1

. The Honorable Judi th M. Billings, Seni or Judge, sat by spec i al

a ss i gnment as authorized by law

. Seege ner a llyUtah Co de Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6)

. 2014 UT App 213

_________________________________________________________



### T HE 

### U T AH 

### C OU RT O F 

### A PPEALS

S TA TE O F U T AH , P la i nti ff an d A pp el le e,
v. K ARL M AR T I N H E GB L OO M , D efen da nt a nd Ap pe ll an t.
Opini on No. 20 12 02 64 -C A Filed September 11, 2014

Thi rd Di stric t Co urt, S alt Lake Depart ment Th e H ono rab le D en i s e P . L i ndbe rg

No. 111903279

Peter A . Daines, IsaacE. McDougall, and John B

. Pli mpton, Att or neys for Appellant Sean D. Reyes and John J. Ni elsen, Attorn eys fo r Ap pe ll ee
J UDG E J. F R ED ER I C V O RO S J R . authore d thi s Opi ni on, i n whi ch J UDG E J OHN A. P EA R CE and S EN I O R J UDG E J U D I T H M. B I LL I NGS
concu rr ed. 1

VOR OS, J ud ge:
¶1 KarlMartin H egb loomap pe al s fro m h is c onvi c ti on a ft er en tering a co ndi ti ona l gu i lty p le a to tw o c ou nts of atte mp ted violat i on of a pro tective or der. He contends on appeal that t he prot ecti ve o rder he di sobeyed was i ssu ed i n violati on of hi s due process ri ghts and thus void . And becau se i t w as vo i d, he argues,State v. Hegbloo m

20120264-CA 2 2014 UT App 213 he may challen ge it collaterally in thi s cri minal proceedi ng. We affi rm.

BACKGRO UND
¶2 Hegbloom and K.M . shared cus tody of their c hi ld, but
c us todyexcha nge s pr oved di ffi c ul t f or b othpa ren ts . K. M. event ually obtain ed an ex part e ci vil protective or der ag ai nst Hegbloom.
¶3 Be fo re the he aring o n th e p rotec ti ve ord er, He gb loomfi le d
a w ri ttenres pon s e. Bothpa ren ts ap pe ared pro se at th e h ea ri ng. He gb loombro ught e vi de nc e, s om e of i t unk nown to K.M. , to present at t he hearin g. Rat her t ha n r ecei ve t he evidenc e, the commi ssi oner pr oceeded by pro ffer. He gbloom then or ally reque s ted a “fo rma l e vi de nti ary h ea ri ng. ” The c om mi s s i one r responded, “Once I make my r uling, i f t here’s an objection you . . .
c anobjec t an d ta ke i t b ef ore th e ju dge

. . . [ w ho] c ande c i de w he the r there [wi ll] be a f

ull forma l evidenti ary hearin g.” Insi sti ng that wit ho ut the r ej e ct e d e v ide nc e he “ ha [d ] n o ca se , ” He gbl o o m a g a in
r e que st e d a fo r ma l e v ide nt ia r y he a r ing ; the co mm iss io ne r a g a in de ni ed the reque s t.
¶4 At th e c onc lu s i on o f the he aring, the c om mi ssione r as ked Hegbloom i f he agr eed to the ter ms the guardi an ad lit e m h ad propo sed for hi s pr ote cti ve or der. He replied, “I . . . ag ree t o tho se ter ms.” ( Omi ssi on i n origi nal.) The commi ssi oner t hen stated that she w ould recommend an ext ensi on of the prote cti ve o rder again st Hegbloom on those t e r ms
. Ho we v e r , He gbl o o m a g ain requested an evidenti ary hearin g. Th e c om m i s s i one r r e s p onded, “You can object to m y r eco mmend ati ons i f y ou be li eve tha t th ey w ere i nappropr i ate. That wi ll g o to t he judge and yo u canmake that reque s t

. . . .” He gb looms pe c i fi c al ly a s ked i f h i s objec ti on n eed ed to be in w riting, t o wh ich the comm i ssi oner r epli ed that it di d. Hegbloom then t oldthe commi ssi oner t hat hi s wri tte n submi ssi ons inc luded a request for a for mal evi denti ary hearin g. The
c om mi s s i one r res pon de d th at sh e had al rea dy den i ed tha t, a dd i ng,State v. Hegbloo m

20120264-CA 3 2014 UT App 213 “ Y o u m a y no w o bj e ct a nd we ’ l l ma k e tha tr e que st, ” bu t t ha this objection “need[ed] to be in wri tin g.”
¶5 Hegbloom did not fil e a wri tte n objection to t he
c om mi s s i one r’s rec om me nd ati on. Wi tho ut hol ding a n e vi de nti ary hearin g, the dist r ict court followed the r ecommendati on and enter ed a permanent pro tective or der ag ai nst Hegbloom. Hegbloom did not appeal.
¶6 A few months later, K.M . repo rt ed Hegbloom to the polic e fo r mu lti pl e vi ola ti ons of the orde r. She al le ged tha t he ha d s en t he r multi ple tex t mess ages and had c ome to her apart ment “dressed as
a c lown. ” H e w as c ha rged w i th n in e vi ola ti ons of the prote c ti ve or der, all third degree feloni es.
¶7 In the crim i nal court, Hegbloo m contended t hat the prot ecti ve o rder had been entered inv i olation of hi s due process rights, rendering i t v oid. The court r ul e d t hat Hegbloo m’s oral
o bj e ct io n t o the co mm iss io ne r ’ s r e co mm e nd a t i o n w a s n o ta v a l id objection and that the entr y o f t he order di d not v i olate his due proc es s ri ght s . The c ou rt s tate d, “The pr o ble m h ere i s tha t Mr. He gb loo m di d n ot f oll owthe s tatu tory requi rem en ts

. . . e ven though t he commi ssi oner repeat edly gav e hi m t hat i nformation.” Th e cri mina l cou rt c onc lu de d tha t th e c om mi s s i one r ha d e xpl aine d t o H e g b loomhowto objec t to th e c om mi s s i one r’s rec om me nd ati on bu t th at H egb loomha d f ai le d to d o s o.
¶8 He gb loom en tere d c ond i ti ona l gu i lty pl ea s to tw o c ou nts of atte mpted violati on of a p r o t ecti ve o rder , clas s A mi sdemeanors,

r e se r v ing the r ig ht t o a p p e a l the d ist r ictco ur t ’ s r ul ing d e ny ing his motion to declare t he prot ecti ve o rder vo i d.

ISS UE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 Hegbloom challenges hi s convi cti on on the g ro und that the prot ecti ve o rder was voi d. It was void, he a r gues, becau se i t was enter ed i n violati on of hi s due process ri ghts, speci fi cally, hi s ri ght to an ev i denti ary hearin g. And becaus e the or der was void, heState v. Hegbloo m

2. Although Hegbloom nomi nally menti ons the Ut ah Consti tution, he does not set for th “a uni que state consti tutional anal y si s.” See State v. W

orwo od, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 19, 164 P.3d 397. Acc or di ngly, we decline to separately consi der any stat e consti tutional c lai m. See id.

20120264-CA 4 2014 UT App 213 argu es , h e ma y c ha ll en ge i t c oll ate ral ly in th i s c ri mina l p roc eed i ng. “Constituti onal i ssu es, inc luding questi ons regar di ng due process,

a r e questi ons of law that we review f or corr ectness.” St a t e v. M a rt inez, 2013 UT 23, ¶ 6, 304 P.3d 54 (c it a t ion and internal quo t a t io n m a r k s o mit t e d ). S imil a r l y , “ [w]hether a j ud g me nt is v o id
or vo i dable is a q ue st i on of law.” Nebeker v. Sum mit County, 2014 UT App 137, ¶ 9.

AN AL YSIS
¶ 1 0 Th e thr e sh o l d que st io n he r e is wh e the r He gbl o o m m a y , in this cr i mina l p roc eed i ng, c oll ate ral ly a ttac k th e p rotec ti ve ord er en tere d in th e p ri or c i vi l p roc eeding. Col la tera l a ttac ks are di s fa vored . “ Wi th ra re ex c ep ti on, w he n ac ou rt w i th p rope r jurisdi cti on enter s a final judgment .

. . that judgment c an only be attacke d on di rect appeal.” State v. Hamilton , 2003 UT 2 2 , ¶ 2 5 , 70 P.3d 111. An attack “is reg arded as collatera l if made when the judgment is offered as t he ba si s of a clai m in a subsequ ent proceeding.” Ols en v . B o a rdo f E duc. , 571 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1977).
¶11 A vo i d judgment “is open to collateral at tack.” Fa r ley v. Fa rley, 431 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah 1967); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 29 (2 00 6) . B ut“[ t] he c onc ep t of a voi d ju dgm en t i s na rrow ly c ons tru ed i n the i ntere st of finali ty.” Brimhall v. Mecham , 494 P.2d 525, 526 (U tah19 72 ). Tw o c i rc um s t an c es ma y ren de r a ju dgm en t voi d. Fi rs t, a “judgment [is ] void o n it s fa ce for lack of j uri sdi cti on i n the court.” Bo we n v. Ols en , 246 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah 1952). Se cond, a j ud g me nt is v o id wh e n the co ur t e nt e r ing the j ud g me nt “ a ct e d in
a manner i nconsi stent wi th due pr ocess of law .” Br imh a ll , 494 P.2d at 526. Hegbloo m reli es on the second bas i s. 2State v. Hegbloo m

3. Hegbloom does not assert that, had he obj e ct e d t o the
c om m i s s i on e r’ s fi n d i n g inth e m a nn e r s h e p re s c ri b e d , th e d i s tr i ct court would have denied h i m an evi denti ary hearin g. Nor does he
as s ert th at th e a ll ege d p roc ed ural error w ou ld notha ve b een corr ected on appeal had he appealed.

20120264-CA 5 2014 UT App 213 ¶12 “‘The purpose of due process i s to pre vent fundamental unfai rness.’” St a te v. Pa rker , 872 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 19 94 ) ( qu oting State v. M aesta s , 815 P.2d 1319, 1325 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)); seea lso Co lo ra do v. Co nnel ly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) ( statin g that t he ai m of due p r o ce ss i s “‘to pr eventfund amental
un fa i rne s s ’” ( qu oting Lise nb a v. Ca lif o rnia, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941))). Du e p r o ce ss ca nn o t be co nf ine d t o a sp e cif ic f o r mu l a bu tr a the r is “‘flexib le and call s for such procedural prot ecti ons as the par ticular si tuation deman ds.’” Mathe ws v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (quo ti ng M o rri ssey v . B rew er , 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
¶13 At a mini mu m, du e proc es s requi res “[ t] i me ly a nd ad equa te notic e and an opport uni ty t o be h eard in a meaningful w ay.” Sa lt La ke City Co rp . v. Jo rd a n Riv er Rest o ra ti o n Net wo rk , 2012 UT 84, ¶ 50, 29 9 P .3 d 9 90 (a lte rati on in ori gi na l) (c i tati on a nd i nte rna l quo tati on marks omitted). The oppo rt uni ty to be hear d i n a meaningful w ay i n c l u d e s th e “ o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e a n d a r g u m e n t on that is sue b efore decis i on.” Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990).
¶14 Hegbloom does not clai m that he lacked actual notic e of the prot ecti ve-or der pr oceedi ng. Rather , he co nt ends that he was de ni ed the opp ortu ni ty to b e h ea rd. Thi s de ni al, h e rea s ons, took the for m of a requi rement t hat he file a written obj ecti on to the commi ssi oner’ s recommendati on after t he conclu si on of the he aring b ef ore th e c om mi s s i one r. An d b ec au s e th e d i s tri c t c ou rt enter ed the pro tective or der in vi olation of hi s due process rights, He gb loomma y, h e a s s erts, c oll ate ral ly a ttac k i t. 3
¶15 We do n ot agre e th at th e c i vi l p rotec ti ve ord er i s s ubjec t to
c oll at er al atta c k. T o b egin w i th, the c as e l awdoe s nots up port Hegbloom on t hi s poi nt. Hegbloo m cites m any Utah cases s tatingState v. Hegbloo m

4. S e e, e.g. , St a tev. Ca ndl a nd, 2 0 1 3 UT 5 5 , ¶¶ 1 3 , 2 5 , 3 0 9 P

. 3 d 230 (rej ecti ng, on direct appeal, a challenge to gui lty plea); In re Ad o pt io n o

f B a byE. Z. , 20 11 UT 38 , ¶¶ 37 , 44, 26 6 P .3 d 70 2 ( hol ding, on d i rec t ap pe al, th at th e fed era l P are nta l Ki dn ap ping P reven ti on Ac t doe s notde prive U t ah co urt s of s ubjec t m atte r juri s di c ti on where another state fi rst ex erci sed juris di cti on ov er the adopt i on); Ga rci a v. Ga rci a , 712 P.2d 288, 291 n.5 ( Ut a h 1 9 86) (holding that di vo rce decree ente red without effecti ve serv i ce on respondent sh o ul d be se ta sid e un d e r r u l e 6 0 (b ) o f t he U t a h R ul e s o f C iv il Procedure); Br imh a ll v . M ech a m, 4 94 P.2d 525, 526 (Utah 1972) (refusing rule 60(b) reli ef to a wi fe who ass ert ed the j udgment again st her was void on the gro und that th e appearance of the atto rney e mployed by her husband w as un authorized to r epresent her in ter ests); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Richm ond Irrigation Co. , 13 P .2 d 3 20 , 3 24 (U tah19 32 ) ( hol ding, on di rec t ap pe al, th at th e m ere fact that a j udgment may be err oneous d o e s not render i t v oid) ; Bangerter v. Petty, 2010 UT App 49, ¶ 14, 228 P.3d 1250 (holding that
ani nc orrec t prope r t y de s c ri pti on in as he ri ff’s de ed i s a “ minor i rregu la ri ty” th at d i d n ot ren de r the s al e voi d a nd thu s subj ect to collateral at tack); State v. Rawlings , 8 93 P.2 d 10 63 , 1 07 1 ( Uta h C t. Ap p. 19 9 5 ) ( h o l d i n gth a tb e c a u s e th e d e f e n d a n tw a s n o tg i v en prop er n oti c e of

a p rob ati on e xten s i on h ea ri ng, the di st ri c t c ou rt lacked the au thor i ty t o ex tend the defendant’s probat i on); Je nk ins
v. W eis , 8 68 P .2 d 1 374, 13 83 (U tahCt. Ap p. 19 94 ) (h old i ng voi d, on di r ect appe al, a di s tri c t c ou rt’s s uas pon te d i s mi s s al of a c au s e of acti on wi thout no tic e or hearin g); Rich ins v . De lb ert Chipma n & So ns Co. , 817P

. 2 d 3 8 2 , 3 8 5 ( Ut a hC t. Ap p
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( a ffi rm i n g, ond i re ct appea l , t he deni al of relief u nder rule 60(b)(5) on the g ro und that “[ n] oth i ng in the rec ord i nd i c ate s tha t the c ou rt la c ked juri s di c ti on ov er t he su bject matt er o r o ver the part i es or was other wi se i ncompetent to render judgment”); W o rk ma n v. NagleCo nst r. , Inc ., 802 P. 2 d 749, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holdi ng vo i d, on di rect (conti nued...)

20120264-CA 6 2014 UT App 213 i n the abstract the r ule t hat a deni al of due process renders a jud gm en t voi d a nd he nc e s ubjec t to c oll ate ral atta c k. B utnon e of thes e c a s e s a d d re s s th e s i tu a ti onb e f or e u s h e re : th e w ro ngful de ni al of anevi de nti ary h ea ri ng. 4State v. Hegbloo m

4. (...conti nued) ap pe al, a jud gm en t aga i ns t m embe rs of a c la s s i n ac la s s ac ti on where “nothing in the recor d i ndi cates that the member s o f the would-b e clas s .
. . were notifi ed that thi s acti on had been brought to adj udi cate their clai ms”)

.

20120264-CA 7 2014 UT App 213 ¶16 Indeed, Hegbloom ci tes no Utah cas e upholding a collater al
a t t a ck

. He d o e s c it e a U t a h c a se a l l o win ga ch a l l e ng e t o a v o id jud gm en t u nd er ru le 60 (b )( 5) of the Uta h Rul es of Ci vi l P roc ed ure , bu t th at c as e invol ved la c k of s ervi c e, no t la c k of

anevi de nti ary hearin g. See Ga rci a v. Ga rci a , 712 P.2d 2 8 8 , 291 & n.5 (Utah 1986) (h old i ng tha t a di vorc e dec ree en tere d wi tho ut effe c ti ve servi c e on the res pon de nt s hou ld be s et a s i de un de r rul e 6 0( b) (5 )) . H egb loom ci tes one non- Utah c ase permi tting collateral at tack on due pro cess gr ounds, b ut i ts rat i onale relies on lac k o f no tic e, not lack o f an evidenti ary hearin g. See Olson v. S tat e, 7 7 P .3 d 1 5, 16 –1 8 ( Al as ka C t. Ap p. 20 03 ) (ho lding th at a de fe nd an t w ho h ad “n ever re c ei ved not i c e of the he aring” on a pe ti ti on f or a l ong -t ermprote c ti ve ord er could not be convi cted for v i olating i t).
¶17 He gb loomatte mp ts to fram e h i s de ni al of anevi de nti ary he aring a s a d en i al of

not i c e. Bu t he rec ei ved not i c e of bo th the ex parte or der and the ex tensi on of thator der. He att e nded t he he a rin g a n d e ve nc h a l l e n ge d th e gr ou n d s f or th e or d e r t o the ext ent possible wi thout calli ng wi tn e ss e s. But he di d not seek an evidenti ary hearin g indi stric t court as instr ucted by t he
c om mi s s i one r. H egb loomnowc ont en ds t hat th e c om mi s s i one r’s ins t r uc t io ns we r e e r r o ne o us un d e r r ul e 7 o f the U t a h Rul e s o f C iv il P roc ed ure an d s ec ti on 7 8B -7 -1 07 (1 )( f) of the Uta h C ode . B uteven if H e gbl o o m is co r r e ct, we ca nn o ta g r e e tha tthe e r r o r d e nie d him
no ti ce
. We thus reje ct hi s argument that “t he fact that he was deprived of an op p or tu ni ty t o be meaningfully heard meant that he
ne ver rec ei ved s uffi c i en t no ti c e a nd the i s s uing c ou rt la c ked jurisdi cti on.”
¶ 1 8 He gbl o o m’ s c l a im f ind s t he st r o ng e st su p p o r tinWiscombe v. Wiscombe, 74 4 P. 2 d 1 0 2 4 , 1 0 2 5 (U t a h C t

. A p p
. 1 9 8 7 ). Th e ba sic facts of Wiscombeare si mi lar to t ho se before us. In Wiscombe, aState v. Hegbloo m

20120264-CA 8 2014 UT App 213 di vo rced couple attende d a proffer hear i ng before a do mesti crelat i ons commi ssi oner. Id. at 1024–25. T he husband m ade no wri tte n objection to t he commi ssi oner’ s recommendat io n, but clai med to have or ally obj ected, a clai m the wi fe chal lenged. Id. at 10 25 . The di s tri c t c ou rt f ou nd tha t th e husba nd h ad fai le d to proper ly obj ect to the re commendati on of the commi ssi oner and
en tere d ju dgm en t c ons i s ten t w i th t he c om mi s s i o n er’s recommendati on. Id. Th e hu s ba nd di rec tly a pp ea le d to thi s c ou rt. Id.
¶19 We he ld , “ Gi venthe la ck o f o pp ortu ni ty f or a c om pl ete evidenti ary hearin g inproceedings b efore t he dom e st ic r elations commi ssi oner, we beli eve in thi s case that procedural due process requi res tha t any doubt s ab ou t c om pl i an c e w i th Rul e 8 (d ) o ught t o be resolve d i n favor of [the husb and], who was s eeking a fu ll evidenti ary hearin g before [the di stric t court ].” Id. “ One of the fund amental requi si tes of due pr ocess,” w e noted, “is the oppor tuni ty t o be fully heard.” Id. at 1025–26. And where “it was not clear that [the husband ] wai ved his due process ri ght t o a full hearin g,” the dis tr i ct court should have gr anted one. Id. at 1026.
¶20 Our o pi ni on i n Wi scombe ai ds Hegbloom to t hi s extent: we clas si fi ed the w ro ngful deni al of an evidenti ary hearin g on t he prot ecti ve o rder as a v io l ation of due process . Cruci ally, thoug h, Wiscombei nvolv ed a di rect appeal. Eve n in di cta, i t neve r mentions
vo i d ne ss , j ur isd ict io n, o r co l l a t e r a l a t t a ck s. A nd un li ke the husband i n Wiscombe, Hegbloom di d not appeal t he judgment o f the di stric t
c ou rt in th e p rotec ti ve- orde r c as e. In s tea d, he vi ola ted the orde r and now belatedly s eeks to attack i t c ollater ally . We are unwi lling to e xte nd Wiscombe ’s hol ding b eyon d i ts fact s an d i ts s tate d rat i onale. Wiscombedoes gr ound its ho lding on due pr ocess. But as exp la i ne d abo ve, ou r rea ding o f the c as es s ug ges ts tha t no t eve ry due process vi olation rendering a j udgment err oneous necess arily render s i t v oid aswell.
¶21 Ha d Heg bloom l ac ked not i c e of the prote c ti ve- orde r proceeding, we m i ght well agr ee that t he resulti ng or der was void. A li ti gan t de ni ed not i c e of a p roc eed i ng h as no o pp ortu ni ty toState v. Hegbloo m

20120264-CA 9 2014 UT App 213 bring an ap pe ll ate c ha ll en ge; to de ny s uch a li ti gan t the r ight to collaterally challen ge t he judgment ente red wi thout no tic e—and thus w i thout an o pport uni ty t o be heard—would i ndeed be fund amentally unfai r. Denyin g a collater al chall enge to that j ud g me nt wo ul d f o r e cl o se a ny o p p o r t un it y t o be he a r d in
c onn ec ti on w i th the en try of the orde r.
¶22 Bu t He gb loo m st an ds on d i fferen t f ooting. He rec ei ved
no t ice , a t t e nd e d the he a r ing be fo r e the co mm i ss io ne r , st a t e d his i nte nti on t o s eekanevi de nti ary h ea ri ng, an d w as i ns tru c ted how to do so. He does not clai m that he lacked notice of entry o f the di stric t court judgment o r was pr event ed from bringing a di rect appeal. The hu sban d i n Wiscombeap pe al ed the jud gm en t en tere d again st hi m. Hegbloom could have done li kewi se. A fter all, “[t]he prop er m eth od for con tes ti ng an ad vers e ruling i s to app ea l i t, n ot to v i olate it.” St a te v. Cla rk , 200 5 UT 75, ¶ 36, 124 P .3 d 235 . We s ee not hing f und ame nt al ly unfa ir in no tal lo wing a litig ant t o cha ll en ge collaterally a judgment he could have c ha l lenged di rectly had he
c hos ento do s o.
¶23 In sum, once the pro te ct i ve o rder was en ter ed again st He gb looman d w i th h i s kno w le dge , h e w as ob li gat ed ei the r to ap pe al i t or ob ey i t. H e w as notfr ee t o di s ob ey i t an d th en cha ll en ge i t c oll ate ral ly in th e cr iminal pr o cee ding . W hat ev er errors we r e o r we r e no t ma d e by the co mm iss io ne r o r the d ist r ict co ur tin the pro tective-order pr o ce e di ng di d not r ender the j udgment
en tere d th ere vo i d a nd s ubjec t to c oll ate ral atta c k.

CON CL USION
¶24 The judgment of the dis tr i ct court is affi rmed.