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97–865 2006

S. HRG. 108–838

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA INVESTIGATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 14, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

ROBERT W. CHAMBERLIN, Republican Chief Counsel 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

GREGG ELIAS, Democratic General Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on May 14, 2003 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of Senator Allen ..................................................................................... 5

Statement of Senator Breaux ................................................................................. 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Statement of Senator Brownback ........................................................................... 32

Statement of Senator Hollings ............................................................................... 2

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3

Statement of Senator McCain ................................................................................. 1

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 37

Statement of Senator Snowe ................................................................................... 26

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

Statement of Senator Sununu ................................................................................ 3

Statement of Senator Wyden .................................................................................. 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4

WITNESSES

Gehman, Jr., Admiral Harold W., Chairman, Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

O’Keefe, Hon. Sean, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ................................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to: 

Hon. Sean O’Keefe ............................................................................................ 51

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. ..................................................................... 55

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to Hon. Sean 

O’Keefe .................................................................................................................. 55

(1)

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA INVESTIGATION 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 14, 2003

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today’s hearing is the second in 

a series of hearings to examine the causes of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. I welcome Administrator O’Keefe and Admiral 

Gehman and look forward to hearing from them on the status of 

the investigation, including the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board’s most recent recommendations and NASA’s plan to return 

the Space Shuttle flight program. 

It is extremely important that Congressional Oversight Committees have access to all critical information in this investigation, and 

I want to fully impress that fact on our witnesses. I repeat, it is 

extremely important that Congressional Oversight Committees 

have access to all critical information in this investigation. 

In addition to the Columbia accident, we will also discuss NASA 

funding concerns. I am greatly troubled over the increasing pattern 

of congressional earmarking, and we may learn that the funding directives to Members’ priority projects at the expense of NASA’s 

own funding priorities have led to grave consequences. 

Congressional earmarking of NASA funding increased from $24.7 

million for Fiscal Year 1998 to $167 million in Fiscal Year 2003, 

a 576 percent increase in NASA earmarks. Examples of such earmarking which have prevented NASA from allocating funding to 

programs that it considered to be most critical include $15.5 million for the Institute for Scientific Research in Fairmont, West Virginia, $7.6 million for hydrogen research being conducted by the 

Florida State University System, $2.25 million for the Life Sciences 

Building at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, $1.8 million for the construction of a Gulf of Maine Laboratory at the Gulf 

of Maine Aquarium Foundation, and $1.35 million for expansion of 

the Earth Science Hall at the Maryland Science Center in Baltimore, Maryland. These are just a few of the egregious earmarks 

that have little or nothing to do with NASA, or certainly its core 

mission. 

2

While the level of congressional earmarks has grown, NASA’s 

overall budget has remained relatively stable. As a result, NASA 

has been forced to do more with less money while facing deteriorating infrastructure and safety concerns. I would like to hear from 

Administrator O’Keefe and Admiral Gehman and learn their views 

on how this pork-barrel spending may have affected NASA operations, including the Space Shuttle Program. 

In addition, I am concerned that it appears that NASA tries to 

curry favor with a broad base of members by trying to ensure that 

programs affect as many states as possible, even when this may 

not be the most effective or productive use of resources. Even more 

remarkable is when NASA funds a $900,000 Computing Information and Communications Program for mobile, wireless, and 

broadband Internet capability that had been, according to NASA’s 

Fiscal Year 2003 operations plan, quote, ‘‘inadvertently dropped as 

an earmark,’’ unquote, from the 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Conference Report. I urge the Administrator to conduct a thorough review of all NASA’s funding plans to ensure they are oriented to 

meet the legitimate needs of NASA’s missions. 

Other important issues that need to be examined today include 

NASA’s culture and the concerns of NASA employees about Columbia’s safety, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and why 

it was not used to take on on-orbit images of the Columbia—we 

have heard conflicting stories on that particular aspect of the Columbia’s tragedy, and we would hope that will be cleared up; the 

impact of the Columbia accident on the construction of the International Space Station; the safety of the Soyuz, which is currently 

the only transport to and from the Space Station; and congressional 

access to privileged information from the CAIB investigation. 

I look forward to an informative hearing this morning and, 

again, thank the witnesses for appearing today. 

Senator Hollings? 

STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just 

file my prepared statement, with only this comment. 

The distinguished Chairman has just allowed that we at the congressional level expect to receive all statements and all materials. 

The Chairman more or less gives that command like he is still in 

the Navy, but that is not what has happened. As I understand, 

from the news reports, you have given confidentiality to those giving statements to make darn sure that the Congress does not receive all materials of the investigation. 

So point one, I am disturbed about the investigation itself, because we went through with this with Challenger. This accident 

looks like the same act, same scene, with no regard for safety for 

the Columbia. I will just leave it at that, and we will have some 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]

3

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

On February 1, America lost seven heroes. Today, the Committee, our witnesses, 

and NASA have the responsibility to learn from this tragedy so that we will not 

repeat the mistakes that led to this accident. 

Mr. Chairman, those of us who have been on this Committee for many years are 

experiencing a sense of deja vu. Some of the problems highlighted by the Challenger

accident are eerily present again. It seems that some of the lessons that we learned 

about quantifying risk and evaluating near-misses were learned and then forgotten 

in the ensuing years. 

For example, since the first Shuttle flights more than 20 years ago, pieces of the 

external tank’s insulating foam have come off during ascent to orbit many times. 

But the Shuttle’s tiles and reinforced carbon-carbon were not designed to absorb debris hits. NASA engineers issued waivers, then tried to eliminate foam shedding; 

but never fully succeeded. Last October, Atlantis shed a much larger piece than normal which struck the solid rocket booster. Yet, two flights later, not a single mention of foam trouble was made in Columbia’s ‘‘flight readiness review,’’ the vigorous 

pre-flight discussion of safety issues. 

While there is no question that we will continue to send humans to space, we 

must put everything else on the table. Today we begin at square one—how and why 

did the Columbia Accident happen and what does it mean? How does NASA deal 

with problems, including seemingly innocuous ones such as foam shedding that have 

such tragic consequences? What are the demands of space flight, and is NASA as 

an agency, or are we as a nation prepared to step up to them? 

We are not asking questions like these to find blame nor to wander from the path 

that the heroes of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo laid out before us. Rather, we want 

this hearing to begin to inform the larger questions that the Committee will need 

to address after Admiral Gehman and his colleagues have finished their report. 

How do we go about fulfilling the charter that John F. Kennedy originally laid 

out for us, to do these things because they are hard, not easy. For too long, we have 

avoided dealing with the hard questions about the future of space. We want today’s 

hearing to begin take us to a place from where we can see our way forward into 

space, not backward, perhaps more clearly than we have ever seen this distance before. 

Thank you Mr. O’Keefe and Admiral Gehman for being with us today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Sununu? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Administrator O’Keefe and Admiral Gehman. I am 

looking forward to the testimony. I know there has been a tremendous amount of work done, and I think, at the very least, we owe 

a great deal of thanks to all of the personnel that have been on the 

ground, volunteers—I mean, literally thousands of them working 

hours and hours and hours to make sure that, to the best of our 

ability, we have as much material as possible to draw sound conclusions from through the investigation. So welcome, and I look forward to your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wyden? 

STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for their 

cooperation. There are a number of areas I want to explore this 

morning. One involves the preliminary recommendations that have 

been received from the Accident Investigation Board. There are two 

preliminary recommendations, one calls for the comprehensive inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
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spection plan to determine the structural integrity of the reinforced 

carbon-carbon system components, and the second is to modify 

NASA’s agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to use satellites to make on-orbit imaging for each Shuttle flight 

a standard requirement. 

When I learned about these two recommendations, and I recognize these are both, preliminary recommendations, what really 

struck me is, ‘‘Why were these recommendations not put in place 

prior to the tragedy?’’ I think this would be an area that I would 

want to explore with you, Administrator O’Keefe, because you just 

say to yourself, it seems really tragic that current inspection techniques are not adequate to assess the structural integrity of the reinforced carbon-carbon supporting structure and attaching hardware. And I think my questions in this area would be twofold. One, 

why was it not done before the tragedy? And second, what is being 

done currently to implement the recommendations? 

The other area, Mr. Chairman, that I want to look at is this 

question of the way technical analyses are used by the agency. Of 

course, the concern here, as has been reported widely in the press, 

is that NASA managers refused to seek the photographs of the 

damaged Shuttle, and the engineers were making pleas that it be 

done so. I recognize this deals with the memorandum that you all 

sent to the Committee, but I think I would like to explore this some 

more, and I will be asking about that, Administrator O’Keefe. 

Mr. Chairman, I am glad you are doing this. To me, there really 

is not anything more important than the oversight function of the 

United States Congress, and I appreciate the fact that you are 

bringing us here on a host of the key issues to look at these matters. I look forward to our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Wyden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

Today the Committee will hear from Admiral Gehman, who by all accounts is 

leading a thorough and objective investigation of the Columbia tragedy of February 

1. In my view, it is important that Congress evaluate the findings of the Admiral’s 

investigation as thoroughly and objectively as he has conducted it. 

The Economist recently reported that ‘‘NASA spends the lion’s share of its $15 billion annual budget on manned spaceflight,’’ and then asked the question ‘‘Should 

it?’’ I believe that now is the time to reexamine the nation’s mission in space and 

perhaps reallocate our resources. In the joint House and Senate hearing on the 

Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy on February 12, I told NASA Administrator Sean 

O’Keefe that I personally believed more unmanned space flights would guarantee 

the most efficient use of resources. In my view, it is time to ask whether research 

projects currently within the space shuttle program can be conducted efficiently and 

effectively on an unmanned vehicle. In addition, now is the time to make sure that 

manned space flights are safer and more efficient as well. While we are here today 

to discuss the accident investigation, we must keep in mind the broader picture and 

think about establishing a new course for the future of our space program. We owe 

the men and women of the Space Shuttle Columbia that much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Allen?

5

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. 

And, Administrator O’Keefe and Admiral Gehman, thank you for 

appearing before this Committee. And, more importantly, I want to 

commend you for your tireless, your honest, and your open efforts 

in the last three-and-a-half months since this disaster occurred. 

Briefly, I would like to make three points. First, Admiral 

Gehman and Administrator O’Keefe, I think you all have done an 

outstanding job in responding to the concerns of Congress and responding to our concerns insofar as the investigation Board and its 

independence from NASA. When one looks at this tragedy compared to that of the Challenger, the Columbia investigation, in my 

view, is certainly more expeditious and certainly more forthright; 

not to criticize the other, but I think you have made a substantial, 

significant, and noticeable improvement in that openness, forthrightness, and the speed in which you are sharing that information 

and getting on it. I think that those efforts are helping us, and you 

are to find the underlying and contributing causes of this tragedy. 

Secondly, I want to echo and underscore previous comments 

about NASA’s human space flight program. Virtually every aspect 

of NASA depends on the success of the Shuttle and the human 

space flight program. Generally, I look at space flight as a means 

to a greater end, which is research and discovery and exploration, 

and I know the brave crew of the Columbia engaged in a wide variety of scientific research; in fact, research that only could be done 

in space. I truly believe that if anything good can come out of this 

tragedy, it would be a reinvigorated focus on NASA and its primary 

mission of scientific research that actually benefits people here, life 

here on this planet. Some of the comments of the Chairman, in my 

view, to the extent you end up funding extraneous matters that are 

not the primary focus of NASA, it diminishes that capability. 

Now, finally and thirdly, I have previously raised concerns about 

NASA in the area of one of its primary functions, which is aeronautics, and also, insofar as space is concerned, the advancements 

in technology; specifically, embracing some of the advancements in 

nanotechnology, that I know Senator Wyden shares my views on, 

as well as automation and robotics that could potentially minimize 

the risks associated with human space flight. I am interested in 

learning any specific areas where NASA is embracing some of these 

advancements in automation and robotics, which I believe are essential for us here in Congress, as well as NASA, to work together 

to get that right balance of humans, as well as the advancements 

in robotics and automation to function in these scientific research 

projects that are done in space. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing, and 

thank both gentlemen for your leadership. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Breaux?

6

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,

U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Very briefly, I think that it is good that we are having this hearing. Out of the tragedy of Columbia, hopefully, can come some 

good, and hopefully the good will be an assessment of where we are 

and where we need to be, what steps need to be taken to make 

sure that the launch vehicles for future flights are safe and dependable. And I think that hopefully we can start focusing in on 

what we need to do to meet the needs of the future after we determine the reasons for the accident itself. 

One of the things that has given me great concern is that there 

is no replacement vehicle for the Space Shuttle. Not only is there 

not a replacement vehicle, there is not even anything on the drawing Board. And if somebody came to the Administrator tomorrow 

with the best designs for a new vehicle, it would take a substantial 

amount of time to put that vehicle into construction and, ultimately, into use. I mean, these are 15-, 20-year projects, at the 

very least. And right now I think the failure of all of us is that we 

have not made preparation for what is going to come after the 

Shuttle, and it’s not a one-week proposition; it’s a 15-, 20-year 

proposition. And right now there is nothing on the drawing Boards, 

and I think there is probably a lot of fault to go around for all of 

us as to why that is the situation. 

But we thank our witnesses this morning. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Breaux follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN B. BREAUX, U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA

The future of space flight will be composed of many things, including a vehicle 

we trust, a program that makes sense and has a clear and undeniable purpose, and 

an institution we think is designed to take on the challenges of the future. 

NASA was originally designed to take on a single challenge, single-mindedly, and 

work until it was achieved. Since then, NASA has taken on many other challenges 

that compete for NASA priority and compete for funding in the national debate 

about space. 

While we have seen steady progress in some areas of space—including the marvels of the Hubble and our recent visits to the planets Jupiter and Mars—we have 

seen many missteps in the human space program, particularly in attempts to generate a second generation of reusable launch and service technologies. Now, with the 

loss of Columbia, we are far behind in these efforts, with no clear agenda forward 

that we can see. 

Today is a stage-setting hearing. We are anxious to hear the views of Admiral 

Gehman about the accident he’s been examining, and to hear Mr. O’Keefe’s response. And we are anxious to determine what happened and what it means, how 

fast we can recover, and, at the end of process that has yet to have begun, where 

we are going. 

For too long we have had a national program in space, but not a national commitment to space flight. The accident that occurred last February is not the fault of 

any single individual—it is the fault of anyone who did not contribute their best to 

this program that a very few, our astronaut heroes, commit their lives to and others 

commit their careers to. 

Mr. Chairman, I think the future looks different from the past, but I cannot today 

tell you how: A different vehicle; a different ambition; a different way of doing business. Today is our first attempt to visit these questions at a time I believe will be 

seen as a turning point in the future of space. Let us get on with the debate, because our space program has been waiting a very long time for this discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Breaux. 

7

I want to thank Administrator O’Keefe and Admiral Gehman for 

their outstanding work. We will have some tough questions, and I 

hope we can have some meaningful exchanges. But none of that, 

I believe, will diminish the respect and appreciation that we have 

for both of you and your service to this Nation. We thank you. 

Administrator O’Keefe, begin with you, please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN O’KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR,

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of 

the Committee. 

Much has happened, I guess, since we last had an opportunity, 

February 12th, for this Committee and the Joint Committee with 

the House Science Committee, to discuss the specific aspects of the 

Columbia tragedy. 

First and foremost, over the course of the six weeks after the 

tragedy, I have personally attended nine separate memorial services and every funeral, which—I am still stunned, I think, by the 

extraordinary effort that the Air Force, and the Navy, particularly, 

went to render full honors to all of the members of the crew of Columbia. It was an extraordinary effort, and I think it honored and 

respected their memory in an extraordinary way. 

The recovery effort that occurred over the course of the last 100 

days was equally impressive and one that I do not think anybody 

expected we would recover much more than about 10 percent of the 

orbiter. Instead, over the course of that time, better than 20,000 

people in 200 different federal, state, and local agencies and departments from the State of Texas, State of Louisiana, the various 

communities, as well as the Federal Government, conducted the 

most impressive interagency, intergovernmental recovery effort 

that has ever been recorded. And, in the course of that time, there 

was no less than about 6,000 people in the East Texas/West Louisiana area that were engaged actively every single day in working 

through an area that is depicted on this particular chart, from a 

little southeast of Dallas, Texas, into Vernon Parish in Louisiana, 

that is the equivalent of—250 miles and about ten miles wide—this 

is the equivalent, in acreage, to the size of the State of Rhode Island. And the teams from NASA, the U.S. Forest Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and countless state and local agencies and departments literally walked every single acre of that area 

and recovered now what is the better part of about 40 percent of 

the orbiter and what is equivalent to about 83,000 tons of the orbiter itself, which has now been shipped to the Kennedy Space 

Center. 

Our activities in that area demonstrate, I think, some of the 

most remarkable efforts at interagency cooperation that is a model 

for how that cooperative effort can be conducted in pursuit of a 

common objective in ways that there were absolutely no—and 

every single trip I made to the area was stunned to see that there 

were absolutely no conflicts between and among agencies, between 

state and local officials. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency conducted the primary coordination of that effort, but it 

was one that required little cooperative assistance or instigation on 

their part. It was extremely well-handled and one that we are exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
8

tremely proud of and thankful to the Governor of the State of Louisiana and the Governor of the State of Texas for their extraordinary contributions, as well as cooperation, as we worked through 

this. 

This particular land area, I think, is—and, I guess, in the category of remarkable developments, as well—is occupied by about 

400,000 citizens in a stunningly—inasmuch as this was tragic and 

horrific for the loss of seven very important lives, it is amazing that 

there were no other collateral-damage efforts as a result of it. No 

one else was injured, all of the claims have been very, very minor 

in dealing with these issues. But an awful lot of debris was recovered, and the wreckage itself has been, again, now reassembled, in 

large measure, at the Kennedy Space Center, which is informing 

the investigation in ways that we are exceeding our expectations 

in many respects. I will certainly defer to Admiral Gehman on this 

commentary on that point. 

As it pertains to the cooperation with the Board itself, there is 

no element of what they may desire, require, or need that we have 

denied. And, indeed, our effort has been to cooperate with the 

Board on each and every issue that is necessary in order to reach 

a common objective, which is to determine the truth, find the facts 

and the evidence to support exactly what happened and how we 

may go about the process of fixing it and return to flight safely as 

soon as we can. 

In that regard, the return-to-flight efforts that we have engaged 

in is, rather than wait for the final report to be released, as Senator Breaux alluded, and Senator Wyden, as well, there are a series of recommendations that the Board has released as findings 

and recommendations thereafter that we are beginning to implement now rather than waiting for that activity to be in its totality. 

Our effort is to follow the better than nine separate public hearings 

that have been conducted, as well as the public commentary that 

has been offered by the Board, in order to inform the kind of approaches we need to take to return to flight expeditiously, but safely in doing so. So there is a range of different recommendations 

and findings that they have come up with that we are beginning 

now to implement, and we will continue throughout the course of 

their activity to engage in that activity as rapidly as we possibly 

can. 

Finally, I do want to thank the Board members for their diligence, their literally six/seven-day-a-week activity that they have 

conducted for the past 100 days. They were appointed and assembled on the very first day of the accident, and have been unceasing 

in their efforts since then to find the truth and to find the evidence 

to support what happened on that day so we may make those corrections and move on to safe flight again. 

In particular, I want to thank Admiral Gehman, who responded 

to my call hours after that horrific accident and pulled him out of 

retirement—blissful, I think, retirement—in which he certainly had 

lots of other things to do than return to public service in this situation. He has been relocated to Houston, Texas, for the entire threemonth period since that time and has conducted what I think is a 

very thorough effort to date at this point. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

9

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Keefe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN O’KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee with Admiral Gehman to discuss our ongoing efforts to 

honor the solemn pledge we have made to the families of the crew of Columbia and 

to the American people. That pledge is that we will find out what caused the loss 

of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew, correct what problems we find, and 

safely continue with the important work in space that motivated the Columbia astronauts and inspired millions throughout the world. 

Much has happened since I appeared before this Committee and the House Committee on Science at a joint hearing on February 12, less than two weeks after the 

tragic accident. 

Most importantly, a grateful Nation has laid to rest with full honors six American 

heroes: Rick Husband, William McCool, Mike Anderson, Dave Brown, Kalpana 

Chawla and Laurel Clark. The people of the state of Israel also paid their final respects to Israel’s first astronaut, Ilan Ramon. We continue to be sensitive to, and 

supportive of, the needs of the astronauts’ families and will be at their side as long 

as they desire our support. 

We appreciate that the FY 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act included $50 million 

in funding to help pay for the costs of the recovery operation and accident investigation by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). We have established 

new accounting codes in the NASA financial system, titled Columbia Recovery and 

Investigations, to capture these costs. We are monitoring very closely the costs associated with this effort and we will ensure that Congress is kept apprised of our continued progress. 

I would like to thank the Committee for their expeditious enactment of the Columbia Orbiter Memorial Act which authorizes construction of a Memorial at Arlington National Cemetery in recognition of the STS–107 Columbia astronauts. In addition, NASA has established the NASA Family Assistant Fund which enables NASA 

employees to help provide for the families of the STS–107 crew and families of other 

NASA employees who have lost their lives while serving the Agency. 

NASA is deeply grateful for the support we have received during recovery operations from the men and women from the Department of Homeland Security, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Transportation Safety 

Board, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Park 

Service, Texas and Louisiana National Guard, State and local authorities, and private citizen volunteers who have helped us locate, document, and collect debris. In 

visiting with these folks, I can report to the Committee that the morale and commitment of the recovery team was an inspiration to me and to the entire NASA family. 

The outpouring of support from the local businesses, community leaders and the 

citizens of East Texas have especially humbled us. During the past three months 

there were approximately 5,700 personnel in Texas at any one time involved in the 

Shuttle material recovery. More than 20,000 people in all helped with this effort. 

The recovery operations, which stretched from San Francisco, California to Lafayette, Louisiana, are essentially complete. Nearly 85,000 pounds of debris have been 

recovered, representing approximately 38 percent of Columbia’s dry weight. Of the 

nearly 83,000 specific items recovered from the accident, more than 79,000 have 

been identified, with 762 of these coming from the left wing of the Orbiter. We are 

continuing to search some remote areas in western Texas, Utah and New Mexico. 

As of May 5, the Lufkin Operations Center had completed searches in all 169 

Texas counties that reported Shuttle material sightings. The Lufkin Center closed 

on May 10 and we have transitioned to a smaller scale Recovery Operations Center 

located at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. We are hoping that in the fall, 

when vegetation dies back, hunters and campers may find additional debris. In fact, 

directions for reporting any debris will be given to each hunter as he or she applies 

for licenses. 

I am saddened to note that one of the helicopters searching for debris from the 

Space Shuttle Columbia crashed in the Angelina National Forest in east Texas on 

March 27. Buzz Mier, the pilot and Charles Krenek, a Texas Forest Service Ranger

were killed in the crash, and three other crewmembers were injured. Our thoughts 

and prayers go out to the families of the helicopter crew members killed in the accident. 

10

Using video of Columbia’s re-entry provided by research institutions and helpful 

citizens, along with radar and telemetry data, we have identified several additional 

search areas in West Texas, Utah and New Mexico. To date, no material in these 

areas has been positively identified as coming from Columbia. 

NASA Cooperation With Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

The investigation of the CAIB is progressing. NASA recognizes the need for a 

credible and thoroughly independent inquiry and is fully cooperating with the 

Board. 

The Contingency Action Plan and Standing Investigation Board were activated 

within an hour after the Columbia accident. This standing Board was the result of 

the lessons learned from the Challenger accident in 1986, which indicated the importance of having a panel of qualified investigators ready to initiate work immediately following an accident. Subsequent to the Board’s formation, we received advice and counsel from Members of this Committee, as well as your colleagues in the 

House of Representatives and others, that the Board’s charter should include revisions to guarantee its complete independence in the investigation and to ensure that 

the investigation be as thorough as possible. NASA has been responsive to these 

suggestions and has moved expeditiously to make appropriate changes to the charter and to add members to the Board to expand its composition. 

More broadly, across our entire organization, NASA personnel are cooperating 

with the work of the CAIB. We continue to coordinate and categorize the collection 

of debris along the path of Columbia’s re-entry and reconstruct the orbiter at the 

Kennedy Space Center. We are collecting and providing the Board with integrated 

image analysis and data. We are conducting fault tree analyses to look at all possible causes of the accident that the Board will independently validate. 

In summary, the men and women of NASA fully understand and support the important work of the CAIB. We look forward to learning from and acting on the 

Board’s recommendations. 

Status of International Space Station and Hubble Space Telescope 

While waiting for plans to be made for their return to Earth, the ISS Expedition 

6 crew—Commander Ken Bowersox, Science Officer Donald Pettit, and Cosmonaut 

Flight Engineer Nikolai Budarin—continued to perform science and routine ISS 

maintenance on orbit. The Expedition 7 crew—Edward Lu and Yuri Malenchenko—

arrived at the ISS aboard the Soyuz early Monday, April 29. The Expedition 6 crew 

returned to Earth on May 3. 

In the absence of Shuttle support, NASA and the International Partners are addressing contingency requirements for the ISS for the near-and long-term. In order 

to keep the Expedition 7 and future crews safe, we must ensure that they have sufficient consumables, that the ISS can support the crew, and that the crew is able 

to return safely to Earth. 

Working closely with our International Partners, we have confirmed that the ISS 

has sufficient propellant to maintain nominal operations through at least the end 

of this calendar year. With the docking of the Progress re-supply spacecraft on February 4 (ISS Flight 10P), the crew has sufficient supplies to remain on the ISS 

through August without additional re-supply. The next Progress flight is scheduled 

for June. As we move beyond June, however, potable water becomes the constraining commodity. We are currently working closely with our Russian partner, 

Rosaviakosmos, to explore how best to address this issue on future ISS re-supply 

missions. 

All remaining U.S. manufactured International Space Station hardware for the 

Core Configuration has been delivered to the Kennedy Space Center and element 

ground processing is on schedule. The Node 2 module for the Space Station, built 

for NASA by the European Space Agency, will be delivered to the Kennedy Space 

Center by early this summer. Only one Space Shuttle mission to the Space Station 

in the critical path to U.S. Core Complete, STS–118, was scheduled to use Columbia. A revised U.S. Core Complete assembly schedule and subsequent deployment 

of international partner modules after installation of Node 2 will be confirmed when 

the Shuttle is ready to return to flight status. 

With respect to the Hubble Space Telescope, all of our remaining Shuttle Orbiters 

are capable of supporting any necessary servicing missions. Currently, the Hubble 

Space Telescope is performing well, and this robust observatory is in no immediate 

need of servicing. Should a delay in the planned November 2004 servicing mission 

occur that impacts the Telescope’s ability to perform its science mission, the Hubble 

can be placed in safe mode until a servicing mission can be arranged. 

11

Anticipating a Return to Flight 

We have begun prudent, initial planning efforts to prepare for ‘‘Return to Flight’’ 

in order to be ready to implement the findings of the CAIB. NASA’s Return to Flight 

analysis will look across the entire Space Shuttle Program to evaluate possible improvements in safety and flight operations in addition to implementing all of the 

recommendations of the Board. 

I have selected Dr. Michael A. Greenfield, the Associate Deputy Administrator for 

Technical Programs, to lead our Return to Flight activity along with William 

Readdy, our Associate Administrator for Space Flight. They will co-chair the newly 

formed Space Flight Leadership Council. The Council is composed of the Associate 

Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance, the Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space Station and Space Shuttle, and the four Space Flight 

Center Directors. The Council will review and assess each course of action recommended by the Return to Flight Planning Team and provide direction to the 

Space Shuttle program for implementation. The Return to Flight Planning Team is 

already working to incorporate the CAIB’s first two preliminary recommendations 

into the Return to Flight strategy. 

In the interest of assuring that NASA fully addresses each of the CAIB’s recommendations, I have asked Tom Stafford to lead a team that will provide an independent assessment of NASA’s strategy for implementing the CAIB’s recommendations. We are working to define the full membership of the team. 

I would also like to thank Admiral Gehman and the rest of the Board members 

for the thorough and diligent manner in which they are conducting their investigation. We are grateful for their efforts. We will make our human space flight program 

better and safer because of their work. 

As I stated earlier in my testimony, we still have a long road to travel until we 

can return the Shuttle to flight. The lessons of past accident investigations tell us 

that we have reached a critical juncture in the process of evidence gathering and 

analysis at which patience is absolutely required. I commend the Members of this 

Committee for their support of this vital investigation. We at NASA look forward 

to continuing to work with the Committee to ensure that we learn from this accident, move forward to develop and utilize the capabilities that can best and safely 

help us achieve our national objectives in Aeronautics and Space Research and Exploration. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing. I look forward to responding to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Gehman? 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HAROLD W. GEHMAN, JR., 

CHAIRMAN, COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD 

Admiral GEHMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before you this morning. 

Rather than read my statement, I will just ask that it be entered 

into the minutes, and I will just——

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Admiral GEHMAN. Thank you very much. And I will just make 

a couple of brief points, and we can get on to business. 

First of all, I would like to introduce a couple of my fellow Board 

members, who are here today. Seated behind me is Mr. Steve Wallace, the Chief of the Aviation Safety Division of the FAA, and Dr. 

John Logsdon, from George Washington University, who is the 

Chair of the Space Policy Division. 

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome. 

Admiral GEHMAN. And also, the real strength behind my move 

to Houston, my wife, who’s sitting behind, me, too.——

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome, Mrs. Gehman. 

Admiral GEHMAN.—Members of the Committee——

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your service. 

12

Admiral GEHMAN.—Members of the Committee, I am delighted to 

appear before you and answer all of your questions fully and completely on any matter that you would like to hear about. I would 

have to say, however, that this report is not written. And I will be 

delighted to give you my personal opinion, but this is a Board of 

13 members, some of whom feel very strongly about some of these 

matters, and I do not want to overstate our progress or get ahead 

of my headlights here. Many of the things that you are interested 

in the Board has not decided upon. 

So I will have to caveat my answers by, when I know that the 

Board is comfortable with a subject or when the Board has not 

even addressed the subject yet, and give you my personal opinion. 

So if you will excuse me for that caveat right at the beginning, that 

I am delighted to give you an interim report, but we have not written this report yet. 

The intent of our Board is to provide you with an independent 

analysis and an independent review of not only this accident and 

what caused it, but also a deep, rich, complete, and intrusive inquiry into the entire manned space flight program. The goal of our 

Board is to hit the target. The target is determined by you, the 

Members of Congress. And in my dialogue with Members of Congress, which I have found very helpful, I have noticed that the target tends to move a little bit, which is perfectly all right. And it 

is that dialogue which allows me to adjust my aim, adjust my 

sights, so that we meet your requirements. 

Several Members of Congress have indicated to me that when my 

work is finished, yours is just beginning, and, ‘‘Please don’t hand 

me a half-baked loaf,’’ and I understand that. 

Our intent is to give you a complete, rich, deep review of this 

program, a review which has not been conducted before by any 

other Board. And in order to do that, we are using some old, wellproven, tested tools that get into the culture and the attitudes and 

the processes and the management and the climate that cannot be 

gotten into by any other way. 

Mr. Chairman, you, as a naval aviator, are very familiar with the 

safety-review process that is used in several agencies, and we have 

found, over the years, that that is a process that allows you to get 

a look at an organization that you cannot get by any other process. 

So you really have two investigations in one here. You have an 

accident investigation, what happened, that is being done in complete public, with full disclosure, public hearings, interim recommendations, lots of press conferences, plenty of oversight; and 

then we have a safety investigation, which is being conducted in 

accordance with procedures that have been set up by several agencies in the Executive Branch, which allows you to get the kind of 

look that you cannot get any other way. It is the opinion of the 

Board that that will allow us to write a report which will be of aid 

to Congress in a way that no other review of NASA has ever given 

you before, and it cannot be done any other way, in our opinion. 

The Board is fully aware of the oversight responsibilities of Congress. We are fully aware of your requirements. And we are meeting right now, our staffs are meeting right now, to find a way to 

fully meet all of your requirements in some fashion or another, 

which I am advised, even though I am not an expert at this, that 

13

these processes have been worked out between the Executive 

Branch and the legislative branch many times before, and there 

are processes to allow you complete access to anything you want 

to see. So until we agree on all of what those processes are, I do 

not want to get ahead of myself here. But I do not see this as a 

problem, meeting the oversight responsibilities of Congress in a 

way that is satisfactory to you. 

Meanwhile, the Board wants to hold onto this tool, which is 

going to give you a better product, and a product that you will not 

have had the advantage of having before. Enough said on that. 

This Board is completely independent. Contrary to some of the—

I have got to watch my words here—headlines of the past, NASA 

does not pay our salaries; you pay our salaries. The Congress enacted a $50 million grant to conduct this investigation. NASA 

keeps the books for me, but I spend that money. So somehow suggesting that members of this Board are influenced by the way the 

records are kept, I find to be somewhat naive. 

I also would like, on behalf of the Board, to recognize and acknowledge the work of the thousands and thousands and thousands of volunteers who have spent weeks and weeks walking 

through the State of Texas picking up debris. This serves two purposes, one of which is a public-safety purpose, because some of this 

debris is hazardous, and to get it up and out of the ground and out 

of the streets and schoolyards and public places is very important. 

The second point that I would make is that it turns out that the 

analysis of this debris and the reconstruction of this debris has 

been very important to this Board’s work. It turns out it was more 

important than we ever thought it would be. We have learned a lot 

of things from analyzing and learning from the debris. So it turns 

out that that work turned out to be more critical and more important than we thought it would be at the first, and we owe a great 

debt of gratitude to a whole lot of people who are never going to 

get their names in the paper and their pictures on the paper. So 

I would like to second that, too. 

Let us see. And I think that with the exception of the points that 

I make in my prepared statement, I think that I best could serve 

this Committee if I stopped and responded to the questions. 

Thank you for the opportunity, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Gehman follows:]

PREPARD STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HAROLD W. GEHMAN, JR., CHAIRMAN, COLUMBIA

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, distinguished Members of the 

Committee. 

It is a pleasure to appear today before the Commerce, Science and Transportation 

Committee. I thank you for inviting me and for the opportunity to provide an update 

on the progress of the investigation into the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her courageous crew of seven. 

My intent today is to provide the Committee with the latest information on the 

progress and direction of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and its three 

and a half months of investigation. I am prepared to explore any area in which you 

or the Committee are interested; however, in order to be concise I’ve limited my prepared remarks to these three areas:

• The Board itself

• The accident investigation

• Matters beyond the initiating event

14

I. The Board Itself 

Within an hour after the accident, Administrator O’Keefe activated the accident 

contingency plan and the standing mishap Board that was called for by NASA procedure—a procedure adopted based upon lessons learned from the Challenger accident. The standing Board, excluding the Chairman, had seven members appointed 

by position, not name. These are positions such as the Commander of the Air Force 

Safety Center, the Commander of the Navy Safety Center, the Director of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Accident Investigation and the Division 

Manager of the Department of Transportation’s Aviation Safety Division, among 

others. These experts are all Federal Government employees. They are arguably 

some of, if not the, most experienced and knowledgeable aircraft accident investigators in the world. 

To augment this standing Board, we immediately started adding non-government, 

non-NASA people, starting with me. As the need for additional expertise and the 

amount of actual work grew, I added, in my capacity as Chairman of the Accident 

Investigation Board, a total of five more non-government, non-NASA Board members. This brings us to where we are now: Thirteen Board members, which just happens to be the same as the number of members of the Rogers Commission. Only 

one of these professionals has any significant connection with NASA. 

I want to emphasize that our Board members are active investigators, not passive 

listeners. We are in session seven days a week and have been since the first week. 

We have developed a staff that is almost exclusively non-NASA. We are following 

many precedents set by the Rogers Commission, including using the Department of 

Justice to archive records and using frequent public hearings to allow our progress 

to be monitored by all of our constituents. We are taking all possible advantage of 

other organizations with applicable expertise. These include, among others, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Department of Defense, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Safety Council and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, just to name a few. 

Mr. Chairman, as a Naval Aviator, I am sure you will appreciate the significance 

of the Board’s extensive use of the special tools available to us under the rubric of 

a safety investigation. We are gaining insights into areas we would not be privy to 

under other investigatory models. The benefit of this process will flow directly to 

you and your Committee in the form of a deeper and much more complete view into 

Shuttle Program processes, management, safety programs and quality assurance. 

II. The Accident Investigation 

The Board has made excellent progress in gaining a precise picture of the environment and forces acting on the Columbia in her last ten minutes of flight. Through 

detailed and exhaustive scientific and engineering analysis and through just plain 

hard work, we have determined the facts related to the loss of the Shuttle and her 

crew. While I cannot lay out for you with absolute certainty the entire chain of 

events that led to this catastrophe, I can tell you that the pieces of this puzzle, particularly regarding the mechanics of the accidents, are fitting together with increasing precision and consistency. 

As a means for cross-checking the consistency of our evidence and findings, we 

are simultaneously building six separate ‘‘pictures’’ or scenarios of the accidence sequence. These ‘‘pictures’’ may be labeled:

• The aerodynamic scenario

• The thermodynamic scenario

• The detailed system timeline from telemetry and recovered on-board recorder

• The photographic and videographic scenario

• The story the debris reconstruction and analysis tell us, and

• The story the records of maintenance and modification work tell us....

We have developed each picture quite accurately; we then overlay the scenarios 

one on the other to find the best fit. All six scenarios point toward the same conclusion: that the Columbia entered the Earth’s atmosphere with a pre-existing deformation in the leading edge of the left wing. That deformation allowed super-heated 

air, well above 3,000 °F, to get into the wing’s internal structure over a period of 

10 minutes. After a few minutes, the heat-damaged wing began encountering significant aerodynamic forces with which it could not cope. 

When traveling at over 12,500 miles per hour, it doesn’t take a lot of damage to 

create significant heat and significant aerodynamic forces. Because the Shuttle 

maintained a nominal flight path and altitude until the very end, we believe the 

accident itself was sudden and catastrophic. Mr. Chairman, while the Board ultimately expects to speak with a high degree of confidence regarding the entire acciVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
15

dent scenario, at present we are not entirely confident that we know for certain 

what physical event initiated the failure chain of events. We are all aware that the 

left wing was struck by External Tank insulating foam 81 seconds after launch, but 

to date, we are still looking for hard evidence that this foam strike caused any damage to the left wing. We are conducting tests now to help fill in this critical link 

in the chain of events. 

III. Matters Beyond the Initiating Event 

Defining the point of the origin and timing of the failure sequence is extraordinarily important, but this by itself does not satisfy our requirement to find both 

the contributing and underlying causes of this accident. We also must determine 

why and how this failure process got started in the first place. We are looking in 

parallel at all related processes that pertain to the Shuttle system as a whole. These 

processes include, but are not limited to: safety, risk management policies and practices, quality assurance, maintenance practices, consistency in control of waivers 

and anomalies, turnaround processes, preparations to launch, work force issues, 

budgets, and the group dynamics of all Boards and committees that NASA has set 

up to ensure inter-disciplinary coordination. 

Mr. Chairman, the Board intends to draft a final report that places this accident 

in context. By ‘‘in context’’ I mean we will attempt to build a complete picture of 

how this accident fits into the complicated mosaic of budget trends, the myriad previous external reviews of NASA and the Shuttle Program, the implementation of 

Rogers Commission recommendations, changing Administrations and changing priorities, previous declarations of estimates of risk, work force trends, management 

issues and several other factors—each of which may contribute to a safer program 

to a greater or lesser degree. 

We on the Board are fully aware that when our work is finished, your work will 

be just beginning. We have set a high intellectual bar for the Board to clear. That 

bar is this: our report will be of sufficient depth and breadth that it will serve as 

the basis for a complete public policy debate on the future of the Space Shuttle Program. We believe we can both find the cause of this accident and relate it to these 

other issues. 

As we find items relevant to the return to flight decision, we have and will continue to release those results in the form of interim findings and recommendations, 

similar to the way the National Transportation Safety Board does in its aircraft accident investigations. These will both keep the Congress, the Administration, and 

the public informed of our progress and allow for interim work at NASA to proceed 

as quickly as possible. 

Mr. Chairman, speaking for the 13 dedicated experts on the Board and the thousands of people working to solve this mystery, I can assure you, the astronauts’ families, and the American people that we will spare no effort to get to the bottom of 

this. I estimate that we are better than half done. We have all the assets and expertise we need, or we know where and how to get it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my prepared remarks and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you both. 

There are several issues that I would like to address, and we 

may have to have subsequent rounds. But the first issue I want to 

discuss with you concerns whether satellite photos could have been 

taken of the Columbia. And if so, would it have mattered in helping prevent this tragedy? 

Now, from my standpoint, here is what happened. I was notified 

shortly after the tragedy, in a highly classified fashion, that the 

National Imaging and Mapping Agency had offered to take satellite 

photos of the Columbia in order to ascertain whether, if any or the 

extent of, the damage was a result of the foam striking the capsule 

on launch. 

Now, I was originally briefed that the offer was rebuffed by 

NASA and that the offer had been made on several occasions. I 

consulted Senator Hollings, and we discussed it and sent a letter 

to Administrator O’Keefe asking for information concerning this 

situation. 

16

It is still not clear to me what happened, who is responsible, and 

whether a picture or imaging could have been rendered, if it had 

been given sufficient priority, which may have provided information that would have at least alerted NASA and the people onboard Columbia that there was a significant problem. 

So Admiral Gehman, you may not have reached any conclusion 

on that yet. But I would like to hear information from both you and 

Mr. O’Keefe, beginning with you, Administrator O’Keefe. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am certainly going to be a bit circumspect in the response, 

given how chary the intelligence community is about discussing the 

full extent of the quality of the imagery that is made available or 

the products that are available from the intelligence community. 

But as we have discussed——

The CHAIRMAN. Could I just remind you, Senator Hollings and I 

communicated to you in a classified fashion. It was not until information was in the media that we felt free to discuss this issue. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Oh, yes, sir. No, no. 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. And in response to your joint letter, recall that, immediately, we responded on an unclassified basis, as well as classified information, to provide that information, as well. And then we 

have discussed this several times in closed session. 

Nonetheless, the procedure that was followed during the course 

of this operation, and prior, was the National Imagery and Mapping Agency had an agreement with NASA that, upon our request, 

they would provide products from the assets that they operate. 

That procedure required a level of import that had to be attached 

to it, whether it was routine, an emergency, urgent, you know, et 

cetera, that kind of—‘‘How serious is your problem,’’ essentially 

was the nature of the MOU. 

In this particular context, there was certainly the dialogue that 

goes on every day between NASA and NIMA on matters of availability of assets in which there were offers rendered in which they 

asked that there be some attachment of urgency to it. Based on all 

of the Mission Management Team’s assessment in that 16-day mission, their judgement was there was no safety-of-flight consideration. So we have certainly asked the agency to make available 

those products to the extent that was available and easy to do on 

a normal, routine basis. 

Given the other priorities, which we are totally unaware of that 

NIMA has and has to respond to, their judgment about exactly how 

that is made available is their call. If we had said, ‘‘We have an 

urgent matter. We need you to take, use, or employ your assets for 

the purposes of releasing those products,’’ they would have done so. 

We had no basis upon which to determine an urgency. That was 

a judgment call. We now realize that, given the circumstances, that 

may have been of greater utility. But at the time, in order to meet 

that criteria, we would had to have put a matter of some urgency 

attached to it. 

As a consequence of this, and based on the findings and recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 

which was among the first two they have released, I have re-enjoined with General Clapper at NIMA and have asked him specifiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
17

cally to, ‘‘Let’s disregard the MOU, let’s rewrite it,’’ and to simply 

make available imagery on every future operational mission as it 

comes available, period, without any qualification of its urgency or 

emergency requirements or anything else. 

The quality of that imagery, of course, always depends upon a 

range of factors, and, as a consequence, there is no comparability 

between each and every available product, as it were. So, as a consequence, we will get wide-ranging degrees of quality of what may 

be useful in the future. But, nonetheless, we will get it, and there 

will be no ambiguity about that procedure. That MOU is being, the 

memorandum of understanding the two agencies, is in the process 

of being redrafted with that specific understanding between the 

two agencies unambiguous. 

The CHAIRMAN. You have no idea as to whether that imagery 

would have revealed there was a problem. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Again, without describing what the extent of their 

quality is, let me simply say that the Tom Clancy novels would 

have us believe that the quality is extraordinary. They may not be 

as close to that reality as the novelists would have us believe. And, 

on that basis, it depends on a whole range of variables, and it is 

purely speculation on whether or not any of the products would 

have been of sufficient information to have given us any understanding. Indeed, I think Admiral Gehman’s Board investigation 

process, while it has not yet determined what was the cause, the 

initial factor that caused this, it may well have been something 

that might not have been even determining based on any use of 

any product from any intelligence source. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the indulgence of my colleagues. My 

time has expired, but I would like to hear from Admiral Gehman 

on this rather important issue. 

Admiral GEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You happened to hit on a good first question, because, as you 

may know, the Board has issued a recommendation on this subject, 

and, therefore, this is something the Board has agreed upon. 

My evaluation when we write this section probably will be a little 

more critical than the Administrator’s description. There are a 

number of issues here. We will attempt to pin this issue down in 

our report. But there were a number of bureaucratic and administrative missed signals here. There is no one person responsible; 

there are a whole lot of people responsible. The system did not 

work in this particular case. And I would not blame that on any 

one person. 

We have listened to a lot of people, and we have gotten quite a 

bit of testimony on who said what to whom, and we have tracked 

the issue, we diagrammed it out, and we are a little disappointed 

at how the process worked. That is why we issued this recommendation. We were a little disappointed in what some of the 

senior people knew and understood about how you get these images 

and what the images can do for you. They did not understand. 

Some people in decision-making processes did not fully understand 

what they were talking about here. Some cases, people made decisions based on an erroneous understanding of what was happening. 

There were missed signals going up, and there were missed signals 

going down, too. And we are not quite so happy with the process. 

18

We thought that there were some administrative and bureaucratic 

missed opportunities here. So we will be a little more critical of the 

process in our report. 

Now, whether or not it would have made any difference, we will 

not be able to speak to that. Since we do not know the mechanical, 

physical initiating event, the—we do believe that the orbiter entered the Earth’s atmosphere with a pre-existing flaw. But that 

flaw could be as small as two inches by two inches, or it could be 

larger. So whether or not any photography could have detected that 

is pretty argumentative. 

But when we speak to the old-timers, some of the original flight 

engineers and flight directors and astronauts, they give us a slightly different view. They all say, ‘‘None of that makes any difference. 

This is a test vehicle. Of course you want pictures just so you 

know, and all the rest of this stuff is bureaucratic fumbling and 

bumbling.’’

So I can answer part of your question. The Board has investigated this. As illustrated by our interim recommendation, we 

have satisfied ourselves that this process did not work, that it was 

no one person’s failure, but we cannot determine, to any satisfaction, that it would have made any difference. 

I hope that answers your question, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hollings? 

Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Gehman, right from the get-go, what about the Chairman’s observation that we need to have every statement, every bit 

of information that you folks on the commission of inquiry have 

made? Can we have all of those, or have confidentiality agreements 

been made to give cover for some of those statements that, in other 

words, cannot be made public or cannot be given to the Committee? 

What is your answer to the Chairman’s request that we have all 

the information you have? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

As I indicated in my opening remarks, it is our belief that the 

Congress of the United States will get a better report from us——

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, I know we are going to get a better report. Let me ask, Have you given confidentiality agreements to 

anybody in this investigation whereby their statements will not be 

available to this Committee? 

Admiral GEHMAN. We have, Senator, but——

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, there you go. 

Admiral GEHMAN.—but that does not mean that their statements 

will not be available to this Committee. We have conducted witness 

interviews, in accordance with the safety procedures used by several branches of the executive branch, and there are processes by 

which this Committee can have access to those. And, as I indicated 

in my opening statement, those processes are now being negotiated 

by our staffs. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, I am not clear yet. One minute you say 

you have given confidentiality agreements, and then you have got 

to argue with lawyers and so forth as to whether we get them. But 

anyway, that is by the pale. 

The real important question is, could anything have been done 

to save those astronauts? Now, we know from Appollo 13 about the 

19

ingenuity of NASA engineers. And you have got an ingenious 

group, Admiral, you and I have discussed it, and they know how 

to work and go and implement. 

I disagree with the distinguished Administrator’s observation 

that there was no urgency. The truth is, within 81 seconds, we 

knew that insulation had caused damage. The truth is that two 

days thereafter, the engineers were calling up and asking for an investigation and pictures. Boeing, I guess it was, made the investigation on potential foam damage, but they did not report until 

day 12. Now, that there would go along with the Administrator’s 

‘‘no urgency,’’ but you had urgency on the other side. Namely, the 

Mapping Agency was calling up and saying, ‘‘We can get pictures. 

We can get pictures.’’ You had the engineers calling for imagery. 

You call it ‘‘bureaucratic’’ and ‘‘missed signals.’’ But, really, it was 

not until, like I said, day 12 that he found out, ‘‘Wait a minute, we 

should have done something.’’

Could anything have been done? I have talked to an astronaut 

or two, and they think that, yeah, you could have gotten another 

Shuttle up; otherwise, you could have turned that around for reentry so the cool side would be to where the damage had been inflicted. There are all kind of maneuvers that could have been made. 

But it just looks to me like somebody that saw that in charge just 

all of a sudden just crossed their fingers and said, ‘‘Well, it has 

worked before, let us hope it works again,’’ and just, ‘‘Cool it, cool 

it. No, no, we do not want any pictures.’’ In other words, they were 

refusing to get the pictures, not on account of urgency. The urgency 

was there. 

What is your comment, Admiral? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Senator, we, as a Board, early in this investigation, considered the question about, What, if anything, could 

have been done, or how close did the astronauts come to surviving 

this? And in the early part of this investigation, the Board decided 

that there were still too many emotions and too many egos and too 

many feet stuck in concrete to address that. Now, three months 

later in this investigation, we know more, some of the emotions are 

off the sleeves now a little bit, and we have just directed and just 

begun a formal inquiry into what could have been done. That inquiry is about ten days old. We think that the emotions are out of 

it. Some of the reluctance to discuss these things have—we have 

got a little separation of time now, so people can be cooler about 

this. 

That investigation is going on right now jointly with our Board 

and a bunch of real smart people from NASA. And it is headed in 

a direction—it is too early to say—we have not found any magic 

fix. Let me put it that way. But I will say that it is inconceivable 

that we would come up with the answer that we could do nothing. 

I mean, of course, we would do something. And we have determined that, for example, that—the estimate of how long the orbiter 

could just hang up there, for example, the harder we dig into that, 

the longer that day gets. It turns out that they could have stayed 

in orbit a couple more days, more than a couple more days. And 

it turns out that the more we dig into this, the longer that number 

gets, and it gives you more opportunities to do things. And even if 

20

we came up with a fix that only had a 10 percent chance of succeeding——

Senator HOLLINGS. We would have tried. 

Admiral GEHMAN.—of course, we would have done something. 

Absolutely. So, thus far, this review, which I have looked at myself, 

I have found it to be pretty aggressive and pretty well thought out, 

has not found any magic formula, but has found several steps that 

could have been done to mitigate this. We may find more. But this 

is tough work for people who are closely associated with the program, and they are doing a good job of it. So maybe I will be able 

to get back to you later on. 

But doing nothing is obviously not the right answer. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Bless you. 

How about Mr. O’Keefe? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, Senator. 

I do not disagree with your assessment, Senator. It was a judgment call. It was clearly the wrong judgment. And as a consequence—I mean, what we know now, hindsight being the circumstance, there are a variety of signals that could have gone—or 

told us what we should have been observing and what we could 

have corrected. Nonetheless, the judgment by the Mission Management Team at the time was—they looked at the 16-day mission, 

they said, ‘‘Every one of the things we have observed’’—all the spirited debate that you refer to; you are exactly right, lots of dialogue 

back and forth—in the end, they made a determination and said, 

‘‘Do we think this is a more urgent circumstance than we have ever 

experienced before?’’ And the answer, rightly or wrongly, was they 

felt, in their judgment, this was not outside the normal. That certainly proved to be an erroneous judgment. 

So, you know, looking back on this, there is no question. The 

clarity is there. At the time they went through it, the Mission Management Team certainly looked at that. I concur entirely with Admiral Gehman’s assessment. But had there been a different determination, we would have spared nothing to find a way to return 

the orbiter and the crew safely to this planet. No question. 

Senator HOLLINGS. But just one little observation. Of course, it 

does look like the judgment was made that it was urgent and it 

was perhaps a fatal injury to the Shuttle itself, and they determined to make sure that that was not proved by not taking pictures and those kind of things. Those are the things that worry us 

on the Committee. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

Senator HOLLINGS. It looks like they knew it, and there was the 

urgency, and they knew about the urgency and everything else, but 

they tried to sort of cover up the urgency. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, if I could—yes, Senator. I entirely concur in 

Admiral Gehman’s assessment of this. When you look at the memorandum of agreement between NASA and NIMA, there is nothing 

that really jumps out at you and says, ‘‘Geez, this looks like it is 

going to be a really bureaucratic procedure.’’ In practice, it proved 

to be absolutely impossible to implement correctly. It was the 

wrong way to go about doing it. We have corrected that. There is 

no ambiguity about this point. 

21

General Clapper and I have had some very specific, direct words 

on how to arrange this, and there is going to be no ambiguity on 

this point in the future. But there was nothing that would scream 

off that page of the memorandum of understanding that says, 

‘‘What we have here is an impractical or impossible situation.’’ In 

practice, I agree entirely with the way Admiral Gehman described 

it. It is something that you have got folks who do not know or were 

not aware of the quality of what could be available, and then a procedure that ultimately turned on the determination of NASA about 

what other priorities the intelligence community may require, singularly unqualified to make that judgment call. And so, as a consequence, it ground itself down to the null set, and that is what 

we have fixed. There is no ambiguity about this procedure any 

longer. 

It is infuriating to see how that process played out, and I share 

your absolute frustration with the fact that that should not have 

occurred that way. 

The CHAIRMAN. And it is equally infuriating that no one is responsible. Those decisions were not made by machines. Someone is 

responsible. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen? 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me switch from this line of questioning to the current operations. The Space Shuttle, while it is an old craft, it is still the 

most capable, it is reusable, it can carry loads, as well as, obviously, crew members, up to the Space Station. It is clearly a national asset that is currently grounded. My question is regarding 

the future of the Shuttle and the International Space Station. Specifically, what is our strategy that will be guiding the operation of 

the Space Station while the Space Shuttle is grounded? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir, thank you. 

Our partnership with the International Space Station partners of 

16 Nations has demonstrated the depth of that partnership by responding and stepping up when we need that capability most; in 

particular, our Russian partners, and the Rosaviakosmos, the Russian Space Agency, have responded in a remarkable way, not only 

by accelerating the logistics flights that are necessary to resupply 

the International Space Station, but also to honor their commitments previously made to launch the Soyuz spacecraft, which will 

now be used for crew-rotation purposes. 

I was in Russia weekend before last to, after several tense hours, 

welcome home the Expedition 6 crew, Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, 

and Nikolai Budarin. And, just days before, Ed Lu and Yuri 

Malenchenko were launched on the Soyuz to man the Space Station as it is today on Expedition 7. So that rotational pattern will 

continue, and we will then maintain a capability there that, again, 

our International Space Station partnership has stepped up to the 

task of maintaining that capability independent of the Shuttle’s operation. 

The catch is we cannot continue to build the International Space 

Station, complete it, until we return to flight safely. And so the imperative for moving ahead, finding the problem, fixing it, and responding by returning to safe flight is the imperative of building 

22

the International Space Station and conducting the activities that 

we had planned and worked through for so long. 

Senator ALLEN. Well, implicitly, if we are doing simple math, we 

are sending two crew members now, rather than three, which then 

gets to the question of its capabilities and can two do as many as 

three. And then, following that is what is the strategy of NASA insofar as the balance between the use of manned space flight versus 

robotic satellites? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Well, the maintenance of Expedition 7, as 

well as each crew hereafter that will be launched on Soyuz or recovered by the return of the attached Soyuz flight that is aboard 

now, is what is required to maintain continued safe operations of 

the International Space Station. It is a, you know, lights-on, fluidsrunning, you know, kind of maintenance capability, and some 

science. There is not a complete diminution of that. They are not 

just there as an engineering or maintenance crew, but they are—

it does guarantee safety-of-flight operations and keeping it at the 

appropriate altitude in order to maintain safe operations. 

So the diminution of one is more a function of how many folks 

can you support with logistics flight, the progress flights that are 

sent now—five a year is what we are planning—in order to maintain the logistics, the consumables—food, water, you know, repair 

spare parts, et cetera—and that is adequate in order to support 

two, not three. We could have maintained a longer or more extended presence of three crew members through early fall, but that 

would have drawn down the consumables faster, so we elected to 

make the change to two crew members earlier. 

In terms of what is the future of human space flight and the imperative thereof, certainly this tragedy reminds us of the extraordinary risk that is taken when humans are engaged in space exploration. And in doing so, it means we have to absolutely convince 

ourselves of the imperative of why humans need to be involved in 

certain mission activities. 

As it pertains to the operations aboard the International Space 

Station, I think in the opening comments from so many Members 

here of the Committee, particularly your statement that this be a 

science-driven research enterprise, indeed, that is its primary purpose. A lot of that can be done robotically. A lot of it can be done 

remotely. Some of it cannot. It requires human interaction and activity in order to divine the kind of science and research activities 

and experimentation that is necessary. The Hubble Space Telescope, classic example, again, of why human space flight is a very 

important element of the overall equation. Because when we 

launched the capability ten years ago, it was determined to be out 

of focus and was widely deemed to be a $1 billion piece of space 

junk. It has come back from the ashes as a consequence of that because of human interaction. Were it not for the capacity on the part 

of humans to make adjustments to that piece of machinery that 

could not be done remotely, it would have remained a billion-dollar 

piece of space trash. Today, it is rewriting the astronomy books, 

based on what we are learning from it, because of human interaction. 

So we have got to be very selective, very careful, on how we engage in human space flight and expose the risk only when you see 

23

the imperative is there for human interaction required. But, beyond that, I do not see a circumstance under which we would eliminate it entirely. 

Senator ALLEN. But you do see an increased value in it——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

Senator ALLEN.—as advancements go forward. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Absolutely. No question at all. 

Senator ALLEN. My time is concluded. Thank you both. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Wyden? 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you. 

And beginning with you, if I might, Mr. O’Keefe, and explore 

something with you that really goes back to the days when I 

chaired the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, now 

chaired very well by our colleague, Senator Brownback. And my 

sense, Mr. Administrator, is that there is really an urgent need for 

a thorough overhaul of the way people within NASA communicate 

with each other. If you look, for example, at the kinds of things 

that we are talking about here, and Senator Hollings and Chairman McCain have gotten into it, what we see is it just does not 

seem that the people on the front lines, the engineers, seem to feel 

that they are getting through to people up at the top. And you hear 

that again and again and again. 

Now, I recognize that we are still in the preliminary kinds of 

stages in this area, but I would be interested in your sense, at this 

point, (a) whether you think that there really is a need for significant change at NASA with respect to how people communicate with 

each other, and (b) what you think some of the elements of—if you 

feel that way, what some of the significant elements of those 

changes ought to be. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Well, thank you, Senator. 

I do not disagree that we have got to constantly work to open the 

communications to garner and divine everyone’s best judgment, advice, and opinion on the engineering and technical challenges we 

experience on a regular basis. There are two things that apply on 

this one that I have come to—looking at the record and all the Email traffic and all the reviews of what has occurred here. 

The first one is that in this age of modern information technology, what we have created, again, as a consequence of it, is a 

very egalitarian process. When you look at the wiring diagrams of 

who was talking to who, who was E-mailing who, it was independent of where they fit on the overall hierarchical chain. There 

is nothing monolithic about how that approach was taken. Indeed, 

you have junior engineers communicating with very senior people 

in the organization on what they thought, and responding on that 

basis. So the Mission Management Team that conducted the inflight-operations coordination effort encouraged and received an 

awful lot of commentary, from not just the folks within the space 

flight community, but outside of it, and solicited commentary from 

others. So that part is the good news. 

24

The problem is it is much like anything else, where you are encouraging volume. It becomes a cacophony. You cannot quite put it 

in context, and, therefore, judgment calls get made. 

And that is the second part that really is a pattern here that it 

concerns me a bit. We engage in an unbelievably rigid process leading up to launch. The flight-readiness reviews and so forth, everything prior to that is a very methodical effort that is a very hard 

lesson learned from Challenger in which everyone is encouraged to 

pipe up. There are all kinds of interaction. And then as soon as the 

operation begins, it becomes a group of folks in the Mission Management Team. 

You know, this derives from, I think, a very tried-and-true kind 

of military operational procedure in which you want to hear lots of 

commentary; but, in the end, somebody has got to have the operational control of how this works and make decisions about it. 

There is a little less of a rigidity to that process, for good reason, 

in order to maintain flexibility and to be adaptive to circumstances 

as they present themselves. 

But, nonetheless, this clearly—this indicates that yes, indeed, the 

premise of your question is right on. We need to really examine 

this carefully, not because there is not enough interaction, but its 

quality is confused. It is in volume, but not in any organized manner. 

And in terms of how the operational management of a mission 

is conducted, it does not lend itself as well, from what I can divine, 

towards any prioritization of those observations. 

So yes, indeed, sir, I am committed to that, looking at how we 

overhaul that function, and encouraging what is good about it and 

figuring out how to put some organization to it to make it meaningful. 

Senator WYDEN. The other area I wanted to ask about, we have 

talked, obviously, about one of the recommendations, the preliminary recommendations, of the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board with respect to the imaging issue, and I am pleased to see 

that you would have handled that issue differently. But what about 

the other recommendation calling for a comprehensive inspection 

plan to look at the structural integrity of the reinforced carbon-carbon system components? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Sure. 

Senator WYDEN. Now, this, again, is a preliminary recommendation from the Accident Investigation Board, but certainly people 

have asked me, having been involved in these issues, why something like this was not done before the tragedy, and I am sure 

there are some technical questions in this area, but I would like 

to get your response for the record on that. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator. 

Indeed, this is an area that the finding and the recommendation 

of the Board—you know, I will defer to Admiral Gehman in terms 

of the approaches they looked at to come to this conclusion; but, 

nonetheless, their finding and recommendation was right on the 

mark. These are the kinds of things that we need to develop. 

The catch is, I am advised by our technical community, the engineering folks, that there is no specific nondestructive testing method that is available to do and accomplish what is necessary while 

25

the leading edge is in place. And so, as a consequence, we work 

with our friends and colleagues at the Langley Research Center to 

develop such a technique, because there has been a lot of work on 

it, and a lot of folks have been talking about it trying to figure out 

how to do this, but there is no known technique where you can just 

simply say, ‘‘Let’s go get that approach,’’ and go do it. Instead, 

what it requires, you take the leading edge off and then examine 

it through a variety of different techniques rather than in place. 

And in doing so, the engineers are of the view that that, in turn, 

creates, unintentionally, the prospect that you may further damage 

or compromise the seals at each of the points of the leading edge 

itself. So what we have got to find is a nondestructive testing method in place in order to do this. 

Now, having said that, during the course of every OMM process, 

which is the major maintenance process where you tear down the 

orbiter essentially every eight to ten flights, typically they will be 

removed and inspected through that process, or replaced, if need 

be. On Columbia, I believe, and I will defer to Admiral Gehman on 

the specifics of this, but some number of those leading-edge panels 

were replaced, but not all of them. Some of them were original material. And so the actual inspection of them may have been, and 

certainly was, inadequate during the course of that. But we are trying to develop a technique that would do just that. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Chairman, if we could just get the Admiral’s 

response on it, because I think the point Mr. O’Keefe was making 

is that to have really done the job as comprehensively as the Administrator would have liked, you needed to develop some new 

technology, and there were, I think I caught in the Administrator’s 

comments, some flaws, even in terms of the inspection process that 

was used. 

If that is the case, Admiral, could you tell us your thoughts with 

respect to the flaws in the inspection process? Because I have not 

heard that on the record. 

Admiral GEHMAN. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. 

Once again, I will differ slightly in my analysis from the Administrator’s analysis. Of the 44 panels on the two wings of the Columbia, 44 RCC panels, only three had been replaced. The other 41 are 

original equipment. They are 25 years old. The question is, Does 

anyone know whether or not those carbon-laminate pieces—which 

are not fiberglass, but think of fiberglass—which are subjected to 

weather and lots of other things, does anyone know the condition 

of those panels? And the Board was not satisfied that, like any 

other aircraft which is approaching its 20th or 25th year, an extensive amount of aircraft-aging analysis is done. The Board was not 

satisfied that a similar engineering kind of pattern was being followed by NASA. 

And, indeed, every once in a while some of these panels are returned to the manufacturer—for example, if there is a visual 

flaw—and the manufacturer does these introspective, nondestructive kinds of testing. And guess what? On occasion, we find 

flaws, serious flaws, which are not visible to the naked eye. That 

led us to believe that we have a condition here—or we have an unknown condition. The Board is not saying there is anything wrong 

26

with those RCC panels; the Board is saying that NASA does not 

know the condition of 25-year-old panels and that this is a big flaw. 

And we, of course, wanted to make sure we did not say anything 

that was factually incorrect or anything like that, so we consulted 

experts inside/outside NASA. And, oh, by the way, when we consulted experts at NASA, we got the same pushback that the Administrator got, ‘‘Oh, by the way, the systems are not perfect. Yeah, 

we’ll have to take them off in order to do this.’’ But we found that 

to be not relevant to our discussion. You cannot fly an orbiter with 

25-year-old pieces of equipment that you do not know the condition 

of them. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Snowe? 

STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

How many people would have been involved in the decision-making, once it was recognized after the Shuttle launch that damage 

had been done? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. I will have to get you a head count for the record, 

but the Mission Management Team is composed of folks from the 

Johnson Space Center, the Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy 

Space Center; and primarily at Johnson, because mission control is 

operated there out of Houston. It is a fairly large number, but let 

me get you a precise one for the record here. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The Mission Management Team (MMT) is responsible for each Space Shuttle mission, from launch to landing. The team is composed of the following members:

Manager, Launch Integration, (Chair, Launch MMT)*

Manager, Space Shuttle Program Integration, (Chair, Flight MMT)*

Manager, Space Shuttle SR&QA*

Manager, Space Shuttle Systems Integration*

Manager, Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering*

Manager, EVA Project*

Director, Flight Crew Operations*

Director, Mission Operations*

Director, Space and Life Sciences*

Manager, MSFC Shuttle Projects*

Manager, RSRM Project 

Manager, SSME Project 

Manager, ET Project 

Manager, SRB Project 

Director of Shuttle Processing, KSC*

Manager, ISS Program (as required)*

Director of IS S/Payloads Processing, KSC 

Commander, DDMS *

Flight Manager*

Program Manager, Hamilton Sundstrand*

Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems 

Thiokol Corporation 

Boeing-Rocketdyne 

Boeing Company Payload Ground Operations Contact 

SSP, Deputy Program Manager, SFOC*

The titles with asterisks represent those members who are required to be present 

during each mission.

Mr. O’KEEFE. But, in terms of active members of that team, 

there may be that many or more folks who are actually being 

27

tasked or required to participate or whatever else. But in terms of 

decision-makers, you have got a very specified number of folks 

there. 

Senator SNOWE. And how far up the chain of command does a 

safety-related question go on the day of the mission? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. The mission management team is run primarily by 

the Shuttle program, which reports primarily to the Office of Space 

Flight in Washington, as well as to the center director at Houston. 

A safety issue would escalate all the way through that process 

quickly if the mission management team were of a mind that we 

had a safety-of-flight consideration. 

Senator SNOWE. They did not, obviously, identify this as a serious safety-related issue. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. They did not determine that, based on all the evidence, that there was a safety-of-flight consideration during the 16-

day mission. That was a judgment call made by the mission management team, indeed. 

Senator SNOWE. Yes, it just seems to me that there is no question that the whole decision-making process and communication 

and the bureaucratic structure that goes up through the chain of 

command has to be altered significantly. 

Admiral Gehman, you had mentioned that no one is responsible. 

Well, that is the problem. When you have a committee of 100 or 

less, if everybody is responsible, no one is responsible. It is true. 

It has to change, I think, before any next launch, among other 

things, because we have to get to the root causes. It just appears 

to me that it was a very complicated decision-making environment 

when it came to making those kind of decisions, and red flags were 

not readily identified. 

You could not access previous records or abnormalities that were 

associated with the Columbia Shuttle, and that is also of concern. 

You cannot have an antiquated system. If there were problems that 

had been identified with the Columbia Shuttle on previous flights, 

there was no way to access that previous experience readily or 

quickly in ascertaining whether or not this was a serious problem. 

So if there was a growing list of abnormalities, there were no red 

flags being raised, because you could not access the lists; and you 

have a very cumbersome bureaucratic environment that does not 

raise a red flag with respect to this. 

It is disconcerting, because—and I do not know if this is true; I 

read this in one of the newspaper accounts, talking about a memo 

that named over 30 high-risk concerns regarding tanks and foam 

and identified the idea of foam shedding from the tank and causing 

damage to the thermal-protection system of the tiles and panels. 

But over time, the space agency had come to classify the problem 

as a maintenance issue and not a serious threat to the safety of 

the craft or its crew. 

But even though it might have been considered a maintenance 

issue, the fact that it is on a list of 30 high-risk concerns should 

have raised a red flag. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Senator, if I might, I want to disagree just a bit 

with the assertion that there were not—there was not enough dialogue or exchange or whatever else during the course of this. There 

was plenty of that. And ultimately, there is accountability. There 

28

are people that can be identified very clearly as to who makes decisions about this during the mission management activity during 

on-orbit operations. And they are very clearly specified in terms of 

how they make those choices. The audit trail was pretty clear on 

this. 

Having said that, it is a judgment call. And what they came to 

was—and that is the hard part of this; this is a much tougher conundrum about this than any other aspect—it is not that the information was not available; it was analyzed and deemed to be within 

the context of safety-of-flight considerations. That was a judgment 

call. And you are right, there were several different high-risk items 

that were identified, and those were all identified as things that 

need to be treated; but during the course of operations every previous flight—and yes, indeed, that information was available that 

demonstrated and was reviewed during the course-of-flight-readiness reviews and so forth—but determined to be not a safety-offlight risk consideration. Needed to be fixed, but not something 

that would compromise the mission. 

You know, last June we shut down the operations of the Space 

Shuttle program for the better part of 41⁄2 months after identification of a hairline fracture in a fuel line. Now, that was determined 

to be a safety-of-flight consideration on those kinds of high-risk 

issues; therefore, stop everything until we fix that. And that is the 

difference. In some cases—there are all kinds of different abnormalities that you will find on every commercial aircraft, on any 

military aircraft, no matter what it is, that are requiring of corrections, but not determined to be safety-of-flight. That was a judgment call; and we will find out, in this investigation, whether that 

was an accurate judgment call. And certainly there appears to be 

plenty of doubt on that. 

Senator SNOWE. If the photos had been able to show damage to 

the carbon-carbon leading edge that Senator Wyden was referring 

to, would anything have changed? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Absolutely. No question. If there had been something, any evidence at all, to suggest that there was a safety-offlight consideration, it would have gone to, you know, five-alarmfire status where everybody would have been absolutely beaten to 

parade rest every possible idea of how to correct the problem. 

There would be nothing left. 

Admiral GEHMAN. Senator, may I comment? 

Senator SNOWE. Yes. 

Admiral GEHMAN. The Board is probably going to spend a good 

fraction of the time or the, you know, the linear inches of our report on this subject, and we have looked really hard at the question 

that you asked, Why do we have all this dialogue going on, but no 

transmission of any messages? And there is all this talking, but 

nothing is being transmitted. 

And the Board is taking an interesting approach to this, and that 

is—the approach is that if you look at the O-rings on the Challenger and you kind of backtrack on how that decision failed to get 

made, and if you take the foam and the photographs in the Columbia and you backtrack and you say, ‘‘Oh, look, they missed something,’’ we find that to be kind of unfair, because hindsight is wonderful. So the Board has said, ‘‘Let’s look through all the waivers 

29

and all the anomalies and all the steps that NASA has waived on 

all the flights and see if there are other items like this in which 

we continuously have these waivers and the acceptance of anomalies, and are there other things like this going on? And is it symptomatic of some process which is not working very well?’’ Because 

to pick these two incidents and work backwards does not take a 

whole lot of introspection; that is pretty obvious. 

So the Board is interested, Are there others out there? And if 

there are others out there, how did they come to be accepted? How 

come we are still flying? 

We have found others. And what we are doing is, we are trying 

to find out whether or not there is a process flaw which is not allowing safety items and engineering items to get up to the level 

that they should. We find that to be more intellectually honest 

than to go back and thrash people for what they should have seen 

on this one, and we have found what we believe to be some good 

analysis and good data which will help this process in the future, 

not just beat up on people for the past. 

Senator SNOWE. Yes, I could not agree more. And I think looking 

prospectively and addressing the root causes is important so that 

it does not happen again—I agree. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Snowe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. America and the world was shocked and deeply saddened by the loss of Columbia in the skies over Texas on the morning of February 

1. My thoughts and prayers continue to be with the families of the seven brave astronauts who lost their lives that day. 

It is my hope that this hearing today will honor the memory and the service of 

the Columbia crew by aggressively investigating the events leading up to that tragedy to improve the safety of all future missions. 

Clearly, many questions remain unanswered for all of us, and I hope that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board will continue to pursue all avenues to find answers. As we go through this process, we have an obligation to determine not only 

the circumstances of the actual event that caused the Shuttle Columbia to break 

up, but also the root causes behind that tragic loss. In doing so, we must look at 

our space program in its totality to identify any systemic breakdowns—from management structure to funding requests to potentially outdated equipment to pressures on the system resulting from the International Space Station program or 

plans to create a new orbiter, so we may remedy these problems to ensure we don’t 

relive this tragedy. 

At our Joint Hearing on February 12, I asked why military telescope imaging had 

not been requested in order to assess the damage that the Columbia Shuttle might 

have suffered from the foam debris that hit the Shuttle soon after liftoff. At that 

time, I was told that NASA had decided this imaging would not have been useful 

or necessary, even though similar imagery had been requested on previous missions. 

Furthermore, relying on computer models and past experience was described as the 

best way to assess the potential damage. 

Since that time, we have learned that there actually was considerable division 

within the ranks of NASA regarding how important the debris hit might have been 

to the Shuttle’s integrity. We have heard reports that at least two requests were 

placed for images, but that these were unofficial and not considered a high priority. 

It has been reported that at least one of those requests was cancelled because it 

did not come through the proper channels. So I come to this hearing very concerned 

about NASA’s decision-making environment, and believing that the process has to 

be significantly altered. 

At our February hearing, the actual cause of the Columbia accident was unclear. 

Now, through the tireless efforts of the Accident Investigation Board, we have a 

high degree of confidence that the Shuttle entered the earth’s atmosphere on February 1st with pre-existing damage to its left wing—that this damage allowed the 

30

hot gases of re-entry to enter the Shuttle and destroy it. Although the Board cannot 

guarantee that the foam debris that hit the Shuttle during lift-off directly caused 

the fatal damage to the wing, it seems likely there was a connection. While I am 

sorry that these tests are being performed after the Columbia loss rather than before, I look forward to hearing the results of the tests currently underway to investigate the extent of damage that foam debris hits can cause. 

While the Board has learned a great deal in the past few months, at this point, 

we still don’t have a detailed picture of all the factors that contributed to the loss 

of Columbia. So we cannot ignore any potential culprits—we cannot take any issue 

off the table that might have contributed to the accident. It is crucial that we obtain 

a complete picture of all of these factors and maintain our patient resolve regardless 

of the broad changes these findings might require before resuming Shuttle flights. 

We must scrutinize what was done and what was left undone... decisions that 

were made during the two weeks of the Shuttle mission that we now 

question... and whether, more broadly, the competition between short-term and 

long-term goals has required trade-offs for years—trade-offs which contributed to 

this catastrophic event. We must inspect the tension between these priorities to help 

us determine the extent to which the Columbia disaster holds implications for our 

future goals. 

As I have said in the past, space travel will always be an inherently risky endeavor. But we should never stop asking ourselves how we might best reduce the risk. 

Our intent to move forward with the exploration of space must also be accompanied 

by an unwavering, unrelenting, unceasing commitment to safety—and today I hope 

will mark an important step in that journey. 

Again, thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing of the most recent 

progress of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Breaux? 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses. 

I have two points. First is, it seems that a great deal of the investigation leads to the conclusion, I guess, that damage to the 

leading edge of the left wing caused part of the problem. The question then becomes, what caused the damage to the leading edge of 

the left wing? And the speculation has been that the foam coming 

off at the time of the launch hit the leading edge and caused some 

deterioration to the panels. And I know that you all have been testing that theory by some type of a mechanism that threw or shot 

the foam towards the leading edge to see if it could possibly do that 

type of damage. What can you tell us about the results of that test 

so far? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Yes, sir. 

The testing started last week. We are, indeed, shooting pieces of 

foam at test articles that are orders of magnitude larger than ever 

been done before. This testing has been going on for years and 

years and years. But the shots have always been tiny little pieces 

of foam at tiles and all that kind of stuff. And, of course, that then 

leads to this erroneous analysis of how much damaged the tiles, 

but that is another story. 

We started by shooting foam at—once again, this was the first 

time that foam of the size that came off this time has ever been 

used as a test. We started shooting at the wheel well doors, because, as you may recall, six or eight weeks ago we suspected that 

the heat was getting in through the wheel well door. The recovery 

of the onboard recorder changed all that. We are now building a 

leading-edge test target. That will not be ready until the first of 

June. The first couple of shots that were conducted by Southwest 

Research Institute were very, very mild, angle-of-impact kinds of 

shots. Little or no damage was done. The angle of impact underVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
31

neath here was much shallower than was actually experienced in 

real life. As we start to crank the angle of impact around, the damage gets much more severe, and that is the testing that is going 

on now. We are just now getting——

Senator BREAUX. That is damage on the bottom? 

Admiral GEHMAN. To the tiles. To the tiles. 

Senator BREAUX. To the tiles. On the body, not the leading edge? 

Admiral GEHMAN. That is correct. We have not started shooting 

at the leading edge yet. We will start shooting at the leading edge, 

to get to your question directly, around the 1st of June. 

Senator BREAUX. But the results of the tests on the tiles on the 

undersurface of the Shuttle indicated much more damage than had 

been experienced before in the test? 

Admiral GEHMAN. The damage is dependent on the angle of impact. And as we get up into angles of impact which are representative of what we think really occurs to the Shuttle, the damage is 

more severe than previously thought. That is correct. It is dependent on the angle of impact. 

Senator BREAUX. Mr. O’Keefe, how many times in previous 

launches has foam insulation separated from the fuel tank and broken off in launch or at other parts of a mission? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. There were four observable events that were recorded and analyzed as a consequence—going back to, I think, 

STS–7, I think, was the first one. There were several other events 

of smaller pieces, apparently, that were documented, as well. But 

the ones that were significantly analyzed were these four different 

events, the most recent of which was on STS–112, which was 

launched in October. 

Senator BREAUX. Are there any reports anywhere in NASA that 

raised a serious concern, a red flag, alert, that this was a problem 

or could be a more severe problem? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. I think for the reasons Admiral Gehman just described, there were tests that were conducted thereafter that led 

engineers to conclude that the impact was not—on those four significant events, was not considered a safety-of-flight compromise. 

Admiral GEHMAN. Senator, may I——

Senator BREAUX. Yeah, any comment on——

Admiral GEHMAN.—I will respectfully disagree with the Administrator, here. Foam coming off the external tank has hit every flight 

on every orbiter. If you want to measure total number of hits, it 

is thousands. If you want to measure hits that have caused damage 

to the tiles of greater than an inch, it is about 30 per flight. 

What the Administrator was referring to is this particular piece 

of foam that we are talking about in this instance, which is a special piece of foam molding that is hand-molded to cover a certain 

connection point called the ‘‘bipod.’’ That particular piece of foam 

is known to have come off six total times, including this flight, but 

there are over 40 flights for which we have no information—for example, the ones launched at night or ones where we could not photograph the external tank when it comes away. So there are six 

that we know of, out of 40, minus 113, minus—out of 70-some 

flights. 

32

And so, just to make the record straight, this particular big piece 

of foam, the Administrator is right, only half a dozen times; but 

foam hitting the orbiter occurs on every single flight. 

Senator BREAUX. Well, I mean, I think that is a significant piece 

of information for everyone to understand. I cannot draw any conclusions in my own mind, but it seems to me that that might be 

the smoking gun. And the fact is that this is not the first time it 

happened, but that insulating foam was coming off on every flight, 

and that, on thousands of hits, damage to the tile had occurred. It 

just seems to me that it was only a question of time when one of 

those hits did the damage that ultimately was done to the Columbia. 

Thank you. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Senator, if I could. Again, I do not disagree with 

Admiral Gehman at all. I apologize for having understated this at 

all, because it is a very significant event. There is no doubt about 

it. I was referring very specifically to the bipod section, and Admiral Gehman is precisely right, this is how it has happened in each 

and every case. And I do not want to understate this. 

The question that is really being debated internally in NASA 

right now is, Why did we permit a process that would tolerate any 

strike? That is the really important factor, I think, and we are really going through a soul search now saying, What is it that contented ourselves to believing that any strike should have been tolerated? And that is a much deeper-process issue that really is 

being examined, and there is a lot of real soul search going on that 

says, we rationalize based on historical evidence of what we 

thought was acceptable damage. Why would we think any level of 

damage would be deemed acceptable? 

Senator BREAUX. Well, I mean, you have just put your finger on 

the real question. You know, if it had been one hit at one time——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Uh-huh. 

Senator BREAUX.—I think someone would be justified in saying, 

‘‘Well, you know, it happened once out of thousands of flights.’’ But 

it happened thousands of times, and this was probably the last 

time. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brownback? 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,

U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thanks. Thank you very much, witnesses, 

I appreciate the information you are putting forward. 

Admiral Gehman, has the commission come up with any ideas on 

changing the decision-making process to see that a mistake that 

had been made in judgment this time around—Mr. O’Keefe has already said that we clearly should have gotten imaging and there 

was a mistake in judgment made—has the commission come up 

with any recommendations to change the decision-making process 

yet that they are willing to put forward? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Senator, we have not come to any conclusions 

yet, but I will predict that probably a third of our report is going 

33

to be on this subject, because we believe that is really the lasting 

and the significant legacy that we can leave here. 

Yes, indeed, we think this is a systemic problem, that if you just 

change the people or change the names of the committees, it will 

not do any good, that there actually is a process problem here. And 

we have opinions on how to go about this. We have availed ourselves of literally dozens of experts in the area of safety engineering, risk assessment, risk management, high-reliability organizations, in order that we can write authoritatively on this subject. 

I will add, also, parenthetically, that you—in our opinion, neither 

the Congress nor this Board could get at these very, very deep-rooted institutional problems unless we availed ourselves of the investigating technique that is associated with a safety investigation, in 

which people can speak without being in fear of retribution. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, who was responsible for the mistake 

in judgment this time around, particularly on the imagery? You 

said, I think, clearly, ‘‘Well, okay, there was a mistake in judgment 

made. We should have gotten imagery.’’ Who made that determination? Who was responsible for that decision? 

Admiral GEHMAN. I would not characterize that decision as a 

mistake by any one individual. When you have got an organization 

which is run by boards and committees, and those boards and committees do not work, I am not sure you can blame an individual 

person. So I will have to duck that question. I can tell you which 

Board or committee did not work as designed, and I can tell you 

why——

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, which one did not? 

Admiral GEHMAN. In my opinion, because the Board has not spoken on this yet, in my opinion both the boards that assess the condition of the orbiter before it is launched, which are boards and 

committees set up by the program manager, and the boards and 

committees that run the mission after it is flying, are ill-served by 

an imperfect system of checks and balances. And by that I mean 

specifically the safety organization sits right beside the person 

making the decision; but behind the safety organization, there is 

nothing back there. There is no people, money, engineering, expertise, analysis. The engineers sit right to the other side of them. But 

the engineering department is not independently funded. The engineers all have to charge to a program or something like that, so 

their allegiance is to the program. And we find that to be an imperfect system, and the boards are ill-served, and you are going to get 

the same wrong answer no matter how many times you convene 

those Boards. And it does not make any difference who the chairman is. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, now, this is a very troubling point 

that you make, that you are going to get the same——

Admiral GEHMAN. Wrong answer. 

Senator BROWNBACK.—wrong answers? Why are we going to get 

the same wrong answers? These are good people. They are all wellmeaning people. Why are we going to get the same wrong answers? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Once again, I am kind of a little bit out in 

front of my headlights here, because the Board has not completely 

spoken on this. But giving my own personal view of it, we have 

availed ourselves of a very, very rich and deep academic world, who 

34

studies these kinds of things, as well as industry, like nuclear 

power plants and petrochemical plants and things like that about, 

How do they do safety, and how do they build in checks and balances so that the people who are making decisions are getting 

good, contrary opinions? And to us it seems that this is the flaw 

in the system, that unless you change the management techniques 

and unless you change the procedures, you can change the people 

sitting at the seats and they will still not give good advice. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, what you are describing to me is a 

committee without a head or a process without a design——

Admiral GEHMAN. No, I——

Senator BROWNBACK.—that just communicates a lot back and 

forth, that there is not a responsible point at which a person is responsible for the decision-making? 

Admiral GEHMAN. No, sir, I would not agree with that. There is 

a Chairman, and there is someone responsible, and everybody 

knows who that is, but the process is not serving that person very 

well. 

Senator BROWNBACK. How is the process not serving that person? 

Specifically how is the process not serving that person well? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Because the key advisors, the people who 

would bring up alternative points of view, the people who would 

say, ‘‘Wait a minute, this is not safe,’’ or—they are in the room, but 

they are not supported by—they can’t come and argue their cases 

with 18-inches worth of documentation, because they are not funded well enough. They are not independently funded. There are not 

enough people in there to do that independent research in order 

that they can come to the table and make a persuasive argument. 

They are kind of there by themselves. 

Senator BROWNBACK. They are there without backing, I guess? 

Admiral GEHMAN. They are there without backing. And when 

you get into these very technical issues about whether this is safe 

or whether or not this signal is important or whether or not this 

little anomaly needs to be paid attention to, you have to come with 

data. These are engineers. You have to come with facts and data 

and studies. You cannot just get in there and wave your arms and 

beat your breast. You have got to come armed with ammunition. 

And so the safety—we find the safety organization is, on paper, 

perfect. But when you bore down a little bit deeper, you do not find 

any ‘‘there’’ there. And the engineering department looks precisely 

organized exactly right, but then when you go bore down and find 

out what these 600 engineers are doing, you find that three quarters of them are funded by the program, and so you know where 

their allegiance is, et cetera. 

So we are going to try and make some recommendations to improve the process of safety, but do not mislead, do not—that is why 

I am giving you this unsatisfactory answer, and I know the Chairman is still looking at me—but that is why we are trying to find 

a way to fix this and fix it right. But it is not necessarily any individual one person’s responsibility. 

Senator BROWNBACK. So you need internal muscle that is separate and distinct from the program that can effectively argue within the structure—for the change that we need to be addressing. Is 

that correct? 

35

Admiral GEHMAN. That is correct. And now the Board is loathe 

to make specific organizational and management recommendations 

for the fear of the law of unintended consequences. We are not 

going to be around to manage these things and steer them. But I 

believe that when we write our report, we are going to give quite 

direct and specific guidelines on how this process ought to operate. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I comment very briefly? 

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. In this——

The CHAIRMAN. Could I comment first? When I was a young lad, 

the U.S.S. MISSOURI ran aground not too far from here. The captain was asleep in the cabin, and the navigator ran it aground. The 

captain was relieved immediately. But now, since there seems to be 

an interesting situation, no one is responsible. No one is responsible because we are all responsible; so, therefore, no one is responsible. No one is responsible for 9/11. No one is responsible for 

Khobar Towers. No one is responsible for a whole bunch of other 

things, bad things, that have happened. We are all responsible; so, 

therefore, no one is responsible. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, sir. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

That is a perfect prelude to my respectful disagreement with my 

friend, the Chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board. There is no ambiguity on who is responsible. There are two 

folks who sit at the flight readiness review. The Associate Administrator for space flight and the Associate Administrator for safety 

and mission assurance. They sign the order that says, ‘‘We certify 

this is ready for flight.’’ The argument that is being advanced here 

is that the quality of advice they are receiving, in the opinion, I 

think, of the Chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board, needs further support. That is a point that we have positively got to look at. But in terms of who is responsible, there is 

no question about it who signs the certification on this case. There 

are identified, named individuals who are part of this mission management team. 

Senator Snowe asked the question, ‘‘How many people participate in that?’’ Lots of engineers and so forth. You bet. Lots of folks 

participate there. But there are specified folks, with name, faces, 

serial numbers, and, you know, pay checks that are provided that 

are chair of the mission management team and members of it that 

make determinations and are responsible for that. 

There will be accountability here. There is no question about it. 

This will not be ambiguous about who is responsible at the end of 

the day. We are awaiting the report. There are certain changes 

that have to be made. But, in the end, there is no line or argument 

of a mush-mouth system here of how these decisions are arrived at. 

There are individuals who you can identify and say, ‘‘That is the 

responsible official.’’ And I think the point that has been made here 

is, the quality of the advice that is being rendered to them may not 

be as organized as it should be. 

My attendance at flight-readiness reviews in prior flights, to include, you know, most recently, I guess, 113, was—you look in this 

room, and everybody and anybody who has an opinion on the qualVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
36

ity of the readiness of the orbiter to fly are in that room. It is a 

big confab. And anybody has got the opportunity to step up and 

speak. And many of them are the functional equivalent in the 

space flight community of E.F. Hutton; whenever they stand up, 

immediately everybody recognizes them and they stop everything 

until the issue is resolved. In the end, that judgment has to be rendered by two people, and that is very clear in the way this process 

works. 

Same is true during an operational mission management team. 

And the issue, I think, that Admiral Gehman is raising is, What 

is the quality of that advice, how is it organized, and how do we 

make it more relevant for them to make the kinds of decisions they 

are asked to make? 

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, could I respond to this, because I want to bore in on this point, and it does seem to be a very 

important one. What I hear the Admiral saying is, that there is not 

a muscle, an independent muscle, behind that is challenging this 

process internally, that the people, the engineers and the others 

that are commenting are part of one a systemic system all funded 

from one system, and it needs an independent muscle that is there 

in the room that can speak from engineering data and specifics. 

They can challenge the decision-making process. Is that correct, 

Admiral? 

Admiral GEHMAN. That is correct. And, by the way——

Senator BROWNBACK. If I could, then——

Admiral GEHMAN. Yes, that is correct. 

Senator BROWNBACK.—if I could. 

Administrator O’Keefe, I am not here trying to point fingers, but 

I am trying to figure out how we keep this from happening again. 

We do not want anybody to die. You do not want anybody to. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Sure. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Do you agree with that assessment, that 

there is not the independent muscle behind the challenge process 

internally in making these safety and engineering decisions? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Again, I am guided by the view of the Board. If 

their view is that it is inadequate, that is the answer, it is inadequate, and we will go fix that. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Gehman, did you want to make an additional comment? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Thank you very much. 

As I indicated, we, on the Board, have grounded ourselves, we 

think, in aerodynamics and thermodynamics and physics to the 

point where when we write on what caused this accident, it is unlikely that we are going to get challenged on any of our findings. 

In order for us to write on this subject, we have had to ground ourselves in what we, in the United States, know about these very 

complex management techniques. And so we have done that, to a 

great extent. 

And two of the principles that have struck me get to the point 

where, indeed, the person who is the Chairman of this Board or the 

Chairman of this Committee or the two people who have to sign 

the paper, they are identified by name. We know who they are, and 

you know who they are. But so many of these experts in this area 

37

have told us that just picking on those two people and firing them 

or something like that will not prevent this from happening again. 

If you have got a flawed process, the next chairman is going to 

make the same mistake, probably. So we are quite driven by that. 

The second thing that we are quite driven by is writing out of 

a report that I would like to acknowledge other people here, but 

the writing goes along the lines of this. This way. That the wonderful engineers who give us all these magical things also make a pact 

with the devil—I am thinking of things like nuclear power plants 

and petrochemical plants and dams and things like that—that you 

get all the—and Space Shuttles—you get all these magical things 

from engineers, but the pact that you make with the devil is you 

have to be vigilant forever, because now you have got this dragon 

by the tail. And it could be that in the 25 years or 20 years of this 

program, as the conditions of Shuttle life change, the Board is looking at whether or not this vigilant-forever law has been observed, 

or somehow have we migrated away from that? And the Board is 

going to try to write on that. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Very good. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson? 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Brownback, I want to pick up on your line of questioning. But first I want to say, Admiral, thank you for your public 

service. Thank you for the public service that you rendered, even 

after your retirement, with regard to the U.S.S. COLE investigation. Thank you for your public service for this. And it is this Senator’s hope that you are going to succeed, and that is what we want 

to see, that you succeed. 

In the line of questioning from Senator Brownback and in your 

response earlier with regard to the safety process that had been set 

up 17 years ago, and your quote was, ‘‘There is no ‘there’ there.’’ 

Now, that makes my blood boil. Because of the communication 

problems 17 years ago with Challenger, which it, in large part, 

was—that was the reason for the destruction of Challenger, that information could not flow from the bottom up; it was much easier 

flowing from the top down. And so this process of safety was imposed, and the safety process was supposed to be an automatic 

failsafe. But you say ‘‘there is no ‘there’ there.’’

Why do you think we have not learned the lessons from Challenger, as painful as that was? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Senator Nelson, thank you very much for the 

vote of confidence. We will see whether or not that is well founded 

or not. But the Board is going to spend an enormous amount of energy to answer that very question. 

It is possible—it is possible—that we have the system that we 

have right now because of Challenger. There were recommendations to consolidate, have a more formal chain of command, have 

a more strict and monolithic program, that were part of the Challenger recommendations, and, once again, I do not want to get 

ahead of myself, but we are going to look at this in great detail. 

38

We have also looked at best-business practices from other very, 

very risky communities and have found how they do high-reliability 

kinds of things, and the Board will attempt to write an outline that 

will ensure that these kinds of safety issues do, indeed, get raised 

at the right level and then the people who have to make the judgments are advised well and these issues are not submerged. 

I do not want to get into anymore detail than to say that, at this 

time, the preliminary—at this stage in our report, I am willing to 

volunteer that we are not completely satisfied that underneath the 

box that says ‘‘safety’’ and ‘‘S and MA’’ that there is a big, robust 

organization which allows the person in the box to come to the 

table with the same number of chips as everybody else. And under 

the box that says ‘‘engineering directorate,’’ that there is not 

enough independent good old engineering kind of thinking that 

NASA used to be known for to come to the table and bang on the 

table and say, ‘‘You are wrong, and I can prove it.’’

That is about as far as I am willing to go at this time. 

Senator NELSON. All right. Let me nail down something that the 

Chairman and Senator Hollings said earlier, asked you about, with 

regard to our congressional oversight. 

Admiral GEHMAN. Sure. 

Senator NELSON. I need to know, specifically for the record, since 

you are trying to protect the identity of the witnesses, since you 

want to encourage people to come forth and tell the truth without 

having to subpoena them for the truth, understandably, you want 

to protect their identity. What we need to know, is that testimony, 

that full testimony, available to this Committee in our congressional oversight capacity? 

Admiral GEHMAN. The answer, the short answer, is we are in the 

process of working out an arrangement by which you will have access by some process to all that information. The answer, the short 

answer, is yes. 

If I may just say that the purpose of giving witnesses guarantees 

of anonymity is not so they will tell the truth. That is not the issue. 

They will tell the truth when they come up here and raise their 

hand. The purpose is to find out things that they would not volunteer under questioning. That adds a whole different range of information, a whole different body of insights in which they may say 

something that they are not fully sure of, for example. They just—

or it is a feeling that they have or something they cannot prove or 

something like that which they would not give to anybody who was 

doing this in a public forum. 

Senator NELSON. Well, there was some question in Senator Hollings’ mind. I am glad that you have clarified that, that the answer 

to the question is yes. 

All right, let me comment. I happen to agree with your statement 

about the old-timers, that the old-timers basically, if they knew 

there was the potential of a problem, they would have started 

working it. They would have done photos immediately. They would 

have started pulling out of their hip pocket every possible theory 

of changing anything that could be changed, as well as what Senator Hollings had said, ‘‘cold soaking,’’ no roll reversal to the left, 

maybe a different angle of attack. 

39

What do you think? Why did NASA and its leaders tolerate—I 

guess the question is, What is your report going to tell about reenacting this of how you would do it pursuant to the old-timers? 

Admiral GEHMAN. The old-timers certainly taught me something, 

which I find compelling. In the business about photos, for example, 

on-orbit photography. They would say, ‘‘It doesn’t make any difference whether you could have done anything to save this crew or 

not, we would have taken photographs just so we would have 

known what happened.’’ I mean, the old-timers have a more flighttest, test-pilot kind of attitude that even though the loss of a crew 

is terribly regretful, if you have a test-pilot kind of an attitude, you 

always want to know what happened so that they did not die in 

vain. So, of course, they would have taken photographs. You would 

not have had to prove that there was a foam strike. All you have 

to do was scratch your head and say, ‘‘Hey, I don’t think I know 

what happened here,’’ and the next thing all the lights would have 

gone off. 

And so that is compelling to me. In other words, you do not have 

to prove that somebody made a mistake, or you do not have to 

prove that an error in judgment was made. The old-timer attitude 

would have got you photographs ‘‘just because.’’ And maybe we 

could not have done anything about it, but we would have—maybe 

we would have known what happened in this particular case. It is 

more of an intellectual inquiry kind of an attitude. 

Senator you were not in the room when I mentioned earlier that 

we and NASA have just begun, ten days ago, a very in-depth and 

aggressive analysis of what could have been done. And I mentioned 

that we could not have done this earlier because there were too 

many emotions. Everybody was too close to it. But now that we 

have got a little time separated and we, the Board, know a little 

bit more about this, together we are looking very, very hard at 

what might have been done. But I do not really know that even if 

we find an answer, you know, put duct tape on it or something like 

that, I do not know that it is going to result in whether or not—

that it can result in whether or not we could have saved this mission or not. I just do not know. 

The only thing I do know, and I know that the Administrator 

agrees with me, is that we would not have done nothing. I mean, 

that is not the way we do things. We would have done something. 

And even if we only had a 10 percent chance of saving this, we 

would have—there were two EVA suits on-board; they could have 

gone out and taken a look at it, they could have put duct tape on 

the thing—I mean, I do not know, I am just making that up, of 

course. But they would have done something. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sununu? 

Senator SUNUNU. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin by exploring this issue of accountability that the 

Chairman raised. Admiral, I think you said that, something to the 

effect, you do not want to ‘‘pick on’’ those that were responsible for 

signing off on the flight security, because if there is a flawed process, even if you have a replacement, you will still have a flawed 

process. 

And I would maybe differ with that just slightly. The Chairman 

used an example of the U.S.S. MISSOURI, I think, that ran 

40

aground. Now, I do not know that they changed the process or not, 

but my guess is not only did the subsequent captain not run 

aground, I bet the Missouri never ran aground again. 

So we do not want to single anyone out inappropriately. We want 

the criticisms to be based on good information, good analysis. But 

I do think there is something to be said for a system that does hold 

those in a position of responsibility accountable, even if there is a 

flawed process and even if you are not sure you have implemented 

a perfect process, because a system that holds individuals accountable will create an incentive for those in a position of responsibility 

to do everything possible to make sure the support systems, the 

processes that help them make decisions, are good ones. Would you 

agree with that? 

Admiral GEHMAN. I think you—I support your comments completely. I come from a system that is the way we do business. And 

I have no problem whatsoever with the process, the Administrative 

processes, of NASA and the Congress and the Administration, of 

taking whatever steps are necessary if you think someone’s performance was lacking. It is just not the function of this Board. 

Now, you will be able to tell from my report where to go looking. 

We are not ducking the issue. It is just not the function of this 

Board. The function of this Board is to try and make space flight 

safer, to find out what happened and try to make space flight safer 

in the future if we can. And we believe we will be able to do that 

for you. And if there are—if we found that someone had not executed their duties in accordance with NASA regulations, we will 

note that. But that is not the purpose of this Board. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Senator, if I could. I think at the conclusion of this 

investigation, when this report is finalized and after the agency 

takes said actions to implement those findings, I am confident you 

will find no ambiguity on this question of accountability at all. 

Senator SUNUNU. Excellent, thank you. 

Senator Breaux, in his line of questioning, talked about the foam 

insulation breaking loose, and I want to be clear on what you said. 

I think you indicated that there had been 30 impacts, approximately 30 impacts, that had resulted in a specific amount of damage. 

Admiral GEHMAN. One inch. 

Senator SUNUNU. One inch? Or I take it that is one inch or greater. 

Admiral GEHMAN. One inch or greater. 

Senator SUNUNU. And——

Admiral GEHMAN. Sir, excuse me, per flight. 

Senator SUNUNU. There have been an average of 30 impacts per 

flight that have resulted in damage of one inch or greater. And can 

you describe—when you say ‘‘damage of one inch or greater,’’ can 

you give us a little bit more background or detail as to what type 

of damage that is and what part of the Shuttle? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Yes, sir. It is on what we call the ‘‘acreage 

tile,’’ the 25,000 individual tiles, like this. And we are talking about 

a divot, a chip, that is greater than one inch in any dimension. And 

underneath this black is white, so if you chip this, it is pretty obvious. So a chip in the tile anyplace on the orbiter in the thermalVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
41

protection system that has a dimension in any direction of greater 

than one inch. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thirty, an average number or——

Admiral GEHMAN. Thirty is an average number. 

Senator SUNUNU. And talk to me a little about the standard deviation. Did it vary greatly from flight to flight or——

Admiral GEHMAN. There were——

Senator SUNUNU.—was it pretty consistent that you would have 

30 impacts of that nature? 

Admiral GEHMAN. With the exception of four or five flights in 

which there were tremendous variations, up in the hundreds, and 

these were accounted for—for example, when NASA changed what 

we call the ‘‘blowing agent,’’ the air power behind the foam application, in accordance with EPA regulations to stop using freon, on the 

very next tank that flew with the new blowing agent the number 

of divots was up in the hundreds. They immediately knew what the 

problem was. They changed blowing agents. It had gasified in a different way that they had not anticipated. So they fixed it, and the 

next time it went back down to 30, just like that. 

I would also tell you, Senator, that the trend over all 113 flights 

is flat, not getting any better. 

Senator SUNUNU. There seems to be, or have been, a process to 

measure and quantify the damage from these impacts. Was there 

any process, albeit unsuccessful, from your description, to address 

or reduce the number of impacts? 

Admiral GEHMAN. There have been steps taken. There have been 

discussions, meetings, studies, analyses to reduce it. Unsuccessful. 

And while our audit—we call it an ‘‘audit,’’ because—we call it ‘‘following the foam’’—there is a foam audit going on right now, all the 

way from the first flight, trying to go through the records to see 

what the records say that these various boards and committees did 

to adjudicate, ‘‘What should we do about the foam?’’ And, generally 

speaking, the records kind of just die off. What I mean is that the 

issue just kind of goes away. It is never actually really addressed 

in an engineering point of view. 

Senator SUNUNU. When did it go away? 

Admiral GEHMAN. What happen is, is that the foam hits the orbiter, there are a couple of significant issues, it appears on the 

FRR, the flight readiness review, and various material Boards, 

they study it real hard to see what they can do about it, they have 

four or five more flights in which there are only minor problems, 

and they say, ‘‘Well, looks like it is not a big problem.’’ And then 

what happens is that success clouds their engineering judgment. 

They say, ‘‘Well, look, it is still happening, but nothing bad is happening. It looks like it is okay.’’ Then another couple of years will 

go by, and something big will happen, it will appear in the records 

again, some studies will be ordered, some engineering analysis, 

maybe a fix, and then the number go back down to reasonable 

numbers, and success again breeds this attitude that it looks like 

it is okay. 

Senator SUNUNU. But it is fair to say the average number of impacts over the last, just say, 20 flights was relatively constant. 

Admiral GEHMAN. All the way from the first one, it is relatively 

constant. 

42

Senator SUNUNU. Throughout, the issue of space debris was 

raised during just some of the early press accounts, guesswork, hypothesis, you know, of what might have happened. I assume that 

has been reviewed pretty thoroughly by the Board. Is that concern 

or question still a possibility as a cause of damage or perhaps 

something that made existing damage worse while in orbit? And on 

a related note, have you learned anything or come to any conclusions about our ability to track and to deal with the threat of space 

debris to future flights? 

Admiral GEHMAN. The issue of the possibility of the orbiter being 

hit by space debris is unresolved by the Board at this time after 

a lot of work. The Board understands the ability of the United 

States to track space debris down to a certain size, and the Board 

understands how the orbiter is maneuvered around the intersection—you can call ‘‘conjunction’’—with space debris down to a certain size. But then micrometeorite, the little, tiny stuff that we 

cannot track, that we do not even know is out there, remains an 

open issue. 

And we have attempted to get at this issue by a number of very 

clever ways. The orbiter has some very, very sensitive 

accelerometers on-board the output of which is recorded on-board 

and not ‘‘telemetried’’ down to earth. It turns out that the recovery 

of this data recorder, which is a miracle, has allowed us to read out 

those accelerometers. There are a couple of little jiggles in some of 

those accelerometers, which would suggest that we need to look 

harder at that. But we cannot rule out a tiny little micrometeorite 

kind of a strike. 

Senator SUNUNU. My final question for the——

The CHAIRMAN. The time has expired. 

Senator SUNUNU. May I ask just one final question? 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. 

Senator SUNUNU. And I think it is a short answer. In hindsight, 

or looking back to the very first few days of this investigation, 

which was a difficult time for so many people, is there anything at 

this point that you would look back and say, ‘‘You know, in hindsight, in the first few days, I do wish we had taken a particular 

step or structured things slightly differently or taken some time, 

you know, to facilitate a particular task,’’ anything that you could 

identify, Administrator? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. I guess, as a personal and professional philosophy, 

my attitude is make the best decision you can based on the information you have at the time and move on and continue to progress. 

I do not spend a lot of time thinking back to what we mighta, 

coulda, shoulda, woulda. I think it is as professional and as 

straightforward a process as I know how to do, and it was within 

hours that not only the NASA team, but also the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, was empaneled and the investigation 

began immediately. Everybody followed a contingency plan that I 

had personally reviewed several times, in the event something like 

this could happen, and was very content that starting at 9:29 that 

morning, the first action item on that contingency plan was actionable, and we followed the procedure exactly the way we had talked 

about it. Secure in the knowledge that we would likely not ever 

43

have to use it, we, nonetheless, had to, and I just cannot look back 

on that and really revise the history of it. 

If I could, very quickly, Senator, just observe one point, I think, 

in the discussion here that you have had on the strikes. This is 

the—the tile damage on each and every flight—Admiral Gehman 

has got it exactly right—some of it comes from foam strikes, no 

question about it. And there are many other things that will also 

damage the tile. Of those 25,000 tiles that are aboard, as soon as 

every orbiter has landed, the first thing the commander wants to 

do first, and Senator McCain will appreciate this, is you want to 

make sure that the wheels are right on the center line of the runway. That is the first obsession on the part of every commander. 

The next step, though, is to walk around the orbiter and observe 

every one of these strikes. And there are lots and lots of streaking 

that occurs on the tiles. 

And based on the condition of those tiles, they are either replaced or repaired in between flights, and the issue that I think 

Admiral Gehman was talking about—so, in other words, there are 

a lot of contributing factors; not just foam, but plenty of other incidents that will occur on orbit or on re-entry that will create a visible kind of damage to the tiles on-board the Shuttle itself. And 

each of those are either replaced or repaired. 

But the issue I think that Admiral Gehman is raising that really, 

really is a point of deep consternation with us right now, that we 

are really doing a lot of soul searching about, is there are certain 

aspects of this that were tolerated because it had this exacting kind 

of ‘‘no unusual circumstance out of the norm.’’ And so what academics are referring to is the normalization of deviation, as in ‘‘if 

you see it so many times, you finally consider it to be an acceptable 

condition,’’ is the issue. That is the point we are really doing some 

deep soul search about. 

And as we talked about earlier, why we ever got into a position 

where we tolerated anything greater than zero on this is the point 

we are really debating among ourselves right now and trying to determine how we can create a system that would never tolerate that 

kind of circumstance again. And it is not just foam; it is the range 

of things that could tell you, in a trend, what could potentially become a deep compromise to safety-of-flight consideration. That is 

the deeper issue that I think is being raised by the Board, that we 

are hearing in public testimony, we are hearing supported, and we 

are clearly seeing evidence of that concern, and we are wrestling 

with, How do you adjust that process to assure that kind of understanding in the future? 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Keefe, did you request $15.5 million for 

the Institute for Scientific Research in Fairmont, West Virginia. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. How about $7.6 million for hydrogen research 

being conducted by the Florida State University system? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Not that I am aware of. 

The CHAIRMAN. 2.25 million for the Life Sciences Building at 

Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Not that I am aware of. 

The CHAIRMAN. You will notice that each of these are geographically specific? How about $1.8 million for the construction of a Gulf 

44

of Maine Laboratory at the Gulf of Maine Aquarium Foundation? 

Did you request that? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir, not that I am aware of. 

The CHAIRMAN. How about 1.35 million for expansion of the 

Earth Science Hall at the Maryland Science Center in Baltimore, 

Maryland? Did you ask for that? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, also, you are paying for a bug exhibit in Chicago. I saw that on one of the networks. Did you see 

that? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. I am not aware of it, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And yet your budget has been largely flat. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. I had a 3 percent increase last, and projected, if 

the Congress will tolerate, a 41⁄2 percent increase this year that we 

hope for Congress’ support. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about in previous years. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Prior—yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in the issue of responsibility, Admiral 

Gehman, I hope that you will, in your deliberations, if there are 

programs, critical programs, that have been underfunded in this 

pork-barrel spending, which is in the hundreds of millions of dollars over the past few years—hundreds of millions of dollars—

unrequested, add-ons, some outrageous, some not so outrageous, 

some of it may be good things, none of it requested—as I mentioned earlier, it went from, in 1998, from 24.7 million to 167 million in 2003—I hope that the Board, when we are talking about responsibility, will talk about the responsibility of Congress to spend 

these monies that are earmarked for NASA that are supposed to 

be for programs associated with NASA rather than pork-barrel 

spending and whether that may have impacted the funding of critical programs. I hope that the Board will be looking at that, Admiral Gehman. 

Admiral GEHMAN. We will, sir. We are going to look at budgets, 

and $100 million will buy a lot of safety engineers. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. As I mentioned, last year it was $167 

million, and some of it, it just staggers the imagination, has no 

more relation to—well, anyway. 

I have one additional question for Mr. O’Keefe. We all know what 

happened to the Soyuz capsule, steep angle, 10 Gs, 300 miles away, 

no radio communications. Are you confident that that is a vehicle 

that should be used in this interim period? And if not, what are 

the options? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Certainly, this was an outside-the-norm landing 

pattern. It was an upgrade of the Soyuz capsule, and it was the 

first time that specific upgrade module had flown. The 

Rosaviakosmos, the Russian Space Agency, is conducting an investigation now. We are a participant, and we have got members who 

are involved there. We have got a significant team of folks who are 

resident in Moscow and in Star City, who are working with the 

Russian engineers to determine exactly how this particular abnormality occurred. But it is not outside the envelope of what would 

have been expected. A ballistic re-entry can and does occur. Very 

infrequently, but it did. And in this particular case, trying to deterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
45

mine exactly what caused it in this particular case is what our objective is all about. 

Having said that, it has not posed a safety-of-flight, you know, 

factor, and it is not one that our outside folks, General Stafford and 

others who have reviewed the flight worthiness of the Soyuz, have 

concluded that it is a more than acceptable, flight-worthy craft for 

the purpose of the effort we are engaged in now to replace the 

International Space Station Expedition crews. 

So our confidence is still very high. It was, no question about it, 

the better part of two-and-a-half hours of extremely anxious period 

and four hours before we were able to get a visual, look-’em-rightin-the-eye determination that, yes, everybody was okay. But all the 

commentary from—I met with all the crew immediately after they 

returned to Star City that day, and they found that while it was 

an exciting trip, it was not, nonetheless, something that they were 

untrained for. They knew that was within the envelope of how that 

happens. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ten Gs is a pretty——

Mr. O’KEEFE. It was——

The CHAIRMAN.—interesting experience. 

Mr. O’KEEFE.—really exciting. Yes, sir. No doubt about it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson has promised me that he will 

take a maximum of ten minutes, realizing that you have already 

been here for well over two hours, and I appreciate his involvement, his experience, and what he brings to this Committee on a 

variety of issues, but particularly on this one. He is also a man of 

his word. Ten minutes. 

Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON (PRESIDING). Mr. Chairman, as long as they do 

not give ten-minute answers. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. Mr. O’Keefe, were you aware of the piece of debris that left the Shuttle on flight-day one? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Who was aware? And would they have had a 

responsibility of telling you about that debris? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Let me give you a full list of all the people who 

were aware of that particular incident. 

Senator NELSON. Make it short, because I have got lots of questions, and the Chairman wants to keep it short. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Sure. We will provide that for the record, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. 

[The information referred to follows:]

In addition to the official in the Space Shuttle Program, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, the Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space 

Station and Space Shuttle Programs, and the Associate Administrator for Safety 

and Mission Assurance were made aware of the debris hit and advised that the 

MMT had determined the event not to be a safety of flight issue. The Space Shuttle 

Program Manager was also notified that the no safety of flight decision had been 

made. 

The Administrator is kept informed of any critical aspects of any NASA 

spaceflight mission. At this point in time during the mission where the foam debris 

was not defined as a safety hazard for the STS–107 crew, it was not necessary to 

notify the Administrator.

46

Admiral GEHMAN. Senator, the piece of debris orbiting the Shuttle on flight-day two was not discovered until six days after the accident. Nobody knew about this thing when the flight——

Senator NELSON. Thank you for sharing that. 

Well, given the fact of the multiple thousands of hits from foam 

in the past, how far—did the safety people directly engage in a discussion about the foam hits? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. I am advised they did, as recently as the STS–113 

mission, which was the one immediately preceding 107. There was 

a discussion at the flight readiness review of the foam strike—of 

significance, the bipod strike that had occurred on 112—and they 

had reviewed that particular matter. 

Senator NELSON. Well, Admiral, of course, that will be a main 

part of your investigation. Admiral, when do you expect your commission to issue a report? 

Admiral GEHMAN. We are event-driven. I would characterize us 

as finishing up the investigation phase right now, and we are beginning the deliberation. We are going to move here to DC the first 

week in June and begin writing. It would be my goal, assuming 

that the Board can move along with me, to have our report delivered to you prior to the August recess. But I have to caveat that. 

That is my goal. 

Senator NELSON. Are you contemplating that you are going to 

recommend that the vehicle should be fully recertified? 

Admiral GEHMAN. I am afraid I am going to have to duck that 

question, because we have not got to that point yet. Every time we 

come to a conclusion about a recommendation, we issue it as soon 

as we can. We have a number that are percolating up right now, 

and that is not one of them. 

Senator NELSON. And, of course, as I said at the outset, it is 

enormously important to us that you are successful in this and that 

we can get on and get the thing fixed and start flying again. Now, 

in view of that, Mr. Administrator, I wanted to ask you, What are 

you anticipating in the way of an impact on the Shuttle workforce? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. We are looking to mitigate that as much as possible right now. And, indeed, folks are very busy in preparation in 

working through the issues on return to flight. If anything, I think 

we are going to be short of folks that we may need, because, again 

the nature of the recommendations that Admiral Gehman and the 

Board have released thus far, as well as those yet to come, will require a diligent, extremely vigorous implementation of that effort, 

which will require everybody in the space flight community turning 

to very, very hard. 

Senator NELSON. By the way, Admiral, on the previous answer, 

why did we not discover on flight-day two that piece of debris trailing? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Well, Senator——

Senator NELSON. Why was it only after the accident? 

Admiral GEHMAN. Right. Senator, the United States does not 

currently track the Shuttle. The United States Air Force Space 

Command and the U.S. Strategic Command keep track of everything that is in space. They keep track of all of our satellites, including the Shuttle when it is on orbit, for the purpose of making 

sure they do not run into each other. But we do not track it in the 

47

sense—like a fire-controlled guidance system or anything like that, 

that watches it. 

After this accident, we asked the U.S. Strategic Command and 

the Air Force Space Command to go back over all their millions 

and millions of records and pull out all of their observations of the 

Shuttle to see whether or not any damage could be detected. They 

could not detect any damage, but they found 3100 observations of 

the Shuttle, due course, and they discovered, in their reconstruction, ‘‘Oh, look at this. Here is something that is orbiting alongside 

the Shuttle,’’ which was reported to us six days after the accident. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you for clarifying that. 

Mr. O’Keefe, there is always this gut-wrenching question about 

whether the crew should have been told. What was the crew told 

about the strike by the foam and the likelihood of the damage? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. To my knowledge—again, I will clarify this for the 

record if it needs further—they were not advised of that and were 

not advised of any significant damage, because, again, it was inside 

what was deemed, on every previous flight, every time that it occurred, within the realm of acceptable and not a safety-of-flight 

consideration. So, therefore, it was not raised with them specifically. 

Senator NELSON. And——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Lots of other things were. Many other issues were 

raised with the crew regularly. But this did not rise to that level. 

That was a judgment call and one that was determined not to be 

a safety-of-flight consideration. 

Senator NELSON. And, Admiral, as you make your recommendations, I would respectfully suggest that the old-timers would say 

that they would definitely want the crew involved. 

Admiral GEHMAN. I think that if you will let us respond for the 

record, Senator, I think that we can shed more light on that subject. I think there is—I am not completely conversant with every 

detail, but the crew was advised at some time, and I do not know 

exactly when and what day it was or whether they were consulted 

or not. But let us get that for the record for you. There are some 

facts there. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. On that point, Admiral, and exactly right, I guess 

the question, as I interpreted it, Senator—I apologize—was, ‘‘Were 

they specifically consulted and advised about it?’’ They received the 

daily flight reports from the Mission Management Team, and on 

those reports was the noted incident of strike and a resolution of 

the question, I believe, on day 12, in which, unambiguously, it says, 

‘‘We’ve analyzed this, examined the issues, and determined it is not 

a safety-of-flight consideration.’’ So it was treated as another data 

point. It was not something that was raised specifically. 

So as you are well aware, the process during the course of onorbit is you receive lots of data, lots of information, lots of reporting 

back and forth with mission control, and it comes in many forms, 

some by voice, some by the notice and requirements. But in this 

particular case, it was noted on the Mission Management Team reports, and that will be provided for the record, as I think it was 

on February 12th, at that hearing. But there was not a specific dialogue that I am aware of with the commander or the payload specialists—I am sorry—the mission specialists aboard that were speVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
48

cifically engaged in the activity. I do not believe that was the case, 

but I will provide that for the record, as well. 

[The information referred to follows:]

On January 23, 2003, Steven Stich, a NASA Space Shuttle Flight Director who 

was working the Orbit 1 (first) shift in the Mission Control Center during the STS–

107 mission, sent an e-mail to Columbia Commander Rick Husband, informing Col. 

Husband that NASA had observed some debris striking the orbiter during launch. 

In this e-mail, Mr. Stich indicated that initial engineering analysis suggested that 

the debris did not pose a safety of flight issue to Columbia. Col. Husband replied 

to the e-mail, acknowledging its receipt and clearly indicating his understanding of 

the notification provided. A few hours later, Mr. Jeff Hanley, another Orbit 1 Mission Control member, transmitted a second e-mail to Col. Husband containing video 

of the launch and showing what appeared to be a piece of foam from the External 

Tank striking Columbia. No other communication in any form occurred between 

NASA and the crew concerning this matter. 

The foregoing e-mail exchange used the ‘‘personal’’ e-mail channel, and followed 

receipt of several media inquiries concerning the foam debris visible during ascent. 

The Johnson Space Center newsroom believed the information might prove useful 

if questions were posed about it during a scheduled series of in-flight interviews on 

January 25. While the personal e-mail protocol was not created to provide missionrelated information to orbiter crews, such use is not unusual or unprecedented. Although anticipated operational, media, and other issues are normally provided to 

the crew as part of a standard daily ‘‘package,’’ NASA has reviewed each of these 

packages, and has confirmed this exchange as the sole source of information on the 

debris strike provided Columbia. 

The STS–107 Mission Management Team (MMT) finished its evaluation of the debris strike on January 27, four days after the Stich-Husband e-mail exchange. 

Based on the findings of the debris assessment team, the MMT concluded that the 

debris impact did not pose a safety of flight issue; consequently, no additional information was provided to the Columbia crew. 

Copies of the MMT minutes, this e-mail exchange, and the daily ‘‘packages’’ will 

be available on the NASA web site at: http./www.nasa.gov/columbia/foia/

index.html

Senator NELSON. Well, I know that to cut the crew out, you are 

eliminating a great resource, and I know that there have been 

many occurrences where emergencies have arisen in the past that 

the crew responded immediately and had the problem fixed before 

mission control even knew about it. So you all will deliberate that 

in due time. 

Well, let me just wrap up here for the Chairman, and you can 

provide these for the record. 

What I want to do is what all of us want to do. I want us to get 

the problem fixed and get flying and get back and utilize these 

wonderful assets that we have out there, including the Space Station. But we are going to have to attend to safety in a way that 

we never have. And, of course, you have heard me rail from this 

podium in the past about, over the past decade, of the safety upgrades not being done on the Space Shuttle, and delayed. 

So if you, Mr. Administrator, will provide for the record, How 

does NASA determine what Shuttle upgrades are required, and 

how these upgrades will be selected and prioritized? And does 

NASA have a 2020 plan to show when the Shuttle-upgrade requirements will be completed? And then if you will round that out as 

we are grappling to get the technologies for a follow-on vehicle, 

why have we seen so many missteps in the development of a second-generation technology in NASA’s program? 

Any comment now? And then, if you would, supply the rest of it 

for the record. 

49

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. I will be delighted to provide all that for 

the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

General Michael Kostelnik, Deputy Associate Administrator for the International 

Space Station and Space Shuttle Programs, initiated a new Space Shuttle Service 

Life Extension Program (SLEP) during the past year, which is responsible for providing a coordinated review of the Space Shuttle upgrades by the entire space flight 

community. During the annual SLEP Conference, the Chairmen of the seven SLEP 

panels—Safety, Sustainability, Infrastructure, Resources, Industry, Performance, 

and Operations—present the prioritized list of upgrades their panels support for the 

coming year. The Integration Panel prioritizes these seven sets of upgrades into a 

single set of requirements, which is presented to the Space Flight Leadership Council. The Space Flight Leadership Council approves the final upgrades requirements 

for inclusion as part of NASA’s annual budget cycle. As long as the Space Shuttle 

is required to be available for flight, the SLEP process will be conducted to ensure 

that the Space Shuttle is maintained at the proper level for safe human space flight.

Mr. O’KEEFE. We are moving ahead aggressively on the orbital 

space plan to guarantee a crew-transfer vehicle capacity between 

here and the International Space Station. That is its mission, that 

is its objective. To use, then, the Shuttle for the purpose of the 

heavy-lift cargo capacities, as required. That is a mid-term kind of 

a requirement. 

We are also developing the next-generation launch technologies 

which will ultimately provide for a space-exploration vehicle. 

Whether it is a replacement for Shuttle or not is something that, 

really, we ought to think about long and hard, because it is only 

capable of orbit within low-earth orbit, it has minimal maneuverability, it has no power-generation source of its own, all of which 

are things we need to correct, from a technology standpoint, to look 

at anything beyond low-earth orbit. I think you will see emerge 

from this process an answer on that front for the longer term, 

‘‘What replaces this capability for more expansive space-exploration 

objectives,’’ in very short order. 

Senator NELSON. Gentlemen, thank you very much. The meeting 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(51)

APPENDIX

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

HON. SEAN O’KEEFE

Question 1. In the recently submitted NASA FY 2003 Operating Plan, it was stat- ed in the Congressional Increases section that $900,000 had been provided for the 

‘‘Computing, Information, and Communication Technology Program only for Mobile, 

Wireless, and Broadband Internet Capability.’’ It was indicated in the plan that this 

earmark had been inadvertently dropped as an earmark from the final Conference 

compilation. Can you explain how this process of adding ‘‘inadvertent’’ earmarks 

works within NASA? 

Answer. The Congressional increase for the item in question was included as part 

of total funding provided for Aerospace Technology programs in House Report 107–

740, accompanying H.R. 5604, the FY 2003 VA–HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill. Conference action yielded a total for Aerospace Technology that was 

$900,000 greater than all items listed in the Report. Committee staff subsequently 

notified NASA that this item had been inadvertently omitted from the Conference 

Report, and requested that NASA include it in the Operating Plan as a technical 

correction.

Question 2. Based upon commercially available satellite imaging, can you comment on the utility of having satellite images of the Columbia’s left wing on-orbit? 

Answer. NASA has significantly enhanced procedures in place to maximize available national assets to assess Shuttle orbiters during human space flight missions. 

The memorandum of agreement between NASA and NIMA was finalized on July 11, 

2003.

Question 3. What lessons has NASA learned from its analysis of the Columbia 

tragedy? What have you done to ensure that these ‘‘lessons learned’’ are fully integrated into NASA’s management and operations? Is there a definitive ‘‘lessons 

learned’’ program at NASA to minimize the repetition of past mistakes? 

Answer. On February 1, 2003, NASA pledged to the Columbia families that we 

would find the problems, fix them and return to the exploration objectives to which 

they dedicated their lives. NASA has just received the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report, which fulfills the first of NASA’s commitments to the families. To fulfill the second commitment—fixing the problems—the first important 

step is that NASA has accepted the findings and recommendations of the CAIB report and will comply with them. The CAIB report represents a valuable blueprint 

and roadmap to achieving the second commitment, and the Board provided NASA 

a head start by releasing information throughout their deliberations. As of this time, 

NASA has developed a preliminary Implementation Plan for the recommendations 

of the CAIB, and will update it now to include all the findings and recommendations. The next step involves wise choices by NASA to select the options necessary 

to comply with the recommendations. In addition, all of the ‘‘lessons learned’’ will 

be documented in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System including information and recommendations provided by the CAIB.

Question 4. Questions have been raised by NASA’s impact analysis performed by 

Boeing of the foam strike on the left wing of the Columbia. In response to post hearing questions from the Committee’s earlier hearing on the Columbia accident, NASA 

stated the results of scenarios 5 and 6 from the impact analysis were ‘‘discussed’’. 

Is this an acceptable practice of documenting results at NASA? 

Answer. Results of the analysis were presented (discussed) during a Mission Management Team (MMT) meeting during the STS–107 flight. This MMT process is 

being strengthened to provide rigor and a requirement for documented presentations.

Question 5. What role did the NASA Safety Office play in the assessment of the 

impact analysis? 

Answer. The safety community was actively engaged in the review and assessment of the impact analysis that was prepared and presented by Boeing. A safety 

52

representative (from the JSC safety organization) was present at all the meetings 

during which this topic was discussed, including the Mission Management Team 

briefings. The safety community agreed with the conclusion that a safe return of the 

vehicle was likely, provided that the suspected damage was bounded within the limits of the damage assessment estimates and the analytical capability. The safety 

community, based on input from the safety representative on the team through status reporting up to the Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, was aware of the findings and recommendations of the analysis and concurred 

with the Shuttle program’s assessment that there was no significant re-entry risk 

due to any anticipated tile damage. Further, a safety representative was present at 

all of the Shuttle program manager’s weekly status teleconferences, where the topic 

was openly discussed among all the team members.

Question 6. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board has already made two recommendations. The first one was that NASA should develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan, using advanced non-destructive inspection technology, to 

determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system 

components. The second recommendation was that NASA should modify its Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to 

make on-orbit imaging for each Shuttle flight a standard requirement. What steps 

have you taken to implement these recommendations, and how much will they cost? 

Answer. NASA is in the process of developing the comprehensive plan for inspecting all RCC components. A technical interchange between NASA and industry representatives was recently held to assess available state-of-the-art methods of nondestructive inspection. Additional non-destructive inspection methods, such as 

thermography and shearography, are being evaluated to determine their effectiveness in determining potential flaws in various materials used in the Shuttle program.

Additionally, NASA and the NIMA have finalized an updated agreement for support of Space Shuttle missions.

Question 7. What type of inspections was NASA doing to the RCC components on 

the leading edges of the Shuttle wings prior to the Columbia accident? 

Answer. As specified in the Orbiter maintenance document, the following inspection were conducted on the wing leading edges of each Orbiter:

• Surface tactile inspection—every flight

• Visual surface inspection—every flight

• Pre/post-flight lower access panel micro inspections—every flight

• RCC pinhole inspection—every Orbiter maintenance and major modification period

• Detailed breakdown inspection including eddy current and ultrasound—every 

Orbiter maintenance and major modification period

Question 8. According to press reports, NASA has begun a widespread review of 

critical design and safety features and management practices to prepare for returning the Space Shuttle to flight. NASA officials are reported to believe that it could 

take 18 to 24 months before the Shuttle will fly again. Could you please describe 

what NASA is reviewing, and NASA’s ‘‘return to flight’’ strategy? 

Answer. Return to Flight actions will consider, but not be limited to:

• Review the adequacy and robustness of key Space Shuttle hardware systems.

• Review the Certificate of Flight Readiness and MMT process

• Quantify entry risk

• Validate that controls are appropriate and implemented properly for accepted 

risks

• Review Failure Modes and Effects Analyses, Critical Items Lists, Waivers, etc.

• Review the identification and resolution of the in-flight anomaly review process.

• Redesign of External Tank Bi-Pod thermal protection system to eliminate foam.

• Improved vehicle inspection techniques and methods during launch, ascent and 

on-orbit operations

• Develop on-orbit thermal protection system repair techniques.

Reaching specific milestones will drive NASA’s Return to Flight effort, not specific 

calendar dates. NASA is working toward a target launch date for planning purposes, 

to keep Space Shuttle and Return to Flight processing moving forward, but the 

Agency is not locked into any particular date. NASA will launch STS–114 when the 

53

Agency determines that the Shuttle is ‘‘fit to fly’’ and when we have safely achieved 

specific milestones throughout the Return to Flight effort.

Question 9. The halt in Space Shuttle operations will delay the construction of the 

International Space Station—a program that is already well known for schedule 

delays and cost overruns. What effect will the Columbia accident have on schedule 

and costs of construction of the Space Station? 

Answer. NASA has maintained the original delivery schedules for all items of 

U.S.-provided Space Station flight hardware and is continuing with the integration 

and test of all ISS launch packages as planned. Additionally, the European-provided, U.S.-owned Node 2 was delivered to NASA Kennedy Space Center in June 

2003, completing the delivery of all flight elements needed to complete the U.S. Core 

configuration. However, delays to the ISS assembly sequence resulting from the Columbia accident will require NASA to retain critical contractor expertise longer than 

anticipated. NASA has just received the report of the CAIB. We will not know the 

extent of overall delays or costs until we have received and assessed the final recommendations of the CAIB and progressed further into our return to flight planning.

Question 10. Last year NASA appointed a Mishap Investigation Board to examine 

the loss of the CONTOUR mission, a satellite that broke apart last August. Are the 

Columbia and CONTOUR accidents being treated as isolated events or in context 

of NASA’s long term plans? 

Answer. The CONTOUR and Columbia accidents are both being addressed in 

terms of NASA’s long-term plans. While these accidents involved very different 

kinds of spacecraft, there are nonetheless some important common elements in both 

mishaps with regard to NASA’s approach to engineering rigor, processes, and instincts. These common elements are among those addressed in ongoing improvements to NASA’s engineering culture, in part by the establishment of the NASA Engineering and Safety

Question 11. Could you please expand upon the purpose of General Stafford’s 

independent assessment team and the role that it will play in NASA’s implementation on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s recommendations? 

Answer. The Return to Flight Task Group, led by Gen. Tom Stafford, has been 

tasked to perform an independent assessment of NASA’s actions to implement the 

recommendations of the CAIB, as they relate to the safety and operational readiness. While the Task Group will not attempt to assess the adequacy of the CAIB 

recommendations, it will report on the progress of NASA’s response to meet their 

intent.

Question 12. Can you update us on your consideration of crew escape mechanisms 

on the Shuttle orbiters? 

Answer. Crew survivability has been studied continuously since the Challenger

accident. Through the Shuttle Life Extension Program (SLEP), additional studies 

are planned to further refine a number of crew escape concepts that were developed 

in a 1999 study conducted by the Orbiter Project together with United Space Alliance and Boeing Company.

Question 13. You testified during the hearing that you were concerned by the 

‘‘normalization of deviation’’ at NASA, especially the toleration of foam insulation 

falling from the External Tank, because it happened so many times it was considered an acceptable condition. The recent return of Expedition 6 by Soyuz capsule 

was also considered an ‘‘outside-the-norm’’ landing pattern, but NASA has claimed 

that it was not a ‘‘safety-of-flight’’ issue, because similar landings had occurred before. Are you concerned that NASA’s response to the Soyuz landing is yet another 

case of ‘‘normalization of deviation?’’ What do you intend to do to ensure that the 

cause of this ‘‘outside-the-norm’’ landing is found and fixed, so that it doesn’t happen 

again? 

Answer. The ballistic mode of re-entry for the Soyuz TMA–1 (ISS Flight 5S) descent module was one of four pre-programmed modes of re-entry. Soyuz crews are 

trained for all four modes. The ballistic re-entry was conducted safely and as designed and the Soyuz TMA–1 (ISS Flight 5S) landed in the predicted ballistic descent landing zone. The crew was never in danger.

Experts from Russia and the United States are making every effort to fully understand and resolve the factors that contributed to the Soyuz TMA–1 (ISS Flight 5S) 

spacecraft’s return to Earth in the backup ballistic mode. The Russian Aviation and 

Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) established a technical investigative Board, which it 

calls a ‘‘Commission,’’ led by RSC Energia the responsible organization for Soyuz 

manufacturing, to determine the cause of this mode of re-entry and provide specific 

recommendations. The Commission determined that the Soyuz automatically 

54

switched to the ballistic mode shortly before re-entry when the on-board computers 

received an indication of a failure in the capsule’s electronic attitude control system. 

The NASA Advisory Council Task Force on International Space Station Operational Readiness (the Stafford Task Force) will work with its counterpart Russian 

organization, the Rosaviakosmos Advisory Expert Council (together referred to together as the Stafford-Anfimov Joint Commission), to conduct an assessment of the 

Commission’s investigation of the Soyuz TMA–1 (ISS Flight 5S) re-entry. This assessment occurred during the week of July 21 in Moscow. The Deputy Associate Administrator of NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance is an ex-officio member of the Stafford Task Force and will be integrally involved in the Joint Commission’s review of the Commission’s investigation. 

NASA, which has been regularly briefed by the Commission throughout its investigation, will review the Commission’s investigation, and the assessment of that investigation, by the Stafford-Anfimov Joint Commission. NASA will continue to work 

with our Russian colleagues to ensure that all necessary follow-up actions are implemented.

Question 14. I understand that the tiles are so sensitive that the Shuttle will not 

launch in the rain, and touching them can cause damage. If this is the case, why, 

when there was an image of debris hitting the tiles, did not this result in the immediate classification of this event as a serious emergency that threatened the loss of 

crew and/or orbiter? 

Answer. Given the information available at the time that the foam hit the wing 

of Columbia, it was presumed that the impact was to the tile-covered underside of 

the wing and not the leading edge. A tile assessment and analysis concluded that 

the impact to tile was not a safety of flight issue. If it had been known that the 

impact was to the wing leading edge, a different analysis would have been conducted.

Question 15. NASA has stated that safety is a top priority for the agency. What 

role did NASA’s safety office play in the decision concerning Columbia’s re-entry? 

Answer. The safety community was actively engaged in the review and assessment of the impact analysis that was prepared and presented by Boeing. The Shuttle’s Mission Management Team includes a safety representative. Safety personnel 

agreed with the conclusion that a safe return of the vehicle was likely, provided the 

suspected damage was bounded within the limits of the damage assessment estimates and the analytical capability. The safety community, based on input from the 

safety representative on the team through status reporting up to the Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, was aware of the findings and 

recommendations from the analysis and concurred with the Shuttle program’s assessment that there was no significant re-entry risk due to any anticipated tile damage.

Question 16. Recently, the Soyuz, which is the only vehicle currently being used 

to reach the International Space Station, missed its landing target by 300 miles, 

and came in at the wrong angle, subjecting its 3-man crew to high gravitational 

forces. What has NASA’s Safety office done to address concerns about Soyuz’s safety 

and reliability? 

Answer. Russia’s RSC Energia, which is responsible for Soyuz manufacturing, established a technical review Board to conduct an investigation into the possible 

causes of the Soyuz TMA–1 spacecraft’s return to Earth in the ‘‘ballistic mode’’ of 

re-entry. The Board determined that the ballistic descent mode likely occurred due 

to the failure of one of the descent control system instruments. The Board was then 

tasked with detecting the failure location, specifying its origin, and generating specific recommendations to prevent similar situations from occurring during subsequent flights of the Soyuz TMA spacecraft.

It should be noted that the ballistic mode of re-entry for the Soyuz TMA–1 descent 

module was one of four possible programmed modes for re-entry. Soyuz crews are 

trained for all four-re-entry modes. The Soyuz TMA–1 landed in the predicted ballistic descent-landing zone. 

The NASA Advisory Council Task Force on International Space Station Operational Readiness (the Stafford Task Force) will work with its counterpart Russian 

organization, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) Advisory Expert Council (referred to together as the Stafford-Anfimov Joint Commission), to 

conduct an assessment of the Energia Board’s investigation of the Soyuz TMA–1 reentry. This assessment occurred during the week of July 21, 2003 in Moscow. 

NASA will review the Energia Board’s investigation and the assessment of that 

investigation by the Stafford-Anfimov Joint Commission, and will continue to work 

with our Russian colleagues to ensure that all necessary follow-up actions are implemented.

55

Question 17. Given the history of tile damage to the Shuttle orbiters during a mission, do you have any thoughts as to whether or not on-orbit contingency plans 

should address this problem? 

Answer. NASA is currently assessing various new technologies that could provide 

methods to inspect and repair damage to the Orbiter’s thermal protection system 

during flight. Previously, there were no methods available that did not subject the 

crew or vehicle to additional risk. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

HON. SEAN O’KEEFE

Question 1. How does NASA determine what Shuttle upgrades are required and 

how these upgrades will be selected and prioritized? 

Answer. The new Space Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) addresses 

the critical investments that will ensure the Space Shuttle can safely and effectively 

meet the requirements of the new Integrated Space Transportation Plan. The Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space Station and Space Shuttle Programs has created a process—the SLEP Summit—that will meet annually to identify and frame the immediate and long-range investment direction and strategy for 

SLEP.

In preparation for the SLEP summit, eight panels were identified to examine and 

prioritize potential investments. The panels focused on Space Shuttle safety, sustainability, infrastructure, resources, operations, and performance issues. In addition, an industry panel was chartered to provide a unique industry perspective. 

With the exception of the industry panel, each panel was lead by a senior NASA 

manager and populated with a diverse membership across each space flight center 

and relevant NASA Headquarters functional offices and Enterprises. The panels 

were tasked with assessing the potential costs, risks, and benefits of additional investments for their respective areas. 

The first SLEP Summit was held on March 19–20, 2003 in Michoud, LA. The Panels briefed those in attendance and the Space Flight Leadership Council (SFLC) on 

their findings and recommendations for the strategic investments needed to maintain and improve the long-term operational capability of the Space Shuttle. On May 

7, 2003, the SFLC selected its top priorities for investment from among the panels’ 

recommendations. Additionally, recommendations from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board requiring long-term investment are likely to be incorporated into 

the SLEP process. 

A SLEP Summit will be held annually to re-evaluate and update Shuttle priorities 

and investment strategies.

Question 2. Does NASA have a 2020 plan to show when the Shuttle upgrade requirements will be completed? 

Answer. The 2020 plan was an internal study that provided a foundation for identifying the resources required to maintain the safety and sustain the viability of the 

Space Shuttle program through 2020. The Space Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is our current process. SLEP will prioritize and implement immediate 

and long-range investment direction and strategy for the Space Shuttle. This includes many of the recommendations that were derived from the 2020 study. Since 

a SLEP Summit will be held annually to re-evaluate and update Shuttle priorities 

and investment strategies, there is no detailed long-range plan roadmap that describes exactly what upgrades will be completed when. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

ADMIRAL HAROLD W. GEHMAN

Question 1. Another issue that has been raised is about privileged information 

that the Board has gained from confidential interviews with witnesses. Could you 

please explain the importance of this privileged information to your investigation, 

and what will become of this ‘‘privileged’’ testimony after the Board’s work is done? 

Answer. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) conducted essentially 

two investigations in one. The first investigation was the accident investigation, 

that is, an investigation to determine what happened to the Columbia. This accident 

investigation was conducted with full disclosure of all processes and evidence obtained in support of the Board’s findings and recommendations. The second investigation could be described more accurately as a safety investigation. It used procedures long established as effective by various government agencies, including allowing individuals to express frank and honest views and opinions in a manner that 

56

protects them from any threat, real or perceived, of retaliation from their organization. The statements of these individuals provide a very important view of organizational practices that relate to safety. Experience has shown that investigations frequently cannot obtain candid, truthful, or possibly incriminating information any 

other way. Therefore, being able to grant witnesses confidentiality is very important 

to the Board. The ultimate disposition of these protected statements has not yet 

been determined. If they are archived by the National Archives along with the rest 

of the Board’s documents, every effort will be made to ensure that the CongressCAIB agreement, regarding access and disclosure, will remain in effect.

Question 2. In testimony before the Science, Technology, and Space Subcommittee, 

Dr. Alex Roland, a former NASA historian, testified that NASA originally planned 

for the fleet of Space Shuttles to be replaced every five years. Many observers have 

warned that the Space Shuttle is being used past its expected lifetime, and that it 

is becoming obsolete. There have even been reports that NASA engineers have to 

use the Internet site, E-Bay, to find sources for parts. Based on your investigation, 

do you believe that the Space Shuttle has become ‘‘worn out’’ and should be replaced? 

Answer. The referenced incident involving an E-Bay parts search involved an obsolete circuit card for a personal computer, part of a shop test equipment set at the 

NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD); it was not flight hardware, which requires 

full certification in all instances. NSLD personnel work very hard to either repair 

parts or have spares available. From May 2, thru Apr 3, 18,213 parts were delivered 

from stock with no orbiter cannibalizations, a testament to effective repair and 

stocking efforts. For flight hardware as well as ground systems equipment, one of 

the significant challenges to NSLD has been what is referred to as ‘‘Diminishing 

Manufacturing Sources,’’ or DMS. The availability of spare parts is an ongoing challenge for all systems, not just the Shuttle, but has little to do with the Shuttles 

being ‘‘worn out.’’ The Shuttle mission life capability is continually updated by 

NASA, which has concluded that 100 missions are achievable.

Question 3. One area that the Board said it would investigate concerns NASA’s 

use of contractors. Specifically, the Board has indicated that it will examine NASA’s 

inspection and oversight of contracts, and whether NASA is making high enough demands from private companies in its contracts. Could you please discuss the work 

that the Board has done in this area? 

Answer. The CAIB has examined the relationship between NASA and its contractors at various levels, starting at the top (Space Flight Operations Contract) and including actual performance at the tactical level (e.g. Government Mandatory Inspection Points/GMIPs, surveillance, and Foreign Object Debris/FOD prevention). The 

final report will include specific recommendations on modifying and improving the 

current contract and government-contractor relationships at these various levels.

The trend in government over the last 15 years has been toward decreased government execution, with contractors performing more execution and the government 

providing oversight. 

NASA has also followed this trend, but as headcount NASA has been reduced, 

there has also been a shift from NASA’s intensive monitoring to NASA’s sampling 

and auditing, with an increased dependence on partnering, moving NASA further 

from actual technical performance and into performance monitoring. Prime contactor cuts have, in turn, resulted in ‘‘self oversight’’ of critical suppliers. Emphasis 

on partnering has blurred lines of responsibility and accountability between NASA 

and its contractors. 

Additionally, performance-based contracting has proven difficult in terms of emphasizing and measuring the right things with the appropriate benchmarks, such 

as outcomes, milestones, result, launches and compliance at lower/intermediate levels. In general, award fee scores are high, but it is important to understand what 

is being measured, as well as what impact the scoring system itself has on performance. 

Question 4. At the Board’s March 6 hearing, Henry MacDonald, a former Director 

of the NASA Ames Research Center, stated that the NASA’s recordkeeping was poor 

and that its records cannot be searched by modern tools like Web browsers. He said 

that there was no easy way for managers to search NASA records for the four previous occasions where pieces of foam insulation fell off of the external tank. Could 

you please comment on this testimony, and the role that this database and other 

inadequately designed management tools may have played in NASA’s decisions regarding the Columbia? 

Answer. NASA’s system for tracking problems and corrective actions across the 

Space Shuttle Program (SSP) is cumbersome to use, not well-integrated across various centers and program elements, and difficult to search or use for analytical purVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:47 Mar 29, 2006 Jkt 097865 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\97865.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
57

poses. That said, it is difficult to show that these shortcomings played a direct role 

in management decisions relating to Columbia, or otherwise contributed to the accident.

The Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) System is the SSP’s system for reporting problems and tracking corrective actions on Space Shuttle hardware and software. Throughout the investigation, the CAIB heard repeatedly from 

NASA employees and contractors about difficulties with this system, and experienced many of these same problems during limited first-hand attempts to use it. 

In an effort to integrate PRACA databases across different centers, NASA initiated the Web Program Compliance and Status System (WEBCASS). While it provides the user access to consolidated information with some higher-level search capability, it is still reportedly difficult to use. 

Database shortcomings cannot be directly implicated in decisions relating to foam. 

The history of falling foam was well known, and most managers could recall from 

memory the major incidents, particularly those involving bipod ramp foam. The fact 

that there was a well-known history, without catastrophic consequences, is reflected 

in repeated statements that foam has never been a safety of flight issue.

Question 5. You mentioned during the hearing the extensive use of accelerometers 

on the Shuttle’s exterior. What is the extent of capability in temperature sensors 

on the exterior? Are they sensitive enough to detect any abnormality due to damage 

tiles? 

Answer. There were 94 temperature sensors on Columbia, 50 of which were surface temperature sensors. Forty-one were mounted in tiles, eight were structure 

temperature sensors, and one was on an insulation blanket. All of these surface 

temperature measurements were recorded on the Modular Auxiliary Data System, 

which was recovered in southeast Texas.

Any disturbance in surface smoothness will manifest itself as a downstream flow 

field disturbance. Thus, if the temperature sensor is close enough to the damage and 

the damage is large enough, it is possible that the sensor would detect a disturbance. However, the tiles are very good insulators, so small damage in a tile that 

also has a temperature sensor embedded in it may not sense the damage. 

Observers have noted the many similarities and differences between the Rogers 

Commission and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Question 6. What lessons did you learn from the Rogers Commission and apply 

to your investigation into the Columbia tragedy? 

Answer. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board benefited significantly from 

the Rogers Commission and even includes members who participated in the Challenger accident investigation. All CAIB members read the Rogers Report and spoke 

to people with knowledge regarding how the Challenger investigation was organized. 

The lessons learned are many, including:

• Don’t assume anything

• Don’t fall in love with the first plausible cause scenario

• Break up into independent work groups

• Independently verify certain matters

• Crosscheck testimony

• Public hearings are valuable

Question 6a. Based on your investigation, do you believe that NASA is continuing 

to operate under the ‘‘lessons learned’’ from the Challenger accident, or have these 

lessons been forgotten? 

Answer. This issue is currently under review by the CAIB. It would be premature 

to express what the Board might finally decide, however, this is certainly a matter 

at which the Board is taking under consideration.

Æ