VICTORIES ARE NOT ENOUGH:

LIMITATIONS OF THE GERMAN WAY OF WAR

Samuel J. Newland

December 2005

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily 

reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department 

of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; 

distribution is unlimited.

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My sincere thanks to the U.S. Army War College for approving and funding the 

research for this project. It has given me the opportunity to return to my favorite 

discipline, Modern German History, and at the same time, develop a monograph 

which has implications for today’s army and officer corps. In particular, I would like 

to thank the Dean of the U.S. Army War College, Dr. William Johnsen, for agreeing 

to this project; the Research Board of the Army War College for approving the 

funds for the TDY; and my old friend and colleague from the Militärgeschichliches 

Forschungsamt, Colonel (Dr.) Karl-Heinz Frieser, and some of his staff for their 

assistance. In addition, I must also thank a good former student of mine, Colonel 

Pat Cassidy, who during his student year spent a considerable amount of time 

finding original curricular material on German officer education and making it 

available to me. I greatly appreciate a valued colleague, Dr. Tony Echevarria, who 

took a considerable amount of time reviewing this monograph and providing 

suggestions for its improvement. Credit as well goes to Mr. Rich Baker, Military 

History Institute, for helping me with some bibliographical problems and serving 

as a great research resource. Finally, credit must be given to the Chairman of the 

Department of Distance Education, Dr. Clay Chun, for encouraging and supporting 

research, writing and publication, something that a scholar genuinely appreciates 

in a department chair.

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iii

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 1. Imperial Roots of the Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 2. Leaders in German Unification: 

Founders of Traditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapter 3. A Rudderless Ship of State: 

German Security Policy after Bismark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Chapter 4. The Education of an Officer Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Chapter 5. Charting the Course for Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Chapter 6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

v

FOREWORD

 Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and 

the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, 

specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging 

that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia—

produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German 

way of war must not be ignored.

 Even the casual observers should have noted that, despite the 

military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 

20th century. This Letort Paper, authored by Dr. Samuel J. Newland, 

explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military 

reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He 

emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, 

and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has 

failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. 

This failure, which led to Germany’s defeat in these wars, should not 

be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vii

SUMMARY

 Since the early 1940s, the students of military operations in general, 

and from the United States in particular, have studied German military 

operations. While some of these studies have dealt with the wars of 

the imperial era, particularly the Wars of German Unification (1864-

71), much more study has centered on the wars waged by the Third 

Reich from 1939-45. From these studies, lessons have been extracted, 

and military doctrine has been influenced. Regrettably, however, as 

the German way of war has been studied, too often those studies have 

focused on the tactical or the operational levels of war. The exploits, the 

victories of German operational leaders such as Erwin Rommel, Heinz 

Guderian, and Eric von Manstein have been traditional favorites. And 

while the Germans have clearly influenced warfare on this level, even 

the casual observer should have noticed that the Germans fought two 

major wars in the 20th century and lost both of them, the second with 

disastrous consequences. Thus the question emerges, What was wrong 

with the oft-studied German way of war?

 A significant factor in their military failure can be laid at the top 

with both their civilian and military leadership. For while the Germans 

have excelled tactically and operationally, they have exhibited 

significant weaknesses in developing achievable goals for their nation 

and appropriate strategies for achieving these goals. In the time that 

stretched from the beginning of the 1860s until the end of World War II, 

Germany only had one brief period when it could bask in the glory of the 

European leadership it so desired. That brief period was from 1871 until 

1889 when Otto von Bismarck was Chancellor. Following Bismarck (and 

Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke), the German 

record of setting achievable goals and developing and following logical 

strategies is poor.

 This Letort Paper is designed to explore these issues and provide 

an overview of the development of Germany as a nation and German 

military thought in the 19th century. It examines the origins of modern 

German military thinking and the concepts promoted by some of 

Germany’s key military and political leadership.

 It emphasizes that, if a nation is unwilling or incapable of designing 

logical strategies, tactical and operational victories in the field will come 

to naught.

1

INTRODUCTION

From Thomas Carlyle to Martin Van Creveld, Prussian-German Prowess 

has attracted more than its share of homage from soldiers and military 

historians alike.

 Holger H. Herwig1

 This Letort Paper is written to examine the claimed German 

“genius for war,” whether it exists and, if so, at what levels. This 

question has long intrigued the author who is, by his academic 

education and major interest, a German historian. Beyond the writer’s 

own intellectual curiosity, the question has significance for the U.S. 

Army. Consider, for example, that since the end of World War II, the 

U.S. Army has expended considerable energy studying the German 

way of war. These studies include numerous publications produced 

at Fort Leavenworth, as well as such impressive projects as the 

multiple interviews and monographs completed by German officers 

from 1945 to 1954, working in cooperation with Headquarters, U.S. 

Army Europe. These Army studies cover a profusion of topics from 

strategies and campaigns in all theaters where the German Army 

fought during World War II, as well as obscure topics such as the 

utilization of canines by the German Army. They also cover the full 

spectrum of warfare from theater level operations to anti-partisan 

operations in the Balkans and Russia.

 Despite the passage of some 60 years, German doctrinal concepts 

such as Auftragstaktik and examples of battles and campaigns are still 

studied at military educational institutions, and some are included in 

U.S. Army doctrinal and instructional materials. The title of Colonel 

T. N. Dupuy’s Book, A Genius For War . . ., seems to best sum up 

the rationale for many military writers’ fascination with German 

military practices.2

 The fascination with German military prowess is not just a 

“military thing,” a fascination by soldiers about other soldiers. 

Indeed, serious historians, pseudo historians, and military buffs 

have added, seemingly weekly, to the bulk of studies on the Army 

fielded by the Third Reich, causing the shelves of respectable military 

libraries to creak from the sheer weight of these publications. The 
2

intrigue with the successes, leadership, and tactics of the German 

Army also has been shared by the military establishments of other 

nations, providing a student of German military history who wishes 

to achieve proficiency in this field of study with a daunting task.

 In addition to the literature of the past 50 years, mainly focusing 

on the military of the Third Reich, publications continue to emerge 

on the German conduct of World War I, the Wars of Unification, 

and the wars fought by Frederick the Great and his immediate 

successors. In particular, the history of the National Socialist State 

and military doctrine, as well as its impact on political processes and 

the leadership ability of key senior German officers, continues to 

intrigue students of the military art. This fascination shows no signs 

of abating.

 This paper is designed to explore German military practices and 

their origins, and analyze the weaknesses in the 19th and early 20th 

centuries of Prussian/German military thought. It emphasizes the 

importance of national political and military leaders responsible for 

higher levels of strategy, developing logical and sequential plans and 

strategies. The first 80 years of Germany’s existence indicate that, no 

matter how proficient a nation’s forces are on the battlefield, if senior 

political and military leaders have not done solid strategic planning 

and have not developed achievable goals, the efforts of its military 

forces will likely fail to produce the desired results.

 Although many militaries have attempted to analyze the 

competencies of the German military and even emulate some of 

them, particularly on the operational level of war, too often the 

failings of the German Army have not been studied properly. Most 

military authors recognize any number of German capabilities on 

the tactical and operational levels of war. Conversely, during the 

20th century, the Germans have employed their forces in two major 

World Wars and, despite their well-documented capabilities, have 

been defeated, the second defeat being an overall calamitous event 

for both the nation and its citizens. This causes students of military 

history to ask, what was missing? How is it that a nation that has 

dominated 20th century military thought has been unable to win its 

wars? Or stated another way, if there is, in fact, a German genius for 

war, why didn’t it produce victories rather than defeats in the wars 

of the 20th century? 
3

 Many authors have studied this issue and attempted to identify 

German shortcomings. Popular military historian Kenneth Macksey 

concluded, though the Germans had “many admirable attributes, 

talents and skills . . .,” that “Germany’s military methods so widely 

respected were overshadowed by arrogance, excess, rigidity of 

mind, bullying, and a blindness to the lessons of history.”3 Geoffrey 

P. Magargee took a more balanced approach. Looking at the postwar German officers’ assertion that Hitler had bullied them into 

impossible military campaigns over their protests, Magargee stated:

Hidden below that superficial argument, however, lies the Germans’ 

fundamental inability to make sound strategic judgments. This was a 

problem with deep historical roots that, at the very least, stretched back 

to Schlieffen and the senior officers and officials of his era. With almost 

no exceptions, the Nazi-era military and government were devoid of 

people who could correctly balance means and ends in order to come up 

with a realistic strategic plan.4

 Whether one totally agrees with his assessment, Megargee has 

highlighted an important fact. Most of the flaws in the German way 

of war were evident before 1914, long before Hitler’s entry into 

military affairs. The flaws are thus ones of considerable duration and 

have origins in the imperial period, rather than in the tragic National 

Socialist era. Adding to the misunderstanding, many students have 

been “taken in” by the memoirs, the interviews of senior German 

officers who, after World War II, claimed that the German Armed 

Forces were robbed of many of their rightful victories by Hitler’s 

interference in everything from strategic to tactical decisions. This 

postwar revisionist line by key German generals would lead one 

to believe that most of the flaws in the German way of war were 

tied to the National Socialist era and Hitler’s interference in military 

matters.5 In fact, this writer’s research indicates that from 1870-1945, 

four significant problems existed within the German political/

military system. All deserve careful examination by serious students 

of the military art. 

 First, from the mid 1860s, German military thinkers planned for 

and relied on the concept of a short, speedy victory to achieve their 

major goals. Planning for the short war acknowledged that Germany’s 

warmaking capabilities would not likely support long wars of 
4

attrition. And the concept of short, speedy decisive wars was based 

largely on the experiences of 1864-71. Despite this recognition, twice 

in the 20th century, Germany became involved in lengthy attritional 

conflicts, both producing disastrous results for that nation.

 A second problem deserves careful consideration. If a country’s 

political and military leadership has not engaged in the necessary 

strategic planning and established achievable objectives, no matter 

how tactically or operationally proficient that country’s military is, 

successes on the battlefield likely will be squandered. In short, military 

victories are not enough and should not be viewed in isolation! 

Obviously this problem is not exclusively a military issue since a 

nation’s national security strategy normally should be developed 

through the political system with military input. When this does not 

occur, there is a serious disconnect. As succinctly described by Major 

General, a.D., Christain O. E. Millotat, “Sheer military virtuosity 

cannot compensate for the lack of political direction and National 

Strategic objectives.”6

 Third, and closely related to the previously-mentioned problem, 

from the early 1890s until 1945, the military leadership consistently 

intruded into the political side of the German national security 

process. In part, this was due to the political leadership systematically 

failing to develop a logical national security strategy. The military 

leadership, particularly members of the famous (or in the opinion 

of some, infamous) General Staff, intruded into the political realm 

and, in essence, developed political as well as military priorities for 

the German government. With their excessive involvement in this 

important process, most of the solutions to Germany’s strategic 

problems appeared resolvable by the use of the military, rather than 

the political instrument of power. 

 Fourth, in a closely-related problem, the history of Germany from 

the beginnings of the Second Reich (1871) through the Gotterdamerung

of the Third Reich7 shows an inability to recognize the value of using 

multiple elements of power to achieve the nation’s goals. The writer 

acknowledges that this descriptor, elements of power, is rather 

recent terminology.8

 Conversely, for generations many political and 

military leaders have recognized intuitively that alternate methods 

exist to achieve a nation’s political goals other than through waging 
5

war. As the ancient Chinese philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, stated, 

“. . . Those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle. 

They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow 

his state without protracted operations.”9 In Germany, however, 

even though the political element was often used—whether it was 

chicanery on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, negotiations on the 

eve of World War I, or at Munich—a distinct tendency on the part 

of the Germans was to gravitate, all too quickly, to blunt coercion 

and to ignore all but the military element of power. In particular, 

once conflicts started, the other elements of power were pushed 

aside unceremoniously, and the Germans all too quickly pursued 

their goals by using almost exclusively the military element of 

power.10 War was viewed as the professional domain of the military, 

and the military seemed to ignore the concept that a nation can, in 

fact should, use concurrently or simultaneously several elements of 

power to achieve its goals.11

7

CHAPTER 1

IMPERIAL ROOTS OF THE PROBLEMS

Two great soldiers, Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder, and Alfred von 

Schlieffen, dominated Prusso-German military thinking from the mid19th century into the First World War and beyond. They taught and 

practiced a mode of offensive warfare that adapted to the industrial age 

Napoleon’s precept to seek prompt decision by battle, and in battle seek 

to destroy the enemy.

Gunther E. Rothenberg12

 The roots of German military greatness and the basis for its failures 

lie deep in the 19th, rather than the 20th century. When the subject 

of military failures is discussed, many Germans quickly gravitate 

to the 20th century and a discussion of Hitler, whose progressive 

interference in military matters becomes a classic example of how 

the military was led to failure.13 Granted, from the earliest stages 

of World War II, Hitler, with only the perspective of an enlisted 

soldier, meddled in matters far above his capabilities. Conversely, 

it is far too easy to blame an obviously evil dictator, a madman, for 

Germany’s military failures rather than to analyze the root causes 

of these failures. To blame one man, who’s “Thousand Year Reich” 

only endured for 13 years, is far too simplistic. To understand the 

origins of Germany’s military failures, one must first understand at 

least some rudiments of modern German history and its military and 

political traditions. 

 This paper will refer to a “German way of war,” a term that 

begs definition. The German way of war owes much to Napoleonic 

warfare. Key elements in Napoleon’s practice of warfare were rapid 

movement of his forces followed by the concentration of large bodies 

of troops to seek a quick decision on the battlefield, using tactical and 

operational excellence to destroy the enemy force. In the last half 

of the 19th century, German military leaders significantly enhanced 

Napoleonic offensive warfare. This enhancement consisted of using 

railroads, telegraph, and repeating rifles—products of the new 

industrial age—to make this type of warfare more rapid and lethal, 

more decisive. This German way of war emerged in the 1860s during 
8

the Wars of Unification, and would continue to be used until the 

waning stages of World War II. 

 Germany, among the major European powers, is a distinctly 

modern creation. In the immediate post-medieval world when modern nation-states such as Britain and France emerged, Germany was 

a series of fragmented states that seemed to have little opportunity to 

unify as a nation-state under a single sovereign. Prior to 1871, some 

300 states and fiefdoms existed, ruled by princes and, at best, minor 

nobility, rather than a nation. Thus, while a people called Germans 

have existed as an identifiable group for thousands of years, Germany, 

the nation-state, has existed only for approximately a century-anda-half, making it a decided newcomer among the modern nationstates. Complicating this problem of multiple political entities, these 

semi-feudal states also were economically autonomous, thereby 

restricting, if not stifling, economic intercourse.14 Since as a unified 

nation-state it is, in many ways, still in its infancy, Germany’s recent 

emergence on the world scene may explain some immaturity on the 

world stage.

 Complicating any effort to unify these states, at the beginning 

of the 19th century two countries vied for the leadership of the 

German people. The largest and most influential of Europe’s 

German-speaking countries was the Hapsburg Empire, dominated 

by Austria. This empire was ruled and administered by a veneer 

of German officials, but its population included a number of other 

peoples who conceivably could not claim German origins. Czechs, 

Slovaks, Slovenes, Poles, and Croats were included in this number, 

to name only a few. Though it was an essentially polyglot state, the 

Hapsburg Empire tended to dominate central European politics and, 

to a large extent, the politics of the German states. In fact, from the 

1815 Congress of Vienna, which forged the agreements ending the 

Napoleonic Wars, until the Revolutions of 1848, its leader’s (Prince 

Klemens von Metternich) brand of conservative politics dominated 

Europe. 

 In the same period, to the north of the Hapsburg domain, the 

second leading German state and the Hapsburg’s direct competitor 

was the increasingly influential Prussia. This state was noted for its 

military prowess rather than its cultural or commercial excellence. 

The Prussian military had enhanced its reputation in the wars waged 
9

by Frederick the Great and most recently in the Napoleonic Wars. 

In fact, the German army, relying heavily on Prussian traditions, 

retained this aura of military preeminence into the early 20th century. 

The reader should note, however, that the Prussian army was in 

many respects a dual-purpose entity. It had, in addition to its role 

to defend the state, a significant domestic role, i.e., preserving the 

existing social order and the Hohenzollern-led state.15 Still, the roots 

of a unified Germany’s military greatness, and at the same time its 

failures, emerge in the post-Napoleonic period from Prussia rather 

than from the Hapsburg Empire.

 The movement for a unified Germany emerged in the late 

Napoleonic era. In the wave of nationalistic feeling that swept 

Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, German nationalists 

were significant among the discontented European groups who 

believed their aspirations had been ignored by the reactionary 

settlements forged by the Congress of Vienna during 1814-15.16
10

While acknowledging their grievances, the many divisive issues 

that separated the various principalities in the first half of the 19th 

century were so numerous that Germany seemed more of a dream 

for dreamers, for visionaries, rather than a realistic possibility.

 The creation of a modern, unified Germany and the philosophical 

and experiential basis for the German way of war resulted from a 

series of wars (1864-71) initiated by Prussia. Unification was not 

accomplished through a political or diplomatic process.17 As its 

critics frequently point out, war forged the German state, rather than 

a diplomatic or political process.18 The leading military officer of the 

Prussian army, Helmuth Von Moltke, justified this approach, widely 

accepted in Prussia, stating:

A world historical transformation of German condition, such as that which 

occurred in 1866, could not have come about by peaceful conventions 

and decrees. Action was required—pressure on the inside, war on the 

outside. One of the many German states had to become powerful enough 

to carry along the rest of them.19

In short, rather than through diplomacy and politics, revolutions and 

revolutionaries, German unification would have to be forced, not 

negotiated, and would be led by those more comfortable in uniform, 

instead of those wearing coat and tails. 

 Ultimately Prussia, which was actually an on again-off again 

supporter of German unification, would take the lead in the effort to 

unify the German states. Understanding Prussia, the core influence 

on Germany’s political and military traditions from the mid-19th 

century until 1945, and its role in the unification of Germany is 

essential to understanding the German way of war. Prussian military 

thought, particularly in the wake of the Wars of Unification (1864-70) 

and its military campaigns during the same period, is the foundation 

of both modern Germany and German military thought.20

 The largest obstacle to unifying the German states was opposition 

from neighboring European nations. For various reasons, strong 

opposition to a unified Germany under Prussian leadership existed. 

Prussia, after all, was synonymous with militarism as well as 

autocratic rule. France, already a major power and for several centuries 

a unified nation, opposed the formation of a strong German nationstate on its eastern flank. France’s mid-19th century emperor, Louis 
11

Napoleon, also had hopes of extending his nation’s borders to its 

“natural” boundary, that is, the Rhine River. That obviously would 

place a substantial number of Germans under French rule.21 Such a 

move placed France in conflict with Prussia, which had expanded 

westward toward that same river and, by this time, included a 

province on the west bank, the Rhineland, which was coveted by 

Louis Napoleon. 

 Even more serious for German nation-state proponents was the 

opposition of the Hapsburg Empire. This empire and its dominant 

German elite strongly opposed the emergence of a German nationstate; that is, one that was led by Prussia and excluded or minimized 

the participation of the Hapsburgs. Even within German nationalistic 

circles, there was a sharp divide about what should be included in 

a unified Germany and who should lead it. This question resulted 

in a serious rivalry between the two major German states, Prussia 

and the Hapsburg Empire. With two of the three major continental 

empires (the other being Russia) in opposition to the formation of a 

united Germany, establishing a German nation-state, again, was no 

small task.

 An abortive attempt to unify Germany under a constitutional 

government occurred during the Revolution of 1848, but reactionary 

forces stopped this.22 The unification of 1848 was led by liberal 

political leaders. Since the liberal elements had limited experience 

with the political process, had limited power, and faced enormous 

political obstacles, their attempt to create a unified and more 

democratic state ultimately failed. Given the significant obstacles 

preventing unification, it was unlikely that it would have been 

accomplished in a timely fashion using the traditional diplomatic 

or political processes. In particular, the opposition of the major 

continental powers, particularly France and the Hapsburg Empire, 

made a diplomatic solution to this process somewhat dubious. As a 

further complication, between 1848 and assumption of William I to 

the throne in 1861, the popular enthusiasm for German unification 

cooled considerably. 

 The successful unification, the extension of Prussian power, 

and many of the elements of the German way of war have their 

origins in the new Prussian leadership that came to power in 1858. 

In that year, William I assumed the role of Regent for the Emperor 
12

of Prussia.23 As regent, William ruled Prussia for the physically and 

mentally ailing Frederick Wilhelm IV. Curiously, upon ascending 

the throne, William’s primary interest was not focused on the issue 

of unification. Rather, he was most concerned in reforming and 

expanding the Prussian Army, a factor that ultimately would be key 

in the unification process.24 His interest in the military was likely 

due to the fact that, despite his political position as King of Prussia, 

William was, by education and nature, a soldier, a position for which 

he had been well-trained. Nonetheless, he should not be dismissed as 

being indifferent or opposed to the unification of the German states. 

In reality, some of his early comments indicate he recognized that 

unification was important, and that Prussia would have a leading 

role in it. As early as 1849, he wrote: 

Whoever wishes to rule Germany must conquer it . . . That Prussia is 

destined to lead Germany is shown by our whole history, but it is a 

matter of when and how.25
13

The writer is quick to point out that prior to becoming Emperor, 

William’s proposed “conquest” was through example and strong 

leadership, not military campaigns. The above-cited quote is 

significant because it best shows his real interest, the promotion 

of Prussian power. Prussian strength and leadership would then 

bring about the unification of Germany and at the same time would 

enhance Prussia’s power. Whatever the motivation, Prussia had set 

a clear azimuth; its Emperor intended to lead the Germans, or more 

clearly dominate the German unification process.

 Upon becoming King, William was faced with a significant 

problem in achieving his primary goal for Prussia, i.e., military 

reform. To accomplish his plan for expanding and strengthening 

the Prussian army, he had to contend with dedicated and organized 

opposition in parliament.26 When he submitted his plan to the 

Prussian Chamber of Deputies, however, the deputies refused to 

pass it without amendments that would have, in William’s opinion, 

neutered his proposal. The King was so irritated and frustrated that 

he even considered abdication. It was, however, in this atmosphere 

that he selected a new Minister President for Prussia, Otto von 

Bismarck. German unification and a decidedly autocratic approach 

to dealing with parliamentarians will be associated with his name 

forever. 

15

CHAPTER 2

LEADERS IN GERMAN UNIFICATION:

FOUNDERS OF TRADITIONS

His [Bismarck’s] motive for expansion was not geopolitical, but nationalistic 

for the greater glory and power of Prussia and the Hohenzollern dynasty.

Otto Pflanze27

Moltke was both an exceptionally skilled organizer and a great field 

commander, employing rare powers of reasoning and administrative 

competence to solve an apparently deadlocked strategic or operational 

situation. This made him the most important military thinker between 

the fall of Napoleon and the First World War.

Gunther E. Rothenberg28

 The subject of German unification is, for all time, strongly tied 

to the name Otto von Bismarck. The name Bismarck should also 

be associated with exceptionally brilliant and talented political 

and strategic leadership. By background, Bismarck was a member 

of an old, but not particularly distinguished Pomeranian Junker 

family. When he came to power in September 1862, Bismarck, who 

had achieved fame and notoriety as a reactionary delegate to the 

Frankfurt Assembly, had been essentially “waiting in the wings” 

for a number of months. The King had hesitated to appoint him 

simply because he did not trust Bismarck. Despite his sovereign’s 

initial reticence, Bismarck would prove to be unflinchingly loyal to 

the Crown and to Prussia. Furthermore, the first few years of the 

Chancellor’s tenure would show that both Bismarck and the Emperor 

were clearly in pursuit of similar “ends.” Both were committed to 

retaining and extending the power of Prussia and preserving the 

Hohenzollern dynasty. Thus, as accurately described by one of 

Bismarck’s biographers, Otto Pflanze, “His (Bismarck’s) motive for 

expansion was not geopolitical, but nationalistic for the greater glory 

and power of Prussia and the Hohenzollern dynasty.”29 Bismarck 

and the King, however, initially appeared to have different priorities 

for achieving their mutually accepted ends.
16

 As noted by numerous writers, as early as the 1850s Bismarck, 

who was regarded as an ultra-conservative but not as a German 

nationalist, came to appreciate the power of nationalism as a 

significant strategic weapon that could reinforce Prussian strength 

and foreign policy.30 In fact, during and immediately after the 

revolutions of 1848, Bismarck recognized and reported on the 

potential of properly mobilized German public opinion as a weapon 

that Prussia could use against liberal forces then in control of the 

Frankfurt Assembly.31 Recognizing the potential power of German 

nationalism, Bismarck was very willing to use nationalistic ardor 

for his own purposes. Conversely, in the mid and latter 1850s, the 

nationalism of 1848 had no immediate utility because nationalistic 

ardor had cooled. If one were to read the writings of some of the 

post-1870 German nationalistic historians, the reader would be led to 

believe that after 1848, the German states were a seething nationalistic 

caldron, waiting anxiously, pressing for yet another chance to form 

a nation-state called Germany.32 In reality, however, after the failed 

revolutions of 1848, nationalistic ardor and the move for unification 

had suffered a temporary hiatus. Nonetheless, it would be Bismarck 

who would appreciate the power of German nationalism to overcome 

the resistant loyalties of many Germans to their local principalities.33

In fact, it is not an exaggeration to state that Bismarck “hijacked” the 

cause of nationalism from the German Progressives and utilized it to 

strengthen the power of Prussia and the Hohenzollerns.34

 In the Army War College’s terminology, as used in its strategy 

analysis system, the overall goal, the “ends,” pursued by both 

William and Bismarck were the maintenance of the Hohenzollern 

monarchy and the leadership/dominance of the German states by 

Prussia. A complementary element of this goal was that Prussia, not 

the Hapsburgs, would lead the German states. Both Bismarck and 

William witnessed and participated in the struggle between Austria 

and Prussia over who would lead the states, particularly during the 

calamitous events of 1848-50. Both recognized that unification—

the development of nation-states—was a strong movement in 

Europe, and both were determined that Prussia must take the lead 

in German affairs, rather than Austria. In Bismarck’s opinion, the 

maintenance or enhancement of Prussian and Hohenzollern power 

and the preeminence of Prussia in German politics would have to 
17

be achieved through Prussia’s pressing its role as a leader of the 

German states. Ultimately this would mean a confrontation with 

another state, Austria, for it was loathe to surrender the leading role 

it had enjoyed in the German states for centuries. 

 Having a solid agreement on the basic goals for Prussia, the 

achievement of these goals would not be so simple. The obstacles 

to unification were daunting. The two major continental powers—

France and the Hapsburg Empire—had strong objections to a unified 

Germany and/or a stronger Prussia. Nor was Russia keen about such 

a prospect. It was unlikely that diplomacy alone would succeed in 

unraveling the “Gordian Knot” of who would lead in the affairs of 

central Europe or who would lead the on-again, off-again movement 

to unify the German states under one sovereign. If Prussia was to 

be the leader, a sound strategy to accomplish this, a committed 

sovereign, and a wily, a shrewd political leader would be necessary. 

This leadership would come from Bismarck.

 When he became Minister President of Prussia, his policies offered 

many positive and refreshing elements. Though he was regarded as a 

conservative, even an ultra-conservative, he had political leadership 

skills that are often overlooked. First, he never wavered from the 

goals that both he and his sovereign had set. Throughout his tenure, 

there was a remarkable continuity in his goals. At the same time, he 

showed his willingness, his ability to compromise—that is, when it 

served his purposes—and when compromise did not undercut his 

goals. This is in contrast with the extreme ultra-conservatives, like 

Edwin von Manteufel, who were more than willing to deal with 

recalcitrant parliamentarians by having the army turn its guns on 

them and drive them from their building. Bismarck avoided this type 

of drastic response. Instead, he would use diplomacy, chicanery, or 

coercion to stifle the opposition, rather than an iron hand. During 

his tenure in power, he had no qualms about blatantly co-opting 

some of the opposition’s programs or ideas and promoting them as 

his own.35 His ability to maneuver and his tactics under fire from 

the opposition resulted in numerous successes which prompted 

repeated conversions from the opposition to Bismarck’s guidon.36

 Above all, Bismarck’s hallmark and significance for this 

monograph centers on his ability to focus clearly on his goals and 

his consistency in retaining them throughout his tenure in office. His 
18

aims, the extension of Prussian power 

and the maintenance of the Hohenzollern 

monarchy, were clearly shared with 

those of his sovereign. He possessed an 

additional talent; he was exceptionally 

perceptive and intuitive as a politician 

and diplomat. While he was a politician, 

not a soldier, he did not shrink from 

using the military element of power to 

achieve his political goals. 

 For Bismarck, the first test of his 

leadership and his determination under 

fire would be in support of William’s 

interest in reforming and expanding 

the Prussian military. Rather than evict 

the Parliamentarians and lock the doors 

to their chambers, he reinterpreted 

his powers and that of his sovereign and obtained the means—

the finances—to accomplish his sovereign’s goal. Simply, after 

attempting to reach a peaceful accommodation with parliament over 

the approval of the budget, Bismarck ignored the deadlock, the royal 

bureaucracy continued to collect revenues without parliamentary 

approval, and the government and the army continued to function 

without interruption. 

 Though this was a successful tactic, he could not continue simply 

to confront the opposition with such coups. Rather, it would be more 

logical to employ tactics to neuter and, in some cases, convert members 

of the liberal opposition within the Progressive Party. Thus, to erode 

both Austria’s leadership role in German affairs and to begin the 

process of robbing the liberal elements of their nationalistic banner, 

in 1864 he involved Prussia and Austria in a war against Denmark 

over the territories of Schleswig-Holstein. Though Austria and 

Prussia were allies in this lopsided victory over the Danes, Prussian 

prestige and leadership in the German states were elevated because 

Prussia engineered the war. As an added benefit, the joint AustroPrussian administration of the two duchies provided a potential 

backdrop for conflict between the Austrians and the Prussians. That 

Otto von Bismarck, initially Minister President of Prussia, and 

later Chancellor of Germany.

(Author’s Collection)
19

conflict, inherent in the dual administration of Schleswig-Holstein 

and which supported Bismarck’s anti-Austrian posture, came to a 

climax in 1866. In a calculated dispute over the administration of 

the duchies, Bismarck, for the second time in the same decade, led 

Prussia into a war.37 This war was designed to strip Austria of its 

role as a leader in the politics of the German states and clearly put 

Prussia into a leading role. 

 The war was a quick and decisive victory over Austria, a 7-weeks 

war. Prussian troops went into motion on June 15, 1866, and the 

decisive battle—Königgrätz—was fought on July 3. Although many 

of the independent states of the German confederation supported 

Austria, Prussia won through superior leadership on the field and 

with an army that clearly appreciated the advantages of mid-19th 

century technology.38 At this juncture, however, a conflict emerges 

between practitioners of the German way of war. Bismarck, mindful 

of his goals, shared by the King, wanted to defeat Austria’s military 

forces and, through the defeat, force Austria to bow out of the politics 

of the North German states. He did not, however, wish to humiliate, 

to defeat totally and occupy Austria. To do so could potentially 

create a desire for vengeance by the Hapsburg Empire or cause a 

power vacuum to develop in this region.39 Neither would it be in 

Prussia’s interest. Prussia still had to live in central Europe after the 

War and needed at least Austrian acquiescence in a likely future 

war with France, a nation that stood squarely in the way of Prussian 

ambitions. As Bismarck so succinctly wrote:

If we are not excessive in our demands and do not believe that we have 

conquered the world, we will attain a peace that is worth our effort. But 

we are just as quickly intoxicated as we are plunged into dejection, and 

I have the thankless task of pouring water into the bubbling wine and 

making it clear that we do not live alone in Europe, but with three other 

powers that hate and envy us. 40

Thus, peace with some sort of honor was desired with and for 

Austria. 

 This strategically and politically wise decision on Bismarck’s part 

was not well-received by elements within the military establishment. 

From the army’s perspective, even though Königgrätz was a 

tremendous victory, a substantial part of the Austrian army remained 
20

intact. Austria was not defeated until its 

army had been destroyed. Within the 

military community, a clamor also was 

heard to annex key areas and occupy 

other parts of the Hapsburg lands, to 

include Vienna. In this contest of wills, 

Bismarck won perhaps in part because his 

sovereign, William, had not been eager 

to go to war in the first place because he 

disliked the idea of fighting a kindred 

nation. While Bismarck was setting the 

pace for political and diplomatic action 

in Prussia, the thoughts and traditions 

of the emerging Prussian military 

leadership should also be explored. 

 Helmuth von Moltke, often referred to as Moltke the Elder, 

dominated Prussian military practice in the 1860s. This officer, who 

effectively became field commander of the Prussian army on June 2, 

1866, seemed an unlikely candidate as military leader of the Prussian 

army. Though born in Parchim, Mecklenburg, on October 26, 1800, 

Moltke began his military career in Denmark, largely through the 

insistence of his father. After a brief career in that country’s service, he 

resigned from the Danish army in 1822 and joined the Prussian army, 

certain that there were better chances for career advancement there.41

Moltke was an extremely intelligent officer who had a serious and 

studious disposition. With his scholarly interests, including a deep 

appreciation for the classics and a talent for languages, he seemed 

more likely to be an academic rather than a soldier. Nonetheless, 

he pursued a career as a soldier, and his talents were evident when 

high scores on entry exams resulted in his admittance to the General 

War School in 1823. From then until the outbreak of the AustroPrussian War, he held numerous positions in the Prussian army. 

His assignments, however, were as educator, historian, or staffer, 

not as a commander of military units in the field.42 Yet this officer, 

who began serving in an age when horse-drawn artillery and black 

powder weapons were the standard, would, through his writings and 

his command style, have a major impact on the Prussian/German 

conduct of war from the 1860s until the end of the Third Reich.

Helmuth von Moltke
21

 Moltke’s intellect, sharpened by years of study, permitted him 

to understand clearly the challenges facing Prussia, particularly if it 

chose to exercise the military element of power. He recognized that 

Prussia, a nation with totally open borders and not truly a major 

power, faced significant challenges from larger and more powerful 

nations. Prussia was limited in terms of resources. It did not have 

significant manpower reserves, like Russia, that would permit it to 

lose or sacrifice significant military formations while it built up its 

forces or planned military responses.43 Thus, battles of attrition were 

not a feasible tactic for Prussia. Nor could it trade ground for time, 

as could the Russian Empire, because its land area was too small. 

With limited resources, Prussia would have to engage its enemies 

and wage its wars in a different, perhaps more efficient, fashion.

 Moltke held an approach to war that had some similarities to 

Carl von Clausewitz, who Moltke openly acknowledged as one of 

his philosophical mentors (even though they did not ever directly 

work together).44 Thus, in true Clausewitzian style,he recognized the 

changing, dynamic nature of war and, as a result, disliked doctrine 

or establishing dogma on how wars should be waged, how battles 

should be fought.45 In his thoughts he consistently emphasized 

that set “cookie cutter” approaches to the flow of actions on the 

battlefield were not at all appropriate for the Prussian army. Thus he 

stated, “In War, as in art, we find no universal forms; in neither can 

a rule take the place of talent.”46 Simply, hard fast doctrinal solutions 

were not desirable for modern warfare. Thus, “Universal rules (i.e., 

doctrine) and the systems built upon them therefore can have no 

possible practical value.”47 While a commander obviously should 

have a strategy in mind, the strategy had to be flexible in order to 

take advantage of opportunities that would certainly occur on the 

battlefield, once the first shot was fired.48 Consequently, well-trained 

and experienced officers who were able to improvise and who had 

the authority to take independent action based on the emerging 

situations were necessary, rather than doctrine-driven officers. 

 If for no other reason, the ability of commanders to analyze the 

situation and act independently provided an important element to 

the battlefield, what we today would call a force multiplier, speed. 

Through speed and decisive action, a nation could achieve victory. 

Moltke was convinced that to win wars, the key element to achieve 
22

a nation’s victory was the destruction of the enemy force through 

battle on the field by conducting rapid and decisive campaigns. In 

his writings he noted:

Victory in the decision of arms is the most important moment in war. 

It alone breaks the enemy’s will and forces him to submit to our will. 

Neither the occupation of a certain piece of terrain nor the capture of 

a fortified place, but only the destruction of the hostile fighting force 

will be decisive as a rule. It is therefore the most important object of all 

operations.49

Once a nation chose war, annihilation of the enemy’s armies was the 

route to victory, not the exercise of any other element of power.

 Moltke understood the role of politics and national policy in 

war. Clausewitz consistently emphasized that war must be based 

on the extension of a nation’s politics or must be based on national 

policy. Moltke, while acknowledging this fact, added that politics 

and politicians had no place at all once the path to war was taken. 

In short, once the nation proceeded to war, Moltke believed that 

political leaders and their interests had to be removed from the 

conduct of war, leaving its conduct to the professionals, the military. 

Once the course of resorting to arms had been taken, politicians and 

politics would do more harm than good. According to Moltke, 

Policy must not be allowed to interfere in operations. In this sense, General 

von Clausewitz wrote in his tactical letters to Müffling (Frederich Karl 

Freiherr von, an officer partly responsible for the Prussian contribution 

to the victory at Waterloo): “the task and the right of the art of war, as 

opposed to policy, is mainly to prevent that policy from demanding 

things which are against the nature of war and out of ignorance of the 

instruments from committing errors in their use.”50

 The difference of opinion about the role of the political leader 

versus that of the military man came to the fore when the Prussian 

army went to war against Austria in 1866. When the war began, the 65-

year-old intellectual Moltke, who had never commanded significant 

military formations, was at the military’s helm. Using technology—

the railroads—for the necessary speed to mobilize and move his 

troops, the telegraph for communication, and the Prussian needle 

gun for its proven firepower, Moltke began conducting the types of 
23

operations the Germans would become famous for in the following 

century. With speed and determination, he set about moving his 

forces to the site of battle, concentrating his army, and focusing it 

on destroying the enemy force. His goal was the destruction of the 

Austrian army and the defeat of Austria. Though the famed battle of 

Königgrätz was a spectacular victory over Austria, a substantial part 

of its army escaped destruction. The Prussian generals wanted its 

destruction and wanted Prussian troops in Vienna; a simple defeat 

of the army was not sufficient.51 For Bismarck, however, the army’s 

defeat enhanced Prussia’s role in German affairs and advanced the 

stature of the Hohenzollern house. The achievement of these two 

goals clearly supported the long-term objectives of both William and 

Bismarck. The army’s annihilation was unnecessary.

 As was noted in a previous section, that war was necessary and 

that Moltke understood its goals were evident when he later wrote:

A world historical transformation of German condition, such as that which 

occurred in 1866, could not have come about by peaceful conventions 

and decrees. Action was required—pressure on the inside, war on the 

outside. One of the many German states had to become powerful enough 

to carry along the rest of them. It was King William who, through the 

reform of the Prussian Army, created the power that secured unity and 

the resulting liberty for Germany.52

Moltke and his superiors clashed due to his beliefs about the role of 

the political leader once the first shot of a war was fired.53 Because he 

felt that once the war started, the military commander should become 

the preeminent leader, Bismarck and Moltke strongly disagreed, 

initiating a conflict that would outlast both of them and would not 

be resolved throughout the Imperial period. As mentioned before, 

this initial conflict emerged when Moltke and most of his military 

colleagues were irritated about the political leadership denying them 

the opportunity to defeat totally the Austrian Army. 

 The conflict over the appropriate role of the politician and 

general became even worse in 1870 when, through carefully laid 

plans and outright chicanery, Bismarck drew the French into a war 

with Prussia. The excellent mobilization machinery of the Prussian 

army and its allied German states, sound tactics, and inspired 

leadership allowed Prussia to deliver a significant and rapid defeat 
24

to the French Army at Sedan, a victory which also sealed the fate 

of Napoleon III. Remembering the disappointments of the AustroPrussian War, Moltke and his senior staff at first held the Minister 

President of Prussia at arms’ length. They had never forgiven 

Bismarck for his “betrayal” after Königgrätz and for keeping them 

from a complete victory over Austria. Bismarck was excluded from 

military conferences, which were attended only by the Generals 

and the King of Prussia. Both Bismarck and the Minister of War 

Albrecht von Roon were kept in the dark about military plans. This 

problem again emerged at Sedan, when Moltke, conducting his own 

negotiations with the French, attempted to impose harsh peace terms 

on the surrounded French army. As the French were preparing to 

break off negotiations, Bismarck stepped in to restart and negotiate 

the surrender.54 Bismarck wanted to avoid the complete humiliation 

of France, but Moltke, representing the military point of view, 

proposed less than honorable terms for the French.55

 The dispute arose again when the French refused to surrender, and 

the Prussian Army surrounded Paris. Bismarck wanted to bombard 

Paris to force the French to surrender, but the military leadership was 

opposed to using siege guns. With the Army and the Chancellor at 

odds regarding the extent of the Army’s power during wartime, on 

January 25, 1871, William settled the matter. On that date he issued 

a directive that required Chancellor Bismarck to be informed of 

military operations and have the opportunity to comment on them. 

Furthermore, William clearly told Moltke not to correspond with 

French authorities over surrender/peace terms until the sovereign 

determined whether the Chancellor should be informed/involved.56

Thus, it would be Bismarck, the political leader, not Moltke and the 

military, who would negotiate terms with the French. Once again, a 

political leader and one who (in the military’s opinion) had already 

squandered some of their successes with his interference again 

outmaneuvered them. 

 Despite this philosophical disagreement, which at times was bitter, 

the end result of Bismarck’s political and diplomatic maneuvers and 

Moltke’s military skills was a unified Germany. Though Bismarck 

prevailed over the generals, the dispute over the military’s role 

once hostilities started was never completely settled. Instead, this 

controversy continued to simmer over the next 2 decades. The limits 
25

on the military’s role in foreign relations and in politics began to 

reemerge in the early 1880s. That the political leadership lost in this 

conflict is evident by the preeminence of the military in the period 

1914-18. Without a skillful and a determined political leader, the 

German experience was that the military would likely dominate 

politics.

 The question remains, however, how or in what ways did the 

entire unification episode, and the leadership that promoted it, 

contribute to, or perhaps lay the basis for, the German way of war? As 

the contributions are considered, remember that the way of war that 

has been analyzed is not so much a German way of war, but rather 

a Prussian. Unified Germany was also a Prussianized Germany in 

terms of its political and military traditions.57 The military tradition 

proves by far the easiest to trace, particularly if one begins with 

Moltke, who held the position of Chief of Staff of the Prussian General 

Staff from 1857-71 and then Chief of the German General Staff from 

1871-88. In his writings, he recognized some of Clausewitz’s basic 

teachings and clearly admitted that Clausewitz’s writings had a 

significant impact on his thoughts. For example, in his comments on 

strategy, he directly quoted Clausewitz, when he stated “Strategy is 

the employment of battle to gain the ends of war.”58

 Moltke, however, is most significant for the way of war he espoused 

and practiced, what he termed Bewegungskrieg, wars of movement. 

His way of war was to conduct operations where his armies would 

move rapidly, concentrate, and strike at the heart of the enemy. The 

goal was to destroy its army or its will to resist, and quickly conclude 

the war.59 His were wars of tactical and operational victories that 

supported the goals and the political strategies developed by the 

crown and the political leadership (Bismarck). 

 He recognized, like Clausewitz, that defense was a stronger form 

of warfare.60 At the same time, he believed that the best defense a 

country could have was a well-trained mobile field army with which 

to wage offensive war. As he stated, “The advantages of the offensive 

are sufficiently known. Through the offensive, we lay down the law 

of action to the opponent. He has to conform his measures to ours 

and must seek the means to meet them.”61 To use this offensive army 

to best defend the country, Moltke believed the superior method 

to defeat and annihilate an enemy army was through the use of a 
26

flank attack or envelopment. “The best guarantee of success of an 

attack over the defense lies in a flanking attack and the simultaneous 

advance of all of our forces against the enemy’s flank and front.”62

 Moltke, who for 31 years held the position of Chief of Staff of the 

most capable military force in Central Europe, essentially formed 

and nurtured military thought in Germany in these formative years. 

After the Franco-Prussian War concluded in 1871, the new united 

Germany entered a period of peace that lasted over 40 years. During 

this period, the military and political leadership had the opportunity 

to ponder how best to defend the new nation. Moltke, who recognized 

that Germany could not endure long wars, continued to be an avid 

proponent of the short war/decisive battle and of the use of flank 

attacks to destroy the enemy force. Although he believed that any 

prewar plans could not outlast the first shots of a war, he also felt that 

the nation’s military leadership had the responsibility of planning 

for likely military contingencies. Thus, after his last great victory, the 

Franco-Prussian War, he developed and repeatedly revised plans to 

defend the new German Empire for the remainder of his career. 

 In many respects, through his writings Moltke provided the 

foundation for German military thought until the end of World War 

II. Likewise, his belief in the preeminence of the military over the 

political leadership once hostilities began would become the accepted 

practice under William II as Germany planned for and waged World 

War I. History shows that this element of Moltke’s teachings would 

have disastrous consequences for Germany and the world.

 A final significant element for the Wars of Unification is that 

too many saw the operational, the tactical victories in isolation. 

Thus, the defeats of Prussia’s adversaries, which proved the power 

or the military prowess of Prussia, and the stunning victories at 

Königsgrätz and Sedan, seemed to obscure an important fact. The 

military conducted and won these campaigns in support of the goals 

and the political strategies developed by Bismarck and agreed to by 

his sovereign. As noted by Holger Herwig, in years to come, a newer, 

post-Moltke generation:

The “demigods” of the General Staff, to use Bismarck’s term, were indeed 

a new breed. Unlike the elder Moltke, they ignored the great philosophical 

questions and studiously avoided deep analysis of statecraft and historical 
27

forces. Instead, they drew their experiences from Prussia’s victories over 

Denmark, Austria, and France.63

The euphoria of wartime victories also obscured the fact that a welldeveloped set of achievable goals, logical national strategies, and 

good political leadership were as important as military prowess in 

ensuring the future security of a united Germany. 

 Through his victories and his writings, Moltke, the sword of 

unification, had laid the foundation for modern German military 

thought. Conversely, the contribution of Bismarck, the political 

leader, must not be overlooked. Bismarck was not a political 

philosopher, but rather a determined politician who diligently 

sought the accomplishment of the goals mutually agreed upon with 

his sovereign. He carefully guided Prussia into the leadership role in 

the unification of Germany. Once the Franco-Prussian War concluded 

in early 1871, he diligently pursued the security of the new German 

Empire, protecting it from internal threats (the socialists and liberals) 

and from external enemies, namely the French. He knew that a war of 

revanche’ was likely since French nationalists seethed over the bitter 

defeat of the Franco-Prussian War and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. 

Like Moltke, who for the remainder of his career consistently planned 

for a possible war on two fronts, Bismarck consistently watched 

France and worked through diplomacy to isolate the French. Though 

their methods and approaches to the problem were different, they 

recognized the same threat and sought to promote a secure united 

Germany. 

 In many respects, despite the fact that Bismarck’s uncanny 

political abilities gave him and the German nation many successes, 

his overall impact as it relates to the German way of war is mixed. 

His unique style of politics, referred to as realpolitik, showed an 

almost total disregard for any standards of ethics. Furthermore, 

in the example of the infamous Ems dispatch which led to the 

Franco Prussian War, Bismarck was simply dishonest.64 In addition, 

Bismarck, though not a soldier, did not hesitate to wage war, that is, 

if it was to Prussia’s advantage. He could be incredibly talented and 

polished as a diplomat, but if diplomacy did not produce what was 

required for the good of Prussia, then coercion or war were paths 

taken without any hesitancy, as 1864, 1866, and 1870 show.
28

 The future German political and military leadership failed to 

learn from or ignored significant lessons from Bismarck and his 

Emperor. The first and foremost lesson was the importance of setting 

achievable, realistic goals, within the means of the new German state. 

William and Bismarck never wavered from their aims of maintaining 

the power and prestige of Prussia and of the house of Hohenzollern. 

Too many German leaders also failed to appreciate Bismarck’s 

insistence on keeping the military in its appropriate role in the state, 

even in the time of war. Moltke and his associates repeatedly tried 

to dominate the issues of both war and peace during the conflicts of 

1864, 1866, and 1870, but Bismarck prevailed. 

 Finally, future German generations did not understand that even 

when a nation has the power, the military and economic strength that 

the German Empire had in the last quarter of the 19th century, such 

power should not be flaunted. Moderation and diplomatic finesse are 

still perhaps even more important for the powerful.65 Under Bismarck, 

the new German Empire learned to walk a precarious line; Germany 

became the strongest economic and military power in Europe but 

avoided seeking the territorial expansion of the new German Reich. 

While the old balance of power in Europe was shattered, in a sense 

Germany became the master balancer of power in central Europe, 

sometimes courting rulers and their countries, in other situations 

isolating them. When the Balkans threatened to erupt in war in 1877, 

the conference to settle the issue was not the Congress of Paris, or 

Vienna, but the Congress of Berlin. 

 In all situations, Bismarck successfully protected and advanced 

the interests of the new German Empire. From the start of his 

reign as Minister President of Prussia until his resignation as 

Chancellor, forced by a new and impetuous Emperor William II in 

1890, Bismarck dominated the political scene in Germany and often 

in Europe. Bismarck, however, held his cards close to his chest, 

and the complexity, at times duplicity, of his political schemes 

were beyond many of his associates. Ultimately, it was Moltke’s 

handpicked successor as Chief of Staff, Alfred Von Waldersee, and 

the new Emperor, William II, both of whom were unconvinced of his 

strategies and unable to fathom the complexity of European politics, 

which brought about Bismarck’s exodus from appointive office.
29

CHAPTER 3

A RUDDERLESS SHIP OF STATE:

GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AFTER BISMARCK

The staggering course of the First and still more the Second World War 

no longer permits the question to be ignored whether the seeds of later 

evil were not already present in the Bismarckian Reich.

Hans Kohn66

 Though the methods, strategies, or “ways” are not in keeping with 

today’s standards of international conduct, the successes of Moltke 

in the military realm and Bismarck as a political leader cannot be 

denied. In merely a decade, their combined talents had unraveled 

the Gordian knot of German unification, strengthened Prussia and 

its Hohenzollern monarchy and, for 2 additional decades, produced 

in Europe what might be termed the Pax Teutonica. This chapter 

briefly considers the postwar goals developed by Bismarck and the 

strategies he used to achieve them. It also examines the decay of a 

well-developed national security strategy once Bismarck and his 

sovereign were no longer in charge of Germany’s policies. 

 Though Moltke, more than Clausewitz, had formed the basis for 

the German way of war, we must remember that this way of war, as 

exhibited in the campaigns of 1864-71, was only successful through 

the attainable goals and strategies established by Bismarck. As the 

writer repeatedly has emphasized, Bismarck and his sovereign had 

moderate and achievable goals. The writer understands that some 

would question that Prussia’s goals were “reasonable,” given the 

prosecution of three aggressive wars to achieve them. Certainly 

French writers could be irritated by such a claim. Conversely, the 

writer, while readily recognizing German excesses in both the Second 

and Third Reich, stands behind this statement. After all, success did 

not spoil either Bismarck or William, pushing them for excessive 

territorial demands comparable to the expansionistic plans that were 

devised by the leadership of the Third Reich. They established their 

goals—the enhancement of Prussian power and the maintenance of 
30

the Hohenzollern monarchy—and once these were attained, they 

sought neither additional territory nor hegemony in Europe. 

 Bismarck was successful and, in many respects, Germany’s famed 

victories produced tangible results for the new nation because he 

sought and attained a reasonable compromise for German ambitions. 

After 1871, Bismarck continued this moderate path and avoided 

seizing additional territory in Europe for the new German Empire. 

He did not seek to impose Germany’s approach to politics on the 

other European nations. In essence, this approach to Germany’s 

role in Europe clearly emerged after the Franco-Prussian war, but it 

was formalized during Bismarck’s famed “retreat” to Bad Kissingen 

in June 1877. Away from the pressures of Berlin and internal and 

external crises, the Chancellor considered the domestic and foreign 

challenges that faced him and the German Empire.67 The potential 

foreign threat that loomed on Germany’s horizon was an anti-German 

coalition similar to that which had faced Frederick the Great in 1756, 

and from which the latter only barely survived. The dread fear of 

both military and political planners was an anti-German coalition, 

likely led by France and allied with Russia, forcing Germany to wage 

a two-front war. As a result of this analysis, Bismarck defined the 

road ahead as:

. . . no expansion, no push for hegemony in Europe. Germany was to be 

the strongest power in Europe but without being a hegemon . . . Next 

he identified a potential enemy: France. From that followed his course 

of action: to create “a political situation in which all powers except 

France need us.” His basic axioms were first, no conflict among major 

powers in central Europe; and second, German security without German 

hegemony.68

 Bismarck not only established these basic concepts for German 

security policy, he was able to follow these constructs with few 

exceptions and maintain a powerful and secure Prussianized 

Germany that would have a dominant role in Europe for the next 10-

plus years. Though it was a military and political powerhouse and 

rapidly becoming an economic powerhouse, the unified Germany 

under Bismarck’s tutelage did not seek to expand in Europe either 

politically or geographically.69 Granted, in the early 1880s Germany 

did become involved in the race for colonies, causing it to grab 
31

territories in Africa, the Pacific, and Asia. This brief engagement 

in the colonial race is more an aberration in Bismarck’s career than 

something he willingly and enthusiastically embraced.70 Internal 

political pressures caused him to join the colonial race reluctantly, 

rather than concentrate on goals and strategies that he had developed 

for a unified Germany.71 Aside from his brief colonial excursion, 

Bismarck did not seek to be an obvious hegemon in Europe or to 

expand German power through territorial acquisitions in the colonial 

sphere. 

 Although Bismarck had devised an ingenious system for the 

security of a united Germany, it was his system and it depended 

on his immense political talents/insights. The writer has elected to 

praise Bismarck as a wily and astute politician, but the career of the 

“Iron Chancellor” also highlights a major problem with the political 

and military leadership of Imperial Germany. Despite all of his 

capabilities, Bismarck was not immortal. His tenure in office, like 

any political or military leader, was finite. In the course of modern 

German imperial history, Germany produced only one Bismarck. 

From his dismissal to the end of the Imperial period it is virtually 

impossible to find political or military leaders with his insights or 

his vision. Some of this problem may be attributable to the fact that 

Bismarck was a solitary actor on the political scene, formulating and 

even implementing Germany’s policies according to his plans, his 

strategies. Many, if not most, of his plans were formulated in isolation, 

and often he did not utilize, consult, or inform his subordinates of 

his intentions or his actions. By nature he was not a mentor and thus 

never truly groomed suitable subordinates or a true successor that 

could so adroitly understand and manipulate European politics.72

With his passing, a vacuum was certain to develop, that is, until a 

capable leader could emerge. Regrettably for both Germany and 

Europe, such an astute political leader never did emerge. 

 While in today’s world of political correctness it might seem 

inappropriate to bemoan the passing of an avowed autocrat like 

Bismarck, one must, in fact, bemoan the passing of the world order he 

created after 1870. Consider that it is no exaggeration that Bismarck’s 

diplomacy, in the wake of the Wars of Unification, made Berlin the 

center of European diplomacy for roughly 2 decades. Other than 
32

during the Balkan crisis of the late 1870s, which Bismarck helped to 

resolve, Europe was at peace for the remainder of the century. Even 

when elements within the General Staff attempted to push Germany 

into war during the Bulgarian crisis of the late 1880s, Bismarck, in 

his waning years, masterfully defused this crisis.73 Granted, tensions 

existed and crises emerged, but they were settled by diplomacy 

rather than by the sword.74 The reasons for these successes were 

Bismarck’s talents and that German goals—security strategy, as well 

as its foreign policy—focused on the sovereign’s and Chancellor’s 

shared goals. This resulted in a consistency in policy that brought 

stability to both Germany and Europe. 

 Another significant element for his success, often ignored, was 

his subordination of the Prussian/German military to civilian 

control. The attempts by the General Staff and by former military 

officers to devise strategies and plans that were in conflict with his 

designed European order were reoccurring, but while Bismarck was 

Chancellor and William I Emperor, the military was kept in its proper 

subordinate role. Conflicts still emerged between the Chancellor and 

the military, but William I, despite his 

life-long love of the military, normally 

backed down or acquiesced to the 

Chancellor. Once William I passed 

away and when Bismarck ceased to 

be Chancellor, this orderly world 

quickly unraveled.75 Interestingly, it 

began to unravel over issue of how 

best to defend Germany.

 Since the end of the Wars of 

German unification, Bismarck and 

Moltke had been concerned about 

a possible war on two fronts, with 

Germany being sandwiched between 

the French and the Russian armies. 

After the successful conclusion of the 

Franco-Prussian War, a significant 

amount of Bismarck’s diplomatic 

energy was focused on preventing 

France and Russia from reaching any 

The aged Otto von Bismarck and the 

New Emperor of Germany (author’s 

collection)
33

accommodation. In Bismarck’s world of interlocking alliances, Russia 

was an ally of Germany. This was initially accomplished through the 

Three Emperor’s League (1873) that bound the three monarchies—

German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian—together and excluded 

Republican France. When friction between Austria-Hungary and 

Russia made this alliance unstable, Bismarck negotiated a secret 

alliance between Russia and Germany referred to as the Reinsurance 

Treaty (1887). Although some of Germany’s leadership, to include 

Moltke, was convinced that Russia was a long-term threat, during 

Bismarck’s tenure, skillful, at times devious, diplomacy kept the 

German and Russian alliance intact and maintained the isolation of 

“revolutionary” and democratically minded France.76

 Nonetheless, Moltke stewed about the recovery of French 

military capabilities, Russian military strength, and, in the event that 

Russia and France became allies, the best strategy to fight a twofront war. The modern technology he had used so well in the Wars 

of Unification and his understanding of the lethality of the modern 

battlefield, due to the increased firepower, made him uncertain that 

rapid and clear-cut victories—like those of 1866 or 1870-71—were 

still possible.77 Perhaps it was no longer possible to achieve the 19th 

century general’s dream—the destruction of the adversary’s army. 

He also was certain that diplomatic initiatives alone would not be 

able to solve Germany’s unique problem, i.e., being sandwiched 

between France and Russia and thus the necessity of waging a 

two-front war. By the 1880s, additional senior German military 

leaders expressed great concern about the inherent incompatibility 

of a German/Russian alliance. According to the senior military 

leadership, improved Russian military capabilities, as demonstrated 

by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, meant that Russia had the 

potential of posing a serious threat to the German Empire.78 In the 

opinion of many of Germany’s senior military leaders—virtually all 

with General Staff ties—the aging Bismarck was failing to recognize 

the problem. Still, with his power and capabilities, Bismarck managed 

to keep the doubters at bay.

 Bismarckian strategy was undercut and began to go awry both 

through the issue of the potential threat posed by Russia and through 

a second issue that never truly went away—the subordination of the 

military to civilian control. In the 1880s, these two issues in a sense 
34

merged, causing Bismarck’s diplomatic “house of cards” to collapse. 

The issue of civilian control centered on to whom the famed General 

Staff reported and what the role of its leadership was in advising the 

political leadership on Germany’s strategy and on foreign relations. 

During the wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, Moltke 

chaffed against what he had regarded as unreasonable restrictions 

imposed by the Chancellor in the Army’s war efforts. As mentioned 

in the previous chapter, Moltke and most of the key German military 

leadership felt that after the first shot had been fired, the nation’s 

strategy, the conduct of the war, and negotiations to conclude the 

war should be left in the hands of the military. Furthermore, as chief 

of the General Staff, Moltke felt that he should be able to report 

directly to the Emperor on the conduct of the war and the prospects 

of peace rather than through the War Minister or the Chancellor. 

In Moltke’s eyes, the chief of the General Staff and the Chancellor 

should be equal, with one controlling the military sphere, the other 

the political. 

 At the same time, there was not always a clear agreement 

between the General Staff and the War Ministry as to the limits on 

each office’s authority, which also provided a source of conflict. 

Since the period of military reform at the early part of the 19th 

century, authored by Scharnhorst, et. al, all sections of the military 

administrative structure had been subordinate to the War Ministry, 

a civilian part of the government.79 This system was, to say the least, 

unique. For example, the development of German military policy 

was the responsibility of the sovereign, the Minister of War, the 

Naval Office, the Admiralty Staff, and, finally, the Reich Chancery. 

The War Minister was an active duty officer who, though a serving 

military officer, had responsibilities to both houses of the German 

parliament. At the same time, this officer was responsible to the 

Emperor for the preparedness of the Army. The General Staff, whose 

prestige had grown consistently during the middle part of the 19th 

century, had no real legal authority to direct any of the military entities 

mentioned above and had no official role in the formulation of the 

nation’s security strategy. It had become more powerful through an 

evolutionary policy and its prestige, rather than through statutory 

change. The General Staff’s prestige soared as a result of the Wars 

of Unification and, despite its military capabilities clearly proven 
35

between 1864-71, it was increasingly uncomfortable due to its lack of 

legal status in the governmental structure and its subordinate role to 

this unnecessarily confusing military/civilian bureaucracy. 

 Despite the maze of military, nonmilitary, and pseudo military 

entities, sometimes the system functioned well. During the Wars of 

Unification, Moltke, as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, worked 

well with his trusted colleague, War Minister General Albrecht Roon. 

Moltke felt personally and professionally responsible to keep Roon 

informed, but he did not deem providing information and plans 

to the minister to be a legal responsibility. Roon, though a general 

officer and a friend, had to be kept in his place because his line of 

responsibility was to the civilian government, not the military in 

general, or the General Staff in particular.

 In the years following the Franco-Prussian War, Moltke, as a 

national hero, was successful in adding some additional powers to the 

General Staff, but the correct chain of command between the Chief of 

the General Staff and the Emperor and the issue of the subordination 

of the General Staff to a civilian authority were contentious. In many 

ways the political currents in the 1870s and 1880s may have made 

the pressure for a more independent General Staff—with direct 

access to the Emperor—even more pressing. In the eyes of the ruling 

class, the rising demand in the Reichstag for democratic changes 

made the Prussian/German army in general and the General Staff 

in particular seem like a bastion of stability.80 The General Staff was, 

after all, a well-organized and well-trained group of officers which 

schooled its future leaders and perpetuated its values. Given the 

successes of the Wars of Unification, the General Staff seemed to 

offer the best hope as the strongest link, the Imperial Guard of the 

Hohenzollern monarchy. In short, the General Staff as the crème del 

la crème of the army was a dependable bulwark for the monarchy 

against what appeared to be the rising tide of both socialism and the 

democratization of the Second Reich.81

 In the early 1880s, the military leadership that supported a more 

independent General Staff achieved several significant victories. First, 

by Imperial Order on March 8, 1883, the Division of Personnel of the 

War Ministry was abolished and the responsibility was shifted to the 

Military Cabinet. Following this action, on May 24 of the same year, 
36

an Imperial Order gave the Chief of the General Staff and his Deputy 

direct access to the Emperor.82 Even though this would appear to be 

an obvious example of the General Staff slipping away from proper 

“civilian” control, these changes did not alarm Bismarck, who was a 

civilian, rather than a military officer.83 The “Iron Chancellor” seemed 

willing to allow an increase in the General Staff’s autonomy, since 

it served as an imperial bulwark against the liberals and socialists 

with whom the Chancellor consistently sparred and against whom 

he waged a consistent low intensity conflict.

 In all likelihood, Bismarck tolerated these military incursions 

into his realm because through his power, his persona, he was still 

able to maintain civilian control over the military. Through General 

Staff intrigues, however, the potential for major problems between 

the Chancellor and the General Staff had increased significantly. 

Only Bismarck’s power, the Emperor’s tendency to back him, and 

Moltke’s understanding of the Chancellor’s power averted major 

conflict. Even the casual observer would recognize the avoidance of 

a conflict was the result of Bismarck’s persona, rather than through 

parameters set by either statute or imperial decree. Conversely, all of 

this would change, as would the key personalities involved. By the 

late 1880s, all of the principals—William I, Bismarck, and Moltke—

were in the twilight period of their lives, and without comparable 

strong leadership, the ability of civilian authority to resist military 

intrusions into the realm of strategy and national security policy 

would fade. 

 Moltke retired as Chief of Staff in 1887, at the advanced age of 

88. Still sharp witted and astute, he was increasingly concerned 

about the possibility of a war, a war on two fronts. In preparation 

for his retirement, Moltke gave a classic speech to the Reichstag. 

Although he is best remembered for making war, for his role in the 

Wars of German Unification, in this period of his life he genuinely 

was concerned about a future war which Germany might be 

unable to win and could cost the country its gains from the wars 

of 1866-71. Thus he issued a strong warning to the deputies and 

military leaders gathered there: “woe be unto those who set Europe 

aflame and who first ignites the powder keg.”84 Unfortunately, a 

new aggressive group of military and political leaders were not 

listening.
37

 Approaching a long overdue retirement, Moltke had groomed 

General Count Alfred von Waldersee as his successor. Waldersee 

was a talented and experienced military officer but one who did not 

recognize his limitations. Bismarck, who came to dislike and distrust 

him, stated that Waldersee never knew “how to restrict himself to 

his military calling.”85 Though a soldier, he aspired and conspired to 

move into the political realm where he believed he had considerable 

talent. Waldersee even had aspirations to become Chancellor when 

the Bismarck retired. Due to his political ambitions, he was quite 

different from his mentor who was never regarded as a statesman 

nor was he ever recognized as an important political thinker. Moltke 

was a soldier through and through. The months following Moltke’s 

retirement show that Waldersee should have followed his mentor’s 

lead. 

 As Chief of Staff, Waldersee, like Moltke, sincerely believed that 

Russia was an ever-growing threat due to its increased military 

capabilities. It seemed to escape Waldersee that Bismarck’s system 

was based on the concept that France posed the greatest threat to 

Germany, rather than Russia being a long-term friend or ally to 

Germany. In reality, an alliance with Russia was only a stopgap 

measure to prevent Russia from falling into the eager arms of France. 

Bismarck understood that, in the long term, an alliance between the 

German and Russian Empires was illogical. A treaty with the Russians 

served to keep Russia comfortable with its German neighbor, given 

the Russian discomfort with the growing power of the German 

Empire and distrust of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. An alliance 

with Russia was for Bismarck a necessity, since the failure to provide 

Russia with such a security blanket could very easily push it into 

an accommodation with France, a nation he had worked so hard to 

isolate. 

 Waldersee, however, lacked these strategic insights. He saw no 

virtue in such arrangements or perhaps was not astute enough to 

understand such concepts. Regrettably, he seemed to know more 

what he did not want, rather than what he did want, as it related to 

German security policy. Thus, as succinctly summarized by Gunther 

Rothenberg “. . . Count Alfred von Waldersee, who in 1888 became 

Von Moltke’s successor, never formed a consistent strategic policy.”86

Thus, when the Reinsurance Treaty came up for renewal, he would 
38

join a newly appointed Chancellor in opposing its renewal. In his 

opinion, the treaty only gave advantages to the Russians. 

Waldersee’s elevation to Chief of the General Staff surfaced 

another issue. Like many of his General Staff colleagues, he believed 

in the independence of the General Staff both from the War Minister 

and from any entity that had responsibilities to civilian authority. 

From almost the onset of his appointment as Quartermaster General 

in 1882, he began intrigues against the War Minister whose authority 

over the General Staff he sought to undercut. The neutering of the 

War Minister’s powers, previously described, reached their climax 

in 1883 when the Chief of the General Staff and his deputy were 

granted direct access to the Emperor. This happened through a 

prearranged deal with the incoming War Minister, General Paul 

Bronsart von Schellendorf.87 Bismarck himself was in sympathy with 

the sentiments of Moltke and Waldersee because he was concerned 

about the fact that a “civilian” ministry had an intermediary position 

between the Army and the Emperor.88 What Bismarck, despite all of 

his insights, either failed to appreciate or underestimated, was the 

ability of the General Staff officers to undercut his diplomacy, his 

alliances, and his long-term strategy of preventing Germany from 

being faced with a two-front war. In all likelihood, he thought that 

he could outmaneuver them but, despite his advanced age, he failed 

to recognize how limited his tenure would be.89

 A second major change in the German political scene as it 

related Germany’s security strategy and civilian-military relations 

began with the ascension of Crown Prince Frederick to the throne 

in March 1888. Frederick III and his wife were rightfully regarded 

as friends of the liberal parliamentary opposition and were viewed 

with suspicion by the conservative elements within the military and 

the Prussian establishment. For certain, they were far less arbitrary 

in their approach than previous sovereigns or, for that matter, the 

Chancellor. With their democratic ideals, they seemed destined to 

put Germany on a decidedly different path. 

 Frederick, however, would never have the opportunity to make a 

significant impact on Germany because, at the time of his coronation, 

he had already been diagnosed with throat cancer. Seriously ill, he 

was unable to speak at his coronation and was destined to only 

rule for 99 days before his untimely death. To further complicate 
39

the political scene, during Frederick’s brief reign, Bismarck was 

still Chancellor, and he quietly but systematically undermined the 

new sovereign in all ways possible. Appointments and plans of the 

Emperor, and particularly those of the Empress who he genuinely 

disliked, were subject to his intrigues.90 After an uneventful 99 days 

on the throne, Frederick passed away and, with his passing, the 

hopes of Germany’s liberals quickly evaporated. The crown passed 

to his eldest child, Frederick William Victor Albert, better known 

in history as William II, or to American readers, Kaiser William. 

Father and son could not have been more different in personality or 

interests.

 It is hard to describe accurately the new Emperor without 

appearing to be biased against him. At best, William was a unique 

individual. He was a bright young man—not yet 30 when he 

ascended the throne—and a dynamo of human energy. Had he 

been born in today’s world, he might have been characterized as 

having attention deficit disorder or certainly as a hyperactive child. 

Virtually from the time of his birth, he was in constant motion, 

seemingly unable to sit still or focus on any one thing too long.91 In 

addition to this excessive energy, whatever the cause, William was 

also physically handicapped. His left shoulder had been severely 

damaged in a difficult birth, causing his left arm to be visibly smaller 

and very weak. In addition to being excessively energetic, he seemed 

determined to prove himself to be equal, if not superior, to other 

men. Thus, he relished the life and the trappings of soldiering.92 He 

loved and excelled in the physical and mental challenges of the hunt 

and of outdoor life. As Emperor, he was known for his incessant 

traveling all over the globe, causing his subjects to refer to him as the 

“ReiseKaiser,” the traveling Kaiser. He had an unbelievable range of 

interests and could be extremely charming to friend and foe alike. 

When faced by serious crises, however, his responses were all too 

often not reasoned or diplomatic. Instead, the Emperor often replied 

with off-the-cuff comments and, all too often, irrational outbursts.

 Prior to becoming Emperor, William’s relationship with Bismarck 

had been extremely good because the elder statesman recognized 

the advantages of being attentive and complementary to the young 

prince. Once William took the throne, however, Bismarck failed to 

realize that the new Emperor would not be content to acquiesce 
40

to the Chancellor’s plans, as had his 

grandfather. The new emperor meant 

to be actively involved in the affairs of 

government and intended to rule and 

set policy, not acquiesce to his ministers. 

Bismarck had always acknowledged the 

Emperor’s authority and frequently used 

this to his own advantage. Thus, when his 

critics questioned policies and practices, 

the old Chancellor reminded them that 

he could only set policy and establish 

priorities with the Emperor’s consent. 

In short, he was stating that his ideas 

had already been given the Emperor’s 

stamp of approval. Though he often used 

this tactic to shore up his position, in 

reality, as long as William I was on the throne, he normally had the 

Emperor’s agreement or acquiescence to his policies. As was also his 

practice, when William began to formulate his own ideas on matters 

of policy which did not agree with his plans, Bismarck intrigued 

against the young Emperor and tried to ignore his plans and policies. 

The impetuous sovereign refused to tolerate such behavior, despite 

Bismarck’s stature. By 1890 Chancellor and sovereign were clearly at 

loggerheads, and Bismarck, after a rather stormy meeting on March 

15, 1889, resigned from office.

 When Bismarck lost William II’s confidence and was forced to 

retire, the young and impetuous sovereign was soon faced with a 

significant decision that related to Germany’s security, the renewal 

of the Reinsurance Treaty. Although William was originally inclined 

to renew the treaty, he had a newly appointed Chancellor, Leo Von 

Caprivi, who was inexperienced in the policial realm. Though a 

distinguished military officer and a capable administrator, Caprivi 

had limited knowledge about either domestic politics or foreign 

policy. He almost immediately was confronted by the Reinsurance 

Treaty but was at a decided disadvantage since he had not even seen 

its text. Thus he was easily convinced by elements in the Foreign 

Ministry that the treaty was not in Germany’s interests. Caprivi, at 

the urging of officials in the Foreign Ministry, in turn convinced the 

William II (author’s collection)
41

Kaiser that a renewal benefited Russia far more than it did Germany.93

With Waldersee’s opposition, as previously mentioned, the Kaiser 

did not renew the treaty. The Emperor and his chancellor discovered 

too late that there were, in fact, significant advantages for Germany 

in the treaty’s renewal. If nothing else, it was a significant bulwark 

again the dread fear of both Bismarck and Moltke, a Russian-French 

alliance. Thus, despite Russian interest, Germany failed to renew the 

treaty and, through this action, destroyed Russia’s security blanket. 

 With this mantel of security removed, the Russians began to seek 

accommodation with France. In 1890 the French and Russians drew up 

a military convention, which promoted a closer working relationship 

between the two countries. Collaboration was successful between 

Russia and France, and in 1894 relations warmed even further with 

the signing of a formal alliance. The dread fear of both Bismarck and 

Moltke had become a reality. Germany was sandwiched between an 

unfriendly alliance, raising the specter of a two-front war. Although 

the General Staff, aided by the Foreign office, had won their long 

hard battle in derailing a renewal of the alliance, in the end they 

were the major losers. Now German planners would have to develop 

a winning strategy for a war on two fronts. 

 Although elements within the Army’s senior leadership like 

Waldersee were in part to blame for torpedoing the Reinsurance 

Treaty, the military, the new Chancellor, and the Foreign Ministry 

were all involved. Each had their own rationale for opposing the 

treaty. The Army opposed the treaty based on a perceived threat 

from the Russian Empire, a position held by both Moltke and his 

successor. With Russia’s military capabilities on the rise and military 

spending increasing, if a war was to occur with the Russians, it would 

be better for it to occur while they were comparatively weak.94 The 

real hotbed of opposition to the treaty’s renewal, however, was the 

Foreign Ministry. Even as Bismarck had subordinated the military 

to his authority, he also dominated and often ignored the Foreign 

Office. The Young Turks of this office, led by Friedrich von Holstein, 

were convinced that Bismarck’s efforts to integrate Russia into the 

mainstream of the European security system and keep it away from an 

alliance with France were doomed to failure. Freed from Bismarck’s 

heavy hand, the Foreign Office advised against the renewal, and 
42

Waldersee, an important voice in William’s inner council, worked to 

convince the young and impressionable Emperor that renewing the 

treaty was not in Germany’s best interest.95

 This failure to renew the treaty was serious but not fatal for 

Germany’s national security strategy. The problem was that neither 

the new Chancellor nor the senior military officers who opposed 

Bismarck’s system developed a new comprehensive security plan 

or a set of guiding principles to replace the overarching principles 

established by Bismarck. Their focus had been on unraveling 

Bismarck’s strategy, his complex system of alliances and agreements, 

but they failed to develop a logical system to replace it. Perhaps 

they had served too long under the firm and autocratic hand of this 

solitary actor on the world scene who stifled subordinates and whose 

schemes and strategies were often too complex for those around 

him. If these officers/officials had developed a workable alternative 

strategy that satisfied Germany’s security needs, it would have been 

another matter, but they offered no clear azimuth to chart the future 

course for Germany. Likely they failed to appreciate Bismarck’s 

concept of being the hegemon, sitting in the cockpit of the European 

craft, but without exhibiting the arrogance that comes with the seat 

of leadership. 

 Equally important, under Bismarck 

and William I, the political leadership 

had used the military to attain their 

basic goals, but at the same time kept 

the military at bay.96 Bismarck, the 

political leader, maintained firm control 

of the nation’s national security strategy 

and sought to retain the gains of the 

period of 1864-71 but without posing 

additional threats to his neighbors. This 

formula was as logical in 1890 as it was 

in 1877. The problem was that Bismarck 

was gone!

 Once Bismarck no longer controlled 

Germany’s destiny, the country’s security strategy became exceptionally 

difficult to determine.97 That William 

“Dropping the Pilot” 

Punch, March 29, 1890 

(author’s collection)
43

wanted a powerful and secure Germany is beyond a doubt, but 

his policies and those of his political and military advisers were 

not clearly focused, nor were they based on political realities. It is 

unfortunate for Europe in general and Germany in particular that 

William II never had his own retreat to Bad Kissingen where he 

thought through and established his achievable goals for the nation. 

This, however, would have been too much to ask. To give thoughtful 

and analytical consideration of precisely what his goals were for 

Germany and how these could be accomplished was simply out of 

character for the new Kaiser. He had neither the will nor the discipline 

to accomplish such an organized approach and, at the same time, he 

did not have an experienced politician like Bismarck to moderate his 

whims. That he desired the new and increasingly powerful German 

nation to achieve its place in the sun is evident from the onset of his 

reign, but specific goals and policies or logical strategies to achieve 

this were often ill-conceived and lacked reality.

 Was Germany destined to descend on the slippery slope 

toward 1914, once Bismarck had departed and the young Emperor 

increasingly was involving himself in both military matters and 

matters of state? Not necessarily, but Bismarck’s retirement, the 

coronation of a new Emperor, the increase of the General Staff power, 

and the absence of clearly enunciated goals caused Germany’s 

security strategy to slowly but steadily go awry. Had Germany’s 

failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty been an isolated instance, 

perhaps Germany could have recovered. It was, however, the first 

of many significant errors. To further compound the problem, the 

number of players who affected Germany’s security policy began to 

burgeon. Beginning with the Reinsurance Treaty fiasco, the Foreign 

Ministry, which Bismarck had always dominated, began to affect the 

country’s security policy. The ministry found the alliance with Russia 

to be an unnatural act since, in terms of both military power and 

commercial competition, alliance with an emerging potential enemy 

made little sense. Bismarck’s other alliances and secret agreements 

and diplomacy were simply too complicated for the officials in this 

ministry, some of whom had long disagreed with his policies. They 

favored the Triple Alliance, which brought together three “natural” 

allies: Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. In addition, the Foreign 
44

Ministry believed that beyond the Triple Alliance, a more logical 

alliance for the German Empire was closer ties to, and hopefully, in 

the end, an alliance with Britain. 

 German attempts to draw closer to Britain resulted in even more 

complications for Germany’s post-Bismarckian era. To win British 

favor, they negotiated a colonial territorial settlement in Africa with 

Britain that was unusually generous to the British.98 This land giveaway was done in the hope that this would be one of many agreements 

with the British that would involve the island nation in continental 

politics and in support of German plans. For the first 3 years of the 

1890s, the Foreign Ministry worked to promote closes ties with 

Britain, ties which they hoped would result in Britain edging toward 

a bona fide alliance with Germany. In this venture, they were totally 

unsuccessful. The Foreign Ministry and the Ambassador to Britain, 

Paul von Hartzfeldt, failed to understand the British. In the 1890s 

Britain was not at all interested in becoming entangled in continental 

alliances. This was not completely an isolationist approach, rather it 

was because the British were very much involved in colonial affairs, 

as well as with internal issues. Therefore they sought to avoid any 

entanglement in continental affairs. After several attempts at wooing 

the British, it finally became obvious that the Island kingdom was 

not interested, particularly if it meant embroiling it in European 

squabbles. 

 Even as attempts continued at wooing the British, Paul Kayser, 

chief of the Colonial Section of the Foreign Ministry, further confused 

the main thrust of German policy. He believed that Germany could 

enhance its status among the world powers by being the international 

arbiter in disputes over colonies, a role accepted with significant 

enthusiasm by the Emperor. While on the surface such an initiative 

seemed to have some degree of merit, in reality it merely spelled 

more trouble for the Germans. Because the world’s two major 

colonial powers were France and Great Britain, this tactic was a sure 

recipe to fuel the ever-burning anti-German fires in France and, at 

the same time, irritate, if not alienate, the British. After all, to be an 

arbiter requires significant diplomatic skills, and if these skills are not 

present, the arbiter can become the target of the disputant’s wrath. 

 To confuse the overall thrust of foreign policy even more, Germany 

made concurrent, though belated, attempts to repair the damage to 
45

relations with Russia, which had resulted 

from the failure to renew the Reinsurance 

Treaty, in hopes of negating the French/

Russian rapprochement. As a final complication, the Emperor, ever impetuous 

and seldom patient, became concerned 

about the German diplomacy and security 

issues. He became increasingly involved 

in foreign affairs; and, after watching 

the muddled diplomacy, he, too, became 

part of the crowded field of those dealing 

with diplomacy and strategy. Although 

initially interested in better relations with 

Britain, he soon wearied of courting his 

cousins in London and determined that 

the British were not all that dependable, 

not really worth the effort.99 Then he 

involved himself personally in an attempt to repair relations with 

the Russians. Since little progress was evident with one side of his 

family, the British cousins, he promoted a friendship with another 

cousin, Czar Nicholas II, attempting to reverse the previous falling 

out. In this initiative, he was no more successful than his ministers.

 The crowded world of foreign affairs, alliances, and security 

policy became even more complicated because William allowed or 

promoted more military input into the development of his policies. 

Even though the military—specifically the Chief of the General 

Staff—already had direct access to the Kaiser and thus had the 

opportunity to affect directly Germany’s security policy, the Kaiser 

added more military input and more complexity. In 1889, shortly after 

becoming emperor, he put his military advisors together into what 

was called a “royal headquarters,” a military organization consisting 

of aid-de-decamps, adjutants, and assorted others, all under their 

own commanding general, which even further linked the emperor 

to military advisors. With the adoption of the Constitution of 1849, 

the emperor had specific military powers, but William II took his 

military authority and his ties to the military even further than his 

grandfather, William I had.100

William II with his cousin “Nicky” 

(Tsar Nicholar II) on board the 

Hohenzollern. (Author’s collection)
46

 Adding to the militarization of security policy as well as irritants 

to British/German relations was the influence and naval programs 

of Admiral Alfred Tirpitz. His influence in German security policy 

increased considerably from 1890-1914. He had an obvious entrée’ 

into the inner circles of government because he knew Leo Caprivi. 

Both he and Caprivi, Chancellor from 1890-94, were Naval officers 

by background. In fact, prior to his entry into the political realm, 

Caprivi had been in charge of the German admiralty (beginning in 

1883). Thus, the two men had a common background and a similar 

view of German security. Tirpitz became a significant figure because 

he had a clear but dangerous vision for Germany’s security policy. 

Tirpitz was the apostle of expanding the German Navy, building 

a high seas fleet that would put Germany in direct competition, if 

not conflict, with Great Britain. The Navy was a military element 

that had been virtually nonexistent through the 1864-70 Wars of 

Unification. It began a significant expansion in the early 1890s once 

William II became emperor.101 The young impressionable Kaiser had 

a life-long love affair with the German Navy. For him, the Navy, 

with its powerful capital vessels, was visible proof of the power and 

authority of the German Empire which could be projected around 

the world. 

 Tirpitz, who would ultimately become Secretary of State of 

the Imperial Naval Office, sought to build a battle fleet that was 

comparable to the British fleet. Though it likely would be smaller 

in the overall number of vessels, he thought that the German fleet, 

with the latest in the technology of the 

period, would actually have superior 

capabilities. Tirpitz was convinced 

that Britain, in fact, posed a significant 

stumbling block in Germany’s drive 

to its place in the sun.102 In his opinion, 

the only way Germany could achieve 

the desired great power status was 

to develop the power, that is, a fleet 

that the British would respect. Thus, 

from the onset, the construction of a 

powerful high seas fleet was directed 

against Britain; it was not merely a 

The Emperor, Tirpitz, and Moltke 

(the younger).
47

generic program for the purpose of expanding/extending Germany’s 

power or to protect its own fleet. Tirpitz believed that if and when a 

naval confrontation took place, it would likely occur in the North Sea 

and, if Germany was up to the task, would be a cataclysmic battle in 

which British sea power could be destroyed. 

 The naval race and the efforts of the Foreign Ministry to serve 

as a mediator in colonial conflicts meant that the Germans were 

becoming an irritant to the British in two separate arenas. Despite 

this fact, even as they pursued courses that were bound to irritate the 

British, elements within the Foreign Ministry held the hope, even the 

desire, that Britain and Germany could reach an amicable agreement 

on their respective places as world powers in the soon-to-arrive 20th 

century. Thus, a flirtation of sorts continued between the British and 

the Germans, with the latter playing an on again-off again wooing 

game yet, at the same time, establishing a sufficiently high cost for 

friendship. Mixed signals from Berlin further complicated the picture 

as to what type of arrangements the Germans sought between the 

two nations. This dangerous and amateurish game of diplomacy 

continued into the first decade of the 

20th century. 

 What becomes obvious at this point 

is that the military element of power 

was becoming much more significant 

in forming, or at least affecting, German 

security policy. Brigade General Dr. 

Günter Roth, formerly Chief of the 

Bundeswehr’s Military History Research 

Office, explained this by stating the 

increasing influence of the German 

military:

. . . was the fault of Bismarck’s successors, 

who carelessly squandered his legacy. The 

first Chancellor’s alliance policy, aimed at 

establishing a balance of power, was not 

continued, and the German Reich all of a 

sudden found itself encircled from all sides 

and isolated. The politicians now looked like 

defaulters with a bankrupt estate on their hands. 

The vacuum was filled by the generals.103

 

Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz 

who added to the German 

strategic dilemma in the two 

decades before the outbreak of 

World War I. (photo courtesy of 

USAMHI)
48

In the author’s opinion, it is inaccurate to state that the military had 

to step into this role because of a vacuum in civilian leadership. 

At the same time, it is also an error to simply point a finger at the 

military—specifically the General Staff—and accuse them or the 

senior leadership of diabolical schemes, which made them the 

significant force in formulating Germany’s security policy and its 

military strategy. In reality the blame should be shared.

 The difficulty in assessing the military’s role is due to the 

ineffective political leadership at the national level. The Chancellor’s 

office, in particular, was exceedingly weak. Germany had come into 

being as a united country through the plans and strategies devised 

by Otto von Bismarck. Once this process was completed, Bismarck, 

as Chancellor, dominated internal affairs, determined what was 

necessary for the new nation’s security, and devised strategies 

relating to foreign relations to keep Germany’s enemies at bay. Longterm security problems and the threat that faced Germany—a war on 

two fronts—were averted through the complex but effective system 

of alliances developed by the Chancellor. Once Bismarck resigned, it 

was impossible to find a nonuniformed political leader who had the 

capabilities of either effectively carrying on the Chancellor’s policies 

or developing a consistent azimuth that would allow Germany 

to enter securely into the 20th century with the stature it desired. 

Granted, with the new ebullient Kaiser, it would have been difficult 

to find a political leader who could have controlled or manipulated 

him. 

 Not only was there not another Bismarck waiting in the wings, 

there was not a Moltke. Although Moltke chaffed under the civilian 

control (i.e., Bismarck) of the military, he recognized the value of 

diplomacy when it came to a nation realizing its goals, and he knew 

that Bismarck had the confidence of the crown. He was well aware 

of the value of utilizing elements of power other than the military 

to achieve the nation’s goals. Given his experiences in the Wars 

of Unification, and in particular the Franco-Prussian War, he was 

concerned that the technology available on the battlefield might 

make short and conclusive wars, wars that resulted in the destruction 

of the enemy’s army on the battlefield, unlikely. Though he stewed 

about and planned for a future conflict, he was uncertain that wars 
49

like those fought from 1866-71 would give Germany future victories. 

Conversely, he was certain that diplomacy alone could not solve 

Germany’s strategic dilemma, particularly as it related to France. 

 After the Bismarck/Moltke era ended, diplomacy and any type 

of serious strategic thought appeared to expire, as did the terms 

of office of these two men. As mentioned previously, the Foreign 

Ministry pursued its schemes, some of which bore little relationship 

to reality, and few of which produced anything tangible for German 

security policy. The Chancellor attempted to deal with alliances and 

potential conflicts, internal and external, but seemed to have no longterm plan concerning how best to improve Germany’s security. While 

civilian authority wrestled with half-baked schemes or retreads of 

Bismarck’s alliance system, in the military arena there was a group of 

aggressive officers who, like Moltke, believed that diplomacy alone 

could not solve Germany’s defensive dilemma. Unlike Moltke, they 

believed, even in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that quick 

and decisive victories could replicate Moltkian-style victories. Thus, 

through the military means alone, Germany’s dilemma of a war on 

two fronts was solvable. The acid test of their theories would not 

come until 1914. 

 Without the Chancellor’s participation, although he had no 

inclination to participate anyway, they began to plan for the next 

war, again with no clear national security strategy. Taking Moltke 

as a pattern, they began planning for swift campaigns to defeat 

France, then Russia, using technology, as had the master, and using 

the favored tactic, flanking maneuvers or, better yet, envelopments 

to destroy the enemy’s forces. Was there a goal, a clear azimuth for 

Germany comparable to what Bismarck had established in 1877? 

Was the increasingly militarized policy/strategy goal still promoting 

policies that were for the good of a greater Prussia/Germany and the 

maintenance of the Hohenzollern dynasty? Was Germany still seeking 

no additional territorial gains and attempting to be the hegemon of 

Europe, without appearing or seeming to be the hegemon? Or was 

it to return to the position of being in the cockpit of the European 

vessel, as Germany had been between 1877-89, serving as the arbiter 

of Europe? Or did anyone, to include the Kaiser, know for sure? 

 As the civilian leadership wallowed in indecision and impractical 

schemes, the military became increasingly significant in planning. 
50

The question must be raised, how well was the German officer corps 

prepared for such tasks, i.e., strategic planning and influencing 

foreign policy? This factor deserves a careful examination. 
51

CHAPTER 4

THE EDUCATION OF AN OFFICER CORPS

Tactics reigned supreme in Prussia. The system concentrated on the nuts 

and bolts of the military profession.

Holger H. Herwig104

 As the German military establishment began to involve itself 

more in the nation’s strategy formation, two factors should be 

considered: German officer education, and overall experience level 

of the officer corps. From the mid-19th century until the eve of 

World War I, German officer education was largely focused on the 

tactical level of war and gave officers few, if any, opportunities to 

study strategy and strategy formulation on the highest political and 

military levels. Since the German military establishment was, in fact, 

based on the Prussian military establishment, a look at the evolution 

of the Prussian officer educational system, its curriculum, and how 

its educational system functioned is important.

 The Prussian educational system had its origins in the Napoleonic 

period. Napoleon’s successes in the early part of the 19th century 

resulted in several serious defeats for the Prussian army. These 

defeats were so catastrophic to the nation that some questioned 

whether a strong and independent Prussia would continue to exist. 

In the midst of these defeats, a cabal of reformers, to include Baron 

vom Stein, David Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August Gneisenau, 

Hermann von Boyen, and C.V.G. von Grolman, worked to initiate a 

series of major reforms for the Prussian army, including the selection 

and education of officers. This reform movement was nourished 

through the establishment of the Militärische Gesellschaft (Military 

Society) in Berlin in 1801, a voluntary association that had comparable 

organizations in other German cities.105

 A key individual in educational reform was David Gerhard 

von Scharnhorst. This officer was an outstanding performer on the 

battlefield and a deep thinker. He had only been appointed to Prussian 

service in 1801, but he quickly became a major player in the reform 
52

movement. His interest in officer education resulted in Scharnhorst’s 

establishment of an academy for young talented officers in 1804. Its 

existence, however, was brief for, after the disastrous battles of Jena 

and Auerstadt in 1806, the academy was closed. In the following 

year, the officer education program was scrutinized carefully. As 

a result, reforms were instituted that laid the foundations for the 

Prussian/German educational system.

 The reforms to the Prussian system went beyond merely the 

schools and their curriculums. The changes included both officer 

selection and education. The reformers promoted the philosophy 

that leadership potential and academic talent, not class, should be 

the basis for selecting the Army’s leadership.106 In the late 18th and 

early 19th centuries, officer appointments were given to the upper 

and noble classes, regardless of the appointee’s capabilities.107 The 

rising middle class, who had much talent to offer, was regarded 

with suspicion. Due to this mistrust and based on class, middle-class 

citizens were not considered suitable for positions of leadership. The 

traditional Prussian officer corps was opposed to opening officer 

appointments to the middle and lower classes because any such move 

would decidedly threatened their privilege and, as a result, the issue 

of who or what classes could be selected for leadership positions was 

not totally resolved until after 1918.108 Despite the resistance of the 

privileged classes, the reformers actively promoted the concept that 

ability, not class, should be a major consideration for appointment 

and advancement in the Prussian Army. 

 A significant reform in officer education occurred in 1810 with 

the founding of a new military academy in Berlin. The Academy, 

which was initially named the Allgemeine Kriegsschule, provided a 

rigorous 3-year education to a small group of officers—initially 50, 

later reduced to 40—who studied, among other subjects, geography 

(as it related to military applications), artillery physics, chemistry, 

and both tactics and strategy.109 Though it was a military school, it 

was intended to be a military equivalent of Humboldt University, 

which opened in Berlin the same year. Thus, the curriculum was 

both specialized—providing military science topics—and, at the 

same time, included what could be termed academic subjects like 

the sciences, literature, and foreign languages. In the Scharnhorst 

era, an important part of the revised curriculum was providing a 
53

new generation of officers with a higher level of scientific training—

in essence a broader education—than military topics alone.

 The curriculum for this new school reflected the educational 

philosophy of Scharnhorst, the school’s head. He sought better 

educated, or in reality, more broadly educated officers. He was highly 

intrigued about how Napoleon’s army, a people’s or a revolutionary 

army that was not composed of professional soldiers, could engage 

professional armies on the battlefield and win. Since this defied 

conventional logic, nonprofessionals defeating professionals, he 

believed that to understand how this could happen, one had to 

understand the French and go beyond merely studying their tactics 

and military methods. Thus, in accordance with Scharnhorst’s 

philosophy, the curriculum had more depth than just military and 

tactical subjects. Simply put, officers needed to be educated, not 

narrowly trained in pure or direct military skills.

 It is probably no coincidence that a young lieutenant, Carl von 

Clausewitz, a promising officer who was a part of Scharnhorst’s study 

group, would in his writings become an advocate of understanding 

war on a broader plane. Clausewitz would later become strongly 

associated in the minds of many students of military affairs with this 

newly established school for Prussian military officers.110

 The better students in this academy proved to be an excellent 

recruiting ground for General Staff officers. One of the better-known 

reforms of the Prussian officer corps during this period was the 

reorganization of the General Staff in 1803. General Staff officers 

became a highly trained group of military who could effectively 

support their commanders.111 The idea of having well-trained 

and well-educated officers on the staff of larger units and higher 

headquarters was important for reforming some of the problems in 

the Prussian army. With senior command positions held by officers 

of class and nobility, well-educated and talented young officers could 

serve an important function by advising the ill-prepared nobility on 

the art of war. As noted by Scharnhorst,

Normally it is not possible for an army to simply dismiss incompetent 

generals. The very authority which their office bestows upon generals is 

the first reason for this. Moreover, the generals form a clique, tenaciously 

supporting each other, all convinced that they are the best possible 
54

representatives of the army. But we can at least give them capable 

assistants. Thus, the General Staff Officers are those who support 

incompetent generals, providing the talents that might otherwise be 

wanting among leaders and commanders.112

Scharnhorst’s concept of an officer, who was both educated in the art 

of war and at the same time was given a broader education which 

was designed to provide a better understanding of the world and its 

problems, was the essence of his educational reforms. The overall 

purpose was to teach the officer how to think or, as stated at the 

time:

Although the training is tailored to teach the student the special knowledge 

and skills corresponding to his future assignments, great store is set by 

combining the studies with the extended use of thinking in order to make 

the training of the mind the main subject of training.113 

 The system of education devised by Scharnhorst, which proved 

to enhance the strength of the recently reformed Prussian General 

Staff, assumed that the head of state, in this case the King of Prussia, 

would make the necessary political decisions and set the azimuth 

for the government. Then a ranking military officer would be given 

the task in the event of war of assisting the sovereign to achieve 

his political goals through the military instrument of power. Since 

the ranking military officer might hold his position due to nobility, 

rather than education or military experience, it would be the welleducated General Staff officer(s) who could assist the commander in 

achieving his and his sovereign’s goals.

 To achieve this level of expertise, the education, or training as 

it was called at the Allgemeine Kriegsschule (General War School), 

lasted 3 years. As mentioned previously, initially 50, later reduced 

to 40, officers attended lectures for essentially 9 months per year. 

Beginning in 1819, the school was placed under the Inspector General 

of Training and Education. Despite Scharnhorst’s death in June 1813, 

the educational philosophy he promoted remained even after the 

end of the Napoleonic era.114 The curriculum used between 1823-26 

clearly shows that the concept of producing well-educated officers 

endured despite the passage of a decade.
55

Allgemeine Kriegsschule Curriculum.

First Year Second year Third Year

Analysis of Finites Spherical Progonometry History of Selected Campaigns

Topography Essentials of Mechanical Science Fortress Warfare

General History Analysis of Infinites General Literature

Statistics Science of Fortifications History of the General Staff

Artillery Natural Science/Physics Terrain Surveying

Tactics Effective Strategic Development 

Terrain Surveying Terrain Surveying

Conversational French Conversational French

Horsemanship German Literature

Table 1. General War School Curriculum by Year, 1823.

115

 The curriculum blended military studies, mathematics, science, 

literature, and foreign language. The concept of developing a broadly 

educated officer was imbedded in the academy’s curriculum while 

Carl von Clausewitz was director (1818-30) and was the philosophy 

while Helmuth von Moltke was a student at the General War School 

(1823-26).

 Ultimately the General War School was intended to educate two 

different types of officers. First, it was designed to prepare officer 

candidates for their exams, and second, it also offered officers an 

opportunity to have a higher, more advanced education, including an 

emphasis on the sciences which Scharnhorst thought was important. 

Frederick Willhelm III, King of Prussia from 1797-1840, ultimately 

split these functions, establishing three officer schools. The first was 

in Berlin and the other two in Breslau and Königsberg. The General 

War School became an institution for educating more senior officers. 

In fact, as noted by one writer, the officers attending the General War 

School desired “to prepare themselves for higher and extraordinary 

tasks in the service.” 116

 Once Germany grasped the guidon of unification and the Wars of 

Unification made a unified Germany a reality, the curriculum evolved 

slowly and subtly. One study, critical of German officer education 

during the Imperial period, charges that there was a gradual but 

consistent trend to focus the curriculum much more directly on 
56

military matters. Thus, these changes eroded Scharnhorst’s concept 

to provide selected German officers with a broad educational 

experience. As noted by the study’s author:

Prussian officer education actually declined in quality during the Imperial 

period. Despite the liberal beginnings of Scharnhorst, professional 

curricula throughout most of the 19th century, and especially during the 

imperial period, were increasingly confined to purely military studies. 

Providing a broad view of events, ideas, and people was, if not publicly 

scorned, determined by the army to be the business of secondary schools 

and universities, not the armed forces.117

 An examination of the curriculum, however, calls this assertion 

to question. If, for example, the curriculum immediately following 

the establishment of the German Empire is examined, it still appears 

to follow the Scharnhorst model in that it emphasized a broader 

education for German officers. Philosophy, literature, history, and 

foreign languages were required, and the emphasis on science and 

math that Scharnhorst found important was also still present. 

Kriegsakademie Curriculum, 1871.

First Year Second Year Third Year

Formal Tactics Applied Tactics Military Justice

Military History Military History (to 1815) Military Hygeine 

Arms and Ordinance Permanent Fortifications Military History to 1815 

Field Fortifications Military Surveying Siege Warfare

Mathematics Military Geography General Staff Service

History Military Administration Mathematics 

Geography Mathematics Geodesy (only with math option)

Physical Geography History History of Literature

Conversational French Intro. to History of Philosophy History of Philosophy

Conversational Russian Experimental Physics General History to 1840

Conversational French Experimental Physics

Conversational Russian Conversational French

Conversational Russian

Table 2. War College Curriculum by Year, 1871.118

 A review of the 1898 edition of Die Aufnahme-Prüfung für die 

Kriegsakademie (The Admissions Test for the War Academy), a book 

intended to prepare students for entry into the War College, also 

reveals a similar conclusion.119 This preparatory text focuses on 
57

the tactical level of war, ignoring the strategic level as well as the 

societal or economic factors that impacted the strategy of their state. 

Consistently in the literature of this German Academy of higher 

learning, the strategic level and the societal and political elements 

that impact on the affairs of the nation were conspicuously absent. 

 Even after the turn of the century, the curriculum at the war college 

retained most of Scharnhorst’s concepts. The instructional program 

had the traditional math and science element that Scharnhorst so 

valued and even added a fourth foreign language, Japanese, to the 

curriculum. At the same time, philosophy and literature, present for 

decades in the instruction program, disappeared. 

Kriegsakademie Curriculum, 1903.

First Year Second Year Third year

Tactics Tactics Tactics

Military History Military History Military History

Arms and Ordinance Fortification Theory Siege Warfare

Field Fortifications Field Intelligence General Staff Service

Military Justice Plotting Naval Warfare

History Transportation State Administration, State

Physics Military Hygiene and International Law

Physics for Mathematics (or) Mathematics

Mathematics History Surveying

Physical Geography Mathematics (or) French (or)

General and Chemistry Russian (or)

French (or) French (or) English (or)

Russian (or) Russian (or) Japanese

English (or) English (or)

Japanese Japanese

Table 3. War College Curriculum by Year, 1903.120

 What is most intriguing in this curriculum is the apparent 

expansion of tactical studies. Granted, most wars for the average 

military man relate to tactics, and most officers and their soldiers will 

have to fight either on the tactical or, at most, on the operational level 

of war. If the Prusso-German experience from 1864–71 is considered, 

as well as the tactical reforms from 1872-1906, it is perhaps logical 

that additional tactical instruction was deemed important for the 

new German army’s leadership. During the Wars of Unification, the 
58

Prussian/Moltke approach to war had focused on tactical victories 

that facilitated the achievement of strategic goals set by Bismarck 

and the crown. Many Germans credited the Prussian General Staff 

and the senior officer leadership with German victories, ignoring 

the role that reasonable goals and logical strategies played in this 

achievement. Thus, the laurels were given to the tactical commanders 

in the field and their overall commander, Helmuth von Moltke. As 

noted by one writer, “The Prusso-German army was an institution at 

once simple and complex, with a strategic culture largely shaped by 

the three short Wars of Unification against Denmark, Austria, and 

France.”121 This focus has caused the distinguished German historian, 

Holger Herwig, to conclude:

Tactics reigned supreme in Prussia. The system concentrated on the nuts 

and bolts of the military profession. Its members were drilled in the theory 

and practice of the latest weapons, their implications for operations, and 

their advantages and limitations.122

 The experience of the Wars of Unification, which emphasized 

the role of tactical victories—the defeat of enemy forces and the 

destruction of their armies—promoted a tactical culture and the 

pursuit and achievement of tactical victories in the field. In many 

respects, the pursuit of tactical victories became a strategy in itself. 

The senior German officer corps ignored Clausewitz, the key German 

strategist who is studied today at American military institutions. 

Clausewitz was considered more of a philosopher, a theoretician of 

war rather than a practitioner. General Wilhelm Groener, who was 

Chief of the War Office from 1916-17, indicated that in his reading 

he was “more occupied with books of the practical service, than with 

books on high strategy.”123 Of equal significance, Moltke the younger 

advised his son, who was preparing to enter the War Academy, to 

read Schlieffen’s essays on Cannae, rather than Clausewitz. This 

was likely good advice, considering the tactical focus of the War 

Academy’s curriculum.124 Hans Delbrück, a later strategist whose life 

parallels the second German Empire and who was a keen critic of the 

lack of logical strategy by the officer corps, was ignored, criticized, 

and ostracized.125 Thus, even as a later generation of German officers 

readily admitted that they had failed to read the turgid prose of 
59

Mein Kampf, the Imperial officer corps of the late 19th and early 20th 

centuries ignored Clausewitz, who they deemed more a political 

philosopher. Instead, they studied more practical authors. 

 As the curriculum in the senior educational institution of the 

Prussian/German army is considered and criticized for its tactical 

focus, the question should be asked whether the curriculum at the 

U.S. Army’s senior level institution was any better focused on the 

strategic level than that of the German institution. In certain respects, 

an exact comparison is somewhat difficult because the United States 

did not even have a senior institution until after the turn of the 

century. Such an institution was created through the educational 

reforms proposed by Secretary of War Elihu Root and put into place 

by War Department General Order #155. At the cornerstone laying 

of the War College in early 1903, however, Root in his comments 

was clear about what he considered the focus of the institution. He 

called for, among other things, the study of the “great problems of 

National Defense.”126 Furthermore, comparison is difficult because, 

at first, the Army War College avoided an emphasis on lectures 

and classes and instead had study groups which worked with the 

Army Staff on important issues for national defense. Although the 

curriculum content varied, depending on who was the president, 

enough references to strategic issues, to regional studies, and other 

higher level studies exist to state that the curriculum of this new 

institution was not one exclusively focused on the tactical level.127

 The tactical orientation of the German military education system 

did not cause any noticeable problems immediately following the 

Wars of Unification. In the latter part of Moltke’s and Bismarck’s 

tenure, however, senior German officers, largely members of 

the General Staff, pressed to become more involved in matters 

of strategy, if not strategy-making itself. This resulted from the 

officer corps’ unease over their perception that Bismarck failed to 

understand the dangers posed by an increasingly powerful Russia. 

This and the defense quandary that faced Germany in the 1880s, 

i.e, the possibility of Germany having to fight a war on two fronts, 

caused many General Staff officers, active and retired, to push for 

direct involvement in the development of German strategy. 

 Their desire to participate more directly in strategy development, 

if not lead in it, calls to question another problem for the German 
60

military as well as the political leadership—a lack of experience as a 

world power. Consider that in the time frame from 1864–71, Prussia 

progressed from its role of one of the two leaders of the German 

states to that of the most powerful state dominating a unified 

Germany. It transitioned from being a strong player in the politics 

and military affairs of Western and Central Europe to being the most 

significant and powerful nation in those regions. In the latter part of 

the 19th century, it transitioned from being a continental power with 

a miniscule navy, to that of a major naval power competing with 

the British Navy on the high seas. The second wave of the industrial 

revolution, which hit Europe in the last third of the 19th century, 

would also propel Germany into the role of the economic giant in 

these regions. In short, in a period of less than 25 years, Germany 

came into being as a unified state and Prussia moved from being one 

of the German states to being the primary influence as the dominant 

player in European politics. As noted by one historian:

Every nation-state is continually developing. Sometimes there are periods 

of rapid change when this development seems to get out of hand. During 

the late 19th century, Germany entered such a period. It was a time of 

essential schizophrenia: the state appeared at the same time monarchical 

and constitutional in its politics, agrarian and industrial in its economy 

and feudal and egalitarian in its society.128

The rapid change in the nation’s status in Europe and the immense 

political, military, and economic power available to Germany came 

so quickly that the political and military leadership, with a few 

exceptions, did not have the time or the experiences to transition 

from being a European state to being the leading European power. 

In short, there was an immaturity in the nation’s political and 

military leadership that would not have been present if the nation’s 

development had proceeded at a slower or more measured pace. 

 Despite the lack of experience in being military leaders of a major 

power, key senior officers in Berlin, active and retired, with tactical 

and, at most, campaign level experience, chafed under the plans and 

restrictions of Bismarck’s heavy hand. They sought to have a larger 

role in Germany’s strategy development. Moltke, with his stature 

as a military hero and a military educator in his own right, perhaps 

could have influenced this emerging German military culture (and 
61

its educational structure) because, despite his disagreements with 

the political leadership in 1866 and 1871, he understood strategic 

thinking. Conversely, though he recognized the importance of 

strategy, he seemed to be more comfortable in the tactical world 

and found tactics more important than strategy for the vast majority 

of the officer corps.129 He was, after all, the epitome of the General 

Staff officer whose role was to consider the enemy that the German 

Empire might have to fight, and to develop and refine the war plans 

that would bring about German victory. He likely developed this 

understanding based on voluminous self-imposed studies of both 

history and military affairs, which he consistently undertook during 

his entire career. Even though this patron saint of German military 

thought acknowledged the role of war and how it could be used to 

achieve the policy goals of the government (sounding very much 

like Clausewitz), in practice he seemed much more comfortable with 

tactics and what is now called operational warfare. Besides, he found 

strategy to be logical and intuitive. In his own words, “strategy is the 

application of common sense to the conduct of war.”130

 Neither through education nor through the experiential base of 

its military and political leadership, was the young German nation 

prepared for its new role in the world. It came all too fast. Once 

the 19th century drew to an end and the 20th century emerged, the 

military leadership of Germany was increasingly unable to handle 

the challenges facing it. The influential military leadership viewed 

the world’s political and military landscape almost solely from a 

military view, and neither experience nor education promoted an 

appreciation of national policy, strategy, or strategy formulation. 

Had the political leadership of the nation been more astute or more 

experienced, the military shortcomings might have been solvable. 

But it was not. The political leadership could not seem to develop 

a long-term set of goals and a security policy that would promote 

the long-range national interests of the nation. Even if it had, the 

mercurial and immature Kaiser, whose influence on both realms was 

not at all constructive, remained. None of these factors boded well 

for the newly emerging nation-state of the late 19th century or for the 

community of nations. 

63

CHAPTER 5

CHARTING THE COURSE FOR DISASTER

It has never been my “business to comment upon Grand strategy . . . 

there never took place during my entire period in office a sort of war 

council at which politics were brought into the military for and against.

Theobald von Bettmann Hollweg, Chancellor131

 What seems certain, national security strategy and strategy 

development floundered in the post-Bismarck era. With a new 

and impetuous Emperor, a weak Chancellor, and an increasingly 

rudderless ship of state, the most organized entity in Germany 

appeared to be the military. On the surface, the military establishment 

appeared to be stable, organized, and, in all, a dependable bulwark 

for the Emperor and Germany’s social structure. In reality the 

military was not nearly as organized as it seemed. The Imperial 

military establishment, much like the government it served, was a 

Byzantine operation with intrigues, deals being cut, and careers made 

and terminated in an atmosphere that was often only constrained by 

the inherent limits of the individual’s capabilities. Thus, the military 

dabbled in the business of foreign relations and alliances, often in 

isolation from civilian authority, and in the Chancellor’s realm, which 

prior to 1889 had dominated both domestic and foreign affairs. 

 It is also relevant that, as the 19th century came to a close, there 

was not simply one German military establishment. By the 1890s, 

actually two very independent military establishments existed. As 

noted previously, the late 19th century had seen the rapid expansion 

of the German Navy. It had been a small and rather insignificant 

force in the heyday of German military victories, i.e., the Wars of 

Unification. A greater role for the Navy in the military structure 

of all major powers, to include Germany, had been significantly 

boosted by the writings of Alfred Mahan. The impact of Mahan’s 

writings, the interest of Kaiser William in this visible evidence of 

Germany’s growing power, and the political influence of Admiral 

Alfred von Tirpitz meant that the German Navy was destined 

to become a significant part of the force structure. When Admiral 
64

Tirpitz formulated his plans for the high seas fleet to defend against 

an enemy that his plans helped create (Great Britain), he and his 

naval colleagues worked in isolation from the Army and the civilian 

government on budgets, manpower projections, strategy, and war 

plans. The Navy, dominated by a group of aggressive officers, 

planned for a qualitative force that could wage a cataclysmic battle 

between Germany and Britain on the south central regions of the 

North Sea. Their planning was exclusively navy planning, which 

was never shared or coordinated with their Army peers. 

 The Army, too, continued its planning for a future war in isolation 

from their colleagues in blue. Its planning for the next war, initially 

accomplished by the elder Moltke, tended to follow his philosophy 

of war. Thus, the next war would be a short but violent war, a war of 

rapid maneuver, with Germany concentrating its forces and quickly 

and decisively defeating the French Army with a flank attack. With 

the French army destroyed, the German Army could then turn on the 

Russians and defeat this secondary threat.132 The concept of massive 

single-wing envelopment, normally referred to as the Schlieffen 

Plan, is normally attributed to the Army’s Chief of the General Staff 

(1891-1905), Alfred von Schlieffen. In actuality, the overall concept 

of this flank attack and envelopment owes more to Moltke than to 

Schlieffen.133 Moltke promoted this type of indirect attack, particularly 

after witnessing the firepower which was employed in the FrancoPrussian War. He came to doubt whether victories like Königgrätz 

and Sedan were achievable any longer, 

given the emerging modern firepower 

on the battlefield. Still, there seemed little 

choice, and he continued to plan for and 

brood about a two-front war. 

 After Moltke’s retirement, Schlieffen 

studied and wrote about Germany’s 

precarious situation and added his wisdom 

on how Germany’s dread fear, a war on 

two fronts, could best be handled. His 

Cannae essays, published in the Quarterly 

For Tactics and Military Science (1909-13), 

showed a consistent interest in the concept 

of envelopment, and his 1909 essay, “War Alfred Graf von Schlieffen
65

in the Present Day,” clearly demonstrated more of a studious nature 

than someone pursuing a singular method of waging the next war. 

Schlieffen actually considered a number of eventualities to defend 

Germany from its unique strategic dilemma and indicated a decided 

preference for defensive offensive operations.134 His successors, 

however, clearly focused on the concept of single wing envelopment, 

ignoring the elder Moltke’s reservations about the increasing 

advantages of defensive operations.

 It is curious yet predictable, considering the Byzantine nature 

of German civilian and military politics, that as the Navy prepared 

for its North Sea battle and the Army attempted to defend against 

enemies on two fronts, no serious move took place to develop any 

type of a joint planning. Ironically, they even failed to agree on 

the issue of what constituted the major threat to Germany. For the 

Army, the major threat was from France and Russia, which had 

encircled Germany through their alliance. According to the Navy, 

the major threat to Germany was clearly Great Britain. Even when 

Britain succeeded in resolving its colonial issues in France, resulting 

in the entente’ cordiale and the extension of this entente’ to Russia in 

1907, the two services still maintained their different perspective on 

the threat—and planned according to their perceptions. Despite the 

worsening situation for the German Empire, no serious attempt was 

made to create a board or a commission to provide the new nation 

with either a joint or at least a national approach to either military or 

strategic planning.135

 In this respect, Germany was unique among the major western 

powers it would ultimately face in World War I. Great Britain had 

its Committee of Imperial Defence which coordinated defense 

planning. France had established its Conseil superieure de guerre 

as its coordinative body. Even the United States, only gradually 

acknowledging its major power status, recognized the significance 

of some type of coordination in planning among the services. Thus, 

in the wake of the Spanish American War, as a part of Elihu Root’s 

reforms in 1903, a Joint Army and Navy Board was established. 

This board consisted of four officers from each branch and was 

chaired by Admiral Thomas Dewey. Their task was to develop the 

overall general principles for the defense of the United States and 
66

its possessions, and to undertake the development of war plans in 

the event of a possible war with designated nations. While, as noted 

by Russell Weigley, “none of this strategic planning turned out to 

have much relevance to the war the country found itself in 1917,” it 

was nonetheless a coordinated planning effort by two services, even 

though each had their own priorities.136

 To complicate Germany’s situation even further, at the start of 

the 20th century, the army’s role in the new unified Germany was 

splint into two significant parts. Granted, an obvious role was to 

defend the nation, but from whom was still a question. The Prussian 

Army of the 18th century always had a domestic role of defending 

the state from its own people, i.e., the middle and lower class masses. 

The fear of the masses by the ruling class did not disappear in the 

post-Napoleonic era but continued throughout the 19th century. In 

fact, it was still an issue on the eve of World War I. After all, from 

the perspective of the ruling elites, the 19th century had seen two 

revolutions from the lower and middle classes, one in 1830 and the 

most serious in 1848. After unification had been accomplished, the 

consistent growth of liberalism and socialism in German political 

life threatened the social fabric and political structure of Imperial 

Germany. These events were clear evidence to the leadership that a 

bulwark was needed to maintain the country’s social order. Between 

1905 and 1913 there were several reminders of the importance—even 

primacy—of the Army’s role in maintaining domestic tranquility. As 

Admiral von Tirpitz was planning his high seas fleet, which Germany 

could ill afford, and General Alfred von Schlieffen was writing 

analyzing Cannae and double wing envelopments, Kaiser Wilhelm 

informed then Chancellor (1905) Bernhard von Bülow that Germany 

could not afford to fight a war. Tying down the German Army in 

a war against a foreign adversary could endanger “the safety and 

property of its [Germany’s] citizens in the face of the mounting ‘red 

menace’ (that is, the growing socialist party).”137 As late as 1913, the 

new Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke (the 

younger) was trying to obtain authorization for the additional troops 

needed to successfully stage the single wing envelopment known 

as the Schlieffen Plan. He was warned repeatedly by the German 

War Minister, Josias von Heeringen, of the Army’s important role 

in quelling domestic disturbances and the dangers of opening the 
67

army to democratization (by including more and more working class 

citizens).138 Thus the question emerged, What was the prime role 

for the Army—defense against internal disorder or defense against 

external enemies? Did Germany have the resources to defend against 

both? 

 As a final insult to common sense, coordination in defense 

planning and strategy between the civilian and military authorities 

was nonexistent. The civilian authorities had in many respects set 

the stage for this problem by their inability to get their own house 

in order. From the time Waldersee became Chancellor in 1890, the 

Chancellor’s role in working with the Emperor to develop goals 

and objectives and strategies to achieve these goals continually had 

diminished. The first failure in the German political realm was the 

inability of the Kaiser and his Chancellors to develop something akin 

to the rather symbiotic relationship that existed between William I and 

Bismarck.139 The immediate post-Bismarck Chancellors were unsure 

of what they wanted, except that their goals and strategies would 

not follow Bismarck’s. Thus, they bumbled and bungled, attempting 

to chart their own course, but without taking a compass along on 

their diplomatic journeys. By the time of Theobald von BethmannHollweg’s Chancellorship (1909-17), the Chancellor was largely 

absent from a significant role in developing national strategy, even 

though his postwar claim of his lack of involvement in this realm is a 

distortion.140 In the end, his major contribution to Germany’s defense 

for the coming war was to convince the Socialists to support the war 

effort.

 For Germany, the disconnect between civilian and military 

authorities was a major problem because the strategies developed 

by the General Staff were not strategies at all. Based on officer 

education and the army’s culture, they were instead tactical and 

operational concepts. In all, the Army lived in the shadow of the 

Wars of Unification, perhaps never truly recognizing that tactics 

and operational concepts were no substitute for strategy. The 

Emperor also was little help because, even though he clearly wanted 

to find Germany’s place in the sun and to gain the respect among 

the community of major powers, he failed to recognize that this 

cannot be done by treading on the diplomatic toes of the other major 

nations. He ignored Bismarck’s concept of being the hegemon of 
68

Europe, without appearing to be, without flaunting the economic 

and military power of the German Empire.

 Conversely, neither William II nor his Chancellors were the evil 

men portrayed by wartime propaganda. The Kaiser was instead an 

unbelievably immature individual who could not set reasonable and 

achievable goals for his nation. Due to the quirks in his personality, 

neither could he acquiesce to the goals nor strategies set by a strong 

chancellor, as had his grandfather, even if such an individual had 

been available. As a consequence, Germany wallowed diplomatically 

through the last decade of the 19th century and the first of the 20th 

with the Chancellors, Foreign Ministers, and the Kaiser irritating the 

other major powers through their ineptitude and through William’s 

bombast. By 1907, if not earlier, Germany had achieved one major 

accomplishment on the world scene as it related to security policy; it 

had managed to encircle itself with unfriendly alliances composed of 

the other European powers. In Bismarck’s heyday, Berlin had made 

rapid progress toward becoming the center of European diplomacy. 

Under William II, it had become an island surrounded by unfriendly 

waters. 

 In this atmosphere, the planners of the services became even more 

significant. Moltke had planned on how to fight a war on two fronts, 

and Schlieffen’s writings had contributed to additional thought on 

how to deal with such a quandary. Men, more men, and more corps 

were needed to fight the war that military planners knew would 

come. The goal of this war was to break out of the encirclement 

that was threatening Germany. On December 8, 1912, William II 

convened a war council. When the council met, War Minister Josia 

von Heeringen was not even present. After all, though an officer, he 

was a part of the civilian government. While subordination of the 

military to civilian authority had been a problem since Bismarck’s 

day, at this juncture it was clear that the General Staff had won.141

 The Kaiser’s assessment was that war was inevitable, an 

assessment agreed to by Moltke the younger. In the wake of this 

council, pressure was exerted on the civilian side of the government 

to increase appropriations for the military and to increase the number 

of German soldiers in uniform. In the days following this meeting, the 

War Minister and the Chancellor were briefed on the basic concepts 

of the General Staff’s version of the Schlieffen Plan. The war, when 
69

it came, would be a war to relieve the peace-loving German nation 

from the encirclement that threatened its very existence. Was there a 

grand strategy that governed all of this? No, initially there were only 

operational and tactical plans designed to relieve the encirclement of 

Germany. This, in short, had become the German way of war. 

71

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

It is simply not true that Schlieffen was keen on wresting control from the 

politicians. . . . His continued influence on German policy was the fault of 

Bismarck’s sucessors, who carelessly squandered his legacy.

Brigadier General Dr. Günter Roth142

Even before the Guns of August opened up in 1914, initiating 

the over 4 years of carnage we know as World War I, the failures of 

the German way of war were already evident. They did not begin 

with the nightmare National Socialist years when a political leader 

with the background of a corporal in a Bavarian Regiment moved 

corps and armies, they began in the mid-19th century as Germany 

was being formed into a nation-state and they saw their ultimate 

expression during World War I.143 The problems and the resulting 

failures are summarized below. 

 The first problem relates to the German General Staff, the elite 

military staff group that was reformed during the Scharnhorst era. 

It was redesigned in the early 19th century to provide well-trained 

and professional advice to senior officers. The senior leaders of that 

period generally had their appointments due to social and/or political 

position rather than military training and thus needed the advice of 

experts to carry out their duties competently. The capabilities of the 

General Staff officers and their professionalism were clearly evident 

in the Wars of Unification, but they came to regard themselves as 

experts, Bismarck said demagogues, both in war and in matters 

of state, i.e., as these matters related to Germany’s security policy. 

The latter, matters of state, were far and above their training and 

experience. Their experience was in the Moltke era, in a time when 

Moltke had taken concepts of Napoleonic warfare—rapid maneuver 

and concentration of forces on the field to destroy the enemy army—

and had significantly improved them using the technology of the 

Industrial age. Through Moltke’s writings and his campaigns, the 

General Staff came to believe that in these “modern” campaigns, 
72

characterized by rapid and decisive military actions, a strategy could 

be found for the German nation.144

 Beginning in the 1860s, the General Staff, and the senior officer 

corps in general, chaffed against and intrigued against civilian 

control of the nation in war and peace. They were a dangerous 

group for a new parliamentary democracy as they were outside the 

constitutional government and ignored, as well as actively subverted, 

the constitutional lawful part of the government. They built their 

fame and their reputation on the Wars of Unification, more than in the 

reformist Scharnhorst era. Through their mid-19th century victories 

and by the last decade of that century, they had become dominant 

players in German security strategy/military strategy. Their push to 

short circuit their fellow officers in the “civilian” branch of the war 

ministry and their desire to override the Chancellor in matters of 

strategy were, by this time, completely successful.

 The success of the General Staff in attaining a dominant role in 

determining Germany’s security policy was dangerous for Germany 

and for Europe. By education and experience, they had little exposure 

to the higher levels of strategy and perhaps never truly realized that 

their famed victories in the Wars of Unification were due to the wise, 

though arbitrary, policies and strategies established by Otto von 

Bismarck rather than the military in general, and the General Staff 

in particular. Again, their mentor was Moltke the Elder, a master of 

military art in the field, and not Clausewitz who is remembered for 

his writings on strategy.145 Thus, their perspective was that of tactical 

field officers, though admittedly they also functioned on what we 

today call the operational level of war. Thus, they came to confuse 

tactical and operational success as synonymous with strategy. In 

fact, successful tactics with victory on the field was, for many senior 

German officers, a strategy in itself.

 The reforms of the early 19th century gave them a significant 

place in the Prussian/German system, but those same reforms failed 

to give them the necessary education to see above and beyond the 

area of tactical operations. Had appropriate counterbalances existed 

in the civilian realm to negate their rise to prominence, perhaps the 

Germany of the 20th century might have been somewhat different—

but there were none. After Bismarck, Germany failed to produce, 

or better yet, elevate to a position of authority, a statesman of the 
73

former’s stature or talents. One cannot agree with the assertion by the 

Chief of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt that, after Bismarck, 

the senior military officer corps moved to fill a vacuum created 

by defaulters, bankrupt politicians.146 In reality, the General Staff 

had pressed for an increasing role in strategy and security policy 

from 1871 until the end of that century. In reality, Gerhard Ritter’s 

comments likely sum up the situation best:

The historic guilt of Bismarck’s successors lies in the fact that they allowed 

themselves to be drawn into this dependency, [a dependency on military 

technocrats] that without raising a voice of opposition they accepted war 

planning as being the privilege of the military expert.147

 The failure, however, was both military and political. The 

politicians acquiesced, were taken in, or were overwhelmed by the 

military experts. In the end, the General Staff’s army plans and that 

of Tirpitz and his naval staff for only military options sufficed for 

some sort of strategy for the German nation. Their solutions were 

not really a strategy for Germany; in reality, they were militarydominated tactical and operational plans devoid of strategies.

 Where were the political solutions for Germany between 1890 

and 1914? Could the political element of power have been exercised, 

rather than the military? At one time, political solutions clearly 

existed to resolve Germany’s problems, but they were squandered 

by inept politicians who had seriously damaged Germany’s political 

reputation by their ineptitude and unrealistic schemes and strategies. 

Even if the political leadership had designed achievable strategies 

for the post- Bismarck Second Reich, or had promoted the political 

or economic element of power, there was the Kaiser. As the 19th 

century came to an end, there could not have been a more unfortunate 

successor to the German throne. Even another Bismarck might not 

have been able to counterbalance this mercurial personality. While 

the post-1945 German generals consistently complained about 

Hitler’s interference in Germany’s military plans and operations, 

one only has to give a cursory review of the post-Bismarck era to 

see that Hitler assuredly was not the first German head of state to 

meddle in politics and military affairs.

 Returning to the original question raised in the introduction, are 

there lessons to be learned from studying the German way of war, 
74

or have we, in fact, studied them far too much? At the same time, 

have key lessons been missed? In reality, military students have 

missed or glossed over a very important lesson: the importance of 

the national leadership setting achievable goals and the importance 

of adopting strategies to achieve them. Instead, both civilian and 

military students of modern Germany have pursued a fascination 

with the tactical and operational victories won by the Germans, 

particularly in World War II. Granted, whether one studies the 1870 

Sedan operations or the almost staggering victory brought about by 

the Wehrmacht through the 1941 Kiev encirclement, tactically and 

operationally the German Army was an amazing force in the field. 

 What we have ignored, a significant lesson provided by the 

Germans, is that sometimes victories in the field are not enough. The 

Germans, too, ignored this lesson. Instead, they studied, particularly 

in the late 19th century, tactical and operational warfare, for the 

patron saint of Germany’s military leadership was Helmuth von 

Moltke, not Clausewitz. From the mid-19th century, the German 

army—Moltke’s Army—developed a fascination with flank attacks 

and envelopments which culminated in the immediate pre-World 

War I Cannae essays. As Schlieffen studied classical warfare and 

wrote about the Punic wars, both he and his military disciples missed 

a significant lesson. Hannibal, the mastermind of Carthaginian 

victories, was only a success tactically. Despite his domination of 

the Roman countryside, from the start of the Second Punic War (218 

B.C.) until virtually the end, 14 years later, he lost the Second Punic 

War. Even though he had amassed an almost unbelievable string 

of tactical victories throughout the length of the Italian Peninsula, 

including the classical double-wing envelopment at Cannae, in the 

end the famous Carthaginian failed. In the Battle of Zama, he not only 

lost this solitary battle, he lost the war together with the Carthaginian 

Empire. Roman strategies, and ultimately tactics, prevailed. The 

lesson of the Second Punic War and of 20th century Germany is that 

without sound strategies, both national and military, without logical 

achievable goals, tactical and operational victories—even small war 

victories—may in the end mean very little to a nation. For Hitler’s 

Germany, Poland, France, the Low countries, and Norway were all 

spectacular victories—victories still studied today, but what was the 

result for the German nation? The most significant lesson provided 
75

by a study of the German way of war is the importance of having an 

achievable set of goals for a nation and strategies to achieve those 

goals. This lesson is far more significant than the factors that resulted 

in their tactical and operational successes.

 Second, once a nation sets its goals, to have the best chance of 

achieving them, that nation should always attempt to use multiple 

elements of power. If a nation’s military is allowed to plan in 

isolation, if the political leadership acquiesces and defers to the 

military in developing security policy, in all likelihood, the solutions 

to the problems will be military and the element of power utilized 

will be military. That Germany, after unification and after Bismarck, 

failed to develop a competent and respected diplomatic corps and 

that this nation failed to recognize how to use the economic power 

resulting from its rapid late 19th century industrialization, is a sad 

commentary on its leadership.

 Third, a nation must have its military establishment function as a 

unified force. If, as was the case with the German Navy, its plans are 

based on one set of contingencies with the army’s on another and both 

compete for the same resources with no coordination, the country’s 

military will be unable to fully develop or effectively employ the full 

strength of its forces. Since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, today’s 

U.S. military forces have been pushed, sometimes dragged into a joint 

culture. At times, this process has been painful for the leadership of 

all of the services, but if there is ever a lesson to be learned from 

studying the German military experience, it is the consequence of 

failing to have joint planning and utilization of joint military forces 

in war. A student of history can only wonder if Germany’s army and 

navy had tried to stage any significant joint operations in World War 

I, whether this could have improved Germany’s military position in 

the war. Instead, other than a Baltic joint operation in 1917, it was 

as if the German Army and Navy were in the service of different 

nations.148 Neither coordination nor cooperation was the order of the 

day. 

 Above all, and something that nations entering the 21st century 

should remember, is that the German experience shows the student 

of military history/affairs that sometimes technical operational 

victories in the field are not enough. They need to be a part of a 

strategy in pursuit of achievable goals, if the nation is to succeed. 

77

ENDNOTES

 1. Holger Herwig, “The Prussian Model and Military Planning Today,” Joint 

Forces Quarterly, Spring 1998, p. 67.

 2. Colonel T. N. Dupuy, A Genius For War: The German Army and General Staff, 

1807-1945, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1977.

 3. Kenneth Macksey, Why the Germans Loose a War: The Myth of German Military 

Superiority, London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p. 228.

 4. Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, Lawrence: University 

of Kansas, 2000, p. 232.

 5. For example, see B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk: Startling 

Revelations from Hitler’s High Command, New York: Quill, 1975; and of course 

a classic in this line of thought, Eric von Manstein, Lost Victories, Chicago: The 

Regency Press, 1958.

 6. Oberst i.G. Christain O. E. Millotat, Understanding the Prussian-German 

General Staff System, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, p. 42. 

 7. This term, Gotterdamerung, is normally used to describe the catastrophic 

collapse of the Third Reich in the late spring, 1945. This term was taken from 

Richard Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen, a favorite of Hitler’s. The opera ends 

with an orgy of destruction, similar to what happened in Berlin in April 1945. 

 8. For those who are unfamiliar with the concept of elements of power, a 

good primer is Hans J. Morgenthau’s book Politics Among the Nations: The Struggle 

for Power and Peace, New York: Knopf, 1968. Morgenthau found that there were 

elements that were relatively stable, and then there were those that were subject 

to change. Application of these elements of power is the means to achieve national 

goals. Currently the key elements of power that are recognized are economic, 

political, military, psychological, and, most recently, informational. The fault with 

the Germans appears to be that they had a distinct tendency to gravitate to the 

military, ignoring/overlooking the others. 

 9. Michael Handel, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, 1991, p. 21. Even more pointedly, Sun Tzu stated: “For 

the Emperor to resort to violence was an admission that he had failed in his own 

conduct as a sage pursuing the art of government. The resort to warfare, wu, was 

an admission of bankruptcy in the pursuit of wen, the arts of peace. Consequently 

it should be a last resort and it required justification both at the time and in the 

record.” P. 23.

 10. The author readily acknowledges a notable exception to this statement. 

Chancellor Otto von Bismarck willingly used the military element of power 

from 1864-71 in order to unify Germany. Conversely, once his basic goals were 

achieved, the chancellor consistently avoided war and through diplomacy, and at 

times chicanery, defused crises and forsook the military element of power. 
78

 11. This is in contradiction to the concepts promoted by the preeminent 19th 

century German thinker Carl von Clausewitz, who stated, “. . . We also want to 

make it clear that war itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into 

something entirely different. It is essential that intercourse continues irrespective 

of the means it employs.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Sir Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret, trans. and eds., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 605. 

 12. Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic 

Envelopment,” Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret, ed., Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1986, p. 296.

 13. A student of military history only has to look at the profusion of memoirs 

written by the German officer corps after World War II to find the roots of this 

legend. From Guderian to von Manstein, a common theme exists that many of the 

“Lost Victories” were due to Hitler’s interference in maneuvering forces from the 

Army to the company level.

 14. Do note, however, that in 1834 Prussia exercised leadership in this regard 

through the establishment of the Zollverein, a voluntary customs union which erased 

the economic barriers between participating German principalities. Conveniently 

for Prussian ambitions, Austria was excluded from membership. 

 15. The Hohenzollerns, the Prussian ruling dynasty with its roots in southern 

Germany, had ruled Brandenburg-Prussia for generations. In general, the 

Hohenzollerns were divine right kings who, above all, wished to retain their 

royal prerogatives and to protect their dynasty from intrusions by popular rule or 

competing houses.

 16. The reader should remember, however, that at this congress a German 

confederation, not a unified state, was created. The purpose of the confederation 

was not to unify the Germans but to protect against external threats and to guard 

against internally-based revolutions. In structure this confederation was not a 

unifying force but rather an organization of 38 sovereign states and principalities 

whose representatives functioned and voted as their sovereigns instructed. A 

good read on this period remains Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, 

Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 

1999.

 17. As stated by one author, “It was perhaps a bad omen that the second 

German Reich, the United Germany, had been founded on the basis of three wars. 

With hindsight, it seems as if no peaceful existence could have resulted from such 

aggressive beginnings.” Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of 

the First World War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 16. 

 18. Critics of Prussian politics should use appropriate perspective when 

criticizing Prussia for its initiation of these Wars of Unification. Despite Anika 

Mombauer’s quote in the previous footnote, consider the experience of other 

European nations. The United Kingdom did not come into existence through a 

peaceful joining of Wales, Scotland, and England. France was a battleground for 

centuries between English nobility and French nobility before the English and their 
79

allies finally were evicted and France became a nation-state. War was the order 

of the day for Spain beginning with the 9th century through the end of the 15th 

century, when the Spaniards destroyed the last vestiges of the Moorish civilization 

and became a united country. In short, Prussia was one of many European nations 

that unified by the sword; perhaps its problem was that it happened to be a 

latecomer in the process. For a U.S. reader, it should not be forgotten that our 

country also grew and expanded westward through innumerable wars with the 

Native American tribes. 

 19. Daniel Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War: Selected Writings, Novato CA: The 

Persidio Press, 1993, p. 25. At the same time, following the Wars of Unification, 

Moltke was both a skeptic and a realist noting, “One hopes that with advancing 

civilization war will be less frequent, but no state can entirely dispense with it.” 

Hughes, p. 24. 

 20. For example, one author correctly noted that “the Prusso-German Army 

was a strategic culture largely shaped by three short Wars of Unification against 

Denmark, Austria, and France.” (Emphasis added.) Holger H. Herwig, “Strategic 

Uncertainties of a Nation-state: Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918” in Williamson 

Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: 

Rulers, States and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, Looking 

at these wars and how they were viewed by German military thinkers, Gunther 

Rothenberg stated that the Germans found “the campaign of 1866 as the Moltkean 

ideal of war. The decisive battle was fought within weeks after the outbreak of 

hostilities, and its outcome deprived the adversary of the means and the will 

to fight further.” Gunther E. Rothenburg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine 

of Strategic Envelopment,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the 

Nuclear Age, Peter Paret, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 302. 

 21. Louis Napoleon, nephew of the famous French Emperor and principal 

claimant to the throne, should not be confused with the Emperor Napoleon 

Bonaparte. Louis Napoleon, or Napoleon III, was aptly called “Napoleon the 

Small” by Victor Hugo, but he assuredly had territorial ambitions like his uncle, 

whether they were at the expense of Germany or a new world empire, initially 

focusing on Mexico. 

 22. The revolutionary Parliament meeting at Frankfurt actually offered the 

Prussian Emperor the crown, but according to one of Bismarck’s biographers, 

“He, the emperor, detested election by a parliament, a crown offered by the 

representatives of the people. That was revolution, and he hated revolution all the 

more as he remembered his own humiliation before it. So he declined the crown 

on the grounds that he would accept it only if offered unanimously by the German 

princes.” Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire, New York: W. W. Norton 

and Company, 1958, p. 27. Note, however, that the German Emperor did devise a 

plan to reduce Austrian influence in the German Confederation and pressed for a 

Prussian-led plan to unify the German states. In the end, however, Austrian and 

Russian pressure forced Prussia to sign an agreement to renounce these ambitions, 

and this agreement at Ölmutz became known by German Nationalists as the 

“Humiliation of Ölmutz.” 
80

 23. Frederick William IV suffered a stroke in 1857 that incapacitated him. He 

died in 1861 and with his passing, William officially became Emperor. William had 

not been groomed as Emperor because it was assumed that Frederick William’s 

heirs would reign. Since the latter was childless, William was in line for succession. 

While both men were decidedly absolute monarchists, William was the soldier 

and determined to build Prussia’s power, a factor which was extremely important 

in German unification. 

 24. William’s plan called for the enforcement of the traditional 3 years of military 

service for all men, a provision that previously had not been well-enforced, and 

a weakening of the Landwehr, the traditional Prussian militia, which had proven 

to be unreliable during the revolutions of 1848. Through these provisions, he 

thought there would be increased funds and manpower to support the additional 

regiments for the Prussian Army.

 25. Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of 

Unification, 1815-1871, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 120-121. 

 26. The opposition refused to pass the necessary budget to fund William’s 

enlargement of his army and, when a budget could not be agreed upon, the 

government proceeded without one, collecting taxes and expending funds 

according to the plans and programs of William and Bismarck. In Bismarck’s 

opinion, “If a compromise cannot be arrived at and a conflict arises, then the 

conflict becomes a question of power. Whoever has the power, then acts according 

to his opinion.” Thus, since the crown had the power, it simply functioned without 

parliamentary concurrence. Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire, p. 61.

 27. Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of 

Unification, 1815-1871, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 72.

 28. Gunther E. Rothenberg, in his foreword to Daniel Hughes, Moltke on the Art 

of War, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993, p. x.

 29. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, p. 72.

 30. Ibid., p. 111.

 31. Ibid.

 32. Classic examples of this romanticized fiction were the writings of Heinrich 

Von Treitschke and Heinrich Von Sybel, both of whom portrayed the pressure 

for German unification as essentially an irresistible popular current which was 

sweeping through the German states.

 33. Gordon Craig placed the issue of Bismarck and unification in perspective 

when he stated, “If he had never risen to the top in Prussian politics, the unification 

of Germany would probably have taken place anyway but not at the same time 

or in quite the same way it did.” Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945, New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 1. 

 34. Rather than terming it “hijacking,” his main biographer better describes it 

as “Bismarck first conceived his plan for the exploitation of German Nationalism in 
81

1858-1859 when conditions for its execution appeared particularly ripe.” Pflanze, 

The Unification of Germany, p. 156.

 35. Examples of Bismarck’s “borrowing from others” includes his adoption 

of German nationalism and German unification for his own purposes or, after 

unification was achieved, borrowing elements of the social legislative agenda, 

specifically social insurance, from the Socialists whom he was determined to 

destroy. See William H. Dawson, The German Empire, 1867-1914, 2 vols., Vol. II, 

New York: George Allen & Unwinn, 1919, pp. 39-46.

 36. This was particularly true once the Wars of Unification started. Gordon 

Craig quotes a former member of Bismarck’s opposition, Gustav Mevissen, who, 

after the victories against Austria in 1866, stated, 

I cannot recover from the impressions of this hour. I am in truth no devotee 

of Mars; the goddess of beauty and the mother of the graces appeal more 

to my understanding than the powerful god of war, but the trophies of 

war exercise a magic spell even upon the child of peace. Involuntarily the 

look is fettered, and the spirit dwells with those countless masses who 

are hailing the god of the moment, success.

Craig, Germany 1866-1945, p. 8.

 37. Calculated in that Bismarck cooperated with the Austrians in the brief War 

against Denmark, but in the Convention of Gastein, 1865, Prussia administered 

Schleswig and Austria administered Holstein. This dual power administration 

between the two powers, with relations already strained over the question of who 

would be the leader of the German states, was a recipe for future conflict. 

 38. As an example, the Prussian Army had transitioned from muzzleloading 

weapons to the Dreyse Needle gun, a breechloader that allowed a Prussian soldier 

to fire five-to-six times faster than his Austrian adversary. Conversely, the Austrians 

were at the same time transitioning to muzzleloaders converted to breech loaders 

and had finally seen the need to adopt the concept of interchangeable parts, 

something their arms industry had failed to do. See John Walter, The German Rifle: 

A Comprehensive History of the Standard Bolt Action Designs, 1871-1945, London: 

Arms and Armor Press, 1979, pp. 20-46; and Hans-Dieter Götz, Die deutschen 

Militargewehre und Machinenpistolen, 1871-1945, Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1974, 

pp. 8-9. The Austrians, in terms of weapons technology, had only one advantage 

over their Prussian adversaries—artillery. Even though the Prussian Army, through 

its studies of the American Civil War, appreciated the impact of modern artillery, 

they were slow in converting to rifled tubes made with high quality steel. 

 39. Although politicians had robbed Moltke of his total victory over Austria, 

a real victory resulting from the Austrian war was the rout of the Progressive 

party. A key plank in the Progressive Party platform had been the unification of 

Germany. Bismarck, in practice the leader of unification, simply ripped that plank 

from their platform. 
82

40. A letter from Otto von Bismarck on July 9, 1870, in Fürst Herbert 

Bismarck, ed., Bismarcks Briefe an Seine Braut und Gattin, Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta’sche 

Buchandlung, Nachfolger, 1900, p. 572. 

 41. A good overview of Moltke’s early life and the rather chaotic early family 

years is summarized very well in Arden Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864 

-1871, New York: Palgrave Publications, 2001, pp. 25-49 

 42. After completing his studies at the General War School, Moltke did spend 

some 12 years with a regiment. but after this period in the tactical world and a 

brief period as a military advisor in Turkey, he moved to higher staff positions 

and to his military studies. See William O’Conner Morris, Moltke: A Biographical 

and Critical Study, New York: Haskell House Publishers Ltd, 1971.

 43. In his comments in a section of his writings entitled Sieg und Überlegenheit: 

Schnelle Entscheidung, Moltke stated,

The character of the present day conduct of war is marked by the 

attempt to obtain a great and rapid decision. Calling into service all of 

those capable of bearing arms: the strength of armies; the difficulties of 

sustaining them; the enormous cost of being under arms; the disruption 

of commerce, manufacture and agriculture; the battle-ready organization 

of the Armies and the ease in which they are assembled, all press for 

early termination of the war.

Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War: Selected Writings, Novato CA: The Persidio 

Press, 1993, pp. 125-126. 

 44. As noted by my friend and colleague, Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Nonetheless, 

in an interview in 1890, Moltke reputedly listed Homer’s works, the Bible, and On 

War among the five books that most influenced him.” Echevarria, “Moltke and the 

German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies,” Parameters, Spring 1996, p. 

92. A clear indication of Clausewitz’s influence can be seen in Moltke’s Comments 

on Strategy, written in 1871, where he stated, “policy uses war for the attainment of 

its goals; it works decisively at the beginning and the end of the war so that indeed 

policy reserves for itself the right to increase its demands or to be satisfied with 

a lesser success.” Max Horst, Moltke: Leben und Werke in Selbstzeugnissen, Briefe, 

Schriften, Reden, Bremen: Carl Schunemann Verlag, n.d., p. 361. 

 45. In many respects even though he acknowledged Clausewitz as a major 

influence, he actually broke with a significant part of Clausewitz’s thinking. 

While Clausewitz consistently referred to war as a political act, Moltke tended to 

minimize the political element and seek military, tactical, and operational solutions 

to problems. In particular, in war he espoused the idea that once the first shot was 

fired, the generals would run the war. The political leader did not have a role. 

 46. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War p. 124. 

 47. Ibid., p. 46.

48. Grosser Generalstab, ed., Moltke’s Militärische Werke, 14 vols., Berlin: E. S. 

Mittler, 1892-1912, Vol. II, part 2, pp. 33-40. As he stated, “Kein operationsplan reicht 
83

mit einiger Sicherhiet über das erste Zusammentreffen mit der feindlichen Hauptmacht 

hinaus.” See also, Horst, Moltke: Leben und Werke in Selbstzeugnissen, Briefe, Schriften, 

Reden, p. 361.

 49. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, pp. 128-129.

 50. Ibid., p. 36.

 51. As noted by Arden Bucholz in his work, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-

1871, New York: Palgrave Publications, 2001, pp. 135-138, William I initially had 

serious reservations about going to war against a kindred state, no matter how 

serious their disagreements about the leadership of the German states. Once the 

victories began to amass, however, William was in favor of marching on to Vienna 

and imposing a punitive peace. Bismarck, worried about Louis Napoleon’s plans 

and intentions and concerned about weakening the Hapsburgs and the ensuing 

power vacuum, was the voice of moderation. 

52. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, p. 25.

 53. After the Franco-Prussian war, however, he recognized the significance of 

politics prior to the war, but he held fast to the view that once the war had begun, 

political leaders and their policies should be removed from issues of military 

strategy and policy. As noted by Holger Herwig, 

. . . the Elder Moltke remained open to change. He understood the 

geopolitical chessboard of the 1890s and appreciated that the location of 

the Reich between France and Russia defied simple operational tactical 

resolution. “It must be left to diplomacy,” Moltke concluded, “to see 

if it can achieve a peace settlement” in a future war among the great 

powers.

Holger H. Herwig, “The Prussian Model and Military Planning Today,” Joint 

Forces Quarterly, Spring 1998, p. 70.

 54. The encircled French Army was to become prisoners of war, and all of 

their weapons and equipment would fall into German hands. All French officers 

would be allowed to retain their firearms, but they, too, would be prisoners of war. 

Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871, pp. 181-182. 

 55. As noted by one author, a part of Bismarck’s concern was the possibility of 

foreign intervention to bring the war to an end. Were this to occur, it might not be 

possible to achieve Prussia’s goals in the war completely. See Gordon Craig, The 

Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 206. 

 56. As succinctly summarized by Otto Pflanze, “The conflict between Moltke 

and Bismarck is a classic example of the uneasy relationship between political 

and military leadership in wartime. To the Chancellor the fall of Paris meant the 

possibility of peace on German terms, but to the general, it meant the release of 

troops for further military operations.” Perhaps most significant, he noted, “The 

Junker had won his private struggle with the military at a crucial time in German 

history. But the institutional dualism of military and political authority which was 

its cause remained unaltered. One day, long after his death, the problem would 
84

rise again to plague his successors in a war of far greater dimensions.” Emphasis 

added. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, p. 468.

 57. The author acknowledges that Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurttemberg were 

able to maintain a degree of autonomy, but this, too, would begin to erode in 1914 

and disappear after the end of World War I. 

58. Horst, Moltke: Leben und Werke, p. 363. 

59. The reader should note, however, that this was not a new or innovative 

concept on the battlefield. The idea of rapid movement, concentration of force, and 

annihilation of the enemy army is warfare in the Napoleonic tradition. Moltke’s 

contribution was using the new technology of the period: railroads, telegraph, 

and breech loading rifles, to give the Prussian Army the speed and firepower to 

accomplish the task. See Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, 

and the Unification of Germany, Hampden CT: Archon Books, 1975.

 60. Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War, p. 52. Moltke stated, “I am convinced that 

improvements in firearms have given the tactical defense a great advantage over 

the tactical offense.” 

 61. Ibid., pp. 128-129.

 62. Ibid., p. 59.

 63. Holger H. Herwig, “Strategic Uncertainties of a Nation-state: PrussiaGermany, 1871-1918,” in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin 

Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War, Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 251.

 64. The Ems dispatch episode is classic Bismarck. When Bismarck received 

the original “Ems” telegram, he was initially discouraged by its contents for he 

feared that the French message would not serve as the catalyst for the coming 

conflict. Thus, he edited the telegram to make it inflammatory and released it to 

the press. For Bismarck, war with France was necessary to complete the process of 

unification. See William L. Langer, “Bismarck as a Dramatist,” in A. O. Sarkissian, 

Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honor of G. P. Gooch, London: 

Longman, 1961, pp. 199-216.

 65. Too often people miss important elements of Germany’s post-1870 power. 

By the beginning of the 20th century, Germany not only had the most powerful 

army on the continent, it also was out-producing Britain in pig iron, had rapidly 

expanded its electrical and chemical industries, and had the lion’s share of the 

world’s dye production. As noted by Otto Pflanze, between 1850 and 1860, coal 

production in Germany doubled, and the number of steam engines in use rose from 

1,416 in 1846 to 10,113 in 1861. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany,

p. 114. In short, in the latter part of the Bismarck years, Germany had immense 

political and economic, as well as military power. For the sake of the German 

people, it is rather a pity that William II and his ministers did not appreciate that 

there were elements of power to be exercised above and beyond the military 

element.
85

 66. Hans Kohn, German History: Some New German Views, London: Allen and 

Unwinn, 1954, p. 30.

 67. For those unfamiliar with this period of German history, Bismarck was 

faced by two serious issues: the possibility of France waging a war of revanche’; 

and, particularly in the cities, the growth of the Social Democratic Party—with its 

socialist agenda—which, together with the other democratic forces in Germany, 

threatened to unravel the social fabric of the German state which both Bismarck and 

William sought to preserve. The Social Democrats and the Liberals were, for him, 

a serious threat. See Johannes Ziekursch, Politische Geschichte Des Neuen Deutschen 

Kaiserreiches, 3 vols., Frankfurt: Societäts-Druckerei, 1925-30, particularly Vol. II.

 68. Herwig, “The Prussian Model and Military Planning Today,” p. 71.

 69. Consider, for example, the economic indicators and the power they 

provided. Two key indicators were the production of pig iron and coal. In the 

period 1850-60, annual pig iron production increased from 215,000 tons to 529,000, 

and coal production doubled, increasing from 6 million tons to 12 million. By 

the end of the 19th century, Germany was producing more pig iron than Great 

Britain.

 70. The Chancellor never regarded himself as a Kolonialmenschi, but in all 

likelihood, he engaged briefly in the race for colonies due to necessities of internal/

domestic politics rather than any true belief in the worth of overseas posessions. 

See Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire, New York: W. W. Norton Inc, 

1964, pp. 272-281. 

 71. A vocal lobby in Germany wanted Germany to have an overseas empire. 

Bismarck traditionally was skeptical of the value of colonies but had no hesitancy 

to use German “Colonial Humbug” for the purposes of his politics, both foreign 

and domestic. 

 72. Bismarck seemed intent on grooming his eldest son, Herbert von Bismarck, 

as a potential successor. Bismarck’s son had the determination of his father but 

totally lacked subtlety and charm. He had a violent temper and was frequently 

cowed and verbally abused by his father. Thus, Herbert had the name but not the 

talent to assume his father’s mantle.

 73. The crisis over Bulgaria came at a time when German/Russian relations 

were deteriorating and elements within the German General Staff, notably General 

Alfred von Waldersee, attempted to push Germany into war with Russia, together 

with Germany’s ally, Austria. This attempt was stopped dead by Bismarck 

through his direct intercession with the Austrian government. The Chancellor 

made it perfectly clear to the latter that the defensive alliance between Austria 

and Germany was simply that, a defensive alliance. Furthermore, he clearly stated 

that advice to the monarchs on matters of politics should not be from the General 

Staffs. See Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945, London: 

Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 266-270. 

 74. Erich Brandenburg, in his study From Bismarck to the World War: A Study 

of German Foreign Policy, 1870-1914, London: Oxford University Press, 1927, pp. 2-
86

16, rightfully claims that Bismarck truly sought peace and of course the isolation 

of France. He could see no real value in a war—even a victorious war—for the 

German Empire.

 75. Lawrence Lafore, in his book entitled The Long Fuze: An Interpretation of the 

Origins of World War I, New York: Lippincott Publishing Company, 1971, 2nd ed., 

p. 83, noted, 

The preeminence of Germany assured, while it lasted, a quite 

unprecedented measure of stability. In the 1880s, it faded into a second 

stage where Germany’s preeminence was less certain and where overseas 

issues began to intrude into European politics and a period of instability 

and tension ensued. This was to be replaced by a third phase about 1905 

when Germany’s preeminence had largely disappeared . . .

 76. The alliances, to include secret alliances, inherently created tensions 

in European politics. Nonetheless, these were products of Bismarck’s skillful 

diplomacy and, while alliances that isolated France did produce angst and tension, 

with his skillful hand they also kept a measure of order in the European scene. 

 77. Thus, in 1874 he stated, “I am convinced that improvements in firearms 

have given the tactical defense a great advantage over the tactical offense. It is true 

that we were always on the offensive in the campaign of 1870 and that we took the 

enemy’s strongest positions. But at what a sacrifice! Taking the offensive only after 

having defeated several enemy attacks appears to me to be more advantageous.” 

Daniel Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War Selected Writings, Novato CA: The Presidio 

Press, 1993, p. 52.

 78. This threat went beyond a simple military assessment. Cheap Russian 

grain threatened the income of the agricultural population, particularly the 

landed gentry of the eastern provinces, causing a demand for tariffs to protect 

Germany’s powerful agricultural interests. Conversely, the commercial interests 

in the rapidly industrializing areas of Germany wanted open trade because, for 

them, Russia was a rapidly expanding market for their goods. Trade, tariffs, and 

threats of tariffs added to the tension. 

 79. The War Ministry was a civilian ministry, but military personnel, in 

fact, served in it. Thus, for example, General Alfred K. G. von Kameke was War 

Minister from 1873-83. Even though he was a general officer, he antagonized 

Bismarck and some of the military establishment because he tried to work with 

and appease deputies in the Reichstag who were critics of the Army. In short, it 

wasn’t the personnel, civilian or military, within the War Ministry who were the 

problem. It was the issue of to whom the ministry reported, i.e., civilian rather than 

military officials. In an era when parliamentary demands were rising, together 

with criticism of military budgets, having any part of the military responsible to a 

civilian ministry was a major problem for Prussian conservatives. 

 80. Problems went beyond the trends within the Reichstag. There were also 

liberal-minded officers that worried about leadership in the General Staff and the 

Chancellor, as well. Concern also was that some of these officers were in league 
87

with the liberal-leaning Crown Prince and his decidedly liberally-leaning wife. 

Thus, for the conservatives of the William I/Bismarck/Moltke persuasion, there 

were repeated threats to the established order. See Gordon Craig, Germany: 1866-

1945, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 161-164. 

 81. In many respects, the Prussianized German army in the late 19th century 

never totally lost its class orientation. The reforms of the Scharnhorst era had 

sought to remove some of the class prejudices in the selection of officers through 

promoting the idea that officers should be selected on the basis of ability rather 

than social class. Despite the acceptance of middle class candidates into leadership 

positions, the old order officer corps still distrusted the masses and thus the 

German Army retained a dual mission of protecting the country from its foreign 

enemies and being prepared to defend the government from its citizens. As the 

Social Democratic Party increased its power at the end of the century, the role 

of the Army as an internal security force became even more significant. See Stig 

Forster, Der doppelte Militarismus: Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik zwischen StatusQuo-Sicherung und Agression. 1890-1913, Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1985, pp. 

25-26. 

 82. As noted by Holger Herwig, the actions of 1883 literally “emasculated the 

single agency that accounted for it in the Reichstag, The Prussian War Ministry.” 

In addition, “The General Staff no longer kept the Prussian War Ministry abreast 

of strategic planning.” Holger Herwig, “Strategic Uncertainties of a NationState: Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918,” The Making of Strategy: Rulers States and War,

Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 246. 

 83. Like many high officials in that era, Bismarck was given a military rank 

and could and did wear a uniform. In fact, he was ultimately promoted to the rank 

of Field Marshal at the time of his retirement. Nonetheless, he never trained as a 

soldier and never commanded troops in battle. Simply, he was a civilian given a 

military rank due to his high governmental position. 

84. He stated, Meine Herren, es kann ein siebenjahriger, es kann ein dreissigjahriger 

Krieg warden—und wehe dem, der Europa in Brand steckt, der zuerst die Lunte in das 

Pulverfass schleudert. Max Horst, Moltke: Leben und Werke in Selbstzeugnissen, Briefe, 

Schriften, Reden, Bremen: Carl Schunemann Verlag, n.d., p. 423. 

85. Hermann Hoffman, Fürst Bismarck, 1890-1898; nach personlichen Mitteilungen 

des Fürsten and eigenen Aufzeichnungen des Verfassers, nebst einer authentischen Ausgabe 

aller vom Fürsten Bismarck, Berlin: Stuttgart Union deutsche verlagsgesellschaft, 

1913, Vol I, p. 196.

86. Gunther E. Rothenburg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic 

Envelopment,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,

Peter Paret, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 308-309.

 87. Bronsart von Schellendorf was himself a General Staff officer who shared 

Moltke’s and Waldersee’s concern about a civilian department, the War Ministry, 

standing between them and the Emperor. When he was appointed as War Minister, 
88

it was with the understanding that he would agree that the Chief of the General 

Staff would have direct access to the Emperor.

 88. As noted previously, this civilian ministry usually had a military leader, 

but the issue was not the background of the ministry’s chief executive; it was to 

whom he reported, the civilian authority or the military. 

 89. The conflict over the authority of the “civilian” ministry vs. the military, 

to include the General Staff, continued even after the military’s coup. Lieutenant 

General Walter Bronsart von Schellendorf, younger brother of Paul Bronsart von 

Schellendorf, attempted to reverse the loss of the ministry’s influence which his 

brother had willingly and enthusiastically helped to neuter but to no avail. The 

controversy continues up to the eve of World War I. See Martin Kitchen, The 

German Officer Corps, 1890-1914, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968, pp. 9-10. 

 90. This dislike was reciprocal, for the Empress, a daughter of Britain’s Queen 

Victoria, was a decided enemy of Bismarck and the “Iron Chancellor’s ways.” A 

liberal who had many strong connections with Britain, she was determined to see 

a different kind of Germany following William’s death. Neither the Empress nor 

her husband were ever given such a chance.

 91. This is not merely the writer’s assessment. His mother, writing to her mother, 

Queen Victoria, noted after William’s birth, “Your Grandson is exceedingly lively 

and when awake will not be satisfied unless kept dancing around continually. 

He scratches his face and tears his caps and makes every sort of extraordinary 

noise.” Sir Frederick Ponsonbody, ed., Letters of the Empress Frederick, London: The 

Macmillan Co., 1929, p. 20.

 92. The Kaiser had an unbelievable wardrobe of uniforms which he genuinely 

loved. He had uniforms from regiments of which he was an honorary member 

and even uniforms from a number of other countries, like Britain, where he held 

honorary memberships. He relished wearing these at any appropriate occasion. In 

the late 1930s, another German political leader, who had his own uniform fetish, 

Hermann Göring, was the butt of jokes when it was rumored that he had gotten 

into the old Imperial palace, found the Kaiser’s fantastic uniform collection and 

had his left arm surgically altered so he could wear some of the vast military 

wardrobe. 

 93. Not all of the blame, however, should fall on Caprivi’s shoulders because 

at the time the Chancellor was working the issue, he was without a Secretary of 

State for Foreign Affairs as the former occupant of that position was Herbert von 

Bismarck, son of the former Chancellor. Herbert had resigned after his father’s 

departure. Since Caprivi was unfamiliar with all of the particulars of the treaty, he 

went to the Foreign Ministry for assistance, and the input of Frederick von Holstein 

and others convinced him that the treaty offered much to the Russians and little 

to the German Empire. In short, in addition to Germany’s military leadership, 

that is to say, the General Staff, elements in the Foreign Ministry also opposed the 

Reinsurance Treaty. Therefore, the Kaiser was convinced that the Treaty should 

not be renewed. 
89

 94. In fact, Waldersee and the aging Moltke even promoted the concept of 

a preventative war before the Russians became too strong. Bismarck scoffed at 

this concept for, in his opinion, a prophylactic war was like committing suicide 

to prevent one from dying. See Dennis Showalter, Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, 

Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1991, p. 24. 

 95. In all fairness to the young Emperor, it must be noted that he originally 

sought the renewal of the treaty but was later convinced that it was not in Germany’s 

interest. The real culprits in subverting Bismarck’s system of alliances were 

Waldersee and the leading anti-Bismarck official in the Foreign Office, Friedrich 

von Holstein. For years, Holstein had a significant philosophical disagreement 

with the old Chancellor about Russia and its threat to the Second Reich.

 96. As succinctly stated by Gunther Rothenburg,

An exceptional statesman like Bismarck, enjoying the full confidence and 

support of the ruler, and a soldier of the caliber of the elder Moltke still 

could arrive, albeit grudgingly, at a common understanding of what was 

necessary, desirable, and possible in war. But once these men were gone, 

strategic planning in Germany, and for that matter in most European 

states, was dominated by military appreciations alone and no longer was 

subject to any serious political appraisal and review.

Ibid, pp. 324, 325. 

 97. For a good reference on the post-Bismarck period, see John C.G. Röhl, 

Germany Without Bismarck, Berkley: University of California Press, 1967.

 98. In short, the German government agreed to British claims to vast tracts of 

land in Africa, which gave the British control of the headwaters of the Nile, and 

clear access to the Nile from the East coast of Africa. The treaty was unpopular in 

Germany but, in the opinion of Caprivi and Friedrich von Holstein, a key person 

in the successful move to kill the Reinsurance Treaty, the potential to draw Britain 

back into European issues and be supportive of Germany was worth any internal 

criticism. For the diplomacy surrounding this issue, see William Langer, The 

Diplomacy of Imperialism, revised ed., New York: 1951, pp. 6. 

 99. Even when relations soured in the first decade of the 20th century, the 

Kaiser at times seemed baffled by the British. In an interview by the Daily Telegraph, 

William stated, “You English are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come 

over you that you are so completely given over to suspicions unworthy of a great 

nation? . . . I have said time after time, that I am a friend of England . . .” Interview 

with William II, The Daily Telegraph, October 28, 1908.

 100. The Prussian Constitution of 1849, adopted in the wake of the Revolutions 

of 1848, in article 44 had a provision which gave the Emperor a prized and carefully 

guarded power, the Kommandogewalt or the power of command over German 

military forces. 

 101. Tirpitz, like the American proponent of sea power, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 

had developed essentially the same theory of power for which Mahan is much 
90

better known. Like Mahan, he believed that great power status necessitated 

command of the sea and that the only way to truly command the sea was through 

the possession of major fleets consisting of capital vessels like battleships and 

heavy cruisers. Conversely, reading Tirpitz’s plan makes one question whether 

the Admiral really understood Mahan’s theories. While Germans read Thayer’s 

classic work, The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783, Boston: Little Brown 

and Company, 1890, the writer who brought him to German audiences was Ernst 

von Halle, who wrote the book, Die Seemacht in der deutsche Geschichte. 

 102. The concept of England being a major adversary went beyond Tirpitz. 

Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, the Chancellor from 1894-1900, stated, 

“We must not expose ourselves to the danger of suffering the fate from England 

that Spain suffered from the United States. That the English are merely waiting for 

a chance to fall on us is clear.” Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, p. 656.

 103. Brigadier General Dr. Gunther Roth, “Operational Thinking of Schlieffen 

and Manstein,” in Development, Planning and Realization of Operational Conceptions 

in World Wars I & II, Miltärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, ed., Bonn: E. S. Mittler 

& Sohn, 1989, p. 7.

 104. Holger H. Gerwig, “The Prussian Model and Military Planning Today,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1998, p. 69.

 105. Charles White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische 

Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805, New York: Praeger Publications, 1989, pp. 28-55.

 106. Scharnhorst himself was an excellent example of how superior talent 

could have been squandered due to position and class. He was the son of a former 

Hanoverian noncommissioned officer who, after his military service, became a 

tenant farmer. The younger Scharnhorst received his military education at the 

nearby Castle of Count von Shaumburg-Lippe and then applied to Frederick 

Willhelm, King of Prussia, for a position in the Prussian Army. He subsequently 

was given the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and elevated to nobility, but he was an 

exception. See White, The Enlightened Soldier, pp. 2-10.

 107. Obviously the nobility felt their privilege and their opportunities were 

threatened by opening officer appointments to middle class citizenry. It was still 

too early for working class individuals to be considered for leadership roles. The 

objections of the nobility were two-fold: first, too much education could spoil the 

character of the officer; second, a spiritual bond of sorts existed between the noble 

classes and the sovereign, whom the officer corps was obliged to protect. Both 

too much education or the intrusion of middle class citizens had the potential of 

destroying this bond with supposed disastrous consequences. 

 108. As noted by one author, “As late as 1911 the Army took 94 percent of 

its recruits from the conservative, loyal countryside and only 6 percent from 

urban industrial centers.” See Holger Herwig, “The Prussian Model and Military 

Planning Today,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring, 1998, p. 68. 

 109. Steven E Clemente, For King and Kaiser: The Making of the Prussian Army 

Officer, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 176. Note, however, that the full 
91

content or the syllabus of this class is unknown. Thus, while a strategy class is a 

part of the curriculum, the actual content is not at all clear. 

 110. Actually Scharnhorst’s recognition of Clausewitz’s talents predated the 

founding of what became known as the Kriegsakademie. Scharnhorst’s short-lived 

academy for promising young officers, which opened in 1804 and only stayed in 

existence until its dissolution in 1806, had among its students Lieutenant Carl von 

Clausewitz. 

 111. An old standard but still valid book on this period is William O. Shanahan’s

Prussian Military Reforms—1786-1813, New York: Columbia University Press, 

1945.

 112. T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and the General Staff, 

1807-1945, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Inc, 1977, p. 25.

 113. Oberst i.G. Christain O. E. Millotat, Understanding the Prussian-German 

General Staff System, Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, p. 

28.

 114. According to one well-known military scholar, Scharnhorst’s ideas 

impacted far beyond the Prussian Army. In his well-known study, The Soldier and 

the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, New York: Vintage Books, 

1957, p. 31, Samuel P. Huntington states the reforms promoted by Scharnhorst, 

Gneisenau, Grolmann, and the Prussian Military Commission “mark the true 

beginning of military professionalism in the west . . . To Prussia goes the distinction 

of originating the Professional officer.”

 115. This translated curriculum table was taken from Clemente, For King and 

Kaiser: The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, p. 176. 

 116. Millotat, Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System, p. 28.

 117. Clemente, For King and Kaiser: The Making of a Prussian Army Officer, p.

xiii. The fact that public education in Germany had improved dramatically since 

the founding of the General War School is overlooked by the author of this study. 

Thus the assertion that the army depended on German schools for a broad public 

education may well be recognition of the improvement in public education in 

Germany, rather than a dilution of the war college curriculum.

118. Clemente, For King and Kaiser: The Making of a Prussian Army Officer, pp. 

176-177.

119. A. Kuhn, Major, ausser Dienst, Die Aufnahme-Püufung fur die KriegsAkademie: Ein Hülfsmittel zur Vorbereitung fur die Kriegs=Akademie und für die 

militärische Uebungs=Reisen, Berlin: Liebelichen Buchhandlung, 1898.

120. Königliche Hofbuchhandlung, Lehrordnung der Königlichen Kriegsakademie, 

Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mitler und Sohn, 1903. The curriculum included in the 1910 

edition of the same book, only 4 short years before the outbreak of World War I, 

shows again that tactics, taught all 3 years, dominates in terms of the level of war. 

Königliche Hofbuchhandlung, Lehrordnung der Königlichen Kriegsakademie, Berlin: 

Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1910. 
92

 121. Holger H. Herwig, “The Making of Strategy: Rulers States and Wars,” 

p. 242.

 122. Holger H. Herwig, “The Prussian Model and Military Planning Today,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1998, p. 69.

 123. Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of 

Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars, 

Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1986, pp. 196-198.

 124. Ibid.

 125. Delbrüch engaged in a “Federkrieg” with professionals from the General 

Staff from the 1890s until the end of World War I. Delbrüch found that military 

strategy and political strategy should be used in tandem and that the fixation in 

German circles on the battle of annihilation overlooked the fact that in some wars 

a strategy of exhausting and/or attriting the enemy had been used. As an amateur, 

a historian rather than a professional military officer, he was not well-accepted 

by the General Staff. See Antulio J. Echevarria, After Clausewitz: German Military 

Thinkers Before the Great War, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000, pp. 183-

188. 

 126. Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War 

College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the U.S Army War 

College, 1983. See, in particular, pp. 68-115.

 127. Ibid, p. 89. 

 128. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning, Providence 

RI: Berg Publishers, 1991, p. 9. 

 129. The modern reader should also remember that in his writings there is no 

mention of operational warfare, only tactics and strategy. For that matter, German 

writers in the post-Imperial era do not mention the operational level either. The 

term operational level of war is a recent addition to the military lexicon. Conversely, 

the literature of the period does mention campaigns. 

 130. Quoted by Colin S. Gray in “Why Strategy is Difficult,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, Spring 2003, No. 34, p. 83. He also stated, “Strategy is a system of 

expedients. It is more than a discipline; it is the transfer of knowledge to practical 

life . . .” See also Horst, Moltke: Leben und Werke in Selbstzeugnissen, Briefe, Schriften, 

Reden, p. 363.

 131. Herwig, “The Prussian Model and Military Planning Today,” p. 71.

 132. Note, however, that from 1871-88 as Moltke was Chief of the General 

Staff, planning for a possible war on two fronts varied with Russia occasionally 

being targeted as the most serious threat and thus the recipient of the initial attack. 

In Bismarck’s eyes, the major threat was France, but in the Army’s opinion, the 

greatest and growing threat was Russia. 

 133. The old standard on this plan is Gerhard Ritter’s, The Schlieffen Plan: 

Critique of a Myth, Andrew and Eva Wilson, trans., New York: Praeger, 1958. See 
93

also Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning, New York: Berg, 

1991. 

 134. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “An Infamous Legacy: Schlieffen’s Military 

Theories Revisited,” Army History: The Professional Bulletin of Army History, 

Summer-Fall, 2001, pp. 1-8.

 135. Although as noted by Holger Herwig, Vice Admiral Wilhelm Buchsel of 

the German Admiralty Staff demanded the creation of a strategy council of army 

and navy leaders to be chaired by the Emperor and to include the Chancellor. 

The object was to analyze the potential war with Britain and France. This 

proposal, however, was rejected since it could be regarded as an infringement 

on the Emperor’s Kommandogewalt. See Holger H. Herwig, “From Tirpitz Plan to 

Schlieffen Plan: Some Observations on German Military Planning,” The Journal of 

Strategic Studies, March 1986, p. 55.

 136. Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States 

Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 200-

201. See also Adolf Carlson, Joint Army-Navy Planning on the Eve of the First World 

War: Its Origins and Its Legacy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

1998. 

 137. Holger H. Herwig in his article, “Strategic Uncertainties of a NationState: Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918,” The Making of Strategy: Rulers States and War,

Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, eds., Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 249.

 138. This element of the defense debate is well-described by Herwig in 

“Strategic Uncertainties of a Nation-state: Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918,” pp. 246-

249.

 139. For the benefit of the nonhistorian, in the Second Reich the Chancellor 

was chosen by the Emperor and served at the Emperor’s pleasure. Unlike a prime 

minister, he was not the leader of the major party in parliament, rather he was 

responsible only to the crown. He had a responsibility to go before the Reichstag 

and present proposals, but his responsibility was to the crown alone. 

 140. Thus his oft quoted, though in part inaccurate comment, “It has never been 

my business to comment upon Grand strategy . . . . there never took place during 

my entire period in office a sort of war council at which politics were brought into 

the military for and against.”

 141. An excellent overview of the panic in the German military establishment 

over the encirclement of the German Empire and the increasing power of Germany’s 

adversaries can be found in Holger H. Herwig’s article, “Strategic uncertainties 

of a nation-state: Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918,” The Making of Strategy: Rulers, 

States and War, Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., 

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 257-263.

 142. Brigadier General Gunther Roth, “Operational Thinking of Schlieffen 

and Manstein,” Development, Planning, and Realization of Operational Conception 
94

in World Wars, Militargestrehtliches Forshulingsaust, ed., Bonn: E. S. Mottler & 

Sohn, 1989, p. 7.

 143. If anything, Hitler, in many respects, reversed the trend that had been 

established in the Imperial era by subordinating the General Staff officers and the 

old-line professional officers to his political will.

 144. The classic quote which summarizes the failure of too many senior 

imperial officers comes from Eric Ludendorff in 1918. As Operation MICHAEL 

was planned, Ludendorff was irritated by a General Staff Officer who asked what 

the objective was of Operation MICHAEL—a part of the German spring offensive. 

The general retorted, “I object to the word ‘strategy.’ We shall punch a hole in 

their line. For the rest, we shall see.” Holger H. Herweg, “The Prussian Model and 

Military Planning Today,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1998, p. 72. 

 145. This statement is largely true although there were some of the German 

officer corps who did read and appreciate Clausewitz. For example, on the eve 

of World War II General der Artillerie Horst von Metzsch published a 48-page 

pamphlet entitled Clausewitz Katechismus, which highlighted some of the key 

teachings of Clausewitz but in classic Catechism style. See Horst von Metzsch, 

General der Artillerie, Clausewitz Katechismus, Berlin-Carlottenburg: Bucholz und 

Weisswange Verlagsbuchandlung, editions of 1937 or 1941.

 146. Brigadier General Dr. Gunther Roth, “Operational Thinking of Schlieffen 

and Manstein” in Development, Planning and Realization of Operational Conceptions 

in World Wars, Miltärgeschichliches Forschungamt, ed., Bonn: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 

1989, p. 7.

 147. Ibid, p. 9.

 148. The writer refers to the successful joint operation against the Russian 

island of Oesel, Dago and Moon, largely unknown in the west but well-described 

by Dr. Rich Di Nardo in an excellent paper given at the Annual Conference of the 

Society of Military History at Knoxville, Tennessee, May 1-4, 2003.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SAMUEL J. NEWLAND is the holder of the General Colin Powell 

Chair of Military and Strategic Studies and Professor of Military 

Education at the U.S. Army War College. Prior to joining the 

faculty of the U.S. Army War College, he was a Strategic Research 

Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute. He recently returned to 

Carlisle from the College of International and Strategic Studies at 

the George C. Marshall Institute in Garmisch, Germany, where he 

was a visiting professor. A modern German historian and a modern 

military historian, to include the American military experience, he 

is the author of numerous publications on military history. Among 

his publications are a book, Cossacks in the German Army, 1941-1945, 

two books on the History of the Militia and National Guard in 

Pennsylvania, and the lead chapter for the recent commemorative 

volume entitled The D-Day Companion, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 

2004. Dr. Newland received his B.A. from Evangel College, M.A. 

from Pittsburg State University, and his M.Phil. and Ph.D. from the 

University of Kansas.