J-S16031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3133 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered November 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0001315-2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.J.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3134 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000654-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MAY 31, 2023

In these consolidated appeals,1 S.S. (Mother) appeals from the decree 

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas involuntarily 

____________________________________________

1 On January 4, 2023, this Court entered an order consolidating these appeals 

sua sponte. Order, 1/4/23.
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terminating her parental right to K.J.S. (Child),2 born in September of 2012,

and the order, entered that same day, which changed Child’s permanency goal 

from reunification to adoption.3 Upon our review, we affirm the termination 

decree and dismiss as moot the appeal from the goal change order.

Child was born to Mother in September of 2012. Father is not listed on 

Child’s birth certificate, and his whereabouts are unknown. See Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 11/2/21, Exhibit B, Child’s 

Certification of Birth; Trial Ct. Op., 1/27/23, at 1. 

On December 9, 2020, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(DHS) applied for emergency protective custody of Child, after Mother was 

arrested for theft and trespassing; the trial court granted an order of 

protective custody that same day. See DHS’s Application for Order of 

Protective Custody, 12/9/20, at 2 (unpaginated); Order, 12/9/20. Following 

a shelter care hearing on December 11th, the court adopted the 

recommendation of DHS that Child should remain in foster care placement. 

Order, 12/11/20. Child was subsequently adjudicated dependent on February 

23, 2021. Order of Adjudication & Disposition, 2/23/21. Although Mother was 

____________________________________________

2 K.J.S. and K.S. are the same child.

3 That same day, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of J.M.

(presumptive Father), as well as any unknown putative father. See N.T., 

11/9/22, at 65-66. Neither presumptive Father, nor any other putative father, 

participated in these proceedings, or appealed from the termination order. 
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released from prison in February of 2021, she was later incarcerated in August 

of 2021, following her arrest for murder. See N.T. at 13, 16. 

On November 2, 2021, DHS filed a petition for goal change to adoption, 

and a petition seeking the involuntary termination of the parental rights of 

both Mother and presumptive Father. See DHS’s Petition for Goal Change to 

Adoption, 11/2/21, 1-2; DHS’s Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental 

Rights, 11/2/21, at 3-6. The scheduled hearing was continued several times 

due to the unavailability of the parties. The goal change/termination hearing 

was finally conducted on November 9, 2022, at which time the following 

testimony was presented.4

Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) Case Manager Supervisor Shiera 

Williams, who has been Mother’s case manager since Child’s initial placement,

detailed DHS’s involvement with Mother and Child. She testified that DHS 

received a General Protective Services (GPS) report in January of 2020 that 

Mother’s home did not have “any gas, any electric, [or] running water for 

almost five to six months[,]” there was no food in the home, and Child “was 

sleeping in the car.” N.T. at 10. The report also indicated that Mother was 

using drugs, and Child “[p]resented late to school and unkept.” Id. Case 

Manager Williams did not elaborate as to what services were provided to 

Mother at that time. However, on December 9, 2020, DHS applied for, and 

____________________________________________

4 Child’s interests were represented by Child Advocate Aaron Mixon, Esquire, 

and Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) James DeMarco, Esquire.
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was granted, an emergency order for protective custody of Child when Mother 

was arrested for theft and trespassing. See id. at 10-11; DHS’s Application 

for Order of Protective Custody at 2 (unpaginated). Child was placed in the 

pre-adoptive foster home where he currently resides. See N.T. at 19. 

Although he was removed for a few months to kinship care, he returned to 

the pre-adoptive foster home in April of 2021.5 See id.

Mother was released from prison in February of 2021. See N.T. at 13. 

On February 23, 2021, Child was adjudicated dependent and committed to 

DHS. Id. at 11. Case Manager Williams stated that she prepared “single case 

plans” for Mother, which she updated regularly. Id. at 13-14. She testified

Mother’s objectives, which have remained the same throughout Child’s 

placement, were as follows:

. . . to comply with CUA case management services, to comply 

with all court orders, which is a [Behavioral Health Services 

(BHS)] Eval[uation], CUA dual assessment and random[ drug 

screenings], . . . [a referral to Achieving Reunification Center 

(ARC)] for parenting, housing, and employment, supervised visits 

at [C]hild’s discretion once a week in person at that time, and to 

obtain and maintain employment and to provide a lease for 

housing.

Id. at 14. Case Manager Williams testified that the only objective with which 

Mother was compliant was visitation. Id. Although she was provided with a 

copy of her objectives and received the pertinent referrals, Mother failed to 

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5 Child’s kinship care was with a maternal cousin. See N.T. at 26.
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schedule any evaluations or avail herself of any services. Id. at 15, 30. She 

also did not provide adequate proof of housing or employment.6 Id.at 15.

Case Manager Williams explained that Mother was generally consistent

with supervised visitations, and the visits she personally supervised were 

“good.” N.T. at 15-16, 27, 39. However, both his foster parents and kinship 

caregivers noticed that Child would “act out behaviorally when he returned . . 

. home” after his visits. Id. at 26. Child indicated that Mother “told him to 

do stuff[,]” such as “drag[ging]” the kinship caregiver’s daughter, although

Mother denied that allegation. Id.

In May of 2021, Mother was “removed from the visitation list” because 

she missed three consecutive visits. N.T. at 27, 35. Also around that time, 

Mother’s in-person visits were suspended due to an “altercation where 

[M]other tried to remove [C]hild” from the agency, and the police were called. 

Id. at 35. Mother was late to that visit and was “really upset” because it was 

going to be cancelled. Id. After that incident, Mother’s visits were virtual. 

Id. Case Manager Williams stated that Mother missed a “few” of the virtual 

visits because she tried to log on late (past the 15-minute grace period) or 

she failed to confirm the visit 48 hours in advance. Id. at 36.

____________________________________________

6 Under cross-examination, Case Manager Williams acknowledged that 

although Mother was employed, she failed to provide the requested 

documentation of her employment. N.T. at 33. The case manager also

conceded that Mother was “staying in” her paramour’s house, but explained 

that it was not appropriate for Child. Id. at 33-34 (explaining there were 

“derogatory sayings” written “all over the walls[,]” the ceiling was falling down 

in the bathroom, the basement was inaccessible, the sleeping arrangements 

were “improper,” and “there was no heat in the home”).
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In August of 2021, Mother was arrested for murder, and has remained 

incarcerated since that time. N.T. at 16. Following her arrest, the court 

determined visitation would be at the discretion of Child’s therapist, and the 

therapist did not “make a recommendation” for visitation. See id. at 27-28. 

Case Manager Williams also confirmed that Child did not want to visit Mother 

after her incarceration. See id. at 40. Subsequently, on June 23, 2022, 

Mother entered an open guilty plea to charges of third-degree murder and 

possessing an instrument of crime. See id. at 17, Exhibit DHS-5 (Mother’s 

criminal docket). In September of 2022, she was sentenced to serve an 

aggregate term of 71⁄2 to 17 years’ imprisonment. Id.

Case Manager Williams confirmed that Child’s foster parents provide 

Child with “love, stability, safety, and support” and meet all of his “emotional, 

medical, educational, developmental and daily needs[.]” N.T. at 20. She also 

testified that his foster mother “share[s] his primary parent child bond[.]” Id. 

With regard to Mother, Case Manager Williams described her relationship with 

Child as “[s]trained.” Id. at 21. She stated: “I don’t think that he looks to 

her for any care or safety. When I speak to him he doesn’t really want to talk 

about [Mother].” Id. Case Manager Williams reported that Child told her that 

although he would like to visit with his extended family, “he does not want to 

reside with them” and “he would like to be adopted.” Id. at 22. Child 

Advocate Attorney Mixon confirmed that he spoke with Child in August of 

2021, and Child confirmed that he “did understand adoption” ─ which Child 
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described as “[l]iving with [his foster family] forever” ─ and he wanted to be 

adopted by his foster parents. Id. at 57-58 (quotation marks omitted).

Case Manager Williams opined that a goal change to adoption and 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest to “establish 

permanency” and “a sense of belonging.” N.T. at 23-24. She also opined that 

termination would not result in “irreparable harm” to Child, and that Child did 

not have a bond with Mother “at this point[.]” Id. at 20-21, 23.

Mother testified at the termination hearing and explained that she 

participated in an anger management program during her first stint in jail 

(December 2020 until February 2021) but was unable to complete it before 

she was released. N.T. at 42-43. She described her visits with Child as 

“lovable” and “emotional.” Id. at 44. Mother stated that “for him to be 

snatched away from [her] was very traumatic for him as well as it was for 

[her].” Id. She claimed she was late for visitation appointments because 

she worked in New Jersey and had explained that to Case Manager Williams. 

Id. at 44-45. Mother also stated that she provided proof of employment via

text, i.e., screenshots of her paystubs. Id. at 45-46. She further claimed 

that she cleaned up her house so that it would be appropriate for Child to 

return, and that Case Manager Williams told her she “did a remarkable job[.]” 

Id. at 47.

With regard to the altercation during the May 2021 visit, Mother 

acknowledged that she arrived 10 minutes late because she was coming from 

work. N.T. at 49. Although Case Manager Williams permitted her to meet 
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with Child in the lobby, Mother claimed that Child’s foster father “didn’t like 

the fact that he still had to wait on [her.]” Id. at 49-50. She stated that she 

was the one who called police for help, and she was not “trying to take [her] 

son.” Id. at 50. 

Mother further testified that Child “never expressed to [her] that he 

wanted to be adopted” or that he “didn’t want to live with [her] anymore.” 

N.T. at 52. She acknowledged that her prison release date is February 13, 

2029, but that she hoped she could complete programs to receive an “early 

release.” Id.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it found Case 

Manager Williams’ testimony “credible” and that Mother failed to comply with 

“any of her single case plan objectives outside of visits with [C]hild while she 

was out of custody until August of 2021” or while in prison from August 2021 

until the date of the hearing. N.T. at 64-65. Thus, the court determined DHS 

met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination 

was in Child’s best interest pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and 

(8), and (b). Id. at 65-66. That same day, the trial court entered a 

permanency review order changing Child’s goal from reunification to adoption, 

and a decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. These 

timely appeals follow.7 

____________________________________________

7 Mother filed a separate notice of appeal from each order, accompanied by

identical concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Mother raises the following three issues for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court . . . err in finding that [DHS] had met its 

burden in proving grounds for termination of parental rights 

under 23 Pa.C.S.[ ]§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)?

2. Did the [trial] court . . . err in finding that DHS had met its 

burden to prove that termination would be in [C]hild’s best 

interests, under § 2511(b)[?]

3. Did the [trial] court . . . err when it found that DHS by clear 

and convincing evidence had met its burden to change [C]hild’s 

goal to adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 5.8

Mother’s first two issues challenge the trial court’s decree involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to Child. Our review of a termination decree 

is well-settled:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental 

rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether 

the decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard 

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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) (in a family fast track appeal, concise statement “shall 

be filed and served with the notice of appeal”). 

We note that Mother’s concise statement does not present any challenge 

to the goal change order. See Mother’s Concise Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal, 12/9/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated). Moreover, she 

presents two claims in the concise statement that she does not address in her 

brief ─ (1) Mother was not properly served with notice of the termination 

hearing, and (2) Mother’s due process rights were violated. See id. Thus, 

we conclude she has abandoned these issues on appeal. 

8 DHS filed an appellee brief opposing Mother’s claims. Child’s GAL Attorney

DeMarco, did not submit a responsive brief, but rather filed a letter indicating 

that he joined the brief filed by DHS. See Letter, 3/31/23. Child Advocate 

Attorney Mixon did not respond to Mother’s appeal, although he advocated for 

the termination of her parental rights at the hearing. See N.T., at 64.
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employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not 

require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences 

or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported, 

we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an 

error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's 

decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized 

our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However, 

[w]e must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in 

order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported 

by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (citations & 

quotation marks omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs the involuntary termination of 

parental rights and requires the trial court to conduct a bifurcated analysis. 

See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in [Subs]ection 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to [Subs]ection 2511(b): determination of 

the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare 

analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 942 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted). In recognition of the “the significant gravity” of the termination of 
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parental rights, as well as its “far-reaching and intentionally irreversible 

consequences[,] . . . the burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination 

to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the statutory 

grounds for doing so.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d at 358 (citation & 

quotation marks omitted). 

[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so 

clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact 

to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of 

the precise facts in issue.

Id. (citation & quotation marks omitted).

In the present case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). See Decree of 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 11/9/22, at 1-2; Trial Ct. Op. at 

7. However, in order to affirm the termination of parental rights, we need 

only agree with the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 

2511(a), as well as subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Accordingly, we confine our analysis to 

Subsection 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Subsection 2511(a)(2) provides for the termination of parental rights

upon proof of the following:

The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). If the court determines termination is warranted 

under subsection (a), it must then consider the needs and welfare of the child 

under subsection (b):

The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect 

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the 

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent 

to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Relevant herein, we note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held

that a parent’s incarceration,

while not a litmus test for termination, can be determinative of 

the question of whether a parent is incapable of providing 

“essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the length of 

the remaining confinement can be considered as highly relevant 

to whether “the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent,” 

sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 

[Subsection] 2511(a)(2).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). 

Nevertheless, a parent’s incarceration itself is not determinative. Rather, as 

noted above, a trial court must also consider the child’s needs and welfare 

under Subsection 2511(b). Thus, the Supreme Court has explained that “trial 

courts must carefully review the individual circumstances for every child to 
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determine, inter alia, how a parent’s incarceration will factor into an 

assessment of the child’s best interest.” Id. at 830-31.

Turning to Mother’s first issue on appeal, she contends that DHS failed 

to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds for the involuntarily 

termination of her parental rights under Subsection 2511(a). See Mother’s 

Brief at 12. Although she addresses each of the statutory subsections, we will 

focus on her argument concerning Subsection (a)(2). First, Mother 

emphasizes that under Subsection 2511(a)(2), at trial court is permitted to 

consider any efforts she made after the termination petition was filed “to 

remedy the conditions described therein[.]” Id. at 14. Her entire argument 

regarding subsection (a)(2) is as follows: 

In many instances, Mother did initiate such efforts. Mother 

did make progress with her objectives. And if the law permits the 

court to consider efforts, even when initiated after notice that 

the [termination p]etition has been filed, then a fortiori, there is 

no requirement that the efforts be completed at some arbitrary 

date.

DHS failed to prove by “clear and convincing” evidence that 

grounds exist to terminate parental rights, under § 2511(a)(2).

Id. at 14. Mother does not state what “efforts” she “initiated” to meet her 

objectives either before or after the termination petition was filed, nor does

she provide any citations to the hearing testimony. See id.

Upon our review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in finding grounds for termination under Subsection 2511(a)(2). First, it is 

evident that the “repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

of [Mother] caused [C]hild to be without essential care, control or subsistence 
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necessary for his physical or mental well-being[.]” See 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(2). Indeed, Mother does not even argue to the contrary. 

Child was initially removed from Mother’s care in December of 2020, 

when Mother was arrested and imprisoned for theft. See DHS’s Application 

for Order of Protective Custody at 2 (unpaginated). At the time, Mother’s 

home did not have any food, electricity or running water, and Child was 

sleeping in the car. See N.T. at 10. Although Mother was released from 

custody in February of 2021, she failed to comply with any of her case plan 

objectives, other than visitation with Child. See id. at 13-15. Her in-person 

visits ceased, however, in May of 2021, after she tried to leave with Child. Id.

at 35. In August of 2021, Mother was, once again, arrested and incarcerated 

on a charge of murder. Id. at 16. Thus, Mother’s incarceration, as well as 

her refusal to comply with her service plan objectives, has left Child without 

essential care. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

To the extent Mother argues that the cause of her incapacity or neglect 

can be remedied within a reasonable period of time, we disagree. First, 

Mother failed to make any progress toward her reunification goals before her 

August 2021 arrest. In fact, the trial court commented that Mother “took no 

accountability for her actions and blamed others for” her missed visits and the 

May 2021 altercation that led to cessation of in-person visits. See Trial Ct. 

Op. at 13. Presently, Mother is serving a minimum term of 71⁄2 to 17 years’ 

imprisonment, with a minimum release date of February 13, 2029. See N.T. 

at 16-17, 52, Exhibit DHS-5 (Mother’s criminal docket). At that time, Child 
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will be nearly 17 years old. While Mother maintains that “there is no 

requirement that [her] efforts [towards meeting her reunification objective]

be completed at some arbitrary date[,]”9 we emphasize that “[p]arental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform 

one’s parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs.” See Interest of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474 

(Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation & quotation marks omitted). Indeed, it 

is axiomatic that a parent must make “diligent efforts” and “utilize all 

resources” to preserve and maintain her relationship with her child. See id.

(citations omitted). Accordingly, we conclude the record supports the trial 

court’s determination that DHS presented clear and convincing evidence to 

support termination of Mother’s parental rights under Subsection 

2511(a)(2).10

In her second issue, Mother contends DHS failed to provide clear and 

convincing evidence that termination was warranted under Subsection 

2511(b). See Mother’s Brief at 16. She insists “there was insufficient 

evidence that the bond between [C]hild and . . . Mother has been broken[,]” 

and “inadequate testimony concerning the likely effect . . . severing any bond”

____________________________________________

9 Mother’s Brief at 14 (emphasis omitted).

10 Because we conclude termination was warranted under Subsection 

2511(a)(2), we need not consider Mother’s arguments regarding the lack of 

evidence supporting termination under Subsections (a)(1), (5), and (8). See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
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would have on Child. Id. at 17. Mother maintains the facts of her case are 

similar to In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

The trial court provided the following analysis with regard to termination 

under Subsection 2511(b):

In regard to 2511(b) and the best interest of [Child, Case 

Manager] Williams testified that [Child] is currently placed in a 

preadoptive home though New Foundations since April 2, 2021. 

She testified that [Child] has established close personal 

relationships with his current caregivers which is the resource 

parent, her husband, and their daughter. [Case Manager]

Williams further testified that the [foster] mother and father 

provide [Child] with love, stability, safety, and support and that 

they meet all of his emotional, medical, educational,

developmental, and daily needs. [Case Manager] Williams 

testified that at this point [Child] shares his primary parent child 

bond with the current caregivers. There is no parent child bond 

between [Child] and his Mother according to [Case Manager] 

Williams and she described the relationship as “strained” as 

[Child] does not look to Mother for any care or safety. [Case 

Manager] Williams further testified that Mother does not meet any 

of [Child’s] emotional, medical, educational, developmental, or 

daily needs and has not done so at all during the life of this case. 

[Case Manager] Williams has no concerns in regard to the current 

caregiver. [Child] told [her] that he wishes to remain in his 

current setting and would like to be adopted. [Child] wants to 

visit with his family but does not want to reside with them. The 

Child Advocate, Aaron Mixon, Esq., also testified at trial that 

[Child] indicated to him when he last met with [Child] on August 

12, 2022, that [Child] wishes to remain with his current caregivers 

forever because [Child] understands that to be adoption. 

The most recent time that [Case Manager] Williams saw

[Child] was November 8, 2022. He was safe and his basic needs 

were being met. [Case Manager] Williams testified that she 

believed that it was in the best interest of [Child] to terminate the 

rights of Mother and any father of [Child] so that permanency and 

a sense of belonging could be established for him. [She] did not 

believe that the termination of parental rights of Mother or 

unknown father would cause any irreparable harm to [Child]. 
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[Further, Case Manager] Williams believed that it is in the best 

interest of [Child] to change his goal to adoption. 

The Court found credible the testimony from [Case 

Manager] Williams regarding the close bond between [Child] with 

the current caregivers, that they are meeting all of his needs and

that there is no bond between Mother and [Child]. The Court also

found credible the testimony from [Case Manager] Williams and 

[Child Advocate] Mixon that [Child] wishes to remain in his current 

placement and to be adopted by the current caregivers. 

Consequently, the termination of Mother’s parental rights would 

be in the best interest of [C]hild pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 

2511(b). Additionally, termination of parental rights would not 

have a detrimental effect on the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs of [Child].

Trial Ct. Op. at 15-16 (record citations omitted).

Upon our review, we agree with the determination of the trial court that 

DHS presented sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support termination 

of Mother’s parental rights under Subsection 2511(b). Contrary to Mother’s 

assertion, Case Manager Williams ─ who has been involved in the matter since 

Child’s initial placement ─ testified that Child no longer has a bond with 

Mother, and that termination of her parental rights would not be detrimental 

to him. See N.T. at 20-21, 23. Rather, Child has “close personal 

relationships” with his foster family, who provide him with all of his “emotional, 

medical, educational, developmental, and daily needs.” Id. at 20. Child has 

expressed his desire to be adopted by his foster parents to both Case Manager 

Williams and Child Advocate Mixon. See id. at 22, 57-58. Further, Case 

Manager Williams testified that Child’s primary parent child bond is with his 

foster mother. Id. at 20. The trial court specifically credited her testimony. 
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See id. at 64; Trial Ct. Op. at 16. See also In re Adoption of C.M., 255 

A.3d at 358.

We also conclude that Mother’s reliance on In re T.F. is misplaced. In 

that case, the trial court involuntarily terminated the mother’s parental rights 

to her two children. See In re T.F., 847 A.2d at 740-41. A panel of this 

Court reversed on appeal, concluding that the trial “court’s analysis with 

regard to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

children [was] lacking.” Id. at 743. Although the trial court concluded that 

the children were adjusting well to their foster homes, the panel found nothing 

in the record to support that determination. Id. Moreover, the panel noted:

[T]here is no discussion about bonding or a lack thereof between 

the children and Mother, or between the children themselves. 

Nothing was submitted into evidence about the children’s health, 

their schooling and whether or not they are content in their 

surroundings. Therefore, we have no way of knowing what effect 

the termination of Mother’s parental rights will have on the 

children. Nor can we conclude that the trial court’s conclusion is 

based on any evidence in the record.

Id. 

Conversely, in the present case, Case Manager Williams explicitly 

testified that Child no longer had a bond with Mother, and that Child looked 

to his foster family for all of his physical and emotional needs. See N.T. at 

20-21. Further, Child ─ who was 10 years old at the time of the hearing ─ 

expressed to both Case Manager Williams and Child Advocate Mixon his desire 

to be adopted by his foster family. See id. at 22, 57-58. Thus, unlike In re 

T.F., the trial court’s ruling in the case sub judice is supported by the 
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testimony presented at the termination hearing. Accordingly, Mother’s second 

claim fails.

In her final claim, Mother argues that the trial court’s order changing 

Child’s placement goal from reunification to adoption was not supported by 

clear and convincing evidence. Mother’s Brief at 19. However, given our 

disposition affirming the termination decree, Mother’s argument concerning 

the goal charge order is moot. Therefore, we need not review this claim. See

In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“[T]he effect 

of [a] decision to affirm [an] orphans’ court’s termination decree necessarily 

renders moot [a] dependency court’s decision to change [a c]hild’s goal to 

adoption.”), appeal denied, 258 A.3d 1144 (Pa. 2021).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s

parental rights and dismiss as moot Mother’s appeal from the order changing 

Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Termination decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Dubow Did Not Participate in the consideration or decision of 

this case.
J-S16031-23

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2023