i

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iii

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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

PROFESSIONALIZING THE IRAQI ARMY: 

US ENGAGEMENT AFTER THE ISLAMIC STATE

C. Anthony Pfaff

January 2020

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vi

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ISBN 1-58487-819-3
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

C. ANTHONY PFAFF is a retired US Army colonel 

and is currently the research professor for strategy, 

the military profession and ethic at the Strategic 

Studies Institute and a senior non-resident fellow 

at the Atlantic Council. A retired Army foreign area 

officer for the Middle East and North Africa, Dr. Pfaff 

recently served as Director for Iraq on the National 

Security Council Staff. His last active duty posting 

was senior Army and military advisor to the State 

Department from 2013–16, where he served on the 

policy planning staff advising on cyber, regional 

military affairs, and the Middle East. Prior to taking 

the State Department position, he served as the 

defense attaché in Baghdad, the chief of international 

military affairs for US Army Central Command, and 

as the defense attaché in Kuwait. He served twice in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, once as the deputy chief of 

intelligence for a Joint Special Operations Task Force 

and as the senior military advisor for the Civilian 

Police Assistance Training Team. He also served as 

the senior intelligence officer on the Iraq Intelligence 

Task Force and as a UN observer along the IraqKuwait border. Dr. Pfaff has a bachelor’s degree in 

philosophy and economics from Washington and 

Lee University; a master’s degree in philosophy from 

Stanford University; a master’s in national resource 

management from the Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces; and a PhD in philosophy from Georgetown 

University.

ix

SUMMARY

While the US intelligence community worries 

about the emergence of “Da’esh 2.0,” the US security 

cooperation community has to worry about the 

development of the “Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 4.0” 

that will have to fight Da’esh and meet a broad range 

of other security and defense requirements. Here, 

the “4.0” refers to the facts that this is not the United 

States’ first attempt to assist the Iraqis in building 

their defense capacity and the United States is not 

the first security partner to try. Britain and the Soviet 

Union also took their turns developing Iraqi military 

capabilities, both with similar results.

None of these difficulties, however, should be a 

surprise. A survey of Iraqi military history suggests 

a pattern of strengths, weaknesses, and performance 

that includes courageous soldiers, cohesive units, 

incompetent leaders, divided loyalties, poor combat 

support, and weak institutions that have, on occasion, 

risen to the defense challenge. As a result, the Iraqi 

Army continues to be plagued by a number of crippling 

deficiencies including a disunified command; endemic 

corruption; poor communications, intelligence, and 

logistics; and high rates of absenteeism, all of which 

are exacerbated by sectarian divisions inflamed and 

exploited by Iran.

Moving forward, the United States needs to first 

determine the purpose of this cooperation. Security 

cooperation with Iraq is not just about defeating the 

Islamic State or other terrorist groups. It should also 

not be about establishing a partner that can threaten 

Iranian interests. The Iranians and the Iraqis fought 

a long, bloody war and have no interest in doing so 

again. However, the United States stands to gain 
x

when Iraq can play a constructive security role as 

an accepted member of the broader regional and 

international community. Iran cannot get the Iraqi 

military to that point, but the United States can. Thus, 

the long-term goal of US security cooperation with 

Iraq should be to establish its military as a valuable 

security partner, capable of participating in regional 

security arrangements, much in the same way Jordan, 

Saudi Arabia, and even Oman does.

Now is the time to reinvigorate efforts to develop 

the Iraqi armed forces. Iraq’s victory over the Islamic 

State has allowed it, for the first time in its history, 

to play the role of liberator in a way that bridges 

Iraq’s sectarian cleavages. For the United States and 

its partners to take advantage of this opportunity, 

however, they will have to overcome significant 

challenges. Despite widespread protests against 

malign Iranian influence, Iran’s control over the 

Iraqi government is undiminished and will constrain 

what kind of cooperation it can have with the United 

States. Moreover, despite the image of Iraqi soldier as 

liberator after the fight against the Islamic State, its 

role in suppressing widespread protests in southern 

Iraq risks mediating that image with that of oppressor. 

At the same time, the establishment of the Popular 

Mobilization Forces (PMF) as a separate armed force 

threatens competition for roles and resources, which 

will undermine the Iraqi military’s effectiveness.

On that point, it is often said when it comes to 

Iraq, the Iranians are playing chess while the United 

States plays checkers. That’s not exactly true. The 

United States is playing chess. Like the Iranians, the 

United States engages a range of diplomatic, security, 

economic, and social actors and institutions. Unlike 

the Iranians, it does so to encourage them to set aside 
xi

sectarian difference and corrupt practices to build 

an inclusive, prosperous Iraq that is a contributing 

member to global society. More to the point, and again 

unlike the Iranians, it provides billions of dollars in 

reconstruction and security assistance and connects 

the Iraqi government to regional and international 

partners to further assist development of critical 

institutions.

Still, while the United States may be playing chess, 

it is more apt to say the Iranians are playing “Settlers 

of Catan.” By playing chess, the United States seems to 

think that this “game” ends when it captures the king, 

or in the context of Iraq, when the Iraqi government 

behaves consistently according to US interests. 

Meanwhile, the Iranians will have built a road over 

the chess board taking not only the king, but the park 

in which everyone is playing. In the Iraqi context, 

however, this game never ends. But more to the point, 

losing one source of power or influence does not end 

the game, it just requires one have others to rely upon. 

Unlike the United States, Iran gains this influence 

by exploiting the sectarian differences and corrupt 

practices that the United States seeks to discourage.

Still all is not lost. The United States has a 

number of comparative advantages over Iran that, 

if used properly, can set conditions for a more 

professional army. Those comparative advantages 

do not just include superior weapons, equipment, 

and maintenance support. They also include superior 

intelligence and logistics support as well as, when 

appropriate, access to coalition air and indirect fire 

assets. After the experience of fighting Da’esh with US 

assistance, it will be difficult for Iraqi leaders to turn 

down the quality of equipment, support, and expertise 

the United States-led coalition can offer. This point 
xii

suggests that a significant component of US security 

cooperation should emphasize interoperability where 

Iraqi forces can “plug into” US capabilities with 

relative ease so it can better support Iraqi military 

operations.

Additionally, partnership with the United States 

can facilitate greater connectivity to the international 

community, which will increase the resources available 

for development and which can, over time, bolster the 

country’s legitimacy as a responsible, international 

actor. Though there is not necessarily a correlation 

between positive international engagement and an 

increasingly trusted and competent Iraqi Army, the 

benefits of such do serve as incentives for the Iraqis to 

make at least some of the necessary reforms.

In exploiting these advantages, the United States 

needs to ensure that whether support is offered or 

withheld, it is done so with specific behaviors in 

mind. Prior to the rise of the Islamic State, the United 

States withheld much critical support, especially 

intelligence, because of Iraq’s relationship with Iran. 

What was missing from that dynamic was specific 

asks regarding Iraq’s cooperation with Iran that could 

open up mutually beneficial space for the United 

States to better cooperate with Iraqis to prevent an 

Islamic terrorist resurgence. As a result, Iraqi requests 

for support often went unmet while there was nothing 

specific individual Iraqi partners could do to address 

US concerns.

At the same time, the United States also provided 

much critical support, including aircraft and major 

weapon systems in addition to an ongoing training 

relationship with the counterterrorism service (CTS).

The result was predictably mixed. The Iraqi military 

had a number of high-end systems they could not 
xiii

maintain or use effectively while the CTS transformed 

into the Iraqi armed forces most capable unit. It may 

have been possible to expand that kind of positive 

influence, but only had the United States made 

provision of these systems contingent on access 

and minimum standards of professional behavior, 

including adherence to effective maintenance 

practices.

In addressing these concerns, the United States is 

not going to compete with Iranian influence using the 

same means as the Iranians. In fact, it is a strength of 

the US approach that it seeks to remove the corruption 

and sectarianism the Iranians exploit. This asymmetry 

in approaches, however, gives Iran the upper hand in 

the short term, as they are able to benefit individual 

Iraqi decisionmakers who use the Iraqi government as 

a source of revenue with which they can build their 

own patronage networks. Meanwhile, US efforts 

benefit the Iraqi state but individuals more indirectly. 

As a result, progress is slow to take hold and easily 

undermined.

However, as the protests in 2019 clearly 

demonstrated, the Iraqi people want to be part of 

a state that is not only more functional, but better 

integrated with the international community. Thus the 

protestors’ demands place pressure on Iraqi leaders 

to make meaningful reforms. However, without 

the proper encouragement and support, there will 

not likely be sufficient collective will to withstand 

Iranian influence and overcome barriers to progress. 

In providing that encouragement and support, the 

United States should use its comparative advantage to 

incentivize the following measures to address critical 

shortcomings that must be resolved if the Iraqi Army 

is to professionalize.
xiv

UNITY OF COMMAND

• Encourage the appointment of a non-sectarian 

and militarily competent Chief of Defense who 

would answer for all security services, including the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), to 

the prime minister.

• Recruit and train capable junior leaders who 

respond through the chain of command to the 

“clearly recognized leadership” of the Chief of 

Defense. US leadership can quietly identify such 

leaders and encourage the Iraqi government to 

appoint them.

• Identify alternative chains of command and continue to discourage their use by reinforcing the 

formal chain. To facilitate this effort, US advisors should reinforce ties between the Ministry 

of Defense, the National Operations Center, and 

the Chief of the Army.

• Identify overlapping areas of responsibility 

within the army and other services, including 

the PMF, and seek ways to make competing 

roles and responsibilities more complementary.

CORRUPTION

• Make US support, including training and equipment, contingent on units adopting accountability practices, in the same way the United 

States does end-service monitoring. The idea is 

to set up a dynamic where a relationship with 

the US Army brings sufficient benefit—tangible 

and intangible—such that abandoning corrupt 

practices will be worthwhile.
xv

• Leverage US support to get the Iraqis to adopt 

procedures to reduce the opportunities for corruption, such as establishing individual bank 

accounts from which Iraqi soldiers would be 

paid.

• Leverage technology to the extent Iraqis can 

adequately absorb it to reinforce corruptionresistant procedures.

• Encourage senior Iraqi leadership to develop 

and promulgate a professional ethic compatible with Iraqi culture which establishes an Iraqi 

Army identity encouraging commitment to 

humanitarian ideals, competence, and effective 

stewardship of the profession.

POOR COMBAT SUPPORT: 

COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND 

LOGISTICS

• Encourage Iraqis not to use civilian communications infrastructure, especially cell phones, that 

is extremely unreliable and unsecure. Rather, 

encourage the use and maintenance of military 

communications.

• Improve intelligence sharing and, more importantly, interoperability of the US and Iraqi intelligence organizations to provide Iraqi forces 

with timely and actionable tactical intelligence.

• Discourage the use of intelligence and security 

services to monitor each other’s activities.

• Encourage Iraqis to develop sustainable technical solutions that provide independent accounting for supplies, spare parts, and maintenance 

activities.
xvi

• Emphasize logistic interoperability so US logistics capabilities can assist the Iraqis quickly in 

times of crisis.

ABSENTEEISM, ADMINISTRATION, AND RISK 

AVERSION

• Improve administrative capabilities to ensure 

better accountability, resources, and pay for soldiers as well as limit opportunities to inflate unit 

rosters with “ghost soldiers.” Better accountability will improve soldier quality of life and 

begin to build trust between soldiers and their 

leaders.

• Recruit college graduates, particularly those 

in technical fields, to assume roles as junior 

officers.

• Emphasize individual and small-unit skills with 

the aim to build a competent base of skilled soldiers and junior leaders while setting the conditions for developing capabilities for larger unit 

operations.

• Emphasize relationships between US professional military educational schools with Iraq’s. 

These relationships should emphasize both tactical and operational skills and the standards 

associated with establishing and maintaining 

a profession. Additionally, the United States 

should attempt to reinvigorate Iraq’s Defense 

Language Institute English language programs, 

as doing so would facilitate interoperability 

with US forces and the larger coalition.
xvii

SECTARIANISM

• Avoid zero tolerance policies regarding Iranian presence. Certain kinds of Iranian influence should limit US cooperation, but making 

the Iraqis always choose between a relationship 

with the United States and a relationship with 

Iran simply cedes space to the Iranians. Rely on 

US advantages the Iranians cannot replicate and 

make any support contingent on taking steps 

required to build a more professional, nonsectarian Iraqi Army.

• Publicize instances of malign Iranian influence.

• Discourage the Iraqi government from creating new security institutions and encourage 

it to place all security organizations under the 

direct operational control of either the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of the Interior, as 

appropriate. 

• Maintain a relationship with and support for 

Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades. Play a role in 

building up the Regional Guard Brigades, but 

in a way that builds, or at least does not undermine, ties with Baghdad. Avoid the zero-sum 

game of Iraqi politics: supporting the Kurds 

could be seen as a threat by Baghdad and result 

in restrictions on its cooperation with the United 

States. Alienating Baghdad risks ceding more 

space to the Iranians, as good relations with 

Baghdad are necessary to contesting malign 

Iranian influence.

• Encourage more international cooperation to 

increase the resources available to the Iraqi 

Army and legitimate the US presence in ways 

the Iranians will not be able to replicate.
xviii

• Encourage a local role for the various militias 

similar to the model the British employed during 

the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman. In Oman, the 

British convinced the Omani sultan to establish 

firqat, which were platoon-to-company-sized 

organizations of tribal fighters who came from 

the same tribes that were rebelling. They were 

employed locally, had a few British Special Air 

Service advisors, and served as scouts, guides, 

and “home guards” that were able to consolidate regular Omani force gains.

With Da’esh no longer in control of Iraqi territory, 

the rationale for US direct action, large numbers of 

advisors, and robust intelligence and logistics support 

will disappear. This point is true from the perspectives 

of both the Iraqis and the United States. For the Iraqis’ 

part, they will likely accept—and the Iranians will 

likely tolerate—only limited forms of US cooperation 

against Da’esh and any other militant groups that 

again threaten Iraqi sovereignty. For the United States’ 

part, limited resources and growing global security 

challenges will likely divert its attention—and, with 

it, security cooperation resources—elsewhere. These 

points suggest whatever bilateral US cooperation 

survives in post-Da’esh Iraq will be inadequate to the 

task of wholly professionalizing the Iraqi Army, much 

less the other defense and security institutions.

Engagement will have to steady and successes will 

likely be small and incremental.

Despite this bleak assessment, all is not necessarily 

lost. It should be clear from this analysis that no 

external party, neither the United States nor Iran, will 

ever be in a position to entirely address the political, 

social, cultural, and economic factors that impede 
xix

the Iraqi Army’s ability to professionalize. But by 

directing attention to the conditions that facilitate the 

growth of a professional officer and noncommissioned 

officer corps, one can help develop institutions that 

communicate and expand expert knowledge as 

well as the factors that undermine trust. In this way, 

external actors can influence the Iraqi Army to make 

the reforms necessary to become an effective fighting 

force.

Moreover, the current moment in Iraq’s military 

history gives it rare momentum to reform. As long as 

it does not embrace again its role in the suppression 

of domestic opposition, the Iraqi Army can capitalize 

on its image as national liberator and defender to 

attract the right kind of recruits as well as the urgency 

of its ongoing defense requirements to enact the right 

kinds of reforms. To support such efforts, the United 

States should engage in continued, steady efforts 

emphasizing the critical areas discussed above to 

set conditions for meaningful improvement when 

political and social conditions permit. Of course, no 

one measure is going to improve the Iraqi Army. But, 

taken together, these recommendations represent 

a good chance for US security cooperation efforts to 

achieve a “tipping point” that enables the kind of 

reform that can allow the Iraqi Army to move beyond 

its historic limitations.

As US security cooperators attempt to set those 

conditions on what will likely be a shoestring budget, 

getting to that tipping point will require implementing 

measures aimed at building trust within the Iraqi 

Army and with the other security services and the 

civilian government. Building that trust will allow 

the Iraqi Army to better harness the resources it has, 

establish the kinds of institutions that can sustain its 
xx

current momentum toward meaningful reform, and 

establish itself as a professional, effective military 

force in a region in desperate need of stability.
1

PROFESSIONALIZING THE IRAQI ARMY: US 

ENGAGEMENT AFTER THE ISLAMIC STATE

INTRODUCTION

While the US intelligence community worries 

about the emergence of “Da’esh 2.0,” the US security 

cooperation community has to worry about the 

development of the “Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 4.0” 

that will have to fight Da’esh and meet a broad range 

of security and defense requirements.1

 Here, the “4.0” 

refers to the facts that this is not the United States’ first 

attempt to assist the Iraqis in building their defense 

capacity and the United States is not the first security 

partner to try. Britain and the Soviet Union also took 

their turns developing Iraqi military capabilities, both 

with similar results.2

Of course, neither the intelligence nor security 

cooperation tasks are easy; however, developing the 

Iraqi Army poses a number of challenges that are as 

much a function of Iraqi military history and culture as 

they are about choices regarding equipment, doctrine, 

1. For the purposes of this discussion, I will refer to the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant by the English rendering of 

the Arabic acronym, “Da’esh.”

2. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus exclusively, 

except where noted, on the Iraqi Army, as described in the 

Iraq entry in the Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The 

Gulf States database. IHS Markit, Iraq, Jane’s Sentinel Security 

Assessment: The Gulf States, September 10, 2018, https://my.ihs

.com/Janes?th=JANES&callingurl=https://janes.ihs.com. The army 

includes 13 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, supporting 

units, and special operations forces. Many of the conclusions here 

apply to Iraq’s other security services. I will use “Iraqi Security 

Forces (ISF)” to refer to the combination of Iraqi military and law 

enforcement organizations.
2

and training. Even before its decisive defeat in 2003 by 

the United States-led coalition, the Iraqi military lost 

to Kurdish rebels, the Israelis, the Iranian Army, and 

the United States. Moreover, despite several years of 

focused security assistance and cooperation by the 

United States, the Iraqi military was again decisively 

defeated by a small number of Da’esh fighters who 

seized significant parts of northern Iraq in 2014.

These defeats occurred despite assistance from 

partners with effective militaries. The British trained 

the Iraqi Army that lost to the Kurds in the 1930s 

and Israelis in the 1940s.3

 The Soviet Union trained 

and equipped the Iraqi Army that lost to the Israelis 

in the 1970s and the Iranians in the 1980s. The Iraqi 

Army did eventually enjoy some limited success 

against the Iranians at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, 

which had as much to do with Iranian weaknesses 

as it did the strengths the Iraqi Army does possess. 

Up to that point, the Iraqi military’s most significant 

successes were against its own people, especially 

rebellious Assyrians and tribal groups, as well as its 

own government, which it overthrew no less than five 

times between 1936 and 1968.

A number of scholars account for the Iraqi 

military’s difficulties by pointing to the “human 

factor,” rather than size, training, and equipment. 

Ken Pollack attributes its poor performance to 

inadequate military effectiveness, which he describes 

as the “ability of soldiers and officers to perform 

on the battlefield, to accomplish military missions, 

and to execute strategies devised by their political 

3. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Boulder, 

CO: The Westview Press, 2012), 54–55.
3

leaders.”4 Trevor Dupuy, in his analysis of Arab army 

performance against the Israelis in 1973, suggests 

the Iraqis were simply not as tactically proficient as 

even the other Arab armies, though he does little to 

account for why.5

 Anthony Cordesman, on the other 

hand, attributes the Iraqi military’s poor combined 

arms capabilities to its focus on regime protection 

and internal stability.6 Others, like Norvell De Atkine, 

would ascribe the Iraqi Army’s failures to a variety of 

cultural influences that resulted in an inflexibility that 

prohibited effective maneuver warfare.7

Though any full explanation would take all of these 

factors into account as well as many others, what any 

external partner can do about them remains elusive. 

For the United States’ part, security cooperation efforts 

have emphasized professionalizing the ISF, which 

includes institution building as well as the provision 

of training and equipment.8 But limited access for 

US personnel, often due to security concerns, and 

generally incoherent execution on the part of the Iraqis, 

whose complex cultural and political environment 

4. Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–

1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 4.

5. Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948–

1974 (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1978), 537.

6. Anthony Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and 

Military Lessons (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and 

International Studies Press, 2003), 17.

7. Norvell B. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East 

Quarterly 6, no. 4 (September 1, 1999), https://www.meforum.org

/articles/other/why-arabs-lose-wars.

8. Terrorism and Iran: Defense Challenges in the Middle East, 115th 

Cong. (2018) (statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, 

US Central Command).
4

places competing demands on their priorities and 

resources, have restricted the impact of these efforts.9

None of these difficulties, however, should be a 

surprise. A survey of Iraqi military history suggests 

a pattern of strengths, weaknesses, and performance 

that includes courageous soldiers, cohesive units, 

incompetent leaders, divided loyalties, poor combat 

support, and weak institutions that have, on occasion, 

risen to the defense challenge. If the United States is 

going to be more successful in this next round, it will 

need to change its approach to better account for 

these factors and how they shape the Iraqi Army’s 

professional culture.

Determining what needs to change requires a better 

understanding of what it means to professionalize 

a military force in the Iraqi context. Of course, it is 

trivial to say that the word “professional” means 

different things to different people. Within Western 

cultures the word is often used to signal a high degree 

of proficiency or, simply, one is getting paid for work. 

In the context of civil-military relations, it is often 

used just to convey that the military is subordinate 

to civilian authority. But, when considering its own 

development, the US military employs a specific 

understanding of “professional” that plays a large role 

in determining how it organizes itself to fight.10 This 

understanding and what it fully entails, however, 

are a product of a long history of confronting specific 

challenges in a uniquely American context. That 

unique history, context, and culture in turn give rise 

9. Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges 

for the United States (Philadelphia, PA: University of Philadelphia 

Press, 2018), 193–194.

10. Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP-1: The 

Army Profession (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, June 2015).
5

to a unique way of war that does not always translate 

well into another history, context, and culture.

Given that the United States’ history and context 

are not shared by the Iraqis, it should not be surprising 

that these efforts to professionalize often fail. Having 

said that, the universal nature of warfare settles to 

some degree what practices lead to effective militaries 

and which ones do not. So despite not sharing a 

history, both the Iraqi Army and its US partners share 

a desired outcome: a capable military. Addressing 

the barriers to developing that capability requires an 

understanding of the professional ideal as well as the 

historical and cultural barriers to achieving that ideal.

THE MILITARY AS A PROFESSION

A military’s professional culture is part of a broader 

set of political and social relationships that give rise 

to a particular way of war which accounts for how a 

particular military organizes for war and performs 

in combat.11 The modern US, if not Western, view 

of the military as a profession is heavily influenced 

by the views of Samuel Huntington, who argued 

that professions are characterized by three features: 

expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.

To be a professional in his view, one must first 

possess “specialized knowledge and skill in a 

significant field of human endeavor,” apply that 

knowledge in service to society, and possess a sense 

of corporate identity that sets the professional 

11. Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Cambridge, 

UK: Polity Press, 2005), 42. Martin Shaw describes a “way of war” 

as a “particular way of organizing for war adopted by an actor or 

group of actors.”
6

apart from the nonprofessional.12 In the military 

context, Huntington characterizes that skill as the 

“management of violence,” which includes “(1) 

organizing, training, and equipping the force; (2) the 

planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its 

operations in and out of combat.” Moreover, unlike 

professions such as medicine and law, the clients of 

which are typically individual members of society, the 

military’s client is the state, to which it is responsible 

for providing expert advice regarding the application 

of military force in defense of the society the state 

represents.13

Professionalism, of course, is an ideal, and no 

occupation is ever entirely professionalized.14 Having 

said that, it is not hard to see how such a professional 

ideal informs how a military organizes, trains, and 

equips itself to manage violence, as well as how it 

interacts with the state and civil society in doing so. In 

this view, the state, as the client, gives the profession 

the autonomy to recruit and certify its members 

and regulate their professional activities by a code 

of ethics, as well as, most importantly, a monopoly 

on applying their respective expertise in the service 

of human progress.15 This monopoly, in turn, gives 

the profession jurisdiction over the provision of the 

relevant social good.16 This jurisdiction makes sense, 

12. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The 

Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: The 

Belknap Press, 1957), 8–10.

13. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 11–18.

14. Allan R. Millett, Military Professionalism and Officership 

in America (Columbus, OH: Mershon Center of the Ohio State 

University, 1979), 2.

15. Millett, Military Professionalism, 3.

16. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Pamphlet 360-

302: The Profession of Arms: The 1962 Lees Knowles Lectures Given at 

Trinity College, Cambridge, by Lt.-General Sir John Winthrop Hackett
7

as Alan R. Millett observes, because the “profession, 

serving the vital interests of man, considers its first 

ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the 

client.”17 As long as the profession does not violate 

that imperative, it should have the trust of the client, 

and it should reasonably expect its autonomy over its 

jurisdiction to be secure. Or so the theory goes.

This view of professionalism is, of course, Western, 

which raises the question whether it can be applied in 

non-Western contexts or, if it can, whether it should. 

The short answer to both questions is “no.” It would 

be futile, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, 

to try again to export a Western model of military 

effectiveness to the Iraqi Army. But there is an 

objective standard here. States want their armies to 

win wars. When armies do not do that, then something

has to change. This point suggests that there should be 

some way of transferring some level of capability to 

armies that exist in different environments.

So though this view of professionalism may be 

Western, aspects of it do transcend culture. Expert 

knowledge, autonomy, and jurisdiction in service 

to a democratically elected civilian government set 

conditions for trust between the army and the state 

and between the army and the society it defends. 

Achieving these conditions do not ensure victory; 

however, they are necessary conditions for improving 

any army’s military effectiveness. Security cooperation 

efforts should thus focus on achieving a level of 

professionalism, as described here, for an Iraqi Army 

that has only known it by exception. To understand 

(Washington, DC: The Pentagon, November 17, 1966), 3. Hackett 

stated the “function of the profession of arms is the ordered 

application of force in the resolution of a social problem.”

17. Millett, Military Professionalism, 3.
8

how, one must first understand how the Iraqi Army’s 

history has shaped its culture.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IRAQI ARMY

Prehistory of the Iraqi Army

The martial history of the Iraqi Army begins with 

the somewhat romanticized Bedouin raiding culture, 

which emphasized courage, stealth, and cleverness and 

deemphasized direct combat as a way to avoid blood 

feuds.18 Islam moderated this identity, as the constant 

raiding and subsequent blood feuds made the Arab 

tribes vulnerable to the more unified Muslim armies, 

which exploited this vulnerability to rapidly expand 

the religion on the Arabian Peninsula.19 Thus, for the 

first time on such a grand scale, Islam united people in 

the region to fight for a cause that transcended narrow 

tribal identities and transformed largely unknown 

tribal groups from the Arabian Desert into rulers of 

the Middle East, North Africa, and Spain.20 Later this 

unity would set conditions for pan-Arabism, which 

had a profound impact on the Iraqi Army’s identity.

By the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire 

had established itself as the dominant power in the 

18. Ralph Patai, The Arab Mind, rev. ed. (New York, NY: 

Hatherleigh Press, 2002), 86. See also Williamson Murray and 

Kevin M. Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic 

History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5. 

Murray and Woods describe Arab military culture as “resting on 

a complex mix of myths and notions of bravery, tribal loyalty, 

raiding parties, and martyrdom” which were both features of that 

culture and measures of its effectiveness.

19. Patai, The Arab Mind, 222.

20. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York, NY: Vintage 

Books, 1993), 192.
9

Muslim world, ensuring its place as a key influencer 

in the armies of almost every Middle Eastern state, 

certainly Iraq. For much of their history, the Ottoman 

armies were often more modern—and more effective—

than their European counterparts. After some decline 

in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 

Ottomans undertook a modernization effort beginning 

in 1826 and invited European advisors, one of whom 

was the Prussian general Helmuth von Moltke (the 

elder), to assist with military modernization.21 The 

result was a competent, modern army, but one whose 

soldiers often loathed the empire they were supposed 

to defend.22 This loathing was certainly the case of 

Iraqis in the ranks, who often joined secret Arab 

nationalist organizations, even while they served the 

empire.23

The Modern Iraqi Army

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at 

the end of World War I, the British took control over 

Iraq’s boundaries, government, and military under 

its postwar mandate. After a tribal revolt in the south 

in 1920, the British installed King Faysal, a Sunni 

leader from Saudi Arabia, in 1921 and established 

a constitution that would integrate Iraq’s disparate 

population under a partially, at least, democratic 

government.24 Concurrently, it also established a small 

Iraqi Army capable of maintaining state authority 

21. Keegan, History of Warfare, 32–39.

22. Sydney Nettleton Fisher and William Ochsenwald, The 

Middle East: A History (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1990), 

161–162.

23. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York, NY: 

Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc., 1935), 46.

24. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 22–24.
10

over an often restive population but not large enough 

to challenge British rule.25 As a hedge against the 

uncertain effectiveness of that army, the British more 

directly relied on Assyrian levies to see to their specific 

interests and used the Royal Air Force to bolster both 

the levies and the Iraqi Army.26

Recruitment, in the beginning, was difficult. A year 

after establishment, the army had only grown to 3,618 

personnel, far short of the modest initial 6,000-soldier 

target.27 The lower ranks were, for the most part, Shia, 

though members of other sects did join. Much of the 

mostly Sunni officer corps was composed of former 

Ottoman officials, mostly Sunni, who had previously 

participated in the Arab revolt against the Turks 

and returned to Iraq to take part in building the new 

state.28 At the outset, the British had little trust in 

and less regard for the Ottomans, so they limited the 

number they commissioned to 250 and excluded any 

who had participated in the revolt of 1920 or opposed 

the British in Syria. Conscious of Iraq’s diversity, the 

British tried to make up the difference by reserving 

positions for Iraq’s Shia tribes, but largely made up 

the difference with recruits from well-off urban, Sunni 

families. So, despite attempts at integration, the officer 

25. Ibrahim al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq’s Armed 

Forces: An Analytical History (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 20.

26. Paul P. J. Hemphill, “The Formation of the Iraqi Army, 

1921–1933,” in The Integration of Modern Iraq, Abbas Kelidar, ed. 

(New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 94; Marr, Modern History 

of Iraq, 24–26.

27. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 21–22.

28. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 26. I owe the point regarding 

these officers’ participation in the Arab revolt against the Turks to 

an anonymous observer.
11

corps remained largely urban and Sunni, much like 

the civilian leadership, and fervently nationalist.29

As a result, the Iraqi Army started off with an 

identity crisis. The British wanted a small, indigenous 

force that could share the security burden of 

controlling unrest and securing the borders as a means 

to realizing Britain’s other interests. Iraqis, however, 

wanted a much larger army capable of maintaining 

order; building a national identity that would “make 

Iraqis out of peasants, nomads and townsmen alike, 

of Sunni and Shii, of Arabs and Kurds;” as well as 

play an important role as part of the larger Arab 

nation.30 Perhaps more importantly, this new Iraqi 

soldier would become the “new model Iraqi citizen” 

who would take the ideals of patriotism, loyalty, and 

national service into civilian life.31

Building this identity would require a substantially 

larger army than the approximately 9,000 ground 

troops the British thought suited for Iraq’s security 

needs. So, in 1927, the Iraqi parliament introduced 

a conscription bill to expand the army. The British 

opposed it because they believed Iraq did not have 

the financial or administrative resources to manage 

a large force. They, however, were not alone in their 

opposition. Nationalists opposed it because they saw 

the army as British-controlled, Shia opposed it because 

they saw the army as another mechanism for Sunni 

domination, and tribal sheikhs opposed it because 

they thought conscription would undermine their 

tribal authority. Thus by the time of independence 

in 1932, the Iraqi Army was still relatively small, 

29. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 98–99; Marr, 

Modern History of Iraq, 25–26.

30. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 92–100.

31. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 24.
12

numbering around 11,500.32 With independence, 

however, the expansionists won and, by 1936, the Iraqi 

Army had grown to twice its original size, forcing the 

government to recruit officers from “promising sons 

of poorer families” and thus breaking class barriers 

that previously disincentivized wider participation.33

Despite that expansion, the building of the Iraqi Army 

did not have quite the nationalizing effect desired.

Part of the army’s failure to act as a nationalizing 

element lay with its culture. Iraqi society then, much as 

it is today, was essentially “personality-oriented and 

bound to a considerable extent by patronage and interpersonal ties.”34 As a result, institutional autonomy 

would often be hostage to the other social ties its 

members had. For senior leaders, that could mean 

prioritizing the political needs of particular patrons 

within the government over that of the institution. For 

those farther from the top, it meant seeing the Iraqi 

Army as a means to obtaining government patronage 

and resources. Loyalties, however, remained with the 

tribal, sectarian, or local community.

Despite these diverse loyalties, the army did play 

an important nationalizing role. The army was a 

venue for upward mobility for both those who would 

opt in to the Iraqi state and enforcers who brought 

back into line those who would not. The most iconic of 

the army’s early enforcing roles came when it fought 

the Assyrians, who had become a well-armed, but 

recalcitrant, minority population that refused to submit 

to Baghdad.35 The fighting was limited, consisting of 

one minor skirmish that quickly degenerated into 

32. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 92–97.

33. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 100.

34. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 100.

35. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 39.
13

mass killings and looting of Assyrian villages.36 But 

the Iraqi people saw this as the army’s first real victory 

over forces of instability. The returning soldiers—

especially their commander, the Kurdish general 

Bakr Sidqi—were greeted as heroes. The result was 

greater interest from Kurds and tribesmen in serving 

in the military, which set the stage for the passage of a 

conscription bill.37

These events established the emerging army’s 

identity as either patron or punisher. For non-Sunnis, 

like Bakr Sidqi, opting in was a means of obtaining 

state patronage, which enabled the building of Sunni 

patronage networks. For those such as the Assyrians 

who chose not to buy in, the army functioned as a 

punisher and brought such would-be rebels in line. 

Thus, the Iraqi military leadership saw for themselves 

an integral role in ensuring popular compliance with 

Baghdad’s rule and as a check when that rule took on 

a character that the army felt was detrimental to its or 

the nation’s interests.

Ironically, the first such check came in 1936 against 

the government of Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi 

at the hands of Bakr Sidqi, now commander of the 

Iraqi armed forces, and Hikmat Sulayman, a former 

supporter of Hashimi’s who had been denied the 

key post of minister of the interior.38 Frustrated by 

Hashimi’s dictatorial moves, which included using 

the army to crack down on opposition, as well as 

a recalcitrance to modernizing and reforming the 

36. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 107. In one 

case, Iraqi forces killed around 315 civilians who had huddled 

around a police station in the city of Simele for protection; Marr, 

Modern History of Iraq, 39.

37. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 40.

38. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 46.
14

economy and military, Sidqi and Sulayman overthrew 

him but left the monarchy in place.39

Unfortunately, Sulayman and Sidqi’s government 

did not last long either. Sidqi, being a Kurd, feared 

Iraq’s participation in a pan-Arab state would 

marginalize the Kurdish people, and thus did little to 

advance the pan-Arab agenda.40 As a result, he was 

assassinated in 1937 on the orders of Arab nationalist 

officers.41 This ushered in military rule until 1941, when 

the British intervened after another coup replaced the 

pro-British government with one sympathetic to the 

Nazis. When that government tried to prevent the 

British from moving troops into Basra, the British 

military intervened. With a small number of troops, 

the British military defeated the Iraqi Army in under 

30 days and reinstalled the pro-British government, 

which allowed the British to maintain control of Iraq 

until after World War II.42 As Trevor Dupuy observes, 

though by 1941 the Iraqi Army had been the longeststanding army in the Arab world, it was “an Army 

without much confidence in itself,” having been 

repeatedly beaten by smaller, often less well-equipped 

adversaries.43

FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISRAELIS

The Iraqi Army’s first action after World War II 

was to participate in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, in 

which it sent a sizeable force of four infantry brigades 

and an armored battalion, along with support 

39. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 43–46; Marashi and Salama, 

Iraq’s Armed Forces, 46–49.

40. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 52.

41. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 48.

42. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 54–55.

43. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 18.
15

personnel, to fight under the Arab Liberation Army. 

The Iraqi Army’s performance in this conflict was 

entirely consistent with its past. As Pollack observes, 

senior leadership was unimaginative and uncreative, 

junior officers showed little initiative, and soldiers 

were poorly trained and uncommitted. Having said 

that, Iraqi units fought hard and showed a great deal 

of cohesion and courage. Perhaps surprisingly, the 

Iraqis also appeared to do well in logistics, having 

adequately moved a fairly large force hundreds of 

miles and supported it without relying on allies.44

The Iraqis largely missed the 1967 war, due 

largely to readiness deficiencies, the speed of Israeli 

operations, and devastating air attacks by the Israeli 

air force against the token force they did try to 

send.45 This pattern repeated itself when the Iraqis 

entered the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this war, Iraq 

sent a large force consisting of 2 armored divisions, 

2 infantry brigades, 12 artillery battalions, and a 

Special Forces brigade, totaling approximately 60,000 

men, 700 tanks, 500 armored personnel carriers, and 

over 200 artillery pieces. Here again, Iraqi logistics 

performed well and, this time, moved a corps-sized 

unit over 1,000 kilometers in just a few days and 

sustained it for several weeks.46 Moreover, the Iraqis 

had some tactical success when elements of the Iraqi 

3rd Armored Division showed up on the Israeli flank, 

forcing the Israelis to stop their advance on Damascus 

and deal with the threat the Iraqi forces represented. 

The Israelis never recovered their momentum, and the 

delay effectively stopped their advance to Damascus.47

44. Pollack, Arabs at War, 155.

45. Pollack, Arabs at War, 167.

46. Pollack, Arabs at War, 167–168.

47. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 468.
16

The Iraqis owe this victory more to accident than 

intention. Up until contact, they were not aware of 

their proximity to the Israelis, having failed to send out 

any reconnaissance or engage in tactical intelligence 

collection.48 Over the next few days, the Iraqis would 

haphazardly try to push the Israelis back. Rather than 

attempt to maneuver around the exhausted Israeli 

formations, they drove straight into the trap set for 

them by the Israeli commander. Three days later, as a 

result of subsequent skirmishes with the Israelis, the 

Iraqis had lost 80 percent of the tanks it had committed 

to battle.49

FIGHTING AGAINST THE KURDS

The Iraqi Army arguably had more success against 

the Kurds, but certainly at a much higher cost than it 

should have paid. As Sidqi’s overthrow demonstrated, 

the inclusion of Kurds in Iraq set up an irreconcilable 

tension in Iraqi politics: Baghdad’s moves toward 

Arab nationalism alienated the Kurds, many Shia 

encouraged their own separatist tendencies, and any 

actor’s moves toward an independent Iraqi identity 

alienated the pan-Arab nationalists.50 Moreover, 

Kurdish aspirations for true independence, frustrated 

by the Treaty of Lausanne, set additional conditions 

for tensions with Iraq’s neighbors, all of whom had 

their own restive Kurdish populations.51

48. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 467–468; Pollack, Arabs at War, 

174.

49. Pollack, Arabs at War, 169.

50. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London, 

UK: I. B. Taurius, 1996), 142–144.

51. Edmund Ghareeb, “The Kurdish Issue,” in Iraq: Its History, 

People, and Politics, ed. Shams Inati (Amherst, NY: Humanity 

Books, 2003), 168; McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 142.
17

Even under the British mandate, the Iraqi Army 

had often and unsuccessfully confronted Kurdish 

separatists.52 As a result, the new government had little 

appetite for more fighting, so relations were relatively 

quiet from Iraq’s independence to the 1960s. In fact, 

Kurdish participation in the army increased after the 

successes of Bakr Sidqi against the Assyrian levies 

and tribes.53 The situation changed in 1958 when Abd 

al-Karim Qasim overthrew the Iraqi government in yet 

another coup, ending the British-backed monarchy. 

Qasim then reached out to the Soviets, who were more 

than happy to assist with Iraq’s military expansion.54

Ironically, the Kurds originally supported Qasim’s 

rise to power, believing that he would support greater 

autonomy and independence for the Iraqi-Kurdish 

region. But despite an apparent desire to do so, Qasim 

could not find an appropriate balance between the 

pan-Arabists and the Kurds. To make matters worse, 

he also imposed land-reform measures that would 

have distributed more than half of tribal-held lands 

in Kurdistan as well as the rest of Iraq. As a result, 

the Kurds, under the leadership of mullah Mustafa 

al-Barzani, revolted.55 In September 1961, fighting 

started after Barzani’s peshmerga ambushed an army 

convoy.56

The first round of fighting ended in a stalemate. 

Though the Kurds were able to take almost all of Iraqi 

Kurdistan within two weeks, they were not able to 

hold it. As Pollack notes, they were “unprepared for 

serious combat” and retreated to the mountains for 

52. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 105.

53. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 40.

54. Pollack, Arabs at War, 156.

55. Pollack, Arabs at War, 156–157; Marr, Modern History of 

Iraq, 105; McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 306–307.

56. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 105–106.
18

the winter.57 The Iraqi Army’s response, however, 

was not much more effective. The army maintained a 

defensive posture, garrisoned major Kurdish towns, 

and conducted operations largely to keep roads and 

supply lines open, hoping the rebellion would collapse 

from internal conflict, characteristic of inter-Kurdish 

politics. Such a strategy was, of course, manpowerintensive, and eventually three-quarters of the Iraqi 

Army was in Kurdistan.58

Unfortunately for the Iraqi Army, its operations 

were characteristically indiscriminate, and Iraqi 

soldiers frequently killed civilians and looted Kurdish 

villages. Predictably, this practice had the effect 

of encouraging support for Barzani, even from his 

enemies, and reduced the likelihood of the rebellion 

falling apart. The Iraqi Army’s defensive posture 

also gave the Kurds the opportunity to regroup and 

establish external sources of supply from Kurds in Iran 

and Turkey, as well as the Shah of Iran, whom Qasim 

needlessly alienated.59 As Pollack observes, “Thus by 

taking control of the major roads at night and using 

secondary routes that the army did not patrol during 

the day, the Kurds had plenty of access to the supplies 

they needed. Meanwhile, the systematic destruction 

of Kurdish villages by Iraqi air and ground forces 

ensured a steady flow of new recruits and Kurdish 

deserters into Barzani’s camp.”60

In 1963, frustrated with Qasim’s passive strategy, 

elements of the army initiated a coup that brought 

Abd al-Salam Arif and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr to 

power. Even though Arif was not a member, it brought 

57. Pollack, Arabs at War, 157.

58. Pollack, Arabs at War, 158.

59. Pollack, Arabs at War, 158–159.

60. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 92; Pollack, 

Arabs at War, 159.
19

the Baath Party to power as well.61 Under the Baath 

regime, the newly empowered Iraqi Army conducted 

a series of offensives against the Kurds, none of which 

were successful. The failure of the first offensive 

was largely due to tactical reasons. The Iraqi Army 

characteristically stuck to the roads and conducted 

frontal assaults against Kurdish positions with little 

reconnaissance, maneuver, or flank protection. 

Unfortunately for the Kurds, all they could do was 

conduct ambushes, and thus they were not able to 

effectively capitalize on their successes or the Iraqi 

Army’s weaknesses. As a result, this first offensive 

ended in stalemate, due in no small part to the Kurds’ 

ability to get supplies from Turkish Kurds and Iran.62

When the Iraqi Army undertook its second 

offensive in the spring of 1965, it had effectively 

removed the Kurds’ external support by getting 

the Turks to conduct an offensive against their own 

Kurdish rebels and Iran to agree to stop supplying the 

Iraqi Kurds as well as block peshmerga who might 

try to cross the border. But the Iraqi Army’s tactics 

did not change, and the Kurds again defeated the 

army. It tried again the next spring but, despite some 

tactical success, lost again. The final defeat came when 

Kurds attacked a large Iraqi Army formation that had 

established a camp in a valley but was not defending 

the surrounding heights. The Kurds descended and 

killed more than 2,000 Iraqi soldiers before they fled, 

leaving much of their heavy equipment behind. The 

Iraqis tried again in March 1970 with little success. So, 

61. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 92–93; Pollack, 

Arabs at War, 159.

62. Pollack, Arabs at War, 160–161.
20

in March 1970, Baghdad granted autonomy and other 

concessions to the Kurds.63

The resulting peace, however, did not last. After 

four years of Baghdad’s inconsistent implementation 

of the 1970 agreement, coupled with Barzani’s belief 

that Iran and the United States would support him, 

the Kurds went on the offensive.64 In the intervening 

four years, in addition to making deals with Iran, the 

United States, and Israel for support, he had built 

up the peshmerga to approximately 50,000–60,000 

regulars and another 50,000 irregulars. The large 

number of troops convinced Barzani that he could 

adopt conventional military operations and avoid 

the stalemates of the past by taking the Iraqi Army 

head-on. But Baghdad had also built up its strength 

during the same time and had 90,000 troops, 1,200 

tanks and armored personnel carriers, and 200 combat 

aircraft arrayed against the Kurds. Moreover, it had 

learned some tactical lessons from its earlier failures 

against the Kurds and Israelis.65

Though the Iraqis by this point had acquired 

equipment and some advisers from the Soviet Union, 

they never fully embraced Soviet military doctrine. 

In fact, after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Iraqis 

had abandoned most of what they had learned from 

the Russians and sent all but a few technical advisers 

home. In their place they welded Soviet and British 

practices and introduced a few innovations of their 

own. First, they resolved many of the logistics issues 

that had allowed the Kurds’ starvation strategy to 

work. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they 

abandoned frontal assaults and instead adopted a 

63. Pollack, Arabs at War, 162–164.

64. McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 327–338.

65. Pollack, Arabs at War, 176–177.
21

doctrine of “overwhelming firepower.” As Pollack 

describes it, “[r]ather than charging a position as had 

been their previous practice, Iraqi forces were trained 

not to assault a well-defended objective at all, but to 

dig in immediately and then call in massive firepower 

from tanks, artillery, mortars, multiple rocket 

launchers, and close support aircraft to obliterate the 

source of resistance.”66

The implementation of these tactics, as Pollack 

observes, was not elegant, “but with the cooperation 

of the peshmerga, they got the job done.”67 Instead of 

retreating back into the mountains as they had done 

in the past, the peshmerga tried to take the Iraqis 

head-on. The result was disastrous for the Kurds. Had 

it not been for Iranian intervention, which included 

heavy weapons and, later, troops, they would have 

been defeated. Saddam Hussein, who was then vice 

president, broke the stalemate in 1975 by negotiating 

a deal with the Iranians which included a number of 

Iraqi territorial concessions codified in the Algiers 

Agreement of 1975 in exchange for their withdrawal 

of support for the Kurds. Without that support, the 

Kurds were quickly defeated.68

THE BAATH PARTY

After the Baath Party reclaimed power in 1968, it 

made a number of deliberate moves to prevent the 

history that had enabled its return from repeating itself. 

That history consisted of three elements: infiltrating 

the armed forces; using the armed forces to bring the 

party to power; and then asserting control over the 

armed forces once in power. So that would not happen 

66. Pollack, Arabs at War, 177–178.

67. Pollack, Arabs at War, 179.

68. McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 338.
22

again, the Baath Party first placed the military under 

the control of the Revolutionary Command Council, 

which would become the ultimate decision-making 

body in Iraq and which served to control and eliminate 

opposition within the government, the military, and 

society at-large. This move was significant. Before, 

the Iraqi Army essentially had veto power over the 

government and over any matter it considered within 

its or the state’s interest. Now, that veto belonged to 

civilians, guaranteeing their unchecked domination of 

the political process.69

Second, the Baath Party immediately expelled or 

executed a number of officers who were not members 

of the party. It took special interest in purging 

members of the Iraqi Communist Party, which at the 

time was the only other secular party that could put 

together a cross-sectarian opposition to the Baathists. 

They continued over the next two years to “rotate, 

expel, or retire” any officers they deemed a threat to 

party control. Some 2,000 officers were purged during 

this time. To further control the officer corps, they 

prohibited any political activity not endorsed by the 

Baath Party under penalty of death.

Third, by the end of 1970, the party had replaced the 

expelled officers with 3,000 Baathists, at various ranks, 

effectively—and intentionally—providing the party 

with an alternative chain of command that reported 

to party headquarters rather than the formal military 

chain of command.70 Essentially, the party politicized 

the military in order to keep it out of politics.71

69. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 110–112.

70. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 112–113.

71. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 56–57. These 

authors note that in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in the SixDay War with Israel in 1967, the Baath Party did try to pay some 
23

In the years between the Baath Party takeover and 

the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Iraq undertook a 

major military expansion and reform overseen by 

Saddam Hussein, who was vice president for most of 

this time. First, he established a 150,000-man popular 

army to handle domestic security functions, providing 

a check on the military as well as freeing it for other 

missions. Second, and in part because of the army’s 

poor performance in the 1973 war, he expanded and 

modernized the Iraqi military, doubling its size from 

6 to 12 divisions, and purchased 1,600 modern T-72s 

and BMP-1s as well as over 200 fighters and fighterbombers from the Soviet Union.72 Meanwhile, he 

continued to purge senior leadership and promoted 

those loyal to him in their place, regardless of their 

competence. Further, he frequently rotated those he 

appointed to prevent them from building loyalty 

among their men.73 This well-equipped but poorly led 

army would be the one with which Saddam would go 

to war with Iran.

FIGHTING AGAINST THE IRANIANS

After the fall of the Shah in 1979, militant Kurds, 

who managed to flee into Iran despite the border 

closure, took advantage of the chaos and crossed 

attention to professionalizing the military; however, ensuring 

political loyalty took priority.

72. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 59–60; Pollack, 

Arabs at War, 182. Murray and Woods make the point that new 

equipment did not translate into new capabilities. Two years after 

receiving four squadrons of MiG-23s, only two were operational 

due to pilot and maintenance-crew shortages.

73. Pollack, Arabs at War, 182. Pollack provides the following 

numbers: Iraq—2,750 tanks, 1,040 artillery pieces, and 330 fighter 

bombers; and Iran—approximately 500 operational tanks, 300 

functional artillery pieces, and less than 100 operable aircraft.
24

back into Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, the 

revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini 

called for the spread of the revolution to the Shia of 

Iraq. These dual provocations, coupled with Saddam’s 

perception of a weakened Iranian military due to 

purges by the new regime, presented Saddam with an 

opportunity to reverse the concessions made in 1975. 

At first, he tried an indirect approach and sought to 

destabilize Khomeini’s government through support 

to its opposition. When this effort failed to get the 

desired results, he decided to take matters into his 

own hands and, on September 23, ordered the Iraqi 

Army to invade Iran.74

The offensive did not go well for long as the 

army tried to defeat the Iranians with the same 

overwhelming-firepower tactics that worked with the 

Kurds. Despite the fact they heavily outnumbered the 

Iranian forces by a ratio of one-to-five in tanks and 

a ratio of one-to-three in artillery and aircraft, Iraqi 

forces would halt at the first sign of resistance (no 

matter how small), dig in, and blast the objective. The 

main reason for this state of affairs, of course, was 

leadership: Saddam’s politicization of the army, which 

included putting family members and loyalists with 

no military experience into senior positions, meant 

that “virtually none of Iraq’s senior generals . . . had 

the experience and understanding to command large 

forces.”75 There were no attempts to take advantage 

of the Iraqi forces’ superior numbers and mobility to 

outmaneuver the Iranian forces.

Moreover, there were few attempts to conduct 

tactical intelligence and reconnaissance operations 

74. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 181–182; Murray and Woods, 

The Iran-Iraq War, 97.

75. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 62.
25

to locate the Iranian units so they could be 

outmaneuvered. While Iraqi logistics performed well 

and soldiers again “showed tenacity, courage, and 

endurance in combat,” they did not get far.76 After 

two months of fighting, the Iraqis had only advanced 

about 65 kilometers.77 As a result, it did not take long 

for Iran to take those kilometers back during offensives 

conducted in the spring of 1982.78

In July 1982, the Iranians decided to invade 

Iraqi territory and attempted to seize Basra while 

inspiring a Shia uprising against Saddam Hussein.79

But invading Iraq was very different than defending 

Iran. Iraqis were now fighting on Iraqi soil. In addition 

to increasing the determination of the average Iraqi 

soldier, it afforded the Iraqi Army better lines of 

communication, which it amplified with fortifications 

in depth. Moreover, Saddam had replaced 200–300 

loyal but incompetent senior leaders with those 

who were at least competent.80 Taking these factors 

together, the Iraqis were able to stall four Iranian 

offensives around Basra undertaken from 1982 to 

1986. Furthermore, Khomeini’s hoped-for revolt never 

happened, demonstrating that even under Saddam, 

a sense of Arab, if not Iraqi, nationality superseded 

religious affiliation in determining individual loyalty.81

While the Iranians’ limitations in mobility and supply 

accounted for their failure in part, much of the credit 

goes to Saddam’s newly professionalized General 

76. Pollack, Arabs at War, 192–193.

77. Pollack, Arabs at War, 187–190.

78. Anthony Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The 

Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO: 

The Westview Press, 1990), 138–140.

79. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 192.

80. Pollack, Arabs at War, 206–209.

81. Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 169.
26

Staff, who were able to concentrate forces and rapidly 

respond to Iranian attacks.82 Pollack notes, however, 

that the “dog that did not bark” was “Iraqi tactical 

effectiveness.” He observes the following:

Despite Herculean labors of Iraq’s general staff to improve 

their army, there was no discernable enhancement in 

tactical competence. Iraqi units continued to perform well 

when sitting behind their impressive fortifications and 

blasting away at the Iranians, but—as the failure of both of 

their operational-level counteroffensives demonstrated—

they remained hapless at basically all other operations. 

Iraqi tactical commanders had displayed all of the 

recurrent problems of passivity, inflexibility, dogmatism, 

poor combined-arms integration, unwillingness to 

maneuver, and mismanagement of information.83

To lift the siege against Basra, Iraqi forces had to go 

on the offensive, a task of which the army was not 

capable. To build that capability, beginning in 1982, 

Saddam’s generals expanded the Republican Guard 

and began to promote on merit. They filled vacant 

slots with drafted college students and soldiers from 

other units who had demonstrated capability.84 By 

the beginning of 1988, the Republican Guard had 

expanded from 7 brigades to 28, with a total of 100,000 

troops who were given the best weapons, including 

Iraq’s newly acquired Soviet T-72s as well as modern 

European and South African artillery and advanced 

Soviet air defense weapons. The Iraqis also made 

improvements in naval infantry, chemical weapons, 

and even tactical intelligence, including the use of 

82. Pollack, Arabs at War, 224.

83. Pollack, Arabs at War, 224.

84. Pollack, Arabs at War, 219.
27

night-vision devices, radio intercept and electronic 

warfare, as well as tactical counter-battery radar.85

Despite being overwhelmingly Sunni, however, 

the expansion of the Republican Guard and emphasis 

on merit over loyalty played on Saddam’s paranoia. 

As a result, he created the Special Republican Guard 

to handle the mission of protecting the regime.86 This 

is just one example of the kind of layering Saddam 

imposed on the various security services to ensure no 

one service grew powerful enough to challenge his 

government.87 As Cordesman observes, “Many Iraqi 

combat elements were better at watching each other, 

and at suppressing the Iraqi people, than at fighting a 

foreign opponent.”88

The signature innovation, however, was to 

provide detailed scripting of military operations. 

Since previous attempts to encourage initiative, 

creativity, and aggressiveness had failed, the General 

Staff decided to plan operations in minute detail. As 

a result, they wrote the elements typically missing 

from Iraqi operations—coordination, maneuver, and 

innovation—into the “scripts,” which the assigned 

forces would then rehearse until “they could perform 

each task from memory.”89 The General Staff kept the 

duration of these operations short and the objectives 

of these operations limited to “keep unforeseen events 

to a minimum.”90

85. Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 354–

357; Pollack, Arabs at War, 218–220.

86. Pollack, Arabs at War, 220.

87. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 234–235. See also Ibrahim 

al-Marashi, “The Family, Clan, and Tribal Dynamics of Saddam’s 

Security and Intelligence Network,” International Journal of 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 2 (April 2003), 202–211.

88. Cordesman, The Iraq War, 16–17.

89. Pollack, Arabs at War, 220–221.

90. Pollack, Arabs at War, 230.
28

The plan worked. The first offensive to retake the 

al-Faw peninsula caught the Iranians off guard and “in 

thirty-five hours, the Iraqis had secured the peninsula 

and captured much of the Iranian equipment intact.”91

In the end, five Iraqi offensives destroyed Iran’s 

ground forces and forced the Iranians to accept a 

ceasefire. Though the Iraqis never fully overcame 

the issues that kept them from defeating the Iranians 

inside Iran, they did figure out a way to adapt to 

those shortcomings and get the most out of the forces 

they had. With detailed planning combined with 

improved intelligence, some of which was provided 

by the United States, the Iraqi Army was able to push 

back the Iranians, who had no choice but to accept a 

cease-fire.92

According to an unclassified Defense Intelligence 

Agency assessment, the Iraqi Army at the end of 

the Iran-Iraq War was a “battle-hardened force 

capable of conducting effective offensive and 

defensive operations. The Iraqi Army polished its 

offensive capability, achieving good results during 

final operations against the Iranians.”93 What that 

assessment ignored was the important role chemical 

weapons played in breaking up the Iranian Basra 

offensive as well in the Iraqi Army’s final push to 

drive the Iranians out of Iraq.94 So, though the army’s 

subsequent performance against the United States 

in 1991 suggests that assessment was somewhat 

optimistic, Pollack does observe it had a “reasonably 

good ability to perform set-piece offensives and static 

91. Pollack, Arabs at War, 225.

92. Pollack, Arabs at War, 225–230.

93. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, AIA-DS1-90: Identifying the Iraqi Threat and How They Fight (Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, September 1990), 2.

94. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 228, 294, and 339.
29

defensive operations” as well as good, especially by 

regional standards, logistic and combat engineering 

capabilities. But it remained, as it had since its 

founding, “almost entirely incapable of fighting fluid, 

maneuver battles.”95

FIGHTING AGAINST THE AMERICANS

In many ways, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was 

necessitated by the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War. 

Though Saddam claimed victory, the Iraqi economy 

was under a great deal of stress from almost a 

decade at war and, moreover, Saddam’s army 

had expanded to approximately one million men, 

with commensurate growth in sophisticated—and 

expensive—equipment.96 At the same time, Iraq was 

also saddled with sizeable foreign debt, the repayment 

of which amounted to over 50 percent of oil revenues 

in 1990. Austerity measures, such as downsizing 

the government, especially the military, simply 

exacerbated unemployment and further stressed the 

economy, thus threatening the patronage networks 

Saddam relied on to maintain power.97 At first, 

Saddam turned to his gulf neighbors, especially Saudi 

Arabia and Kuwait, to help him out of this economic 

mess by backing oil price increases, forgiving the 

debt Iraq owed them, and giving to Iraq’s economic 

reconstruction. When they refused, Saddam invaded 

Kuwait.98

95. Pollack, Arabs at War, 264.

96. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: 

From Revolution to Dictatorship (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 

283–284.

97. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 

Cambridge University Press, 2005), 251.

98. Tripp, A History of Iraq, 251–252.
30

As is well-known, the initial invasion of Kuwait 

went well for the Iraqi Army. Essentially driving 

down the Basra-Jahra highway, the army brushed 

aside Kuwaiti defenses at the Mutla Ridge and seized 

Kuwait City in less than 24 hours. It employed the 

same formula that led to success in the Iran-Iraq War: 

elite units, acting on well-rehearsed and detailed 

plans, were able to achieve success before unforeseen 

events could disrupt the script.99 But as is also wellknown, the resulting Iraqi defense of Kuwait did not 

go so well.

The reasons for that failure begin with bad 

strategic assumptions. First, the Iraqi military 

believed the “brief, sharp clashes” that characterized 

its way of war would be sufficient to defend against 

a casualty-averse US military and it would be able to 

survive whatever damage the coalition air campaign 

inflicted.100 It also underestimated the coalition’s 

logistic and maneuver capabilities, which enabled 

the “left hook” that caught Iraqi forces by surprise.101

Exacerbating that surprise were the high numbers 

of casualties it suffered as a result of the coalition air 

campaign. The campaign, which started January 17, 

1991, caused the loss of approximately 150,000 troops, 

many of whom deserted, and 20–30 percent of the 

Iraqi Army’s armored forces by the time the ground 

war began on February 24. Had the Iraqi Army been 

able to collect tactical intelligence and maneuver in 

response to it, it may have still been able to put up a 

successful defense. But those were not capabilities the 

Iraqis ever really possessed and, as a result, the whole 

thing was over in about 100 hours.102

99. Pollack, Arabs at War, 236.

100. Pollack, Arabs at War, 237, 257.

101. Pollack, Arabs at War, 239.

102. Pollack, Arabs at War, 246–248.
31

The real challenge for Saddam came after the 

war when Shia and Kurdish provinces revolted.103

The rebellion in the south started shortly after the 

ceasefire, on March 1, when a retreating Iraqi soldier 

fired a tank round at a picture of Saddam. The revolt 

quickly spread and, by March 8, it controlled most of 

the provincial towns south of Baghdad. The rebellion 

in the north began shortly after the one in the south. 

On March 4, sparked by the shooting of a deserter in 

the town of Ranya, another rebellion rapidly spread, 

though this one was much better organized, thanks to 

the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and 

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.104

Just as quickly as they had spread, both rebellions 

were crushed. The response in the south was especially 

brutal, with probably more than 100,000 civilian deaths 

and extensive damage to homes and infrastructure. 

The response was similarly brutal in the north and 

caused a massive refugee problem, with up to two 

million displaced. The growing humanitarian crisis 

forced the international community to take action and 

impose the northern and southern no-fly zones as well 

as create a safe haven in the north, defended in part 

by US forces. At the same time, the peshmerga, who 

were better organized and equipped than the rebels 

in the south, were able to drive the Iraqi Army from 

major cities in northern Iraq, including Dahuk, Zakho, 

Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, encouraging the return of the 

refugees. Likely because he did not want a renewed 

insurgency in Kurdistan, Saddam agreed to pull 

back to a defensive line, effectively establishing an 

103. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, GEN (USMC 

Retired), Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of 

Iraq (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006), 55.

104. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 228–230.
32

autonomous Kurdish zone.105 Thus by the time the Iraqi 

Army had to think about facing the Americans again 

in 2003, it had returned to its focus on controlling civil 

unrest, an effort that was led by loyal but incompetent 

officers who subordinated their professional judgment 

to Saddam’s whims.

To defeat the invading coalition in 2003, Saddam’s 

generals proposed a “Russian-style defense in depth” 

where the tribes would function like Russian partisans, 

bleeding the invading forces as they crossed a bleak 

desert, which they compared to the Russian snows 

that defeated Napoleon and Hitler. If the Americans 

got to Baghdad, the Republican Guard would then 

finish them off, employing the same kind of in-depth 

fortifications they had had against the Iranians. 

Though such a strategy may have worked, Saddam, 

ironically, thought its reliance on insurgency was 

“foreign.”106

Additionally, he was concerned that arming the 

same population that had rebelled against him in the 

1990s would encourage further revolt. The Fedayeen 

Saddam, which he formed in 1994, were supposed 

to take on restive populations. They were given 

small arms and the mission to protect Baath Party 

headquarters and other critical sites. Their intent was 

to control (or at least contain) any uprising until the 

Republican Guard could get there to crush it. In fact, 

the Fedayeen were organized as a counterinsurgent 

force.107 Thus, “[w]hile the army languished, 

development of militia and paramilitary forces 

for internal security took on great importance.”108

105. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 232–233.

106. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 58–59.

107. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 58–62.

108. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 61.
33

Saddam eventually tried to create a one-million man 

popular army that would make each Iraqi city its own 

“fortress,” hampering, if not stopping, an invading 

force before it could reach Baghdad. This army never 

materialized and, in the end, the insurgence part of 

the strategy consisted of Fedayeen raids on coalition 

lines of communication.109

As far as Iraq’s conventional forces went, when the 

invasion started the Iraqi Army remained deployed in 

its peacetime positions, which were focused mainly 

eastward, toward Iran and Kurdistan. For those units 

that were oriented south, desertions and US air strikes 

prohibited them from mounting an effective defense. 

When Saddam tried to reinforce them with Republican 

Guards, coalition air assets ground their movement to 

a halt. Thus, the Iraqi defense quickly lost coherence 

and, despite some successful engagements, mostly 

near Nasiriyah, it was not able to stop the US drive 

toward Baghdad and prevent the fall of the regime.110

Cordesman sums up the Iraqi failure well:

Iraq never succeeded in exploiting its water barriers with 

any meaningful success. It left major gaps in its defenses 

of the Karbala Gap, and southwestern approaches to 

Baghdad. It could not improvise an effective defense 

of the road from al Kut to Baghdad in the east. And it 

continued to commit its Republican Guard piecemeal to 

the defenses of the approaches to Baghdad against both 

the 5th Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in 

a manner that largely destroyed them and deprived the 

regime of the ability to create a cohesive defense of the 

city.111

109. Cordesman, The Iraq War, 17.

110. Cordesman, The Iraq War, 17–20.

111. Cordesman, The Iraq War, 19.
34

REBUILDING UNDER THE AMERICANS

Not since the British mandate has the Iraqi Army 

had such a close relationship with a foreign military. 

Given one of the first acts of the Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA) was to disband the Iraqi military, the 

Americans were in some ways in the same position 

the British were in 1921: starting from scratch to build 

a small force (though it was intended to be bigger than 

the original British version) capable of maintaining 

internal stability and defending Iraq’s borders against 

external threats.112

Just as the British tried to build the first Iraqi 

Army with former Ottoman officers, the CPA tried to 

build the new Iraqi Army with officers from the army 

they had just disbanded. But they conditioned that 

participation by making it explicit returning officers 

and soldiers would not necessarily return at their 

previous rank; instead, they would be placed based on 

their assessed competence. In many ways this made 

sense. Developing a professional army along the lines 

of the American model required that position, rank, 

and promotion be based on merit, which includes 

dimensions of practical and moral competence. After 

all, if professionalism depends on expertise, then it is 

the experts who should be in charge of the profession. 

As a result, many officers either did not return or 

were not allowed to join and were thus left vulnerable 

to recruitment by insurgent and sectarian forces.113

Many who did return were later ousted in a highly 

politicized de-Baathification process that enabled the 

112. Patricia Brasier, LTCOL (USMC, Retired), But Ma’am, the 

Security: The Manning of the New Iraqi Army (West Conshohocken, 

PA: Infinity Publishing, 2008), 1.

113. Brasier, But Ma’am, 12.
35

removal of competent officers in service to sectarian 

political ends.114

Moreover, the comparison with the British was not 

lost on the Iraqis. Like the British effort in 1921, many 

Iraqis viewed the US effort as one of an occupying 

power trying to build a military that suited its interests 

over those of the Iraqi state. As a result, when the new 

Iraqi Army came into being, there was a “trust deficit” 

among both senior civilian leaders and the Iraqi 

people.

When Iraq regained sovereignty in June 2004, the 

new Iraqi political leadership regarded the military 

much the same way their predecessors did: as a force 

to keep Iraq’s various factions in line and as a potential 

threat to the government as well as to their own 

leadership positions. Thus, loyalty again became as 

important as, if not more important than, competence 

when selecting personnel for key senior positions.

The difference this time, however, was there was 

no strongman who could centrally disperse positions, 

roles, and salaries that encouraged loyalty to a single, 

central government. Rather, Iraqi ministry formation, 

especially for the security ministries, was a sectarian 

free-for-all among Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, as well as 

various parties within each of those factions.115 The 

result was severe internal competition over roles and 

positions at the expense of institution building.

The collapse of the police after Saddam’s fall 

increased pressure on the CPA, and later the Iraqi 

government, to speed the development of the 

army and transition internal security roles and 

114. Author observation while serving with the Coalition 

Police Assistance Training Team, 2005–2006.

115. Tony Pfaff, Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police 

Forces (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 17–19.
36

responsibilities to it. Thus, the CPA was forced to 

abandon its original plan to rebuild the Iraqi military 

from the ground up—units first, then the ministry—

and instead accelerate establishment of the Ministry of 

Defense (MOD), which would suffer from the rush.116

To facilitate reestablishing the military, the CPA 

established the Coalition Military Assistance Training 

Team to man, train, and equip the Iraqi Army. The 

initial intent was to raise nine battalions by 2004 which 

would serve as a cadre for expansion.117 Originally, 

that expansion was to create a 3-division corps, with 

each division containing about 12,000, which could 

then grow as needed.118 In an effort to learn lessons 

from the past, the Coalition and Military Assistance 

Training Team established demographic requirements 

for every 1,000 recruits sent to the Kirkush Military 

Training Base: 40 percent Arab Shia, 30 percent Arab 

Sunni, and 30 percent Kurds, with no specification as 

to what percentage of Kurds had to be Shia or Sunni.119

Though the demographic requirements seemed to be 

a reasonable effort to build an inclusive military, these 

sectarian quotas would later impede unit cohesiveness.

As a result, rebuilding Iraq’s military got off to a 

rocky start. In 2005, a RAND study noted a number of 

concerns, including the infiltration of army and police 

forces by sectarian militias and insurgents, tension 

between long-term institution building and short-term 

needs associated with fielding the ISF, limited Iraqi 

ownership of the institution development process, 

116. Andrew Rathmell et al., Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: 

The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 2005), 14, 28–31.

117. Brasier, But Ma’am, 1.

118. Rathmell et al., Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, 33.

119. Brasier, But Ma’am, 3.
37

and a fragmentation of authority.120 When coupled 

with low pay and inadequate facilities and training, 

many soldiers decided to desert in the early years.121

As one Iraqi told an advisor in 2006 regarding the 

motivation of the Iraqi soldiers, “Their country is at 

war, their families are in constant danger, and they 

are not paid much, they live in Al Anbar, their works 

sucks, everyone is corrupt, they don’t get a chance to 

see their families often, their relatives and friends are 

dying every day, and there is no real incentive to even 

be alive.”122

Two years later, The Report of the Independent 

Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (the Jones 

Report) raised similar concerns. The report noted 

though the Iraqi Army’s capability was slowly 

improving, the army was still hampered by poor 

leadership, absenteeism, a lack of discipline, as well as 

poor logistics, maintenance, tactical intelligence, and 

combined arms capabilities, such as close air and fire 

support.123 A US Government Accountability Office 

report delivered that same year added disunity and 

sectarian influences to that list.124

120. Rathmell et al., Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, xvi–xix.

121. Brasier, But Ma’am, 152.

122. Wesley R. Gray, Embedded (Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 2009), 188.

123. James L. Jones, GEN (USMC, Retired), The Report of the 

Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Washington, 

DC: Atlantic Council, September 6, 2007), 13–14.

124. Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing Iraq: 

Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces

(Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, March 13, 

2007), 2.
38

DA’ESH ATTACKS

Despite these difficulties, in 2014 the almost 

200,000 Iraqi Army soldiers—not to mention the 

44,000 Federal Police—should have been able to stop 

the 3,000–5,000 Da’esh fighters who participated in 

attacks on Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah.125 According 

to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The 

Military Balance 2014, the Iraqi Army was comprised 

of 193,400 personnel who comprised 14 divisions, 

including 1 armored and 5 mechanized infantry 

divisions. These numbers do not include the two 

counterterrorism service (CTS) brigades, which fell 

under the prime minister’s direct control. They also 

do not include the more than 500,000 Ministry of the 

Interior (MOI) forces personnel who were also in a 

position to confront the Da’esh threat.126

Moreover, these security forces had resisted 

al-Qaeda and Da’esh attacks on fixed positions in 

125. W. Andrew Terrill, “Understanding the Strength and 

Vulnerabilities of ISIS,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014), 16. See 

also “Why Iraq’s Army Crumbled; The Forces in Iraq,” Economist

411, no. 8892 (June 21, 2014), https://www.economist.com/middle

-east-and-africa/2014/06/19/why-iraqs-army-crumbled. According to 

this report, the number of Da’esh fighters who attacked Mosul 

was under 1,000.

126. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The military 

balance 2014: The annual assessment of global military capabilities 

and defence economics (London, UK: International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, 2014), 322–323. The MOI forces consisted 

of approximately 531,000 personnel, including 302,000 in the 

Iraqi Police Service, 44,000 in the Iraqi Federal Police, 60,000 in 

the Department of Border Enforcement, 95,000 in the Facilities 

Protection Service, and 30,000 in the Oil Police Service. Of course, 

not all of these forces were in a position to directly confront Da’esh 

forces. It is also worth keeping in mind that the bulk of the Iraqi 

Police Service are deployed in small, local groups that are easily 

overmatched by even small concentrations of Da’esh forces.
39

the past. Prior to the 2014 offensive, there were 

several complex attacks on police stations in western 

Iraq involving a combination of suicide vehicles 

to breach any defenses followed by assault teams 

that attempted to take over these stations.127 Perhaps 

more impressively, the security forces successfully 

provided security for the largely nonviolent April 

30, 2014, parliamentarian elections. This success was 

no small feat. The ISF secured 8,000 polling places 

where more than 21 million Iraqis voted with levels 

of violence much lower than in 2010.128 Thus, in June 

2014 it would not have seemed unreasonable to 

expect the ISF to effectively battle an outnumbered 

and ill-equipped opponent. Instead, the ISF dropped 

weapons, equipment, and uniforms and fled.

The causes of the Iraqi Army’s failure begin with 

extremely poor civil-military relations and an almost 

complete lack of trust in the army where Da’esh 

operated. The security situation deteriorated over 

extreme feelings of political, economic, and social 

marginalization that arose in an isolated Sunni 

population that saw few alternatives besides protests, 

and later violence, to settle its disputes with a central 

government it perceived as being unresponsive or 

having inappropriate responses. Demands varied 

127. During the author’s time as the defense attaché in 

Baghdad from 2012–2013, the Iraqi press reported multiple such 

attacks in Fallujah, Rawa, and Anah in western Iraq.

128. Matt Bradley and Ali A. Nabhan, “World News: Iraqis 

Turn out to Vote under Tight Security—Authorities Report Strong 

Turnout and Relatively Low Violence; Shiite Prime Minister 

Nouri al Maliki Seeks Third Term,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 

2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/15082893?accountid=14741. 

See also “Interview: Election was ‘Entirely Iraqi-Owned Process,’” 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 7, 2014, https://www.rferl

.org/a/iraq-elections-interview-mladenov/25376175.html.
40

depending on which Sunni leader made them, but 

they for the most part included better representation 

of Sunnis in state institutions, reintegration of army 

officers allegedly dismissed for sectarian reasons, the 

end of arrests on unsubstantiated terrorism charges, 

and the withdrawal of the government’s security 

forces from Sunni-dominated areas.129 It was the Iraqi 

government’s sectarian response to these demands 

that did more to set the conditions for the increase in 

violence than any military failure of the ISF. Though 

Sunnis in general were alarmed when Nouri al-Maliki 

ordered the arrest of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi 

almost immediately after the departure of US forces 

in 2011, these concerns turned to protest when Maliki 

later attempted to arrest Minister of Finance Rafi 

al-Issawi, as well as members of his security detail, 

on terrorism charges in December 2012. In response, 

Sunnis in Ramadi and Fallujah established protest 

camps and temporarily blocked the road leading 

from Baghdad into Ramadi. Over a few months, 

these protests spread beyond Anbar, especially into 

Ninevah and Diyala.130 It was this constant message of 

marginalization in part that allowed Da’esh to portray 

itself as the defender of the Sunni people against a 

hostile and foreign government.

Of course, Da’esh attacks against the larger Shia 

population prompted it to support the harsh measures 

Maliki and the ISF took against the Sunni population. 

The continued drumbeat of attacks in Shia-dominated 

areas increased popular frustration with the security 

129. International Crisis Group, Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian 

Bargain, Middle East Report No. 150 (Brussels, Belgium: April 28, 

2014), 5.

130. Dexter Filkins, “What We Left Behind,” New Yorker, 

April 28, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28

/what-we-left-behind.
41

situation and, consequently, the government. Shia 

militants, often dressed in uniforms indistinguishable 

from those of the ISF, attempted to fill that vacuum 

and began a campaign to drive Sunnis out of some 

mixed areas.131 By the end of 2013, many Iraqis were 

worried about a return to levels of violence seen in 

2007, when sectarian strife had reached its peak.132

In December 2013, Maliki ordered the ISF to break 

down protest camps and surround the cities of Ramadi 

and Fallujah. At the same time, he ordered the arrest of 

Sunni parliamentarian Ahmed al-Alwani on charges 

of terrorism. Shortly afterward, Da’esh fighters 

poured into those cities, effectively taking control.133

Though these political decisions were instrumental 

in giving Islamist terrorists a platform from which 

to build support, the ISF—the army, in particular—

often conducted operations in a way that both was 

ineffective against terrorist targets and reinforced 

Iraqi Sunnis’ perception that the government was 

marginalizing them. The reasons for this conduct are 

complex.

131. Anthony Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and 

the Risk of Civil War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, April 2006), 47–48. During the period of 

2012 to 2013, numerous contacts expressed concern to the author 

regarding ethnic cleansing, especially in Baghdad. Furthermore, 

the kind of cleansing described was also reported in newly 

liberated areas in 2017. See also Amnesty International, Iraq: 

Turning a Blind Eye: The Arming of the Popular Mobilization Units

(London, UK: Amnesty International, 2017), 16.

132. Matt Bradley, “Iraqi Officer Takes a Dark 

Turn to Al Qaeda; Alliance against Maliki Government 

Develops after Armed Militants Overtook Fallujah,” Wall 

Street Journal, March 17, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles

/iraqi-officer-takes-dark-turn-to-al-qaeda-1395022540.

133. Joel Rayburn and Frank Sobchak, eds., The US Army in 

the Iraq War: Volume 2, Surge and Withdrawal, 2007–2011 (Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2018), 592–593.
42

Prior to the Iraqi Army and CTS’s rapid retreat 

from Sunni-dominated areas, their performance had 

been a confusing and inconsistent mix of courage 

and cowardice; effective precision raids and large, 

ineffective “sweeps”; and significant restraint and 

indiscriminate attacks. The CTS, which maintained 

constant partnership with US advisors even after the 

withdrawal, conducted a number of effective raids 

against Da’esh-related targets. But the CTS, which 

was not designed to hold ground, would quickly 

depart the areas where it conducted operations, 

allowing the terrorists to return. Unfortunately, the 

Iraqi Army, which should have provided a more 

sustained presence, was not up to the task. When it 

conducted operations, it would typically mitigate risk 

by operating from secure bases and moving in large 

formations that often gave Da’esh elements sufficient 

warning to evacuate personnel and equipment.134

Foreshadowing the Da’esh takeover of Fallujah, 

hundreds of al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters entered the 

western towns of Rawa and Anah in late September 

2013, attacking the mayor, his house, and other 

government facilities and blowing up the bridges 

that led into town to prevent reinforcements. One 

interlocutor describing the events stated that though 

the residents were not happy about the Islamist 

presence, few were upset by the raid since al-Qaeda in 

Iraq attacked only government officials and facilities 

that were not popular in the province. The interlocutor 

quoted one resident as saying that unlike the ISF, the 

al-Qaeda in Iraq forces conducting the raid did not 

harass the population, but focused on government 

of Iraq officials and facilities. As if to underscore that 

point, the next day the ISF reportedly arrested more 

134. Rayburn and Sobchak, The US Army, 591.
43

than 300 Sunnis, though all were reportedly later 

released by Iraqi judges due to insufficient evidence.135

As the summer went on, Da’esh increased its presence 

in Iraqi towns and along Iraqi highways, where the 

ISF had previously been able to move unchallenged.

Back in Anbar, especially Fallujah, the tribes found 

themselves in an uncomfortable position. Local police 

had abandoned their posts, and many fled or were 

otherwise keeping a low profile.136 Desperate to keep 

the ISF from entering the city—for fear of a repeat of 

the events at Hawija—these local tribal leaders found 

themselves relying on Da’esh for protection while 

at the same time trying to broker its departure. This 

desperation increased as ISF artillery pounded the city, 

forcing thousands to flee. As an International Crisis 

Group report noted, Fallujah found itself in a “vicious 

circle.” The more the army shelled the town, the more 

the town needed Da’esh to defend it. The more Da’esh 

defended it, however, the more likely the army was to 

increase military force, often indiscriminately.137

After the fall of Fallujah to Da’esh in January 2014, 

the Iraqi Army further mitigated risk by employing 

indirect fire, even in crowded urban areas,138 rather 

than assaulting and seizing the territory. These 

tactics, which were reminiscent of the overwhelmingfirepower approach the Iraqi Army used against the 

135. Sunni tribal leader, interview by the author, September 

26, 2013.

136. International Crisis Group, Iraq, 1.

137. International Crisis Group, Iraq, 15.

138. Loveday Morris, “Iraqi Army Faces Death, Desertions 

as It Struggles with Anbar Offensive,” Washington Post, May 

10, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east

/iraqi-army-faces-death-and-desertions-as-it-struggles-with-anbar

-offensive/2014/05/08/83720f79-6cd2-4c7c-883b-dfe181ce7a5b_story

.html. Multiple press reports have described ISF use of artillery in 

urban areas. See also International Crisis Group, Iraq, 7.
44

Kurds in the 1960s, further alienated the population 

and largely failed to disrupt insurgent operations.

Meanwhile, despite an additional 42,000 personnel 

being deployed to Anbar by May 2014, the Iraqi Army 

was frequently outgunned and outmaneuvered. As a 

result, its operations became bogged down, forcing it 

to rely more on standoff weapons, such as artillery and 

air-attack, including, reportedly “barrel bombing,” 

which entailed dropping large, air-fueled, explosive 

containers indiscriminately in neighborhoods were 

Da’esh had a foothold.139 During these operations, the 

Iraqi Army suffered mass desertions, especially from 

those units that were transferred into the area from 

more peaceful parts of Iraq.

This dynamic placed the ISF in another vicious circle 

where risk aversion stemming from poor conditions 

drove indiscriminate practices that alienated the 

population and empowered its adversaries, which, in 

turn, encouraged greater risk aversion because there 

was little incentive to take risks on behalf of leaders 

responsible for these conditions and little reason for 

Iraqi soldiers to take risks on behalf of a population 

that resented them. If the hallmark of professionalism 

is trust, the Iraqi Army of 2014 did not have it: the 

people did not trust it and its members did not trust 

each other.

IRAQ FIGHTS BACK

Just as it did when Iranian forces threatened Iraq’s 

territorial integrity, the Iraqi Army rallied to fight back. 

139. Mark Lattimer, Miriam Puttick, and Mays Al-Jaboori, 

Civilian protection in the battle for Mosul: Critical priorities (London, 

UK: Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights 

Group International, October 2016), 4. See also Morris, “Iraqi 

Army Faces Death.”
45

The difference this time was, rather than relatively 

covert and limited support from benefactors such as 

the United States, Great Britain, and France, the Iraqi 

Army had the robust backing of a United States-led 

coalition, which included several of the gulf Arab 

states. This coalition provided advisors; weapons; 

equipment; as well as intelligence, indirect fire, and 

close air support. The other difference this time was 

the creation of the Shia PMF, which rapidly mobilized 

more than 100,000 Iraqi citizens and brought Iraq’s 

militias, especially those backed by Iran, into the fight 

on the side of the government. For the first time in 

Iraq’s history, almost all of its neighbors as well as 

international partners were fighting with it.140

The counteroffensive got off to a rough start when, 

in June 2014, an assault on Tikrit stalled.141 By August, 

however, the ISF had its first significant success. With 

the help of US airstrikes against Da’esh vehicles and 

supply routes, a combined force of Iraqi Army, Kurdish 

peshmerga, and Shia militias lifted the Da’esh siege 

of Amerli, effectively stopping Da’esh’s southward 

advance.142 This would establish a successful pattern of 

US-Iraqi military cooperation where the more precise 

coalition strikes would enable the Iraqi Army and CTS 

to assault Da’esh positions while the PMF and other 

units would secure the area and prevent Da’esh retreat 

or counterattack.

140. Amnesty International, Iraq, 4.

141. Heather L. Pickerell and Ahmed Ali, Iraq Situation Report 

June 28, 2014 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 

June 2014), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2014

-06-28%20Situation%20Report_6.pdf.

142. Ahmed Ali and Lauren Squires, Iraq Situation Report: 

August 29-31, 2014 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of 

War, August 2014), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default

/files/2014-08-29-31%20Situation%20Report.pdf.
46

The ISF, including the PMF, renewed its efforts to 

take Tikrit in March 2015 when it initiated an offensive 

that would fully liberate the city by early April.143 The 

offensive began as an uncoordinated attack on the part 

of the Iran-backed PMF—reportedly ordered by Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander 

Qasem Soleimani—which quickly got bogged down.144

The Iraqi government reinforced the PMF with the CTS 

and the Iraqi Army as well as requested US close air 

support, which the United States provided contingent 

on the removal of the PMF,145 which had already 

developed a reputation for brutality among Sunni 

populations.146 Though the move caused some friction 

between the Baghdad- and Iran-backed militias, Tikrit 

was liberated.147

As the fight went on, other patterns were 

established. First was the prime role of the CTS 

in almost every major engagement as well as the 

contrasting limited role of the Iraqi Army and PMF. 

During the liberation of Fallujah, for example, the 

Iraqi Army 10th Division ended up doing not much 

more than providing logistics to the CTS, despite 

being ordered to play a major role in the operation. 

143. Sinan Adnan, Iraq Situation Report: February 28–March 

3, 2015 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, March 

2015), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20

SITREP%202015-2-28-3-1_V5.pdf.

144. Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Omer Kassim, and Patrick Martin, 

Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Order of Battle

(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, December 2017), 

31.

145. Dan De Luce and Henry Johnson, “Can the U.S. Control 

Iran’s Militias in the Fight for Fallujah,” Foreign Policy, June 9, 

2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/09/can-the-u-s-control-irans

-militias-in-the-fight-for-fallujah-shiite-iraq-isis/.

146. Amnesty International, Iraq, 4.

147. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 31.
47

Moreover, the PMF performed equally dismally, 

having failed in almost every operation in which it 

was involved.148 Even Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi 

reportedly remarked on the PMF’s insubordination, 

noting that despite it being ordered to recapture areas 

surrounding Tal Afar to cut Da’esh supply lines to 

Syria, it had not even tried.149

The situation for the Iraqi Army, however, had 

improved by the Mosul campaign. The army had 

displayed a degree of endurance and adaptability 

reminiscent of the days when it drove Iranian forces 

from Iraqi soil. It had also made improvements 

to equipment—such as mounting Kornet missile 

launchers onto United States-provided high mobility, 

multipurpose wheeled vehicles—and collected 

actionable intelligence. As Middle East expert Norman 

Ricklefs observed, “This represents considerable 

progress from the static, defensive ‘checkpoint force’ 

that characterized much of the regular army at time 

of the IS blitzkrieg.”150 As a result, the 9th Armored 

Division, which advanced up the eastern bank of the 

Tigris, and the 15th Infantry Division, which advanced 

up the western bank, made a more substantial 

contribution to Mosul’s liberation than the Iraqi Army 

10th Division did in Tikrit.151

Moreover, the CTS, at least, had developed a good 

relationship with civilians in Mosul. In conducting 

operations, it limited collateral harm and even took 

148. Norm Ricklefs, “The Iraqi Military, the US-Led Coalition 

and the Mosul Operation: The Risk of Snatching Defeat from the 

Jaws of Victory,” Small Wars Journal, December 22, 2016, http://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-iraqi-military-the-us-led-coalition

-and-the-mosul-operation-the-risk-of-snatching-defea.

149. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 31.

150. Ricklefs, “The Iraqi Military.”

151. IHS Markit, Iraq, 88–89.
48

extra measures to protect civilians.152 As Ricklefs 

noted, one good news story that emerged from 

Mosul was the “well documented positive reception 

CTS has had in cleared neighborhoods, with many 

residents expressing the wish that Iraqi forces will 

stay on.”153 Amnesty International noted that civilians 

praised the ISF in general, and the CTS in particular, 

because they attempted to spare them from violence 

during the heat of battle and showed “kindness and 

respect” to civilians in areas they had recently taken 

from Da’esh.154 In fact, a February 2017 survey by the 

National Democratic Institute observed that the Iraqi 

Army (which included the CTS) had emerged as a 

potent symbol of cross-sectarian pride.155

These CTS operations, which prioritized the 

protection of civilians, came at a high cost. In east 

Mosul, air strikes tended to be against preselected 

targets as opposed to calls from troops in contact. 

Moreover, the CTS was expected to fight without 

air support in the densely populated neighborhoods 

that Da’esh held and where they forced civilians to 

remain to use them as human shields. As an Amnesty 

International study observed, “The CTS paid a heavy 

price for this tactic; estimates of CTS casualties, 

including deaths and injuries, in east Mosul range 

from 4,000 to 6,000 of a total fighting force of 8,000 

152. Amnesty International, At Any Cost: The Civilian 

Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq (London, UK: Amnesty 

International, 2017), 25–26.

153. Ricklefs, “The Iraqi Military.”

154. Amnesty International, At Any Cost, 26.

155. National Democratic Institute, A Fragile Unity: After 

Military Gains, Iraqis Look to Leaders for a Better Future, February 2017, 

https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Iraq_FocusGroupPublication

_FullReport2.pdf.
49

troops, meaning the CTS was depleted by between 

50% and 75%.”156

As a result, while the CTS still fought in west 

Mosul, it was joined in greater force by the MOI’s 

Federal Police and Emergency Response Divisions as 

well as elements of the Iraqi Army. These forces were 

not as well-trained as the CTS and were arguably more 

risk-averse. Moreover, as an Amnesty International 

report notes, the fighting was harder since the PMF 

had effectively cut off Da’esh escape routes, forcing 

its fighters to take a stronger stand than they had in 

east Mosul. As a result, this operation saw a greater 

reliance on less-precise weapons, such as artillery, 

mortars, and improvised rocket assisted munitions, 

which caused greater civilian casualties and damage to 

infrastructure.157 Arguably, in some cases, the battle for 

west Mosul probably looked more like the operations 

the Iraqi Army had conducted in its 1974–1975 

confrontation with the Kurds, where any resistance 

was met, as discussed previously, by overwhelming 

firepower.

By the end of the conflict, the Iraqi Army had 

performed substantially better than it had in the past 

and had achieved a number of victories. The Iraqi 

Army, in general, performed substantially better than 

it had in the past, and has a number of victories it can 

claim. The army, in conjunction with Federal Police 

and Sunni tribal groups, successfully defended the 

dam, power, and refining facilities in Haditha as well 

as at Dhuluiya, where they held out six months before 

they were relieved. Moreover, beginning in 2015, the 

Iraqi Army successfully led a number of offensives 

156. Amnesty International, At Any Cost, 11.

157. Amnesty International, At Any Cost, 11–13.
50

that finally wrested control of Iraqi territory from 

Da’esh.158

With the end of Da’esh control over Iraqi territory, 

the Iraqi Army finds itself in a unique moment in 

its history. In addition to being successful against a 

determined foe, it fought in a way that strengthened its 

legitimacy among multiple Iraqi sects.159 But if the past 

is any indication, the Iraqi Army will not likely sustain 

this momentum without continuous engagement 

by the United States and like-minded allies. As 

Cordesman observes of the ISF in general following 

the US withdrawal in 2011, “The ISF often found it 

easier to revert to the past than accept US military 

models, particularly when Iraq’s political leadership 

insisted on repeating Saddam Hussein’s efforts to 

micromanage every aspect of security operations, 

enforce political control, bypass the formal chain of 

command, and limit initiative at every level.”160

The ISF’s initial poor performance was largely 

due to long-standing issues including overlapping 

chains of command; poor administration; sectarian 

influences; and limited logistic, command and control, 

and intelligence capabilities. Moreover, corrupt legacy 

practices made it difficult to reform because they 

diverted resources away from the fight and created 

158. Michael Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces

(Baghdad, Iraq: Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, March 

2016), 26.

159. National Democratic Institute, A Fragile Unity. See also

Munqith Dagher, “Iraqi Public Opinion Shows a New Bridge of 

Hope and a New Valley of Concerns,” The Washington Institute, 

June 7, 2017, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view

/iraqi-public-opinion-shows-a-new-bridge-of-hope-and-an-old-valley

-of-concer.

160. Anthony Cordesman, Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

June 12, 2014), 19.
51

poor conditions for soldiers and police as funds for 

food, housing, fuel, and maintenance were drained. 

These practices limited the resources available to Iraqi 

forces and undermined the kind of trust necessary for 

reform. As a result, absent positive external influences, 

the Iraqi Army will likely revert to the disunified, 

ineffective, corrupt, and risk-averse organization it 

has been for much of its history.

ERA STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES NOTES

PREISLAMIC

(Pre 7thCentury)

Courage; stealth; 

cleverness; agility

Large operations; 

defense against 

better-organized 

opponents

Raid culture; 

blood feuds cause 

for most violence

ISLAMIC 

(Ottoman)

(late 18thearly 20th 

Centuries)

Modern, wellequipped; largescale operations

Personnel; 

leadership

Divided loyalties, 

nationalism 

lowered morale; 

recruited soldiers 

from lower, 

uneducated 

classes

MANDATE

(1921-1933)

Internal stability 

operations

Counter

insurgency operations

Successful 

against 

small groups 

(Assyrians, 

tribes); British 

support enabled 

limited success 

against Kurds; 

Nationalizing 

force in tension 

with sectarian 

loyalties caused 

identity crisis

ISRAEL 

WARS

(1948, 1973)

Modern, wellequipped; 

logistics; cohesion

Combined arms 

operations; 

maneuver; 

intelligence; 

tactics; initiative

Modernized 

with Russian 

equipment; 

poorest tactical 

performer among 

Arab armies

Table 1. Iraqi Army Historical Strengths

and Weaknesses
52

ERA STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES NOTES

FIGHTING 

KURDS

(1961-1970; 

1974-1975)

Improved 

logistics; 

improved 

strategic choices

Tactics; initiative Success result of 

isolating Kurds 

and choice of 

Kurds to fight 

Iraqi Army 

conventionally; 

overwhelming 

firepower

IRAN-IRAQ 

WAR

(1980-1988)

Defense; combat 

engineering; 

small, limited, 

well-rehearsed 

operations; 

logistics; cohesion

Combined arms 

operations; 

maneuver; 

intelligence; 

maintenance; 

politicization

Poor offensive 

operations in 

Iran due to 

overwhelmingfirepower tactics; 

in Iraq, increased 

cohesion and 

merit promotions 

GULF WAR

(1991)

Small, limited, 

well-rehearsed 

operations

Combined arms 

operations; 

maneuver; 

intelligence; 

communications; 

cohesion; 

politicization

Poor strategic 

assumptions 

regarding 

coalition plans 

and resilience

US 

INVASION

(2003)

Guerrilla 

operations

Combined arms 

operations; 

maneuver; 

intelligence; 

cohesion; 

communications; 

politicization

Poor 

conventional 

defense; 

ex-military 

contributed 

to success 

of multiple 

insurgent groups

AL-QAEDA 

IN IRAQ/

DA’ESH

(2011-2014)

Fixed-site defense Morale; 

intelligence; 

tactics; initiative; 

logistics and 

maintenance; 

cohesion; 

politicization

Low morale 

due to corrupt 

practices, 

hostility of 

population

DA’ESH

(2014-2018)

Air-ground integration; improved 

intelligence; 

improved counterinsurgency 

operations; 

cohesion

Local security 

operations; 

logistics and 

maintenance

Uncoordinated 

operations, 

especially 

where PMF 

was involved; 

poor ability 

to establish 

security for local 

populations

Table 1 (continued)
53

THE FUTURE IRAQI ARMY

If the Iraqi Army’s history is an indicator of future 

performance, at its best the Iraqi Army is characterized 

by courageous soldiers fighting in cohesive units led 

by tactically incompetent and often highly politicized 

officers who have competing loyalties arising from 

multiple, competing patronage networks. It should 

be no surprise, then, that the Iraqi Army has had 

difficulty developing a way of war that works. The 

raw materials are there, but the ability to generate and 

disseminate expert knowledge over any jurisdiction 

associated with landpower simply does not yet exist.

This historically optimized Iraqi Army should be 

able to handle significant logistics and engineering 

challenges as long as corruption and competition from 

other services do not prevent it from doing so. But it is 

challenged to provide other kinds of combat support, 

such as communications and intelligence. Senior 

Iraqi leadership can, in times of crisis, improvise with 

the limited resources they have to achieve limited 

strategic military objectives; however, their tendency 

toward politicization—driven by the army’s historic 

association with coups—undermines their ability to 

hold on to the improvements they have made.

Unlike in the 1930s, when Arab and Kurdish 

Iraqis rallied around the army’s victory against the 

lightly armed Assyrians, a majority of Iraqis, many 

from different sects and ethnicities, have placed a 

newfound faith in the Iraqi Army after its role in the 

victory against a well-organized, well-equipped, and 

determined enemy that was a threat to all Iraqis. 

Where the former victory established the Iraqi Army as 

an enforcer, the latter has established it as a liberator. 

Of course, that identity is currently at risk given the 
54

army’s role in suppressing anti-government and antiIran protests; however, it is too soon to see how Iraqi 

public perception will evolve.161

So, to the extent it can also establish itself as 

inclusive, it can play a positive role in bridging Iraq’s 

sectarian divides. Moreover, this inclusivity does not 

have to express itself in terms of demographic balance, 

which tends to undermine trust in individual units, as 

the Coalition and Military Assistance Training Team 

experienced. Rather, the army’s ability to coordinate 

its operations in Anbar with those of the Sunni tribal 

militia and Shia-dominated Federal Police suggests 

it can play an accepted, neutral role in establishing 

security throughout Iraq.

There will, of course, be plenty of opportunities 

to play a positive role in the foreseeable future. 

As the glow of liberation fades, the Iraqi Army, in 

conjunction with the other security services, will need 

to focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 

and consolidation operations as it works with Iraqi 

law enforcement organizations to set conditions for 

local security. To conduct those missions effectively, 

the Iraqi Army will have to address the enduring 

weaknesses and vulnerabilities to which their history 

has given rise. Fortunately, that history also indicates 

which critical areas the Iraqi Army, along with its 

partners, should emphasize.

These weaknesses and vulnerabilities are critical not 

only because they reoccur throughout Iraq’s military 

history. In addition, they overlap to the degree that 

improvements in one are necessary for improvements 

161. Richard Gonzales, “Iraqi Security Forces Killed 149 People 

in Recent Protests, Inquiry Concludes,” National Public Radio, 

October 22, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/22/772443972/iraqi

-security-forces-killed-149-people-in-recent-protests-inquiry-concludes.
55

in the other and, moreover, failure to improve at least 

somewhat in all will likely undermine any benefit 

from improving in just one. In this way, disunity 

creates space for corruption, which in turn inhibits the 

Iraqi Army’s ability to establish the communications, 

logistics, and intelligence infrastructure necessary for 

a modern army and undermines the administrative 

accountability necessary to effectively recruit, 

train, and equip soldiers. The result is a high rate of 

absenteeism as well as risk aversion among those 

soldiers who remain. In this next section, I will discuss 

each of these critical areas for engagement in more 

detail.

UNITY OF COMMAND

One of the enduring problems associated with 

the ISF in general is a lack of unity. Given the 

authoritarian nature of Iraqi governance, this concern 

might seem counterintuitive. It arises, however, 

out of a combination of culture and politics. As De 

Atkine observes, Arab armies in general are plagued 

by a “lack of cooperation” resulting from cultural 

difficulties with extending trust outside close circles 

typically identified by family, tribe, and sect.162 This 

cultural norm is amplified, especially in totalitarian 

states, by a general distrust of the military which 

arises from its historic role in coups. As noted above, 

this distrust drives the creation of competing military 

and intelligence organizations that further undermine 

unity of command.

162. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” 7. De Atkine notes 

that elite units, which have the mission to protect the regime, 

rather than the country, are an exception to this pattern.
56

In the Iraqi context, this disunity is as much a 

function of the army’s historic mission of being a 

balance to the government and other armed forces 

as it is a function of the current, competitive political 

situation. To underscore the enduring nature of this 

problem, it is worth pointing out that Iraqi leaders 

since Saddam have tried to create alternate chains 

of command within the armed forces. For example, 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki created the Office 

of Commander in Chief in 2006, which reported 

directly to him and included the CTS, to which he 

added the Iraqi Special Operations brigades. The 

Office of Commander in Chief also controlled the 

56th Brigade (the “Baghdad Brigade”) and the 57th 

Brigade, which he assigned in 2013 to guard the Green 

Zone’s outer ring. The office exerted influence through 

Baghdad Operations Command, which in turn was 

able to influence the other provincial operations 

commands. Though its control over the provincial 

operational commands was less direct, it still served 

as a node through which Maliki could control security 

operations throughout the country outside the view 

of the National Operations Center. Though Prime 

Minister Abadi dissolved the office shortly after he 

took power, some of those relationships still endure, 

such as the CTS reporting directly to the prime 

minister.163

Achieving unity can be further complicated 

by the top-heavy nature of the Iraqi Army. In the 

battle for Ramadi, for example, 5 3-star or 2-star 

generals controlled areas of operations with as few 

as 2,000 troops. Over those five, there were two main 

headquarters: the Combined Joint Operations Centre, 

which compensated for the partial collapse of Anbar 

163. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 10.
57

Operations Command, and Baghdad Operations 

Command. The result of this was conflicting orders, 

gaps in troop coverage, and eventual, if temporary, 

defeat.164

Exacerbating this concern is, of course, the PMF, 

which the passage of the popular mobilization law 

in 2016 established as an independent part of the ISF 

and provided with $1.5 billion from the Iraqi budget.165

Like the CTS, these forces also report directly to the 

prime minister; however, their precise role has not 

yet been established.166 Though the PMF could play a 

complementary role to the Iraqi Army, its leadership 

has expressed the intent to transform the organization 

into an Iraqi equivalent of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps, which itself competes with the regular 

Iranian armed forces for jurisdiction and resources, to 

the latter’s detriment.167 There is no reason to believe 

the same will not happen in Iraq.

Moreover, having a force under the prime minister 

as large as the PMF—perhaps as much as 141,000 

personnel168—facilitates alternate chains of command 

that make effective coordination of security operations 

difficult, if not impossible. The PMF’s attack on Tikrit 

suggests the organization did not coordinate the 

attack with the other Iraqi services and launched the 

attack on the orders of Iran. Furthermore, as Abadi’s 

complaint suggests, this incident was not isolated, 

but rather one more example of divided loyalties. It is 

worth pointing out both the deputy chairman of the 

PMF and the commander of Kata’ib Hezbollah, Abu 

Mahdi al-Muhandis, as well as Badr Corps Secretary 

164. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 41–42.

165. Amnesty International, Iraq, 9.

166. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 28.

167. Amnesty International, Iraq, 11.

168. Amnesty International, Iraq, 9.
58

General Hadi al-Amiri have also acknowledged the 

PMF’s dependence for guidance and resources on Iran 

rather than the government of Iraq.169 Perhaps even 

more important is the role these militias are currently 

playing in violently attacking protestors on the order 

and direction of Iran.170 Thus, a permanent PMF 

organized along the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps model will, in addition to creating competition 

with the other services, serve as another avenue of 

Iranian influence that will further undermine the unity 

of Iraq’s armed forces.171

CORRUPTION

The greatest weakness of the Iraqi Army is its 

tendency toward corrupt activities that undermine its 

readiness and capabilities. Though no military is free 

from corruption at some level—consider the recent 

“Fat Leonard” scandal the US Navy experienced—

the nature and scale of corruption in the Iraqi Army 

renders many of its units ineffective. This corruption 

takes a number of forms, the most malicious of which 

is the purchasing of command and other senior 

positions. One anonymous Iraqi officer explained the 

following in 2014 after Da’esh seized Mosul.

169. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 32.

170. Ali Mamouri, “Chaos spreads in Iraq as PM office 

remains vacant,” Al-Monitor, December 6, 2019, https://www

.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/12/iraq-protests-najaf-prime

-minister.html#ixzz67MpDZwnu; and Renad Mansour, Thanassis 

Cambanis, and Michael Wahid Hanna, “These Iraqi militias 

are attacking protestors and getting away with it. Here’s why,” 

Washington Post, November 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost

.com/politics/2019/11/18/these-iraqi-militias-are-attacking-protesters

-getting-away-with-it-heres-why/.

171. Amnesty International, Iraq, 27. See also Dury-Agri et al., 

Iraqi Security Forces, 28.
59

Okay. I will explain the corruption to you. If I am the 

battalion commander—they are selling the positions of 

leadership in the Iraqi Army. I pay you $50,000 US and 

I can be a battalion commander right now. If I get this 

command position, I can control more than $100 [sic] 

Million dinar each month and get a very good benefit—

it’s a business—not an Army. Going down from the 

battalion commander—the S2 can blackmail officers in 

the unit as well. If I don’t pay the S2 he can report people 

to the intelligence in Baghdad. The battalion commander 

will pay the S2 to make him shut his mouth. You will see 

the intelligence guy with the battalion commander—they 

are the best of friends. Because the BC gives money to the 

S2 so both of them get benefited, so the unit’s screwed up, 

so the IA is screwed up, so ISIS will win.172

These positions can come at a high price, but as the 

above testimony suggests, the price is worth it. There 

are reports a brigade command can be bought for as 

high as USD $500,000 and a division command can 

go for as much as $2 million.173 Though US advisors 

observed this practice prior to the departure of 

US forces in 2011,174 its effects were more apparent 

after US forces left. As a 2013 Center for Strategic 

and International Studies report noted, “[m]ilitary 

leadership positions are opportunities for senior 

personnel to solidify power bases and dispense 

patronage in the form of military supplies, including 

ammunition, food, water, and vehicle repair parts. 

As a result senior commanders hoard supplies in 

order to maintain their power and influence, and 

172. Chris Mercado, “Voices from the Front: An Iraqi Army 

Officer’s Account of the Battle Against the Islamic State of Iraq 

and al-Sham (ISIS),” Foreign Intrigue, September 1, 2014.

173. Peter Van Buren, “You Too Can Command an Iraqi 

Division for Only $2 Million,” Reuters, December 10, 2014, 

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/10/you-too-can-com

-mand-an-iraqi-army-division-for-only-2-million/.

174. Cordesman, Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces, 10.
60

military sustainment is held hostage to bureaucratic 

infighting.”175

By using their operating budget and supplies to 

build patronage and power bases—thus justifying their 

large investment to obtain the position—commanders 

ultimately have to cut back on expenditures for food, 

housing, spare parts, and fuel. The result is a force that 

is poorly housed, poorly fed, and poorly equipped. 

As one Iraqi soldier put it, “we have no pay, no new 

clothes, no new uniforms, no food, we get shot at 

every day. How can we continue this way of life?”176

It should not be surprising, then, that units where 

these practices are limited or nonexistent, like the 

CTS, perform better than those where they are more 

widespread, even when both units have received 

similar support from the United States and its allies.

Corruption of this sort is, of course, endemic and 

pervasive in Iraqi society and certainly not exclusive 

to the security ministries. As noted earlier, the 

dominance of external patronage relationships—like 

family, tribe, and sect—always ensured complex and 

competing loyalties for the individual Iraqi and a level 

of patronage within the armed forces that undermined 

meritocracy. Saddam, of course, managed those 

networks to ensure this patronage worked toward his 

goals, often at the expense of Iraqi Army capability.

But UN sanctions imposed in the aftermath of 

the 1991 Gulf War reduced the resources available 

across the Iraqi economy and stimulated the growth 

of a shadow economy that relied more on family, 

clan, tribal, and other ties to generate the kind of trust 

needed to make an economy work. More specifically, 

in the austere years of the 1990s, the central 

175. Cordesman, Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces, 11.

176. Gray, Embedded, 86.
61

government in Baghdad was forced to outsource 

the funding of many of its security and economic 

functions because it lacked the resources to do it itself. 

In order to preserve control, the Baath Party began to 

function as more of an umbrella organization for tribes 

that then served these functions. According to Robert 

Looney, “[b]y 1996, officially sanctioned ‘tribes’ were 

not only responsible for the maintenance of local law 

and order, but also collected taxes on behalf of the 

government, were appointed judicial powers, and 

applied customary tribal law within their territory.”177

The effect was to strengthen tribal hold on the 

distribution of goods, services, and, perhaps more 

importantly, jobs. As Phil Williams states, “In sum, 

Iraq under Saddam Hussein resembled an extended 

mafia family with Saddam as the ‘godfather,’ 

presiding over extensive criminal entrepreneurship, 

some under the direction of the regime, some under 

the tacit blessing of the regime, and some clearly 

outside its purview and control.”178 When Saddam fell, 

these networks became available for co-option by a 

host of new actors who struggled for control of Iraq’s 

government, including Shia militias, Sunni insurgents, 

and transnational jihadists who made it “sometimes 

impossible to differentiate political or military agendas 

from the purely criminal pursuit of profit.”179

Perhaps more importantly for the security 

ministries, the political parties, most of which had 

an association with Shia militias, employed similar 

methods to expand their networks in the ministries. As 

177. Robert E. Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding 

Under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption 

in Iraq, International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (June 2008), 435.

178. Phil Williams, “Organized Crime and Corruption in 

Iraq,” International Peacekeeping 16, no.1 (February 2009), 118.

179. Williams, “Organized Crime and Corruption,” 118.
62

discussed before, under Saddam loyalty was probably 

the most important qualifier for senior positions in 

the Iraqi government. After Saddam, the importance 

of that qualifier did not change; however, the number 

of persons or institutions to which one could or 

should owe loyalty proliferated to the extent that it 

undermined the possibility of trust at every level. 

As Looney further observed, “In short, government 

ministries are being staffed with party cronies and 

their budgets are being used as sources of power 

for political parties.”180 Moreover, as Major David 

Voorhies, an advisor to the Iraqi Army in 2006, noted, 

“Tribal loyalties; religious alliances; and the aspects 

of prestige, influence, power, money, and revenge 

played heavily on the motives of those I advised.”181

There is no reason to think those competing loyalties 

and motives are not still present in the Iraqi Army 

today.

As a result, there is little of the trust in the Iraqi 

Army necessary for it to truly professionalize. This 

point is not to say that trust is entirely absent. What 

is missing is the kind of trust large organizations need 

to function. As Looney states, there are generally three 

kinds of trust relationships: ascribed, process-based, 

and extended. In the first, trust is based on identity. To 

the extent one is a member of a particular family, tribe, 

or ethnic group, one is trusted. There is plenty of this 

kind of trust in the Iraqi government, especially where 

parties and sects have consolidated power. In the 

second, trust is based on personal knowledge about 

another person, but independent of that person’s 

180. Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding,” 428.

181. Major David Voorhies, “Making MITT Work: Insights 

into Advising the Iraqi Army,” Infantry 96, no. 3 (May/June 2007), 

31.
63

identity. In the Iraqi context, it is difficult for this kind 

of trust to supersede the first kind. As a result, units 

that are relatively integrated are likely to have a harder 

time establishing trust internally, though externally 

they may serve as a model for others. In the third, 

persons are willing to enter into trust relationships 

based on limited information about specific attributes 

of another person. These kinds of relationships are 

essential for the efficient functioning of, for example, 

large economies where persons who are relatively 

anonymous are nevertheless willing to extend the 

kind of trust necessary to make loans, buy on credit, 

and wait for goods and services to be delivered after 

payment is given.182 That kind of trust does not exist 

on any meaningful scale anywhere in Iraq.

This last kind of relationship is, however, essential 

to the running of any large, diverse, professional 

organization in which members need to trust 

individuals with whom the only thing they have in 

common is their professional identity. Trust has a 

strong correlation with loyalty and as long as the 

individual’s loyalty is divided, the organization will 

suffer. This is not to say that one cannot be loyal to 

more than one person or organization in more than 

one context. It is just that loyalty has to be ordered 

so the organization is not divided. One can certainly 

be a loyal US soldier while still being a loyal spouse, 

parent, child, or church member. The issue arises 

when one is forced to choose. In the Iraqi context, 

such choices often entail employing or promoting a 

relative over the more competent other. Doing so may 

promote trust on the small scale, but it discourages it 

on the larger scale. The task, then, for the Iraqi Army is 

182. Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding,” 431.
64

to institutionalize ways to prevent such choices from 

arising.

POOR COMBAT SUPPORT CAPABILITIES: 

COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTICS, AND 

INTELLIGENCE

It can be said of most Middle Eastern militaries that 

their communications, logistics, and intelligence—

especially technical—capabilities are typically their 

least developed.183 There are, of course, a number of 

reasons for this situation, and I will not go into all of 

them here. But in working security cooperation with 

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, the most frequent 

request from military and defense leaders is assistance 

in developing these three areas. In this regard, 

the Iraqi military shares the same organizational 

shortcomings, except the current conditions under 

which they operate place these already weak systems 

under considerable stress.184

Communications

In addition to the lack of unity described above, 

the Iraqi Army also suffers from poor communications 

infrastructure and practices. It is important to note, 

however, that things are not as bad as they were in 

2007, when the Government Accountability Office 

reported the ISF had to rely on the United States 

for much of its communications architecture. As 

Marisa Sullivan noted, the Iraqis had improved their 

capabilities even prior to 2014, to the extent that 

the operations commands were “quite successful 

at planning and executing security operations, 

183. Pollack, Arabs at War, 6–11.

184. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 53.
65

coordinating the efforts of military and police forces in 

a given area, [and] improving communication across 

the chain of command.”185 But even in the battle for 

Mosul, which likely represented a high point of Iraqi 

Army capability, coalition advisors reported that the 

ISF had some difficulty because of problems with 

“sporadic” partner position location information, 

making it difficult to get a common operating picture 

during this battle.186

Some of the difficulties may be due to cultural 

factors. As De Atkine also observes, “Arabs husband 

information and hold it especially tightly,” adding 

that Arab soldiers understand their value to the 

organization in terms of the unique skills and 

knowledge they possess. Transmitting those skills and 

knowledge to others undermines the soldiers’ personal 

value.187 It is important, however, not to overstate 

this dynamic. Though it accounts for an observed 

reluctance by members of different organizations 

within the security services to share expertise and 

specialized knowledge, it does not follow that there 

is a lack of willingness to give and take orders from 

higher levels of command. In fact, as Pollack noted, 

the greater problem for the Iraqi Army has been an 

unwillingness to do anything absent such orders, as 

when the Iraqi Army failed to pursue weaker Israeli 

forces in 1973.188 This point suggests what is lacking 

185. Marisa Sullivan, Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime

(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, April 2013), http://

www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian

-Regime-Web.pdf.

186. Mosul Study Group, What the Battle for Mosul Teaches the 

Force (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), 11.

187. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” 3.

188. Author observation. On more than one occasion, the 

author was asked by one element of the ISF to obtain information, 
66

is the kind of lateral communication necessary for 

better situational awareness and combined arms 

operations.189

A larger contributor to communications problems 

is poor infrastructure. The civilian backbone through 

which the operations centers communicate with 

subordinate units as well as the National Operations 

Center suffer frequent power outages as well as theft 

of equipment.190 Moreover, this system is not very 

secure. A lot of operational information is provided 

over email, which also uses the civilian infrastructure. 

Fortunately, Da’esh does not appear to have sufficient 

capability to fully exploit such vulnerabilities, 

so it does not seem that secure communications 

issues significantly impair ISF operations, though 

this vulnerability would significantly impact ISF 

operations against a more capable foe.

Logistics and Maintenance

The 2007 Jones Report described logistics as the 

“Achilles heel of the Iraqi ground forces.”191 As one 

senior Iraqi officer stated, Iraqi commanders “lack 

basic knowledge of military logistics,” which leaves 

“many enlistees to scrounge for themselves or go 

hungry.”192 Food is not the only commodity Iraqis have 

such as maps, from other elements.

189. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” 5.

190. IHS Markit, Iraq, 58–59.

191. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 69.

192. Matthew Bradley and Ali A. Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi 

Military is Outmatched on Battlefield,” Wall Street Journal, 

updated May 1, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/fledgling-iraqi

-military-is-outmatched-on-battlefield-1398652250. See also “Alas, It 

May Make Little Difference; Iraq’s Elections,” Economist, May 3, 

2014, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2014/05/03

/alas-it-may-make-little-difference.
67

difficulty supplying.193 The same system that moves 

food also moves fuel and spare parts. As a result, 

though supplies at Iraqi bases are often adequate, 

the Iraqis have extreme difficulties supplying troops 

on the move. This deficiency forces the army to 

operate from large bases, which significantly reduces 

their range of operations. Additionally, the corrupt 

practices of officers husbanding unit resources for 

their own personal aggrandizement further limit what 

is available for the fight. Thus, when it does move, 

the Iraqi Army often finds itself outgunned and with 

limited ammunition compared to Da’esh fighters.194

Widespread corruption and the competing 

desire to eliminate it result in a cumbersome, highly 

centralized bureaucracy that makes supplying and 

maintaining the force prohibitively difficult. These 

difficulties arise because this centralization relieves 

the individual soldiers and junior officers of the 

responsibility to ensure equipment works and soldiers 

have sufficient food, fuel, and ammunition to operate. 

As Michael Knights observed in 2016, “it can take the 

signatures of three three-star generals and the minister 

of defence [sic] to release a shipment of Humvee tires 

from Taji to a military unit.”195

As a result, spare parts and ammunition remain 

on shelves, forcing soldiers to cannibalize captured 

weapons and sometimes their own systems to remain 

in the fight. It is no wonder that Iraq’s M1A1 fleet 

is at 40-percent readiness. It is also no wonder that 

rather than repairing them, it was easier for the Iraqis, 

whatever their actual reasons were, to buy T-90s from 

193. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.”

194. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.”

195. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 50.
68

Russia to make up for this shortfall.196 In fact, from the 

Iraqi perspective, there is a strategic utility in having 

multiple security partners, especially those with UN 

Security Council veto power. Though Russia may not 

be a preferred partner from the United States’ point of 

view, from the Iraqi point of view, having Russia as 

a potential supplier diversifies sources of equipment 

and expertise and makes the Iraqi government less 

vulnerable to external political pressure.

Intelligence

Iraqi Security Force (ISF) intelligence operations, 

including those of the Iraqi Army, improved after 

2014. The ISF improved both its ability to act on 

intelligence quickly, as in an Iraqi helicopter attack 

on a Da’esh convoy in Fallujah, and its collection and 

dissemination of real-time intelligence from civilians 

during the battle for Mosul.197 But enduring problems 

remain, and the chances of backsliding are high. As the 

Jones Report noted in 2007, “information sharing and 

cooperation between the Iraqi intelligence community 

and the Iraqi Security Forces is not satisfactory—a 

problem exacerbated by bureaucratic competition 

and distrust among duplicative intelligence 

organizations.”198 Though anecdotally things arguably 

improved during the Da’esh fight, the army’s—as 

well as Federal Police’s—reliance on less discriminate 

196. “Iraq Receives First Batch of Russian T-90 Battle 

Tanks,” Middle East Monitor, February 16, 2018, https://

www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180216-iraq-receives-first

-batch-of-russian-t-90-battle-tanks/.

197. Christian Triebert, “An Open Source Analysis 

of the Fallujah ‘Convoy Massacre’(s),” Bellingcat, July 

6, 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/07/06

/an-open-source-analysis-of-the-fallujah-convoy-massacres/.

198. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 52.
69

weapons suggests an inability to locate and maneuver 

against enemy positions without first making contact. 

Better use of tactical intelligence would alleviate this 

concern to some degree.

There are, as discussed, cultural and political 

trends that could undermine improvements made 

in this area. In addition to being predisposed to 

restricting information flow, intelligence organizations 

could slide back into their traditional role of acting 

as a check on the other organizations, which would 

only worsen trust issues and make information 

sharing more difficult. A lot will depend on how the 

new government decides to manage and control the 

military. If it creates and relies on informal, alternate 

networks, then, very likely, intelligence sharing and 

capability development will stagnate and eventually 

degrade.

If this happens, then Iraqi Army operations will 

begin to look more like they did in the past when the 

army targeted based solely on human intelligence, 

some of which is uncorroborated and has been used 

to settle personal scores rather than larger military 

objectives. Though doing so was sometimes effective, 

the ability of Da’esh to escape before Iraqi troops 

reached their targets often enabled them to determine 

who the source was. As a result of these operations, 

the Iraqi Army often lost sources. This vicious cycle 

will likely again lead to a significant degradation 

of the army’s ability to target terrorists and their 

facilities. Furthermore, the resulting imprecision 

would further encourage mass arrests and detentions, 

which may have the effect of temporarily disrupting 

some terrorist operations, but may also anger the 

population, driving them into the opposition’s camp.
70

ABSENTEEISM, ADMINISTRATION, AND RISK 

AVERSION

Absenteeism has long been documented as 

endemic in the Iraqi Army. Despite the fact that the 

Jones Report observed the Iraqi Army possessed “an 

adequate supply of willing and able manpower,” it 

also noted that all of the services and ministries had 

difficulty with the administrative tasks associated 

with accountability for personnel.199 Underscoring that 

last point, the 2007 Government Accountability Office 

report cited high absenteeism as well as near-complete 

administrative inability to account for personnel as 

significant impediments to ISF development and 

operations.200 The problem, of course, runs deeper than 

simple absenteeism or poor administrative capacities, 

and there is little reason to think it has changed 

significantly, even after the success against Da’esh.

The first of these practices is using “ghost 

soldiers,” where commanders place additional 

soldiers on the rolls in order to collect the pay those 

soldiers are owed. In some cases, these soldiers exist; 

however, commanders permit them to remain home 

for extended periods, returning once a month to 

collect part of their salaries, while the commander 

keeps the rest. In other cases, these soldiers do not 

exist, as commanders simply add names to their rolls 

(or do not report desertions) to increase the amount 

of money the unit receives to pay its soldiers.201 This 

199. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 9.

200. Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing Iraq, 11.

201. Morris, “Iraqi Army Faces Death.” See also Michael 

Knights, “Bringing Iraq’s Ghost Soldiers Back to Life,” 

The Washington Institute, December 10, 2014, https://www

.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/bringing-iraqs-ghost

-forces-back-to-life. See also Gray, Embedded, 95.
71

creates a perception of favoritism and increases the 

workload of the soldiers who remain.

Anecdotal evidence suggests the practice is wide 

enough to have a significant impact. Prime Minister 

Abadi publicly announced in December 2014 that 

there were 50,000 ghost soldiers in the military.202

Other estimates suggest 30–40 percent of any given 

unit may be ghosts.203 This practice, combined with 

poor living and working conditions, creates soldiers 

who are mistrustful of their leadership and who take 

their frustrations out on a population they perceive as 

hostile. For example, when the Iraqi Army responded 

to Da’esh forces in Qere Tepe, they also turned on 

the Sunni population. As one account noted, “[i]

nstead of chasing the gunmen, the soldiers turned on 

the residents of the Sunni-majority village . . . troops 

raided the homes the militants had used for cover and 

arrested a dozen people, including two elderly men.”204

More to the point, where these conditions are 

present, trust is absent. In addition to there being very 

little reason for Iraqi soldiers to trust their leadership, 

when soldiers take their frustration out on the local 

citizenry, there is little reason for that citizenry to trust 

them. When fighting renewed in late 2012, there were 

mass desertions. Though it is difficult to get accurate 

numbers, frequent references in the Iraqi press suggest 

that the problem is significant.205 In fact, in August 

2013, Maliki issued an amnesty for deserters in hopes 

of getting the soldiers to return.206 Given that this 

202. Knights, “Bringing Iraq’s Ghost Soldiers.”

203. Rayburn and Sobchak, The US Army, 589–590.

204. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.”

205. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.”

206. Morris, “Iraqi Army Faces Death.” See also Bradley 

and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.” According to Bradley, 

“Desertion is a persistent and growing problem, particularly for 
72

amnesty was offered prior to Da’esh seizure of Mosul 

and Anbar and the subsequent increase in fighting, it 

suggests that the desertions were motivated, in part 

at least, by the conditions under which the soldiers 

served more so than the threats they faced.

All of these conditions, of course, have a profound 

impact on discipline—or the lack thereof. One adviser 

reported in 2007 that discipline in the new Iraqi Army 

was characterized by a lack of respect for officers not 

seen in the old army. Moreover, there is evidence that 

the officers, at least at the time, did not care. The Jones 

Report also cited ineffective implementation of the 

Iraqi Code of Military Discipline as a significant point 

of concern.207 As the advisor described it:

Sadly, the Iraqi Army is set up so that soldiers have no 

service obligation and face no legal punishments. If a 

jundi [soldier] decides the Iraqi army sucks and wants 

to quit, he can. Likewise, if he wants to tell a superior 

officer to rot in hell, he can. In the Iraqi army it is nearly 

impossible for officers to maintain military rule that is 

necessary to execute combat operations. A formal legal 

system simply does not exist. The only way for officers to 

punish the jundi is to take away pay or leave, but when 

they implement this punishment, the jundi just quit.208

To the extent that the Iraqi Army has not made 

improvements in enforcing its disciplinary code, it 

will very likely backslide into the ineffective force of 

2014.

troops deployed in Anbar and other areas in the north where ISIS 

is active.”

207. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 55.

208. Gray, Embedded, 108.
73

SECTARIANISM AND MILITIA INFLUENCE

As suggested above, sectarian and militia 

influences will continue to plague the Iraqi Army, 

much as they did prior to 2007 when Iraq nearly fell 

into civil war, though the nature of that influence has 

changed. At one level, sectarian influence in the Iraqi 

Army is structural. As noted above, when the United 

States reformed the Iraqi Army in 2004, it deliberately 

set demographic quotas for the newly formed units. 

Though there were some anecdotes of cross-sectarian 

cooperation,209 for the most part, these demographic 

divides undermined organizational trust and created 

barriers to effective communication, coordination, and 

cooperation within organizations.

For example, in May 2013, the Kurdish commander 

of the 16th Brigade of the 4th Division refused orders to 

rotate his unit out of the disputed internal boundaries 

and defected with the rest of the Kurdish soldiers 

and their equipment to the peshmerga, in a way 

reminiscent of how Kurds in the Iraqi Army defected 

in the sixties and seventies.210 Though this defection 

did not significantly impact Baghdad’s fight against 

the Islamists, it did illustrate the point that until Iraq 

resolves its sectarian political issues, the sectarian 

209. Brasier, But Ma’am, 24. Brasier relates that sectarian 

boundaries seemed to drop when a Kurdish officer saved the life 

of a Shia officer after a traffic accident.

210. Ben Van Heuvelen and Patrick Osgood, “Amid 

Rising Ethnic Tension, Kurdish Brigade Soldiers Stop Taking 

Orders from Baghdad,” Washington Post, June 11, 2013, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/amid-rising

-ethnic-tension-kurdish-brigade-soldiers-stop-taking-orders-from

-baghdad/2013/06/10/e3faa8d4-d1f7-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story

.html?utm_term=.89923bce00b1.
74

identities of its leaders and forces will continue to 

negatively impact its operational capabilities.

Moreover, political parties, especially Shia ones, 

took advantage of these quotas to ensure personnel, 

especially those in leadership positions, were loyal to 

their party. But rather than cooperatively pooling their 

resources to develop effective forces, these parties—

even ones which shared a sectarian identity—

competed for positions within the new forces. Thus, 

the struggle was better described in political, not 

sectarian, terms. But since these parties aligned 

with particular sects, this political struggle naturally 

became sectarian in nature.211 As a result, it was 

often the case that members of some sects, especially 

Sunnis, were displaced both because they were not 

trusted and to make room for personnel associated 

with other competing parties. Whatever the source, 

these sectarian influences “eroded the dependability 

of many Iraqi units,”212 rendering them “incapable of 

providing security to the Iraqi public.”213

Further, militia relationships with the ISF worked 

both ways, as soldiers would often moonlight for 

militia organizations when they were on leave. As 

one Iraqi officer put it, “You are a young military 

man, strong, trained, and so forth. How can you not 

join a militia when you get home? Your family and 

tribe would be ashamed if you did not help the local 

militia.”214

Additionally, as The Military Balance 2014 observed, 

Maliki installed dimaj [integration] officers in the ISF 

to contain possible Baathist resurgence following the 

211. Pfaff, Development and Reform, 9–16.

212. Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing Iraq, 11.

213. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 9.

214. Gray, Embedded, 189.
75

reintegration of officers who served under Saddam.215

For the most part, these integration officers had 

no military experience and were simply a vector 

for political influence, further contributing to the 

politicization of the ISF. It is not clear to what extent, 

if any, they play a role in the current security services.

Unlike in 2007, when parties and militias battled 

over control of the ministries and their resources, 

these same sectarian entities now often compete 

and cooperate with these ministries to ensure their 

prominent and public role in improving the security 

situation. In some cases, they coopt ISF units, 

including uniforms, vehicles, and identification, 

to ensure freedom of movement as they ethnically 

cleanse Sunni neighborhoods. For example, in the 

town of Buhriz, near Baqubah, Shia militia members 

associated with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq reportedly entered 

the town at the ISF’s request to assist in responding to 

Da’esh’s killing of an ISF officer. While in the town, 

they detained a number of Sunni males and otherwise 

disrupted civil life. As a press report noted, “[b]y the 

following day, 28 villagers had been killed and several 

houses torched, local officials said.”216 In other cases, 

they conduct their own, independent operations to 

secure Shia populations in mixed areas.

Additionally, to support their operations, these 

same militias are known to extort funds through 

kidnapping and other forms of organized crime, in 

addition to more conventional, and legal, forms of 

fundraising.217 As a result, in their zeal to contribute 

215. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 

Balance 2014, 322. Dimaj is Arabic for “integration.”

216. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.” See also

“Alas, It May Make Little Difference.”

217. Anthony J. Schwarz, “Iraq’s Militias: The True Threat 

to Coalition Success in Iraq,” Parameters 37, no. 1 (Spring 2007), 
76

to Iraq’s security, they undermine the government’s 

monopoly on force, which is a cornerstone of national 

stability.218 This problem is especially acute where 

militias associated with the PMF have stepped in 

to fill the security vacuum. In these areas, militias 

often extort money from locals by charging them for 

protection or for simply using the roads, on which 

they have established numerous checkpoints.

So though it would be wrong to say the ISF has 

overcome its sectarian past, how that sectarianism 

manifests itself continues to evolve as each faction 

attempts to both carve out its own space and respond 

to others’ attempts to do so. As former Office of 

Security Cooperation—Iraq Chief Lieutenant General 

Robert Caslen stated in 2013, “the Iraqis preserved 

ethnic and sectarian diversity in the military’s upper 

ranks, as instructed by the Americans. But the nation’s 

divisions permeated even that arrangement. Officers 

routinely bypassed the chain of command to deal with 

soldiers from similar backgrounds. . . . There is a lot of 

distrust in the organization.”219

FUTURE ENGAGEMENT

The current moment affords the United 

States and its partners a unique opportunity to 

advance the capabilities—and, to some degree, the 

professionalism—of the Iraqi Army. Taking advantage 

of this opportunity, however, will come with 

significant challenges. At the time of this writing, the 

results of the May 2018 elections have placed a mix of 

pro-Iran, pro-Muqtada al-Sadr, and pro-United States 

55–71.

218. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization

(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1964), 156.

219. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.”
77

politicians in positions of power.220 Moreover, the PMF 

has established itself as a security force practically, if 

not constitutionally, separate from the MOD and MOI. 

This division will ensure competition for funds and 

resources and complicate the provision of US support, 

requiring additional oversight to ensure militia 

organizations do not benefit. Further complicating 

the picture is the ISF’s role in killing and injuring 

protestors who have been demonstrating against 

Iranian influence and poor governance.221 In doing 

so, it threatens the popular legitimacy and support it 

gained in the fight against Da’esh.

Still, the United States has a number of 

comparative advantages over Iraq’s other security 

partners, especially Iran, that, if used properly, can set 

conditions for a more professional army, improve the 

Iraqi Army’s ability to partner with coalition forces 

in the continued fight against Da’esh, and enable the 

army to conduct unilateral operations that serve the 

mutual interests of Iraq and the United States. Those 

comparative advantages do not just include superior 

weapons, equipment, and maintenance support. They 

also include superior intelligence and logistics support 

as well as, when appropriate, access to coalition air and 

indirect fire assets. Though the Iranians have made 

much in Iraqi media regarding their contribution 

in the fight against Da’esh, most senior Iraqi leaders 

220. Jessa Rose Dury-Agri and Patrick Hamon, “Breaking 

Down Iraq’s Election Results,” Institute for the Study of War, 

May 24, 2018, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder

/breaking-down-iraqs-election-results.

221. C. Anthony Pfaff, “Iraq Protests: How Should 

the Government and US Respond?” The Atlantic Council, 

October 3, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource

/iraq-protests-how-should-iraq-and-the-us-respond/.
78

would acknowledge the decisive contribution the 

United States-led coalition made to the outcome.222

Additionally, partnership with the United States 

can facilitate greater connectivity to the international 

community, which will increase the resources available 

for development and which can, over time, bolster the 

country’s legitimacy as a responsible, international 

actor. Though there is not necessarily a correlation 

between positive international engagement and an 

increasingly trusted and competent Iraqi Army, 

the benefits of such status and scrutiny do serve as 

incentives for the Iraqis to make at least some of the 

necessary reforms.

Despite the current Iraqi government’s 

inconsistently positive relations with Iran, it is still 

very likely Iraq will still seek some level cooperation 

with the United States and its partners. After the 

experience of fighting Da’esh with US assistance, 

it will be difficult for Iraqi leaders to turn down the 

quality of equipment, support, and expertise the 

United States-led coalition can offer. In fact, Iraqi 

leaders closely associated with Iran, such as Hadi 

al-Amiri and Interior Minister Qasim al-Araji, have 

expressed interest in continued security cooperation 

with the United States as well as the presence of some 

US troops.223 Moreover, Prime Minister Adel Abdul 

Mahdi is known as a relatively moderate member of 

the pro-Iranian Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq who 

222. Matt Bradley, “Victory over Islamic State in Iraqi Town 

Has Some Cheering Iran,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2015, 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/victory-over-islamic-state-in-iraqi-town

-has-some-cheering-iran-1446240997.

223. Margaret Coker, “The US Takes a Risk: Old Iraqi 

Enemies Are Now Allies,” New York Times, May 11, 2018, https://

www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/middleeast/iraq-iran-election

-enemies.html.
79

lived in exile in France until the fall of Saddam. Thus, 

future cooperation seems likely.224

Good relationships with a variety of Iraqi actors 

will be critical to the success of US security cooperation 

efforts. Mara E. Karlin, in Building Militaries in Fragile 

States, argues that deep US involvement in a partner’s 

“sensitive military affairs” and a diminishing role 

of actors antagonistic to US involvement are critical 

elements to successful security cooperation aimed 

at assisting the ability of partners to provide for 

internal defense.225 This point suggests US security 

cooperators, advisors, and senior leaders should 

work to develop sufficiently close relationships that 

Iraqi military leaders accept advice and suggestions 

regarding measures that will facilitate the Iraqi 

Army’s development and reform. Failure to establish 

such relationships should be considered a constraint 

on the effectiveness of security cooperation efforts.

Unity of Command

Much of the Iraqi Army’s problems boil down 

to one thing: leadership. Michael Knights, who 

authored The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces on behalf 

of the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, an 

Iraqi think tank, argues Iraq needs a “powerful Chief 

of Defense (CHOD)” who would serve as the “one 

paramount military deputy to the prime minister.” 

This CHOD should be nonsectarian; militarily 

competent; and willing to improve discipline, punish 

incompetence and corruption, and stand-up to the 

224. “Iraq: Adel Abdul Mahdi named prime minister,” 

Al Jazeera, October 3, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com

/news/middleeast/2018/10/iraq-adel-abdul-mahdi-named-prime

-minister-181003053509104.html.

225. Karlin, Building Militaries, 19.
80

militias. Additionally, he argues for a “broadening 

of capable junior leaders” who respond through 

the chain of command to the “clearly recognized 

leadership” of the CHOD.226 Knights is right about 

the ISF needing such leadership; however, Iraq’s past 

suggests obtaining it is unlikely, at least in the short 

term, until the political and social dynamics that 

divide Iraq’s loyalties are resolved and the army is 

trusted by the government to work for it rather than 

serve as a potential check against it. Thus, in the short 

term at least, divided leadership will be a constraint 

on the kind of capability development the Iraqi Army 

can accomplish, even with US help.

• Having said that, the Iraqi Army could make 

a great deal of progress with a leader who is 

broadly trusted and able to reach across sectarian lines. US leadership can quietly identify 

such leaders and encourage the Iraqi government to appoint them.

• At the same time, US security advisors should 

identify alternative chains of command and 

continue to discourage their use by reinforcing the formal chain. To facilitate this effort, 

US advisors should reinforce ties between the 

MOD, the National Operations Center, and the 

chief of the army.

US security cooperators should also identify 

overlapping areas of responsibility within the army 

and within the other services and PMF and seek 

ways to make competing roles and responsibilities 

more complementary. For example, Knights 

observes the PMF was good at defensive operations 

in Shia-dominated areas; however, it was largely 

incompetent at offensive operations in Da’esh-held 

226. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 40–43.
81

areas.227 It is worth pointing out that complementary 

roles do not have to be entirely exclusive. There will 

always be the potential for some overlap, especially 

as counterterrorism and counterinsurgence efforts 

involve the full range of security services. As noted 

earlier, some jurisdictional competition is healthy, so 

to the extent any overlap does exist, it can promote the 

effectiveness of the profession.

Corruption

As noted above, corruption is endemic and 

entrenched in the Iraqi government, not just the 

security services. Though it is unlikely it will be 

eliminated, units like the CTS have demonstrated it 

can be reduced to a level such that it is not a barrier 

to effective and professional leadership. But, as with 

unity of command, any meaningful solution will 

require strong and determined Iraqi leadership. The 

United States should continue to encourage senior 

Iraqi leadership to remove corrupt and incompetent 

leaders at every level.

• To encourage that leadership, US security cooperators should make US support, including 

training and equipment, contingent on units 

adopting accountability practices, in the same 

way the United States does end-service monitoring. The idea is to set up a dynamic where 

a relationship with the US Army brings sufficient benefit—tangible and intangible—such 

that abandoning corrupt practices will be 

worthwhile.

• To support anti-corruption efforts, US security 

cooperators should leverage support to get the 

227. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 31.
82

Iraqis to adopt procedures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. For example, rather than 

providing funds directly to units to pay soldiers, the Iraqi Army should establish individual accounts at local banks. Soldiers would have 

to physically go to the bank and provide adequate identification to receive their pay. While 

not a foolproof system, it would make it more 

difficult to employ ghost soldiers.

• To the extent technology can reinforce corruption-resistant procedures, US security cooperators should leverage support to get the Iraqis 

to adopt it, consistent with their ability to use it 

effectively.

• Conditioning US support on meaningful corruption reduction measures will likely limit the 

units, organizations, and leaders with which 

the United States can effectively cooperate, at 

least in the short term. This point suggests the 

United States should be prepared to provide 

more direct support, including direct action, 

to prevent a Da’esh resurgence. Thus, security 

cooperation efforts should emphasize interoperability, including joint training, to exercise 

the US ability to effectively support Iraqi Army 

operations.

• Encourage senior Iraqi leadership to develop 

and promulgate a professional ethic compatible with Iraqi culture which establishes an Iraqi 

Army identity, encouraging commitment to 

humanitarian ideals, competence, and effective 

stewardship of the profession.
83

Poor Combat Support: Communications, 

Intelligence, and Logistics

Improving unity of command and reducing 

corruption, will, of course, go a long way in improving 

Iraq’s combat support capabilities. But divided and 

corrupt leadership is not the only barrier the current 

Iraqi Army has to developing these capabilities. There 

are a number of technological and procedural hurdles 

the Iraqis will have to overcome as well.

• Currently, a great deal of communication 

among Iraqi Army units occurs over civilian 

infrastructure that is extremely unreliable and 

unsecure. Moreover, Iraqis tend to prefer to 

use their personal cell phones to communicate, 

even when military means of communication 

are available. This point suggests that advisory engagement, as well as Title X exchanges, 

aimed at encouraging the use and maintenance 

of military communications should be a part of 

any comprehensive security cooperation plan.

• In the years after the withdrawal of US forces 

and before the fall of Mosul to Da’esh, US military intelligence cooperation was extremely 

limited, despite numerous Iraqi requests for 

assistance. Since poor intelligence has been a 

frequent contributor to Iraq’s military disasters, US security cooperators should emphasize 

intelligence cooperation and interoperability as 

key elements of the security cooperation plan. 

While Iraq’s relationship to Iran will likely limit 

what intelligence the United States can share, 

US advisors need to ensure authorities, permissions, and procedures are in place to share 
84

intelligence regarding Da’esh resurgence before 

it metastasizes.

• US advisors should strongly discourage the 

use of military intelligence units to secure the 

Iraqi government against other security services. Though it makes sense for each service to 

have effective counterintelligence and criminal 

investigation units, the services need to be independent of the chain of command and strictly 

focused on threats internal to the respective 

organizations. US advisors are likely going to be 

limited in their ability to monitor such relationships, so where they are present, they should be 

seen as a constraint on cooperation.

• Regarding logistics and maintenance, Knights 

reports Iraqis “remain fearful of trusting electronic systems, feeling they can minimize theft 

and loss if they stick to paper and sign-offs they 

are more familiar with.”228 Unfortunately, the 

reality has been the opposite. Much of these 

difficulties have been the result of degradation 

of the Iraqi military following the 1991 Gulf 

War, the subsequent sanctions that reduced 

Iraq to a survival economy that relied on corrupt practices, and the disbanding of the army 

in 2003 and the unfamiliar systems US advisors 

imposed when trying to rebuild it. These points 

suggest the following three measures for stimulating reform and building resiliency.

◦ Encourage the Iraqis to develop technical solutions that are compatible with their 

capabilities and comfort level but that 

can provide independent accounting for 

supplies, spare parts, and maintenance 

228. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 50.
85

activities. Fixing Iraq’s combat support systems requires—to the extent possible—an 

independent source of relevant information that illuminates corrupt and inefficient 

practices in a way all parties, regardless of 

sectarian affiliation, can trust. Technology is 

one way to provide that.

◦ Decentralize logistics and maintenance operations to make the system more responsive.

◦ As with intelligence, Iraqi capabilities will 

take a long time to develop and may not be 

adequately capable by the time Da’esh has 

been revived. This point suggests US security cooperators should emphasize logistic 

interoperability so US logistics capabilities 

can assist the Iraqis quickly in times of crisis.

Absenteeism, Administration, and Risk Aversion

As suggested above, all of these critical 

vulnerabilities of the Iraqi Army are closely linked 

to each other. Improving unity, reducing corruption, 

and improving accountability will go a long way 

toward reducing absenteeism and risk aversion, and 

improving administrative capabilities will be critical 

to all of these efforts. The goal here is to establish a 

“virtuous cycle” where improving administrative 

capabilities reduces corruption, leads to better quality 

of life for soldiers, and thus increases trust in their 

leadership. Such trust should reduce risk aversion 

as well as incentivize improvements in combat and 

combat support capabilities.

• Creating such a virtuous cycle requires improving the quality of Iraqi soldiers. As noted above, 

in 2007 most Iraqi soldiers saw the military as 
86

a job—and a miserable one at that. By 2018, 

the Iraqi Army had partially restored the pride 

Iraqis once took in the military; however, to 

sustain that, the Iraqi Army must draw on more 

educated and capable elements of its society. 

Doing so suggests the following measures.

◦ Just as it did at its founding—and again 

during the Iran-Iraq War—the Iraqi Army 

needs to recruit capable individuals, particularly those in technical fields, to assume 

roles as junior officers.229 Given the current 

divisiveness of Iraqi politics, the government should not resort to conscription, as 

this would likely be viewed as a means to 

marginalizing certain populations, just as it 

was in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, the government should capitalize on the current 

public trust and provide strong incentives 

for college students and graduates to join.

◦ As the Iraqi Army’s historic ideal suggests, 

it can be very proficient at heavily scripted, 

short-duration operations with very specific 

objectives. But it will be some time before it 

is capable of more complex operations without considerable external support. Thus, 

US advisors should emphasize individual 

and small-unit skills with the aim to build a 

competent base of skilled soldiers and junior 

leaders and to set the conditions for developing capabilities for larger unit operations.

◦ As noted earlier, the establishment of professional military educational institutions 

was critical to establishing the army as a 

profession. Thus, US security cooperators 

229. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 44.
87

should emphasize relationships with Iraq’s 

professional military education schools. 

These relationships should emphasize both 

tactical and operational skills and the standards associated with establishing and 

maintaining a profession. Additionally, the 

United States should attempt to reinvigorate 

Iraq’s Defense Language Institute English 

language programs, as doing so would facilitate interoperability with US forces and the 

larger coalition.230

Sectarianism

While it is worth noting that Iraq’s Shia population 

are largely responsible for the protests directed at 

Iran and the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, 

it may be too soon to say that Iraq may finally be 

getting past the sectarianism that has divided it since 

the US invasion as the forces that tore it apart are 

still, potentially at least, in play.231 Iranian influence, 

especially when manifested by the brutal practices 

of the PMF, continues to drive fear into the Sunni 

population, which creates space for Da’esh or any 

other group that claims to defend Sunnis’ interests.232

Any such resurgence would simply validate again a 

willingness among the Shia majority to sanction harsh 

measures against Sunni actors, resulting in the same 

230. When the author toured the English language lab at the 

Iraq Military Academy Rustamiyah in 2013, it appeared to be 

largely unused.

231. “Fifteen Years after America’s Invasion, Iraq 

is Getting back on its Feet,” Economist, March 31, 2018, 

https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/03/31

/fifteen-years-after-americas-invasion-iraq-is-getting-back-on-its-feet.

232. See Amnesty International, Iraq, for a fuller account.
88

dynamics seen in 2014. The aftermath of the Kurdish 

independence referendum in 2017 has both made 

independence more remote and exacerbated divisions 

among Iraq’s parties. So, in many ways, Iraq’s sects 

are even more divided now than they have been in 

the past. How those divisions manifest themselves 

depends to a large extent on the actions of the new 

government, the formation of which at the time of this 

writing is incomplete. Playing a role in resolving these 

tensions suggests the following measures.

• Do not let the presence of Iranian influence prevent relationship development with Iraqi units, 

including the PMF. Given Iran’s location and 

history with Iraq, it naturally has a strong security interest in how the ISF develops. Thus, it 

would be naïve to expect it not to try to influence the ISF’s evolution and futile to try to stop it 

from doing so completely. Zero tolerance of Iranian influence, a past US policy, simply will not 

serve any purpose in post-Da’esh Iraq. Though 

certain kinds of Iranian influence should limit 

cooperation, not having any relations simply 

cedes that space to them. Moreover, it reinforces the perception that Iran is dominant in 

Iraq, which both stokes fear among Sunnis and 

divides the various Shia groups, not all of whom 

want to have such close ties to Iran. The key to 

such relationships is to rely on US advantages 

the Iranians cannot replicate and to make any 

support contingent on taking the steps required 

to build an Iraqi Army which is, among other 

things, nonsectarian.

• Discourage the Iraqi government from indulging in the urge to create new security institutions and encourage it to place all security 
89

organizations under the direct operational control of either the MOD or MOI, as appropriate. 

As the recent establishment of the PMF as yet 

another force that directly reports to the prime 

minister has shown, new organizations are often 

just another means for some actor to engage in 

malign influence.233

• Maintain a relationship with and support for 

Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades, which are 

peshmerga units that have agreed to respond 

to Iraqi government control. After the events 

in Kirkuk in 2017, when Iraqi Army units occupied territory in the disputed areas, the relationship between peshmerga and the Iraqi military 

is tenuous at best, with the likelihood they 

will be adversaries or allies an even split. The 

United States should play a role in building up 

the Regional Guard Brigades, but in a way that 

builds, or at least does not undermine, ties with 

Baghdad. In the zero-sum game of Iraqi politics, 

supporting the Kurds could be seen by Baghdad as a threat and result in restrictions on its 

cooperation with the United States. Alienating 

Baghdad risks ceding more space to the Iranians, as good relations with Baghdad are necessary for contesting malign Iranian influence.

• When engaging a wide variety of potential Iraqi 

partners, it is important to remember the United 

States represents to some factions the same 

kind of sectarian concerns Iran does.234 For that 

233. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 37.

234. Gray, Embedded, 65. Gray reports multiple interactions 

where Iraqis compared US forces to the British mandate. The 

author had similar experiences in 2012–2013 and 2005–2006 when 

serving in the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team.
90

reason, the United States should continue to 

encourage a wide variety of like-minded partners to develop security cooperation activities 

with the Iraqis, much like the Italian Carabinieri’s

cooperation with the Iraqi Federal Police. More 

international cooperation will both increase the 

resources available to the Iraqi Army and legitimate the US presence in ways the Iranians will 

not be able to replicate.

• To contain the growing influence of the PMF 

as well as avoid the mistakes regarding ISF 

integration made in the past, the United States 

could encourage a local role for the various militias similar to the model the British employed 

during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman. In that 

country, the British convinced the Omani sultan 

to establish Firqat, which were platoon-tocompany-sized organizations of tribal fighters 

who came from the same tribes that were rebelling. They were employed locally, had a few 

British Special Air Service advisors, and served 

as scouts, guides, and home guards that were 

able to consolidate regular Omani force gains.235

• The US should also actively release information 

regarding PMF and Iranian malign activities, 

especially violence conducted against Iraqis, 

in order to undermine support for Iran and its 

proxies both with the Iraqi public as well as the 

international community.

235. Walter C. Ludwig III, “Supporting Allies in 

Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion,” Small 

Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 1 (March 2008), 73.
91

FOCUS AREA IRAQI ACTION US ACTION OUTCOME

UNITY OF 

COMMAND

Empowered CHOD, 

ground force 

commander; align 

CTS, PMF under 

MOD or MOI; 

eliminate alternate/

overlapping chains 

of command and 

roles; improve 

quality of junior 

officers

Title X activities should emphasize communications, 

use of issued 

radios, communications 

gear; actively 

discourage alternate chains 

of command

Empowered 

CHOD and 

subordinate 

commanders 

who effectively 

address 

corruption and 

incompetence, 

build trust; 

adequate 

communications 

infrastructure 

to securely 

coordinate 

operations 

across multiple 

operations 

commands; 

clear and 

complementary 

roles among 

services

CORRUPTION Eliminate 

purchasing 

commands, ghost 

soldiers; fire corrupt, 

ineffective officers; 

pay soldiers through 

individual bank 

accounts; improve 

professional 

standards to create 

extended trust

Identify and 

advocate for 

trusted leaders 

in critical 

positions; 

leverage 

support to 

encourage 

adoption of 

anti-corruption 

measures

Resource loss 

due to corruption 

does not affect 

readiness; 

widespread 

perception 

that corrupt 

practices will be 

punished and 

good practices 

rewarded; 

improved trust

COMBAT SUPPORT (Communications, Logistics 

and Maintenance, 

Intelligence,)

Improve 

communications 

infrastructure; 

automate 

accountability to 

extent possible; 

decentralize 

responsibility; 

improve tactical 

intelligence 

collection/

dissemination

Title X activities should 

emphasize 

interoperability and exhibit 

good practices; 

encourage 

like-minded 

partners to 

engage in 

these areas; 

decentralize 

responsibility

The United States 

and coalition 

partners can 

effectively 

integrate their 

communications, 

logistics, and 

intelligence 

capabilities to 

support Iraqi 

operations; Iraqi 

capabilities 

gradually 

improve

Table 2. Focus Areas for Iraqi and US Engagement
92

FOCUS AREA IRAQI ACTION US ACTION OUTCOME

PERSONNEL 

(Absenteeism; 

Administration; 

Risk Aversion)

Adopt appropriate 

technological 

accounting and 

management 

solutions; better 

enforce disciplinary 

code; increase 

recruitment of 

college-educated 

persons

Encourage 

appropriate 

technological 

solutions to 

accountability 

and 

management 

issues; Title 

X activities 

should 

emphasize 

small-unit 

tactics and 

individual 

soldier skills

Administrative 

backbone capable 

of accounting 

for personnel 

and equipment, 

identifying 

corrupt activities; 

Iraqi soldiers and 

units confident 

in ability to 

conduct limited, 

short-duration 

operations

SECTARIANISM Align PMF under 

MOD/MOI or establish complementary 

roles; avoid creating 

additional security 

institutions; eliminate demographic 

quotas; adopt Dhofar model for militia 

integration—militias 

integrated as groups 

and which play local 

security role under 

control of the ISF

Consider 

establishing 

relations with 

select PMF 

units and 

support those 

willing to play 

constructive, 

nonsectarian 

roles; support 

the Regional 

Guard Brigades, but 

work toward 

better integration with 

MOD; encourage like-minded partner 

engagement, 

especially 

with units 

with which 

the United 

States may 

not be able 

to establish a 

relationship

PMF plays complementary, defensive roles and 

does not provoke 

sectarian tensions; Iraqi-Kurd 

cooperation/

interoperability 

sufficient to avoid 

misunderstanding; local militias 

play constructive, 

local security role 

and are responsive to central 

government

Table 2 (continued)
93

CONCLUSION

With Da’esh no longer in control of Iraqi territory, 

the rationale for US direct action, large numbers of 

advisors, and robust intelligence and logistics support 

will disappear. This point is true from the perspectives 

of both Iraq and the United States. For the Iraqis’ 

part, they will likely accept—and the Iranians will 

likely tolerate—only limited forms of US cooperation 

against Da’esh and any other militant groups that 

again threaten Iraqi sovereignty. For the United States’ 

part, limited resources and growing global security 

challenges will likely divert its attention—and, with 

it, security cooperation resources—elsewhere. These 

points suggest whatever bilateral US cooperation 

survives in post-Da’esh Iraq will be inadequate to the 

task of wholly professionalizing the Iraqi Army, much 

less the other defense and security institutions.

Despite this bleak assessment, all is not necessarily 

lost. If, as de Toqueville observed, unwarranted 

optimism is a condition of the American culture,236 it 

is inevitable that the United States will try yet again. 

The good news this time is the US military has a lot 

more experience with what works and what does not, 

as well as what is achievable.

It should be clear from this analysis that no 

external party, neither the United States nor Iran, will 

ever be in a position to entirely address the political, 

social, cultural, and economic factors that impede 

the Iraqi Army’s ability to professionalize. But by 

directing attention to the conditions that facilitate the 

236. Jared Keller, “What Makes Americans So 

Optimistic,” Atlantic, March 25, 2015, https://www

.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-american

-ethic-and-the-spirit-of-optimism/388538/.
94

growth of a professional officer and noncommissioned 

officer corps, one can help develop institutions that 

communicate and expand expert knowledge as 

well as the factors that undermine trust. In this way, 

external actors can influence the Iraqi Army to make 

the reforms necessary for it to become an effective 

fighting force.

Moreover, the current moment in Iraq’s military 

history gives it rare momentum to reform. The catalyst 

for this reform is both the expected, long-term demand 

to confront Da’esh and the benefits Iraq stands to gain 

by playing a constructive security role as an accepted 

member of the broader international community. Thus, 

the long-term goal of US security cooperation with 

Iraq should be to establish its military as a valuable 

security partner capable of participating in regional 

security arrangements, much in the same way Jordan, 

Saudi Arabia, and even Oman do. Of course, getting 

to that point depends on political developments the 

United States has limited ability to influence, much less 

control. As such, failure to reconcile and accommodate 

Iraq’s multiple competing factions would reinforce 

alternate chains of command and undermine the 

unity essential to reducing corruption and sectarian 

influence. Unless these factors are addressed by a 

forward-looking US military assistance program, 

the Iraqi Army will remain one of the least effective 

fighting forces in the Arab world, despite the courage 

of its individual soldiers. The shortcomings of the 

Iraqi Army and other security services identified in 

this paper should both inform and constrain the kinds 

and scope of security cooperation undertaken by the 

United States.

Having said that, continued, steady engagement 

emphasizing the critical areas discussed above should 
95

serve to set conditions for meaningful improvement 

when political and social conditions permit. Of course, 

no one measure is going to improve the Iraqi Army. 

But, taken together, these recommendations represent 

a good chance for US security cooperation efforts 

to achieve a tipping point that enables the kind of 

reform that can allow the Iraqi Army to move beyond 

its historic limitations. As US security cooperators 

attempt to set those conditions on what will likely be 

a shoestring budget, getting to that tipping point will 

require implementing measures aimed at building 

trust within the Iraqi Army and with the other security 

services and the civilian government. Building that 

trust will allow the Iraqi Army to better harness the 

resources it has, establish the kinds of institutions that 

can sustain its current momentum toward meaningful 

reform, and establish itself as a professional, effective 

military force in a region in desperate need of stability.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General John S. Kem

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

AND

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Dr. Isaiah Wilson III

Director of Research

Colonel George Shatzer

Author

Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff

Editor in Chief

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

*****
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