Special Commentary:

Outbreak: COVID-19, Crime, and Conflict

May 14, 2020 | Dr. Paul R. Kan

The COVID-19 pandemic is the byproduct of illicit global trafficking. Although COVID-19 

was likely transmitted to humans via pangolins sold in the wet markets of Wuhan, China, these 

markets acted as mere way stations for the virus. The natural habitats of the pangolins are the 

forests, grasslands, and savannahs of Africa. But, through a network of impoverished local 

communities, poachers, transnational organized crime, gangs and corrupt officials, 

approximately 2.7 million of this endangered species are captured and smuggled to Asia every 

year. The pangolin has earned the sad distinction of being “the most trafficked animal on earth.” 

The illicit global network of wildlife trafficking was a major facilitator of the pandemic, but 

the effects of the virus’ spread are, in turn, facilitating more criminal activities while creating the 

potential for greater internal instability in many states. The contagion-crime nexus has been 

overshadowed by the urgent need to combat the spread of the virus. Nonetheless, COVID-19 is 

acting as an amplifier for crime and conflict that will have repercussions in the international 

security environment in the near and long term.

RAIDING THE ANIMAL KINGDOM

The global trafficking of pangolins was a highly lucrative business before the COVID-19 

pandemic. Wildlife trafficking in general is not only profitable but is not punished as severely as 

trafficking in other illicit commodities. The combination of high profit and low risk has made 

wildlife the fourth largest illegally trafficked commodity in the world after drugs, weapons, and 

humans. At an estimated value of $7 to $23 billion per year, global wildlife trafficking provides 

the context to understanding how illegal pangolin smuggling created the conditions for the 

outbreak of COVID-19 and how organized crime will continue to bring violence to societies and 

undermine state governance.

The United States has recognized the significant power of wildlife trafficking and its ability 

to harm the stability of a number of countries. Congress passed the Eliminate, Neutralize, and 

Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act in 2016, directing federal agencies to work to strengthen 

law enforcement, demand reduction, and build international cooperation and commitment. In 
fiscal year 2018, the US government dedicated approximately $122 million to combat global 

wildlife trafficking. This funding supports a multilayered approach that includes international, 

regional, national, and local actions to tackle the illicit worldwide trafficking of animals. The 

Department of Defense also plays an important role in combating wildlife trafficking. The 2015 

National Defense Authorization Act specifically mentions that the DOD may support law 

enforcement missions around the world to counter transnational organized criminal activities

including “the illegal trade in natural resources and wildlife.”

However, both supply and demand incentives in the pangolin trade have made it resistant to 

US and other efforts to halt it. Trafficking in pangolins did not emerge solely from a demand in 

Asia for the mammal’s purported medicinal benefits. When China banned sales of ivory, Asian 

organized crime adapted and engaged their African criminal counterparts to shift to the 

acquisition and selling of pangolins. 

Transnational organized crime’s role in wildlife trafficking has worsened challenges to state 

governance by weakening law enforcement and aiding violent opposition groups. In some cases, 

insurgent and terrorists groups have helped supply organized criminal gangs with illegal wildlife 

products. The outbreak of COVID-19 will continue to exacerbate these criminally generated

effects.

BUSINESS AS USUAL DURING THE UNUSUAL

Operating as a “shadow state” in many countries, organized crime groups have long played a 

role in dealing with the repercussions of disasters. In the aftermath of hurricanes, floods, 

earthquakes, tsunamis, as well as during famines, disease outbreaks, and sudden economic 

downturns, criminal syndicates have helped to alleviate societal suffering in ways that 

governments have not. As a result, organized crime groups have been able to take advantage of 

societal disruption to further their interests at the expense of state legitimacy. 

Although organized crime syndicates often act predatorily against people and businesses, 

they have nonetheless used their illicit supply chains to deliver necessities in uncertain times. 

After the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the yakuza mobilized a fleet of trucks to 

be the first to deliver food, bottled water, and blankets to hard hit communities. With their 

accumulation of illicit profit, organized crime groups have also been a source of capital for 

communities that have taken hard economic hits. During the 2008 financial crisis, the Italian 

mafia groups offered needed liquidity in the form of business and personal loans. The current 

pandemic has proven no different; Mexican drug cartels have been distributing similar 

humanitarian and economic relief in the form of food and cleaning supplies. 

Far from being altruistic acts, criminal support for affected and vulnerable communities is a 

way for organized crime to continue to exert, and even expand, its power and legitimacy. 

Criminally supplied relief comes at a cost to be paid when legitimate emergency aid arrives in 

the form of reconstruction and business loans. Organized crime has routinely received a share of 
government directed emergency funds aimed at helping residents and legal businesses recover 

from disasters through bribery, extortion, and corruption.

Beyond gaining money from the diversion of government funding, organized crime has also 

found novel ways to generate illicit profit in crises. In the initial stages of the current pandemic, 

many organized crime groups’ illicit activities were dealt a blow—the sudden disruption of the 

global supply chain affected their ability to transport and sell many illegal commodities. Drug 

traffickers have struggled to get needed precursor chemicals to manufacture certain narcotics 

and their customers have stayed away due to stay-at-home and social distancing restrictions. 

Criminal syndicates have quickly shifted to new black market opportunities such as 

counterfeiting personal protective equipment and disinfectant. Russian organized crime has 

assisted in diverting scarce ventilators to wealthy oligarchs who have links to the government.

Governments have not always taken a confrontational stand against organized crime groups 

in disasters and crises. In fact, states have also benefited from the community control that many 

criminal groups exert, this has been especially noticeable during the COVID-19 outbreak. Gangs 

in El Salvador have helped enforce stay-at-home restrictions while gangs in the favelas of Brazil

are mandating more stringent measures than the government. The exertion of community 

control buttresses organized crime groups as alternate forms of governance and legitimacy in 

many countries.

THE COMING COVID CONFLICTS?

In a May webinar on “Corruption, Global Trade and COVID-19,” Nikos Passas warned of

emerging of “criminogenic asymmetries”— inequalities and gaps between the legitimate and 

illegitimate provision of scarce public goods leading to group grievances that feed violent 

movements. The sudden economic downturn and increasing private and public debt due to the 

COVID-19 outbreak has combined with the strain on people, businesses, and governments to

create fertile ground for criminogenic asymmetries. Emergency measures to prop up economies 

have, so far, included broad discretionary power to distribute benefits, but will come with little 

political appetite for the slow-moving processes needed for transparency, oversight, and 

accountability. Such conditions will give rise to new criminal schemes to gain access to funds 

and resources that have reduced official scrutiny. As a result, government corruption is also 

likely to emerge. Increasing crime and government corruption will nurture group grievances and 

lend credibility to calls from violent actors to alter fundamentally the political status quo. 

Group grievances surrounding COVID have already created simmering conflicts—leaders in 

Bolivia and Sri Lanka have used the outbreak to delay elections, leading opposition figures to 

claim widespread extraconstitutional manipulation of democratic processes. In the 

predominantly Muslim state of Gujurat, India, hospitals have been accused of “apartheid” for 

separating patients based on religion. Hezbollah has been able to gain access to highly sought 

after medical supplies and is utilizing thousands of its medical professionals to fight the 

pandemic, bolstering its status as an alternative to the Lebanese state. 
The pandemic will also constrain the ability of political leaders to rely on traditional levers of 

power as in the past. The capacity of the police and military to manage conflicts and deal with 

crime will likely be diminished. State agents will be preoccupied with medical responses to the 

spread of the virus and hamstrung in meeting the growing social and political challenges. 

International organizations and non-governmental organizations that have worked to resolve 

internal conflicts will also be affected by the pandemic; their operations on the ground and on 

the frontlines will contract. Many international organizations and non-governmental 

organizations have already removed their personnel from conflict zones, not due to increased 

levels of violence, but because of health concerns related to the spread of the coronavirus. The 

United Nations announced an end to the rotation, repatriation, and new deployments of 

peacekeepers due to the spread of COVID-19, endangering fragile ceasefires and fresh 

transitional political agreements. Recognizing the unprecedented threat of COVID-19 and its 

intersection with violent conflicts, the UN Secretary General appealed for a global ceasefire.

CONCLUSION

The end of the pandemic will not mean that the crime and corruption associated with it will 

also come to an end. Even the development of a vaccine or a successful therapeutic regimen to 

prevent or treat COVID-19 will be subjected to criminal schemes; organized crime can divert 

medicine before it reaches the right populations or make counterfeit medicine to earn illicit 

profit. Seeking or finding treatments for COVID-19 may, therefore, also become part of future 

criminogenic asymmetries. Conflict zones will also reduce the access to populations when 

administering vaccinations or medical treatments, prolonging the pandemic in certain 

communities.

Without new strategic approaches to tackle the contagion-crime nexus, internal conflicts will 

blossom and haunt the international security landscape. International coordination is not only 

needed to find adequate medical solutions to COVID-19, but is also needed to reign in the 

criminality that fuels group grievances. One easy strategic approach is to raise the priority of 

illegal wildlife trafficking as an international and national security threat. The international 

community had treated wildlife as a lower tier illicit commodity to tackle. However, the current 

pandemic justifies the targeting of wildlife trafficking networks more fully and with a new sense 

of urgency. Preventing the next pandemic will require breaking the contagion-crime nexus, 

which may result in mitigating and stopping conflicts. 

The US Army can play an important role in reducing global wildlife trafficking. The Army 

has many institutional links to military forces in source countries where endangered species are 

harvested and where well-armed poachers and technologically proficient criminal groups often 

outmatch local forces. With a renewed commitment to the training of local forces to take on 

wildlife traffickers, the Army can engage once again in a comprehensive program that focuses on 

operations like “casualty care in austere environments, mission orders, mission planning, key 

leader engagements, detainee operations, site exploitation, civil military operations, the 

fundamentals of patrolling, and tracking and operating geospatial equipment.” Working with 
non-governmental organizations and conservation organizations that track and combat wildlife 

trafficking would also add to the Army’s ability to understand current and emerging patterns 

and practices in the exploitation of endangered and rare species. As an institution, the Army can 

also provide training programs to dissuade its own Soldiers from obtaining endangered and rare 

species products in regions where they are serving and, therefore, reduce one part of the 

demand.

Elevating the contagion-crime nexus as a strategic threat is not just an issue of global public 

health or human security, but also a significant way to lessen the scope and scale of internal 

conflicts. With the world focused on combating the pandemic, the opportunity exists for the 

United States and the Army to take the lead in developing strategic approaches to stop, not only 

the next pandemic, but also the outbreak of fresh rounds of violent conflicts.

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The views expressed in this Special Commentary piece are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department 

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