THE INVITATION TO STRUGGLE:

EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COMPETITION

OVER THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

William E. Berry, Jr.

May 17, 1996
ii

*******

This monograph was presented at the International Workshop

on the U.S.-ROK Alliance held in Seoul, Korea, October 5-7, 1995.

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of the Army, the Department of the Air Force, the

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This monograph is

cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this monograph are invited and should

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Copies of this

report may be obtained from the Publications and Production

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX

(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisleemh2.army.mil.

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All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic

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iii

FOREWORD

In this monograph, Dr. William E. Berry examines the history

and the ongoing debate between the legislative and executive

branches of the U.S. Government regarding policy in Korea. The

issue of troop presence has taken a back seat to concerns over

the North Korean nuclear threat. Most of the current

congressional criticism is focused on the effectiveness of the

administration's counterproliferation policy with respect to

North Korea. Dr. Berry concludes that, until the nuclear issue

is resolved, U.S. forces will likely remain in South Korea

because vital national security interests are involved.

This monograph was presented originally at the International

Workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance held in Seoul, Korea, in

October 1995. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to have

co-hosted this workshop in collaboration with the Institute for

Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University and in partnership

with The Korea Society and the Defense Nuclear Agency. We hope

that the ideas presented there will lead to a strengthening of

the ROK-U.S. partnership and thereby enhance the peace and

stability of Northeast Asia.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies

 Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM E. BERRY, JR., currently Senior Military Professor and

Department Head of Political Science at the U.S. Air Force

Academy, completed a tour as Air Attache to Malaysia in July

1993. Prior to that, he was Director of Field Studies Programs

and Assistant Director of National Security Policy at the

National War College in Washington, DC. Colonel Berry has had

extensive experience in Asia with assignments in Vietnam, the

Philippines, and the Republic of Korea. A Cornell Ph.D., he is

the author of a book on the Philippine base negotiations that was

published by Westview Press and a recent monograph on the North

Korean nuclear weapons program. He has written many journal

articles and chapters in edited books on U.S. security interests

in Asia and other Asian-related topics.
v

SUMMARY

The primary focus of this monograph is the ongoing debate

between the executive and legislative branches of government in

the United States concerning the American military presence in

the Republic of Korea. It begins by examining the debate

surrounding the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty in

1953, and the Senate's decision to attach an "understanding" to

that treaty. The Nixon and Carter administrations are

particularly important because major efforts occurred in each to

reduce the U.S. presence. In the case of the Nixon

administration, the Congress was a major impetus to this

reduction, whereas in the Carter administration, the Congress

worked hard to impede Carter's troop withdrawal initiative. The

reasons for this role reversal are very informative.

The suspected North Korean nuclear weapons program has added

another dimension to this debate. Much of the current debate

between the Clinton administration and the Congress concentrates

on whether the U.S. counter- proliferation policy has been

successful in reducing the North Korean threat rather than on

whether the United States should continue to station military

forces in South Korea. The 1995 Defense Department security

strategy makes a compelling case for this military presence and

appears to be generally accepted in the Congress. The conclusion

is that unless or until the nuclear issue is resolved, the U.S.

troop presence will not be as controversial as in previous times.

 Provided the South Koreans desire these forces to remain, the

United States will keep them there, at least in the short term,

because they contribute to the achievement of the new critical

counterproliferation objectives, as well as their original

deterrent purpose.
1

THE INVITATION TO STRUGGLE:

EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COMPETITION

OVER THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Since the end of the Korean war, the primary purpose of the

U.S. military forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has

been to deter, in conjunction with the ROK military, another

attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). To

this end, these forces have been largely successful and have

served as an important link in the bilateral relationship between

the United States and South Korea, as well as an essential

component of the containment strategy during the Cold War. 

However, domestic politics in the United States has also played a

major role in the continuation of the U.S. military presence on

the Korean peninsula, particularly the competition between the

executive and legislative branches in the foreign policy

formulation process. One author has described the constitutional

separation of powers in foreign policy formulation as an

"invitation to struggle" since both branches of government have

specific powers and responsibilities which on occasion bring them

into conflict.1 More specifically, the President's role as

commander- in-chief of the military has conflicted with the

Congress' authority to appropriate funds for the military, and,

in the case of the Senate, its treaty ratification

responsibility. The primary thesis of this monograph is that in

the post-Cold War era, the struggle between the executive and

legislative branches of government concerning U.S. policy

involving Korea may intensify for geopolitical, economic, and

partisan political reasons. However, because of the North Korean

nuclear weapons threat, the debate over the retention of U.S.

military forces has been subsumed by the larger security issues.

 At least for the next few years, it is likely that the United

States will continue to station its military forces on the Korean

peninsula if its South Korean ally supports this retention.

The Mutual Defense Treaty and the Nixon Doctrine.

In October 1953, representatives of the United States and

South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) which went into

effect in November of that year.2

 Article III stipulates that

each country accepts that an external attack in the Pacific on

either of their territories under their respective administrative

control "would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and

declares that it would act to meet the common danger in

accordance with its constitutional processes." Article IV

provides for American land, air, and naval forces to be stationed

in South Korea. When the U.S. Senate ratified this treaty, the

senators added an "understanding" which stipulated that the

treaty would only be applicable if an external attack were

directed against the ROK.3 Presumably, the Senate intended to
2

ensure through this understanding that the treaty would not go

into effect if South Korea launched an attack against North

Korea, as South Korean President Syngman Rhee had threatened, to

reunify the country. This understanding serves as an early

example of potential differences between the two branches of

government on Korean policy.

ROK political leaders have remained apprehensive concerning

the credibility of the American commitment to come to South

Korea's assistance ever since the MDT went into effect. The

Senate reservation expressed in the referenced understanding 

partly explains this apprehension, but more important is the

clause in Article III which provides that each country would act

"in accordance with its constitutional processes." The Koreans

wanted the United States to commit to an automatic response in

case of attack, but the United States has never made such a

commitment. Therefore, the presence of American ground forces,

in particular those deployed along the likely invasion routes,

provides the next best guarantee that the United States will

respond immediately to an attack across the 38th parallel.4 The

"trip-wire" nature of these American soldiers' presence is so

important because the ROK views this presence as a major

deterrent against another North Korean invasion. In this

instance, it is the psychological element of deterrence that is

deemed so important, both to reassure the South and to deter the

North.

Korean anxieties about the American commitment increased

during the administration of Richard Nixon. President Nixon was

influenced by both domestic and international pressures as far as

his views on American troops in Korea were concerned.

Domestically, public opinion and the mood of Congress opposed

continuation of the U.S. role as "policeman of the world," a role

the United States had assumed in the period leading to the

involvement in the Vietnam war. Congress demanded that military

budgets be cut and American forces abroad reduced. 

Internationally, Nixon was influenced by his own plans to improve

relations with the People's Republic of China. A reduction in

the American military presence in Asia was perceived as a means

to this end.

During a trip to Asia in July 1969, the President indicated

on several occasions that American allies must assume more of the

responsibility in providing for their own defense and the broader

security of the region. The United States would continue to play

a role, but the individual countries would have to do more.5

 At

the conclusion of his trip, Nixon released a statement on Guam

which became known as the Nixon Doctrine.6 Briefly, this

doctrine contained three main principles. First, the United

States would keep its treaty commitments. Second, the nuclear

umbrella would continue to be extended to those countries deemed
3

vital to American security interests. Third, and most important

as far as the troop issue is concerned, the United States would

furnish economic and military assistance, but the country

directly involved would be responsible for providing the actual

manpower for its own defense. What this meant essentially was

that the United States would consider providing air and naval

support to an ally, but the ground forces would have to come from

the country itself.

In August 1969, President Park Chung Hee and President Nixon

met in San Francisco. They issued a joint communiqué at the

conclusion of this meeting which was significantly different from

that issued after Park's meeting with President Lyndon Johnson in

1968.7 Rather than the pledge to offer "prompt and effective

assistance to repel armed attack" that his predecessor had made,

Nixon agreed only "to meet armed attack against the Republic of

Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the

Republic of Korea and the United States."

In 1971, Nixon began to reduce the ground presence in Korea

by withdrawing the 7th Infantry Division. After this withdrawal,

only the 2nd Infantry Division remained. This action reduced the

U.S. military forces from approximately 60,000 soldiers to about

40,000.8 Because of the deterrent value attributed to the

American presence, the Korean government was profoundly disturbed

by the Nixon decision. As a result, President Park launched a

major effort during the early 1970s in the Third Five-year

Economic Development Plan (1972-76) to increase the industrial

capabilities of his country so that South Korea would become as

self-sufficient as possible in the production of military

hardware. Park gave particular attention to the development of

the iron and steel industries, heavy machinery, transport

equipment, and chemical industrialization.9 Quite obviously,

Korean confidence in American reliability was shaken by the Nixon

troop withdrawal decision at least in part because of policy

differences between the executive and the legislative branches

and also by concerns that the ROK was not as important to the

United States as other geopolitical and geostrategic

considerations. The latent fears always just below the surface

of the bilateral relationship were exacerbated by this action.

When Gerald Ford succeeded to the presidency in 1974, he

attempted to reassure American allies in Asia that the United

States intended to remain a military power in the region. On his

return from the Vladivostok meeting with Leonid Brezhnev, Ford

stopped in Seoul to consult with Park. The joint communiqué they

issued is instructive in that Ford reiterated that the United

States would remain an Asian power, but more specifically because

of the wording he used in reference to the U.S. ground forces in

South Korea.10 Ford reverted to the language used by Johnson in

1968, pledging "prompt and effective assistance to repel armed
4

attack against the Republic of Korea." He went on to state

directly that "the United States had no plan to reduce the

present level of United States forces in Korea."

At the conclusion of a subsequent Asian trip in 1975, Ford

attempted to clarify his Asian policy further. In a speech

delivered in Hawaii, he outlined his "Pacific Doctrine" and made

specific reference to South Korea. The fifth tenet of this

doctrine stated that peace in Asia would be difficult to achieve

as long as existing tensions remained high on the Korean

peninsula. To reduce these tensions, the United States intended

to maintain close ties with the ROK, to include the retention of

American military forces there.11 Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger reinforced this policy in a 1976 speech. He warned

against unilateral troop withdrawals from the region as

threatening the security of allies and reducing American

influence. Concerning Korea, he stated that the United States

"will not undermine stability and hopes for negotiation by

withdrawing forces unilaterally."12

Ford and Kissinger were attempting to reassure America's

friends and allies that the United States intended to remain an

Asian power even though the United States had not been able to

prevent communist victories in Indochina. It is clear that Ford

and Kissinger believed that the retention of combat ground forces

in South Korea was a signal of American resolve to remain a force

to be reckoned with in Asia. While these reassurances were

welcome in Seoul, doubts still remained because of policy shifts

from one administration to another and because of significant

differences between the Republican President and the Democratic

Congress on the proper course for U.S. foreign policy in Asia. 

In other words, Korean political leaders were not certain what

the long-term U.S. policy on the troop presence would be, and

their anxiety level increased as the identity of the Democratic

nominee for president in 1976 became known.

The Carter Troop Withdrawal Decision.

As early as 1975, candidate Jimmy Carter indicated he would

withdraw American ground forces from Korea if he became

president.13 The Korean reaction was more muted than might have

been expected because in 1975 it did not seem likely that Carter

would win the Democratic nomination, let alone the presidency,

and because campaign rhetoric is not always translated into

policy. Carter proved the Koreans wrong on both counts. After

becoming president, he directly addressed the troop issue. The

President believed that the approximately 32,000 ground forces in

Korea could be removed over a 4-5 year period, allowing South

Korea time to prepare its own forces to replace the departing

Americans. Carter did anticipate, however, that American air and
5

naval support forces would remain in the ROK for a long time.14

During the spring of 1977, the administration prepared

Policy Review Memorandum 13. This document contained the various

arguments under consideration at that time on the troop

withdrawal plan. Although granting that the strategic balance

had shifted in favor of the DPRK since 1970, it concluded that

after a 5-year period of withdrawing American ground forces,

South Korea could defend itself adequately if U.S. air, air

defense, naval, logistics, and intelligence support continued to

be made available to the ROK.15 In May 1977, the administration

sent Presidential Decision 12 to the Departments of State and

Defense ordering these departments to implement Carter's troop

withdrawal plan.

There were several reasons for the Carter decision. First,

he did believe that because of quantitative and qualitative

improvements in South Korean forces and equipment, U.S. ground

forces were no longer necessary to maintain stability. Second,

what he described as "strategic considerations" had changed from

the late 1940s and early 1950s in relations between the United

States and the Soviet Union.16 Although he did not say so

explicitly, presumably the President was referring to the

improvement in relations with both the Soviets and Chinese and

the concomitant deteriorating relationship between the two

communist giants. According to this view, these changing

"strategic considerations" reduced the possibility of a

repetition of the North Korean invasion of June 1950 in that

neither the Soviet Union nor People's Republic of China would

want to jeopardize the improving relations with the United States

by supporting a North Korean attack. This line of rationale was

exactly what the South Koreans feared: events outside the

country, and over which they had little control, were directly

affecting the ROK's defense. Third, South Korea was developing a

strong economy and was fast approaching the time when it could

provide for its own defense.17

There were other reasons for Carter's decision. The new

President desired additional flexibility in determining how or if

the United States should respond to an attack against South

Korea. If American forces remained deployed along the major

invasion routes, his choices were limited because Americans would

be killed in the first moments of the attack. It would be very

difficult for any president not to respond with military

escalation if such deaths occurred. Also, Carter had campaigned

to cut the defense budget; reducing military forces overseas was

a means to achieve this promise. Finally, the President stressed

the adherence to basic human rights as a major standard to

influence U.S. relations with other countries. He found many of

the policies and practices of the Park regime to be offensive,

and he decided that he wanted to distance himself and the United
6

States from Park.18

The Korean response to this withdrawal plan was predictable.

 Even opposition political leaders supported the retention of

U.S. forces. Park indicated strongly that the United States

would have to make major contributions to the South Korean

military force improvement program so that his military could

provide for the national defense as American forces withdrew. In

1977, the estimates were that Korean industry was providing

approximately 50 percent of the equipment used by the ROK's

military. This represented a significant improvement from the

early 1970s when Park began his major industrialization projects.

 In negotiations during the summer of 1977, the United States

agreed to provide nearly $1.5 billion during the course of the 5-

year force-improvement program, primarily through Foreign

Military Sales (FMS) credits.19 This assistance was a significant

contribution to the ROK's efforts to expand further its defense

industries. Nevertheless, Korean skepticism about the

credibility of the American commitment reached one of its highest

points since the end of the Korean war during these first years

of the Carter administration.

In actuality, the Carter withdrawal policy resulted in the

removal of less than one combat battalion. Again, significant

differences between the executive and legislative branches of

government were instrumental in this outcome as each sought to

define what American policy should be. It is interesting to

note that the roles were reversed from the earlier Nixon period

when congressional pressure was a significant force limiting

President Nixon's options in East Asia after the Vietnam

experience. The 1977 withdrawal plan was never popular with many

in the U.S. Congress and military. When the intelligence

community conducted an intelligence reassessment in 1978, the

remaining support was further diminished. Prior to this

reassessment, the Carter administration argued that while the

DPRK had some definite advantages, such as more combat aircraft

and superior naval forces, these advantages were not so

significant that Kim Il Sung could be confident of victory if he

launched an attack. Geographical features favored the South as

far as defensive positions were concerned, and the South Korean

Air Force had more modern aircraft. Also, the ROK military

experience in the Vietnam war had provided recent battlefield

training which the North Koreans did not have.20

The intelligence reassessment involved both the Central

Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency and

focused on the DPRK's military capabilities. In June 1979,

Congressman Les Aspin, a member of the House Select Committee on

Intelligence, announced the results of this reassessment.21 After

reviewing the new intelligence data, Aspin and others reached the

following conclusions: the North had achieved a numerical
7

superiority in ground forces to accompany its numerical

advantages in the air; the number of North Korean divisions had

increased from a projected 29 in 1977 to 37 in 1979; and the

number of tanks and armored personnel carriers had grown by 35

percent and 20 percent respectively.

While these quantitative changes were disconcerting to

Aspin, he found additional causes for concern in how Kim Il Sung

had deployed his forces. Previously, American military analysts

believed the DPRK was dedicated to a forward defense concept in

which forces would be deployed along the 38th parallel and

reinforced if necessary from rear areas. Such reinforcements

would require time and could be detected by various intelligence

means. However, the new data indicated that rather than a

forward defense deployment, North Korea more than likely had

developed a defense-in-depth posture. This new orientation could

allow Kim to launch an attack without the sizable reinforcements

required by forward defense planning. Therefore, the ROK and

United States would not have the luxury of the requisite time to

provide reinforcements as an attack became imminent. Since

Seoul, the South Korean capital, is less than 30 miles from the

38th parallel, this new capability sent shock waves throughout

the ROK and the bilateral security alliance.22

Confronted by increasing congressional opposition, concerns

of the U.S. military, and the public statements of the Park

government plus the new intelligence estimate, President Carter

reevaluated his troop withdrawal plan. To assist in this

reevaluation, he included Korea on his itinerary for an Asian

trip scheduled for the summer of 1979. In an exchange of toasts

with President Park, Carter emphasized the importance of the

U.S.-South Korean relationship and stressed that the American

military commitment to the ROK's security was "strong,

unshakable, and enduring."23 In the joint communique, the American

President was more specific about this commitment. He promised

"prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack" against

the South and assured President Park that "the United States

nuclear umbrella provided additional security for the area." 

Specifically relating to the withdrawal plan, Carter pledged that

"the United States will continue to maintain an American military

presence in the Republic of Korea to ensure peace and

stability."24

Although President Carter's statements were somewhat

nebulous and non-specific, the implication was that U.S. ground

forces would remain in South Korea. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant

Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, made this point

more explicitly in his testimony before the House Investigations

Subcommittee after the President returned from Korea. In

response to a question, Secretary Holbrooke stated that the

communiqué was "a clear statement that the United States will
8

continue to maintain an American military presence in the

Republic of Korea to insure peace and stability."25

Finally, in July 1979, President Carter announced that he

had decided to hold the withdrawal plan in abeyance.26 Although

Carter did not completely abandon his goal, he postponed further

implementation of the withdrawal plan until well after the 1980

presidential election. More important, he attached a condition

to any subsequent consideration of this issue: some indication

or sign that the DPRK was willing to help reduce tensions on the

Korean peninsula. Any future withdrawal decision would not be a

unilateral U.S. decision.

This comparison of the Nixon and Carter policies is

instructive. The Congress was the driving force in the Nixon

decision to withdraw the 7th Infantry Division from the ROK

because of congressional desires to reduce American commitments

abroad in the aftermath of the Vietnam experience. It also

wanted to reduce defense spending. During the Carter

administration, the Congress reversed its role. Rather than

supporting the President's initiative to remove the 2nd Infantry

Division, many in the legislature opposed this policy and worked

hard for its defeat. Les Aspin and others were concerned that

America's credibility as a reliable ally was at stake. The

collapse of friendly regimes in Indochina during 1975 was a

factor, but the U.S. policy to establish normal diplomatic

relations with the People's Republic of China was another. The

PRC demanded that the United States break diplomatic relations

with Taiwan and abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the

island before normalization could occur. The Carter

administration complied with these demands for good geostrategic

reasons, but U.S. credibility did suffer. The Congress acted to

retain the troop presence in Korea in part as a damage-control

measure.

The Reagan and Bush Efforts to Restore U.S. Credibility.

The Carter policies on the troop issue and human rights

violations in Korea contributed to a deterioration in the

bilateral relationship to one of its lowest levels since the end

of the Korean war. When Ronald Reagan became president, he made

it clear that he opposed any U.S. force reduction from Korea. In

his view, a withdrawal would impede progress in achieving

important American political and security interests. He was

particularly concerned that the abrogation of the U.S. security

treaty with Taiwan would adversely affect U.S. credibility in

East Asia. As a result, Chun Doo Hwan, who succeeded Park after

the latter's assassination in late 1979, was one of the first

foreign leaders to visit Reagan in February 1981. In a joint

communiqué, Reagan stated that the United States "had no plans to
9

withdraw U.S. ground forces from the Korean peninsula."27 The

American President reiterated this pledge on his trip to the ROK

in 1983 and during Chun's second visit to the United States in

1985.28 On many political issues, the Reagan administration

preferred to conduct what was described as "quiet diplomacy" to

influence other countries in contrast with Carter's more direct

approach, and this change of emphasis became apparent in the

warmer official relations between the United States and South

Korea.29

While the troop withdrawal issue remained muted during most

of the Reagan administration at least in part because of

executive-legislative agreement on policy choices, this issue

resurfaced during the presidency of George Bush. In June 1989,

three senators introduced legislation that would have reduced the

U.S. ground force presence by 10,000 soldiers over the next 3

years. They were frustrated by budgetary factors in the United

States and a changing threat perception in Northeast Asia as the

Cold War concluded. Pentagon studies in 1989 estimated the U.S.

costs of maintaining troops in South Korea at $2.6 billion per

year.30 Although this legislation never came to fruition, it did

identify two issues which continue to convince many Americans

that the U.S. forces should be further reduced or withdrawn

completely: economic factors in the United States, specifically

the need to reduce the budget deficit, and a more benign threat

environment after the Cold War.

Roh Tae Woo, who was elected president in December 1987,

challenged the basic premises of the three senators who

introduced this legislation. He argued that increasing North

Korean unpredictability required the continuation of the U.S.

presence if stability were to be continued. His foreign minister

stated that a reduction of American military forces should occur

only after the DPRK reduced its forward based forces just north

of the 38th parallel.31 Vice President Dan Quayle visited South

Korea in September 1989 and attempted to put the issue to rest,

at least temporarily. He indicated that the Bush administration

would oppose any legislative efforts to force a withdrawal.32

The important point here is that the debate in the United

States was focusing more on domestic economic factors and a

changing threat perception. It is only normal that these issues

should receive increased emphasis; however, from the Korean

perspective, the precedents set by Nixon and Carter once again

became concerns. While the South Koreans opposed both the

withdrawal plans in the early and late 1970s on their merits,

they also were highly offended that neither administration

consulted with them before announcing its policy decision. 

During Bush's visit to Seoul in January 1992, he made a pledge

similar to that given by his vice president in 1989. He pledged

that the United States would keep its military forces on the
10

Korean peninsula "as long as there is a need and we are

welcome."33

In 1990, the Department of Defense published a document

entitled A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: 

Looking Toward the 21st Century.34 This study attempted to

respond to the changing international environment after the end

of the Cold War and to take into account increasing economic

pressures in the United States to reduce the defense budget. In

so doing, its authors tried to define U.S. national objectives in

Asia and the force structures required to protect and foster

these objectives. Regarding the Korean peninsula, it described

the border between the two Koreas "as one of the world's

potential military flashpoints" and set forth three bilateral

security objectives. The first was to deter North Korean

aggression or defeat this aggression if deterrence failed. 

Second, to reduce political and military tensions on the

peninsula and to encourage the initiation of confidence-building

measures. Third, to begin the transition of U.S. forces in the

ROK from a leading to a supporting role.35

As part of this important transition, the Pentagon

envisioned a three-phased restructuring of American forces. In

the first phase, estimated to take between 1 and 3 years, the

United States pledged to reduce its forces by approximately 7,000

personnel—2,000 from the Air Force and 5,000 support troops from

the Army.36 In phase two, between 3 and 5 years, the United

States and South Korea would review the threat and consider

reducing the force structure of the 2d Infantry Division. In the

third phase, between 5 and 10 years, the two allies agreed to

consult with each other based on the progress made during the

first two phases. As the Koreans proceeded to take the lead role

in providing for their own defense, the rationale was that fewer

American military forces would be required.

The Pentagon study also addressed burden sharing, an

indication of the congressional concerns as evidenced by the

legislative initiative in June 1989 to bring 10,000 soldiers back

to the United States This study called for the ROK to assume

additional costs for the salaries of Korean workers on the U.S.

bases and to pay for the construction of new facilities.37

The proposed reduction in U.S. forces and demands for

increased Korean burden sharing were not new topics of

discussion. As in previous cases when the United States

announced proposed changes in its force structure, there was some

negative reaction in Seoul when the Pentagon proposals were

announced. Some officials questioned whether the timing was

right based on the leadership succession which was then underway

in the DPRK as Kim Il Sung continued his efforts to pass on

political control to his son, Kim Jong Il. Others argued that
11

the ROK already shared enough of the burden in supporting the

American military presence.38

Nonetheless, the Korean response to the Pentagon study and

subsequent events was much less vitriolic than was the case with

the Nixon and Carter reduction plans. Part of this change in

response is attributable to increased Korean confidence in its

capabilities, as well as an appreciation of the changes which had

occurred in the threat environment. Part was also influenced by

improved consultations between the two allies on national

security issues. As an example, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney

went to Seoul in November 1991 to participate in the annual

Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). The United States and South

Korea established the SCM in the early 1970s to coordinate

important security issues. At the November meeting after

discussions with his Korean counterpart, Secretary Cheney

announced that the United States would suspend its planned force

reductions, announced in the 1990 Pentagon study, "until the

dangers and uncertainties of the North Korean nuclear program

have been thoroughly addressed." Cheney's statement on

suspending further force reductions was important because the

U.S. Air Force had begun to remove its personnel and equipment

from three air bases. The two sides had agreed to redesignate

these facilities as collocated operating bases which meant that

the USAF would have access to these bases in a crisis, but there

would not be a peacetime American presence.39 Cheney and the

Koreans also reached an agreement on burden sharing through 1995.

 The ROK announced it would increase its support from

approximately $150 million in 1991 to $180 million in 1992. By

1995, they agreed to pay about $280 million.40 The most important

point was that the Secretary of Defense consulted with his

counterparts and responded to Korean concerns without the

acrimony associated with the Nixon and Carter initiatives.

The Clinton Administration, the Nuclear Weapons Issue,

and the U.S. Military Presence.

Domestic issues dominated the 1992 presidential election in

the United States, but Democratic candidate Bill Clinton did

address security concerns on the Korean peninsula on occasion. 

For example, he stated that he intended to retain an American

military presence in the ROK to deter North Korean aggression.41

After his election, President Clinton visited Korea in July 1993.

 While there, he addressed the ROK's National Assembly and

outlined his concept of a Pacific Community. One of the key

components of this concept was the continuation of the U.S.

military commitment in Asia. Concerning Korea, the President

unequivocally stated that peace on the peninsula "remains a vital

American interest," and that he would continue to station U.S.

forces in the ROK "as long as the Korean people want and need
12

them there."42 President Clinton has continued to pledge his firm

intention to retain this presence throughout his first term, 

most recently when President Kim Young Sun visited Washington in

July 1995. During this visit, Clinton restated his pledge that

U.S. troops would remain as long as South Korea desired and that

the alliance with South Korea was "stronger than ever."43

The retention of the military presence has been overshadowed

in recent years by American concerns over the North Korean

nuclear weapons program. While some differences remain between

the executive and legislative branches as to how the United

States should respond to this nuclear threat, the two branches

appear to have reached a general consensus on retaining U.S.

military forces in Korea for the foreseeable future. An

examination of the North Korean nuclear weapons program is beyond

the scope of this paper, but basic highlights are important to

support the above contention that the U.S. military presence is

likely to remain for several years.44

North Korea became a signatory to the Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) in 1985 but refused to sign the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards agreement even though

obligated to do so under the provisions of the NPT. Concerns over

the DPRK's refusal to allow IAEA inspections increased in 1989

when U.S. intelligence reports indicated the North Koreans were

building what appeared to be a nuclear reactor and possibly a

nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at the Yongbyon facility

approximately 60 miles north of Pyongyang.45 If the DPRK

developed the capability to extract plutonium, then it could

possibly build nuclear weapons, a prospect neither the ROK, the

United States, nor many other countries would welcome because of

probable increased regional instability and proliferation

pressures on other countries. North Korean officials have

consistently denied that they have any intentions to develop a

nuclear weapons capability, but these denials have not been

accepted in Seoul or Washington.46

Some progress appeared to be made in resolving this issue on

New Year's Eve 1991 when the two Koreas signed an agreement

entitled the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula. This agreement committed both countries not to

"test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or

use nuclear weapons."47 In January 1992, North Korea signed an

agreement with the IAEA that provided for international

inspections of its nuclear facilities. Between May 1992 and July

1993, the IAEA conducted seven ad hoc inspections of the DPRK's

facilities.48 IAEA inspectors began to suspect during these

inspections that North Korea had extracted more plutonium than

the few grams they admitted to extracting for research purposes.

 To resolve these discrepancies, the IAEA requested access to two

additional sites its inspectors believed were storage facilities
13

for nuclear waste. The DPRK denied these buildings were waste

sites but rather military warehouses, and, therefore, not subject

to IAEA inspections.49

In March 1993, the U.N. Security Council voted 13-0 to adopt

a resolution calling on the DPRK to allow IAEA inspectors access

to the two suspected nuclear waste sites. North Korea refused to

comply and shocked the international community on March 14 by

announcing its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation

Treaty. This was the first instance in the history of the NPT

where a signatory officially stated its plan to withdraw.50 By

late May 1993, the United States and North Korea had agreed to a

series of negotiations in the effort to resolve this dispute

before the North actually withdrew from the NPT, scheduled for

June 12. These negotiations in June and July 1993 were somewhat

successful in that North Korea agreed to "suspend" its withdrawal

from the NPT, but not in resolving the larger issue of the

possibility that North Korea had a nuclear weapons program

underway.51

Discussions continued between the United States and North

Korea at the United Nations for the next several months, but

without major success. Once again in May 1994, the North shocked

the international community when it announced that it had begun

to remove an estimated 8,000 spent fuel rods from one of its

reactors in Yongbyon without IAEA inspectors being present as

required by the NPT.52 In August, the United States and DPRK

resumed high-level discussions in another effort to resolve the

nuclear dispute. This time, more substantive arrangements were

achieved. In a statement released at the end of the

negotiations, the North Koreans agreed to replace their graphitemoderated reactors with light water reactors (LWRs). The latter

are preferred by the United States and others because they

produce less material which can be used to build nuclear weapons

than the graphite reactors. In return, the United States pledged

to help arrange for the acquisition of the LWRs and to assist in

finding alternative energy sources for the DPRK. North Korea

agreed to freeze the construction of additional reactors at

Yongbyon while the LWRs are under construction, to forego

reprocessing any more plutonium, and to seal what the IAEA

suspected of being a reprocessing plant. Finally, the DPRK again

stated it would remain in the NPT and allow the implementation of

IAEA safeguards.53

The bilateral negotiations resumed during October 1994 in

Geneva, and the two sides reached an agreement on October 21.54

This framework agreement basically called for a three-phased

resolution of North Korea's nuclear program. In the first phase,

which could take as long as 5 years, the DPRK pledged not to

refuel its 5MW reactor at Yongbyon and to stop building the two

larger reactors. The North Koreans also agreed to keep the 8,000
14

spent fuel rods in cooling ponds and to allow the IAEA to

inspect them. In return, the United States and its allies

indicated they would begin constructing two LWRs at a cost of

approximately $4 billion, most of which the ROK and Japan would

finance. While the LWRs are under construction, the United

States will provide 50,000 metric tons of heavy oil for heating

and electricity during the first year; this amount will increase

to 500,000 metric tons per year thereafter until the LWRs come

on-line. During the second phase, likely to begin in about 5

years, North Korea will allow IAEA inspections of the two

suspected nuclear waste sites which should clarify how much

plutonium the DPRK processed previously. The United States and

its allies will complete work on the first LWR and bring it online. In the final phase, which will take several more years,

the DPRK will dismantle all three of its graphite reactors as

well as other facilities associated with reprocessing spent fuel.

In return, the second LWR will be completed and brought on-line.55

The October 1994 framework agreement became controversial as

soon as it was signed with several critics arguing that the

United States had granted too many concessions without obtaining

immediate inspections of the two suspected waste sites.56 More

significantly for the purpose of this monograph, after the

November congressional elections, several influential Republicans

attacked this agreement. Senator Robert Dole, the new Majority

Leader, stated shortly after the agreement was signed that "it

was always possible to get an agreement when you give enough

away." Subsequently, Senator Frank Murkowski, the chairman of

the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia, criticized the agreement

because it did not provide for the initial inspections of the

suspected storage sites. Senator Larry Pressler has also been

critical, charging that this agreement established a bad

precedent for countries such as Iran which may in the future

prohibit IAEA inspections unless the United States and others

provide new power plants.57

Administration officials have responded to these criticisms

in defense of the framework agreement.58 The important point is

that congressional criticism now is focusing more on the nuclear

weapons issue on the Korean peninsula than on U.S. military

forces in the ROK. In fact, until the nuclear problem is finally

completely resolved, it is unlikely that the military presence

issue will be the subject of serious debate between the executive

and legislative branches because neither wants to send a signal

to North Korea which both Koreas could interpret as a diminution

of U.S. resolve.

One final problem associated with the nuclear issue deserves

attention. Both the United States and South Korea intended for

the ROK to provide the LWRs to the DPRK, but North Korea

expressed reluctance to have the ROK play this role for a variety
15

of obvious reasons. United States and North Korean negotiators

met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia during June 1995 to attempt to find

a resolution. In a statement released at the end of these

discussions, the two countries agreed that the LWRs should be an

"advanced version of U.S. origin, design and technology currently

under production." While this is somewhat ambiguous, South Korea

produces LWRs based on an American design, and the Korea Energy

Development Organization (KEDO), a joint entity established to

oversee the LWR project, will select the primary contractor which

will most likely be South Korea's Korea Electric Power

Corporation. KEDO is comprised primarily of American, South

Korean, and Japanese representatives; North Korea is not a

member.59 If there are further problems associated with the LWRs,

this would probably stiffen U.S. resolve to continue taking a

hard-line stance with North Korea.

The Clinton administration has continued the evolution of

U.S. policy on the military presence in East Asia, in general,

and the Republic of Korea, in specific, begun during the Bush

administration. In February 1995, the Department of Defense

published United States Security Strategy for the East AsianPacific Region which is a follow-on to the earlier 1990 Strategic

Framework Toward the 21st Century.60 This report identifies

continued political stability and economic growth and development

in East Asia as vital U.S. national security objectives. To

protect these vital interests, the United States must remain

engaged in the region politically, economically, and militarily.61

 This report is basically a practical example of the enlargement

strategy which the Clinton administration initiated in 1993.

In the military context, the United States intends to

maintain approximately 100,000 forces in East Asia. These

forward-deployed forces contribute to a flexible and rapid crises

response capability, discourage the possible emergence of a

regional hegemon, enhance U.S. capabilities to influence issues

in the region, reduce the time and distance problems for the

deployment of military units, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to

the security of friends and allies.62 Because of the conventional

and nuclear threats emanating from Pyongyang, the 2d Infantry

Division, its support units, and a USAF combat air wing will

remain in the ROK for the foreseeable future. The modest

drawdown planned in 1990 has been "permanently halted," and major

modernization programs are planned for the units remaining, as

well as substantial prepositioning of additional equipment. 

Deterring future North Korean aggression continues as the highest

priority by "making it unmistakably clear that the United States

would automatically and immediately be involved in any such

conflict."63

However, the Pentagon report does commit the United States

to continuing the process begun earlier of shifting the primary
16

responsibility for the ROK's defense to its ally. To this end,

the combined ground component commander is now a South Korean

four-star general rather than an American, and the transfer of

peacetime operational control of ROK forces to South Korea took

place in December 1994. The ROK also agreed to increase its

economic support for U.S. forces to $300 million in FY 1995 and

to continue to provide rent-free bases. This represents a $20

million increase from the previous agreement on burden sharing.64

In comparison with earlier periods during the Nixon, Carter,

and Bush administrations, the Congress has not criticized the

1995 troop proposal. This can be explained in part because most

congressmen seemed to accept that the U.S. military presence

should remain in South Korea particularly as long as the DPRK's

conventional and nuclear threats remain as serious as they are at

present. This situation is exacerbated to a certain extent

because the succession process from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il in

North Korea remains incomplete. A final factor is that both the

executive and legislative branches are aware that North Korea has

made substantial efforts to drive a wedge between the United

States and ROK. These efforts are apparent in the bilateral

negotiations between North Korea and the United States addressing

the nuclear weapons issue, a process in which the South Koreans

have not been directly involved. Another example is the DPRK's

attempt to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement with a peace

treaty, again excluding South Korea from this process.

The Clinton administration is certainly cognizant of these

North Korean initiatives and their ulterior motives. Its

diplomats have worked hard to ensure that its South Korean ally

is not marginalized in these negotiations. Both branches of

government seem to recognize that the U.S. military presence

should remain in South Korea to protect U.S. vital national

security interests in a period of uncertainty on the Korean

peninsula. While disputes over the administration's

counterproliferation policy continue, the troop issue is not part

of the current debate.65 Whether this support and cooperation

will continue as the United States tries to implement its postCold War strategy in East Asia remains to be seen, particularly

if isolationist sentiment increases in the Congress in the next

few years and partisan politics become even more

counterproductive. The invitation to struggle between the

executive and legislative branches continues to be a political

reality. Nonetheless, in the mid 1990s, there appears to be

greater agreement on the importance of the American military

forces deployed in support of the ROK than in several years.

ENDNOTES

1. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to

Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy. See
17

Chapters 1 and 2 in particular.

2. Treaties and Other International Agreements Series,

3097, vol. 5, part 3, 1954, pp. 2368-76.

3. Ibid., p. 2375.

4. Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Republic of

Korea: Background for Policy, p. 139.

5. Department of State Bulletin 61, no. 1574, August 25,

1969, p. 143.

6. For a copy of the Nixon Doctrine, see "U.S. Foreign

Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy of Peace," a Report to the

Congress by Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970.

7. The joint communique, dated August 22, 1969, is found in

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United

States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Republic of

Korea, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 2d sess., part 6,

February 24-26, 1970, p. 1725.

8. Buss, United States and the Republic of Korea: 

Background for Policy, pp. 143-44.

9. Eun Mee Kim, "Socioeconomic Development in South Korea",

In Depth, vol. 4, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 13-14.

10. The joint communique, dated 22 November 1974, is found

in Department of State Bulletin 81, no. 1852, December 23, 1974,

pp. 877-78.

11. Ford's Pacific Doctrine can be found in the Department

of State Bulletin 72, no. 1905, December 29, 1975, pp. 913-16. 

The specific reference to Korea is on p. 915.

12. Kissinger's speech, delivered in Seattle on July 22,

1976, is found in Department of State Bulletin 75, no. 1938, pp.

217-26. Specific references to Korea are found on pp. 221 and

223.

13. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, a report by

Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn (hereafter the

Humphrey and Glenn Report), 95th Cong., 2d sess., January 9,

1978, p. 1.

14. Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977, book 1, p. 1018.
18

15. Humphrey and Glenn Report, p. 20.

16. Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977,

book 1, p. 1018.

17. Ibid., pp. 1018-19.

18. For a good discussion, see Franklin B. Weinstein and

Fuji Kamiya, eds., The Security of Korea, pp. 81-84. See also

Frank Gibney, "The Ripple Effect in Korea," Foreign Affairs, vol.

56, no. 1, October 1977, pp. 167-68.

19. Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), June 10,

1977, p. 10.

20. Humphrey and Glenn Report, pp. 27-8.

21. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Forces, The

Impact of Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal of U.S. Troops

from Korea: Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee,

96th Cong., 1st sess., June 21 and July 17, 1979, p. 3.

22. Ibid., p. 6.

23. Department of State Bulletin 79, no. 2029, August 1979,

p. 15.

24. Ibid. p. 16.

25. The Impact of Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal

of U.S. Troops from Korea: Hearings Before the Investigations

Subcommittee, p. 77.

26. Department of State Bulletin 79, no. 2030, September

1979, p. 37.

27. Joint Communique, February 2, 1981, Department of State

Bulletin 81, no. 2048, March 1981, p. 14. For additional

coverage of the Chun visit, see FEER, February 6-12, 1981, p. 18.

28. FEER, November 24, 1983 and FEER, May 16, 1995, pp. 46-

9. See also the International Herald Tribune (hereafter IHT),

April 29, 1985, p. 4.

29. New York Times (hereafter NYT), June 18, 1987, p. 10,

and June 19, 1987, p. 8.

30. Baltimore Sun, June 23, 1989, p. 2.

31. For Roh Tae Woo's comments, see NYT, June 29, 1989, p.
19

9. For Foreign Minister Choi Ho Joong, see the The Washington

Post, July 25, 1989, p. 18.

32. The Washington Post, September 21, 1989, p. 42.

33. IHT, January 6, 1992, p. 1.

34. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: 

Looking Toward the 21st Century, an undated Department of Defense

Publication. For press coverage on the release, see NYT,

February 1, 1990, p. 15.

35. Ibid., pp. 6 and 15.

36. Ibid., p. 16. The call for a 7,000 force reduction

brought this proposal into line with the 1989 Nunn-Warner

Resolution.

37. Ibid., p. 17.

38. NYT, February 15, 1990, p. 10 and The Washington Post,

February 16, 1990, p. 25.

39. IHT, November 22, 1991, p. 1 and FEER, December 5,

1991, p. 28. For details on the collocated operating bases, see

Korea and World Affairs, vol. 14, no. 1, Spring 1990, pp. 196-7.

40. IHT, September 28-29, 1991, p. 2.

41. IHT, November 5, 1992, p. 1.

42. NYT, July 11, 1993, p. 6.

43. Foreign Broadcast Information Service East Asia

(hereafter FBIS-EAS) Daily Report, July 28, 1995, p. 38.

44. For a detailed analysis of North Korea's nuclear

weapons program, see William E. Berry, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear

Program: The Clinton Administration's Response, USAF Academy,

CO: Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 3,

March 1995.

45. The Washington Post, July 29, 1989, p. 9, and NYT, October 25, 1989, p. 9.

46. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, "North Korea's Nuclear

Program," in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World Beyond the

Cold War, pp. 235-236.

47. For a copy of this agreement, see Young Whan Kihl, ed.,

Korea and the World Beyond the Cold War, Appendix C, pp. 347-348.
20

48. IHT, January 31, 1992, p. 4, and Kongdan Oh and Ralph

Hassig, "North Korea's Nuclear Program," pp. 237-238.

49. Ibid., pp. 238-239; and Larry Nitesch, "North Korea's

Nuclear Weapons Program," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research

Service, May 2, 1994, p. 2.

50. IHT, March 12, 1993, p. 6, and March 13-14, 1993, p. 1.

 Article X.1 of the NPT requires 90 days'notice before a

signatory country can withdraw from the NPT.

51. For a copy of the Joint Statement of the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America,

dated 11 June 1993, see The U.S.-Korea Review, vol II, no. 1,

July-August 1993, p. 6.

52. The Washington Post, May 15, 1994, p. 29. For North

Korea's justification for this action, see FBIS-EAS, May 16,

1994, pp. 8-10, and May 23, 1994, pp. 16-17.

53. FBIS-EAS, August 16, 1994, p. 32.

54. "Agreed Framework Between the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea and the United States of America," October 21,

1994, is found in FBIS-EAS, October 24, 1994, pp. 34-35. The

following specifics are taken from this document.

55. NYT, October 21, 1994, p. 4.

56. See William Safire in the NYT, October 25, 1994, p. 11,

and FEER, October 27, 1994, pp. 14-15, and November 3, 1994, p.

5.

57. NYT, November 24, 1994, p. 1, and December 2, 1994, p.

7.

58. See Robert Gallucci's comments in NYT, December 2,

1994, p. 7. Gallucci was the senior U.S. negotiator in the

framework discussions.

59. The joint statement is found in FBIS-EAS, June 13,

1995, p. 26-7. See also NYT, June 13, 1995, p. 4.

60. "United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific

Region," USDP/ISA/AP, The Pentagon, Washington DC, February 1995.

61. Ibid., pp. 7 and 9.

62. Ibid., p. 23.
21

63. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

64. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

65. There is a debate ongoing in the literature concerning

the 1995 Pentagon report. In support, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,

"The Case for Deep Engagement." In opposition are Chalmers

Johnson and E. B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy." 

Both are found in Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 4, July/August

1995, pp. 90-114.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. William E. Berry, Jr.

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler