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PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS FROM 9/11

TO KATRINA: CRITICAL PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 

THE INTERNET

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 29, 2005

Serial No. 109–52

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

Vice Chairman 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, 

Mississippi, Vice Chairman 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho 

SUE MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Ranking Member 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BUD ALBRIGHT, Staff Director 

DAVID CAVICKE, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET

FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, 

Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOE BARTON, Texas, 

(Ex Officio) 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

Ranking Member 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, 

(Ex Officio) 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Testimony of: 

Botterell, Art, Emergency Information Systems Consultant ........................ 103

Boyd, David G., Director, Safecom Program Office, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security ............................. 62

Hitch, Vance E., Chief Information Officer, Department of Justice ............ 69

Kramer, Harold, Chief Operating Officer, The National Association for 

Amateur Radio .............................................................................................. 112

Martin, Hon. Kevin J., Chairman, Federal Communications Commission . 13

Miller, Lt. Col. Thomas J., Deputy Director, Michigan State Police ............ 98

Roemer, Timothy J., Director of the Center for National Policy .................. 94

Trujillo, Tony, Chairman, Satellite Industry Association ............................. 107

Material submitted for the record by: 

Botterell, Art, Emergency Information Systems Consultant, response for 

the record ....................................................................................................... 172

Gyllstrom, Gregory W., Vice President/General Manager, Aftermarket, 

Visteon Corporation, prepared statement of ............................................... 122

Kelley, Edwin A.,Principal Engineer, Interoperable Wireless, prepared 

statement of ................................................................................................... 127

Kramer, Harold, Chief Operating Officer, The National Association for 

Amateur Radio, response for the record ..................................................... 171

Martin, Hon. Kevin J., Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, 

response for the record ................................................................................. 173

Miller, Lt. Col. Thomas J., Deputy Director, Michigan State Police, response for the record ..................................................................................... 183

Roemer, Timothy J., Director of the Center for National Policy, response 

for the record ................................................................................................. 185

Trujillo, Tony, Chairman, Satellite Industry Association, response for 

the record ....................................................................................................... 186

Vaughn, John, Vice President and General Manager, Wireless Systems, 

M/A-COM, Inc., prepared statement of ....................................................... 153

(III) 

(1)

PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS FROM 9/11 

TO KATRINA: CRITICAL PUBLIC POLICY 

LESSONS 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS

AND THE INTERNET, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in room 

2322 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton 

(chairman) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Upton, Stearns, Whitfield, 

Shimkus, Pickering, Fossella, Radanovich, Bass, Terry, Blackburn, 

Barton (ex-officio), Wynn, Towns, Gordon, and Stupak. 

Staff present: Howard Waltzman, chief counsel, telecommunications and the Internet; Neil Fried, majority counsel; Kelly Cole, 

majority counsel; Will Norwind, policy coordinator; Jaylyn Jensen, 

senior legislative analyst; Anh Nguyen, legislative clerk; Johanna 

Shelton, minority counsel; and Peter Filon, minority counsel. 

Mr. UPTON. Good afternoon. To me this seems like it is morning 

because we started a markup yesterday on refineries at 8 a.m. and 

we finished a little bit after midnight this morning so it was a 16-

hour markup, passed by voice and many of us are still wondering 

which day it is. And we also have my friend and colleague, Mr. 

Markey, that serves on the Natural Resources Committee as well 

and they have got a major bill on the floor so we will be expecting 

members to come in and out. I apologize for the room. It is actually 

not a bad room. But we were scheduled for what we call the big 

house downstairs, 2123, but there is another subcommittee hearing 

on at the same time and they needed the video conferencing for 

that witness to appear from, I think, Louisiana or Alabama. So in 

an effort to maintain good relations with my chairman, I indicated 

that we would swap for this hearing. 

Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘Public Safety Communications from 

9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons’’ which is designed 

to explore the issues of interoperability as they relate to our heroic 

first responders in public safety organizations. Interoperability is, 

at its core, the ability for various public safety groups to communicate with each other. To best equip our Nation’s first responders 

to do their job, they must be able to communicate with one another, not just between fire, police, EMS in one jurisdiction, but 

also on the local, State, and Federal jurisdictions. For any disasVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
2

trous event, it is our Nation’s first responders who answer the call 

of relief. When citizens are forced to evacuate to protect themselves, it is our Nation’s first responders who run the opposite direction into harm’s way. For this very reason, interoperable communications are vitally important. For instance, on the morning of 

September 11, New York police officers were able to hear the radio 

warnings from helicopters that the North Tower of the World 

Trade Center was glowing red and most of the police officers exited 

the building safely, while dozens of firefighters who could not hear 

those same warnings, tragically perished when the tower collapsed. 

The radio communication system of the police was not compatible 

with the system that the fire department was using, consequently, 

no warnings could be heard and many, many lives were lost. 

We were faced with some horrible lessons on 9/11 and we are 

here today to examine another disaster, Hurricane Katrina. Crisis 

communications during both of these tragic events failed. There is 

no doubt that achieving interoperability throughout our Nation has 

proven to be a monumental multi-faceted challenge and there are 

a number of reasons for this. 

Two points which I think was most important include the availability of spectrum and funding issues. Back in 1997, Congress directed 24 megahertz of spectrum in the upper 700 megahertz band 

to be allocated to public safety. However, that spectrum is currently occupied by the broadcasters and will be until the transition 

to digital TV is complete. Chairman Barton and I, Ranking Member Dingell and Markey have spent countless hours working to free 

that valuable spectrum for public safety by crafting legislation setting a hard date for spectrum return as a vital and necessary step 

that must occur to make interoperability a reality, and we are committed to making it happen sooner rather than later. 

The need for additional spectrum to replace old and antiquated 

equipment is another challenge for cash strapped State and local 

governments. According to information collected from grantees, 

total State expenditures for interoperable communication projects 

from the Department of Homeland Security Grant Program totaled 

nearly $1 billion in fiscal year 2004 alone. 

Despite such large sums, Katrina showed us that we are still 

well behind the curve. What will it take to make interoperability 

a reality? How much more time, how much more money do we need 

to spend to make interoperability seamless? We cannot sit back for 

another natural disaster or another terrorist attack to strike. It has 

been 4 years since the attack of 9/11. And as Katrina made us all 

acutely aware, sadly we are far from where we need to be. But let 

me be clear, I recognize that this is a far bigger problem than simply a lack of funds or a lack of new equipment. Thousands of shiny 

new radios will not fix the problem if we don’t have a strategic plan 

that allows all of these new radios to interact with each other. We 

need coordination among Government at all levels to ensure the 

equipment purchases of one municipality work with the jurisdiction 

next door. We need a national vision for funding equipment and 

technology. I plan to ask all the witnesses here today, who is going 

to fill that leadership vacuum? These are all the questions we need 

to answer, we must answer to ensure that our first responders can 

do their job. That is literally a matter of life and death. 

3

Finally, I would like to welcome FCC Commissioner Chairman 

Kevin Martin to our committee. It is the first time he has appeared 

before us in his new capacity as Chairman. I thank each of our witnesses today. I also want to say is I have spent time with Chairman Martin. I particularly appreciate the work that he and all the 

commissioners did in reacting so swiftly to the deep-set problems 

that we saw with the hurricane. His folks, he and all the folks 

within the Commission worked many, many overtime hours 

through the weekends doing the things that they had to do to save 

lives and to get that equipment up and running, and for that, the 

Nation is eternally grateful. And I yield at this time to my colleague for an opening statement from the great State of Michigan, 

Mr. Stupak. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET

Good afternoon. Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘Public Safety Communications from 

9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons’’ which is designed to explore the 

issues of interoperability as they relate to our heroic first responders and public 

safety organizations. 

Interoperability is, at its core, the ability for various public safety groups to communicate with each other. To best equip our nation’s first responders to do their job, 

they must be able to communicate with one another, not just between fire, police, 

and EMS within one jurisdiction, but also among local, state, and federal jurisdictions. 

During any disastrous event, it is our nation’s first responders who answer the 

call of duty. As citizens are forced to evacuate to protect themselves, it is our nation’s first responders who run the opposite direction—into harm’s way. For this 

very reason, interoperable communications are vitally important. For instance, on 

the morning of September 11th, 2001, New York police officers were able to hear 

the radio warnings from a helicopter that the North Tower of the World Trade Center was glowing red, and most of the police officers exited the building safety—while 

dozens of firefighters, who could not hear these warnings, tragically perished when 

the tower collapsed. The radio communications of the police was not compatible with 

the system that the fire department was using, consequently, no warnings could be 

heard, and many lives were lost. 

We were faced with some horrible lessons on 9/11, and we are here today to examine another disaster, Hurricane Katrina. Crisis communications during both of these 

tragic events failed. There is no doubt that achieving interoperability throughout 

our nation has proven to be a monumental, and multi-faceted, challenge and there 

are a number of reasons for this. The two problems I view as most important include the availability of spectrum and funding issues. 

Back in 1997, Congress directed 24 Megahertz of spectrum in the Upper 700 

Megahertz band to be allocated to public safety. However, that spectrum is currently occupied by broadcasters, and will be, until the transition to digital television 

is complete. Chairman Barton and I have spent countless hours working to free that 

valuable spectrum for pubic safety by crafting legislation setting a hard date for 

spectrum return. This is a vital and necessary step that must occur to make interoperability a reality and we are committed to making it happen—sooner rather than 

later. 

Beyond additional spectrum, to replace old and antiquated equipment is another 

challenge for cash-strapped State and local governments. According to information 

collected from grantees, total State expenditures for interoperable communications 

projects from Department of Homeland Security grant programs totaled nearly a billion dollars in fiscal year 2004 alone. Despite such large sums, Hurricane Katrina 

showed us that we are still well behind the curve. What will it take to make interoperability a reality? How much more time and how much more money do we need 

to spend to make interoperability seamless? We cannot sit back for another natural 

disaster or terrorist attack to strike. It’s been 4 years since the attacks of 9-11, and 

as Katrina made us all acutely aware, sadly, we are far from where we need to be. 

But let me be clear—I recognize that this is a far bigger problem than simply a 

lack of funds or a lack of new equipment. Thousands of shiny new radios will not 

fix the problem if we don’t have a strategic plan that allows all of these new radios 

4

to interact with each other. We need coordination among government at all levels 

to ensure the equipment purchases of one municipality work with the jurisdiction 

next door. We need a national vision for funding, equipment and technology. I plan 

to ask all of the witnesses here today, who will fill that leadership vacuum? These 

are all questions we need to answer, we must answer, to ensure our first responders 

can do their job. This is literally, a matter of life and death. 

Finally, I’d like to welcome FCC Chairman Kevin Martin to our Committee—this 

is the first time he’s appeared before us in his new capacity as Chairman. And 

thank you to each of the witnesses for being here today. I look forward to hearing 

from all of you and learning the answers to my questions.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for calling this critical hearing on the lack of interoperability communications for first responders. I would also like to 

extend a special welcome to Lieutenant Colonel Tom Miller from 

Michigan State Police. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to start with a quote. ‘‘It is important 

that we understand in the first minutes and hours after attack, 

that the most hopeful time to save lives and that is why we are 

focusing on the heroic efforts of those first responders. That is why 

we want to spend money to make sure equipment is there, strategies are there, communications are there to make sure that you 

have whatever it takes to respond.’’ That was President George 

Bush in February 2002. I agree with his words 100 percent, but 

unfortunately there has been scant follow-through on these words. 

The communication equipment is not there. The strategies are incomplete and the money has not been spent. State and local Governments have received little guidance and fewer Federal dollars. 

The inability of our first responders to communicate with each 

other is a problem known to most of us in this room for years, but 

was brought to the national spotlight beginning way back in 1995 

with the Murrah Building, again on September 11, and most recently with the hurricanes. I wonder when this Congress will finally make a real commitment to first responder communications. 

The 9/11 Commission agreed with those of us who called for a 

much larger Federal commitment. Their final report stated, and 

once again I would like to quote, ‘‘The occurrence of this problem 

at three very different sites is drawing evidence that compatible 

and adequate communications among the public safety organizations at the local, State, and Federal levels remain an important 

problem. Federal funding of such interagency communication units 

should be given high priority.’’ Sadly, 4 years after September 11, 

the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission have fallen on deaf 

ears and the President has not kept his commitment. The 2 years 

after September 11, a mere $260 million was granted for interoperable communication grants at Department of Homeland Security. 

The President has never requested money again for the grants in 

Congress and it has never funded interoperability grants again. While $260 million may be a drop in the bucket of the estimated $18 billion that full operability will cost, it was a start. In fact, the 

Administration has spent—excuse me. In fact, the Administration 

has a $10 billion plan to make its 80,000 Federal law enforcement 

agents interoperable, while there are over 75,000 first responders 

in my State of Michigan alone. 

Frankly, given the lack of funding and the lack of planning, I 

was not surprised by the communication breakdown during and 

after Hurricane Katrina. I know that many in this room were not 

5

either, but I am outraged at how little has been accomplished. Just 

as with September 11, during Katrina, helicopters could not communicate with rescuers on the ground. Just as with September 11, 

radio channels were overwhelmed with traffic. Just as with September 11, police could not talk to firefighters. Just as with September 11, those watching TV had better information than the first 

responders on the ground. 

The Administration had the opportunity to learn a lot after September 11 but I am afraid they failed to listen. Then FEMA Administrator Brown said the agency failed to anticipate and I quote 

‘‘The total lack of communication, the inability to hear and have 

good intelligence on the ground about what was occurring there.’’ 

Perhaps Mr. Brown should have read the report published by the 

U.S. Conference of Mayors. According to their report released in 

June of 2004, more than 80 percent of America’s cities are not 

interoperable with Federal agencies. 

We are going to hear today about the need for spectrum and the 

need for plans, but all those things come down the road. The Administration says it will take over 20 years to become interoperable. We don’t have 20 years. This committee needs to act this year 

on legislation, legislation I have introduced with Congressman 

Fossella and Congressman Engel. 

I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman, so let me put the rest of my 

statement in the record. As you know, I have been on this issue 

for a long time and it is quite frustrating to have hearing after 

hearing and nothing happens. I am hopeful something will happen 

and happen this year. 

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. Mr. Shimkus? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate you calling the hearing. Obviously, we have a lot to 

talk about. I will just briefly address a piece of legislation that I 

am going to introduce along this—the companion legislation has already been introduced on the Senate side by Senators DeMint and 

Stevens, Nelson, and Inouye called the Warn Act which the basic 

premise is this. We do have our only real emergency broadcast system right now is the Free Over Air provided by our broadcasters. 

Telecommunications has changed dramatically as we all know, especially those of us who follow in this arena, and we have got to 

develop a way that we use all our telecommunications assets to 

broadcast immediate alerts. And we look forward to working with 

you, Mr. Chairman on that legislation and look forward to hearing. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Gordon. 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for calling this important hearing. 

We saw an unprecedented collapse of communications on all levels in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. I am particularly concerned 

about the collapse of the 911 system. According to the FCC, 38 911 

centers went down leaving citizens with no way to call for help and 

severely hampering rescue and relief efforts. Because the Legacy 

911 System is not interoperable, once a local 911 center fails, there 

is no back up. The 911 system is a critical component of the Nation’s emergency communication system. A 911 call is the first cry 

6

for help and the first alarm. It is—it tells first responders where 

to go and what to expect when they get there. 

We lost that link between citizens and first responders during by 

virtue of Katrina. And the 911 call center—well, excuse me. By virtue of our experiences there, we found that we lost those 911 centers and which they also frequently function as the dispatch center 

for fire, police, EMS, and all three in many areas. It would be a 

mistake to talk about interoperability issues for the first responders without also considering 911 call centers. They are an integral 

part of local emergency communication systems. 

Along with Representatives Eshoo and Shimkus, I have introduced a bill several months ago that works toward an IP based 

emergency response system that would allow another 911 center to 

take calls if one call center fails. The IP based system would also 

empower 911 centers to share information and coordinate responses in the event of regional disasters. This bill also ensures 

that millions of people who use voice over the internet protocol 

phone service have full 911 e-911 services. I understand this hearing will focus on interoperability issues for the first responders; 

however, I hope the committee would at a later date address the 

Nation’s 911 system so that we can also bring this to light. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Terry. 

Mr. TERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing 

and our witnesses. Mr. Martin, thank you for being here. 

I would agree with the facts on the accusations laid for by our 

friend from Michigan, Bart. They are serious voids and they have 

been identified as long as a decade ago before September 11 about 

the inoperability between our first responders. And I will tell you, 

I just spent 8 years on our city council and went through an upgrade of our emergency systems. We tried to get other agencies, 

other counties to join us in a total metropolitan communication so 

every sheriff, police, fire all of them could talk together and I will 

tell you what, it delayed it for almost 2 years just trying to get people, the other agencies to even sit down and talk with us. 

The State of Nebraska has made interoperability one of the priorities of our homeland security that is the State plan. What happened? Instantly, the counties started fighting with each other. 

And so yes, we have a lot of hurdles to get over. Once we free up 

the spectrum, once again Chairman, we need to get the D-TV blow 

up. We need to get the action, the hard date, and move forward because a lot of this can be resolved, at least the technical aspects, 

with having more spectrum. 

We are going to have to focus on the political part of this, too. 

With so many local agencies, we want to make sure that they remain autonomous but they are not going to become inoperable or 

interoperable if they won’t go there. And so we have got to figure 

out how we do this, how we do it delicately. There are other issues 

not only of spectrum and equipment and technology and political 

cooperation but, you know, how do you keep the lights on when the 

lights are off everywhere else, so distributed energy certainly has 

to be a focus of this as well. There are just so many issues. That 

is why it is important we have hearings like this to kind of vent 

through some of those issues, the complexity of those issues. 

7

And so I want to thank you, Chairman, and thank the panel. 

Yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. Ms. Blackburn. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. I will waive my opening statement and reserve 

my time for questions. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. UPTON. Okay. Well that concludes our opening statements. 

I will make a motion that all members will have an opportunity to 

submit their opening statements as part of the record. 

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CLIFF STEARNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Thank you Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on our public safety communications infrastructure. 

Today, it is easier for Americans to communicate than ever before, and information is incredibly easy to access. This has improved the quality of life for millions 

of Americans, but our reliance on communications might have a drawback: when 

disaster strikes and disables our communications infrastructure, people can’t reach 

their loved ones or find out the latest news, resulting in inconveniences and dangers 

that can be especially painful. 

Millions of Americans suffered from a massive breakdown in communications 

after Katrina hit the Gulf Coast. The disaster exposed the communications infrastructure in the area as extremely fragile. Yet many telecom providers dealt with 

the unprecedented situation in exemplary fashion. 

The wireless industry quickly adapted by using mobile cell sites, VoIP services 

provided critical emergency communications, and the satellite industry’s role in the 

aftermath of Katrina was also impressive. 

I was also pleased to see that many of these private businesses offered free services for those who were in the affected areas. 

While the industry continues to do its part to help Americans deal with disasters 

and maintain communications, it is imperative that Congress do what we can to improve our nation’s ability to communicate during disasters, be they natural or a result of terrorism. 

We can complete the DTV transition and allocate the critical spectrum for emergency services and first responders. 

We can update our nation’s telecom laws, which will provide the regulatory and 

legal certainty the industry needs to invest and innovate, and which will in turn 

undoubtedly result in even more effective and reliable communications technology. 

We can promote interoperability, be it through some sort of legislation or in increased funding. 

Perhaps even some sort of tax credits to help telecom firms recover from these 

recent disasters. 

During this hearing, I hope to hear even more ways that we can help to improve 

disaster communications. 

I look forward to the testimony of all the witnesses here today, especially Kevin 

Martin, who is before this subcommittee for the first time in his capacity as Chairman of the FCC, and who has provided excellent leadership during these critical 

times. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL E. GILLMOR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for holding this hearing today to further investigate 

the growing need to make our first responder communication systems more interoperable. 

After the horrific events of 9/11, we began to really see the need and importance 

of interoperable communications for our country’s first responders. Yet today, we are 

here to discuss the problems that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused the brave 

men and women who, irregardless of self, charged into the disaster areas to provide 

aid to their family members, friends, and quite often, complete strangers. 

One major obstacle that we continue to talk about is the release of the 700Mhz 

spectrum currently being utilized by television broadcasters to send their analog signal into American households. Mr. Chairman, I was pleased to see you and Chairman Barton taking decisive action to remedy this problem. The circulated staff draft 

8

of the Digital Television Transition Act was a positive and fair step towards making 

this spectrum available—sooner rather than later. Yet, this is not the only answer 

to the issue of interoperability. Proper coordination among federal, state, and local 

entities is an equally important component in making sure that, when the spectrum 

becomes available, that no time is wasted in rolling out the new communications 

infrastructure to our firefighters, policemen, emergency medical technicians, and 

volunteer aid organizations. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing and, finally, I would like 

to welcome all of our panelists here today and I look forward to your testimony on 

this timely issue. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA CUBIN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I look forward to our hearing today on the status of America’s emergency communications systems. Having just observed the 4th anniversary of the terrorist attacks 

of 9/11, and the disruption and damage of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, this is a 

timely and appropriate topic. 

As I’m sure our witness will demonstrate today, there is more to improved public 

safety communications than some grant money here, and a spectrum allocation 

there. A nationwide and coordinated effort is paramount. 

Like many states, Wyoming is working on a statewide interoperable communications system. Our system is fairly unique, though, since it is a VHF-based system 

and does not reside in upper areas of spectrum that more urban and populous states 

use. VHF signals are better suited for the vast open spaces we enjoy out west, and 

I am interested in learning from the experts assembled here about how this system 

can work in concert with other communications systems in the upper radio bands. 

Additionally, I would like to learn what the federal plans are for building out a communications network in the VHF band. 

Interoperability and interference-free communication for our first responders is a 

worthy goal and I look forward to hearing testimony on where we are, how we got 

here and what is the best path going forward to achieve this goal. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman for opening this dialog and look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I yield back the balance of my time. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE FERGUSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Thank you Chairman Upton for holding this hearing. The recent tragedy of Hurricane Katrina has not only highlighted the inadequacy of our crisis communications 

infrastructure, it brought the fore the need for Congress to act immediately. 

Thanks to your commitment to moving DTV legislation this fall, we will have the 

opportunity to ensure that the 24 MHz spectrum dedicated to public safety use will 

finally be available to our first responders, who need it now more than ever. 

A few weeks ago, I traveled down to Baton Rouge to help with the relief efforts. 

One of the things I packed with me were a few satellite phones to deliver to our 

colleague Bobby Jindal so his staff can make the critical communications necessary 

to help his constituents. In the immediate days after Katrina, these were among the 

only means of communication. Clearly, we need to do better. 

I would like to briefly highlight the great work companies in my District have 

done to help the Gulf Coast region to help overcome these communications shortcomings. The Lucent Technologies and Bell Labs teams have drawn on their expertise in network disaster recovery, helping to re-establish vital communications services. In addition, they have provided on-site and remote technical support, and 

emergency, back-up and replacement equipment to more than a dozen of the Gulf 

Region’s service providers. 

AT&T has also pitched in, dispatching five Emergency Communications Satellite 

Units which are currently being used by the Louisiana State Police, the Louisiana 

National Guard, and others, and donating AT&T 35,000 AT&T PrePaid Phone 

Cards, each good for distribution to hurricane survivors by the Red Cross and Salvation Army. I am proud of both hometown companies have done and this subcommittee thanks you. 

Now it is time for Congress to pitch in, to learn from past communications shortcomings and help ensure that we close the gap in communications among our first 

responders and achieve true interoperability. I look forward to hearing the views of 

9

FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, our former colleague Tim Roemer, and the rest of the 

witness present today on how we meet that goal. I thank you for being here. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY

AND COMMERCE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today on public safety communications. The United States has seen some catastrophic events in the last five years 

that tested our crisis communications. Each time a crisis arrives, the first casualty 

seems to be the system that permits firefighters and police to communicate. Today 

we examine the progress being made to ensure that when the next crisis occurs, the 

emergency communications systems actually work. 

Most recently, the collapse of communications occurred in New Orleans while 

thousands of people found themselves stranded at the New Orleans Convention 

Center. How much progress has been made since the September 11th terrorist attacks exposed major gaps in communications among federal, state and local officials 

more than four years ago? Not much, it seems. 

On September 11, 1996, five years to the day before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 

the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee released a report which stated that 

‘‘unless immediate measures are taken to alleviate spectrum shortfall and promote 

interoperability, public safety will not be able to adequately discharge their obligation to protect life and property in a safe, efficient, and cost effective manner.’’ And 

yet here we are and public safety is still grappling with inadequate spectrum and 

radios that do not communicate with one another. What I want to learn today is 

this: what on earth does Congress need to do to make sure public safety officials 

and first responders can talk to each other? 

I already know that a big part of the answer is spectrum. I have spent months 

working on a bill to enact a hard date for the digital television transition so that 

the broadcasters will return spectrum in the upper 700 MHz band that Congress 

promised to public safety in 1997. With this spectrum, first responders across the 

nation could share common channels on which multiple local, state, and federal 

agencies could coordinate emergency response. We should not wait for another terrorist attack or natural disaster to remind us of the importance of giving public 

safety the tools they need to do their job. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing. I look forward to working with you to ensure that this Committee does everything it can to ensure that 

first responders achieve communications interoperability. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ELIOT ENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman—As many of us were together until late last night, I will be brief 

in my remarks. I want to thank the new Chairman of the FCC for coming up as 

well as the other witnesses. Your views are most welcome. 

There is no dispute from any quarter that public safety needs more spectrum—

and they shall soon have it. 

However, as we saw in New Orleans, even with that spectrum available—local 

and state public safety officials need the resources to utilize that spectrum. 

I am proud to have co-authored legislation with Rep. Stupak and Rep. Fossella 

that will provide these resources. 

I believe our bill is superior to others that have been introduced for two main rea- sons. First, it is paid for by using revenue from the spectrum auctions. And I would 

add that it would be put into a trust fund unavailable to the annual appropriations 

process. Thus, we would not have to rely on an annual fight among competing priorities. 

The second reason is the breadth of uses for the money. Our bill does not just 

provide new equipment—it allows engineering analysis and design to be done first. 

The fact is that the concrete canyons of Manhattan are vastly different from the 

plains of the Iowa. How radio signals operate in those areas is also vastly different. 

Then, of course our bill allows for equipment. But, finally it also allows the money 

to be used for training. This new equipment will have many features that enable 

not just police, fire and EMT personnel to speak to each other. This new equipment 

will allow local, state and federal officials to talk as well. 

This is a welcome hearing. But, I would welcome more a quick mark up of our 

bipartisan legislation! 

I yield back. 

10

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DOYLE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

It took the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 for most people to fully grasp 

how important it is for government, at all levels, to upgrade the communications 

systems used by first responders. The 9/11 Commission spelled it out for us, we 

need to make the 700 MHz band available as soon as possible, and we need to improve connectivity by encouraging the adoption of newly developed standards. We 

all know this, we just need to do it and do it right. Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath showed us that we have a long ways to go. 

To me the interoperability question is the most important issue related to the allocation of digital spectrum. Our constituents want new digital television service, 

new wifi and wimax services, and all the other goodies that will undoubtedly unfurl 

once we’ve made additional spectrum available to private sector interests. However, 

no doubt more important then those new devices and services, our constituents want 

to know that when they call 911 in the middle of an emergency, they want to know 

that the people that come to save them will be able to communicate with one another so they can figure out how best to save them. 

This is a national problem that requires a focused national solution. This committee has spent much of the last year hammering out the details of a DTV bill that 

will make the spectrum necessary for this transition. Many of the experts that will 

appear before us today—at every level of government and also within the private 

sector—have done the detailed planning it will require to implement a project of this 

magnitude. So now in many ways it is just a matter of implementation. 

I believe it is incumbent upon Congress not only to ensure the availability of spectrum and the feasibility of plans, but also to ensure that our local first responders 

have the financial and technical wherewithal to implement interoperability. As the 

old saying goes, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. I think that is appropriate in this instance because if an issue of national significance breaks out on a 

local level, all these plans and policies are for naught if we aren’t all on the same 

page. 

As I mentioned, the 9/11 attacks taught us many lessons about interoperability. 

It did not take long for us to figure out how to learn from that horrible day. Now, 

we have an opportunity to learn from what happened during and after Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. Those storms revealed different, but equally vital vulnerabilities 

about our systems of emergency communication. 

Public safety radio towers were demolished; those that ran on batteries ran out 

of power, vital electronic components were flooded. What lessons can we learn? Do 

we need to fundamentally alter the design of our communications systems, at least 

in areas prone to hurricanes? 

I look forward to hearing the views of our witnesses on these important issues. 

We must focus our energies on these problems and move expeditiously towards solving them. There is no more important issue before this Congress. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANNA G. ESHOO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

The public safety response to the terror attacks on 9/11 and the Hurricane 

Katrina disaster were, without a doubt, severely hampered by critical failures in 

government and public communications systems. 

In New York and Washington, the responses to the terrorist attacks were handicapped by the inability of different segments of the law enforcement and public safety community to communicate over common networks and interoperable equipment. 

Government and the public were also severely limited by the near total failure of 

public telephone networks in the New York and D.C. areas immediately following 

the attacks. 

This was particularly troubling in Washington because the area’s physical communications infrastructure was not actually harmed when the Pentagon was attacked. 

The public safety response to Katrina was particularly hampered by physical 

damage to the communications networks in the Gulf region. Above-ground telephone 

lines were knocked out, as were numerous wireless telephone towers. 

Much of this damage was unavoidable, so the failures were predictable. The question now is how do we address these failures to ensure a better result when the 

next attack occurs or when the next disaster hits. 

11

I’m particularly interested in making sure we learn everything we can from these 

disasters because the San Andreas Fault runs the length of my District. The U.S. 

Geological Survey has estimated the probability of a 6.7 or greater magnitude earthquake in the San Francisco Bay Area between 2003 and 2032. 

There are many steps Congress can and should take to shore up our communications infrastructure in response to what we experienced on 9/11 and the Gulf Coast 

disaster. 

Many of the problems we observed in these disasters would be greatly alleviated 

if the huge swath of communications spectrum occupied by television broadcasters 

for analog transmissions were made available for public safety and advanced telecommunications services for the public. 

I know that Chairman Barton and his staff are working hard to accelerate this 

process, and as I indicated in my recent letter to the Chairman, I’m eager to work 

with him to move this process forward. 

The availability of the analog TV spectrum would help solve several critical communications problems. First responders have been promised 24 MHz of the released 

spectrum to build their communications capacity and to address critical problems 

of interoperability and system compatibility. All new communications equipment operating in the released spectrum bands is required to interoperate with all new and 

existing equipment in the 700-800 MHz band. 

This spectrum will also become available for a variety of new, innovative wireless 

communications technologies, including WiMax broadband services that will provide 

high-speed broadband access to consumers without the vast deployment of costly, 

highly vulnerable fiber-optic cable networks. 

One of the few success stories in the Gulf Coast disaster was the performance of 

2-1-1 telephone services, particularly in Louisiana and Texas where they have statewide systems. 

Governor Blanco and Governor Perry both designated 2-1-1 as the ‘‘go to’’ number 

to receive assistance, to volunteer, or to ask questions about the hurricane and its 

aftermath. When the 9-1-1 system in Louisiana experience widespread failures, 2-

1-1 call centers were designated to handle emergency calls as well. 

In Louisiana the call volume reached 8,000 calls per day statewide, and in Texas 

it reached 18,000 per day. The United Way sent trained 2-1-1 volunteers from 

around the country to staff the call centers in each state, and call centers around 

the country have been designated as the contact points for any evacuees in need 

of assistance of any kind. 

I’m the lead Democratic sponsor (with Rep. Bilirakis) of H.R. 896, the Calling for 

2-1-1 Act. This legislation authorizes $150 million for each of the first two years and 

$100 million for the subsequent three years to help implement and sustain 2-1-1 nationwide. 

I strongly believe this legislation should be included in any hurricane relief legislative package, and Rep. Bilirakis and I have contacted Chairman Barton, Rep. Dingell, Speaker Hastert, and Leader Pelosi to urge them to do so. 

In any disaster, location information for emergency callers is critical, and further 

enhancement of wireless E-911 capabilities is necessary. This is an issue Rep. 

Shimkus and I have worked on for several years, culminating in the passage of the 

ENHANCE 911 Act late last year. 

A broader issue that arose on 9/11 and the Katrina disaster is the ability of the 

911 system to remain in operation in major disasters. The September 11 attacks disabled a major telecommunications facility in lower Manhattan, and many public 

safety answering points (PSAPs) throughout the Gulf Coast were disabled by 

Katrina. 

One of the integral features of IP-based technologies such as VoIP is the ability 

of the network to withstand attacks or failures on individual nodes in the network. 

In fact, the fundamental design feature driving DARPA’s creation of DARPAnet and 

the Internet was to ensure the safe transport of data between mainframe computers 

at different strategic locations by creating alternate communication routes in case 

of a bomb attack and by decentralizing functions so that no single computer could 

be targeted. 

In the aftermath of the Katrina disaster, New Orleans Mayor Roy Nagin and his 

staff were unable to make telephone calls out of the city for two days and then, only 

through a staff member’s VoIP telephone. President Bush ultimately reached Nagin 

for the first time through the VoIP service. 

Obviously, the migration of voice and data communications from the traditional 

telephone network will harden our communications networks in disasters such as 

these, and Congress should do everything in its power to facilitate this progress. 

12

The communications failures of these disasters are but a few of the factors contributing to the chaos of 9/11 and the massive human tragedy we saw in the 

Katrina aftermath. 

It’s imperative for Congress to investigate thoroughly and learn from these breakdowns so we never experience a human disaster of this magnitude again. 

The American people deserve no less.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. The inability of first 

responders to communicate with each other during emergencies threatens the 

public’s safety. It puts the lives of first responders and those in need of assistance 

at undue risk. Unfortunately, problems with interoperability are neither new nor 

rare. They occur daily, especially during multi-jurisdictional emergencies such as 

fighting large fires or searching for missing children. It is unfortunate that it takes 

large-scale tragedies such as the attacks of 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina to focus needed attention on this issue. 

The damage caused by Katrina, the levee breaches, and the flood that ensued was 

unprecedented in scope and scale. As one public safety official put it, the devastation was so widespread that the biggest issue was not interoperability, but operability. As we heard in testimony from the Federal Communications Commission 

(FCC) earlier this month, the lack of commercial power was the primary issue affecting communications in the days immediately following the hurricane. Power was 

out for so long that batteries in public safety radios ran down and could not be recharged. Emergency generators that powered the infrastructure ran out of fuel and 

fresh supplies could not reach those responding to the disaster areas. 

Having said that, large scale events such as Katrina are foreseeable. Losing commercial power during emergencies is foreseeable. It is therefore incumbent upon decision-makers to devote the resources necessary for public safety officials to communicate with each other whenever and wherever necessary. 

Two years ago, a national task force made up of public safety, State and local government officials issued a report to provide guidance in achieving interoperability. 

The task force identified several key reasons public safety agencies cannot communicate, including incompatible and aging equipment, inadequate funding, lack of coordination and cooperation, and too little spectrum. Likewise, during a hearing in 

this Subcommittee last year on the problems with interoperability, a witness from 

the FCC testified that achieving interoperability requires an emphasis on more than 

spectrum, technology, and equipment issues—it also requires a focus on the organizational and personnel coordination necessary to make interoperability available in 

times of greatest need. 

It is important that we address this complex problem with a comprehensive solution. Funding, spectrum, redundancy, coordination, and planning are all important 

pieces to the interoperability puzzle. They are all needed for true interoperability 

to become a reality. For example, in New Orleans, the public safety communications 

system was damaged by the flooding, but there was not adequate redundancy or 

planning to ensure continued communication. Additionally, in New Orleans, public 

safety has had access to additional spectrum in the 700 megahertz band for years. 

Adequate funding, however, was not available to purchase the necessary equipment 

to take advantage of that spectrum. 

All levels of government must commit the necessary resources to solve this problem. The Federal Government must work in partnership with State and local officials to make true interoperability a reality. Nationwide, regional, and local planning and coordination must take place so that the lines of communication stay open 

during emergencies. Adequate funding must be provided to help pay for the enormous cost of updating public safety’s old communications infrastructure with new, 

interoperable equipment. Likewise, Congress has already allocated to public safety 

24 megahertz of spectrum in the 700-megahertz band. Congress must act this year 

to get this spectrum into the hands of public safety across the country by a date 

certain. It must do so, however, in a comprehensive manner that does not unintentionally harm consumers in the process and potentially delay the return of the spectrum. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today, especially Lieutenant Colonel Tom 

Miller from the Michigan State Police. I look forward to hearing your comments 

about what steps are currently underway as well as what assistance is needed from 

Congress to make sure that first responders can adequately communicate with one 

another in times of public emergencies.

13

Mr. UPTON. Gentlemen, we are delighted that you are here and 

we are joined on our first panel by the Honorable Kevin Martin, 

Chairman of the Federal Communication Commission; Dr. David 

Boyd, Director of SAFECOM, Program Director of Science and 

Technology Director to the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. 

Vance Hitch, Chief Information Officer of the Department of Justice. 

Gentlemen, your statements have been made part of the record 

in their entirety and we would like you to limit your remarks, 

opening remarks to no more than 5 minutes if you can. 

And Chairman Martin, we will start with you, welcome. Is that 

button on? 

STATEMENTS OF HON. KEVIN J. MARTIN, CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION; DAVID G. BOYD, DIRECTOR, SAFECOM PROGRAM OFFICE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND VANCE E. HITCH, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. MARTIN. It is. Good morning, Chairman Upton and all the 

members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be with 

you all today. 

And as we all know, Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita devastated the Gulf Coast region. People lost their homes, their businesses, and even their lives and our hearts go out to all of the survivors who are now struggling with putting their lives back together. 

My statement today will focus on the effects of the recent hurricanes on the Nation’s communications infrastructure. First, I will 

briefly discuss the immediate impact on communication services in 

the area and provide a status report. I will then describe the steps 

the FCC is taking both to facilitate the restoration of service and 

to provide support for evacuees. And finally, I will offer some initial 

lessons learned from this terrible tragedy. 

The destruction that the hurricanes caused to the facilities of 

communications companies and the services upon which citizens 

rely was extraordinary. More than 3 million customer telephone 

lines were knocked down in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 

as a result of Hurricane Katrina. And as you can see on this first 

chart, the most significant damage was in the region colored red. 

The next most significant area colored yellow reached out more 

than 100 miles from where the storm initially landed. And the area 

in green sustained moderate damage and it reached out more than 

300 miles from where Katrina initially hit. And the area of size 

demonstrates just how far reaching the impact was in terms of the 

damage to the communications infrastructure. 

Now approximately 40 call centers, 911 call centers also went 

down as a result of the two hurricanes, 38 due to Katrina and two 

due to Rita. And approximately another 10 were damaged but were 

able to reroute their traffic. And as you can see in this next chart, 

the area in blue reflects the locations where the hurricanes 

knocked call centers out of service, and the area in red indicates 

where the call centers remain out of service today, all of those in 

the New Orleans area. 

14

Local wireless networks also sustained considerable damage with 

more than 1,000 cell sites out of service. And as you can see in this 

next chart, over 20 million telephone calls did not go through the 

day after Hurricane Katrina struck. The number of failed calls 

peaked that day and then slowly decreased daily as service began 

to be restored. We also estimate that approximately 100 broadcast 

stations were knocked off the air. This chart follows the outage and 

restoration of radio stations. You can see that 80 percent of the 

radio stations in the Gulf Coast Region were knocked off the air 

that day that Hurricane Katrina hit. Since then, the stations have 

been coming back on the area each day and Hurricane Rita caused 

an additional 46 radio stations to be knocked off the air. And finally, hundreds of thousands of cable customers also lost their 

service. 

Now, as a result of these service outages, it was extremely difficult for hundreds of thousands of people to receive news and 

emergency information and to communicate with their loved ones. 

Emergency workers and public safety officials had difficulty coordinating and it was at times like these that we are reminded of the 

importance in the ability to communicate. 

Fortunately, the work to restore communication service began almost immediately. While considerable problems remain, the companies in the region have made meaningful progress. They have overcome significant obstacles including flooding, lack of power, dwindling fuel resources for generators and security to rebuild, reconnect, and broadcast. Now to the best of my knowledge, the current 

status is as follows. This chart demonstrates the spike in the number of customers who were out of service, which again fell significantly about a week after Hurricane Katrina. Approximately 2.5 

million customer lines had been restored, leaving about 264,000 

customers still out of service today. Fifty 911 call centers have been 

restored, two in Louisiana remain out of service and this chart 

demonstrates how the sustained damage kept many of the call centers out of operation for almost 9 days as a result of Hurricane 

Katrina when most became operational again. 

Only one wireless switching center in the affected area is not 

operational now and over 1,200 cell sites have been restored, as 

you can see in this chart where out of service cell sites are marked 

in red, approximately 820 sites continue to be out of service, the 

majority within New Orleans and other areas of Louisiana. The 

size of the different pie graphs indicate the size of the markets, and 

the purple colors indicate where the cell sites were knocked out of 

service but have since come back into operation. You can see that 

cell sites were actually knocked down as far north as Hattiesburg. 

As the next chart demonstrates, 70 percent of TV stations in the 

area were knocked off the air on the day after Hurricane Katrina. 

Since then, TV stations have been coming back on the air almost 

daily and 10 remain off the air today as a result of both hurricanes. 

Fortunately, satellite service providers did not experience damage 

to their infrastructure. They have helped to bridge some of the 

gaps left by many of these outages. They provided satellite phones 

and video links to law enforcement officials, medical personnel, 

emergency relief personnel, and news outlets. 

15

Now the Commission has devoted significant time and resources 

to enable first responders to communicate and to facilitate companies’ ability to quickly restore service. We have granted over 90 

STA’s, special temporary authority requests and more than 100 

temporary frequency authorizations. We allowed law enforcement, 

for example, to use ultra wideband imaging systems to locate hurricane victims. We waive numerous rules to enable telephone companies to reroute traffic. From the beginning, the commissioners 

reached out to the impacted industries often numerous times a day 

to identify their needs and pass them along to FEMA and the National Communications System. 

And finally, we have facilitated disaster relief efforts and fundraising efforts by temporarily reassigning the 1-800 number 1-800-

RED-CROSS to the American Red Cross. At our recent open meeting, I also announced my intention for the Commission to take 

three major actions in an effort to continue to provide immediate 

relief to consumers and business and to enhance the Commission’s 

planning response efforts. First, I proposed $211 million in universal service funding to the 

disaster area. For all the people eligible for FEMA disaster assistance, we will provide support for wireless handsets in a package of 

300 free minutes. We will also allow public and non-profit 

healthcare providers, including the American Red Cross, shelters to 

apply for support of their telecommunications needs. We will use 

the E-rate Program to help reconnect schools and libraries throughout the region. And we will allow carriers to use the High Cost Program to prioritize rebuilding of facilities damaged by the hurricanes. 

Second, we are also establishing an independent panel of experts 

composed of public safety and communication industry representatives that we charge with reviewing the impact of Hurricane 

Katrina on the communications infrastructure and the affected 

areas. 

And finally, I announced our intention to create a new Public 

Safety/Homeland Security Bureau to develop policies and rules to 

promote effective and reliable communications for public safety, national security, and disaster management. 

While there is still much work for the Commission to do to facilitate restoration, I think it is important we take the time to learn 

from the tragedy. We need to assess what worked and what did 

not, what the Commission can do now to make our communications 

net work more robust, and I have three initial suggestions. 

First, we need to ensure that the public has the tools necessary 

to know when an emergency is coming and to contact first responders. This involves several steps. We need a comprehensive alert 

system that allows officials at the national, State, and local level 

to reach affected citizens in the most effective and efficient manner 

possible. It needs to incorporate the internet and other advances in 

technology so that officials can reach large numbers of people simultaneously through different communications media. 

We also need to ensure that providers comply with our 911 rules. 

The 911 system is critical to our Nation’s ability to respond to a 

host of crises. This obligation to provide access to emergency operators should not be optional for any service provider. 

16

We also need to ensure that Public Safety Answering Points are 

redundant. That Hurricane Katrina severed communication links 

to multiple PSAPs and to key facilities that handle local emergency 

and first responder calls. We need to establish redundant routing 

that will create a more resilient network to aid those public safety 

calls. 

Second, I suggest we need to enable first responders to communicate seamlessly. We need to have an interoperable mobile wireless communication system that can be rapidly deployed anywhere 

in the country. Such a system must have two essential features. 

First, the system must be interoperable and must allow different 

organizations from different jurisdictions to communicate with each 

other immediately through both voice and data. This requires that 

there be a sufficient spectrum devoted to these purposes. It also requires that first responders have equipment capable of operating 

on multiple frequencies in multiple formats so that different systems can connect with each other. Properly implemented, a system 

with adequate spectrum and such smart radios would help to ensure that both data and voice are transmitted between agencies, instantly replacing the multiple lengthy calls that occur today. 

The system must also be capable of rapid deployment and restoration using multiple flexible technologies and extremely mobile 

infrastructure. Smart radios can enable first responders to find any 

available towers or infrastructure on multiple frequencies, Wi-Fi 

and spectrum technologies can enable them to use limited spectrum quickly and efficiently. And mobile antennas which are capable of using both satellite and terrestrial technology should be used 

to establish communications as quickly as possible. The infrastructure could use inflatable antennas, cell towers on wheels, high altitude balloons, or other mobile facilities. 

And my final suggestion is to enhance network resiliency. We 

need to ensure that all communications providers develop and adhere to best practices to ensure reliability in the event of a disaster 

and quick restoration of service in facilities in the event service is 

disrupted. We should take full advantage of IP-based technologies 

to enhance the resiliency of traditional communications networks. 

IP technology provides dynamic capability to the change and reroute telecommunications traffic within the network so that in the 

event of a systems failure within the traditional network, these 

technologies enable the service providers to restore service more 

quickly and to provide the flexibility to initiate service at new locations chosen by the customers. 

I look forward to working cooperatively with the members of this 

committee, other Members of Congress, and my colleagues at the 

Commission to achieve these goals. We appreciate any guidance 

you may have on these issues and I thank you for the opportunity 

to be here today and look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Kevin J. Martin follows:]

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Mr. UPTON. Thank you again. 

Dr. Boyd, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. BOYD 

Mr. BOYD. Good afternoon and thank you, Mr. Chairman and 

members of the Committee, for the invitation to speak to you 

today. 

Interoperability requires, before all else, operability as Hurricane 

Katrina demonstrated in the absence of a reliable network across 

which respondents within an agency can effectively communicate 

with themselves. Interoperability is both irrelevant and impossible. 

Some seem to believe the introduction of new technologies alone 

can solve our interoperability problems but adding equipment addresses only part of what a fully robust, reliable, and interoperable 

public safety communication system requires. For example, when 

we lose towers, first responders have only their mobile or portable 

units available so range is dramatically reduced and control of the 

incident is severely compromised. Portable units permit some 

short-range communications until the proprietary battery packages 

begin to fail and cannot be recharged because the chargers are 

typically attached to the power grid. 911 centers are tied to the 

wired telephone network and so is the cellular system which depends on cell phones that also use propriety batteries. No single fix 

alone can address all of these elements. 

Many solutions have been offered and many claims have been 

made for each solution and all have a role, but none is a silver bullet. Satellite phones are extremely useful for command elements 

but often hopelessly impractical for individual first responders. The 

required training and signals can be blocked by vegetation, buildings, terrain, and even weather. They also use batteries that need 

recharging. And a first responder in the middle of a rescue or up 

to his armpits in flood water will find the antenna hard or impossible to aim. Van or trailer mounted communication systems 

dropped into the incident nearly always offer significantly less coverage than the original system and may require significant training 

to use. And all of these without solid prior planning and appropriate training will add to the difficulties of achieving interoperability once interoperability is achieved. 

We believe that what we have developed to support interoperability can also help first responders successfully navigate any communications emergency. We of the public safety community have 

identified six key building blocks required to achieve interoperability. Governance, that is the political issue you addressed, sir; 

standard operating procedures; technology, training and exercises; 

routine use of interoperable systems; and cost cutting. Of all of 

these is the sixth and most important element, a high degree of 

leadership, planning and collaboration with a commitment to and 

an investment in sustainability across all regions. To help public 

safety agencies, and especially the policy levels of Government, understand the interrelationship of all of these factors, we developed 

a tool we call the interoperability continuum and if you have not 

seen it, I will be happy to provide you a copy. This planning tool 

explains how all these elements interrelate and it makes clear that 

63

all of these elements need to be addressed not during an emergency. 

Interoperability is not a new issue. It was a problem in Washington, DC, when the Air Florida flight crashed into the Potomac 

in 1982, in New York City when the Twin Towers were first attacked in 1993, in 1995 when the Murrah Building was destroyed 

in Oklahoma City, and in 1999 at Columbine. Too many public 

safety personnel cannot communicate by radio because their equipment is still incompatible or the frequencies they are assigned to 

are different and they have not got bridging technologies available. 

They operate on 10 different frequency bands and they run communication systems that are often proprietary and too often 30 or 

more years old. Over 90 percent of the Nation’s public safety wireless infrastructure is financed, owned, operated, and maintained by 

the more than 60,000 individual local jurisdictions, police, fire, and 

emergency services that serve the public. National efforts to fix the 

problem have historically been erratic, uncertain, and until recently uncoordinated. Worse, the efforts have too often been designed without the direct involvement of the people with the greatest stake in effective communications, the first responders. The attacks on September 11, 2001 made clear all of this had to change. 

Since September 11, significant progress has been made in interoperability thanks to the priorities both the Administration and 

Congress have placed on it. In 2001, SAFECOM was established as 

a Presidential Management Initiative, the first time interoperability had ever been addressed at that level. In 2004, the Department established the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility to 

further strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility 

efforts. And in the Intelligence Reform Act, Congress gave it a legislative charter. 

While fixing the Nation’s interoperability problem will require a 

sustained effort, we recognize that we cannot wait to move things 

forward. That is why SAFECOM has initiated the number of near 

term initiatives, including working with the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology to accelerate the development of standards, the Interoperability Continuum I mentioned earlier, and the 

development of statewide planning tools, RapidCom, which was a 

program to establish command level emergency interoperability 

across 10 high threat areas, the national statement of requirements, the public safety architecture framework, creation of a P-25 

performance testing program, development of coordinated grant 

guidance which for the first time is included in all Federal grant 

programs, creation of a national baseline and identification of public safety spectrum needs. 

This Nation is heavily invested in an existing infrastructure that 

is too often inadequate to the basic communications requirements 

of individual agencies and not interoperable. We must continue to 

pursue a comprehensive strategy that takes into account technical 

and cultural issues associated with improving interoperability 

which recognizes the challenges associated with incorporating legacy equipment and practices in a constantly changing technology 

and cultural environment in which encourages strong local leadership in ensuring that the needs of the front line of emergency response, the first responders are met. Though many challenges reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
64

main, we believe we have accomplished a great deal in the barely 

2 years DHS has managed this program. We are confident that 

with your continued support and the assistance of our many Federal, and in particular State and local partners, we will continue 

to move toward a world where lives and property are never lost because public safety agencies are unable to communicate or lack 

compatible equipment and training resources. 

And I would be happy to answer any questions you have, sir. 

[The prepared statement of David G. Boyd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID G. BOYD, DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR INTEROPERABILITY

AND COMPATIBILITY, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT, DIRECTORATE OF

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for 

the invitation to speak to you today. 

Today’s testimony will focus on SAFECOM, a communications program of the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC), which resides in the Office of Systems Engineering and Development, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security (DHS). SAFECOM provides development, testing, evaluation, guidance, research and assistance for local, tribal, state, and Federal public 

safety agencies working to improve public safety response through more effective 

and efficient interoperable wireless communications. (By public safety we mean fire, 

police, emergency medical services, emergency managers, and others who have 

emergency response missions). Although SAFECOM is working with practitioners to 

develop long-term strategic initiatives without which the nation will never solve the 

interoperability problem, we all know terrorists, natural disasters and other emergencies will not wait for a comprehensive national solution so the program has been 

designed with near-, mid- and long-term goals. 

Communications interoperability refers to the ability of public safety agencies to 

talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging voice and/or data with one another on demand, in real time, as authorized. Unfortunately, the nation is heavily invested in an existing infrastructure made up 

largely of systems that are too often incompatible. To change this, efforts within the 

Federal government to address the interoperability problem are being coordinated 

by SAFECOM and incorporate the needs of local, state, and Federal practitioners. 

But there are no immediate, silver bullet fixes to the financial, technical and cultural challenges that face us. As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) acknowledged in a July 2004 report, communications interoperability is a long-term 

problem with no one-size-fits-all solution. 

PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT

Interoperability is not a new issue; it has plagued the public safety community 

for decades. It was a problem in Washington, D.C., when the Air Florida flight 

crashed into the Potomac in 1982. It was a problem in New York City when the 

Twin Towers were first attacked in 1993. It was a problem in 1995 when the 

Murrah Building was destroyed in Oklahoma City, and in 1999 at Columbine. The 

reality is that today, too many public safety personnel cannot communicate by radio 

with personnel from other agencies or disciplines because their equipment is still 

incompatible, or the frequencies they are assigned are different. They operate on 10 

different frequency bands and run communications systems that are often proprietary, and that are too often 30 or more years old, in an era when the technology 

lifecycle is only 18 to 24 months. Over 90% of the nation’s public safety wireless 

infrastructure is financed, owned, operated, and maintained by the more than 

60,000 local jurisdictions that provide emergency services to the public and only a 

very tiny fraction of this funding is Federal. National efforts to fix the problem have 

historically been erratic, uncertain, and—until recently—uncoordinated. The attacks 

on September 11, 2001, made clear this had to change. 

Since September 11, 2001, significant progress has been made to improve communications interoperability for the public safety community. Yet it is apparent that 

more must be achieved. Much of this progress can be attributed to the priority that 

both the Administration and Congress have placed on solving the problem of communications interoperability. In 2001, SAFECOM was established as a Presidential 

Management Initiative and charged with strengthening interoperability at all levels 

65

of government by coordinating Federal programs, initiating a comprehensive standards program, and developing a national architecture. In 2004, the Department established OIC to further strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility 

efforts to improve local, tribal, state, and Federal public safety preparedness and response. OIC was directed to:

• Identify and certify all DHS programs that touch on interoperability; • Support the creation of interoperability standards; • Establish a comprehensive research, development, testing, and evaluation 

(RDT&E) program for improving public safety interoperability; • Integrate coordinated grant guidance across all DHS grant making agencies that 

touch on public safety interoperability; • Oversee the development and implementation of technical assistance for public 

safety interoperability; • Conduct pilot demonstrations; • Create an interagency interoperability coordination council; and • Establish an effective outreach program. 

LONG-TERM VISION

Practitioners helped SAFECOM articulate a long term vision for interoperability 

which projects that, not later than 2023, first responders will operate on a national 

system-of-systems using standards-based equipment that provides the capability to 

respond to an incident anywhere in the country, using their own equipment, on any 

network, and on dedicated public safety spectrum. They will be able to communicate 

with each other as authorized via voice, data, and video on demand and in real 

time. Making this vision flesh will require work in five critical success areas, including:

1. A common set of guidelines and criteria for public safety communications systems 

in conjunction with a national architecture framework; 

2. Coordinated testing and evaluation processes to ensure communications equipment meets critical requirements; 

3. Standardization of equipment fortified by interim grant guidance measures; 

4. Coordinated spectrum policy that meets the needs of the public safety community; 

and 

5. Certification of state communications plans. 

None of these initiatives will be accomplished overnight, but many of them are 

already beginning to strengthen interoperability in the public safety community. 

NEAR-TERM INITIATIVES

While fixing the nation’s interoperability problem will require a sustained effort, 

we recognize that we must quickly ensure sufficient interoperability at all levels of 

government to meet emergencies of any kind. To do this, DHS and SAFECOM has 

initiated a number of near-term initiatives, including development of the Interoperability Continuum, development of statewide planning tools, execution of the 

RapidCom Initiative, publication of a national statement of requirements, creation 

of a conformance testing program, development of coordinated grant guidance for inclusion in every Federal grant program, creation of a national baseline, identification of public safety spectrum needs, development of emergency response plans for 

immediate communications capabilities, and coordination with Office of State and 

Local Government Coordination and Preparedness’ (SLGCP) Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP). 

Statement of Requirements and a National Architecture Framework 

Interoperability plans to support responses to an incident need to be developed 

based on a common set of guidelines and criteria for public safety communications 

systems and these should be aligned with a national architecture framework. Only 

when these guidelines are universally recognized and followed will first responders 

and the larger public safety community be able to communicate effectively. To that 

end, SAFECOM published Version 1.0 of the first ever comprehensive Public Safety 

Statement of Requirements for Communications and Interoperability (SoR). Developed with public safety practitioner input, the SoR defines the functional requirements for public safety communications. Subsequent versions will further refine 

these technical requirements so that industry will have a blueprint to which to build 

technologies that address public safety’s needs. This SoR also serves as the basis 

for developing a national architecture framework for communications interoperability. SAFECOM is working to develop a Public Safety Architecture Framework 

(PSAF) that, with the SoR, will serve as a tool to help the nation’s first responder 

agencies understand the technical requirements and national migration path toward 

66

fully interoperable communications systems without imposing requirements that stifle innovation. 

Coordinated Testing and Evaluation of Equipment 

The next step in achieving national communications interoperability is the development of coordinated testing and evaluation processes to ensure communications 

equipment meets the critical needs of first responders. Public safety is faced with 

many complex procurement decisions and frequently has to hope that the equipment 

they buy will do what it claims. To ensure that public safety is able to truly trust 

the claims made by vendors, communications equipment needs to be tested and 

evaluated based on first responder needs and capabilities. To do this, SAFECOM 

created a testing and evaluation working group to help ensure that methodologies 

for testing and evaluation of interoperability products are technically sound and 

comparable across testing laboratories. The working group members are practitioners and subject matter experts from law enforcement, fire services, and emergency medical services. These members help review and develop test criteria and 

serve the program by determining which products should be evaluated. S 

National Baseline of Public Safety Communications 

The National Interoperability Baseline study will provide the nation’s first statistically significant, quantitative measurement of the current state of public safety 

communications interoperability. The development of the survey methodology was 

initiated in January 2005 and the resulting study will provide an understanding of 

the current state of interoperability nationwide upon completion. Additionally, it 

will serve as a tool to measure future improvements made through local, state, and 

Federal public safety communications initiatives. 

The survey instrument developed for Interoperability Baseline will allow 

SAFECOM to identify areas with interoperability shortfalls, track the impact of 

Federal programs and measure the success of these programs, establish an on-going 

process and mechanism to measure the state of interoperability on a recurring basis, 

and develop an interoperability baseline self-assessment tool for local and state public safety agencies. 

Coordinated Spectrum Policy That Meets the Needs of Public Safety 

Radio spectrum is a finite resource—there is only so much available and it is 

shared by public safety, radio broadcasters, government users, and other commercial 

and private consumers. The large demand for this resource can lead to overcrowding, which, in turn can cause delays in or disruption of communication for 

public safety. The Federal Communications Commission has allocated certain frequencies to public safety, but these allocations are fragmented, creating challenges 

for communications among different agencies and jurisdictions. In the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in consultation with DHS and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to conduct a study to assess the spectrum needs for local, state, and Federal first responders, which is due 

in December 2005. SAFECOM is currently assessing public safety spectrum needs 

in support of the President’s national spectrum management initiative. DHS, in consultation with the Department of Commerce and other relevant agencies, is developing a Spectrum Needs Plan out of these assessments which will be delivered to 

the President by the end of November 2005. 

Certification of State Communications Plans 

Interoperability requires, before all else, simple operability—that is, communications within the local agency. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, in the absence 

of a reliable network across which responders within an agency can effectively communicate, interoperability is both irrelevant and impossible. Strengthening and ensuring basic level public safety communications capabilities, therefore, is the first 

task. But progressing from agency-specific operability towards multi-jurisdictional 

and multi-disciplinary interoperability requires attention to more than technology. 

Some believe the introduction of new technologies alone can solve our interoperability problems. But adding equipment addresses only one part of what a fully robust, reliable, and interoperable public safety communications system requires. 

With input from the public safety community, we have identified five key building 

blocks required to achieve interoperability. Governance, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Technology, Training and Exercises, routine use (Usage) of interoperable systems, and regular Maintenance must all be present for interoperability to 

be possible. To help public safety agencies and especially the policy levels of government understand the interrelationship of all of these factors, we developed a tool 

called the ‘‘Interoperability Continuum.’’ This planning tool explains how all these 

67

elements relate to each other. For example, if a city within a region procures new 

equipment it may have a technical interoperability capability, but unless it has also 

conducted exercises to test procedures (and find points of failure) and concepts of 

operation, and developed policies agreeable to the entire region, it is unlikely the 

new equipment can be effectively integrated into regional interoperability plans. As 

states develop their emergency communications plans, we recommend that they address all the elements of the Interoperability Continuum. 

Statewide Planning Tools 

Statewide communications plans are often unsuccessful because the top-down approach fails to consider the requirements of the first responders who are the primary users and who control the most of the wireless infrastructure. 

In 2004, SAFECOM partnered with the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Department of Justice to develop a strategic plan for improving statewide interoperable communications for the state. The effort was based on SAFECOM’s ‘‘bottomup,’’ locally-driven approach. The planning process included six regional focus group 

sessions, which culminated in a final strategic planning session. The focus group 

sessions captured perspectives from numerous local public safety representatives 

throughout the Commonwealth; these perspectives were used in the final strategic 

planning session in which recommendations for key initiatives were developed as 

part of a statewide strategic plan for improving public safety communications and 

interoperability. 

Based on lessons learned from the Virginia planning process, SAFECOM published the Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning (SCIP) Methodology 

as a model for integrating practitioner input into a successful statewide strategic 

plan to every state. The SCIP Methodology serves as one approach for states to consider as they initiate statewide communications planning efforts. 

We are also implementing Section 7304 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458), which authorized the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to carry out at least two Regional Communications Interoperability Pilots (RCIP). In accordance with the congressional criteria for determining 

the location of the pilot sites, as well as criteria outlined by the program itself, 

SAFECOM selected the State of Nevada and the Commonwealth of Kentucky as 

RCIP locations. SAFECOM, in coordination with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness’ Interoperable Communications Technical 

Assistance Program (ICTAP), is helping both states implement the SCIP methodology. 

Building on lessons learned from the SCIP Methodology and earlier SAFECOM 

initiatives, the RCIP projects will help us identify models for improving communications and interoperability that take into account the wide range of challenges across 

the nation. When the projects are complete, Nevada and Kentucky will each have 

improved interoperability plans and we will be able to use the lessons learned to 

better develop or strengthen replicable tools and methodologies which will be made 

available to public safety practitioners, as well as to local and state governments. 

An interim report regarding the progress of the pilot projects has been submitted 

to Congress. A final report will be provided to Congress in June 2006. 

We believe statewide emergency communications plans are fundamental to an effective response to a catastrophic event. As states continue to develop their own 

plans, SAFECOM recommends that they do so in coordination with SAFECOM 

methodologies and guidance. 

RapidCom 

On July 22, 2004, President Bush formally announced the RapidCom initiative, 

a program designed to ensure that a minimum level of public safety interoperability 

would be in place in ten high-threat urban areas by September 30, 2004. 

In coordination with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 

Preparedness (OSLGCP), the Department of Justice’s 25 Cities Program, and the 

DHS Wireless Management Office, SAFECOM worked closely with public safety 

leaders in ten high-risk urban areas centered in Boston, Chicago, Houston, Jersey 

City, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and the Washington Metropolitan Area to assess their communications interoperability capacity 

and needs, and to identify and implement solutions. In keeping with the SAFECOM 

‘‘bottom-up’’ approach, local officials drove the design and implementation of solutions in their jurisdictions. 

With the on-time completion of the RapidCom project, incident commanders in 

each of the urban areas now have confirmed they have the ability to adequately 

communicate with each other and their respective command centers within one hour 

of an incident. 

68

Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) 

A key component in achieving interoperable communications across the nation is 

providing on-site technical assistance to states and urban areas. SLGCP funds 

ICTAP, a technical assistance program designed to enhance interoperable communications between local, state, and Federal first responders and public safety officials. The program provides free support to states and urban areas with the goal 

of enabling local public safety officials to communicate across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging voice and/or data with one 

another on demand, in real time, as authorized. 

CONCLUSION

These initiatives are only part of what the SAFECOM program has undertaken 

to advance communications interoperability across the Nation. This nation is heavily invested in an existing infrastructure that is too often inadequate to the basic 

communications requirements of individual agencies and not interoperable. We 

must continue to pursue a comprehensive strategy that takes into account technical 

and cultural issues associated with improving interoperability, which recognizes the 

challenges associated with incorporating legacy equipment and practices in constantly changing technology and cultural environments, and which ensures that the 

needs of the front line of emergency response—the first responders—are met. 

Though many challenges remain, we believe we have accomplished a great deal in 

the short time DHS has managed this program. 

We are confident that with your continuing support and the assistance of our 

many Federal partners, we will continue to move towards a world where lives and 

property are never lost because public safety agencies are unable to communicate 

or lack compatible equipment and training resources. 

APPENDIX I: OIC AUTHORITIES FROM THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM

PREVENTION ACT OF 2004

Congress, with the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 (PL 108-458) less than a year ago, gave OIC and SAFECOM legislative 

authority to carry out its responsibilities. Before passage of this act, responsibility 

for addressing interoperability was spread across three different agencies. Section 

7303 of the Act directed SAFECOM to:

• coordinate with other Federal agencies to establish a comprehensive national approach to achieving public safety interoperable communications; 

• develop, with Federal agencies and state and local authorities, minimum capabilities for communications interoperability for Federal, state, and local public safety agencies; 

• accelerate voluntary consensus standards for public safety interoperable communications; 

• develop and implement flexible open architectures for short- and long-term solutions to public safety interoperable communications; 

• identify priorities for research, development, and testing and evaluation within 

DHS and assist other Federal agencies in doing the same with regard to public 

safety interoperable communications; 

• provide technical assistance to state and locals regarding planning, acquisition 

strategies, and other functions necessary to achieve public safety communications interoperability; 

• develop and disseminate best practices to improve public safety communications 

interoperability; 

• develop appropriate performance measures and milestones to measure the nation’s progress to achieving public safety communications interoperability; 

• provide technical guidance, training, and other assistance to support the rapid establishment of consistent, secure, and effective interoperable communications 

capabilities in the event of an emergency in urban and other areas determined 

by the Secretary to be at consistently high levels of risk from terrorist attack; 

and develop minimum interoperable communications capabilities for emergency 

response providers. 

APPENDIX II: TOOLS AND METHODS BASED ON LOCAL AND STATE PILOTS

• Communications Tabletop Exercise Methodology, a process for a communications-focused tabletop exercise replicable across urban areas. 

• Tabletop Exercise After-Action Report, a template for capturing key findings 

and identifying gaps following each tabletop exercise. 

69

• Interoperability Pocket Guide, a process for creating an area-specific interoperability pocket guide to ensure local public safety officials are aware of current capabilities available in their areas. 

• Templates for Improving Interoperability, including governance charter, 

standard operating procedure (SOP), and memorandum of agreement (MOA) 

templates to help communities improve interoperability. 

• Operational Guide for the Interoperability Continuum—Lessons Learned 

from RapidCom, which outlines the importance of each element of the Interoperability Continuum, provides common challenges to consider when working 

towards improved interoperability, and recommends key actions to increase an 

area’s capabilities.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hitch, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF VANCE E. HITCH 

Mr. HITCH. Thank you. Good afternoon. 

Mr. UPTON. I think you want to just hit the button. There you 

go. 

Mr. HITCH. Can you hear me now? Okay. 

Good afternoon. Thank you for the invitation to speak with you 

today. I am the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Justice and I have held this position since April of 2002. And my testimony today will describe the Department of Justice’s efforts since 

9/11/01 to improve interoperable wireless communications within 

DOJ, as well as within our law enforcement partners in other Federal, State, and local agencies. I will in particular focus my attention on the Integrated Wireless Network Program, which is a program that my office manages and is key to our law enforcement 

mission. 

Although most metropolitan areas have some inter-agency communications capabilities, they are limited and do not meet the requirements in all circumstances. Further, much of the non-urban 

areas of the country have even less. Events such as Hurricane 

Katrina highlight the fact that most public safety communication 

systems are highly dependent on commercial or public infrastructures such as electric utilities, telecommunications, natural gas, 

and so forth. When these core infrastructure systems fail or are 

overwhelmed, the agency communication systems are badly degraded or fail as well. 

DOJ is committed to helping to improve interoperability across 

the entire law enforcement and Homeland Security communities. 

DOJ has several ongoing programs that are designed to address 

particular aspects of the communications interoperability issue. 

Today I am focusing on the Integrated Wireless Network Program. 

However, before I do so, I just want to mention briefly a couple of 

related programs. Through the Office of the Community Oriented 

Policing Services, known as COPS, DOJ awarded $150 million in 

grants in 2003 and 2004 to 37 jurisdictions to improve public safety 

interoperability through voice interoperability and data sharing 

projects. Earlier this month, COPS awarded another $92 million to 

an additional 25 localities. Also through the Communications Technology Program, the National Institute of Justice has granted over 

$90 million to practitioners, universities, industry standards bodies, and vendors to develop interoperability solutions for State and 

local law enforcement. 

70

Finally, as an adjunct and interim measure under the IWN Program, my office has partnered with State and local officials in 25 

cities to connect existing Federal, State, and local agency systems 

together. DOJ has coordinated each of these three initiatives with 

SAFECOM Program managed by the Department of Homeland Security in which you have just heard from. 

I now want to focus on the IWN Program, Integrated Wireless 

Network. IWN is a partnership between the Department of Justice, 

Homeland Security, and Treasury to implement a consolidated nationwide communication system for Federal law enforcement and 

homeland defense agents. IWN will support approximately 80,000 

Federal agents in all 50 states and U.S. territories. Based on the 

Government’s preliminary engineering estimates, IWN will require 

installation of communications infrastructure at approximately 

2,500 locations around the country. 

IWN will replace the antiquated systems currently supporting 

Federal agencies including the FBI, DEA, ATF, U.S. Marshals, the 

Secret Service, ICE, and the Border Patrol. Using a variety of 

interoperable technologies, the IWN will address Federal agency 

requirements to communicate across agencies and with State and 

local law enforcement partners. The IWN will also facilitate Federal use of emerging communications technology such as voice over 

IP and wireless streaming video. Finally, IWN will allow DOJ, 

DHS, and Treasury to address these requirements in the most resource efficient means possible. 

The genesis of the IWN Program was a mandate from the Department of Commerce, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, NTIA, to cut in half the amount of radio 

spectrum used by Federal agencies for each land mobile radio channel. To meet the NTIA ‘‘narrowband’’ mandate, as it is known, Federal agencies have to replace their legacy radio systems. The IWN 

Program began at the Department of Justice in 2000, Treasury 

joined us in November of 2001, and DHS joined us in March of 

2003. 

To date, the IWN Program has developed functional and management requirements, conducted a technical assessment and market 

research into potential products and services, and deployed several 

pilot systems to assess technology options and gain lessons learned 

on managing multi-agency systems. We currently are conducting 

the procurement for the development, deployment, and operation of 

a nationwide IWN system. 

IWN will address the following lessons we have learned from operations of the existing legacy systems, achievements from our 25 

cities interoperability projects, and the results of IWN pilots that 

we have run in Salt Lake City, San Diego, and Seattle. First of all, 

deploying and operating effective communication systems is a very 

complex endeavor. The systems must adapt to each agency’s unique 

business requirements and must be tailored to the geographic region being supported. Second, interoperability must be addressed 

regionally or locally. Agencies and officers usually need to communicate with compatriots from other agencies operating in the same 

general area. Third, a prerequisite for improving interagency communications is the development of successful partnerships among 

participating agencies. And fourth, joint systems such as IWN proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
71

vide a number of opportunities to achieve significant cost efficiencies. In addition, the prime lesson learned from Hurricane 

Katrina is that we must carefully address survivability as we build 

and deploy IWN in the future. 

In closing, we believe that the IWN Program is an example of 

good Government and best practices. We expect to realize significant operational benefits from the IWN, including communication 

services that are more secure, more reliable and accessible to Federal agents over a greater geographic area than is available today. 

The system will also provide inherent interoperability between the 

IWN agencies and will facilitate communication with officials from 

other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. Better 

communications will facilitate better mission coordination and collaboration, which in turn will make our law enforcement and 

homeland security personnel more effective in stopping crime and 

protecting the Nation. 

Thank you for your time this afternoon and I will be happy to 

answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Vance E. Hitch follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VANCE E. HITCH, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Good afternoon and thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

for the invitation to speak to you today. 

I am the Chief Information Officer for the Department of Justice. I have held this 

position since April 2002. My testimony today will describe efforts the Department 

of Justice has undertaken since September 11, 2001, to improve interoperable wireless communication within the Department of Justice, as well as between the Department and our law enforcement partners in other federal, state and local agencies. I will focus particular attention to the Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) program, which is a program that my office manages. 

Interagency communications is a priority issue for the Department of Justice and 

we recognize that such capability is also a top priority for the public safety community at large. DOJ’s ability to protect this country and stop crime (including terrorism) is heavily dependent on working closely with other federal, state, tribal and 

local agencies. Such working relationships cannot be achieved unless we can interconnect agency communications systems. Similarly, we consistently hear this same 

message from law enforcement partners in other federal agencies as well as at the 

state, tribal and local level. Indeed, the need for interagency communications has 

been widely recognized among the law enforcement community for at least two decades.—The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent analysis of 

what occurred during and in response to the attacks, highlighted in a very public 

way the communication deficits facing the country as a whole and the law enforcement and homeland security communities in particular. 

Although most major metropolitan areas have some basic capability to link agency 

communications systems together to communicate in emergency situations, much of 

the country’s existing capabilities are limited and do not meet the requirements for 

all circumstances. Further, most of the nation’s interoperability capabilities exist 

only in our major cities. Much of the non-urban areas of the country have little 

interagency communications capabilities. In addition, events such as Hurricane 

Katrina highlight the fact that most of our public safety wireless communications 

systems (federal, state and local) are highly dependent on commercial or public infrastructure (e.g., electric utilities, telecommunications services, etc.). When these 

core infrastructure systems fail or are overwhelmed—as was the case during Hurricane Katrina—the agency communication systems are badly degraded or fail as 

well. 

The Department of Justice is committed to supporting the improvement of interagency communications among the law enforcement community. DOJ has several 

ongoing programs that are designed to address particular aspects of the communications interoperability issue. The one I want to focus on today is the Integrated Wireless Network Program, an initiative to improve federal tactical law enforcement and 

homeland security communications capabilities. However, before I talk about IWN 

72

in detail, I first want to stress that the Department’s efforts are not one-dimensional—in addition to addressing specific DOJ communications requirements 

through IWN, the Department also has contributed to addressing communications 

issues at the state and local level too. 

Through the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, 

DOJ awarded $150 million in grants in 2003 and 2004, to 37 jurisdictions to improve public safety interoperability. The projects funded by COPS include voice 

interoperability and data information sharing to large and small population centers 

across the nation. Earlier this month, COPS—awarded another $92 million to 26 localities to address public safety interoperability. Through the Communications Technology (CommTech) Program, the National Institute of Justice—has granted over 

$90—million to practitioners, universities, industry standards bodies and vendors in 

order to develop interoperability solutions for state and local law enforcement. 

CommTech efforts span five different disciplines: research and development, integrated product test & evaluation, pilot programs, standards development, and outreach and technical assistance. Finally, as an initial step in the development of the 

IWN, DOJ has partnered with state and local officials in 25 cities across the country 

to augment or implement multi-agency emergency communications capabilities. This 

effort—which we call our 25 Cities Interoperability Program—has sought to achieve 

interoperable communications by connecting existing federal, state and local agency 

systems together. DOJ has made a concerted effort to coordinate across each of 

these three initiatives, and also with the SAFECOM program managed by the Department of Homeland Security. 

I now want to focus on the Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) program. IWN is 

a partnership between DOJ and the Departments of Homeland Security and the 

Treasury to implement a consolidated nation-wide communications system in support of the federal agents and officers engaged in the conduct of the law enforcement 

and homeland defense missions of the three Departments. The scope of the IWN is 

significant. When fully implemented, IWN will support approximately 80,000 federal 

agents and officers in all 50 states and the U.S. territories. Based on the government’s preliminary engineering estimates, the IWN will require installation of communications infrastructure at approximately 2,500 locations around the country. 

The IWN will replace the antiquated and functionally limited existing systems 

currently supporting federal agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In doing so, the IWN will 

address federal agency requirements to communicate across agencies, and with state 

and local law enforcement partners. The IWN also will facilitate federal use of 

emerging communications technology (such as Voice over Internet Protocol, and 

wireless streaming video). Finally, IWN will allow DOJ, DHS and Treasury to address these requirements in the most resource-efficient means possible, thus reducing the dollars, staff time and radio spectrum needed to meet federal agency communications requirements. 

The genesis of the IWN program was a mandate from the Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), to cut 

in half the amount of radio spectrum used by federal agencies for each land mobile 

radio channel [For reference, see 47 U.S.C. 903(d).]. Land mobile radio is the technology most law enforcement and public safety agencies (federal, state and local) use 

for tactical communications systems. The practical effect of the NTIA ‘‘narrowband’’ 

mandate was a requirement for federal agencies to replace their legacy radio systems. In 2000, as a cost avoidance measure, DOJ decided to build one system rather 

than replace the six separate systems in place at that time. A similar decision was 

made by officials at the Department of the Treasury. In August 2001, DOJ and 

Treasury officials began discussing a joint project. Initial agreement was reached on 

September 7, 2001, and the two departments signed the first memorandum of understanding for the IWN in November 2001. The Department of Homeland Security 

joined the partnership when it was created in March 2003. 

The September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon changed the 

focus of the IWN program from compliance with the NTIA narrowband mandate to 

improving the mission effectiveness of the communications system, of which interagency communications is a key aspect. 

To date, the IWN program has developed a comprehensive set of functional and 

management requirements, conducted a technical assessment and market research 

into products and services that may provide the basis for the IWN system, and deployed several pilot systems to assess technology options and gain lessons learned 

on managing multi-agency systems. At present, the Department of Justice—on beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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half of the three-department partnership—is conducting a procurement for the development, deployment and operation of a nationwide IWN system. 

The IWN has been greatly influenced to date (and will continue to be influenced) 

by a number of lessons learned by DOJ, DHS and Treasury. The sources of these 

lessons include the experiences gained through operation of the existing individual 

agency systems, achievements from our 25 Cities Interoperability projects, and results of IWN pilots in Salt Lake City, Utah, San Diego, California and, most recently, Seattle, Washington. From these experiences and pilots, we have learned the 

following:

• Deploying and operating effective communications systems is a complex endeavor. 

Public safety communications systems in general are complicated because they 

must be flexible in order to support the complex business processes of an agency 

that must address or respond to a wide range of non-routine situations. Multiagency systems add a layer of complexity because each agency has its unique 

business processes or functional requirements. In addition, wireless communications systems have to be tailored to the geographic region being supported (this 

is a key distinguishing factor between wireless systems and all other IT). As 

a consequence, wireless communications systems such as IWN can employ common architectures and standards, but cannot be developed and deployed in a 

‘‘cookie cutter’’ manner. • Interoperability must be addressed regionally or locally. While the federal government and its agencies can provide a national perspective to communications 

issues, interoperability, especially as it pertains to law enforcement, is essentially a ‘‘local’’ issue. Agents and officers usually need to communicate with compatriots from other agencies operating in the same general area. Further, because every region has a unique mix of government structures and communications resources in their ‘‘embedded base,’’ no one solution can be appropriately 

imposed uniformly across the country. Instead, what is needed is a set of solution options that can be applied in varying combinations to address the specific 

communications needs of each region. • A prerequisite for improving interagency communications is the development of 

successful partnerships among agencies in a particular region. As DOJ officials 

have worked to implement our interoperability initiatives, we have observed 

that good interoperability solutions start with good partnerships. To the credit 

of state and local government, we have witnessed across the country a tremendous collaborative spirit among law enforcement agencies. This collaborative 

spirit at the local level has served as the foundation for success. Indeed, where 

DOJ has been able to help improve interagency communications, we have simply enhanced the efforts that already were initiated locally. In the rare instances where we have encountered challenges achieving consensus across prospective partners, interoperability efforts have been slowed considerably. • The collaborative projects have a multiplier effect. We have observed that the efforts to bring agencies together to work on a joint project have tended to foster 

better working relationships between agencies beyond the project itself. We 

have seen this specifically in the Seattle IWN pilot. Partnerships forged in developing that joint system have carried over into other operational areas among 

several of the federal agencies participating in the Seattle pilot. • Joint systems such as the IWN provide a number of opportunities to achieve cost 

efficiencies. Examples of such efficiencies include increased purchasing power 

and reducing the aggregate quantity of communications infrastructure and overhead expenditures (e.g. site and circuit leases, infrastructure maintenance, and 

system administration personnel). Such projects also tend to be more open to 

leveraging facilities and services of other joint ventures. As an example, in the 

Seattle and Utah IWN pilots, we were able to obtain microwave connectivity 

services from the respective states. Doing so is saving the federal government 

substantial sums of money we would otherwise have paid for similar services. 

DOJ, DHS and Treasury are also garnering lessons learned from Hurricane 

Katrina. Katrina had a devastating effect on most public safety communications systems in southern Louisiana and Mississippi. All of DOJ’s legacy (non-IWN) systems 

in this region were either disabled or substantially damaged either as a result of 

the storm itself (wind and flood damage), or because the systems were dependent 

on local electricity, natural gas and telecommunications services that all were disabled during or shortly after the storm. Each of our components was able to re-establish emergency communications capabilities within days of the storm. However, 

based on this experience, the IWN program is reassessing requirements for how the 

IWN is built and deployed. We will also look at strategies for reducing dependence 

on utility services that are at risk of damage or failure during a storm—or a terrorist attack. 

74

We believe the IWN program is an example of good government and best practices. IWN will provide management efficiencies through consolidation of departmental resources and the elimination of overlapping federal systems. As an example, by consolidating program management and system acquisition activities, the 

IWN program allows DOJ, DHS and Treasury to avoid a significant portion of the 

overhead costs the government would incur if each Department were to acquire 

services independently. 

More importantly, we believe the IWN is an example of how government can 

achieve mission enhancement through the appropriate use of information technology. Specifically, the three IWN partners expect to realize several significant 

operational benefits from the consolidated system. The most significant of these will 

be communication services that are more secure, reliable and accessible to federal 

agents over a greater geographic area than what is available today to each individual agency. Further, the IWN will provide inherent interoperability between the 

agencies that are regular users of the system, because each agency will be operating 

on common infrastructure and technology and will have preprogrammed inter-operability ‘‘talk groups’’ established for cross-agency communication. The system also 

will have a number of mechanisms (e.g., gateways, system-to-system interconnections, etc.) by which IWN users can communicate with officials on other federal 

agency systems and those of the state and local law enforcement agencies, as well 

as mechanisms to reconstitute wireless communications systems through the use of 

ad hoc deployable systems. 

A point worthy of note is that the shared nature of the IWN further facilitates 

inter-operability by bringing together DOJ, DHS and Treasury officials for the planning, development and operation of the system, thus conditioning the agencies to 

work together at a number of levels—from executive management to field office 

staff. Likewise, we anticipate that our efforts to incorporate inter-connectivity capabilities with other federal, state and local agency systems into the IWN will also 

facilitate building of inter-agency partnerships for mission purposes. 

So what does IWN represent in the ‘‘big picture?’’ The Department of Justice believes that the capabilities of the IWN—and the collateral benefits of joint project 

ownership and management—will result in better communications within DOJ, 

DHS and Treasury, among the federal agencies broadly, and ultimately across the 

law enforcement and homeland security communities as a whole. Better communications will facilitate better mission coordination and collaboration, which in turn will 

make our law enforcement and homeland security personnel more effective in stopping crime and protecting the nation. 

In closing, I want to assure you that DOJ recognizes that the federal law enforcement community is only a small piece of the overall public safety community. Nonetheless, we also understand that we have an obligation to lead by example. Toward 

that end, from this point forward, the communications systems we implement will 

be connected to those available to state, tribal and local agencies. Further, the IWN 

is an example of the type of collaboration needed to improve interagency communications, and is representative of our commitment to achieve this objective across 

the country. These are core principles of the Integrated Wireless Network program. 

Thank you for your time this afternoon. I will be happy to answer any questions 

you have.

Mr. UPTON. Okay, thank you. Thank you all. 

At this point, we will have Members ask questions and dialog 

with our panel. 

Certainly comments that you have testified today underscores 

the need as I see it that we pass our Transition to Digital Bill as 

quickly as we can, knowing that it will free up a lot of that spectrum and be able to give it to our first responders. And in conjunction with that, I have been working with Chairman Barton and 

members on both sides of the aisle to give an added boost for 

money for interoperability as part of that spectrum sale. Once we 

are able to complete that, I look forward to seeing such an amendment passed and wind its way through the Congress. 

But I have to say, Mr. Hitch, and I again appreciated your testimony. When you talk about IWN, the new program we are working 

with 25 different cities——

Mr. HITCH. Yes. 

75

Mr. UPTON. [continuing] did one of those cities happen to be New 

Orleans? 

Mr. HITCH. Yes, sir, one of them was New Orleans. 

Mr. UPTON. And how did it work? Where are we on the timeline 

in terms of getting it started? 

Mr. HITCH. The 25 cities program is an adjunct to the IWN Program; the 25 cities are in various states of completion. Unfortunately, New Orleans is in the last phases and it is not going to 

be—it was not planned to be completed for another 6 months. 

Mr. UPTON. I saw an article in the Chicago Tribune last week, 

you received $6 million to fund emergency response system, regional emergency response system, regional emergency response 

system connecting New York City to surrounding areas will be created with a $6 million Federal grant addressing a flaw identified 

by the September 11 Commission. A grant from the Department of 

Justice will be used to create a regional command and control radio 

frequency for police, fire, and emergency officials in New York City, 

as well as surrounding counties in New York and New Jersey. How 

much money is in that pot that allowed $6 million to go to New 

York and how much is left, and where are we in terms of seeing 

such programs available? Is that part of the IWN? 

Mr. HITCH. Mr. Chairman, actually the 25 cities initiative is really an adjunct to the IWN Program. The IWN Program is really intended to be the next generation radio system for the law enforcement community in the Federal Government, primarily Justice and 

Homeland Security. We wanted to—when we got approval from our 

congressional appropriators—to set aside some money for the 25 

Cities Interoperability Project so that we could make some progress 

in the short term. So it actually was not a lot of money. It was on 

the order of $25 to $30 million for the 25 cities. And in many cases, 

some significant improvements have been made where the projects 

have been fully implemented. As I said, it is in the very early 

stages of implementation. Of the 25, I think about six or seven 

have actually completed the implementation, and the rest of the 25 

are due to be completed over the next 12 months. 

Mr. UPTON. Well, I just know I was reading the Washington 

Times earlier this week and Asa Hutchinson had a wonderful bit 

piece earlier talking about the importance of interoperability, and 

I am going to ask unanimous consent to make that part of the 

record. 

[The article follows:]

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

[Published September 28, 2005]

COMMUNICATIONS DISCONNECT

By Asa Hutchinson 

As hearings begin on how to improve U.S. emergency preparedness after Hurricane Katrina, Congress must give serious and immediate attention to a major, recurring and needless public-safety problem: inability of first responders to communicate with each other during a catastrophe. 

This ‘‘crisis of interoperability’’ came horrifyingly to light on September 11, 2001. 

After the first World Trade Center tower collapsed, more than 100 New York City 

firemen died because their radios could not receive the police band call to evacuate 

the second tower. Soon it was discovered that police, fire and other emergency deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
76

partments in municipalities and counties around the nation could not talk to one 

another as they converged in Lower Manhattan. 

This electronic ‘‘Tower of Babel’’ was seen again during last year’s hurricanes in 

Florida. The hurricanes hit widespread areas and required response efforts from 

many jurisdictions, most of which in the rush of rescue couldn’t communicate to 

each another over their department systems. 

In the days following Katrina, it became clear most jurisdictions in both the Gulf 

region and the nation as a whole have taken little or no action to address interoperability issues. The reason is not lack of will so much as lack of funds. Replacing 

existing first-responder systems with state-of-the-art equipment is a huge financial 

challenge for any locality. Ensuring municipalities nationwide make this transition 

requires a new funding plan. 

Now many in Congress urge a rapid response, at last, to this need of first-responders. Sens. John McCain, Arizona Republican, Susan Collins, Maine Republican, and Joseph Lieberman, Connecticut Democrat, Reps. Jane Harman, California 

Democrat, and Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican, have all provided leadership 

on this issue. One approach, advocated by Mr. McCain and others, would accelerate 

freeing parts of the wireless radio spectrum previously allocated for public safety 

use but not yet available. 

Broadcasters now use this spectrum to transmit analog television signals. It is in 

the highly valuable 700 MHz section of the spectrum. Together with an adjacent 

larger swath, these frequencies are slated to be vacated when stations move to digital television (DTV) transmission in 2009. 

Mr. McCain’s plan would speed this transition. Moving broadcasters out, moving 

public safety in, and auctioning the remainder will be highly complex, but could 

begin earlier than now scheduled. Spectrum engineers agree the McCain plan will 

provide more than enough additional frequencies for first responders’ needs. But it 

will not end the interoperability crisis. 

The inability of first responders to communicate in crises is only minimally due 

to inadequate bandwidth. Mostly it is a matter of inadequate radios and other devices. More frequencies won’t help when agencies can’t pick up one another’s signals. 

Municipalities will need to coordinate their purchases, seeking technologies that 

allow cross-agency communications that don’t interfere with the communications of 

others. All the tens of thousands of police, fire and rescue organizations must receive upgraded software or replace their mobile devices, and very few public safety 

agencies are able to afford that. National costs are estimated in the billions of dollars. 

Simply, Congress will need to provide first responders with not just more radio 

frequency spectrum but more money. Without new funds to pay for communications 

upgrades, giving local agencies additional spectrum will prove fruitless. 

New funding need not mean new federal taxes or borrowing. Congress can and 

should use the spectrum auctions to fund interoperability. The DTV transition plans 

anticipate auctioning the rest of the 700 MHz band to licensed wireless service providers of both voice and broadband applications. 

For technical reasons, this section of 700 MHz spectrum is unusually valuable. 

An auction could raise billions, funding both public safety interoperability and the 

television set-top converter boxes necessary for older TV sets to receive DTV signals 

after broadcasters vacate the analog spectrum. 

The Federal Communications Commission is preparing to auction a section of Defense Department airwaves next year, but most of those proceeds are already earmarked for other uses. Congress should look to the broadcast spectrum to fund 

interoperability, and it should direct the FCC to move up the DTV transition to 

early 2008. 

As Hurricane Katrina showed, America’s public safety interoperability problem remains unsolved. Though the issues surrounding this crisis are complex, the solution 

can be simple. As it begins post-Katrina hearings, Congress has the tools to end the 

interoperability crises once and for all.

Mr. UPTON. Chairman Martin, we applaud your work again in 

establishing a new Public Safety/Homeland Security Bureau to be 

in charge of the interoperability issues. What duties specifically related to interoperability will be tasked and how much money do 

you expect for this new department? What are your staffing needs? 

How quickly do you think that it is going to be up and running? 

77

And do you expect to see standards and protocols established that 

other communities across the country might be able to utilize? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well, certainly, we are certainly trying to address 

the standards issue and potentially even the establishment, not 

only of technical standards, but of standard practices for planning 

purposes is one of the things that they would be able to explore 

and address. As far as the staffing of the new bureau, I would hope 

to be able to pull the staffers that are working on it in the different 

areas of the agency today. So that you have for example people in 

the Media Bureau that work on things like the Emergency Alert 

System, people in the Wireless Bureau that might work on 911 

issues and I think to consolidate them all into one place. 

Mr. UPTON. Are you able to do all of that administratively? Do 

you need any assistance from us? 

Mr. MARTIN. No, we will have to go through, work with Congress 

in getting their approval. Whenever we do a major reorganization 

of the Commission, that would always work through Congress in 

doing it so that is what we would do through that normal process 

and also have to make sure the Appropriations Committee was 

fully apprised and supportive. So we are just actually beginning 

that process and it was only an announcement of our intention to 

do that, to work with Congress to do that. 

Mr. UPTON. Well I know we would like to help and as we look 

at legislation in the near future if there is something that we can 

do, we should be communicating, obviously, to make sure that it is 

bipartisan, and do all that we can. 

I see that my time is expired so I yield to my friend again from 

the great State of Michigan, Mr. Stupak. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Boyd, I have been trying to get information from DHS, 

Department of Homeland Security on home much money is being 

spent because every time we try to get money for interoperability, 

we are told that it has to go through the grants that the State’s 

receive from Homeland Security. So I have been down the floor a 

couple times. I am still looking for the information for 2002, 2003. 

Could you go back to DHS and tell them to give us that information? It sure would help us out a lot. 

Mr. BOYD. Sure, I will be happy to take that message back, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. I understand that DHS and DOJ are solic- iting bids for $10 billion to make your 80,000 Federal law enforcement officials interoperable. It does not include emergency workers 

or health workers. What is DHS’s estimate of trying to achieve full 

operability between local, State, and Federal first responders? 

Mr. BOYD. That is one of the questions we are routinely asked 

and it is really hard to answer and let me explain why. We think 

we can achieve emergency level interoperability that is the kind of 

interoperability you need to address an emergency pretty quickly 

and that, in fact, has occurred in a number of places around the 

United States already. If you have cooperation from all of the political elements, they are willing to sign on——

Mr. STUPAK. Well isn’t that what your job is supposed to be——

Mr. BOYD. Yes, sir, and that is what we are working on. And, in 

fact, that is why we produced this. In the course of the RapidCom 

effort for example——

78

Mr. STUPAK. Well the estimates we have seen it is going to be 

20 years. It is still going to be 20 years to get full interoperability 

in this Nation between the State, local, and Federal? 

Mr. BOYD. You are probably talking about the 2023 number that 

you sometimes will hear. 

Mr. STUPAK. I have not heard anything else different so——

Mr. BOYD. Well the 2023, well let me explain the 2023 number 

because I know exactly how it came about. The 2023 number comes 

from a meeting we had with public safety where we said look, we 

would like to find out what is the ideal. What is the perfect future 

you would like to have? The public safety guys said, okay, let us 

slap a number on the wall arbitrarily and let say it is going to be 

2023 and let us say what would the world look like in 2023. No 

one ever intended to set 2023 as a date when you arrive at full 

interoperability. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well give me your best estimate then, when will it 

be fully interoperable between local, State, and Federal first responders? 

Mr. BOYD. In at the emergency level, I think that can be done 

probably within the next 3 to 5 years. And I think you can achieve 

that in most of the major areas really fast if you have a commitment. In the RapidCom cities——

Mr. STUPAK. Commitment of what, resources, financial resources? 

Mr. BOYD. Well that is what I want to explain. In the RapidCom 

cities, the 10 cities we have pulled together——

Mr. STUPAK. Right. 

Mr. BOYD. [continuing] we were able to establish command level 

interoperability within an hour to address an incident about the 

size of the Twin Towers. We did that roughly in 150 days. In fairness not we did, we helped facilitate each of these localities in 

doing it because ultimately they have to do it. And we did that 

without any new resources. We did that based on what they already have in place. Most of the technical requirements, the kinds 

of equipment you need are available if communities are willing to 

build governess agreements and decide how it is they are going to 

work together to be able to establish that level of interoperability. 

Now full interoperability we define as meaning I can take the radio 

that any public safety officer has——

Mr. STUPAK. Right. 

Mr. BOYD. [continuing] deploy him anywhere and it will work in 

that system. That is going to take a lot longer. 

Mr. STUPAK. For your filibuster you mean. I got a couple of questions. Let me move on. Interoperability in your testimony you said 

the methodology was initiated in 2005 and sort of implies that the 

study has not begun even though it is supposed to be finished by 

2005. Has the study begun? 

Mr. BOYD. No, the study now is we have——

Mr. STUPAK. When it is going to begin? 

Mr. BOYD. As soon as we get through the requirements for the 

Paperwork Reduction Act and we have all the responses in the first 

60-day period that has to be posted. We will make those adjustments and then there is another 30——

Mr. STUPAK. So 2006 maybe, hey? 

79

Mr. BOYD. So we think by summer of next year will have the——

Mr. STUPAK. Summer of next year, okay. 

Let me ask you this. You mentioned stated communication plans 

in your testimony. You explained the criteria you encourage States 

to use when making their plans. Are the States required to submit 

plans and are the States required that their plans be certified? 

Mr. BOYD. When it involves Federal funding, funding that comes 

through the office of State, local Government Coordination Preparedness——

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. 

Mr. BOYD. [continuing] that is part of the selection criteria and 

they have to submit plans to ODP. But remember that more than 

97 percent of these systems are funded locally, it is not Federal 

money. 

Mr. STUPAK. But do they have to be certified? These plans, they 

have to submit plans but my impression is the plans have to be 

certified. My question is if they have to be certified in order to get 

Federal funds, do they or not? 

Mr. BOYD. Well they have to be—you have to address that to 

ODP to ask exactly what the rules are for how they decide whether 

the plan is going to meet their requirements for funding. 

Mr. STUPAK. Are they going to have to be certified in order to do 

it? Can you answer that question, Mr. Hitch? 

Mr. HITCH. I am not from ODP, I am from the Department of 

Justice. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. 

Mr. HITCH. For each DOJ grant that is issued, there are specific 

requirements. We do require that they follow the SAFECOM methodologies and procedures. We require interoperability. I don’t know 

about on a specific grant whether certification——

Mr. STUPAK. Well if you follow your interoperability guidelines 

code sphere, isn’t one of your interoperability guidelines, it is a 

thing we use in Michigan quite a bit. It is a lot cheaper, a lot 

quicker, interfaces and everything works but it is not in your 

guidelines so is Michigan going to be denied if they use code sphere 

to get interoperability in interface communication systems because——

Mr. BOYD. It is not in the guidelines because the guidelines are 

not written in a way that would prevent them from deploying that 

kind of system if they want to. The guidelines are intended to point 

at a way to move forward nationally toward our goal of the system 

of systems. One of the things we have made very clear is that you 

are not going to have a single system. 

Mr. STUPAK. I agree and I mentioned the guidelines, I said certified. Mr. Hitch said required so they do not have to be required 

just as long as they have something to resemble those guidelines? 

I am trying to get this down because the State’s are saying we are 

getting denied and the money is not being pushed over as quickly 

as it should be. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay. Well I cannot speak to that part. I can tell you 

that for the grants that came in particular out of the COPS office 

for example, we were part of that process and so the guidance and 

compliance with the guidance which is fairly general it says if you 

are going to be developing a digitally trunk system, then you ought 

80

to consider P-25 but it does not say you have to because we understand there are times when you do not do that. And we helped to 

develop that criteria and applied that criteria in the selection process in the COPS grants and then earlier in 2003 in the FEMA 

grants. The ODP grants are block grants so the guidance becomes 

a recommendation to the State. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. UPTON. Welcoming the chairman of the full committee, Mr. 

Barton. 

Chairman BARTON. Thank you. And I want to thank each of you 

gentlemen for appearing today, especially Mr. Hitch. I know you 

had to rearrange some things and I appreciate you being here. 

I want to commend you, Chairman Martin for the steps that the 

FCC has already done. I read your testimony and you and the 

Commission’s efforts in terms of the Rural Health Program, the Erate Program, and the High Cost Reconstruction Program I think 

are excellent. I wish we were getting a little bit more publicity 

about what you are doing. 

I did have a question about you on the decision to create a new 

bureau in the FCC, this Homeland Security Bureau. Why do you 

think that is necessary as opposed to the organizational structure 

that you have right now? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well as I mentioned to Chairman Upton, many of 

the issues are still being dealt with across different aspects of the 

Commission and within the different bureaus so while we do have 

an office that focuses on Homeland Security that interacts with 

FEMA, it does not actually have interaction into the policy process 

for example on the Emergency Alert System. That is still handled 

out of the Media Bureau or whether or not wireless 911 issues 

should be handled and that is done out of the Wireless Bureau. 

And I think actually trying to coordinate and have one group of 

people focused on public safety and homeland security will produce 

a more consistent policy and processes across the different sectors 

of the industry. So just like we have an Enforcement Bureau that 

enforces all of our rules and enforces the rules against media companies and telecommunications companies hopefully in a more consistent way, I think the way thing is true of public safety and 

homeland security. 

Chairman BARTON. Can you do that with the existing staff and 

existing resources? 

Mr. MARTIN. I do not think it will require any additional staff 

and resources. I think that it will be pulling staff and resources 

from the existing bureaus that are working in a more disparate 

way and putting them all and locating them all in one area. 

Chairman BARTON. And can you do that without any change in 

existing statutory authority? 

Mr. MARTIN. We do not end up having to seek a change in the 

statute but we do end up having to come to Congress for approval 

when we do a major reorganization of the Commission so we do 

have to work with Congress to make sure they are approving of 

any of the proposed processes as we go forward. 

Chairman BARTON. Let me ask a question about your testimony 

on seamless interoperability. The gist of it appears to be that the 

FCC thinks these smart radios are the way to go. Is that someVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
81

thing as we move our new Telecommunication Bill which we hope 

to do in the next month or so that we should set a standard in the 

law to cut out all the bickering and everything that has been going 

on or do we set some general parameters and leave that up to the 

various State and local officials and Federal officials to determine 

what is best for each particular area? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well I think that the use of smart radios or software defined technologies, software defined radios are able to more 

efficiently use the spectrum that they have so I think that that is 

something that depends upon the other aspects of when they will 

get both the spectrum that they could be able to use and when they 

would have the resources to be able to buy new radios. So obviously 

though, I think that we need to do—to take all the steps we can 

to make sure that those local public safety officials have some additional resources. And I think that smart radios means that they 

can do less with—they can do more with less spectrum. So I think 

it is possible that they could end up addressing it in that way but 

whether or not we should require that in the upcoming rewrite of 

the Telecommunications Act depends in part on how many other 

resources they are going to get to be able to purchase new radios 

and what spectrum will be made available to them. 

Chairman BARTON. Mr. Hitch or Dr. Boyd, do either of you have 

an opinion on that last question I asked the chairman? 

Mr. BOYD. My experience is that the public safety communities 

intensely interested in better technologies that can meet those requirements but it is a very conservative group. So it is going to require that it be available for them and that they get a chance to 

see it piloted in use. And then my expectation is that these new 

technologies that offer so many new features are going to become 

some of the things they are going to look to but they are going to 

ask for that proof up front and I think that will forthcoming as the 

software defined radio and is IP based and so on mature in this 

environment. 

Mr. HITCH. Certainly that is the kind of technology that we are 

looking to implement as part of IWN and we have already implemented it in the pilots that we have done. So we would encourage 

it and it would make it easier for interoperability to work with 

local organizations that have similar technology. It is not impossible to do it otherwise and we will do it but it makes it much more 

efficient. 

Chairman BARTON. Well, I do not know what the will of the committee is, but, you know, I am very disappointed to learn that we 

still have a problem in interoperability 4 years after 9/11. And I am 

not saying that a statutory of standard is the preferred solution but 

it is an optional solution. It is something we are going to be looking 

at. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got another hearing downstairs on the environmental consequences of Katrina so I am going 

to have to excuse myself, but thank you for holding this hearing. 

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. Thanks for keeping us up late last night, 

too. 

Mr. Wynn? 

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

82

Dr. Boyd, I want to understand some process aspects of this 

problem of interoperability. First of all, did your department do a 

prioritization of the country in terms of high risk areas and the degree of interoperability in high risk areas relative to terror and 

areas prone to natural disasters and interoperability relative to 

that? Because I think the one thing we understand is that this cannot all happen at once. So my question goes to who is going to be 

first in line and have you made those kind of determinations, New 

York, Washington, DC, natural disaster prone areas along coastal 

regions, those kind of things. 

Mr. BOYD. My office does not make that kind of prioritization but 

the secretary has made very clear that he wants a risk based process that begins to look at how you can allocate resources best 

across what the real risks are. That is one piece of the issue. 

Mr. WYNN. Okay. So somebody in homeland security has done 

that risk analysis and established the priorities? 

Mr. BOYD. For interoperability the—first, let me explain how you 

are looking at a couple of different things. The ordinary security 

initiative which allocates money to the urban area cities is allocated against threat and there was a threat calculus to do that. I 

cannot provide you all the details on how that is done because that 

is in another office——

Mr. WYNN. Is interoperability on a parallel track with that? 

Mr. BOYD. Interoperability, we look at interoperability as a national issue. My office does not provide direct funding to support——

Mr. WYNN. So it may be that they are on one track of national 

priorities and you are on a different track in terms of interoperability? 

Mr. BOYD. No, I don’t think so. Let me make a clear distinction 

here. The money that comes under the Urban Area Security Initiative or the WAT grant money is defined in formulas by Congress. 

Mr. WYNN. By risk. 

Mr. BOYD. The interoperability funding that was specifically for 

interoperability also had to be allocated according to rules set by 

Congress. 

Mr. WYNN. Most problem money is based on a risk analysis. That 

is what you said. I am just asking you is the interoperability 

money on a parallel track with that risk analysis? In other words, 

are the high risk areas that are getting the grant money for preparedness also getting money for interoperability? 

Mr. BOYD. DHS does not have any money specifically for interoperability. 

Mr. WYNN. Okay, all right. Which brings me to my second question, have you done an assessment of local capabilities? In other 

words, you have got an analysis here, a risk base analysis here, 

have you determined whether or not your high risk areas, what the 

capabilities of your high risk areas are? 

Mr. BOYD. We have a study called the baseline study under way 

now which is intended expressly to try to answer that kind of question. There is no place in the United States you can go to and say 

what is the status of interoperability anywhere in the United 

States or across the country and that is why the baseline study will 

be the first attempt to do that. 

83

Mr. WYNN. When will that be completed? 

Mr. BOYD. It should be complete by summer of next year. 

Mr. WYNN. Okay. Now as the chairman said that is somewhat 

disappointing given the 4 years that have passed. Here is my situation. I represent two suburban counties outside of Washington, DC, 

probably second highest risk area for purposes of terrorism. I happen to know that there are limited capabilities in terms of one of 

those counties. One of those counties would be necessary for evacuation, it is the location of many Federal facilities. My concern is 

have you ascertained what that county’s capabilities are vis-a`-vis 

interoperability so that you can determine whether if something 

happens at NIH or at Census and Census is in a county with fewer 

resources that you are going to get them interoperable as soon as 

possible. Have you made those kind of determinations? 

Mr. BOYD. My office of four Federal officials is focusing on building tools that that county will be able to use to make that assessment and on conducting the baseline studies so that they can collect that. 

Mr. WYNN. They can use to make an assessment. They already 

know they do not have the money. They do not have 800 megahertz 

radios much less smart radios. 

Mr. BOYD. They will have—okay, but they are going to have to 

do some kind of assessment of their own to figure out what it is 

that is required there. 

Mr. WYNN. They have assessed—my time is money. They have 

assessed, they know they do not have the money. You want interoperable system. They are in the second highest risk area, they 

house Federal facilities, what are we going to do to help them get, 

become interoperable with the District of Columbia, the Federal 

agencies, et cetera? Otherwise if somebody hits the Census Bureau 

in Suitland, Maryland you are going to have a mess on your hands. 

Mr. BOYD. Well most of the national capitol region, in fact, has 

established and experimented with having demonstrated a couple 

of interoperability capabilities. My first was in Justice and first got 

involved in interoperability some years ago. We created a system 

based on the Alexandria Police Department which was used on 911 

to support and to be able to provide the kind of monitor you needed 

in this region. You are not—if you are asking what is the funding 

going to be that goes——

Mr. WYNN. I am just saying they do not have the radios and unless that issue is addressed, it is going to be hard to read interoperability. 

One last question because I think my time is just about up. You 

mentioned several times and I think you did, too Chairman Martin, 

the proprietary nature of some of this equipment and suggested 

that that was a barrier to interoperability. Is that the case? 

Mr. BOYD. It is and it can be in many cases because it can make 

it impossible for different systems to communicate with each other. 

Mr. WYNN. How do we overcome that? 

Mr. BOYD. We have a standards process under way with the National Institute of Standards and Technology expressly to address 

that. In October, next month, just a few days, the fixed station 

interface will go to ballad in the standards community so we expect 

that standard will be available almost immediately. That will then 

84

be incorporated in the Standard Grid Guidance and we in January, 

the ISSI interface which is the interface that manages the trunking 

system which is probably the most central piece of the standards 

should be completed and we expect it to be balloted and approved 

somewhere around March and then it will also be incorporated in 

the coordinating grant guidance. 

Remember in the United States, the standards process is a consensus based standard process among all of the industry players 

and we have been able, in fact, to give you an idea how astonishing 

it is that we are able to produce those standards in just the next 

few months, it took about 15 years to produce the first volume of 

P-25 standards. We are going to be able to do these next two pieces 

very, very quickly. 

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Shimkus? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, since we have been here, we have seen the attacks of 

September 11 terrorist attack. Now we see this, you know, this natural disaster of almost historic proportions. I have mentioned this 

to my colleagues before. I serve on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Sam Nunn has come around with a strategic exercise 

called ‘‘Black Dawn’’ where the hypothesis is a small grade nuclear 

blast over Brussels, Belgium, mass casualties, mass destruction. 

Are we taking into consideration at this time the affects of electromagnetic pulse and how harm communications equipment. And if 

we are not, don’t you think we should? Yeah, why don’t we start, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. HITCH. We work with public safety to do it because in fairness you need to understand that the kind of guidance and direction we offer is built within the public safety community. We tell 

them you have to plan for worst case scenarios and it does not matter whether you launch the system because of a major EMP pulse 

or because of a Katrina. You have to plan for worst case scenarios 

and then work back from that. It is very, very difficult to address 

the massive loss of communications facilities if you have not 

thought through these things. 

In my days when I was a career soldier, I can remember the boss 

saying that when you are in the fight is the wrong time to figure 

out how to handle the fight. You need to have done this in advance. 

You need to have planned it up front and you need to have thought 

through all the way to the very worst possible case, and then you 

need to have thought of how many things can aggravate that even 

further and how could I think through all of those pieces not necessarily because I am going to be able to put something in place 

to fix it right now but so I at least know what I am going to have 

to go do, and I will at least have some notion of how I am going 

to approach the answer. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Kevin? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well I think that we do need to end up having to 

have a public safety system that can be—that is not only interoperable it can be reestablished quickly and I think that involves having to have some kind of mobility in the antennas at the end of the 

line, antenna infrastructure. Some of the cellular providers are 

talking about trying to use cell towers on wheels that they can roll 

85

in even if their cell towers have been destroyed and that they 

would be capable of not only plugging back into the land line network but also be sending traffic over satellite so aggregating traffic 

on the ground and then using satellite capability which should not 

be destroyed in the same way. There has also been talk about having inflatable antennas and, you know, they can be dropped even 

from, potentially from airplanes and so they can be reestablishing 

communications quicker. So I think we have got to have a system 

that as I said not only is interoperable but can—is capable of being 

reestablished and is mobile very quickly. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I think the public policy debate that we are going 

to be experiencing when we deal with the DTV issue and I am not 

one that likes to legislate science but we have to make sure we 

have some standards so that when the Federal Government is assisting in the purchase of equipment that it meets the interoperability standard or in essence the harden standard. 

You know, I fear we buy all this communication equipment and 

then there is an electric magnetic pulse that wipes out the communication equipment that we have got safely protected. They pull it 

out and all the things are fried or there is in the atmosphere an 

airburst that knocks out the satellite system. Don’t you—somehow 

we need to be addressing this and I am not sure how we go about 

it other than ask you all and then find out through the process do 

we need a worst case scenario? But when we do that, also it is a 

higher cost, it is at a higher cost which means you have in essence 

less deployment, slower but you have more issues. And that is the 

issue that we have to wrestle with. Anyone want to add or comment on that? 

Let me just end with saying just thank you for coming. I am 

going to work with my colleagues in the Senate along with the 

Committee on trying to address other emergency notification systems across the communication spectrum. I hope you all will take 

a look at that and if there is any advice and counsel you want to 

give us on that, we would be welcome to receive it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. Ms. Blackburn. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for being here today and giving us 

your time on this. It is the communications and what took place 

as we went through Hurricane Katrina is very important and I am 

looking forward to hearing from each of you as we move forward 

as to what your lessons learned are. 

I have said in the initial hearings that we have had whether it 

was financial management, whether it was the initial response, I 

find it incredible and being on the ground in Mississippi following 

this storm, I found it absolutely incredible that you were unable to 

talk to individuals that live there. I found it absolutely amazing 

that we were without cellular service. That we were without basically any kind of service, hard wired phone service, that cable was 

down. I understand in some areas of Mississippi it is going to be 

a year before that infrastructure gets put back in place. And I—

so one of the things that is quite amazing is that nobody seemed 

to have a plan for what you were going to do with the emergency 

communications when everything failed. People did not even have 

86

a plan for how you were going to refill the generator once the generator ran out of gas. And I—that is of tremendous concern. 

And one of things that I want to focus on is what we are going 

to do as we rebuild this infrastructure. As you have cell towers that 

are down, as you have cable systems that the infrastructure is destroyed, as we know there are new technologies available for data, 

for voice, for video, what are the plans going to be and how is that 

going to be approached? 

There was an article I found, I guess it was weekend before last 

in the Weekend Journal. I do not know if any of you saw this. Mr. 

Martin, you are smiling so I guess that possibly you did it. But we 

have got folks that are holed up over in the Superdome, they are 

in New Orleans, they do not have any communications, nothing is 

working, nobody is on the same frequency with their radios and 

one guy remembers he had set up a VOIP account. So as you look 

at how you are going to handle all of this, I think that knowing 

that that is something that needs to be considered. What are your 

different components, what is going to comprise your overall plan 

when you talk about all of your interoperability issues and the different templates that you are going to use. 

So I thank you. I know I have gone around the horn and I have 

vented a little bit. And I know that you all probably will seemingly 

lose your patience with some of us Members of Congress. Dr. Boyd, 

you are smiling and I think you have kind of lost your patience. 

I promise I am not going to get your last nerve. Maybe your next 

to last nerve, sir, but not the last one. But, you know, we definitely 

want to be certain that the communications issue is addressed in 

a very thoughtful manner. My parents in Southern Mississippi still 

do not have telephone. They have cable from time to time and the 

cell towers work about 15 percent of the time, other than Nextel 

it seems to go through fairly regularly. 

Okay, Chairman Martin, may I ask you a question, please? 

What—let us talk about the 700 megahertz band. What can we do 

for our first responders by clearing broadcasters out of that 700 

megahertz band and would that affect the overall communications 

plan? Is there a—do you have a template? Are you thinking forward exactly how you would set that up if you cleared that spectrum and if you were to put folks onto that? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well, in the 700 megahertz band there has been 24 

megahertz of that spectrum that has been dedicated to public safety uses. A certain percentage of that is already being and allocated 

and indicated that it should be used specifically for interoperability, so about a little more than 2.6 megahertz of that should be 

used for interoperability specifically. In addition to that as a result 

of 9/11 Commission’s report and congressional legislation last year, 

the Commission owes a report to Congress in December about 

whether public safety, whether that is an adequate amount of spectrum for all public safety uses or not. And the—we have begun 

gathering a record and giving public safety the opportunity to comment. And there is a record that has been developed public safety 

some have indicated they could use another 10 to 30 megahertz of 

spectrum out of that 700 megahertz band that they could be using 

for other issues not only interoperability but other public safety 

uses. So we have definitely allocated a certain percentage of it alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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ready for public safety. We have already allocated or indicated a 

certain percentage of that will definitely be used for interoperability and we have—we are studying now and we will have a report in December about whether even additional spectrum should 

be provided to public safety. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Okay. Let me ask you one more thing on that. 

You were talking about an additional 10 to 30 and you have talked 

about the public safety. Are you including in this an interface with 

military in any way or are you just looking at first responders? 

Mr. MARTIN. It is just—when we are talking about that it is just 

first responders. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Just first responders. 

Mr. MARTIN. But they do end up interacting with other people 

that would be coming into an area which at times could be military 

but we are not addressing——

Ms. BLACKBURN. But you are not addressing that component at 

all. 

Mr. MARTIN. [continuing] providing any spectrum to the military, 

no. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. All right. I just wanted to clear that because we 

continue to hear more about the relationship between military components and first responder components since we look at national 

disasters. Do you think that is something you should put on your 

plate and look at or not? 

Mr. MARTIN. The interaction between first responders and the 

military you mean? 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Yes, an extra allocation there or may be considering that allocation. 

Mr. MARTIN. Well we certainly—like I said, we are considering 

it and it is whether or not we should be providing them any additional spectrum beyond what they have already been given. I do 

not think we consider specifically the military, any particular military applications in the first responder program. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. That is fine. 

I have got 1 minute left. Dr. Boyd, I am going to come to you. 

You are saying it is going to take 2 years to get the study done so 

then we can start thinking on the process if I am understanding 

you right. Correct, sir? 

Mr. BOYD. Well, not 2 years. This summer we should be finished. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Okay. So this summer you would have your 

study done? 

Mr. BOYD. That is correct. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. All right, okay. You know, we have asked you 

this question and you have been kind to take the time to answer 

it. I just am going to ask you if you will, sir, to list your goals and 

a timetable of where you think you are going to be when. You have 

thrown around several different dates. You are saying 3 to 5 years, 

you know, as we talk about responding to national disasters, I 

would love to have an idea if we are closer to 3 years or if we are 

closer to 5 years. 

And also if you agree with Mr. Hitch that interoperability is a 

local issue. I think that we are all concerned. We are concerned for 

our communities and if you are going to be the one providing guidVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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ance, I would certainly love to see stated goals and stated timetable. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. Okay. Go ahead, Dr. Boyd. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay, well, and in fact you did not hit any nerves but 

you did tickle my funny bone. 

When I talk about 3 to 5 years to achieve emergency level interoperability, that is not a technology issue, it is not even a matter 

of when equipment goes into place, it is experience in helping communities figure out how to build governess processes talking about 

how they begin to build the kind of partnerships that work together. 

In 1993, I initiated the first interoperability program I was involved in while I was in justice. It took about 30 days to implement 

the technical piece. It was fairly permanent but it worked and it 

provided for interoperability in every agency in the county. It took 

2 years for us to get all the agencies, Federal, State, and local in 

the county to agree that they were even interested in being part 

of it. So when I talk about 3 to 5 years, I would start with the point 

that for the most part, if it is applied and if people are committed, 

most of the equipment and the technologies are available now. 

They exist, they can largely be bought fairly inexpensively to allow 

that command level of interoperability. It is not the smoothest, it 

is not the prettiest kind of interoperability but it can meet emergency requirements. 

The hard nut to crack, the very hard nut to crack and typically 

when I use this continuum to talk about all the pieces that have 

to go together depend on two things. One is technology is only one 

of the tracks. It is only one of the six lanes. And I will talk about 

governess last because that is the tough nut to crack because that 

means we have to get sheriffs who many not like to talk to each 

other or fire chiefs who do not want to deal with the police chiefs 

or city council’s that do not want to share money or are afraid that 

it may cost something on—that may cause a problem in their control of the peace. So you have to be able to build a process starting 

from the bottom up so that everybody has a stake, everybody has 

a reason to be a part of it. And we have been, I think every successful in doing that but unfortunately, I have to tell you it is not 

a simple process. Getting people to agree on things like this is a 

really tough challenge because it involves making some concessions 

about control and authority. 

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. 

Mr. Whitfield? 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I just have a few brief questions I would like to ask Chairman Martin and certainly appreciate his being here this morning, 

as well as Dr. Boyd and Mr. Hitch. 

Chairman Martin, when I read your September 15 press release 

about Universal Service Funds going for assistance in the New Orleans and Mississippi Katrina devastated area, it reminded me of 

the number of hearings that we have had here in Congress particularly with the Energy and Commerce Committee on the Universal 

Service Fund, E-rate, and so forth. And all of us, I think acknowledge that that has been a tremendously successful program that 

89

has benefited the entire country in many ways. But we also hear 

criticism from these various hearings that we have had and I guess 

the oversight an investigation subcommittee is going to be issuing 

an E-rate report that will be going to Chairman Upton’s committee 

to take whatever action they may want to take. But in some of 

these hearings there has been criticism or at least concern about 

the coordination, the communication, the planning between the 

FCC and USAC, the Universal Service Administrative Company. 

And they are, at least there seems to be, some perception that 

there are some problem areas there in those areas that I have mentioned, the communication, planning, policy, and so forth. I would 

like to get your perspective on that. 

Do you perceive that there is a problem there? I notice for example that you announced this $211 million in Universal Service 

Funds and I am assuming—did you all talk to USAC about that 

before making the announcement, did you sit down and work that 

through together or not? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well we certainly sought information from them in 

order to ascertain what would be the best way to end up trying to 

do that and what an estimate of some of those costs could end up 

being. For example, talking about how many schools are in that 

area that have received funding and what is the high cost funding 

that has gone to those states. We did not, we have not talked in 

the specifics about some of the orders that are front of the commission implementing data but of course those are—there are some 

more coordinating with them after the Commission has adopted the 

order of course and we have received input from them on some of 

the concerns they have had and tried to address that in our order 

about how it would work. But I think that a lot of the focus in the 

past about for example some of the concerns related to E-rate have 

been on some of the auditing issues that have occurred in the past 

and on some of the distribution of funds. And I think that the Commission has tried to work with USAC to make sure that as an appropriate oversight, I think the Inspector General has been very involved in that as well. He has, on some audits that have already 

occurred, he has worked out with USAC to coordinate to do an extensive additional number of audits going forward. I think about 

700 audits is the plan for them to end up doing of different Universal Service recipients to make sure that they are using funding 

appropriately. So I do think that there needs to be a close coordination and auditing of what is going on with the funds. 

What we are doing with our response from Hurricane Katrina is 

actually just allowing for schools in that area to apply for funding 

through the Universal Service process but they will still have to 

meet the same accountability constraints that any school does 

whenever they are applying for funding. So there would not be any 

exemption from that as going forward, it is just a question of what 

schools would be in the area and what would be an estimate of 

what could be the impact on the fund for that. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. If you were speaking at a rotary club say in Hopkinsville, Kentucky and you were going to explain your relationship 

with the administrator of the Universal Service Fund, what your 

joint responsibilities are to each other, how would you explain that? 

90

Mr. MARTIN. Well there is an unusual relationship and I think 

there has actually been a couple GAO studies that occurred in the 

1990’s that was looking at the way USAC was structured and even 

had some questions that were raised about how that should end up 

functioning. But the Commission is actually the policymaking governmental entity deciding that—what would be the policies for the 

distribution of those resources and I think USAC would be described as administrative in the sense that they would be, not be 

making policy judgments but rather would be handling the administration of applications that are coming in and then dealing with 

whether they met the criteria that we had established as a policy 

perspective to distribute that money. So they both are coordinating 

the collection of the resources from the telecommunications companies and then coordinating the distribution of those but they don’t 

have any independent policy authority so that they can only do so 

in relation to the rules so to speak or priorities that the Commission establishes as the appropriate governmental entity. So they 

can not make policy, they can just administer the fund. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. And who is the primary liaison between say your 

office and USAC? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well I think it depends somewhat on what aspect 

of it. For auditing purposes for example it is the Inspector General’s Office that takes the lead on that. For some of the management issues it would be the Managing Director’s Office. For the 

policy issues, it would be the people in the telecommunications, the 

wire line, Telecommunications Bureau that is set up and made 

those policy decisions. So it depends on if it is a policy decision, a 

management decision, or an auditing one. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Pickering? 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

I want to first follow up on some questions that Chairman Barton asked on whether we need to address legislatively some type 

of requirement to reach the interoperability standards. Having 

seen where we were on 9/11 and then all of the focus and all of 

the recommendations of hoping to achieve interoperability among 

our communication networks and first responders and equipment, 

the tragedy is that we really have not made that much progress. 

And in my own State of Mississippi, the first really 3 to 4 days 

after the storm, we had an essentially no communications capability. Governor Barber talked about how he had a satellite phone 

and his Adjutant General of the National Guard had a satellite 

phone, his emergency response, the MEMA official had a phone but 

it worked so unpredictably and erratically that they basically had 

no communication other than like civil war, he would send runners. 

And that was the means of communication during the most critical 

time to save lives, protect lives, and respond. No ability to coordinate, no ability to help people because you have no communication. 

And no real progress since 9/11 to Katrina 2005. 

So I would like to know legislatively should we put a process together that would give you Dr. Boyd and Chairman Martin and the 

others in the community a chance to have a voluntary standard 

adopted within a deadline and failure to do so would then require 

a mandatory process to the FCC or Homeland Security or the apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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propriate agency so that one way or the other we will have an 

interoperability standard within a time certain given the industry 

and the community their first shot at it to do it as it should be 

done but failure to do so will not justify 5 years from now still not 

having the progress that we should have after 9/11 and Katrina. 

And would you all agree that that would be a good forcing catalyst 

to give you deadlines to work this out by yourself and failure to do 

so would require a Federal action deadline and requirement to 

have the standards in place? Mr. Martin? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well I certainly think that it is helpful in the sense 

that you would make sure that everyone was compliant. I think it 

has got to be not just a technical standard but the protocol standards as well. I mean for example one of the things that we discovered in response to the hurricane is that when 911 call centers go 

down, there is not even a standard protocol for where they send 

those emergency calls. And so the very first thing we started doing 

as Hurricane Rita was approaching the Gulf Region was just calling all the 911 centers the 2 days before and telling them they at 

least need to establish a protocol of if they are physically damaged, 

where do those 911 calls, where should they be rerouted to and 

have you told the telephone companies where to go. And I think 

that some kind of requirements to establish like I said not just 

technical standards but standard protocols could end up being appropriate. That is one example where we made some real progress 

by trying to reach out to do that. 

Mr. PICKERING. I think everybody knows what needs to be done. 

We want to define the problem. We have much better technologies. 

We are beginning to have the spectrum available. My question is 

very straightforward. Do you need deadlines, legislative deadlines 

to give you a voluntary process to get the job done by that deadline? Failure to do so will then start a process to the FCC or 

through Homeland Security that it will be done for the Nation, if 

it is not done on a voluntary basis. Would that be a good way to 

make sure that we get this job done? Dr. Boyd? 

Mr. BOYD. If I can. The current standards process is driven by 

the public safety community through the Association of Public 

Safety, let me explain that, communications officers. The reason I 

think it is imperative that we stick with that——

Mr. PICKERING. I understand the process. I understand the 

issues but we still have not—it has been since 9/11 and we still 

have not done—it sounds like you are on your way from what you 

said earlier about the process and what is about to happen over the 

next 6 months. So my hope is that you are successful in the current 

process to get it done. But let us say 6 months from now, a year 

from now it is still not done. Some disagreement, proprietary, for 

whatever reason you still have—you have had your process but you 

still have not reached the agreements necessary to give us interoperability standards that we need. At that point, would it not be 

helpful to have a legal requirement for all participants to force 

them to either voluntarily reach agreement or that they will be required by law to do it? 

Mr. BOYD. Well——

Mr. PICKERING. And there are many legislative examples of what 

we have had to get the standards in place and we have always 

92

given industry the first shot on a voluntary basis. That would be 

the preferable way. But failure to do so still, our country could not 

if we have an EMP, another hurricane four or five, another terrorist attack over the next year, we do not want to be looking at 

lessons learned if it is the same one that we failed to do something 

about. 

So my question, again, legislatively, should we give you a year 

to do it with your existing process? Failure to do so would be required by law that somebody will be responsible, accountable, and 

required to do that. 

Mr. BOYD. Well that is why I have to defer to the Department 

for legislative issues but I will tell you that one of the reasons 

things have moved forward where they have now is that I was—

is that I told industries some months ago that it is our preference 

that they develop the standard, but if they don’t, we will. 

Mr. PICKERING. Do you have the legal authority to do that? 

Mr. BOYD. As far as we are concerned, working with the public 

safety community and then applying it in the common grant guidance. We have that authority. 

Mr. PICKERING. You have incentives through the grants? 

Mr. BOYD. Yes. 

Mr. PICKERING. Is that enough? 

Mr. BOYD. Well, we don’t have the authority to impose requirements on systems not purchased with Federal money. 

Mr. PICKERING. I think you have answered my question. I think 

that we need to give everybody a chance to do it right themselves, 

and then we need to give a legal backstop that it will be done, shall 

be done, and it will be done by a day certain. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Martin. 

Mr. MARTIN. Well, no, I was just going to say, I can’t speak to 

SAFECOM’s—whether they will be able to get that done within 

any particular timeframe, but I do agree that deadlines are often 

helpful in public safety issues to get them done. I think we see that 

in the context of 911 as well. I think that is how you make a lot 

of progress, by telling people they don’t have it done voluntarily 

within a certain timeframe, you have to end up doing it. And that 

is what we see with Voice over IP and wireless. So I think that is 

critical. 

Mr. PICKERING. For both of you and for the first responder community, I would ask you all to work with Chairman Upton and 

Chairman Barton and the committee to have a process that would 

give the current process the time that they need to do it on a voluntary basis, but with a legal backstop and process that will ensure and give confidence to the country that it is going to be done. 

Mr. Chairman, how much time have I gone over? 

Mr. UPTON. These lights are right in my eyes, but it looks like 

about 3 minutes over. 

Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience, and 

I will come back and ask some other questions in another round. 

Mr. UPTON. Okay. Well, I know that we were just alerted that 

we are expecting votes on the House floor about 3:30, so I am hoping that we can finish with this panel. I might say that a number 

of members have communicated with me that they would like to 

propose sending some written questions to you, so we will try to 

93

get those assembled up and get them to you by the end of tomorrow, maybe. If you can respond by the end of next week, that would 

be very appreciated. 

Ms. Blackburn, do you have one quick question you want to ask? 

Ms. BLACKBURN. I do have a question for Mr. Hitch, and I will 

tell you, Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time and knowing that 

we are going to the floor for votes, these are questions about the 

integrated wireless network, and flexibility with that and expense. 

I will submit those in the interest of time. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Radanovich, did you have questions to ask? 

Mr. RADANOVICH. To Chairman Martin, you know, the FCC is responsible for distributing spectrum to State, local, and public safety 

agencies. Why has the distribution spectrum been done on kind of 

a seemingly random basis, and why hasn’t interoperability been 

the goal from the beginning? 

Mr. MARTIN. We have provided quite a bit of spectrum for public 

safety, about 50 megahertz at the 4.9 gigahertz, and some additional public safety spectrum was just allocated when we were rebanding the 800 last year. But the most significant piece of spectrum that has been given to public safety recently is in the band, 

as Chairman Upton talked about, is in the band that is currently 

used by the broadcasters. So I mean, it is not that some of that 

isn’t anticipated, including the interoperability, it is that but some 

of the spectrum that we have provided to them and that Congress 

has provided to them is in a band that is already currently used 

and that will be vacated in the context of the digital transition for 

television. 

Mr. RADANOVICH. All right, thanks. 

Mr. UPTON. Well, that concludes panel No. 1. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony, and we look forward to working with you 

in the days ahead. 

We will take about a 2-minute recess and let——

Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, could I just——

Mr. UPTON. Go ahead. 

Mr. PICKERING. Just real quickly. I will have some additional 

questions for the panel concerning satellite policy, your universal 

service funds for the affected areas, and plans for deployable systems, whether it is high altitude or balloons that we can pre-position and replace networks. 

You know, interoperability is fine, but if you don’t either have 

satellite or a replacement system, interoperability doesn’t mean 

anything. And so I would like to work with all the members of the 

panel to try to have a greater confidence that we will have capabilities and interoperability in cases of crisis and natural disaster. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. UPTON. Okay. We will take about 2-minute recess and allow 

the nameplates to be changed, and we will get started. 

Thank you. 

[Brief recess.] 

Mr. UPTON. Let me get started. We might—so only I get to ask 

questions so—I say in jest to my good Michigan Police, State Police 

Officer, you might want to arrest this guy, he is a big Notre Dame 

fan and 2 weeks ago——

Mr. ROEMER. What was the score of that game, Fred? 

94

Mr. UPTON. It is called luck of the Irish. We are joined by my—

our formal colleague and for me the—my former member from the 

adjacent district and friend, Tim Roemer who is the Director of the 

Center for National Policy and was a member of the 911 Commission. Mr. Tom Miller, Lieutenant Colonel of the Michigan State Police, Mr. Art Botterell. Is that correct, Botterell, Emergency Information Consultant from California, welcome. Aren’t you glad that 

our hearing did not go in—or our mark up did not go into today 

which would have canceled this hearing. Mr. Tony Trujillo, Chairman of the Satellite Industry Association, and Mr. Harold Kramer, 

CEO of the American Radio Relay League and again we appreciate 

the work of all of your members as we dealt with this terrible 

storm earlier this month. As you know, our rules are such that 

your testimony is made part of the record in its entirety. We would 

like you to spend no more than 5 minutes discussing as an overview your statement. 

And Mr. Roemer, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Welcome 

back. 

STATEMENTS OF TIMOTHY J. ROEMER, DIRECTOR OF THE 

CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY; LT. COL. THOMAS J. MILLER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MICHIGAN STATE POLICE; ART 

BOTTERELL, EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEMS CONSULTANT; TONY TRUJILLO, CHAIRMAN, SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION; AND HAROLD KRAMER, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR AMATEUR RADIO 

Mr. ROEMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

An honor to be before this very distinguished panel. And an 

honor to be with some of the brave and courageous people that 

serve our country on the front lines. 

Mr. Chairman, you have graciously entered my statement into 

the record, I appreciate that. I also appreciate the service with you 

a democrat and republican that worked together often times on fiscal and education issues. It is nice to be back and see you and see 

other Members of this Committee. 

Mr. Chairman, I guess the message from the 9/11 Commission is 

pretty simple. We have threats to our country, people that want to 

kill our citizens not just over there in Iraq, Madrid, London, Indonesia, but right here, New York, potentially Michigan, Indiana, 

California. The people on the front lines like these brave people 

here with me today need all the equipment they can possibly get 

to communicate and fight the enemy. They do not have it. They 

need more. 

Right after 9/11 when I served in this distinguished body, Members of Congress were then provided with some equipment to better 

communicate. ‘‘Blackberries’’ were provided in many of the budgets 

for people in Congress to make sure they could communicate, get 

to their committee assignments, have discussions between each 

other, make sure the Intelligence Committee operated. These people still need some of that same kind of equipment. We need to get 

that to them. 

Let me give you a couple examples of what the 9/11 Commission 

found as to some of these problems. We found all kinds of compelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
95

ling instances of bravery and courage; people going into burning 

buildings and rescuing people. They might have rescued more. We 

might have saved more of the Fire Department chiefs, officers, police officers, emergency personnel if they would have had public 

radio spectrum to better communicate. 

At 9:59 in the morning on 9/11, 4 years ago, a general evacuation 

order was given to firefighters in the North Tower. The South 

Tower had collapsed, a place that held up to 25,000 people had 

been diminished to cement, steel, and ash. The people then in the 

North Tower, many of the chiefs in the lobby did not even know 

that the other tower had collapsed or else they might have been 

able to get more people out more quickly. We had comments from 

people saying such things as we did not know it collapsed. Somebody actually said, Mr. Chairman that people watching TV had 

more information than we did in the lobby on 9/11 in the North 

Tower. People on TV in Florida or California knew more than our 

first responders onsite in New York City. We cannot let that continue. We have got to do more. We cannot make it like a general 

in Iraq who needs reconnaissance and maps and intelligence. We 

try to provide them all we possibly can. So too should we provide 

these officers, these emergency personnel all the intelligence, all 

the communication, all the equipment that they possibly need. 

Mr. Chairman, then we had a disaster happen in the southern 

part of our country in New Orleans where we had other communication problems. In New Orleans, there were three neighboring 

parishes were using different equipment on different frequencies. 

They could not communicate. We had National Guard in Mississippi communicating by human courier, not by radio frequencies, 

and we had helicopters up in the air looking at our own citizens 

on the roofs of their homes in New Orleans screaming and yelling 

for help but they could not talk and the helicopters with the boats 

and the water to try and find out who was rescued, who was not, 

and who needed help. 

We can and we must do better. The 9/11 Commission has recommended that Congress provide as quickly as possible the public 

radio spectrum of 700 megahertz so that these first responders can 

indeed do their job. We don’t lose their lives. We don’t lose American citizen’s lives and we have better interoperability, better 

strength in these communications, and have this communication be 

able to have a deeper capability as well. 

I would just conclude, Mr. Chairman with a quote from one of 

my favorite founding fathers, John Adams. 

Mr. UPTON. I was hoping it was Bob Davey. 

Mr. ROEMER. Bob—no, it was not. It could be Charlie Weiss but 

he is not quite that old as the coach of the Fighting Irish. John 

Adams said this, he said, ‘‘We cannot guarantee success, we can do 

something better, we can deserve it.’’ Congress will never prevent 

every future terrorist attack. There is no way that they can. But 

working democrats and republicans to provide this radio spectrum 

to our first responders, we can deserve to give them, they deserve 

the best protection they possibly can get. Let us get this done as 

quickly as possible. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Timothy J. Roemer follows:]

96

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY J. ROEMER, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR NATIONAL

POLICY

Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Markey, Members of the Subcommittee on 

Telecommunications and the Internet:

• It is an honor to appear before this distinguished panel today to discuss an issue 

of great importance to the security of our nation. 

• As we learned on 9/11, the new threats we face are not confined to distant battlefields—they can materialize here, on the streets of America. 

• Now we are all on the front lines. If terrorists strike again on American soil, it 

will be local emergency responders—police, firefighters, and emergency medical 

technicians—who will answer the call. 

• I would like to talk about our investigation into events of 9/11, as described by 

the 9/11 Commission in its report. Those events dramatically illustrate the need 

for the reform we’re here today to discuss. 

POOR COMMUNICATIONS—FIRST RESPONDERS AT THE WTC

The response at the World Trade Center on September 11 was the largest single 

emergency response in our nation’s history. Hundreds of firefighters, NYPD, and 

Port Authority Police converged on Lower Manhattan to participate in the rescue. 

What we learned in our investigation is that our first responders did not have the 

communications they needed or deserved. 

Firefighters had a particularly difficult time communicating with one another and 

with their commanders. 

As an FDNY chief in the North Tower told us: ‘‘One of the most critical things 

in a major operation like this is to have information. Unfortunately, we didn’t have 

a lot of information coming in.’’

The fire chiefs in the North Tower lobby didn’t have any reports of what the 

NYPD helicopters overhead had seen. 

They didn’t know the extent of the damage to the building over their heads. 

They didn’t know the condition of the stairwells. 

They couldn’t get updated information from FDNY dispatch, where dozens of calls 

were pouring in from civilians on the floors above them. That information would 

have been extremely valuable to them. 

Another chief in the North Tower lobby that day told us that people watching on 

TV had better information than he did. 

Without real-time information, the chiefs were at a huge disadvantage. They were 

like generals on a battlefield without reconnaissance, intelligence, or even a current 

map. 

Without real-time information, many fire department units were told simply to 

head up the stairs and report back via radio. 

As the units in the both towers climbed higher, their radio transmissions were 

disrupted by the many floors between them and their commanders. Communications 

with the chiefs in the lobby became weaker and more sporadic. 

Furthermore, the main radio channel for FDNY communications was not designed 

to handle the number of firefighters at the towers. 

So many people were trying to speak at once, the transmissions overlapped and 

often became indecipherable. 

Because that channel was so overwhelmed, it was impossible for the chiefs to 

track the location of the many FDNY units in the towers. 

At 9:59 that morning, the South Tower collapsed. A general evacuation order was 

issued for firefighters in the North Tower. 

Some did not receive the evacuation order over their radios, but were alerted in 

person by other units. 

Some did not receive the order at all. 

Some received the order, but did not evacuate with great urgency: 

Many disregarded the order to stay and search for civilians. 

Some waited for members of their teams to regroup before they headed down the 

stairs 

Some were tired, so they rested in stairwells before continuing down. 

Many firefighters in the North Tower didn’t even know that the South Tower had 

collapsed. Even chiefs in the North Tower lobby didn’t learn of the collapse of the 

South Tower for 30 minutes. 

Several firefighters who survived told us that they, and others who did not survive, would have evacuated more urgently if they had known of the South Tower’s 

collapse. 

97

NYPD communications were generally better, because most NYPD officers were 

not climbing the Towers, but were outside evacuating civilians and controlling 

crowds. 

Meanwhile, most Port Authority Police had no way to hear any commands issued 

over the World Trade Center command frequency. 

POOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN AGENCIES

As we learned in our investigation, the quality of communications varied from 

agency to agency. But radio communications and operational coordination between 

agencies was uniformly a problem, at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 

For example: 

Fire chiefs in the lobbies of the towers got no information from the police helicopters circling above. Reports that called into question the condition of the North 

Tower, at 10:08, 10:15, and 10:221 a.m., would have been extremely valuable information for the FDNY chiefs in the North Lobby. 

Many redundant searches were conducted that morning. For example, firefighters 

wasted valuable time searching the PATH transit station under the Trade Center, 

not knowing that the area had already been cleared by Port Authority officers. 

Even at the Pentagon, where the emergency response effort was a comparative 

success, the Arlington Country After-Action Report concluded that ‘‘almost all aspects of communications [were] problematic.’’ The report also notes that ‘‘radio channels were initially oversaturated.’’

WHAT WE RECOMMENDED

The courage and determination of the first responders saved thousands of lives 

that morning. 

They risked their lives, and many gave their lives, to rescue people they had 

never met. 

They performed far beyond what we would ever have any right to expect. Had 

they received timely information that morning, many of those brave firefighters and 

police officers could have saved more lives, and their own lives. 

As we said in our report, ‘‘The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks on 9/11. Because no one believes that every conceivable form 

of attack can be prevented, civilians and first responders will again find themselves 

on the front lines.’’

To help those on the front lines, the 9/11 Commission made a common-sense recommendation: Congress should reallocate broadcast spectrum for public safety purposes. 

CONCLUSION

Hurricane Katrina reminds us that this problem has not been solved. Poor communications delayed emergency response. Poor communications again cost lives. 

New Orleans and three neighboring parishes were using different equipment and 

different frequencies—they couldn’t talk to each another. 

Helicopter crews couldn’t talk to rescuers in boats. 

National Guard commanders in Mississippi had to use human couriers to carry 

messages. 

After Katrina, communications for first responders must become an urgent priority for this Congress. We should not have to learn these lessons a third time. 

The transition to Digital TV offers us the perfect opportunity to fulfill this recommendation. The analog TV spectrum is ideal for public safety use. Emergency 

communications on these frequencies can easily penetrate walls, and travel great 

distances. 

Broadcasters have dropped their opposition to a hard deadline for returning the 

analog TV spectrum. This is a step forward.Now the ball is in your court. Congress 

should set the earliest possible date for the transfer of 700 MHz spectrum to America’s first responders. We cannot afford another four year delay—we will surely be 

hit again, and if we have not fixed communications problems lives will be lost. 

We need a date certain for the turnover of the spectrum, so that all involved can 

prepare: 

Manufacturers can produce new public safety communications technologies to 

take advantage of the new spectrum, and 

Public safety agencies can acquire these capabilities. 

We know that there are other contentious issues involved with the Digital TV 

transition. They should not stop a bill to reallocate the spectrum for public safety 

purposes. Our first responders must come first. 

98

Chairman Upton and Ranking Member Markey, Chairman Barton and Ranking 

Member Dingell of the full Committee, Representative Pickering, Representative 

Wynn, and numerous other members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

should be commended for their leadership on this important national security issue. 

Other members of the House and Senate have also been strongly supportive of 

this reform. We thank them for their efforts. 

We look forward to working with you, and with your counterparts in the Senate, 

to enact this common-sense 9/11 Commission recommendation into law this year—

for the safety of our first responders, and the communities they protect. Thank you, 

and I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. 

Lieutenant Colonel Miller, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF LT. COL. THOMAS J. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee. 

I am Lieutenant Colonel Tom Miller, Deputy Director of the 

Michigan State Police. Thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding the urgent need to promote interoperable communications 

between public safety first responders. 

Our first responder capabilities have been tested recently in this 

country from 9/11 to the most recent hurricanes in the Gulf Coast. 

In Michigan, our tests have included a flooding disaster in the 

upper peninsula, civil unrest in Benton Harbor, the blackout of 

2003, and most recently mobilization of our forces to assist the 

communities along the Gulf coast with the recent hurricanes. We 

have fortunately in our State experienced the unexpected and responded well. Still in Michigan, like every other State, we still face 

challenges. My testimony will describe the interoperability and 

communication challenges facing the Michigan State Police, as well 

as all of our State’s 75,000 first responders. 

In my 24 years of law enforcement experience, I have come to 

learn firsthand that effective, coordinated, and accessible communications between first responders is critical to the public safety 

mission. Michigan has the largest geographically based public safety communications system in North America. Since 1995, Michigan 

taxpayers have invested $211 million in the statewide communications system. The State is currently investing another $19 million 

in 2006 to upgrade this operating system to provide enhanced data 

capability, as well as additional microwave backbone capability in 

Southeast Michigan. Governor Granholm has also set an ambitious 

goal that by 2008, our first responders in Michigan will have fully 

interoperable communications. The State of Michigan has been recognized by industry and user groups as visionary as its approach 

to interoperability. But even with this success, Michigan still faces 

critical funding and other challenges in its quest to achieve the required level of public safety communications interoperability. 

There are four interrelated challenges facing public safety agencies in Michigan, as well as public safety agencies across the country. I would like to highlight some of those four areas for you. First, 

limited and fragmented funding. Sufficient funding is not available 

to replace and update equipment. Different communities at different levels of Government have various funding schemes and 

budget priorities. Further, Federal guidance on local and regional 

collaboration, as well as, funding assistance would surely help. 

99

Two, limited and fragmented radio spectrum. Public safety agencies compete with each other and with commercial wireless carriers 

for scarce radio spectrum creating problems among jurisdictions as 

they scramble to acquire as many frequencies as they can to meet 

their own needs. In Michigan today, with the state-of-the-art system that we have, we have significant commercial wireless interference that impacts the safety of the first responders utilizing that 

system. 

Three, limited fragmented planning coupled with lack of coordination. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned that in your opening remarks. The foundation of any effort to achieve interoperability is 

to create a coherent and cooperatively developed and shared plan. 

Currently, public safety agencies in Michigan are working out a 

plan for interoperability, a comprehensive plan for interoperability 

in our State. That is definitely a foundation and requirement to 

have success in this area. 

Four, incompatible and aging communications equipment. Aging 

communications equipment is a key challenge because they are either obsolete, will become obsolete, or aging at different stages and 

different jurisdictions which makes coordination and collaboration 

difficult. Federal assistance is needed as many local Governments 

do not have the resources to modernize their systems. 

Public safety access to the 700 megahertz spectrum is critical to 

the safety of our citizens and to public safety first responders as 

a whole. In 1997, Congress and the Federal Communications Commission allocated 2400 megahertz of spectrum to public safety in 

the 700 megahertz band for additional voice and data capacity but 

there is still a small number of TV stations that use this dedicated 

spectrum, preventing public safety access in most major metropolitan areas. Congress must address the loophole in the 1997 legislation that failed to set a firm date when TV stations must vacate 

the spectrum. There must also be an equitable solution to assure 

that no citizens are left without access to public information during 

a crisis. 

In Michigan, we are taking short-term initiatives or initiating 

short-term strategies to develop and address our interoperability 

issues. I would like to provide this Committee with a couple brief 

examples. First off, Michigan is pursuing implementation of 

TACNET, a mobile digital cross band repeater system for integrated directly into patrol car electronics. This system is integrated 

into the car, patching together as many as five disparate frequencies with the touch of a screen. The State has also deployed 

and interfaced different radio systems in 20 counties in the State 

allowing interoperability. Michigan and Ohio are piloting a project 

involving dual programming of State Michigan radios and Ohio radios. Michigan has developed a microwave link between the State 

of Michigan’s system and the State of Wisconsin for the installation 

of a telephone hotline between our Upper Peninsula dispatch center and the Wisconsin State Police. Talks are currently underway 

with the State of Indiana for an interoperability solution between 

Indiana’s system and the State of Michigan’s system. 

Communications interoperability for first responders is an important life safety challenge. The Michigan State Police commends this 

Committee’s leadership in addressing this urgent issue. Michigan 

100

has been committed to enhancing public safety interoperability 

prior to the heightened awareness placed on this issue as a result 

of the terrorist attacks on September 11. Additional funding and 

spectrum are key to Michigan and other States reaching our goal 

of public safety interoperability. We do urge Congress to assign a 

date as soon as possible for the spectrum transition of the 700 

megahertz band which can be made available for public safety use. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify and will be pleased to 

answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Lt. Col. Thomas J. Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LT. COL. THOMAS J. MILLER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MICHIGAN

STATE POLICE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 

J. Miller, Deputy Director of the Michigan State Police. Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the urgent need to promote interoperable communications 

among and between public safety first responders. On behalf of the Michigan State 

Police and my colleagues in law enforcement and other first responder agencies 

across the state, we appreciate the Committee’s leadership in addressing this vital 

issue. 

Our first responder capabilities have been tested in recent years as a country—

from 9/11 terrorist attacks to the most recent hurricanes. In Michigan our ‘‘tests’’ 

have included a flood in the Upper Peninsula, civil unrest in Benton Harbor, the 

blackout of 2003, and most recently mobilizing our Emergency Operations Center 

in response to Katrina. We have, fortunately, experienced the unexpected and responded well. Still, Michigan, like every other state, faces challenges. 

My testimony will describe the interoperability and communications challenges 

facing the Michigan State Police (MSP) and all of our state’s 75,000 first responders. 

In my 24 years of law enforcement experience, I have come to learn first hand that 

effective, coordinated, and accessible communications between first responders is 

critical to the public safety mission. 

Michigan has the largest geographically-based public safety communication system in North America. Our Michigan Public Safety Communications System 

(MPSCS) is a Motorola 800 MHz trunked radio system and is Association of Public 

Safety Communications Officials (APCO) 25 compliant, providing statewide coverage 

for public safety users. We have studied, conceived, and built a state of the art digital standards-based interoperable radio system with significant audio capacity and 

potentially enormous public safety transmission capacity. Since 1995, Michigan taxpayers have invested $221,000,000 in the construction of this statewide system. The 

state is currently investing another $19,000,000 in 2006 to upgrade our operating 

system statewide and to enhance our microwave backbone capacity in Southeast 

Michigan to accommodate the growth in local users. Governor Granholm has also 

set an ambitious goal—that by 2008 all first responders will have fully interoperable 

communications. She has also created an advisory board charged with developing 

and implementing a plan to achieve this goal. 

Michigan has been recognized by the Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN) and 

other knowledgeable industry and user groups as visionary in its approach to interoperability. No other state in the union boasts such a system, but even with this 

success, Michigan still faces critical funding and other challenges in its quest to 

achieve the required level of public safety communications interoperability. 

THE INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGE IN MICHIGAN

On August 17, 1987, Northwest Airlines Flight 255 crashed a mile from Detroit 

Metropolitan Airport killing 154 of the 155 people on board. Public Safety personnel 

responding to this disaster site could not communicate effectively with each other, 

which hampered rescue efforts. Today, 18 years after this incident, our communications capabilities have improved dramatically, however, public safety agencies in our 

state still lack the necessary equipment to ensure the required level of interoperability and thus a coordinated response. 

There are four interrelated challenges facing public safety agencies in Michigan 

pursuing communications interoperability:

1. Limited and fragmented funding—Funding is not available to replace and update equipment; different communities at different levels of government have 

various funding schemes and budget priorities. Basically, there are many interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
101

ests competing for scarce dollars. Stove pipe solutions have tended to be the 

norm, which has contributed significantly to the interoperability challenges public safety faces in this country today. We do believe that the movement toward 

the requirement for regionally based solutions to qualify for federal homeland 

security funds will have a positive impact on communications interoperability. 

Further federal guidance on jurisdictions working together as well as funding 

assistance would definitely help move along the goal of interoperability in our 

country. 

2. Limited and fragmented radio spectrum—Public safety radio spectrum is a 

scarce and valuable resource. Exacerbating the situation is that public safety 

radio spectrum is not contiguous and is scattered throughout the length of the 

frequency spectrum. Public safety frequencies in Michigan also face geographic 

limitations due to our shared border with Canada and other states. Additionally, public safety frequencies are under assault from commercial wireless interference. Public safety agencies also compete with each other for scarce radio 

spectrum, creating significant problems among jurisdictions as they scramble to 

acquire as many frequencies as they can to meet their own needs. In Michigan, 

this has created challenges in our efforts to add larger jurisdictions such as the 

City of Detroit to the state’s communication system. The lack of available frequencies in the 800 MHz band in Southeast Michigan has made it difficult to 

ensure that this region would have the adequate spectrum resources available 

for the number of users in that geographic area of the state. The bottom line 

is this impacts public safety. 

3. Limited and fragmented planning coupled with lack of coordination—

Achieving interoperability only works when there is coordination and cooperation. Indeed, the foundation of any effort to achieve interoperability is to create 

a coherent and cooperatively developed and shared plan. Currently, public safety agencies are racing to different solutions that exacerbate Michigan’s ability, 

both regionally and on a statewide basis, to meet the interoperability challenge. 

This is not unique to Michigan, but rather typical across the nation. Effectively 

partnering with local responders and jurisdictions and breaking down barriers 

to interoperability is a priority for our state, and must be a priority for our 

country. Governor Granholm has called for interoperable communications 

among first responders by 2008 and created the MPSCS Advisory Board this 

year to develop and implement Michigan’s interoperable communications plan 

and to advise on best practices for implementing interoperability; future trends; 

and coordination with local, regional, and statewide mutual aid agreements, 9-

1-1 dispatch operations, and incident command systems. Again, further focus 

from the federal government on coordination and shared plans in states and 

among regions is crucial. 

4. Incompatible and aging communications equipment—One key challenge 

with achieving interoperability in Michigan is the age of communications equipment. Many jurisdictions have equipment that is at least 20 years old. Clearly, 

these instruments are either obsolete or will become obsolete in the near term 

because manufacturers will no longer support these systems. Additionally, 

equipment used by various jurisdictions is aging at different stages in their 

lifecycle, making it difficult to coordinate and collaborate among jurisdictions to 

acquire common radio infrastructure and equipment. The result is agencies are 

communicating across different frequencies with different types of radios, analog and digital, using proprietary based systems that tend to inhibit communications interoperability. We need more federal assistance to address this problem, as many local governments just do not have the resources to modernize 

their systems. 

THE NEED FOR FIRST RESPONDER ACCESS TO 700 MHZ SPECTRUM

Although coordination and planning for interoperability is essential, public safety 

access to the 700 MHz spectrum, both in Michigan and across the county, is critical 

for the safety of our citizens and first responders. This issue has become apparent 

in public safety responses to major incidents that have occurred since the terrorist 

attacks on September 11, 2001. The 700 MHz band is the only dedicated spectrum 

allocation where public safety can further develop interoperable voice communications and implement advanced mobile wide area systems that bring high speed access to databases, the internet, imaging and video to first responders out in the 

field. Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allocated 24 

MHz of spectrum to public safety in the 700 MHz band in 1997 for additional voice/

data capacity, but there are still a small number of TV stations in that spectrum 

that currently prevent public safety access in most of the major metro areas. ConVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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gress must address the loophole in the 1997 legislation that failed to set a firm date 

when TV stations must vacate this spectrum. Congress needs to enact legislation 

that mandates such a date without exception. Public safety desperately needs the 

700 MHz spectrum today. 

While addressing this most critical public safety responder issue, we must not lose 

sight of the potential impact on citizens who may be dependent on these 700 MHz 

analog broadcasts for their public information during time of emergency. We urge 

Congress to fashion an equitable solution to assure that no citizens are left without 

access to public information during a crisis. 

NEAR-TERM INTEROPERABILITY INITIATIVES

In addition to our statewide planning for interoperability, Michigan is pursuing 

several initiatives to address our short term interoperability needs to enhance public 

safety first response. 

1. TACNET—The Michigan State Police is pursuing implementation of a mobile 

digital-cross band radio repeater system integrated directly into our patrol car electronics. While there are a number of similar technologies, this particular application, offers several unique aspects which have appealed to our officers in pilot tests. 

Because TACNET is fully integrated into a patrol car’s electronic system, patching 

together as many as five disparate frequency bands is accomplished easily on a 

touch-screen mounted on the dash. Any patrol officer can do this. While preplanning 

the frequencies to be coordinated is important, a major advantage of this approach 

is that we—and other first responders—do not need to acquire new radios or equipment. TACNET simply ‘‘controls’’ existing radio equipment, mounted in the trunk, 

in a seamless and effective way. 

2. The Michigan State Police has been involved in interoperability solutions between the MPSCS and local public safety communication systems since 2000 when 

the department deployed the first interoperability ‘‘patch’’ with Clinton County, 

Michigan. Since then, Michigan has deployed patch radios interfacing local radio 

systems with the MPSCS in 20 counties across Michigan. 

3. The Michigan MPSCS and the Ohio MARCS system are involved in a pilot 

project involving dual programming of MPSCS radios and Ohio MARCS radios for 

interoperability with the Ohio Highway Patrol, Ohio National Guard, and the Ohio 

Department of National Resources. In addition, Ohio is installing an MPSCS radio 

connected to a Raytheon ACU1000 pointed at the Michigan system and interfaced 

with the Ohio system which will allow communications between Michigan dispatch 

centers and Michigan units operating in Ohio. Ohio will have the same communications capability with units operating in Michigan. Joint exercises will be conducted 

with appropriate agencies when this solution is operational. 

4. DOJ Cities Project/High Risk Metropolitan Areas—Michigan is finalizing a 

communications interoperability plan between federal, state, and local authorities in 

the Detroit Metropolitan area utilizing the MPSCS as the backbone for communications interoperability between law enforcement agencies.This plan also involves the 

installation of repeaters in Detroit to facilitate communications with other 800 MHZ 

radio systems (such as Oakland County) who may need to work in Detroit during 

a major incident. 

5. Michigan has developed a microwave link between the MPSCS and the State 

of Wisconsin for the installation of a telephone ‘‘hot line’’ between the Michigan 

State Police Negaunee Regional Dispatch Center and Wisconsin State Police Dispatch. 

6. Talks are underway with the State of Indiana for an interoperability solution 

between Indiana’s 800 MHZ Motorola trunked system, which is under construction, 

and the MPSCS. 

CONCLUSION

Communications interoperability for first responders is an important life safety 

challenge. The Michigan State Police commends the Committee’s leadership in addressing this urgent issue. Michigan has been committed to enhancing public safety 

interoperability prior to the heightened awareness placed on this issue as a result 

of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Additional funding and spectrum are 

key to Michigan and other states reaching our goal of public safety interoperability. 

And we do urge Congress to assign a date—as soon as possible—for the spectrum 

transition so that the 700 MHz bandwidth can be available for public safety use. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. 

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Mr. Botterell? 

STATEMENT OF ART BOTTERELL 

Mr. BOTTERELL. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. 

My name is Art Botterell and I am an independent consultant on 

public warning and emergency information systems. In my career, 

I have served at the municipal, county, State, and Federal levels 

of public safety and emergency management, and as a consultant 

to agencies in the U.S. and abroad. I have had the opportunity to 

experience first hand a broad array of emergency communications 

technologies and practices and it is a privilege to share a few observations with you here today. 

Having been through these review exercises after just about 

every major disaster of the past two decades, I will suggest that 

there are some things that we as a Nation cannot and need not afford anymore. First off, we can no longer afford to build separate 

infrastructure for different modes of communication. The question 

is not voice versus data or wired versus wireless or satellite versus 

terrestrial. The question is how to leverage digital convergence to 

get the most capability, reliability, and reach for all our modes of 

emergency communication. 

Second, we can no longer afford to treat the radio spectrum as 

though it were real estate. We have much more efficient ways of 

organizing, identifying and prioritizing our communications than 

by the fixed long-term allocation of blocks of spectrum. The sooner 

we begin the transition to dynamic spectrum management, the 

sooner we will realize its benefits. 

Third, we can no longer afford to rely on vendor driven design 

of our emergency communications infrastructure. Businesses are 

responsible for maximizing shareholder value not for protecting the 

public welfare. We need independent sources of information and 

planning for our future emergency infrastructure lest we continue 

to get updated versions of the same old thing. 

And finally, we can no longer afford an intermittent series of post 

disaster quick fix programs for emergency communications. The development of telecommunications is a continual process of incremental improvement. It requires a consistent program of implementation as well. 

So how might such a program be established? First, we have to 

acknowledge that the problem is not just technical facilities, it is 

also procedures, human resources, and organizational constructs. 

Then we need to draw three lessons from the Internet. The first is 

the end-to-end principle which holds that networks should be as 

simple and transparent as possible so that functions and features 

can be negotiated and improved in an unfettered market of innovative products and services. The second is the power of judicious 

standards. The Internet has no architecture, instead it provides a 

foundation of simple, elegant, enabling standards upon which or 

which an agile ecology of innovation has grown continually, incrementally, and exponentially. And third, improved standards processes. The process used to create the Internet standards has had 

a profound influence on other standards organizations and the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
104

sults have been better, more robust standards developed and deployed faster than by the more traditional standards process. 

And then we need to learn how to harness the energies of the 

academic, non-profit, and open source communities. It has been 

said that free is the one price Government does not know how to 

pay. I have watched several generations of volunteers, amateur 

radio operators and many others develop and deploy innovative 

useful communication technologies only to be turned away by the 

agencies that might benefit from them because they only knew how 

to adopt new technologies by means of cumbersome, commercial 

procurement processes. 

The highly successful common alerting protocol standard is one 

of the few such non-commercial initiatives that have succeeded in 

breaking through this bureaucratic glass ceiling. CAP as it is 

called, offers an example for harnessing the creative energy of the 

non-profit and open source communities for the public benefit. 

The Federal Government can play a vital role in this process. By 

encouraging procurements based on open, non-proprietary standards through grant guidance to State and local agencies and to its 

own acquisitions, by expanding independent research and education of operating and procurement officers by academics and nonprofit organizations so that those officials are no longer solely dependent on vendors for their information about communications 

and information technology. By providing micro grants, counseling, 

recognition, and other support for innovators from the volunteer 

academic, non-commercial, and open source sectors to help them 

bring their good ideas into public service. 

Most importantly, the Federal Government can commit to increasing the robustness, reliability, and adaptability of our national 

communications infrastructure as a continual process of improvement with clear year-by-year goals and measurable usable 

deliverables in order to apply these lessons that disasters teach us 

time and again. 

I will be pleased to respond to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Art Botterell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ART BOTTERELL, EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEMS

CONSULTANT

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. My 

name is Art Botterell and I am an independent consultant on public warning and 

emergency information systems. 

In my career in emergency communications I’ve served in public safety and government at the municipal, county, state and federal levels, and as a consultant and 

advisor in Asia and Europe. I’ve also been involved in international standards development for emergency data exchange, and in advocacy for improvements in public 

warning and emergency public information. 

It’s been my good fortune to accumulate first-hand experience with a wide array 

of emergency communications technologies and practices, and it’s a privilege to 

share a few of the patterns I’ve detected with you here today. 

INTRODUCTION: THE FOUR LAYERS OF COMMUNICATION

Obviously the number one problem identified after 9/11 and again after the 

Katrina response was ‘‘communications.’’ But what does that really mean? 

For many years I’ve used a four-tiered ‘‘layer cake’’ model to help tease apart the 

various issues that get lumped under the broad rubric of ‘‘communication problems’’ 

or, more recently, ‘‘interoperability’’:

Organization—Structures, goals, objectives and metricsHuman 

Factors—Capabilities, training, stresses, personal attitudes 

105

Procedures—Patterns of interaction and problem solving 

Technologies—All the hardware, software and networks 

(There’s actually a fifth layer on top—Culture—which in most tactical contexts is 

a constant, but which definitely comes into play in cross-cultural and international 

applications.) 

Over time I noticed two things about this formulation: The first was that problems, or at least the perceptions of problems, tend to propagate downward through 

the stack . . . so that a lot of non-technical issues wind up being framed as technology 

failures. The political or bureaucratic benefits of this depersonalized reframing are 

fairly clear, as is its attractiveness to vendors and other technology proponents, but 

it leads to a lot of what might be called ‘‘Groundhog Day’’ experiences, as succeeding 

generations of technology are blamed for the same breakdowns. 

In two decades of emergency response field operations, I can truthfully say that 

I cannot recall any occasion when I felt the available technology was being fully utilized. In almost every case, I found it possible to substantially enhance the performance of communications by interventions at the procedural, human-factors or organizational levels. 

The other interesting thing, which I came to appreciate more slowly, was that 

change tends to propagate upward through the stack. New technologies require and 

enable new behaviors, requiring new skills and triggering new stresses, and creating 

new forces to which organizations ultimately adapt themselves. This is a continual 

evolutionary process, and that has important implications to which I’ll return in just 

a moment. 

For now, the first insight is that a lot of the interoperability and data-sharing 

challenges we face aren’t technical problems, and just painting over them with a 

fresh layer of technology won’t necessarily solve them. 

PRICES WE DON’T NEED TO PAY

A couple of truisms here: Nothing is so permanent as a temporary solution, and 

nothing takes longer than a quick fix. Having been through these review exercises 

after just about every major disaster of the past two decades, I’ll suggest that there 

are some things that we as a nation cannot—and need not—afford anymore. I’ll suggest answers in a moment, but allow me a moment to review the problems first. 

First, we can no longer afford to build separate infrastructure for different modes 

of communications. The question isn’t radio versus computers, or voice versus data, 

or wired versus wireless. The question is how we can complete the process of digital 

convergence to get the most capability and reliability for all modes of emergency 

communication. 

Second, we can no longer afford to treat the radio spectrum as, effectively, private 

property. We have much more efficient ways of separating, securing and identifying 

communications channels than by the fixed allocation of blocks of spectrum to either 

public or private licensees or services. Certainly this transition from the traditional 

approach will take time, and it will have financial implications, but the sooner we 

start the sooner we’ll realize the benefits of dynamic spectrum management. 

Third, we can no longer afford to rely on vendor-driven design of our emergency 

communications infrastructure. I make no criticism here of business doing business. 

The problem arises when government fails in its complementary role as steward of 

public resources and champion for the public interest, thus leaving the competitive 

forces of the marketplace unchallenged and unconstrained by any higher values. 

The phenomenon of government program managers whose mastery of technologies 

is limited to what their contactors tell them is, alas, a commonplace of federal and, 

increasingly, of state and local government. Businesses are responsible for maximizing shareholder value, not for maximizing the general public welfare. We need 

independent sources of information and planning for our future emergency infrastructure, else we’ll continue to get updated versions of the same old thing. 

And finally, we can no longer afford an intermittent series of post-disaster quickfix programs for emergency communications. Emergency managers are sadly aware 

of the ‘‘window of opportunity’’ for funding and legislative interest that opens, all 

too briefly, after every major disaster. It forces them to undertake impulsive, piecemeal procurements of whatever can be delivered quickly, because they know if they 

don’t move quickly they’ll soon be back near the bottom of the spending priorities 

list. The development of telecommunications is, as I’ve mentioned, a continual process of incremental improvement. It requires a consistent program of implementation 

as well. 

So how might such a program be established? 

106

HOW TO FIX IT

The first task is to frame the problem properly. The problem isn’t just technical 

facilities; it’s also procedures, human resources and organizational structures. We 

need to involve social scientists, economists and human factors engineers as well as 

electrical engineers and computer scientists. The goal isn’t increased communication 

or enhanced information sharing; those are means, not ends. The goal is to increase 

the resilience and robustness of our society and our economy, even as increasing efficiencies squeeze out the slack resources we used to count on to buffer us against 

unexpected events. 

The second task is to learn three lessons from the Internet:

• The ‘‘end-to-end principle’’—Simply put, this holds that the network should be 

as simple and transparent as possible, so applications and features can be negotiated and improved over time by the end users. (One implication of this is a 

distinction between the ‘‘user interface,’’ e.g., a handheld radio, and the underlying network, which might be of various types without the user noticing any 

difference.) • The power of judicious standards—The Internet has no architecture. Instead, 

the Internet is the spontaneous expression of a fairly simple set of enabling 

technical interface standards, upon which a rich and agile ecology of commercial 

and non-commercial innovation have been built, continually and incrementally. 

Likewise, the challenge for designing emergency communications capabilities is 

not to develop a global top-down architecture, but rather to identify and promote the key enabling standards that will allow technologies to interact, cooperate, compete and improve for the benefit of investors and the general public 

alike. • The revolution in standards development—One quiet impact of the Internet has 

been on the processes by which technical standards are developed. The process 

used by the Internet Engineering Task Force stresses open participation, open 

non-proprietary interfaces, and a requirement that standards must actually 

have been implemented and tested by multiple users prior to formalization. 

This open, iterative approach to standards development has spread to other 

standards organizations, and the result has been better, more robust standards 

being brought to use faster than by more traditional industry standards processes. The third task is to learn how to harness the energies of the academic, volunteer 

and Open Source communities. It’s been said that ‘‘Free is the one price government 

doesn’t know how to pay.’’ I’ve watched several generations of communications volunteers develop and demonstrate innovative and useful communications technologies, only to be frustrated by government bureaucracies that only knew how to 

adopt technologies by means of lengthy and complicated commercial procurement 

processes. 

The highly successful open standard called the Common Alerting Protocol is one 

of the few such non-commercial initiatives that have broken through this bureaucratic glass ceiling. ‘‘CAP,’’ as it’s called, offers a pattern for harnessing the creative 

energy of the academic and open-source communities for the public good. Of course, 

success has a thousand fathers, and so I hope the process that led to the creation 

of CAP will be studied carefully before its product is fully absorbed into common 

process. 

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE

The federal government can play a key role in this process. The federal government can stimulate the development and adoption of open, non-proprietary technical 

standards by encouraging procurements requiring such standards through its grants 

to state and local agencies and its own procurements. 

The federal government can also support independent research and educational 

outreach though academic and non-profit organizations, so that officials at all levels 

of government are no longer so dependent on vendors for information about communications and information technology options and trends. 

And the federal government can provide micro-grants, counseling, recognition and 

other support for volunteer, academic, non-commercial and open-source innovators—

through the Small Business Administration, perhaps—to help them push their good 

ideas across the gap into broader use. 

Most importantly, the federal government can expand its leadership role in approaching the robustness, reliability and adaptability of our national communications infrastructure as a continual process of improvement, with discrete year-byyear goals and objectives, and in tearing down some of the traditional barriers—between disciplines and agencies, between voice and data, between emergencies and 

107

day-to-day—that have kept us from applying the lessons that disasters teach us 

time and again. 

I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. 

Mr. Trujillo? 

STATEMENT OF TONY TRUJILLO 

Mr. TRUJILLO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, on behalf of the Satellite Industry Association, I would like to thank you 

for holding this hearing today. I would also like to express my 

thanks to Chairman Martin, Commissioner Abernathy, Adelstein, 

and Copps, and the staff of the FCC. Their efforts greatly assisted 

America’s satellite companies in restoring telecommunication services to the Gulf Coast Region. 

Satellite communications played a critical role. When the land 

based telephone and broadcast networks went down, satellites remained on the job. Satellites provided redundancy, ubiquity, and 

resiliency that were unavailable from land-based networks. Satellites first warned of the impending danger. Afterwards, satellites 

connected emergency personnel and other first responders. Satellites reunited families. Satellites reconnected communities. And 

satellites enabled the world to witness the devastation of these disasters and also the many acts of heroism. 

Although the performance of satellite systems was impressive, 

their use was often limited by lack of preparation. Had satellite 

systems been more effectively integrated into our emergency communications network, many of the communications problems that 

occurred in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas recently 

and New York City after 9/11 would have been substantially mitigated. As Chairman Martin recently stated, if we learned anything 

from Hurricane Katrina, it is that we cannot rely solely on terrestrial communications. And if I leave you with only one thought 

today, that satellites can guarantee redundancy. And as we learned 

in New Orleans, the importance of redundancy cannot be overemphasized. 

The satellite industry was not as affected as land based networks 

were by the hurricanes. While the outages on land based networks 

surged in the days following the hurricanes, satellite networks 

were also experiencing a corresponding surge in demand for capacity. Even during Hurricane Katrina, those with mobile satellite 

phones along the Gulf Coast found that their phones had a dial 

tone when other networks were silent. FEMA, The National Guard, 

and Red Cross, utility workers, people in search of loved ones and 

even local phone companies were among those using over 20,000 

mobile satellite phones and terminals provided by Globalstar, Iridium, Mobile Satellite Ventures, and Inmarsat. 

Likewise, the fixed satellite service providers also stepped in 

quickly to provide emergency voice, video, and data communications. For example, Hughes Network Systems immediately reestablished Wal-Mart’s satellite communications network creating one of 

the life support systems for local communities starting to rebuild. 

Intelsat reconfigured capacity and donated service to help cellular 

providers reestablish their networks and to provide capacity for the 

Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. PanAmSat donated 

108

capacity to the Red Cross to provide communications to about 40 

of their sites and especially equipped Red Cross mobile units. SES 

AMERICOM and AMERICOM Government Services donated capacity to enable high speed ship to shore communications for the 

USS Iwo Jima. The ship carried disaster relief teams within amphibious construction equipment and medical personnel and supplies to the New Orleans area following the flooding. 

The satellite broadcast community also played a role with both 

XM Satellite Radio and Direct TV providing FEMA and the Red 

Cross with a 24/7 dedicated broadcast station for disseminating 

hurricane related information. XM’s emergency alert channel 

tracked the storm, reported on evacuation routes, and now provides 

updates about storm clean up, road closures, school closings, and 

other vital information. 

America’s satellite industry can do more to aid disaster relief and 

recovery. We offer the following four recommendations. No. 1, satellites should be regarded as an essential component in all future 

critical telecom network planning. No. 2, satellite systems must be 

pre-deployed to a cadre of trained professionals. No. 3, satellite personnel must be credentialed as first responders. And No. 4, satellite spectrum must be preserved and protected. 

With these initiatives, our satellite industry will be even better 

prepared to meet America’s disaster relief and recovery needs in 

the future. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Tony Trujillo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TONY TRUJILLO, CHAIRMAN, SATELLITE INDUSTRY

ASSOCIATION

OPENING

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, on behalf of the Satellite Industry Association, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing today on public safety 

communications and the lessons learned from 9/11 and Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita. I would also like to express my thanks to Chairman Martin, Commissioners 

Copps, Abernathy, and Adelstein and the staff of the Federal Communications Commission. Their tireless efforts have greatly assisted us in supplying critical telecommunication resources to the Gulf Coast Region. 

Satellite communications played a critical role during the response to these manmade and natural disasters. When the telephone and broadcast networks went 

down, satellites remained on the job. Satellites connected emergency personnel and 

other first responders. Satellites reunited families. Satellites reconnected communities. And, satellites enabled the world to witness the devastation of these disasters 

and also the many acts of heroism. 

Although the performance of satellite systems was impressive, their use has often 

been limited by a lack of preparation. Had satellite systems been more effectively 

integrated into our emergency communications network, many of the communications problems that occurred in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi recently, and 

New York City after 9/11 would have been substantially mitigated. As FCC Chairman Martin recently stated, ‘‘if we learned anything from Hurricane Katrina, it is 

that we cannot rely solely on terrestrial communications’’. 

Today, I will highlight;

(1) The diversity and versatility of the commercial satellite systems operating today; 

(2) The role that these satellite systems played in recent manmade and natural disasters; and 

(3) The importance of better integrating satellite systems into future national security and emergency preparedness communications. 

As we discuss how Katrina affected Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, it’s important we apply the lessons we learned to improve disaster relief and recovery telecommunications in the future. 

109

As of September 21st, nearly three weeks after Hurricane Katrina inflicted its 

damage on the terrestrial communications network in the New Orleans area, only 

60 percent of the cell phone networks were working properly, 70 percent of the 

broadcast stations were functioning, and roughly two million calls were still failing. 

On the other hand, and in stark contrast to the failures in the terrestrial networks, 

fixed and mobile satellite services were nearly 100 percent operational on September 21st, just as they were on Aug. 28th, Aug. 29th, Aug. 30th, Aug. 31st, and 

the hours and days immediately following Katrina. 

There have been calls for a new communications network for first responders and 

funding for new technologies and networks that can withstand such disasters. Satellites can and should be an integral part of these new networks. The required capacity is available today from commercial satellite operators and is widely available 

to corporations, government users and consumers across the globe. The intelligent 

integration of satellite and terrestrial technologies can create the communication 

system that our first responders deserve. 

TERRESTRIAL VS. SATELLITE

Hurricane Katrina’s destruction of terrestrial communications facilities in the 

Gulf region, and therefore the services upon which citizens rely, was extraordinary. 

As we know, almost three million customer telephone lines were knocked down in 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. In addition to these wire-line failures, local 

wireless networks also sustained considerable damage, with more than 1,000 cell 

sites out of service. Approximately 100 broadcast stations were knocked off the air, 

and finally, hundreds of thousands of cable customers also lost service. 

The resulting lack of communications infrastructure severely impeded the ability 

of first responders and others in their disaster relief and recovery efforts. 

The satellite industry and our satellite network infrastructure were not as affected by Hurricane Katrina. This is partially because satellites orbit high above the 

problems on the ground. In the hours, days, and weeks following these disasters, 

satellite networks provide critical communications capabilities to emergency personnel and a vital information link for all citizens—whether via satellite radio, satellite television, or via fixed satellite broadband networks or mobile satellite telephony. 

While the outages on terrestrial networks surged in the days following Katrina, 

satellite networks were seamlessly handling a corresponding surge—in demand for 

capacity. 

And I am happy to report to you today that our satellite voice, video, and data 

networks performed exactly as they were designed to perform—providing reliable 

and redundant communications solutions in times of crisis. 

I would like to take you through some of the examples of how satellites performed 

in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. 

SATELLITE QUICKLY STEPPED IN TO PROVIDE INSTANT INFRASTRUCTURE

Mobile Satellite Services 

Within minutes of the disaster, those with satellite phones along the Gulf Coast 

turned to us for immediate telecom access. As those minutes turned to hours and 

then to days, more and more first responders found that satellite telephones provided a dial tone that other networks simply could not. 

FEMA, The National Guard, the Red Cross, state and local first responders, utility workers, reporters, people in search of relatives, and even local phone companies 

were among those using satellite phones to communicate in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The Red Cross quickly deployed nine specially-designed Emergency 

Communications Response Vehicles (ECRV’s). Each vehicle was equipped with 10 

satellite phones and portable, tripod-mounted VSAT satellite dishes. 

Over 20,000 Globalstar, Iridium and Mobile Satellite Ventures (MSV) satellite 

phones and terminals were deployed to the region in the days immediately following 

Hurricane Katrina. In just the first 72 hours of the disaster, Iridium satellite telephone traffic alone in the region increased more than 3000 percent, while the number of subscribers increased more than 500 percent. Globalstar service centers activated satellite phones at an average rate of 1,400 per day (versus an average of 80 

on a typical day). MSV saw approximately a 400 percent increase in traffic in the 

region and provided satellite terminals to numerous emergency responders, including FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue teams. 

CNN and Fox News used an Inmarsat mobile satellite terminal as the hurricane 

came ashore to provide live video reporting. One CNN van (Hurricane 1) was 

crushed by a falling roof after filming the arrival of the hurricane’s eye-wall—fortunately, the crew was not injured, and the Inmarsat terminal survived intact. 

110

Stratos Global, a reseller of Iridium, Globalstar and Inmarsat capacity and equipment, also deployed a team to provide free phone calls home for victims at shelters 

set up throughout the affected area. 

Whether providing critical telecommunications in the aftermath of Katrina or September 11th, the Mobile Satellite Services or MSS industry has positioned itself to 

uniquely provide ubiquitous, reliable, interoperable, secure, and redundant communications during times of crisis. 

First responders, relief workers, political leaders, news professionals and others 

quickly clamored for additional phones, and despite the impressive statistics that I 

just cited, for each phone and terminal provided, countless other requests were 

unmet. Supplies were rationed and all of our companies had to beg, borrow and 

steal every handset and terminal they could find—both within the United States 

and abroad. In fact, many requests, including one from the House Sergeant-at-Arms 

office, had to be severely limited. 

And while these mobile satellite service providers performed nearly flawlessly, the 

one portion of the satellite industry that has gone virtually unnoticed in these past 

few weeks, but has proven equally critical, is the FSS or fixed satellite services sector. 

Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) 

After Hurricane Katrina, the fixed satellite service providers and their resellers 

also stepped in immediately to provide instant infrastructure and emergency voice, 

video, and data communications in the hard-hit areas. From transportable ATM machines to high-speed Internet access for families to stay connected, the organizations 

using these satellite communications ranged from federal, state and local government agencies to schools, churches and local relief organizations. Small businesses 

such as retail gas stations and convenience stores, and larger businesses such as 

insurance companies, financial institutions, and news organizations also used satellite capacity. 

For example, Hughes Networks Systems immediately re-established Wal-Mart’s 

satellite communications network, helping Wal-Mart become one of the ’life-support 

systems’ for the local communities during their recovery. 

Intelsat, Ltd. reconfigured capacity and donated service to help cellular providers 

such as Cingular, and Nextel/Sprint, and long distance carriers MCI, and AT&T reestablish their networks as well as provide capacity for emergency services via mobile vans for relief agencies, and mobile offices and command centers for the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

PanAmSat donated satellite capacity to the Red Cross to provide communications 

to about 40 of their sites and deployed an experimental inflatable antenna at a Red 

Cross center in Biloxi used by evacuees to send email messages to family. 

SES AMERICOM and AMERICOM Government Services donated satellite capacity to enable high-speed ship-to-shore communications for the USS Iwo Jima—which 

carried disaster relief teams to New Orleans with amphibious construction equipment and medical personnel and supplies. 

In addition, Intelsat, Loral Skynet, New Skies Satellites, PanAmSat, SES 

AMERICOM, and other FSS operators provided free satellite communications and 

satellite bandwidth to enable Internet connectivity as well as voice, video, and data 

channels to field hospitals and relief and rescue workers on the ground, in the air, 

and on the water. Also, without the help of the Department of Homeland Security’s 

National Coordinating Center and their Telecom Industry Sector Advisory Committee (ISAC), the satellite industry-government coordination that was accomplished, especially in those first 48 hours, would have been substantially more difficult. 

Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and Satellite Radio 

In addition to the FSS and MSS sectors, the satellite broadcast community also 

played a key role, by helping to ensure there was an efficient method of communicating critical information to first responders and the general population within 

the areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Both XM Satellite Radio and DirecTV provided FEMA and the Red Cross with 

a 24/7 dedicated broadcast station for disseminating hurricane-related information. 

XM’s 24-hour channel called XM Emergency Alert (Channel 247) tracked the storm 

and reported on evacuation routes, and now provides updates about storm clean-up, 

road closures, school closings, and other vital information including information 

from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Department of 

Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. 

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Following the storm, XM launched a new channel called Red Cross Radio (Channel 248) which provides information directly to Red Cross workers located in the 

Gulf Coast, as well as Red Cross aid stations. XM has donated more than 200 radios 

for Red Cross workers to listen to the Red Cross Radio channel. 

DirecTV also coordinated with FEMA and the Red Cross to offer live feeds—free 

of charge—to shelters and command centers throughout the area. 

SATELLITE = REDUNDANCY + UBIQUITY + RESILIENCY

Something that we have been hearing repeatedly in the wake of Hurricane 

Katrina is the word ‘‘interoperability’’ and the need for first responders to communicate seamlessly with each other during times of crisis. We in the satellite industry 

agree that first responders at the federal, state and local level need an interoperable 

communications system that can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the country. We 

also know that such communications networks exist in the form of the applications 

we have just discussed that are being offered today by the mobile and fixed satellite 

industry. 

Moreover, satellite operators are investing billions of dollars in next-generation 

systems that will offer new and even better services for the public safety community. 

I believe one of the themes you have seen throughout my remarks here today is 

that satellites equal redundancy and ubiquity and resiliency. The real world examples that have presented themselves in recent years; 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the London Train bombings, and the hurricanes of 

2004 and 2005, are a testament to the fact that without satellites there is no redundancy. And, without the redundancy, ubiquity and resiliency that satellite networks 

provide, terrestrial-only networks become useless following disasters. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the tremendous contributions of the satellite industry to the rescue and 

recovery efforts in the Gulf region, barriers existed which prevented the full use of 

satellite resources. 

Satellites should be regarded as an essential component in all future critical telecom network planning 

To enable rapid deployment and/or restoration and truly mobile communications, 

the Federal Government should incorporate satellite services and networks as a redundancy requirement in any communications network or architecture. The Department of Homeland Security is currently examining a range of emergency communication proposals, including proposals to ensure interoperability. Satellite systems should be emphasized and included in the early 

planning of these initiatives. 

Satellite systems must be pre-deployed to a cadre of trained professionals 

The US military has long known that, to be effective, you must ‘‘train as you 

fight.’’ In other words, you must prepare for a crisis with the same intensity and 

dedication that you will need during the crisis. Past disasters have shown us that 

first responders must have the satellite tools and training they need before an emer- gency happens. Today, availability of satellite capacity and satellite ground equipment for emergency preparedness requirements has been handled largely by relying 

on whatever excess capacity exists at the time. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have 

demonstrated that this type of reliance is flawed and ultimately dangerous. 

In the aftermath of the recent hurricanes in the Gulf Coast, when many terrestrial communications networks in the region were either totally or partially disabled, emergency responders were relying on satellite solutions. These solutions included satellite telephones, satellite bandwidth, as well as VSAT networks. The 

problem at that point was the availability of equipment and bandwidth to satisfy 

demands. Satellite phones became very difficult to find. VSAT equipment, in the 

quantities requested, was also nearly impossible to obtain, let alone ensure either 

timely importation or delivery to isolated locations. 

Satellite handsets and small, modern, pop-up antennas and satellite phones could 

have been pre-positioned on-site prior to Katrina and available for immediate deployment in the aftermath. In the hands of first-responders this technology could 

have provided the communications necessary to deploy safety of life services to those 

who needed it without delay. 

These products work today. They provide redundancy today. They work with other 

communications today. As such, the Government needs to facilitate a wider 

pre-positioned deployment of these assets today by ensuring that satellite 

capacity and equipment become part of the comprehensive redundant comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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munications solutions used by first responders during the planning stages, 

rather than at the last minute. 

Credentialing Satellite Personnel as First Responders 

The day after Katrina hit, satellite repair crews were ready to begin restoring 

service. Unfortunately, too many of these professionals couldn’t get permission from 

officials to enter the area. 

Given the increasingly critical role the satellite industry is playing in disaster relief and recovery, satellite service providers and their engineers should be designated 

as first responders in the event of a major disaster and should be included in preparations for such events. By credentialing such individuals and companies as first 

responders we can enable critical satellite infrastructure providers and others to get 

into the affected areas to restore vital capabilities without delay or interference. 

• Preserve and Protect Satellite Spectrum at Home and Abroad 

As discussed throughout this testimony, satellite networks are uniquely able to 

deliver redundant, reliable, and resilient communications services users and meet 

the unique demands of the public safety community for ubiquitous and interoperable 

communications. 

The availability and widespread deployment of satellite networks, however, depends upon the satellite industry’s access to sufficient spectrum. Therefore, the 

satellite industry believes that 1) U.S. government policy must ensure that 

existing satellite spectrum be preserved and protected from harmful interference both at home and abroad; 2) the FCC’s rules and policies should afford satellite operators sufficient technical flexibility to continue to meet 

the needs of the public safety community; and 3) the US Government 

should refrain from taking actions that undercut international allocations 

of spectrum for satellite use. 

CLOSING—WE ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE SOLUTION

Again, to recap our recommendations;

1) Satellites must be an essential component of future critical communications networks; 

2) Satellite capacity and equipment must be pre-purchased and pre-positioned; 

3) Satellite operators and personnel must be credentialed as first responders; and, 

4) Satellite spectrum must be preserved, and protected from interference. 

We in the satellite industry are justifiably proud of the crucial part we have 

played in disaster recovery efforts by providing vital communications to relief workers, government agencies, churches, families and journalists. However, we have also 

been frustrated by the knowledge that we could have done much more. On behalf 

of the Satellite Industry Association, I urge this Committee to take steps to ensure 

that satellite systems are completely integrated into emergency planning and preparations so that the unique benefits our services offer can be fully exploited the next 

time disaster strikes.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Kramer? 

STATEMENT OF HAROLD KRAMER 

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you, Chairman Upton and Members of the 

Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify this afternoon on the 

efforts of amateur radio operators providing communications in 

connection with Hurricane Katrina. 

My name is Harold Kramer. My amateur radio call sign is WJ1B. 

And I am the Chief Operating Officer for the American Radio Relay 

League, the ARRL which is the National Association for Amateur 

Radio. Amateur Radio is a voluntary communication service famous for providing reliable emergency and disaster relief communication at no cost to States, municipalities, disaster relief agencies, and the Federal Government. Radio Amateurs respond immediately following any type of emergency with communications facilities and systems manned by volunteered trained communicators. 

Amateur radio operators are probably best known for their immediate responses to the tragic events on September 11, 2001, 

along with hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, fires, snow, floods 

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and other natural disasters. They are immediately available during 

and in the aftermath of such events and commence their first response communications in support of public safety and disaster relief agencies along with State emergency response agencies without 

any advanced requests. When communication systems fail due to 

the wide area or localized disaster, Amateur Radio has consistently 

and repeatedly proven that it works. 

Immediately at the onset of Hurricane Katrina an all volunteer 

army of about 1,000 FCC licensed amateur radio operators provided continuous high frequency, VHF and UHF communications 

for State, local, and Federal emergency workers in and around the 

affected areas in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. These communications were provided for several agencies such as the Red 

Cross and the Salvation Army and to facilitate interoperability between and among first responders such as FEMA, National Volunteers Active in Disasters and other agencies. Trained, volunteer 

amateur radio operators also provided health and welfare communications from within the affected areas to the rest of the United 

States and the world. 

In the days after Hurricane Katrina, the Coastguard, the Red 

Cross, and FEMA all put out calls for volunteer amateur radio operators to provide communications because phone lines and cell 

sites were inoperative and public safety communications were overwhelmed due to the loss of repeater towers and the large number 

of first responders in the area. Amateur radio operators responded 

en masse. Approximately 200 Amateur Radio emergency service 

communicators responded immediately. The number of amateur 

radio operators providing communications in the three States who 

were either deployed or awaiting relief duty onsite or at the reserve 

facility in Montgomery, Alabama swelled to over 1,000 within a 

week. 

The principal reason why Amateur Radio works when over communication systems fail during natural disasters is that Amateur 

Radio is not infrastructure dependent, it is decentralized. Amateurs 

are well-trained in emergency communications. We practice a lot. 

They are disciplined operators and their stations are in general 

both portable and reliable. High frequency Amateur Radio communications use substantially in this communications effort requires 

no fixed repeaters, cable, or wire lines. Portable repeaters for VHF 

and UHF communications were provided very quickly via mobile 

facilities in the affected areas. 

Specifically, in Mississippi, FEMA dispatched amateur radio operators to hospitals and evacuation shelters to relay emergency 

calls 24 hours a day. At airports in Texas and Alabama, radio amateurs tracked evacuees and notified the Baton Rouge Operating 

Center of their whereabouts so their families would be able to find 

them. Amateur radio operators in New Orleans participated directly in locating stranded persons because local cell phone calls 

could not be made by stranded victims due to the inoperative water 

line systems in the area. The Red Cross deployed qualified Amateur Radio volunteers to 250 shelters and food kitchens in Mississippi, Alabama, and Northern Florida. 

Amateur Radio provided a critical link between Coast Guard helicopters and emergency centers because the ambulance crews could 

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not contact the helicopters directly. In Texas, Amateur radio operators worked 24 hours a day in the Astrodome in Houston, in the 

Reliance Center next door, and in the Harris County Emergency 

Operations Center. In San Antonio at the Kelly Air Force Base, 

radio amateurs from Montana provided local and national health 

and welfare communications for evacuees. These examples were repeated throughout the Gulf Coast and in the southern cities that 

received a large number of evacuees. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the Committee should be aware that 

this vast volunteer resource in support of public safety is always 

at the disposal of the Federal Government and of State and local 

Governments. The United States can absolutely rely on the Amateur Radio service. Amateur Radio provides immediate high quality 

communications that work every time when all else fails. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today on the views of the 

ARRL and its membership and I would welcome any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Harold Kramer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAROLD KRAMER, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, THE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR AMATEUR RADIO

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity 

to testify today on issues related to Public Safety Communications. As Chief Operating Officer of ARRL, the National Association for Amateur Radio, it gives me 

great pleasure to provide this statement for the record to the Committee on the successful efforts of Amateur Radio operators providing communications for First Responders, Disaster Relief agencies, and countless individuals in connection with the 

Hurricane Katrina relief effort. As has been proven consistently and repeatedly in 

the past, long before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when communications systems fail 

due to a wide-area or localized disaster, whatever the cause, Amateur Radio works, 

right away, all the time. This is not a statement of concern about what must be 

changed or improved. It is, rather, a report on what is going right, and what works 

in emergency communications, and what can be depended on to work the next time 

there is a natural disaster, and the times after that. 

Immediately at the onset of Hurricane Katrina, an all-volunteer ‘‘army’’ of approximately 1,000 FCC-licensed Amateur Radio operators provided continuous highfrequency (HF), VHF and UHF communications for State, local and Federal emergency workers in and around the affected area in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. These communications were provided for several agencies such as the American National Red Cross and the Salvation Army, and to facilitate interoperability 

between and among these agencies; First Responders; FEMA, VOAD (National Volunteers Active in Disasters) and other agencies. Trained volunteer Amateur Radio 

operators also provided health and welfare communications from within the affected 

area to the rest of the United States and the world. Amateur Radio was uniquely 

suited to this task by virtue of the availability of HF communications covering long 

distances without fixed infrastructure. During the week of September 7, 2005, the 

Coast Guard, the Red Cross, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency all 

put out calls for volunteer Amateur Radio operators to provide communications, because phone lines, cell sites and public safety repeaters were inoperative, and those 

public safety communications facilities which were operational were overwhelmed 

due to loss of repeater towers and the large number of First Responders in the area. 

Amateur Radio operators responded en masse: Approximately 200 Amateur Radio 

Emergency Service (ARES) trained communicators responded to the Gulf Coast 

within a week after the call. The Red Cross, a week after they issued the call, notified ARRL that they had enough radio operators and Amateur Radio communications facilities. The number of Amateur Radio operators providing communications 

in the three States, either deployed or awaiting relief duty on-site or at a reserve 

facility in Montgomery, Alabama, swelled from 800 to 1,000 in a week. Many more 

thousands of radio amateurs outside the affected area regularly monitored radio 

traffic and relayed thousands of messages concerning the welfare and location of victims. 

The principal reason why Amateur Radio works when other communications systems fail during natural disasters is that Amateur Radio is not infrastructure-deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
115

pendent, and is decentralized. Amateurs are trained in emergency communications. 

They are disciplined operators, and their stations are, in general, portable and reliable. High-frequency Amateur Radio communications, used substantially in this 

emergency communications effort, require no fixed repeaters, cable or wirelines. 

Portable repeaters for VHF and UHF communications can be provided via mobile 

facilities (many Amateur Radio groups deployed communications vans in the Gulf 

Coast for precisely this purpose) in affected areas instantly. There are now approximately 670,000 licensees of the FCC in the Amateur Service, which assures the 

presence of Amateur stations in most areas of the country. Emergency communications are conducted not only by voice, but also by high-speed data transmissions 

using state-of-the-art digital communications software known as WinLink. As 

Motorola’s Director of Communications and Public Affairs stated earlier this month: 

‘‘Amateur Radio communications benefit us all by having a distributed architecture 

and frequency agility that enables you to set up faster in the early phases of disaster recovery and can provide flexible and diverse communications—Motorola believes that the Amateur Radio spectrum provides valuable space for these important 

communications.’’

In Mississippi, FEMA dispatched Amateur Radio operators to hospitals and evacuation shelters to send emergency calls 24 hours per day. At airports in Texas and 

Alabama, radio amateurs tracked evacuees and notified the Baton Rouge operations 

center of their whereabouts so their families would be able to find them. Amateur 

Radio operators in New Orleans participated directly in locating stranded persons, 

because local cellphone calls could not be made by stranded victims due to the inoperative wireline systems in the area. The Red Cross deployed qualified amateur 

radio volunteers at its 250 shelter and feeding station locations, principally in Mississippi, Alabama and northern Florida. 

The local 911 operators could not handle calls from relatives calling in from outside the affected area, so they passed those ‘‘health and welfare’’ inquiries to amateur radio operators stationed at the 911 call centers, for relay of information back 

to New Orleans to facilitate rescue missions for stranded persons. 

Amateur Radio provided a communications link between Coast Guard helicopters 

and emergency centers because the ambulance crews couldn’t contact the helicopters 

directly. In Texas, Amateur Radio operators worked 24 hours per day in the Astrodome in Houston and the Reliant Center next door, and as well in the Harris County Emergency Operations Center. In San Antonio, at the Kelly Air Force Base, radio 

amateurs from Montana provided local and national health and welfare communications for evacuees. These examples were repeated throughout the Gulf Coast and 

in the cities in the southern states receiving large numbers of evacuees. 

The Salvation Army operates its own Amateur Radio communications system 

using Amateur Radio volunteers, known as SATERN. In the Hurricane Katrina effort, SATERN has joined forces with the federal SHARES program (SHAred RESources), which is a network of government, military and Military Affiliate Radio 

Service (MARS) radio stations. MARS is an organized network of Amateur Radio 

stations affiliated with the different branches of the armed forces to provide volunteer communications. SATERN, in the Katrina relief effort, received over 48,000 requests for emergency communications assistance, and the affiliation with the 

SHARES program allows the Salvation Army to utilize Federal frequencies to communicate with agencies directly. This is but one example of the innovative and reliable means by which Amateur Radio right now provides organized interoperability 

on a scope far beyond that now being planned for local and State public safety systems. 

Much discussion has been given in recent years to the issue of Public Safety interoperability. The Amateur Radio Service provides a good deal of interoperability communications for First Responders in disaster relief incidents. This critical role for 

our Service exists because, though there are interoperability channels right now in 

most Public Safety frequency allocations, those channels, and all others, become 

useless where the communications infrastructure of public safety facilities becomes 

inoperative. Interoperability, in short, presumes operability of Public Safety facilities. While some ‘‘hardening’’ of public safety facilities is called for, there is in our 

view an increasing role for decentralized, portable Amateur Radio stations which 

are not infrastructure-dependent in providing interoperability communications onsite. 

Mr. Chairman, Amateur Radio is largely invisible to both the FCC and to Congress on a daily basis, because it is virtually self-regulating and self-administered. 

It is only during emergencies that the Amateur Radio Service is in the spotlight. 

At other times, emergency communications and technical self-training and advancement of telecommunications technology occupy licensees’ time. For the first time 

ever, in recognition of the work of Amateur Radio Operators in this Hurricane Relief 

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effort, the Corporation for National And Community Service (CNCS), which provides 

strategic critical support to volunteer organizations which in turn provide services 

to communities, has made a $177,000 grant supplement to ARRL to support the 

Katrina emergency communications efforts in the Gulf Coast. This enables ARRL 

to reimburse to a small degree, on a per diem basis, some of the expenses that radio 

amateurs incur personally in traveling to the Gulf Coast to volunteer their time and 

effort. The CNCS grant is an extension of ARRL’s three-year, Homeland Security 

training grant, which has to date provided certification in emergency communication 

training protocols to approximately 5,500 Amateur Radio volunteers over the past 

three years. 

ARRL wishes to commend the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau (specifically the Special 

Counsel for Amateur Radio Enforcement), for the efficient and successful effort during the Hurricane Katrina relief in monitoring the Amateur Radio High Frequency 

bands to prevent or quickly remedy incidents of interference. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the Committee should be aware that this vast volunteer 

resource in support of Public Safety is always at the disposal of the Federal government and to State and local government. The United States absolutely can rely on 

the Amateur Radio Service. Amateur Radio provides immediate, high-quality communications that work every time, when all else fails. 

I thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify today on the views of the ARRL and its membership. I would 

welcome any questions.

Mr. UPTON. Well thank you. 

Thank you all for your very good testimony. We look forward to 

you answering some of our questions and again note that some of 

members are on other subcommittees that are meeting and we are 

expecting votes on the floor soon so we may be sending you questions like we did with the first panel. 

Mr. Roemer, we again appreciated your testimony. Something I 

said earlier, you were not here because I know you were not here 

for the entire first panel that was here, but it does look like we 

have an agreement and not only with the House and the Senate, 

but with Republicans and Democrats on actually setting a date as 

part of the transition for the DTV Bill that we are anticipating a 

move to the House floor as early as next month. And with that, of 

course, comes in, once that happens will free up some more spectrum, which is so important for our first responders and it really 

seems to be quite a theme that we have heard for some time. 

As it relates to that, Lieutenant Colonel Miller, I have seen the 

TACNET devices in some of our police vehicles back home. I think 

it was both in sheriff, county sheriff, as well as, State Police vehicles. Are those and for those in the audience, these are little mini 

computers that are in the squad car where the officer is able to 

identify with a license number, get a history of not only the driver 

but the vehicle, all those different things. They are, in fact, do provide what we need, does it not, in terms of interoperability between 

the different departments? Does the TACNET, do those devices 

have interoperability with—as it relates to the other first responders? It provides a shell to communicate with that device to the 

State Police to fire and rescue? 

Mr. MILLER. It does provide that capability, Mr. Chairman, it is 

multifaceted technology in the sense that one of the primary benefits of the technology is it improves the interior ergonomics and 

safety of the patrol car. But in addition to that, they have fashioned the technology to provide the capability to link up to five disparate systems or frequencies so that they can communicate within 

a specific geographical area. 

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Mr. UPTON. Now does that utilize the 800 megahertz spectrum, 

do you know? 

Mr. MILLER. It can operate at any spectrum level based on whatever system the agencies within that geographical area are operating on. 

Mr. UPTON. Now how is that again? I am making it sort of a 

Michigan related question. Our delegation, Mr. Stupak, myself, 

others, the Senate, as well, work very hard to get a weapons of 

mass destruction team, civil support team which is now based, as 

it turns out, in Battle Creek at Fort Custer. I watched some of 

their operations as they integrate their personnel with different 

first responders in my district but I know they have been to the 

Upper Peninsula and other places around. I also know that they 

work with other States as part of the Defense Authorization Bill 

a couple of years ago. Every State is now going to have one of these 

teams and they have a pretty sophisticated communication device 

and I think they have five vehicles, 22 staff, but obviously communications where they can downlink right into the Pentagon and 

work, integrate again with our first responders. Have you worked 

with that particular team out of Battle Creek? 

Mr. MILLER. Our personnel have. Congressman we have a comprehensive strategy in the State where our military affairs, Department of Military Affairs, our military have the State public safety 

communication system equipment and have access to that equipment. They are in the State EOC in the case of any event or any 

disaster. So they absolutely have the ability to communicate with 

public safety and coordinate a response to any type of incident 

within our State. 

Mr. UPTON. And the equipment they have obviously is mobile. I 

mean one of the reasons why they are in Battle Creek is that there 

is an Air Force installation there so they are able to use the runways, but it is also on an interstate and they are actually able to 

deploy, you know, with relative ease throughout the State. 

Mr. Trujillo, one of the things we heard quite a bit and I had 

some private conversations with Chairman Martin earlier this 

week and the last couple weeks actually was the great success of 

the satellite industry in terms of coming to the needs of those with 

Katrina in the ability finally to bring in literally thousands of devices begin to set up the links terrestrial with the satellite. Some 

of that was mobile that they brought in, but I think some of the 

firms had literally one drop. How important is it to have a stockpile of this equipment to be able to pre-deploy it in a variety of different places around the country and how active is—what do you 

see the needs of the satellite industry in terms of providing that 

type of benefit and who should manage it? Should it be directly our 

first responders, should it be through the DHS, maybe through regional offices, should the FCC? What are some of your suggestions 

as it relates to that? 

Mr. TRUJILLO. Well assuming the question, Mr. Chairman that 

mainly following the disaster that it became clear there was a paucity of mobile satellite phones in the State of Mississippi and certainly one of the things we are advocating is the idea that we ought 

to pre-deploy some of this equipment to areas that it can be quickly 

funneled into the affected areas before a disaster strikes. So we 

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certainly think that pre-deployment and credentialing satellite personnel to help with the infrastructure there is very important. 

In terms of at the Federal, State, and local levels who should be 

responsible, I think in some of these disasters such as a Katrina, 

it clearly would benefit from a Federal coordination effort in whether it is this new bureau that Chairman Martin discussed or, you 

know, an internal agency sort of set of some kind. The important 

thing is to secure satellite capacity ahead of time, secure the satellite equipment ahead of time and have it pre-deployed so that it 

is immediately available when disaster strikes. That would be very 

helpful. 

Mr. UPTON. Let me ask one more question before I yield to my 

colleague and that is we saw Katrina coming. I mean all of us that 

watch The Weather Channel, CNN, a couple days saw this, you 

know, giant storm moving its way through the Keys and then up. 

At what point did the satellite industry realize that they needed to 

come up—that they could really be of true assistance by providing 

these devices? Was it after the storm hit? Were there any preparations made before the storm hit in terms of assembling caches of 

these, of this material and be willing to respond to FEMA and others that—when it was ready? At what point did you really start 

hitting the panic button and getting things ready? 

Mr. TRUJILLO. Well generally speaking, I would say that it was 

certainly a case that our commercial customers were much more 

sensitized to the impending disaster that was looming on the television screen and heading toward the Gulf Coast. And we were already working with our commercial customers and to a degree also 

with the Government customers. But the problem was is that there 

was not the equipment, the satellite phones, and that kind of 

equipment on the ground already or in preset staging areas that 

you could truck it in very quickly or fly it in very quickly. The wonderful thing about the satellites are that they are 22,000 miles 

above the earth’s equator. They are impervious to what is going on 

on the surface of the earth. It is just a matter of getting the equipment to the right people, first responders and others. 

Mr. UPTON. Last question very briefly, how hard was it to get 

that XM station literally into a local station that folks on the 

ground could listen to? Did they have to get a special waiver from 

the FCC? 

Mr. TRUJILLO. No, sir. The issue there really was that if you 

were not an XM radio customer, you would not have gotten access 

to it. 

Mr. UPTON. You would not get it. 

Mr. TRUJILLO. Right, that was the issue there. 

Mr. UPTON. So they had the capacity to add the station? 

Mr. TRUJILLO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Stupak? 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Congressman Roemer, good to see you again. 

Mr. ROEMER. Good to see you, Congressman. 

Mr. STUPAK. You were co-chair on the 911 Commission when 

Governor King said after Katrina hit he said ‘‘It is the same thing 

all over again. It is a lack of communication, first responders not 

being able to talk to each other. It is no command and control. NoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Mar 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24252.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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body is in charge. It is delayed responses. It is basically many of 

the things that frankly if some of our recommendation had been 

passed by the U.S. Congress, that could have been avoided.’’ And 

your statement today seemed to echo those same comments. In 

fact, the 9/11 Commission said Federal funding of such interagency 

communication units should be given a high priority. And do you 

think Congress has heeded that advice? 

Mr. ROEMER. Well Congressman, in my testimony, what I am 

very clear about is that we need to do this now not next week, not 

2 years from now, not 4 years from now, as quickly as possible. 

Look, we know that we are going to have another natural disaster. 

We know Al Qaeda or jihadists are going to attack us again. We 

know looking back at 9/11 that lives were lost because we did not 

have interoperability and we did not have access to public radio 

spectrum. We know in New Orleans that lives were lost because we 

did not have this capability. We need it now. These folks need it 

now. And we are very clear about that. 

We are also very clear, Congressman as you well know as a fiscal 

conservative that we outline in the 9/11 Commission report, Lieutenant Colonel Miller talked at length about this. He needs funding 

for aging equipment. Congress needs not to spend money, you 

know, on how pork barrel weighs on Homeland Security but to respond to a national strategic plan developed by Homeland Security 

and Congress that will invest wisely in things like public radio 

spectrum, incident command and control, evacuation plans that are 

worked, practiced, and simulated so that we can get people out of 

the fourth largest city in the country like Houston. We are not 

doing that. We have not done any of those three things yet, incident command and control, evacuation plans that are tested and 

simulated for Federal Funds to be allocated and this public radio 

spectrum. So we hope Congress will act right away on these kinds 

of initiatives. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well even if it costs, and I do not believe it does, 

but even if it costs $18 billion to make us fully interoperable, when 

you pass a budget that has $106 billion in tax breaks for a limited 

number of people in this country, I would think we would cut that 

back at least $18 billion and get us interoperable so all Americans 

can be protected during natural disaster and a terrorist attack, 

wherever it might be. 

The part that baffles me a little bit is it almost seems like we 

use this 700 megahertz spectrum sale which is supposed to be in 

2008 as an excuse not to do anything like nothing can happen. We 

cannot do anything because we got to sell the spectrum and then 

we will be able to do it. But Lieutenant Colonel Miller in your testimony, you talk about TACNET and in fact a question by Mr.—

Chairman Upton you talked about patch and that technology has 

been around for awhile. And we have Mr. Trujillo, I am sorry, satellite phones. Why can’t we—we knew that Hurricane Katrina was 

going to hit. We all watched it. We knew it was going to—they 

could tell you the exact time it was going to hit and we knew that 

for days. Why could not we put some TACNET, some patch, code 

spear, satellite phones down there? Why couldn’t we pre-deploy it? 

Why couldn’t we interface communication systems with patch or 

120

TACNET or some of the other technologies you are using right now 

in Michigan? 

Mr. MILLER. Michigan State Police responded with other Michigan law enforcement agencies to assist down there. We took our 

communications equipment there and we operated out of Louisiana 

State Police communication system. We reprogrammed, the technology is there. It is not something that——

Mr. STUPAK. How long did it take you to reprogram it? 

Mr. MILLER. We reprogrammed those radios probably in 

hours——

Mr. STUPAK. We knew days before that Katrina was going to hit. 

We knew that it was going to be a Category 4 or 5 but no one 

thought of it. 

Mr. MILLER. Right. 

Mr. STUPAK. You know, I called the guys from Cold Spear and 

said could you have done something, could you have interfaced the 

communication system in greater New Orleans? They sure, I said, 

how much time do you need, just a couple hours. That is interfacing it through their computer system and I know you are using 

it for your emergency services. I know Wayne Gulley is using it. 

But aren’t you using the same system with Ohio right now as pilot 

program? 

Mr. MILLER. There is some alerting and notification pilots that 

we are doing there. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. 

Mr. MILLER. The big issue in my mind as a law enforcement administrator is you cannot legislate leadership. And a lot of discussion has gone on today about proper planning, proper training, 

proper coordination, proper exercise and Congressman Roemer 

mentioned that. The Department of Homeland Security funds those 

types of initiatives today. The real issue is getting people to the 

table to develop a strategy in ensuring that the Federal Government requires the State and local Government to adhere to a 

standard and to adhere and to develop a strategy before you fund 

anything. If you are funding initiatives that are not cooperative efforts that are not enhancing interoperability and you are not tying 

those funding requirements to that, you are going to continue to 

have agencies out there purchasing equipment that is not going to 

communicate with each other. And that is really the issue here is 

developing those requirements at the Federal level and then ensuring at a State and local level that there is leadership that places 

a proper sense of urgency on this issue. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure, I do not dispute that and I agree having been 

in law enforcement that there is jurisdictional turf wars many 

times when you are doing this thing but I would think when you 

have a Hurricane 5, Level 5 bearing down on you, a little common 

sense would prevail and you could bring the satellite phones and 

get them properly deployed. I think I read somewhere there was 

only 200 in all of the Gulf Region when Katrina hit. Well, why 

don’t we pre-deploy that stuff. Why don’t we have your patch system and others there? Why do we have to wait until after the fact 

and then why does the helicopters from the Coast Guard cannot 

talk to the people in the boats as we are all talking about when 

it could be done if we just pre-deploy, plan ahead. Someone has 

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got—I mean, the President declared the Gulf Region a national disaster area before, a day or two before the storm ever hit, I think 

48 hours before. So I guess maybe it is leadership but I get frustrated sitting here. I have heard this for so many years. 

And someone mentioned the plane going down the Potomac that 

was in 1982. I was still in the State Police then. I remember that 

well. And then that was the start of the—Congress should have 

been alerted then in 1982 since it happened in their back yard 

about interoperability and I have heard about this for 20, 30 years 

since I have been in police work. But it is just sort of frustrating 

to sit here and it seems like we always have excuses below practical common knowledge and we could get some of this stuff done 

before it hits. We know that there are certain cities that are subject 

for a terrorist attack. Why can’t we pre-deploy right now? We do 

not have to wait for 700 megahertz spectrum sale. 

And I am not going to go to you, Chairman, on that but I am 

just—the frustration just continues on and on here. 

So I thank all of you for providing good insight to us and we appreciate everything you have done. 

Mr. UPTON. Well I share those sentiments and I was looking forward to supporting the gentleman from Michigan’s amendment 

yesterday on the Department of Justice Bill that would have added, 

I think a half a billion dollars for interoperability and sadly it was 

denied as an amendment on the House floor but I was looking forward to voting for that and was surprised when it was not allowed. 

But I just want to again underscore our thanks to all of you. It 

is helpful for all of us. I cannot think of a higher priority within 

the Department of Homeland Security as we look to defend not 

only our first responders, the men and women that put their lives 

on the line every day but in order to do their job to help all of us 

non-first responders, they have got to have that equipment and for 

the life of me, sometimes I do not understand some of the priorities 

within the funding stream of what their providing when, in fact, 

here we are 4 years later and it is the same thing happened again. 

Who knows that it would not be the same result that we have been 

commiserating about over the last 4 years. So again, I appreciate 

your testimony, your work. We look forward to hearing from you 

in the days and months ahead and we wish you the very best. 

Thank you. We will adjourn the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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