F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

W I L L I A M C E C I L T H O R N T O N , Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

E D M U N D G. B R

O W N , J R

. , * Governor of California; M A T T H E W C A T E , Secretary of Corrections; L E W I S , J ohn Doe, Parole Unit Supervisor; M A R K J O S E P H , Parole Ag ent; C H R I S T I N E C A V A L I N , Parole Ag ent; J O H N D O E #1, Parole Ag ent,

Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 11-56146

D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01583- RB B

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Ruben B . B rooks, Mag istrate J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted November 9, 2012—Pasadena, California

F iled J uly 31, 2013 Amended F ebruary

18, 2014

* T h e Ho n o ra b le Ed m

u n d G. B ro w

n , J r., is su

bstitu t ed f o r h is
p red ecesso r, T h e Ho n o rab le A rn old S ch w arzen eg g er, as Go v ern o r o f Calif o rn ia. Fed . R. A p p . P . 4 3 (c)(2 ).T H O R N T O N V

. B R

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B e fore: My

ron H. B rig ht, * * Susan P. Graber, and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.

Order; Dissent to Order by

J udg e O’Scannlain Opinion by

J udg e Graber; Dissent by

J udg e I k uta

SUMMARY * * *

Civil Rights

The p anel replaced the opinion and d issenting opinion, filed on J uly 31, 2013, and published at 724 F .3d 1255, with

an amended opinion and amended dissenting opinion, denied

a petition for panel rehearing

, denied a petition for rehearing

en banc on behalf of the c ourt, and ordered that no furth e r petitions shall be entertained.

I n the amended op inion, the panel reversed the district court’s order d ismissing

, pursuant to F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

a civil rig h ts action involving a constitutional challeng e to the imposition and enforcement of two condi t i o n s of plaintiff’s parole: a r esidency restriction and a requirement that p laintiff submit to electronic monitoring using a Global Positioning Sy stem device. The p anel held that because p l a i n tiff challeng ed two parole conditions

, w hich were imposed

** T h e Ho n o rab le My

ro n H

. B rig h t, Sen i o r C ircu it J u d g e f or t h e Un ited States Co u rt o f

A p p eals f o r th e Eig h t

h Circu i t, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.

*** T h is su

m m ary co n stitu t es n o p art o f

th e o p in io n

o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.T H O R N T O N V

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throug h a discretionary d ecision of the Department o f Corrections and Rehab i l itation, his success w ould neither result in speedier release from parole nor impl y , either directly or indirectly

, the invalidity of the criminal judg ments underly ing that parole t e r m

. T h erefore Heck v. Humphrey

, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)

, d i d n o t bar plaintiff from proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dissenting

, J udg e I k uta stated that a s a matter of California law, plaintiff’s challeng es, if successful, would n ecessarily demonstrate that a portion of his underly

ing sentence was invalid.

Dissenting from the denial o f rehearing e n banc, J ud g e O’Sca n nlain, joined by J udg es B y bee, Callahan, B ea a

nd I kuta, st a ted that the panel misapplied Supreme Court precedent and created a split with the Seve n t h C ircuit, a s described in J udg e I k

uta’s d issent. H e wrote that as a result of the panel’s d e c ision, state decis i o n s about parole conditions w ill now be subject to far-reaching and searching review by federal courts in this circuit. He em p h a s i z e d the important federalism and p ractical con c e rns that warranted rehearing this case en banc.

COUNSEL

Karen Gal-Or (arg

u ed) and Craig E. Stewart, J ones Day
, San F rancisco, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

J ose A. Z elidon-Z epeda (arg ued), D eputy Attorney

General; Kamala D. Harris, A ttorney General o f California; J onathan L

. W olff, Senior Assistant Att o r n ey General; Thomas S. Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney G eneral

, San F rancisco, California, for Defendants-Appellees.T H O R N T O N V

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ORDER

The opinion and dissenting opinion, filed on J uly 31, 2013, and published at 7 2 4 F. 3 d 1255, are replaced by the amended opinion and a mended dissenting opinion filed concurrently w ith this order. W ith these amendments, J udg e s B rig h t and G raber h av e v o ted to deny the petition for panel rehear i n g, a n d J udg e I kuta has voted to g r ant it. J udg e Graber has voted to deny the p etition f o r rehearing en banc, and J udg e B r ig ht has so re commended. J udg e I kuta has voted to g rant it.

The full court h as been advised of the petition f o r rehearing e n banc. A judg e o f t h e court called for a v ote on whether to rehear t h e m a tter en banc. On such vote, a majority of the nonrecused active judg es f ailed to vote in favor of en banc rehearing

.

The petition f

or panel rehearing a

nd p etition f

or rehearing

en banc are DENIED

. N o further petitions for panel rehearing o r petiti o n s for rehearing en banc shall be entertained.

O’SCANNL AI

N, Ci r c uit J u dg e, joined by B YB EE, CAL L A HAN, B EA, and I K UTA, Circuit J udg es, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:

Today

, a panel of o u r Court disreg ards the “strong considerations of comity ” between federal courts and the States, g rasping p o w e r for itself where it is “difficult to imag ine

. . . a S tate has a strong e r interest.” P reiser v

. Rodri g u ez , 411 U.S. 475, 491–92 (1973). To reach thisT H O R N T O N V

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result, the p anel misapplies Supreme Court precedent a nd
creates a split with the Seventh Circuit, as described in J udg e I kuta’s c ompelli n g dissent. I write to emphasiz e the important federalism and p ractical concerns that warra n t ed rehearing this case en banc.

I

The central q

uestion in this ap p e a l is whether W illiam Cecil Thornt o n m ay c halleng e his parole conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or whether he must instead pet i t i o n f or a writ o f habeas corpus. To a casual observer, this issue may

a ppear trivial, but as the relevant statutory framework a nd Supreme Court pre c edents make clear, the answer to this question directly implicate s our constitutional sy stem’s respect for state sovereig n ty and the limitations Cong r ess has placed on federal judicial power.

As t h e S upreme Court has observed, federal h abeas review “ frustrates b oth the States’ sovereig n power to punish offenders a

nd t h ei r go o d

- f

a i t h a t t e m p t s t o h onor constitutional rig hts.” Calderon v. Thompson

, 523 U .S. 538, 555–56 (1998) (internal quotation marks om i t ted). W hen a federal court h as authority to review state criminal matters, it “intrudes o n state sovereig nty to a deg ree m a t c hed by few

ex e rc i ses of federal judicial authority .” Harrington v

. Richter

, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting Harris v. Reed

, 489 U.S. 255, 282 (1989) (Kennedy , J ., dissenting )).

I n order to “con f

i r m that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challeng es” t o state confinement, Cong ress has dramatically restricted f e d e ral habeas r eview. Id. A petitioner seeking a writ from a federal
court must “first attempt to present h is claim in state court.”T H O R N T O N V

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Id

. Moreover, a f

ed eral court can issue a writ of h abeas
corpus only where a s t ate court’s judg ment “resulted in a d e cision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasona b l e application of, clearly e stablished F ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination o f the facts in lig ht of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding

. ” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)–(2). I n this way , Cong r ess has curtailed f ederal judicial interference w ith a State’s “sovereig n power to p u n i s h offenders.” Thompson

, 523 U.S. at 555.

B y contrast, the power of federal courts in § 1 983 suits is far g r eater—and the intrusion on state sovereig nty f a r mo re sig nificant. Unlike a habeas petitioner, a plaintiff suing under § 1983 by p asses the state court sy stem and g oes dir e c t l y to federal c ourt. Patsy v. Bd. o f Regents
, 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982); Steffel v. Thompson

, 415 U.S. 4 52, 472–73 (1974). Absent is the notion that “state proceeding s a r e the c entral process,” as they are in the h abeas contex t. R i c h t e r , 1 3 1 S. Ct. a t 7 8 7

. And whereas federal habeas review e ntails deference to a state court judg me n t unless that judg ment is “bey ond any possibility for fairminded disag reement,” id.

, no such deference to the States e x ists in § 1983 suits. F or these and other reasons, § 198 3 s uits involve “a basic p roblem o f American federalism,” Monroe v. Pape
, 365 U.S. 167, 222 (1961) (F rankfurter, J
., dissenting )

, and this is e specially true in the contex t of state penal sy stems. Cf. Thompson

, 5 2 3 U.S. at 555.

Ag ainst this b a c kg round, the implications of the panel’s decision f or state sovereig nty are obvious

. S t a te decisions

a b o ut parole conditions will now be subject to far-reaching and searching review b y federal courts in our circuit. RatherT H O R N T O N V

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than reserving f

eder a l j udicial intervention for cases o f “ex treme malfunctio[ n] ” of state penal sy stems, as is the case with habeas review, Burt v. Titlow

, 1 34 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (alteration i n orig inal) (quoting Richter

, 131 S. Ct. at 786), federal judicial involvement in th e setting o f parole conditions will now b e c ome routine. As J udg e I kuta’s dissent convincing ly arg ues, chall eng e s to p arole conditions fall within the purview of the federal habe a s statute, with a ll its attendant limitations o n our power. B y instead p e r m i t ting such c halleng es to be broug ht u nder § 1983, the p anel has worked “a major new intrusion into state sovere i gn t y under

our federal sy stem,” Maine v. Thiboutot

, 448 U.S. 1
, 33 (1980) (Powell, J
., dissenting ), so m e t h i n g Cong ress ex pressly
soug h t to avoid.

I I

The consequences of the panel’s decision go bey ond its disreg ard of fundamental f ederalism p rinci p l e s

. One of the key differences between habeas a nd § 1983 a ctions is that the latter holds out the prospect of attorney ’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff. S

ee 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ( b )

. As federal courts have observed o n numerous occasions, awarding attorney ’s f ees in § 1983 litig ation encourag es would-be plaintiffs to bring suits that mig ht otherwise never make it into court because counsel have a financial incentive to undertake such cases. See, e.g. , Dennis v. Chang

, 611 F .2d 1302, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 1980). That incentive is c onspicuousl y l ac king in habeas a ctions, which means that the likely effect of the panel’s d ecision will be a rush of parolees to the federal courthouse steps.

Given the predictable increase in § 1983 litig ation the panel’s opinion w ill p roduce, one would ex pect the panel to

a r t iculate how litig ants and district courts will determ i n eT H O R N T O N V

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w h e n a c halleng e must be broug ht in habeas. B ut the pane l remains c oy , offering o nly hints at what may or may not be relevant c onsiderations in f uture cases. The panel’s p roffered standard is a my stery , one t h a t the district courts of this circuit must strug g le now to solve.

I respectfully dissent from our reg rettable decision not to rehear this case en banc.

OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:

I n this civil rig hts action u nder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff W ill i am Cecil Thornton bring s a constitutional challeng e to t h e imposition and enforcement of two conditions o f h i s parole: a r esidency restriction a nd a requirement tha t he submit to electronic monitoring using a Global Positioning Sy stem (“GPS”) device. Citing Preiser v

. Rodrig u ez , 411 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1973), and Heck v. Humphr e y , 512 U .S. 477, 487 (1994), the district court c o ncluded that habeas corpus provided the e x c l usive federal r emedy for Plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the action under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

The Supreme Court has not d irectly considered the application o f the H

eck doctrine to § 1983 actions that challeng e conditions of p a r ole. A mong the courts of appeals, only the Seventh Circuit has done so, in Drollinger v

. Milligan

, 5 5 2 F .2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977), w hich considered conditions of probation, and W illiams v. W

isconsin
, 336 F .3d 576 (7th Cir

. 2 003), which considered conditions of parole.T H O R N T O N V

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Consist e n t w i th Supreme Court precedent and that of our sister circu i t, we hold that such an action is not b arred b y Heck if it is not a collateral attack on eit h e r t he fact of a parolee’s c onfinement as a parol ee or the parolee’s underly ing c onviction or sentence. B ecause we conclude that P l a i n tiff’s action is not such an a ttack, we reverse a nd remand.

BACK G ROUND

California’s Sex Offender Reg istration Act requires certain convicted sex offenders to register with law enfor c e ment officials in the communities in which they reside. Cal. Penal Code §§ 290(c), 290.005(a). California’s Sex ual Predator Punishment and Control Act of 2006—also known as J e ssica’s L aw or Proposition 83—imposes several requirements that apply to parolees who, as sex offenders, a re subject to that duty to reg ister. One of those requirements is

a residency restriction according to wh i c h a person who is required to reg ister may not “reside withi n 2 0 0 0 feet of any public or private school, or park w he re c h ildren reg ularly
g ather.” Id. § 3003.5(b). Anoth er requirement is that any person who is convicted of a “reg is t e rable sex offense” a s defined by section 290(c)—a section which enumerates

v arious sex offenses under California law—must submit to electronic monitoring by a GPS device, either for the duration of that person’s parole or for life. Id. §§ 3000.07(a), 3004(b). The state’ s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“the D epartment”) also has discretionary authority to require
any p arolee to s u bmit to electronic monitoring

. See id. § 3010(a) (providing that “the [ Department] may utiliz e continuous e lectronic moni t o r ing to electronically monitor the whereabouts of persons on parole”).T H O R N T O N V

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I n 2 011, a California t rial court ruled that section 3003.5(b)’s residency restriction, w h en applied to all
reg istered sex offenders a s a “blanket” parole condition, was unconstitutional. In re Taylor

, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 67–68 (Ct. A pp. 2012). The appellate court affirmed the lo w er court’s o rder, which p r o hibited the “blanket enforcement o f the residency restriction”; but the c ourt also h eld that the Department “may
, after c onsiderat i o n of a parolee’s particulariz ed ci r cumstances, impose a special parole condition that mirrors section 3 0 0 3.5(b) or one that is more or less restrictive.” Id. at 83–84. 1

I n 1987, Plaintiff p l eaded g uilty in Tennessee to sex ual battery

. I n 2006, he was convicted in California o f buy ing o r receiving stolen property and was s e n t e nced to a 16-month
term o f imprisonment. California law requ i r e s a period o f parole or supervised release following su ch a p r ison term, Cal. Penal Code § 3000, and w hen Plainti ff was released in J une 2 008, he received a three-y ear par o l e term. Citing Plaintiff’s previous Tennessee offense, the Department imposed, as parole conditions, a G PS monitoring r equirement (pursuant to section 3010 o f the Penal Code) and a residency restriction prohibiting him from living within 2000 feet o f schools or parks where chil d r e n g ather (pursuant to section 3003.5(b)). Plaintiff was later convicted of robbery a nd was sentenced to a three-y ea r prison term for that offense, pursuant to California Pena l C ode section 1 170. Ag ain, California law required a term of parole to f ollow his
sentence. C a l. Penal Code § 3000. W hile he was in prison, the Department i s s ued new p arole conditions that would

1 T h e Calif

o rn ia Su prem e Co u rt h as g ran ted th e state’ s p etitio n f or

rev iew o f th at ru lin g

. In re Ta

ylo r , 2 9 0 P .3 d 1 1 7 1 (Cal. 2 0 1 3 ).T H O R N T O N V

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apply upon h is release. Those conditions included the same GPS monitoring requirement and residency restriction.

During his second prison term, Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking both monetary a nd injunctive relief. He alleg es that the Department violated his constitutional rig hts b y imposing t he GPS monitoring requirement and residency restriction a s p a r o l e conditions a

nd by enforcing those condit i o n s in an arbitrary o r discriminatory manner. T h e district court reasoned that, as a parolee, Plaintiff was “in custody ” within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus s t a t u te, 28 U .S.C. § 2254. I t f urther reasoned that, un d e r t h e Heck d o ctrine, a habeas petition is the ex clusiv e m e ans by which Plaintiff can challeng e a condition of his p arole. Accordin g l y , t he district court dismissed the claim.

Plaintiff timely appeals. W e review de n ovo the leg al issues presented here. Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ. , 584 F .3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009).

D ISCUSSION

A. Im m unity

Plaintiff’s claims ag ainst the G overnor, the S e c retary o f Correct i o n s, and a Parole Unit Supervisor are limited to in j u n c t i v e relief. See W

ill v. Mich. Dep’t o

f State Police

, 491 U .S. 58, 71 ( 1989) (cit i n g E leventh A mendment considerations and holding that § 1983 does not permit suits for damag es ag ainst states); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab.

, 131 F .3d 836, 8 39 (9th Cir. 1997) (h o l d i n g that “state officials sued in their official c apacities are not ‘persons’ within the mea n i n g of § 1983” e x cept when “sued forT H O R N T O N V

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prospective injunctive relief ”). Neither absolute nor qualified immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims ag ainst those defendant s

. See, e .g. , Buckwalter v. Nev. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs
, 678 F .3d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Absolute immunity is n ot a bar to injunctive or declaratory relief.”); Vance v. Barrett
, 345 F .3d 1083, 1 091 n .10 (9th Cir. 2003) ( “[ A] defense of qua l i fi e d immunity is not available for prospective injunctive relief.”).

Absolute immunity does bar Pla intiff’s claims for damag es ag a inst his parole officers for imposing a l l eg edly unconstitutional parole conditions. W e have h eld that absolute immunity “ e x t e nd[ s] to parole officials for the ‘imposition o f p a role conditions’” because that task is “integ rally related to a

n official’s d ecision to g rant or r evoke parole,” which is a “quasi- j u dicial” function. Swift v

. California

, 3 84 F .3d 1184, 118 9 ( 9 th Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v

. Boyd

, 714 F

. 2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1983)). B oth parole conditions currently in effect were imposed throug h particulariz ed and discretionary d ecisions by parole officers. The GPS c ondition was impos ed pursuant to the Department’s discretionary authority u n der section 3010 o f the California Penal Code, 2 a nd t h e r esidency restriction “mirrors” section 3003.5(b), which, as int erpreted by the California courts, permits such a c ondition only “after consideration of a parol e e ’s particulariz ed circumstances.” Taylor , 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 83–84. According ly , the parole officers are absolutely immune with respect to Plaintiff’s

2 A l th ou g h sectio n s 3 0 0 0 .0 7(a) an d 3 0 04 (b ) o f th e P en al Co de req u ire th e Dep artm e n t to i m

p o se a GP S m o n ito rin g co n d itio n f o r an y p aro l ee

co n v icted o f a “ reg isterab le sex o f f en se” u n der sectio n 2 9 0 (c), th at

su b sectio n lists o n ly crim es u n d er Calif o rn ia law

. T h u s, P l ai n tif f ’ s

co n d itio n , w

h i ch relates to a co n v ictio n u n d er T en n essee law

, ref lects an

ex ercise o f

th e Dep artm en t’ s d iscretio n u n der sectio n

3 0 1 0

.T H O R N T O N V

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claims f o r damag es a

rising from the imposition of those conditions.

Absolute immunity does not ex tend, thoug h, to Plaintiff’s claim that the parole officers en forced the conditions of his parole in an unconstit u t i onally arbitrary or discriminatory

manner. Parole officers’ “immunity for conduct arising from their duty to supervise parolees is qualified.” A n de rson , 714 F .2d at 910. Plaintiff’s alleg ation that the o f ficers enforced the residency restriction ag a inst him but not ag ainst similarly situated parolees relates to the mann e r in which Defendants implemented that condition—an element of their supervisory function. Absolute immunity therefore does not

a p ply to Plaintiff’s enforcement-based claim. However, t h e district court also dismissed this claim as barred by qualified immunity

. On appeal, Plaintiff does not challeng e that ruling

ex c e pt to the ex tent that it bars him from pursuing injunctive relief. B ecause q

u alified immunity does not b a r i njunctive relief, Vance , 345 F .3d at 1091 n.10, Plaintiff may assert his non-monetary claim a

rising from the alleg edly discriminatory enforcement of his parole conditions.

B. Heck Doctrine

W i t h r e spect to his claims f or injunctive r elief, the
ques t ion remains whether Plaintiff appropriately broug ht those claims under § 1 9 8 3 instead o f throug h a petition for habeas corpus.

Persons subject to state cus t ody g enerally “have two potential avenues to remedy violations of their f e d eral constitutional rig hts: a h abeas petition under 28 U

. S

. C

. § 2254, and a c ivil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Osborne v

. Dist. A ttorney’s Office , 423 F .3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2 005)T H O R N T O N V

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(citing Heck

, 512 U.S. a t 480). I n Preiser
, the Supreme Court addressed “‘ t h e ex tent to which § 1983 is a permissible alternative to the traditional remedy o f habeas corpus,’” Docken v. Chase

, 393 F

. 3d 1024, 1 027 (9th Cir. 2 004) ( q u o t i n g Preiser
, 411 U.S. at 500), and held that § 1 9 8 3 implicitly e x cludes from its coverag e claims that lie “within the core of habeas c orpus,” Preiser
, 411 U.S. at 487–88. 3 Thus, a person who is in state c u stody may not use § 1983 to ch al l e n ge “the very fact o r duration of

. . . confinement” b y seeking “a d etermination that h e i s entitled to immediate release or a speedier release f r o m that imprisonment”—for

ex a mple, an injunction requiring prison offici a l s to g rant g ood-time credits that would shorte n h i s prison term. Id. at 499–500. I n H

eck

, the Court elaborated on the ex ception set forth in Preiser
, hold i n g t h at a state prisoner may not maintain a § 1983 claim for damag es if “ a judg ment in favor of the plaintiff wo u l d n ecessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” with respect to a prior judg ment that has not been nullified previously

. Hec k

, 512 U.S. at 484, 487.

Not all claims that a

re cog niz able in habeas are precluded from § 1983’s scope under that stan d a r d; rather, there a re

“ i n s tances where the same constitutional r ig hts mig h t b e redressed under ei t h er form o f relief.” W olff v

. McDonnell

, 418 U.S. 539, 579 ( 1974); see also Osborne

, 423 F .3d at 1055 (rejecting “the no tion that a claim which can be broug ht in

3 T h e Su prem e Co u rt rested th i s co n clu sio n o n its o b serv atio n th at “ th e lan g u ag e o f th e ha b eas statu t e is m o re sp ecif ic, an d t h e w rit’ s h isto ry

m ak es clear th at it trad itio n ally ‘ ha s b e e n accep ted as th e sp ecif ic in stru m en t to o b tain release f ro m [u n law f

u l] co n f in em en t.’ ” W

ilkin so n v. Do tso n , 5 4 4 U.S. 7 4 , 7 9 (2 0 0 5 ) (alteratio n in o rig in al) (q u o tin g Preiser
, 4 1 1 U.S. at 4 8 6 –8 7 ).T H O R N T O N V

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habeas m ust be b roug ht in h abeas”). 4 T hus, the f act tha t a § 1983 plaintiff is “ i n c u s t ody ” and therefore may f ile a habeas petition challeng ing the unlawfulness of that c ustody does not, by itself, d etermine whether the § 1983 clai m is available. I nstead, a c laim that meets the statutory c riteria o f § 1983 may be asserted u n less its success would release the claimant from confi n e m ent or shorten its d uration, Preiser
, 411 U.S. at 5 00, or would necessarily imply the invalidity o f the conviction or sentence, Heck

, 512 U

. S

. a t 487. See also W ilkinson v

. Dotson
, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (ex plaining that Preiser a nd Heck bar a § 1983 c laim only if that c laim will either result in a “speedier r elease” from custody or “a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t n e c e s s arily implies t h e unlawfulness of the State’s custody ”). 5

A state parolee is “in custody ” for p urposes of the federal habeas statute, Jones v. Cunningham

, 371 U.S. 2 36, 243 (1963), and may challeng e parole con d i t i ons imposed by a state correctional department throug h a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Bagley v. Harvey
, 718 F

. 2 d 9 2 1, 922–23 (9th Cir. 1 983). B ut neither we nor the Supreme Court has addressed previously whether, or under what circumstances,

4 S ee a lso Preiser
, 4 1 1 U.S. at 4 9 9 (n otin g th at h ab eas an d § 1 9 8 3 m ay p ro v id e altern ativ e m ean s t o c h allen g e p riso n co n d itio n s); S kin n er v. S witzer
, 13 1 S. Ct. 1 28 9
, 1 2 99 (2 0 1 1 ) (raisin g , w ith o u t d e c i d in g , th e q u estio n w

h eth er “ h ab eas [is] th e so l e rem ed y , o r ev en an av ailab le o n e,” f o r certain ty

p es o f claim s ).

5 W e d iscern little, if an y , d isag reem en t b etw een o u r an d th e d isse n t ’s

u n d erstan d in g s o f th ese g o v ern i n g p rin cip les. T h e d issen t d iscu s ses th e f acts o f D o t

so n in so m e d etail, b u t w e do n o t f in d th o se f

acts p articu larly relev an t to t

h is case. In Do tso n , th e p lain t if f s w ere p riso n ers w

h o so u g h t, i n a § 1 9 8 3 actio n , relief th at w o u ld h av e en t itled th em to a n ew p a r o l e h earin g

. T h ey d id n o t ch allen g e an y p a ro le co n d itio n s th at m ig h t

acco m pan y th eir ev en tu al release f

ro m p riso n

.T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 16

Heck ’s implicit e x ception to § 1983 applies to such a c laim. H e r e, we hold that Plaintiff’s claims, which challeng e t w o parole conditions, do not fall w ithin that e x c e p tion, because

a judg ment enjoining e n forcement of his G PS monito ri ng requirement and residency restrictions will neither affect the “fact or d uration” of his parole nor “necessarily im p l y ” the invalidity of his state-court conviction or sentence.

The o nly federal c o urt of appeals to have decided h ow Heck applies to the conditions o f a non-phy sical form o f custody is the Seventh Circ u i t , w hich addressed the issue in Drollinger

, 552 F .2d 1220. I n dismissing a state probationer’s § 1983 claim chall e n ging a condition o f her probation, that c ourt identified the crux of the issue: “B ecause probation is b y i t s nature less c onfining than incarceration, the distinction between the fact of confinement and the conditions thereof is necessarily blurred.” 6 I d. at 1225. However “blurred” this line mig ht appear at f irst blush, in California a parolee’s status is leg a lly and factually d istinct from his conditions of p arole. “I n California, parole e s t atus carries distinct disadvantag es when compared to the situation of the law-abiding citiz en.” People v

. Lewis
, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 236 (Ct. App. 1999). A parolee remai n s a “ prisoner” under Califo rnia law and is subject at all times to the jurisdiction of the Department, which may im pose o r alter

6 It b ears n o tin g th at Dro llin g er in v o lv ed a ch allen g e to a co n d itio n of
p ro b a tio n , a statu s th at th e S u p r e m e C o u rt h as h eld to b e less ak i n to im p riso n m en t th an p aro le. S a mso n v. Ca lifo r

n ia
, 5 4 7 U.S. 8 4 3
, 85 0 & n .2 (2 0 0 6) (“As w e n o ted in [ Un ited S ta tes v. Kn ig h ts , 5 3 4 U.S. 1 1 2
, 1 1 9 (2 0 0 1)], p aro lees are o n t h e ‘ co n tin u u m ’ f o r state- im

p o sed p u n ish m en ts. O n t h i s co n t in

u u m , p aro lees h av e f

ew er ex p ectatio n s o f p riv acy th an p ro b atio n ers, b ecau se p aro le is m o re ak in to im p riso n m en t th an p ro b atio n is to im p riso n m en t.”T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 17

conditions at will for the duration of the term of parole. 7 Id. The conditions imposed by the Department, like those challeng ed here, are simply an exercise of that jurisdiction,

w h ich remains unaffected by even a successful challenge t o particular conditions placed on the parolee. 8

Moreover, the d istinction between t h e “fact” a nd “duration” of imprisonment, o n the one hand, and the “conditions” o f i m p risonment, on the other h and, is a distinction t h a t Supreme Court precedent has created: a prisoner may chal l e n g e the “fact” or “duration” o f imprisonment only throug h a habeas proceeding

, but may challeng e “conditions ” of confinement in an action under § 1983. Heck

, 512 U.S. a t 480–81; Preiser
, 411 U.S. at 500. Nor is it difficult to apply that distinction in most cases. See,
e.g. , Roles v. Maddox

, 4 39 F .3d 1016, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a challeng e t o the confiscation o f
mag az ines in prison p ertains to a condition o f c onfinement, which is properly broug ht under § 1983, and col l e c t ing cases); Nonnette v. Small

, 3 16 F .3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) (“I t has been clear for over thirty y e ars that a sta t e prisoner seeking injunctive relief ag ainst t h e denial or revocation o f

7 S ee, e.g

. , C

a l ifo rn ia D ep a rtmen t o

f C o rrectio n s a n d R e h a b ilita tio n Op era tio n s Ma n u a l 8 1 0 1 0 .1 6 .1

– 19

. 1 (J an

. 1
, 2 0 1 3 ) (p ro v i d i n g th at a p aro le ag en t h as th e au th ority to m o d i f y o r im p o se n ew sp ecial co n d itio n s

o rally

, a t an y tim e, as lo n g as w ritten n otice is p ro v id ed to th e p aro l ee

w ith in f i v e d ay s).

8 In deed

, a co nt r a r y v iew w o u ld lead to an arb itrary in co n g ru i ty in th e

sco p e o f av a i lab le rem ed ies: P riso n ers w o u ld h av e tw o p o ten tial m ean s to ch allen g e asp ects o f th eir cu sto dy

, w h ereas p aro lees w ou l d h av e o n ly

o n e. W e see n o n eed to allo w t h e Preiser ex cep tio n to sw allo w t he r u le th at § 19 8 3 ’ s b ro ad t e x t p r o v id es a rem ed y f or u n law f u l co n d itio n s of

co n f in em en t.T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 18

g ood-time c redits must proceed in habeas c o r p u s, and not

u nder § 1983.”); Bennett v. King
, 293 F .3d 1 096, 1098 (9 t h Cir. 2002) ( holding that a claim c oncerning harassment b y prison g uards is a challeng e t o a c ondition of confinement, which is properly broug ht u nder § 1983). The same line must be drawn for parole as for incarceration b ecause, as ex p lained above, in California parole is simply a less on erous form o f imprisonment and the parolee is still considered a prisoner.

Here, Plaintiff does not challeng e his status as a parolee

or the duration of his parole and, even if he succeeds in this action, nearly all of his parole c onditions wi l l remain in effect. Those conditions include drug and alcohol testing a nd treatment; psy c hiatric and behavioral counseling ; limitations

on trav el, e mploy

ment, association with certain individuals, patronag e of certain busine s s e s , and the use of motor vehicles; a curfew; numerous sex -offender reg istration requirements; a duty not to contact his robbe r y v i c tim; a nd other restrictions. I n these circumstances, w e hold t h at his challeng e to two parole c o n ditions does not threaten his “confinement” as a parolee. See J one s , 3 7 1 U.S. at 242–43 (ex plaining that a parolee’s “rel e as e” into the custody a nd control of the Parole B oard “involves sig nificant restraints on [ the parolee’s] liberty because of his conviction and sentence, which are in addition to those imposed by the State u pon the public g e nerally ”). Thus, even if the line between conditions of confinement and the fact thereof may be “blurred” in some cases, it is clear that Plaintiff’s claims in this case d o not seek “speedier release” from his confinement within the meaning of Preiser ’s ex ception to § 1983. 9

9 W e n eed n ot an d d o n o t decid e w h eth er w e w o u ld reach a d if f eren t

resu lt w ere P lain tif

f ch allen g in g all o r a su

b stan tial p o rtio n o f h is paro le

co n d itio n s. T h e d issen t d eclares o u r h old in g “ u n w o r k ab l e” b ecau se aT H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 19

Moreover, because Plaintiff challeng es onl y the discretionary decisio n s of the Department in imposing the GPS monitoring and r esidency restrictions, his success would
not imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The focus of the Supreme Court’s inquiry in Heck was whether a plaintiff’s success o n a § 1983 c laim would call into question

a state c ourt’s judg ment. See Heck

, 512 U.S. at 484–86 & n.4 (rely ing on a co m m on-law rule ag ainst “collateral attack on [ a c r iminal] conviction throug h the vehicle of a civil suit” a nd determining that “§ 1 983, which borrowed g eneral tort princip l e s , w as not meant to p ermit such collateral attack” (internal quotation marks omitt e d ) )

. W e have held that a claim d o e s n ot “necessarily imply ” the invalidity o f a conviction or sentence under Heck unless its success will “inevitably ” call int o q u e s tion the state court judg ment that led to the plaintiff’s custody

. Osborne

, 423 F .3d at 1055 (citing Dotson
, 544 U.S. at 78–82). C onsistent with this view, the Seventh Circuit, in Drollinger

, concluded that habeas relief was the ex c lusive relief available to ch a l leng e

a probation condition imposed under I n d i a n a law only a fter determining that, under state law, t h e challeng ed condition was part of the sentence imposed by the state court:

Our analy s i s of the I ndiana statutes

a u t h o r i z i n g the g ranti n g o f p r o b a t i o n demonstrates [ that]

. . . [ i] n placing a defendant on p robation the trial court i s

p aro lee’ s ch allen g e to 5
, 7
, o r m ore paro le co n d itio n s arg u ab ly co u ld

a m o u n t to a ch allen g e to t h e f act o f h is o r h er p aro le itself

. L ik e t h e d issen t, w e esc h e w a n

u m erical ap p ro ach

, an d w e d o n o t rely o n th e

n u m b er o f co n d i tio n s ch allen g ed to r e a ch o u r h o ld in g

. W e m erely n o te th at P la i n t i f

f ’ s ch allen g e is q u ite n arro w an d is f o cu sed o n th e n atu re of
sp ecif ic co n ditio n s o f p aro le, rath er t h a n o n h is p aro l e’ s ex isten ce o r its d u ratio n

.T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 20

required to impose conditions concerning the

manner in which the defendant must conduct himself.

. . . [ The plaintiff’s] challeng e to the conditions o f her p r obation is, therefore, an attack on the sentence of the trial court.

552 F .2d at 1224–25 (citations omitted). 1 0

This case is dist i n guishable from Drollinger

, thoug h, because the p a

role conditions th a t Plaintiff challeng es were not imposed as part of a court judgm e n t

. Rather, the Department imposed the GPS monit o r ing r equirement pursuant to its discretionary autho r i t y under section 3010 o f the Penal Code, and the D e partment imposed the residency restriction pursua n t to the individualiz ed a ssessment permitted by section 3000.5(b), as interpreted in Taylor

, 1 4 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d a t 67–68. Even if successful, Plaintif f’ s claims will have no effect on his criminal sentence, including the duration of his parole. B e c ause Plaintiff challeng es only the discretionary decisions of an administ r a t i v e body

, it is unlike the I ndiana probation cond i t i on considered in Drollinger

. 1 1 And because a j u d g ment in Plaintiff’s favor

10 Dro llin g er w as d ecid ed b ef o re th e Su p rem e C o u rt issu ed Heck

, so th e Sev en th Circu it d id n o t h av e th e b en efi t o f th at later d ecisio n , w h ich

ex p lain ed Preiser i n l i g h t o f a p olicy o f p rev en tin g im p licit co llateral attack o n state crim in al j u d g m en ts. B u t th e Sev en th Circu it lim ited its h o ld in g to p ro b atio n co n d itio n s th at, u n d er state law

, w ere p art o f th e

sen ten cin g co u rt’ s j u d g m en t. T h u s, D ro llin g er is co n sisten t w ith Heck

.

11 T h e Sev en t

h Circu it’ s statem en t in W i llia ms th at Preise r p ro b ab ly b arred a § 1 9 8 3 ch allen g e t o nu m e r o u s p aro le co n d itio n s ex ten ded Dro llin ger ’ s ru le f

o r p ro b atio n co n ditio n s t o t h e p aro le co n tex t w ith o u t

e x p l a i n i n g w

h y th at ex ten sio n w as j u stif ied

. W illia ms , 3 36 F.3 d at 5 7 9

– 8 0

. In p articu lar, i n W illia ms , th e co u rt co n clu d ed w ith o u t discu ssio n th at u n d er th e state law in q u estio n , p aro le d i d n o t ex ist ap art f ro m itsT H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 21

would neither shorten nor a lter any s e n t e n c e o r judg ment o f

a state c ourt, it is u nlike the administrative proceedin gs relating to g ood-time credits that were at issue in Preiser

. Cf. Dotson
, 5 44 U.S. at 82 ( holding that P reiser ’s ex ception does
not bar a § 1983 claim seeking “relief that will render invalid the state p rocedures” t h at re late to a p risoner’s custody but would not n ecessari l y r equire early release from the prison sentence). B e cause his challeng e to discr e t i o n ary decisions of the Department will n ot affect his court-impos e d p r ison
term or re s ult in release from parole, Plaintiff’s possible

success in this a c t i o n w ould not “necessarily imply ” the invalidity of any state-court judg ment. 1 2 W e need not and do

co n d itio n s. B u t as n o ted , u n d er Calif o rn ia law , th e statu s o f

p aro le d oes

ex ist, an d h as leg al co n s eq u en ces, w h o l ly ap art f

ro m co n d itio n s im

po s ed b y th e Dep artm en t. Mo reo v er, th e co u rt in W illia ms d i d n o t a d d r e s s

w h eth er th e co n d itio n s th at t h e paro lee ch allen g ed w ere p art o f th e state

co u rt’ s j u d g m en t o r w ere in stead

, as in th is case, d iscretio n ary co n d itio n s im p o s ed b y an ex ecu tiv e au th o rity

. T o t h e ex te n t t ha t o u r h o ld in g is in
ten s io n w ith th e S ev en t

h Circu it’ s d ecisio n s in Dro llin g er an d W i llia ms , w e sim p ly are n o t p ersu ad ed b y

th em

.

12 T h e d issen t in t e r p r e ts C alif o rn i a law

, as w e d o , to p ro v id e th e Dep artm en t w ith t

h e d iscretio n a ry au th o rity to ch o o se an d im p o s e paro le

c o n d itio n s. A m en d ed d i ssen t at 2 7

– 2 8 ; see a l so Kevin R. v. S u

p e r i o r Co u r t , 1 2 0 Cal. Rp tr. 3 d 5 4 9 , 5 54 (Ct. A pp . 2 0 1 0 ) (“ T h e p o w er to g ran t p aro le, in clu d in g settin g paro le co n d itio n s, is v ested in th e bo ard

, n o t th e

co u rts.”). U n lik e u s, th o u g h

, th e d issen t co n c l u d e s th at in ch allen g in g th o se d iscretio n arily selected p aro le co n dit i o n s, P lain tif f “ is ch allen g in g a statu to rily

- m an d ated co m p o n en t o f h is sen ten ce.” A m en d ed d issen t at 2 8 . W e d o n o t ag ree th at su ch a co n clu sio n f o llo w s. J u st as au th o rity

is

v ested in th e Dep artm en t to ad m in ister p riso n s an d set p riso n co n ditio n s,

so , to o , th e Dep artm en t h as th e au th o rity t o ad m i n ister th e p aro le sy stem , in clu d in g t

h e im p o sitio n an d m o d if

icatio n o f p aro le co n d itio n s. T h is

au th ority is w h o lly d istin ct f ro m th e sen ten cin g au th o rity o f a s tate co u rt

an d do es n o t p er se i m

p licate an y state co u rt j u d g m en t. S ee In re Co ca , 1 4 9 Cal. Rp tr. 46 5
, 4 7 1 (Ct. A p p. 19 7 8 ) (n o tin g th at a co u rt w o u ld u su rpT H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 22

not decide whether we would r each a different result had the Department merely implemented a parole condition that was required by statute as a direct consequence of a court’s judg ment of conviction or sentence.

F urther m o r e , because Plaintiff’s claim, had it been broug ht in h abeas, likely would proceed under § 2241, see Bagley

, 718 F .2d at 9 2 2

– 23, it is a ty pe of habeas claim to which no court has previousl y ex tended Preiser ’ s implicit

ex c e ption to the tex t o f § 1983. 1 3 W e do not rely on this technical distinction between § 2241 and § 2254 o f the h abeas
stat u t e in reaching our decision, but w e note that the same consideration dri ves our reasoning : that Plaintiff d oes not challeng e a judg ment of conviction or a sentence. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing hab eas relief f or unlawful “custody pursuant to the judg ment of a State c ourt”) with id. § 2241(c) (providing relief for other forms of unlawful

th e Dep artm en t’ s ad m in istrativ e au th o rity to req u ire, f o r e x a m p le, n ew p riso n f acilities to b e b u ilt).

13 G en erally

, d ecisio n s i n w h ich co u rts h av e ap p l ied Preiser t o b ar a § 1 9 83 claim h av e sp ecif

ically n o ted t

h e ap p licab ility o f 2 8 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 4

. S ee, e.g

. , Heck

, 5 1 2 U.S. at 4 8 0 (“ T h is case lies at th e in tersectio n o f

. . . 4 2 U.S.C. § 1 9 83 [] an d

. . . 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 54 .”); Preiser
, 4 1 1 U .S. at 4 7 7 (“ [T ]h e f ed eral h ab eas co rp u s statu te, 2 8 U .S.C. § 2 2 5 4
, clearly p ro v i des

a sp ecif i c f ed eral rem ed y .”); Osb o rn e , 4 2 3 F.3 d at 1 0 5 3 (n o t in g t h at th e claim at issu e w as co g n izab le u n d er § 2 2 54 ); Ra m irez v. G a la za , 3 3 4 F.3 d 8 5 0
, 8 5 4 (9 th Cir. 2 00 3 ) (sam e); Nea l v. S h imo d a , 1 31 F .3 d 8 18
, 8 2 3 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 7 ) (sam e); Fierro v. Go mez , 7 7 F.3 d 30 1
, 3 0 4 (9 t h Cir. 1 9 9 6) (sam e); see also McQu illio n v. S ch wa rzen eg

g er , 3 6 9 F.3 d 1 0 9 1
, 1 0 9 4 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ) (n o t in g th e p lain tif f ’ s co n cu rren t § 2 2 5 4 h ab eas actio n ).T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 23

custody ). 1 4 W e need not and do n ot dec i d e whether the

a v ailability of a § 2241 claim may ever bar a parolee f r o m proceeding under § 1983. I t is sufficient that, h ere, the same

reasons that w ould place Plaintiff’s claim within the scope o f § 2 2 4 1 a lso demonstrate that it is not “a collateral attack on [ a] conviction [ or sen t e n c e] throug h the v ehicle of a civil suit,” Heck

, 512 U .S. at 484, and is therefore different in kind from the ty

pes of habeas claims for which the Supreme Court has determined that habeas relief is ex clusive.

The dissent asserts that our d ecision will “m u ddle the clear line H

eck and Dotson d

r ew,” and r

un contrary to Skinn er v

. Switzer
, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 n.12 (2011). Amended dissent a t 3 1 (internal q uotation marks omitted). W h at the dissent neg lects is that the “ clear line” tha t t h e Supreme Court referred to in Skinner is th e r ule that Heck bars a § 1983 action only if the a c t i on’s success will

n e c essarily imply the invalidity of a state court’s judg ment. Id. at 1298–99 (permitting a prisoner’ s § 1983 c laim that
soug h t potentially ex o nerating DNA testing because success would n o t “necessarily

” imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction); see also Nelson v. Campbell

, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004) (“[ W ] e were c areful in Heck to stress the importance of the term ‘necessarily .’”). Here, we a dhere to the Supreme

14 W e h av e d raw

n a sim i lar d i stin ctio n b etw een h ab eas claim s b y f ed eral
p riso n ers ag ain st f

ed eral p aro le d eterm in atio n s an d th o se th at ch allen g e th e o rig i n al sen ten ce. See Izsa k v

. S i g l e r , 6 0 4 F.2 d 1 2 0 5
, 1 2 0 6 n .1 (9 th Cir. 1 9 7 9) (“ Hab eas co rp u s, an attack on t h e l eg ality of i n carceratio n an d

n o t a co llateral attack o n j u d g m en t, is th e p ro p er v eh icle f o r attack in g P aro l e Co m

m i s sio n actio n

. An d

rin o v. Un ited S ta tes Bo a rd o f Pa ro le

, 5 5 0 F.2 d 5 19 (9 t

h Cir. 1 97 7 ) [(p er cu riam )]. A c o l lateral attack o n th e

sen ten ce i m

p o sed b ro u g h t u

n d er 2 8 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 5 w ill n o t lie.”); An d rin o , 5 5 0 F.2 d at 52 0 (h o ld in g th at a h ab eas p etitio n u n d er § 2 2 4 1 is th e ap p ro p riate v eh icle f

o r su ch attack s).T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 24

Court’s “clear line.” B e cause h is success in this action would
not necessarily imply the invalidity of either his conviction o r sentence, Plaintiff may p r oceed under § 1983.

I n sum, we ho l d t h a t a state p a r olee may challeng e a condition of parole under § 1983 if his or her claim, if successful, would neither result in speedier release from parole nor imply

, either directly or indirectly

, the invalidity of the criminal judg ments under l y i ng that parole term. B ecause Plaintiff challeng es t wo parole conditions, which

were imposed throug h a disc r e tionary decision o f the Department, h is success would do neither, and Heck does not bar him from proceeding

under § 1983.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e, dissenting :

As a matter of California law, Thornton’s challeng es, if successful, would necessarily demonstrate that a p o rtion o f h i s underly

ing sentence w as invalid. B ecause the Supreme Court has held such challeng es must be broug ht in a h abeas petition, not under § 19 8 3
, I w o uld a f firm the district court. I n h olding otherwise, the majority misunderstands California law, misap plies Supreme Court precedent, and c reates a circuit split with the Seventh Circuit.

I

I n 2 010, Thornton was convicted of robbery in California
state court. He was sentenced under California’s determinate sentencing law, Cal. Penal Code § 1170, to a two-y e arT H O R N T O N V

. B R

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sentence for the r obbery offense and a o n e

- y ear consecutive
term for a prior o ffe n s e

. S ee id. §§ 211, 213 (robbery ), 667.5(b) (consecutive term). As required by California law, i d. § 3 000(b)(7), the California Department of Correct i o n s and Rehabilitation (the CDC R ) defined the term a nd conditions of Thornton’s parole, w hich incl u ded a GPS monitoring requirement and a residency restriction. Thornton challeng ed these conditions u n d e r 42 U.S.C. § 1 983 on the
g rounds that they v iolated hi s rig h ts under the F irst, Eig hth,

a n d F ourteenth Amendments, and soug ht damag es a n d injunctive relief.

A

Section 1983 provides that: “Every person who, under color of [ state law]

, subjec t s , o r causes to be subjected, any citiz en o f the United States or o t h e r p erson within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation o f a n y rig hts, privileg es, or immunities secured by t h e C onstitution a nd laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. B ecause Thornton cl a i m s t h at the CDCR, under color o f California law, deprived him of his constitutional rig hts, the plain lang uag e of the statute seems applicable.

B u t b eg inning with Preiser v. Rodriguez

, 411 U .S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court carved out “an implicit ex c eption from § 1 9 8 3 ’ s otherwise broad scope for actions that lie ‘within the c ore of h abeas corpus.’” W ilkinson v

. Dotson
, 544 U.S. 7 4, 79 (2005) (quoting P reiser
, 411 U.S. at 487). I n Preiser
, the Court reasoned that “even thoug h the literal terms of § 1983 mig ht seem to cover” a claim, “because C o n gr ess has passed a more specific act,” namely the federal h abeas statute, to cover state prisoners’ constitutio nal challeng es to their convictions and senten c es, prisoners bring ing suchT H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 26

claims are limited to h abeas relief. 411 U.S. at 489. The Court concluded that any prisoner complaint ly ing at “the core of habeas corpus” cannot be p ursued under § 1 983. Id.

F ol lowing Preiser
, the Court decided a series of cases spelling out what actions lie within the “core of h abeas corpus” and therefo r e c a nnot be broug ht in a § 1 983 action. Dotson
, 544 U.S. at 81–82. Among o ther limitations, relief under § 1983 is not available for actions that would

“ necessarily i m p ly the unlawfulness of a (not previously i n v a lidated) co n v i ct i o n o r s en t e n c e ” o r o f “ s t a t e confinement.” Id. at 81 ( citing Heck v. Humphrey , 520 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balis o k

, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)). Summing up, Dotso n h eld that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation )

— n o matter the relief soug h t (damag es or equitable relief )

, n o matter the targ e t o f the prisoner’s suit (s t a te c onduct leading to conviction o r internal prison p roceeding s)— if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invali d ity o f confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81–8 2

. A p ply ing these considerations in the parole contex t, D otson then analy z ed whether the prisoners’ challeng es to c ertain parole procedures would n ecessarily challeng e the fact or duration of their confinement. Id. a t 8 2

. B ecause the prisoners’ lawsuits, if successful, would, at mo s t, g ive them a new parole hearing

, Dotson determined their c halleng e s did not necessarily imply the invalidity of t h eir sentence o r confinement under Heck

, and therefore could proceed under § 1983. I d. at 82–84.

B

Here, if Thornton were successful in his challeng e to the parole conditions imposed b y the CDCR, it w ould necessarily imply the invalidity

of a portion of his sentence.T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 27

W e must look to California law to determine what constitutes Thornton’s “sentence.” “States are independent sovereig ns with plenary authori t y t o make and e nforce their

own laws,” including the definition of crimes a nd
p u n i shments, “as long as they do not infring e on fede ra l constitutional g uarantees.” D anforth v. Minnesota
, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008); see a lso Muhammad v

. Close

, 540 U.S. 749, 754–55 (2004) (looking to state laws g overning the effect o f prison disciplinary p roceeding s on g ood-time cr e d i ts to determine wh et h e r a § 1983 claim was barred under Heck ). Under section 3000 of the California Penal Co d e , every sentence imposed on a defendant convic t ed under California’s determin a te sentencing law, Cal. Penal Code § 1170, must include a period of parole. Id. § 3 000(a)(1) (“A
sentence resulting in imprisonment in the state prison pursuant to Section 1168 or 1 1 70 shall inc l u de a p eriod o f parole supervision or postrelease community supervision, unless waived, or as otherwise provided i n this article.”) (emphasis added). To effectuate this statutory requirement, the CDCR “shall provide

. . . the conditions of p arole and the leng th of parole u

p to the max imum period of time provided by law.” Id. § 3000(b)(7); 1 see also K ev i n R

. v. Super. Ct.
,

1 Cal. P en al Co d e § 3 0 0 0 (b )(7 ) states, in p ertin en t p art:

T h e D ep artm en t o f Co rrectio n s an d Reh ab ilitatio n sh all

m eet w ith each in m ate at least 3 0 d ay s p r i o r to h is or h er g o od tim e release d ate an d s h a ll p ro v id e, u n der
g u id elin es sp ecif

ied b y t h e p aro le au th o rity o r th e d ep artm en t, w

h i ch ev er is ap p l icab le, th e co n d itio n s o f
p aro le an d th e len g th o f p aro le u p to th e m ax im

u m p erio d o f tim e p ro v id ed b y

law

.

T h u s, th e CDCR h a s a m a nd ato ry statu to ry ob lig atio n to def in e th e

co n d itio n s an d len g t

h o f p aro le “ u n der g u id elin es sp ecif ied b y th e paro le

au th ority o r th e d ep artm en t .”T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 28

191 Cal. App. 4th 676, 684 (2 010) (stating that “[ t] he [ CDCR] h a s ex pansive a uthority to impose a

ny parole conditions deemed p r o p er” in determining this part of a defendant’s sentence). 2

B e cause Thornton was sentenced under section 1170 for his 2010 robbery of

f e n se, his sentence necessarily included the term and conditions of parole set by the CDCR, Cal. Penal Code § 3000(a)(1), (b)(7). I n challeng ing his parole conditions, then, T h ornton is challeng ing a statutorily

mandated component of his sentence, and if he is successful, it would n ecessarily imply the invalidity o f a portion of his
sentence. Therefore, under the rules ex plained in Dotson
, he

m ay not bring this challeng e under § 1983. See 544 U.S. at 81–83.

C

A c cording ly

, the majority errs in concluding that the discretionary conditions imposed b y the C D C R are not part of Thornton’s sentence. Am. maj. op. at 20–22. The root o f the majority ’ s error is its ill-foun d e d a ttempt to disting uish between the status of parole and its conditions. The majority analog iz e s the d istinction between th e “ status” a nd

2 T h e m aj o rity o b serv es th at th e CDCR “ m ay im p o se o r alter co n d itio n s at w ill f or th e d u ratio n o f t h e term o f p aro l e,” citin g th e C DCR’ s

o p er a t i o n s m an u al. A m

. m aj

. o p

. at 1 6

– 1 7 n .7

. W h ile it is tru e t h at, p u rsu an t to a reg u lat i o n p ro m u lg ated u n d er t

h e au th o rity g ran ted b y sectio n s 3 0 52 an d 5 0 7 6 .2 o f th e P en al Co d e, th e C D CR m u s t “ estab lish

an d im p o se th e sp ecial co n d itio n s of paro le” f o r p riso n ers sen ten ced u n der th e d eterm in ate sen ten cin g law

, lik e T ho r n t o n , Cal. Co d e Reg s. tit. 1 5
, § 2 5 1 0
, th at is irrelev an t to w h eth er, if su ccessf

u l, h is ch allen g es to so m e

o f h is p aro le co n d itio n s w ou ld n ecessarily im p l y th e in v alid ity o f a p o rtio n

o f h is sen ten ce.T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 29

“conditions” of parole to the d istinction between the status o f being a pris o n e r and the conditions o f confinement, a nd
asserts that a parole e ’ s “ s tatus” e x ists reg ardless of whether the CDCR h as imposed o r altered conditions. Am. maj. op. at 17–18. Merely

restating this arg ument shows its flaw: A prisoner is confined in prison r eg ardless of any particular condition of confinement, while a parolee is not confined o r restri c t e d a t all in the absence of parole conditions. Rather, due to the n ature of parole, “[ t] h e elimination or substitution” of one con d i tion would free the parolee “substantially from [ his] c onfinement; fig uratively speaking

, one of the ‘bars’ woul d b e removed from [ the parolee’s] cell.” Drollinger v

. Milligan

, 552 F .2d 1220, 1225 (7th Cir. 1977)

. A person’s
tec h n ical “status” as a parolee has little or no meaning if all the prison bars have been removed.

More important, California courts have not recog niz ed a distinction b etween the status and c o n d i t ions of parole. Under California law, a parolee in California is confined a nd “constructively a p risoner” because of the conditions o f parole. People v. Lewis
, 74 Cal. A p p

. 4 t h 662, 669 (1999). The California Supreme Court h as ex plained that “[ a ] lthoug h

a parolee is n o long er confined in prison his custody status is

one which requires

. . . restrictions which may not be imposed

on members of the public g enerally .” People v. B u rgener , 41 C a l

. 3 d 5 05, 531 (1986) (in b ank). The United States Supreme Court views the requirement that “the prisoner abide by certain rules” while released from phy sical cu stody a s “[ t] he essence of parole,” Samson v

. California

, 5 4 7 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer
, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1 972)) (internal quotation marks omitted), because the

con ditions of parole “sig nificantly confine and restrain” a parolee’s freedom to the p oint where a p arolee is “in custody ” f o r habeas p urposes like a person confined b y prison wal l s

.T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 30

Jones v. Cunningham , 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). A parolee
possesses “not

. . . the absolute liberty to which e very citiz en is enti t l e d

, b ut only

. . . the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special p arole restrict i ons.” Lewis
, 74 Cal. App. 4 th at 670 (quoting Morrissey
, 408 U.S.
at 477, 480) (internal qu o t a tion marks omitted). I n sum, California considers parole to be “custody ” because of the conditions imposed on the p arolee, so there is no basis to conclude that the “ status” of being a p arolee is part of a defendant’s sentence but parole conditions are not. See id

.

Perh a ps recog niz ing that the “status” of parole necessarily evaporates if a released prisoner i s n o long er subject to any “conditions” of parole, t h e m a jority offers a second a nd inconsistent reason t hat T hornton’s challeng e to two conditions may proceed unde r § 1 983: such an action is permissible because “nearly all o f [ Thornton’s] parole conditions will remain in e ffect” even if Tho r nton is successful. Am. maj. o p. at 18; see also am. maj. op. at 16 (emphasiz ing that Thornton “challenge [ s ] two parole conditions”); am. maj. op. a t 24 (same). I ndeed, the majority hints it mig ht “reach a different result were [ T h o r n t o n] challeng ing all or a s u b s t a ntial portion o f his parole conditions.” Am. maj. o p

. a t 1 8 n.9. Yet log ically

, if the “status” of p arole is distinct from the conditions of parole, it should be irrelevant how m a ny conditions Thornton challeng es. See Am. maj. op. at 16–17 ( indicating that it is the CDCR’s “ju risdiction” that makes the parolee a prisoner,
reg ardless of w hether the parolee h a s successfully challeng ed
any or all of the conditions of parole). M o r e over, the majority ’s focus on the nu m b e r of challeng ed parole

con d i t ions is entirely arbitrary

. W o u ld Thornton have been b a rred from bring ing a § 1 983 action if he had chall e n g e d five parole conditions, instead of only two?T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 31

Alternatively

, the ma

j ority sug g ests that T h ornton’s § 1 983 action is permissible because Thornton’s “challen ge is quite narrow and is f ocused o n the nature o f s p ec ific conditions of parole.” A m. maj. op at 19 n.9. B ut the majority fails to ex plain what differences in the “ nature o f specific conditions” are important, and how courts should weig h the import of t hese differences. Here, for instance, Thornton c halleng es the conditions allowin g the CDCR to monitor all of his movements by means of a GPS tracker, a nd barring him f

rom living in certain g eog raphical areas. These constraints on Thornton’s phy sical movements are akin to the f a c t o f actual confinement, Am. maj. op at 17, y e t t h e majority asserts that T hornton’s success on these c laims “would not imply the invalidity ” of his sent e n ce, Am. maj. op. at 19.

District courts will have no idea wh a t to make of the majority ’s Delphic g uidance as they co n f r o nt § 1 9 83 suits challeng ing various k inds a nd permutations of parole conditions. I ndeed, the majority ’ s ruling will r equire the sort of case-by -case analy sis that the Supreme Cou r t r ecently rejected in Skinner v. Switzer
, where it advised courts not “to muddle the clear line He ck a n d Dotson drew” b etween challeng es that could be broug ht under § 1983, and those that could not. 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 n.12 (2011).

F inally

, t h e majority ’s h olding is inconsistent with the only other circuit to have considered this issue. See W illiams

v

. W isconsin
, 336 F .3d 576, 5 79–80 (7th Cir. 2003); Drollinger

, 5 52 F .2d at 1 224

– 2 5

. I n W illiams

, the Seventh Circuit held that a parolee could not bring a § 1 983 a ction to challeng e a travel r estriction imposed as a c ondition o f his parole. 336 F .3d at 579–80. According to the court, because “the ‘conditions’ of parole ar e t h e confinement,” theT H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 32

parolee’s c halleng e to the travel res t riction constituted a collateral attack on his parole, a nd had to be broug ht in a petitio n fo r habeas corpus. Id. a t 579. I n so holding

, the Se v e n t h Circuit relied on its earlier opinion in Drollinger

, which held that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action could challeng e her probation conditions (which under state law were part o f her sentence) only b y means of a habeas petition. 552 F .2d at 1225.

T he majority attempts to disting uish Drollinger beca u s e the conditions in that case w e r e i mposed “as p art of a court judgm e nt.” Am. maj. op. at 20; see also am. maj. op. at 21 n.12. B ut the Supreme Court has not indicated that it makes
any difference under Heck whether an ag ency , r a t h e r than a court, establishes the parole conditions that a re imposed a s part of a sentence under state law, and the majority does not

ex p lain why this is sig n ificant. Moreover, Drollinger itself did not rely

on this factor o r deem it relevant in its analy sis. 3 The Seventh Circuit’s r easoning is directly on point h ere, a nd
to be consistent with our sister circuit, we sh o uld apply the Califor nia parole statutes at face value and hold that

3 No r is th ere an y m erit to th e m aj o rity ’ s statem en t th at th e Sev en th Circu it “ ex ten d ed Dro l lin g er ’ s ru le f o r p ro b atio n co n d itio n s to th e paro le

co n tex t w ith ou t ex

p lain i ng w h

y th at ex ten sio n w as j u stif ied ,” A m

. m aj

. o p

. at 2 0 n .1 1

. T h e m aj o rity i g no res th e o b v io u s reaso n b eh in d th e

ex ten sio n : th e essen ce o f bo t h p ro b atio n an d p aro le is th at, in ex ch an g e f or f reed o m f ro m t h e p h y sical co n f

i n em en t o f p riso n , an o f f en d er m u st

co m ply w ith co n d itio n s restrictin g h is lib erty

. W illia ms , 33 6 F.3 d at 5 7 9 (“ Fo r p aro lees,

. . . t h e ‘ co n d itio n s’ o f paro le a re th e co n f in em en t.”); Dro llin ger , 5 5 2 F.2 d (ex p l ain in g th a t a p ro b atio n er w as “ in cu sto d y ”

u n d er Jo n es , 3 7 1 U.S. at 24 3
, w h ich ad d ressed p aro le as “ cu s to d y ,” b ecau se “ w e can d iscern n o sig n if i can t d if f eren ce b etw een th e s tatu tes of
p aro le an d p ro b atio n

w ith reg ard to th e q u estio n

o f cu sto d y ”).T H O R N T O N V

. B R

O W N 33

Thornton’s challeng e s to the GPS r equirement and residency restriction are likewise cog niz able only

in habeas.

I I

I n sum, T hornton’s challeng es to his parole conditions would necessarily imply the p artial invalidity of h is sentence because parole is a required part of a determinate sentence in California. Therefore, his challeng e cannot be b roug ht under § 1983. I respectfully dissent from the majority ’s conclusion
to the contrary , which conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and sister circuit authority

.