i

YEMEN AND STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF:

CONFRONTING THE THREAT FROM WITHIN

Stephen C. Pelletiere

May 22, 1996
ii

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iii

FOREWORD

Yemen is one of the oldest societies in the Middle East. It

sits athwart one of the world's most strategic waterways, and

hence, throughout the Cold War, the United States and Soviet

Union contended for influence over it. With the end of the Cold

War, Yemen's fortunes sank. Soviet support vanished, and the

United States saw little need to cultivate Sana'a, particularly

in light of Yemen's actions preceding the Gulf War.

This study argues that Yemen should not be abandoned. It is

part of the vital Persian Gulf system, which the United States

has pledged to uphold. That whole system could be destabilized

by conflicts that currently simmer on Yemen's borders. The study

suggests ways in which Yemen could be assisted economically, and

also how tensions between it and its most important neighbor,

Saudi Arabia, could be attenuated.

Finally, the study focuses attention on a problem of growing

importance for U.S. policymakers--that of the so-called failed

state. It rarely happens, the author declares, that states can

be allowed to fail without undermining regional stability. And

sometimes--as looms in the case with Yemen--the damage could be

considerable.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE received his Ph.D. in International

Politics from the University of California, Berkeley. In the

early 1960s he served in the Middle East as a foreign

correspondent during which time he was based in Beirut. Dr.

Pelletiere returned to the Lebanese capital in 1970, for a stay

at Shemlan, the Arabic language school of the British government.

 In 1975, when the Lebanese civil war erupted, Dr. Pelletiere was

in Cairo, Egypt, conducting research on a Fulbright Fellowship. 

He interviewed refugees fleeing Lebanon to Egypt, including many

United Nations professionals. Dr. Pelletiere has taught at the

University of California, Berkeley; at Ripon College, in

Wisconsin; and at Union College, Schenectady, NY. From 1982

until 1987 he was an intelligence officer in Washington

monitoring the Iran-Iraq War. He came to the Strategic Studies

Institute in 1988, and became a full professor in 1992. He has

written two books on the Middle East: The Kurds--An Unstable

Element in the Gulf, and The Iran War--Chaos in a Vacuum.
v

SUMMARY

This study looks at Yemen, a small state which over the

course of centuries has played a minor--but nonetheless

important--part in the history of the Middle East. Yemen's

importance derived from its strategic location. At various times

great powers wishing to control the Red Sea/Indian Ocean area

tried to take over Yemen. (See Figure 1.)

Now that the Soviet Union is no more and the United States

alone is a superpower, Yemen's strategic value seemingly is at

an end; U.S. policymakers apparently believe that, with Moscow

out of the picture, the importance of Yemen has declined.

At the same time, however, tensions between Yemen and its

neighbors have recently disturbed relations in the crucial

Persian Gulf region. This study argues that, unless these

tensions are resolved, the whole Persian Gulf system could be

destablized, and thus U.S. policymakers must rethink relations

with Sana'a. The study tracks how the current disputes over

Yemen developed, and then describes how they are likely to affect

Gulf stability, which America has pledged to uphold.
1

YEMEN AND STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF:

CONFRONTING THE THREAT FROM WITHIN

Introduction.

Under the New World Order, American interest in the Middle

East has undergone fundamental change. Whereas in the past the

area was of great strategic importance to Washington, now the

strategic aspect is no longer of such concern. With the Soviet

Union gone, the United States does not need to buttress its

military might in obscure corners of southwest Asia. Economics is

what counts today, and only those countries that are strong

trading partners of the United States remain of interest.

In the Middle East only a handful of countries are

commercially important to the United States;1 these are the socalled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.2

 The United States

has undertaken extraordinary measures to show its support of

these small, but extremely influential, entities.

At the same time, other countries in the region, once the

recipients of Washington's special regard, now are out of favor.

One such state--which once was a key ally of the West--is Yemen.

Situated on the Bab al Mandab (see Figure 1), Yemen formerly was

the object of an intense struggle between the Soviet Union and

the United States. Both tried to lure the Yemenis into an

alliance, plying them with offers of military and economic

assistance. This enabled Sana'a to maintain itself despite the

fact that Yemen is among the poorest countries in the world.3

As soon as the Cold War ended, the United States found that

it could dispense with having to worry lest Yemen fall into

Soviet hands. In 1991, Washington cut Agency for International

Development (AID) funds to Sana'a from $50 millon to just under

$3 million.4

This was a blow to the Yemenis. Suddenly Sana'a was forced

to depend on its own meager resources. To be sure, Yemen has

oil, but this has only recently been discovered, and the Yemenis

have scant infrastructure with which to develop their finds (a

matter to be discussed below).

Not long after the cut was made, several disturbing events

occurred--first, a major civil war blew up in Yemen, which the

government barely was able to quell; next, Saudi Arabia tried to

take over territory claimed by its neighbor; and, finally,

Eritrea, at the end of last year, seized an island (Hanish al

Kabir) garrisoned with Yemeni troops (see Figure 1).

Given the seriousness of these incidents, Washington's
2

apparent continued indifference toward Yemen was hard to fathom.5
3
4

But then, just as this study was being readied for the printer,

Washington did take action. It moved indirectly (through the

International Monetary Fund [IMF]), but the effect was to bolster

the regime in Sana'a, and this could only be welcomed.

Nonetheless, the study goes on to argue that Washington's

moves may not be enough. More needs to be done, if this problem

is not to fester, and ultimately grow into something large and

dangerous.

U.S. policymakers seem to believe that threats to Gulf

security come only from without, specifically from Iraq and Iran.

In fact, significant dangers are developing from within the Gulf,

and one of the most dangerous involves local discontents over

Yemen.

Stability in the region requires adequate responses to the

Saudi-Yemeni, Eritrean-Yemeni discords, and a changed approach to

dealing with area security problems in general.

In the New World Order, policymakers must think

systemically. If the United States is to maintain stability in

the Gulf, it must be concerned with all of the states in the

area; Washington cannot restrict its concern to the narrow focus

of just a few. A seemingly inconsequential entity like Yemen can

bring the whole Gulf system crashing down if its problems are not

attended to.

The study opens with a look at the early history of Yemen,

which forms the basis of the Yemenis' fierce national pride, and

also what makes them so dangerous to offend. It then proceeds to

detail the long rivalry between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in which

the Yemenis consistently have given as good as they got.

Next, the study deals with the period of unification, when

north and south Yemen--formerly two separate countries--allied

themselves. For a time after that, the future of Yemen seemed

full of promise, but then, with the outbreak of the Second Gulf

War,6

 the bright hopes perished. Yemen sided with Iraq in that

struggle, a step which cost it dearly, as the study will show.

The study ends with a call for a critique of U.S. policy

which I maintain is leading towards a dangerous situation, one

that could quite easily get out of hand. Thus, there is a need

for a review by U.S. policymakers of the policy of the United

States, not only towards Yemen, but for the entire Gulf.

Yemen and the Glory Days.

Yemen has an impressive past, going back to pre-Biblical
5

times. It was here, almost before recorded history, that a

kingdom arose that served as an entrepot between Southeast Asia

and the Middle East, and also between the Middle East and Africa.

Yemen was the starting point for one of the Middle East's oldest

caravan routes. Merchants from here travelled north, carrying

spices to Saudi Arabia and beyond to Damascus and Baghdad.7

The Yemenis originally were traders. They were also great

masons. They built the Great Dam at Marib, one of the wonders of

the ancient world. All of this splendor is gone now. Practically

no evidence remains of the civilization that flourished in what

is today modern Yemen.8

Yemen reenters history with the appearance of the Prophet

Muhammad in the 7th century. The north of Yemen became the home

of a peculiar sect of Muslims, the Zaydis. These were Shias,

which links them to the Iranians, who constitute the bulk of

Shias under Islam. However, the relationship of the two groups

is tenuous, since the Zaydis never subscribed to the extreme

practices for which the Iranian Shias are known. In that

respect, they are closer to the conservative Sunnis.9

Yemen was a frontier land of the Ottoman Empire. It was so

far off the track, it almost was not a part of the civilized

world. The Ottoman Turks were only able to conquer portions of

Yemen, mainly the Red Sea littoral. They never penetrated far

inland.

Yemen is extremely rugged territory. A chain of mountains

stretches along the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean (see Figure 2),

and then runs east to Oman and the Gulf. In places, the chain

rises to heights of several thousand meters. In former times, the

mountains were forested. Today, they are virtually bare.

Successive generations of Yemenis have denuded them for wood.

Despite the harshness of the landscape, the Yemenis manage

to farm. They do so assiduously and with great skill, building

terraces high on the mountainsides, on which they produce mainly

coffee and qat. The latter is a mild narcotic the Yemenis take in

ritualized settings. Supposedly, it promotes a feeling of good

will, ameliorating the Yemenis's normally disputatious

personalities.10

In the late 1980s, North Yemen, with a population (at the

time of six million), had over 50,000 settlements, of which the

average size was only 90 people.11 Only three of these had a

population of more than 50,000, six with more than 10,000, and

134 with more than 1,000. That Yemen could function as a modern

state with a demographic base such as this is impressive.

The Yemenis are a tough people, organized primarily along
6

tribal lines. The tribes (in the north, at least) are presided
7

over by sayyids, i.e., religious figures who claim descent from

the Prophet. Until the 20th century, Yemen was ruled by a socalled Imam, also a descendent of the Prophet.

This Imam held power of life and death over his subjects.

That power had to be wielded deftly as the Yemenis, being a

tribal people, practice the vendetta. Great tension exists

between ruler and ruled. A chief who exercises good judgment (and

has charisma) will do well; a heedless (and weak) ruler is

unlikely to survive.12 Finally, the significant fact about the

Yemenis is that until World War I, they and the Morrocans were

the only two Arab peoples never to have been conquered.

Into the Modern Age.

Yemen was never totally conquered. However, the southern

part of the country was taken over by the British in the early

19th century. The British wanted Aden (see Figure 1), then a mere

fishing village of only 500.13 Aden is one of the best natural

ports in the Red Sea/Indian Ocean area, and is also--because of

its location--of great strategic importance.
8

In the last century India was the cynosure of British

foreign policy. The sub-continent was the source of much of

Britain's wealth, and, to secure it against foreign penetration,

London established bases throughout the Red Sea/Indian Ocean

area. Aden was one such base. After the French built the Suez

Canal (circa 1875), the Red Sea became a conduit for vessels

entering the Indian Ocean from the Mediterranean, and, from Aden,

Britain could control this traffic. Although initially a

checkpoint, Aden later developed into a commercial center. 

Indeed, it was not long before Aden became one of the foremost

bunkering stations for ocean-going traffic in the Middle East.

Technically, Britain took Aden from the Turks. But, as

already indicated, the Ottoman Empire's hold on Yemen never was

absolute. Consequently it did not take much for the British to

prise the southern region away from Istanbul. Then, after World

War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Britain took

control of southern Yemen de jure as well as de facto.

The Imam of Yemen, whose capital Sana'a was located to the

north of Aden, resented British machinations in the south.

However, there was little he could do about it. The Imam had been

a nominal ally of the Central Powers in World War I, and this

complicated attempts to defy the British once that war had ended.

The outcome of World War I affected Yemen in another way. 

During the war the British navy switched from coal-to oil-powered

ships. Britain's main supplier of oil was Iran, where the

British-controlled Anglo-Persian Oil Company had an exclusive

concession. Britain tried to build a refinery in Iran, but the

plan was frustrated by nationalist agitators. This forced London

to look for an alternate site, and it decided on Yemen. Thus it

was that one of the largest oil refineries in the Middle East

rose at Aden, transforming the lives of not only the southern

Yemenis but the northerners as well.14

The British used local labor to build the refinery and

afterward employed Yemenis in its operation. The work force had

to be housed, fed, and clothed, and thus the area's economy was

reinvigorated. Moreover, Aden attracted immigrants from India,

Ethiopia, and Somalia. By 1963 the city's population had risen to

225,000, and it had become a major entrepot--as it had been in

Biblical times.15

However, one unanticipated (by the British) development of

Aden's transformation was the appearance of labor militancy. The

refinery workers unionized, and it was not long before the union

grew into the most powerful in the Middle East. Ironically--from

the standpoint of the British--it was the unionists who

ultimately led the fight to oust Britain from Aden, and from the
9

whole of south Yemen.16

Initial Clashes with the Saudis.

As stated, the Imam of Yemen was displeased over the British

taking control of southern Yemen. He capitulated because at the

time he was pressured by the Saudis. Coincidentally, with the

British seizure and subsequent development of Aden, there

appeared in Saudi Arabia a conservative religious movement known

as the Wahhabiis. This movement, championed by the house of Saud,

embarked on a campaign of conquest. Ultimately Ibn Saud, the

founder of the current dynasty, seized practically all of the

Arabian peninsula including an area known as Asir (see Figure 1).

This latter territory was claimed by the Imam.

The Imam could not hold Asir because of the venality of the

local chiefs. They took bribes in the form of rifles and

ammunition, which the Saudis dispensed to them. Nonetheless, the

Imam resisted stubbornly, and, in the end, the Saudis negotiated

a truce whereby they agreed to lease Asir, thus abandoning

attempts to annex it.17

Having practically lost out in this contest, the Imam was

not in a position to defy Britain over Aden. He agreed to a

treaty that demarcated the boundary between his northern holdings

and South Yemen, which stipulated that no changes be made in the

governing arrangements of the south once the treaty was signed.18

But then Britain decided that physical possession of the

port of Aden was not enough. London also wanted to control the

southern hinterland, stretching along the Indian Ocean portion of

the peninsula (see Figure 1). To secure this, the British plied

the princes of the coastal region with weapons.19

This was a significant shift in British policy towards the

region. London was aiming to set up a loose confederation of

princely states that would shut the Saudis off from the Indian

Ocean—an important point, because, as will be shown below,

attempts to deny the Saudis southern access recurred in later

years.

While this was going on (in the late 1930s), Britain

appeared invincible. However, forces had begun to operate which

eventually would destroy the hegemony of Great Britain over the

entire Middle East.

The Fate of Empire.

After World War II, Britain suffered a succession of

humiliations, starting in 1951 when Iran nationalized the Anglo-
10

Iranian Oil Company.20 Following that blow, in 1956 Egypt's Arab

Nationalist leader Gamal Abdul Nasser seized the Suez Canal.

Britain tried to abort the takeover by going to war with Cairo.

Ultimately, however, it lost. Then in 1958, a newly installed

Arab Nationalist regime in Baghdad ejected the British from Iraq.

Thus, as of the mid-1960s, Britain's only apparently solid 

base in the Middle East was Aden. Britain's Conservative Party

determined to hold on to it at all costs. However, a strong

nationalist movement had by this time appeared in South Yemen.

The leading dissidents were those unionists mentioned earlier,

many of whom were ideological Marxists.21

Britain's Labor Party came to power in October 1964, and it

decided that Britain's presence in South Yemen was too expensive

to maintain. Economic conditions in Britain had deteriorated

after World War II, and the British public would no longer bear

the costs of empire. Thus, in February 1966, the Labor government

decreed that Britain would pull out--not only from South Yemen

but from all its bases "East of Suez," which effectively ended

the era of British colonialism.22

The Arab Nationalist Phase.

I referred earlier to the difficulties encountered by the

Imam of Yemen over the Saudis' policy of suborning the tribes.

This taught the Imam a lesson, viz., that he must have a private

army. The Yemeni tribes--as with tribes anywhere--are not easy to

manage. Before they act, they must achieve consensus, and even

after consensus is obtained, nothing ensures that the tribesmen

will not later change their minds.23

Thus in the late 1940s the Imam Yahia (Yemen's ruler at the

time) began sending Yemeni youths to Egypt and to Iraq for

military training. This seemed a safe choice, since both

countries were then ruled by hereditary monarchs and therefore

sympathetic to the Imam, himself a royal figure. However, it was

not long before, first in Egypt, later in Iraq, the royal rulers

were swept from power by republican revolutions.

In the case of Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser took hold of

government there in 1952. Nasser was the first true Arab

Nationalist leader, and, in line with his philosophy of uniting

the Arabs to oppose Israel and the West, in 1958 he formed the

United Arab Republic (UAR). The UAR initially was a union of

Egypt and Syria, although the aim, ultimately, was to draw all of

the Arab states into a single political unit. For reasons that

were never adequately explained, the Imam Ahmad, who had

succeeded Imam Yahia, decided to make his country a part of the

UAR, at which point the name of the union changed to the United
11

Arab States (UAS).

The formation of the UAS was perceived as threatening to

many conservative Middle Easterners. It was not that Egypt and

Syria (even with the addition of Yemen) were all that powerful;

in resource terms, they were weak. But, Cairo, under Nasser, was

a center of propaganda. Nasser's agents skillfully played on

resentments of the various Arab states for the "colonialists."

From 1955 on, several Arab leaders joined the Arab Nationalist

cause. In practice, this meant turning against the West.

The Soviet Union also became involved with the Arab

Nationalists. Under Khrushchev, the Soviets took advantage of the

burgeoning anti-Western sentiment to become a principal sponsor

of Arab Nationalist regimes. Thus, by the early 1960s, Arab

Nationalism, which originally excited the fears mainly of the old

colonialists, and of Israel, became the bete noire of Washington

as well.24

At the same time, however, once the Soviet Union entered the

scene, a counter movement developed of Middle Easterners who

looked to Washington for protection. These, by and large,

comprised the area monarchs. Chief among them was King Feisal of

Saudi Arabia. Initially, the rivalry between Feisal and Nasser

was confined to a war of words, but gradually this cold war

turned hot as the two leaders got into actual clashes over

Yemen.25

Before Imam Ahmad died in 1962, he had taken Yemen out of

the UAS, but his decision came too late. Several senior Yemeni

officers had already fallen under Nasser's spell. Living in Cairo

and subjected to the Egyptian's propaganda, the officers joined

the Arab Nationalists, castigating the Imam, their erstwhile

benefactor, as a retrograde representative of the ancien

regime.Thus when Ahmad died and his son Badr inherited, the

renegade military men mounted a coup in which they expressed

their loyalty to Nasser. The officers made a big mistake,

however; they failed to capture Badr, much less kill him. The new

Imam escaped to the north to find shelter with the tribes. And

there he threw himself on the mercy of the Saudis.

The Civil War in Yemen.

Confronted by hostile Arab Nationalists, Badr embraced the

only individual who had a hope of saving him, viz., Feisal. The

Saudi ruler deplored the appearance of yet another Arab

Nationalist regime, this one virtually on his doorstep. The king

was particularly distressed because in a previous Arab

Nationalist takeover, the reigning monarch had been murdered.26

Therefore, despite the long-standing enmity between their two
12

countries, King Feisal felt bound to uphold the cause of his

neighbor, the Imam.

Within months, Yemeni royalist forces, comprising mainly the

tribes, were at war with Sana'a's "modern" army, which, although

it fought determinedly, was no match for the tribesmen in their

mountain redoubts. The struggle was more and more taken over by

the Egyptians. It is estimated that by the mid-1960s Nasser had

committed at least 40,000 troops to the Yemeni imbroglio (some

put the figure as high as 85,000).27

Yemen was Egypt's Vietnam. From 1962 to 1967--when Nasser

ought to have been concentrating on Israel--he instead was

obsessed with Yemen, a morass into which he sank deeper and

deeper. Yemen, as mentioned earlier, is extremely mountainous,

the perfect territory for guerrilla warfare. A Yemeni tribesman,

with a thorough knowledge of terrain, could inflict significant

damage on Egyptian units attempting to maneuver in unfamiliar

territory. It is a measure of the Egyptians' frustration that

they were driven to use gas against the tribesmen, howbeit

ineffectually.28

Several times over the course of the war, attempts were made

 to bring the conflict to a close. However, after 1966 Nasser

lost interest in peacemaking. The British announcement that they

would quit Aden spurred the Egyptian leader into expanding his

horizons. He now felt confident that, if he could only defeat

the Yemeni royalists, he would then be in a position to exploit

the power vacuum in the south caused by Britain's departure. And

then, once the Egyptians took over in the south, they could deny

the Saudis access to the Indian Ocean, which, of course, was what

the British had tried to accomplish earlier.29

Unfortunately for Nasser, he committed a number of blunders

and thus was drawn into the disastrous Six-Day War, in which not

only Egypt, but the entire Arab world, was humiliated. After

that, the Egyptians left Yemen forthwith. A conference was held

in Khartoum in August 1967, at which time Nasser agreed to pull

out in return for a subsidy from Saudi Arabia.30

The Yemeni royalists, spurred on by the Saudis, then

attempted to seize Sana'a and failed. After that, the Saudis

induced their clients to accept a compromise solution; the

royalists entered into an alliance with the republicans, an

arrangement which ensured the unity of North Yemen. In fact, the

republic became a conservative, right-leaning bastion, which

seemed to endear it to the Saudis. On the eve of the 1973 ArabIsraeli War--and the associated Arab oil embargo (which enriched

the Saudis almost beyond belief)--this was not a bad position for

the Yemenis.
13

The Marxist Republic in the South.

As noted above, Nasser thought at one point in the Yemeni

Civil War that, if he could just hold out against and ultimately

overcome the royalists, he could co-opt South Yemen after Great

Britain's departure. The Egyptian leader had reason to hope this

would come about, since parties sympathetic to Cairo were active

in the South's rebellion. However, it was not Arab Nationalists--

of the Nasser-stripe--that won out there, but rather doctrinaire

Marxists, of the reddest hue.

It appears that after years of labor militancy the

southerners were enamored of Marxism which, earlier in the 20th

century, seemed to be the wave of the future. When the radicals

took power, they set up the first Marxist republic in the Middle

East. (For all the willingness of the Arabs to ally with the

Soviet Union during the Cold War, only one Arab state, South

Yemen, ever actually adopted Marxism as the ideology of the

regime.)

To all of this, the Soviet Union lent its support and, as a

reward, was given a number of perks. Most important, from the

point of view of the West, the Soviet Navy was invited to take

advantage of Aden's facilities, and thus it abandoned its Indian

Ocean berth in Berbera, Somalia (see Figure 1).

As may be imagined, all of the above developments proved

dismaying to Washington and Riyadh. By this time, the civil war

in North Yemen had ended, and the formerly warring parties had

been reconciled. With good relations established, the Saudis--

with Washington's assistance--moved to make the north a bastion

against southern subversion. North Yemen went along with this,

mainly because the Sana'a government was now assured of arms

supplies from the United States by way of Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis, however, dispensed the weapons equally to the

central government and to the tribes. This caused friction with

Sana'a's leaders, who saw Saudi policy as inhibiting the Yemeni

government's taking control of the country. Thus, in the 1970s,

Sana'a looked around for an alternate supply of weapons, which it

found in Moscow, concluding a large arms deal with the Russians

in 1979.31

As a consequence, by the late 1970s, Yemen--north and south-

-had become a veritable arms bazaar, with weapons flowing to the

area from both East and West. Unfortunately for the two Yemens,

they used the arms against each other, which effectively

precluded any hope of unification.

Interestingly, among the Yemenis--north and south--strong
14

sentiment existed for unity. It seems that, for all their

feuding, both parties wanted a unified state. The South Yemenis

actually wrote into their constitution that they would strive for

ultimate union.

Be that as it may, the reality was that the Yemenis fought

each other. Actual firefights erupted along the north-south

border, and several high ranking officials on both sides were

assassinated by killers hired by one or the other of the parties.

Several commentators have detected Saudi intriguing in these

incidents--Riyadh apparently not only backed Sana'a against the

Marxist south, but on occasion lent support to the Marxists to

embarrass the northerners.32

This constant maneuvering for ascendency went on until 1978,

when Ali Abdullah Salih, the north's present ruler, took over.

Salih pushed a policy of moderation, and, partly as a

consequence, the rivalry began to cool. Ultimately it became

possible to effect union, which came about because of a

remarkable series of events.

To begin with, the Berlin Wall went down in 1989, signalling

the collapse of the Soviet Empire. As a result, South Yemen had

no patron. Then, practically coincidentally, reports of

previously suspected oil deposits were confirmed in an area

straddling the north-south border. As long as the two Yemens were

at odds, these potentially rich fields could not be exploited. 

And therefore the time seemed ripe for another try at

unification.

Various Strategies.

If one looks back at this period, what does one find?

Essentially that over the years the Yemenis--north and south--

exploited three separate strategies. The first, which might be

called the strategy of xenophobia, operated from the early 19th

century to just after World War II. This was an attempt to keep

the world at a distance. It was not very successful. It failed

to keep the British from taking Aden in the south, and, in the

north, the Yemenis also had to give way to the Saudis over Asir.33

So by the late 1950s, the xenophobia strategy had broken

down, to be replaced by the strategy of the "third force." This

was an attempt by the Yemenis--the Imam, specifically--to offset

pressures on his regime by finding a third party with whom he

could ally. The Imam thought he had found such an offsetting

force in Egypt's Nasser.

Nasser, in those days, was unambiguously opposed to the

British. The Egyptian leader sprang from a tradition of Egyptian
15

anticolonialism, dedicated to breaking Britain's hold over that

country. Nasser was also, by temperment, anti-Saudi, or rather

antimonarchy. He viewed the institution of the monarchy as

retrogressive. In Nasser's view, kings belonged to Egypt's past.

The Arab nation that Nasser was trying to call to life had no

place for pharaohs.

For the Yemenis to ally with Nasser, therefore, seemed not

to make any sense, since the Imam was a monarch, no different

than Feisal or any of the other oil shaykhs Nasser professed to

despise. Still, among Middle Easterners it is well known that

"the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Perhaps for this reason the

alliance was struck.

In my view, something more was involved, viz., economics. 

Arab Nationalism was a vehicle for have-nots, and in the 1960s,

there were many have-not states among the Arabs. Egypt, Syria,

Jordan--all were comparatively poor countries, as, of course, was

Yemen. Indeed, next to these, Yemen was practically an economic

basket case.

What Arab Nationalism proposed was to treat all Arab states

as a single entity, and then to share out the wealth of all to

each. Under such a setup, revenue from oil--owned by the Gulf

monarchs--would be prorated among all 21 Arab powers, down to the

poorest.34 Assuming this arrangement could be made to work, Yemen

stood to benefit.

Practically speaking, then, one could say that the Yemeni

officers who overthrew the Imam and took Yemen into the Arab

Nationalist fold were acting rationally. They were looking out

for both their individual interests and the interests of the

nation as a whole.

The great flaw in the Arab Nationalism theory was that

ultimately it was anti-West. In the 1960s, Middle Eastern oil

practically was controlled by the so-called Seven Sisters, a

consortium of oil companies from the United States, Great Britain

and the Netherlands.35 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) was not a power then--as later on it became--and

consequently the oil producing states did what the consortium

required of them.

Thus, when Nasser targeted the Saudis--which he did by

entering the Yemeni Civil War--he antagonized the consortium and

indirectly angered Washington and the whole of the West. The

Egyptian leader managed to survive the defeat of the Six-Day War,

but, after that, the center of Arab Nationalism shifted to

Baghdad. And Yemen lost Cairo, one of its strongest potential

allies.
16

This brings us to the third strategy. Having lost out with

Arab Nationalism and the scheme of finding a third force to back

them against their foes, the Yemenis, in effect, agreed to play

the superpower game. After the Civil War, Sana'a went over to the

side of the Saudis, which meant allying with the West. South

Yemen, after the British departed, allied with Moscow.

This latter move, one could argue, was not astute. Moscow

was a fairly weak reed, and thus South Yemen could not hope to

gain much by allying with it. To be sure, in the late 1960s

Moscow's limitations were not widely perceived. The Soviets were

believed to be making significant penetrations into the area.

It would have made better sense had South Yemen avoided all

contact with the Soviets and, instead, redoubled efforts to ally

with North Yemen. However, the South Yemenis went over to the

side of Moscow, with results that were predictable--Moscow did

virtually nothing to help the south economically; indeed, it had

not the means to do so.

The whole episode of the Yemenis playing the superpower

game, from a development standpoint, was sterile. A lot of guns

flowed into the area, but nothing very positive occurred as far

as the economies of the two countries were concerned.

Thus the stage is now set to look at Yemen in the period

just before the Kuwait invasion, and to examine the events which

effectively ruined its chances of benefiting in the era of

American dominance in the Middle East.

The ACC.

During the period of the Cold War, both Yemens exploited

superpower rivalries. Marxist South Yemen, in addition to opening

its port to the Soviets, launched an assault on its neighbor,

Oman, where it sought to promote a Marxist movement of national

liberation. The attempt failed, but not before Iran and Iraq both

became involved, Iran on the side of Oman, and Iraq, South Yemen.

North Yemen stood by the West during all of this period; acting

as a counter to Soviet penetration.

The difference between the two states was that whereas the

south received its aid directly from its patron, Moscow, aid to

Sana'a was funneled from the United States through Saudi Arabia.36

The Saudis equipped North Yemen's army; they also provided

financial support, and this enabled the regime to perpetuate

itself.

At the same time, however, Saudi support had strings

attached. The Saudis constantly worried that Yemen would become
17

self-supporting and pose a threat to them. This was a well

grounded fear--the population of Yemen is 14 million, compared to

Saudi Arabia, which claims 17 million but probably has no more

than 7 million.37 Moreover, the Yemenis went through a long civil

war; the Saudis have never waged a war of such intensity (a fact

to be discussed below). And, finally, recent oil discoveries in

Yemen have raised the possibility Sana'a might finally be able to

stablize its economy.

Fearing the creation of a strong unified Yemen, the Saudis

supported Sana'a guardedly. And the Yemenis, as a consequence,

were constantly looking around for other outside assistance.

Immigration was always an income earner. Yemenis constantly

were going overseas to work and sending back money to their

relatives. Many of these expatriates--indeed upwards of a

million--were in Saudi Arabia. Many others went to Asia and the

United States. This setup brought additional funds but presented

difficulties for the government--the expatriates remitted their

money directly to agents in Yemen, who passed it to their

families. Thus the government was not able to take its cut, as it

were. Still, the expatriate remittances were vital for

maintaining living standards, and so Sana'a adopted a policy of

noninterference in these transactions.38

The state derived income from other schemes. For example,

during the Iran-Iraq War, North Yemen sent a brigade to fight on

the side of Baghdad. It was rewarded by the then-affluent

Iraqis. However, this action was to have an extraordinary effect

on the future of Yemen once the war had ended.

The Iran-Iraq War ended most unexpectedly. Iraq, after

fighting Iran from 1980 until 1987--with barely a sign that it

could defeat its enemy--suddenly in the summer of the 8th year

launched a blitzkrieg offensive that destroyed Iran's war

machine. Iraq won a clear military victory and was thus

perceived, for a time, as a regional superpower.

Iraq then began to flex its muscles. Saddam Hussein behaved

like the previous Arab strongman, Nasser. One of the projects he

launched immediately after the war was to construct a regional

economic bloc, similar to efforts in the Americas to form the

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and by the Europeans

to enhance the European Community (EC). The idea was that by

creating a large, centrally controlled mass of consumers, several

states could enhance their economic power.39 This was the

economic side of the equation.

There was also a security side. Iraq proposed to form this

bloc--the so-called Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)--out of the

countries of Jordan, the now-unified Yemen, and Egypt. The
18

rationale appeared to be that all of the states had helped

Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq War; in other words, this was a pay-off,

of a kind.

At the same time, however, this particular combination of

states was extremely threatening to Saudia Arabia. The four

countries comprising the ACC surrounded the Saudis (see Figure

1), physically wrapped themselves around it. And hence this was

not something that would set the Saudis' minds at ease.

Additionally, the ACC clearly was meant to challenge the

GCC--the choice of a name suggests this. When the GCC was founded

in 1981, neither Iraq nor Yemen were asked to join, and there was

resentment over this. However, this was in line with the GCC's

makeup--it was an exclusive club composed of hereditary monarchs;

Iraq and Yemen were republics. One could say, therefore, that

Iraq, in forming the ACC, was seeking to resurrect the cause of

Arab Nationalism, presumably defunct after the Israeli-Egyptian

peace treaty.

The Israelis, too, had reason to be concerned about the ACC.

 The four states which made it up constituted a "pragmatic

front."40 The Iraqi President even referred to the alliance as

such. He claimed that the front would defend the Palestinian

people, who, at this juncture, were not doing well--with the

collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Washington as

the single surviving superpower, the Israelis expected to make

short shrift of the Palestinians' territorial claims. But now,

with the Front pledged to lend its support, Israel could expect

to experience pressure.41

Of course, all this was predicated on Iraq's getting back on

its feet financially. As can be seen, all of the states in the

bloc were have-nots. Iraq, at the end of the war with Iran, was

billions of dollars in debt. But the Iraqis proposed to treat

this as a liquidity crunch, that is, a temporary indisposition.

This they could do because Iraq has probably the world's second

largest reserves of oil. If the international banking community

cooperated by rescheduling Iraq's debts, Baghdad could, in time,

rectify its financial situation. Unfortunately for Iraq, the

banks did not do this which was a major contributing factor to

Iraq's subsequent invasion of Kuwait.42

With the move toward war, Egypt cut itself loose from the

ACC, but Jordan and Yemen remained loyal to the Iraqis and thus

drew on themselves the anger of the Coalition. Yemen, in

particular, because of its behavior both in the United Nations

and the Arab League, was targeted by Washington.

Prior to the Kuwait crisis, it was a rule of the League that

no action could be taken unless approved by consensus. Since many
19

Arab states supported Iraq, the League was prevented from taking

actions favorable to the Coalition as long as this rule held.

When Saudi Arabia and Egypt tried to overturn the rule, Yemen

fought them. In the end, the consensus rule was overturned, but

just barely.43

In the United Nations, Yemen was even better placed to help

Iraq. By coincidence, it held the chair as President of the

Security Council when the debate on the invasion commenced. Yemen

lobbied for an "Arab Solution." It wanted to see the United

Nations withdraw to the sidelines and let the Arab League resolve

the dispute, a move that was vigorously opposed by the United

States.44

Yemen lost out in both fora, and, after the war had ended,

retribution was not long in coming. The hopeful future to which

Yemen aspired under the ACC disappeared. The country found itself

virtually isolated. The most immediate consequence was an angry

reaction from the United States, which retaliated against Sana'a

economically. AID assistance went from $50 million to less than

$4 million virtually overnight.45 For a time, Yemen's economy

appeared to be in a free fall.

Why?

Why did Yemen's President Salih fight so hard for the 

Iraqis? And why--when he must have seen that the fight was lost—

did he not jump ship, or even go as far as to join the Coalition

(as did Egypt)? A number of reasons can be given. It is possible

that Salih was deluding himself--he wanted so badly to see Iraq

escape, he allowed himself to believe that he could help bring

this about. On the other hand, one could say that Salih was

simply being hard-nosed. He had taken a stand in support of Iraq

and felt bound to maintain his position. This sort of attitude

is not unusual in tribal societies or ones where tribal

influences are strong.

In my view, Salih was in over his head. Yemen held the

presidency of the Security Council; this gave it a chance to

affect the outcome of events. However, conditions had to be right

for this, and, in this instance, they were not.

Under the old Cold War system, compromise would have been

the order of the day. Some sort of deal would have been struck to

let Iraq off the hook. But, by 1990, times had changed. With the

Soviet Union falling apart, the United States had no need to seek

a deal and would not do so.

This was a revolutionary development. It signalled nothing

less than the breakdown of the old superpower balance. It is

unlikely, however, that Salih caught on to this. In failing to
20

see what was happening, Yemen's leader became an early victim of

the New World Order.

In any event, Desert Storm really did set the Yemenis back.

 Had Salih been able to proceed with the ACC, he might have

consolidated his position. As noted, oil had been discovered and

concessions let--to the Hunt Brothers from the United States, and

the French company, Total.46 However, Sana'a had no

infrastructure and developing the concessions would prove

difficult. With support from Iraq, the Yemenis might have

overcome this situation. Also, money from Iraq could have helped

Salih in another, more basic, way--it could have given him the

means to buy off his enemies; his opponents would either have had

to come over to his side or face extinction. In view of how

events subsequently turned out, failure to resolve this latter

difficulty affected Salih most adversely.

The Aftermath of the Gulf War.

Immediately after the Gulf War ended, Yemen faced an

international environment hostile to its welfare. Three factors

were at work--Saudi and U.S. punishment for Yemen's support of

Iraq, the end of the Cold War superpower competition, and the

reforms demanded by international banks.

As stated, Yemen had earlier lost the support of the Saudis.

But, worse, in the process of taking their revenge, the Saudis

expelled over a million Yemeni expatriate workers.47 Having this

challenge forced on him was bad enough, but Salih also had to

reckon with the loss of the workers' remittances. Further, there

was the loss of America's favor. For a small, poor, Third World

country, to incur the wrath of Washington was devastating.

Ordinarily, Yemen could have expected someone to help out.

Under the old system of superpower rivalry, the Soviets would

have offered to do so. But that avenue, of course, was now

closed.

Yemen might have appealed to the conscience of the world

community, have pleaded its poverty, and raised the spector of

its imminent dissolution. After all, throughout the 19th

century, as well as most of the 20th, it rarely happened that a

state was permitted to fail.

With the introduction of the New World Order, however, times

had changed. The failure of states was not only possible--some in

Washington were arguing that, under certain circumstances, it

might be inevitable.48

This conviction was based on a reading of current history. 
21

After the demise of the Soviet Union, it was argued, the

structure of world politics had changed. The nation-state was

becoming increasingly irrelevant. States, it was argued, served

but two purposes--to defend against external enemies, and to

promote native industry by keeping foreign competition at bay. 

Now--in the New World Order--tariff barriers were falling, and

power politics, too, would disappear. The world was about to

witness the dawning of an era of international peace.49

To be sure, crises would continue to arise, but these would

be largely economic ones--difficulties of the sort that Yemen was

having to confront, where its position was almost bankrupt. Here

the theorists were ready with an answer. The solution for Yemen-

-and for other similarly afflicted states--was to apply to the

international lenders for relief.

In the specific case of Yemen, the procedure would be for it

to apply, and the IMF--after consulting with the Yemeni

government--would work up a plan of reforms. Yemen would be

asked to undertake certain measures--as, for example, it would

have to end consumer subsidies and other forms of dependence on

the state sector. After the reforms had been initiated, the IMF

would supply the money Yemen required, doling it out in tranches.

 As Yemen moved further along the reform path, more money would

be released to it. In other words, solvency would come about as

a matter of course, and it would be a product of Yemen's

exertions in its own behalf, worked out with the oversight of the

lending authority.

This is all very well, but it raises a question. What if the

affected state cannot implement the mandated reforms? In the

case of Yemen, some of the steps the Fund would require would

entail considerable hardship. Austerity, for example, would be

difficult for the Yemenis, since they were already living so

close to the subsistence level. There would be risk of serious

internal unrest were the Yemenis subjected to deprivations over

and above that which they were already having to undergo.

The theorists never specifically addressed this problem, but

they seem to imply that where states cannot perform, they must

fail.50 And they further suggest that this will not be a great

problem. In the New World Order, states will fail without

seriously disrupting stability. There was, after all, the

example of Somalia.

In the honeymoon period of the New World Order, when much

seemed to be possible, the United Nations went into Somalia

determined to put it back on its feet--and it failed. The United

States was caught up in that failure, and, subsequently, Somalia

had an impact on America's thinking about humanitarian

assistance, and the degree to which the United States should be
22

involved in such undertakings.

The general turning-away of Americans from overseas

involvements derives in part from Somalia. The cost there in

American lives was judged not worth the interests involved. In

essence, Somalia failed, and no great calamity came of that.

Other states, like Yemen, could fail as well without causing

significant disruption of international stability.

This was the climate after 1991, when Yemen fell into its

deep distress. To the Yemenis, it must have seemed that their

situation could not have been worse. It was, however, to become

so.

Clashes With Saudi Arabia.

In May 1994, South Yemen attempted to break away from the

newly formed union, a move that was supported by the Saudis, if

indeed they did not foment the breakaway.51 The North acted to

crush the secession and was successful. In three months the

rebels were defeated, and the leaders of the revolt had fled the

country.

Salih now was in complete control of both Yemens. With

surprising magnanimity, he quashed attempts at revenge-taking

against the southerners and even refrained from forcing a

confrontation with Riyadh--although there could be little doubt

that the Saudis were involved in the affair.52

Salih's restraint was all the more remarkable in view of the

destruction that had been incurred. The Yemeni President later

reckoned that the war cost Yemen over $7 billion. Not only was

the refinery in Aden set ablaze, but the southerners fired Scud

missiles at Sana'a.53

Then, in late December 1994, the Saudis moved troops into

Asir province, the same which Sana'a and Riyadh fought over in

the 1930s (see Figure 2). As pointed out above, the status of

Asir never was settled--the Yemenis only leased the region to the

Saudis; they never gave up their claim to it. Every 20 years

that lease had to be renewed. When it came due in 1994, the

Saudis unilaterally expropriated the disputed territory.54

To Yemen, this is a crucial area, the site of one of the

recently discovered oil fields.55 Sana'a moved to contest the

Saudi seizure, and firefights erupted. As the skirmishes

continued, it began to appear that the dispute would escalate.

Indeed, at one point, it was claimed, the Saudis massed forces at

three places along the border.
23

Abruptly, in January 1995, Riyadh called a halt. King Fahd

agreed to negotiate the dispute after intercession by the Syrian

foreign minister.56 Out of this, the two sides agreed to create a

commission to study the issue.

Subsequently it was claimed that both events--the secession

 try and border dispute--derived from personality clashes. It was

alleged that Saudi Defense Minister Sultan, brother of King Fahd,

feeling himself betrayed by Salih, determined to have revenge. He

first engineered the breakaway and, being thwarted here, next

moved to take away territory that Sana'a prized.57

This interpretation may be correct; personalities may have

been involved. However, it is possible to make a different

interpretation, viz., that this is a simple power grab. Riyadh

saw that Sana'a was hurt by the fallout from the Second Gulf War.

Reduced to pariah status along with Iraq, its old rival appeared

in no position to defend itself.

Riyadh therefore moved against Sana'a, taking advantage of

the latter's compromised position. Unexpectedly, however, the

Saudi machinations miscarried. Riyadh tried again, seizing

territory that Sana'a claimed. But again the energetic response

of the Yemeni government thwarted takeover. Twice frustrated, the

Saudis were forced to change course and open negotiations,

apparently with the aim of suborning the Yemeni leadership.

Since these negotiations are still going on, it is difficult

to predict what will come of them. However, there have been a

couple of disturbing occurrences in the interim. In December

1995 reports surfaced of renewed fighting along the Saudi-Yemeni

border. Moreover, it was alleged that Riyadh now was importuning

Sana'a to, in effect, give it a permanent lease to a strip of

land running through Yemeni territory to the Indian Ocean (see

Figure 2).58

Riyadh apparently wants to build a pipeline to the ocean to

convey its oil, but will not do so unless it can acquire what

amounts to a right-of-way. Sana'a regards the Saudi demand as an

infringement on its sovereignty.

If this is what Riyadh is angling for, then it is likely 

the dispute will not be easily resolved. This could turn into a

long-term complication, and a serious shooting war could erupt at

any time.

Meanwhile, also in December, Eritrea (located opposite Yemen

on the Bab al Mandab) seized Hanish al Kabir, a small island on

which Sana'a had garrisoned troops (see Figure 1). The island

appears to be Yemen's property, but the Eritreans, having taken

it over, refuse to give it up.59
24

This island seizure is worrisome. Particularly so, since it

comes after all of the other events involving Yemen--the attempt

by the Saudis to engineer the break-away of South Yemen from the

north and the two border clashes. This raises the specter that

something more profound is at work here, that the Yemeni problem

is growing.

In line with this, voices have been heard within the Arab

camp that Israel is somehow mixed up in the Eritrea dispute, that

it is backing Eritrea to buttress its geopolitical position in

the Horn of Africa.60 The claim of Israeli involvement is

unsubstantiated and therefore should not, at this stage, be taken

seriously. It is the actions of the Saudis that remain, far and

away, the most troubling. If the Saudi leadership has made up

its mind to destablize the Sana'a government, this will have

adverse reprecussions for the security of the Gulf, and for

American interests in the region.

Preserving Gulf Stability. 

The regime in Riyadh is not strong just now. Indeed, it

appears to be going through a particularly difficult period. In

November Saudi King Fahd stepped down, claiming that his health

would not permit him to bear the responsibility of rule.61 He

handed over the government to his half-brother, the Crown Prince

Abdullah. But then in late February, King Fahd announced that,

with his health improved, he is ready to take over again.62

The King is 74 years old and is known to be suffering from

diabetes. When he announced his decision to step aside, this was

taken by many observers as a useful move, since it ensured that

the succession would not be disputed, Abdullah being the King's

anointed heir.63 Now, with Fahd attempting to retake control,

rumors have surfaced of a contest within the royal family,

pitting Abdullah against Sultan; both princes seek to be Fahd's

successor.64

For the Saudis to become involved in a shooting war with the

Yemenis at a time when the leadership is divided would not be

prudent. Moreover, in addition to uncertainty about the rule,

the House of Saud is experiencing difficulty in another area--

there is popular discontent over the royal family's perceived

corruption. The lifestyle of several of the princes is anathema

to pious Saudis.65

The world was shocked when, in November 1995, a bomb went

off in Saudi National Guard headquarters in Riyadh.66 To date, it

has not been established who set the bomb, but most experts agree

that this was meant to embarrass the royal family.
25

Finally, we have the matter of the economy; it is not in

good shape. For the first time since the oil boom of the 1970s,

young Saudis with advanced degrees are going without jobs, and

the government has called on its subjects to practice austerity,

something totally new to the Saudis.67

What would occur were the Saudis to take on the Yemenis in a

war--and do badly? That the Saudis would outright lose such a

confrontation is unthinkable. But, given the extreme nationalism

of the Yemenis, the latter could be expected to put up a stiff

fight, with the potential of embarrassing the Saudi military. One

would have to expect a backlash against the House of Saud, were

anything untoward to happen. In a tribal society--like that of

Saudi Arabia--the first qualification for leadership is warfighting ability. A regime that is apparently deficient in this

department cannot hope to claim the full allegiance of its

subjects.68

What is at stake, then, in this festering agitation over

Yemen, is nothing less than the stability of the House of Saud,

which raises the question of U.S. interests in the Gulf region.

The U.S. Role.

 U.S. policy in the Gulf is in many ways contradictory. The

policy as regards the northern Gulf is clear. There, Washington

is determined to suppress the regimes of Iran and Iraq. It does

this by imposing economic embargoes on the two. In respect to

Iraq, America has gone further--in effect, it has divided up the

country. It has imposed a no-fly zone in southern Iraq and

declared the northern Kurdish area off limits to the Iraqi army.

 To all intents, the northern Gulf is America's sphere of

influence.

In the south, Washington pursues somewhat the reverse

policy. There, it tries not to interfere in the internal affairs

of the area states and will not become involved in disputes

between those states. When states of the lower Gulf get into

difficulty, Washington is prone to let them work things out on

their own, keeping a distance from the disputants.

Actual clashes between the lower Gulf states have, until

recently, been nonexistent, and so there is no precedent for

intervention. Now, however, with the eruption of fighting

between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Yemen and Eritrea, all this

has changed. America has reason to become involved, and still it

seems to be steering clear.

This raises a question: Is America staying out of these
26

conflicts because it is disinclined to meddle in the affairs of

its allies? This would be commendable, except for the fact that

Washington's declared purpose for having a military presence in

the Gulf is to maintain stability. Moreover, the number of

crises developing in this crucial area seems to be proliferating.

For example, Bahrain--one of the six GCC states--is 

experiencing extraordinary domestic unrest. The majority Shia

population is upset over what it perceives as discrimination by

the nation's Sunni leadership. The Shias charge that, in

suppressing popular demonstrations, the Bahraini government has

jailed some 2,000 people (the regime admits to 500).69 Also, at

the beginning of the the year, Bahrain suffered a series of

bombings; most recently two luxury hotels were targeted in which

several persons were killed.

Similarly, in 1994 in Oman, an attempted plot against the

Sultan was discovered and 200 persons arrested.70 There have been

no significant incidents of unrest subsequently, but that

something of this nature should have occurred at all is

disturbing. The Sultan is presumed to be a popular ruler.

Then there is the case of Kuwait, where the leadership has

yet to regain the respect of the people after the having fled the

country to escape the invading Iraqis, leaving the mass of

Kuwaitis behind.71

Various explanations have been cited for what is causing all

of this unrest. For example, some analysts believe that Iran is

responsible. This may be so in the case of Bahrain. Iran has a

history of involvement in that country's affairs.72 At the same

time, however, it is clear the natives there have a grievance

against their government. And in Oman and Kuwait, there is no

sign of outside involvment, not of Iran or anyone.

I believe that much of this unrest has come about because of

the Second Gulf War. Before that war, the lower Gulf states were

fairly isolated from the world. After the conflict, the states

found themselves thrust into the international spotlight; they

were called upon to play a quite significant role, one for which

they were perhaps unprepared.73

Be that as it may, there needs to be a mechanism for

settling disputes between the states of the lower Gulf, and for

composing dissension within them. Ideally, the summit meetings

of the GCC should provide this. But the GCC, in my view, is a

flawed instrument. It does give the GCC leaders a chance to get

together, but how much good comes out of these meetings is

problematical. In the last of the summits, Qatar walked out,

claiming that Saudi Arabia was steamrolling its projects through

without concern for its fellow members.74
27

Subsequently, the Qatari leadership claimed to have

uncovered a plot to overthow the government, and hinted broadly

that native officers implicated in the affair were acting at the

behest of Riyadh. Apparently, the frustrated rebels fled into

Saudi Arabia after their plot went awry.75 This Qatari-Saudi

tension is particularly disturbing, because, if Qatari

insinuations have any basis in fact, a pattern seems to be

emerging; that is, of the Saudis intimidating their neighbors in

the lower Gulf.

The Qatari-Saudi dispute definitely needs watching. Qatar

is not a negligible entity. It has the third largest supply of

natural gas in the world and is situated close to Iran and Iraq.

 In the past it maintained good relations with both these states.

 Were Qatar truly to become estranged from the GCC, this would

hand a propaganda victory to both the Iranians and Iraqis. Taking

all of these instances into account, it is my belief that the

United States must become more involved in the affairs of the

lower Gulf. It should particularly set itself to monitoring the

disputes between the GCC states, with the intent of--where

possible--heading them off, not allowing them to develop into hot

wars, which is an acute danger with respect to the Saudis and

Yemenis.

Recommendations.

U.S. policymakers must expand their perspective of the Gulf

as an American sphere of influence to encompass, not just the

northern Gulf, but the whole of it, including the Horn of Africa.

 Events in the southern part of the region have an overall impact

on Gulf security. Washington must take the whole area into

account in a comprehensive regional strategy. This should be

done for the health of the region, but also to look out for U.S.

interests there.

In the specific case of Yemen and Saudi Arabia (which I

believe is, far and away, the most serious dispute), Washington

should work to bring about a settlement; and one way of doing

this would be to reinstitute Yemen's AID assistance. At the same

time, however, I realize that, at this particular juncture--given

the mood of Congress--this is probably not a realistic

proposition.

However, just as this study was being concluded, the IMF

acted in Yemen's behalf. On March 20, 1996, its executive board

met and agreed to extend the Yemenis a $193 million loan for a

15-month period. This is in one way a good thing; in another, it

is bad. It is good from the angle that it shows Washington is

turning its attention to Yemen's predicament and has acted to
28

help the country out.76 By getting the IMF to agree to extend a

loan to Yemen, Washington is, at the same time, indirectly

letting the Saudis know that it does not approve of the

continuing unrest over Yemen, and, to the extent that the Saudi

royal family is fomenting it, Washington expects them to desist.77

But there is still the problem--discussed earlier in the

study--of Yemen's ability to fulfill the obligations that IMF

loans incur. It is very likely that the Yemenis will not be able

to put through the mandated reforms, and then the IMF will be

moved to withhold its debt relief. What then? Effectively, this

will put Sana'a back into the difficulty from which it is

struggling to free itself.

The United States will have to keep an eye on this matter

and, if Yemen does fail to carry through on the IMF requirements,

be prepared to step into the breach to somehow tide it over; that

is, to provide enough aid so that the country will remain stable,

and there will not be an explosion of popular unrest.

After that, I feel, the United States should offer to

mediate the Yemen-Eritrea imbroglio. Again, it should do this as

a way of signalling that it views the affair with distaste and is

anxious to see it settled. Finally, as regards to America's Gulf

policy overall, Washington should stop concentrating solely on

the northern Gulf and begin to more closely moniter events in the

south. The situation in Bahrain is becoming quite alarming, and

the Qatari-Saudi dispute, unless mended, could grow into a

significant concern.

The United States cannot afford to lose its special position

in the Gulf. Its energy policy, and indeed its status as the

leader of the New World Order, is conditional on its being able

to maintain stability in this crucial part of the world.

Ultimately, U.S. policymakers should think about the Gulf,

not as a series of bilateral arrangements worked out with a

handful of states (viz., the GCC), but as a system. Systems are

living things; they evolve, and, under some circumstances, they

sicken and die. In the case of the Gulf, this last eventuality

is a distinct possibility. There is yet time to head off serious

difficulties in this area, but U.S. policymakers must move

swiftly.

ENDNOTES

1. For example, Marwan Bishara, writing in "Don't Throw

Good Money After Bad Politics in the Middle East," The

International Herald-Tribune, October 28-29, 1995, says, . . . in

1993, all the Arab countries combined, with the exception of

Saudi Arabia and embargoed Iraq and Libya, garnered only $337
29

million in funds from international capital markets; that is

roughly 0.4 percent of the total $80 billion raised by all

developing countries." Also Thomas L. Friedman, "Egypt Runs for

the Train," The New York Times, October 18, 1995, says, "Today

the Arab Middle East attracts 3 percent of global foreign

investment, while East Asia attracts 58 percent. Egypt exported

and imported more goods and services 20 years ago than it does

today. . . ." Friedman's article, "Almost Egypt," October 25,

1995, New York Times, makes a similar point. In addition, see

"In the Middle East The Newest Rivalry Is Over Cash, Not Arms,"

The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 1995; "Peres warns on peace

dividend," The Financial Times, October 25, 1995; and for the

statistics on which many of these articles are based, see

Claiming the Future: Choosing Prosperity in the Middle East,

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1995.

For articles on the cutoff of direct U.S. aid to the Middle

East, see "GOP Foreign Aid Cuts Called Security Threat," The

Washington Post, September 13, 1995; "Conferees Agree on ForeignAid Bill That Reduces Development Assistance," The Wall Street

Journal, October 25, 1995; "New steps on debt relief," The

Financial Times, September 14, 1995; "Debt and Africa's poor, The

World Bank plans $11 bn debtor fund," The Financial Times,

September 14, 1995; "Cutbacks from U.S. worry World Bank," The

Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, September 25, 1995; "A Plea to

Help Capital Flow to Third World," The New York Times, April 28,

1995; "Levels of aid for poor nations fall to 20-year low," The

Financial Times, June 15, 1995; "Unicef criticizes economic

reform's high human cost," The Financial Times, January 27, 1994;

and "As Congress Sharpens Knives to Cut Foreign Aid, Critics Warn

of Damage to U.S. Policy-Making," The Washington Post, May 18,

1995.

2. The GCC, founded in 1981, is made up of Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qater, Bahrain and Oman.

3. At the time of unification (1990), Yemeni unemployment

was about 25 percent; it has subsequently risen to 50 percent. 

Inflation escalated from 55 percent in 1993, to 145 percent in

1994, and was anticipated to be 175 percent for 1995. Runaway

inflation is fueled by the accelerating devaluation of Yemeni

riyal, which reached 140 to the U.S. dollar at the end of March

1995; steadily rising budget deficits, which have gone from 18

percent of GDP in 1992 to 23 percent in 1994, and an anticipated

25 percent in 1995; and mounting foreign debt, which reached an

all-time high of $7 billion in 1995. See the Country Profiles,

under Yemen, for the years 1990 through 1994, The Economist

Intelligence Unit, London; also Claiming the Future: Choosing

Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa.

4. There are indications that Yemen's aid will be
30

completely cut in subsequent budget negotiations.

 5. Yemen is a next-door neighbor to Saudi Arabia, which

has the largest reserves of oil in the world. As the study will

bring out, severe dislocations experienced in Yemen have their

effect on the Saudis, and this, ultimately, could disturb the

economy of the West. The stability of the free market system is

therefore keyed to this part of the world.

6. Throughout the study, I will refer to Iraq's invasion of

Kuwait as the Second Gulf War.

7. See Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in

Yemen, Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 6.

8. Ibid.

9. For a good explication of the Zaydis, see The Yemens:

Country Studies, Washington, DC: Foreign Area Studies, 1986, p.

24-28.

10. Ibid., 106-108.

11. J.E. Peterson, Yemen: The Search for a Modern State,

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, p. 13.

12. There would appear to be a contradiction here--if the

Yemenis are so intractable and covetous of their individual

honor, how could the Imam hold sway over them? It appears that

he did this by, in effect, manipulating the religious law. As an

expert in the law, the Imam could discover justification for

actions that he wished to take. Whereas the individual tribesmen

might stand up to secular authority that he perceived to be

arbitrary, disputing with the religiously sanctioned rulings of

the Imam was another matter. See Peterson, Yemen: The Search for

a Modern State, pp. 23-24.

13. Britain occupied Aden in 1839, after the Ottoman Turks

had virtually abandoned the place. See Tom Little, South Arabia:

Arena of Conflict, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, pp. 10-

11.

14. See Robert Stookey, South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in

Arabia, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982, p. 31 f.

15. Ibid.

16. For background on the growth of the radical movement in

South Yemen, see Little, South Arabia: Arena of Conflict; also

Stookey, South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia.
31

17. The Treaty of Taif, whereby the war was concluded, did

not grant Asir to the Saudis permanently, but only for a 20-year

renewable term. The treaty was renewed in 1954 and 1974, and

came up for renewal again in 1994. However, this last time no

renewal was set, which led to Saudi-Yemeni clashes, as we shall

see below. See Mark Katz, "External Powers and the Yemeni Civil

War," in The Yemeni War of 1994, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates:

The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1995, p.

82.

18. South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia, p. 41 f.

 19. Ibid.

20. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company subsequently changed its

name to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In addition, the Iranian

government in the early 1950s nationalized the company, but then

the consortium of multinational oil companies (the Seven Sisters)

fought the move, and, ultimately, the U.S. Government prevailed

on the Shah to modify the nationalization so that the companies

retained many rights and privileges. The change was accompanied

by the CIA overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq, who originally

pushed through the nationalization.

21. See Stookey, South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia,

56 f.

22. Ibid.

23. For the best discussion of the tribal system in Yemen,

see Dresch, Tribes, Government and History in Yemen.

24. See Samir Amin, Re-reading the Postwar Period, New

York: Monthly Review Press, 1994, p. 28.

25. See Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd alNasir (sic) and his Rivals, 1958-1970, London: Oxford University

Press, 1971.

26. This was the youthful Feisal, King of Iraq, during the

republican coup in 1958.

27. The Yemens: Country Studies, p. 77.

28. Yemen: The Search for a Modern State, p. 89.

29. The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir (sic), 1958-

1970, p. 108.

30. The Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Libyans agreed to subsidize

the Egyptians and Jordanians (the Syrians boycotted the
32

conference), as the two so-called confrontation states which had

fought Israel in the 1967 war.

31. South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia, p. 59 f.

32. International Defense Review, 11/1990, "Unified Yemen:

New Power in the Arabian Peninsula," pp. 1227-1229.

33. Yemen: The Search for a Modern State, p. 144 f.

34. There are 20 Arab states, and PLO is usually included

as the 21st.

35. The so-called Seven Sisters were Mobil, Exxon, Texaco,

Socal, Gulf, British Petroleum, and Royal Dutch Shell.

36. See Robert D. Burrowes, "The Other Side of the Red Sea

and a Little More," in The Horn of Africa and Arabia, Defense

Academic Research Support Program, December 1990.

37. See Mark N. Katz, "Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security,"

Middle East Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1; and "Peace Still in the

Balance," Jane's Defense Weekly, March 28, 1992.

38. See Yemen: The Search for a Modern State, p. 147.

39. See The New York Times, "The Arabs Are Forming Two

Economic Blocs," February 17, 1989.

40. See Ofra Bengio, Saddam Speaks On the Gulf, Tel Aviv,

Israel: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African

Studies, 1992, pp. 94-95. 

41. There was another worry for the Israelis, and that was

a plan, evidently conceived by Saddam Hussein, for Iraq to enter

into an arms building project with the Egyptians. The Egyptians

would provide the technical know-how and Iraq the cash to develop

an Arab arms industry. See The Washington Post, "Egypt Drops Out

of Missile Project," September 19, 1989; and "Egypt May Drop Plan

to Build Tank," The Washington Post, May 11, 1989.

42. For a discussion of Iraq's difficulties with the banks,

see Stephen Pelletiere, Chaos in a Vacuum, New York: Praeger,

1992.

43. For the Saudi reaction to Yemen's support for Iraq at

the Arab League and the United Nations, see James E. Akins, "The

New Arabia," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1991.

44. See "Baker Rebuffed By Yemeni Leader On U.N.

Resolution," The Washington Post, November 23, 1990.
33

45. After the U.N. vote in which Yemen backed Iraq (Cuba

was the only other dissenter; China abstained), American diplomat

John Kelly was quoted as telling Yemeni Ambassador Abdullah Al

Ashati in the Security Council chamber, "that was the most

expensive vote you ever made." "U.S. Takeover at the U.N.," The

Nation, October 12, 1992. See also James Baker, The Politics of

Diplomacy, New York: Putnam, 1995, pp. 325-329, for Baker's

account of his reaction to Yemen's vote in the Security Council.

 Baker says, incidentally, that Yemen's AID assistance was $70

mn, not $50 mn.

46. At this time reports circulated throughout the oil

industry that the Saudis tried to sabotage the Yemenis by

refusing to do business with firms that bid on the Yemeni

concessions.

47. See "Yemen and Saudi Arabia," Middle East

International, June 23, 1995.

48. The Washington Post, in an editorial entitled "A

Genocide Evaded," January 15, 1996, bemoaned what it perceived as

a growing disposition on the part of American policymakers to

allow nations to fail. In part, the editorialist observed,

@BLOCK QUOTE = The United Nations is heavily influenced in

this instance [the crisis in Barundi] by the United States, and

the United States by its own past misfortunes and political

embarrassments in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. In American

discourse, the messy and uncertain work of treating such

situations has come to be dismissed as "social work" remote from

a discernable "national interest." The standards for engagement

become rules for nonengagement. Success is measured not in terms

of genocides deterred but quagmires avoided.

49. See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", in The

National Interest, Summer 1989. Specifically, Fukayama talks

about the coming into being of a "universal homogenous state." 

This state, according to Fukayama, is what is left after

liberalism has vanquished all of its competitors, the most

formidable of which was communism. Under the universal

homogenous state, there is no "conflict over large 'issues'

(Fukayama), and consequently no need for generals or statesmen;

what remains is primarily economic activity." In the same issue

of National Interest, a number of scholars comment on Fukayama's

theory, some in quite glowing terms, and it is here that the

intended application of Fukayama's theorizing comes through. For

example, Allan Bloom, of the University of Chicago, writes, "It

appears (from a reading of Fukayama's theory) that the world has

been made safe for reason as understood by the market, and we are

moving toward a global common market, the only goal of which is
34

to minister to men's bodily needs and whims." French political

scientist Pierre Hassner, in the same issue of National Interest,

observes that "(Fukuyama) is certainly right about the dominant

trend of international politics: the prevalence of . . . economic

calculations over grand politics." And, finally, Stephen

Sestanovich, of the Center for Strategic and International

Studies, questions what he regards as Fukuyama's belief that (in

the New World era) "ideological antagonism and military

competition will give way to 'Common Marketization'--to a world

in which . . . war is a senseless interruption of commerce and

bureaucratic accommodation will resolve all conflict."

Also see "The nation-state is dead, Long live the nationstate," The Economist, December 23, 1995; and the review of JeanMarie Guehenno's book, The End of the Nation-State, "Beyond Maps

and Passions to a Decentered Empire," New York Times, January 1,

1996.

50. See "Is West Slighting Africa's Hot Spots Like

Liberia," The New York Times, January 23, 1996, in which this

attitude is clearly expressed. Also see "Home Truths About

Genocide," The Financial Times, January 13, 1996.

51. The Saudis initially promoted a vote of the GCC

supporting South Yemen. They then attempted to get the United

Nations to impose a ceasefire. Had they been successful in this,

the South Yemenis might have entered into negotiations with the

north, while still preserving their independent status. When the

ceasefire bid failed, the Saudis next appealed to the United

States to recognize South Yemen. Here, again, they were

frustrated, as Washington refused to go along. Had Washington

acceded to the request, the whole affair probably would have

turned out differently than it did, since several European states

were poised to recognize the South, once Washington pointed the

way. For background on this, see "Yemen Says Saudi Threat Bars a

Truce," The New York Times, June 6, 1994; also "A Saudi-Yemeni

Truce," Al-Quds al-Arabi (editorial), June 5, 1994, quoted in

Middle East International, June 23, 1995.

52. See "North Yemenis Seize Aden, Claim Victory in Civil

War," The Washington Post, July 8, 1994.

53. Ibid.

54. See "Saudi Arabia: 'Source' Denies Yemeni Statement on

Border," SPA, FBIS-NES-94-245, December 21, 1994; "Official

Sources Claim Saudi Attack on Border Post," Paris-Radio Monte

Carlo, FBIS-NES-95-001, January 3, 1995; "Steps To Prevent

Clashes with Saudi Arabia Agreed," AFP, FBIS-NES-95-003, January

5, 1995; "Salih Discusses 'Incidents' With Fahd Over Phone,"

Sanaa Radio, FBIS-NES-95-007, January 11, 1995; "House Speaker
35

Denies Troop Deployments on Saudi Border," London AL-HAYAH 10

Jan, FBIS-NES-95-007, January 11, 1995; "High Level Delegation To

Visit Saudi Arabia 14 Jan," Paris Radio Monte Carlo, FBIS-NES-95-

009, January 13, 1995; "Paper Explains Buildup on Saudi-Yemeni

Border," AL-ANWAR 17 Jan, FBIS-NES-95-012, January 19, 1995;

"Paper Welcomes Containment of Yemeni-Saudi Border Dispute,"

London Al-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 17 Jan, FBIS-NES-95-012 January 19,

1995; "Salih Confirms Saudi Concentrations in BBC Interview,"

Sanaa Radio, FBIS-NES-95-019, January 30, 1995; "Reaction To

Accord With Saudi Arabia Reported,' Sanaa Radio, FBIS-NES-95-038,

February 27, 1995; "Salih: Dispute With Saudi Arabia Can Be

Resolved Through Dialogue," Sanaa Radio, FBIS-NES-95-021,

February 1, 1995; and "Crisis over the Border," Middle East

International, January 20, 1995.

55. "Breaking the Ice," Middle East International, June 23,

1995.

56. See Ibid.; also "Reaction to Accord Reported," FBISNES-95-038, February 27, 1995; "Yemen Border Tension Defused,"

The Financial Times, January 16, 1995; and "Saudi Arabia, Yemen

OK a group to define border, Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27,

1995.

57. Sultan, as Defense Minister, signed off on all arms

deals with the Yemenis and also was in charge of all direct

dealing with Salih. The Saudi Foreign Ministry did not handle

Yemeni matters.

58. See "Ministry Denies Border Tension With Saudi Arabia,"

Riyadh Radio, FBIS-NES-95-239, December 13, 1995; "'Clash' Said

Followed Saudi Troop Movements on Border," London AL-QUDS AL-

'ARABI, FBIS-NES-95-239, December 13, 1995; and "Yemen tries to

defuse Saudi border tensions," The Financial Times, December 15,

1995.

59. See "Sanaa Accuses Eritea of Attacking Red Sea Isle,"

AFP, FBIS-NES-95-242, December 18, 1995; "Yemeni Prime Minister

Vows to Defend All Land," Sanaa Radio, FBIS-NES-95-243, December

19, 1995; "Yemen Denies Launching New Attack By Warplanes," AFP,

FBIS-NES-95-244, December 20, 1995; "Yemen's Taqi: 'Military

Option' Not Ruled Out," Baghdad TV, FBIS-NES-95-246, December

22, 1995; "Butros-Ghali To Mediate Yemen-Eritrea Dispute," KUNA,

FBIS-NES-95-250, December 29, 1995; "Yemen Said Preparing To

Retake Island From Eritrea," London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI 6 Feb,

FBIS-NES-96-026, Febuary 7, 1996; and "Yemen, Eritrea Fight Over

Island," The Washington Post, December 18, 1995.

60. See "Yemen Envoy Hints At Israeli Involvement," MENA,

FBIS-NES-95-244, December 20, 1995; and "Israeli Role Alleged,"

AL-SHAQ AL-AWSAT, FBIS-NES-95-242, December 18, 1995.
36

61. See "Saudi King Cedes Power to Half Brother," The Wall

Street Journal, January 2, 1995; "Saudi shift of power is seen as

permanent," The Philadelphia Inquirer, January 3, 1996; "In

Smooth Transfer of Power, Saudis Allay Short-term Fears," The

Washington Post, January 6, 1996; "Saudi Crown Prince to Take

Over While King Rests," The New York Times, January 2, 1996;

"Conservative Abdullah takes reins of power," The Financial

Times, January 26, 1996; and "Ailing King Fahd hands over power

to Saudi Prince, The Financial Times, January 2, 1996.

62. See "Saudi King Says He's Well Enough to Rule," The

Washington Post, February 22, 1996.

63. See "In Smooth Transfer of Power, Saudis Allay Shortterm Fears, The Washington Post, January 6, 1996.

64. Sultan is a full brother of King Fahd. However,

Abdullah, who is the next oldest among the brothers, is a half

brother (their father had more than one wife). It is fairly

widely conceded that all power in Saudi Arabia rests in the hands

of five brothers, including the King and Abdullah. However, four

of the power wielders are full bothers; Abdullah is the odd man

out.

65. See "Ruling Family and the Economy Fuel a Simmering

Saudi Discontent," The International Herald Tribune, December 19,

1994; "Britain Expels Saudi Dissident," The Washington Post,

January 4, 1996; and "Saudi nerves soothed by government's

action," The Financial Times, January 10, 1996.

66. See "Bomb in Saudi Arabia Felt Round the Persian Gulf,"

The New York Times, November 17, 1995.

67. "See Deficit fears remain after tight Saudi budget,"

The Financial Times, January 3, 1996.

68. The Saudi rulers have already lost considerable face

over the Yemeni clashes. According to a story in the Washington

Post ("Bentsen To Meet With Saudi Ruler," September 23, 1994),

the Saudis were so chagrined by the defeat of South Yemen (which

they obviously were supporting) that they asked President Clinton

to send a high ranking U.S. official to meet with King Fahd to

bolster the impression that Riyadh was still high in Washington's

favor. The Saudis wanted National Security Advisor Anthony Lake,

the Post story claims, but they accepted then-Treasury Secretary

Lloyd Bentsen. In the same connection, some observers feel that

Prince Sultan is making an issue of the fight with Yemen to

enhance his chances of taking over as King after Fahd. Sultan's

reputation was somewhat tarnished by the apparent poor showing of

Saudi troops during Desert Storm, and he is trying to compensate
37

for this, or so the story goes. For background on this, see "In

Uneasy Time, Saudi Prince Provides a Hope for Stability," The New

York Times, January 19, 1996.

69. See "Paper Sees Wider Danger in Bahrain Unrest," FBISNES-94-247, December 23, 1994. Also for recent developments see

"Bahrain Opposition Says Police Fired on Protestors," The New

York Times, January 10, 1996; "Bahrain Breaks Up Opposition

Rally," The Washington Post, January 11, 1996; "Hundreds flee

after bomb goes off in Bahrain hotel," The Philadelphia Inquirer,

January 18, 1996; "Bahrain Arrests Shiite Opponents," The

Washington Post, January 23, 1996; "Bahrain Seizes More

Protestors After Sabotage, The New York Times, January 24, 1996;

"Gulf states 'must curb unrest,'" The Financial Times, January

29, 1996; "Iran Expelled a Bahraini Diplomat," The Wall Street

Journal, February 2, 1996; "Bahrain unrest points to Gulf-wide

problem," The Financial Times, February 6, 1996; "Bomb Explodes

In Auto Near Bahrain Market," The Washington Post, February 15,

1996; and "Bahrain Arrests Suspects in Two Hotel Bombings," The

Washington Post, February 20, 1996.

70. See "Oman 'investigating motives' of 200 dissidents,"

The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 31, 1994.

71. See "Kuwaiti Parliament Tries to Assert Power," The

Washington Post, May 16, 1995.

72. Bahrain has always been an object of covetous interest

for the Iranians. Under the Shah, the Iranians claimed that

Bahrain was part of Iran. Then, when Khomeini took over, the

claim was advanced anew--indeed, the GCC came into being in the

aftermath of violent disturbances in Bahrain, which the United

States claimed the Iranians had fomented. Today there is no

doubt Iran is supporting the Shias who are demonstrating against

the Sunni leadership. However, the Shias are backed up by Sunni

elements of the population, and the demand of the protestors is

for the government to revive the parliament which was suppressed.

 There is a question, then, whether the difficulties in Bahrain

are due to outside agitation by the Iranians or this is a

homegrown affair.

73. For example, before the Second Gulf War, Iraq was the

defender of the GCC states against Iran; now it is the enemy. 

Before the war, Israel was the principal threat to these states;

now the GCC rulers are opening up to Tel Aviv and discussing

trade exchanges. Most significant, perhaps, is the support

formerly tendered by the GCC to such causes as that of militant

Islam. This was considered a sacred duty not too long ago and is

now construed as helping "terrorists." One could argue that the

inhabitants of the Gulf states have failed to keep up with such

changes and are confused with some of the moves made by their
38

leaders. This confusion is enhanced by the fact that none of

the states are democracies, and, therefore in many cases where

the policy shifts occur, the people are not set to anticipate

them, and, hence when they develop, they are perceived as

shocking departures from the norm.

74. See "Public Opinion Does Not Support GCC," Al-Sharq,

FBIS-NES-95-250, December 29, 1995.

75. See "Qatar thwarts plot to shake Hamad's rule," The

Financial Times, February 21, 1996; and "Qatar Reports Numerous

Arrests in Attempt to Restore Ex-Ruler," The Washington Post,

February 21, 1996.

76. This is the case because the United States, as the

largest contributor to the Fund, has a significant say in its

lending behavior. It would be virtually impossible for Yemen to

have received a loan, had not the United States signed off on it.

77. It could be argued that, without meaning to, the United

States created the conditions that led to Yemen's present

difficulties. U.S. action in cutting off aid to Yemen (after the

Security Council vote) seemingly conferred pariah status on the

Yemenis. Having incurred the wrath of the sole surviving

superpower, it might have seemed to Yemen's enemies that Sana'a

was now fair game.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

Mrs. Kay L. Williams

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler