I

1

7

1.

c

I

i

0

k

D.

I

I

cC

I
The Attack

At the end of August 1942, according to the results of our reconnaissance, the British stood approximately in the following positions:

In the northern sector under the

command of the XXX Corps were

the 5th Indian Div, the 50th British*

and the 9th Australian Divs; behind

them, on the coast, was the 1st South

African Div in reserve. The southern sector was defended by the 2d

New Zealand Div under the XIII

Corps and adjacent to it on the left,

the 7th Armd Div with its reconnaissance units. Behind the center and

the southern sectors of the Alamein

position stood the 1st British Armd

Div,** and as it was later discovered,

the 10th Armd Div also.

Rommel had the following intentions:

By observing all precautionary

measures possible in order to avoid

detection, the mechanized offensive

group consisting of the German

Afrika Korps (a part of the Panzerarmee Afriha), the XX Italian Corps

and the 90th Light Div were to be

moved into assembly areas at Djebel

Kalakh. The tanks were to be

moved by night-marches into positions on the line of departure in the

course of 4 nights, one quarter each

night, and there camouflaged in

position. Following this, the wheeled

vehicles were to be moved into the

assembly areas the last night. But at

the same time their disappearance

was to be covered by the dispositions

of the supply and service troops into

their old area. Above all, our intentions must be kept secret.

Our reconnaissance had consistently reported during the last few weeks

that in the southern portion of

the Alamein front the enemy had

planted minefields which could be

easily overcome. These obstacles

should be penetrated during the

night of 30/31 August by pioneers

and infantry, and the enemy ejected

from the positions by tank units following immediately behind. The

Deutsches Afrika Korps, with elements of the Italian Motorized

Corps, should advance at top speed

to the east during the same night to

seize the territory southwest of El

Hammam, 40 to 50 kilometers disBayerlein

Discussing the situation just prior to the battle: Rommel, Bayerlein, von Bismarck

tant from the line of departure.

While the X Italian Corps (which

held the southern front) was to remain ready for the defense, the 90th

Light Div and part of the XX Italian Corps were to cover the left

flank of the offensive group in order

to ward off anticipated British counterattacks.

At first light the Deutsches Afrika

Korps, however, should even continue to press the advance northward to the coast and seek a decision in open battle. In this operation, relying on previous experience,

Rommel, above all else, reckoned on

the long time required for the British command and troops to react.

He hoped, therefore, to be able to

confront the British with the fait

accompli of the entire operation by

this stroke.

Following this, everything was to

move rapidly. According to Rommel's concept, he couldn't afford to

have the battle fall into a static

phase. Continuing smaller limited

attacks by the remaining German

and Italian infantry in the Alamein

position were to tie down the British

strength there while the decisive

battle was planned to take place behind the British front. We wanted

to equalize our inferiority in materiel strength by relying on the superior ability of our troops to wage

a battle of movement and the highly developed tactical skill of our

commanders. This had been our experience in the recent battles in the

Western Desert, 1941-42. Separated

from their supply points, the only

thing that would remain for the

British to do would be to fight to the

last round of ammunition or breakout and escape to the east, which

would mean giving up Egypt.

The success of this operation depended not only on the availability

of supply support to our forces, but

also on the surmise that our offensive preparations could be completed

without being discovered by the

enemy. In addition, we had to assuine that the British positions could

rapidly be overwhelmed and the adLast light -the attack would jump off at night

*ED: This division was not in the line, though one of its brigades was brought up on 2 Sept. **This unit did not participate in the battle. See Gen Roberts' map for correct order of battle.
From assembly areas . . .

Bayerlei n

after heavy artillery preparation . .

vance into the British rear could be

speedily effected.

By the end of August the supplies of munitions and fuel promised

by the Italian Commando Supremo

had not yet arrived. The period of

full moon, which was absolutely necessary for the execution of the operation was already waning. A further

delay would have meant the complete abandoning of our offensive

plans.

During the night of 30/31 August

we jumped off in the attack against

the southern bastions of the British

Alamein Front. Shortly after our

troops had crossed the eastern limits

of their own minefields and traversed

No-Man's-Land, they ran into heretofore unknown British mine obstacles which were tenaciously defended. Under cover of heavy artillery fire and after several assaults,

our pioneers and infantrymen succeeded partially in driving narrow

passages through the British barricades. As a result of this, our losses

were considerable and we lost much

time since the mine fields were of

considerable depth and had been

additionally planted with a great

number of booby traps.

Soon the carpet bombing of the

RAF began on the area occupied by

our forward elements. Wave after

wave of heavy bomber formations

dropped their high explosives while

both sky and earth were intermittently made light as day by parachute flares and pyrotechnics. Gen

von Bismarck, commanding general

of the 21st Panzer Div was killed by

a direct hit and Gen Nehring, commander of the Afrika Korps was severely wounded by a bomb fragment.

As a result, by daybreak, the most

forward elements of the Deutsches

Afrika Korps and the Reconnaissance Group could only reach a

point 12 to 15 kilometers east of

their own mine fields. Rommel's

intention, to drive 50 kilometers to

the east with his motorized units

during the moonlit night and to further press the attack northward at

first light, had not succeeded. The

element of surprise upon which, in

the final analysis, the entire plan

was built, had consequently been

lost. We now considered, in the face

of this fact, whether or not we

should break off the battle. The

British now knew our dispositions.

Rommel decided to base his decision

to break off the battle or to continue

the offensive upon the immediate

situation of the Afrika Korps.

The Deutsches A frika Korps, in the

. . and Go! booby-trapped minefields prove difficult...

aayerlein

Pioneers move into the minefields clearing lanes for the infantry to get ready . . .

but the attack moves on through the barriers . . .
meantime under my command (I

had taken over command of the

Afrika Korps after Gen Nehring

had been wounded) had overcome

all the British mine obstacles and

was in the process of continuing the

attack to the east. Rommel discussed

the situation with me, and we arrived at the decision - continue the

attack.

Since the British armored units

had now concentrated and stood

ready for immediate counteraction,

we were forced to make our turning

movement northward earlier than

we had originally planned. The

operational objectives for the Deutsches Afrika Korps was now Hill 132,

Alam Halfa; and for the XX Italian

Corps, Alam Bueib. According to

the information of our air reconnaissance this ridge was heavily fortified

and, as was later confirmed, occupied by the 44th British Inf Div,

which had just been assigned to the

Eighth Army fresh out of Great

Britain. Naturally, it was quite

clear to us that the struggle for this

high ground which was the key to

the el Alamein position, would be

very difficult in light of our experiences in similar battles. Fieldmarshal Kesselring, commander of the

Luftwaffe in Africa, was therefore

requested to attack the fortified

ridge with strong air forces.

After the Deutsches Afrika Korps

had refueled and rearmed, which

took considerable time, it assembled

at 1300 hours. During an intense

sandstorm, which was blowing from

our backs into the face of the enemy,

the attack of the 15th and the 21st

Pz Divs got underway well in the

beginning. Unfortunately, at this

time the Italian armored divisions

Ariete and Trieste were still held up

by clearing lanes through mine fields

and by the serial movement of their

units through the captured British

defense system. For this reason they

could only begin their attack by evening.

After Rommel had again discussed the situation with me he

travelled over to the Italian divisions and spurred them on with all

haste. In the meantime, our tanks

the forward elements have progressed only 12 to 15 kms eastward ... in the afternoon the attack of the Panzer divisions is well underway...

still the Afrika Korps moves on (here east of Djebel Kalakh) . . .

Bayerlein

and passes through the minefields east of Djebel Kalakh ...

Bayerlein

Rommel discusses with Bayerlein the possibility of breaking off the action

or the advisability of continuing the attack
and vehicles labored with the greatest difficulty through the loose sand

which covered the terrain of the approach march. The entire day a

sandstorm raged, making life miserable for our men, but at the same

time it prevented the RAF from

attacking our units. Because of this

difficult terrain, the fuel levels within the Deutsches Afrika Korps had

been seriously reduced by evening.

Around 1600 hours our attack

against Hill 132 was stopped for the

time being. The Italian Corps,

which was to support us on our

flank, was still a considerable distance away. The 90th Light Div

had reached its assigned position.

The Reconnaissance Group (Recon

Detachments 3, 33 and 580) had

made contact to the east and southeast with the 7th Armd Div.

During the night 31 August/1

September our Recon Group was

the target of heavy British bomber

and fighter attacks. With the help

of countless parachute flares every

movement was subject to an immediate strafing attack. Soon a great

number of our vehicles were in

flames and burned out. The Recon

Group suffered heavy losses.

In the meantime, the gasoline

which had been promised us had

not arrived in Africa. Also the task

of the resupply columns moving east

through the clearings in the mine

fields became very difficult in view

of the heavy harassing attacks of

British armored units and the RAF.

So, at the very last minute (the

morning of 1 September) Rommel

was forced to stop any large-scale

actions for the time being because

movements involving greater depths

with motorized units had to be

avoided. At the most, we could only

attempt to conduct several local limited attacks.

Limited by these requirements,

the Deutsches A frika Korps continued

the attack during the course of the

morning of 1 September against

Alam Halfa with the 15th Pz Div.

In the course of this action the major portion of the Division reached

the terrain just south of Hill 132

after destroying several British

heavy tanks. Then, however, this

attack, too, had to be halted because

there was hardly enough fuel on

hand to continue, and strong enemy

armored attacks were being launched

against our unprotected east flank.

During this entire day the RAF

conducted heavy strikes against the

Deutsches Afrika Korps. In the open

coverless terrain, where the explosion of the bombs was partially reinforced by rock fragments, heavy casualties were incurred. From the staff

of the Afrika Korps alone, 7 officers

were killed in action on this day.

In the afternoon Rommel again

reconsidered whether or not he

should break off the engagement in

view of the critical supply situation.

All day the ceaseless attacks of the

British bomber formations continued

on the battlefield. Enemy artillery

fired immense quantities of ammunition into our positions. Movement on the battlefield was impossible. Again and again our outnumbered fighter aircraft threw themselves against the British bomber

formations. But seldom did they

succeed in getting close to the British bombers, since they were always

engaged in aerial battles with extraordinarily strong fighter formations of the RAF which were assigned to protect the seemingly endless flight of the bomber squadrons.

Rommel moves forward with the advance.

He and Bayerlein consider the course of

events - their decision is based on the

immediate situation of the Afrika Korps

Bayerlein

The Panzers move on past the captured strongpoint of Deir el Shein

Bayerlein

Italian infantry move up - Rommel urges them on with all haste
Our problem was one of supply.

Even at this late date the gasoline

which had been promised by Kesselring and Cavallero had still not yet

arrived on African soil. By the night

of 1 September the Panzerarmee had

only enough gasoline left at its disposal to keep the supply columns

going, and even by most frugal use

it would only last for a short time.

There was no fuel for tactical maneuver.

The whole night through, until

the morning of 2 September, we

were again under continuous aerial

bombardment by bombs of all sizes.

After this night, because of the

critical situation in the air and the

catastrophic supply situation, Rommel decided to discontinue the attack and pull back, step by step, to

positions extending from el Taqua

to Bab el Qattara. For the time

being, we remained in this area.

In the meantime, the British hacd

gathered powerful armored units

between Alam Halfa and Bab el

Qattara. However, they attacked

hesitantly and could easily be repulsed.

Also during the night of 2/3 September we were hit by ceaseless

attacks of large formations of British

aircraft. Pyrotechnics bathed the

entire desert in bright light. Magnesium bombs, which could not be

extinguished, burned on the ground

and lighted the surrounding area.

In between these, huge quantities of

high explosive and fragmentation

bombs fell on the terrain occupied

by our troops. The 88mm flak guns,

which during the days before succeeded in shooting down a bomber

now and then, were discovered by

the British and attacked from much

higher altitudes. Hundreds of our

vehicles were destroyed or damaged.

On 3 September we continued our

retrograde movement according to

plan. The British attacked only

here and there and for the most part

let the RAF and the artillery take

over.

An attack by our Luftwaffe against

the 10th Indian Div, which was in

the assembly area for a counterattack against the center of the

front, caused the units which were

assembled there to scatter to the

Bayerlein at the head of the Afrika Korps

- leading the advance to Alam Halfa

Bayerlein

Rommel gives a push to his command car bogged down south of Munassib Baverlein

The battle at Alam Halfa 1 September Baverlein

M~oving around south of Alam Haifa Moving by Garet el Himeimat during withdrawal from Alam Rnvor l,-in
f ,Lw

I

I

The German attack as it was executed

winds. Also, all other attacks

launched by other units against our

flanks, especially the New Zealanders, were too weak to be able to effect a penetration -they could be

repulsed. A night attack conducted

against the X Italian Corps resulted

in especially high losses for the

British. Countless enemy dead lay

on the battlefield and 200 prisoners

were taken among whom was Gen

Clifton, commanding general of the

6th New Zealand Brigade.

In general, the British showed

little enthusiasm to engage us in a

decisive battle. Such an engagement

was not necessary for them in view

of the fact that time was working

for them in gaining mat6riel superiority.

By the morning of 6 September

our retrograde movement had been

completed and our troops had again

established contact and linked up in

the defense. With the failure of this

offensive operation, our last chance

to win in the Nile Delta had passed.

Conclusions

The offensive failed for the following reasons:

1) We were too weak for such an

extended enveloping operation.

2) The British positions in the

south were, in fact, exceptionally

heavily mined as compared to the

information we had from reconnaissance; and the British knew our intentions.

3) Devastating attacks by the

RAF, which had complete command

of the air and which literally nailed

us to the ground, made any orderly

advance and any effective movement

impossible.

4) The fuel, a necessary requirement for the completion of our

plan, did not arrive. The ships,

which Cavallero had promised us

were either sunk, delayed or never

sent. Kesselring, unfortunately, was

not able to keep his promise - if

necessary, to fly 500 tons per day to

the front.

The losses to our troops were extraordinarily high. In the front

lines they were caused by the bombs

and strafing attacks of the RAF.

The German and Italian units suffered casualties amounting to 570

dead, 1,800 wounded and 570 captured-altogether almost 3,000 men.

We lost in addition: 400 vehicles, 50

tanks (of the 200 we had), 15 artillery pieces and 35 antitank guns.

According to reports from our units,

during the course of the operation

they had taken 350 British prisoners

and 150 British tanks and armored

cars fell into our hands or were destroyed-along with 10 pieces of

artillery and 20 antitank guns.

An important lesson which was to

influence all our later plans, especially the entire method of our conduct of the war, had been learned

during this operation: The operational and tactical capabilities are of

little consequence if the enemy commands the air space with a powerful

air force and can fly massive attack

missions undisturbed.

The ground troops of the British

had hardly come into the picture

during our attack. Montgomery had

desisted from undertaking a strong

attack to regain his southern front,

an attempt at which he probably

would not have succeeded. Instead

of this, he let his overwhelmingly

superior artillery and air force take

over. In addition to this, our lines

of communication were constantly

exposed to harassing attacks by the

7th British Armd Div. This action

by the British commander was indeed correct and practical, since,

thereby, he could inflict on us much

greater loss in comparison to his

own casualties and still keep his

units combat-ready.

After these experiences we could

only look forward to the coming

offensive of the British against the

el Alamein position with gloomy

thoughts.

-28-

)73 1
CRITIQUE

IT WAS NATURAL that the disappointing end of the British July counteroffensive should have renewed

the bad impression left by the disastrous breakdowns of June - obscuring the basic fact that the enemy's

aim of overrunning Egypt had been

defeated - and produced an impulsive feeling that a clean sweep of the

higher command was needed. Psychologically, such drastic action had

much justification, for it responded

to the wave of feeling among the

public at home and in the contributing Commonwealth countries as well

as among the troops on the spot. But

in the light of later knowledge and

historical examination, these sweeping changes were an undiscriminating and unjust conclusion to a

crucial month of the war. It was

left to the enemy to put Auchinleck's achievement in true proportion and be first in paying him due

tribute. An ironical sequel to his

removal was that the renewal of the

British offensive was postponed to

a much later date than he had contemplated, and an impatient Prime

Minister had to bow to the new

High Command's determination to

wait-until satisfied that preparations and training were complete,

even though the delay meant leaving the initiative to Rommel.

During August Rommel was reinforced by only 2 fresh formations,

one German and one Italian-the

Ramcke Parachute Brigade and Folgore Parachute Division, both being "dismounted" and employed as

infantry. But the wastage in the

other formations was made up to a

considerable extent by drafts and

fresh supplies of equipment - although much more arrived for the

Italian divisions than for the German. By the eve of the attack there

was approximately a total of 200

gun-armed tanks with the 2 panzer

divisions and 240 with the 2 Italian

armored divisions-which, as Alexander remarked in his dispatch,

"hardly came into action at all in

this battle." The German armored

strength comprised 169 Panzer IIIs

(of which 74 were J type, with the

long 50 mm gun), and 35 Panzer

IVs (of which 26 had the new long

75 mm).

On the British side, the now wellfortified front was still held by the

same 4 infantry divisions as in July,

with strength rebuilt, and the 7th

(Light) Armd Div remained, while

the 1st Armd Div went back to refit

and was replaced by the 10th-comprising two armored brigades, the

8th and the 22d (which had 4 tank

units instead of the usual 3). There

were 3 other fresh divisions now in

Egypt - the 44th and 51st Infantry,

and the 8th Armored. The 44th was

brought up to the front to reinforce

the rearward position on the Alam

Halfa Ridge. From the 8th Armd Div

the 23d Armd Brigade already

brought up, was initially used to

support the infantry holding the

front, but after the opening phase it

was placed under Gatehouse's 10th

Armd Div, which thus controlled 3

armored brigades - the largest body

of armor that ever fought under one

divisional commander during the

campaign. As for the tank strength,

the Prime Minister in his report to

the War Cabinet from Cairo on 21

August said: "For an August battle

we should have at the front about

700 tanks, with 100 replacements."

Alexander in his dispatch gives the

figure as 480 in the formations engaged.

There was no alteration of the plan

for countering a renewed enemy offensive that had already been devised before Auchinleck left. Alexander, in his dispatch, stated the

facts with an honesty that shattered

stories of its radical recasting which

subsequently became current. He

said that when he took over the

command from Auchinleck: "The

plan was to hold as strongly as possible the area between the sea and

Ruweisat Ridge and to threaten

from the flank any enemy advance

-29-

south of the ridge from a strongly

defended prepared position on the

Alam el Halfa ridge. Gen Montgomery, now in command of Eighth

Army, accepted this plan in principle, to which I agreed, and hoped

that if the enemy should give us

enough time he would be able to

improve our positions by strengthening the left or southern flank."

The Alam Halfa position was given

further reinforcements before Rommel struck, but in the battle its defense was not put to the test, as the

issue was decided by the positioning

of the armor.

The XXX Corps front, from the

coast to the Ruweisat Ridge inclusive, was held by the 9th Australian,

1st South African and 5th Indian

Divs-from right to left. South of it,

the XIII Corps front was held by

the New Zealand Div, while the

open flank of 15 miles between its

left and the escarpment of the Qattara Depression was covered by a

mined belt that was itself given

mobile cover by the 7th Armd Div

(composed of light tank and armored car units).

This southern stretch was, obviously, the only part of the front

where a quick penetration could

possibly be achieved, so in making

such an attempt Rommel was bound

to take that line of advance. This

was what the defense system evolved

under Auchinleck had been designed to produce.

While surprise in direction was

thus ruled out, Rommel sought a

solution of the offensive problem

by surprise in time and speed-to

break through the southern sector

and get astride the Eighth Army's

communications so quickly that it

would be thrown off balance and

drawn into disjointed action on a

reversed front. His plan was that,

following a concealed side-step of

his mobile forces, the mined belt

should be captured by night attack,

and the Afrika Korps with part of

the Italian XX Corps was to drive
Outcome of the entire battle was dictated by use of the terrain and immobilization of the German offensive effort by airpower.

on eastward for 25-30 miles before

morning. Then at dawn the striking force would wheel northwards

to the coast and overrun the British

supply area. This menace, he

hoped, would draw most of the British armor in chase, so that he might

trap and destroy it in the open.

Meanwhile, the German 90th Light

Div and the rest of the Italian XX

Corps was to form a protective corridor which, in that case, should be

strong enough to withstand piecemeal attack from the north until he

had won the main battle, in the

British rear. Ile said that in adopting this plan he "placed particular

reliance on the slow reaction of the

British command, for experience

had shown us that it always took

them some time to reach decisions

and put them into effect."

If Rommel's night advance had

gone anything like as fast as planned, the effects might have been upsetting-as the British armored brigades were not kept close together

at the outset, and in the event were

30-

not concentrated until the second

morning. But they were allowed

ample time. For Rommel soon discovered that his Intelligence was

mistaken both about the depth of

the mined belt and of the British

positions. On those obstacles his

plan was wrecked. By dawn the

leading troops were only some 8

miles beyond the mined belt, while

the ma<s oL the Afrika Korps was

not re -l} t: begin its long eastward

drive uxi:l 0930. By then it was a

target for air attacks.
As speed-surprise had been lost,

Rommel thought of abandoning his

offensive, but after discussion with

Bayerlein decided to let it go on,

in a modified way. Since it was evident that the British armor had

been allowed to assemble for action,

Rommel came to the conclusion

that "it was impossible to continue

with our wide sweep to the east, as

our flanks would be under constant

threat. . . . This compelled us to

decide on an earlier turn to the

north than we had intended." The

Afrika Korps was therefore ordered

to make an immediate wheel and

head for Pt. 132, the dominant feature of the Alam Halfa Ridge, while

the XX Corps came up on its left

flank. This change of direction

brought it towards the area where

the 22d Armd Brigade was postedand also towards an area of soft

sand, cramping to local maneuver.

Its original line of thrust was well

clear of this area.

On the British side, the 8th Armd

Brigade's battle positions were some

10 miles distant, southeastward,

from the 22d. It was thus more

directly placed to check a by-passing move, on Rommel's part, instead of trusting to the indirect deterrent of a flanking position. In

taking the risk of such a separation,

between the brigades, the higher

command relied on the fact that each

of them was almost as strong in

armor as the whole Afrika Korps,

and thus should be capable of holding out until the other brigade arrived to support it.

The 8th, however, did not reach

its assigned position until 0430-it

was fortunate that the enemy had

been so much delayed, for under

Rommel's original plan the Afrika

Korps had been directed on that

same area and intended to arrive

there before dawn. A collision in

the dark, or assault in the morning,

before the 8th was firmly in position, might have produced an awkward situation, especially for troops

who were in action for the first

time.

As a result of the enemy's change

of plans, the attack fell on 22d Armd

Brigade alone, but not until late in

the day. Continued harassing by the

7th Armd Division-which only gave

way gradually-and the delayed arrival of fuel and ammunition convoys as well as air attacks, so retarded the advance, that the Afrika

Iorps did not begin the shortened

northward wheel until the afternoon. On approaching the battle

positions of the 22nd Armd Brigade

its massive tank columns came under a storm of fire from "Pip" Roberts' well-sited tanks and then from

his supporting artillery. Repeated

advances and attempted local flank

moves were checked-until nightfall

closed down the fight, bringing wellearned respite to the defenders and

spreading depression among the attackers.

The abortiveness of the enemy

attack was due, however, not only

to these actual repulses. For fuel

was so short in the Afrika Korps

that as early as 1600 hours, Rommel

had cancelled his orders for an allout effort to gain Pt. 132.

When morning came, fuel was

still so short that Rommel was

forced to give up the idea of making any large-scale move that day,

1 September. All that could be attempted was a local and limited attack, to gain the Alam Halfa ridge,

employing only the 15th Pz Div.

It was a very uncomfortable situation for the Afrika Korps, for the

pounding it had suffered all night

from the RAF and the XIII Corps

artillery was continued throughout

the day. The diminished attacks of

the German armor were successively

checked by a reinforced defenseearly that same morning Montgomery, now convinced that the enemy

was not driving east towards his

rear, had ordered the rest of the armor to concentrate alongside Roberts' brigade.

In the afternoon Montgomery

"ordered planning to begin for a

counterstroke which would give us

the initiative"-his idea being to develop a wheeling push southward

from the New Zealand position to

close the neck of the bag. He also

made arrangements to bring up X

Corps HQ-"to command a pursuit

force" that was "to be prepared to

push through to Daba with all reserves available."

But after another night of almost

continuous bombing by the RAF,

and the Panzerarmee having now

only one day's standard fuel issue

left, Rommel had decided to call off

the offensive and make a gradual

31-

withdrawal;

During that day, 2 September,

the Germans were seen to be thinning out and columns started moving westward. But requests for permission to follow them up were refused-as it was Montgomery's policy to avoid his armor being lured

into one of Rommel's traps. At the

same time he ordered the southward

attack by the New Zealand Div, reinforced, to begin on the night of

the 3/4 September.

On the 3d, the Afrika Korps made

a general step-back, but was only

followed up by patrols. That night

the "bottling" attack was launched,

against the corridor held by the 90th

Light and Trieste Divs. The attack

became badly confused, suffered

heavy losses and was abandoned

next day.

During the 4 and 5 September the

Afrika Korps continued its step by

step withdrawal from "the bag,"

but no further attempt was made

to cut it off, and it was only followed up by small detachments. On

the 6th it came to a halt on a line

of high ground 6 miles east of the

original front, and was clearly determined to make a stand there. So

on the 7th, Alexander and Montgomery decided to break off the battle, leaving Rommel in possession

of this limited gain of ground-a

small consolation for his strategic

frustration.

Since taking over the Eighth

Army, Montgomery had impressed

his personality on the troops with

very bracing effect. This was now

strengthened by the thrill and relief of seeing the enemy in retreat,

even if only for a short distancea palpable sign that the tide had

turned.

The question remains whether an

exceptional opportunity was missed

of annihilating the enemy while the

Afrika Korps was in "the bag," and

thereby saving the later trouble and

cost of assaulting him in his prepared positions. But so far as it

went, the battle of Alam Halfa was

a great success. At its conclusion

the enemy in Africa was left powerless to resume the initiative and,

with the ever-increasing flow of

British reinforcements, the next battle was bound to be, as Rommel

called it, a "Battle Without Hope."
SUMMING UP

Tactically, this battle has a

special interest. For it was not only

won by the defending side, but decided by pure defense, without any

counteroffensive-or even any serious attempt to develop a counteroffensive. It thus provides a contrast to most of the "turning point"

battles of the Second World War

and earlier wars. While Montgomery's decision to abstain from following up his defensive success in an

offensive way forfeited the chance

of trapping and destroying Rommel's forces-momentarily a very

good chance-it did not impair the

underlying decisiveness of the battle as a turning point in the campaign. From that time onwards, the

British troops had an assurance of

ultimate success which heightened

their morale, while the opposing

forces labored under a sense of hopelessness, feeling that whatever their

efforts and sacrifice, they could

achieve no more than a temporary

postponement of the end.

The lesson-value of the Battle of

Alam Halfa is increased by the conditions of the atomic age in which

we now live. For where both sides

possess the power to use thermonuclear weapons of unlimited destructiveness that very potentiality

imposes fundamentally limiting conditions on warfare and the military

aim. An aggressive-minded dictator

may still venture on an invasion

with limited objectives in some part

of the globe on the calculation that

so long as he does not pursue his

advantage too far, his opponents will

hesitate to use their thermonuclear

weapons against his homeland, since

that would precipitate an all-out

nuclear war fatal to both sides. In

meeting a limited invasion of this

kind it would be worse than foolish

for his opponents to follow up a

repulse of the invading forces with

a counteroffensive in the old way,

aimed to annihilate the invading

forces-as that would be the surest

way to produce general suicide.

Threatened with imminent annihilation, anyone will resort to the use

of mutually suicidal weapons for,

if he is made to feel that he is likely

to be destroyed in any case, he will

not care whether it happens in a

"conventional" or "unconventional"

form of warfare, nor care how many

other people perish with him. Thus,

in the atomic age th2 old aim of

complete "victory" has become a

lunatic aim. and the only sane concept of strategy is to aim at repulsing

the aggressor's forces so effectively

as to make him abandon his aim.

"Alam Halfa" is worth studying

from this new strategical viewpoint,

as a prototype battle.

There is also much to be learned

from its tactical technique. The positioning of the British forces, and

the choice of ground, had a great

influence upon the issue. So did

the flexibility of the dispositions.

Most important of all was the wellgauged combination of airpower

with the ground forces' plan. Its

effectiveness was facilitated by the

defensive pattern of the battle, with

the ground forces holding the ring

while the air forces constantly

bombed the arena, now a trap, into

which Rommel's troops had pushed.

In the pattern of this battle, the air

forces could operate the more freely

and effectively because of being able

to count on all troops within the

ring as being "enemy," and thus

targets-in contrast to the way that

air action is handicapped in a more

fluid kind of battle.

Rarely has any vital battle been

as uneventful as that which is now

engraved in history as the "Battle

of Alam Halfa." The battle was

won by sitting tight-and offering no

target-in a well-chosen position

that commanded the enemy's line of

thrust, while the air force battered

he attacking force which could

neither press an assault nor dare to

push deeper.

-32-

r,

CIZYSCJ