Colloquium Brief

U.S. Army War College,

University of Pittsburgh, 

Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies

DRUG TRAFFICKING, VIOLENCE, AND INSTABILITY

IN MEXICO, COLOMBIA, AND THE CARIBBEAN:

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

KEY INSIGHTS:

•	 The relationships between powerful criminal groups and states are complex and create transnational issues of

corruption and the production, transportation, marketing, and consumption of illegal products and services that

have national security implications for most states in the Western Hemisphere.

•	 The Colombian government has successfully responded to challenges from the FARC and several criminal groups,

but the challengers have responded with adaptations that ensure their survival. The persistence of these security

challenges continue to cause concern over the intersection of drugs and terror.

•	 Mexico has experienced an increase in organized criminal violence in several of its states; much of the violence is

associated with drug trafficking and associated illegal activity. Counterintuitively, some areas sustain high levels of

illegal activity without high levels of violence if the state retains sufficient enforcement capacity or cooperates with

organized crime.

•	 U.S. drug policy has had enormous effect on the Mexican drug trade. However, the solution to organized crime

and related violence will ultimately rely on Mexican federal, state, and community ability to understand the issues

and more effectively combat corruption and gangs, while providing more effective governance and economic

opportunities for its citizens.

•	 The small Caribbean nations are experiencing increases in drug trafficking and related violence, but are even less

equipped than their larger neighbors to combat these problems; lack of U.S. support has created a vacuum that is

being filled by Cuba and Venezuela.

•	 Consistently identified issues were: (1) the region’s need to address the intersection of corruption and violence, (2)

the unexpected and unintended consequences of national and international policies, and (3) the operational issues

surrounding the concepts of decriminalization, tolerance of criminal activity, tough stands against criminal activity,

and improving governmental systems.

Introduction.

	 The University of Pittsburgh Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, the Graduate School of Public

and International Affairs, the University Center for International Studies, the Center for Latin American Studies, the Office of the

Provost, and the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, conducted a colloquium at the University of Pittsburgh campus

on October 28-30, 2009, entitled “Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability in Mexico, Colombia, and the Caribbean: Implications

for U.S. National Security.” Key note speakers were: (1) Bruce Bagley, Professor and Chair, Department of International Studies,

University of Miami and Director, University of Miami’s Center of Latin American Studies (CLAS), who addressed “What Can the

Mexican State Do to Combat Organized Crime?” and (2) Jorge Chabat, Professor/Investigator, Centro de Investigación y Docencia

Económicas (CIDE), who discussed “The Drug War in Mexico: Dilemmas and Options.” This colloquium was attended by over

150 government officials, academic experts, think tank members, U.S. military, and U.S. and international students and faculty.

The conference focused on a national security challenge which has to this point been contained but is taking dramatically

new and dangerous forms. The emergence of new criminal groups in Colombia, increased violence in Mexico, and the possible

spread of these criminal activities to Cuba and other Caribbean islands, create new instabilities which could result in one or

more strategic shocks, in an area which is both the backyard and soft underbelly of the United States. Even if this does not

Dallas D. Owens

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occur, the growing violence and instability in Mexico and the

Caribbean will clearly demand greater attention in the future.

Until now, Mexico has been seen as simply a border problem.

As the trafficking organizations continue to defy authorities,

undermine governance, and escalate violence, Mexico has

become much more of a national security challenge. Several

Caribbean states could fall into the same category. This

conference offered an important opportunity to assess these

threats, and to consider what can be done to counter them.

Panel I: Setting the Scene: Globalization, Transnational 

Threats, and Borders.

	 The first panel introduced the problem of criminal

groups in Latin America and their relationship with the

state. Panel members and their presentation topics included:

(1) Phil Williams, Director, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for

International Security Studies, Chair and Discussant; (2) Vanda

Felbab-Brown, Fellow, Brookings Institute, “Drugs, Violence

and Instability: A Global Perspective,” and Nate Freier, Senior

Fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS; Visiting

Research Professor at the United States Army’s Peacekeeping

and Stability Operations Institute, “The Changing Strategic

Environment and Strategic Shocks.”

	 The first two presenters challenged the conventional views

of a state’s ability to defeat criminal groups and to restore

stability. They argued for a much more complex relationship.

The first panelist argued that the rise of violence in Mexico,

for example, has been driven in part by the end of the oneparty state, and its cooperation with criminal groups. Further

successes against criminal groups have created “vacancy

chains,” gaps in criminal group leadership and organization

that have produced even more instability. Similarly, the

second panelist made the case for the contribution to stability

that criminal groups often bring. In the absence of a strong

state, criminal groups can provide public goods that would

otherwise be lacking, and serve not just as a target of the state,

but as competition. The final panelist examined these issues

from the U.S. perspective, discussing the new and varied

challenges the United States faces from both state and nonstate

actors. He concluded by proposing several possible “strategic

shocks” that the United States needs to be concerned about,

all of which revolve around instability rather than interstate

warfare.

Several participants discussed the problems of dealing

with both strong criminal groups and weak states. If criminal

groups behave like states, one asked, should the United States

treat them as states? Panelists agreed that this needed to be

examined on a case by case basis, but they could conceive of

such situations. Groups in Afghanistan and Myanmar (Burma)

were discussed as examples where the support of criminal

groups might be consistent with U.S. national interests, and

one panelist argued that the United States would need to set

aside moral concerns to achieve pragmatic results. A second

participant asked how states rebound when their decline

results in the shift of political support to state-like criminal

groups. One suggestion was that state strength was not the key

variable, but state presence instead. While security is primary,

the perception of state presence also needs to be positive. If

peoples’ perception of state presence is primarily punitive,

political support will continue to fade.

Panel II: Perspectives on Drugs, Violence, and Stability in 

Colombia.

	 The second panel focused on Colombia and looked for

solutions to its long-running conflict. The panel consisted of:

(1) Steve Metz, Research Professor and Chairman, Regional

Strategy Department, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Chair and Discussant; (2) Roman Ortiz, Grupo

Triarius, “FARC: Insurgents, Drug Traffickers?” (3) Gustavo

Duncan, Doctoral Candidate, Northwestern University, “The

Paramilitaries in Colombia”; and (4) Andres Saenz, Grupo

Triarius, “Drug Trafficking Organizations: Current Trends

and Developments.”

	 The chair framed the problem by noting that the United

States was in the process of relearning irregular warfare, but

relying primarily on Cold War case studies. Contemporary

Colombia, he argued, might be more paradigmatically

important. The panelists then examined the FARC, Colombian

paramilitaries, and Colombian drug trafficking organizations.

Each poses unique challenges to the Colombian state, and play

a specific role in the panoply of criminal groups. The FARC has

survived,despite success by the Colombianmilitary, by shifting

its focus from the peasant class and Marxism to become a more

rural, Bolivarian group with increased international ties. The

presenter did not see the FARC as remaining a threat to the

Colombian state, but neither did he see it at risk of elimination.

The second panelist discussed the role that paramilitary

groups at times play by bringing public goods to parts of the

nation. He suggested that the state had neither the political

capital nor the capability to tax and regulate the dominant

illicit economy, consequently, paramilitary groups exploit the

black market. For Colombia to regain control, he concluded, it

must create an order it can regulate.

The final panelist analyzed the range of drug trafficking

organizations and their relationships with the FARC and

each other. He explained that these groups no longer seek

to dominate all facets of the drug trade, but focus on specific

steps. Their increased coordination and cooperation pose a

rising threat to the state, requiring substantial resources and a

holistic approach to solve the problem.

	 A conference participant inquired about evidence for a

growing FARC-Venezuela relationship. The panelist pointed

to not only public statements by President Chavez, but military

intelligence captured from rebels, especially Venezuelan made

weapons found in rebel camps. A second participant inquired

as to whether recent Colombian military successes against

the FARC necessitated continued U.S. support. The response

noted that even with the greatly shortened life span of criminal

leaders, there was enough demand side pressure to repopulate

both the FARC and other drug trafficking organizations. The

panelist then argued that U.S. support needed to continue

because of the intersection of drugs and terror. However, he

also suggested that expectations need to be moderated, and

that narcoterror could not be defeated, only managed.

Panel III and IV: Perspectives on Drug Trafficking and 

Stability in Mexico.

	 The third and fourth panels both analyzed the growing

violence and instability in Mexico. Members of Panel 3 were:

(1) Kathleen DeWalt, Director, Center for Latin American

Studies and Professor of Anthropology and Public Health,
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University of Pittsburgh, Chair and Discussant; (2) Carlos

Flores, Associate Professor at the Center for Research and

Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS), “Drug

Trafficking, Violence, Corruption, and Democracy in Mexico”;

(3) John Sullivan, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for

Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST); Lieutenant, Los

Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Emergency Operations Bureau,

“Post-Modern Social Banditry: Criminal Violence or Criminal

Insurgency?” and (4) Angelica Duran, Doctoral Candidate,

Brown University, “Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug

Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets.” Panel 4

consisted of: (1) Dallas Owens, Chairman, Strategic Research

and Analysis Department, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, Chair and Discussant; (2) Luis Astorga,

Researcher, Institute of Social Research of the National

Autonomous University of Mexico, “Mexico: Drug Trafficking,

Violence, and Political Change”; Paul Kan, Associate Professor

of National Security Studies, U.S. Army War College, “Why

Mexico is not Colombia”; and Louis Casale, Senior Intelligence

Analyst, National Drug Intelligence Center, SPU, “Mexican

Drug Trafficking Organization Presence in the United States

and Their Ties to U.S. Based Gangs.”

	 The first panelist took up the idea of increasing violence as

a result of the breakdown of state control over organized crime.

With homicides increasing in some states at massive rates, he

wondered when the threshold of violence would be reached

that would lead to an erosion of governance. He concluded by

noting that even the Mexican Army would be unable to solve

the violence problem without serious reforms at the highest

levels of government. The second panelist then examined the

nature of the violence itself, and whether it should be classified

as criminal violence or a criminal insurgency. He saw evidence

of both; at times groups behave as standard criminal elements,

but in other cases openly challenging the legitimacy of the

government. This led to a problem that was not strictly

military, but social, as the groups began to engage in socially

attractive crime. The final panelist expanded on the alternative

view by examining the connection between illegality and

violence, and why, in some cases, illegality flourishes with

relatively low violence. She saw that illegal markets could

foster low violence if the state operated as a single protector

and enforcer. As the state lost its monopoly, either by refusing

to cooperate with (perhaps competing with) organized crime

or through diminished capacity, violence and instability rose

markedly.

The fourth panel continued the analysis of Mexican drug

violence, with the first panelist providing a history of state

involvement in drug trafficking. He argued that U.S. drug

policy has had an enormous, and often damaging, effect on

the scale of the Mexican drug trade. He also noted that Mexico

itself is not a large drug consumer, but the transit of drugs

to the U.S. market nonetheless draws in up to half a million

people. The next panelist then warned against the danger of

comparing Mexico and Colombia too closely, suggesting that

while Colombia had been fighting a war against the FARC, in

Mexico the problem was one oflaw and order. Major challenges

to this problem were identified as both the limited capacity of

the Mexican state, as well as the hybrid nature of Mexico’s

drug problem as a source of both drugs and demand, requiring

a more complex and multifaceted response. The final panelist

then described Mexican drug organizations’ connections to

U.S. street gangs, and the extent of their penetration.

Several participants asked about the militarization of the

Mexican drug war. One panelist suggested that the alternative

to militarization had to be community based, perhaps

raising public outrage. The government could enable this

process, but the panelists’ opinions differed as to what extent.

Another panelist saw a national security state as the likeliest

outcome, as the government lacked the political will or time

to forge a political solution. A third participant noted that the

disaggregation of illegality and violence suggested a tradeoff

between corruption and violence. The other panelists agreed,

saying that the theory was not normatively appealing, but that

perhaps it could help address violence while later mitigating

the resulting corruption. A number of participants also

quizzed the panel about the activity of criminal organizations

in the United States. Panelists reported that the groups were

definitely transnational and had links into Canada; that there

was increasing cooperation with U.S. gangs that was likely to

continue to grow; and that while cooperation with terrorist

groups was certainly possible, there was as yet no evidence of

such links.

Panel V: Perspectives on the Caribbean.

	 The fifth panel addressed the problems of drugs and

violence in the Caribbean. Panelists included: (1) Taylor

Seybolt, Director, Ford Institute for Human Security, Chair

and Discussant; (2) Lilian Bobea, Latin American Social Science

Faculty, Santo Domingo, “Private Vices, Without Public

Benefit: The Dominican State versus Organized Crime”; (3)

Desmond Arias, Associate Professor of Political Science, John

Jay College of Criminal Justice, “The Structure of Criminal

Organizations in Kingston, Jamaica, and Rio de Janeiro,

Brazil”; and (4) Anthony Maingot, Professor Emeritus and

National Security Scholar-in-Residence, Florida International

University, “Sovereign Sensibilities and Small Caribbean State

Capacity in the Face of a Changed Geopolitical Environment.”

Panelists noted that the Caribbean has been the victim of

extremely imbalancedrelationships with theUnitedStates.One

panelist pointed out that the islands were a minor consumer of

drugs but a major transit point to the United States; with the

attendant increase in corruption and violence, the Caribbean

governments are ill-suited to combat it. The second panelist

described Caribbean government policies as being driven by

Cold War concerns for decades, leading to relative ignorance

of the drug problem, or the framing of it as a U.S. problem.

Both agreed on the immense difficulty experienced by the

regional governments in navigating the powerful influences of

both the U.S. Government and drug organizations. The third

panelist then discussed his work doing network analysis on

Jamaican and Brazilian gangs. He provided further evidence

for the recurring idea that the state plays a key role not only in

combating criminal organizations, but also in facilitating them.

He described evidence of substantial political organization

support for criminal networks, concluding that governments

need to understand these complex networks of criminal and

political support if they are to make progress in combating the

problem.

Many of the questions from the conference participants

asked the panelists to address what needs to be done, both by

local governments and the United States, given the complex

dynamics in the Caribbean. There was agreement that, despite

the impactofthe recentrecession,governmentsneedtomeetthe
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problem head on, especially in terms of rooting out corruption.

One panelist argued for the need to expand opportunity for

local citizens as opposed to increasing the strength of the

security services. Another discussed the role of Venezuela and

especially Cuba in supporting many of these states, and the

opinion that this support would continue regardless of the U.S.

view of Cuba and Venezuela. Others inquired as to the use

and utility of network analysis, specifically whether it implied

policy prescriptions. The panelist replied that above all, local

policymakers need to better understand the interconnected

nature of criminal organizations, and that more training was

needed for this purpose. These criminal organizations can only

be effectively combated once they are more fully understood.

Panel VI: Assessment and Responses.

The final panel was a round-table of U.S. officials who

offered their perspectives on the challenges of drugs, violence,

and instability in Mexico, Colombia, and the Caribbean that

were identified in the conference and how the United States

might respond more fully and effectively to the challenges.

The panel consisted of (1) William “Trey” G. Braun, III, (COL)

Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, Chair and Discussant; (2) Rita Koch (Joint Military

Information Support Command-USSOCOM), Agnes Schaefer

(RAND), L. Bradley Hittle, Office of National Drug Control

Policy (ONDCP) and Robert Mandel (Lewis & Clark College).

The panel attempted to summarize the broad themes

of the conference; the chair identified three core ideas: the

dichotomy between corruption and violence; the dangers

of unanticipated consequences of policies; and the difficulty

with effectively operationalizing policy, running the gamut

from decriminalization to state national security. Specific

recommendations by the panelists were varied. The first argued

that the United States had three specific priorities: organized

crime, migration, and terrorism. Addressing this range of

problems will require a long-term approach, with a focus on

reform and institution building. The second panelist analyzed

the situation from the local government point of view, noting

that the limiting factor is resources. An effective strategy will

have to prioritize challenges and initiatives, and work to build

political coalitions to secure the needed resources. The third

panelist considered the security challenge from the point of

view of the U.S. Department of Defense, explaining that a

key concern was local perceptions of criminal organizations.

Perceptions of the problem and support for the organizations

were important factors in developing a response, and the

United States needs to be fully aware of unique cultural

factors, especially in terms of coca growing, that affect public

perception. The final panelist discussed the overall problem in

terms of values, arguing that there are inherent tensions in any

policy, and no clear consensus in Latin America about what

should be done. The dilemma for the state is how to ensure

that steps to combat criminal organizations also improve the

lives of the population, since anti-narcotics policies often result

in the opposite effect.

	 Questions for the final panel focused substantially on

U.S. relationships with local governments. One panelist noted

that in the case of Mexico, it is perhaps the easiest example

to defend the necessity for U.S. aid policy because of the

synthesis of domestic and international threats. He concluded

that current initiatives were generally correct but the United

States needs to include the priority for institution building.

Other panelists focused on ensuring a coherent and credible

U.S. message regarding its drug policy. The United States can

only accomplish this by creating an effective partnership at all

levels and ensuring long-term resource flows to national, state,

and local governments.

Conclusion: The Way Ahead.

	 This colloquium demonstrated that government experts

fromacross thehemisphere, academics studying the region, and

policymakers from many countries understand the complexity

of drug trafficking, organized violence, and corruption issues

that pervade much of the hemisphere. Additionally, drug

consumption is increasing in many areas that were previously

noted solely for their production or trafficking activity. Longterm solutions cannot be successful if confined to single

countries or bilateral agreements. Though the issues are

hemispheric, each country has distinct perspectives about these

issues, and they require the unique application of common

solutions. Critical relationships that must be considered when

developing national strategies to address criminal and security

concerns posed by the drug trade include:

	 •	 The root causes of violence and the level of violence;

	 •	 The host state’s confrontation with, complicity with,

tolerance of, or stance against drug trade organizations;

	 •	 Relative political, economic, and military power of

participating state and nonstate actors;

	 •	 The positions taken by regional activist or power

states intervening as third party supporters for the state and

for drug organizations; and,

	 •	 Border control operations and their impact on

sovereignty issues and multistate relations.

	 Distinctions must be made between large countries,

such as Mexico and Colombia, and small countries, like any

of the Caribbean countries. Regional powers, like Brazil, and

countries with long-term activities, like Cuba, and more recent

activists, such as Venezuela, must be considered in, or may be

distinct parts of, plans to address the issues, especially those

that have cross-border operations. The problems of drug

trafficking, organized violence, and corruption have evolved

over many years; any solutions will require long-term plans

and investments to show results.

*****

	 The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position

of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,

or the U.S. Government. This colloquium brief is cleared for

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

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programs may be found on the Institute’s homepage at

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