RENDERED: JANUARY 13, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-1310-MR

PIERETTE THOMPSON APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM MARTIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CI-00071

STATE FARM MUTUAL 

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 

COMPANY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Pierette Thompson appeals from the order granting State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) summary judgment, entered 

on October 7, 2021, by the Martin Circuit Court. Following a careful review of the 

record, briefs, and law, we affirm. 
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BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 30, 2018, Thompson paid Earnest Dingess, Sr., to give 

her a ride to a local Cash Express. Thompson alleges that while they were in 

Dingess’s car in the parking lot, another vehicle ran into them. She claims Dingess 

exited his vehicle and spoke with the other driver but let the driver leave without 

obtaining any personal information. No police report was filed.

On January 26, 2019, Thompson contacted Dingess’s insurance 

company, State Farm, seeking uninsured motorist benefits. When State Farm 

questioned Dingess about the incident, he admitted he drove Thompson to Cash 

Express but denied having an automobile accident. Because no police report was 

filed and State Farm was not notified about an accident within 30 days as required 

by the policy, State Farm denied coverage. 

Thompson eventually sued Dingess, State Farm, and an unknown 

defendant – the other driver. Both Dingess and State Farm moved the trial court 

for summary judgment, which was granted. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
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that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR1 56.03. An 

appellate court’s role in reviewing a summary judgment is to determine whether 

the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 

moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 

S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de 

novo because factual findings are not at issue. Pinkston v. Audubon Area Cmty.

Servs., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing Blevins v. Moran, 12 

S.W.3d 698 (Ky. App. 2000)).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Thompson asserts the trial court erred in dismissing her 

claims against State Farm. She argues State Farm’s 30-day notification 

requirement impermissibly shortens the statute of limitations for making an 

uninsured motorist claim, citing Elkins v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual

Insurance Company, 844 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. App. 1992), in which a one-year

limitation for filing suit was held unreasonable. However, the case herein differs 

factually and legally from Elkins, including the fact this case arises from an alleged 

hit-and-run accident. 

Under KRS2 304.20-020(2), an “uninsured motor vehicle” includes:

1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 

2

 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 
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an insured motor vehicle where the liability insurer 

thereof is unable to make payment with respect to the 

legal liability of its insured within the limits specified 

therein because of insolvency; an insured motor vehicle 

with respect to which the amounts provided, under the 

bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable 

at the time of the accident with respect to any person or 

organization legally responsible for the use of such motor 

vehicle, are less than the limits described in KRS 304.39-

110; and an insured motor vehicle to the extent that the 

amounts provided in the liability coverage applicable at 

the time of the accident is denied by the insurer writing 

the same.

This definition “does not provide that a motor vehicle will be considered uninsured 

when the driver flees the scene and cannot be identified. If the legislature had 

intended to include ‘hit and run’ vehicles within the mandated coverage, it could 

have done so.” Huelsman v. Nat’l Emblem Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Ky. 

App. 1977). It did not, nor may we do so on its behalf. 

Shortly after the passage of Kentucky’s Motor Vehicle Reparations 

Act, it was established by the Supreme Court of Kentucky that although insurers 

are required by KRS 304.20-020 to provide uninsured motorist coverage, “there is 

no requirement that coverage against loss caused by hit-and-run vehicles be 

afforded.” Jett v. Doe, 551 S.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Ky. 1977). It further held:

the statute recognizes by its language “subject to the 

terms and conditions of such coverage” contained in 

subsection (2), that insurers may insert restrictions in 

their policies’ provisions defining what is an “uninsured 

motor vehicle.” The matter herein is thus a purely 

contractual issue between the insurer and its insured 
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which we cannot disturb. By issuing an automobile 

liability policy providing for uninsured motorist coverage 

in hit-and-run cases, even though such coverage be 

subject to the restriction under consideration here, the 

insurer is providing coverage greater than that required 

by KRS 304.20-020. The insurer, in affording this 

additional coverage, has the right to require whatever 

conditions precedent to such protection as it sees fit, 

and once such a condition is clearly expressed in the 

policy and agreed upon by the parties, the courts 

must give it full force and effect and abstain from 

making a new or different contract under the guise of 

interpretation at the instance of a disappointed party.

[Mullins v. Nat’l Cas. Co.,] 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 

928 (1938). In bringing a claim under the hit-and-run 

provision here, it was incumbent upon the insured to 

bring herself within its requirements. This the appellant 

admits she has not done. We therefore must conclude 

there to have been no error in the circuit court’s judgment 

denying coverage.

Id. at 223 (emphasis added). 

Turning to the case herein, there is no dispute that even if there was an 

accident, it was a hit-and-run. Accordingly, compliance with the terms of the 

policy was mandatory for coverage, and any failure to do so forfeited said 

coverage. Thompson’s contention that she should not be held to the terms of the 

policy is nonsensical because a second-class insured3is not afforded greater rights 

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 Ordinarily, there are two classes of insureds. The first class generally consists of “the named 

insured, the insured who bought and paid for the protection and who has a statutory right to 

reject uninsured motorist coverage, and the members of his family residing in the same 

household.” Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky. 1979). The second class 

is normally comprised of others in the vehicle at the time of the accident. While the protection 

afforded to the first class is typically broad, that of the second class can be more limited.
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and coverage than a first-class insured who procured and paid premiums for said 

coverage. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Thompson’s claims against 

State Farm. 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order entered by the 

Martin Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Travis O. Terry

Hindman, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Darrin W. Banks

John V. Porter

Cameron D. Allen

Paintsville, Kentucky