THE U.S. ARMY AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Andrew Scobell

April 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-048-6

ii
FOREWORD

As the Bush administration reassesses U.S. foreign and

defense policies, few regions of the world loom as large as

the Asia-Pacific. This is an area where the United States

has key economic and security interests. In recent decades,

the Asia-Pacific has experienced rapid economic growth, a

wave of democratization, and the emergence of a web of

regional and subregional multilateral institutions. All these

developments have contributed to enhancing the peace and

prosperity of the region. Nevertheless, difficult challenges

and perilous threats to regional stability remain; these

necessitate the continued forward presence of U.S. forces in

the Asia-Pacific.

This monograph highlights the significant and ongoing

contribution of the U.S. Army in deterring war, executing

smaller-scale contingencies, and shaping the security

environment. The author advocates a robust, pro-active

Army presence for the foreseeable future. Such a presence

will ensure the promotion and protection of U.S. national

interests in the region.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANDREW SCOBELL joined the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) in August 1999 and is SSI’s expert on Asia. He taught

at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers

University, New Jersey. Since 1988 Dr. Scobell has

published articles in such journals as Armed Forces and

Society, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative

Politics, Journal of Political and Military Sociology,

Political Science Quarterly, and Problems of PostCommunism. Recent articles have focused on the Korean

War and the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. His most recent

SSI study, Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang

Zemin, was published in September 2000. Dr. Scobell holds

a B.A. in History from Whitman College, an M.A. in

International Studies from the University of Washington,

and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. 

iv
THE U.S. ARMY AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC

This monograph assesses U.S. interests in the

Asia-Pacific region and the principal threats to those

interests for the next 25 years. It analyzes the role of the

U.S. military, the Army in particular, in promoting those

interests. Lastly, it makes recommendations for future U.S.

strategy with a particular focus on the use of military power

to achieve desired outcomes. In this monograph, the

Asia-Pacific Region refers to the area of the globe that

stretches from Hawaii to Pakistan and from the Aleutian

Islands to Australia.

U.S. INTERESTS

The United States has a number of vital interests in the

Asia-Pacific Region. These include preventing the

domination of the region by an unfriendly power and

assuring U.S. political and economic access and influence.

But perhaps the most pressing and tangible vital interest is

to ensure the continued peace and prosperity of the region.

This is often abbreviated to a single word—“stability.”

Peace cannot simply be said to be the absence of war; rather

than a residual category, peace should be defined in robust

and positive terms, not merely as a fleeting or temporary

state. “Enduring peace” can be defined as the presence of

thriving regional and subregional cooperation mechanisms

in the arenas of politics, economics, security, and

environment. The key contributors to enduring peace are

political, economic, and cooperative security arrangements.

Prosperity can be defined in terms of adaptive and

accountable domestic political institutions, vibrant

economies and commercial relations, professional and

civilian controlled militaries, and pollution-free high

quality of life in urban and rural living and working

environments. The key dimensions of prosperity are

responsive governments and dynamic economies. In short,

1
without durable and effective cooperative mechanisms,

democratic regimes, and thriving market economies, peace

and prosperity (or “stability”) will be beyond reach in the

Asia-Pacific Region.

1

Where the Army Fits In.

A fundamental contention of this study is that a U.S.

military forward presence, in some form or another, is

essential for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. While

the precise positioning, size, and mix of forces will depend on

specific threats and conditions, it is vital that such a forward

presence include a significant land power component. In a

region as vast and ocean-covered as the Asia-Pacific, naval

and air forces are extremely important. Nevertheless, the

Army is the ultimate symbol of a rock-solid U.S.

commitment to the enduring peace and prosperity of the

region. The Army is the core service in the labor-intensive

business of peacetime engagement.

2

 Moreover, when

hostilities break out and the commitment of U.S. forces is

required, the Army forms the nucleus of any mission force.

Finally, only the Army, the sole service that can occupy

land, can guarantee a decisive strategic (i.e. political)

outcome and an effective transition to a desired end state

(e.g. East Timor).

Key Threats and Challenges to the Stability of the

Asia-Pacific.

Over the next 25 years, the stability of the Asia-Pacific is

likely to be challenged by complex threats from four key

geographic hot spots; the United States will be faced with

four fundamental challenges. The four threats emanate

from Korea, the Taiwan Strait, South and Central Asia, and

Southeast Asia. If current trends continue, the threat posed

on the Korean peninsula will decline considerably over

time. Meanwhile, the threat in the Taiwan Strait is likely to

endure and fluctuate in its level of severity over the next two

decades. South and Central Asia and Southeast Asia,

2
meanwhile, are emerging as subregions of chronic

instability and are increasingly likely to cause complex and

multidimensional threats to the stability of the entire

Asia-Pacific region. The four fundamental challenges likely

to confront the United States during the first quarter of the

21st century are: maintaining a forward presence; deterring

a conflict in the Taiwan Strait; shaping what I call “powder

keg” states; and, managing relations with allies and friends

in the region. These threats and challenges are addressed

below.

KEY FLASHPOINTS

Korea.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula no longer appear to be

the principal threat to peace and prosperity in the

Asia-Pacific, and these tensions are likely to dissipate even

further.

3

 The recent rapprochement between Seoul and

Pyongyang and the ongoing thaw in U.S.-North Korea

relations come as a jolt to a national security apparatus that

has spent half a century with the peninsula as a critical

flashpoint. The speed of these dramatic developments

makes it difficult for the defense community to comprehend

and assess their impact. Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific

Command Admiral Dennis C. Blair appropriately called

them “breathtaking.”

4

 The past year alone has seen the

June summit between President Kim Dae Jung of South

Korea and Chairman Kim Jong Il of North Korea, the visit

to Washington of Vice Chairman Jo Myong Rok and the

reciprocal visit of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to

Pyongyang (both in October 2000). Few analysts would have

predicted these events even a few years ago, and certainly

none of them would have anticipated these might all take

place within a single 5-month time span! The implications of

these fast-paced changes are far-reaching for the U.S.

military and the Army in particular. Although momentum

(and enthusiasm) appears to have slowed as of March 2001,

3
it is difficult to tell whether this is merely a temporary lull or

a sustained slowdown.

5

Certainly, unification on the peninsula is not a foregone

conclusion.

6

 Unification would mean some form of political

union between North and South Korea. Reconciliation—a

necessary prerequisite for unification—is far more likely

than unification, at least in the short-to-medium term.

Reconciliation would entail a peace agreement, a

framework for regular trade, travel, and communication

between North and South, and an ongoing dialogue aimed

at some sort of eventual confederation or unification.

7

Reconciliation is also a long, drawn-out, and graduated

process.

Pyongyang’s record of brutal and violent deeds and the

nature of the Kim dynasty dictatorship itself provide

powerful reasons to be skeptical about the regime’s

commitment to reform.

8

 Moreover, the experience of the

peace settlements in other strife torn areas of the world

cautions that the process can be difficult, protracted, and

littered with obstacles. Hence the United States must

remain vigilant and continue to work hand-in-glove with

our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, to ensure we are

prepared for any eventuality. At the same time the

experience of other divided nations such as Vietnam and

Germany demonstrate that unification can come rapidly

and suddenly via either peaceful or violent means.

While it is still too early to say when and how Korean

unification might occur, it is prudent to proceed on the

assumption that reconciliation is possible within a decade

and unification is possible at some point within the next 25

years. In short, as the Perry Commission concluded in

October 1999, the “status quo” does not appear to be

“sustainable.”

9

 The leaders of both North and South Korea

desire reconciliation. However, leaders in Seoul and

Pyongyang, while in general accord on the concept of

unification, seem to believe that the process should move

forward gradually. Both sides, each for its own reasons,

4
want to see the continued existence of the two separate

Korean regimes and steady progress toward some kind of

confederation. Seoul is concerned about shouldering the

staggering cost it would likely have to bear in order to

realize unification, while Pyongyang is concerned that the

process of unification may threaten regime survival.

10

Although President Kim of South Korea has expressed a

desire to maintain a U.S. military presence on the Korean

Peninsula, even after unification, and Chairman Kim of

North Korea reportedly has indicated the same desire, this

does not represent any firm commitment by either

government.

11

 On the other hand, it reflects their distrust of

other foreign powers and can be a point of great U.S.

leverage.

12

 There are three factors that caution against an

assumption that U.S. forces will remain on the peninsula for

the next quarter century.

Popular Opinion. Public opinion has emerged as a key

determinant of policy in South Korea, is likely to emerge as

such in the United States, and perhaps will eventually

emerge in North Korea. This is most evident in South Korea

as popular opposition to U.S. military presence has been

vocal, strident, and sometimes violent. In part, this is an

expression of outrage over threats to quality of life, and, in

part, it represents an expression of forthright Korean

nationalism, xenophobia, and indeed virulent antiAmericanism. Concerns over quality-of-life issues are

specific to each locale—noise, air or water pollution

attributed to particular U.S. bases and misbehavior by U.S.

service personnel. These issues are reinforced by assertive

Korean nationalism and anger at what is perceived as an

overbearing U.S. presence.

13

 The recent controversy over

the wartime killings of Korean civilians at No Gun Ri has

underscored this feeling. Increasingly, South Koreans are

questioning the need to have tens of thousands of U.S.

troops stationed there when the threat from the North

appears to have decreased dramatically.

14

5
While expressions of anti-Americanism and popular

support for a reduction or even an end to the U.S. military

presence will probably fluctuate, if the North-South

rapprochement continues unabated this groundswell is only

likely to increase in intensity over time. To date, North

Korean public opinion has not been a factor. However, it will

probably emerge as a factor at some point if the iron grip of

the Pyongyang regime loosens and society becomes more

assertive. Public opinion in the north may very well mirror

feelings in the south.

And one should not overlook public opinion in the United

States. If tensions on the peninsula continue to decline

and/or anti-American sentiment in Korea rises, there is

likely to be growing sentiment to “bring the boys home.”

15

These feelings may be influenced by calls from prominent

members of Congress that changing circumstances on the

peninsula merit the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea.

New Circumstances, New Leaders. While President

Kim of South Korea and Chairman Kim of North Korea

seem to be in favor of continued U.S. troop presence, these

positions may change as conditions and public opinion

change.

16

 Furthermore, North Korea has floated an offer to

end its missile program if another country would agree to

launch Pyongyang’s satellites. The precise offer remains

unclear, as does the seriousness of the proposal itself, even

after Secretary Albright’s October 2000 visit.

17

Moreover, there is no guarantee that political successors

in Seoul or Pyongyang will be of like minds.

18

 President

Kim’s term expires in early 2003 and Article 70 of the

Republic of Korea Constitution bars him from seeking a

second term. The tenure of his counterpart in Pyongyang is

likely to be longer, but unification may not take place before

59-year-old Kim Jong Il has passed from the political scene.

While some kind of political ouster—or even regime

implosion—is possible, a leadership transition to the

post-Kim Jong Il era is unlikely to come until his death or

6
incapacitation. The views of a new generation of Korean

political leaders are difficult to predict.

Furthemore, one cannot ignore the potential for policy

changes by successive U.S. administrations and/or

developments in the region. A future U.S. president could

very possibly decide that the time had come to withdraw

American forces from Korea, especially if he is under

domestic pressure to do so.

Challenges To Negotiating a Future Defense Pact.

Even assuming that the governments of North and South

Korea and the United States agree on the desirability of a

continued U.S. military presence on the peninsula, they

may find it difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to reach

common agreement on the shape, size, location, and details

of such a presence. This is possible, judging by the climate of

the protracted Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

negotiations in late 2000.

19

 However, the fact that a SOFA

agreement was reached in late December 2000 and signed

by Washington and Seoul in mid-January holds the promise

that future defense agreements can be attained. In the new

SOFA accord, the United States agreed to give Korea

jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel charged with

crimes in Korea and accept new regulations concerning

environmental pollution originating from U.S. military

bases.

20

Taiwan Strait.

In the opening decade of the 21st century, tensions in the

Taiwan Strait appear to be the principal threat to peace and

prosperity in the Asia-Pacific for the foreseeable future.

Some analysts now view it as the “most dangerous”

flashpoint in Northeast Asia.

21

 The threat in the Taiwan

Strait is likely to remain a feature of the strategic landscape

of the Asia-Pacific in the coming decades and is likely to

absorb more and more attention from the Department of

Defense. Reconciliation between Beijing and Taipei is

certain to be very difficult to attain and unification is

7
probably unachievable within the foreseeable future. Three

factors point to the likelihood of continued tensions in the

Taiwan Strait and the persistent specter of armed conflict

looming.

A Frustrated Beijing. China, especially its armed

forces, has become more frustrated over the lack of tangible

progress toward unification with Taiwan.

22

 Unification

with Taiwan has been a core national security objective of

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for half a century.

More than two decades of the moderate and pragmatic “one

country, two systems” policy formulated by the late Deng

Xiaoping have yet to bear fruit in the case of Taiwan. This is

made all the more frustrating by the successful returns of

the former British colony of Hong Kong in mid-1997 and

former Portuguese enclave of Macao in late 1999.

Expectations were also heightened by the dramatic

rapprochement of the late 1980s and early 1990s when

cross-strait trade and investment developed and travel for

family reunions, business, and tourism expanded virtually

overnight.

23

 Most noteworthy was the significant

diplomatic groundwork: the establishment of quasi-official

organizations in Beijing and Taipei to manage bilateral

relations. The high point was the summit held in 1993 in

Singapore between the chiefs of these two organizations.

The goodwill and progress evaporated in mid-1995 when

Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui was granted a visa to visit

the United States. Lee’s rhetoric during the visit, combined

with other initiatives launched by Taipei, led Chinese

leaders to conclude that Taiwan was embarked down a path

toward independence. China’s missile tests off the Taiwan

coast and exercises in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait

during late 1995 and early 1996 were calibrated to make

Taiwan rethink the advisability of such a course.

24

For several years China’s saber rattling appeared to

have had its intended effect: Taiwan cooled is rhetoric and

actions. But in mid-1999 Taiwan’s President Lee suggested

8
that relations between China and Taiwan should be

considered “state-to-state.”

This triggered a further round of vitriolic rhetoric and

threats from China, culminating in the Taiwan White Paper

of February 2000.

25

 This official document added a third

justification for the use of force against Taiwan: lack of

progress on negotiations directed at unification. Further

warnings in the lead up to Taiwan’s presidential elections of

March 2000 admonished the island’s electorate not to vote

for long time pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-bian.

The attempt at intimidation seemed to backfire when Chen

won the election. Tensions cooled following Chen’s victory

and his inauguration, and China adopted a “wait and see”

policy.

26

However, tensions could flare up again at any time. As of

October 2000, the PRC officially characterized the situation

in the Taiwan Strait as “complicated and grim.”

27

 It is

important to note that the PRC government has never

renounced the use of force to achieve unification with

Taiwan (or to prevent the island from attaining

independence). Moreover the Taiwan Strait is the PLA’s

central warfighting scenario, and the Chinese military

believes it has been entrusted with the sacred mission of

unifying Taiwan with the Chinese mainland.

28

While political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait

have a great interest in avoiding a military conflict, this

does not ensure hostilities will be averted. Conflict could

occur through miscalculation or result from a deliberate

decision by China’s leaders or Taiwan’s leaders. Significant

potential exists for miscalculation or misperception in the

kind of coercive diplomacy that China is in the habit of

pursuing.

29

 In some future round of saber rattling, a missile

launched simply to intimidate Taiwan could veer off its

anticipated course and cause unintended death and

destruction. Or a massive military exercise in the Taiwan

Strait could be misinterpreted by Taipei as preparations for

an imminent attack. A deliberate decision by Beijing to

9
launch a military operation against Taiwan also cannot be

ruled out. The issue of unification with Taiwan is sensitive,

emotional, and, most importantly, a core element of the

Chinese Communist Party’s political legitimacy. As such,

many of China’s elites appear to believe that the party-state

might not be able to survive the righteous indignation of the

masses should the regime not fight to keep Taiwan. Under

certain circumstances the PLA might be ordered to launch

an operation against Taiwan even if it was thought to have

little or no chance of success.

30

 The bottom line is that

political expediency—not military feasibility—is the

paramount determinant of whether or not China uses

armed force.

31

An Increasingly Assertive Taiwan. China has

detected that Taiwanese politicians have become

increasingly assertive and outspoken on a host of issues,

particularly the nature of Taiwan’s relations with China

and the island’s international status. This was true of Lee

Teng-hui who was president of Taiwan from January 1988

until May 2000, and it is also true of the man who succeeded

him, President Chen Shui-bian. Many Chinese leaders

consider Taiwan’s current president as a devious and

double-dealing individual who remains committed to

pursuing independence for Taiwan.

32

 The fact is that the

island’s inhabitants aspire to be citizens of a political entity

that is recognized and accepted as a member of the

community of democratic states. At the same time the vast

majority of Taiwanese recognize that their options are

limited by China’s opposition to the island gaining greater

international recognition and understand that they must be

constantly alert to Beijing’s sensitivities. Taipei must be

careful not to do anything that would constitute a

“declaration of independence” in Beijing’s eyes. The real

challenge for Taiwan may be avoiding actions that could be

construed as stalling on negotiations aimed at achieving

unification. This may be especially difficult in the current

political environment with a divided government in Taipei

embroiled in controversy. President Chen’s political party

10
does not control the legislature, and relations between the

major parties were strained to the breaking point by Chen’s

sudden decision in late 2000 to halt construction of a nuclear

power plant.

33

At this writing, cross-strait relations are enjoying a

period of temporary calm, but there are signs that bode ill

for the future.

34

 At the very least Taiwanese political

leaders will periodically say and do things that will raise the

ire of Beijing, such as happened in 1995 and 1999.

Inevitably these episodes will trigger blasts of

condemnatory rhetoric and saber rattling from the PRC.

The United States cannot be certain when a crisis might

erupt into an actual military conflict.

An Entangled United States. The United States is

deeply involved in the Taiwan Strait standoff whether it

wants to be or not. Since 1950, when President Harry S.

Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to interpose itself in the

Taiwan Strait, Beijing has identified Washington as

Taipei’s protector. This was reinforced during the 1995-96

Taiwan Strait Crisis when the U.S.S. Independence and

U.S.S. Nimitz were dispatched to the vicinity of Taiwan.

Moreover, the United States continues to sell weaponry to

the island. China has been particularly angered by U.S.

readiness to provide Theater Missile Defense (TMD) to

Taiwan and by Congressional efforts to pass the Taiwan

Security Enhancement Act (TSEA). The issue of TMD is

especially incendiary with some Chinese researchers

insisting that provision of TMD by the United States would

constitute justification for China to attack Taiwan.

35

Most Chinese leaders assume that in any conflict with

Taiwan, there will be some military response by the United

States. Bravado aside, most Chinese military strategists

take the matter very seriously.

36

 PLA war planning appears

to be focused on either (1) a sudden whirlwind military

operation to subdue Taiwan so rapidly as to present the

United States with a fait accompli, or (2) a more gradual and

carefully calibrated operation against selected key military,

11
political, or infrastructural targets that would cause

maximum psychological damage but minimal casualties. In

the first scenario, PLA planners believe that the United

States would have no time to marshal forces to defend

Taiwan and almost certainly be forced to accept the

situation. In the second scenario, Beijing would do its best

not to cross the threshold that would trigger U.S. military

intervention.

37

 In either case, in the context of deterring

U.S. military support for Taiwan, Chinese military

modernization focuses on operations against Taiwan and

the United States. An outright invasion scenario with

amphibious landings is highly unlikely but cannot be ruled

out.

38

Whether or not China and Taiwan come to blows, the

Taiwan Strait flashpoint is unlikely to disappear any time

soon.

39

 In fact, it is very possible that this hot spot will heat

up during the next 25 years. Senior Chinese leaders may

have set themselves a deadline for achieving unification

with Taiwan. Officially Beijing has deliberately avoided

setting any deadline. Nevertheless, the high level of

frustration over the lack of progress on unification with

Taiwan, the concurrent belief that time is not on China’s

side, and the formal warning (in the Taiwan White Paper of

February 2000) that Beijing will not tolerate indefinite

procrastination by Taiwan in cross-strait negotiations

suggest that some internal timetable for the attainment of

unification has been formulated. It appears that a timetable

has been set for the first or second decade of the 21st

century.

40

 However, a deadline—if one has been set—is not

necessarily cause for alarm. Because it has not been

formally announced, Beijing will not feel pressured to abide

by the deadline and can readily push back or adjust it.

Nevertheless, the existence of such a timetable still can

exert psychological pressure on Chinese leaders and/or

become a point of controversy in elite politics.

12
South and Central Asia.

Much attention has focused on the Asian subcontinent

since the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in the spring of

1998. There has also been considerable attention given to

the upheaval in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir,

the protracted civil war in neighboring Afghanistan, and

the international terrorist threat highlighted by the alleged

activities of Osama Bin Laden who is based in Afghanistan.

However, the threats posed are not limited to South

Asia, and there are valid reasons to view South Asia and

Central Asia as forming a near organic and seamless whole.

In a real sense an arc of instability stretches from the Jaffna

Peninsula in Sri Lanka to the steppes of Central Asia.

Ethnic conflict and ethno-secessionist movements exist in

and threaten the stability of virtually all the countries in the

region. The pivotal state in South and Central Asia is

Pakistan and the “geopolitical fault line” lies on the

Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

41

 Pakistan is in dire straits

economically, and most of its inhabitants live in abject

poverty, including as many as two million Afghan

refugees.

42

 The misery and political turmoil are breeding

grounds for extremist groups, particularly Islamic radicals,

and provide substantial pools of willing and highly

motivated young recruits to wage holy war or Jihad against

their perceived enemies. First, this messianic movement

was focused on Afghanistan itself; increasingly it is

concentrating on nearby countries, especially Indiancontrolled Kashmir and the Central Asian states. The

Taliban and other radical Islamic armed groups have

tended to have close ties with Pakistan’s Inter-Service

Intelligence (ISI). In the past, ISI has provided funding,

weapons, and other assistance to these groups.

43

The prime threats to the stability of Central and South

Asia are major theater war, weapons of mass destruction,

terrorism, and persistent ethnic conflict.

13
Threat of Major Theater War. At present the most

likely scenario is a war between India and Pakistan over

Kashmir. The historical record is sobering: to date, the two

countries have fought serial conflicts. There have been

three major wars, in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and most

recently a smaller war in the remote Kargil region in 1999

and the threat of war in multiple other crises.

44

 Three of

these conflicts have been fought over the status of Kashmir.

Given the level of distrust and animosity between

Islamabad and New Delhi and roller coaster experience of

bilateral relations in the past several years, the situation

must be considered highly volatile.

Moreover, if Pakistan appeared to be disintegrating

and/or exploded into civil war, India would be tempted to

intervene.

45

 Such a chain of events could dramatically

escalate the conflict. There is also the potential for a conflict

between India and China, although this is far less likely

than another Indo-Pakistani war.

46

Weapons of Mass Destruction. The threat of WMD

must also be taken very seriously, particularly a nuclear

war between India and Pakistan.

47

 This is what former

President Bill Clinton had in mind when he called the

subcontinent “the most dangerous place on earth.” In both

India and Pakistan, the command and control mechanisms

are unclear at best. This increases the potential for

mistakes.

48

 But the greatest cause for alarm is the political

instability in Pakistan. This point is underscored by the fact

that Pakistan is the only nuclear power to have experienced

a successful military coup (in October 1999) resulting in a

military takeover.

49

 While arguably the current military

regime provides more stability for Pakistan than did its

civilian predecessor, the domestic political scene is far from

settled.

50

 Without a doubt, the military is the most

important national institution in the country. If the military

were to fragment, so, too, would the country. If nuclear

devices or materials were to fall into the hands of

extremists, the outcome could be catastrophic.

14
Terrorism. The threat of terrorism from extremists

based and/or trained in, and/or sponsored by, Central and

South Asia is all too evident.

51

 The 1993 World Trade Center

bombing, the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya

and Tanzania, and the regular attacks on, and kidnappings

of, Westerners and other foreigners around the world

highlight the magnitude of the threat. Afghanistan-based

Osama Bin Laden has been conclusively linked to the

embassy bombings.

52

 Recently there has been a spate of

kidnappings in the southern Philippines and Malaysia

committed by Abu Sayyef, a group with strong ties to

Afghani extremists.

53

 A group with links to Bin Laden

appears to have perpetrated the bomb attack on the U.S.S.

Cole in October 2000.

54

The Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Ethnic conflict in

Central and South Asia appears to be intensifying and

spreading. Today, foreign forces reportedly make up a

significant portion of the Taliban forces fighting in

Afghanistan.

55

 These forces are readily being infiltrated

into neighboring countries to support radicals seeking

secession or the overthrow of the current regimes.

56

While it is possible that radical Islamic regimes can

bring stability to a country (arguably this is the case in

Iran), it is very likely that the victorious movement will

prove incapable of effective governance and/or wartime

coalitions will disintegrate. Whatever the fate of such

movements, continued ethnic feuding is likely since these

movements tend to be comprised of certain ethnic groups

while others are excluded. The excluded will inevitably be

discriminated against or oppressed perpetuating conflict.

Even a country like Pakistan with a well-trained and

relatively cohesive military finds the amalgam of diverse

tribal and ethnic groups difficult to manage.

57

The ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka receives much less

publicity than the ethnic cauldrons further north, but

merits attention, too. No end appears in sight for this brutal

war between the majority Sinhalese population and Tamil

15
minority.

58

 The conflict has a significant terrorist

dimension.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam—the main rebel

organization—is classified as a terrorist group by the U.S.

Government. The Liberation Tigers have international

tentacles that have so far focused on fundraising rather

than engaging in terrorism.

59

 Although U.S. citizens and

property have yet to be singled out as targets, Americans

have been the unintended victims of at least one attack, an

October 2000 terrorist bombing in Columbo aimed at Sri

Lankan political leaders.

60

The outcome of the threats of MTW, WMD, terrorism,

and ethnic conflict is chronic turmoil in an arc of instability

running across South and Central Asia.

Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia is a subregion that is very likely to

require more attention from the United States in the next 25

years. Despite experiencing dynamic economic growth,

unprecedented prosperity, and significant democratization,

Southeast Asia remains “at risk.”

61

 While there are

significant territorial disputes among Southeast Asian

neighbors, the underlying causes of the instability are not

inter-state tensions but intra-state and transnational

threats. Certainly the simmering disputes over islands,

reefs, and territorial waters in the South China Sea—

including claims by China to virtually the entire area—are

significant, but they are unlikely to erupt into a major

conflict. For the foreseeable future, none of the disputants,

including China, has the capability to seize outright direct

control of the area through military force.

62

Moreover, there is generally a basic level of trust and

understanding fostered through entities such as the

ten-member Association for Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) and the related ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

that includes an even larger membership, including the

16
United States and most recently North Korea, which joined

in July 2000. While ASEAN and the ARF have proved to be a

disappointment to many observers, they have endured and

provide useful mechanisms to ensure a basic level of

dialogue.

63

Of greater concern are the threats emanating from

within states, such as ethnic and religious conflicts and

terrorism, as well as the contagions of disease, narcotics,

and environmental pollution that have spread throughout

the subregion without regard to national borders. These

nontraditional security threats pose the greatest danger to

the subregion. The severity of these trends varies from

country to country.

In Thailand, for example, the major security threat

comes from narcotics and AIDS.

64

 Meanwhile, in the

Philippines and Indonesia it is political turmoil, ethnic

conflict, and terrorism. While the Philippines will probably

weather the current storm surrounding the impeachment of

President Joseph Estrada and his handover of power to the

Vice President, it continues to be tormented by

ethno-secessionist movements in the south. Militant

Islamic groups are behind these threats.

65

 Recent activities

have centered on the kidnapping of foreigners, including an

American citizen, by the Abu Sayyef group on the island of

Jolo. The objective seems to be ransoms to raise money for

the groups.

In Indonesia, secessionism seems endemic with regions

throughout the archipelago seeking independence. The

ethno-secessionist groups are undoubtedly encouraged by

the example of East Timor. Also significant is terrorism,

much of it religiously or ethnically motivated. While much

attention has been focused on the violence perpetrated by

the pro-Indonesia militias in East Timor and the reign of

terror in refugee camps in West Timor, there has been much

violence inflicted on ethnic Chinese and Christian

minorities in recent years.

66

 Most recently some terrorism

has been aimed at Americans—threats against the U.S.

17
Embassy and other American targets.

67

 In addition to the

potential for chronic instability, there is the possibility of

terrorism expanding to neighboring countries and beyond.

Indeed, terrorism has already crossed borders with

kidnappings taking place in Malaysia, and the victims being

transported to the Philippines.

Furthermore, cyber terrorism put Southeast Asia on the

map in 2000. The so-called “Love Bug” virus, which caused

an estimated U.S.$10 billion worth of damage to computer

systems around the world and included attacks on the

Pentagon, originated in the Philippines. The suspected

perpetrator has not been brought to justice by the Manila

authorities because the individual was not found to have

violated any Philippine law.

68

Another serious problem in the region is sea piracy.

While many of the pirates seem to be small local groups who

simply board passing cargo ships to steal the personal

valuables from the crew and then leave, some appear to be

well-organized, well-connected, and ambitious—they hijack

the vessel, pilfer the cargo, and then sell the ship.

69

Lastly, mass migration poses a serious potential threat

to Southeast Asia if economic and political conditions

deteriorate sufficiently. Refugee outflows from the

Philippines and Indonesia have the potential to dwarf

similar seaborne exoduses from Vietnam, Cuba, and Haiti.

KEY CHALLENGES

Maintaining Our Forward Presence. 

The broader challenge for the U.S. military in the

Asia-Pacific over the next quarter of a century is likely to be

simply maintaining a forward presence.

70

 Political trends

on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan strongly suggest that

the United States might be faced with increasing pressures

to reduce or curtail its military presence. Moreover, a

greatly reduced presence or complete withdrawal from

Northeast Asia will bring into question the extent of the

18
U.S. commitment to the security of the region and its overall

balance of power. Without bases in such places as Korea and

Okinawa, any operations to assist in the defense of Taiwan

would prove difficult.

Deterring Conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

The dominant challenge for the United States is to deter

a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This effort is especially

daunting because it entails what has been called “dual

deterrence.”

71

 What this term means is that Washington

must, on the one hand, deter Beijing from opting for a

military solution for unification with Taiwan, while on the

other hand deter Taipei from doing anything that would

provoke a military reaction by China. The United States

finds itself in a classic dilemma. If Washington is seen as

speaking too softly and is too limited in its actions in

working for Taiwan’s defense, then this may embolden

Beijing and/or alarm Taipei. And if the United States is seen

as too adamant verbally and too generous in its military

assistance to Taiwan, then this may goad China to take

military action and/or make Taipei over confident. Both

paths are fraught with danger and a middle way will be

difficult to navigate.

Engaging “Power Keg” States.

“Powder keg states” are “volatile countries upon which

the stability . . . of the region or subregion hinge.”

72

 These

are Asia-Pacific states with the greatest potential to explode

in conflict or implode into turmoil. Moreover, because of

their geographic locations, large populations, and

significant defense capabilities, in such a scenario these

states would seriously threaten the stability of the

subregion and/or region. There are at least four powder keg

states in the Asia-Pacific: China, North Korea, Indonesia,

and Pakistan. China is the key “powder keg” state for the

entire region and will require sustained attention. Often

overlooked are the significant results of the U.S. policy of

19
engagement with China including engaging China in a

strategic dialogue, expanding China’s involvement in

multilateral fora, and increasing transparency. The release

in October 2000 of China’s latest White Paper on National

Defense, its most detailed and forthcoming to date, was a

significant milestone.

73

North Korea, with nuclear and missile programs and the

world’s fifth largest armed forces, is the powder keg state in

Northeast Asia and will require the most immediate

attention. Indonesia, with the world’s fourth largest

population inhabiting an area about three times the size of

Texas, is the powder keg state in Southeast Asia and one

that will require more American efforts in coming decades.

74

Meanwhile, Pakistan, a nuclear state with the world’s sixth

largest population living in an area approximately twice the

size of California, and the world’s seventh largest armed

forces, is the powder keg state for South and Central Asia.

These efforts will be politically sensitive since all of the

states have poor human rights records and large militaries,

three of them (China, North Korea, and Pakistan) pose

serious threats to U.S. proliferation policy, and two (North

Korea and Pakistan) have strong ties to terrorist groups or a

record of state-sponsored terrorism.

Effective Alliance Management.

The operational challenges just mentioned raise broader

strategic questions of alliance management. Cultivating

relations with our allies has not received the priority it

deserves.

75

 Priority should be given to enhancing our

security ties with “linchpin states”—those critical states

that form the bedrock of U.S. strategic posture in the

Asia-Pacific. The dramatic developments on the Korean

Peninsula in the 1990s have resulted in closer cooperation

and coordination between South Korea, Japan, and the

United States through the Trilateral Coordination and

Oversight Group. Alliance management requires constant

attention. Better interagency cooperation with the United

20
States would help, particularly in preparing for SOFA

negotiations. There must be greater recognition of the

importance of public relations efforts and matters of

protocol and culture. Such symbolism is particularly

important in Asian countries but following up with

substance is essential. Moreover, our relations with our

allies and friends in Southeast Asia and Australasia require

more attention from both sides.

76

U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE

ASIA-PACIFIC

Baseline U.S. strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific

should be to:

• Maintain a forward presence in the region.

• Apply “dual deterrence” in the Taiwan Strait and work

to facilitate a modus vivendi between China and Taiwan.

• Engage China, North Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia and

other countries in the region with particular attention to

military-to-military relations. Strive to realize

reconciliation between North and South Korea; and

promote confidence-building measures between India and

Pakistan.

• Sustain and nurture relations with our allies and

friends. American priorities should be in working with

South Korea and Japan to improve not only cooperation and

coordination with the armed forces of these countries but

also with their governments and people.

77

 The majority of

this effort should be oriented toward substance, but part of

the effort should be directed toward improving public

relations.

78

 The United States should give due attention to

our alliances with Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Taiwan Strait currently represents the most

dangerous flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific. Of course, the

21
North Korean threat remains serious although an MTW on

the Korean Peninsula is gradually becoming less probable

than smaller-scale contingencies. Still, we cannot declare

that peace has broken out on the peninsula. Nevertheless,

tensions on the peninsula are likely to decline over the next

few decades; meanwhile, tensions over Taiwan are likely to

remain serious, and may even escalate. A Strait conflict

involving the United States would be very different from

one on the peninsula. The risk of escalation to a nuclear

conflict would be significantly higher over Taiwan than over

Korea. For its part China might be tempted to go nuclear in

the face of conventional defeat but two factors suggest that

Beijing would be reluctant to escalate a conventional

conflict with the United States and probably would do so

only if it thought a nuclear strike by the United States was

imminent. First, China realizes the overwhelming

numerical superiority of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

79

 Second,

since 1949 China has a clear record of seeking to contain a

conflict to a particular locality for a specific time period, and

at a certain level of intensity.

80

Air and naval forces assume greater importance in a

Taiwan Strait conflict than in one on the Korean Peninsula.

But land power would remain a key component to the

successful outcome of any Taiwan Strait conflict,

particularly if the conflict were prolonged and/or

escalated.

81

 Certainly it is unlikely that the Army would be

directly involved in a Taiwan scenario—in the sense of

sending troops into combat. However, to achieve a decisive

strategic end state it is possible that U.S. ground forces

would be deployed on Taiwan and/or would be garrisoned on

the soil of our allies and friends in the region (see below).

Such steps would be taken to ensure that both friends and

foes get the unambiguous message of strategic deterrence:

America’s commitment to the peace and prosperity of the

region remains rock solid in the face of wanton aggression.

No matter what the duration or scope of a U.S.-China

war, the Army would be involved in at least three ways.

First, in the event of the outbreak of war in the Taiwan

22
Strait, the most immediate impact on the Army would likely

be pressure to reinforce its forward presence in the region

(i.e., Japan and South Korea). Indeed the United States

could expect its friends and allies in the region to request

immediate assistance in the form of U.S. force buildups to

provide added psychological reassurance. The second

impact on the Army would be a heightened state of alert and

readiness to deter an attack by another state or nonstate

actor seeking to take advantage of the diversion provided by

a U.S.-China conflict. Despite the recent positive

developments on the Korean Peninsula, tensions remain. It

is conceivable that North Korea might launch an attack on

the South if Pyongyang believed that, with a distraction in

the Taiwan Strait, a surprise attack would have a fair

chance of succeeding. A third impact on the Army could be

the order to deploy a force on Taiwan either after the

outbreak of war or following the cessation of hostilities.

While military leaders would probably not favor such a

move, under certain circumstances the National Command

Authorities might direct it. This may simply be a small

military assistance advisory group to provide training for

new weapon systems provided to the Taiwanese military; or

it may be a token combat force deployed on the island after

hostilities have subsided to serve a tripwire function—one

similar to that played by U.S. forces along the demilitarized

zone (DMZ) in Korea.

Pre-Crisis Response. The Taiwan Strait may be

approaching crisis and the United States must respond to

ensure one is avoided. The goal of achieving a peaceful

resolution of the Taiwan Strait is currently subsumed under

the so-called policy of “strategic ambiguity.” The result is

that China assumes the United States will intervene

militarily in any Strait conflict. This means that China is

probably preparing to do battle with the United States. The

peaceful resolution of Taiwan Strait tensions then becomes

in the U.S. vital national interest. It is therefore incumbent

upon the National Command Authorities to be very clear as

to what U.S. policy on Taiwan is, how the military

23
instrument of national power fits in, and to communicate all

of this to the defense community.

Moreover, a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, even

without U.S. involvement, poses a direct threat to the

stability of the entire region. The United States should do

everything it can to deter such an eventuality.

Unfortunately our influence, while significant, has its

limits. Both Taipei and Beijing now respond to fluid

domestic dynamics in their own political systems and to the

rhetoric and actions of each other. Washington should put

pressure behind the scenes on both sides to begin talks

immediately without preconditions. Washington can also

help to maintain a rough balance of military power in the

Strait by providing Taiwan with weapon systems that fill

gaps in the island’s defenses. The most immediate threat to

address is that posed by Chinese ballistic missiles.

82

 While

the question of TMD for Taiwan is extremely inflammatory

to China and must be carefully managed so as not to provoke

a military response, the United States can and should

provide the components for a lower tier missile defense

system.

83

 Of course if China reversed its missile build up in

the Taiwan Strait the need for a Taiwanese TMD could be

reassessed.

84

 Creative means can be adopted to supply

Taiwan with weapon systems appropriate for the island’s

defense without antagonizing China.

85

Force Protection Plus. Washington should proceed

deliberately and prudently to develop and deploy limited

lower tier missile defense systems to protect U.S. forces in

the Asia-Pacific, the most vulnerable U.S. civilian areas,

and our allies as appropriate. It is important to recognize

the sensitivity of missile defense (both theater and national)

to many countries in the region, including our allies. There

is, for example, strong opposition to U.S. missile defense

initiatives from China. Meanwhile support from Japan and

Australia is conditional and could be affected by changes in

the regional security environment, national economic

performance, or a change of government.

86

 Limited

deployment would provide sufficient defense in the medium

24
term and help assuage the concerns of countries in the

region. Limited deployment would include the systems to

protect U.S. forces in Korea and Japan, and U.S. military

installations and population centers in Alaska, Hawaii, and

on the western coast of the continental United States.

Washington should seize the initiative and develop

plans for reconfiguring U.S. forward presence in the

Asia-Pacific. This is preferable to being forced to respond

to pressures from a host country or rapid sudden changes in

the strategic environment. One need only recall the

circumstances that led to the sudden and rapid exit of U.S.

forces from the Philippines a decade ago.

87

The United States must recognize that, extrapolating

from current trends, reduction and, perhaps, withdrawal of

most, and possibly all U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula

may be in the cards. The United States and Republic of

Korea should begin serious discussion about the

circumstances and logic of a continued U.S. military

presence in Korea after reconciliation and unification. The

recently completed SOFA agreement is necessary but not

sufficient to prepare adequately for the future.

88

 Moreover,

changes seem inevitable in the location, format, and size of

the U.S. military presence in Japan.

89

 While there is strong

public support in Japan for the alliance, almost two thirds of

the respondents in an opinion poll taken in mid-2000

desired a smaller, less intrusive U.S. military presence.

90

 It

is time for the Pentagon and each of the individual services

to draw up alternative proposals for significant changes in

the U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific. These

changes might include a smaller Army presence and/or

possible relocation of some forces to Southeast Asia or

Australia.

While not ignoring the missile and nuclear issues, the

Pentagon, in consultation with the Department of State and

our Republic of Korea allies, should discuss the feasibility of

a phased-in comprehensive reduction of all forces (U.S.,

North Korean, and South Korean) on the peninsula.

91

 At the

25
very least, a symbolic pull back of some U.S. or ROK units

from forward positioning along the DMZ should be

considered. This would demonstrate good will on the part of

the United States and Republic of Korea and call for similar

goodwill gestures from the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (DPRK). If no response in kind were forthcoming

from the North, this would be a significant, albeit negative,

indication of North Korea’s intentions.

The U.S. Army should plan now for how it will dispose of

the more than one million estimated anti-personnel

landmines (APLs) placed by United Nations Command

forces in the DMZ. The Army is likely to face the daunting

challenge of landmine clearance on the Korean Peninsula

within the next decade or so. This challenge could be turned

into a worthwhile confidence-building exercise with the

North Korean military. A major initiative could be launched

to work with Seoul and Pyongyang to establish a timetable

whereby both sides of the DMZ would undertake clearance

of all APLs on the peninsula. Former President Clinton has

directed the end of the use of all APLs on the Korean

Peninsula by the year 2006, and the Republic of Korea has

indicated that it wants to end use of APLs at an early date.

92

Certainly, any such effort should be undertaken cautiously,

mindful of not adversely affecting the defense of the

Republic of Korea or the protection of U.S. forces on the

peninsula.

93

 However, such an effort would not only achieve

a key policy objective but also serve as an excellent

confidence-building measure between the armed forces of

North Korea, South Korea, and the United States. Moreover

a mine clearance initiative is a logical extension of the

limited mine clearing effort proposed to permit the

reopening of the north-south railway link.

At the same time, however, U.S. and South Korean

forces must remain at a high state of readiness and alert for

a MTW or lesser acts of belligerence.

Focus shaping activities around the “powder keg

states” identified above (China, North Korea,

26
Pakistan, and Indonesia). A critical dimension of U.S.

shaping activities is military-to-military relations. This is

particularly crucial because in each of these powder keg

states, the armed forces exercise enormous political

influence and play a prominent role in national security

policymaking. If U.S. policy objectives are to be attained,

then military-to-military relations must be pursued. While

the military in a dictatorship tends to be viewed as part of

the problem, it must also be seen as part of the solution. If

the Beijing and Pyongyang regimes are to moderate and

become less confrontational, then this will only be done with

the concurrence of their respective military establishments.

If Indonesia is to become a country with firm civilian control

over the military and one in which members of the armed

forces demonstrate a clear respect for human rights, then

the military leadership must conclude this is in the best

interests of the institution and the country. Pakistan is the

clearest case in which the armed forces matter because the

country is ruled by a military government. Obviously the

military will not relinquish power to civilians until military

leaders believe the time is right. Moreover, significant

reforms of the Pakistani military are called for, particularly

in the ISI, which, as noted above, has been extremely active

in covert operations involving Islamic militants in South

and Central Asia.

Concentrating on these powder keg states does not mean

ignoring other states. For example, working to reduce

tensions with North Korea necessarily entails cooperating

closely with our allies South Korea and Japan, and working

with China and Russia. And concentrating on Pakistan

certainly means engaging with proximate countries, such as

India, and addressing the upheaval in Afghanistan.

Developing a more vigorous military-to-military relationship with India would be a particularly valuable exercise.

Moreover, CINCPAC’s attention to multilateralism,

through the development of “security communities” or

“enhanced regional security cooperation,” is not

inconsistent with a powder keg state’s peacetime

27
engagement strategy.

94

 These states can be encouraged to

participate in multilateral regional structures. North

Korea, for example, recently joined the ARF. Targeting

these countries simply means focusing efforts on trying to

help those countries that have the potential to destabilize

their neighbors. Resuscitating the South Asia Association

for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and strengthening

ASEAN/ARF will not only help regional cooperation but

these steps will also help bring stability to Pakistan and

Indonesia respectively.

THE ARMY’S CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL

SECURITY

What is the Army’s contribution to maintaining the

peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific? In light of the

threats and challenges outlined above, what should the

Army do to enhance its contribution to regional stability?

The answer to these questions entails attention to the

Army’s contribution in three areas: deterring large-scale

conflict, executing smaller-scale contingencies, and

engaging with regional armies.

The most important immediate strategic

contribution of the U.S. Army in the Asia-Pacific is to

deter the outbreak of a major war. It is often said that

the primary mission of the Army is to fight and win

America’s wars. However, this does not fully encapsulate its

core functions. Certainly the prime operational focus of the

Army must be to fight and defeat a foe when called upon by

the National Command Authorities. But from the strategic

perspective, the Army’s mission is foremost to deter a major

war. Indeed, the textbook example in the region where the

U.S. Army has been extremely successful in its deterrence

function is on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. Eighth Army,

in conjunction with our ROK allies, has for almost 50 years

dissuaded the Korean People’s Army from launching a

major attack against the Republic of Korea. Yet, deterrence

is only credible if potential adversaries view the U.S. Army

28
as capable of defeating them in battle. Thus the best form of

deterrence is the demonstrated ability to undertake

large-scale sustained land combat. This can best be

achieved through regular major exercises at the division

and multidivision levels.

The greatest challenge to the Army’s deterrence mission

in the region is the broad scope and spectrum of threats that

confront the United States and our friends and allies there.

While the Army’s deterrence mission in Korea is clear

because the source and nature of the threat are self-evident,

this is not the case with the rest of the Asia-Pacific. In Korea

our deterrence can be focused, while beyond the peninsula

deterrence must be a broader and more general type as a

consequence of the dispersed and varied nature of the

security threats. The best way to execute this general

deterrence mission is with a dynamic forward military

presence and vigorous engagement with armies of the

region. This must be augmented with the demonstrated

ability to project power to the region if necessary. To this

end, at a minimum the Army should sustain its active

program of a total of more than two dozen annual, biannual,

and quadrennial exercises with allied and friendly armies

in the region.

95

 In addition the Army should consider the

feasibility of larger multinational exercises at the division

level or above which involve the deployment of

CONUS-based divisions. Possible locales for such exercises

would be Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In

addition to demonstrating the ability of the U.S. Army to

project power to the region, the operation would provide

invaluable training for American forces.

The U.S. Army is the service best equipped to

execute extended Smaller Scale Contingencies

(SSCs), and it is essential that this capability be

enhanced in the Asia-Pacific. The Marine Corps is very

good at dealing with short-term crisis situations such as

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) deployments.

However, operations lasting longer than a few weeks or

months require greater capabilities that only the Army can

29
provide. The Army’s critical contribution in this area is

indicated by the fact that the Army paid 53 percent of the

Department of Defense’s incremental costs for peace

operations between 1994 and 1998.

96

To improve the capabilities of American and regional

militaries to conduct multinational operations, such as

peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, and

enhance military cooperation with allies and friends in the

region, the Army should explore the feasibility of

establishing a combined training facility in the region. Such

a training center would complement the Center for

Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian

Assistance (or COE) located at Tripler Army Medical Center

in Hawaii. While COE focuses on peace operations,

humanitarian intervention, and disaster relief, it does so

from a more academic perspective with seminars,

conferences, and simulations.

97

 The COE also supports

command post exercises and field exercises. The proposed

combined training center would concentrate solely on the

actual field training of military units from the United States

and other Asia-Pacific countries. Perhaps the most logical

location for such a facility would be Australia. Such an

initiative would be particularly timely and appropriate

because it would follow on the heels of the successful

Australian-led multinational operation in East Timor in

which the U.S. armed forces provided valuable and much

appreciated support.

98

 In addition, Australia has just

completed a major review of its defense needs. According to

Australia’s Defense White Paper of December 2000,

Australia’s alliance with the United States is “one of our

greatest national assets.”

99

 ANZUS celebrates it 50th year

in 2001, and Canberra would likely be very receptive to a

new joint venture on Australian soil that would enhance

cooperation with the U.S. military and improve the

capabilities of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The

White Paper anticipates that the ADF will be involved in

“regional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief

30
operations,” perhaps even several such operations

simultaneously.

100

In any SSC in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. Army will likely

be operating as part of a multinational force, coordinating

and cooperating with one or more partners. Indeed this is

the most desirable option since such operations require less

of a commitment of manpower and resources. Indeed the

United States need not always take the lead in an SSC. Here

the example of East Timor is significant. While the United

States provided considerable support in the form of

logistics, including the airlift of food and supplies,

construction of community buildings, and medical care,

Australia took the lead in International Force East Timor

(INTERFET). The result was a relatively small U.S.

footprint. At the height of the operation some 2,000 U.S.

military personnel were involved in the U.S. Support Group

East Timor. As of February 2001, the U.S. presence in East

Timor had shrunk to 12 personnel.

101

 The training center

described above would be invaluable in preparing the

United States and regional partners for such operations.

In an SSC, U.S. forces seem best suited to initial entry: to

intervene with decisive force and establish overall security

and stability on the ground. As soon as it becomes feasible,

basic level security ought to be handed over to coalition

partners and/or a multinational police force. Once the

situation on the ground has stabilized, a civilian-type police

force provides the most appropriate security formation.

This is evident from the example of the International Police

Monitors in Haiti, ably led by former New York City Police

Chief Raymond Kelly.

102

 But if any type of military unit

were useful at this stage, it would be Military Police.

However, the U.S. Army can be most useful in providing an

insurance policy in the form of a rapid reserve force based

nearby for swift deployment in the event of an escalating

crisis.

103

The U.S. Army should take the lead in engaging the

militaries of the Asia-Pacific. As the most admired and

31
respected armed forces in the world, the U.S. military

provides a living and breathing example of a dynamic and

action-oriented defense establishment that is under civilian

control, governed by rule of law, and in the service of a

democratic political system. And it is the U.S. Army—

rather than the Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps—that is

best suited to take the lead in this effort, because in each

country the indigenous army is by far the largest and most

dominant service. Indeed, USARPAC is already actively

engaged with its brother land services throughout the

Asia-Pacific.

Army-to-army relations must be tailored to the specifics

of the army and political entity concerned and the

sensibilities of neighboring states. Two distinct categories

of states are “linchpin” U.S. allies and “powder keg” states

(and their neighbors). The former category involves

established democracies that are by-and-large

noncontroversial. The latter classification consists of

outright dictatorships or fledgling democracies with

militaries viewed by many Americans as instruments of

domestic repression and/or as potential adversaries of the

United States. Such military-to-military relations require

considerable caution and sensitivity. There are political and

diplomatic constraints on both the United States and these

other countries that limit the feasibility of certain activities.

North Korea’s political leaders, for example, would be

unlikely to permit Korean People’s Army (KPA) officers to

participate in a U.S. sponsored “role of the military in a

democracy” workshop. And there would likely be outrage

within the United States if Americans discovered that the

U.S. military was demonstrating cutting-edge high-tech

weaponry to KPA leaders. Moreover the sensitivities of

subregional tensions must be considered. Thus, for

example, the official high-level visit with full military pomp

and ceremony by the Taiwanese Army Chief of Staff to

Washington would be guaranteed to enrage Beijing. The

current low profile military-to-military interaction between

the island and the United States is satisfactory and

32
adequate for now. However, should tensions in the Taiwan

Strait escalate due to the actions of China, the U.S.-Taiwan

military-to-military relationship can be reassessed and

enhanced as needed. Similarly, any program of

military-to-military engagement with Pakistan without a

corresponding effort at a relationship with India would

inevitably raise concerns and suspicions in New Delhi and

only serve to increase subregional tensions. Avoidance of

controversial subjects will minimize the likelihood of

disruptions to the relationship due to partisan political

squabbles in either country.

Engaging Armies from Linchpin States.

For the foreseeable future the primary focus of

army-to-army engagement with our allies—linchpin

states—in the Asia-Pacific should be South Korea, Japan,

and Australia. The degree of cooperation and coordination is

generally good but can always benefit from attention. In

Japan and South Korea integration can be further improved

through constant contacts and a greater appreciation and

understanding of cultural differences and sensibilities in

Tokyo and Seoul. More efforts can be made to build

relationships between officers, NCOs, and enlisted men of

the U.S. Army and their host armies: the ROK Army and

Japan Self-Defense Ground Force. A concerted effort to

provide language study and cultural sensitivity training to

American soldiers and their families prior to their

permanent change of station and continued after the start of

their tour in Northeast Asia would enhance relations

between armies and countries. Military-to-military

relations with Australia are very good but would be

enhanced through the establishment of the training center

proposed above.

Engaging Armies from Powder Keg States.

While fully cognizant that we cannot expect dramatic,

short-term results from military-to-military engagement

33
with countries such as China, North Korea, Pakistan, and

Indonesia, we can engage in a long-term effort on matters of

substance to further U.S. national interests.

104

 This effort

should consist of four types of activities, which one could call

the “pillars” of U.S.-Asia defense diplomacy: high-level

visits; functional exchanges; routine military confidencebuilding measures; and, integrating defense

establishments into multilateral fora. High-level bilateral

exchanges hold not merely symbolic importance, but also

help develop key personal relationships providing

continuity as the larger relationship develops.

Functional exchanges provide the greatest potential for

substantive interaction and learning but also tend to be the

most controversial. Exchanges and conferences between

research institutes and military education institutions

could focus on nonsensitive matters. Possible themes to

pursue are joint studies of classic military campaigns in

history and professional military education in the two

countries, and the military’s role in peacekeeping and

humanitarian operations.

Military exchanges, such as faculty/student visits from

professional military education institutions, are valuable

for establishing basic goodwill and building relationships.

Thus, the high-level Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Academy of Military Sciences delegation visit to the United

States in August 2000 ought to be reciprocated.

Such activities should ideally reach the point where they

are seen as “routine” rather than unusual. This does not

mean they should be treated casually or lightly but rather

they should not attract undue attention or controversy and

simply be considered “normal.” And the impact of these

interactions should not be underestimated—they promote

important American values such as the principle of

democratic civilian control of the military and increased

transparency in defense matters. A greater appreciation for

the differences in areas such as national cultures and

service cultures—things that are easy to overlook but

34
extremely important—can minimize the chances of one side

misinterpreting the acts of the other.

Integrating foreign armies into multilateral defense fora

is also highly desirable. It permits the other armies to

realize the common challenges and aspirations they share

with their colleagues in other countries. This kind of

interaction helps soldiers from such insular states as China

and North Korea gain a better sense of the characteristics of

a modern military beyond crack troops and the possession of

high-tech weaponry. Furthermore, soldiers increasingly

will value the formal and informal dialogues with their

counterparts in other countries and find the interaction

useful and professionally rewarding. The U.S. Army is

well-equipped to build this pillar with well-developed

multilateral mechanisms already in place in the

Asia-Pacific. The Pacific Armies Management Seminar

(PAMS), annually co-hosted by USARPAC and the land

service of another Pacific Rim country, recently celebrated

its 24th year. PAMS is now attended by delegates from more

than 30 countries. The recently established biannual Pacific

Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC) promises to enhance

further this spirit of multilateralism. Meanwhile, PACOM’s

answer to the Marshall Center, the Asia-Pacific Center for

Security Studies (established in 1995), is now ensconced in

new facilities in Honolulu.

The Asia-Pacific offers significant opportunities for

Army Transformation concepts to be tested. The Army, in

the course of fulfilling its function of deterring major war,

exercising its ability to execute SSCs, and take the lead in

engaging the militaries of the region, can display the newest

capabilities. The Asia-Pacific provides a prime training

ground to put the Army’s new lighter armored brigades

through their paces and demonstrate U.S. power projection

capabilities. 

35
CONCLUSION

The stability of the Asia-Pacific is a vital U.S. national

interest. To ensure stability in the region, all the

instruments of national power must be brought into play.

The Taiwan Strait has replaced the Korean Peninsula as

the most dangerous flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific. The

United States must focus special attention on the ongoing

tensions in the Strait both in terms of deterring a conflict

and promoting reconciliation between China and Taiwan.

Military power, primarily in the form of a continued

forward presence, is an invaluable dimension. This

presence is only possible and effective with a vigorous

network of allies and friends in the region. With the ongoing

transformations in Northeast Asia, every effort should be

made to ensure that the United States is able to maintain

forward bases in the region. This probably will entail

reconfiguring our current forces in South Korea and Japan

and, very possibly, involve relocating personnel to other

locations in Southeast Asia, Australasia and/or U.S.

possessions in the Pacific.

Summary of Recommendations.

• The United States should focus greater attention on

deterring any Chinese military operation in the Taiwan

Strait. While not relaxing its vigilance on the Korean

Peninsula, the U.S. military should give more consideration

to deterring a Chinese attack against Taiwan.

• The Department of Defense should develop options for

reconfiguring the U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific

in anticipation of possible political pressures in Northeast

Asia to reduce force levels or perhaps even close

installations.

• The United States should proceed deliberately and

prudently to develop and deploy limited lower tier missile

defense to protect U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

36
• The best form of deterrence the Army can provide is

the demonstrated ability to undertake large-scale,

sustained land combat. This can be achieved through

regular major exercises at the division and multidivision

level.

• The Army must enhance its ability to execute

extended SSCs and multinational operations. To this end

serious consideration should be given to establishing a

combined training center to focus exclusively on military

field exercises for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,

and peacekeeping operations.

• The Army should take the lead in engaging the

militaries of the Asia-Pacific, focusing in particular on the

armies of the “powder keg” states of China, Indonesia,

North Korea, and Pakistan. At the same time it is essential

that the Army remain engaged with the armies of the

“linchpin” states of South Korea, Japan, and Australia.

ENDNOTES

1. This is essentially the core of U.S. national security goals. See A

National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999.

2. The Marines would also have a key role to play. On the general

point, see Brigadier General Huba Wass De Czege (USA Ret.) and

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria, “Precision Decisions,” Armed 

Forces Journal International, October 2000, p. 58.

3. This is a dramatic change from the view stated in the National

Security Strategy of 1999. See A National Security Strategy for a New

Century, p. 35.

4. “Enhancing Regional Security Cooperation,” speech by Admiral

Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, to Asia

Society, New York, October 19, 2000.

5. See, for example, Ilene R. Prusher, “S. Korea’s Enthusiasm

Fizzles For Cozying Up to North,” Christian Science Monitor, November

7, 2000.

6. See Victor D. Cha, “The Continuity Behind the Change in Korea,”

Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 4, Fall 2000, pp. 585-598.

37
7. The distinction between reconciliation and unification is an

important one and has been recognized by General Henry Shelton,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Richard Halloran, “Ground

Forces in Japan, S. Korea Under Review,” Washington Times,

September 29, 2000.

8. Accord to the Perry Commission, “The North Korean regime

would strongly resist . . . reform, viewing it as indistinguishable from a

policy of undermining [the regime].” Review of United States Policy

Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations, Unclassified

report by Dr. William J. Perry, U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator and

Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State, October 12,

1999 [hereafter Perry Report ]. Accessed from www.fas.org/new/dprk/

1999/991012_northkorea_rpt.htm on December 6, 1999. Nevertheless

the 5-day visit to Beijing and Shanghai in January 2001 by a high-level

Pyongyang delegation led by Kim Jong Il—Kim’s second to China in 8

months—suggests there is serious contemplation about economic

reform in North Korea. For excellent insights and analysis on the North

Korean regime, see Adrian Buzo, Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and

Leadership in North Korea, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

9. Perry Report.

10. On Seoul’s concerns, see Cha, “The Continuity Behind the

Change in Korea,” pp. 592-593.

11. For analysis on the expressed desires of these two leaders, see

Nayan Chanda, “G.I. Joe, Meet Kim Jong Il,” Far Eastern Economic

Review, October 5, 2000, p. 20.

12. Indeed, this concern about the intentions of other powers is

clearly evident in the exchange between the two Korean leaders. Kim

Dae Jung reportedly told Kim Jong Il: “The peninsula is surrounded by

big countries, and if the American military presence were to withdraw,

that would create a huge vacuum that would draw these big countries

into a fight over hegemony.” The North Korean leader is said to have

responded: “Yes, we are surrounded by big powers—Russia, China, and

Japan, and so therefore it is desirable that the American troops continue

to stay.” See Doug Struck, “South Korean Says North Wants U.S. Troops

to Stay,” Washington Post, August 30, 2000.

13. Scott Snyder, “Anti-Americanism and the Future of USFK,”

Korea Times, August 10, 2000.

14. A poll of South Koreans, taken in June 2000 found that 90

percent of those surveyed held a positive image of North Korea and its

38
leaders, and 53 percent dismissed the possibility of North Korean

invasion of the south. Cha, “The Continuity Behind the Change in

Korea,” p. 586. Also see the discussion in Sung-Joo Han, “The Koreas’

New Century,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 2000-01, pp. 88-91.

15. See also Han, “The Koreas’ New Century,” p. 90.

16. President Kim has gone on record favoring the continued

presence of American troops. Reportedly, his North Korean counterpart

has expressed similar sentiments although the precise context and

meaning of his remarks remain unclear. Struck, “South Korean Says

North Wants U.S. Troops to Stay.”

17. Doug Struck, Steven Mufson, “North Korea Mulls Curb of

Missile Program; Kim Accepts ‘Idea’ But Albright Leaves Without

Agreement,” Washington Post, October 25, 2000.

18. This point is also made by Joel S. Wit, “North Korea: The Leader

of the Pack,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2001, p.

83.

19. Shin Yong-bae, “Seoul, Washington, Likely to Clash over

SOFA,” Korea Herald, November 28, 2000; Kil Byung-ok, “White Paper

on SOFA Highlights The Unfairness of Korea-U.S. Agreement,” Korea

Herald, November 8, 2000; Son Key-young, “ROK, US to Resume SOFA

Talks in October,” Korea Times, October 3, 2000.

20. “Korea, U.S. Sign Revised Troop Pact,” Korea Herald, January

19, 2001; “U.S., Korea Complete Negotiations on Status of Forces,”

Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Release,

Washington, DC, December 28, 2000.

21. See, for example, Paul Dibb, “The Strategic Environment in the

Asia-Pacific Region,” in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds.,

America’s Asian Alliances, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, p. 8.

22. Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen,

and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly,

Vol. 115, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 227-246.

23. Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People to

People Diplomacy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

24. See, for example, Scobell, “Show of Force.”

25. See Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “ ‘State to State’ Tension Rises Again

Across the Taiwan Strait,” China Perspectives, No. 25, October 1999, pp.

39
4-13 and “The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” Xinhua

News Agency, February 21, 2000.

26. Andrew Scobell, Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang

Zemin, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September

2000, p. 21; and author’s interviews with civilian and military

researchers in Beijing and Shanghai, February-March 2000 and

September 2000 [hereafter “Author’s interviews, February-March

2000” and “Author’s Interviews, September 2000”].

27. Defense White Paper 2000.

28. Scobell, “Show of Force,” pp. 239, 240.

29. Ibid.

30. Author’s interviews, February-March 2000; Scobell, Chinese

Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin, p. 26.

31. Author’s interviews, February-March 2000. See also Mark

Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force:

Evidence From History and Doctrinal Writings, Santa Monica, CA:

RAND, 2000.

32. Author’s interviews, February-March 2000.

33. Mark Landler, “Taiwan Ends Construction of Its 4th Nuclear

Plant,” New York Times, October 28, 2000 and “World Briefing,” New

York Times, November 1, 2000.

34. For one perceptive recent analysis, see Bonnie S. Glaser,

“Beijing Fears About Chen Shui-iban Subside as Taiwan’s Political and

Economic Troubles Mount,” PacNet February 2, 2001 available from

Pacific Forum at www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0105.html.

35. See, for example, Scobell, Chinese Army Building in the Era of

Jiang Zemin, p. 22.

36. Scobell, “Show of Force”; author’s interviews, February-March

2000.

37. Author’s interviews, February-March 2000.

38. This is the most commonly discussed scenario. For studies that

assess the likelihood of success for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan,

see David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire

Strait?: Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and

40
Options for U.S. Policy, Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2000; and

Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan?”

International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000, pp. 51-86.

39. Andrew J. Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan

Policy,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp.

93-106.

40. See, for example, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing Considers

Deadline for Taipei,” South China Morning Post, February 23, 2000;

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Dual Edge to ‘Liberation’ Timetable,” South China

Morning Post, March 1, 2000; Robert Kagan, “How China Will Take

Taiwan,” Washington Post, March 12, 2000.

41. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Lawless Frontier,” The Atlantic

Monthly, September 2000, p. 72.

42. “Pakistan Closes Border to Refugees,” New York Times

(Washington edition), November 10, 2000.

43. Eric S. Margolis, War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for

Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet, New York: Routledge, 2000.

44. Sumit Ganguly, “Wars Without End: The Indo-Pakistani

Conflict,” The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences,

No. 542, September 1995, pp. 167-178; Margolis, War at the Top of the

World, pp. viii-ix, 139-140.

45. Margolis, War at the Top of the World, p. 172.

46. For an analysis that makes the case that a China-India war is all

but inevitable, see Ibid.

47. Judith Miller and James Risen, “A Nuclear War Feared Possible

over Kashmir,” New York Times (Washington edition), August 8, 2000.

48. On the general problem, see Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The

Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age, New York:

HarperCollins, 1999, pp. 117-120. On India and Pakistan, see Dibb,

“The Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific,” p. 10. On India, see

George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, Berkeley and Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 1999, chap. 15.

49. A military coup d’etat does not necessarily result in a military

government, although the latter tends to correlate with the former. I

contend that another nuclear power, China, experienced a military coup

in October 1976. However, in that case the military did not establish a

41
military government. See Andrew Scobell, “Military Coups in the

People’s Republic of China: Failure, Fabrication, or Fancy?” Journal of

Northeast Asia Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 25-46.

50. Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Coup: Planting the Seeds of

Democracy?” Current History, Vol. 198, No. 632, December 1999, pp.

409-414.

51. John Lancaster, “U.S. Study Finds Terrorist Shift to South

Asia,” Washington Post, May 2, 2000.

52. See, for example, Benjamin Weiser, “Bin Laden Linked to

Embassy Blast by An Ex-Soldier,” New York Times, October 21, 2000;

Alan Feuer, “Jihad Inc. Finds a Business in Terrorism, New York Times, 

February 13, 2001.

53. Ahmed Rashid, “Tenatacles of Terror,” Far East Economic

Review, August 10, 2000; Ahmed Rashid, “Epicentre of Terror,” Far

Eastern Economic Review, May 11, 2000, pp. 16-18.

54. Jonathan S. Landay and Lenny Savino, “Islamic Group Is A

Suspect in Cole Attack,” Philadephia Inquirer, October 20, 2000; John

F. Burns, “2 Saudis, With Ties to Bin Laden, Linked to Cole Attack,”

New York Times (Washington edition), November 23, 2000.

55. Ahmed Rashid, “Lion of Panjshir At Bay Against Taliban’s

Armies,” Daily Telegraph (London) October 3, 2000. See also Ahmed

Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central

Asia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.

56. Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban Exports Revolution to Ex-Soviet

States,” Daily Telegraph (London), October 25, 2000.

57. Kaplan, “The Lawless Frontier,” pp. 66-80.

58. “The war the world is missing,” The Economist, October 7, 2000,

pp. 27-32.

59. For more on the Tamil Tigers, see Patterns of Global Terrorism

1999: Asia Overview at www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/

1999report/asia.html accessed on October 19, 2000. On international

linkages of the group, see Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, “A Ruthless Tiger

Leads Long Battle Against Sri Lanka,” Boston Globe, June 22, 2000.

60. Dilip Ganguly, “Americans Hurt in Sri Lanka Bombing,” Los

Angeles Times, October 19, 2000.

42
61. See, for example, Alan Dupont, “Southeast Asian Stability At

Risk,” International Herald Tribune, September 28, 2000; and David

Lamb, “Political Unrest Has Southeast Asia on Edge,” Los Angeles

Times, August 31, 2000.

62. Andrew Scobell, “Slow Intensity Conflict in the South China

Sea,” Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute E-note,

August 16, 2000.

63. See inter alia, James Cotton, “The ‘Haze’ Over Southeast Asia:

Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement,” Pacific

Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 331-352; John Garofano,

“Flexibility or Irrelevance?: Ways Forward For the ARF,” Contemporary 

Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 74-94; Carlyle A. Thayer,

Multilateral Institutions in Asia: The ASEAN Regional Forum,

Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, October 2000.

64. Rodney Tasker and Shawn W. Crispin, “Flashpoint,” Far

Eastern Economic Review, June 1, 2000, pp. 24-26; Andrew Scobell and

Larry M. Wortzel, The Asia-Pacific in the U.S. National Security

Calculus for a New Millennium, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, March 2000, pp. 10-11.

65. David Lamb, “Insurgency in the Philippines Runs Deeper Than

Ideology,” Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2000; Johnua Kurlantzick,

“Muslim Separatists in Global Network of Terrorist Groups,”

Washington Times, May 2, 2000.

66. Scobell and Wortzel, The Asia-Pacific in the U.S. National

Security Calculus, pp. 20-21.

67. Calvin Sims, “U.S. Braces for Trouble In Indonesia As Relations

Rupture,” New York Times, October 30, 2000; and Ben Barber,

“Anti-U.S. Violence Threatens Influence,” Washington Times,

November 1, 2000.

68. Wayne Arnold, “Virus Brings Publicity to Computer Subculture

in Philippines,” New York Times, May 15, 2000 (Washington edition);

Mark Landler, “A Filippino Linked to ‘Love Bug’ Talks About His Cause

to Hack,” New York Times (Washington edition), October 2, 2000.

69. Jack Hitt, “Bandits in the Global Shipping Lanes,” New York

Times Magazine, August 20, 2000, pp. 36-69.

70. See, for example, the discussion in Thomas E. Ricks, “For the

Pentagon, Asia Moving to the Forefront,” Washington Post, May 26,

2000.

43
71. Nathan, “What’s Wrong With American Taiwan Policy.”

72. Scobell and Wortzel, The Asia-Pacific in the U.S. National

Security Calculus, p. 24. In this earlier study, the term “pivotal” was

used. Here the term “powder keg” is preferred. For more on the concept

of pivotal states, see Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds.,

The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing

World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999.

73. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, p. 44. For an

assessment of China’s latest defense white paper, see David

Shambaugh, “Here Is a Welcome Shift By China Toward Military

Transparency,” International Herald Tribune, October 24, 2000. For a

more circumspect perspective, see Evan S. Medeiros, “Through a Red

Glass Darkly,”Far Eastern Economic Review, November 9, 2000, p. 36.

74. For more on these states, see Scobell and Wortzel, The

Asia-Pacific in the U.S. National Security Calculus, pp. 24-27. The

Security Situation in East Asia-Pacific notes that Indonesia “plays a

pivotal role in fostering regional stability and will continue to . . . in the

Asia Pacific region into the next century.”

75. Philip Zelikow, “American Engagement in Asia,” in Blackwill

and Dibb, America’s Asian Alliances, p. 25.

76. Zelikow, “American Engagement in Asia,” pp. 29-30; on the

U.S.-Australia alliance, see John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, “The

U.S.-Australia Alliance,” in Blackwill and Dibb, America’s Asian

Alliances, pp. 87-109.

77. Kurt M. Campbell, “Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security

Relationship,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn 2000, pp.

125-134.

78. See Stuart Harris and Richard N. Cooper, “The U.S.-Japan

Alliance,” and Ralph A. Cossa and Alan Oxley, “The U.S.-Korea

Alliance,” both in Blackwill and Dibb, America’s Asian Alliances, pp.

31-60, 61-86. See also Michael J. Green, “The Forgotten Player,” The

National Interest, Summer 2000, pp. 42-49.

79. For a recent analysis of China’s nuclear posture, see Brad

Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, “China: The

Forgotten Nuclear Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July/August

2000, pp. 53-63.

44
80. Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of

Force: Evidence From History and Doctrinal Writings, Santa Monica:

RAND, 2000.

81. The following discussion is drawn from Scobell, Chinese Army

Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin, pp. 28-29.

82. Scobell, “Show of Force,” p. 245; The Security Situation in the

Taiwan Strait, Report to Congress Pursuant to FY99 Appropriations

Bill, February 26, 1999, at www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/twstrait

_02261999.htm.

83. Thomas J. Christensen, “Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’s

Security,” Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 79-90.

84. Thomas J. Christensen, “Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’s

Security,” Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 79-90; Scobell, Chinese

Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin, p. 27.

85. A case in point is the agreement by the United States announced

in September 2000 to sell Taiwan Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air

Missiles (AMRAAMs) worth $150 million. The missiles will only be

provided to Taiwan in the event of a threatened attack by China.

Meanwhile, Taiwan Air Force pilots will train with the missiles. See

“Missile Sale to Taiwan Has Unusual Clause,” New York Times,

September 30, 2000; Associated Press, “Taiwan Will Get Missiles if

Attacked,” September 30, 2000, accessed on http://taiwansecurity.org/ 

AP/AP-093000.htm. 

86. For a comprehensive overview of Asian views of missile defense,

see Michael J. Green and Toby F. Dalton, Asian Reaction to U.S. Missile

Defense, NBR Analyses, Vol. 11, No. 3, November 2000. See also Robert

E. Hunter, “The New Politics of the Pacific Sends Shudders Through

Australia,” Los Angeles Times, July 24, 2000; Michael Richardson,

“Missile Shield Stirs Up Dissent in Australia,” International Herald

Tribune, July 19, 2000; Murray Hiebert and Susan V. Lawrence, “A Call

to Arms: America’s Missile Defense Programme Could Unleash an

Asian Arms Race,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 3, 2000, pp.

16-19; Chester Dawson, “Japan: Blueprint for Controversy,” Far

Eastern Economic Review, July 13, 2000, pp. 19-20; Theater Missile

Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region, A Henry L. Stimson Center

Working Group Report, Report No. 34, June 2000, accessed at

www.stimson.org/pubs/tmd/tmdreport/pdf on July 6, 2000.

87. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Exit From Manila: Making of a Hasty

Retreat,” New York Times, January 5, 1992.

45
88. See, for example, Cossa and Oxley, “U.S.-Korea Alliance,” pp.

84-86.

89. Halloran, “Ground Forces in Japan, S. Korea Under Review”;

Ricks, “For Pentagon, Asia Moves to Forefront.”

90. Richard Roester, “Foley Says Support for U.S. Forces in Japan at

Highest Level,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, June 29, 2000.

91. See, for example, the proposal by Richard Scorza, No Hostile

Intent, Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army

War College, forthcoming, 2001.

92. Kang Seok-jae, “Seoul To Join Global Treaty Banning Use of

Landmines,” Korea Herald, December 11, 2000.

93. For a discussion of what may be at stake, see John F. Troxell,

“Landmines: Why the Korean Exception Should be the Rule,”

Parameters, Vol. XXX, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 82-101.

94. Blair, “Enhancing Regional Security Cooperation.”

95. USARPAC conducts a total of some two dozen exercises, half of

them on an annual basis. Information provided at a briefing by

USARPAC, Fort Shafter, HI, September 2000.

96. Conrad C. Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and

Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001, pp. 14-15.

97. For more information about the COE, see its webpage at

www.coe-dmha.org. COE was established in 1994. It is the result of a

partnership between PACOM, the Pacific Regional Medical Command,

the Centers for Disease Control, and the University of Hawaii.

98. Interviews with Australian Government defense analysts and

academics, Canberra, September 2000.

99. Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Canberra: Defence

Publishing Service, 2000, p. 34.

100. Ibid., p. 48.

101. Jan Wesner Childs, “U.S. Military Presence in East Timor

Reduced to 12 People,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, January 27, 2001.

46
102. Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds., Interagency

and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace-Operations: Haiti—A Case

Study, Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for

National Strategic Studies, 1996, pp. 28, 57-58.

103. A similar recommendation is made in Steven Metz, The

American Army in the Balkans: Strategic Alternatives and Implications, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001, pp.

14, 34.

104. This section draws on Scobell, Chinese Army Building in the

Era of Jiang Zemin, pp. 29-31.

47
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler