter, an outbreak of disease). 

• Build partnerships with key players. When 

participating FHA/DR efforts, the Joint Force 

must have an understanding of the organizational culture, language, and operating practices of its partners to optimize collaborative 

efforts. This requires both institutional and 

personal relationships developed prior to and 

during the FHA/DR operation. The exchange 

of liaison officers among key organizations has 

proven beneficial to fostering relationships, 

understanding, and unity of effort. During 

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, the institutional relationship between the Joint Force and 

many of the foreign military forces within MINUSTAH enabled the troops on the ground to 

conduct combined patrols quickly and develop 

an understanding of the environment.182 The 

personal relationship between LTG Keen and 

Major General Peixoto strengthened the partnership among their forces. Similarly, the per-
90

sonal relationships that medical staff on USS

Comfort had previously developed through 

SOUTHCOM’s security cooperation missions 

enabled them to partner quickly with local and 

international medical personnel and integrate 

into the larger assistance effort. Partnerships 

within the Joint Force, developed over time, 

also provide a strong foundation for working 

together during crisis situations. For example, 

when the 22nd MEU deployed aboard USS 

Bataan, the relationship between the Marines 

and sailors developed while working together 

since September 2008, proved indispensable 

to the rapid reconstitution of the ARG/MEU. 

This enabled the deployment of a competent 

and capable force less than 48 hours following 

notification.183

• Clarify military roles and responsibilities 

upfront. During FHA/DR operations that involve multiple U.S. Government departments 

and agencies, NGOs, and various international 

participants, it is important to understand the 

scope of the military’s role. While the military 

has specific resources and expertise for FHA/

DR, it is often best for its partners to perform 

those tasks that are most suitable to them. 

Rather than Joint Force personnel distributing humanitarian aid themselves directly to 

the people, they can often work with partners 

that may have best practices, local knowledge, 

and established procedures for doing so. This 

would allow the Joint Force to focus on areas 

where it has a comparative advantage, such as 

in providing security, logistics, engineering, 

and assessment capabilities.184
91

• Ensure communication is transparent and 

consistent. As demonstrated during Operation 

UNIFIED RESPONSE, participation in largescale FHA/DR efforts requires regular communication with multiple organizations outside 

of the Joint Force. This often involves working 

outside normal military communication channels and collaboration venues. The Joint Staff 

cell within the RMT in Washington D.C. enabled DoD and USAID to establish a dedicated 

connectivity link to share information and outline priorities during the ramp up for Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. This was especially 

important because it facilitated direct communication, in the midst of a fluid situation and 

evolving U.S. response structure (e.g., ORC, 

RMT, DART, interagency task force). The use 

of “open” communications and an unclassified 

information-sharing network allowed JTF-Haiti to expand its coordination and collaboration 

with non-U.S. entities. Though degraded, the 

commercial communications infrastructure became part of the de-facto crisis response coordination architecture and a viable alternative to 

military communications, helping to improve 

situational awareness, promote unity of effort, 

prevent unnecessary duplication of resources 

and activities, and enable adaptation to an 

evolving situation.185

• Include the Host Nation Government and local nationals as much as possible. Among the 

multitude of actors participating in a FHA/

DR effort, it is important that the host nation 

government be intimately involved in plan-
92

ning and visibly concerned with the execution 

of the disaster response, especially when dealing with issues affecting sovereignty and local laws. Because the people are the “center of 

gravity” for an FHA/DR operation, they must 

see their government leading the relief effort. 

During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, the 

Joint Force was cognizant of the importance 

of clearly articulating its supporting role. JTFHaiti identified specific ways to integrate its 

efforts with the Government of Haiti and highlight the contributions and importance of local 

leaders: having them organize local aid distribution points, negotiating respectful terms for 

taking control of the air traffic over Haiti, and 

developing a responsive IDP strategy. Overshadowing the host nation government could 

have caused the population to doubt its leaders’ abilities or perceive the foreign military 

presence as overbearing. 
93

APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACP Assault Command Post

AFFOR Air Force Forces

AFNORTH Air Forces Northern

AFRICOM Africa Command

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOUTH Air Forces Southern

AOC Air and Space Operations Center

AOR Area of Responsibility 

APAN All Partners Access Network

APS Africa Partnership Station

ARFOR Army Forces

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

ARSOUTH Army South

BCT Brigade Combat Team

CA Civil Affairs

CAP Crisis Action Planning

CARICOM Caribbean Community

CCT Combat Control Team

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CLB Combat Logistics Battalion 

CONOP Concept of Operations

COP Common Operational Picture
94

CRG Contingency Response Group (CRG)

CSC Coordination Support Committee

CSG Carrier Strike Group

DART Disaster Assistance Response Team

DCHA Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and 

Humanitarian Assistance

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Teams

DOC Department of Commerce

DOI Department of the Interior

DOJ Department of Justice

DOT Department of Transportation

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOF Escalation of Force

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

ESC Expeditionary Sustainment Command

EXORD Execute Order

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (United 

Nations)

FCC Federal Communications Commission 

FHA/DR Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster 

Response

FRAGO Fragmentary Order
95

FRAPH

Revolutionary Front for Haitian Advancement 

and Progress (Front pour l’Avancement et le 

Progrès Haitien)

FUNCPLAN Functional Plan

FY Fiscal Year

GCE Ground Combat Element (U.S. Marine Corps)

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GRF

HA

Global Response Force

Humanitarian Assistance

HACC Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

HC Humanitarian Coordinator (United Nations)

HFOCC Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center

HHS Health and Human Services

HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired 

Immunodeficiency Syndrome

HLCC High Level Coordination Committee

HMMWV High-Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IHRC Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission

IOM International Organization for Migration

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Command

JFSOCC Joint Force Special Operations Component 

Command

JIIC Joint Interagency Information Cell
96

JLC Joint Logistics Command

JOTC Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (United 

Nations)

JPME Joint Professional Military Education

JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force

JTF Joint Task Force

LCU Landing Craft Utility

LTG Lieutenant General 

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MIGOPS Migrant Operations

MINUSTAH

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 

(Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en 

Haïti)

MISO Military Information Support Operations

MITAM Mission Tasking Matrix

MIST Military Information Support Team

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NCA National Command Authority

NECC Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

NCR National Capital Region

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NSC National Security Council

OAS Organization of American States
97

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Assistance (United Nations)

OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Human Rights

OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid

OPLAN Operational Plan

ORC Office of the Response Coordinator

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAO Public Affairs Officer

PCC Policy Coordination Committee

PFACC Partnership for the Americas Collaboration 

Center

PKSOI Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

(U.S. Army)

PMCC Project Management Coordination Cell

RC Resident Coordinator

RFA Request for Assistance

RMT Response Management Team

ROE Rules of Engagement

ROWPU Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units

RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and 

Integration

SAR Search and Rescue

SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOUTHCOM Southern Command
98

SOW

SRSG

Special Operations Wing

Special Representative for the Secretary General

TSC Theater Sustain Command

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children Emergency Fund

UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

USAID United States Agency for International 

Development

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCGC

USDA

United States Coast Guard Cutter

Department of Agriculture

USNS United States Naval Ship

USS United States Ship

VOCO Verbal Orders of Commanding Officer

WFP World Food Programme (United Nations)

WHO World Health Organization
99

APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY

January 12, 2010

7.0 magnitude earthquake strikes Haiti at 1653 

hours.

Haitian President Préval requests assistance from 

the United States.

CJCS declares x-hour 1800.

SOUTHCOM begins crisis action planning and 

submits its initial request for forces.

USAID stands up a Response Management Team 

in Washington, D.C.

January 13, 2010

U.S. President Barack Obama pledges U.S. 

Government support through a whole-ofgovernment effort.

U.S. Ambassador Ken Merten declares Haiti a 

disaster area.

CJCS Michael Mullen issues EXORD 2236 

authorizing U.S. military forces to commence 

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. Declares n-hour 

1800.

Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sends Assistant 

Secretary General Edmond Mulet to Haiti to 

direct the U.N.’s immediate response efforts.

USS Carl Vinson and USS Bataan are ordered to 

support the earthquake response.

USCG Cutters Forward and Mohawk arrive in 

Haiti and begin delivering relief supplies and 

evacuating American citizens.

USAID sends DART into Haiti.

AFSOC, 1st SOW, Combat Control Teams arrive 

and reestablish flight operations at the Toussaint 

L’Ouverture International Airport.

SOF Situational Awareness Team arrives.

SOUTHCOM SJTFHQ deploys to Haiti.
100

January 14, 2010

JTF-Haiti officially stands up.

USNS Comfort, 22nd MEU, 82nd Airborne 

Division, and JTF-PO ordered to joint operations 

area.

82nd Airborne Division begins to arrive in Haiti 

(1st Squadron, 73rd Calvary (1-73)).

SOF MIST arrives. 

60th Air Mobility Wing transports California 

Task Force 2 Urban SAR Team to Port-au-Prince.

Joint Assessment Team (621st Contingency 

Response Wing) arrives in Port-au-Prince to 

assess the airfield.

817th CRG arrives Port-au-Prince and begins to 

assume control of air operations from AFSOC. 

January 15, 2010

XVIII Airborne Corps ACP arrives in Haiti.

USS Carl Vinson arrives in Haiti and supports 

the operation offshore from Port-au-Prince, 

delivering relief supplies and providing 

helicopters for airlift. 

Carrier Strike Group ONE (CSG-1), with USS

Carl Vinson as its flagship, is designated JFMCC. 

JTF-Haiti and the FAA assume temporary 

control of Haiti’s airspace.

JFT-Haiti reaches initial operating capability.

The Haitian Government establishes the 

Presidential Commission on Recovery and 

Reconstruction, which worked with the UN 

cluster groups to coordinate needs and priorities 

for the response.
101

January 16, 2010

USS Bunker Hill arrives in Haiti and joins USS 

Carl Vinson.

62nd Airlift Wing transports New York Task 

Force 1 Urban SAR Team to Port-au-Prince.

January 17, 2010

82nd Airborne troops continue to arrive (1st 

Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry (1-325)).

JTF-MIGOPS (ARSOUTH) deploys to 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 

USNS Grasp arrives at Port-au-Prince to begin 

repairs to the wharves.

January 18, 2010

22nd MEU begins conducting FHA/DR 

activities, operating from USS Bataan ARG 

ships off the western shore of Haiti.

USS Gunston Hall anchors at Killick and begins 

relief operations.

January 19, 2010

82nd Airborne troops continue to arrive (2nd

Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry (2-325)).

SOUTHCOM headquarters conducts an instride reorganization to realign its structure 

with the traditional J-code arrangement.

January 20, 2010

USNS Comfort arrives and serves as a referral 

hospital for the most severely injured.

January 21, 2010

2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd 

Airborne Division is complete with the arrival 

of the 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field 

Artillery (2-319).

SOUTHCOM’s 24th Air Expeditionary Group 

takes over air traffic control operations from 

817th CRG.

Approximately 10,500 people have been 

evacuated from Haiti to the U.S., including 

8,300 U.S. citizens. Approximately 45,000 

American citizens were thought to have been 

in Haiti at the time of the earthquake.
102

January 24, 2010

24th MEU arrives in theater on USS Nassau 

ARG and begins distributing humanitarian 

aid, conducting assessments, and providing 

medical assistance along the northern peninsula 

of Haiti.

JTF-Haiti stands up the JTF-PO and JFSOCC 

Headquarters.

January 26, 2010 The Haitian Government suspends search and 

rescue efforts.

January 28, 2010 JTF-Haiti stands up the Joint Logistics 

Command. 

January 31, 2010

JTF-Haiti reaches its peak capacity with over 

22,000 service members, 58 aircraft, and 23 

ships.

9 of 16 WFP food distribution points are open. 

Phase I of the WFP food distribution surge 

begins (providing two-week rations of rice).

February 1, 2010

USS Carl Vinson, USS Bunker Hill, and USNS

Henson (T-AGS-63) end their mission and 

depart Haiti.

USS Bataan ARG assumes lead for the JFMCC.

12 of 16 WFP food distribution points are open.

January 22, 2010

U.S. Navy underwater construction team reopens the seaport.

U.S. Ambassador Ken Merten signs a 

Statement of Principles between the U.S. 

Government and the United Nations, 

recognizing the primary responsibility of the 

Haitian Government for the humanitarian 

response and the supporting role of the UN 

and U.S. Government

January 23, 2010

JTF-Haiti establishes its Air Forces 

Headquarters
103

February 2, 2010 14 of 16 WFP food distribution points are open.

February 3, 2010

The USS Higgins ends its relief mission in Haiti.

All 16 WFP food distribution points are open.

February 5, 2010

JTF-Haiti transitions from initial response 

operations (Phase I) to relief operations (Phase 

II).

February 9, 2010 USS Nassau ARG/24th MEU depart Haiti.

February 13, 2010 The USS Gunston Hall ends its relief mission in 

Haiti.

February 14, 2010 JTF-Haiti reduces its forces by roughly 13,000 

troops.

February 20, 2010 817th CRG departs Haiti.

March 1, 2010 USS Carter Hall redeploys to the United States. 

March 6, 2010

3rd ESC departs Haiti.

Phase II of the WFP food distribution surge 

begins (providing two-week rations of rice and 

four-week rations of beans, corn soy-blend, oil 

and salt). Phase II ends on March 31.

March 10, 2010 USNS Comfort departs Haiti.

March 13, 2010 JFSOCC stands down. 

March 15, 2010 JTF-PO departs Haiti.

Mid-March 2010

JTF-Haiti transitions to Restoration (Phase 

III), focusing on addressing the plight of an 

estimated one-to-two million IDPs.

March 16, 2010

Haitian Government resumes control of the 

Toussaint Louverture Airport.

March 18, 2010

JTF-Haiti Headquarters conducts a relief-inplace as ARSOUTH Headquarters replaces 

the XVIII Airborne Corps ACP, and LTG 

Keen hands over command to MG Simeon 

Trombitas. 

March 24, 2010 24th MEU redeploys from Haiti. 

March 25, 2010 USS Bataan ARG/22nd MEU leave Haiti. 

JFMCC stands down. 
104

April 18, 2010 JLC begins redeployment back to the United 

States. 

May 5, 2010

President Préval and the Council of Ministers 

sign a Presidential Decree establishing 

the IHRC to provide oversight of Haiti’s 

reconstruction and development. 

May 20, 2010

President Préval directs the development 

of a more robust and permanent Bureau for 

Resettlement of IDPs to plan for large-scale IDP 

relocation.

Late May, 2010 JTF-Haiti transitions to Recovery (Phase IV).

June 1, 2010 JTF-Haiti declares mission complete.
105

Appendix C: Biographical Sketches of Key Leaders

United States

President Barack Obama: President Obama called 

for swift action and pledged U.S. support to Haiti 

through a whole-of-government effort, led by USAID. 

The President’s guidance directed his administration 

to “lean forward” and instructed departments/agencies to work together to save lives in the wake of the 

earthquake. In addition, President Obama pledged 

$100 million to meet the disaster response needs. He 

understood that the humanitarian situation required 

a united effort with numerous individuals and organizations; he called for cooperation and partnership 

with other countries, international bodies, and NGOs. 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton: Haiti 

was a priority for the Department of State, and Secretary Clinton was actively involved in executing the 

President’s policy and ensuring that appropriate funding was available to U.S. entities for the humanitarian 

response. Secretary Clinton took special interest in the 

coordination, planning, and execution of the relief effort. Under her direction, the Department of State established an emergency operations center to manage 

the crisis continuously and stood-up six separate task 

forces to accomplish various efforts. Officials played 

a key role in evacuating 16,800 U.S. citizens from Haiti: processing visa applications for Haitian refugees 

wanting to come to the United States; planning for 

recovery, reconstruction, and stabilization; and working with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and the American and International Red Cross 

to assist orphans and vulnerable minors.186
106

Ambassador Kenneth H. Merten: In Haiti, Ambassador Merten led the U.S. Government effort. 

Shortly after the earthquake, a Haitian Government 

representative rode up on a motorbike and delivered 

an oral request for U.S. assistance, which Ambassador Merten relayed to Washington D.C. The following day, on January 13, Ambassador Merten declared 

Haiti a disaster area, clearing the way for OFDA to 

provide an initial $50,000 of aid through the U.S. embassy. To underscore that the U.S. aim was to support the Haitian people, Ambassador Merten signed 

a Statement of Principles between the U.S. Government and the United Nations, which recognized the 

primary responsibility of the Government of Haiti for 

the response effort and the supporting role of the UN 

and U.S. Government.187

USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah: President 

Obama designated Rajiv Shah, the USAID Administrator, as the unified U.S. Government coordinator 

for the Haitian disaster response. In this role, Administrator Shah synchronized the efforts of USAID, 

the Department of State, DoD, and eleven other U.S. 

departments and agencies. Within hours of the disaster, Administrator Shah deployed a DART to Haiti 

to assist the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince in managing efforts on the ground. Having assumed office 

only five days prior to the earthquake, Administrator Shah faced a number of challenges, to include an 

overstretched response structure that did not have 

adequate capacity to deal with the Haitian disaster. 

To help address this challenge, USAID established the 

Office of the Response Coordinator to strengthen coordination efforts in Haiti with the various U.S. Government departments and agencies, inadvertently cre-
107

ating some overlap of responsibilities with the USAID 

Haiti Mission Director and the DART. 

General Douglas Fraser: At the time of the Haitian 

earthquake, the SOUTHCOM Commander, General 

Douglas Fraser, had been in command for a little over 

six months. He had expressed concerns earlier about 

the command’s ability to manage a crisis and work 

with outside organizations, due to SOUTHCOM’s 

non-traditional structure (e.g., stability directorate, 

partnering directorate, partnership center). Days before the earthquake, he held a Director’s meeting to 

discuss modifications to the command’s organizational model. General Fraser felt that SOUTHCOM 

had lost some of its planning discipline—as well as 

capacity—across several of the traditional staff functional areas. When the disaster struck, the command 

had not yet implemented any organizational changes. 

General Fraser requested personnel augmentation via 

the Joint Staff. Five days into the crisis, he directed the 

staff to reorganize into the traditional J-code structure. 

Through this decision, General Fraser enabled the 

rapid integration of 274 augmentation personnel and 

made possible a more immediate contribution by the 

command.188

LTG P.K. (Ken) Keen: The Deputy Commander of 

SOUTHCOM, LTG Keen, was visiting the residence of 

the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti at the time of the quake 

and was appointed commander of JTF-Haiti on January 14. In part, LTG Keen’s selection as the JTF-Haiti 

Commander was due to his extensive relationships 

with key actors that would participate in the humanitarian response effort, including individuals in the U.S. 

Embassy, MINUSTAH, and several NGOs. His long-
108

time relationship with the MINUSTAH Commander, 

Major General Peixoto, was especially crucial; LTG 

Keen was able to facilitate early and continual coordination and ensure unity of effort between his forces 

and the UN contingent in Haiti. 

MG Simeon Trombitas: On March 18, 2010, MG 

Trombitas assumed command of JTF-Haiti. At the 

time, he was the ARSOUTH Commander and had 

been functioning as the JTF-Haiti Deputy Commander. 

When the ARSOUTH Headquarters relieved the XVIII 

Airborne Corps ACP as the JTF-Haiti Headquarters, 

MG Trombitas assumed command. The leadership 

transition occurred as JTF-Haiti prepared for the rainy 

season, and its activities focused on safeguarding IDP 

camps from impending floods. In addition, JTF-Haiti 

was in the process of redeploying forces, retaining 

only those capabilities required to assist its partners. 

During his tenure as JTF Commander, MG Trombitas 

oversaw the initial implementation of the NEW HORIZONS exercises, which included medical, dental, 

and veterinarian readiness exercises as well as the 

conduct of civil affairs and engineering projects (e.g., 

digging wells, conducting site assessments, refurbishing schools) in Port-au-Prince and interior areas of 

Haiti.189

Haiti

President René Préval: Within hours of the earthquake, President Préval sent a representative to U.S. 

Ambassador Merten’s residence, requesting immediate assistance from the United States to help reopen 

Haiti’s air and sea ports. During the initial days following the disaster, President Préval and the Hai-
109

tian Prime Minister developed an initial government 

framework to manage the response effort and coordinate with the international community. President 

Préval spearheaded the establishment of the IHRC, 

which functioned as a forum for developing Haiti’s 

long-term reconstruction and development plans. 

When the earthquake struck, President Préval was in 

his second non-consecutive term as President of Haiti. 

He also served as President from February 7, 1996 to 

February 7, 2001, and he was Prime Minister from 

February 1991 to October 11, 1991. 

Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive: Together 

with President Préval, Prime Minister Bellerive led 

the Haitian government’s response to the humanitarian disaster at both the policy and operational level. 

Within 36 hours of the earthquake, the President 

and Prime Minister developed an initial government 

framework to manage the crisis and coordinate with 

the international community. Prime Minister Bellerive 

co-chaired the High Level Coordination Committee that facilitated policy development and played a 

critical role in validating decisions by officials at the 

operational level. He also co-chaired the IHRC with 

former U.S. President Bill Clinton. The IHRC ensured 

the recovery efforts were Haitian-led; coordinated 

with donor, civil society, and private sector communities; furthered Haiti’s development goals; promoted 

accountability and transparency; and communicated 

the aspirations of the Haitian people.190
110

United Nations

UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon: As leader 

of the UN, Secretary Ban Ki Moon was a proactive 

diplomat and advocate for the Haitian people during the earthquake response effort. He directed the 

UN’s humanitarian agencies to mobilize swiftly and 

coordinate closely with the international community. 

Throughout the evening of January 12 and during 

the following morning, the Secretary General was in 

contact with key world leaders to make sure that the 

developing response would be well-coordinated, effective, and timely. Secretary Moon worked especially 

close with the Obama Administration, requesting that 

the United States send helicopters, engineers, and 

medical supplies to aid in the immediate crisis response effort. He also released $10 million from the 

Central Emergency Response Fund to kick-start the 

UN’s reaction to the crisis. 

Assistant Secretary General Edmond Mulet: Assistant Secretary Mulet was tasked by UN Secretary 

General Ban Ki Moon to assume full responsibility 

for the UN Mission in Haiti during the earthquake 

response effort. Secretary Mulet directed the UN’s 

emergency actions and played a central role in coordinating international aid. Secretary Mulet was the former SRSG for MINUSTAH, serving in this role from 

2005 to 2007. He understood Haiti, its culture, and its 

challenges. In addition to aiding the Haitian people, 

Secretary Mulet had to reassure a traumatized UN 

staff in the aftermath of the earthquake. The MINUSTAH Headquarters was completely destroyed, and 

96 UN peacekeepers lost their lives. Secretary Mulet 

provided critical leadership and helped the UN find 
111

its footing. On January 22, he signed a Statement of 

Principles between the U.S. Government and the United Nations that recognized the primary responsibility of the Government of Haiti for synchronizing the 

response effort and the supporting role of the UN and 

U.S. Government

Major General Floriano Peixoto: Major General 

Peixoto was the MINUSTAH commander during the 

Haiti relief effort. He was out of the country when the 

earthquake hit, but upon learning of the disaster, he 

returned quickly to Haiti on 13 January. He took immediate action to reconstitute command and control, 

establishing an emergency operations center at the MINUSTAH logistics base at the Port-au-Prince airport. 

He also redistributed his forces, bringing troops from 

less-affected or unaffected parts of the country into the 

capital region and downtown Port-au-Prince.191 Since 

MINUSTAH already had a strong military presence 

in Haiti, it assumed primary responsibility for maintaining security. One of the first things Major General 

Peixoto and LTG Keen did, based on their previous 

interaction and personal relationship, was to develop 

a combined concept for how JTF-Haiti and MINUSTAH would work together. Peixoto and Keen agreed 

to collaborate and provide mutual support whenever 

possible. Their early dialogue set the stage for a series 

of combined efforts, with UN and JTF-Haiti troops 

operating alongside each other, administering food 

distribution points, and providing humanitarian aid.
112

Appendix D: Key U.S. Actors and Roles in Foreign 

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

The Department of State

The Secretary of State has the long-standing, 

preeminent authority to manage the foreign affairs 

of the United States. The secretary is empowered to 

conduct and manage, on behalf of the President, all 

manner of foreign relations. The Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961 (Pub. L. 87-195), as amended (Title 22 U.S. 

Code, section 2151) authorizes the Secretary of State 

to conduct exclusively most programs for foreign assistance. Within the Department of State, the Director 

of the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) is the 

principal staff member for coordinating foreign assistance programs. The DFA mission statement includes 

integrating “foreign assistance planning and resource 

management across State and USAID” and allocating 

“State and USAID foreign assistance funding.”192 The 

Department of State expended approximately $845 

million on international disaster relief in fiscal year 

(FY) 2011 and approximately $860 million in FY 2012.193

Chief of Mission

Under the direction of the President, the Chief of 

Mission to a foreign country has responsibility for 

the direction, coordination, and supervision of all 

U.S. Government executive branch employees in that 

country (except for Voice of America correspondents 

on official assignment and personnel under the command of a United States area military commander). 

Any executive branch department or agency having 
113

personnel in a foreign country must keep the Chief of 

Mission to that country fully and currently informed 

with respect to all activities and operations. Departments/agencies must ensure that their personnel in a 

country comply fully with all applicable directives of 

the Chief of Mission.194 The U.S. Chief of Mission will 

synchronize U.S. Government efforts in a particular 

country, and the U.S. Mission and country team will 

function as an epicenter for USG collaboration.

The United States Agency for International 

Development

USAID is an independent federal government 

agency and is the principal U.S. agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to 

escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. 

To accomplish its work, USAID frequently partners 

with private voluntary organizations, academia, business entities, and international organizations, and it 

often coordinates directly with foreign government 

agencies and with U.S. government organizations, including DoD. USAID has personnel detailed to most 

U.S. embassies around the world.195

Although independent, Title 22 of the U.S. Code 

directs that the USAID Administrator reports to and 

receives foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of 

State. In 1995, President William J. Clinton designated 

the USAID Administrator as the President’s Special 

Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, 

pursuant to section 493 of the Foreign Assistance 

Act. To help establish a common vision, outline priorities, ensure unity of effort, and avoid major policy 

disagreements, the Department of State and USAID 

periodically publish a joint strategic plan. In practice, 
114

USAID is the main U.S. government agency responsible for administering the major portion of U.S. foreign 

assistance, including key programs authorized by the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.196

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

Located within the USAID Bureau for Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, OFDA is the 

principal entity responsible “for facilitating and coordinating U.S. Government emergency assistance 

overseas to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and 

reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide.”197 OFDA coordinates 

the U.S. Government response not only to all forms of 

natural disasters but also for emergencies involving 

civil conflict, acts of terrorism, or industrial accidents. 

OFDA may deploy a Disaster Assistance Response 

Team (DART) into a disaster area to assist in the coordination of a response effort. A DART provides 

specialists, trained in a variety of skills, to assist U.S. 

embassies and USAID missions with the management 

of the U.S. Government response to a foreign disaster. Its composition and specific mission will depend 

on the nature, severity, and duration of a particular 

disaster. Depending on the scope of the disaster and 

composition of the team, the DART is capable of: making assessments, recommending response activities, 

managing relief efforts, coordinating the distribution of humanitarian aid, and providing liaison with 

government officials and NGOs. The DART works 

closely with the U.S. military during foreign disaster 

relief operations. In certain circumstances, the OFDA 

director may establish a response management team 

(RMT), which serves as the primary liaison between 
115

the USAID headquarters and those entities conducting foreign disaster response operations. The RMT is 

the USAID principal point of contact for the DART, 

overseeing headquarters-based support to field operations, and is the USAID representative for workinglevel interagency coordination.198

The Department of Defense

U.S. Code Title 10, section 404 is the basic authority 

for DoD to provide FHA/DR assistance, at the request 

or with the agreement of a foreign government and 

as directed by the President. Assistance may include 

the provision of transportation, supplies, services, and 

equipment. DoD receives annual authorization and 

appropriations for many assistance activities through 

the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid 

(OHDACA) program. The authority under section 404 

is distinct from Title 10 U.S. Code, section 401, which 

authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide humanitarian and civic assistance “in conjunction with 

authorized military operations.”199

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability 

and Humanitarian Affairs

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

policy direction and oversight for FHA/DR operations are provided by the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs.200

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is 

the DoD entity primarily responsible for administering most of the department’s international security cooperation programs. Within DSCA, the Humanitarian 

Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action Division 
116

is responsible for managing DoD humanitarian assistance (HA) programs funded with OHDACA appropriations. DSCA coordinates management of DoD HA 

programs with DoD entities and with other departments/agencies of the U.S. Government, especially 

the Department of State and USAID.201

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the 

President and Secretary of Defense. He advises the 

Nation’s civilian leaders on military operations, including those involving FHA/DR. The CJCS communicates the orders of the President and Secretary 

of Defense to the various combatant commanders. 

Within the Joint Staff, the Director of Strategic Plans 

and Policy (J-5) is primarily responsible for reviewing and recommending to the CJCS the approval of 

operational plans in support of FHA/DR efforts. The 

Director for Operations (J-3) recommends to the CJCS 

the form and substance of EXORDs for such activities. 

The Director for Logistics (J-4) provides oversight of 

supporting joint logistics operations for FHA/DR.202

Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs)

The GCCs have broad latitude in the way they 

plan and conduct FHA/DR operations. Commanders 

historically have created some form of JTF for FHA/

DR operations. Some commanders also have the availability of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) 

around which to form a JTF. Conversely, they may use 

the core elements of the SJFHQ as augmentation to a 

JTF. In addition to a JTF—and, in most cases, prior to 

its deployment and full operational capability—the 
117

GCC has the option of forming other entities to include: 

• A crisis action team for immediate deployment 

and assessment of the situation.

• A survey team to provide an assessment of the 

host nations’ capabilities and facilities; determine points of contact with other governmental and nongovernmental entities involved in 

an operation; and coordinate arrangements for 

the initial arrival of supplies, equipment, and 

personnel.

• A HACC to assist initially with interagency coordination.203

The National Security Council

The NSC serves as the President’s principal entity 

for coordinating policy among various government 

departments and agencies. Within the NSC system, 

various committees may be involved in considering 

important policy issues and eventually recommending to the President a particular course of action. 

The Principals Committee—essentially the full NSC 

without the President or Vice President—historically 

has met to discuss important national security issues 

and to review and coordinate specific policy recommendations developed by subordinate NSC organizations. The Deputies Committee—normally composed 

of cabinet and independent agency deputies—is the 

next level down for the consideration of policy issues 

involving various departments and agencies.204 NSC 

Interagency Policy Committees, enable day-to-day coordination, provide policy analysis to the more senior 

committees, and ensure timely responses to Presidential decisions.205
118

Appendix E: Units Assigned to or Supporting 

JTF-Haiti

Army Forces

• XVIII Airborne Corps Assault Command 

Post (JTF-Haiti Headquarters from January 

15-March 18, 2010)

• United States Army South (JFT-Haiti Headquarters from March 18 – June 1, 2010)

• 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

• 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry (1-325)

• 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry (2-

325)

• 1st Squadron, 73rd Cavalry (1-73) 

• 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery (2-319)
119

Naval Forces

• USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) 

• USS Bataan (LHD-5) Amphibious Ready Group 

(ARG)/22nd MEU 

• USS Higgins (DDG-76)

• USS Nassau (LHA-4) ARG/24th MEU 

• USS Carter Hall (LSD-50)

• USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43)

• USS Ashland (LSD-48)

• USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19)

• USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44)

• USNS Comfort (T-AH-20)

• USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198)

• USNS Cape May (T-AKR-5063)

• USNS PFC Dwayne Williams (T-AK-30009)

• USS Normandy (CG-60) 

• USS Bunker Hill (CG-52)

• USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE-2)

• High-Speed Ferry Ship Huakai (MV)

Air Force Forces

• 601st AOC (AFNORTH)

• 612th AOC (AFSOUTH)

• 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center

• Air Mobility Command

• 6th Air Mobility Wing, Air Mobility Command

• 19th Airlift Wing

• 43rd Airlift Wing

• 60th Air Mobility Wing

• California Task Force 2 Urban SAR Team

• 62nd Airlift Wing

• New York Task Force 1 Urban SAR Team
120

• 305th Air Mobility Wing

• 317th Airlift Group

• 615th Contingency Response Wing

• 621st Contingency Response Wing

• Joint Assessment Team, 621st Contingency 

Response Wing

Air Force Reserves

• 94th Airlift Wing

• 302d Airlift Wing

• 315th Airlift Wing

• 349th Air Mobility Wing

• 433d Airlift Wing

• 440th Airlift Wing

• 446th Airlift Wing

• 452d Air Mobility Wing

• 512th Airlift Wing

• 908th Airlift Wing

• 910th Airlift Wing

• 914th Airlift Wing

• 916th Airlift Wing

• 934th Airlift Wing 

• Air National Guard

• 107th Airlift Wing

• 118th Airlift Wing

• 123d Airlift Wing

• 130th Airlift Wing

• 136th Airlift Wing

• 139th Airlift Wing

• 145th Airlift Wing

• 152d Airlift Wing

• 164th Airlift Wing

• 165th Airlift Wing

• 172d Airlift Wing
121

• 176th Airlift Wing

• 179th Airlift Wing

• 182d Airlift Wing

• Air Education and Training Command

• 97th Air Mobility Wing

• 314th Airlift Wing

• Air Force Materiel Command

• 412th Test Wing

• Warner Robins Air Logistics Center

• Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)

• 3d Wing

• 15th Mobility Wing

Special Operations Forces

• 1st SOW, AFSOC

• 623rd AOC, AFSOC

• 4th PSYOPS Group (Airborne)

• 27th Special Operations Wing

• 919th Special Operations Wing, U.S. Air Force 

Reserves

• 193d Special Operations Wing, Air National 

Guard

• U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne)

• 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)

Joint Logistics Command

• 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command 

• 377th Theater Sustain Command
122

JTF Port Opening

• 7th Sustainment Brigade, U.S. Army

• 10th Transportation Battalion, U.S. Army

• 544th Engineer Team (Dive), U.S. Army

• 688th Rapid Port Opening Element, U.S. Army

• 817th Contingency Response Group, U.S. Air 

Force

• Explosive Ordnance Group Two (EODGRU-2), 

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 

(NECC)

• USNS Grasp (T-ARS-51)

• USNS Henson (T-AGS-63)

• USNS 1st LT Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011)

• Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit TWO 

(MDSU-2)

• Underwater Construction Team ONE (UCT1), Detachment Alpha

• Naval Mobile Construction Battalion SEVEN (NMCB-7)

• Naval Beach Group TWO (NBG-2)

• Amphibious Construction Battalion TWO 

(ACB-2), NBG-2

• Assault Craft Unit TWO (ACU-2), NBG-2

• Navy Cargo Handling Battalion ONE 

(NCHB-1), NECC

• Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

• Coast Guard Maritime Transportation System 

Recovery Unit (MTSRU) 

• USCG Cutter Oak

• Port Security Unit, USCG
123

U.S. Coast Guard

• USCGC Forward

• USCGC Mohawk

• USCGC Tahoma (WMEC-908)

• USCGC Valiant

• USCGC Hamilton

• USCGC Valiant (WMEC-621)
124

Appendix F: References

Books

Farmer, Paul, Haiti: After the Earthquake, New York, 

NY: Public Affairs, 2011.

Kretchik, Walter, Robert F. Baumann and John T. 

Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold 

Democracy, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998. 

Reports

Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio, Evaluation 

of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake, Final Report, 

January 2011

Cecchine, Gary, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael A. Wermuth, Timothy Jackson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, 

Matthew Stafford, The U.S. Military Response to the 

2010 Haiti Earthquake Considerations for Army Leaders,

Washington, DC: Rand, 2013.

Center for Naval Analysis, Operation Unified Response: 

Reconstruction and Analysis of the U.S. Navy Response, 

13 August, 2010.

DiOrio, Assistant Professor David R., Operation Unified Response – Haiti Earthquake 2010, Joint Forces Staff 

College, version 1, November 2010.

Guha-Sapir, Debarati, M.S., Ph.D., Thomas Kirsch, 

M.D., M.P.H., F.A.C.E.P., Shayna Dooling, M.P.H., 

Adam Sirois, M.P.H., with assistance from Maral DerSarkissian, Independent Review of the U.S. Government 
125

Response to the Haiti Earthquake, U.S. Agency for International Development, March 28, 2011.

Haggerty, Richard A., ed. Haiti: A Country Study. 

Washington: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1989.

NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre and 

Harvard Medical School Department of Global Health 

and Social Medicine, Haiti Case Study: Towards a Comprehensive Response to Health System Strengthening in 

Crisis-Affected Fragile States, working paper of the collaborative NATO-Harvard project, June 27, 2012.

International Crisis Group, Haiti: Stabilisation and Reconstruction after the Quake, Latin America/Caribbean 

Report N°32, March 31, 2010.

Margesson, Rhoda, and Maureen Taft-Morales, Haiti 

Earthquake: Crisis and Response, Washington, D.C.: 

Congressional Research Service, March 8, 2010.

Napoli, Joseph F., Colonel, United States Army, Capacity Building for Latin America and the Caribbean: PKO 

and the Case of Haiti, U.S. Army War College, Strategy 

Research Project, March 18, 2005.

Pendleton, John, Defense Management: U.S. Southern 

Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but 

Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-801, July 

2010.

Serafino, Nina M., The Department of Defense Role in 

Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional 

Research Service, RL34639, December 9, 2008.
126

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission 

in Haiti, February 22, 2010. 

United States Marine Corps Center for Lesson Learned, 

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operation Unified Response, August 23, 2010

Wallwork, Ellery D., Kathy S. Gunn, Mark L. Morgan, 

Kathryn A. Wilcoxson, Operation Unified Response: Air 

Mobility Command’s Response to the Haiti Earthquake 

Crisis, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois: Office of History, 

Air Mobility Command, December 2010.

U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), USSOUTHCOM 

and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in 

Forming a Joint Task Force, Joint Center for Operational 

Analysis, June 24 2010.

Articles

Elton, Colonel Buck, “Haiti: Boots on the Ground 

Perspective,” Small Wars Journal, 2009, available from 

http://smallwarsjournal.com. 

Butterfield, Alan, Ronaldo Reario and Robert Dolan, 

“The United Nations Humanitarian Civil–Military 

Coordination (UN–CMCoord) response to the Haiti 

earthquake,” Humanitarian Exchange, Number 48, October 2010, pp. 13-14.

Catchings, Thomas, “Containers for Haiti: Providing 

Transportation and Temporary Infrastructure,” Army 

Sustainment: The 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command Supports Disaster Relief, November December 

2010, pp. 46-47.
127

Comer, Richard, Major General, U.S. Air Force (Retired), “Military Help in Haiti Earthquake: Initial Entry Force,” Defense Media Network, available at www.

defensemedianetwork.com/stories/

Fraser, General Douglas M. and Major Wendell S. 

Hertzelle, United States Air Force, “Haiti Relief: An 

International Effort Enabled through Air, Space, and 

Cyberspace,” Air and Space Power Journal, Winter 2010, 

Volume XXIV, No. 4 AFRP 10-1, pp. 5-12.

Keen, Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken), Lieutenant Colonel Matthew G. Elledge, Lieutenant Colonel Charles 

W. Nolan, and Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer L. Kimmey, U.S. Army, “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task 

Force Haiti Observations,” Military Review, NovemberDecember 2010, pp. 85-96. 

Keen, P.K. (Ken), Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; 

Major General, Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, Army 

of Brazil; Lieutenant Colonel, Charles W. Nolan, U.S. 

Army; Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer L. Kimmey, U.S. 

Army; and Commander Joseph Althouse, U.S. Coast 

Guard, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” Military Review, 

May-June 2010, pp. 2-12.

Hayes, Major Paul R., “Deploying an Expeditionary 

Sustainment Command to Support Disaster Relief,” 

Army Sustainment: The 3d Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command Supports Disaster Relief, November December 2010, pp. 4-8.

Hayes, Major Paul R., “A Series of Firsts: The 3d ESC 

in Operation Unified Response,” Army Sustainment: 

The 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command Supports 

Disaster Relief, November December 2010, pp. 9-11.
128

Holmes, John Sir, “Learning the lessons of Haiti,” Humanitarian Exchange, Number 48, October 2010, pp. 

2-3.

Lagan, Christopher, “UPDATE: Coast Guard response 

to Haiti earthquake,” Coast Guard Compass, January 

15, 2010, available at coastguard.dodlive.mil, accessed 

on May 20, 2016.

McCaskill, Larry D., “Using Lessons Learned for Contracting in Haiti,” Army Sustainment: The 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command Supports Disaster Relief, 

November December 2010, pp. 49.

Ohlweiler, John N. Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army), 

“ Building the Airplane While in Flight: International 

and Military Law Challenges in Operation Unified Response,” The Army Lawyer, Department of the Army 

Pamphlet 27-50-452, January 2011, pp. 9-30.

Interviews

Hector Pagan, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Retired 

(March 24, 2016)

David Becker, former U.S. Foreign Service Officer, 

(March 30, 2016)

Simeon Trombitas, Major General, U.S. Army, Retired 

(March 30, 2016)

Other References

Keen, Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken), “US SOUTHCOM COMMAND Overview and Operation Unified 

Response,” Presentation at Georgia Institute of Technology, Globalization, Innovation, and Development 

Invited Speakers Seminar Series, November 11, 2010. 
129

Joint Logistics Command, “Joint Logistics Command 

– Haiti, Command Briefing,” February 13, 2010.

Joint Publication 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 

January 3, 2014.

Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, 29 September 2011

Sangrey , Paul M. and Karen J. Finkenbinder (eds), 

Preventing And Managing Conflict in an Unstable World, 

Anthology of United States Army Peacekeeping & 

Stability Operations Institute Intern Papers, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 

2014.

Schear, James, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Partnership Strategic and Stability Operations, 

“National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and 

Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM,” testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security 

and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 

Washington, D.C., July 28, 2010.

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

Stability Operations, Washington, D.C., Department of 

Defense Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009.

Defense Coordinating Office, “Operation Unified Response: Haiti Earthquake Situation Update, Joint Staff 

briefing, 22 January 2010.

Remarks by the President on Recovery Efforts in Haiti, 

White House, January 14, 2010.

United Nations, MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, available from http://www.
130

un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.

shtml.

United Nations (UN) Security Resolution 1542 (establishing the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)), UN Security Council, April 30, 2004.

U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, Fourth Fleet, 

“Haiti HA/DR and Climate Change Impact on Naval 

Operations and SOUTHCOM AOR,” Briefing, Undated.

U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” Joint Center 

for Operational Analysis, Final Draft, May 15, 2010. 

U.S. Southern Command, “Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010,” 

Narrative History of Operation Unified Response, 

available from http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom. 

U.S. Southern Command, “Campaign Plan 

Framework Operation Unified Response - 

Transition to Long Term Engagement,” briefing.
131

End Notes

1 U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Joint Center for 

Operational Analysis, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti 

Earthquake Response,” Final Draft, May 15, 2010, p.13.

2 Haggerty, Richard A., ed. Haiti: A Country Study. Washington: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 

1989, available at countrystudies.us/haiti/, accessed on 7 March 

2016.

3 ibid

4 ibid

5 CIA World Factbook, available at cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html, accessed on 7 March 

2016.

6 Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio, Evaluation of 

OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake, Final Report, January 2011, 

p. 21.

7 CIA World Factbook

8 CIA World Factbook

9 Kretchik, Walter, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, 

Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. 

Army in Operation Uphold Democracy, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998, pp. 1-6 

and Ohlweiler, John N. Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army), “ Building the Airplane While in Flight: International and Military Law 

Challenges in Operation Unified Response,” The Army Lawyer, 

Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-452, January 2011, p.11.

10 Kretchick, et al, pp. 1-6.

11 ibid

12 ibid
132

13 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915–34 and Kretchik, et al, pp. 6-7.

14 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915–34, available 

at history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/haiti, accessed on 

April 11, 2016.

15 ibid and Kretchik, et al., pp. 6-9.

16 Haggerty, Haiti: A Country Study

17 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones - Intervention in Haiti 1994-1995”, available at history.

state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti, accessed on April 7, 2016.

18 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 867, September 23, 1993.

19 Keen, Ken, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; Major General, Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, Army of Brazil; Lieutenant Colonel, Charles W. Nolan, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer 

L. Kimmey, U.S. Army; and Commander Joseph Althouse, U.S. 

Coast Guard, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance 

and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” Military Review, May-June 2010, 

pp.5-7.

20 Keen, et al, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” pp.5-7 and Kretchik, et al., pp. 

46-95, 167-173.

21 Keen, et al, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” pp.5-7

22 ibid and “Operation Secure Tomorrow”, available at globalsecurity.org/military/ops/haiti04.htm, accessed on April 7, 

2016.

23 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1529, February 29, 2004 and United Nations Security Council, “Security 

Council Authorizes Deployment of Multinational Force to Haiti 

for 3 Months, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1529 (2004)”, 

Press Release, February 29, 2004. 
133

23 a President Aristide, however, contends that he was coerced to leave the country and kidnapped by the U.S. military.

24 Napoli, Joseph F., Colonel, United States Army, Capacity 

Building for Latin America and the Caribbean: PKO and the Case of 

Haiti, U.S. Army War College, Strategy Research Project, March 

18, 2005, pp. 7-9.

25 ibid, p. 9.

26 “Operation Secure Tomorrow”, available at globalsecurity.org/military/ops/haiti04.htm, accessed on April 8, 2016.

27 Napoli, pp. 7-12.

28 UN Security Resolution 1542 (establishing the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), UN Security Council, 

April 30, 2004, section 7(I)(a).

29 ibid.

30 JFCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” p. 13.

31 Guha-Sapir, Debarati, M.S., Ph.D., Thomas Kirsch, M.D., 

M.P.H., F.A.C.E.P., Shayna Dooling, M.P.H., Adam Sirois, M.P.H., 

with assistance from Maral DerSarkissian, Independent Review of 

the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, March 28, 2011, p.17.

32 ibid, pp. 8, 17

33 JFCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” p. 13.

34 Guha-Sapir, et al, p. 10.

35 Margesson, Rhoda, and Maureen Taft-Morales, Haiti 

Earthquake: Crisis and Response, Washington, D.C.: Congressional 

Research Service, March 8, 2010, pp. 1-3.

36 ibid, p. 3.

37 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,”, pp. 85-89 and Margesson and Taft-Morales, 
134

p. 1-3, and Cecchine, Gary, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael A. Wermuth, Timothy Jackson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Matthew Stafford, The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake Considerations for Army Leaders, Washington, DC: RAND, 2013, pp.1-4; 

and JFCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake 

Response”.

38 Keen, Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken), “US SOUTHCOM 

COMMAND Overview and Operation Unified Response,” Presentation at Georgia Institute of Technology, Globalization, Innovation, and Development Invited Speakers Seminar Series, November 11, 2010.

39 Cecchine, et al. pp. 11-12

40 Guha-Sapir, et al, pp. 10-11, 36.

41 ibid, pp. 36-37.

42 ibid, pp. 36-37.

43 JFCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” p. 29.

44 Bhattacharjee and Lossio, p. 21.

45 ibid, p. 23.

46 Interview with David Becker, former U.S. Foreign Service 

Officer, who served as the Political Advisor to LTG Keen during 

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, March 30, 2016. 

47 Bhattacharjee and Lossio, pp. 10-29.

48 ibid, p. 29.

49 ibid.

50 Guha-Sapir, et al, p. 73

51 ibid

52 ibid

53 “Haitian boat people,” available at immigrationtounitedstates.org/536-haitian-boat-people.html, accessed on April 6, 

2016.
135

54 Becker, David C. and Robert Grossman-Vermaas, Metrics 

for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, From the Field, PRISM 2, no. 

2, pp. 145-147 and U.S. Department of State, “Haiti Stabilization 

Initiative”, www.state.gov, accessed 14 February 2016. 

55 Guha-Sapir, et al, p.8.

56 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks 

by the President on Recovery Efforts in Haiti, January 14, 2010.

57 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks 

by the President on Rescue Efforts in Haiti,” January 13, 2010.

58 Cecchine, et al. pp. 40, 51.

59 U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), USSOUTHCOM 

and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming 

a Joint Task Force, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, June 24 

2010.

60 Cecchine, et al, p. 32.

61 U.S. Southern Command, “Campaign Plan Framework 

Operation Unified Response - Transition to Long Term Engagement,” briefing, p.5

62 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” pp. 89-90 and SOUTHCOM, “Campaign 

Plan Framework Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE” pp.5-7

63 Keen, et al, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” pp. 9-12.

64 JFCOM,” USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force”.

65 JFCOM, USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force

66 ibid

67 ibid

68 JFCOM, USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force

69 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 
136

Haiti Observations,”p.86

70 Ohlweiler, John N. Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army), 

“Building the Airplane While in Flight: International and Military 

Law Challenges in Operation Unified Response,” The Army Lawyer, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-452, January 2011, 

pp. 15-20.

71 ibid

72 JFCOM, “USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force”.

73 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” p.93 

74 Cecchine, et al. pp. 39-40

75 ibid, pp. 44-45

76 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” p. 91.

77 Cecchine, et al. pp. 44-45

78 JFCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” pp. 67-68 and Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations,” p. 91.

79 JFCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” p. 66

80 ibid, p. 102 and Keen, “US SOUTHCOM COMMAND 

Overview and Operation Unified Response”.

81 JFCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” pp. 102-103.

82 ibid, p. 104.

83 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” pp. 91-94

84 ibid

85 Cecchine, et al., p. 31.
137

86 ibid, p. 40.

87 Cecchine, et al., p. 38, Walwork, et al., p. 4, and SOUTHCOM, “Campaign Plan Framework Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, p. 7-10.

88 Interview with Major General, Retired, Simeon Trombitas, March 30, 2016

89 Cecchine, et al. pp. 38-42.

90 Comer, Richard, Major General, U.S. Air Force (Retired), 

“Military Help in Haiti Earthquake: Initial Entry Force,” Defense 

Media Network, available at www.defensemedianetwork.com/

stories/, accessed on May 27, 2016.

91 Wallwork, et al, p. 29.

92 Comer, “Military Help in Haiti Earthquake: Initial Entry 

Force,”.

93 JFCOM, “USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force”.

94 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” pp. 85-86 and Cecchine, et al., p. 26.

95 Wallwork, et al, pp. 15-24.

96 USSOUTHCOM, “U.S. military relief operations in Haiti”, available at www.dvidshub.net/news/44017/us-militaryrelief-operations-haiti#.VwAlB032bIU, accessed on April 2, 2016 

and Cecchine, et al. p. 35.

97 JFCOM, USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force 

98 Cecchine, et al. p. 40 and JFCOM, “Operation UNIFIED 

RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” p. 146. 

99 JFCOM, “USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force”.

100 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” p. 89.
138

101 Guha-Sapir, et al.., p. 71.

102 Interview with Hector Pagan, Brigadier General, U.S. 

Army, Retired, March 24, 2016.

103 JFCOM, “Operation Unified Response - Haiti Earthquake 

Response,” p. 58-61.

104 NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre and 

Harvard Medical School Department of Global Health and Social 

Medicine, p. A-4.

105 JFCOM, “Operation Unified Response - Haiti Earthquake 

Response,” pp. 59-62 and DiOrio, Assistant Professor David R., 

Operation Unified Response – Haiti Earthquake 2010, Joint Forces 

Staff College, version 1, November 2010, p. 14 and interview with 

Hector Pagan, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Retired, March 24, 

2016. 

106 ibid, pp. 12-16, 36.

107 Cecchine, et al. pp. 23.

108 Wallwork, et al, p.2.

109 Margesson and Taft-Morales, p.12.

110 Fisher-Thompson, Jim, “U.S. Military Helped Searchand-Rescue Efforts in Haiti: Military engineers assisted in rescue 

pitting hope against odds”, Staff Writer, IIP Digital, iipdigital.

usembassy.gov, 28 January 2010, accessed on March 31, 2016

111 Cecchine, et al. pp. 26.

112 USSOUTHCOM, “U.S. military relief operations in Haiti”, available at www.dvidshub.net/news/44017/us-military-relief-operations-haiti#.VwAlB032bIU, accessed on April 2, 2016.

113 “Bataan, 22nd MEU Complete Operation Unified Response Support,” USS Bataan Public Affairs, Story Number: 

NNS100325-01, March 25, 2010, www.navy.mil, accessed on April 

3, 2016. 

114 USS Nassau ARG/24th MEU Depart Haiti, Story Number: NNS100207-09Release, February 7, 2010, available at www.

navy.mil, accessed on April 3, 2016. 
139

115 Schear, James A. Dr., “Haiti’s 2010 Earthquake and the 

U.S. Response: Lessons for Asia-Pacific Disasters”, Banyan Analytics Brief, Anser, July 29, 2015, www.anser.org, accessed on February 29, 2016. 

116 “Joint medical team provides caring hands for Haiti effort,” 3rd Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Public Affairs, 

February 16, 2010. 

117 U.S. Southern Command, “Operation Unified Response: 

Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010,” Narrative History of 

Operation Unified Response, www.southcom.mil/newsroom, 

accessed on 26 February 2016 and Farmer, Paul, Haiti: After the 

Earthquake, New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011, p. 303-306.

118 LaVey, A.M, Army Specialist, “Operation Unified Response transitions to Haitian self-sustainment”, available at 

southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Operation-Unified-Response, 

accessed March 31, 2016.

119 NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre and 

Harvard Medical School Department of Global Health and Social 

Medicine, Haiti Case Study: Towards a Comprehensive Response to 

Health System Strengthening in Crisis-Affected Fragile States, working paper of the collaborative NATO-Harvard project, June 27, 

2012, p. B-5

120 ibid

121 Guha-Sapir, et al.., pp.9, 27.

122 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,”p.87 and Baker III, Fred W., “Airborne troops 

provide first glimpse of relief in Haiti,” American Forces Press 

Service, January 17, 2010. 

123 Keen, et al, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” p. 10.

124 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” p. 87.

125 SOUTHCOM, “U.S. military relief operations in Haiti”, 

available at www.dvidshub.net/news/44017/us-military-reliefoperations-haiti, accessed on April 2, 2016.
140

126 United States Marine Corps (USMC) Center for Lesson 

Learned, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operation Unified 

Response, August 23, 2010, pp. 13-14.

127 Curtis, Bobbie Corporal (USMC), “Haitians receive thousands of pounds of relief supplies each day,” 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, II Marine Expeditionary Force, MCB Camp 

Lejeune, NC, January 28, 2010, available at www.22ndmeu.marines.mil, accessed on April 3, 2016.

128 “Bataan, 22nd MEU Complete Operation Unified Response Support” 

129 USMC Center for Lesson Learned, p. 14-16

130 ibid

131 Interview with David Becker, March 30, 2016.

132 Piper, Robert Gunnery Sgt. (USMC), “24th MEU delivers food, medical supplies and a few smiles”, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, 

NC, January 26, 2010, available at www.24thmeu.marines.mil/

News/, accessed on April 3, 2016.

133 Wallwork, et al, p. 19.

134 Wallwork, Ellery D., Kathy S. Gunn, Mark L. Morgan, 

Kathryn A. Wilcoxson, Operation Unified Response: Air Mobility 

Command’s Response to the Haiti Earthquake Crisis, Scott Air Force 

Base, Illinois: Office of History, Air Mobility Command, December 2010, p. 4.

135 ibid., pp. 4-7, 29-35

136 Wallwork, et al., pp. 4-7, 29-35

137 ibid, pp. 3-4 and Cecchine , et al., p. 39

138 Cecchine, et al. pp. 35-36

139 HQs USSOUTHCOM, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE 

AAR” briefing, 10 May 2010, slide 51.

140 SOUTHCOM, “Campaign Plan Framework Operation 

UNIFIED RESPONSE”, p.10.
141

141 Keen, P.K. (Ken), Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; Major 

General, Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, Army of Brazil; Lieutenant 

Colonel, Charles W. Nolan, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer L. Kimmey, U.S. Army; and Commander Joseph Althouse, 

U.S. Coast Guard, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” Military Review, May-June 

2010, p 9.

142 Schear, “Haiti’s 2010 Earthquake and the U.S. Response: 

Lessons for Asia-Pacific Disasters”.

143 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” p. 90 and LaVey, “Operation Unified Response transitions to Haitian self-sustainment”.

144 Guha-Sapir, et al.., pp. 10, 31, 73.

145 LaVey, “Operation Unified Response transitions to Haitian self-sustainment”, available at southcom.mil/newsroom/

Pages/Operation-Unified-Response, accessed March 31, 2016)

146 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,” p. 95, Cecchine, et al. pp. 41-42, and Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with U.S. Navy Captain 

James Wink, Joint Task Force-Haiti J7 (engineer), via teleconference subject: engineering efforts conducted by Joint Task ForceHaiti Time, April 15, 2010.

147 DiOrio, p. 15.

148 Wallwork, et al.., p. 4

149 DiOrio, p. 15-16.

150 ibid

151 Cecchine, et al., p. 43, DiOrio, p. 15-16, and Interview with 

MG (Retired) Simeon Trombitas.

152 Trombitas, Simeon, Major General, U.S. Army, ”An Enduring Partnership for the Future of Haiti,” DoDLive, available at 

www.dodlive.mil, accessed on May 20, 2016.

153 Guha-Sapir, et al, p. 76
142

154 Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Stability Operations, 29 September 2011, p. viii.

155 Guha-Sapir, et al, p. 11 and interview with MG (Retired) 

Simeon Trombitas.

156 USMC Center for Lesson Learned, p. 14.

157 Guha-Sapir, et al, p. 40, 51.

158 ibid, p. 9.

159 JP 3-07, p. I-16.

160 Keen, et al, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” p. 10.

161 JP 3-07, p. I-16.

162 JFCOM, USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force

163 Cecchine, et al. p. 34 and JOAC “Operation Unified Response - Haiti Earthquake Response,” pp, 93-95, and Keen, et al., 

“Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations,” 

p.86

164 Cecchine, et al. p. 34 and JOAC “Operation Unified Response - Haiti Earthquake Response,” pp, 93-95, and Keen, et al., 

“Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations,” 

p.86

165 Interview with David Becker, March 30, 2016.

166 Guha-Sapir, et al, p. 16.

167 JP 3-07, p. I-17.

168 Interview with David Becker, March 30, 2016.

169 United States Marine Corps (USMC) Center for Lesson 

Learned, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operation Unified 

Response, August 23, 2010, pp. 4, 16. 

170 ibid, p. I-20.

171 Keen, US SOUTHCOM COMMAND Overview and Operation Unified Response
143

172 JFCOM, “Operation Unified Response - Haiti Earthquake 

Response,” p. 39.

173 Guha-Sapir, et al, pp. 10-23.

174 ibid, and Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint 

Task Force Haiti Observations,” p. 93, and JFCOM, “Operation 

UNIFIED RESPONSE - Haiti Earthquake Response,” p. 21.

175 Guha-Sapir, et al, pp. 12-42.

176 Interview with David Becker, March 30, 2016.

177 JP 3-07, Stability Operations, pp. I-18.

178 Ohlweiler, pp. 15-20.and Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster 

Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations,”pp.89

179 Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force 

Haiti Observations,”p.85.

180 JP 3-07, Stability Operations, p. I-18.

181 ibid, p. I-20.

182 Keen, et al, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,”p.9.

183 United States Marine Corps (USMC) Center for Lesson 

Learned, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operation Unified 

Response, August 23, 2010, p.11.

184 USMC Center for Lesson Learned, p. 4.

185 JFCOM, “Operation Unified Response - Haiti Earthquake 

Response,” p. 61)

186 Cecchine, et al. p. 25

187 Cecchine, et al. pp. 22, 49 and Guha-Sapir, et al, pp. 71-72.

188 JFCOM, “USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force”.

189 Cecchine, et al., p. 43, DiOrio, p. 15-16, and Interview with 

MG (Retired) Simeon Trombitas.
144

190 Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “Fast Fact on U.S. 

Government’s Work in Haiti: Interim Haiti Recovery Commission,” January 8, 2011, available at www.state.gov, accessed on 

May 31, 2016.

191 Keen, et al, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,”pp. 1-8.

192 Cecchine, et al., pp. 10-20.

193 ibid

194 22 U.S. Code, Section 3927 - Chief of mission, available 

at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title22/

html/USCODE-2010-title22.htm, accessed on 10 June 2016.

195 Cecchine, et al., pp. 10-20

196 ibid

197 ibid

198 ibid

199 ibid

200 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and 

Humanitarian Affairs, available at http://policy.defense.gov/

OUSDPOffices/ASDforSpecialOperationsLowIntensityConflict/

StabilityandHumanitarianAffairs.aspx, accessed on 4 June 2016.

201 Cecchine, et al., pp. 10-20.

202 ibid and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, pp. II-2, 

7-8. See also: Joint Chiefs of Staff, available at http://www.jcs.

mil/Home.aspx, accessed on 4 June 2016.

203 ibid

204 ibid

205 Presidential Policy Directive – 1, Subject: Organization 

of the National Security Council System, February 13, 2009, available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf, accessed on 

4 June 2016.
145

Appendix E

See Figure 6 for the core JTF-Haiti organization. The list of units 

in this appendix is not exhaustive. The author could not find a 

centralized and official list of all units assigned to or supporting 

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. Many individual services and 

organizations conducted their own studies on the operation and 

partially documented participation. Therefore, this appendix was 

compiled from a variety of sources and is meant to showcase 

the breadth of participation in Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. 

Furthermore, many of the organizations did not deploy their 

entire units but provided select capabilities. For example, a 

number of U.S. Air Force Groups and Wings only deployed 

certain designated aircraft (e.g., C-17s, C-130s) that provided air 

mobility. The sources used for this appendix include: (1) Cecchine, 

Gary, et al, The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: 

Considerations for Army Leaders, Washington, DC: Rand, 2013; 

(2) U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, Fourth Fleet, “Haiti 

HA/DR and Climate Change Impact on Naval Operations and 

SOUTHCOM AOR,” briefing, undated; (3) Center for Naval 

Analysis, Operation Unified Response: Reconstruction and Analysis of 

the U.S. Navy Response, 13 August, 2010; (4) United States Marine 

Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Humanitarian Assistance/

Disaster Relief Operation Unified Response, August 23, 2010; (5) 

Wallwork, et al, Operation Unified Response: Air Mobility Command’s 

Response to the Haiti Earthquake Crisis, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois: 

Office of History, Air Mobility Command, December 2010; and 

(6) Lagan, Christopher, “UPDATE: Coast Guard response to Haiti 

earthquake,” Coast Guard Compass, January 15, 2010.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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Mr. R. Christopher Browne

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Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
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