UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1524

TWANDA MARSHINDA BROWN; SASHA MONIQUE DARBY; CAYESHIA 

CASHEL JOHNSON; AMY MARIE PALACIOS; NORA ANN CORDER; and 

XAVIER LARRY GOODWIN and RAYMOND WRIGHT, JR., on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly situated,

 Plaintiffs – Appellees,

v.

GARY REINHART, in his individual capacity; REBECCA ADAMS, in her 

official and individual capacities as the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of 

the Summary Courts in Lexington County and in her official capacity as the Judge 

of the Irmo Magistrate Court; BRYAN KOON, in his official capacity as the 

Lexington County Sheriff,

 Defendants – Appellants,

and

LEXINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA; ROBERT MADSEN, in his 

official capacity as the Circuit Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of 

South Carolina; ALBERT JOHN DOOLEY, III, in his official capacity as the 

Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in 

Lexington County,

 Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District Judge. (3:17-cv-1426-MBS-SVH)

Argued: December 12, 2018 Decided: January 23, 2019
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Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the majority opinion, in which 

Judge Wilkinson and Judge Motz joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a concurring opinion.

ARGUED: Kenneth Paul Woodington, DAVIDSON, WREN & PLYLER, P.A., 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. Nusrat Jahan Choudhury, AMERICAN 

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for Appellees. ON 

BRIEF: William H. Davidson, II, DAVIDSON WREN & PLYLER, P.A., Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellants. Carl G. Snodgrass, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 

UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York; Toby J. Marshall, Eric R. Nusser, 

TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC, Seattle, Washington; Susan K. Dunn, 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 

Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellees are indigent individuals who were arrested and incarcerated in 

Lexington County, South Carolina (the “County”) for failing to pay fines and fees to the 

magistrate courts. They filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis 

that once arrested, they were not brought before a judge, afforded a court hearing, or 

granted court-appointed counsel. In relevant part, Plaintiffs seek damages against 

Defendants-Appellants--county magistrates Gary Reinhart and Rebecca Adams, and 

Lexington County Sheriff Bryan Koon (“Defendants”)--for their oversight and 

enforcement of alleged countywide policies and practices that purportedly caused 

Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrests and incarceration.

Defendants moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ damages claims based 

on absolute immunity. The district court denied the motion without prejudice and 

ordered that the matter should proceed to discovery.

Defendants subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal, asserting that they are 

entitled to absolute immunity as to Plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Plaintiffs moved to 

dismiss the appeal, arguing that this court lacks jurisdiction under the collateral order 

doctrine. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the 

district court’s order and must therefore dismiss the appeal. Because we conclude that 

we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we do not reach the question of whether the district 

court properly denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the damages 

claims or otherwise address the merits of this action.
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I.

Plaintiffs allege that Lexington County is a municipal government entity that relies 

on the collection of fines and fees imposed on defendants in traffic and misdemeanor 

cases in the magistrate courts as an essential revenue source. To generate this revenue, 

Defendants Reinhart and Adams, as the chief administrators of the magistrate courts, and 

Defendant Koon, as the chief law enforcement officer, exercise their administrative

authority to establish, oversee, enforce, and sanction two unwritten administrative 

policies and practices--the “default payment” policy and the “trial in absentia” policy.

Under the default payment policy, indigent people sentenced to pay fines and fees 

for traffic or misdemeanor convictions are placed on payment plans without regard to 

whether they can afford the monthly payments. Under the trial in absentia policy, 

indigent people who do not appear for a scheduled traffic or misdemeanor hearing are 

automatically tried in their absence, convicted, and sentenced to jail time suspended on 

the payment of fines and fees.

Under both policies, when indigent people fail to pay money owed to the 

magistrate courts, bench warrants ordering their arrest and incarceration for nonpayment 

issue automatically. They are then arrested and incarcerated by the Sheriff’s Department 

unless they can immediately pay their entire debt to the magistrate courts. At no point 

prior to or after their arrest and incarceration are these individuals afforded courtappointed counsel or a determination by a magistrate court or bond court regarding their 

ability to pay the fines and fees.
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Pursuant to these policies, Plaintiffs Twanda Marshinda Brown, Sasha Monique 

Darby, Cayeshia Cashel Johnson, Amy Marie Palacios, Nora Ann Corder, Xavier Larry 

Goodwin, and Raymond Wright, Jr. were arrested and incarcerated in Lexington County

for failing to pay magistrate court fines and fees. Once arrested, none of the Plaintiffs 

were brought before a judge, afforded a court hearing, or given the advice of counsel. 

Unable to pay their debts, they spent weeks or months in jail.1

 Several Plaintiffs also 

suffered from a host of collateral consequences due to their incarceration, including loss 

of housing and employment.

II.

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs brought the instant action. Pursuant to 

§ 1983, they raise claims for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights against Defendants for their oversight and enforcement of the alleged policies and 

practices that caused Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrests and incarceration.

Before engaging in discovery, Defendants filed multiple motions for summary 

judgment, including a motion as to Plaintiffs’ damages claims--the subject of this appeal. 

Defendants argued that those claims should be dismissed because they are entitled to 

judicial, quasi-judicial, or legislative immunity (the “asserted immunities”).

 1 Aside from Plaintiff Wright, who was incarcerated for seven days, Plaintiffs 

spent between twenty to sixty-three days in jail.
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The district court denied Defendants’ motion without prejudice. In its order, the 

district court found that there were outstanding issues of material fact as to whether the 

challenged conduct is administrative and therefore not protected by immunity, as 

Plaintiffs contend, or judicial, quasi-judicial, or legislative, as Defendants do. The court 

thereby ordered that the matter proceed to discovery, citing our decision in Al Shimari v. 

CACI International, Inc., for the proposition that it “is entitled to have before it a proper 

record, sufficiently developed through discovery proceedings, to accurately assess any 

claim, including one of immunity. And even a party whose assertion of immunity 

[ultimately] proves worthy must submit to the burdens of litigation until a court becomes 

sufficiently informed to rule.” Brown v. Lexington Cty., No. 3:17-CV-1426-MBS, 2018 

WL 1556189, at *15 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2018) (quoting Al Shimari, 679 F.3d 205, 220 (4th 

Cir. 2012) (en banc)).

Following the district court’s decision, however, and before discovery, Defendants

filed this interlocutory appeal, seeking review of the district court’s order under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that this court lacks 

jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Accordingly, we first determine, as we 

must, whether we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order. Iko v. Shreve, 535 

F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 

534, 541 (1986) (“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy 

itself . . . of its own jurisdiction.”)). We conclude that we do not.

III.
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A.

We have long recognized that interlocutory appeals are generally disallowed, id. at 

234, and that our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district courts of the 

United States,”2 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the district 

court’s order in this case--denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the 

basis of the asserted immunities--is interlocutory.

Consequently, we have jurisdiction only if we determine that the order satisfies the 

collateral order doctrine, which provides that “a district court’s denial of a claim of 

qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law” is immediately 

appealable. Iko, 535 F.3d at 234 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). 

If, on the other hand, summary judgment was denied “solely because there is a genuine 

issue of material fact, that claim is not immediately appealable and we lack jurisdiction to 

consider it.” Id. at 235.

As a threshold requirement, and before jurisdiction can be invoked under the 

collateral order doctrine, an appealable order must definitively resolve the question in 

dispute. Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 220 (citing Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)).

A question in dispute is not so resolved where “a district court ‘ma[kes] clear that its 

decision [is] a tentative one, . . . and that it might well change its mind’ after further 

proceedings.” Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). In Al Shimari, we 

 2 28 U.S.C. § 1292 sets forth limited categories of interlocutory orders that are 

appealable, but Defendants have not argued that any of these exceptions are at issue here.
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determined that we lacked jurisdiction over decisions denying defendants immunity. In 

so doing, we pointed to the absence of a “vast pretrial record” coupled with the fact that 

the issues were “factually entrenched and far less amenable to meaningful analysis by 

resort merely to the plaintiffs’ pleadings.” Id. at 221 (internal citation omitted). 

Consequently, we concluded that “these appeals encompass fact-based issues of law, with 

the need for additional development of the record,” and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Id. at 221, 224.

B.

We accept as given that immunity is absolute where it applies. Antoine v. Byers & 

Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). The narrow question here is whether, based on 

the limited record before it, the district court’s order is properly before us on appeal.

We conclude that we lack jurisdiction because, as in Al Shimari, the district 

court’s order did not conclusively determine the disputed question. Based on the limited 

record before it, the district court found that there were genuine issues of material fact 

outstanding as to whether the Defendants are entitled to the asserted immunities, and 

subsequently ordered that the matter proceed to discovery. In so doing, the court cited Al 

Shimari for the proposition that it “is entitled to have before it a proper record . . . to 

accurately assess any claim, including one of immunity.” Brown, 2018 WL 1556189 at 

*15 (quoting Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 220). Such an order from a district court indicating 

that its decision is tentative and that “it might well change its mind after further 

proceedings,” is not appealable. Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 220 (quoting Jamison v. Wiley, 

14 F.3d 222, 230 (4th Cir. 1994)).
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Contrary to Defendants’ contention, whether the asserted immunities apply in this 

case is not a purely legal question. Instead, the district court correctly determined that 

whether Defendants are immune from suit is a fact-intensive inquiry that will turn on the 

record as it develops at least through discovery. Here, whether the Defendants are 

entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity depends upon the scope of conduct carried 

out by the Defendants in their administrative capacities and whether such conduct 

included the oversight and enforcement of unwritten policies. Similarly, the applicability

of legislative immunity is also fact-dependent, and will require the court to determine, 

inter alia, whether the alleged policies “bear the outward marks of public 

decisionmaking.” E.E.O.C. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 631 F.3d 174, 184 (4th 

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Such fact-based issues of law require “development of the 

record,” a matter “more within a district court’s ken.” Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 221 

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674).

With respect to their arguments regarding judicial and quasi-judicial immunity 

specifically, Defendants attempt to distinguish our holding in Al Shimari by framing the

immunity inquiry here as purely legal--namely, whether the arrests and incarcerations 

ordered by Defendants were judicial or quasi-judicial acts. This misconstrues the 

complaint. Plaintiffs are not suing Defendants with respect to individual judicial 

determinations, e.g., denials of bond or incarceration orders. In fact, as both parties 

acknowledge, Plaintiffs declined to sue the individual judges who sentenced them. This 

case is therefore distinguishable from our decision in Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 114

(4th Cir. 2018), where we held that the state’s attorney was entitled to immunity 
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regarding her decision to prosecute certain police officers following the death of an 

individual who suffered fatal injuries while in their custody.

Instead, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, acting in their administrative capacities,

oversaw and enforced policies and practices that violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

Specifically, they allege that by order of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the Chief 

Justice delegated significant administrative authority to Defendants Reinhart and Adams

as Chief Judge and Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Lexington 

County Summary Courts, including the responsibility to establish and oversee countywide procedures to ensure the collection of court-generated revenues, and to administer

the County’s Bond Court. Exercising their administrative authority to control magistrate 

court dockets, schedules, and hours of operation, Defendants are alleged to have excluded 

hearings to determine people’s ability to pay fees and fines.

Similarly, Defendant Koon, as chief administrator of the Detention Center, had 

administrative powers and responsibilities. Namely, he was responsible for providing 

direction and overall management for the center’s day-to-day operations, which included 

overseeing the deputies in the warrant and civil process division who track and serve 

warrants. In this capacity, Defendant Koon is alleged to have exercised these 

administrative powers to enforce a standard operating procedure of automatically 

arresting indigent people on bench warrants and incarcerating them in the Detention 

Center unless they can pay the full amount of court fines and fees owed before booking. 

As the Supreme Court has held, “[a]dministrative decisions, even though they may be 

essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as 
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judicial acts” entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 

228 (1988).

Therefore, while it is true that Defendants Reinhart and Adams played a role in 

effectuating the alleged policies through judicial actions--e.g., ordering the 

unconstitutional arrests and incarceration of indigent people for failure to pay fines and 

fees--those specific acts are not the ones that Plaintiffs challenge as unconstitutional. The 

same reasoning applies to Defendant Koon, whom the Plaintiffs sue in his capacity as an 

administrator of the Detention Center, and not as the deputy responsible for enforcing 

specific warrants. To find otherwise would misconstrue the Plaintiffs’ theory of their 

case and run counter to the Court’s caution that “§ 1291 requires [the court] of appeals to 

view [Defendants’] claims of a ‘right not to be tried’ with skepticism, if not a jaundiced 

eye.” Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994).

At the same time, we emphasize our recognition of the importance of immunity 

from suit. And because we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, this opinion does not

address Defendants’ arguments on the merits as to the asserted immunities, nor does it

foreclose the possibility that Defendants may be successful in so arguing following 

discovery on this issue.

We therefore conclude that the district court’s order did not conclusively resolve

the disputed question, and the court’s order fails to meet the threshold requirement of the 

collateral order doctrine. The appeal is therefore

DISMISSED.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion because the majority has made it clear, and the 

district court likewise made it clear, that its opinion was only tentative and not 

necessarily a forecast of what its ultimate ruling on summary judgment might be. See

Maj. Op. at 11 (“[T]his opinion does not address Defendants’ arguments on the merits as 

to the asserted immunities, nor does it foreclose the possibility that Defendants may be 

successful in so arguing following discovery on this issue.”).

Specifically, it is not clear to me that Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc., 679 

F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc), the case on which plaintiffs chiefly rely, is dispositive 

in the different setting of this case. Al Shimari dealt with private contractor immunity. 

This case deals with the very different defense of judicial immunity. Different values are 

at stake. “[A] judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to 

act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to 

himself.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 

U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)). We should hesitate to transplant decisions in the 

context of private contractor immunity to claims of judicial immunity. If we allow actions 

against judicial officers to become progressively burdensome, we risk “destroy[ing] that 

independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.” Bradley, 

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.

Secondly, I am not convinced that the distinction between what is an 

administrative action on the one hand and a judicial action on the other rests solely on the 

matter of whether the challenged action is a “policy.” A policy, written or unwritten, can 
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bear so directly on the judicial function and be so intertwined with judicial duties that 

absolute judicial immunity will attach. While internal personnel actions are a classic 

example of an administrative proceeding, see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988),

policies affecting outside parties in court proceedings are much more likely to be judicial. 

They are not, after all, “acts that simply happen to have been done by judges.” Id. at 227. 

Further factual development in this case may shed light on how the alleged policies here, 

if they existed at all, can be characterized. While the district court is no doubt aware that 

overly burdensome discovery can negate the very reason for an immunity, see Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985), I believe the trial judge is entitled to a fuller 

record at this stage.

I thus concur in the dismissal of the appeal.