2023 IL 128338

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 128338) 

WILLIAM WALTON, Appellant, v. ROOSEVELT UNIVERSITY, Appellee.

Opinion filed March 23, 2023.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Cunningham, Rochford, 

and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 In this appeal, the Cook County circuit court certified the following question 

for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 

2019): 

“Does Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.[ ] § 185 

[(2018)]) preempt [Biometric Information Privacy Act] claims (740 ILCS 14/1 
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[(West 2018)]) asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a collective 

bargaining agreement?” 

The appellate court answered the certified question in the affirmative. 2022 IL App 

(1st) 210011, ¶ 2. This court allowed William Walton’s petition for leave to appeal. 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). For the following reasons, we answer the 

certified question in the affirmative, affirm the judgment of the appellate court, and 

remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 

 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In March 2019, plaintiff, William Walton, filed a class-action complaint against 

his former employer, defendant Roosevelt University (Roosevelt), alleging 

Roosevelt’s collection, use, storage, and disclosure of Walton’s and similarly 

situated employees’ biometric data violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act 

(Privacy Act) (740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b), (d) (West 2018)). 

¶ 4 According to the complaint, Walton was employed in Roosevelt’s campus 

safety department from January 2018 until January 2019. As a condition of 

employment, Roosevelt required Walton and similarly situated employees to enroll 

scans of their hand geometry onto a biometric timekeeping device as a means of 

clocking in and out of work. Walton alleged that (1) he was never provided with 

nor signed a release consenting to the collection, storage, or dissemination of his 

biometric data; (2) he had never been informed of any biometric data retention 

policy developed by Roosevelt; and (3) he had never been informed of the specific 

purpose or length of time for which his biometric information was being stored. 

Specifically, Walton claimed Roosevelt violated (1) section 15(a) of the Privacy 

Act (id. § 15(a)), by failing to develop a written policy, made available to the public, 

establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying 

biometric identifiers or information; (2) section 15(b) of the Privacy Act (id.

§ 15(b)), by failing to provide notice and to obtain written consent before colleting, 

using, and storing Walton’s biometric identifiers or information; and (3) section 

15(d) of the Privacy Act (id. § 15(d)), by disclosing or otherwise disseminating 

Walton’s biometric identifier or information to a third party without consent.

Walton sought damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorney fees. 
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¶ 5 In July 2019, Roosevelt filed a motion to dismiss Walton’s class-action 

complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-

619 (West 2018)), alleging Walton’s Privacy Act claims were preempted by section 

301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 185 

(2018)). In moving to dismiss, Roosevelt stated that Walton was a member of SEIU, 

Local 1, a collective bargaining unit, while he worked as a nonsupervisory security 

employee for Roosevelt and thus agreed to a collective bargaining agreement 

(CBA) between Roosevelt and Walton’s union. Accordingly, Roosevelt argued 

Walton’s claims under the Privacy Act were preempted by the LMRA because the 

manner by which any employee clocks in and out was a subject covered by a broad 

management-rights clause in the CBA. In support of federal preemption, Roosevelt 

cited the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Miller 

v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898, 903 (7th Cir. 2019), which held that federal 

labor law preempts Privacy Act claims when the claims require interpretation or 

administration of a CBA. 

¶ 6 In May 2020, the circuit court denied Roosevelt’s motion to dismiss, finding 

Miller distinguishable and concluding that preemption was inapplicable in this 

matter because a claim under the Privacy Act “is not intertwined with or dependent 

substantially upon consideration of terms of [a] collective bargaining agreement” 

where a “person’s rights under [the Privacy Act] exist independently of both 

employment and any given CBA.” 

¶ 7 Roosevelt filed a motion to reconsider or, in the alternative, to certify a question 

for immediate appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 

2019). The circuit court denied Roosevelt’s motion to reconsider but certified the 

following question for interlocutory appeal: “Does Section 301 of the Labor 

Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.[ ] § 185) preempt [Privacy Act] claims (740 

ILCS 14/1 [(West 2018)]) asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a 

collective bargaining agreement?” 

¶ 8 The appellate court answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding 

“that Privacy Act claims asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a 

collective bargaining agreement are preempted under federal law.” 2022 IL App 

(1st) 210011, ¶ 27. The court found the Seventh Circuit recently addressed this 

question in Fernandez v. Kerry, Inc., 14 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2021). 2022 IL App 
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(1st) 210011, ¶ 18. The court noted that Walton also conceded at oral argument that 

the relevant factual and legal circumstances of this case are indistinguishable from

Fernandez. Id. Therefore, the court determined its real objective in the appeal was 

to determine whether the Seventh Circuit’s ruling on a matter of federal law lacked 

logic or reason and was, therefore, wrongly decided. Id. (citing State Bank of 

Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 54). 

¶ 9 The appellate court recognized the Seventh Circuit in Fernandez, 14 F.4th at 

646-47, held that unionized employees’ claims that their employer violated the 

Privacy Act were preempted by the LMRA (29 U.S.C. § 185). 2022 IL App (1st) 

210011, ¶ 18. The court stated that in Fernandez 

“the court of appeals explained that, when the employer invokes a broad 

management rights clause from a collective bargaining agreement in response 

to a Privacy Act claim, the claim is preempted because it requires an arbitrator 

to determine whether the employer and the union bargained about the issue or 

the union consented on the employees’ behalf.” Id. ¶ 19 (citing Fernandez, 14 

F.4th at 646). 

The court further acknowledged “[t]he court in Fernandez refers substantially to its 

recent decision in Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2019), 

in which it held that a Privacy Act claim was preempted in the same way under the 

Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 152 (2018)).” Id. (citing Miller, 926 F.3d at 903-

04). 

¶ 10 The appellate court determined Fernandez reached the proper conclusion, as 

the Privacy Act contemplates the role of a collective bargaining unit acting as an 

intermediary on issues concerning an employee’s biometric information. Id. ¶ 20 

(citing 740 ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018) (prohibiting private entities from collecting 

a person’s biometric information without obtaining consent from the subject or the 

subject’s legally authorized representative)). The court found the CBA in this case 

contained a broad management-rights clause. Id. ¶ 21. Thus, the court stated “[t]he 

timekeeping procedures for workers are a topic for negotiation that is clearly 

covered by the collective bargaining agreement and requires the interpretation or 

administration of the agreement.” Id. 
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¶ 11 While the appellate court acknowledged Walton’s argument that there was no 

reference to biometric information in the CBA, it found federal courts interpreting 

similar CBAs containing similar management-rights clauses have found the broad 

authority granted to the employer is sufficient to preempt Privacy Act claims. Id.

¶ 22 (citing, inter alia, Fernandez, 14 F.4th at 646-47, and Miller, 926 F.3d at 903). 

Therefore, the court determined the “issue in this case has been uniformly decided 

in federal courts in favor of preemption,” found the “reasoning expressed by the 

federal courts to be sound,” and “declin[ed] to find that all the federal decisions are 

wrongly decided and without logic or reason.” Id. ¶ 24 (citing State Bank of Cherry, 

2013 IL 113836, ¶ 54). 

¶ 12 The appellate court concluded, because Roosevelt advanced a nonfrivolous 

argument that bargained-for rights are at issue, it met its burden to demonstrate that 

the claims are preempted under federal law. Id. ¶ 25. Accordingly, the court stated, 

“Walton and his fellow unionized employees are not prohibited from pursuing 

redress for a violation of their right to biometric privacy—they are simply required 

to pursue those rights through the grievance procedures in their collective 

bargaining agreement rather than in state court in the first instance.” Id. ¶ 27. The 

court remanded the matter to the circuit court. Id. ¶ 29. 

¶ 13 This court allowed Walton’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) 

(eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We allowed the National Employment Lawyers Association 

(NELA)/Illinois and Raise the Floor Alliance leave to file a joint brief as amici 

curiae in support of Walton’s position. We also allowed the International 

Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 705 leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in support 

of Walton’s position. We further allowed the Illinois Chamber of Commerce leave 

to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of Roosevelt’s position. Last, we allowed 

the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the Restaurant Law 

Center, the National Retail Federation, and the Illinois Restaurant Association leave 

to file a joint brief as amici curiae in support of Roosevelt’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 

 
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¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Initially, we note the narrow focus in this appeal. Currently, we are not called 

upon to resolve Plaintiff’s claims. Instead, the task before this court is to answer 

the certified question: 

“Does Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.[ ] § 185) 

preempt [Privacy Act] claims (740 ILCS 14/1 [(West 2018)]) asserted by 

bargaining unit employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement?” 

¶ 16 A. Standard of Review 

¶ 17 A certified question under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) 

presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Eighner v. Tiernan, 2021 IL 

126101, ¶ 18. “Certified questions must not seek an application of the law to the 

facts of a specific case.” Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21. “This 

court’s scope of review is generally limited to the certified question.” Id. ¶ 25. 

 

¶ 18 B. Federal Preemption

¶ 19 The certified question requires us to determine whether Privacy Act claims 

brought by unionized employees subject to a CBA are preempted by federal law. 

“Congress’ power to pre-empt state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause of 

Art. VI of the Federal Constitution.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 

208 (1985); see U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Congressional power in the area of labor 

relations is long established. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 208. “Congress, 

however, has never exercised authority to occupy the entire field in the area of labor 

legislation.” Id. Therefore, the question of whether a certain state action is 

preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent. Id.

 

¶ 20 1. The Labor Management Relations Act

¶ 21 Section 301 of the LMRA states: 

“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as 
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defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be 

brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the 

parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the 

citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2018). 

 

¶ 22 2. Federal Court Interpretation of Federal Statutes

¶ 23 “When interpreting federal statutes, [this court] looks to the decisions of the 

United States Supreme Court and federal circuit and district courts. [Citation.] 

United States Supreme Court interpretation of federal law is clearly binding on this 

court. However, in the absence of a United States Supreme Court decision, the 

weight this court gives to federal circuit and district court interpretations of federal 

law depends on factors such as uniformity of law and the soundness of the 

decisions.” State Bank of Cherry, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 33. 

¶ 24 “[T]his court has consistently recognized the importance of maintaining a 

uniform body of law in interpreting federal statutes if the federal courts are not split 

on an issue.” Id. ¶ 34. “Thus, uniformity of the law continues to be an important 

factor in deciding how much deference to afford federal court interpretations of 

federal law.” Id. ¶ 35. While this court is bound by the United States Supreme 

Court, if lower federal courts are uniform in their interpretation of a federal statute, 

this court, in the interest of preserving unity, will give considerable weight to those 

courts’ interpretations of federal law and find them to be highly persuasive. Id.

However, this court “may choose not to follow Seventh Circuit or uniform lower 

federal court precedent if we find that precedent to be wrongly decided because we 

determine the decision to be without logic or reason.” Id. ¶ 54. Importantly, the 

absence of logic or reason standard is not met just because, had the question initially 

been before us, we may have ruled in a different manner. 

¶ 25 The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue presented in this 

appeal. Therefore, we turn to the lower federal courts to guide our analysis. 

¶ 26 Roosevelt argues two separate panels of the Seventh Circuit, in Miller, 926 F.3d 

898, and Fernandez, 14 F.4th 644, have held that Privacy Act claims for use of a 

time clock are preempted by federal labor law. Walton argues both panels 

erroneously believed the dispute in each case centered on the employers’ 
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implementation of a timekeeping device, when the actual issue raised, as in all 

actions brought under the Privacy Act, was whether the entities collected, stored, 

and disseminated employee biometric data without informed consent—an issue 

entirely separate from the use of the device itself. Accordingly, Walton argues this 

court should not follow these decisions because they were outside logic and reason 

and, therefore, wrongly decided. We analyze both cases in turn. 

¶ 27 In Miller, the Seventh Circuit addressed airline employees’ Privacy Act claims 

against their employers arising from the employers’ use of a biometric timekeeping 

system, which required employees to clock in and out with their fingerprints. 926 

F.3d at 901. The employers responded that the plaintiffs’ unions consented to and 

received notice of the employers’ attendance-tracking system on behalf of the 

plaintiffs “either expressly or through the collective bargaining agreements’ 

management-rights clauses.” Id. Thus, the employers contended “that, to the extent 

these matters are disputed, an adjustment board rather than a judge must resolve the 

difference—and that if state law gives workers rights beyond those provided by 

federal law and collective bargaining agreements, it is preempted by the Railway 

Labor Act.” Id. 

¶ 28 In considering the preemption issue, the Seventh Circuit first noted the Privacy 

Act “provides that a worker or an authorized agent may receive necessary notices 

and consent to the collection of biometric information.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

at 903 (citing 740 ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018)). It then found that the plaintiffs’ 

unions constituted authorized agents under the statute. Id. Further, the Seventh 

Circuit noted that “how workers clock in and out is a proper subject of negotiation 

between unions and employers—is, indeed, a mandatory subject of bargaining.” Id.

Thus, the Seventh Circuit determined the question of whether the unions did in fact 

consent to the collection and use of the plaintiffs’ biometric data or grant authority 

through a management-rights clause is a question for an adjustment board. Id.

“Similarly, the retention and destruction schedules for biometric data, and whether 

air carriers may use third parties to implement timekeeping and identification 

systems, are topics for bargaining between unions and management.” Id.

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held the plaintiffs’ claims under the Privacy Act 

were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2018)). Miller, 

926 F.3d at 903. 
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¶ 29 Following Miller, the Seventh Circuit in Fernandez addressed virtually the 

same issue presented in Miller but involving the federal labor statute also at issue 

in this case—section 301 of the LMRA. In Fernandez, unionized employees filed 

a class-action lawsuit against their former employer arguing the employer violated 

the Privacy Act when it failed to obtain consent before requiring workers to use 

their fingerprints to clock in and out of work. 14 F.4th at 645. The employer 

responded that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by section 301 of the LMRA 

because resolution of those claims depended on the interpretation of a CBA 

between the employer and the union that represented the plaintiffs. Id. 

¶ 30 The Seventh Circuit referred substantially to the preemption analysis in Miller

and found it equally applied to claims under section 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 646. 

Therefore, the court ultimately determined that when an employer invokes a broad 

management-rights clause from a CBA in response to a Privacy Act claim, the 

claim is preempted because it is up to an arbitrator to determine “whether the 

employer properly obtained the union’s consent.” Id. 

¶ 31 This case is similar to Fernandez where here the broad management rights 

clause in the CBA states, 

“Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Employer shall have the 

exclusive right to direct the employees covered by this Agreement. Among the 

exclusive rights of management, but not intended as a wholly inclusive list of 

them are: the right to plan, direct, and control all operations performed in the 

building, to direct the working force, to transfer, hire, demote, promote, 

discipline, suspend or discharge, for proper cause, to subcontract work and to 

relieve employees from duty because of lack of work or for any other legitimate 

reason. The Union further understands and agrees that the Employer provides 

an important service to its tenants of a personalized nature to fulfill their 

security needs, as those needs are perceived by the Employer and the tenants. 

Accordingly, this Agreement shall be implemented and interpreted by the 

parties so as to give consideration to the needs and preferences of the tenants.” 

After reviewing both Seventh Circuit cases, we do not find the decisions in either 

Miller or Fernandez to be without logic or reason. See State Bank of Cherry, 2013 

IL 113836, ¶ 54. Given the language in the CBA and the LMRA, it is both logical 

and reasonable to conclude any dispute must be resolved according to federal law 
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and the agreement between the parties. Therefore, in answering the certified 

question before us, we defer to the uniform federal case law on this matter and find 

that when an employer invokes a broad management rights clause from a CBA in 

response to a Privacy Act claim brought by bargaining unit employees, there is an 

arguable claim for preemption. Accordingly, because we do not believe the federal 

decisions were wrongly decided, and here the CBA contained a broad management 

rights clause, we find Walton’s Privacy Act claims are preempted by the LMRA. 

We therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative.

 

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, 

affirm the judgment of the appellate court, and remand the cause to the circuit court 

for further proceedings. 

 

¶ 34 Certified question answered. 

¶ 35 Affirmed and remanded.