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Military Decisionmaking

Process

MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

iii

Foreword

Historically, a unit’s success is directly related to the ability of the staff to 

execute the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Given the increased 

complexity of today’s operational environment and the vast array of mission 

command systems and processes, integration and synchronization of all 

activities associated with operations are increasingly difficult.

Observations derived from deployed units, as well as from trainers at 

Combat Training Centers (CTCs) over the past decade, indicate a significant 

loss of unit ability to conduct a detailed MDMP. This lack of planning 

expertise results in de-synchronized operations, and could ultimately cost 

the lives of Soldiers.

Both in actual operations and in training at the CTCs, planning time is 

often extremely limited. In these instances, units often omit steps of the 

MDMP. Most CTC trainers agree that when time is limited, completely 

omitting any step of the MDMP is not the solution and often degrades 

mission success. Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in 

the use of non-doctrinal story boards in the planning process. This practice 

lacks the fidelity necessary to provide the commander with decisionmaking 

information he needs, and can lead to a loss of synchronization during 

operations.

The MDMP is a solid model for developing a solution to a problem. 

However, if the staff conducting the MDMP is unfamiliar with each of the 

steps, the process can become very complex, and errors committed early in 

the process become increasingly problematic as planning continues.

The MDMP facilitates interaction among the commander, staff, and 

subordinate headquarters throughout the operations process. It provides 

a structure for the staff to work collectively and produce a coordinated 

plan. During planning, staff members monitor, track, and aggressively 

seek information important to their functional areas. They assess how 

this information affects course of action development and apply it to any 

recommendations they make.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

There are numerous key doctrinal manuals that address MDMP. This 

handbook is designed to consolidate much of this doctrine, combined 

with analysis of observations from recent deployments and CTC 

rotations, into a single source that is useful to junior leaders as 

they conduct the MDMP. More detailed study of the MDMP can be 

accomplished by studying the key doctrinal manuals listed in Chapter 13 

of this handbook.

 

 
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Military Decisionmaking Process

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter 1. Army Design Methodology 3

Chapter 2. Military Decisionmaking Process 7

Chapter 3. Receipt of Mission 9

Chapter 4. Mission Analysis 11

Chapter 5. Course of Action Development 27

Chapter 6. Course of Action Analysis 39

Chapter 7. Course of Action Comparison 59

Chapter 8. Course of Action Approval 63

Chapter 9. Assessments 65

Chapter 10. Operations Order 71

Chapter 11. Rehearsals 83

Chapter 12. Terminology 97

Chapter 13. References 103

Center For Army Lessons Learned

Director COL Paul P. Reese

Deputy Division Chief Mr. George J. Mordica II

CALL Lead Analyst Mr. Jeff Baker

CALL Contributing Analyst Mr. James Cameron

Project Analyst Mr. Mike Flynn 

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this 

periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required 

by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is 

used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in 

this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your 

pinpoint distribution system.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Introduction

 “A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan 

executed next week.”

— General George S. Patton

Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a 

desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. 

Planning helps commanders create and communicate a common vision 

among themselves, their staffs, subordinate commanders, and unified 

action partners. 

All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the 

future. Planning cannot predict exactly what the effects of the operation will 

be, how enemies will behave, or how civilians will respond to the friendly 

force or the enemy. Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that occur 

during the planning process have great value. 

Planning activities occupy a continuum ranging from conceptual to detailed. 

On one end of the continuum is conceptual planning. Understanding the 

operational environment and the problem, determining the operation’s end 

state, establishing objectives, and sequencing the operation in broad terms 

all illustrate conceptual planning. 

At the other end of the spectrum is detailed planning. Detailed planning 

translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical 

plan. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or 

technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, synchronizing, and 

directing the force.

Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning, determining the 

appropriate mix based on the scope of the problem and their familiarity 

with it, the time available, and the availability of a staff. Methodologies 

that assist commanders and staffs with planning include Army design 

methodology, the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), and troop 

leading procedures.

This handbook will provide a brief discussion of the Army design 

methodology and how it is integrated with and complements the MDMP, 

but the focus of this handbook is to provide commanders and their staffs a 

tool to assist in the understanding and implementation of MDMP.

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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 1

Army Design Methodology

This chapter is designed to give a brief explanation of the Army design 

methodology and how it is integrated with the military decisionmaking 

process (MDMP). For a more detailed explanation of the Army design 

methodology, refer to ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0.

Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative 

thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to 

solving them (ADRP 5-0). Army design methodology is particularly useful 

as an aid to conceptual planning, but must be integrated with the detailed 

planning typically associated with the MDMP to produce executable plans. 

Army design methodology entails framing an operational environment, 

framing a problem, and developing an operational approach to solve 

the problem. It results in an improved understanding of the operational 

environment, a problem statement, the initial commander’s intent, and 

an operational approach that serves as the link between conceptual and 

detailed planning. Based on their understanding gained during the Army 

design methodology, commanders issue planning guidance, to include an 

operational approach, to guide more detailed planning using the MDMP. 

Figure 1-1 depicts the general activities of Army design methodology. While 

planners complete some activities before others, the learning generated in one 

activity may require revisiting the learning derived in another activity.

Figure 1-1. Frame the operational environment (ADRP 5-0)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Frame the Operational Environment

The commander, members of the staff, subordinate commanders, and 

unified action partners form a planning team to establish context for 

describing the problem and developing an operational approach by framing 

an operational environment. This framing facilitates hypothesizing, or 

modeling, that focuses on the part of the operational environment under 

consideration. Framing provides a perspective from which commanders can 

understand and act on a problem. 

In framing an operational environment, the planning team focuses on 

defining, analyzing, and synthesizing the characteristics of the operational 

and mission variables. Members of the planning team capture their work 

in an operational environmental frame (using narrative and visual models) 

that describes and depicts the history, culture, current state, relationships, 

and future goals of relevant actors in an operational environment. An 

operational environmental frame consists of two parts — the current state 

of the operational environment and the desired end state of the operational 

environment.

Frame the Problem

A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired 

goal or objective. In the context of operations, an operational problem is the 

issue or set of issues that impede commanders from achieving their desired 

end state. Problem framing involves identifying and understanding those 

issues that impede progress toward the desired end state.

Members of the planning team frame the problem to ensure that they are 

solving the right problem, instead of solving symptoms of the problem. 

Framing the problem involves understanding and isolating the root causes 

of conflict. The planning team closely examines the symptoms, the 

underlying tensions, and the root causes of conflict. From this perspective, 

the planning team can identify the fundamental problem with greater clarity 

and consider more accurately how to solve it. A technique for framing the 

problem begins with two basic questions:

• What is the difference between the current state and the desired state 

of the operational environment?

• What is preventing U.S. forces from reaching the desired end state?

Based on the problem frame, the planning team develops a problem 

statement — a concise statement of the issue or issues requiring resolution.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Develop an Operational Approach

Based on their understanding of the operational environment and the 

problem, the planning team members consider operational approaches — 

the broad general actions — to solve the problem. The operational approach 

serves as the main idea that informs detailed planning and guides the force 

through preparation and execution.

The planning team uses the elements of operational art (see ADRP 3-0) 

to help think through the operational environment and visualize and 

describe the operational approach. As the planning team considers various 

approaches, it evaluates the types of defeat or stability mechanisms that may 

lead to conditions that define the desired end state. Thus, the operational 

approach enables commanders to begin visualizing and describing possible 

combinations of actions to reach the desired end state, given the tensions 

identified in the operational environment and problem frames. The staff 

uses operational approaches to develop courses of action during detailed 

planning.

Planners can depict the operational approach by using lines of effort that 

graphically articulate the links among tasks, objectives, conditions, and the 

desired end state. Army design methodology offers the latitude to portray 

the operational approach in a manner that best communicates its vision and 

structure. Ultimately, the commander determines the optimal method to 

articulate the operational approach. However, it is important that narratives 

accompany lines of effort to ensure that subordinate commanders and 

Soldiers understand the operational approach.

Document Results

Commanders and staffs document the results of Army design methodology 

to inform more detailed planning. Key outputs of Army design methodology 

conveyed in text and graphics include the problem statement, initial 

commander’s intent, and planning guidance to include an operational 

approach.

The problem statement generated during problem framing communicates 

the commander’s understanding of the problem or problem set upon 

which the organization will act. The initial commander’s intent describes 

the purpose of the operation, initial key tasks, and the desired end state. 

The operational approach organizes combinations of potential actions 

in time, space, and purpose that will guide the force to the desired end 

state. Planning guidance orients the focus of operations, linking desired 

conditions to potential combinations of actions the force may employ to 

achieve the desired end state.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Reframing

Through continuous assessment, the commander and staff monitor the 

operational environment and progress toward setting conditions and 

achieving objectives. If the current operational approach is failing to meet 

expectations, or if aspects of the operational environment or problem 

change significantly, the commander may decide to begin reframing efforts.

During operations, commanders decide to reframe after realizing that the 

desired conditions have changed, are not achievable, or cannot be attained 

through the current operational approach, or because of change of mission 

or end state. Reframing provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits 

of any single perspective. Conditions will change during execution, and 

such change is expected because forces interact within the operational 

environment. Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to 

Army design methodology and essential to an organization’s ability to learn.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 2

Military Decisionmaking Process

The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology that integrates the 

activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other 

partners to understand the situation and mission, develop and compare 

courses of action (COAs), decide on a COA that best accomplishes 

the mission, and produce an operation plan or order for execution. The 

MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, 

and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options 

to solve problems, and reach decisions. The MDMP is a process that 

helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and creatively while 

planning.

The MDMP facilitates collaborative and parallel planning as the higher 

headquarters solicits input and continuously shares information concerning 

future operations with subordinate and adjacent units, supporting and 

supported units, and other military and civilian partners through planning 

meetings, warning orders (WARNORDs), and other means. Commanders 

encourage active collaboration among all organizations affected by the 

pending operations to build a shared understanding of the situation, 

participate in COA development and decision making, and resolve conflicts 

before publication of the plan or order.

The MDMP also drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, 

commanders and staffs conduct a time analysis early in the planning 

process. This analysis helps them determine what actions are required and 

when those actions must begin to ensure forces are ready and in position 

before execution. This may require the commander to direct subordinates 

to start necessary movements; conduct task organization changes; begin 

information collection operations; and execute other preparation activities 

before completing the plan. The commander directs these tasks in a series of 

WARNORDs as the commander and staff conduct the MDMP.

During planning, assessment focuses on developing an understanding of the 

current situation, ascertaining what to assess, and determining how to assess 

progress using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

Developing the unit’s assessment plan occurs during the MDMP — not after 

the plan or order is developed.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 2-1. Military decisionmaking process (FM 6-0)
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 3

Receipt of Mission

Figure 3-1. Receipt of Mission (Ref: FM 6-0)

Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt or in anticipation of a 

mission. The purpose of this step is to alert all participants of the pending 

planning requirements; determine the amount of time available for planning 

and preparation and decide on a planning approach, including guidance on 

how to design and abbreviate the MDMP, if required. When a new mission 

is identified, commanders and staffs perform the actions and produce the 

outputs as described in the following paragraphs.

1. Alert the staff and other key participants.

2. Gather the tools. Once notified of the new planning requirement, the staff 

prepares for mission analysis by gathering the tools needed to perform it. 

These tools include, but are not limited to:

• Appropriate manuals, including ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 

and ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols.

• All documents related to the mission and the area of operations, 

including the higher headquarters’ operation plan and operation order, 

maps and terrain products, and operational graphics.

• Higher headquarters’ and other organizations’ intelligence and 

assessment products.

• Estimates and products of other military and civilian organizations.

• Both the unit’s own and the higher headquarters’ standing operating 

procedures.

• Updated running estimates.

• Army design methodology products.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

3. Update running estimates.

4. Conduct an initial assessment. During receipt of mission, the commander 

and staff conduct an initial assessment of time and resources available to 

plan, prepare, and begin execution of an operation. This initial assessment 

helps the commander determine the following:

• Time needed to plan and prepare for the mission.

• Guidance on using the Army design methodology and abbreviating the 

MDMP, if required.

• Which outside agencies and organizations to contact and incorporate 

into the planning process.

• The staff’s experience, cohesiveness, and level of rest or stress.

The chief of staff or executive officer develops a staff planning timeline 

that outlines how long the headquarters can spend on each step of the 

MDMP. The staff planning timeline indicates what products are due, who is 

responsible for them, and who receives them.

5. Issue the commander’s initial guidance. Initial guidance includes the 

following:

• Initial time allocations.

• Decision to initiate design or go directly into the MDMP.

• How to abbreviate the MDMP, if required.

• Necessary coordination to perform, including liaison officers to 

exchange.

• Authorized movements to begin information collection activities.

• Collaborative planning times and locations.

• Initial information requirements.

• Additional staff tasks.

6. Issue a warning order (WARNORD #1). The WARNORD includes, at a 

minimum, the type of operation, the general location of the operation, the 

initial timeline, and any movement or reconnaissance to initiate.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 4

Mission Analysis

Figure 4-1. Mission analysis overview (FM 6-0)

If the MDMP is, simply speaking, a systematic method to solve a 

specific problem, then mission analysis is the method to clearly identify 

the problem and the tools available to solve the problem.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

During the mission analysis step, the staff analyzes the higher headquarters’ 

plans or orders to ensure staff members fully understand the mission, intent, 

resources available, constraints and limitations, and specified and implied 

tasks. The staff performs initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

(IPB); develops critical facts and assumptions; and determines the initial 

commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and essential 

elements of friendly information (EEFIs). At the end of this step, the staff 

has developed a proposed problem statement and a proposed mission 

statement; has presented the mission analysis briefing; is prepared to 

develop courses of action; and issues a warning order to subordinate units.

While the staff is conducting its analysis, the commander is conducting 

his own. The commander’s analysis provides a frame of reference that 

helps to quickly assess the staff’s work. Though mission analysis marks 

the beginning of the staff estimate, it is not a one-time effort. Mission 

analysis is a continuous effort that is constantly re-evaluated as the situation 

develops and new information is presented.

Mission Analysis Steps

• Step 1: Analyze the higher headquarters’ plan or order.

• Step 2: Perform initial IPB.

• Step 3: Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.

• Step 4: Review available assets and identify resource shortfalls. 

• Step 5: Determine constraints.

• Step 6: Identify critical facts and develop assumptions.

• Step 7: Begin risk management.

• Step 8: Determine initial CCIRs and EEFIs.

• Step 9: Develop initial information collection plan.

• Step 10: Update plan for the use of available time.

• Step 11: Develop initial themes and messages. 

• Step 12: Develop a proposed problem statement.

• Step 13: Develop a proposed mission statement. 

• Step 14: Present the mission analysis briefing.

• Step 15: Develop and issue the initial commander’s intent. 

• Step 16: Develop and issue initial planning guidance.

• Step 17: Develop course of action (COA) evaluation criteria.

• Step 18: Issue a warning order (WARNORD).
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Step 1: Analyze the higher headquarters’ plan or order.

Commanders and staffs thoroughly analyze the higher headquarters’ plan 

or order to determine how their unit — by task and purpose — contributes 

to the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of the higher 

headquarters. The commander and staff seek complete understanding of the 

following:

• Higher headquarters:

○Commander’s intent.

○Mission.

○Concept of operations.

○Available assets.

○Timeline.

• Missions of adjacent, supporting, and supported units and their 

relationship to the higher headquarters’ plan.

• Missions of interagency (IO), intergovernmental (IGO), and 

nongovernmental (NGO) organizations that work in their operational 

areas.

• Their assigned area of operations (AO).

Liaison officers familiar with the higher headquarters’ plan can help clarify 

issues. Collaborative planning with the higher headquarters also facilitates 

this task. Staffs also use requests for information (RFIs) to clarify or obtain 

additional information from the higher headquarters.

Step 2: Perform Initial Intelligence Preparation 

of the Battlefield (IPB).

IPB is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, 

terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine 

their effect on operations. The IPB process identifies critical gaps in the 

commander’s knowledge of an operational environment. As a part of 

the initial planning guidance, commanders use these gaps as a guide to 

establish their initial intelligence requirements. IPB products enable the 

commander to assess facts about the operational environment and make 

assumptions about how friendly and threat forces will interact in the 

operational environment. The description of the operational environment’s 

effects identifies constraints on potential friendly COAs. It also identifies 

key aspects of the operational environment, such as avenues of approach, 

engagement areas, and landing zones, which the staff integrates into 

potential friendly COAs and running estimates. For mission analysis, 

the intelligence staff, along with the other staff elements, will use IPB to 

develop detailed threat COA models, which depict a COA available to the 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

threat. The threat COA models provide a basis for formulating friendly 

COAs and completing the intelligence estimate.

The intelligence staff, in collaboration with other staff sections, develops 

other IPB products during mission analysis. That collaboration should 

result in the drafting of initial priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), the 

production of a complete modified combined obstacles overlay, a list of 

high-value targets, and unrefined event templates and matrices. IPB should 

provide an understanding of the threat’s center of gravity, which then can be 

exploited by friendly forces.

(Note: The IPB is arguably the most important portion of the MDMP. It 

identifies where you are operating and who is operating with and against 

you. The rest of the MDMP builds upon this fundamental framework.) For 

detailed information on the IPB process, refer to ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence 

Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace.

Step 3: Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.

The staff analyzes the higher headquarters’ order and the higher 

commander’s guidance to determine its specified and implied tasks.

In the context of operations, a task is a clearly defined and measurable 

activity accomplished by Soldiers, units, and organizations that may support 

or that other tasks support. The “what” of a mission statement is always a 

task.

Specified tasks are tasks specifically assigned to a unit by its higher 

headquarters. The higher headquarters may assign the tasks either orally 

during collaborative planning sessions or in directives from the higher 

commander.

Implied tasks are tasks the unit must perform to accomplish a specified 

task or the mission, but the higher headquarters’ order does not state 

them. The staff derives implied tasks from a detailed analysis of the 

higher headquarters’ order, the enemy situation, the terrain, and civil 

considerations. Additionally, analysis of doctrinal requirements for each 

specified task might disclose implied tasks. Units with an assigned AO 

are responsible for ensuring the conduct of essential stability tasks for the 

population in areas they control. While higher headquarters specifies some 

stability tasks, commanders consider the primary stability tasks found in 

FM 3-07, Stability Operations, as sources for implied tasks. These implied 

tasks, at a minimum, provide for civil security, restoration of essential 

services, and civil control for civil populations in the AO they control. 

Based on this analysis, the staff determines if there are other agencies, civil 

or military, that can provide these tasks. If not, the unit plans to provide 

these tasks using available assets. If the unit determines it does not have the 

assets, it informs its higher headquarters.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Once staff members have identified specified and implied tasks, they ensure 

they understand each task’s requirements and the purpose for accomplishing 

each task. They then determine the task or tasks units must successfully 

execute to accomplish the mission.

Essential tasks are specified or implied tasks the unit must execute to 

accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit’s 

mission statement.

Step 4: Review available assets; identify resource shortfalls.

The commander and staff examine additions to and deletions from the 

current task organization, command and support relationships, and status 

(current capabilities and limitations) of all units. This analysis also 

includes the capabilities of civilian and military organizations (joint, 

special operations, host nation, and multinational) that operate within the 

unit’s AO. The commander and staff consider relationships between and 

among specified, implied, and essential tasks and available assets. From 

this analysis, staffs determine if they have the assets needed to accomplish 

all tasks. If shortages occur, they identify additional resources needed 

for mission success to the higher headquarters. Staffs also identify any 

deviations from the normal task organization. A more detailed analysis of 

available assets occurs during COA development.

Step 5: Determine constraints.

The commander and staff identify any constraints placed on their command. 

A constraint is a restriction placed on the command by a higher headquarters. 

A constraint dictates an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom 

of action of a subordinate commander. Commanders find constraints in 

paragraph 3 in the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). 

Annexes to the order may also include constraints. The operations overlay, 

for example, may contain a restrictive fire line or a no-fire area. Commanders 

may issue constraints orally, in WARNORDs, or in policy memorandums.

Step 6: Identify critical facts and develop assumptions.

Imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future form the basis for all 

planning.

A fact is a statement of truth or a statement considered to be true at the time. 

Facts concerning the operational and mission variables serve as the basis 

for developing situational understanding, for continued planning, and for 

assessing progress during preparation and execution.

An assumption is a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition 

on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the 

absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process 

of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on 

the COA.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Appropriate assumptions used during planning have two characteristics:

• They are likely to be true.

• They are necessary — that is, essential — to continue planning.

Key points concerning the use of assumptions:

• Assumptions must be logical, realistic, and considered likely to be 

true.

• Too many assumptions result in a higher probability the plan or 

proposed solution may be invalid.

• The use of assumptions requires the staff to develop branches and 

sequels to execute if one or more key assumptions prove false.

• Often, an unstated assumption may prove more dangerous than a 

stated assumption proven wrong.

Replace assumptions with facts as soon as possible. The staff identifies 

information needed to convert assumptions into facts and submits them 

to the appropriate agency as information requirements. If the commander 

needs information to make a decision, he may designate the information 

requirement as one of his CCIRs. Submit requirements for information 

about threats and the environment to the S-2, who incorporates them into 

the initial information collection plan.

Note: Assumptions induce risk into operational planning. Consider these 

assumptions during risk management.

Step 7: Begin risk management.

Risk management is the Army’s process of identifying, assessing, and 

controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions 

that balance risk cost with mission benefits. During mission analysis, 

the commander and staff focus on identifying and assessing hazards. 

Developing specific control measures to mitigate those hazards occurs 

during course of action development.

The chief of protection (or operations staff officer (S-3) in units without 

a protection cell) in coordination with the safety officer integrates risk 

management into the MDMP. All staff sections integrate risk management 

for hazards within their functional areas. Units conduct the first four steps of 

risk management in the MDMP. ATP 5-19, Risk Management, addresses the 

details for conducting risk management, including products of each step.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Figure 4-2. Risk management in MDMP (ATP 5-19)

Step 8: Develop initial CCIRs and EEFIs.

Mission analysis identifies gaps in information required for further planning 

and decision making during preparation and execution. During mission 

analysis, the staff develops information requirements.

Information requirements are all information elements the commander and 

staff require for the successful conduct of operations; that is, all elements 

necessary to address the factors of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain 

and weather, troops and support available — time available and civil 

considerations). Some information requirements are of such importance to 

the commander that the staff nominates them to the commander to become a 

CCIR. The two types of CCIRs are priority information requirements (PIRs) 

and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).

• PIRs: Those intelligence requirements stated as a priority for 

intelligence support that the commander and staff need in order to 

understand the adversary or the operational environment (OE).

• FFIRs: Information the commander and staff need in order to 

understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities.

The initial CCIRs developed during mission analysis normally focus 

on decisions the commander must make to focus planning. Once the 

commander selects a COA, the CCIRs shift to information the commander 

needs in order to make decisions during preparation and execution.

Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs) establish an element 

of information to protect rather than one to collect. EEFIs identify those 

elements of friendly force information that, if compromised, would 

jeopardize mission success.

Depending on the situation, the commander and selected staff meet prior to 

the mission analysis briefing to approve the initial CCIRs and EEFIs. This 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

is especially important if the commander intends to conduct intelligence 

collection operations early in the planning process. The approval of the 

initial CCIRs, early in planning, assists the staff in developing the initial 

and subsequent intelligence collection plans. Approval of EEFIs allows the 

staff to begin planning and implementing measures to protect friendly force 

information, such as deception and operations security.

Step 9: Develop the initial information collection plan.

The initial information collection plan is crucial to begin or adjust the 

information collection effort, which helps answer information requirements 

necessary in developing effective plans. The initial information collection 

plan sets intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in motion. 

It may be issued as part of a WARNORD, a fragmentary order (FRAGORD), 

or an OPORD. As more information becomes available, it is incorporated 

into a complete information collection plan (Annex L) to the OPORD.

The intelligence staff creates the requirements-management tools for the 

information collection plan. The operations staff is responsible for the 

information collection plan. During this step, the operations and intelligence 

staff work closely to ensure they fully synchronize and integrate information 

collection activities into the overall plan.

The operations officer considers several factors when developing the initial 

information collection plan, including:

• Requirements for collection assets in subsequent missions.

• Time available to develop and refine the initial information collection plan.

• The risk the commander is willing to accept if information collection 

missions are begun before the information collection plan is fully 

integrated into the scheme of maneuver.

• Insertion and extraction methods for reconnaissance, security, 

surveillance, and intelligence collection assets.

• Contingencies for inclement weather to ensure coverage of key named 

areas of interest or target areas of interest.

• The communications plan for transmission of reports from assets to 

command posts.

• The inclusion of collection asset locations and movements into the fire 

support plan.

• The reconnaissance handover with higher or subordinate echelons.

• The sustainment support.

• Legal support requirements.

FM 3-55, Information Collection, contains additional information on 

information collection, planning requirements, and assessing collection.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Step 10: Update plan for the use of available time.

The commander and staff compare the time needed to accomplish tasks 

to the higher headquarters’ timeline to ensure mission accomplishment is 

possible in the allotted time. They also compare the timeline to the assumed 

enemy timeline or the projected timelines within the civil sector regarding 

the anticipation of how conditions may unfold. From this, they determine 

windows of opportunity for exploitation, times when the unit will be at risk 

for enemy activity, or when action to arrest (stop) deterioration in the civil 

sector is required.

The commander and executive officer (XO) also refine the staff planning 

timeline:

• Subject, time, and location of briefings the commander requires.

• Times of collaborative planning sessions and the medium over which 

they will take place.

• Times, locations, and forms of rehearsals.

Step 11: Develop initial themes and messages.

Gaining and maintaining the trust of key actors are an important aspect of 

operations. Faced with the many different actors (individuals, organizations, 

and the public) connected with the operation, commanders identify and 

engage those actors who matter to operational success. These actors’ 

behaviors can help solve or complicate the friendly forces’ challenges as 

commanders strive to accomplish missions.

Themes and messages support operations and military actions. Commanders 

and their units coordinate what they do, say, and portray through themes 

and messages. A theme is a unifying or dominant idea or image that 

expresses the purpose for military action. Themes tie to objectives, lines 

of effort, and end-state conditions. They are overarching and apply to 

capabilities of public affairs, military information support operations, and 

Soldier and leader engagements. A message is an oral, written, or electronic 

communication that supports a theme focused on a specific actor or the 

public and in support of a specific action (task). Units transmit themes and 

messages to those actors or the public whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, 

and behaviors matter to the success of an operation.

The public affairs officer adjusts and refines themes and messages received 

from higher headquarters for use by the command. These themes and 

messages are designed to inform specific domestic and foreign audiences 

about current or planned military operations. The military information 

support operations element receives approved themes and messages. This 

element adjusts or refines depending on the situation. It employs themes and 

messages as part of planned activities designed to influence specific foreign 

audiences for various purposes that support current or planned operations. 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The commander and the chief of staff approve all themes and messages used 

to support operations. The information operations officer assists the S-3 and 

the commander to deconflict and synchronize the use of information-related 

capabilities used specifically to disseminate approved themes and messages 

during operations.

Note: To ensure a common “narrative,” develop, synchronize, and execute 

all themes and messages across all inform-and-influence activities.

“Inform-and-influence activities” is defined as the integrating activities 

within the mission command warfighting function which ensure that themes 

and messages designed to inform domestic audiences and influence foreign 

friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations are synchronized with 

actions to support full spectrum operations. Inform-and-influence activities 

incorporate components and enablers, expanding the commander’s ability to 

use other resources to inform and influence.

Step 12: Develop a proposed problem statement.

A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired 

goal or objective. The problem statement is the description of the primary 

issue or issues that may impede commanders from achieving their desired 

end states.

Note: The commander, staff, and other partners develop the problem 

statement as part of Army design methodology. During mission analysis, 

the commander and staff review the problem statement and revise it as 

necessary based on the increased understanding of the situation. If Army 

design methodology activities do not precede mission analysis, then the 

commander and staff develop a problem statement prior to moving to Step 3 

of the MDMP, COA Development.

How the problem is formulated leads to particular solutions. It is 

important that commanders dedicate the time to identify the right problem 

to solve and describe it clearly in a problem statement. Ideally, the 

commander and staff meet to share their analysis of the situation. They 

talk with each other, synthesize the results of the current mission analysis, 

and determine the problem. 

As part of the discussion to help identify and understand the problem, the staff 

compares the current situation to the desired end state, and brainstorms and 

lists issues that imped the commander from achieving the desired end state.

Based on this analysis, the staff develops a proposed problem statement 

— a statement of the problem or set of problems to be solved — for the 

commander’s approval.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Step 13: Develop a proposed mission statement.

The chief of staff, executive officer, or operations officer prepares a 

proposed mission statement based on mission analysis and presents it for 

approval normally during the mission analysis briefing.

The mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the 

organization’s essential task(s) and purpose — a clear statement of the 

action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement 

contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom 

specifies how.

The five elements of a mission statement answer the following questions:

• Who will execute the operation (unit/organization)?

• What is the unit’s essential task (tactical mission task)?

• When will the operation begin (time/event) or what is the duration?

• Where will the operation occur (AO, objective, and grid coordinates)?

• Why will the force conduct the operation (for what purpose or 

reason)?

The unit mission statement, along with the commander’s intent, provides 

the primary focus for subordinate actions during planning, preparation, 

execution, and assessment.The who, where, and when of a mission 

statement are straightforward.

The what and why are more challenging to write and can confuse 

subordinates if not stated clearly. What is a task? Express it in terms of 

action verbs.

The why puts the task into context by describing the reason for performing 

it. The why provides the mission’s purpose — the reason the unit is to 

perform the task. It is extremely important to mission command and mission 

orders. Examples of three mission statements are shown on the next page.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Example 1: Not later than (NLT) 220400 Aug 09 (when), 1st 

Brigade (who) secures ROUTE SOUTH DAKOTA (what/task) in 

AO JACKRABBIT (where) to enable the movement of humanitarian 

assistance materials (why/purpose).

Example 2: 1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (who) seizes (what/

task) AIRPORT (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow 

follow-on forces to air-land into AO SPARTAN (why/ purpose).

Example 3: The 1-509th Parachute Infantry Regiment (who) seizes 

(what/task) AIRPORT (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to 

allow follow-on forces to air-land into AO SPARTAN (why/purpose). 

On order (when), secure (what/task) OBJECTIVE GOLD (where) to 

prevent the 2d Pandor Guards Brigade from crossing the BLUE RIVER 

and disrupting operations in AO SPARTAN (why/purpose).

Step 14: Present the mission analysis briefing.

The mission analysis briefing informs the commander of the results of 

the staff’s analysis of the situation. It helps the commander understand, 

visualize, and describe the operation. Throughout the mission analysis 

briefing, the commander, staff, and other partners discuss the various facts 

and assumptions about the situation. Staff officers present a summary of 

their running estimates from their specific functional area and how their 

findings impact or are impacted by other areas. This helps the commander 

and staff as a whole to focus on the interrelationships among the mission 

variables and to develop a deeper understanding of the situation. The 

commander issues guidance to the staff for continued planning based on 

situational understanding gained from the mission analysis briefing.

Ideally, the commander holds several informal meetings with key staff 

members before the mission analysis briefing, including meetings to assist 

the commander in developing CCIRs, the mission statement, and themes and 

messages. These meetings enable commanders to issue guidance for activities 

(such as reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations) 

and develop their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance.

A comprehensive mission analysis briefing helps the commander, staff, 

subordinates, and other partners develop a shared understanding of the 

requirements of the upcoming operation. Time permitting, the staff briefs 

the commander on its mission analysis using the following outline:

• Mission and commander’s intent of the headquarters two echelons up.

• Mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of the 

headquarters one echelon up.

• A proposed problem statement.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

• A proposed mission statement.

• Review of the commander’s initial guidance.

• Initial IPB products, including civil considerations that affect the 

conduct of operations.

• Specified, implied, and essential tasks.

• Pertinent facts and assumptions.

• Constraints.

• Forces available and resource shortfalls.

• Initial risk assessment.

• Proposed themes and messages.

• Initial information collection plan.

• Recommended timeline.

• Recommended collaborative planning sessions.

During the mission analysis briefing or shortly thereafter, commanders 

approve the mission statement and CCIRs. They then develop and issue 

their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance.

Step 15: Develop and issue the commander’s initial intent.

The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for 

the operation. It includes the operation’s purpose and the conditions that 

define the end state. The commander’s intent links the mission, concept 

of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. During planning, the initial 

commander’s intent summarizes the commander’s visualization. The 

commander’s intent should be used to develop and refine COAs. During 

execution, the commander’s intent spurs individual initiative.

Step 16: Develop and issue the initial planning guidance.

Commanders provide planning guidance along with their initial intent. 

Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization. 

Guidance may be broad or detailed. It outlines an operational approach — 

the broad general actions that will produce the conditions that define the 

desired end state. The guidance should outline specific COAs the commander 

wants the staff to look at and rule out any COAs he will not accept.

(Note: Refer to ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, for additional 

information on commander’s guidance.)

When developing their concept of operations, commanders first visualize 

the decisive operation and develop shaping and sustaining operations to 

support the decisive operation. The decisive operation is the focal point 

around which commanders develop the entire operation and prioritize effort.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Step 17: Develop COA evaluation criteria.

Evaluation criteria are factors the commander and staff will later use to 

measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to 

other COAs. Developing these criteria during mission analysis or as part of 

the commander’s planning guidance helps to eliminate a source of bias prior 

to COA analysis and comparison.

Normally, the executive officer initially determines each proposed criterion, 

with weights based on the assessment of its relative importance and the 

commander’s guidance. Commanders adjust criterion selection and weighting 

according to their own experience and vision. Sample evaluation criteria:

 • Simplicity.

 • Maneuver.

 • Fires.

 • Civil control.

 • Support mission narrative.

Other possible criteria: time required, casualties, damage to infrastructure, 

host-nation special operating forces integration, local support, media 

impact, and external agency support.

Step 18: Issue a WARNORD.

Immediately after the commander gives the planning guidance, the staff 

sends subordinate and supporting units a WARNORD (WARNORD #2) that 

contains, at a minimum, the following information:

• Approved mission statement

• Commander’s intent

• Changes to task organization

• Unit AO (sketch, overlay, or some other description)

• CCIRs and EEFIs

• Risk guidance

• Priorities by warfighting functions

• Military deception guidance

• Essential stability tasks

• Initial information collection plan

• Specific priorities

• Updated operational timeline

• Movements
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Lessons and Best Practices

Observation: CCIRs are often not tied to decisions.

Discussion: The exercise of mission command reduces the number 

of decisions the commander must make. This allows him and the staff 

to focus on the most important decisions that cannot or will not be 

delegated. Required decisions drive the development of CCIRs, PIRs, 

and FFIRs. The staff focuses on the CCIRs to support the commander’s 

decision making and develops a battle rhythm that supports the 

commander’s decision cycle. Failure to clearly define the commander’s 

decisions wastes valuable time, causing the staff to try to to assist the 

commander in understanding problems that are not his to solve. Often, 

the staff presents or focuses on irrelevant information that exhausts 

collection assets and analysis efforts by looking at the wrong things.

Recommendations:

• As the commander goes through the mission command process, 

he should identify his key decisions. This process is continuous as 

the operational environment changes and affects the mission.

• The staff, under the direction of the XO, should develop decisions 

that are solely for the commander. Part of the staff’s work in 

helping the commander understand the problem is presenting him 

with its analysis on required decisions.

• Commanders should adopt a process to guide the staff. This 

process should include specific responsibilities for development, 

validations, disseminating, monitoring, reporting, and 

maintenance (i.e., modifying/deleting) of CCIRs.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons and Best Practices

Observation: Executive officers are routinely challenged in 

synchronizing or leading the MDMP efforts across the staff.

Discussion: XOs often do not understand their role in synchronizing 

staff efforts during planning. They do not conduct a sufficient 

time analysis, and they do not develop a detailed “plan to plan.” 

This detracts from the staff’s ability to execute cross-functional 

collaborative planning. XOs often do not put enough emphasis on 

developing and enforcing appropriate digital and analog planning 

SOPs. Staff personnel understand the basics of the MDMP, but the 

lack of direction results in stovepiped efforts until personnel are 

directed to compile slides for the respective MDMP briefing. XOs do 

not allocate enough time to rehearse and make necessary adjustments. 

The result is a missed opportunity to help the commander understand 

and visualize the operation and provide the guidance needed to begin 

the next step. Units typically end up completing a major portion of the 

mission analysis during COA development. 

Recommendations:

• The XO must lead staff planning efforts to ensure the commander 

can understand and visualize the operation. The XO must develop 

a “plan to plan” that includes time for staff to conduct both 

internal and cross-functional planning sessions. The timeline must 

address each step and sub-step of the MDMP.

• The XO should make recommendations to the commander on 

what steps to abbreviate. Units should develop a planning SOP 

that includes an initial timeline and prescribed formats (analog 

and digital) to reduce time spent building and refining briefings. 

Selecting a common map and a common format for products is 

essential to reducing preparation time.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 5

Course of Action Development

Figure 5-1. Course of action (COA) development (FM 6-0)

A COA is a broad potential solution to an identified problem. The COA 

development step generates options for follow-on analysis and comparison 

that satisfy the commander’s intent and planning guidance. During COA 

development, planners use the problem statement, mission statement, 

commander’s intent, planning guidance, and the various knowledge 

products developed during mission analysis to develop COAs.

Examine each prospective COA for validity using the following screening 

criteria:

• Feasible: The COA can accomplish the mission within the established 

time, space, and resource limitations.

• Acceptable: The COA must balance cost and risk with the advantage 

gained.

• Suitable: The COA can accomplish the mission within the 

commander’s intent and planning guidance.

• Distinguishable: Each COA must differ significantly from the others 

(such as scheme of maneuver, lines of effort, phasing, use of reserve 

forces, and task organization).
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Complete: A COA must incorporate the following information:

○How the decisive operation leads to mission accomplishment.

○How shaping operations create and preserve conditions for 

success of the decisive operation or effort.

○How sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive operations 

or efforts.

○How to account for offensive, defensive, and stability or civil 

support tasks.

○Tasks to be performed and conditions to be achieved.

COA development includes the following eight steps:

• Step 1: Assess relative combat power.

• Step 2: Generate options.

• Step 3: Array forces.

• Step 4: Develop a broad concept.

• Step 5: Assign headquarters.

• Step 6: Develop COA statements and sketches.

• Step 7: Conduct COA briefing.

• Step 8: Select or modify COAs for continued analysis.

Step 1: Assess relative combat power.

According to ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, combat power is the 

total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities 

that a military unit can apply at a given time. It is the effect created by 

combining the elements of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, 

sustainment, protection, mission command, information, and leadership. 

The goal is to generate overwhelming combat power to accomplish the 

mission at minimal cost.

To assess relative combat power, planners initially make a rough estimate 

of force ratios of maneuver units two levels down. Planners then compare 

friendly strengths to enemy weaknesses, and vice versa, for each element 

of combat power. From these comparisons, they may deduce particular 

vulnerabilities that may be exploited or may need protection. These 

comparisons provide planners insight into effective force employment.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

For stability and civil support operations, staffs often determine relative 

combat power by comparing available resources to specified or implied 

stability or civil support tasks. This is known as troop-to-task analysis. 

This analysis provides insight into what options are available and 

whether more resources are required. In such operations, the elements of 

sustainment, movement and maneuver, nonlethal effects, and information 

may predominate.

Comparing the most significant strengths and weakness of each force in 

terms of combat power gives planners insight into the following areas:

• Friendly capabilities that pertain to the operation.

• Types of operations possible from both friendly and enemy 

perspectives.

• How and where the enemy may be vulnerable.

• How and where friendly forces are vulnerable.

• Additional resources that may be required to execute the mission.

• How to allocate existing resources.

Assessing combat power requires assessing both tangible and intangible 

factors such as morale and levels of training. A relative combat power 

assessment identifies enemy weaknesses to exploit, identifies friendly 

weaknesses that require protection, and determines the combat power 

necessary to conduct essential stability or civil support tasks.

Planners combine the numerical force ratio with the results of their analysis 

of intangibles to determine the relative combat power of friendly and 

enemy forces. They determine what types of operations are feasible by 

comparing the force ratio to the historical minimum planning ratios for the 

contemplated combat missions and estimating the extent to which intangible 

factors affect the relative combat power. If, in the staff’s judgment, the 

relative combat power of the force produces the effects of the historical 

minimum planning ratio for a contemplated mission, that mission is feasible.

Step 2: Generate options.

Based on commander’s guidance and initial results of the relative combat 

power assessment, the staff generates options. A good COA can defeat all 

feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks. In an 

unconstrained environment, the goal is to develop several possible COAs. 

The commander’s guidance may limit options depending on time.

Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It requires 

time, imagination, and creativity, but it produces the widest range of 

choices.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Note: When possible, brainstorming should include participants from all 

agencies and organizations that provide a capability to the planning unit.

When generating options, staff members determine the doctrinal 

requirements for each proposed operation, including doctrinal tasks for 

subordinate units. In addition, the staff considers the potential capabilities of 

attachments and other organizations and agencies outside military channels.

The staff starts with the decisive operation identified in the commander’s 

planning guidance. The staff checks that the decisive operation nests within 

the higher headquarters’ concept of operations. The staff clarifies the 

decisive operation’s purpose and considers ways to mass the effects (lethal 

and nonlethal) of overwhelming combat power to achieve it.

• The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders 

develop the entire operation and prioritize effort.

• The main effort is the designated subordinate unit whose mission at a 

given point in time is most critical to overall mission success.

Next, the staff considers shaping operations. The staff establishes a purpose 

for each shaping operation tied to creating or preserving a condition for 

the decisive operation’s success. Shaping operations may occur before, 

concurrently with, or after the decisive operation.

The staff then determines sustaining operations necessary to create and 

maintain the combat power required for the decisive operation and shaping 

operations.

After developing the basic operational organization for a given COA, the 

staff then determines the essential tasks for each decisive, shaping, and 

sustaining operation.

Once staff members have explored possibilities for each COA, they 

examine each COA to determine if it satisfies the previously established 

screening criteria. In doing so, they change, add, or eliminate COAs 

as appropriate, but must avoid the common pitfall of focusing on the 

development of one good COA among several throwaway COAs.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Step 3: Array forces.

After determining the decisive and shaping operations and their related 

tasks and purposes, planners determine the relative combat power required 

to accomplish each task.

Figure 5-2. Historical minimum planning ratios (FM 6-0)

In counterinsurgency (and stability) operations, planners can develop 

force requirements by gauging troop density — the ratio of security 

forces (including host-nation military and police forces as well as foreign 

counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within 

a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents in an AO. 

(See FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies)

A COA may require a follow-on force to establish civil security, maintain civil 

control, and restore essential services in a densely populated urban area over 

an extended period. Planners conduct a troop-to-task analysis to determine the 

type of units and capabilities required to accomplish these tasks.

Planners initially array friendly forces starting with the decisive operation 

and continuing with all shaping and sustaining operations. Planners 

normally array ground forces two levels down. The initial array focuses 

on generic ground maneuver units without regard to specific type or task 

organization, and then considers all appropriate intangible factors. During 

this step, planners do not assign missions to specific units; they only 

consider which forces are necessary to accomplish the task. In this step, 

planners also array assets to accomplish essential stability tasks.

If the number of units arrayed exceeds the number available and 

compensating for the difference is not possible with intangible factors, 

the staff determines whether the COA is feasible. Commanders should 

also consider requirements to minimize and relieve civilian suffering. 

Establishing civil security and providing essential services such as medical 

care, food and water, and shelter are implied tasks for commanders during 

any combat operation.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Step 4: Develop a broad concept.

The broad concept describes how arrayed forces will accomplish the mission 

within the commander’s intent. It concisely expresses the “how” of the 

commander’s visualization and will eventually provide the framework for 

the concept of operations. The broad concept summarizes the contributions 

of all warfighting functions. The staff develops a broad concept for each 

COA, which it expresses in both narrative and graphic forms.

A sound COA is more than the arraying of forces. It should present an 

overall combined arms idea that will accomplish the mission.

The broad concept includes the following:

• Purpose of the operation.

• Statement of where the commander will accept risk.

• Identification of critical friendly events and transitions between phases 

(if the operation is phased).

• Designation of the reserve force, including its location and 

composition.

• Information collection activities.

• Essential stability tasks.

• Identification of maneuver options that may develop during an 

operation.

• Assignment of subordinate AOs.

• Scheme of fires.

• Themes, messages, and means of delivery.

• Military deception operations.

• Key control measures.

• Designation of the operational framework for this operation: deepclose-security, main and supporting effort, or decisive-shapingsustaining.

• Designation of the decisive operation, along with its task and purpose, 

linked to how it supports the higher headquarters’ concept.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Note: For the purpose of this section, the decisive-shaping-sustaining 

operational framework is an example. Planners use the same process when 

analyzing the other two operational frameworks, deep-close-security and 

main and supporting effort, to develop initial concepts of the operation.

Planners select control measures, including graphics, to control subordinate 

units during the operation. Good control measures foster freedom of action, 

decision making, and individual initiative.

Planners may use both lines of operations and lines of effort to build their 

broad concept. Lines of operations portray the more traditional links among 

objectives, decisive points, and centers of gravity. A line of effort, however, 

helps planners link multiple tasks with goals, objectives, and end-state 

conditions.

Combining lines of operations with lines of effort allows planners to include 

nonmilitary activities in their broad concept. This combination helps 

commanders incorporate stability or defense support of civil authorities – 

tasks that, when accomplished, help set end-state conditions of an operation.

Based on the commander’s planning guidance (informed by the Army 

design methodology concept if this preceded the MDMP), planners 

develop lines of effort by confirming end-state conditions from the initial 

commander’s intent and planning guidance, determining and describing 

each line of effort, and identifying objectives (intermediate goals) and 

determining tasks along each line of effort.

During COA development, lines of effort are general and lack specifics, 

such as tasks to subordinate units associated with objectives along each line 

of effort. Units develop and refine lines of effort, including specific tasks 

to subordinate units, during war-gaming. (See ADRP 5-0 and FM 3-07 for 

examples of operations depicted along lines of effort.)

Step 5: Assign headquarters.

After determining the broad concept, planners create a task organization by 

assigning headquarters to groupings of forces. They consider the types of 

units for assignment to a headquarters and the ability of that headquarters 

to control those units. Generally, a headquarters controls at least two 

subordinate maneuver units (but not more than five) for fast-paced offensive 

or defensive operations. The number and type of units assigned to a 

headquarters for stability operations will vary based on factors of mission, 

enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and 

civil considerations. If planners need additional headquarters, they note the 

shortage and resolve it later.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Step 6: Develop COA statements and sketches.

The operations officer prepares a COA statement and supporting sketch 

for each COA. The COA statement clearly portrays how the unit will 

accomplish the mission. The COA statement should be a brief expression 

of how to conduct the combined arms concept. The sketch provides a 

picture of the movement and maneuver aspects of the concept, including the 

positioning of forces.

At a minimum, the COA sketch includes the array of generic forces and 

control measures, such as the following:

• Unit and subordinate unit boundaries.

• Unit movement formations (but not subordinate unit formations).

• Line of departure or line of contact and phase lines, if used.

• Information collection graphics.

• Ground and air axes of advance.

• Assembly areas, battle positions, strong points, engagement areas, and 

objectives.

• Obstacle control measures and tactical mission graphics.

• Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures.

• Main effort.

• Location of command posts and critical communications nodes.

• Enemy known or templated locations.

• Population concentrations.

Planners can include identifying features (e.g., cities, rivers, and roads) to 

help orient users. The sketch may be on any medium.

Graphic control measures (GCMs) are graphic directives given by a 

commander to subordinate commanders to assign responsibilities, coordinate 

fire and maneuver, and control combat operations. In general, the commander 

and staff develop GCMs during COA development. They use GCMs to 

convey and enhance the understanding of the concept of operations, prevent 

fratricide, and clarify the task and purpose of the main effort.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Figure 5-3. Sample brigade COA sketch (FM 6-0)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Step 7: Conduct COA briefing.

After developing COAs, the staff briefs them to the commander. The COA 

briefing includes the following information:

• Updated IPB (if there are significant changes).

• As many threat COAs as necessary, but at a minimum, most likely and 

most dangerous COAs must be developed.

• Approved problem statement and mission statement.

• Commander’s and higher commander’s intents.

• COA statements and sketches, including lines of effort if used.

• The rationale for each COA, including:

○Considerations that might affect enemy COAs.

○Critical events for each COA.

○Deductions resulting from the relative combat power analysis.

○Reason for unit arrangements as shown on the sketch.

○Reason the staff used the selected control measures.

○Impact on civilians.

○How the COA accounts for minimum essential stability tasks.

○Updated facts and assumptions.

○Refined COA evaluation criteria.

Step 8: Select or modify COAs for continued analysis.

After the COA briefing, the commander selects or modifies those COAs for 

continued analysis. The commander also issues planning guidance. If the 

commander rejects all COAs, the staff begins again. If one or more of the 

COAs are accepted, staff members begin COA analysis.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Lessons and Best Practices

Observation: Units deployed to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) 

often do not successfully conduct command post (CP) operations to 

facilitate the commander’s mission command of tactical operations. 

Discussion: Units must practice managing information essential to 

communicating the common operational picture (COP) and other 

execution information to achieve situational understanding and to 

direct the conduct of operations. The staff must establish and revise 

SOPs to create a set of instructions covering tasks and functions of 

the command post. Units must also develop their ability to maintain 

continuity of command through the use of forward CPs (TAC) to 

ensure the ability of the commander to exercise mission command 

continuously from any point in the operational environment.

Recommendations:

• Maintain focus through the chaos. The best units rely on their 

SOPs and can handle the current fight and plan larger operations 

using MDMP, but also maintain focus on day-to-day progress of 

targets and lines of effort.

• Organize for flexibility. In operations, effective mission command 

requires continuous, and often immediate, close coordination, 

synchronization, and information sharing across staff sections. 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons and Best Practices

Observation: Units do not routinely incorporate effective graphic 

and direct fire control measures to regulate aspects of operations or 

efficiently control fires to destroy the enemy. 

Discussion: Units must practice effective use of graphic control 

measures and direct fire control measures to apply the science of 

control to their operations. Units must develop COA sketches and 

graphics that depict unit and subordinate boundaries, the line of 

departure and phase lines, reconnaissance and security graphics, 

ground and air axes of advance, assembly areas, battle positions, 

strongpoints, engagement areas, and objectives. Units must also 

develop direct fire control measures to control their scheme of 

maneuver at the templated line of contact, to include fire support 

control measures, target reference points, and restricted fire lines to 

better portray how their combined arms concept will be conducted and 

successfully accomplished. Units also must incorporate these control 

measures and graphics into rehearsals.

Recommendations:

• Graphic control measures must be used to regulate maneuver, 

movement, use of airspace, fires, and other aspects of operations.

• All graphic control measures should relate to easily identifiable 

natural or man-made terrain features.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 6

Course of Action Analysis

Course of action analysis enables commanders and staffs to identify 

difficulties or coordination problems as well as probable consequences of 

planned actions for each COA being considered. COA analysis not only 

assesses the quality of each COA, it also identifies potential execution 

problems, decisions that must be made, and requirements for contingency 

planning.COA analysis (war-gaming) is a disciplined process, with rules 

and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation given the force’s 

strengths and dispositions, the enemy’s capabilities and possible COAs, the 

impact and requirements of civilians in the AO, and other aspects of the 

situation. The eight steps of COA analysis are: 

• Step 1: Gather the tools.

• Step 2: List all friendly forces.

• Step 3: List assumptions.

• Step 4: List known critical events and decision points.

• Step 5: Select the war-gaming method.

• Step 6: Select a technique to record and display results.

• Step 7: War-game the operation and assess results.

• Step 8: Conduct a war-game briefing (optional).

Figure 6-1. COA analysis (FM 6-0)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Each critical event within a proposed COA should be war-gamed using the 

action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly and enemy forces 

interaction (as well as impact on the local population). This helps the 

commander and staff to synchronize warfighting functions and:

• Determine how to maximize the effects of combat power while 

protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.

• Develop a further visualization of the operation.

• Anticipate operational events.

• Determine conditions and resources required for success.

• Determine when and where to apply force capabilities.

• Identify coordination needed to produce synchronized results.

• Determine the most flexible COA.

The staff’s war-gaming results in refined COAs, a completed 

synchronization matrix, and decision support templates and matrices for 

each COA. War gamers need to:

• Remain objective, not allowing personality or their sense of what the 

commander wants to influence them. (They avoid defending a COA 

just because they personally developed it.)

• Record advantages and disadvantages of each COA accurately as they 

emerge.

• Continually assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of each 

COA. (If a COA fails any of these tests, they reject it.)

• Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts to support 

such conclusions.

• Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. (This 

occurs during COA comparison.)
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

War-gaming Steps

Step 1: Gather the tools.

The executive officer directs the staff to gather tools, materials, and data 

for the war game. Units war-game with maps, sand tables, computer 

simulations, or other tools that accurately reflect the physical and human 

terrain. The staff posts the COA on a map displaying the AO. Tools required 

include but are not limited to the following:

• Running estimates.

• Threat templates and models.

• Civil considerations overlays, databases, and data files.

• Modified combined obstacle overlays and terrain effects matrices.

• Recording method.

• Completed COAs, including graphics. 

• Means to post or display enemy and friendly unit symbols and other 

organizations.

• Map of the AO.

Step 2: List all friendly forces.

The commander and staff consider all units that can be committed to the 

operation, paying special attention to support relationships and constraints. 

This list must include assets from all participants operating in the AO. The 

friendly forces list remains constant for all COAs. The staff should take 

into account elements such as host-nation special operations forces and 

nongovernmental and interagency organizations.

Step 3: List assumptions.

The commander and staff review previous assumptions for continued 

validity and necessity.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Step 4: List known critical events and decision points.

Critical events are those that directly influence mission accomplishment. 

They include events that trigger significant actions or decisions (such as 

commitment of an enemy reserve), complicated actions requiring detailed 

study (such as a passage of lines), and essential tasks. The list of critical 

events includes major events from the unit’s current position through 

mission accomplishment. It includes reactions by civilians that might affect 

operations or that will require allocation of significant assets to account for 

essential stability tasks.

A decision point is a point in space and time when the commander or staff 

anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific COA (JP 5-0, 

Joint Operation Planning). Decision points may also be associated with the 

friendly force and the status of ongoing operations. A decision point may be 

associated with the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), 

which describe what information the commander needs in order to make the 

anticipated decision. The priority information requirement (PIR) describes 

what the commander must know about the enemy or the operational 

environment and often is associated with a named area of interest (NAI).

Step 5: Select the war-gaming method.

There are three recommended war-gaming methods: belt, avenue in depth, 

and box. Each considers the area of interest and all enemy forces that 

can affect the outcome of the operation. The staff can use these methods 

separately or in combination for long-term operations dominated by stability.

The belt method divides the AO into areas running the width of the AO 

based on the METT-TC factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, 

troops and support available-time available and civil considerations. 

The belt method is most effective when the terrain is divided into welldefined cross-compartments, during phased operations, or when the 

enemy deploys in clearly defined belts or echelons. Belts can be adjacent 

to or overlap each other. The basis for this war-gaming method is a 

sequential analysis of events in each belt. It is preferred because it focuses 

simultaneously on all forces affecting a particular event. The modified 

belt method divides the AO into not more than three sequential belts. 

In stability operations, the belt method can divide the COA by events, 

objectives (goals, not geographic location), or events and objectives in a 

selected slice across all lines of effort.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Figure 6-2. Sample belt method (FM 6-0)

Figure 6-3. Sample belt method using lines of effort (FM 6-0)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The avenue-in-depth method focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, 

beginning with the decisive operation. This method is good for offensive 

COAs or in the defense when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support. 

In stability operations, the staff may modify the avenue-in-depth method. 

Instead of focusing on a geographic avenue, the staff war-games a line of 

effort. This method focuses on one line of effort at a time, beginning with 

the decisive line. It includes not only the war-gaming events, or objectives 

in the selected line, but also war-gaming relationships among events or 

objectives on all lines of effort with respect to events in the selected line.

Figure 6-4. Sample avenue-in-depth method (FM 6-0)
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Figure 6-5. Sample avenue-in-depth method for stability operations 

(FM 6-0)

The box method is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an 

engagement area, a river crossing site, or a landing zone. It works best in 

a time-constrained environment, such as a hasty attack. It is particularly 

useful when planning operations in noncontiguous AOs. The staff isolates 

the area and focuses on critical events in it. Staff members assume that 

friendly units can handle most situations in the AOs and focus their attention 

on essential tasks. In stability operations, the box method may focus 

analysis on a specific objective along a line of effort such as development of 

local security forces as part of improving civil security.

(See Figures 6-6 and 6-7 on the next page.)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 6-6. Sample box method (FM 6-0)

Figure 6-7. Sample box method for stability operations (FM 6-0)
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Step 6: Select a technique to record and display results.

The results of the war game provide a record from which to build task 

organizations, synchronize activities, develop decision support templates, 

confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders, and compare 

COAs. Two techniques are commonly used to record and display results: 

the synchronization matrix technique and the sketch note technique. In both 

techniques, staff members record any remarks regarding the strengths and 

weaknesses they discover.

The synchronization matrix is generally the most common technique. The 

synchronization matrix is a tool the staff uses to record the results of war 

gaming and helps it synchronize a COA across time, space, and purpose in 

relationship to potential enemy and civil actions.

Figure 6-8. Sample synchronization matrix (FM 6-0)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The sketch note method uses brief notes concerning critical locations or 

tasks and purposes. These notes refer to specific locations or relate to 

general considerations covering broad areas.

The commander and staff mark locations on the map and on a separate war 

game work sheet. Staff members use sequential numbers to link the notes 

to the corresponding locations on the map or overlay. Staff members also 

identify actions by placing them in sequential action groups, giving each 

sub-task a separate number. They use the war game work sheet to identify 

all pertinent data for a critical event. They assign each event a number and 

title and use the columns on the work sheet to identify and list in sequence:

• Units and assigned tasks.

• Expected enemy actions and reactions.

• Friendly counteractions and assets.

• Total assets needed for the task.

• Estimated time to accomplish the task.

• The decision point tied to executing the task.

• CCIRs.

• Control measures.

• Remarks.

Figure 6-9. Sample sketch note method (FM 6-0)
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Step 7: War-game the operation and assess the results.

War gaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of operations given 

the friendly force’s strengths and disposition, the enemy’s capabilities and 

possible COAs, and civilian locations and activities. During the war game, the 

commander and staff try to foresee the actions, reactions, and counteractions 

of all participants, to include civilians. Staff members analyze each selected 

event. They identify tasks the force must accomplish one echelon down and 

the use of assets two echelons down. Identifying strengths and weaknesses of 

each COA allows the staff to adjust the COAs as necessary.

The war game follows an action-reaction-counteraction cycle. Actions 

are those events initiated by the side with the initiative. (In defensive and 

stability operations, this is generally the enemy.) Reactions are the opposing 

side’s actions in response. With regard to stability operations, the war game 

tests the effects of actions, including intended and unintended effects, as 

it simulates anticipated responses from civilians and civil institutions. 

Counteractions are the first side’s responses to reactions.

The commander and staff examine many areas in detail during the war 

game to include:

• All friendly capabilities.

• All enemy capabilities.

• Civilian reactions to all friendly (and enemy) actions.

• Global media responses to proposed actions.

• Movement considerations.

• Closure rates.

• Lengths of columns.

• Formation depths.

• Ranges and capabilities of weapon systems.

• Desired effects of fires.

The staff identifies the required assets of the warfighting functions to 

support the concept of operations, including those needed to synchronize 

sustaining operations. If requirements exceed available assets, the staff 

recommends priorities.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The staff considers how to create conditions for success, protect the force, 

and shape the operational environment. During the war game, staff officers 

perform a risk assessment for their functional areas for each COA. They 

then propose appropriate control measures. They continually assess the risk 

of adverse reactions from population and media resulting from actions taken 

by all sides in the operation, and develop ways to mitigate those risks.

The commander can modify any COA based on how the war game 

develops. When doing this, the commander validates the composition and 

location of the decisive operation, shaping operations, and reserve forces. 

Control measures are adjusted as necessary. The commander may also 

identify situations, opportunities, or additional critical events that require 

more analysis. 

War-gaming Responsibilities

The executive officer coordinates actions of the staff during the war game. 

The XO is the unbiased controller of the process, ensuring the staff stays 

on a timeline and achieves the goals of the war-gaming session. In a timeconstrained environment, the XO ensures that, at a minimum, the decisive 

operation is war-gamed.

The following paragraphs list the staff members who are involved during 

the war game and their responsibilities.

Intelligence

The S-2 role-plays the enemy commander. The S-2 develops critical enemy 

decision points in relation to the friendly COAs, projects enemy reactions 

to friendly actions, and projects enemy losses. When additional intelligence 

staff members are available, the intelligence officer assigns different 

responsibilities to individual staff members within the section for war 

gaming (such as the enemy commander, friendly intelligence officer, and 

enemy recorder). The intelligence officer captures the results of each enemy 

action and counteraction as well as the corresponding friendly and enemy 

strengths and vulnerabilities. By trying to win the war game for the enemy, 

the intelligence officer ensures the staff fully addresses friendly responses 

for each enemy COA. For the friendly force, the S-2:

• Identifies information requirements.

• Refines the situation and event templates, including NAIs that support 

decision points.

• Refines the event template with corresponding decision points, target 

areas of interest, and high-value targets.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

• Participates in targeting to select high-payoff targets from high-value 

targets identified during the IPB.

• Recommends PIRs that correspond to the decision points.

• Refines civil considerations overlays, databases, and data files.

• Refines the modified combined obstacle overlays and terrain effects 

matrices.

• Refines weather products that address the impact on operations.

Movement and Maneuver

The S-3 normally selects the technique for the war game and role-plays 

the friendly maneuver commander. Various staff officers such as the 

aviation officer, engineer officer, and red team members assist the S-3. 

The S-3 executes friendly maneuver as outlined in the COA sketch and 

COA statement.

The S-5 assesses warfighting requirements, solutions, and concepts for each 

COA. This plans officer develops plans and orders and determines potential 

branches and sequels arising from the war gaming of various COAs. The 

S-5 coordinates and synchronizes warfighting functions in all plans and 

orders. The planning staff ensures the war game of each COA covers every 

operational aspect of the mission. The members of the staff record each 

event’s strengths, weaknesses, and the rationale for each action. They 

complete the decision support template and matrix for each COA.

Fires

The chief of fires (fire support officer) assesses the fire support feasibility of 

each war-gamed COA. This officer develops a proposed high-payoff target 

list, target selection standards, and attack guidance matrix. The chief of fires 

works with the intelligence officer to identify named and target areas of 

interest for enemy indirect fire weapon systems, and identifies high-payoff 

targets and additional events that may influence the positioning of field 

artillery and air defense artillery assets. The chief of fires should also offer a 

list of possible defended assets for air defense artillery forces and assist the 

commander in making a final determination about asset priority.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Protection

The chief of protection assesses protection element requirements, refines 

EEFIs, and develops a scheme of protection for each war-gamed COA. 

The chief of protection:

• Refines the critical asset list and the defended asset list. 

• Assesses hazards.

• Develops risk control measures and mitigation measures of threats and 

hazards.

• Establishes personnel recovery coordination measures.

• Implements operational area security to include security of lines of 

communication (LOCs), anti-terrorism measures, and law enforcement 

operations.

• Ensures that survivability measures reduce vulnerabilities. 

• Refines chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.

Sustainment

The S-4 assesses the logistics feasibility of each COA. This officer 

determines critical requirements for each logistics function (Classes I 

through VII and IX) and identifies potential problems and deficiencies.

The S-4 assesses the status of all logistics functions required to support the 

COA, including potential support required to provide essential services to 

the civilians, and compares them to available assets.

The S-1 assesses the personnel aspect of building and maintaining 

the combat power of units. This officer identifies potential shortfalls 

and recommends COAs to ensure units maintain adequate manning to 

accomplish their missions. The personnel officer estimates potential 

personnel battle losses and assesses the adequacy of resources to provide 

human resources support for the operation.

Note: The sustainment section should include host-nation security forces 

and local population battle losses and resource capabilities into war gaming. 

The S-8 assesses the commander’s area of responsibility to determine the 

best COA for use of resources. This includes both core functions of financial 

management: resource management and finance operations. This officer 

determines partner relationships (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 

and multinational), requirements for special funding, and support to the 

procurement process. The surgeon (medical) section provides advice for 

medically related matters and exercises technical supervision of all medical 

activities within the AO.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Mission Command

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the 

commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the 

commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of 

unified land operations. An effective approach to mission command must be 

comprehensive, without being rigid, because military operations as a whole 

defy orderly, efficient, and precise control. 

The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems 

that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance 

the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the 

other warfighting functions. Throughout the mission command warfighting 

function, commanders integrate the other warfighting functions into a coherent 

whole to mass the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.

All staff proponents have a role in developing the mission command 

warfighting function tasks and activities. The staff members with the 

preponderance of the planning requirements for mission command, and 

their primary tasks during this step of the MDMP, are:

• The signal officer assesses network operations, spectrum management 

operations, network defense, and information protection feasibility 

of each war-gamed COA. He determines communications systems 

requirements and compares them to available assets, identifies 

potential shortfalls, and recommends actions to eliminate or reduce 

their effects.

• The information operations officer assesses the information operations 

concept of support against the ability of information-related 

capabilities to execute tasks in support of each war-gamed COA. The 

information operations officer, in coordination with the electronic 

warfare officer, also integrates information operations with cyber 

electromagnetic activities.

• The electronic warfare officer provides information on the electronic 

warfare target list, electronic attack taskings, electronic attack requests, 

and the electronic warfare portion of the collection matrix and the 

attack guidance matrix. Additionally, the electronic warfare officer 

assesses threat vulnerabilities, friendly electronic warfare capabilities, 

and friendly actions relative to electronic warfare activities and other 

cyber electromagnetic activities not covered by the S-6 or S-2.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• The S-9 ensures that each war-gamed COA effectively integrates civil 

considerations (the “C” of METT-TC). The civil affairs operations 

officer considers not only tactical issues but also sustainment issues. 

This officer assesses how operations affect civilians and estimates 

the requirements for essential stability tasks that commanders might 

have to undertake based on the ability of the unified action partners. 

Host-nation support and care of dislocated civilians are of particular 

concern. The civil affairs operations officer’s analysis considers how 

operations affect public order and safety, the potential for disaster 

relief requirements, noncombatant evacuation operations, emergency 

services, and the protection of culturally significant sites. This officer 

provides feedback on how the culture in the area of operations affects 

each COA. If the unit lacks an assigned civil affairs officer, the 

commander assigns these responsibilities to another staff member.

Note: Do not become derailed by extraneous minutiae. If the allocation of 

the assets is appropriate to address a specific situation, then quickly assess 

the results and continue the process.

An effective war game results in refining:

• Each COA, including identifying branches and sequels that become 

on-order or be-prepared missions.

• The locations and times of decisive points.

• The enemy event template and matrix.

• The task organization, including forces retained in general support.

• Mission command requirements, including control measures and 

updated operational graphics.

• CCIRs and information requirements — including the last time 

information of value — and incorporating them into the information 

collection plan.

An effective war game results in identifying or confirming:

• Key or decisive terrain and determining how to use it.

• Tasks the unit retains and tasks assigned to subordinates.

• Likely times and areas for enemy use of weapons of mass destruction 

and friendly chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense 

requirements.

• Potential times or locations for committing reserve forces.

• The most dangerous enemy COA.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

• The most dangerous civilian reaction.

• Locations for the commander, command posts, and information system 

nodes.

• Critical events.

• Requirements for support of each warfighting function.

• Effects of friendly and enemy actions on civilians and infrastructure 

and how these will affect military operations.

• The locations of NAIs, target areas of interest, decision points, and 

information requirements needed to support them.

• Hazards, assessing their risk, developing controls for them, and 

determining residual risk.

• The coordination required for integrating and synchronizing 

interagency, host-nation, and nongovernmental organization 

involvement.

An effective war game results in analyzing:

• Potential civilian reactions to operations.

• Potential media reaction to operations.

• Potential impacts on civil security, civil control, and essential services 

in the AO.

An effective war game results in developing:

• Decision points.

• A synchronization matrix.

• A decision support template and matrix.

• Solutions to achieving minimum essential stability tasks in the AO.

• The information collection plan and graphics.

• Initial information themes and messages.

• Fires, protection, and sustainment plans and graphic control measures.

An effective war game results in:

• Analyzing and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of each COA.

• Determining requirements for military deception and surprise.

• Determining the timing for concentrating forces and starting the attack 

or counterattack.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Determining movement times and tables for critical assets.

• Estimating the duration of the entire operation and each critical event.

• Projecting the percentage of enemy forces defeated in each critical 

event and overall.

• Projecting the percentage of minimum essential tasks that the unit can 

or must accomplish.

• Anticipating media coverage and impact on key audiences.

• Integrating targeting into the operation, to include identifying or 

confirming high-payoff targets and establishing attack guidance.

• Allocating assets to subordinate commanders to accomplish their 

missions.

Step 8: Conduct a war-game briefing (optional).

If time permits, the staff delivers a briefing to all affected elements to ensure 

everyone understands the results of the war game. The staff uses the briefing 

for review and makes sure it captures all relevant points of the war game for 

presentation to the commander, chief of staff or executive officer, or deputy 

or assistant commander in the COA decision briefing. In a collaborative 

environment, the briefing may include selected subordinate staffs. A wargame briefing format includes the following:

• Higher headquarters’ mission, commander’s intent, and military 

deception plan.

• Updated IPB.

• Friendly and enemy COAs that were war-gamed, including:

○Critical events.

○Possible enemy actions and reactions.

○Possible impact on civilians.

○Possible media impacts.

○Modifications to the COAs.

○Strengths and weaknesses.

○Results of the war game.

• Assumptions.

• War-gaming technique used.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Lessons and Best Practices

Observation: Units continue to have difficulty integrating and 

synchronizing assets into the combined arms fight.

Discussion: Units at all levels often are challenged to synchronize 

the capabilities of their assets to maximize the effectiveness of their 

force. Synchronization of assets begins with COA development, is 

refined during COA analysis, and is further refined during rehearsals. 

Lack of synchronization often results in a disjointed effort, as opposed 

to operating with unity of effort. Units are challenged to synchronize 

and coordinate their intelligence efforts, and fires often are not 

synchronized with obstacles to maximize engagement of the enemy. 

Key combat multipliers often are piecemealed out during preparation 

as opposed to organizing the effort based on priority of effort. 

Recommendation: Course of action analysis is a critical step of the 

MDMP in which all enablers should participate. An effective war game 

results in defining the roles of all enablers and warfighting functions 

and synchronizes their role in the fight. Key products to be developed 

in the war game include the synchronization matrix, decision support 

template, and decision support matrix. 

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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 7

Course of Action Comparison

Course of action comparison is an objective process to evaluate COAs 

independently of each other and against set evaluation criteria approved 

by the commander and staff. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of 

COAs allows for the COA with the highest probability of success to be 

selected and further developed in an operation plan or operation order. The 

commander and staff perform certain actions and processes that lead to the 

key outputs in Figure 7-1.

Figure 7-1. COA comparison (FM 6-0)

Step 1: Analyze advantages and disadvantages. 

COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing each COA from 

their perspectives, using the evaluation criteria developed before the war 

game. , Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies 

their advantages and disadvantages with respect to each other.

Step 2: Compare COAs.

Comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that 

facilitates developing those key outputs and recommendations and helping 

the commander make the best decision. A common technique is the decision 

matrix.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 7-2. Decision Matrix (FM 6-0)

The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest 

probability of success against the most likely enemy COA, the most 

dangerous enemy COA, the most important stability task, or the most 

damaging environmental impact. The selected COA should also:

• Pose the minimum risk to the force and mission accomplishment.

• Place the force in the best posture for future operations.

• Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.

• Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and 

opportunities.

• Provide the most secure and stable environment for civilians in the 

area of operations.

• Best facilitate initial information themes and messages.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Step 3: Conduct a COA decision briefing.

After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies its preferred 

COA and makes a recommendation. If the staff cannot reach a decision, the 

XO decides which COA to recommend. The staff then delivers a decision 

briefing to the commander. The XO highlights any changes to each COA 

resulting from the war game. The decision briefing includes the following:

• The commander’s intent of the higher and next higher commanders.

• The status of the force and its components.

• The current IPB.

• The COAs considered, including:

○Assumptions used.

○Results of running estimates.

○A summary of the war game for each COA, including critical 

events, modifications to any COA, and war-game results.

○Advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA.

○The recommended COA. (If a significant disagreement exists, 

then the staff should inform the commander and, if necessary, 

discuss the disagreement.)

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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 8 

Course of Action Approval

After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA to best 

accomplish the mission. If the commander rejects all COAs, the staff starts 

COA development again. If the commander modifies a proposed COA or 

gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff war-games the new COA 

and presents the results to the commander with a recommendation. 

After approving a COA, the commander issues the final planning 

guidance. The final planning guidance includes a refined commander’s 

intent (if necessary) and new CCIRs to support execution. It also 

includes any additional guidance on priorities for the warfighting 

functions, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation. This guidance 

includes priorities for resources needed to preserve freedom of action 

and ensure continuous sustainment.

Commanders include the risk they are willing to accept in the final planning 

guidance. If there is time, commanders use a video teleconference to discuss 

acceptable risk with adjacent, subordinate, and senior commanders. However, 

commanders still obtain the higher commander’s approval to accept any risk 

that might imperil accomplishing the higher commander’s mission.

Based on the commander’s decision and final planning guidance, the 

staff issues a WARNORD to subordinate headquarters. This WARNORD 

contains the information subordinate units need to refine their plans. It 

confirms guidance issued in person or by video teleconference and expands 

on details not covered by the commander personally. The WARNORD 

issued after COA approval normally contains:

• The area of operations.

• Mission.

• Commander’s intent.

• Updated CCIRs and EEFIs.

• Concept of operations.

• Principle tasks assigned to subordinate units.

• The COAs considered, including:

○Preparation and rehearsal instructions not included in the SOPs.

○A final timeline for the operations.

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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 9

Assessments

The Assessment Process

Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, 

creating an effect, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes 

and guides the other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves 

deliberately comparing actual events to forecast outcomes to determine the 

overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment 

helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired 

end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves 

continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to 

determine what changes might affect the conduct of operations. 

Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their own 

assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other 

unified action partners. Primary tools for assessing progress of the operation 

include the operation order, the common operational picture, personal 

observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan. The latter includes 

measures of effectiveness, measures of performance, and reframing criteria. 

The commander’s visualization forms the basis for his personal assessment 

of progress. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and 

recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. 

Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process 

activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, 

assessment consists of, but is not limited to, the following activities:

• Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information. 

• Evaluating progress toward attaining end-state conditions, achieving 

objectives, and performing tasks.

• Recommending or directing action for improvement. 

Monitoring

Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the 

current operation. Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs 

to collect relevant information, specifically information about the current 

situation that can be compared to the forecast situation described in the 

commander’s intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, 

nor effective decisions made, without an accurate understanding of the 

current situation. 
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During planning, commanders monitor the situation to develop facts and 

assumptions that underlie the plan. During preparation and execution, 

commanders and staffs monitor the situation to determine if the facts are 

still relevant, if their assumptions remain valid, and if new conditions 

emerged that affect the operations. 

CCIRs and decision points should focus the staff’s monitoring activities and 

prioritize the unit’s collection efforts. Information requirements concerning 

the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations are identified and 

assigned priorities through reconnaissance and surveillance. 

Staffs monitor and collect information from the common operational 

picture and friendly reports. This information includes operational and 

intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters 

and communications and reports from liaison teams. Staffs also identify 

information sources outside military channels and monitor their reports. 

These other channels might include products from civilian, host-nation, 

and other government agencies. Staffs apply information management and 

knowledge management to facilitate getting this information to the right 

people at the right time. 

Staff sections record relevant information in running estimates. Staff 

sections maintain a continuous assessment of current operations as a basis 

to determine if they are proceeding according to the commander’s intent, 

mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff sections 

use this new information and these updated facts and assumptions as the 

basis for evaluation. 

Evaluating

Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions 

and determining why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is 

at the heart of the assessment process, where most of the analysis occurs. 

Evaluation helps commanders determine what is working and what is not 

working, and it helps them gain insights into how to better accomplish the 

mission. 

Criteria in the forms of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of 

performance (MOPs) aid in determining progress toward attaining endstate conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. MOEs help 

determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if 

a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria — they 

do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant 

information in the form of indicators for evaluation. 
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system 

behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring 

the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of 

an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive 

and negative. MOEs help to answer the question “Are we doing the right 

things?” MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment 

plans. Examples of MOEs for the objective to “Provide a safe and secure 

environment” may include: 

• Decrease in insurgent activity. 

• Increase in population trust of host-nation security forces. 

A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions 

that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs help answer 

questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed 

to standard?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly 

performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all levels in 

execution matrices. MOPs are also commonly used to evaluate training. 

MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things right?” 

Current operations integration cells use MOPs in execution matrices and 

running estimates to track completed tasks. The use of MOPs is a primary 

element of battle tracking. MOPs focus on the friendly force. Evaluating 

task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often 

results in a yes or no answer. 

In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that 

provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance. 

Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, 

and information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question “What 

is the current status of this MOE or MOP?” A single indicator can inform 

multiple MOPs and MOEs. 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

MOE MOP Indicator

Answers the question:

Are we doing the right 

things?

Answers the question:

Are we doing things 

right?

Answers the question:

What is the status of 

the MOE or MOP?

Measures purpose 

accomplishment.

Measures task 

completion.

Measures raw data 

inputs to inform 

MOEs and MOPs.

Measures why in the 

mission statement.

Measures what in the 

mission statement.

Information used to 

make measuring what 

or why.

No hierarchical 

relationship to MOPs.

No hierarchical 

relationship to MOEs.

Subordinate to MOEs 

and MOPs.

Often formally tracked 

in formal assessment 

plans.

Often formally tracked 

in execution matrices.

Often formally tracked 

in formal assessment 

plans.

Typically challenging 

to choose the correct 

ones.

Typically simple to 

choose the correct 

ones.

Typically as challenging 

to select correctly as the 

supported MOE 

or MOP.

Figure 9-1. Assessment measures and indicators (ADRP 5-0)

Evaluation includes analysis of why progress is or is not being made 

according to the plan. Commanders and staffs propose and consider possible 

causes. In particular, the question of whether changes in the situation can be 

attributed to friendly actions is addressed. Commanders and staffs consult 

subject matter experts, both internal and external to the staff, on whether 

staffs have identified the correct underlying causes for specific changes in 

the situation. Assumptions identified in the planning process are challenged 

to determine if they are still valid. 

A key aspect of evaluation is determining variances — the difference 

between the actual situation and what the plan forecast the situation would 

be at the time or event. Based on the significance of the variances, the staff 

makes recommendations to the commander on how to adjust operations to 

accomplish the mission more effectively. 

Evaluating includes considering whether the desired conditions have 

changed, are no longer achievable, or are not achievable through the 

current operational approach. This is done by continually challenging the 

key assumptions made when framing the problem. When an assumption is 

invalidated, then reframing may be in order.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is 

incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may 

diagnose problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its 

use to the commander is limited. 

Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff brainstorms possible 

improvements to the plan and makes preliminary judgments about the 

relative merit of those changes. Staff members identify those changes 

possessing sufficient merit and provide them as recommendations to 

the commander or make adjustments within their delegated authority. 

Recommendations to the commander range from continuing the operation 

as planned, to executing a branch, or making unanticipated adjustments. 

Making adjustments includes assigning new tasks to subordinates, 

reprioritizing support, adjusting information collection assets, and 

significantly modifying the course of action. Commanders integrate 

recommendations from the staff, subordinate commanders, and other 

partners with their personal assessment. Using those recommendations, they 

decide if and how to modify the operation to better accomplish the mission. 

Although establishing cause and effect is sometimes difficult, it is crucial to 

effective assessment. Sometimes, establishing causality between actions and 

their effects can be relatively straightforward, such as in observing a bomb 

destroy a bridge. In other instances, especially regarding changes in human 

behavior, attitudes, and perception, establishing links between cause and 

effect proves difficult. Commanders and staffs must guard against drawing 

erroneous conclusions in these instances. 

Effective assessment incorporates both quantitative (observation-based) 

and qualitative (opinion-based) indicators. Human judgment is integral to 

assessment. A key aspect of any assessment is the degree to which it relies 

on human judgment and the degree to which it relies on direct observation 

and mathematical rigor. Rigor offsets the inevitable bias, while human 

judgment focuses rigor and processes on intangibles that are often key to 

success. The appropriate balance depends on the situation, particularly the 

nature of the operation and available resources for assessment, but rarely 

lies at the ends of the scale.

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Chapter 10

Operations Order

The operations order serves as a directive to subordinate units to relay 

the commander’s orders. It is intended to coordinate the activities of all 

organizations participating in the specified mission. 

The S-3 section prepares, coordinates, authenticates, reviews, publishes, and 

distributes written operations orders and plans. The operations officer must 

be firmly in charge of the OPORD process. He should serve as the unifying 

force the rest of the staff routinely works with to generate a product that 

is concise yet informative to subordinate leaders. Each staff section will 

produce an annex to the main order containing information pertinent to its 

field of expertise. The S-3 must ensure these annexes are completed in time 

for review and publication with the base order.

Normally, the XO coordinates with staff primaries to assist the S-3 in 

developing the OPLAN or OPORD. Based on the commander’s planning 

guidance, the XO:

• Dictates the type of order to be issued.

• Sets and enforces the orders production timeline.

• Determines which staff sections publish which portions of the order.

Prior to the commander’s approving the OPLAN or OPORD, the XO and 

S-3 along with the rest of the staff ensures it is internally consistent and is 

nested with the higher commander’s intent, which is done through:

• Plans and orders reconciliation.

• Plans and orders crosswalk.
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The following is an example of a way to format a typical OPLAN/OPORD.

 Copy # of # copies

 Issuing headquarters

Place of issue

Date-time group of signature

 Message reference number

OPLAN/OPORD (Number) [(Code name)] [(Classification of title)]

(UNCLASSIFIED [U]) References:

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:

(U) Task Organization:

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Area of Interest

b. (U) Area of Operations

 (1) (U) Terrain

 (2) (U) Weather

c. (U) Enemy Forces

d. (U) Friendly Forces

 (1) (U) Higher Headquarters’ Mission and Intent

 (a) (U) Higher Headquarters Two Levels Up. 

 (b) (U) Higher Headquarters

 (2) (U) Missions of Adjacent Units

e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental

 Organizations

f. (U) Civil Considerations

g. (U) Attachments and Detachments

h. (U) Assumptions

2. (U) Mission
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3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Commander’s Intent

b. (U) Concept of Operations

c. (U) Scheme of Movement and Maneuver

 (1) (U) Scheme of Mobility/Countermobility

(2) (U) Scheme of Battlefield Obscuration

 (3) (U) Scheme of Information Collection

d. (U) Scheme of Intelligence

e. (U) Scheme of Fires

f. (U) Scheme of Protection

g. (U) Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

h. (U) Stability Tasks

i. (U) Assessment

j. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units

k. (U) Coordinating Instructions

 (1) (U) Time or condition when the OPORD 

 becomeseffective

 (2) (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

 (3) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information

 (4) (U) Fire Support Coordination Measures

 (5) (U) Airspace Coordinating Measures

 (6) (U) Rules of Engagement

 (7) (U) Risk Reduction Control Measures

 (8) (U) Personnel Recovery Coordination Measures

 (9) (U) Environmental Considerations

 (10) (U) Soldier and Leader Engagement

 (11) (U) Other Coordinating Instructions
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4. (U) Sustainment

a. (U) Logistics

b. (U) Personnel

c. (U) Health Service Support

5. (U) Command and Control

a. (U) Command

 (1) (U) Location of Commander and Key Leaders

 (2) (U) Succession of Command

 (3) (U) Liaison Requirements

b. (U) Control

 (1) (U) Command Posts

 (2) (U) Reports

 c. (U) Signal

ACKNOWLEDGE:

 (Commander’s Last Name) 

 (Commander’s Rank)

(The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the 

representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The 

signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters’ files.)

OFFICIAL:

(Authenticator’s Last Name)

(Authenticator’s Rank)

(Use only if the commander does not sign the original order. If the 

commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If 

the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer 

requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander 

appear in the signature block.)
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ANNEXES:

A – Task Organization

B – Intelligence

C – Operations 

D – Fires

E – Protection 

F – Sustainment 

G – Engineer

H – Signal

I – Not used

J – Public Affairs

K – Civil Affairs Operations

L – Information Collection

M – Assessment

N – Space Operations 

O – Not used

P – Host-Nation Support 

Q – Knowledge Management

R – Reports

S – Special Technical Operations 

T – Spare

U – Inspector General

V – Interagency Coordination

W– Operational Contract Support

X – Not used 

Y – Not used

Z – Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: (Furnish distribution copies either for action or for 

information. List in detail those who are to receive the plan or order. Refer 

to Annex Z (Distribution) if lengthy.)
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Annexes Explained

ANNEX A – TASK ORGANIZATION (S-3 or S-5) 

ANNEX B – INTELLIGENCE (S-2)

Appendix 1 – Intelligence Estimate

Tab A – Terrain (Engineer Officer) 

Tab B – Weather (Staff Weather Officer) 

Tab C – Civil Considerations

Tab D – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Products

Appendix 2 – Counterintelligence

Appendix 3 – Signals Intelligence 

Appendix 4 – Human Intelligence 

Appendix 5 – Geospatial Intelligence 

Appendix 6 – Measurement and Signature Intelligence 

ANNEX C – OPERATIONS (S-3 or S-5)

Appendix 1 – Army Design Methodology Products

Appendix 2 – Operations Overlay

Appendix 3 – Decision Support Products 

Tab A – Execution Matrix

Tab B – Decision Support Template and Matrix

Appendix 4 – Gap Crossing Operations

Appendix 5 – Air Assault Operations

Appendix 6 – Airborne Operations

Appendix 7 – Amphibious Operations

Appendix 8 – Special Operations (S-3)

Appendix 9 – Battlefield Obscuration (CBRN Officer) 

Appendix 10 – Airspace Command and Control 

(S-3 or Airspace Command and Control Officer)

Appendix 11 – Rules of Engagement (Staff Judge Advocate) 

Tab A – No-Strike List (S-3 with Staff Judge Advocate)

Tab B – Restricted Target List (S-3 with Staff Judge Advocate)
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Appendix 12 – Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

(Electronic Warfare Officer)

Appendix 13 – Military Information Support Operations

(Military Information Support Officer)

Appendix 14 – Military Deception (Military Deception Officer)

Appendix 15 – Information Operations (Information Operations Officer)

ANNEX D – FIRES (Chief of Fires) 

Appendix 1 – Fire Support Overlay

Appendix 2 – Fire Support Execution Matrix Appendix 3 – Targeting

Tab A – Target Selection Standards

Tab B – Target Synchronization Matrix

Tab C – Attack Guidance Matrix

Tab D – Target List Work Sheets

Tab E – Battle Damage Assessment (S-2)

Appendix 4 – Field Artillery Support.

Appendix 5 – Air Support

Appendix 6 – Naval Fire Support

Appendix 7 – Air and Missile Defense (Air and Missile Defense Officer)

Tab A – Enemy Air Avenues of Approach

Tab B – Enemy Air Order of Battle

Tab C – Enemy Theater Ballistic Missile Overlay

Tab D – Air and Missile Defense Protection Overlay

ANNEX E – PROTECTION (Chief of Protection/Protection 

Coordinator as designated by the commander)

Appendix 1 – Operational Area Security

Appendix 2 – Safety (Safety Officer) 

Appendix 3 – Operations Security

Appendix 4 – Intelligence Support to Protection

Appendix 5 – Physical Security
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Appendix 6 – Antiterrorism

Appendix 7 – Police Operations

Appendix 8 – Survivability Operations

Appendix 9 – Force Health Protection

Appendix 10 – Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear Defense (CBRN Officer)

Appendix 11 – Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD Officer)

Appendix 12 – Coordinate Air and Missile Defense (Air Defense Officer)

Appendix 13 – Personnel Recovery (Personnel Recovery Officer)

Appendix 14 – Detainee and Resettlement

ANNEX F – SUSTAINMENT (Chief of Sustainment [S-4])

Appendix 1 – Logistics (S-4)

Tab A – Sustainment Overlay 

Tab B – Maintenance

Tab C – Transportation

Exhibit 1 – Traffic Circulation and Control

 (Provost Marshal)

Exhibit 2 – Traffic Circulation Overlay

 Exhibit 3 – Road Movement Table

 Exhibit 4 – Highway Regulation (Provost Marshal)

Tab D – Supply

Tab E – Field Services

Tab F – Distribution

Tab G – Contract Support Integration 

Tab H – Mortuary Affairs

Appendix 2 – Personnel Services Support

Tab A – Human Resources Support (S-1)

Tab B – Financial Management (S-8)
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Tab C – Legal Support (Staff Judge Advocate)

Tab D – Religious Support (Chaplain)

Tab E – Band Operations (S-1)

Appendix 3 – Heath Service Support (Surgeon) 

ANNEX G – ENGINEER (Engineer Officer)

Appendix 1 – Mobility/Countermobility 

Tab A – Obstacle Overlay

Appendix 2 – Survivability 

Appendix 3 – General Engineering 

Appendix 4 – Geospatial Engineering

Appendix 5 – Environmental Considerations

ANNEX H – SIGNAL (S-6)

Appendix 1 – Defensive Cyberspace Operations

Appendix 2 – Information Network Operations 

Appendix 3 – Voice, Video, and Data Network Diagrams

Appendix 4 – Satellite Communication

Appendix 5 – Foreign Data Exchanges

Appendix 6 – Spectrum Management Operations

Appendix 7 – Information Services

ANNEX I – Not Used

ANNEX J – PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Public Affairs Officer)

Appendix 1 – Public Affairs Running Estimate

Appendix 2 – Public Affairs Guidance

ANNEX K – CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (S-9)

Appendix 1 – Execution Matrix

Appendix 2 – Populace and Resources Control Plan

Appendix 3 – Civil Information Management Plan
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ANNEX L – INFORMATION COLLECTION (S-3)

Appendix 1 – Information Collection Plan

Appendix 2 – Information Collection Overlay

ANNEX M – ASSESSMENT (S-3 or S-5)

Appendix 1 – Nesting of Assessment Efforts

Appendix 2 – Assessment Framework

Appendix 3 – Assessment Working Group

ANNEX N – SPACE OPERATIONS (Space Operations Officer)

ANNEX O – Not Used

ANNEX P – HOST-NATION SUPPORT (S-4)

ANNEX Q – KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 

(Knowledge Management Officer)

Appendix 1 – Knowledge Management Decision Support Matrix

Appendix 2 – Common Operational Picture Configuration Matrix

Appendix 3 – Mission Command Information Systems Integration Matrix

Appendix 4 – Content Management 

Appendix 5 – Battle Rhythm

ANNEX R – REPORTS (S-3)

ANNEX S – SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

Appendix 1 – Special Technical Operations Capabilities Integration Matrix

Appendix 2 – Functional Area I Program and Objectives

Appendix 3 – Functional Area II Program and Objectives

ANNEX T – Spare

ANNEX U – INSPECTOR GENERAL

ANNEX V – INTERAGENCY COORDINATION (S-3)

ANNEX W – OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT (S-4) 

ANNEX X – Spare

ANNEX Y – Spare

ANNEX Z – DISTRIBUTION (S-3)
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Lessons and Best Practices

Observation: Units are often challenged to write and publish quality 

WARNORDs, FRAGORDs, and OPORDs.

Discussion: Observations from recent CTC rotations show that units 

often neglect to conduct a thorough MDMP for upcoming missions. 

Most units produce a daily FRAGORD that is simply a cut and paste 

from the higher headquarters’ order. Various FRAGORD writers are 

often identified during an exercise, including the Planner, the JAG, 

and the S-6. The confusion resulting from an unclear orders-writing 

procedure hampers situational understanding among the staff and 

with subordinate units.

Recommendation: Clearly delineate the orders-writing procedure 

in the SOP. A clear understanding among the staff on how orders are 

staffed and written will enhance situational understanding across the 

command post.

Observation: A lack of staff integration during the orders process 

hinders the unit’s ability to produce a complete operations order 

(OPORD)/fragmentary order (FRAGORD).

Discussion: Many units have difficulty in bringing all of the 

individual staff efforts together into a coordinated planning effort, 

and do not establish formal touch points or synchronization meetings 

for the purpose of revising and refining plans with inputs from all of 

the warfighting functions.

Recommendation: Conduct daily (or as needed) staff planning 

meetings in order to disseminate commander’s guidance, receive 

operational updates, integrate warfighting functions, and guide the 

operations process. Update the unit TACSOP with a synchronization 

matrix that includes all warfighting functions.

After the order is issued, the commander and staff participate 

in formal or informal confirmation briefing(s), as required, with 

subordinate staffs. This ensures that subordinate staffs understand the 

commander’s intent and concept.

The staff assists subordinate staffs by reviewing subordinate 

commander’s plans and orders upon completion, and integrating 

subordinate graphics into the staff products.

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Chapter 11

Rehearsals

Rehearsals allow leaders and their Soldiers to practice key aspects of the 

concept of operations. These actions help Soldiers orient themselves to their 

environment and other units before executing the operation. Rehearsals help 

Soldiers build a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within 

the operation.

Rehearsals are the commander’s tool to ensure staffs and subordinates 

understand the commander’s intent and the concept of operations. They 

allow commanders and staffs to identify shortcomings in the plan not 

previously recognized. Rehearsals also contribute to external and internal 

coordination, as the staff identifies additional coordinating requirements.

Effective and efficient units habitually rehearse during training. 

Commanders at every level routinely train and practice various rehearsal 

types. Local standard operating procedures (SOPs) identify appropriate 

rehearsal types and standards for their execution. All leaders conduct 

periodic after-action reviews to ensure their units conduct rehearsals to 

standard and correct substandard performances. After-action reviews also 

enable leaders to incorporate lessons learned into existing plans and orders, 

or into subsequent rehearsals.

Units conduct rehearsals at the lowest possible level, using the most 

thorough technique possible, given the time available. Under timeconstrained conditions, leaders conduct abbreviated rehearsals, focusing on 

critical events determined by reverse planning. Each unit will have different 

critical events based on the mission, unit readiness, and the commander’s 

assessment.

Rehearsal Types

Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a specific place in the 

preparation timeline. The four types of rehearsals are the:

• Back brief.

• Combined arms rehearsal.

• Support rehearsal.

• Battle drill or SOP rehearsal.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Back Brief

A back brief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how 

subordinates intend to accomplish their mission. Normally, subordinates 

perform back briefs throughout preparation. These briefings allow 

commanders to clarify the commander’s intent early in subordinate 

planning. Commanders use the back brief to identify any problems in the 

concept of operations.

The back brief differs from the confirmation brief (a briefing subordinates 

give their higher commander immediately following receipt of an order) 

in that the back brief gives subordinate leaders time to complete their plan. 

Back briefs require the fewest resources and are often the only option under 

time-constrained conditions. Subordinate leaders explain their actions from 

the start to the finish of the mission. Back briefs are performed sequentially, 

with all leaders reviewing their tasks. When time is available, back briefs can 

be combined with other types of rehearsals. Doing this lets all subordinate 

leaders coordinate their plans before performing more elaborate drills.

Combined Arms Rehearsal

A combined arms rehearsal is a rehearsal in which subordinate units 

synchronize their plans with each other. A maneuver unit headquarters 

normally executes a combined arms rehearsal after subordinate units 

issue their OPORD. This rehearsal type helps ensure that subordinate 

commanders’ plans achieve the higher commander’s intent.

Support Rehearsal

The support rehearsal helps synchronize each warfighting function with 

the overall operation. This rehearsal supports the operation so units 

can accomplish their missions. Throughout preparation, units conduct 

support rehearsals within the framework of a single or limited number of 

warfighting functions. These rehearsals typically involve coordination and 

procedure drills for aviation, fires, engineer support, or casualty evacuation. 

Support rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals complement preparations 

for the operation. Units may conduct rehearsals separately and then 

combine them into full-dress rehearsals. Although these rehearsals differ 

slightly by warfighting function, they achieve the same result.

Battle Drill or SOP Rehearsal

A battle drill is a collective action rapidly executed without a deliberate 

decisionmaking process. A battle drill or SOP rehearsal ensures that all 

participants understand a technique or a specific set of procedures. Throughout 

preparation, units and staffs rehearse battle drills and SOPs. These rehearsals 

do not need a completed order from higher headquarters. Leaders place priority 

on those drills or actions they anticipate occurring during the operation. 
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Rehearsal Responsibilities

Commander

Commanders provide certain information as part of the commander’s 

guidance during the initial mission analysis. They may revise the following 

information when they select a course of action:

• Rehearsal type.

• Rehearsal technique.

• Location.

• Attendees.

• Enemy course of action to be portrayed.

Executive Officer

The executive officer ensures all rehearsals are included in the 

organization’s time-management SOP. The XO responsibilities include:

• Publishing the rehearsal time and location in the OPORD or 

WARNORD.

• Conducting staff rehearsals.

• Determining rehearsal products, based on type, technique, and mission 

variables.

• Coordinating liaison officer attendance from adjacent units.

Rehearsal Preparation

Everyone involved in executing or supporting the rehearsal has 

responsibilities during preparation.

Executive Officer

The XO through war-gaming and coordination with the commander:

• Prepares to serve as the rehearsal director.

• Coordinates time for key events requiring rehearsal.

• Establishes rehearsal time limits per the commander’s guidance and 

mission variables.

• Verifies rehearsal site preparation. 

• Appropriate markings and associated training aids.

• Parking areas.

• Determines the method for controlling the rehearsal and ensuring its 

logical flow.
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Subordinate Leaders

Subordinate leaders complete their planning. This planning includes:

• Completing unit OPORDs.

• Identifying issues derived from the higher headquarters’ OPORD. 

• Providing a copy of their unit OPORD with graphics to the higher 

headquarters.

• Ensuring they and their subordinates bring all necessary equipment.

Conducting Headquarters Staff

Conducting headquarters staff members:

• Develop an OPORD with necessary overlays.

• Deconflict all subordinate unit graphics. 

• Publish composite overlays at the rehearsal, including at a minimum: 

Movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, signal 

operations, and protection.

Rehearsal Execution

During the rehearsal execution, the commander, XO, assistants, subordinate 

leaders, recorder, and staff from the conducting headquarters have specific 

responsibilities.

Commander

Commanders command the rehearsal just as they will command the 

operation. They maintain the focus and level of intensity, allowing no 

potential for subordinate confusion. Although the staff refines the OPORD, 

it belongs to the commander. The commander uses the order to conduct 

operations. An effective rehearsal is not a commander’s briefing to 

subordinates. It validates synchronization — the what, when, and where 

— of tasks that subordinate units will perform to execute the operation and 

achieve the commander’s intent.

Executive Officer

Normally, the XO serves as the rehearsal director. This officer ensures each 

unit will accomplish its tasks at the right time and cues the commander to 

upcoming decisions. The executive officer’s script is the execution matrix 

and the decision support template. The XO as the rehearsal director:

• Starts the rehearsal on time.

• Has a formal roll call.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

• Ensures everyone brings the necessary equipment, including 

organizational graphics and previously issued orders.

• Validates the task organization. Link-ups must be complete or on 

schedule, and required materiel and personnel must be on hand. The 

importance of this simple check cannot be overemphasized.

• Ensures synchronization of the operational framework being used. 

• Rehearses the synchronization of combat power from flank and higher 

organizations. These organizations often exceed the communications 

range of the commander when they are away from the command post.

• Synchronizes the timing and contribution of each warfighting function.

• For each decisive point, defines conditions required to commit the 

reserve or striking forces, move a unit, close or emplace an obstacle, 

fire at planned targets, or change the posture of sustainment activities.

• Disciplines leader movements, enforces brevity, and ensures 

completeness.

• Keeps within time constraints.

• Ensures that the most important events receive the most attention. 

• Ensures that absentees and flank units receive changes to the OPORD 

and transmits changes to them as soon as practical. 

• Communicates the key civil considerations of the operation.

Operations Officer, S-3

• Portrays the friendly scheme of maneuver.

• Ensures subordinate unit actions comply with the commander’s intent.

• Normally provides the recorder. 

Intelligence Officer (S-2)

The intelligence officer portrays the enemy forces and other variables 

of the operational environment during rehearsals. The S-2 bases actions 

on the enemy course of action that the commander selected during the 

MDMP. The S-2:

• Provides participants with current intelligence. 

• Portrays the best possible assessment of the enemy course of action.

• Communicates the enemy’s presumed concept of operations, desired 

effects, and end state.
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• Explains other factors of the operational environment that may hinder 

or complicate friendly actions.

• Communicates the key civil considerations of the operation.

Subordinate Leaders

Subordinate unit leaders, using an established format, effectively articulate 

their unit’s actions and responsibilities as well as record changes on their 

copies of the graphics or OPORD.

Recorder

The recorder is normally a representative from the S-3. During the 

rehearsal, the recorder captures all coordination made during execution 

and notes unresolved problems. At the end of the rehearsal, the recorder 

presents any unresolved problems for resolution, restates any changes 

directed by the commander, and estimates when a fragmentary order 

codifying the changes will follow.

Rehearsal Details

All participants have responsibilities before, during, and after a rehearsal. 

Before a rehearsal, the rehearsal director states the commander’s 

expectations and orients the other participants on details of the rehearsal, 

as necessary. During a rehearsal, all participants rehearse their roles in the 

operation. They make sure they understand how their actions support the 

overall operation and note any additional coordination required. After a 

rehearsal, participants ensure they understand any changes to the OPORD 

and coordination requirements, and they receive all updated staff products.

Commanders do not normally address small problems that arise during 

rehearsals. Instead, the recorder keeps a record of these problems. This 

ensures the commander does not interrupt the rehearsal’s flow. If the 

problem remains at the end of the rehearsal, the commander resolves it then. 

If the problem jeopardizes mission accomplishment, the staff accomplishes 

the coordination necessary to resolve it before the participants disperse. 

Identifying and solving such problems is a major reason for conducting 

rehearsals. If commanders do not make corrections while participants are 

assembled, they may lose the opportunity to do so. Coordinating among 

dispersed participants and disseminating changes to them often prove more 

difficult than accomplishing these actions in person.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Before the Rehearsal

Before the rehearsal, the rehearsal director calls the roll and briefs 

participants on information needed for execution. The briefing begins with 

an introduction, overview, and orientation. It includes a discussion of the 

rehearsal script and ground rules. The detail of this discussion is based on 

participants’ familiarity with the rehearsal SOP.

Introduction and Overview

Before the rehearsal, the rehearsal director introduces all participants as 

needed. Then, the rehearsal director (normally the XO) gives an overview of 

the briefing topics, rehearsal subjects and sequence, and timeline, specifying 

the no-later-than ending time. The rehearsal director explains any constraints, 

such as pyrotechnics use, light discipline, weapons firing, or radio silence. 

For safety, the rehearsal director ensures all participants understand 

safety precautions and enforces their use. Last, the director emphasizes 

results and states the commander’s standard for a successful rehearsal. 

Subordinate leaders state any results of planning or preparation (including 

rehearsals) they have already conducted. If a subordinate recommends a 

change to the OPORD, the rehearsal director acts on the recommendation 

before the rehearsal begins, if possible. If not, the commander resolves the 

recommendation with a decision before the rehearsal ends.

Orientation

The rehearsal director orients the participants to the terrain or rehearsal 

medium. The rehearsal director identifies orientation using magnetic north 

on the rehearsal medium and symbols representing actual terrain features. 

After explaining any graphic control measures, obstacles, and targets, the 

rehearsal director issues supplemental materials, if needed.

Rehearsal Script

An effective means for the rehearsal director to control rehearsals is the use 

of a script. It keeps the rehearsal on track. The script provides a checklist so 

the organization addresses all warfighting functions and outstanding issues. 

It has two major parts: the agenda and response sequence.

Agenda

An effective rehearsal follows a prescribed agenda that everyone knows and 

understands. This agenda includes, but is not limited to:

• Roll call. 

• Participant orientation to the terrain.

• Location of local civilians.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Enemy situation brief.

• Friendly situation brief.

• Description of expected enemy actions.

• Discussion of friendly unit actions.

• A review of notes made by the recorder.

The execution matrix, decision support template, and OPORD outline the 

rehearsal agenda. These tools, especially the execution matrix, both drive 

and focus the rehearsal. The commander and staff use them to control the 

operation’s execution. Any templates, matrices, or tools developed within 

each of the warfighting functions should tie directly to the supported unit’s 

execution matrix and decision support template. Examples include an 

intelligence synchronization matrix or fires execution matrix.

An effective rehearsal realistically and quickly portrays the enemy force 

and other variables of the operational environment without distracting from 

the rehearsal. One technique for doing this has the S-2 preparing an actions 

checklist. It lists a sequence of events much like the one for friendly units, 

but from the enemy or civilian perspective.

Response Sequence

Participants respond in a logical sequence: either by warfighting function 

or by unit as the organization deploys, from front to rear. The commander 

determines the sequence before the rehearsal. The staff posts the sequence 

at the rehearsal site, and the rehearsal director may restate it.

Effective rehearsals allow participants to visualize and synchronize the 

concept of operations. As the rehearsal proceeds, participants talk through 

the concept of operations. They focus on key events and the synchronization 

required to achieve the desired effects. The commander leads the rehearsal and 

gives orders during the operation. Subordinate commanders enter and leave 

the discussion at the time they expect to begin and end their tasks or activities 

during the operation. This practice helps the commander assess the adequacy 

of synchronization. Commanders do not “re-war-game” unless absolutely 

necessary to ensure subordinate unit commanders understand the plan.

The rehearsal director emphasizes integrating fires, events that trigger 

different branch actions, and actions on contact. The chief of fires (fire 

support officer) or firing unit commander states when to initiate fires, who 

to fire them, from where the firing comes, the ammunition available, and the 

desired target effect. Subordinate commanders state when they initiate fires 

per their fire support plans. The rehearsal director speaks for any absent staff 

section and ensures the rehearsal addresses all actions on the synchronization 

matrix and decision support template at the proper time or event.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

The rehearsal director ensures that the rehearsal includes key sustainment 

and protection actions at the appropriate times. Failure to do so reduces 

the value of the rehearsal as a coordination tool. The staff officer with 

coordinating staff responsibility inserts these items into the rehearsal. 

Special staff officers should brief by exception when a friendly or enemy 

event occurs within their area of expertise. Summarizing these actions at 

the end of the rehearsal can reinforce coordination requirements identified 

during the rehearsal. The staff updates the decision support template and 

gives a copy to each participant.

Under time-constrained conditions, the conducting headquarters staff may 

provide copies before the rehearsal and rely on participants to update them 

with pen-and-ink changes. 

Ground Rules

After discussing the rehearsal script, the rehearsal director:

• States the standard (what the commander will accept) for a successful 

rehearsal. 

• Ensures everyone understands the parts of the OPORD to rehearse. If 

the unit will not rehearse the entire operations, the rehearsal director 

states the events to be rehearsed.

• Quickly reviews the rehearsal SOP if all participants are not familiar 

with it.

• Establishes the timeline that designates the rehearsal starting time in 

relation to H-hour. For example, begin the rehearsal by depicting the 

anticipated situation one hour before H-hour.

• Establishes the time interval to begin and track the rehearsal. For 

example, a 10-minute interval equates to one hour of actual time.

• Updates friendly and enemy activities as necessary; for example, 

describing any ongoing reconnaissance.

During the Rehearsal

Once the rehearsal director finishes discussing the ground rules and 

answering questions, the S-3 reads the mission statement, the commander 

reads the commander’s intent, and the S-3 establishes the current friendly 

situation. The rehearsal then begins, following the rehearsal script.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Step 1 – Enemy Forces Deployed

The S-2 briefs the current enemy situation and operational environment and 

places markers on the map or terrain board (as applicable) indicating where 

enemy forces and other operationally significant groups or activities would 

be before the first rehearsal event. The S-2 then briefs the most likely enemy 

course of action and operational context. The S-2 also briefs the status of 

information collection operations (for example, citing any patrols still out or 

any observation post positions).

Step 2 – Friendly Forces Deployed

The S-3 briefs friendly maneuver unit dispositions, including security forces, 

as they are arrayed at the start of the operation. Subordinate commanders 

and other staff officers brief their unit positions at the starting time and 

any particular points of emphasis. For example, the chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer states the mission-oriented 

protective posture level, and the fire support officer or fires unit commander 

states the range of friendly and enemy artillery. Other participants place 

markers for friendly forces, including adjacent units, at the positions they 

will occupy at the start of the operation. As participants place markers, they 

state their task and purpose, task organization, and strength.

Sustainment and protection units brief positions, plans, and actions at the 

starting time and at points of emphasis the rehearsal director designates. 

Subordinate units may include forward arming and refueling points, refuelon-the-move points, communications checkpoints, security points, or 

operations security procedures that differ for any period during the operation. 

The rehearsal director restates the commander’s intent, if necessary.

Step 3 – Initiate Action

The rehearsal director states the first event on the execution matrix. 

Normally this involves the S-2 moving enemy markers according to the 

most likely course of action. The depiction must tie enemy actions to 

specific terrain or to friendly unit actions. The S-2 portrays enemy actions 

based on the situational template developed for staff war gaming.

As the rehearsal proceeds, the S-2 portrays the enemy and other operational 

factors and walks through the most likely enemy course of action (per the 

situational template). The S-2 stresses reconnaissance routes, objectives, 

security force composition and locations, initial contact, initial fires 

(artillery, air, and attack helicopters), probable main force objectives or 

engagement areas, and likely commitment of reserve forces.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Step 4 – Decision Point

When the rehearsal director determines that a particular enemy movement 

or reaction is complete, the commander assesses the situation to determine 

if a decision point has been reached. Decision points are taken directly from 

the decision support template.

If the commander determines the unit is not at a decision point and not at 

the end state, the commander directs the rehearsal director to continue to the 

next event on the execution matrix. Participants use the response sequence 

and continue to act out and describe their unit’s actions.

When the rehearsal reaches conditions that establish a decision point, the 

commander decides whether to continue with the current course of action 

or select a branch course of action. If electing the current course of action, 

the commander directs the rehearsal director to move to the next event 

in the execution matrix. If selecting a branch, the commander states the 

reason for selecting that branch, states the first event of that branch, and 

continues the rehearsal until the organization has rehearsed all events of 

that branch. As the unit reaches decisive points, the rehearsal director 

states the conditions required for success.

When it becomes obvious that the operation requires additional coordination 

to ensure success, participants immediately begin coordinating. This is one 

of the key reasons for rehearsals. The rehearsal director ensures that the 

recorder captures the coordination and any changes and that all participants 

understand the coordination.

Step 5 – End State Reached

Achieving the desired end state completes that phase of the rehearsal. In an 

attack, this will usually be when the unit is on the objective and has finished 

consolidation and casualty evacuation. In the defense, this will usually be 

after the decisive action (such as committing the reserve or striking force), 

the final destruction or withdrawal of the enemy, and casualty evacuation 

are complete. In stability tasks, this usually occurs when a unit achieves the 

targeted progress within a designated line of effort.

Step 6 – Reset

At this point, the commander states the next branch to rehearse. The 

rehearsal director resets the situation to the decision point where that 

branch begins and states the criteria for a decision to execute that branch. 

Participants assume those criteria have been met and then refight the 

operation along that branch until they attain the desired end state. They 

complete any coordination needed to ensure all participants understand and 

can meet any requirements. The recorder records any changes to the branch.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The commander then states the next branch to rehearse. The rehearsal 

director again resets the situation to the decision point where that 

branch begins, and participants repeat the process. This continues until 

the rehearsal has addressed all decision points and branches that the 

commander wants to rehearse.

If the standard is not met and time permits, the commander directs 

participants to repeat the rehearsal. The rehearsal continues until 

participants are prepared or until the time available expires. (Commanders 

may allocate more time for a rehearsal but must assess the effects on 

subordinate commanders’ preparation time.) Successive rehearsals, if 

conducted, should be more complex and realistic.

At the end of the rehearsal, the recorder restates any changes, coordination, 

or clarifications that the commander directed and estimates how long it will 

take to codify changes in a written FRAGORD.

After the Rehearsal

After the rehearsal, the commander leads an after-action review. The 

commander reviews lessons learned and makes the minimum required 

modifications to the existing plan. (Normally, a FRAGORD effects these 

changes.) Changes should be refinements to the OPORD; they should not 

be radical or significant. Changes not critical to the operation’s execution 

may confuse subordinates and hinder the synchronization of the plan. The 

commander issues any last-minute instructions or reminders and reiterates 

the commander’s intent.

Based on the commander’s instructions, the staff makes any necessary 

changes to the OPORD, decision support template, and execution matrix 

based on the rehearsal results. Subordinate commanders incorporate these 

changes into their unit’s OPORDs. The COS (XO) ensures the changes 

are briefed to all leaders or liaison officers who did not participate in the 

rehearsal.

A rehearsal provides the final opportunity for subordinates to identify and 

fix unresolved problems. The staff ensures that all participants understand 

any changes to the OPORD and that the recorder captures all coordination 

done at the rehearsal. All changes to the published OPORD are, in effect, 

oral FRAGORDs. As soon as possible, the staff publishes them as a written 

FRAGORD that changes the operation order.
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Lessons and Best Practices

Observation: Fires rehearsals are often ineffective or not conducted. 

Discussion: A noted trend at the CTCs indicates that many unit fires 

cells and commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to 

conduct effective fires rehearsals, both as part of the combined arms 

rehearsal (CAR) and as technical fire support rehearsals. Rehearsals 

and back briefs occur during preparation and ensure an orderly 

transition between planning and execution. Rehearsals also allow 

leaders to assess their subordinates’ preparations. 

Recommendation: Use the CAR to enable commanders and staffs 

to visualize the concept of operations and sequence of events. The 

technical fire support rehearsal is conducted to verify the fire support 

plan and also the communication links for mission execution. The 

target list, including any refined target locations. The observation 

plan, including primary and alternate observers, primary and alternate 

Observation Posts (OPs), the task and purpose of each target, and the 

engagement criteria for each target are discussed for all fire support 

events. Priority of fires, by phase of the operation. Priority of targets, 

ensuring that everyone understands the priority of engaging targets 

if two targets must be attacked simultaneously. Primary and alternate 

communications nets, including an anti-jam plan. Fire support 

coordination measures, ensuring they are de-conflicted. That all unit 

obstacles are covered by fire. 

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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 12 

Terminology

Four Forms of Reconnaissance

The four forms of reconnaissance are zone, area, route, and reconnaissance 

in force.

The S-3 assigns zone reconnaissance when the enemy situation is vague 

or when he needs information concerning cross-country trafficability. It 

is appropriate when previous knowledge of the terrain is limited or when 

combat operations have altered the terrain. The reconnaissance may be 

threat-oriented, terrain-oriented, society-oriented, infrastructure-oriented, 

or a combination. Additionally, the unit commander may focus the 

reconnaissance effort on a specific force, such as the enemy’s reserve.

A terrain-focused zone reconnaissance must include the identification 

of obstacles, both existing and reinforcing, as well as areas of chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) contamination.

A single continuous line enclosing the reconnaissance area, such as an 

objective, defines the “area” for an area reconnaissance. A named area 

of interest, when focusing on a relatively small area such as a building, 

bridge, or key piece of terrain, can also define the reconnaissance area. Area 

reconnaissance enables the unit to conduct decentralized reconnaissance in 

multiple areas simultaneously.

Route reconnaissance is conducted to determine whether the route is clear 

of obstacles and/or threat forces and how well or how poorly it will support 

the planned movement. The route is a prescribed course from a start point to 

a specific destination (release point). It can be a road or an axis of advance. 

At the unit level, route reconnaissance is a task often performed during zone 

or area reconnaissance. If enemy contact is expected, it is normal to assign 

a unit one major route. If enemy contact is unlikely, it is normal to assign a 

unit two routes.

The normal conduct of a zone, area, and route reconnaissance with a 

multidimensional focus includes such factors as society and infrastructure 

as well as the threat and terrain.

Conduct a reconnaissance in force when the enemy is operating within an 

area and it is not possible to obtain adequate intelligence by other means. 

It is an aggressive reconnaissance, conducted as an offensive operation, 

to answer clearly stated commander’s critical information requirements 

(CCIRs). It differs from other reconnaissance operations because the normal 

conduct is only to gain information about the enemy and not the terrain. The 

end state of a reconnaissance in force is to determine enemy weaknesses 

that higher headquarters can exploit. 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Actions by Friendly Force

Attack by fire – A tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct 

fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy force without closing 

with the enemy to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive that enemy. (FM 3-90-1)

Breach – A tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available 

means to break through or establish a passage through an enemy defense, 

obstacle, minefield, or fortification. (FM 3-90-1) 

Bypass – A tactical mission task in which the commander directs his unit 

to maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the 

momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an 

enemy force. (FM 3-90-1) 

Clear – 1. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove 

all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. 

(FM 3-90-1) 2. The total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is 

usually performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. 

(ATTP 3-90.4) 

Control – A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain 

physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to 

create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. (FM 3-90-1) 

Counterreconnaissance – A tactical mission task that encompasses all 

measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and 

surveillance efforts. (FM 3-90-1) 

Disengage – A tactical mission task where a commander has his unit break 

contact with the enemy to allow the conduct of another mission or to avoid 

decisive engagement. (FM 3-90-1) 

Exfiltrate – A tactical mission task where a commander removes Soldiers 

or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or 

clandestine means. (FM 3-90-1)

Follow and assume – A tactical mission task in which a second committed 

force follows a force conducting an offensive task and is prepared to 

continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited, or unable to continue. 

(FM 3-90-1) 

Follow and support – A tactical mission task in which a committed force 

follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive task. (FM 3-90-1) 

Occupy – A tactical mission task that involves a force moving a friendly 

force into an area so that it can control that area. Both the force’s movement 

to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition. (FM 3-90-1)
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Reduce – 1. A tactical mission task that involves the destruction of an 

encircled or bypassed enemy force. (FM 3-90-1) 2. A mobility task to create 

and mark lanes through, over, or around an obstacle to allow the attacking 

force to accomplish its mission. (ATTP 3-90.4) 

Retain – A tactical mission task in which the commander ensures that 

a terrain feature controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy 

occupation or use. (FM 3-90-1)

Secure – A tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, 

or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of 

enemy action. (FM 3-90-1)

Seize – A tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a 

designated area using overwhelming force. (FM 3-90-1)

Support by fire – A tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves 

to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of 

another maneuvering force. (FM 3-90-1)

Effects on Enemy Forces

Block – A tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or 

prevents his advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. Block 

is also an obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to 

achieve the tactical task. (FM 3-90-1)

Canalize – A tactical mission task in which the commander restricts enemy 

movement to a narrow zone by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of 

obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver. (FM 3-90-1)

Contain – A tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, 

or surround enemy forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given 

front and prevent them from withdrawing any part of their forces for use 

elsewhere. (FM 3-90-1)

Defeat – A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has 

temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The 

defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted 

course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can 

no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. 

Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. (FM 3-90-1)

Destroy – A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force 

combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a 

combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function 

or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. 

(FM 3-90-1)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Disrupt – 1. A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct 

and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation 

or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit 

prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90-1) 2. An obstacle 

effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to achieve the tactical 

task. (FM 90-7) 

Fix – A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from 

moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific period. 

Fix is also an obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to 

achieve the tactical task. (FM 3-90-1)

Interdict – A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, 

or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route. (FM 3-90-1)

Neutralize – A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy 

personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation. 

(FM 3-90-1)

Suppress – A tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of 

the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to 

accomplish the mission. (FM 3-90-1)

Turn – 1. A tactical mission task that involves forcing an enemy force 

from one avenue of approach or mobility corridor to another. 2. A tactical 

obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to achieve the 

tactical task. (FM 3-90-1)

Miscellaneous

Center of gravity – The source of power that provides moral or physical 

strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 5-0)

Combat power – The total means of destructive, constructive, and 

information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a 

given time. (ADRP 3-0)

Graphic control measure – A symbol used on maps and displays to 

regulate forces and warfighting functions. (ADRP 6-0)

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield – A systematic process of 

analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat, 

terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for 

a specific mission. By applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 

commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and 

maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space. 

(ADRP 1-02)
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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Mission command – The exercise of authority and direction by the 

commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the 

commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of 

unified land operations. (ADP 6-0) 

Running estimate – The continuous assessment of the current situation 

used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the 

commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 

5-0)

Situational understanding – The product of applying analysis and 

judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the 

operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADP 5-0)

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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Chapter 13

References

Joint Publications

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011

U.S. Army Publications

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012

ADP 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012

ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, September 2013

ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, May 2012

ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012

ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012

ATP 5-19, Risk Management, April 2014

FM 3-07, Stability, June 2014

FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, May 2014

FM 3-55, Information Collection, May 2013

FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Volume I, March 2013

FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, May 2014

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MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

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jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

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successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.