UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 96-978
B URKE H ENS L EY , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
. On Appellant' s Application for A ttorney Fe es and Expenses
(De cided Nove mber 27, 2002 )

Ed wa rd B. My e rs , of North Potomac, Ma ryland, and Barton F. Stichman , of Washington, D. C., we re on

the ple a din g s f

or the a pp e lla nt. Leigh A. Bradley , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , A ssi sta nt G e nera l Co un se l; Michae l A. Le on ar d , Deputy Assistant G ener al Counsel; and An n G . G awa lt , all of Washington, D.C., we re on the pleading s for the a

ppellee.
Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and HOL DAWAY and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. HOL DAWAY, Judge , filed the opinion of the Court. STEI

NB ERG, Judge , filed an opinion c on c ur ri ngin p art

and dis se nti ngin p art

. HOL DAWAY, Judge : Be fore the Court is the appe llant's a pplication, pursuant to the Equa l Acc ess to J ustice Ac t (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), for attorney fee s and ex penses, in the amount of $58,691.54. The Sec reta ry has filed a

response oppos i n g t h e grant of E AJ A fe es, and the appellant ha s filed a reply

. Eac h party subsequently submitt ed a supple mental memora ndum of law in r e sp on se to the Court ' s or de r of May 10 , 20 02

. F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , th e Court wi ll g ra nt i n part the a ppellant' s EAJ A application, in the amount of $47,098.97.2 I. BACKG ROUND The a ppellant, B urke H ensley , previously appea led a Fe bruar y 1996 decision of the B oard of Veterans' Appea ls (B VA or Boa rd) that had denied, as not well g rounded, his cla im for servic e
con n ec tion for hea

rt disease as a r esidual of mustard g as exposure bec ause his condition was not among the disabilities lis ted i n 3 8 C

. F. R. § 3.316 as presumptively service connec ted base d on mustard g as exposure. The a ppellant appe al ed the B oard' s decision to this Court, asking the Court to re verse the Boa rd' s determination bec ause, he alleg ed, his claim for service connec tion was well g rounded. The Se c re tary fi le d a br ie f wi th the Court se e kin g a ff ir manc e ; he argue d that the a pp e lla nt fa iled to

s u b m i t c o m p et en tm ed i ca l ev i d en ce o f a n ex u s b et we en m u s t ar d gas ex p o s u re an d

t h e ap p el l an t 's hear t disease. On September 22, 1998, the C ourt, by single judge , aff

irmed the B oard de cision; the Court noted that, althoug h the B oard ha d err ed in finding the appe llant's c laim not well gr ounded simply beca use h i s condit ion was not among those listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.316, that error was harmless be cause , upon perf orming a de novo r eview of the well g roundedne ss issue, the Court found that the a

ppellant' s claim for dire ct servic e conne ction was not we ll gr ounded. The a ppellant appe aled the Court' s decision to the U.S. Court of Appea ls for the F eder al Cir c uit (F e d e r a l C i r c u i t )

. O nM ay 1 2 , 2 0 0 0 , t h e F e d e r a l C i r c u i ti s s u e d ano p i n i o nh o l d i n g t h a t, althoug h this Court correc tly held that the B oard e rre d in finding that the appellant' s hear t condition was not we ll gr ounded solely beca use his condition was not listed with those eligible f or pre sumptive service connec tion unde r 38 C.F.R. § 3.316, the B oard ha d not rea ched the fac tual issue of whe ther sufficie nt evidence had bee n prese nted to establish a well-g rounded c laim for dire ct servic e
connec tion, and that this Cour t i m permissibly eng ag ed in fa ct finding in holding, upon de novo revie w, that the appe llant's c laim for dire ct servic e conne ction was not we ll gr ounded. The Fe dera l Cir c uit va c a te d th is C ourt ' s d eci si on and re mand e d th e ma tte r f

or pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt w ithits opinion. He ns le

yv . W est , 212 F.3d 1255 ( Fe d. Cir. 2000). On Jul y 24, 2000, this Court vacated the Fe b ru ary 1 9 9 6 Bo a r d d e c i s i o nan d re m an d edt h e ap p el l an t 's cl ai m t o t h e B o ar d fo r p ro ce ed i n gs consistent with the Fe dera l Circuit's opinion. J udg ment was e ntere d on Aug ust 15, 2000, and mandate w as issued on Oc tober 17, 2000.3

On September

8, 2000 , t he appe llant submit ted a pr emature EAJA application, which the Court filed on Octobe r 17, 2000, whe n mandate ha d issued, signi fy i n g t h at t he August 15, 2000, judgme nt ha d become final. See P ardue v. Princ ipi , 15 Vet.App. 120, 122 ( 2001) (pe r cur iam order ) (holding that judgme nt becomes final, by operation of l aw, 60 day s after entry of judg ment; issuance

o f m an d a t e i s "m i n i s t er i al fu n ct i o n " ( qu o t i n g Str ou th v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 502, 504 ( 1996) (pe r curiam order) )).

II. AN AL YSI S A. Juri sd ic tio na l and

Con te nt R e qu ir e me nts "T he Court has jurisdiction to awa rd reasonable attorney

fee s and expenses pursua nt to 28 U.S .C . § 24 12 (d) (2) (F)." Cullens v. Gober , 14 Vet.App. 234, 237 (2001) (en banc)

. I n order for the Court to have jurisdiction ove r an EAJA application, the application must be filed within the 30-day p e r i o d e s t a b l i s h e d i n 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 4 1 2 ( d ) ( 1 ) ( B )

. I n o r d e r f o r an a p p e l l an t t o b e e l i g i b l e f

o r anE A JA

aw ar d , t h e E A JA a

p p l i c a t i o n m u s t c o n t a i n ( 1 ) a s h o w i n g t h a t t h e a p p l i c an t i s a p re va ili ng pa rt y within the meaning of the EAJA; (2) an assertion t hat t he applicant' s net worth does not exceed $2 milli on; (3) an a lleg ation that the position of the Secre tary at t he adminis trative level or in litigation

wa s n ot s ub sta

nti a lly jus tif ie d; a nd (4 ) an i tem iz ed sta te me nt o f t he fe e s and

e xpe ns e s so ug ht, supported by

an af fidavit from the a

pplicant' s counsel. See 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) ; Thayer v. Principi , 15 Ve t.A pp . 2 04 , 2 07 (2 00 1) ; Cullens , 1 4 V e t.A pp . at 23 7; Che

sse r v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 497, 499 (1 99 8) ; Ba

za lo v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 304, 308 ( 1996) (e n banc) , rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ba za lo v . W est, 15 0 F .3 d 1 38 0, 13 84 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 8) . In o rd e r f or an a pp lic ant t o b e e nti tle d to fe e s, (1 ) t he Court mus t f ind tha t th e pa rt y op po sin g the Un ite d State s is a pr e va ili ng pa rt y ; (2 ) the re mus t be an a lleg ation by

the appe llant that the g overnme nt's position was not substantially justified and there must be no Court finding to the contra ry ; and (3) the re must be no Court finding that there are circ umstances that would make an aw ard a g ainst the g overnme nt unjust. See Cullens , 14 Vet.App. at 240; Elc

y zy n v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 170, 174 ( 1994). As the Secr etar

y conce des, t he appellant' s EAJA application wa s timely filed, and the re a

re no circ umstances that would make an aw ard in some r easona ble amount unjust. Further , the Court notes that the appellant does assert that his net worth did not exceed $2 milli on at t he ti me t he ac tion4

was filed, he alleg es that the Secre tary ' s position at both the administrative and litigation levels wa s not substantially

justified, and he ha s filed an itemized statement of f ees a nd expenses supported by his c ouns e l' s a ff

ida vit

. Th e a pp e lla nt a lso a sse rt s th a t he is a pr e va ili ng pa rt y
. Th e Court ha s r e c e ntl y he ld t hat in order to be considere d a preva iling party for purposes of obtaining an EAJA aw ard, th e appellant who obtains a re mand that does not direc t the awa rd of be nefits must show that the rema nd was "pred ica ted up on adm in is tr ati ve er ror ." Sumner v . Principi , 15 Vet.App. 256, 2 6 4 -6 5 (2001) ( en banc)

. Given that the rema nd here was based on the Boa rd' s misint erpr etation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.316 and the B oard' s failure to consider whe ther the a ppellant had prese nted evidenc e of a w ell-g rounded

c la im fo r dir e c t se rv ic e c on ne c tio n, and , in lig ht o f t he Se c re tary ' s c on c e ssi on that th e a pp e lla nt i s a pre vailing pa

rty , the Court finds that the appe llant is a preva iling par ty

. See B riddell v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 267, 271-74 (2 0 0 2). The only issues remainingin contention are (1) whe ther the Secre tary was substantially justified in his a dminist rative and litigation positions and, if the Court finds that the S ecr etar

y was not substantially justified in either positi on, (2) whe ther the EA J A fe es reque sted by

the appe llant are rea sonable.

B. Substantial J ustification Once an appe llant has alleg ed a l ac k o f subs tantial justification, the burden shifts to the Secre tary to pr ove that VA was substantially justified both in its administrativ e a n d litigation positions. See Cullens , 14 Vet.App. at 237; Loc he r v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A pp . 5 35 , 5 37 (1 99 6) ; Ba

za lo , 9 V e t.A pp . at 30 9; Sti llwe ll v . B ro wn , 6 Ve t.A pp . 2 91 , 3 01 (1 99 4) . T his Cou rt ha s h e ld, in de te rm ini ngwh e the r t

he po sit ion

of the Se c re tary

wa s su bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d: VA must demonstrate the rea sonablene ss, in law and fac t, of the position of . . . VA in a matter before the C ourt, and of the action or failure to ac t by . . . VA in a matter be fo re
. . . V A, ba se d u po n t he tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s, inc lud ingme ri ts, c on du c t, re a so ns g ive n, and c on sis te nc y

wi th j ud ic ia l pr e c e de nt a

nd VApo lic y

wi th respe ct t o s uch position, and ac tion or failure to act, as r efle cted in the r ecor d on a pp e a l and the fi lin g s o f t

he pa rt ie s b e fo re the Court

. Id. at 302. Fur

ther, " rea sonablene ss is determined by the t otality of circumstance s, and not by any si ngle- fact or ap pro ach. " Id . I n S t illwe ll , the Court went on to explain that "' a position can be jus tif ie d e ve n th ou g h it

is n ot c or re c t, a nd we be lie ve it c an b e su

bs tanti a lly

(i .e ., fo r t he mos t pa

rt )5

justified if a rea sonable person could think it corr ect, that is, if it ha s a rea sonable ba sis in law and fact .'" Id. (q u o t i n g Piercev. Unde rwood , 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988))

. Th e C o u rt m ea s ures substantial justification ba sed not on the law exis ting at the time that the EAJA application was filed, but rather on the law at the time V A adopted its position. Se e Bo we yv . W est , 218 F.3d 1373, 1377 (F ed. Cir. 2000). The Secre tary argues that his position was s u b s t an tially justified at both the administrative and litigation phases of the a ppellant' s underlying c ase. I n his response to the appellant' s EAJA application, the Secre tary conce des that his position at the administrative leve l "wa s not e n t i re l y corr ect" beca use the B oard " did not fully consider whether [t he a]ppellant would be e ntitled to direct service connec tion for re siduals of mustard g as." Response (Resp.) at 6. Howeve r, t he S ecr etar y points out, t his Court ruled that the B oard' s position did not prejudice the appellant be cause , the Court conclude d, the claim for direc t service connec tion was not we ll gr ounded. The Secre tary asser ts that the Court e quates a nonprejudicia l positi on of the Bo ar d wi t h re as o n ab l en es s , ci t i n g Vaughn v. Gobe r , 14 Vet.App. 92, 95 ( 2000) (pe r cur iam order ). Th e re fo re , h e argue s th a t be c a us e the B oa

rd ' s er ro r be c a me pr e

jud ic ia l only wh e n th e F e de ra l Cir c uit issued its opini on which, he c laims, "ove rturned the [C ourt' s] well-settled interpretation and application of the de novo standard," the S ecr etar y was subst antially justified in his admini strative position. The only authority cited by the Secre tary in suppor t of his a rg ument that a n o n p re

judicial po sit ion is e qu iv ale nt to a r e a so na ble on e is Vaughn , su

pra . Vaughn pr e se nts a

sit uatio n q uit e distinct from the prese nt one. I n Vaughn , t h e C o u rt fo u n d t h at t h e B o ar d 's t re at m en to f a v et er an 's claim as a n orig inal claim, rathe r than a reope ned one, w as nonpre judicial, and ther efor e re asonable , b e c a u s e t h a tt r e a t m e n ta c tu a l l y benefitted the a pp e lla nt, in that it e lim inate d th e ne e d f or him to demonstrate that he had prese nted new a nd materia l evidence

. Vaughn , 14 Vet.App. at 95. I n the prese nt case , the B oard' s rejec tion of the appe llant's claim as not well g rounded be cause his condition was not elig ible for pr esumptive s er v i ce connec tion, and its error in not ana ly zing whethe r the appellant ha d prese nted evidenc e of dire ct s ervic e connection ca n in no way

be conside red be nefic ial to the appellant. The Boa rd' s action wa s contrar

y to then-existi ng prec edent, se e Com be e v . B ro wn , 34 F.3d 1039 ( Fe d. Cir. 1994), was c ontrary to what the r eleva nt regulations require ( see 38 C.F .R. § 3.303(d) (1996)), and deprive d the appellant of the opportunity to prove dire ct servic e conne ction.6

The Sec reta

ry ' s argument relies solely on a subsequent determination by this Court t hat the B oa rd ' s er ro r w a s n on

pr e jud ic ia l. H ow e ve r, wh e n th e B oa rd re nd e re d it s d e c isi on , in

no wa y c ou ld it h a ve fo re se e n th a t th e Court wo uld la te r f ind e rr or in i ts d e ter mi nat io n bu t no ne the le ss d e e m it ha rm le ss b e c a

us e fo r ano the r re a so n a lto g e the r the a pp e lla nt did no t me ri t the re lie f he so ug ht. Th is Court ' s 1 99 8 d e c isi on

di d no t ex cus e the B oa

rd ' s e rr or , n or

did it f ind the B oa rd re a so na ble in i ts position; rathe r, i t found t hat the B oard' s err or wa s harmless. A nonpr ejudicial, or ha rmless, position is quite distinct from a rea sonable one. I t is difficult t o imag ine a circ umstance in which the B oard, actingcontra

ry to clear and unambig uous case prec edent a nd a cle ar a

nd unambig uous regulation, could be c onsidered to have adopte d a re ason ab l e p o s i t ion. Perhaps if the c ase pr ece dent or regulation were not clear

and unambig uous that might be a differ ent matter. Bu t t h at wa s not the situation under the fa cts of this case
. The Court holds that, in t he pre sent ca se, the Sec reta ry was not substantially

justified in his admini strative position. Bec ause that is suf ficient to make the a

ppellant elig ible for a

n EAJA award, the Cou rt need not r eac h the question of whe ther the Sec reta ry was substantially justified in his litigation posit ion. Se e J ac k so n v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 422, 429 ( 1999). C. F e e s f or an App e a l to the F e de ra l Cir c uit Havingdeter

mined that the appellant is e ligible for a n EAJA award, the Court now considers the i ssue t hat pro mp te d

it to is s u e a

s h o w - c a u s e o r d e r o nM ay 1 0 , 2 0 0 2

. O nth a t d a te , th e Co u rt order ed the a

ppellant (1) to show c ause w hy the portion of his EAJA application seeking an aw ard of fe es and ex penses for work his counsel did in association with the appe llant's a ppeal to the F eder al Cir c uit sh ou ld no t be dis mis se d fo r la c k of jur isd ic tio n, and

(2 ) o rd e re d th e a

pp e lla nt t o s ho w c a

us e why the Fe dera l Circ uit, the highe st court that re viewed the appellant' s case on the merits, was not the prope r cour

t in which to file his EAJ A application. As the appe llant states in hi s supplemental memora ndum of law filed July

10, 2002, the Fe dera l Circuit has held, in PPG Industries v. Celanese Poly mer Spe cialties Co. , 840 F.2d 1565, 1569 (F ed. C ir. 1988), t hat i t does not have exclusi ve jurisdi ction over a g rant of attorney

fee s for work done befor e it. I n that case , a district cour t decl i n ed t o aw ard fees f or work done by

the pr e va ili ngpa

rt y ' s c ouns e l in

c on ne c tio n w iththe pr e va il in g p art y ' s a pp e ara nc e a s a n in te rv e no r i n a sepa rate appea l to the Fede ral Circuit that had binding eff ec t on the outcome of

the under ly ing

a c tio n b e tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s. Th e dis tr ic t court c ite d, a s the ba sis fo r d e nyingthe fe e s, F e de ra l Cir c uit7

L ocal Rule 20(a )(1) , which per mitted filing an application for attorne y fee s directly

with the Fe dera l Circuit. The F eder al Circuit rev er s ed , h o lding that whe re a n appea l is "an integ ral pa rt of the

o n go i n g litigation . . . the powe r to awa rd attorne y

fee s for a

ppellate wor

k is not the ex clusive do mai n o f an app ell ate cou rt ." Id. I n its opini on, the Fe dera l Circuit cited numerous ca ses dec ided in other federa l courts of a ppeal in which the appellate court e ither appr oved a district c ourt' s awa rd of fe e s f or a pp e llate wo rk

or re mand e d a

c a se to a di st ri c t c ourt

to p e rm it the dis tr ic t c ourt to deter mine the amount of re asonable attorney fee s for a ppellate wor

k. Id. Fur ther, the Supre me Court has established, in Commis sion er, INS v. J ean , 496 U

. S. 154 , 159 ( 199 0) , that only

one thre shold determination of substantial justification is to be made f or the e ntire litigation. Given that the Feder al C ircuit does not have exclusi ve jurisdi ction to make this nec essar y t h r e s h o l d d e t e r

m i n a t i o n , t h i s C o u rt h o l d s t h a t i t d o e s h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o aw ar d f e e s u n d e r t h e E A JA fo r w or k a sso c ia te d w ithan a

pp e a l to the F e de ra l Cir c uit

. D. Reasona

bleness of the Fe e The Sec reta

ry asks the Court to reduc e the fe es re q u es ted by the appe llant to $35,675.36,

asser ting that the claimed fee s are not rea sonable. Resp. at 10-15. The Court has w ide discre tion in the awa rd of attorney

fee s under the E AJ A. Se e He ns le yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Chiu v. United States , 948 F.2d 711, 713 (F ed. C ir. 1991). In Ec k e rh ar t , th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court instructed that, in revie wing fe e applica tions, a court should exclude hours that ar e not

rea sonably

expended. Ec k

e rh ar t , 461 U.S. at 434. The Supreme Court stated: "Counsel for the preva iling part y

should make a g ood-fa ith effor t to ex clude f

rom a fe e re quest hours that ar e
ex cess iv e, re du nd ant , o r ot herw is e un neces sary
. . . . " Id. I n deter

mining the number

of hours that

wer e re as o n a

b ly s p e n t, th e Co u rt ma

y c o n s id e r a n u mb e r o f f a c to r s , in c lu d in g w h e th e r th e work perf ormed was duplicative, whether an attorney takes extra time due to inex perie nce, or whether an
a tto rn e y pe rf or ms t a s k s n o r

m a l l y pe rf or me d b y pa ra le g a ls, c le ri c a l pe rs on ne l, o r o the r n on -atto rn e y s. Us se ry v . B ro wn , 1 0 V e t.A

pp . 5 1, 53 (1 99 7) ; se e Sa nd ov al v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 177, 180 ( 1996). The Court " may

proper ly reduc e t h e number of hour s claimed for time spent in duplicative,

un organi z ed, or o th erwi se u np rod uct iv e effo rt s. " Vi da l v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 488, 493 ( 1996) (c iting Jordan v. U

.S. Dep't of Justice , 691 F.2d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). How ever , if unsupported, the8

Se c r e t ar y ' s a l l e g at i o n s o f

e xc e s s i v e t i m e e xp e n d e d ar e i n s u f f i c i e n tt o j u s t i f

y a r e d u c t i o ni nho ur s. Sandoval , 9 Vet.App. at 181. Th e Se c re tary

ass erts th a t th e fe e s r e qu e ste d a re un re a so na

ble in a numbe r o f s pe c if

ic ins tanc e s, name ly , the tim e sp e nt in 199 7 pre pa ri ng mot ion s and pr e pa

ri ngthe pr inc ipa l br ie f f

or thi s Court, the time spent in 1998 prepa ring the re ply

brief a nd prepa ring the motion for re consideration for this Court, and the time spent in 1999 pre paringthe principa l brief a nd the re p l y b rief f

or the Fe dera l Circuit. Resp. at 10-15. 1. 1997 First, the Sec reta

ry contests the appe llant's c laim of 3.5 hours for att o rn ey t i m e t hat the

a pp e lla nt attr ibute s to the dr a ft ing , o n Apr il 2 4, 19 97 , of tw o ve ry br ie f p a pe rs to b e fi le d w iththi s Court; the Secre tary

argues that, beca

use one of these pa

pers ( an answ er) was ne ither complex nor novel, consisting only

of a shor t proce dural hist ory of t he ca se, the c laimed hours should be re duced to 1 hour. The appellant responds that the time c laimed is r easona ble considering the s u b s t an t ial leng th of the re cord. The Court a g ree s with the Secre tary that the claim of 3.5 hours is excessive. Notwithstandi n g t h e l en g th of the fac tua l history of the c ase, the brief a

nswer summar ized the pr oc e du ra l history

of the c ase be fore this Court alone, which wa s quite short at the time. Moreove r, in describing how the 3.5 hours we re spe nt, the appellant' s counsel make s no mention of having revie wed the underlying rec ord, nor would re viewing the under ly ing r ecor d have be en nec essar y for the purposes of

prepa ring that answe r. The Court will re duce the claim of 3.5 hours to 1 hour. Ne xt, th e Se c re tary

ob je c ts t o th e a

pp e lla nt' s c la im o f a to tal of 2.75 ho ur s o ve r t wo da y s, October 20 and 21, 1997, spent by counsel prepar ing a m otion for an e x tension of time. The Court

no te s th a t un de r R

ule 26 of its Rul e s o f P ra c tic e and Pr oc e dure (Rule s) , it

may , s ua sp on te or

in response to a mot ion by

a par ty for g ood cause shown, extend the time prescr ibed by the Rules for doing a ny act. The Court e lected to g rant such e x tensions in the case at hand on numer ous occa sions in r esponse to motions of the appellant, and the appellant, in his application for an EAJA aw ard, ha s
c la ime d ti me fo r t

he pr e pa ratio n of the se mot ion s. Al tho ug h the Court ' s Rul e s pe rm it su c h mo tio ns , pe rm itt ingan a

pp e lla nt t o a sk fo r a n e xten sio n o f a

de a dli ne and

fi nd ingthat th e pu

bli c fi sc sh ou ld subsidiz e such e ffor

ts are two e ntirely

differ ent m atters. The prepar ation of such motions would be

unnece ssary

if the appe llant would timely perf orm the ac t require d of him or h er
. Howeve r, the9

Court re c og nize s th a t on occasi on , c ir c ums tanc e s b e y on d th e a pp e lla nt' s c on tr ol m a ke tim e ly perf ormanc e diffic ult, if not im possible. I n this case, the Court, in its determination of w hat

c on sti tut e s a

re a so na ble fe e fo r p ur

po se s o f a

n a pp lic a tio n und e r t

he EAJA, wi ll e xer c ise its discretion to re duce or

eliminate as unre asonable cer tain fee s for wor

k associated with prepa

ring motions for extensions of ti me. Se e ge ne ra lly Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. at 437 (holding that Court has wide discre tion in award of attorney fee s under EAJA). I n this inst ance , the appe llant's c ounsel soug ht an extension of time be cause of " the pre ss of court pr ocee dings in the U nited States District Court fo r t he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia " ; th e neces sity of dr a ft inga

mot ion fo r a n e xten sio n o f t ime would have be en eliminated had the appellant's c ounsel more e fficie ntly manag ed his workload a

nd t i m el y fi l edt h e o p en i n g b ri ef

b ef o re t h i s C o u rt

. T h e C o u rt fi n d s i tu n re as o n ab l e t h at t h e ap p el l an t 's

c ouns e l e xpe c ts the pu

bli c fu nd s to su bs idi ze his de lin qu e nc y

and wi ll s tr ike the c la ime d 2 .7 5 h ours
. Simi larly , the Secr etar

y objects to the appe llant's c laim that, on November 17 and 19, 1997, his counsel spent 2.75 hours to pr epar e a motion for an extension of time. Ag ain, appellant' s counsel soug ht an extension "due to the pr ess of c ou rt p ro ceeding s in other cour t proce eding s." F or the

re a so ns lis te d a

bo ve , th e Court

wi ll s tr ike the c la ime d 2 .7 5 h ours
. T h e S ec re t ary

al s o o b j ec t s t o t h e ap p el l an t 's cl ai m i n g an y t i m e w h at s o ev er fo r hi s at t o rn ey 's prepa ration of the initial brief filed befor e thi s Court in Dece mber 1997; the Sec reta ry asser ts that the appe llant's a

rg uments were reje cted by the Court and ther e f

o r e we re unne cessa

ry to the resolution of the c a se . H e c ite s Pe rry

v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 319, 334 ( 1998), in support of the proposition that an EAJA a

war d is justified only

for a ctions that are a " nece ssary and important fa ctor in ac hieving the re lie f d e sir e d, " imp lie dly dr awi ngthe c on c lus ion that ti me sp e nt o n a

rgume nts that are ult imate ly

unsucce ssful is unnecessa ry and ther efor e should not be re compense d under the EAJA. The appellant r esponds that the pre paration of the initial brief wa s nece ssary to the resolution of the c ase, that one ar g ument ultimately was s u cc es s fu l, and that, in any event, hour s relatingto his other,

unsucce ssful, argument have been ex cised fr om the application in the exerc ise of billing discr etion. The Court ag ree s with the appellant that in his opening brief he did advanc e one c orre ct argument, the one r elating to the Boa rd' s err oneous i nterpre tation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.316. Fur ther, a nd

mor e imp or

tantl y , this Court and oth e r co ur ts have he ld that an a

pp e lla nt may rec over f

ees unde r the EAJA for unsucce ssful, but r easona ble, arguments, if the litigant ultimately was succ essful on the10

claim. See Che

sser , 1 1 V e t.A

pp . at 50 3- 04 ; Schneide r v. Colegio de Abogado s de P.R. , 187 F.3d 30 , 4 8- 49 (1 st Cir

. 19 99 ) (p e r c ur iam op ini on ) (L ipe z, C. J., c on c ur ri ng ); Jaffee v . Redmond , 142 F.3d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1998); People W ho Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ. , 90 F.3d 1307, 1314 ( 7th Cir. 1996). I t is a close ca ll , b u t the Court finds that the appe llant's a rg uments in his opening br ief,

a lth ou g h in

so me de g re e ir

re le va nt a nd fo r t he mos t pa

rt no t ul tim a te ly

su c c e ssf ul, w ere mad e in g ood faith and c onstitut ed eff ort rea sonably expended in a dvancing his case. G iven the leng th of the

rec ord and the arguments prese nted, the Court doe s not f ind the appellant' s claim of 41.75 hours of attorney time spent prepa

ring the openingbrief to be excessive or unre asonable

. There fore , the Court will reduce the total amount of time c laimed in 1997 for wor k done by Ed wa rd My e rs , E sq ., fr om 7 8 h ours to 7 0 h ours
. 2. 1998 The Sec reta

ry contests the appellant' s claim of 4.75 hours of attorney time on April 20, 1998, spent in draf

ting a nd filing a

n opposition t o the Secr etar y ' s motion for an extension o f t i me; the Secre tary argues that the opposition consisted of one and one ha lf pag es of a simple arg ument. He

s e e k s a reduct io n t o . 75 ho urs . T he ap pel lan t r esp on ds th at d raft in g the m ot io n req ui red "a substantial amount of orig inal rese arc h" beca use the appe llant's c ounsel had not pre viously draf ted

su c h a mot ion

. Th e Court no te s that, in his op po sit ion , the a pp e lla nt did no t c ite any

statut e or c a se that w o u ld p r o v id e a le g a l b a s is f o r d e n y in g th e Se c r e ta

r y ' s mo ti o n f

o r an e xte n s io n o f time. T he Court ag ree s with the Secre tary that a cla im of 4.75 hours for a simple moti on unsupported by leg al

a uth or ity is e xce ssi ve and

wi ll r e du c e the 4. 75 ho ur s to .7 5 h ours
. The Sec reta

ry also contests the appellant' s claim of 2 hours of attorney time on May

27, 1998, spent prepa

ring a motion for an e x tension of t i m e. Ag ain, the appe llant's c ounsel soug ht an extension "be cause of t he press of business befor e this Court and befor e other ag encie s of the fe dera l go v ern m en t

. " Fo r t h e s am e r ea s o n s l i s t edp re v i o u s l y i ns t ri k i n g t h e t i m e c l ai m edfo r t h e ap p el l an t 's

c ouns e l to pr e pa

re mot ion s f

or an e xten sio n o f tim e ba se d on wo rk loa d ma

na g e me nt, the Court

wi ll str ike the c la ime d 2 ho ur s. Th e Se c re tary

ob je c ts to th e app e lla

nt' s c la im o f 3 2. 25 ho ur s f or wo rk do ne pr e pa

ri nghis reply brief for thi s Court. Ag ain, the Secr etar y asser ts that one argument was not succ essful and that the tot a l ti me th erefo re sh ou ld b e re du c e d to 15 .2 5 h ours . T he a pp e lla nt r e sp on ds tha

t th e tim e11

a sso c ia te d w iththe un su c c e ssf ul c la im ha s be e n omi tte d. Th e Court ' s r e vie w o f t he a pp e lla nt' s r e ply br ie f r e ve a ls that no t ju st o ne bu t a ll a rgume nts c on ta ine d th e re in w e re re je c te d b y the Court . In h is

re ply br ie f, the a

pp e lla nt p ri nc ipa lly

ana ly zed e vid e nc e that he cl a ime d pro ve d a ne xus b e tw e e n h is condition and mustard g as exposure (and did not argue that the Court c ould not revie w this evidence in the fi rs t insta

nc e ), and pr of

fe re d vari ou s othe r ar g ume nts la te r fo un d to be wit ho ut m e ri t. I

n h is

re ply br ie f, the a

pp e lla nt did no t a dd

re ss the B oa

rd e rr or in i nte rp re tin g 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 16 , b e c a us e thi s w a s b a sic a lly

c on c e de d b y

the Se c re tary . A g a in, thi s is a c los e c a ll. Ho we ve r, fo r t he same
rea sons list ed pre viously relating to the a

ppellant 's o p ening brief , the appe llant should be

rec ompensed for these unsuccessful arg uments beca use they wer e expended r easona

bly . Howeve r, the Cou rt wi ll s tr ike the 1. 75 ho ur s c la ime d on June 30 , 19 98 , f or the a pp e lla nt' s c ouns e l to dr a ft

a motion to file t he reply

brief out of

time, as unrea sonable, g iven that such a motion was nece ssitated

s o l e l y b y t h e a

p p e l l an t ' s c o u n s e l ' s d e l i n qu e n c y. The Sec reta

ry also contests the 31 hours of attorney time claimed b y t h e ap pellant for pr e pa ri nghis mot ion

fo r r e c on sid e ratio n o r f

or a pa ne l de c isi on

in t hi s Co urt , an d a sk s th a t th is amount be eliminated f

rom the EAJA awar d, pointing out that the mot ion was de nied by the Court as moot. The appe llant argues that the denial of the motion was but a " temporar y setbac k" a

nd that the ar g uments in the motion were late r ac cepte d by the Fe dera l Circuit. The Court note s that its memora ndum de cision aff

irming the Boa

rd' s decision was issued on September 22, 1998. U nder the Court's Rules, t h e ap p el l ant' s time to file a motion for

rec onsideration or f

or a pa nel dec ision ex pired on October 15, 1998, and judgme nt w as enter ed on that date. On O ctober

20, 1998, the appe llant reque sted an extension of time to f ile such a motion. On Octobe r 30, 1998, the Court noted t hat t he ti me for filing the motion for rec onsideration or f or
a pa ne l de c isi on

ha d e xpir e d, and the a

pp e lla nt' s mot ion fo r an e xten sio n of tim e wa s de nie d a s mo ot. Ha vin g fa ile d to me e t th e de a dli ne se t by lon g sta nd ing Court

Rul e s, the a

pp e lla nt' s o nly re c ours e was to file a

n appea l with the F eder al Circuit. Neve rtheless, on Nove mber 18, 1998, the a ppellant inexpl icably

filed with the Court a motion for leave to file out of time a re consideration moti on and fo r v ac at u r o f t h e C o u rt 's j u d gm en t

. On t h at s am e da t e, t h e C o u rt re ce i v edt h e ap p el l an t 's 1 7 -p age motion for rec onsideration or for a panel decision. The Court denied the motion for leave to file out of time and for

vacat u r o n No v em b er 25, 1998, beca use the Court had pr eviously denied the12

appellant' s motion for an extension of time. The appe llant's filing of the m otion for leave to file out of time and for

vacatur and submission of the reco nsideration motion was unre asonable and

un ne c e ssa

ry , g ive n th a t he ha d a lr e a dy mis se d th e fi lin g de a dli ne . M or e ov e r, a lth oug h it is n ot a de c isi ve fa c tor , the Court a lso is c on str a ine d to no te tha t in thi s unti me ly

mot ion , th e a

pp e lla nt d id not raise the issue upon w hich he ultimately preva iled, i.e., the au tho rit yof thi s Court to f

ind fa c ts in the first instance. Acc ording ly , the Court w ill st rike the 31 hour s associate d with the prepa ration of the re consideration moti on. As outlined above, the Court will re duce the amount of time claimed in 1998 for work done by Ed wa rd My e rs , E sq ., fr om 8 4. 35 ho ur s to 45 .6 ho ur s. 3. 1999 Finally , the Secr etar

y contests awa

rding EAJA fee s for tim e spent by the appe llant's c ounsel prepa ring briefs that contained va rious unsucce ssful arguments befor e the Fe dera l Circ uit. First, the Secre tary objects to awa

rding EAJA fees for

the appe llant's c ounsel' s time spent prepa ring part I of the openingbrief a

nd part I Iof the reply brief, beca use t hose par

ts contained the a

ppellant' s argument that Epps v. Gobe r , 1 26 F .3 d 1 46 4 ( F e d. Cir . 199 7) , sho uld be ov e rt ur ne d. Th e Se c re tary

c or re c tly

no te s th a t a

pa ne l of jud g e s at the F e de ra l Cir c uit c ann ot o ve rt

ur n a pr ior pa ne l de c isi on

of that c ourt ; only the cour t deciding a case en banc ma y do so. See South Corp. v. United States , 690 F.2d 1368 (F e d. Cir

. 19 82 ). He a sk s the Court to e xclu de the ho ur s sp e nt p re pa ri ngtha t po rt ion of the br ie fs

. Th e a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t he is e nti tle d to be c omp e ns a te d f or a tto rney time s pe nt p re pa ri nga ll

argume nts be fo re the F e de ra l Cir c uit

. As noted above , an appe llant may rec over f

ees unde r the E AJ A fo r unsucce ssful but

rea sonable a

rg uments if the litigant was ultimately succe ssful on the claim. Courts ma y awa rd fe es for time re asonably

spent on an unsucc essful ar g ument in support of a successf ul claim; however , the touchstone in dete rmining w h et h er f ees oug ht to be awa

rded in such a

case is whether the

ar g u me n t w a s r e a s o n a

b le

. Peo pl e W ho Car e , 90 F.3d at 1314. The appe llant contends that the argument to overturn Epps was reasona bly made to the panel bec ause a rule of that court per

mits an ap p el l an t t o as k a p an el t o o v erru l e p re ce d en twi t h o u tp et i t i o n i n g fo r a h ea ri n g en banc

. See F ED
. C IR
. R. 35(a) (2). How ever , in its opi nion in this case , the Fe dera l Circuit stated:13

Mr . H e ns le y

de vo tes muc h o f h is b ri e f t o urg ingus to o ve rt ur n th is c ourt ' s Epps de c isi on
. . . . Ho we ve r, a s Mr. He ns le y is fu lly awa re , th is p ane l la c ks the a

uth or ity to overturn a p ri o r d ecision of a nother pa nel. See South Corp. [, su pra ]. Any reve rsal of Ep

ps by thi s c ourt

wi ll h a ve to b e do ne by

the c ourt en banc

. He ns le yv . W est , 212 F.3d 1255, 1260- 61 (F ed . Cir. 2000). The F eder al Circuit made no f urther

me nti on of

the a pp e lla nt' s argume nt t

hat Epps should be overtur ned. Thus, althoug h the Fe dera l Circuit's r ules technic ally

may allow a litigant to a sk a panel to overrule prior pre cede nt, there is no question that a pane l lacks authority to rule on that reque st. See South Corp. , su pra . N e ve rt

he le ss, the a pp e lla nt d e vo te d f

ull y 27 of the 48 pa g e s o f t

he argume nt s e c tio n in

his op e nin g br ie f ( a

lit tle more than ha lf) and 15 of the 33 pag es of the a

rg ument section of his re ply brief ( a l i ttle less than half) to the Ep

ps argument. Given the Fe dera l Circ uit's treatment of the Epps iss ue , th is C ourt fi nd s th a t, i n th is c a se , it

was unre asonable for the a ppellant' s counsel to have expended such consider able e ffor ts on the Epps argument befor e a panel of the Feder al C ircuit. The question is not whether it was withi n the rules to advan ce a fu t i l e arg ument; it is whether it was rea sonable for

the appe llant's c ounsel to have de vo te d th e ma

jor ity of the argume nt p or

tio n o f h is b ri e f t o a p ane l th a t la c ke d a uth or ity to r ule in his favor on that issue. Se e ge ne ra lly Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. at 434. The F eder al Circuit itself pointed out that the appellant wa s "f ully awa re" that the pane l l ac k ed authority to rule on such a

matter (a lth ou g h in his op e nin g br ie f to the F e de ra l Cir c uit , the a pp e lla nt a sk s " thi s pa

ne l" to overru le Epps ). Hensley , 212 F.3d at 1260-61. I n the pre sent ca se, the ap p el l an t 's counsel c ould have provided a su c c inc t sy

nopsis of the Ep

ps argument in his brief to the panel, ther eby prese rving the i s s u e f o r a l a t e r e n b an c ar g u m e n t , an d t h e n , i f g r an t e d e n b an c r e v i e w , c o u l d h a ve a pp ro pr ia te ly submitt ed to the en ba

nc cour t a fully develope d analy sis of his arg ument to overrule Epps

. Now come s the difficult i s s u e o f dete rmining howmuch time was de voted to the Epps argument, including time spent prepa ring the openingbrief, the reply brief, a nd prepa ring for or al argument. I t appea

rs from the itemiz ation of fe es that only one attorne y , Ba

rton F. Stichman, Esq., draf ted the Epps argument, which comprised part I of t he opening brief and part I Iof the re ply brief. Un fo rt un a te ly , in his b ill ingre c or ds , M r. Stic hma n o ft e n li sts va

ri ou s a c tiv iti e s und e r a

sin g le tim e blo c k, and

it i s im po ssi ble to asce rt a in e xac tly ho w m uc h ti me wa s d e vo te d to e a c h d isc re te ta sk listed. The tot al t ime that included tasks re lated to the Ep ps argument for the ope ning br ief, a s listed14

fo r F e br ua ry 5, Marc h 19 , 26 , 29 , 30 , and 31 , A pr il 1 , a nd 6, 19 99 , is 32 .5 ho ur s. Th e Court wi ll

re du c e that amo un t by a

pp ro xima te ly ha lf

, to 16 hour s, wh ic h is pro ba bly g e ne ro us
. Th e tot a l ti me that included tasks re lated to the Epps argument for the r eply brief, a s listed for J une 29, J uly 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, and 20, and Aug ust 9, 1999, is 32.25 hours

. Again, the Court will reduc e that amount by

approximately

half, to 16 hours. T h e tot al time that included tasks re lated to the Epps argument for the or al ar g ument, as listed for Oc tober 29 a nd Dec ember 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7, 1999, is 18 hours. The Court will reduc e that amount by half, to 9 hours. Ove rall, then, the Court will reduc e the total hours claimed by Ba rton F. Stichman, Esq., in 1999 from 97.5 hours to 55.75 hours. The Secre ta r y a ls o c o n te s ts th e in c lu s io no f a tt o r n e y ti me s p e n t p r e p ar in g v ar io u s o th e r u n s u c c essful

argume nts to t

he F e de ra l Cir c uit , b ut t

he Court fi nd s th e re ma ind e r o f t

he a pp e lla nt' s argume nts to be no t unre a so na

ble un de r a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s. I ncidentally , the Court n otes that the appe llant's c ounsel has made an er ror in his fee

a pp lic a tio n. On

pa g e 8, the tot a l f

or e xpe ns e s is lis ted as $7 99.1 1; t he tot a l of

the lis te d it e ms i s actua lly $499.11. Howeve r, it appea rs that i n calc ulating the total of the fe e application ($58,691.54, comprised of

$58,192.43 in leg al fe es plus expens es ), t h e appellant's c ounsel ac tually did use the

c or re c t f ig ur e of $4 99 .1 1, no tw ith sta

nd ingthe mis state d e xpe ns e s to ta l on pa g e 8. As e xpla ine d in Part I I .D.1-2, the Court will reduc e the hour s claimed for the work of Edwar d My ers, Esq., in 1997 from 78 to 70 hours and f

or his work in 1998 from 84.35 to 45.6 hours. As explained in Part I I .D.3, the Court will reduce the hours cla imed for the w ork of B arton F . Stichman, Esq., in 1999 from 97.5 hours to 55.75 hours. The other totals rema in the same, a nd the Court will calculate the fe e at the rate s proposed by

the appellant's c ounsel and will reimburse the appe llant for all expenses cla imed.

III . C ON CL USI ON After consideration of the pleading s and a revie w of the rec ord, the Court g rants in pa rt the appellant' s EAJ A application, in the amount of $47,098.97.

STEI NB ERG, Judge , concur

ring in part and dissenting in part: Ijoin in the Court's opinion wi th t he e xce pti on

of pa rt I I .D .3 . an d the a mou

nt of the tot a l re du c tio n in pa rt I I I . I c ann ot a g re e to the conc lusion reac hed by the Court, in the exercise of its discr etion based on the fa cts of this case ,W i th th e e n a c tm e n t o f th e V et er an s Cl ai ms As s i s t an ce Act of 2000, Pub. L. N o. 106- 475, 114 St at

. 2096 1 (V C A A ), on N ov em ber 9, 2 0 0 0 , t he i s s ue s s e t f o r o r a l a r g um e nt i n B r oc k w er e m oot ed an d h en c e w er e n ev er de c i de d, a nd a p a ne l o f t he Fe de r a l C i r c ui t v a c a t e d o ur o p i ni o n i n Br o c k v . Br o wn , 1 0 V e t . A p p . 1 5 5 ( 1 9 9 7 ) , a nd
r e m a n d e d " to a llo w [th is C o u r t] to c o n s id e r th e a p p lic a tio n o f t h e V C A A "

. B r oc k v

. Pr i nci pi , N o . 95
- 44 4, 20 01 W L 3 2 4 5 9 6 a t * 1 (V e t. A p p . M a r . 2 9 , 2 0 0 1 ) ( s in g le
- ju d g e o r d e r ). 15 to exclude all

hours that the Court g uesstimates wer e attributable to the appellant' s argument that the Fe dera l Circuit's o pinion in Epps v. Gobe r , 126 F.3d 1464 ( Fe d. Cir. 1997), should be over ruled. Nor do I find rea sonable the Court' s calc ulations that 41.75 hours were attributable to the Epps issue. On the first point, the rules of the U .S. Court of Appeals for the Fe dera l Circuit (Fe dera l Cir c uit ) p ro vid e in R

ule 35 (a )( 2) : Ar gui ng t o a P ane l t o Ov e r r ule a P r e c e de nt Although only

the cour t en banc may

overr ule a binding pr e c e de nt , a part

y may argue , in

its br ie f a

nd or a l a rgume nt, to overr ule a binding pre cede nt without petiti oning f or hea ring en banc

. The pan e l w ill de c ide wh e the r t o a sk the re g ula

r a c tiv e jud g e s to consider he aringthe ca se en ba nc. F ED
. C IR . R. 35(a)( 2). Althoug h it is t rue, a s t h e majority states, an te at 12-13, that the F eder al Circuit pointed out that the panel could not over rule Ep ps i n t h i s ca se, that cour t's Rule 35( a)( 2) specific ally

permits such ar g ument to a pane l a s a method of rea ching the en banc court. F ED
. C IR
. R. 35(a)( 2). Ther efor e, I do not bel i ev e that the appe llant's attorney rea sonably

could have anticipated that such brief i n g to a pane l of a potential e n banc issue w ould be consider ed as

u n r e a s o n a

b l e b y this Court. I n the future, it would see m, attorney s may wish to temper the amount of e ff or t, o r at le a st b e pr e pa

red to a c c e pt l e ss t

ha n f ull EA JA f

e e s f or su c h e ff or t, d e vo te d to pr e se nti ng su c h a

rgume nts to F e de ra l Cir c uit pa ne ls. B ut w e are de a lin g wi th w hat w a s r e a so na ble i n the instant case , and, althoug h Iwould not object to s o me reduc tion for the Epps matter – espec ially beca use some of the a

r g u me nts pr esente d may

have be en pre sented in other c ases a ppeale d to t he F e de ra l Cir c uit

– I be lie ve that th is C ourt ' s d e c isi on to e lim inate all

such hours is unwar

rante d. This total reduction see ms pa rticularly unrea sonable beca use soon afte r the Fe dera l Circuit issued its opini on in He ns le

yv . W est , 212 F .3 d 125 5 (20 00 ), that cou rt , sitti nge n b anc , is su e d a n o rd e r i n Brock v . Gober , i nwh i c h i t s e t f o r o ra l ar gu m en tt h e q u es t i o no f o v erru l i n g Epps ; it therefor e appea rs that the Epps argument was fa r fr om "f utile", a s the majority

sug g ests, an te at 13. Brock, 222 F.3d 988, 989 ( Fe d. Cir. 2000) (en ba nc). 116

Reg arding the num ber of hours, 41.75, that the Court disallows for the Ep ps arguments, the Court rejec ts approxim ately 50% of the 32.5, 32.25, and 18 hours t hat counsel spent working on the p r i n c i p a l an d r e p l y b r i e f s an d p r e p ar i n g f

o r o r a l ar g u m e n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y
. H o w e v e r , t h e E A JA application re veals that, with two exceptions (Mar ch 19 and J une 29, 1999), the hours claimed involved multipl e tasks or actua lly made no direc t or indirect ref ere nce to the Epps m at t er
. Al t h o u gh Ifind no basis for the 50% reduc tion, counsel for the appellant invited such a rbitrar y action by failing to provide ade quate spe cificity in the fee itemiz ation included in the application. For the fore g oing rea sons, Idissent from the Epps reduc tion and, hence, from the ca lculation of the total amount re duced.