THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERIC

SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE

Donald E. Schulz

March 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-016-8

ii
 Developing a U.S. national security strategy for 

America is a daunting task in an era of scarce resources. Y

important at this historical juncture that the eff

undertaken. The demise of the Cold War has produced 

“End of History” but a “New World Disorder,” which ma

become more tumultuous in the decades ahead. Thus, it is 

at this turn of the millennium to reconsider the prospe

regional security, the challenges that both new and old d

may pose to U.S. interests, and the kind of strategy and p

that might enable the United States to both better cop

current problems and head off those that are just ov

horizon.

 In this report, Dr. Donald E. Schulz first analyze

security interests in Latin America. He then surveys the pr

challenges to those interests, and how well U.S. strateg

policy are equipped to cope with them. But he does not stop 

He suggests how the security environment is likely to chang

the next quarter century, both in terms of the new dange

may arise and the evolution of problems that already exi

conclusion that we are not strategically equipped to fa

future is a disturbing one, for Latin America’s importance 

United States is growing fast even as our attention is fla

Will we have the insight to recognize our own interests, the 

commit sufficient resources to attain them, and the intel

wherewithal to relate our means to our ends?

 This is a timely study. U.S. presidential elections will b

later this year. Thus, this report provides a excellent oppor

for policymakers and aspiring policymakers alike to 

reviewing where we are and where we are going. The St

Studies Institute is pleased to publish this monograph 

contribution to what promises to be a lively debate over ou

American policy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
DONALD E. SCHULZ is Chairman of the Political S

Department at Cleveland State University. Prior to th

was Research Professor of National Security Policy 

Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War Co

Dr. Schulz has authored or edited a half dozen b

including The Role of the Armed Forces in the Am

Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century; Mexico 

the 21st Century; Cuba and the Future; The United S

Honduras and the Crisis in Central America; Revo

and Counterrevolution in Central America an

Caribbean; and Political Participation in Comm

Systems. His numerous articles have appeared in 

scholarly and policy journals, including Foreign 

Washington Quarterly, Orbis, the Journal of Interam

Studies and World Affairs, and Mexican Studies/Es

Mexicanos, as well as media outlets such as Newswee

Washington Post, the Miami Herald, the Los Angeles T

and the Christian Science Monitor. Currently, 

completing a book on “Narcopolitics in Mexico

co-editing a volume on “War and Peace in Colombia.”

iv
SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE

The standard U.S. approach to security relations in t

Western Hemisphere is at the end of an era. Deep a

wide-spread changes in the hemisphere’s political a

economic environment over the last 20 years have introduc

anomalies that the existing U.S. paradigm did not anticipa

Transformations in Latin America and the Caribbean sin

the Cold War have produced a growing sense th

Washington’s past experience is no longer adequate to m

problems shaped by an environment that it in part created. 

The United States is moving in this security milieu withou

clear view of the horizon or a plan of action to get there.

 John A. Cope

1

The end of the Cold War has witnessed a 

transformation of the international security environ

The Evil Empire is no more. Yet, early predictions th

were entering a “New World Order” have proven prem

The growing chaos in Russia, the Asian economic cris

bloodbaths in the Balkans and Central Africa, the U.S

war, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, non

threats (e.g., from terrorists and drug mafias), and 

dangers to international peace and stability suggest 

while the old order has changed, a new one has 

emerge. In many respects, indeed, the current milieu 

as much resemblance to a “New World Disorde

anything else.

2

Latin America is no exception. While conside

progress has been made on some fronts—especially 

regard to democratization and the adoption of m

reforms—there has been a tendency to overlo

underestimate growing disintegrative forces in cou

like Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. At the same 

there remain significant “holdover” threats t

consolidation of democracy and regional stability. 

essay will begin by discussing current U.S. na

1
importance to the United States. It will review t

regional security environment, and then go on to explo

most likely challenges to regional security and 

interests over the next two decades. Finally, it will eva

how well U.S. strategy and military structures are equ

to pursue those interests, and make policy recom

dations where appropriate.

The Importance of Latin America

and the Caribbean to U.S. National Interests.

The U.S. National Security Strategy of “Engageme

built on three core objectives: (1) Creating a stable, pe

international security environment in which our n

citizens and interests are not threatened; (2) Conti

American economic prosperity through increasingly 

international trade and sustainable growth in the 

economy; and (3) The promotion of democracy, h

rights and the rule of law.

3

At the same time, U.S. interests can be groupe

three categories: Vital Interests—that is, those of 

overriding importance to the survival, safety and vita

the nation; Important Interests—those which, whi

affecting national survival, do affect our national well-

and the world in which we live; and Perip

Interests—which might lead us to act because our v

demand it, but which do not have a substantial imp

us.

How does Latin America fit into this scheme? Th

thing that must be said is that in a hemisphere t

increasingly integrated and interdependent, the g

and prosperity of the Latin America economies 

profoundly affect the prosperity of the United States. 

America is the United States’ fastest growing market

exports in 1998 exceeding those going to the Eur

Union.

4

 By 2010, indeed, overall U.S. trade with the r

is projected to exceed that with Europe and J

combined. Some of this, at least, is of strategic impor

2
as do all of the Persian Gulf states together.

5

 The cont

provision of Venezuelan and Mexican petroleum, as w

access to the major new oil reserves of Colombia, const

an important—and arguably vital—U.S. interest 

directly affects national well-being.

A second major interest is the promotion of demo

At first glance, this might appear to be a peripheral con

For much of its history, the United States was per

comfortable with authoritarian regimes in Latin Am

so long as they did not threaten higher priority interes

regional security or U.S. economic holdings. But that 

longer the case. U.S. values have changed; democrac

been elevated to the status of an “important” intere

part, this has been because American leaders have ga

greater appreciation of the role of legitimacy as a sou

political stability. Governments that are popularly e

and respect human rights and the rule of law ar

dangerous to both their citizens and their neigh

Nations which are substantively democratic tend not 

to war with one another. They are also less vulnerable 

threat of internal war provoked, in part, by state vio

and illegality and a lack of governmental legitimacy.

In short, democracy and economic integration a

simply value preferences, but are increasingly bou

with hemispheric security. To take just one example

restoration of democracy in Brazil and Argentina and 

increasingly strong and profitable relationship in Mer

have contributed in no small degree to their decisio

forsake the development of nuclear weapons. Percepti

threat have declined, and perceptions of the bene

cooperation have grown, and this has permitted progr

a range of security issues from border disput

peacekeeping, environmental protection, counternarc

and the combat of organized crime. Argentina ha

developed a strong bilateral defense relationship wi

United States, and is now considered a non-NATO al

3
commonly defined as “vital”—i.e., the need to preve

contain direct threats to the “survival, safety and vita

our nation,” including the “physical security of our ter

and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, our eco

well-being and the protection of our critical infrastructure

most obvious threat of this kind would arise from the poss

of Weapons of Mass Destruction by a hostile governm

terrorist organization. The closest this hemisphere has co

such a scenario was during the Cuban Missile Crisis, t

more recently there was concern about the spread o

weapons to the Southern Cone. That danger has been a

temporarily alleviated, however, with the result that the 

to medium- term threat from national governments is vir

nil. In military terms, the United States today is the undis

hegemonic power in the hemisphere.

The situation with regard to subnationa

transnational entities is considerably less sanguine

principal security concerns in the hemisphere toda

transnational in nature, stemming from such activit

drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, i

immigration, and terrorism.

8

 Of these, narcotraff

probably poses the most serious danger. Illicit 

account for roughly 14,000 U.S. deaths every year, an

American society an estimated $110 billion.

9

 The m

have spread corruption and violence in numerous 

American and Caribbean countries, subverting na

institutions, endangering political stability, and mak

mockery of the notion of sovereignty. The outlook f

future is not good.

Finally, the United States also has humanitaria

other concerns, including the need to respond to natur

manmade disasters, the preservation of human r

demining, the promotion of sustainable developmen

support for democratization and civilian control o

military.

10

 While some of these interests may be perip

others are based on more than just ideologic

humanitarian values. Some have security implication

might place them in a higher priority category. H

4
American conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s. And so did 

or corrupted attempts at disaster relief, such a

Nicaraguan government’s response to the 1972 earthq

In this sense, then, the international response to the r

devastation of Honduras and Nicaragua by Hurr

Mitch should be considered not simply a humanit

effort, but an attempt to preserve political stability 

region that has only recently emerged from civil war

The Current Latin America Security Environm

Threats and Challenges.

What are the major threats confronting Latin Am

how do they affect U.S. security interests, and how i

configuration likely to change over the next qu

century? Currently, there are several concerns. One 

most important is the danger posed by economic insta

By late 1998, the international financial crisis tha

begun in Asia in 1997, and then moved on to deva

Russia in the summer of 1998, hit Latin America. 

seemed to be teetering on the brink of disaster. C

flight was depleting its reserves, raising questions abo

country’s ability to pay its short-term debt. As the e

largest economy in the world, Brazil accounts for a

half of the output of Latin America, a region which 

roughly a fifth of U.S. exports. If the Brazilian eco

went into a deep and prolonged recession, the spillove

other countries might trigger social and political tu

that could endanger the region’s young and still f

democracies. Similarly, the impact on the U.S. ba

system and economy would be substantial. More than 

the Fortune 500 companies do business in Brazil, 

receives more direct foreign investment from the U

States than any other country except China.

11

 Fears 

the country’s economic health were already affectin

U.S. stock market.

With this in mind, in November 1998 the C

Administration and the International Monetary 

5
part of a new strategy to help countries reform 

economies before they were overwhelmed by the tum

ous global market forces sweeping the international sy

Subsequently, President Fernando Henrique Ca

persuaded a reluctant Congress to reduce social se

benefits, a move foreign officials and investors viewe

litmus test of the government’s willingness to pu

country’s economic house in order. In January

government announced it would allow the real to fl

the global markets, resulting in a 40 percent plunge 

value. At that point, the country was rapidly moving 

recession, and the only question seemed to be how dee

prolonged it would be, and how much impact it would 

on other Latin American countries.

12

By June 1999, however, the situation had imp

considerably. As early as April, Brazil made a trium

return to the international capital markets. From 

record lows in the first turbulent days of the crisis, the 

market rose by over 50 percent, more than recoveri

losses. Meanwhile, interest rates fell, and investment 

flooding back into the country. Foreign reserves 

rapidly, inflation eased. While the central bank contin

buy and sell currency in the foreign exchange market t

stabilize the real, the objective now was no longer to p

up but to prevent it from becoming too strong. Thus ha

sleepless nights of January” given way to a resurge

optimism. Talk of a Brazilian “contagion” all but van

The only major downside was the continuing impact 

crisis on the Brazilian people, who still had to bea

burden of the austerity that had been imposed on the

What is striking about this episode is not jus

quickly the crisis disappeared, but the continuing fra

and volatility of the Brazilian and Latin Ame

economies. Clearly, economic analysts and investor

overestimated and overreacted to the initial sig

trouble. But just as clearly, they were also overly opti

about the future. The bottom line is that the re

economies remain highly vulnerable to foreign shocks 

6
around the world, a decision of the U.S. Federal Rese

raise the discount rate), domestic mismanagement

other destabilizing forces (the impact of hurric

earthquakes, etc.). Just how vulnerable was dramatiz

a Washington Post headline in early August: 

Recession Envelops Latin America.” By then, the re

economies (with the significant exceptions of Mexic

Peru) were being battered by a variety of forces, incl

low commodity prices, soaring public debt, 

unemployment, currency destabilization, and a lo

foreign capital. In turn, this was inspiring a se

backlash against free market reforms, raising the pro

that the movement had reached its high-water mar

would now recede.

14

A second major concern is the growing turmoil 

northwest quadrant of South America, especia

Colombia.

15

 Until very recently the armed forces had 

steadily losing ground to the estimated 20,000 M

guerrillas of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed F

(FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). The 

effectively control much of rural Colombia. Over the 

several years, they have inflicted a number of signi

military defeats on government forces. They are well-a

as a result of the war chest they have accumulated th

drug taxes, kidnappings and a wide range of bu

investments. 

Nor are these the only combatants. The most ra

growing violent groups in the country today are right

paramilitary organizations which are waging a hol

against the guerrillas, sometimes in tacit alliance with 

military commanders. There are now several thousa

these combatants. They are increasingly well-arme

organized, and are believed to be responsible for ov

percent of the political killings in the country today. 

the government is nowhere near collapse, the mome

until recently has been in favor of the guerrilla

paramilitaries. The danger is that Colombia will be

increasingly balkanized and divided among reg

7
neighboring countries. This process has already b

especially in the Venezuelan and Panamanian border

and it may be expected to get worse.

Closely related to these threats is the scour

narcotrafficking. Violence and corruption have always 

a problem in Colombia, as has the weakness of the stat

inability to command an effective presence—in rural 

But the narco-revolution of the 1980s served as a ca

for worsening these afflictions by channeling new reso

(both financial and military) to old foes and creatin

social actors, which transformed a polarized armed co

between two sides (the armed forces and the guerrilla

one in which multiple groups and sectors are armed.

The paramilitaries and guerrillas, of course, are n

only groups with ties to the narcos. The latter 

penetrated all branches of government, from the na

level to the local. While the case of Ernesto Samp

which the former president accepted drug money f

presidential campaign) may be the most notorious ins

it should not obscure the fact that scores of congres

have also accepted drug money in return for prov

political protection for the mafias. Similarly, cou

judges have let off narcos because of bribery or intimid

Nor have military officers been exempt from 

temptations. Or civil society, for that matter

Colombian economy is far more dependent on n

trafficking than is, for instance, the Mexican economy

in the process of circulation these illicit funds taint vir

all social sectors. If anything, the country’s current 

economic downturn is likely to increase this depende

In short, Colombia is an incipient narcostate. 

traffickers cannot control the political system, they 

nevertheless had a profound influence. Even 

destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels ha

diminished their empire, for in the aftermath the ind

decentralized into smaller mafias which, in turn, 

shifted much of the coca production from Peru and Bol

8
to become the largest producer of raw coca in the w

Some 80 percent of the world’s cocaine comes from with

borders. Needless to say, there has been no diminut

the flow of Colombian drugs (including marijuana 

increasingly, heroin) into the United States. All of 

suggests that, while mafias and mafiosos may come a

the basic problem remains unresolved. Nor is it likely 

resolved, at least not within the foreseeable future.

Venezuela also is entering perilous waters. 

increasingly unstable. The past couple of decades 

witnessed severe socioeconomic decline and wides

corruption, which have decimated living standards

undermined the legitimacy of the traditional po

parties and the democratic system. The electi

December 1998 of Lieutenant Colonel (retired) 

Chavez as president was a reflection of that disco

Chavez is a populist messiah, whose allegian

democracy is suspect. In 1992, he launched a blood

unsuccessful golpe de estado. During his first year in 

he convened a Constituent Assembly, which has 

rewritten the constitution, significantly expandin

powers of the Executive branch of government. Th

charter abolishes the Senate, one of the two prev

existing houses of Congress, and gives the pres

authority to dissolve the legislature under ce

circumstances. The presidential term has been incr

from 5 to 6 years, permitting Chavez to seek imm

reelection (which had been prohibited under th

constitution) and potentially allowing him to rema

office for another dozen years. The powers of state

municipalities have been reduced, as has civilian c

over the armed forces. The state’s role in managin

economy has been increased.

18

The danger, of course, is that Chavez may use thes

powers—which were overwhelmingly approved by po

vote in December 1999—to establish a dictatorship. W

occurring in Venezuela is a full-scale constitutiona

institutional crisis pitting the Executive branch again

9
polarized, with Chavez manipulating class resent

through demagogic appeals for social justice a

redistribution of national wealth. The issue is being fr

as a choice between Good and Evil, with the pres

portraying himself as the supreme authority 

personification of the people’s will.

19

 In the process, h

not hesitated to use threats and intimidation to get his 

He has militarized the government and society to an e

unwitnessed since the restoration of democracy in 

Numerous officers have been brought into 

administration. Two hundred sixty-seven have 

promoted, including 34 who were involved in his 1992 

attempt, though there are not enough military pos

them to fill. At the same time, some 70,000 soldie

being used in civic action projects, building sc

hospitals and roads, providing free medical care, s

food to the poor at below market prices. Soon, m

doctrine will even be taught in the schools. Clearl

armed forces are being courted. The president is try

assure their loyalty and transform them into one 

power bases, while using them as an instrumen

mobilizing mass support for the regime.

Where Chavez will go from here remains to be see

program is still largely at the stage of swe

generalizations and bombastic appeals. It will have 

defined more concretely for fair judgments to be ma

addition to the constitutional changes mentioned abov

president has at various times suggested that he migh

payments on Venezuela’s foreign debt and revers

privatization initiatives in the petroleum industry. 

are also some simmering resentments against the U

States. Chavez has denied American counternar

planes permission to fly over Venezuelan terr

developed close relations with Fidel Castro, and is cur

promoting a plan to construct a railroad track factory 

China and Iran. The potential for angry rhetoric be

Washington and Caracas is high, and Chavez migh

succumb to the temptation—à la Fidel—of using the sp

10
economic and political problems prove intractable.

All this notwithstanding, some observers have 

questions about the quality of his radicalism. Chave

not been above saying different things to diff

audiences. Moreover, as president he will have to op

within considerable constraints, not the least of whic

the economic and political pressures the United State

the international community can bring on him to 

radical economic measures and the breakdow

democracy. This being said, however, his electio

alarmed not only Venezuela’s traditional politica

economic elites, but elites throughout the region. It ha

a wake-up call that long-festering problems of po

inequality and corruption can no longer be ignored, le

populace revolt and replace current leaders with a 

generation of caudillos (strongmen), modeled perhaps 

the lines of Chavez and his Peruvian counterpart, A

Fujimori, both of whom came to power through demo

means. At the same time, there is a fear, not simpl

return to the statist and protectionist policies of the 

but of the spread of the economic chaos and po

instability they would probably engender.

How all this might affect the U.S. access to Venez

oil is not clear, but it is worth noting that we h

considerable stake in that pot. Venezuela is current

leading foreign supplier of petroleum, and uns

Colombia next door ranks fifth. Whether a deteriorat

U.S. relations with the Chavez government would end

that access is difficult to say. This is not the 1960s

Chavez does not have the option of turning to the S

Union as an alternative market and economic patron 

event of a breakdown of relations with the United S

Given the low international demand for oil in recent 

he might think twice about alienating his best custom

the other hand, this past year has witnessed a specta

increase in the price of petroleum. If that win

continues, the constraints on the president would be 

considerably.

11
are to U.S. security interests, they pale beside Mexico

countries are more vital to the well-being of the U

States than its neighbor to the south. Not only is Mexi

second largest trading partner, but the two countries 

a 2,000-mile boundary. Any serious political or eco

turmoil below the Rio Grande is almost certain to spi

the border in the form of illegal immigrants, po

refugees, narcotrafficking, violence or corruption.

U.S. national security interests in Mexico are bas

several concerns, the most important being (1) narcop

and drug trafficking, (2) political instability and vio

(3) insurgency, (4) economic crisis, and (5) the pot

disruption of regional integration (in particular, the 

American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]).

Of these threats, the first is the most pressing

decade of the 1990s has witnessed an unprecedented g

and proliferation of major drug mafias. These synd

have amassed huge fortunes, bought political protect

all levels of government, and engaged in intern

warfare against each other and anyone else unlucky en

to get in their way. In the process, they have so penet

the Mexican state and socioeconomic structure tha

have effectively subverted the country’s institution

undermined national sovereignty. You nam

institution, and it has to one extent or another 

corrupted: congress, the courts, state governors, the b

businesses, the military, the police. The Federal Ju

Police have been so corrupted that it is no longer poss

make clear-cut distinctions between them and the crim

they are supposed to apprehend. In Mexico, the polic

often are the crooks, and they have been deeply invol

narcotrafficking. Even the presidency has been touch

least indirectly. There have been numerous repo

former cabinet members and other high officials with 

connections. A former member of President Zedillo

ex-President Salinas’ security detail has admitted h

been an operative for the Tijuana mafia. Salinas’ br

12
possibly with the Tijuana cartel as well.

20

The ultimate danger, of course, is that Mexico 

develop into a full-fledged narcostate. Already some 

percent of the cocaine, up to 80 percent of the marijuan

20-30 percent of the heroin imported into the United S

comes from or through Mexico.

21

 In addition, the Me

mafias have dominated the methamphetamine “revol

of the 1990s. These drugs are poisoning American so

destroying the social fabric, spreading crime and vio

and costing billions of dollars through lost produc

medical expenses, incarceration of prisoners, and so on

syndicates operate deep inside the United States, and 

is mounting evidence of their corrupting effects on 

federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, fin

institutions, and other socioeconomic and pol

structures. Even the U.S. military has been affected

evidenced by the several dozen servicemen investiga

recent years for drug running.

22

 Should narcotics-r

violence in Mexico escalate, moreover, the United S

will not be immune. It will spread over the border. Ind

already has.

23

Another danger, which seemed on the ver

realization during the traumatic year of 1994, is that M

might become “ungovernable.”

24

 This might occur in v

forms and degrees, the worst case being a descen

anarchy or civil war. One possibility, for instance, 

result from an intensification of the political stru

between the governing Party of Revolutionary Institu

(PRI) and the opposition Party of Democratic Revo

(PRD) and National Action Party (PAN). The PRI has 

lot of ground in recent years. It no longer exercises the 

of dominance it did in the early 1990s, when Mario V

Llosa described Mexico as “the perfect dictatorsh

Today, it no longer controls the Mexico City governm

the Chamber of Deputies. Many governorships are 

hands of the opposition. It is not at all unthinkable th

opposition candidate might win the presidency in the 

13
turn nasty.

The situation is also complicated by an internal 

struggle within the PRI. While the modern

technocratic elements have been able to captur

presidency during the last three national elec

imposing a reform agenda that has included NAFTA 

substantial transition towards democracy, the Old G

party bosses or “dinosaurs” are attempting a come

They blame the tecnicos for the erosion of the PRI’s po

hegemony, and want to turn back the clock. The stak

high, and the possibilities of violence cannot be dism

though, at this writing, party unity seems to 

weathered the divisive November 1999 primary.

27

 

Some observers still believe that the 1994 assassinati

PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio an

secretary general Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu wer

product of such internal conflicts.)

28

Even if Mexico is able to avoid major intra-elit

partisan violence, there remain serious doubts abou

future. If the PRI loses power, what will replace it

opposition is deeply divided between the leftist PRD an

rightist PAN. Can these very different tendencies coop

with one another to effectively govern the country

could conceive a situation, for instance, in which the 

Cuauhtemoc Cardenas wins the presidency, but th

stifled in his efforts to govern by a conservative PRI

coalition. The ensuing political conflicts and immo

could frighten foreign investors, damage the economy

aggravate an already difficult socioeconomic situatio

Still another danger is the spread and intensificat

the insurgencies that have cropped up in Chiapas and 

(mostly southern) states during the past decade

socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to these movem

have not been eliminated, and in some respects have g

worse. Moreover, human rights violations by the mi

local authorities, and paramilitary groups often link

them have added to the volatility of the situation. Whi

14
kind of massive revolutionary violence that swep

country early this century, things could certainly get w

Another economic crisis would undoubtedly fue

discontent. If at the same time Mexico experienc

upsurge of conflict from other sources (factional 

within the PRI, violence aimed at the political oppos

mafia-related killings, common crime) this combinat

factors could potentially lead to a situation of ungo

ability. Under such circumstances, the government 

be tempted to return to more authoritarian metho

maintain order. Though unlikely, a military coup “to 

the patria” is a possibility as is the rise of a ci

strongman, perhaps backed by the armed forces.

Beyond this, there is the uncertain course of the Me

economy. For over two decades, the country has been 

rollercoaster ride of boom-bust cycles. In the process, 

and expectations for a better future have been repea

raised, only to be dashed on the shoals of neoliberal re

and unstable capital flows. There is no particular rea

think that the pattern will end soon. Though the Z

administration has done all the things the Interna

Financial Institutions wanted, the growing interde

ence of the world economic system means that eco

shocks on the other side of the earth can have a trau

effect on Latin America. Not until internat

mechanisms are created capable of preventing or at 

minimizing such “contagion” will Mexico, or anyone e

really secure. Along these same lines, there continues 

concern about how a slowdown of the U.S. econom

further moves by the Federal Reserve to raise the dis

rate would affect Mexican economic growth and stab

Nor can one be confident about the internal factor

can lead to crisis. Political instability and violence coul

increase in the years ahead. Growing socioecon

inequalities and poverty, worsened by neoliberal ref

could trigger popular unrest. New governments could 

into office less committed to marketization and p

ization, or even pledging to turn back reforms already 

15
economy into a downward spiral. One indicator to wa

how the economy behaves as the 2000 elections app

Ever since the mid-1970s, Mexico has suffered fr

syndrome in which the economy has been subject

disruption or decline as each administration has draw

close. Will Zedillo be able to escape the “curse of the Me

presidents”? Will his successors?

Finally, all this has implications for the future o

economic relations both with Mexico and the rest 

hemisphere. Political and economic turmoil could 

ammunition to opponents of the North American 

Trade Agreement, both in the United States and M

This would be especially likely if the narcotraffi

situation worsened and high-level Mexican official

instance, the president) were implicated. The en

uproar would certainly trigger demands for decertific

in the U.S. Senate, which in turn would lead 

nationalistic reaction in Mexico. In the midst of al

protectionists on both sides would no doubt demand 

NAFTA’s pull-out clause be activated. If successful, s

move would have a devastating impact on U.S. eco

and political interests in Mexico, and would toll the 

knell for any hope of expanding NAFTA into a 

sphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas.

Pitfalls and Prospects of the Future.

And what of U.S. national security interest

objectives in the hemisphere 20 years from now? In ge

they will be pretty much what they are today. The U

States will seek to shape a stable, peaceful regional se

environment; it will try to foster American pros

through expanding trade and regional economic gr

and it will in all likelihood continue to promote demo

human rights and the rule of law. Thus, many o

challenges we will face will reflect current problems.

One of the most obvious needs between then an

will be the creation of mechanisms to maintain the sta

16
Antonio Ocampo has noted, the world faces a systemic 

associated with the “enormous asymmetry existing be

an increasingly sophisticated and dynamic interna

financial world and the absence of a suitable institu

framework to regulate this.” While in the short ru

answer is expansionist policies in the industrial econo

there is a long-term need for far-reaching reform 

international financial establishment, increasing 

America’s capacity to handle financial volatility wi

own fiscal, financial and exchange instruments.

29

 If 

not done, the consequence is likely to be chronic eco

instability. Economic crises would become more freq

along with the social and political turmoil they enge

The implications for personal security, political sta

and democracy would not be salutary.

30

But even if international economic stability c

established, one cannot be confident about the prospe

political stability. The neoliberal model of econ

development has not yet proven it can generate an equ

distribution of wealth. Thus far, indeed, it has h

polarizing impact, increasing the gaps between ric

poor. Whether this is a short-term phenomenon, whic

be reversed once economic stability is attained an

benefits of growth “trickle down” to the masses, or wh

the inequalities and poverty generated will 

intractable cannot be predicted with confidence. Shou

latter be the case, however, it will make the ta

maintaining political legitimacy and stability that 

more difficult. As Cynthia McClintock has noted, f

democracy is not enough.

31

 Unless people believe t

political system provides tangible benefits—e.g., imp

living conditions, law and order, respect for h

rights—they may withhold their support or cast 

demagogues or guerrilla groups who promise 

democracy or a more fully “developed” democracy, o

reject liberal democracy altogether in favor of caudill

anocracy, or “totalitarian democracy.”

32

17
of societal and political weaknesses for such lead

exploit. Unless rural areas can be rejuvenated and 

economically viable for their inhabitants, proble

landlessness and land poverty will continue to provid

raw materials for insurgency and urban migration. A

same time, continuing rapid urban population growth

all the attendant problems of decapitalization, corru

unemployment, violent crime, and poverty, will c

conditions fostering “ungovernability,” including terro

insurgency, and an enhanced role for the milita

internal security. The upshot will be continuing large

migration to the United States, which will serve 

escape valve to avoid social explosion, and quite poss

return to less democratic forms of governance.

One must place this within the context of the re

history. In the past, Latin American countries have 

through cycles of democracy and dictatorship. W

wholesale authoritarian restoration could conceivably 

again, a more plausible scenario would be a li

reversion, with the pendulum swinging only partway 

Thus, most countries would remain more-or

democratic, with some developing more substa

democracy, others combining democratic form 

authoritarian substance, and a few perhaps revert

outright dictatorship. Needless to say, authorit

restorations would be most likely where democrat

elected governments lose legitimacy because of a fail

meet popular expectations.

33

Where are the greatest danger points? Certainl

three countries discussed earlier—Colombia, Vene

and Mexico—will all bear close watching. At presen

Colombian crisis continues to worsen, with no end in 

One should remember that this is a nation which has 

torn by violence for half a century. It is by no m

unthinkable that it may still be in turmoil 20 years 

now. The exact form may change, as it has in the p

might assume the shape of de facto balkanization

division of the country into more-or-less distinct terri

18
paramilitary). Or there might be interminable civil 

left-wing or right-wing dictatorship, or even 

development of a full-fledged narcostate. It is also po

that Colombia’s contagion might spread to its neig

infecting them with the kind of violence and narcoac

commonly subsumed under the rubric of “Colombia niza

The outlook for Venezuela is not quite as b

Nevertheless, the current crisis has been incubatin

several decades, and during the past 10 years it has g

much worse. At this point, there is no way of confid

forecasting the country’s political future. Democracy 

ultimately survive, but in the short run at least the co

seems to be heading into a period of caudillo rule, 

may or may not be cloaked in a democratic fa

Venezuela is blessed with an abundance of na

resources—most notably petroleum—so its econ

condition should eventually improve, assuming oil 

stabilize at reasonably high levels, the government d

frighten away investors or otherwise mismanag

economy, and some semblance of regional economic sta

can be achieved. But whether the distribution of na

wealth will become any more equitable is problemati

bottom line is that the Venezuelan crisis is not likely 

any time soon and could conceivably drag on for a dec

more.

Of the three countries discussed earlier, M

probably has the best chance of passing through its “t

troubles” relatively unscathed. Even so, the future re

fraught with hazards. Its nascent democracy may con

to develop and deepen, or it may stagnate or even re

And even if the country experiences considerable eco

development—as it almost certainly will—that growt

probably be uneven, with boom-bust cycles and a m

tribution of wealth continuing to undermine po

stability and democratization. For the United State

greatest challenges will probably be: (1) the continuat

the narcothreat from Mexican mafias, allied 

Colombian and other foreign drug syndicates; and (2) 

19
U.S. military to deal with these challenges.

Arguably, the primary security threat in the hemis

today is narcotrafficking.

34

 It is a problem that is not 

to go away. According to the 1998 Strategic Assessm

National Defense University’s Institute for Na

Strategic Studies:

The illegal drug market long ago achieved stability and, in so

cases, saturation, and that situation is unlikely to change 

time soon. Without a major change in counterdrug policy 

methodology, the only measurable change in the market wil

in methods of smuggling or in market taste.

35

While it is difficult to take seriously the kind of di

scenario posited by former Secretary of Defense C

Weinberger, in which the United States and M

actually go to war over the issue,

36

 one can certainly im

the use of Special Operations Forces to, for instance

down in Ciudad Juarez or Tijuana to capture some 

drug kingpin. Such actions would probably be unilate

nature, the by-product of growing U.S. frustration 

Mexican authorities’ unwillingness or inability to ste

narcotics trade, and would severely aggravate al

strained relations between the two countries. Agai

implications for NAFTA and, by extension, reg

economic integration could be considerable.

Another possible scenario might involve a growin

military presence and aid program, designed to comb

mafias and/or guerrilla groups. Here Colombia, rathe

Mexico,

37

 may become the primary troublespot. 

counternarcotics aid to that country is rapidly incre

(Counterdrug aid in 1999 is $289 million, more than 

times the level in 1998, and a tenfold increase over a 5

period. Colombia now receives more U.S. aid than any 

country except Israel and Egypt. This assistance, mor

is likely to increase substantially over the next se

years.)

38

 Currently, there are at least 100-150 Ame

military personnel in the country at any given 

20
gathering intelligence and performing other function

For the moment, at least, the United States is try

maintain a distinction between counternarcotics 

counterinsurgency, with aid being given solely fo

former. But whether this selectivity can be maint

indefinitely is anybody’s guess. If the situation o

battlefield worsens, the United States may, like it o

become increasingly involved in a counterinsurgency 

In any case, the distinction between insurgency 

narcotrafficking is not clear-cut; in Colombia th

phenomena are interrelated. Much of the counte

assistance is fungible; moreover, operations can easily 

the line. Crop eradication efforts, for instance, are u

not directed against traffickers, but against pe

cultivators of coca, amapola and marijuana. Unfortun

by attacking campesino growers, counternar

operations risk pushing them into the arms of the guer

and paramilitaries, thus increasing the violence an

threat to the Colombian state. Similarly, targetin

areas of illegal crop cultivation and transit may simply 

these activities into other territories or countries. Th

been an all too common pattern in the past. The upsh

been the spread, rather than the eradication, o

affliction.

Three other countries where the United States ma

well become militarily involved are Cuba, Haiti

Panama. The transition to a post-Castro era has al

begun. The only questions are how long it will take, wh

it can be achieved peacefully, whether the political s

that emerges will be democratic, and whether some k

foreign military presence will accompany the transit

With regard to the first question, it is likely that w

still some years away from the post-Castro era. The C

brothers clearly intend to stay the course, with 

designated as Fidel’s successor in the event the 

brother dies first. While the Castros could go at any 

(both have had health problems in recent years), they 

21
remembered, is only 73 years old.

40

 So no one sho

surprised if the year 2010 dawns with at least one 

brothers still in power.

The more interesting questions involve how 

transition will develop once the Castros depart. R

widely held to be a temporary figure. Lacking F

charisma and authority, he nevertheless comm

considerable support because of his name, history

positions as Second Secretary of the Cuban Comm

Party and Minister of Defense. Whether he or Fide

designate a post-Castro successor, or try to cre

constitutional or institutional mechanism for choosin

remains to be seen. In any event, there will probabl

succession struggle. Whether it turns violent or not c

be predicted. If it does, however, there will undoubte

calls for a military intervention from influential C

American groups and their allies in Congress. 

massive refugee flows may also create strong pressure

temptations to intervene. If such a course were chos

could result in substantial resistance and blood

requiring a prolonged military occupation, perhaps so

U.S.-Cuban relations for decades more.

Another scenario involves the possibility of a r

disintegration while Fidel is still in power. Some an

have raised the specter of a Götterdammerung. Accord

this line of thought, if Castro were in danger of being o

by an internal revolt he might prefer to go out with a 

rather than a whimper. He has always craved hist

greatness. What better way to assure it, at this late st

his career, than by launching an air assault on the 

nuclear power plant at Turkey Point, in South Fl

Or—in a variation of that scenario—biological we

might be used in an attack.

41

This scenario is plausible enough so that U.S. de

planners must take it into account. But it is not very lik

occur. For one thing, Castro has created an extraord

system of controls, which will probably prevent succ

22
“below” (via a mass uprising) for as long as he is aliv

functioning.

42

 Moreover, for all his sins, one may 

whether he really wants to go down in history as a 

murderer. If the United States were poised to inva

attack Cuba, however, that would be another matte

U.S. policymakers should keep that in mind. Durin

Cuban Missile Crisis, it will be recalled, Castro 

Khrushchev to launch a nuclear strike against the U

States if the latter invaded the island.

43

But even if Castro, under desperate circumstances

to resort to desperate measures, it is by no means clea

he would be able to successfully carry out a strike aga

target like Turkey Point. As Albert Coll has pointed ou

one thing for Cuban jets to stealthily approach 

territory in peacetime, as has happened in the pas

quite another in time of crisis, when American air de

systems would presumably be in a state of heightened 

And as for the biological warfare scenario, even if h

biological agents available (and some observers belie

does), it is unclear how much progress has been ma

adapting them for use as weapons.

44

A more likely possibility is that in the midst of a 

Castro might open up the floodgates of emigration an

his “boat people” card to defuse pent-up tension and 

popular outrage away from his regime onto fleeing refu

the United States, and the Miami exile community. H

done this before, most tellingly in 1980 and 1994, a

could happen again. The United States must be prepar

such an eventuality.

Finally, there has been an ongoing concern in 

political circles about the possibility of a nuclear accid

the unfinished Russian technology nuclear pla

Juragua. Indeed, the Defense Department has auth

the creation of a Caribbean Radiation Early Wa

System (CREWS) to monitor possible leaks from the fa

More recently, however, Castro announced the inde

suspension of the Juragua project due to a lack of fina

23
island’s continuing energy needs, one should n

surprised if the nuclear option is raised again at 

point.

45

Haiti, too, is a potential candidate for intervention

country was the object of the most recent U.S. m

invasion, in September 1994, when more than 20,000 t

were sent in to depose a brutal military dictatorshi

restore the government of President Jean-Ber

Aristide. Yet, all the king’s horses and all the king’s 

have not been able to put the country together again. 

remains a “failed state”—a society torn by the inability 

political leaders to cooperate with one another, propp

by foreign doles and the unspoken but acutely felt pro

of another intervention should things once again fall 

While there has been progress in some areas—most no

in the formation of a Haitian National Police—give

country’s long cyclical history of despotism and ana

and the continuing domestic political strife 

experiencing,

46

 it seems likely that sooner or lat

democratic experiment will collapse, violence and re

flows will ensue, and some foreign military presence 

again be needed to maintain order and civility.

47

Another potential trouble spot—though somewha

so than Cuba and Haiti—is Panama. The strategic va

the Panama Canal is no longer much of an issue.

48

 Th

War is over, the Soviet and Cuban threats no longer 

and the U.S. military presence has now been termin

Still, the waterway remains “one of the world’s c

‘choke-points’ for oceanborne traffic, controll

significant portion of international commerce.”

4

United States continues to have an important inter

the canal’s physical protection, and arguably has the 

to intervene militarily to reopen it or restore its opera

in the event that it is closed or no longer functioning

Under what circumstances might such an interve

occur? One issue, certainly, is the possibility of a h

foreign involvement. (Opponents of the canal turnover 

24
role.) Another concern is Panamanian political sta

For most of this century, a strong American mi

presence has served as a deterrent to foreign threat

more debatably, Panamanian domestic turmoil.

51

 No

deterrent—always as much psychological as physical

been removed. Will Panama perhaps fall prey to insta

and dictatorship? Such things have happened in the 

Currently, moreover, the country must deal with incre

incursions from Colombian narcotraffickers, guerrilla

paramilitaries. Might not these developments, if 

continue to worsen, eviscerate the nation’s sovere

Might not Panama, for instance, become a narcostate

fact that it has only a constabulary rather than a sta

military raises questions about its ability to withstand 

threats. Moreover, beyond this, Panamanian polit

may not be able to resist the temptation of treating the 

as a piñata—a fabulous opportunity for graft—i

process neglecting its upkeep and modernization 

endangering its future utility. What would the U

States do under those circumstances?

Some of these dangers are more credible than o

The China scenario, in particular, seems a bit far-fe

The “threat” in question is based largely on the aw

port concessions at both ends of the canal to Hutc

Whampoa, a Hong Kong firm. According to some 

conservatives, the company will be a puppet of the Ch

military and could block American ships from enterin

waterway. But this ignores the fact that the ports ha

control over the entry to the canal and that Ch

attempts to interfere with U.S. access would viola

facility’s neutrality and almost certainly trigg

American military response. China would find itsel

similar position to the Soviet Union during the C

Missile Crisis—eyeball-to-eyeball with the United Sta

a region of overwhelming U.S. strength and eq

overwhelming Chinese weakness. Nor can the Ch

military threat be compared to the Soviet threat in 

25
capabilities far from its borders.

Moreover, even if some of these problem

materialize, they would not necessarily constitute 

threats. Panamanian political instability, for ins

might have little effect on the canal’s opera

Nevertheless, the U.S. Southern Command is suffic

concerned that it is conducting contingency planning 

intervention, “cooperatively with the Panamania

unilaterally if the condition dictates.”

52

While we are in a speculative mode, it may be use

raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from 

the United States might have to deal with a reg

hegemon or peer competitor. The most obvious candida

such a role would be Brazil, which already accoun

almost half of Latin America’s economic production an

by far the largest armed forces in the region (313,250 

troops).

53

 That country could very well assume a 

commanding political and military role in the de

ahead.

Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about 

has been that it might acquire nuclear weapon

delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian mi

embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bom

the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggres

pursuing nuclear development programs that had 

military spin-offs.

54

 There were powerful militar

civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapon

ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, howeve

situation has changed. As a result of political leade

transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina 

appear firmly committed to restricting their nu

programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered 

various nuclear-related agreements with each other—

notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeg

agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of al

nuclear installations by the International Atomic E

26
Regime. 

Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As 

Tollefson has observed:

. . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and spa

programs depends less on technological considerations th

on political will. While technological constraints presen

formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballis

missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The criti

element, therefore, in determining the applications of Braz

nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.

5

Put simply, if changes in political leadership 

instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear pro

towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals 

still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Ci

supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept 

by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the cu

democratic experiment were to be undermined by eco

crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are ci

leaders necessarily less militaristic or more commit

democracy than the military. The example of P

Fujimori comes immediately to mind.

How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? 

been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra do

(Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capac

could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If produ

from other plants were included, Brazil would h

capability three times greater than India or Pak

Furthermore, its defense industry already has a subst

missile producing capability. On the other hand

country has a very limited capacity to project its mi

power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces ove

distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes signi

military manpower increases (which could place Braz

numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran 

Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a la

economic resources. Indeed, the development of all 

military potentials has been, and will continue 

27
reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control 

Argentina in the first place.)

56

In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, im

with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, 

unthinkable, and such a regime could present some 

serious problems. That government would probably 

foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justi

existence. One obvious candidate would be the U

States, which would presumably be critical of any ret

dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectr

predatory international community, covetous of the 

of the Amazon, could help rally political support t

regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers 

been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far 

as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then c

the Military Command of the Amazon, threaten

transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if deve

countries tried to “internationalize” the Am

Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined mi

exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an 

response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers.

Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations 

improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic 

international concerns over the Amazon—the threat 

region’s ecology through burning and deforestation

presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian que

etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very 

intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, 

growing trend towards subregional economic grouping

particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to inc

competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA coun

Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to int

political differences, and could lead to heigh

politico-military rivalry between different blo

coalitions in the hemisphere.

Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalrie

conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between 

28
group’s evolution. Among other things, the past 

witnessed a serious deterioration of relations be

Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the for

January 1999 currency devaluation, which sev

strained economic ties between the two countries. In 

too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argen

(unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic T

Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted 

attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot wa

relations soured to the extent where questions have 

raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR its

light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what i

a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined 

a push for regional hegemonic status, would ha

Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the U

States. 

Finally, closer to home, there is the difficult prob

U.S. border defense. One suspects that the years ahea

witness growing pressure to use Department of De

personnel and resources to bolster law enforce

agencies patrolling U.S. frontiers to prevent i

immigration and drug smuggling. (Indeed, legislatio

already been proposed authorizing the deployment of 

10,000 more troops on the Southwest Border. In late 

however, the bill was rejected by the Senate.) Since 

the military has been engaged in several thou

operations along the frontier, running listening po

assist the Border Patrol in tracking drugs and mig

building fences and barriers, repairing roads, and he

law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics opera

Yet, notwithstanding this aid, civilian agencies contin

be stretched thin. The amount of drugs coming ove

border has not been significantly reduced, and 

enforcement officials often find themselves outgunne

outmanned by their adversaries. Consequently, there 

increasing temptation to look to the military for answe

29
The preceding analysis, it must be emphasized, is 

in the realm of speculation about potential problems 

prediction. Latin America is a huge and enorm

complex region, and the farther into the future one att

to extrapolate from current trends and realities, th

accurate the forecast is likely to be. Yet, even if one ta

more optimistic view of the future than I am inclined t

the previous pages should provide ample warning ag

complaisance. The next quarter century is as likely 

marked by political turmoil, violence, poverty 

inequality as by democratization and socioecon

development.

It is especially important that this be recognized be

U.S. attention to Latin America has historically ebbe

flowed. Unless there is a crisis, we tend to take the regi

granted. Economic ties may be an exception, but even 

our attitude is ambivalent, as witnessed by Con

unwillingness to grant the Clinton administr

“fast-track” authority for an extension of NAFTA to 

Benign neglect is our preferred posture. As Scotty R

once observed, Americans will do anything for 

Americans except read about them.

The problem is that what happens in Latin Am

matters. Regional stability deeply affects U.S. na

interests and security, and unless the United S

remains engaged it is likely to find itself unprepar

crises when they arise. And they will arise. If we 

learned anything from history, it is that bad times a

return. In the past, this has often led to overreactio

ill-advised interventions, which we are still paying for 

in the form of the distrust they have sown amon

southern neighbors. One consequence is that the U

States has no real military alliances in the Latin Ame

theater.

60

Thus, it is difficult to argue with President Cli

“imperative of engagement” or the National Mi

30
Prepare Now.”

61

 In theory at least, if we are success

shaping the environment there will be no need for a mi

response because we will have forestalled or deterre

threats that might arise.

62

The problem is that there are severe limitations o

ability of the United States to perform the shaping fun

In the words of one U.S. Southern Command (SOUTH

observer: “We do a pretty good job of reacting 

preparing,” but “shaping is more problematic.”

63

This is so for a number of reasons. One is the 

magnitude of the task and the inability of U.S. influe

compete with Latin American domestic influenc

affecting the course of political, economic, socia

military development in these countries. Thus, eve

frequently cited “success” of the Reagan administrat

promoting democracy was due less to U.S. efforts than 

of Latin Americans. U.S. influence may have been de

in a handful of countries—El Salvador, Hondura

Grenada come to mind—but elsewhere internal force

sway.

64

 More recently, while U.S. military power was a

oust dictatorships in Panama (1989) and Haiti (1994

subsequent democratization of those countries depen

least as much on Panamanians and Haitians as o

United States. (Is Haiti really a democracy? In 

perhaps, but not in much else.)

In short, except on those rare occasions where po

exercized overwhelmingly, as in an invasion or the sup

massive aid to a dependent client state, the United S

will have to rely on more subtle and less effective me

shape the environment. Influence rather than power w

the name of the game.

Beyond this, the U.S. ability to influence will be sh

limited by a severe lack of resources. Foreign aid has 

up in the post-Cold War era. Even SOUTHCOM is stre

thin. The byword there is that: “We are an economy o

theater, but it is not free. It doesn’t take much, but i

take something.”

65

31
Rather, shaping and engagement are its primary activ

It has very few troops, especially in comparison to the 

larger and better resourced CINCdoms like the Eur

Command (EUCOM). Thus, if soldiers are needed f

invasion, they will have to be obtained from a 

provider” such as the U.S. Joint Forces Com

(previously known as the Atlantic Command).

66

 Whil

48,000 troops rotated through Central and South Am

in 1998, fully 35 percent came from the Reserv

National Guard. This included special operations f

humanitarian, peacekeeping and road-building brig

counterdrug trainers, and personnel sent to relieve 

duty troops and provide operational support.

67

 S

icantly, the recent shift from bilateral to multil

exercises in this AOR has been driven by a lack of resou

Another problem is that the United States often c

predict the consequences of its own actions. Secon

third order effects are difficult to calculate. Even wi

best of intentions (and U.S. intentions are not always 

American policy sometimes has precisely the opposite 

of what is intended. Indeed, J. Patrice McSherry, 

important article on “The Emergence of ‘Gua

Democracy,’” argues that there is a central contradict

the Clinton administration’s Latin American stra

While encouraging democracy, on the one hand, the U

States is simultaneously strengthening the very force

military) that have traditionally constituted the gr

threat to democracy in the region. The upshot has bee

containment and weakening of democratic institution

processes, and the development of a hybrid fo

authoritarian democracy.

At the heart of the argument is the contention th

economic hardships and social dislocations caused by 

economic strategy (neoliberalism) have led many 

American governments to adopt authoritarian measu

order to maintain public order/national security. 

civilian presidents, allied with military forces,

32
they simultaneously carry out economic restructuring, oft

by decree. . . . Executives have used national security la

reminiscent of the military states and mobilized the milita

and security forces to enforce order.

In turn, new U.S.-sponsored roles and missions fo

armed forces have drawn them deeper into the po

realm and legitimized their involvement in social c

and guardianship activities.

68

McSherry argues that six trends epitomize the dan

countries as diverse as Peru, Argentina, Mexico, 

Colombia, Brazil, and Bolivia: (1) the enlargement 

military presence in civilian institutions; (2) the u

authoritarian practices by civilian governments; (3

internal security and domestic-intelligence doctrine

missions for the military; (4) the use of political intelli

organizations; (5) continued impunity for violato

human rights; and, (6) acts by paramilitary group

unregulated private security organizations. To this 

perhaps be added a seventh trend, namely the r

tendency for retired military officers to enter presid

politics (as in the successful election campaig

Presidents Banzer in Bolivia and Chavez in Venezuel

the less successful efforts of Lino Oviedo in Paragua

Harold Bedoya in Colombia).

These are important developments, and they unde

the hazards of not coming to terms with the 

socioeconomic challenges mentioned earlier—most no

poverty, inequality, and the problem of econ

instability/volatility. They should also caution again

uncritical embrace of military-to-military cooperatio

minimum, they suggest that strengthening the m

without a corresponding strengthening of civ

institutions and leadership can gut democracy of much 

substance. Clearly, there is a critical need to bolster c

control of the military, as well as civilian competen

national security affairs. Just as evident, there 

ongoing need to cultivate understanding of and respe

33
problem of authoritarianism is not restricted to the fo

The recent examples of Fujimori in Peru and Men

Argentina, in particular, demonstrate that civilians to

be caudillos. Intimidation of the political oppos

harassment of the press, human rights abuses

continuismo can be just as much a part of civilian r

military rule.

It is in part within this context that one must pla

expanding roles and missions issue. The concern, of c

is that the increasing involvement of the armed for

“new” missions such as counternarcotics, law enforce

counterterrorism and infrastructural developmen

militarize society and politics to an unhealthy e

undermining civilian institutions and leader

increasing human rights violations, and sev

constraining the further development of these nascen

still very fragile democracies.

69

 The dangers are very 

especially in countries where the professionalization 

military has been only partial or incomplete. Ther

assumption of new roles and missions could lead 

politicization of the military in a pattern reminiscent 

1960s experiences with nationbuilding and “civic act

Yet, it is crucial that the total context be conside

the dangers of “militarization” are real, so are the dang

not coming to terms with new threats to national secur

civilian institutions are incapable of dealing with the 

drug cartels and rapidly escalating criminal violenc

instance, governments may feel they have little choice 

to call on the armed forces. In such situations, the risk

costs of inaction—whether it be the corruption 

weakening of political institutions, the loss of na

sovereignty to substate actors (e.g., mafias), or 

dangers—may be prohibitive.

The bottom line is that the United States must re

engaged. We have an important role to play in fos

regional peace, security, democratic values, and a re

for human rights. To take just two recent examples: 

34
members of the Peruvian and Ecuadoran Armed F

helped defuse tensions and encourage a separation of 

at a time when unrest threatened to ignite armed co

and derail the peaceful resolution of that border di

About the same time, senior members of the Sou

Command personally intervened with Paraguayan mi

leaders when it appeared that extraconstitut

measures might be invoked during that country’s ele

crisis. In both of these cases, engagement activities an

development of personal relationships between U.S

Latin American military leaders created opportuniti

constructive dialogue and mediation that migh

otherwise have been available. Similarly, the Sou

Command has made a considerable effort to incorp

human rights instruction into its training program

Latin American militaries. And there is reason to b

that this has had some effect.

70

In short, U.S. isolationism would be counterprodu

It would send precisely the wrong message—namely

we don’t care. Such signals would not improve civil lib

or dissuade the military from intervening in po

affairs. Rather, they would pave the way fo

reemergence or revitalization of some of the worst aspe

the traditional political culture. Authoritarianism 

submission have deep roots in the Latin American ps

One of the dangers in the current situation is tha

military may be simply undergoing a kind of institu

hypothermia or “cocooning,” temporarily retrenchin

adopting a low profile to protect its corporate interests 

awaiting a more favorable future climate in wh

reassert itself. U.S. leaders should be alert to such pot

developments, and should discourage them where fea

At the same time, Latin American countries face ver

security threats, which cannot be ignored lest they l

even more dangerous situations. The United States 

help them meet these needs.

35
Military-to-military engagement will be an impo

part of the emerging U.S. strategy towards Latin Amer

the 21st century. But it is not an end in itself. It is a me

pursuing a much broader range of objectives, incl

regional stability and security, democracy, human r

and socioeconomic development. The overall strategy 

be coherent and comprehensive, and it must clearly d

and relate ends, ways and means. (What, exactly, a

objectives of the strategy? What resources are necess

attain them? How—in what ways—can those mea

employed to achieve the goals being sought?) The str

must be devised primarily by civilian leaders, th

clearly in consultation with the military. Once defined

civilian and military leaders must exercise the nece

oversight to make sure that policy implementation is 

in a way that does not inadvertently subvert the pr

aims of the strategy. Put simply, strategy must 

operations, rather than vice versa. Without p

supervision, there is always a danger that those 

implement policy will actually make policy.

This has sometimes been a problem in both civilia

military bureaucracies. A narrow focus on bu

military-to-military contacts, for instance, can obscu

forest for the trees. In the words of one human 

observer: “The United States runs the risk of h

[SOUTHCOM] set its own policy.”

71

 It is easy to forge

the recipients of military aid have interests and agen

their own, which are often different from the intere

either Latin American civilians or the United Stat

minimum, greater attention should be pa

strengthening civilian institutions and leadership. In 

Latin American countries, the armed forces still ex

disproportionate political power. Too often, civilians 

been reluctant to exert their authority in areas whe

military has traditionally been dominant. In this, the

have been too timid.

72

36
do more to redress the historical imbalance in 

American civil-military relations by seeking to stren

civilian institutions, both in the state and civil society. 

and judicial reform should be a priority. As matter

stand, many governments feel they have no choice 

bring the armed forces into law enforcement

alternative is rampant criminality and national insec

Only when civilian law enforcement institution

strengthened—professionalized, purged of incomp

corrupt and brutal elements, and given more resou

will they be able to perform the missions they were des

for. A failure on this score would mean that militariz

would become a semi-permanent feature of the eme

Latin American political order—or at least a chronic 

wherever civilian institutions fail.

U.S. policy with respect to police training is especia

need of review. Currently, it is largely paralyzed by S

660a of the Foreign Assistance Act. There is here no 

irony. As Ambassador (retired) David Passage has po

out, we have no problem with training Latin Ame

militaries in law enforcement—though we would 

allow our own armed forces to police the United States

we refuse to train civilian police.

73

 Such restrictio

nothing to professionalize or improve the human 

performance of the police; they merely weaken ci

control of the military. It is past time to lift them.

Greater efforts must also be made in the vettin

training of judicial personnel. It will do little good to 

improve the quality of police forces if judges—wh

through incompetence, bribery or intimidation—s

turn loose the guilty. Such behavior only under

morale and fosters cynicism and human rights abu

officers resort to extra-judicial justice to punish those 

the courts do not.

Nor are these the only challenges. Most Latin Ame

countries have achieved formal democracy. The next s

to go beyond the forms to more substantive demo

37
training, civic education, corruption control, an

fostering of strong political parties and civil societies

all this can be done in an era of declining U.S. will to pr

foreign aid is not immediately apparent. Bu

consequences of failure are likely to be stagnation, po

decay and, quite possibly, a return to the authoritaria

and instability of the past.

Secondly, the United States must come to terms w

contradictions in its regional strategy. Two of the

particular, stand out: The first is the contradiction be

the U.S. economic strategy and the requirements of re

political stability; the second is between U.S. co

narcotics policies and political stability. The 

movement towards globalization and marketizatio

and will continue to aggravate problems of povert

inequality in the short-to-medium run. Privatizatio

state enterprises have worsened unemployment

reduction or elimination of tariffs have opened up 

American economies to foreign trade and investment, 

driving local producers out of business. Rapid and ma

transfers of capital have led to boom-bust cycles and s

socioeconomic dislocation. At the same time, 

counternarcotics policies have chased traffickers fro

Caribbean to Mexico and back to the Carib

destabilizing both areas. Successful counternar

campaigns in Peru and Bolivia have pushed growers 

into Colombia. Attempts to sanction the Sa

administration (because of that president’s complic

accepting campaign contributions from narcotraffi

have impaired the ability of the Colombian state to 

with guerrilla and paramilitary violence, helping acce

the disintegration of that country.

A detailed treatment of these issues is beyond the 

of this study. The point is simply that U.S. econom

counternarcotics strategies have had unintended 

effects that must be recognized and addressed. And th

require a greater degree of U.S. flexibility and imagin

than we have shown so far. It makes little sens

38
aid to the eastern Caribbean and insist on an end 

European Union’s system of preferences for the is

bananas if the consequence is socioeconomic devast

There is a major security problem brewing in these f

British and French colonies, and it is in large p

consequence of an unfortunate combination of U.S. po

that have increased drug trafficking while simultane

undermining the socioeconomic structures of 

ministates. 

In short, a rigid adherence to neoliberal eco

doctrines is likely to be counterproductive. Reg

security and stability will require that some protect

structures be retained, at least in the medium run, an

the state continue to play some role in the economy (e

regulating financial flows to prevent massive capital f

At the same time, it is an exceedingly poor idea fo

United States to gut its economic aid program at a 

when such assistance is needed to strengthen demo

institutions and foster socioeconomic stability. As 

Atwood, former director of the Agency for Interna

Development, warned just prior to his departure, with

larger budget to help struggling nations, we could ver

see “democracies defeated and radical leaders comin

office.”

74

Nor does it make much sense to blame Latin Ame

for the failure of U.S. drug policy. Certainly, they mus

their share of the responsibility. But the driving force 

illegal narcotics industry in this hemisphere is the 

demand and the enormous profits generated by 

creating this incentive, the United States has contri

mightily to the subversion and destabilization 

southern neighbors. In sum, we must clean up ou

house. This means reducing domestic consumption th

public health, education and law enforcement. This do

mean putting more marijuana users in jail, but h

traffickers, money launderers and associated cri

organizations much harder. It also means imposing 

rigorous surveillance and transparency on the ba

39
transactions. This must be a multinational effort 

effective. The United States should take the lead in se

the cooperation of other states and central banks in cre

an international system that would check m

laundering and relieve the economic pressures on sta

behave criminally.

75

Finally, one should avoid the temptation to mili

the war against drugs. This is not to say that the 

military has no role. Certainly, it can suppor

interdiction of illegal drug shipments, train Latin Ame

armed forces and police in appropriate strategie

tactics, plan and carry out intelligence operations and 

information with them, and serve as a role mod

professional behavior and the appropriate subordinat

the military to civilian authority. But militarization e

serious risks and costs, and it clearly cannot “win the 

Any strategy worthy of the name must come to terms 

the nonmilitary requirements of the situation. Among 

things, there must be an emphasis on altern

development. This means not crop eradicati

fumigation, but a serious development plan for those 

(of Colombia, Peru and Mexico, for instance) that have 

largely abandoned by their countries and that have 

engaged in drug trafficking for decades. The bottom 

that unless peasants are given alternative ways to m

living, spraying and eradication will just create 

guerrilla recruits.

76

In sum, a more successful counternarcotics polic

require a multifaceted strategy that will place pr

emphasis on civilian requirements. This does not 

reducing military aid, but rather substantially incre

nonmilitary assistance. Here I am returning to the 

made in my first recommendation. There is a critical n

develop Latin American civilian institutions 

resources—police, justice systems, local government

civil society. This will require aid primarily from 

civilian agencies like the Department of Justice an

Agency for International Development. For this reaso

40
“czar.”

77

 It sends an unfortunate message. With a

respect to General McCaffrey, he is the wrong man 

wrong place for the wrong war.

A third recommendation has to do with reg

economic integration. It is crucial that momentum tow

Free Trade Association of the Americas be recapture

not imply by this that critics of the FTAA (and NAFT

not have legitimate concerns. They do. Bu

international balance of power is shifting, and to re

competitive with other rapidly emerging power cente

China and East Asia, in particular) the United State

have to use its traditional geopolitical and cultural re

of influence as a motor for economic growth. And here 

America will be very important as a source of ma

investments, raw materials and even manufactured g

(One should not forget that out of every dollar 

Americans spend on imports, 44 cents buy goods fro

United States.)

78

 Political influence and military 

ultimately rest on an economic base. Unless that b

assiduously cultivated, our power and influence abroa

wane with increasing rapidity.

79

 Accordingly, one of th

priorities of the next President of the United States s

be the reopening of talks/negotiations with both the 

Congress and Latin American governments aim

creating a Free Trade Association of the Americas.

A fourth recommendation concerns U.S. mi

strategy and organization. In December 1997, the Na

Defense Panel issued a provocative recommendat

reorganize the Unified Command Plan (UCP), elimin

the Atlantic Command and creating an Americas Com

that would incorporate SOUTHCOM and a new Hom

Defense Command as subordinate commands.

8

proposal has considerable merit. It is both comprehe

and intellectually neat. Among other things, it would 

all of the nations in the hemisphere under a s

command, as opposed to the current system in which M

and Canada do not fall under the jurisdiction of any 

unified commands (which makes coordination be

41
worst).

81

Several criticisms of this proposal have been r

Some people, for instance, argue that there is a 

problem. As one SOUTHCOM official protested, thi

huge area, both in terms of geography and amou

activity. Currently, SOUTHCOM cannot keep track 

the activities in its area of responsibility (AOR). To cre

even larger unified command, which would have to 

with everything that is going on in Mexico and Cana

well as the new and ambitious mission of Hom

Defense, may be asking too much for any one CINC.

Second, Mexico might well oppose the idea. As m

now stand, the Mexicans deal directly with the Joint 

which writes the U.S. military’s Theater Engagemen

for the country. Bypassing SOUTHCOM, with its leg

interventions in the region, avoids rankling nation

sensitivities, even as it bolsters Mexican pride in hav

“special relationship” with the United States. 

Americas Command meant they would have to give u

arrangement, they would be loath to do so. (On the 

hand, Mexico’s place within the Americas Comman

not explicitly defined by the panel, and there might be 

for some creative innovations.)

Third—and most important—it would be the w

message to send to Latin America. Most Latin Ame

militaries value their relationships with SOUTHCO

reduction in that organization from a unified 

subordinate command would be perceived as a demot

the region’s status. It would appear that Latin Ame

were no longer important enough to the United Sta

merit a unified command. Coming on top of the tradi

U.S. neglect of its southern neighbors and the more r

decline in resources allocated to the region, this 

further undermine U.S. influence over Latin Ame

military organizations and behavior. This would m

harder for the U.S. military to promote democratiz

and could potentially have destabilizing results.

42
developed by then Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Nuñez 

U.S. Army War College, who argues that the Am

Command should contain two subunified commands: 

North American Command as well as the existing Sou

Command. Like NAFTA, the North American Com

would cover Canada, the United States and Mexico. N

argues that it only makes strategic sense to move fro

current bilateral arrangements with Mexico and Can

an

organization that reflects regional economic realities a

security concerns . . ., particularly considering our burgeon

trade through NAFTA and the growing threat of terrori

that can penetrate through our borders.

83

This plan has a lot of merit. Clearly, the proc

hemispheric economic integration has important se

implications for counternarcotics, arms con

counterterrorism, peacekeeping, the resolution of b

disputes,

84

 immigration control, environmental co

ation, and other issues. While the hemispheric struc

that eventually emerge are not likely to add up to a full

alliance like NATO, the U.S. military must adjust 

step-by-step changes that are occurring. The reality i

it makes little sense to deal with the Mexicans on a bil

basis. It is inefficient, and advances neither their int

nor ours.

85

 At the same time, however, there re

substantial political obstacles to the Nuñez proposa

Mexicans would probably still object. Not only would 

presumably lose their direct relationship with the 

Staff, but they would be relegated to dealing w

subunified commander rather than a CINC. Moreover

an arrangement would still send the same “wrong mes

to the Latin American militaries—namely, that they a

important enough to merit a unified command.

There is, however, a third possibility. Douglas Lov

has suggested, and I agree, that the most logica

politically acceptable approach to the problem would 

“grow” SOUTHCOM into an Americas Command.

86

 S

43
status of a subunified command. The Latin Ame

countries would not be isolated as the “poor neighbors 

south,” but would be brought into a hemisphere

relationship as equals. Similarly, Mexico and Canada 

be treated as peers with the United States. Everyone 

benefit from the increased attention and resources 

would accrue to Latin Americans by dint of their 

joined with North Americans. Command Headqu

would be in Washington, DC, which would improve 

access considerably. Military-to-military cooperation w

be facilitated by the U.S. ability to coordinate 

effectively with Mexico on issues like drug traffi

immigration, disaster relief/humanitarian assist

search and rescue missions, and other matters.

No arrangement, of course, will be perfect. It migh

be objected that this proposal does not solve the prob

size. But that issue may be more apparent than real. 

are other large unified commands—e.g., the P

Command—and they seem to function fairly well. Yes, 

will be a lot of diplomatic responsibilities fo

Commander-in-Chief. But all this really means is th

will probably have to use his deputy and staff to pe

some of the functions he now handles person

Additionally, the creation of subunified commands re

a viable option. The Nuñez proposal to have a 

American Command (headquartered in Colorado Sp

could be complemented by other subunified comman

South America (HQ at SOUTHCOM’s present locat

Miami) and Central America and the Caribbean 

perhaps in Puerto Rico). Under such an arrangemen

AORs would be much more manageable than the

today.

In short, one adjusts to new circumstance

perspective, the size argument may be more of a rat

for protecting SOUTHCOM’s current status and reso

than anything else. “Growing” that command in

Americas Command, with increased responsibilitie

resources, would be a relatively nonthreatening 

44
be made.

A fifth recommendation concerns the need to gra

strengthen and institutionalize inter-American se

cooperation. One of the peculiarities of the Latin Ame

theater is the lack of effective alliances and end

coalitions.

87

 The consequence is that security policie

to be ad hoc or unilateral. A crisis arises, and if Washi

cannot muster multinational support for a resolut

intervenes on its own. Institutional mechanisms need 

strengthened or created in order to discourage this ten

and deal in a more effective and multilateral manne

shared security concerns.

This is a controversial issue. Some commentators 

expressed a fear that regional military and sec

arrangements could be used to bolster “gua

democracies” and inhibit the development of more equ

and democratic systems. In light of the traditional ro

the United States and Latin American militaries

concern cannot be dismissed. But these critics te

underestimate or ignore the very real security pro

faced by these countries. Threats like the Colom

insurgencies and the more general problem of n

trafficking pose continuing dangers to national and reg

security and sovereignty. Unless they are dealt with

will grow worse. When at last they can no longer be ign

they will be much more difficult to resolve, and the cos

risks will be enormous.

The strengthening of the inter-American sec

system will not occur overnight. Nevertheless, 

important that a beginning be made and that 

Americans participate. As Luis Bitencourt Emili

observed, this is the first time they have been pres

with an open agenda. There may now be an opportun

Latin Americans to help formulate more productive se

arrangements, as genuine partners of the United S

rather than as objects on whom someone else’s w

45
may pass them by.

88

This is not the place for a detailed listing of change

might be made. Such a compendium has already 

presented elsewhere.

89

 A logical place to start

SOUTHCOM has already adopted this approach—

foster regional cooperation under the assumption th

countries in a particular geographic area (Central Am

the Caribbean, the Andean Ridge, the Southern Cone) 

common problems and would be more likely to 

together to resolve them. From that begin

inter-regional linkages could be constructed, even

culminating in hemispheric arrangements.

90

Simultaneously, however, some changes can be m

the hemispheric level. The Organization of Ame

States, for instance, could be strengthened considerab

were allowed to assume a more substantive security 

Among other things, the Inter-American Defense 

could be more fully and effectively integrated in

deliberative processes. The Inter-American Defense C

could be upgraded and reformed to include signi

numbers of civilian students. Joint politico-military 

could be designed to cope with any number of prob

from counternarcotics to unauthorized immigration 

and natural disasters. As trust built over time, 

cooperation could be extended to increasingly substa

areas, including crisis mediation, peacekeeping, 

control, and so on.

91

 Again, none of this would be qu

easy. It is the direction that matters.

Sixth and seventh, something should be said abou

and Colombia, two countries where U.S. policy has be

only ineffective, but counterproductive. First, Cuba: Fo

decades, the United States has played Goliath to F

David, in the process providing the Cuban dictator wi

foreign enemy he has so sorely needed to mobiliz

masses behind his leadership. Castro is a mast

“pushing our buttons,” and we have repeatedly falle

the trap by reacting in ways that have only strengt

46
about facilitating a transition to a post-Castro era

should change. Rather than timidly reacting to Ca

initiatives, we should boldly launch our own.

What is needed is a strategy designed to open u

island to U.S. influence.

92

 There is nothing so subver

failed Communist regimes as democratic and materi

values and life styles. Castro understands this far 

than we, which is why he has so assiduously soug

manage and limit the economic changes that have 

introduced over the past decade. In this he has been la

successful. It is one thing, however, to contain Euro

Canadian, and Mexican influence, quite another to 

that of the United States. The potential U.S. impact on 

is greater than that of any other country or combinat

countries. No one else has the combination of geogr

proximity, ethnic/cultural linkages, seductive standa

living, economic resources (trade, aid and investment

strong desire to promote political change. It is time—

overdue—to begin using these resources effectively.

The place to start is with a unilateral lifting of th

embargo. This should be done whether or not C

reciprocates with concessions of his own. In the judgm

the author, such a move would be in our interest, as w

the interest of the Cuban people. It would remove th

scapegoat Castro has to deflect public discontent fro

own failures. And if we played our cards right, it could 

the process of de-demonization—the elimination o

spectre of the U.S. threat—that has been so crucial 

political career. How he would react is not en

predictable, but one anticipates it would be with sus

and hostility. Nevertheless, it would be much more di

for Castro to maintain popular support for his bes

fortress policy if we publicly demonstrated—in deeds a

as words—that we are not Cuba’s enemy.

In short, I would argue that we should change the n

of the U.S.-Cuba “game.” Fidel has mastered the poli

hostility, and we cannot effectively compete on those t

47
control will we be able to exploit his weaknesses.

This being said, we should not deceive ourselve

thinking that this strategy is risk-free. One would l

promote a peaceful democratic transition and improv

human rights situation. But there are no guara

Castro might well react to the perceived threat to his 

by intensifying repression. The transition to democra

slippery slope. U.S. efforts to open up Cuba might lea

regime to increase controls. It might also lead to a com

loss of control, accompanied perhaps by major violenc

latter, in particular, could produce strong pol

pressures within the United States for a mi

intervention. Accordingly, one of the tasks the nex

president should undertake—and the earlier the be

should be a serious cost/risk/benefit analysis of our 

policy. 

The bottom line is that we need to determine, to th

of our ability, whether the risks and benefits of a 

change are greater or less than maintaining our cu

course. This can only be established (or disproven) by a 

systematic and detailed examination than is possi

these pages. With this in mind, a nonpartisan presid

commission should be appointed. In addition to tak

fresh and (hopefully) objective look at the issue, such a 

would lend considerable legitimacy to whatever 

emerged from its findings.

Seventh, U.S. policy is currently at a crossroa

Colombia. We have still not come to terms wit

interrelationship between counternarcotics and cou

insurgency. For domestic political reasons, we have c

to pretend that the two can be separated—that we ca

the Colombian government’s counternarcotics e

without becoming involved in counterinsurgency. Bu

is disingenuous. The guerrillas have become so d

immersed in the drug business and receive su

substantial portion of their finances from it that effo

wage the war against drugs will inevitably have a 

48
government circles, where counternarcotics aid is w

viewed as a way to combat the insurgency “through the 

door.” The calculation is that if we were candid about 

we were doing the political opposition would be so grea

U.S. aid to Colombia would be greatly reduced, setting 

the wars against both the narcos and the guerrillas.

This may be tactically convenient, but it is 

strategically insufficient. Under current U.S. policy, co

insurgency has become hostage to counternarcotics. P

as a result, the ability of the Colombian state to conta

guerrillas and paramilitaries has been seriously er

That must change. The armed forces and police mu

strengthened, the tide on the battlefield turned. But 

some of this can be done by providing hardwar

instance, helicopters to permit greater mobility), we 

be wary of seeking purely military solutions. To fa

that trap would not only increase the death toll enorm

it could very well make the battlefield situation w

Thus, U.S. aid should stress military reforms, trainin

the development of a coherent strategy

93

 more 

firepower. Unless the professionalism and compete

the Colombian armed forces can be greatly improved

are likely to use any weapons we supply in ways that v

human rights and undercut the government’s legiti

That would be a prescription for losing the w

Washington as well as Colombia.

Gabriel Marcella and I have already offered num

specific policy recommendations for both the militar

nonmilitary facets of Colombia’s “three wars.”

94

 Mor

most of what I have said in previous pages about the n

strengthen civilian authority and institutions, re

human rights, reconsider counternarcotics strategy

foster rural development is as relevant for Colombia a

where else, if not more so. I will not go over that g

again. One point, however, must be stressed: In its co

with the threats posed by the narcotraffickers 

guerrillas, U.S. policy has neglected the paramilitarie

the latter pose the greatest security threat in Col

49
killings, and their ranks are growing even more ra

than those of the insurgents. Accordingly, a strategy 

be devised for combating them. In all likelihood, the a

forces will have to play a major role. That also is wh

military must be strengthened. It is simply unrealis

expect it to simultaneously take on three formi

enemies—the guerrillas, the narcos, and the paras—

present weakened condition. That, too, would be a fo

for disaster.

The upshot is that if peace is to be attained the gue

and paramilitaries must be given incentives to ba

seriously. As matters now stand, they have very few. 

are holding their own on the battlefield, and re

enormous profits from their narcotics connections. Th

no pressing reason why they should want to come in 

the cold. Until that changes, they may be expected 

negotiations as a ploy to secure concessions from 

government, while further undercutting the latter’s po

support and legitimacy.

Eighth, one last recommendation may be presented 

form of a cautionary with regard to the involvement 

U.S. military in patrolling the border with Mexico. 

there may be political pressure to use the armed for

reinforce overwhelmed civilian agencies, there are 

reasons why their involvement should be limited. A

other things, there is the danger of casualties. The 

1997 killing in Redford, Texas, of Esequiel Hernandez 

warning of what can happen when armed troops eng

even a passive listening and observation mode. Herna

a U.S. teenager who was tending his family’s goat h

the time, was shot (perhaps by accident, perhaps not

member of a four-man military observer team which w

the lookout for illegal immigrants and drug smuggler

incident created a huge uproar and led to a congres

investigation. Questions were raised about the wisd

“militarizing” the border. Put bluntly, soldiers are tr

to kill enemies; they are not particularly well-equipp

the more subtle combat of border patrolling or policin

50
there will be other such tragedies, with attendant casu

both civilian and military. The publicity resulting from 

incidents would be damaging to the U.S. military both 

national level (in terms of its relations with Congres

the public) and in its relations with the affected b

communities.

95

To this one might add other liabilities: There 

danger that U.S. troops might become engaged in co

with Mexican units. The latter have been know

occasionally stray over the border, and it takes 

imagination to envision a scenario in which there wo

casualties on both sides. Even if that does not occu

spectre of a “militarized” border touches sensitive ner

Mexico. U.S. relations with its southern neighbo

already rife with distrust and resentment. Unnece

provocations and risks should be avoided.

Finally, there are issues of OPSTEMPO and read

Over the past decade, the major armed services 

steadily shrunk in both size (36 percent) and weaponry

the number of peacekeeping missions, relief effort

other Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW

proliferated.

96

 The services are increasingly stretche

and can ill afford to become more heavily involved o

border. A buildup there would require the divers

personnel from other missions and detract from mi

readiness.

97

In the aftermath of the Hernandez affair

Department of Defense cancelled armed military p

along the border. It was the right decision and shou

maintained in the future. This is not to say that the mi

should not provide other support services (e.g., 

reconnaissance, personnel training, engineering

document analysis) for U.S. law enforcement agencie

the primary responsibility for stemming the flow of 

immigrants and drugs must lie with civilian autho

The military is no substitute for adequately st

professional, well-trained and equipped law enforce

51
the hard decisions and commitments that are necess

the United States is to restore the rule of law on its sou

border.

On the Shaping of an Illusion and the Illusion

of Shaping.

Formulating a U.S. security strategy for Latin Am

is a daunting task in an era of severely limited reso

For the fact is that resources shape strategy more tha

versa. Unless means are available, we are unlikely to o

the ends desired. So we either (1) wind up with a “wis

of goals divorced from any coherent ways of attaining 

(2) lower our goals, adjust strategy accordingly, and a

the fact that the latter is incapable of dealing with the 

challenges and dangers that will be faced; or, (3) 

worrisome) deceive ourselves into believing tha

dangers do not exist or that, if they do, we can meet 

with the resources and strategy at hand.

My reading of recent U.S. National Security Str

documents

98

 suggests that we are currently engage

combination of the first and third of these tendencies. U

the illusion of shaping the Latin American sec

environment, we are, by and large, shaping an ill

Unless we can find the will to commit the nece

resources and the imagination to fashion coherent w

linking those resources to well-defined goals, we w

really have a strategy at all. As all too often in the pas

United States will largely be relegated to the posit

reacting to crises rather than preventing them. 

continuing to enjoy various tactical successes, U.S. po

a whole will be a strategic failure.

ENDNOTES

1. John A. Cope, “Hemispheric Security Relations: Remode

U.S. Framework for the Americas,” Strategic Forum, National D

University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, N

September 1998, p. 1.

52
Responsibility in the New World Disorder, London: Frank Cass

3. President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strate

New Century, Washington, DC: The White House, October 199

4. Ibid., p. 49.

5. Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, U

Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, bef

105th Congress, Committee on Armed Services, United States 

March 5, 1998, p. 2.

6. See Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, “Insurgen

Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach,” Sma

and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 272-310.

7. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century

8. Ibid., p. 48.

9. Barry R. McCaffrey, “A Strategy for Confronting the N

Drug Problem,” San Diego Tribune, August 2, 1998.

10. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Centur

11. Anthony Faiola, “$1 Billion Flows Out of Brazi

Washington Post, January 15, 1999; and “Unpredictable Congr

to Brazilian Reform,” Ibid., January 20, 1999.

12. On the Brazilian crisis, see Kenneth Maxwell, “Br

Meltdown,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp

13. Larry Rohter, “There’s a Lot of Grit in Brazil,” New York 

April 23, 1999.

14. For details, see Anthony Faiola, “Deep Recession Envelop

America,” The Washington Post, August 5, 1999.

15. The following is based primarily on Gabriel Marcella and 

E. Schulz, Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Cro

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

1999.

53
percent. Larry Rohter, “Colombia is Reeling, Hurt by Rebels and Ec

New York Times, July 18, 1999.

17. Between 1977 and 1993, per capita Gross National Income 

US$3,310 to US$2,600. International Bank for Reconstructi

Development, World Bank Tables 1995, Baltimore, MD: Johns H

Press, 1995, pp. 8-9.

18. Larry Rohter, “Divided Venezuela Votes on New Charter 

New York Times, December 15, 1999.

19. “Now, Chavez is not Chavez! Chavez is the people! And th

will not be stopped!” Address from the balcony of the Miraflores 

following the Constituent Assembly elections. Anthony Faiola, “Ven

Leader Raises Hopes, Fears,” The Washington Post, July 27, 1999.

20. For details, see Donald E. Schulz, “Narcopolitics in Mexic

manuscript, January 2000.

21. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narco

Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

1996-1999.

22. H.G. Reza, “Drug Probes Find Smugglers in the Milita

Angeles Times, December 13, 1998.

23. See, e.g., the testimony of DEA Administrator Tho

Constantine before the House Government Reform and Ov

Committee’s National Security, International Affairs, and Crimina

Subcommittee, February 25, 1997, pp. 10-11; and Howard LaFranc

Awakes to Drug Violence Spilling North From Mexico,” Christian 

Monitor, June 17, 1997.

24. See, especially, Donald E. Schulz, “Mexico in Crisis,” Sma

and Insurgencies, Vol. 6, No. 2, Autumn 1995, pp. 224-268; and M

Baer, “Mexico’s Coming Backlash,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, 

July/August 1999, pp. 90-104.

25. Proceso, No. 723, September 10, 1990, p. 53.

The perfect dictatorship is not communism, not the So

Union, not Cuba, but Mexico, because it is a camoufla

54
the characteristics of dictatorship: the perpetuation, not of o

person, but of an irremovable party, a party that allo

sufficient space for criticism, provided such criticism serves 

maintain the appearance of a democratic party, but wh

suppresses by all means, including the worst, whatev

criticism may threaten its perpetuation in power.

26. Not unthinkable, but still unlikely, since this would p

require the PRD and PAN to unite behind a common can

Ideological and policy differences and the ambitions of their s

candidates have prevented this, however.

27. In November, the establishment’s choice, Francisco La

Ochoa, defeated the Old Guard’s Roberto Madrazo in the PRI’s fi

primary election. Subsequently, the Labastida camp made it a 

courting Madrazo and his followers in an effort to maintain part

To date, their efforts appear successful.

28. Such arguments are highly speculative. Neither case h

satisfactorily resolved. Though Raul Salinas was recently conv

masterminding the Ruiz Massieu killing, most of the eviden

circumstantial or hearsay. Nor is his alleged motive entirely cl

29. “Impact of Crisis ‘Greater Than Expected’,” Latin Am

Weekly Report, December 8, 1998, p. 570. On these issues, s

Antonio Ocampo, Reforming the International Financial Arch

Consensus and Divergence, at www.eclac.org.cl.

30. For a detailed analysis, see William Greider, One World

or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism, New York: Sim

Schuster, 1997.

31. See Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements i

America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path, Wash

DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999, pp. 93-155, es

p. 155.

32. An anocracy is a regime where democratic and autho

forms are mixed. While democratic institutions, constitutio

elections are in place, they do not function in a way in which el

held accountable. The narcostate is one form of anocrac

especially, David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Mon

Democracies, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press

55
neototalitarian regimes epitomized by the Soviet Union, Chi

their imitators, and also by the Jacobin dictatorship in France. S

Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, New York: Fred

Praeger, 1960.

33. For a detailed and insightful analysis of the weaknesses 

American democracy, see Howard J. Wiarda, “Consensus 

Consensus Lost: Disjunctures in U.S. Policy Toward Latin Am

the Turn of the Century,” Journal of Interamerican Studies an

Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 1997, esp. pp. 15-20.

34. See, e.g., Albert R. Coll, “United States Strategic Inte

Latin America: An Assessment,” in Ibid., p. 56; and Instit

National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1998: Engagin

for Peace, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1998, p

35. INSS, Strategic Assessment 1998, pp. 112-113.

36. Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer, The Nex

Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1996, pp. 163-213.

37. Mexico’s nationalistic political culture will likely ser

major barrier to U.S. military involvement. In contrast, the Colo

seem to have comparatively few compunctions about “bringing 

gringos."

38. Diana Jean Schemo, “Congress Steps Up Aid for Colom

Combat Drugs,” New York Times, December 1, 1998; David Ada

the Thick of Colombia’s Messy War,” St. Petersburg Times, De

20, 1998. For details, see Adam Isacson and Joy Olsen, Just the 

Civilian’s Guide to U.S. Defense and Security Assistance t

America and the Caribbean, Washington, DC: Latin America W

Group, 1998, especially pp. 166-168.

39. This is the estimate reported by Larry Rohter, “In U.S.-T

Force, Colombia Unites War on Rebels and Drugs,” New York 

July 29, 1999. However, earlier estimates have been around 2

See, for instance, Douglas Farah, “A Tutor to Every Army i

America,” The Washington Post, July 13, 1998.

40. As of August 1999.

56
America: An Assessment,” pp. 48-50; also, Stephen Blank, “The 

the Affair: Moscow and Havana, 1989-1992,” in Cuba and the 

Donald E. Schulz, ed., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 112.

42. See, especially, Donald E. Schulz, “Can Castro Su

Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 35

Spring 1993, pp. 89-118.

43. See James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Wels

Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet C

New York: Pantheon Books, 1993.

44. Coll, “United States Strategic Interests in Latin Ameri

48-49.

45. For details, see Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, “Cuba’s N

Program: A Hollow Threat?” Cuba Briefing Paper Series, 

October 1998; “Pentagon Network to Track Cuban Nuclea

Leaks,” Washington Times, February 1, 1999.

46. This led President Rene Preval in early 1999 to 

Parliament and form a government by decree after more than a y

a half of political deadlock during which there was no Prime M

47. See Donald E. Schulz, “Whither Haiti,” Small Wa

Insurgencies, Vol. 7, No. 3, Winter 1996, pp. 324-359; “Haiti: Will 

Fall Apart?” Parameters, Vol. 27, No. 4, Winter 1997-98, pp. 73-

“The Challenge of Haiti’s Future,” in Manwaring and Fishe

Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder, pp. 50-71.

48. In the words of Max Manwaring: “The logic of the d

regarding the strategic value of the Panama Canal is simple: no 

no strategic value. Even if there were a threat, however, the

defense. Ergo, the Canal has no strategic value.” “The Sec

Panama and the Canal: Now and in the Future,” Jou

Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3, Fall 1

154.

49. Mark Falcoff, Panama’s Canal: What Happens When the 

States Gives a Small Country What It Wants, Washington, DC: T

Press, 1998, p. 66.

57
especially, find the idea unacceptable. See the DeConcini reserv

Article V of the Neutrality Treaty, in Walter LaFeber, The P

Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford Un

Press, 1989, p. 244; and “Do Treaties Allow U.S. to Intervene?

American Weekly Report, July 13, 1999.

51. Gabriel Marcella argues that the U.S. presence never d

Panamanian turmoil, and sometimes even provoked it. The latt

is certainly true, but I suspect the overall situation was more com

think there were crosscurrents. Whether the American presen

more stabilizing than destabilizing is, of course, impossible to p

52. This does not, of course, imply any intent to int

Continency plans are simply plans for events that conceivably 

occur sometime in the future. SOUTHCOM is also incre

concerned about protecting “high value assets” transiting the 

Previously, this was not much of a problem, because the United 

had forces on the ground to provide additional securi

SOUTHCOM’s security concerns, see especially General W

testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 

Foreign Relations Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Holds H

on Threats to Security in the Americas,” FDCH Transcripts, J

1999.

53. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The M

Balance 1998/99, London: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 21

54. On the Brazilian nuclear and missile programs, see S

Tollefson, “Brazilian Arms Transfers, Ballistic Missiles, and 

Policy: The Search for Autonomy,” Ph.D. dissertation, Baltimo

The Johns Hopkins University, 1991.

55. Scott D. Tollefson, “Brazil’s Nuclear, Space and 

Programs: An Assessment of Capabilities and Intentions,” 

Prepared for Research Sponsor, December 17, 1994, p. 32.

56. Max G. Manwaring, “Brazilian Security in the New 

Disorder: Implications for Civil-Military Relations,” in 

Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition, Ric

Millett and Michael Gold-Biss, eds., Miami, FL: North-South 

Press, pp. 228-231.

58
Report Prepared for Research Sponsor, December 17, 1994, p. 3

Brazilian analysis of the threats and issues that have arise

respect to the Amazon, see Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro and Paul

Miranda de Azevedo, “A Vision of the Brazilian National Securit

on the Amazon,” Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military 

Office, n.d. To some extent, of course, such posturing may be disc

as attempts to justify missions and claim resources.

58. Even so, funding for U.S. military activities on the Sou

Border has declined in recent years. As of FY 1998, planned fun

such activities amounted to only $105.6 million, or 13.1 percen

DOD drug control budget, the lowest percentage and absolute 

since 1991. See Nina M. Serafino, “U.S. Military Participa

Southwest Border Drug Control: Questions and Answers,” CRS 

for Congress, 98-767 F, Updated September 17, 1998, p. 5. For a 

view of the “militarization” of the border, see Carol Nag

“Militarizing the Border Patrol,” NACLA Report on the Americ

32, No. 3, November/December 1998, especially pp. 39ff.

59. See, e.g., the INSS’s Strategic Assessment 1998; and S

MacDonald and Georges A. Fauriol,Fast Forward: Latin Americ

Edge of the 21st Century, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Pub

1997.

60. Interview with Brigadier General Ricardo Sanchez, No

1998. There is the Rio Treaty, of course. But this is more a paper 

than anything. I mean a real (functioning) alliance, like NATO

61. General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint C

Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States: Shape, R

Prepare Now —A Military Strategy for a New Era, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.

62. General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief, 

States Southern Command, Posture Statement before the 

Armed Services Committee, March 13, 1999, p. 12.

63. Sanchez interview.

64. Much, however, depends on how one defines democr

Thomas Carothers points out, transitions to civilian governme

not necessarily the same thing as transitions to democracy. A

policy often had a negative as well as a constructive impact

59
Latin America in the Reagan Years, Berkeley: University of Ca

Press, 1991.

65. Interview with Colonel Brett Weaver, SOUTHCO

November 1998.

66. The redesignation was made on October 1, 1999. Joint C

Staff, J-5, Unified Command Plan For Instructional Pu

September 29, 1999, p. 7.

67. Wilhelm, Posture Statement, March 13, 1999, p. 13.

68. See J. Patrice McSherry, “The Emergence of ‘Gu

Democracy,’” NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 32, 

November-December 1998, pp. 16-24, quoted material at p. 21.

69. For a detailed analysis of the dangers of “militariza

Mexico, see Donald E. Schulz, “Between a Rock and a Hard Pla

United States, Mexico and the Challenge of National Securit

Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol. 6, No. 3, Winter 1

1-40.

70. Wilhelm, Posture Statement, March 13, 1999, p. 16-17. S

Ambler H. Moss, “A New Vision of U.S.-Latin American Relatio

Donald E. Schulz, “The Role of the U.S. Army in Promoting Dem

in the Americas,” in Security and Civil-Military Relations in 

World Disorder: The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas, 

Manwaring, ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 19

40-48.

71. Coletta Youngers, as quoted in Farah, “A Tutor to Every A

Latin America.” The issue she was referring to was the use 

Pentagon’s Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) prog

conduct specialized training exercises with Latin American 

These activities often avoided effective civilian overs

congressional restrictions that applied to other foreign m

operations. Many of these deployments seemed to go well bey

intent of the law (which envisioned the purpose of such exer

being primarily the training of U.S. troops) and were being 

provide counternarcotics and other kinds of training on the sl

region’s armies.

60
“Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Pitfalls and Prospe

Donald E. Schulz, ed., The Role of the Armed Forces in the Am

Civil-Military Relations for the 21

st Century, Carlisle: Strategic 

Institute, 1998, pp. 75-76.

73. David Passage, “Untying the Gordian Knot: Differen

Counternarcotics From Counterinsurgency,” paper presented 

conference on “Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare: The Chal

Colombia in the 21st Century,” held at the U.S. Army War C

Carlisle, PA, December 10-11, 1998, p. 3.

74. Philip Shenon, “Departing Foreign Aid Chief Says C

Dangerous,” New York Times, July 6, 1999.

75. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democrac

115-116. For a review of what has already been done and wh

needs to be done, see Ibid., pp. 206-215.

76. For a more detailed discussion, see Bruce M. Bagley, “Th

Armed Forces in Drug Interdiction: The Strategic Conte

Manwaring, ed.,Security and Civil-Military Relations in the New 

Disorder, pp. 55-62.

77. To quote Kenneth Maxwell, “a banker or a medical doctor

psychiatrist, would be a better choice.” “Avoiding the Im

Temptation: The United States and Latin America,” World 

Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3, Fall 1999, p. 66.

78. Wilhelm, Posture Statement, March 13, 1999, p. 3.

79. This of course includes our influence in the W

Hemisphere. See, e.g., my earlier comments on Brazil and MERC

For a much more detailed and comprehensive treatment of thes

as they relate to East Asia, the Middle East and other regio

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Rem

the New World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

80. For details, see Transforming Defense: National Securi

21st Century, Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1

72-73.

81. One should not infer from this that there is no coop

between SOUTHCOM and Mexico. Actually, there is more 

61
assistance. But these are matters that U.S. and Mexican aut

prefer not to publicize, lest a nationalistic backlash set ba

development of military-to-military relations. Information from 

SOUTHCOM sources, including General Sanchez.

82. Sanchez interview.

83. LTC Joseph R. Nuñez, “A New United States Strat

Mexico,” Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, C

Barracks, April 1999, pp. 25-26.

84. While the Ecuador-Peru dispute has been temporarily re

it could still erupt in the future, since many Ecuadorans and Pe

remain dissatisfied with the settlement. And of course there ar

territorial disputes still simmering—most notably between Ve

and Colombia, and the latter and Nicaragua.

85. Nuñez, conversation with the author.

86. Conversations with the author.

87. There is, of course, the Rio Treaty. But that has never am

to much, and since the U.S. decision to support Great Britain 

Argentina in the Malvinas conflict, it has become pretty much o

issue.

88. “Civil-Military Relations in the Americas for the 21st Cen

Latin American Perspective,” in Schulz, ed., The Role of the 

Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Cen

99-100.

89. See, e.g., Donald E. Schulz, “The Role of the Armed Force

Americas: Conclusions, Lessons, Recommendations and Unr

Issues,” in Ibid., pp. 157-183.

90. Interview with Captain Randy Robb, Deputy Directo

Policy and Strategy, U.S. Southern Command, November 1998

91. For a more detailed discussion, see William Perry an

Primorac, “The Inter-American Security Agenda,” Journal o

American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 3, Fall 19

119-124.

62
“The United States, Cuba and the Future,” Ibid., Vol. 35, No. 2, S

1993, pp. 81-102. There have been a number of similar studies 

the past decade, the most recent by the Council on Foreign Rel

93. The current Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity 

Strengthening of the State is more of a “wish list” than a s

connecting ends, ways and means.

94. See, especially, Gabriel Marcella and Donald E. Schul

and Peace in Colombia,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3, S

1999, pp. 222-227, and “Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy 

Crossroads,” Strategic Review, forthcoming January 2000

Ambassador (retired) David Passage’s “The U.S. and Co

Untying the Gordian Knot and Differentiating Counternarcoti

Counterinsurgency,” revised version of a paper presented 

December 1998 conference on “Landpower and Ambiguous W

The Challenge of Colombia in the 21st Century,” at the U.S. Ar

College, November 1999.

95. On the Hernandez case, see Amnesty International, 

States of America Human Rights Concerns in the Border Reg

Mexico, May 1998, pp. 44-47.

96. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, “Peace Strains the Army,” N

Times, July 11, 1999.

97. Nina M. Serafino, “U.S. Military Participation in Sou

Border Drug Control: Questions and Answers,” CRS Rep

Congress, 98-767 F, September 17, 1998, p. 6.

98. This study covers only those recent NSS documents up t

October 1998. I have read a draft of the current version, but as t

product had not been released at the time this study was com

have not listed it in the footnotes. Nevertheless, my comments a

readily to that document as to its predecessors. 

63
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Donald E. Schulz

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler