Technical Report 1137

Lessons Learned on Collective Efficacy in

Multinational Teams

Angela I. Karrasch

U.S. Army Research Institute

April 2003

20030604 110

United States Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Lessons Learned on Collective Efficacy in Multinational Teams

6. AUTHOR(S)

Angela L Karrasch (U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences)

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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Technical Report 1137

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14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This report documents a focused look at the dynamically integrated beliefs a team develops concerning their

capabilities (collective efficacy) in multinational teams. The results ofthis research indicated that the level of

collective efficacy for the Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina appears relatively strong, as would be

expected, given their history ofsuccess. Efficacy at the organizational level was not as strong and not as

homogenous as compared to primary team level, indicating that primary teams have more of a shared sense of

capability. A discussion ofthe situational and individual level variables expected to impact the formation of efficacy

is included. Finally, this report highlights some lessons learned about conducting research with multinational teams.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Collective efficacy Multinational teams Cross-cultural research Stabilization Force SFOR

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11
Technical Report 1137

LESSONS LEARNED ON COLLECTIVE EFFICACY IN

MULTINATIONAL TEAMS

Angela I. Karrasch

U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences

Leader Development Research Unit

Stanley M. Halpin, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

April 2003

Army Project Number Personnel Systems and

2O262785A790 Performance Technology

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

111
IV
FOREWORD

It has become increasingly clear that the United States Army will not be conducting

global operations alone. The Army will work with military allies from countries we have never

worked with before, we will coordinate with governmental and non-governmental agencies that

many of us have never heard of before, and we will work as a team. The importance of

understanding the dynamics ofmultinational teams cannot be overstated.

LTG John J. Sylvester, commander ofthe Multinational Division - North, Stabilization

Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina approved the research request from the Human Research and

Engineering Division - Army Research Laboratory (HRED-ARL) in return for a product that

would enhance the Stabilization Force's ability to work more efficiently as a team. Once

approval was obtained HRED-ARL turned to the Leader Development Research Unit ofthe U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) to request additional

support. In January of 2002, ARI began collaborating with the HRED -ARL to determine

methods and products that would enhance team performance.

This report documents a part ofthe overall project, specifically - ARI's effort to

understand collective efficacy, a critical aspect ofteam performance. The immediate resuhs of

this effort were briefed to LTG Sylvester in June 2002. Additional work on communication

training followed, and documentation ofthat effort will be pubUshed in a separate ARI Technical

Report.

KATHLEEN A. QUINKERT

Acting Technical Director
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research took a considerable amount of coordination and cooperation from all

involved. Dr. Linda Pierce ofthe Human Research and Engineering Division - Army Research

Laboratory, began coordination with the help of LTG (R) Frederic J. Brown, PhD, and LTG John

Sylvester. The participants from the Stabilization Force Headquarters graciously shared their

time, insights, and expertise with the research team. In completing the project, two retired

Colonels were key advisors and liaisons for our research team, thus appreciation also goes to

COLs (R) Greg Fontenot and Mike Sullivan.

VI
LESSONS LEARNED ON COLLECTIVE EFFICACY IN MULTINATIONAL TEAMS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

The leaders of the United States Army face a future where they must lead troops from

many nations, and they must team with military and civilian allies from other countries to

conduct military operations other than war, as well as wage war. Understanding how to

successfully "team" cross-culturally is still very much an unknown. There is a lack oftheory

and meager research available to guide development oftraining multi-cultural teams.

Procedure:

The research team traveled to the Stabilization Force Headquarters (SFOR HQ),

Multinational Division -North in Bosnia. As part of a larger project, data on team efficacy was

collected from military officers representing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and

non-NATO staff members ofthe SFOR HQ. Sixty-eight staff officers provided background

information related to their position and experiences and responded to a scale used to assess their

perception ofthe SFOR's capability to perform as a team. These data were analyzed and are

reported here. A separate report on the larger effort is forthcoming.

Findings:

The team members are confident that the SFOR can coordinate as a team in tasks such as

problem solving, plaiming, monitoring activities, and developing recommendations. Collective

efficacy is stronger for primary teams (e.g., intelligence team or public affairs team) as compared

to the organizational level team (i.e., SFOR as a whole). There was less variance in responses at

the primary team level, indicating a more shared sense of efficacy, as compared to the more

heterogeneous responses at the SFOR level. Finally, the indicators of experience that were used

to test hypotheses are in need ofrevision. Rank and number of months of multinational

experience are probably not adequate indicators in a multinational environment without

additional information to supplement their meaning.

Utilization of Findings:

This research has implications for the development of efficacy measures as well as for

understanding the antecedents ofthe construct itself Training developers and researchers can use

this information to better understand team performance and team training. There are lessons

learned from studying this multinational team that apply to any cross-cultural study ofmilitary

teams, thus this report is an addition to the limited body of knowledge in an area of critical

importance to the U.S. military.

Vll
VUl
LESSONS LEARNED ON COLLECTIVE EFFICACY IN MULTINATIONAL TEAMS

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ^

Intent of Report ^

Review and Definition of Collective Efficacy Research 1

Overview ofthe current study ^

METHOD ^

RESULTS 4

DISCUSSION 5

REFERENCES ^

APPENDIX A. Defining Training Success A-1

B. Collective Efficacy Scale B-l

C. Visual Representation of SFOR and Primary Team Collective Efficacy C-1

IX

LESSONS LEARNED ON COLLECTIVE EFFICACY IN MULTINATIONAL TEAMS

Introduction

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) in

collaboration with the Army Research Laboratory recently had the opportunity to examine

teamwork with a multinational military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This opportunity came in

the form of a request from the Commander ofthe Stabilization Force (COMSFOR) at Camp

Butmir, near Sarajevo. The total number oftroops in the Stabilization Force at that time was

about 15,000. Five hundred ofthose troops were stationed at Headquarters ofthe Stabilization

Force (HQ SFOR). The COMSFOR was interested in methods or products that could help the

SFOR teams work more efficiently. The primary ARI product developed for this project was a

communication training program and it will be described in full detail in a forthcoming ARI

report. This report documents an exploration of a variable considered to be critical to future team

training and team performance, specifically - collective efficacy.

Previous research on team training suggests the importance of a team's beliefs about their

capacity to work as a team, referred to here as collective efficacy (Zaccaro, Blair, Peterson,

Zazanis, 1995). According to a recent review ofresearch on collective efficacy beliefs (Bandura,

2001), stronger perceived collective efficacy is associated with higher group aspirations and

motivational investment in a group's tasks, stronger staying power in the face of impediments

and setbacks, higher morale and resilience to stressors, and greater performance

accomplishments. Meta-analyses have also shovm support for the influential role of efficacy

beliefs (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). However, the literature is not complete and certainly when

we try to understand the development of collective efficacy amongst cross-cultural teams, we

find a lack ofresearch and theory for measurement, for understanding hs development and for

understanding its influence on training.

Intent ofReport

Until very recently, there has been a lack oftheory building in training research in

general (Salas, 2001). Additionally, a lack of control or assessment of important individual and

situational variables that impact training effectiveness is evident in training research. Training

may not be evaluated at all, or when training outcomes are evaluated, there often is no way of

knowing for certain what situational, individual or team factors facilitated or impeded the

success ofthe training. Campbell (1988) has argued at the individual level that differences such

as self-efficacy and situational influences such as socialization and group processes should be

incorporated into training effectiveness studies. This same argument should be applied to

muhinational team training, where the need for theory building is even greater. This report is an

attempt to look at a group level variable, collective efficacy, and determine ifsome ofthe

individual team members' demographic information influences its development.

Review and Definition ofCollective Efficacy Research

Some ofwhat is established about self-efficacy probably generalizes well to the

collective level. For instance, Bandura (1986) defined self-efficacy as "people'sjudgments of
their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required in attaining designated types

of performances" (p.391). He emphasized that efficacy is concerned not with the cognitive,

social and behavioral skills one has, but with judgments ofwhat one can do, with whatever skills

one possesses. Bandura has argued that perceived collective efficacy is an emergent group-level

property, not simply the sum ofthe efficacy beliefs of individual members.

Collective efficacy beliefs are considered to serve functions similar to those of personal

efficacy beliefs and operate through similar processes. According to Gist & Mitchell (1992),

there are three important characteristics ofself-efficacy. First, efficacy involves a comprehensive

summary orjudgment of perceived capability for performing a specific task. Second, efficacy

involves a motivational component. Finally, efficacy is a dynamic construct that changes over

time and in response to new experiences and information. Previous research also indicates that

self-efficacy is an important predictor variable in training effectiveness (Gist, Schwoerer, &

Rosen, 1989; Gist, Stevens, & Bavetta, 1991; Latham & Frayne, 1989; Mathieu, Martineau &

Tannenbaum, 1993; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993, Saks, 1995).

Zacarro et al., (1995) have highlighted differences in the definition and measurement of

the concept of collective efficacy. These various definitions of collective efficacy include: 1)

people's perceptions ofthe group's efficacy to effect change, 2) group potency -the collective

belief of a group that it can be effective 3) group members' perceptions of what performance

level the group could attain and the certainty they felt in reaching that level, 4) the perceived

probability that collective effort will result in collective accomplishments, and 5) an individual's

judgment of how well the group can execute actions required to perform the task.

Zacarro suggests that the most useful approach is to consider both judgments of

members' abilities and perceptions ofhow well group members work together in achieving

collective outcomes. Thus, he defines collective efficacy as " a sense of collective competence

shared among individuals when allocating, coordinating, and integrating their resources in a

successful, concerted response to specific situational demands" (p. 309) -this definition has

several key elements: a) collective efficacy as shared beliefs, b) perceptions of competence in a

collective's coordination activities, c) consideration of other members' resources and d) the

situational and behavioral or task specificity of collective efficacy.

Initial success has a positive impact on efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1977). The history of

the SFOR has proven it to be a successful team. The Implementation Force (fore-runner to the

SFOR) carried out its mission successfully, and the SFOR is currently meeting its milestones

(SFOR Informer, 2002). The SFOR commander perceives the organization to be an effective

one. Published personal interviews (Murray & Gordon, 1996) indicate participants feel that their

work is making a difference in Bosnia (although they do acknowledge that Bosnia may not be

able to maintain the peace for long, once the SFOR no longer has a presence there), and there is

also a sense that SFOR gets things done, and done quickly. Thus, higher reports of SFOR

efficacy in general were expected. Second, once new members ofthe SFOR become familiar

with its history and culture, a strong sense ofteam efficacy should develop. Although the amount

of information soldiers arrive with is uncertain, it was generally expected that as individuals

became more familiar with SFOR, their personal judgments ofthe SFOR team capability would

increase. Thus, time at SFOR was expected to be positively related to SFOR collective efficacy.
This would support the assertion that time within a team is an important influence on collective

efficacy beliefs.

Collective efficacy is a group level dynamic, however, it is possible that individual level

variables can shape or influence the development ofthis team construct. One potential individual

level variable examined was experience. Because more military experience might indicate a

better initial understanding of how SFOR works, and less apparent chaos to a newcomer (Saks,

1995), we expected more experience (as indicated by rank and by previous NATO work) to be

positively associated with collective efficacy.

Overview ofthe current research

The environment in which data was collected was the SFOR HQ. This HQ is an

international, professional military climate. The work to be accomplished is staff work such as

planning, coordinating, monitoring, and decision-making. There are NATO (Belgium, Canada,

Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,

Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States) and Non-NATO (Albania,

Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuan Slovakia, Morocco,

Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Sweden) countries working as part ofthe SFOR and many of

those nations are represented at HQ. Australia and New Zealand also contribute through a special

arrangement with the United Kingdom. We were briefed about the complexities associated with

establishing any type of cohesiveness or trust in a multinational environment such as this.

Cohesiveness and trust are typically associated with high performing teams, but we were also

satisfied that those attributes are not always necessary in order to accomplish team work. We

were asked to deliver a product or products that would enable this multinational team to work

more efficiently. The focus ofthe broader project was to study cultural differences in cognition

and develop a team training system that would enable cross-cultural team awareness, and

enhanced multinational team skills (See Appendix A for a definition of project success). A

second effort was to develop communication training for the team. This report documents a

study of data focused on team efficacy.

The mission ofthe SFOR is to deter hostilities and stabilize the peace, contribute to a

secure environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area ofResponsibility

(AOR), target and coordinate SFOR support to key areas including primary civil implementation

organizations, and support progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further

need for NATO -led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This mission statement is consistent

with the Dayton Peace Agreement or the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)

which contains the goals: 1) to provide a safe and secure environment, 2) to establish a unified,

democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3) to rebuild the economy, and 4) to allow the return of

displaced persons and refugees to their prewar homes.

Method

Procedures and Measures. There were two data collection periods for collective efficacy

research. The first data collection occurred in April of 2002. Forty SFOR team members were

asked to complete a paper and pencil version ofthe collective efficacy scale in English. They
also completed some background questions, personality assessments and participated in either

ini views or focus groups intended to assess beliefs about multinational teamwork. In June of

2002, our research team was provided access to twenty-eight more SFOR team members, and

they were asked to complete the same collective efficacy measure by paper and pencil in English

and then they were asked to participate in a pilot run of a communication training program that

the Army Research Institute had developed. The pilot study and the communication training

materials will be described in a forthcoming ARI report.

A 15-item scale was developed to assess the collective efficacy ofthe primary teams

within the SFOR and to assess the team members' efficacy regarding the HQ as a team. In

accordance with recommendations by Bandura and Adams (1977), the items were tailored to

capture the essence ofthe team tasks. Specifically, the intent was to capture beliefs about the 1)

specific tasks that are performed as a HQ staff, 2) the complexities associated with the

multinational / muhicultural nature ofthis team and 3) the nature ofmilitary constraints

associated with team performance.

Participants were instructed to rate the extent to which they felt confident that the SFOR

HQ could perform each of 15 tasks. They were also asked to rate their primary team (e.g.,

intelligence team, public affairs team) on the same 15 items. Typical items include: Integrate

new team members; Coordinate efficiently, Use different perspectives to solve problems (See

Appendix B for all 15 items). Responses are indicated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at

all confident) to 5 (Extremely confident). The inter-item reliability for this scale was .93. This

indicates that the individual items appear to be assessing one construct. Whether that construct is

collective efficacy cannot be determined with the data we have available (i.e., no construct

validity data available). However, the items at least have enough face validity to make a good

assumption that they are a valid indicator of collective efficacy.

Participants. All ofthe data to be reported in this report are based on a sample of 68 male

soldiers. The majority ofteam members at SFOR HQ were offield grade rank or higher.

Specifically, our sample included 3% Colonels, 32% Lieutenant Colonels, 37% Majors, 20%

Captains, 5% Lieutenants and 3% were Senior NCOs. The majority of our participants were

officers from the United States (n=13); the next largest representation came from France (n=9)

and the United Kingdom (n=7). Some countries were represented by only one officer in our

sample, thus no major statistical analyses were conducted based on nationality. For some, the

SFOR HQ assignment was their first multinational experience. Our sample ranged from 1 month

to 50 months ofinternational experience and the average was 14 months. The amount oftime

working within the SFOR ranged from 1 month to 24 months, with an average of 6 months.

Results

The average SFOR team efficacy score was 3.45 on a 1 (Not at all confident) to 5

(extremely confident) scale. Twenty-five percent of our sample indicated that they were either

very confident or extremely confident that the SFOR HQ could coordinate as a team to complete

their staff work. There was another 25% ofthe sample that indicated on average that tliey were
"somewhat confident" or "slightly confident" or "not at all confidenf in the ability ofthe SFOR

HQ. The remaining 50% ofresponses fell between "somewhat confident" and "very confident."

See Appendix C for graphical representation ofthese data.

It was expected that there would be a positive relation between SFOR team efficacy and

the amount oftime worked as an SFOR member (i.e., the more time in SFOR, the more

efficacious). In fact, we found the correlation between these variables did not approach

significance levels. This indicates that perceptions ofthe SFOR team's ability to complete

multinational staff work is not linearly related to the number ofmonths worked within that team.

It was also expected that experience would be related to reports of collective efficacy.

The results indicate that rank (a proposed indicator of experience) was only marginally related

(r = -.22, p< .09) to collective efficacy ofthe SFOR team. Surprisingly, the direction ofthe

correlation indicates that higher rank is associated with less efficacious beliefs. Resuhs regarding

the other indicator of experience, previous NATO assignments, indicated only a marginal

relationship (r=.21, p<.10) with SFOR team efficacy.

Incidentally, we also looked at the relation between SFOR team efficacy and primary

team efficacy. They were positively and moderately correlated (r =.58, p<.000), indicating that

more primary team efficacy is associated with more SFOR level efficacy. Additionally a paired

sample t-test (t=6.39, df =64, p<.000) indicates that the mean for SFOR team efficacy (x = 3.45,

sd=.61) is significantly lower than the primary team efficacy (x= 3.87, sd=.56). Additionally, the

distribution ofscores for SFOR indicates more heterogeneity in responses as compared to the

more homogenous responses of primary team members. At a larger/organizational level of

teamwork, one could expect a less shared sense of efficacy, so the comparatively more

dispersion in the responses at that level would be expected. (See Appendix C for a graphical

representation of data).

Discussion

One ofthe first things a leader will do upon taking command oftroops is to assess or

"size up" the capabilities, strengths and weaknesses of his unit as a whole. This "sizing up"

contributes to efficacy beliefs that are on target, or accurate, and that allows the commander to

use the team appropriately. Newly forming teams also need to make those assessments oftheir

team members and oftheir ability to coordinate their individual abilities. However, the nature of

muhinational teams (e.g., language problems, differing work styles and attitudes, differing

experience levels and training requirements, etc.) could automatically impede one's ability to

understand other team members' capabilities and probably make it difficult to coordinate a team

effort. Without firmly established shared beliefs about team capability (collective efficacy),

teams may have shaky or ambivalent motivation, limited perseverance, and limited team

performance.

The level of collective efficacy for the SFOR team appears to be fairly strong. Most

participants feh either somewhat or very confident that the SFOR can produce a coordinated

effort from a multinational team to make good decisions, solve problems, plan missions, monitor
activities and the like. It is hard to say, how accurate tliose judgments are without performance

data linked to those responses. However, these data indicate that it is possible to get variance in

responses on this construct. The fear in measuring collective efficacy with a military sample was

that the stereotypical "can do" military attitude would preclude accurate measurement. However,

since there was not an overwhelmingly positive response to these questions, it appears that this

type ofresponse bias is not necessarily a measurement problem. It is also possible that when

there is complete agreement among members on the degree of group competence, we simply

have a very cohesive group with a shared sense of capability. Unfortunately, too few studies

have examined collective efficacy to understand what the conceptual and measurement

implications would be. The scale developed for this project demonstrated inter-item reliability

and face vaUdity, so it may be a good first step for collective efficacy measurement.

On a different level, situational influences may also interact with the individual level

variables because collective efficacy is dynamic and responsive to direct specific performance

feedback. Thus, a recently bungled mission could impact efficacy during one's stay, such that

efficacy is high when a soldier comes in, but when a planned operation doesn't work and the

world hears about it, then collective efficacy might take a dip. The impact ofrecent events

(which was not measured in this study) may dominate efficacy beliefs so much as to override any

type ofinfluence that "team time" might have played. It is very difficult to disentangle the

influences without a more focused examination ofthis construct.

We also examined the impact ofrank and previous NATO experience as antecedents to

the development of efficacy beliefs. Both ofthese findings were marginal and thus should not be

over-interpreted. However, in thinking about these findings, it was determined that there may be

a need to re-examine whether they pass the cross-cultural measures test. In other words, it is

possible that the antecedent variables hypothesized to impact the development ofteam efficacy

simply are not reliable variables m a multinational environment. For instance, rank structure may

be similar across many nations, and may be reliable within nations, however the experience level

and competency associated v^dth rank may vary considerably between countries. Ifthis is so, then

rank is not a reliable variable for the purpose ofmultinational research. As an example, a Captain

from the German Army may go through a stringent selection process in order to be assigned to

the SFOR HQ, however that same rank from the United States may be seemingly, arbitrarily

assigned, with or withoutjoint professional military training.

Similarly, a Lieutenant Colonel from the UK may have been deployed with a

multinational team for the same amount oftime as an American officer, but the American officer

hasn't been trained with the same NATO culture that the UK officer experiences. Additionally,

the type ofmultinational military operation would influence the skills attained during that time,

and may or may not match the skills needed for the current operation. So, the "number ofmonths

in a multinational team" are not equal experiences. Some U.S. soldiers indicated that a sixmonth rotation at SFOR isjust enough time to get "up to speed" on how NATO operates. A UK

officer comes into his first month at SFOR already understanding NATO operating procedures,

so he could potentially get much more development from the next five months than the

American officer. This mdicates that the multinational experience variable may not be adequate

either. Rank and multinational orjoint deployments are good indicators of experience when we

are working within our ovra national system. So, it is not that those variables should be
discounted entirely, quite the opposite. Future research efforts should consider the complexity

beforehand and account for it. Potential solutions involve multiple indicators of experience and a

more in depth analysis of variables that are considered important.

Theorizing and research concerning influences on training effectiveness must move

beyond a simple training program and adopt a more global or systems perspective. Collective

efficacy should probably be integrated into that systems perspective oftraining. Additionally, in

attempting to understand collective efficacy, we come away with lessons learned about

multinational research. This research simply highlights what many cross-cultural researchers

have suspected for quite some time - a shared profession (military culture) cannot override or

substitute entirely for a lack ofshared culture and norms. We must work to understand how

multinational teams can reconcile simple differences that may have a big impact. Strategies used

for improving communication about work to be accomplished are an excellent "first" step in

training multinational teams. Additional team training for multinational teams can build on that

basis, and on the lessons learned in attempting to understand how multi-nationalism impacts all

the training constructs with which we will be working.

References

Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change.

Psychological Review, 84,191-215.

Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations ofthouglit and action: A social cognitive theory.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Bandura, A. (2001). Social Cognitive Theory: An agentic perspective. Annual Review of

Psychology.

Bandura, A. & Adams, N.E. (1977). Analysis ofself-efficacy theory of behavioral change.

Cognitive Therapy and Research, 1,287-310.

Campbell, (1988).Training design for performance improvement. In Campbell JP, Campbell FJ

and Associated (Eds.). Productivity in organizafions (pp. 177-216). San Francisco: JosseyBass.

Gist, M.E., Schwoerer, C, & Rosen B. (1989). Effects of alternative training methods on selfefficacy and performance in computer software training. Journal of Applied Psychology,

74,884-891.

Gist, M.E., Stevens, C.K. & Bavetta, A.G. (1991). Effects ofself-efficacy and post-training

intervention on the acquisition and maintenance of complex interpersonal skills. Personnel

Psychology, 44, 837-861.

Gist, M. E. & Mitchell, T. R. (1992). Self-efficacy: A theoretical analysis ofits determinants

and malleability. Academy of Management Review, 17,183-211.

Latham, G. P. & Frayne, C.A (1989), Self-management training for increasing job attendance: A

follow-up and a replication. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 74,411-416.

Mathieu, J. E., Martineau, J. W., & Tannenbaum, S.I. (1993). Individual and situational

influences on the development ofself-efficacy: Implications for training effectiveness.

Personnel Psychology, 46,125-147.

Murray, R.W. & Gordon, S. (1996). IFOR on IFOR: Nato peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Edinburgh, Scotland: Coimect.

Saks, A.M. (1995). Longitudinal field investigation ofthe moderating and mediating effects of

self-efficacy on the relationship between training and newcomer adjustment.

Salas, E. (2001). The science oftraining: A decade of progress. Annual Review of Psychology.

SFOR Informer. Retrieved September 23, 2002 from http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm
Stajkovic, A.D. & Luthans, F. (1998). Self-efficacy and work-related performance: a metaanalysis. Psychology Bulletin. 124,241-261.

Zacarro, S. J., Blair, V., Peterson, C, & Zazanis, M. (1995). Collective Efficacy. In J. Maddux

(Ed.), Self-Efficacy, Adaptation and Adjustment: Theory, Research, and Application

(pp.305-327). New York: Plenum Press.

10
Appendix A

Defining Training Success

This was a simple exercise intended to help us make our overarching goals explicit. The

project scientists were asked to think about and answer the question, "What will make this

project a success?" Additionally, we asked ourselves, "What would cause us to think ofthis

work as a failed project?" The answers provided below seemed to be a good starting place for

any research team developing training for a multinational team.

Success

• A successful methodology for developing highly performing teams is the outcome.

• A successful training to prepare leaders ofmultinational teams is the outcome.

• A successful preparation for new team members is the outcome.

• The training developed must be self-sustaining, obviously relevant (face validity), and

have growth capability (i.e., a plan for expansion to include moving from awareness to

skills based training, and then to tools/technology that aid training).

• The training needs to be scientifically grounded and theory oriented.

• The training should be tailorable to mission and locale.

• The training should have evaluation embedded to make sure it is on task.

• The training should be exportable.

Failure

• Underestimating or misunderstanding our requirements would lead to failure.

• Offending other national groups, because of cultural insensitivity or misunderstanding

would lead to failure.

• Delivering something that just doesn't work would be considered failure.

• Making promises that we realistically can't keep because oftimeline (1 year) is

considered a failure.

• Good products come out ofthis, but h gets shelved because no funding or champion

exists would be considered failing to a certain extent.

• If our evaluation finds no changes in behavior or awareness, or we can't gauge significant

differences, and don't know why there were no changes, then we haven't learned or

trained.

• Ifthe developed training works for SFOR HQ, but won't transfer, that might be

considered a failure.

• If we don't seek and monitor "buy in" during project, and there is no feedback

mechanism to provide a "check" on how our project is being perceived, then we have

failed.

• If we create suspicions among other national team members, or reinforce view of

American arrogance and do more harm then good, that would be a failure.

• No control group, and no way to rule out rival hypothesis might lead to a failed project.

• Ifthe cultural dimensions/awareness doesn't link to team performance as we suspected

and we don't learn why, that would be a failure.

• Ifthe interviews don't produce evidence of cultural dimensions that is understandable,

then development oftraining scenarios could be hindered.

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A-2
Appendix B

Collective Efficacy Scale

We are interested in your perception ofthe primary team to which you are assigned (CJl,

CJ2, etc.), and your perception ofthe Headquarters as a whole. For each question, please provide

a response based on your confidence level that the SFOR Headquarters can perform each task,

and then indicate your confidence level in the ability of your primary team's ability to perfomi

the same task.

Please use the following scale to respond to the items.

Not at all Slightly Somewhat Very Extremely

Confident Confident Confident Confident Confident

12 3 4 5

How much confidence do you have that the current multinational SFOR HQ, and your

primary team can...

SFOR HQ Primary team

1. Integrate new team members 12345 12345

2. Develop understanding of new team member capabilities 12345 12345

3. Overcome language barriers 12345 12345

4. Use different perspectives to solve problems 12345 12345

5. Overcome cultural differences in work practices 12345 12345

6. Use valuable resources (expertise) effectively 12345 12345

7. Identify and resolve conflicts within teams 12345 12345

8. Plan missions with a multinational team 12345 12345

9. Engage in successful problem solving 12345 12345

10. Coordinate efficiently 12345 12345

11. Communicate effectively 12345 12345

12. Make good decisions 12345 12345

13. Develop appropriate recommendations 12345 12345

14. Respond flexibly to many types of problems 12345 12345

15. Monitor activities in their area of operations 12345 12345

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B-2
/

Appendix C

Visual Representation of SFOR and Primary Team Collective Efficacy

Box Plot Graphic ofthe Average SFOR Team Efficacy Response

Ave SFOR team effica

Range of Scale: 1-5

Range ofresponses: 1.77 - 4.69

Percentiles: 25% -3.04; 50%-3.39; 75%-3.92

Box Plot Graphic ofthe Average Primary Team Efficacy Response

Ave primary team eff

Range of Scale: 1-5

Range ofresponses: 2.46 - 5.0

Percentiles: 25% - 3.62; 50 % - 3.92; 75% - 4.23

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C-2