Army National Guard History

Table of Contents 

Preface ........................................................................................................................................................ 5

Foreword..................................................................................................................................................... 6

Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 10

CHAPTER 1.............................................................................................................................................. 14

The Colonial Militia, 1636-1775 .............................................................................................................. 14

Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 14

The English Militia Tradition ............................................................................................................... 18

Military Forces in the New World ........................................................................................................ 19

The Virginia Militia, 1607-1646........................................................................................................... 21

The New England Militia, 1620-1676 .................................................................................................. 24

The Militia Expands and Evolves ......................................................................................................... 27

The French and Indian War, 1754-1763 ............................................................................................... 31

George Washington: Colonial Militiaman, 1753-1775......................................................................... 33

The Drift Toward Revolution ............................................................................................................... 35

Lexington and Concord......................................................................................................................... 37

Conclusions........................................................................................................................................... 42

CHAPTER 2.............................................................................................................................................. 44

Revolution and Early Nationhood, 1775-1794 ......................................................................................... 44

Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 44

The Battle of Bunker Hill ..................................................................................................................... 46

Congress Creates an Army.................................................................................................................... 50

The American Revolution in the North, 1775-1777 ............................................................................. 52

The American Revolution in the South, 1778-1783 ............................................................................. 57

The Militia and the Constitution ........................................................................................................... 62

The Militia Act of 1792 ........................................................................................................................ 67

The Militia in Federal Service, 1794..................................................................................................... 69

Conclusions........................................................................................................................................... 73

CHAPTER 3.............................................................................................................................................. 75

The Volunteer Militia, 1795-1897 ............................................................................................................ 75

Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 75

The Jeffersonian Era ............................................................................................................................. 77

The War of 1812................................................................................................................................... 79

The Expansible Army Plan ................................................................................................................... 83

The Demise of the Enrolled Militia ...................................................................................................... 84

The Rise of the Volunteer Militia ......................................................................................................... 86

The Mexican War ................................................................................................................................. 92

Civil War and Reconstruction, 1861-1877............................................................................................ 94

Militiamen as Strikebreakers .............................................................................................................. 102

Creation of the National Guard Association ....................................................................................... 104

The Militia and Westward Expansion................................................................................................. 106

The Rise of the National Guard .......................................................................................................... 108

Conclusions......................................................................................................................................... 111

The American Civil War, 1861-1865 The Militia Presidents Abraham Lincoln ............................... 113

Jefferson Davis ................................................................................................................................... 114

CHAPTER 4............................................................................................................................................ 115

The Birth of the Modern National Guard, 1898-1916 ............................................................................ 115

Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 115

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Army National Guard History

The Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection.............................................................. 116

The Root Reforms............................................................................................................................... 122

The Influence of Emory Upton ........................................................................................................... 124

The Militia Act of 1903 ...................................................................................................................... 127

A New National Guard Takes Shape .................................................................................................. 129

The Militia Act of 1908 ...................................................................................................................... 134

The Continental Army Plan ................................................................................................................ 137

The National Defense Act of 1916 ..................................................................................................... 139

The Mexican Border Crisis................................................................................................................. 141

Conclusions......................................................................................................................................... 144

Senator Charles W. F. Dick: Father of the Modern National Guard................................................... 146

CHAPTER 5............................................................................................................................................ 147

The National Guard In The World Wars, 1917-1945 ............................................................................. 147

Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 147

America Goes to War.......................................................................................................................... 149

The Mobilization of 1917 ................................................................................................................... 150

The Guard Goes “Over There!” .......................................................................................................... 156

The Influence of John McAuley Palmer ............................................................................................. 163

The National Defense Act of 1920 ..................................................................................................... 164

The Interwar Years ............................................................................................................................. 167

The Mobilization of 1940-1941 .......................................................................................................... 172

The Opening Shots of World War II................................................................................................... 177

The War in Europe.............................................................................................................................. 180

The War in the Pacific ........................................................................................................................ 184

Conclusions......................................................................................................................................... 187

CHAPTER 6............................................................................................................................................ 190

The Early Cold War, 1946-1970............................................................................................................. 190

Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 190

Plans for the Postwar Guard ............................................................................................................... 192

Army Demobilization ......................................................................................................................... 195

The National Guard Rebuilds, 1946-1947 .......................................................................................... 196

The Armed Forces Reorganize ........................................................................................................... 197

Final Growth of the ARNG, 1948-1950 ............................................................................................. 199

The Korean War, 1950-1953 .............................................................................................................. 201

Important Developments After Korea................................................................................................. 206

Missile Age Minutemen...................................................................................................................... 208

The Pentomic Era................................................................................................................................ 211

The Struggle Against Segregation ...................................................................................................... 213

Integration in the ARNG..................................................................................................................... 215

The Berlin Crisis................................................................................................................................. 217

The McNamara Reforms..................................................................................................................... 219

The Vietnam War................................................................................................................................ 222

Domestic Strife, 1965-1970 ................................................................................................................ 226

Conclusions......................................................................................................................................... 230

Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh Father of the Modern NGAUS ................................................................ 232

CHAPTER 7............................................................................................................................................ 233

The Era Of Total Force Policy, 1970-1990............................................................................................. 233

Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 233

The Army After Vietnam.................................................................................................................... 235

The All-Volunteer Force..................................................................................................................... 236

Total Force Policy............................................................................................................................... 240

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Army National Guard History

The Roundout Program....................................................................................................................... 242

Overseas Training and Mobilization Preparedness............................................................................. 243

Other Important Developments in the 1970s ...................................................................................... 246

The Reagan Buildup ........................................................................................................................... 247

The ARNG and the Reagan Buildup................................................................................................... 250

The Perpich Lawsuit ........................................................................................................................... 255

The End of the Cold War.................................................................................................................... 256

Conclusions......................................................................................................................................... 257

CHAPTER 8............................................................................................................................................ 259

The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991 .......................................................................................................... 259

Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 259

The ARNG in 1990............................................................................................................................. 260

The Road to War................................................................................................................................. 261

Operation Desert Shield...................................................................................................................... 262

The ARNG Roundout Brigades .......................................................................................................... 268

Operation Desert Storm ...................................................................................................................... 272

Redeployment and Demobilization..................................................................................................... 280

Conclusions......................................................................................................................................... 283

Congressman G.V. “Sonny” Montgomery National Guard Soldier and Statesman............................ 286

CHAPTER 9............................................................................................................................................ 287

A New World Order, 1991-2000 ............................................................................................................ 287

Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 287

The Search for a New Strategy ........................................................................................................... 288

The Aftermath of Desert Storm .......................................................................................................... 289

Project Standard Bearer ...................................................................................................................... 292

The Counter-Drug War....................................................................................................................... 293

The Drawdown of 1992-1997............................................................................................................. 295

The Bottom-Up Review...................................................................................................................... 299

Guardsmen as Peacekeepers ............................................................................................................... 303

Increased Domestic Missions.............................................................................................................. 307

The ARNG in the Information Age .................................................................................................... 310

A Rift Over Roles and Missions ......................................................................................................... 311

The ARNG in 2000............................................................................................................................. 315

Mr. Thomas A. Hill A Lifetime of Guard Service .............................................................................. 318

CHAPTER 10 ........................................................................................................................................ 319

The National Guard In Review ............................................................................................................... 319

The National Guard’s Core Characteristics ........................................................................................ 319

The Guard’s Greatest Contributions ................................................................................................... 320

The National Guard’s Transformation................................................................................................ 323

Regulars and Guardsmen .................................................................................................................... 327

Army and National Guard Integration ................................................................................................ 332

National Guard Mobilizations and Preparedness................................................................................ 336

Towards the 21st Century .................................................................................................................... 341

Glossary.......................................................................................................................................... 344

Appendix 1 .................................................................................................................................. 345

Appendix 2 .................................................................................................................................. 346

Notes ................................................................................................................................................. 347

Chapter 1 The Colonial Militia, 1636-1775........................................................................................ 347

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Army National Guard History

Chapter 2 Revolution and Early Nationhood, 1775-1794................................................................... 348

Chapter 3 The Volunteer Militia, 1795-1878...................................................................................... 350

Chapter 4 The Birth of the Modern National Guard, 1898-1916........................................................ 352

Chapter 5 The National Guard in the World Wars, 1917-1945 .......................................................... 354

Chapter 6 The Early Cold War, 1946-1970 ........................................................................................ 356

Chapter 7 The Era of Total Force Policy, 1970-1990 ......................................................................... 359

Chapter 8 The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991...................................................................................... 361

Chapter 9 A New World Order, 1991-2000........................................................................................ 362

Selected Bibliography............................................................................................................................. 365

Primary Sources.................................................................................................................................. 365

Legislative Publications ...................................................................................................................... 365

War Department/Department of Defense Publications....................................................................... 365

State Military Department Documents ............................................................................................... 367

Oral Interviews and Written Questionnaires....................................................................................... 367

Special Studies.................................................................................................................................... 367

Secondary Sources.............................................................................................................................. 369

Articles................................................................................................................................................ 369

Books.................................................................................................................................................. 370

Manuscripts......................................................................................................................................... 373

Periodicals........................................................................................................................................... 373

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Army National Guard History

Preface 

I

Am The Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000 provides a broad, 

comprehensive view of the accomplishments of citizen-soldiers as the militia, the 

National Guard, and since 1947, the modern Army National Guard. Just as our first 

official history was going to press, America endured the heinous terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, a day that reminds us all of the extreme actions some are willing to 

undertake against this nation of free people. In the past, freedom has confronted and 

defeated evil. Like those American citizen-soldiers before us who rose to the occasion 

and vanquished evil, so too will the men and women of today’s Army National Guard 

help to raise the banner of freedom to the world. 

While much has changed since the creation of America’s first citizen-soldier 

regiments in 1636, a number of the National Guard’s important characteristics have 

remained constant. The National Guard has maintained its unique status as both a federal 

and State force. As a federal reserve in the first line of defense, the Army National Guard 

provides ready units for mobilization in time of war and national emergency. As a State 

force, it provides for the protection of life and property and preserves peace, order and 

public safety. Another constant has been the dedication and service of its members. 

From the earliest militia engagements in the New World to the Army National Guard’s 

current role in the war on terrorism, Guard soldiers have performed exemplary, selfless 

service for both community and country. The National Guard has always been a 

community-based force, with citizen-soldier camps and armories appearing wherever the 

American people have ventured. At the same time, the National Guard has been a 

dynamic institution capable of responding to the nation’s changing needs. From the 

musket to the microprocessor, Guard soldiers have quickly adapted to the new weapons 

and tactics of warfare. 

I Am The Guard is an informative, entertaining, and educational account of the 

Army National Guard’s history. May it inspire all of us to exceed the high standards of 

our proud heritage and to face with confidence the clear and present dangers that now 

confront America and the certain challenges that lie ahead in the 21st Century. 

ROGER C. SCHULTZ 

Lieutenant General, GS 

Director, Army National Guard 

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Army National Guard History

Foreword 

For the 225 years of our history as an independent nation, the general defense 

policies of the United States have reflected George Washington’s Sentiments on a Peace 

Establishment. Washington’s Sentiments was written in response to a request from the 

Continental Congress immediately after the cessation of hostilities in the Revolutionary 

War. Washington sought the advice of those stalwarts of the Revolution — Knox, 

Pickering, Huntington, Heath, Hand, Von Steuben, and Rufus Putnam. The Sentiments 

reflects not only the experience of that group in the Revolutionary War, but certainly the 

experience of the colonists in the previous hundred years of intermittent involvement in 

the North American extensions of Europe’s wars as well as the colonists’ own security 

problems with Native Americans. The Sentiments also reflected Washington’s great 

respect for the principles of the Declaration of Independence, his adherence to the 

principle of subordinating the military to civil authority, and the desire to stay at peace 

with the rest of the world while remaining secure in our homeland at the least possible 

cost to our citizens. 

Washington’s Sentiments articulated five fundamental pillars of the national 

defense. The first was a “regular and standing force” large enough to take on the 

immediate tasks of the day. Washington listed “to awe the Indians, protect our trade, 

prevent foreign encroachments, guard us from surprises...” as the purposes of Regular 

forces. The defense establishment would include a Navy “as rapidly as the national 

budget would allow.” It is quite clear that Washington envisioned Regular forces as 

being as small as possible but adequate to take on all those tasks for which the nation’s 

citizen-soldiers would not be equipped. 

The second element of the national defense was, in Washington’s words: “A well 

organized Militia; upon a Plan that will pervade all the States, and introduce similarity in 

their Establishment, Maneuvres, Exercise and Arms.” This particular point reflects 

Washington’s continuing frustration with the lack of standardization and poor quality 

among many of the militia units provided him by the colonies during the war. It also 

reflects his understanding that we were a nation of separate colonies, soon to be States, 

and that our militia tradition was a bulwark of our democracy and necessary for both the 

States and the national government. National defense problems requiring major forces 

were to be resolved, not in the European fashion of the day with professional armies, but 

rather with the employment of the citizens in their own defense. 

Washington’s third and fifth points covered the need for arsenals with war reserve 

supplies and the need for what we would today call a “defense industry.” His fourth 

point called for “Academies, one or more for the Instruction of the Art Military...” 

Washington, like every senior military commander who followed him, understood that 

better trained officers and soldiers from both the Regulars and the militia would have 

made victory in the Revolutionary War much easier. 

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Army National Guard History

The five major points of Washington’s Sentiments were indeed general, as the 

Congress had requested. They were also simple, understandable, and, like other of the 

Founding Fathers’ thoughts, adaptable to the unforeseen problems the nation would face 

in the years ahead. The halls of Congress have echoed with many long and lively debates 

on each of the five points in the Sentiments. For the most part, senators and 

representatives, many of whom have probably never read Washington’s Sentiments, have 

voted to maintain national security policies that reflected the Sentiments. 

In I Am the Guard, Michael Doubler has given us a remarkably comprehensive 

examination of the history and development of the second point in Washington’s 

Sentiments, the “Militia.” He has also given us a balanced look at the interactions, often 

contentious, sometimes smooth and harmonious, but always necessary, between 

Washington’s first point, the “regular and standing force” and point two, the “Militia.” 

The book is a good read, one that should give pleasure and pride to every Guardsman. 

Far more important, it brings invaluable lessons from history to policy makers of today. 

It should be required reading for defense policy makers in both the executive and 

legislative branches of our government and for military officers dealing with force 

structure and mobilization planning. 

Washington didn’t mention it when he wrote the Sentiments, but I’m sure he said 

to himself at the time that tension would always exist between the Regulars and the 

militia. With one part of the total force consisting of professional soldiers convinced that 

soldiering is full-time work requiring undivided attention and the other part of the force 

consisting of citizen-soldiers who train intermittently and whose livelihoods in other 

fields require a lot of attention, conflicting views were bound to rise. Washington 

himself wrote some scathing comments about some of the militia of the Revolutionary 

War. Two hundred years later, I heard the echoes of those criticisms from Regular 

officers in the Pentagon. On the other side of the coin, many a militia (later National 

Guard) officer has been heard disparaging the Regulars and suggesting that whenever 

they were in trouble that citizen-soldiers would “bail them out.” While both views may 

be understandable, neither strengthens the total force. Doubler tells of the frictions, but 

he also tells of the wonderful accomplishments for the nation when Regulars and 

Guardsmen have reinforced each other effectively. 

During the course of a 46-year military career, I had the opportunity to look at 

America’s defense establishment from different perspectives to get a good understanding 

of the wisdom and foresight in Washington’s Sentiments. I was able to view the “regular 

and standing force,” the “Militia,” and their interactions from positions ranging from that 

of a private soldier in the National Guard to that of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

of the United States. My own experience was much influenced by two of the greatest 

Chiefs of Staff the Army ever had, George Marshall and Creighton Abrams; both had 

tremendous respect for—and from—the National Guard. Both understood the necessity 

of meshing the strengths of the Regular Army and the National Guard to produce the best 

defenses for the United States. I spent my first five years as a soldier in a National Guard 

infantry division; nearly three of those five years were in combat. My World War II 

division, the 34th, was the first to be sent overseas after Pearl Harbor, and as a 

7 
Army National Guard History

consequence, retained a richer mixture of Guardsmen than many of the other Guard 

divisions that were required to provide cadres for other new divisions being formed. My 

two wartime division commanders were both superb Regular Army officers, Charles W. 

“Doc” Ryder and Charles L. Bolte. Both understood and carried out Marshall’s policy of 

giving National Guard officers full opportunity to prove their capacity to lead. Both 

retained and promoted competent Guard officers, and both were quick to dispose of 

incompetents whether they were Regulars or Guardsmen. We who served as enlisted 

soldiers and junior officers in the 34th Division were fortunate to serve under fine leaders 

from each of George Washington’s first two pillars. 

Many years later, after the Vietnam War, I had the good fortune of serving as 

Director of Operations on the Army Staff at the time General Abrams was reshaping the 

Army. His belief in the importance of closer integration of the Regular Army and the 

National Guard led us to the “Roundout” concept of the late 1970s. Being one of the 

authors of the idea, General Abrams detailed me to present the idea to the Army Reserve 

Force Policy Board. My briefing to the board was given on a warm day in Washington, 

DC; I was in shirtsleeves without my uniform coat with its 34th Division combat patch on 

the right shoulder. When I finished, the very first person to speak was the chairman 

emeritus of the board who was also the longest serving Guard major general in the force 

at the time. He said, “General, I don’t know who you are, or what your experience has 

been, but I can tell you one thing, and that is that you don’t know a damn thing about the 

National Guard! This idea will never work!” I repressed my reaction to tell him that I 

had far more time in combat with Guardsmen than he had and simply continued to 

explain the benefits of the concept to the nation, the Army, and the National Guard. 

Fortunately, most of the board came to a different conclusion than the first speaker, and 

the concept was implemented. In my next job, I had the even greater good fortune of 

commanding a mechanized division that was “rounded out” by a fine National Guard 

brigade. 

As this book is going to print, a new President and a new and experienced 

Secretary of Defense are conducting a much-needed review of national security and 

defense policies. Those involved in the review would be wise to lean on the wisdom of 

our first Commander in Chief’s Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, recognizing that 

Washington’s two main pillars of the nation’s defense forces — Regulars and the 

National Guard — are both necessary and that the nation’s defenses can be strengthened 

greatly by the judicious reinforcement of both. I Am the Guard provides wonderful 

examples from the past for building cooperation for the future. On the other hand, the 

future will be different from the past. When examining the defense structure of the 

future, the reviewers must consider both State and national needs. If I were the reviewer, 

I would look to a much richer integration of active duty forces and the reserve 

components. It may not be possible, but I would seriously examine combining the Guard 

and the Army Reserve to eliminate the overhead required for two reserve components. I 

would recommend major changes in the pay and retirement systems, emphasizing “pay 

for performance” and providing both Regular and Guard soldiers early vesting in a 

“portable” retirement system to help keep the force young and vigorous. With the size of 

8 
Army National Guard History

the total force becoming an ever diminishing percentage of the overall population, the 

National Guard’s longstanding ties to local communities become ever more important in 

keeping the support of “we the people” for a sensible national defense. The revolutions 

in communications and computing power hold hope for a training revolution that can 

support better readiness for Guard units and closer integration with the Regular Army. 

At the same time, the revolution in the speed of communications and modern transport 

also guarantees that potential enemies of the United States can pose the sort of immediate 

threats that can only be answered by active forces prepared for an almost instantaneous 

response. The Regular Army and the National Guard need each other perhaps more than 

at any time in history. The nation needs both in a strong, mutually reinforcing posture. 

John W. Vessey 

General, USA (Ret.) 

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Army National Guard History

Introduction 

The militia and National Guard have had an enduring and powerful influence on 

America’s development and eventual rise as a world power. When the first English 

settlers established their colonies in the New World, they brought to America the desires 

for freedom of speech, freedom of religious expression, the gaining of economic 

prosperity, and the defense of their lives and property. At the beginning of the 21st 

Century, American society’s major concerns have changed little. Over the past 400 

years, the militia tradition ranks with the free press, churches, and private enterprise as 

institutions that have had a lasting and profound affect on our society. The beginning of 

a new century and the dawn of a new millennium seem a particularly opportune moment 

for a fresh examination of the citizen-soldier’s role throughout American history. 

Rooted in the English tradition of militia service and firmly established by the 

U.S. Constitution, the composition and service of the Army National Guard has evolved 

in three distinct phases during the past 400 years. From its early beginnings in North 

America, the militia provided local protection, law enforcement, and served as the basis 

for more ambitious military ventures. During the American Revolution, the militia 

fought the war’s first battles, provided the foundation for the creation of the Continental 

Army, and contributed troop units of varying quality for a wide range of missions. 

Throughout the 19th Century, militiamen enforced federal, State, and local laws, helped to 

create the vast, volunteer armies of the American Civil War, and protected settlers during 

westward expansion. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the long era of 

militia service surrendered to the rise of the National Guard. With the Militia Act of 

1903, the National Guard became the organized, trained, and equipped federal reserve of 

the United States Army. In two world wars, the National Guard proved its worth during 

battles in Western Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and throughout the far-flung 

archipelagoes of the Pacific Ocean. After World War II, the modern Army National 

Guard emerged as a bulwark against communist expansion. During the Cold War, Army 

Guardsmen fought in the Far East, and deployments to Europe and Central America 

helped to contain communism. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Army National 

Guard soldiers have ventured to Southwest Asia and the Balkans to implement a new 

national security strategy. In nearly four centuries, American militiamen have 

transformed themselves from a loose collection of local defense forces to a modern and 

ready Army National Guard that is perhaps the best reserve force in the world. 

In 2000, the Army National Guard consists of 353,045 men and women serving 

voluntarily in fifty-four States and Territories stretching from the U.S. Virgin Islands to 

Guam. Perhaps the most unique aspect of the Army Guard is that it exists as both a 

federal and a State force. As a federal force, the Guard provides ready, trained units as an 

integral part of America’s field forces. In its State role, the Army National Guard 

protects life and property and preserves peace, order, and public safety under the 

direction of State and federal authorities. No other reserve military force in the world has 

such an arrangement, and the National Guard’s dual allegiance to State and nation has 

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Army National Guard History

often been the subject of much controversy and misunderstanding. The National Guard 

stands separate and distinct from the other federal reserve forces of the Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Marines. National Guard troops serve at the direction of the State Governors 

until the U.S. President orders them to active federal service for either domestic 

emergencies or overseas service. Still, Army National Guard men and women work in 

conjunction with Regular troops and other federal reserves. In its totality, the U.S. Army 

consists of three separate components — the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, 

and the U.S. Army Reserve. 

Four predominant themes provide a useful, analytical framework for an 

examination of the National Guard’s history. First and foremost, the National Guard has 

provided valuable service to the nation, usually within the context of the constitutionally 

defined missions of executing the laws, suppressing insurrections, and repelling 

invasions. Second, the National Guard is a dynamic institution that constantly adapts to 

the political, social, and economic conditions that shape American society. Internally, the 

National Guard is an organization in transition and forever changing in terms of its 

personnel, force structure, weapons, and training. A third, major theme in the Guard’s 

history has been its relations with the Regular Army. Since the creation of the 

Continental Army in 1775, the history of America’s military forces has been a tale of two 

armies. Regulars and Guardsmen have often quarreled over important policy issues 

while forging an uneasy alliance that has seen intermittent periods of mutual support and 

bitter rivalry. Once policy decisions are rendered, Regulars and citizen-soldiers usually 

work together to achieve the nation’s goals. A summary of the successes and failures of 

the integrated efforts of Regulars and State soldiers during national crises constitutes a 

fourth, major theme in the Guard’s history. 

In addition, two fundamental questions loom large in the National Guard’s 

history. First, will the Guard show up in a crisis? While Guardsmen have time and time 

again displayed their dependability during national and local emergencies, the question of 

reliability goes far beyond the willingness of individual soldiers to serve. Various laws, 

court rulings, executive orders, and actions of the Governors have either restricted or 

prompted the Guard’s employment. And second, assuming the National Guard shows up, 

will it be ready? The ability of the National Guard to perform in wartime has always 

been a central concern of American military policy. Since colonial times, Guardsmen 

have responded to domestic emergencies and journeyed overseas to repel aggression and 

to carry out America’s war aims. From the creation of its first regiments in the 

Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636 to Operation Desert Storm, the readiness of the 

National Guard has been measured by the effectiveness of it combat units. 

The National Guard does not stand in isolation in American history, and the 

Guard’s past yields significant lessons that go far beyond its own experience as an 

important, national resource. The Guard is a reflection of the United States and its people 

during national emergencies and periods of peace and prosperity. America’s social 

values, domestic laws, and foreign policy have all had a strong influence on the National 

Guard’s development. The Guard’s story is also a case study in American government. 

Important constitutional questions regarding the militia’s status and the efficacy of the 

11 
Army National Guard History

system of shared powers between the president, Congress, and the States are evident 

throughout National Guard history. Even more importantly, the long-term trends and 

lessons learned from the past 400 years can illuminate strategic thinking regarding the 

proper roles, missions, plans, and policies for the U.S. armed forces and the Army 

National Guard in the 21st Century. 

Because the National Guard’s history is so closely tied to the American people, I 

Am the Guard includes the story of many other organizations and personalities. Deeply 

imbedded in its history are the ongoing debates between Federalists and Republicans, 

competition between Nationalists and States’ Righters, and the strained relations between 

Regulars and citizen-soldiers. Several organizations have had a profound influence on 

the National Guard's development, so the policies and actions of Congress, the War 

Department, the Governors, the National Guard Bureau, and the National Guard 

Association of the United States figure prominently in the narrative. Important leaders in 

and out of the National Guard have exerted influence over citizen-soldiers. From George 

Washington through Senator Charles Dick and Secretary of War Elihu Root to 

Congressman G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery and Generals George C. Marshall and Colin L. 

Powell, legislative and military luminaries have shaped the National Guard. 

No one work can cover all aspects of nearly 400 years of National Guard history, 

and even an official account has its limits. By necessity, the narrative is not a history of 

the National Guard in the several States, but a centralized view of the Guard’s overall 

development and contributions at the national level. While the National Guard’s federal 

role is the primary focus, key actions by Guard soldiers in State service that have defined 

the Guard’s standing in American society are closely examined. Part I (The Militia) and 

Part II (The National Guard) consider the origins and broad trends in the American 

militia tradition. Part III (The Army National Guard) takes a more in-depth look at the 

creation, contributions, and transformation of the Army National Guard during the Cold 

War and toward the end of the 20th Century. The origins and early history of the militia 

and National Guard have previously been well documented and recounted, and therefore 

the early narrative draws extensively from the best secondary sources available. The use 

of primary source materials and official documents is most evident during the treatment 

and analysis of the National Guard in the 20th Century, especially after 1945. The story 

of the Air National Guard lies beyond the volume’s intent, but the development of early 

National Guard flying units is included because their legacy is the foundation for today’s 

Army National Guard aviation force. 

A work that covers the long history of such a grand institution must, by necessity, 

be the result of more than one individual’s efforts. I would like to recognize the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau, Lt. Gen. Russell C. Davis, and the Bureau’s Vice Chief, Maj. 

Gen. Raymond F. Rees, for their continued interest in the completion of the Army 

Guard’s first official history. The Army National Guard History Project Editorial Board 

provided the content review and the significant resources required to complete this book, 

and each member deserves a special thanks. Maj. Gen. William A. Navas, Jr. (Ret.), the 

Director of the Army National Guard at the time, understood that an official history of the 

Army Guard was sorely needed and had the vision to begin the project. His successor, 

12 
Army National Guard History

Lt. Gen. Roger C. Schultz, had the wisdom to continue the work and to give it his 

unwavering support. Brig. Gen. Michael J. Squier always provided welcome 

encouragement and valuable feedback. Col. D. Allen Youngman lent his considerable 

knowledge and analytical skills as well as his friendship to the completion of the task. 

Two Army National Guard chiefs of staff, Cols. Mark L. Juneau and Charles P. Baldwin, 

guaranteed the project’s success by providing crucial administrative and logistical 

support. 

A number of other institutions and individuals deserve special mention as well. 

The National Guard Association of the United States gave me complete access to the 

archival holdings of the National Guard Education Foundation Library that contains the 

best primary source materials on the National Guard in the entire nation. Lt. Col. 

Sherman Fleek, Ms. Renee Hylton and Maj. Les Melnyk of the National Guard Bureau 

Historical Services Division provided yeoman’s work in meticulously reviewing the 

manuscript. Capt. Mark Nelson of the Army National Guard Director’s Staff Group did a 

thoroughly professional job in designing the book’s front and back covers. The U.S. 

Army’s Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania did their usual, 

outstanding work in assisting me with background research. AmerInd, Inc. of 

Alexandria, Virginia provided me a safe refuge and a welcome home during the last half 

of the project. Insightful comments from three preeminent scholars on the National 

Guard, Maj. Gen. Bruce Jacobs (Ret.), Col. Leonid E. Kondratiuk (Ret.), and Dr. Jerry 

Cooper of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, greatly improved the manuscript’s 

analytical and interpretive worth. Chief Warrant Officer John W. Listman, Jr. deserves 

full credit for gathering the photographs and performing essential research. The ARNG 

deputy chief of staff, Mr. Orville W. “Buck” Troesch, Jr. provided key support at crucial 

moments of need throughout the three years required to complete the project. Ms. Karen 

Holly of the Army National Guard Installation Support Office worked tirelessly to make 

sure that publication and distribution were completed in a timely manner. In addition to 

the people named above, I would like to express a sincere word of thanks to all those who 

provided their interest, support, and encouragement as I toiled to finish the manuscript. 

Like most successful endeavors by the Army National Guard, the research, writing, 

publication, and distribution of its first official history was truly a team effort. 

Michael D. Doubler 

Arlington, Virginia 

April 19, 2001 

13 
Army National Guard History 

CHAPTER 1 

The Colonial Militia, 1636-1775 

Every Man therefore that wishes to secure his own Freedom, and thinks it his Duty 

to defend that of his Country, should, as he prides himself in being a Free Citizen, 

think it his truest Honour to be a Soldier Citizen. 

Exercise for the Militia of the 

Province of the Massachusetts Bay, 

Boston, 1758 

Introduction 

On the crest of a low, round hill, portions of two regiments of Massachusetts 

militia nearly five hundred strong stood in a line of battle, their weapons at the ready. 

None of the yeoman farmers wore uniforms, and their heavy work clothes and hats 

revealed no distinctions between officers and enlisted men. The regiment on the right 

was composed of new minuteman companies while the troops on the left were units of the 

standard, enrolled militia. They all stood quietly, awaiting orders as the morning sun 

climbed slowly into the eastern sky. Though it was already nine o’clock in the morning, 

most of the citizen-soldiers had been up well before sunrise. Pealing church bells, 

mounted couriers, rolling drums and the discharge of muskets in the hours before dawn 

had alerted the countryside of the approach of a heavy column of British infantry. 

Minutemen had dressed quickly, grabbed their muskets and rushed to the prearranged 

rally point of their town’s company while enrolled militia companies assembled at a 

slower pace. Further to the west, the alarm had sounded just after sunrise when many 

farmers were already hard at work in the fields. Near the small farming hamlet of 

Pepperel, Abel Parker was plowing when the alarm sounded. Parker left his plow in its 

furrow, and without stopping to unyoke his oxen, dashed to his house, seized his coat in 

one arm and his flintlock musket in the other and ran to his minuteman company’s 

assembly point. 

Colonel James Barrett was on horseback nearby. As the senior officer present, he 

commanded the minuteman and militia companies of the two regiments that had already 

rallied atop the hill. Barrett had full confidence in his men, and on the morning of April 

19, 1775, he was ready to show the British Regulars that his militiamen were not afraid 

to fight. The citizen-soldiers all knew of the talk in Boston’s barracks and rum houses 

where British Regulars voiced their utter contempt for the Yankee militia. But Colonel 

Barrett knew otherwise. Though most of his younger soldiers were inexperienced, many 

of the officers and sergeants were veterans of the French and Indian War and other 

14 
Army National Guard History

campaigns. All of them had benefited during the past year from a thorough regime of 

drill and marksmanship training. 

Beyond the hill at a distance of little more than two hundred yards, Barrett 

closely watched the British infantry positioned around North Bridge, a sturdy, arched 

wooden structure more than forty yards long that spanned the sluggish Concord River. 

The expected British raid sixteen miles deep into the Massachusetts countryside had 

finally come. A column of nearly 1,000 Redcoats had left Boston after midnight heading 

westward along the main road to Concord, intent on searching the town for weapons and 

war supplies. Just after sunrise, the British had engaged a militia company on the village 

common in Lexington, four miles east of Concord. There had been an exchange of 

musketry, with several of the Lexington men killed and wounded. As the British 

continued westward, the militia companies of Middlesex County had rallied at Concord. 

Before the British arrived, Barrett had withdrawn his men to the militia training field 

north of town to await the arrival of reinforcements. Even as he eyed the Redcoats, 

Barrett knew that other British soldiers were ransacking his own farm in their search for 

hidden war materials. Suddenly, a little more than a mile away, a thick, black plume of 

smoke arose from the center of Concord, a sure sign that the British had set a building 

afire. 

“Will you let them burn the town down?” an officer suddenly asked. The 

unexpected challenge to Colonel Barrett’s authority came from Lieutenant Joseph 

Hosmer, the acting regimental adjutant and a local firebrand who advocated open 

rebellion against the British Crown. Despite his abrupt manner, Hosmer was right; with 

the British setting fire to Concord, it was no longer possible for the militiamen to sit 

patiently atop the hill. Barrett turned and ordered his men to load their flintlocks. As the 

citizen-soldiers gripped powder horns and wooden ramrods to load their weapons, 

Barrett rode along the line reminding them not to open fire until fired upon, and that if 

shooting did erupt, they were to return fire as rapidly as possible. The soldiers had 

another standing order--they were to shoot the British officers first in the hopes of 

making the other Redcoats break and run. At the far right of the battle line, Barrett gave 

orders to Major John Buttrick, the acting commander of Middlesex County’s minuteman 

regiment. Buttrick was to march his minutemen down to the bridge and attempt a 

crossing of the Concord River without bringing on an engagement. Meanwhile, Barrett 

and the Middlesex militiamen would await the outcome of events from their position on 

top of the hill. 

Down at North Bridge, Captain Walter Laurie of the 43rd Foot closely watched 

the Yankee militia. His orders that morning had been to occupy North Bridge and to 

prevent armed colonists from disrupting the search of Concord. With three companies of 

British infantry—nearly 120 soldiers in all—Captain Laurie held his position just beyond 

North Bridge. He had confidence in his soldiers and probably shared the Regulars’ low 

opinion of the militia. A British officer leading the Concord expedition had bragged that 

if the lowly militia dared to appear they would surely scatter if he drew his sword only 

half way out of its scabbard. Yet, as the morning wore on and the two sides sat watching 

15 
Army National Guard History

one another, the British became more aware that the Yankee militia greatly outnumbered 

them. The unexpected sight of the yeoman farmers loading their weapons only increased 

the Redcoats’ concerns. 

Suddenly, Captain Laurie noticed the line of minutemen leaving the distant 

hilltop. They descended from the height marching to the beat of a drum and began 

moving toward the bridge in a double file with loaded muskets at their sides. The British 

were astounded that the militia would dare to challenge them. Even more importantly, 

the citizen-soldiers’ order and discipline surprised the onlookers. Slowly, as the British 

Regulars watched the steady, sure advance, they realized a trained and disciplined unit 

was approaching rather than an armed mob of disorganized farmers. Growing anxious, 

Captain Laurie ordered his three companies to fall back over the bridge quickly and to 

take up a close order firing formation on the far side. As the Redcoats withdrew across 

North Bridge, some of them pulled wooden planks from the roadbed. At the sight, a wave 

of anger swept through the approaching minutemen, and they shouted for the British to 

leave their bridge alone. 

At the east end of the bridge, order broke down as the three British companies 

became intermingled. Redcoat officers attempted to sort out the confusion even as the 

minutemen neared the opposite end of the bridge. With Major Buttrick in the vanguard, 

the troops followed behind in a long column, marching two abreast, moving along an 

elevated causeway that led to the bridge. Suddenly, a shot rang out as one British soldier 

opened fire without orders. A second later two other Redcoats shot at the minutemen 

and, finally, the massed infantry let loose with a ragged volley. The Redcoats fired high, 

with most of their musket balls buzzing harmlessly over the heads of the minutemen. 

Several shots did find their mark, killing two citizen-soldiers instantly and wounding four 

others. 

“Fire, fellow soldiers, for God’s sake fire!” Major Buttrick shouted, as soldiers 

fell around him. Immediately, the men behind took up the command and shouts of “Fire! 

Fire!” rose along the entire length of the column. Minutemen scrambled out of 

formation, hastily forming a battle line at the west end of the bridge and along the 

narrow causeway and opened fire with a vengeance. Their muskets rang out with deadly 

accuracy as the minutemen carried out their standing orders; four of the eight British 

officers at the far end of the bridge fell in the opening shots. The minutemen loaded and 

fired with great accuracy as the roar of their discharging muskets echoed up and down 

the Concord River valley and a dense cloud of smoke boiled up over North Bridge. 

Before long, the weight of the militia musketry overwhelmed the Regulars. The British 

formation gave way, and the Redcoats turned and ran for their lives. As the minutemen 

peered through the dense smoke, the British infantry fled back toward Concord, 

abandoning their killed and wounded and ignoring the shouts of the surviving officers. 

As the minutemen stood watching the British retreat, they perhaps did not fully 

realize that their actions had given birth to the world’s greatest democracy. Years later, 

16 
Army National Guard History

the triumph of the American minutemen at Concord’s North Bridge would inspire Ralph 

Waldo Emerson to write: 

By the rude bridge that arched the flood, 

Their flag to April’s breeze unfurled, 

Here once the embattled farmers stood, 

And fired the shot heard round the world. 

The performance of American citizen-soldiers on April 19, 1775 was not a chance 

occurrence but rather the result of deliberate planning. The militia system that developed 

in Massachusetts in the late 18th Century embodied the natural evolution of nearly two 

hundred years of colonial military experience in North America. English settlers brought 

from their homeland two social attitudes that had a profound influence on America’s 

continued development. Steeped in ancient tradition and codified into English law, the 

militia tradition called for the compulsory service of all free males between the ages of 

sixteen and sixty. In early North American settlements, colonial leaders readily adopted 

the philosophy and the specifics of militia service first learned in England. Additionally, 

the colonists brought to the New World a deep and abiding fear of standing armies as a 

repressive agent of ambitious monarchs. The eventual posting of British Regulars to 

America further deepened the feelings of distrust and bitterness that colonial militiamen 

had against full-time soldiers. 

During the colonial period, the American militia performed a number of vital 

military functions. First and foremost, citizen-soldiers organized and armed themselves 

during prolonged struggles with Native Americans. In the absence of military assistance 

from Great Britain, the militia system alone guaranteed the success of early English 

colonization. As the Indian threat receded, militiamen found themselves more and more 

engaged against other colonial powers. Battles against the Spanish and French and 

service alongside British Regulars often revealed the militia’s best and worst aspects. By 

the late 1700s, the militia was a bulwark against unwelcome British intrusion into 

colonial affairs. 

The early militia expanded and developed in a number of different ways. All 

colonies (except Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania) initially adopted compulsory service 

and required militiamen to arm and equip themselves. Colonial legislatures, rather than 

Governors, regulated the militia and allowed the popular election of officers. Throughout 

the period, the quality of the militia varied greatly depending upon the proximity of an 

immediate threat. When danger neared, colonial leaders energized the militia, but as 

threats evaporated, militia units often fell apart from neglect. In New England, a society 

based on separate towns resulted in a militia system concentrated in closely-knit, rural 

communities. In the South, economics and agriculture produced a plantation system that 

created militia units that were more widely dispersed, based on counties rather than 

towns, and concerned more often than not with the control of slave populations. 

17 
Army National Guard History

The English Militia Tradition 

In Western civilization, the concept of an armed citizenry finds its beginnings in 

ancient Greece. The Greek city-states required military service of all able-bodied, free 

male citizens. Such service was usually of a short duration, and Greek citizen-soldiers 

fought locally to defend their own lands and city-state. The word “militia” comes from 

the Latin term miles, meaning “soldier”. (1) 

After the fall of the Roman Empire, the militia concept endured as the Saxon fyrd. 

The Saxon invasions of the 5th Century transplanted the fyrd to England. The AngloSaxon fyrd embodied two key concepts. Each male was obligated to military service and 

citizen-soldiers had to provide their own arms and equipment. Lacking any formal 

system of training, the real value of the fyrd was its ability to mass a great number of 

armed citizens at critical points on short notice. 

The first legal roots of the American militia can be traced to the reign of King 

Henry II of England. Facing a civil war, Henry II turned to the militia for additional 

military support. In his “Assize of Arms” promulgated in 1181, the king formally levied 

the military obligation of every adult male in defense of the realm. Citizen-soldiers were 

required to arm and equip themselves based on their social status and economic standing. 

Henry II’s Assize of Arms formally codified into English law the role of the militia and 

represented a turning point in the history of governments levying military obligations 

upon citizen-soldiers. 

Subsequent laws provided better definition of the militia’s characteristics. In 

1285, the Statute of Winchester defined the militia as “every man between fifteen years 

of age and sixty years” and required every militiaman to maintain arms. In addition, the 

law required the inspection of arms twice annually. During the 14th Century, 

competition between the monarchy and Parliament resulted in constraints on the militia’s 

employment. Under pressure from Parliament, the Crown promised that militia groups 

would not be used beyond the borders of their local shire unless there was the “sudden 

coming of strange enemies into the realm.” Concerned over the Crown’s power to 

impress all Englishmen into military service, Parliament passed other laws specifying that 

no citizen could be compelled to perform military service without the legislature’s assent 

and that militiamen could serve outside their native shires only in the instance of “great 

necessity.” With legal restrictions on the militia’s employment overseas, the English 

monarchs turned increasingly to mercenaries for foreign ventures and the militia 

deteriorated significantly. 

During Queen Mary’s reign, domestic turmoil, religious fanaticism, and an 

increasing military threat from Spain resulted in a militia revival. Her Majesty’s “An 

Acte for the Having of Horse, Armour and Weapon” added important new provisions to 

previous militia laws. Wealthy individuals were required to provide the resources for 

18 
Army National Guard History

those too poor to arm and equip themselves. Each shire was to appoint a “Lord 

Lieutenant” responsible for mustering the local militia, inspecting arms and equipment, 

and conducting periodic training. 

Queen Elizabeth’s long reign from 1558 to 1603 witnessed an even bolder 

restructuring of the militia. The queen rejected the idea of increasing the effectiveness of 

the entire militia and instead decided to focus resources on a smaller portion of the militia 

population. Queen Elizabeth created “trained-bands,” or trainbands, that represented a 

select group of militiamen chosen from each shire to receive proper arms and training. 

By 1573, London’s trainbands included 3,000 militiamen who trained three times a week. 

Ten years later, 12,000 men out of the 180,000 carried on English muster roles were 

members of trainbands. The monarch called out the trainbands in the summer of 1588 as 

the Spanish Armada approached the British Isles. England would depend upon 

trainbands and the common militia for domestic defense until the establishment of the 

British Regular Army in 1661. 

Increasingly, England’s attention turned toward economic opportunities in the 

New World. In December 1606, three small English merchant vessels sponsored by the 

Virginia Company of London departed for the New World. The ships’ crews and settlers 

on board hoped to establish a permanent English colony in North America. The colonists 

were fully aware of the dangers ahead and knew that their very survival depended to a 

large extent upon the ability to defend themselves. No organized group of professional 

soldiers accompanied the expedition, although a few experienced military adventurers 

were aboard. Citizen-soldiers were expected to fight and protect themselves, and the 

holds of the three ships contained arms and equipment. Perhaps more important to their 

survival, the English adventurers carried with them the centuries old tradition of militia 

service. 

Military Forces in the New World 

Well before the English set out to colonize North America, Native American, 

Spanish, and French military institutions existed in the New World. At the time of 

America’s discovery, the powerful Aztec and Inca empires ruled Mexico and South 

America. Though the Spanish conquistadors brought new arms and tactics to bear 

against the Native Americans, the Indian empires fell victim to disease rather than 

weapons. Epidemics of typhoid, smallpox, measles, and other communicable diseases 

from Europe left only one million Native American survivors by the beginning of the 

17th Century. At that time there were perhaps fewer than 300,000 Indians east of the 

Mississippi River. The Indian population was divided into numerous disparate tribes led 

by local chieftains. The most powerful group was the Iroquois Confederation centered 

between Niagara Falls and Lake Champlain. Indian warfare usually consisted of a war 

party of braves acting under the leadership of a local chieftain to exact revenge against a 

neighboring foe. (2) 

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Army National Guard History

The Spanish were the first to introduce European military institutions to the New 

World. On the heels of Columbus and other explorers, Spanish adventurers rushed to the 

New World in search of unimaginable riches. Only twenty years after Columbus 

discovered America, Hernando Cortez, one of the greatest Spanish conquistadors, 

ruthlessly destroyed the Aztec Empire and looted its treasures. The mining of vast 

deposits of gold and silver soon dominated Spanish interests. Military activity centered 

on protecting the mines, controlling the Indian populations and protecting the vital sea 

routes in the Caribbean that allowed convoys to carry precious metals back to Spain. 

Spanish military bases developed in Panama and at Veracruz, Havana, and Santiago. In 

1509, Spanish settlers founded San Juan on the island of Puerto Rico, and King 

Ferdinand appointed Ponce De Leon as the Governor and “Captain of Land and Sea.” 

With no Spanish Regulars available, Ponce de Leon organized the settlers and led them in 

two campaigns that subdued the island’s Caribbean Indians. Afterwards, Ponce de Leon 

organized his milicia into the “Borinquen Regiment.” (“Borinquen” was the original 

Indian name for Puerto Rico and has been a title of renown throughout Puerto Rico’s 

history.) Spain commenced the fortification of Puerto Rico in 1527 and sent Regulars to 

garrison the island. (3) 

In September 1565, the Spanish established St. Augustine, the oldest permanent 

European settlement on the North American continent. Florida became a Spanish 

military province with St. Augustine as its presidio or headquarters. Soon after its 

founding, the Spanish commander designated St. Augustine’s civilian settlers as milicia 

and made them responsible for defending the outpost while Spanish Regulars defeated 

nearby French ventures. An early militia roster from St. Augustine in 1578 carries the 

names of forty-three citizen-soldiers. Through the years, Spain primarily relied upon 

Regulars to defend Florida while the Spanish militia performed auxiliary functions. 

Despite Indian uprisings and devastating raids from English privateers, St. Augustine 

survived as Spain’s permanent outpost on the North American continent. (4) 

Established Spanish bases in the south and abundant fishing grounds off New 

Foundland drew French colonists to the upper regions of North America. The French 

soon occupied the St. Lawrence River valley, established a strong outpost at Quebec, and 

created a lucrative fur trade. The Iroquois represented a serious threat to the French. 

Alliances with Indian tribes hostile to the Iroquois allowed the French to establish 

outposts in the eastern Great Lakes and upper Ohio River valley. Eventually, France 

committed Regular troops to the St. Lawrence valley and organized the local population 

for defense. Militia companies soon formed in New France under the leadership of 

militia officers responsible for administration and training. By the mid-1600s, French 

ministers at Versailles viewed a militarized Canada as the best means of containing the 

expansion of English settlements beyond the Appalachian Mountains. (5) 

20 
Army National Guard History

The Virginia Militia, 1607-1646 

On April 26, 1607, the vessels Susan Constant, Goodspeed, and Discovery 

rounded the head of Cape Henry on America’s mid-Atlantic coast and entered the mouth 

of Chesapeake Bay searching for a suitable site for a permanent settlement. The small 

flotilla represented the investment hopes of the Virginia Company of London who 

intended to establish a profitable settlement based on trade with the Indians and the 

export of timber, tobacco, and precious metals. Concerns over security were second only 

to the profit motive. The Spanish to the south were a direct threat to English ambitions, 

and the settlers were acutely aware of the possibility of attacks from Native Americans. 

The only means of defense for the one hundred settlers on board was to serve as citizensoldiers based on the English militia system. The vessels carried a substantial number of 

arms that included their own mounted cannon in addition to matchlocks, pikes, and 

swords. (6) 

The settlers did not have to wait long to receive a clear demonstration of the need 

for security. On the evening of April 26th, a landing party splashed ashore near Cape 

Henry — the present-day site of Fort Story, Virginia — and before long a band of Indians 

shot arrows at the intruders. The English quickly withdrew without suffering casualties, 

and the engagement confirmed their perception of the Indians as inherently hostile. In 

subsequent days, the flotilla explored the environs of the lower James River searching for 

a suitable landing site that afforded concealment and early warning against Spanish 

maritime raids while offering suitable land defenses against Indian attacks. The settlers 

finally selected a marshy peninsula connected to the mainland by a narrow neck. On 

May 14th, the English unloaded their vessels and established the Jamestown colony. To 

protect the site from Indian intrusions, they erected a weak barrier of logs and brush. 

Not long afterwards, curious Native Americans appeared to study the newcomers. 

In tidewater Virginia, a strong confederation of Indian tribes lived under the leadership of 

the chieftain Powhatan. All together, Powhatan’s tribes could muster 2,500 braves 

against Jamestown’s one hundred inhabitants. Before long, the Native Americans 

decided to eliminate the intruders. On May 26, 1607, 200 braves assaulted the 

settlement. A sharp engagement followed in which two colonists died. Their names 

unknown to history, the two settlers were the first English citizen-soldiers to die in 

America. Only gunfire and cannons from the three nearby ships saved the settlement 

from annihilation. (7) 

In response, Jamestown took on the look of a fortified camp instead of a trading 

settlement. Within a week, standing orders were issued for organizing a defensive 

system. The constant carrying of weapons became customary, day and night watches 

were established, and organized training on Saturday became an established routine. A 

sturdy palisade fort replaced the ineffective barrier of brush and logs. They did not 

survive in written form, but the Jamestown orders might well be considered the first 

militia ordinances in American history. (8) 

21 
Army National Guard History

Though secure behind their defensive barrier, the settlers barely survived 

starvation and disease during the ensuing winter. In September 1608, Captain John 

Smith became Jamestown’s undisputed leader. A mercenary by trade and a veteran of 

many campaigns on the European continent, Smith imposed military discipline and 

training in order to guarantee the settlement’s survival and to provide the means for 

offensive action against the Indians. After further improving Jamestown’s defenses and 

organizing the settlers for work details and guard duty, Smith began a training regime 

designed to prepare the citizen-soldiers to compete in open battle against Powhatan’s 

braves. 

By modern standards, early militia weapons were extremely crude. Troops 

frequently wore metal helmets and various pieces of body armor, including breast and 

back plates. Nearly one-third of citizen-soldiers carried pikes while others were armed 

with matchlocks, a dangerous and inaccurate gunpowder weapon. On muster days, 

A musketeer armed with a matchlock from a 

European training manual published in 1608, 

the year after the founding of Jamestown, 

Virginia. The weaponry and equipment is 

typical of the earliest American militia units. 

(Anne Brown Collection) 

militiamen practiced the complicated 

tactics and techniques more appropriate for 

European battlefields. One commonly 

used drill book described fifty-six steps for 

loading and firing a matchlock. In 

addition, the troops armed themselves with 

an array of knives and hatchets while 

leaders carried swords. 

Once he was confident the 

militiamen could stand up in combat, Smith 

launched a series of devastating raids 

against Powhatan’s people. The campaign 

first exposed the English to the unique style 

of Indian warfare that endured throughout 

the colonial period. An individual brave, 

his face carefully patterned with colorful 

pigments and armed with a bow and arrow 

and any variety of knives, clubs, and 

tomahawks, was a terrifying figure. Highly 

skilled in the techniques of wilderness 

fighting, an Indian warrior could cover 

great distances quickly while subsisting off 

the land or on a small supply of parched 

corn. A war party fought together on 

favorable ground either to make a stand or 

to launch an attack. No formal system of 

tactics prevailed except for the ambush, a 

form of attack in which the Native 

Americans were truly skilled. Over time, 

the Indians acquired gunpowder weapons 

22 
Army National Guard History

and integrated them into their evasive fighting techniques. (9) 

Smith’s offensive terrorized the Powhatan tribes up and down the James River 

and introduced the English to the challenges of Indian warfare. Heavy helmets and body 

armor proved too cumbersome in forests and swamps, and militiamen only wore them 

when defending their fort. The colonists, deeply imbued with the linear tactics and feudal 

concepts of European warfare, developed utter contempt for the Indians’ evasive tactics. 

Believing the Native Americans were little more than savages, the English were slow to 

adapt their unique fighting style. The English eventually discontinued the use of battle 

lines but persisted in moving along trails and paths in tight columns. Over time, the 

colonists developed a healthy respect for the fighting skills and mobility of their 

opponents. By the summer of 1609, Smith’s offensive had resulted in an uneasy peace 

between Jamestown and Powhatan. Weeks later, an exploding powder charge badly 

burned Smith, and he returned to England for treatment. 

After Captain John Smith’s departure, the Virginia Colony continued strict 

military discipline and training to ensure Jamestown’s continued existence and eventual 

profitability. More experienced soldiers arrived, assumed formal rank, divided the 

colony into standing units and imposed training regimes. The colonists waged a 

protracted war of raids and ambushes against Powhatan’s warriors as even more English 

settlements grew up along the James River. A marriage in 1614 between Powhatan’s 

daughter, Pocahontas, and one of the colonists resulted in a truce. Relieved that the 

struggle was over, the English abandoned their strict militia habits in order to focus all of 

their attention on growing tobacco. 

Unfortunately, expanding English settlements and efforts to convert the Indians to 

Christianity caused a widening gulf between the two peoples. On March 22, 1622, the 

Indians launched a massive and coordinated surprise attack against all English 

settlements along the James River. In one awful day of bloody attacks, the Native 

Americans killed three hundred settlers, nearly one-quarter of the white population. After 

recovering from the shock, the colonists launched a series of bloody reprisals. Additional 

arms came from England, and for the first time, widely dispersed plantations and farms 

included an armed citizenry. (10) 

In 1624, the Virginia Company went bankrupt and the English Crown assumed 

control of the colony. The Virginia Assembly moved to create a standing militia system 

to deter further Indian aggression. All males age sixteen to sixty, except for “olde 

planters” and “newe commers,” were liable for militia duty, and the legislators levied a 

series of taxes to buy arms and equipment. The assembly divided the colony into four 

military districts and created a responsive command structure based on county militia 

units. By the 1630s, Virginia mustered over 2,000 militiamen. When a second Indian 

uprising occurred in 1644, the militia struck back with powerful counterattacks. Over a 

two-year period the colonists gained the upper hand, and in 1646, the exhausted 

Powhatan confederation surrendered to English controls. Virginia’s hard-won victory 

was the result of a militia system transplanted from England and successfully applied to 

the unique environment of the New World. (11) 

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Army National Guard History

The New England Militia, 1620-1676 

On November 11, 1620, one hundred Pilgrims landed at Cape Cod and 

established the Plymouth Colony. Though they believed a hostile Indian population 

awaited them, the Pilgrims had taken only modest measures to arm and equip themselves. 

In an important step, the Plymouth Company had secured the services of Captain Miles 

Standish to act as a military advisor. The warning of an Indian raid on February 16, 1621 

prompted action. The following day the Pilgrims met, formally elected Captain Standish 

as “their captain and military commander,” and authorized him complete authority in 

militia matters. (12) 

Standish moved quickly to impose order and discipline. He organized the 

Plymouth militia into four squadrons and instituted a thorough plan for watches, guards, 

and alarms. The colonists realized that their survival was at stake and gave Standish 

broad powers to instill discipline and levy punishments. When one recalcitrant Pilgrim 

refused to stand watch and called his commander a “beggarly rascal,” Standish clapped 

the man into irons. Frequent musters and training sessions became common. Over time, 

militia activities became an integral part of the colony’s social structure. In late 1621, the 

Pilgrims conducted a muster and an exercise of arms as part of the first Thanksgiving 

celebration, and two years later a militia muster and the “shooting off of many muskets” 

“The March of Miles Standish” from an 1873 lithograph that portrays the early militia in the 

Plymouth Colony. (Anne Brown Collection) 

24 
Army National Guard History

accompanied the festivities of one of Plymouth’s first wedding celebrations. 

In subsequent years, Plymouth’s militia expanded and increased. As the original 

Plymouth Colony spread inland, the General Court ordered the creation of a militia 

company in every town under a local commander who reported to Miles Standish. A 

Dutch visitor in 1627 witnessed a disciplined militia organization: 

They assemble by beat of a drum, each with his musket 

or firelock, in front of the captain’s door; they have their 

cloaks on, and place themselves in order, three abreast, 

and they are led by a sergeant without beat of a drum...on 

the left hand [comes] the captain with his side-arms, and 

cloak on, and with a small cane in his hand; and so they 

march in good order, and each sets his arms down near 

him. Thus, they are constantly on their guard night and 

day. (13) 

By 1639, the expanding Plymouth Colony included eight militia companies in as 

many towns. The ultimate responsibility for raising and maintaining the Plymouth militia 

remained in the hands of legislators rather than the Governor. (14) 

Compared to their neighbors to the south, the Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay 

Colony took military matters much more seriously. A royal charter granted the colony 

extensive powers of self-government and permitted the shipment of arms and military 

supplies to America free of taxation. Aboard the first ships to arrive in Massachusetts 

Bay were the arms and equipment for a proposed company of one hundred soldiers. 

Captain John Endecott served as the colony’s first militia leader and established a trading 

post at Salem in 1628. The following year Endecott completed the organization of 

Salem’s first militia company. (15) 

In June 1630, a Puritan fleet of eleven ships reached Massachusetts Bay, and 

settlements quickly sprang up along the coast. Almost immediately, the Puritans formed 

militia companies in Boston and Dorchester. As the population increased and spread 

inland, the Massachusetts General Court authorized the raising of additional companies, 

and by 1636, the colony included ten companies that ranged in size from sixty-four to 

two hundred men. A captain commanded each company and had the responsibility for 

musters, training, and discipline. Starting in 1636, the General Court permitted 

militiamen to elect their officers, and captains appointed noncommissioned officers. 

Musters occurred weekly on Saturdays. Money from fines levied against those absent or 

guilty of improper conduct during training went toward the purchase of arms and 

equipment. (16) 

On December 13, 1636, the Massachusetts General Court directed the 

establishment of the first militia regiments in North America. A total of fifteen separate 

towns contributed as many companies with a combined strength of approximately 1,500 

men to form three new regiments. The North, South and East Regiments encompassed 

the entire colony in separate, geographic districts. A colonel commanded each regiment 

with assistance from a full-time, paid “muster master” who maintained unit rolls. All 

25 
Army National Guard History

three regiment held elections for the choosing of company officers. Regiments 

eventually became the basis for all modern armies, and because Massachusetts was the 

first government in North America to raise militia regiments, December 13, 1636 has 

become recognized as the birth date of the modern U.S. National Guard. (Today, the 

181st and 182nd Infantry and 101st Field Artillery as well as the 101st Engineer Battalion 

of the Massachusetts Army National Guard are the U.S. Army’s oldest units because they 

directly trace their lineage to the North, South, and East Regiments established in 1636.) 

(17) 

Increased tensions between colonists and Indians had done much to stimulate the 

formation of the regiments. New England’s first serious war with the Indians occurred in 

1637 when Massachusetts and Connecticut fought the Pequots. Hated and feared by 

other tribes, the bellicose Pequots resisted English migration into the Connecticut River 

valley and lived up to the meaning of their tribal name-“destroyer”. After a series of 

incidents and reprisals in 1636, the colonists declared war on the Pequots. The decisive 

engagement of the war came on May 26, 1637 when a force of ninety Massachusetts and 

Connecticut militiamen aided by friendly Indians conducted a vicious surprise attack 

against a main Pequot stronghold on the upper reaches of the Mystic River. Attacking at 

dawn, militiamen broke through feeble fortifications and set fire to the village. Other 

militiamen and friendly Indians formed a solid ring around the flaming village and 

prevented the escape of survivors. In an orgy of violence, the attackers killed as many as 

500 Pequots, including women and children, while suffering only two killed and twenty 

wounded. Within weeks, other militia units completed the near destruction of the entire 

Pequot tribe. (18) 

The bloodshed of the Pequot War and the certainty of extended conflicts with 

other tribes resulted in the creation of the American minuteman, the most significant 

militia adaptation of the colonial period. To guarantee rapid responses against Indian 

raids along the colony’s frontier, the Massachusetts General Court directed that a portion 

of the militia remain in a near constant state of heightened readiness. On August 12, 

1645, legislators passed the first law to articulate the minuteman concept. Each militia 

company was to select a third of its members who “shall be ready at half an hour’s 

warning” to respond to alarms. Minutemen were to have their arms, ammunition and 

equipment ready for immediate use day or night. For the next 130 years, Massachusetts 

retained the minuteman concept in various degrees of effectiveness depending upon the 

seriousness of perceived threats. (19) 

In the aftermath of the military emergency of the Pequot War, Connecticut, Rhode 

Island and New Hampshire created formal militia organizations. The Connecticut 

General Court retained for service three small militia companies raised during the war, 

and in 1650 passed broader legislation that enacted a more extensive militia system based 

on the Massachusetts model. By 1680, the Connecticut militia numbered 2,507 men. In 

May 1668, Portsmouth was the first town in Rhode Island to organize a trainband. All 

males ages 16-50 were liable for service — herdsmen and fishermen were exempted — 

and eight musters per year were required. Within three years, Rhode Island mustered two 

regiments. The New Hampshire militia came into existence with the chartering of the 

26 
Army National Guard History

colony in 1679. The first militia units included four infantry companies, “one company 

of artillery...and one troop of horse.” (20) 

King Philip’s War erupted in New England in 1675 becoming the first great war 

in American history and a traumatic conflict that threatened the very existence of the 

colonies. King Philip was the English name the colonists had bestowed upon the 

chieftain of the Wampanoag Indians who had considerable influence with the other New 

England tribes. Various acts of vandalism in the summer of 1675 soon led to a state of 

war between the colonists and Indian tribes inhabiting the lands from Cape Cod to the 

upper Connecticut River. The war’s most famous battle was the Great Swamp Fight on 

December 19, 1675. A combined force of 1,100 militiamen from Massachusetts, 

Plymouth, and Connecticut, aided by a number of Indian allies, raided the main 

settlement of the Narragansett Indians hidden away in Rhode Island’s Great Swamp. 

Attacking in bitter cold and deep snows, the militia destroyed and burned the settlement. 

The Indians resisted valiantly with hundreds killed while the colonists lost approximately 

200 men. (21) 

After the Great Swamp Fight, the colonists became more effective fighters by 

adopting Indian tactics and employing additional Indian allies. The most effective Indian 

fighter of the period was Benjamin Church of Plymouth. Church organized a special 

company that combined militiamen and Indians into a single unit and blended European 

discipline with Native American stealth to create new tactics for forest warfare. Over the 

course of several months, Church’s unit became the spearhead of the New England 

militia’s efforts as he launched a series of punishing raids aimed at the destruction of 

Indian food supplies. The war effectively ended on August 12, 1676 when Church’s men 

killed King Philip in an ambush. They beheaded Philip, cut off his hands, quartered his 

body and then hung each quarter from a different tree. King Philip’s War rocked New 

England with its widespread devastation and loss of life. As many as 1,000 New 

Englanders were killed, and Indian losses were perhaps much higher. The most 

significant outcome was that the militia had provided an adequate defense of the colonies, 

broken the power of the New England Indian tribes, and gained the long-term security of 

the region’s white settlements. The early Indian wars also proved that when the militia 

was not prepared and caught unawares at the opening stages of hostilities, it possessed 

the ability to rebound and organize itself into an effective fighting force. (22) 

The Militia Expands and Evolves 

In the decades following the first English settlements, all but one of the original 

thirteen colonies stretching from New Hampshire to Georgia established militia 

organizations. In all colonies, the militia included the obligated men actually or 

nominally enrolled for training and service at the local level. The legislatures normally 

granted service deferments to high government officials, ministers, university students, 

craftsmen, and fishermen and prohibited most African-Americans and Indians from 

serving. Citizen-soldiers carried on muster rolls and formed into geographically based 

units available for immediate service became known collectively as the enrolled militia. 

27 
Army National Guard History

Adjacent to New England, the Dutch established the colony of New Netherlands 

in 1614 that initially relied upon the promise of Regulars rather than militiamen to 

provide defense. Fifty years later, a strong British military and naval expedition dropped 

anchor off the small city of New Amsterdam at the base of Manhattan Island and coerced 

the Dutch into surrendering. Shortly after capturing the colony and renaming it New 

York, the Duke of York established a militia. Before long, militia units protected the 

colony throughout the length of the Hudson River valley, from Albany in the north to 

New York in the south. In 1664, the General Assembly of New Jersey voted “to 

constitute trained bands” for the colony’s defense. The legislators directed the militia “to 

suppress all mutinies and rebellions” and to wage war when necessary against “all 

Indians, strangers, and foreigners.” William Penn established Pennsylvania in 1681, but 

the heavy pacifist influence of the Quakers and peaceful relations with the Indians 

precluded the establishment of a militia until the middle of the following century. (23) 

In the mid-Atlantic region, the militia came to Maryland in 1634 with the 

founding of a settlement at St. Mary’s on the western shore of Chesapeake Bay. 

Maryland very quickly established trained bands. Unlike Virginia and the New England 

colonies, Maryland refused to use the militia to intimidate or exterminate entire Indian 

villages for the wrong doings of a few renegade braves. However, the English Civil War 

did spark a prolonged, internal conflict in Maryland that often saw militia units fighting 

Infantry and cavalry units of the New York militia pass in review before the Governor in 1700. 

(Anne Brown Collection) 

28 
Army National Guard History

one another. The militia of the Swedish colony of Delaware was first called out on 

August 31, 1655 when a Dutch force threatened Fort Christina on the site of present day 

Wilmington. The fort’s commander rode up and down the colony calling men into 

military service. The Dutch attack succeeded, and under their influence, the Delaware 

militia was given a formal peacetime structure that endured until the colony passed to 

English control. The continued existence of the militia drew Delaware away from the 

control of the Quakers in neighboring Pennsylvania and helped to maintain Delaware’s 

status as a separate, political entity. (24) 

In the South, the militia in the Carolinas developed along lines similar to those in 

Virginia where agriculture dominated the economy. Militia units in the North usually 

formed around towns, but in the South the larger tracts of land needed to support 

plantations and a more widely dispersed population resulted in militia units organized at 

the county level. The first English settlers came to the Carolina colony in April 1670, 

landing at Albemarle Point near present-day Charleston. The following year Carolina’s 

Grand Council passed the colony’s first militia law. In its early decades, the Carolina 

militia expended much effort fighting Indians, Spanish raiders, and pirates. In 1729, the 

colony split into North and South Carolina with separate militia organizations. (25) 

Georgia became the last of the original thirteen colonies in 1733 when General 

James Oglethorpe established the city of Savannah on the high bluffs overlooking the 

Savannah River. One purpose for the founding of Georgia was to create a military buffer 

between the Carolinas and Spanish incursions from Florida. Because of constant attacks 

from the Spanish and Indians, Georgia created a three-tiered defense establishment of 

British Regulars, full-time colonial rangers, and enrolled militia. While Regulars and 

rangers saw service on an intermittent basis, the Georgia militia was the continuous 

bulwark that guaranteed the colony’s survival. (26) 

The use of full-time rangers in Georgia reflected the increasing use of different 

types of military forces throughout the colonies. As settlements moved further inland, 

the Indian threat to seaboard communities waned, and the enrolled militia deteriorated. 

In coastal cities and towns, enforcement of militia laws was lax. On the frontier, settlers 

based their defenses on widely dispersed blockhouses and stockades to provide protection 

against Indian uprisings. In 1645, Virginia built four forts along its frontier and raised 

suitable garrisons from the militia. The colony also created ranger units that patrolled the 

frontier hoping to detect or foil Indian attacks before they hit settlements. All along the 

forward face of the Appalachians, the colonies developed their own systems of forts and 

defense forces. Starting around 1675, the militia laid aside its matchlocks and pikes in 

favor of the sturdy, reliable flintlock musket that remained in service for nearly 150 

years. (27) 

Between 1689 and 1763, conflicting English, French, and Spanish interests 

involved the colonies in a series of near continuous wars. The typical colonial war pitted 

the American colonies against the French Canadians with Indian allies on both sides. 

When ambitious expeditions required more than the militia’s local, defensive capabilities, 

the colonies relied more and more upon ad hoc organizations known as “provincial” 

29 
Army National Guard History

troops for extended military operations beyond their borders. Colonial legislatures 

commissioned officers to raise and lead provincial units. Provincial units were formed 

from volunteers, draftees, substitutes and hirelings that came from the enrolled militia. 

The legislatures usually levied manpower quotas on each town, county or single militia 

unit. Volunteerism was the preferred recruiting method, but militiamen selected to serve 

who did not want to leave their families, farms, or shops for an extended period could 

avoid service by providing a substitute or paying a fine that allowed the colony to hire a 

replacement. As more members of the enrolled militia possessed the financial ability to 

find a substitute or pay a hefty fine in lieu of actual service, the members of provincial 

units came more and more from the lower rungs of society. Provincial troops serving for 

pay believed they had a binding contract with the government, and when their term of 

service was over or a perceived breach of contract occurred, they did not hesitate to stage 

a mutiny or desert in mass. (28) 

The greatest accomplishment of provincial forces was the capture of the French 

fortress of Louisbourg in 1745 during King George’s War. Located on Cape Breton 

Island off the coast of Nova Scotia, the huge fortress guarded the sea-lanes in and out of 

the mouth of the St. Lawrence River and was perhaps France’s most important strategic 

point in all of Canada. In a complex joint operation, the New England militia united with 

the Royal Navy to reduce the fortress. The New England colonies raised a provincial 

army of nearly 4,000 troops under the leadership of William Pepperell of Maine. When 

early recruiting efforts lagged, the colonial assemblies offered pay and the promise of 

plunder as compensation. On April 30, 1745, Pepperell’s army successfully completed a 

hazardous landing on Cape Breton Island while British warships established a firm 

blockade. The provincials soon laid siege to the fortress, and the garrison surrendered 

thirty-nine days later. Louisbourg’s capture by a militia army prompted enthusiastic 

celebrations in the colonies and in Britain. In following years, the successful siege took 

on near mythical proportions in the colonies as a clear demonstration of the native 

fighting abilities of American citizen-soldiers. However, New Englanders felt betrayed 

in 1748 when England returned Louisbourg to the French with the Peace of Aix-laChapelle. The diplomatic concession convinced Americans that Britain had scorned their 

sacrifices in favor of her own self interests and increased the widening social and political 

gap between England and the colonies. (29) 

Minority participation in the militia usually centered on the utilization of AfricanAmericans. Early militia laws defined and restricted the status of blacks. For example, a 

1634 Virginia ordinance forbade free blacks and slaves from carrying firearms and 

ammunition or serving in the militia. In general, colonists believed that armed blacks 

would incite insurrections, force an end to slavery, and form alliances with Indian tribes. 

However, serious military threats eventually softened views on black militia service. 

New York used slaves to build fortifications and granted freedom to slaves who served 

with distinction in wartime. Eventually, the colonies passed laws that permitted slaves to 

accompany militia and provincial forces on campaign as musicians, teamsters, and 

laborers. A shortage of white manpower in the Carolinas resulted in the widespread use 

of blacks as armed militiamen. In 1705, nearly one-third of the men on Carolina muster 

30 
Army National Guard History

rolls were African-Americans. During the Yamasse War of 1715, the South Carolina 

militia included units of armed blacks led by white officers. After the defeat of the 

Yamasse Indians, the Carolina militia restricted the use of blacks and turned its attention 

to controlling the growing slave population. Over time, the primary mission of the militia 

became the conduct of slave patrols that worked to ensure that slaves remained on their 

plantations. (30) 

The French and Indian War, 1754-1763 

The greatest of the colonial wars began out of a dispute over the control of the 

upper reaches of the Ohio River valley. England and France eventually engaged in the 

first true world war for the control of overseas possessions and the balance of power on 

the European continent. The outcome of the French and Indian War determined that 

England would become the dominant power in North America and added to the growing 

divide between the mother country and American colonists. (31) 

During the early 1750s the French increased their presence in the upper Ohio 

Valley in order to block further English expansion. The arrival of Pennsylvania traders 

and Virginia land speculators in a region inhabited by Indian tribes and controlled by the 

French was a recipe for confrontation. In 1753, the French began construction of three 

forts between Lake Erie and the forks of the Ohio River where the Allegheny and 

Monongahela Rivers joined. Before the end of the year, Virginia sent Major George 

Washington to the contested region to demand a French withdrawal. The French politely 

refused Washington’s demands and immediately began to reinforce and fortify their 

settlements in the region. 

In an attempt to gain the upper hand, Virginia sent Washington back to the forks 

of the Ohio River in early 1754 with orders to build a fort. Washington supervised the 

construction work of forty Virginia militiamen until a large French force arrived. On 

April 17th, the Virginia militia conceded to French superiority. After Washington 

withdrew, the French went to work in earnest on the same site to complete a more 

formidable bastion they named Fort Duquesne. Determined to gain control of the region, 

Virginia sent Washington reinforcements. On May 28th, Washington ambushed and 

defeated a Canadian reconnaissance party, and knowing that French reprisals were 

certain, he built a circular palisade that became known as Fort Necessity. Additional 

reinforcements of Virginia and South Carolina militia brought Washington’s strength to 

400 soldiers, but they were not enough to stave off defeat. On July 3rd, a force of 700 

French troops and Indians from Fort Duquesne attacked Washington’s position. Short on 

food and ammunition, Washington surrendered after a nine-hour battle. The colonial 

militiamen were allowed to withdraw the next day under honorable conditions, and in 

return, Virginia was to keep its troops west of the Appalachians for a full year. 

The crisis at the forks of the Ohio prompted the creation of the Pennsylvania 

militia, the last of the militias formed in the thirteen original colonies. Heavily 

influenced by the political dominance and pacifist religious beliefs of the Quakers, 

Pennsylvania had resisted the establishment of a formal militia system even though 

31 
Army National Guard History

informal militia organizations known as “associators” had sprung up throughout the 

colony in the late 1740s. In the months following Washington’s surrender at Fort 

Necessity, emboldened Indian raiding parties burned and looted a number of locations on 

the Pennsylvania frontier. On November 25, 1755, the Pennsylvania Assembly passed 

the colony’s first militia law. Unlike the other colonies, militia service was voluntary 

rather than compulsory. No militiaman had to spend more than three days away from his 

home, and extended service was limited to three weeks. Additional legislation authorized 

the construction of a series of forts to guard the frontier along with a provisional regiment 

of full-time militiamen to serve as a garrison. In 1757, Pennsylvania passed a stronger 

law that created a militia system comparable to those in the other colonies. (32) 

The news of French encroachment in the upper Ohio River valley prompted a 

swift British response. For the first time, London decided to commit British Regulars to 

North America. The British drew up an ambitious plan for four separate offensives 

against as many fortresses along the Canadian frontier. In early 1755, Maj. Gen. Edward 

Braddock arrived in Virginia with two regiments of British Regulars and the authority to 

recruit two additional regiments from among the colonists. Braddock also integrated 

colonial provincial regiments into his plans. 

The most spectacular British failure of 1755 occurred directly under Braddock as 

he attempted to capture Fort Duquesne. Hacking its way through a vast, mountainous 

wilderness, Braddock’s column of Regulars and provincials got to within a day’s march 

of their objective. Along the banks of the Monongahela River on July 9th, a combined 

force of French and Indian troops collided with the British. The French force took up 

dispersed, hidden positions along both flanks of Braddock’s column. Chaos and panic 

ensued as the Redcoats fought an invisible enemy hidden in the dense woods. Trained in 

the tactics of linear warfare, Braddock’s soldiers were unprepared for the ambush. 

Braddock courageously attempted to rally his troops but fell mortally wounded, and the 

remnant of his shattered army fled in panic. “Braddock’s Defeat” became familiar in the 

colonies as the symbol of the British Army’s unwillingness and inability to adjust to the 

military environment of the New World. 

The shock of Braddock’s Defeat and a change in the government in London 

resulted in a more concerted war effort. The Royal Navy established a tight blockade of 

Canada while more British Regulars came to America for direct attacks against French 

strongholds. In 1758, British and colonial troops recaptured Louisbourg and took control 

of the site of Fort Duquesne; the latter the British renamed Fort Pitt, which became the 

genesis for Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Brig. Gen. James Wolfe conducted a spectacular 

campaign in 1759 that resulted in Quebec’s capture on September 16th. The following 

year, the remaining French forces in Canada surrendered at Montreal. Victory in the 

French and Indian War gave England control of North America from St. Augustine to 

Hudson Bay and all lands between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi River. 

32 
Army National Guard History

George Washington: 

Colonial Militiaman, 1753-1775 

George Washington received his first 

experience as a military leader while serving as 

an officer in the Virginia militia. n his youth, 

Washington seemed destined for a life as a 

farmer and land surveyor. ut with the death of 

his older brother in 1752, Washington moved to 

Mount e on the 

Potomac River and ved cer’s 

commission in the Virginia militia. n February 

1753, the twenty-one year old Washington 

received the rank of major and a share of the 

responsibility for training Virginia troops. Ten 

months later, he volunteered for active service 

against French incursions in the upper Ohio 

Valley. 

Washington’s service in the French and 

Indian War gained him widespread recognition 

and valuable experience. command, 

which resulted in the surrender at Fort Necessity, only strengthened Washington’s 

resolve. n 1755, he served as a volunteer aide to Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock during the 

disastrous expedition against Fort Duquesne. Washington’s display of raw courage and 

tactical skills during Braddock’s Defeat caused his personal reputation to soar. 

Afterwards, the Governor of Virginia placed him in overall command of the colony’s 

frontier defenses. During the war, Washington learned the skills needed to lead soldiers 

in battle and observed the role discipline and training played in creating effective fighting 

units. also learned that successful commanders paid attention to administrative 

matters, looked after the welfare of their troops and made do with limited resources. y 

1758, Washington served as a brigade commander, the only American militia officer to 

achieve such rank in the war. 

After the end of hostilities, Washington returned to Mount Vernon to resume his 

life as a planter and a local political leader. approach of the American 

Revolution, Washington remained loyal to Virginia. 

Virginia militia with the rank of colonel and represented the colony in the Continental 

Congress. exington and Concord, the Congress appointed him to various 

committees dealing with military matters. On June 15, 1775, the Continental Congress 

unanimously elected Washington “General and Commander in Chief” of all Continental 

forces. or the next eight years, Washington led the Continental Army in battle and 

served as the Revolution’s senior military officer while employing skills he first learned 

as a colonial militiaman. 

I

B

Vernon, a larg plantation 

recei an offi

I

His first 

I

He

B

With the

He accepted the command of the 

After L

F

33
Army National Guard History

In spite of its successful outcome, the French and Indian War created a widening 

gulf between Great Britain and its American colonies. British Regulars developed a 

loathing for colonial provincial troops. British officers considered the Americans as illdisciplined, prone to desertion, and lacking in basic military skills. Convinced of the 

limited aptitude of American troops, the British relegated most of them to support and 

auxiliary functions. Provincial troops built roads, drove wagons, constructed and 

repaired fortifications, and performed other menial tasks rather than fighting. All 

together, the British Army formed a low opinion of Americans as fighters, and it labeled 

the entire colonial militia as an ineffective institution. In many cases, the British Army’s 

opinions were justified, but the aspersions cast upon the militia were based on an 

ignorance of colonial military practices. Most British officers confused ad hoc provincial 

forces with the enrolled militia and consequently misjudged the militia’s ability to 

respond to crises closer to home. However, a minority of British officers did understand 

the difference between hired provincial troops and militiamen who chose to stay at home. 

“The Militia,” one senior officer wrote, “are the real Inhabitants; Stout able Men, and for 

a brush, much better than the Provincial Troops, whom they hire whenever they can get 

them, and at any price.” 

Not all colonial units performed poorly, and provincial regiments from 

Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey established sound reputations. One of the best 

of these was the “New Jersey Blues” commanded by Col. Peter Schuyler. An 

experienced soldier, Schuyler organized his men as light infantry and trained, armed, and 

equipped them for forest combat. Unlike most provincial regiments, the New Jersey 

Blues were a standing unit with qualified leadership, well trained and with good arms. 

Throughout the war, the regiment participated in almost all of the campaigns in upstate 

New York. With justifiable pride, the Governor of New Jersey reported to London that 

the New Jersey Blues were “universally allowed to be the best Provincial Regiment in 

America.” (33) 

If British Regulars formed a low opinion of colonial troops, the converse was true 

as well. British recruiting policies incensed Americans, especially when the English 

actively sought indentured servants for military service. Strict disciplinary measures that 

included the flogging of Redcoat soldiers for minor offenses appalled the colonists and 

further marked the British Army as a threatening and repressive institution. The 

quartering of British troops in colonial homes outraged Americans who insisted the 

practice was illegal. Still, British authorities pointed to the exigencies of the war and 

routinely placed troops into American homes. Braddock’s Defeat emphasized the limits 

of the British Army in the minds of most Americans while the capture of Louisbourg 

endured as an example of the courage and innate abilities of militiamen. By the end of 

the French and Indian War, American citizen-soldiers held a high opinion of their own 

military prowess and a jaundiced view of the Regulars. 

34 
Army National Guard History

The Drift Toward Revolution 

Great Britain established policies after the French and Indian War that eventually 

led to the American Revolution. The British Army remained in America after 1763 to 

protect the frontiers of the newly acquired territories, to maintain peace between settlers 

and Indians, and to regulate the fur trade. Many Americans were suspicious of a standing 

army posted on their land and argued that for nearly 150 years the militia alone had 

provided adequate security. Lastly, the British government for the first time instituted a 

series of colonial taxes designed to reduce its war debts and to pay the costs of 

maintaining Regular regiments in the colonies. 

A continuing struggle over economic and political power during 1765-1775 

created a gap between Great Britain and the colonies as wide and stormy as the Atlantic 

Ocean itself. In 1765, Parliament passed the Stamp and Quartering Acts that raised taxes 

in the colonies and required the colonists to provide the British Army with living 

accommodations and supplies. Colonial outrage caused the repeal of the Stamp Act, but 

the practice of Regulars quartered in American homes and public buildings endured. 

When the assemblies of New York and Massachusetts refused to provide supplies to the 

Redcoats and thumbed their noses at additional taxes, the British government disbanded 

the New York assembly and threatened the same action against Boston. The British 

government’s reprisals against colonial political institutions sparked a growing resistance 

movement. 

Increased agitation prompted most of the British Army to redeploy from the 

frontier to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. The close proximity of 

British Redcoats to political activists in Massachusetts sparked the infamous “Boston 

Massacre.” On the night of March 5, 1770, a mob of dockworkers and revolutionaries 

confronted British troops outside of a Boston customs house. After considerable 

provocation by the mob, panicked Redcoats opened fire on the angry crowd, killing five 

Bostonians. Afterwards, the British government withdrew its troops from the city. The 

Boston Massacre became a symbol of British political, economic, and military oppression 

and marked the British Army as a threat to liberty. 

A political and economic impasse transpired until the night of December 16, 1773 

when a group of militant Bostonians dumped three shiploads of tea into Boston harbor. 

The “Boston Tea Party” was a violent reaction to an effort by Parliament to coerce the 

colonies into purchasing the heavily taxed tea supply of a company granted a monopoly 

on tea sales in America. Parliament swiftly punished Massachusetts; the port of Boston 

was closed until the city paid for the destroyed tea, the colony’s charter was all but 

repealed, and the right to convene in town meetings was limited. In addition, Maj. Gen. 

Thomas Gage was appointed the new Governor and returned to Boston with 3,500 

Regulars who were quartered in American homes and public buildings. In response to 

Parliament’s actions, American political leaders convened a Continental Congress in 

Philadelphia on September 5, 1774 to fashion a collective response to the increasing 

political and economic tensions. The Continental Congress supported the civil 

35 
Army National Guard History

disobedience in New England and called upon all colonies to strengthen their militias. 

(34) 

Parliament’s sanctions following the Boston Tea Party prompted an extraordinary 

response in Massachusetts. With their normal governing bodies all but eliminated, 

political activists assembled a new Provincial Congress in Worcester. Convinced that 

armed conflict with Britain was all but inevitable, the Provincial Congress viewed 

military preparedness as a top priority. The new government took control of all arms in 

the colony and organized Massachusetts for self-defense. The legislators created an 

intricate system of alarms and mounted messengers to facilitate quick, emergency 

communications across the countryside and to warn of unexpected British actions. 

Ringing church bells, discharging weapons, and shouting messengers on horseback 

formed the core of the alarm system. (35) 

The Provincial Congress turned much of its attention to transforming the enrolled 

militia into a reliable field army. First, it insured the militia’s loyalty and reliability by 

requiring all officers to resign. The extreme measure purged from the ranks all Loyalist 

officers, men with strong allegiance to the British monarchy who eschewed revolution 

and independence. All militia companies elected new officers, and in turn, the officers 

convened to elect battalion and regimental commanders and staffs from among 

themselves. Across Massachusetts, towns and counties expended considerable energy in 

preparing citizen-soldiers for action. All men were directed to carry firearms and to 

participate in more earnest and frequent musters. In the fall of 1774 militia units trained 

with a sense of urgency and determination not seen in years. New England ministers 

exhorted militiamen from the pulpit and compared them to a righteous David about to 

face off against an overbearing Goliath in the form of the British Regulars. (36) 

The Provincial Congress’ most important military measure was to resurrect the 

minuteman concept first created during the early wars against the Indians. The officers in 

each town enlisted as much as one-third of their soldiers who were prepared to react to an 

alarm at any time of day or night in a minute’s notice and to meet at prearranged 

assembly points within thirty minutes. Each minuteman carried a clean musket and a 

bayonet, a knapsack, thirty rounds of ammunition and attended musters at least three 

times a week. Towns provided minutemen with enough supplies, provisions, and 

ammunition for two weeks of service. Across the colony, militia units met to select their 

minutemen, and no town had trouble in finding willing volunteers. Over time, 

minuteman regiments were organized along the same lines as militia regiments. In the 

minuteman regiments, Massachusetts drew from the manpower of its enrolled militia to 

create a well-armed and trained force of light infantry capable of rapid assembly and 

quick movement to any point in the colony. (37) 

A strict regime of training and members with extensive military experience made 

the Massachusetts militia much more effective than outward appearances indicated. 

Frequent drill periods held on village commons instilled discipline and reinforced the 

chain of command. Many musters were dedicated entirely to marksmanship training. 

Captain Timothy Pickering of Salem wrote, published, and distributed simple instructions 

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Army National Guard History

for the loading and firing of a musket as much as four times per minute while 

emphasizing aimed fire. “Lean the cheek against the butt of the firelock, shut the left 

eye, and look with the right along the barrel at the object you would hit,” Pickering 

advised his fellow militiamen, “or, in other words, take good sight.” All across the 

countryside, townspeople heard on nearly every day of the week the distant growl of 

company volleys from various militia units engaged in target practice. A large number of 

the militia officers and senior noncommissioned officers brought with them extensive 

military experience from the French and Indian War. In most cases, combat veterans 

replaced officers whose only prior qualification for service was loyalty to Britain or high 

social standing. Veterans were familiar with the challenges of leading soldiers in combat 

and tried to prepare younger men for the first shock of battle. (38) 

The Provincial Congress well understood that arms and soldiers alone do not 

make an army and turned its attention to acquiring supplies. If armed conflict developed 

between the militia and the Regulars, the force that could sustain itself would eventually 

prevail. The Congress moved quickly to gain control of all of the arms, equipment, and 

ammunition available and established safe supply points and weapons caches in towns 

scattered throughout the colony. Concord held one of the greatest concentrations of war 

materials, making it a point of particular interest for the British. (39) 

Lexington and Concord 

A popular military maxim declares that when discussing war amateurs speak of 

tactics while professional soldiers ponder logistics. It should come as no surprise then 

that the American Revolution began over a scramble to control the most precious 

commodity of 18th Century warfare: gunpowder. In Boston, General Gage received 

reliable intelligence reports of militia units forming, training, and gathering supplies in 

anticipation of hostilities. Hoping to prevent open conflict with the colonists, Gage 

decided to disarm the militia with a series of small, surgical raids secretly planned and 

carefully executed against known caches of war materials. His most important goal was 

to gain more secure control over cannons and gunpowder held in powder houses and forts 

ostensibly under British control. Few firearms were produced in America, and all 

gunpowder was imported from abroad. Without gunpowder, Gage knew the militia could 

not put up prolonged resistance. (40) 

On September 1, 1774, British infantrymen descended on the main Massachusetts 

Powder House six miles west of Boston. The Redcoats discovered that the colonists had 

already removed a considerable amount of powder and quickly took possession of the 

remaining 250 half-barrels of gunpowder. General Gage’s first “powder alarm” enraged 

the colonists, prompted militia units to muster on village commons, and further motivated 

efforts to raise militia units. A second powder alarm in mid-December against Fort 

William and Mary in New Hampshire was a British debacle. Learning of the raid 

beforehand, Boston activist and silversmith Paul Revere rode to New Hampshire with a 

warning. Four hundred New Hampshire militiamen soon captured the British fort, 

seizing 100 barrels of powder and 16 cannons before Redcoats from Boston arrived. In 

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Army National Guard History

Rhode Island and Connecticut, militia units moved against British defenses at Newport, 

Providence, and New London to capture additional cannons and gunpowder. (41) 

On February 22, 1775, Gage’s troops moved against a cache of supplies in Salem. 

They conducted the raid on a Sunday in hopes that most colonists would be engaged in 

church activities. However, an early alarm caused the residents of Salem to stream from 

their meeting houses and delay the column while others removed arms and supplies to 

safer locations. The raiders finally reached their objective late in the day, only to find the 

war stocks gone. The withdrawal from Salem took on a new, ominous tone. As the 

Regulars returned to the coast to board ships for Boston militia units took up positions in 

open fields along the escape route. Near the coast, the Marblehead Regiment, made up of 

rugged fishermen who respected the sea more than they did the British, stood in 

formation as the Redcoats passed. Both sides hurled shouts but neither opened fire. The 

militia’s actions at Salem reflected the desire of political leaders who allowed the militia 

to demonstrate against the British but hoped the Redcoats would fire the first shot in a 

confrontation. (42) 

The situation changed dramatically on April 14th when General Gage received 

direct orders from London to put down the insurrection by force. The ministers in 

London assumed that the “rebels” were nothing more than “a rude Rabble without plan, 

without concert and without conduct.” Gage was directed to move quickly and decisively 

with all of the strength at his disposal to arrest the leaders of the rebellion, to disarm the 

militia and to restore order in the colony. He quickly approved a plan to strike a rapid, 

strong blow at the very heart of the uprising. A single column of British troops much 

larger than those used during previous powder alarms would strike far inland to arrest 

rebel leaders at Lexington and then destroy Massachusetts’ largest cache of war supplies 

at Concord. (43) 

If excellent British intelligence provided detailed information on colonial 

activities, poor security gave the colonists ample warning of Gage’s massive raid. In a 

prodigious effort, they displaced nearly all of the supplies in Concord to safer locations. 

Community leaders reviewed plans for spreading a general alarm across the countryside. 

A lantern signal from the steeple of the Old North Church in Boston would indicate to 

adjacent towns that the British raid had begun while alarm riders spread the word further 

inland. Militia commanders received word that a threatening British raid was imminent 

and prepared both minuteman and enrolled militia units for action. Whenever the British 

raid came, the militia intended to react quickly and to muster their full strength against 

the Redcoats. (44) 

Starting at ten o’clock on the night of April 18th, General Gage quietly mustered 

the troops required for the march on Lexington and Concord. Command of the 

expedition went to Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith, an officer of good judgment and 

prudence but lacking in energy and decisiveness. Gage selected his best troops for the 

mission: twenty-one companies of grenadiers and light infantry with a total strength of 

nearly 900 soldiers. As the infantrymen boarded longboats and paddled their way across 

Boston harbor to a landing site near Cambridge, two lanterns glowing in the steeple of the 

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Army National Guard History 

Old North Church signaled to the surrounding countryside that the raid was underway. 

Meanwhile, Paul Revere rowed across Boston harbor to Charlestown where he acquired a 

horse and galloped further inland with the vital news. (It is an American myth that 

during his midnight ride Paul Revere shouted, “The British are coming!” Instead he 

cried, “The Regulars are coming out!” a warning that had particular meaning for the 

militia.) (45) 

Darkness, confusion, and marshy ground delayed the beginning of the march, and 

not until two o’clock on the morning of April 19th did the British begin moving toward 

Lexington. With clear skies and warm temperatures, the Redcoats made good time 

westward along the main highway. As the column moved deeper into the dark and 

hostile countryside, the troops grew concerned over the sights and sounds all around them 

of a general uprising. Across the entire countryside they heard the echoes of signal guns 

and church bells sounding the alarm. At a safe distance, dark figures on foot and on 

horseback lurked in the shadows keeping track of their progress. Nearly three miles short 

of Lexington, Lt. Col. Smith halted the column for a rest. It was clear that the Redcoats 

had lost the element of surprise, and Smith sent a messenger galloping back to Boston to 

inform General Gage that reinforcements might be necessary. 

In Lexington, Captain John Parker had gathered his militia company on the 

village common around two o’clock in the morning. The forty-six year old Parker 

possessed more military experience than most of the British Regulars headed his way. In 

the French and Indian War he had fought with the British throughout Canada, including 

British infantry fire upon Captain John Parker’s militia company on Lexington common just 

after sunrise on April 19, 1775. (Anne Brown Collection) 

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Army National Guard History

the capture of Quebec. Like a small number of towns, Lexington had declined to create a 

minuteman company under the control of the Provincial Congress, but did maintain a 

robust enrolled militia company. The composition of Parker’s company reflected the 

militia’s close family and social ties. Among the nearly seventy men in the company 

were eight pairs of fathers and sons, and nearly one quarter of the men were Parker’s own 

blood relatives or in-laws. Their ages ranged from sixty-five to nineteen. Among the 

citizen-soldiers was Prince Estabrook, an African-American slave who eventually gained 

his freedom because of his military service. 

Lexington’s decision not to raise a company of minutemen and the British route 

of advance determined that enrolled militiamen rather than minutemen would fire the 

opening rounds of the American Revolution. When it became apparent shortly after their 

muster that the British were still far away, the Lexington company retreated to the shelter 

of a large tavern just off the town common. At dawn a messenger brought word that the 

British column was approaching, and Captain Parker ordered his men to form up on the 

common. As the militiamen deployed into a line of battle, Parker shouted his orders: 

“Stand your ground! Don’t fire unless fired upon! But if they want to have a war, let it 

begin here!” Moments later, the head of the British column reached the Lexington 

common. Seeing the militia, British officers directed the lead companies toward Parker’s 

men. The Redcoats quickly deployed from a marching column to a line of battle as an 

officer barked, “Lay down your arms, you damn rebels!” Hoping to avoid a direct 

confrontation, Parker ordered his men to disperse. But before the militiamen could react, 

either a British officer on horseback or an American just off the village common fired 

one or more shots. The British infantry heard the shots and fired a few rounds without 

orders. Seconds later, at a range of no more than fifty yards, the British let loose with a 

volley followed by rapid, individual fire. A few Americans returned fire but most 

scattered under the unexpected shock of the British volley. In a matter of seconds, seven 

Lexington militiamen were killed and nine wounded. 

After a lengthy pause to recover from the engagement, the British column 

continued westward toward Concord some five miles distant, arriving around eight 

o’clock. As the Redcoats approached, militia units assembling in Concord withdrew to a 

safer location north of town to await the arrival of reinforcements. By mid-morning, one 

regiment of minutemen and a second of enrolled militia had gathered north of Concord. 

Colonel Smith sent out detachments to occupy two bridges on the Concord River north 

and west of town in order to prevent militia units from interfering with the search. The 

British infantry conducted a thorough inspection of Concord but found few war materials. 

One prize was the discovery of a number of wooden gun carriages that the British made 

into a pyre and set ablaze. The smoke from the fire caused the militia regiments north of 

Concord to believe that the British were about to raze their town and prompted an attack 

on the Redcoat companies guarding the North Bridge. It was during this engagement that 

the “embattled farmers” fired the “shot heard round the world.” 

After fighting two engagements with the militia that morning and knowing that a 

general alarm was still spreading throughout the countryside, Colonel Smith’s main 

concern became a swift return to the safety of Boston. With the unfruitful search of 

40 
Army National Guard History

Concord completed, the column began the sixteen-mile return trip around noon. The 

British commander’s concerns were well founded. Militia companies from as far as 

twenty miles away were converging on the highway connecting Concord and Lexington. 

While popular history portrays the minutemen as firing upon the retreating British from 

hidden positions behind trees, rocks, and stone fences, the real battle was much more 

sophisticated. Militia commanders were intimately familiar with the terrain along the 

Boston highway and positioned their troops at critical points that afforded the best 

opportunities for inflicting casualties while minimizing their own losses. In reality, the 

retreating Redcoats faced a successive series of militia defensive positions that hampered 

their withdrawal all the way back to Boston. 

One mile east of Concord, at a road junction named Meriam’s Corner, the militia 

struck back at the British. For the first time that day, nearly 1,000 militiamen 

outnumbered their adversary. As the retreat toward Lexington continued, the combat was 

nearly continuous, and British losses soared. During the battle, Captain John Parker 

gathered his company of Lexington men, and in a remarkable feat of leadership, led them 

in an ambush that wounded the British commander, Colonel Smith. The timely arrival at 

Lexington of a British relief column 1,000-soldiers strong saved the original raiding party 

from all but certain annihilation. As the retreat continued eastward, the fighting 

intensified. Militia units fired and maneuvered skillfully to present a constant hail of 

musketry against the flanks and rear of the British column. The most vicious fighting of 

A detailed view from an early lithograph of the engagement at Concord’s North Bridge on April 

19, 1775. Heavy musketry from the minutemen (left) is prompting a British retreat (right). (Anne 

Brown Collection) 

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Army National Guard History

the day occurred in villages and farmhouses closer to Boston where the opposing sides 

gave no quarter in brutal hand-to-hand combat. At the Jason Russell house in Menotomy 

(present-day Arlington), the British trapped and killed some twelve Americans, the 

greatest single loss of the day. At Cambridge, a militia unit occupying a key bridge 

blocked the line of retreat to Boston. Desperately in seek of safety, the British column 

veered eastward toward the Charlestown Peninsula on the north side of Boston harbor, 

where good defensive terrain, darkness, and the protection of the British Navy finally put 

an end to the fighting. Before the day was over, as many as 14,000 Massachusetts 

militiamen from more than forty regiments had responded to the general alarm, but 

perhaps fewer than 4,000 had actually fired upon the Redcoats. 

In the following days, both sides counted their losses. The militia suffered a total 

of ninety-four casualties: 50 killed, 39 wounded and 5 missing. All together, twentythree villages sustained casualties: Lexington alone suffered twenty men killed and 

wounded. Compared to the militia, the British suffered three times as much. Out of 

nearly 1,800 troops engaged, the Redcoats’ casualties included 65 killed, 180 wounded, 

and 27 missing. Reluctantly, General Gage communicated to London his losses, the 

expedition’s failed results, and a newfound respect for his adversaries. After the battle, 

one British commander wrote of the Yankee militia: “Whoever looks upon them as an 

irregular mob, will find himself very much mistaken. They have men amongst them who 

know very well what they are about...” (46) 

Conclusions 

The militia system that arose in the American colonies found its roots in the laws 

and traditions of England while adapting to the unique environment of the New World. 

Over time, the contributions of militia units in America far surpassed the limited roles 

that English militiamen had performed in the British Isles. The creation of the 

minuteman was a novel innovation that gave the American militia far greater capabilities. 

By 1775, the colonial militia represented a revolution in military affairs. The old 

European system of limited warfare with small, professional armies led by aristocratic 

officers found a new and unusual challenge in an armed and trained citizenry fighting for 

principles rather than monarchical ambitions or personal gain. In this sense, the 

American militia foreshadowed the “nation in arms” that came with the French 

Revolution of 1789. 

The American militia system developed its own unique traits and characteristics. 

The militia was a geographically based, local defense force designed for limited service 

during short-term emergencies. The militia system served as both a training base and a 

reservoir of manpower. During local emergencies, entire militia units responded to 

alarms. For more ambitious and extended operations, the militia acted as a reservoir of 

trained manpower from which colonial leaders raised provincial units. Militiamen 

elected their own company leaders, and officers believed it was their responsibility to 

lead their men into battle, an obligation they were unwilling to cede to others. In general, 

citizen-soldiers believed they could not be sent beyond the borders of their own colony 

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Army National Guard History

without their consent except under the most extreme circumstances. Legislators 

controlled the militia’s organization and training while the Governors usually retained the 

right to commission senior ranking officers. In the New England and mid-Atlantic 

colonies, militia units formed around towns while the southern militias enjoyed county 

affiliations. Usually thought to reflect a universal military obligation of all males ages 

16-60, the militia laws granted deferments to ministers, students, and certain key artisans 

while denying service to black slaves and Indians. 

The militia made many important contributions during the colonial period. More 

than anything else, it insured the success of English colonization in America by 

protecting nascent settlements and colonies from attacks by Native Americans and other 

colonial powers. In a new and hostile land, the militia gave structure and security to 

settlements and became a critical, stabilizing element in colonial social life. As the 

Indian threat receded, the militia allowed the creation of provincial units for more 

ambitious and long-lasting operations during disputes with France and Spain. As 

America drifted toward conflict with England in the late 18th Century, a revised militia 

provided the means for combating British Regulars. In the end, the militia provided the 

foundation for military success in America, first against hostile Indians, then against 

France and Spain, and finally against England herself. 

The Massachusetts militia in the battle of Lexington and Concord represented the 

zenith of the militia’s accomplishments in the colonial period. In almost all respects, the 

militiamen on April 19, 1775 enjoyed conditions that ideally favored their system. The 

fight was a defensive battle of relatively short duration with militiamen serving under 

their own leaders on terrain they all knew intimately. The creation of minuteman units 

allowed an even faster, initial response and reflected the militia’s tendency to allocate 

resources to meet the most serious and immediate threats. In addition, the militia 

benefited from an effective intelligence network, a complex system of alarms, 

experienced combat leaders, and a thorough regime of musters and marksmanship 

training. The failure of British Regulars to identify and understand the militia’s inherent 

strengths and advantages largely explains their bloody failure at Lexington and Concord. 

But as an army of citizen-soldiers encircled Boston in late April 1775, the question of 

whether or not the militia could meet the demands of a protracted, far-flung war for 

American independence remained unanswered. 

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Army National Guard History

CHAPTER 2 

Revolution and 

Early Nationhood, 1775-1794 

By keeping up in Peace “a well regulated, and disciplined Militia,” we shall take the 

fairest and best method to preserve, for a long time to come, the happiness, dignity 

and Independence of our country. 

George Washington, 

Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, 1783 

Introduction 

Colonel William Prescott stood on the parapet of a stout, earthen redoubt 

studying the dazzling panorama of war that stretched out before him. The vantage point 

from atop Breed’s Hill gave Prescott a commanding view of the entire Charlestown 

Peninsula, the city of Boston with its expansive harbor, and most of the surrounding 

countryside all of the way westward to Cambridge. On the afternoon of June 17, 1775 a 

battle was imminent, and curious spectators crowded the rooftops of Boston hoping to 

watch the first deliberate confrontation between the British Army and the American 

militia. In Boston harbor, a number of British warships lay at anchor, sporadically 

bombarding the increasing numbers of American militiamen flowing onto the 

Charlestown Peninsula. 

However, the focus of Prescott’s attention was nearly 2,000 British infantrymen 

drawn up in an attack formation some 400 yards east of Breed’s Hill. The brilliant 

afternoon sun made the Redcoats shine bright with scarlet and steel. The long, upright 

bayonets gleaming in the afternoon sun caused Prescott serious concerns. His own 

Massachusetts militiamen had a limited amount of ammunition and lacked bayonets; if 

the fighting became hand-to-hand, the British would have a distinct advantage. Still, 

Prescott felt better knowing that Colonel John Stark’s New Hampshire militiamen had 

arrived to protect his left flank between the Breed’s Hill redoubt and the Mystic River. It 

was now past three o’clock in the afternoon, and Prescott expected the British assault to 

begin at any moment. 

Colonel Prescott’s Massachusetts regiment had been atop Breed’s Hill for the 

past fifteen hours. Starting at midnight, his soldiers had worked diligently to construct a 

crude, square redoubt that by dawn was a credible defensive position. At sunrise, British 

lookouts observed that the Americans had occupied Breed’s Hill, and a moment later 

British warships had opened fire on Prescott’s position. One of the first shots struck and 

killed a militiaman at work in the redoubt. The first casualty came as a shock; work 

stopped as fellow citizen-soldiers gathered about to stare nervously at their dead 

comrade. Prescott intervened, gave instructions to bury the soldier in a shallow grave, 

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Army National Guard History

and ordered his men back to work. Before long, another shell smashed the barrels 

containing the regiment’s drinking water. Though hunger, thirst, fatigue, and fear took 

its toll on several soldiers, Prescott’s men continued work on the redoubt as the Redcoats 

marshaled their forces for an all-out assault on the American positions across the waist 

of the Charlestown Peninsula. 

The first British attack began at half past three o’clock. With flags flying, the 

British infantry marched up the front slope of Breed’s Hill moving through waist high 

grass while negotiating stone and wooden fences that slowed the advance. British naval 

gunfire had set fire to the nearby town of Charlestown and smoke hung heavy over the 

battlefield as the entire settlement went up in flames. Prescott ordered his men to aim 

low, not to open fire until the Redcoats were very close and to concentrate on hitting the 

British officers. At a range of less than fifty yards, the Americans opened fire with a 

series of volleys that tore large gaps in the British ranks. The Redcoats hastily retreated, 

reformed, and attacked again. Now Prescott ordered his men not to open fire until the 

British were within thirty yards. The British infantry staggered before the militia’s fire, 

and for the second time, fell back from Breed’s Hill. All along the American lines citizensoldiers shouted wildly at their success in turning back the Regulars. 

The militiamen’s enthusiasm quieted when they observed the Redcoats forming 

for a third assault. In the redoubt, Prescott’s men were desperately low on ammunition. 

Soldiers rummaged among the dead and wounded searching for powder horns and 

cartridge boxes. Enough ammunition remained for one last volley. The British soon 

charged again with an effort more determined than before. Prescott’s men held their fire 

until the Redcoats were only twenty yards away and then let loose with a final, 

devastating volley that emptied their muskets. The British ranks staggered under the fire, 

recoiled and rushed headlong over the forward rampart of the redoubt. A desperate 

hand-to-hand fight ensued in which Prescott’s militiaman used their empty muskets as 

clubs and wielded rocks, knives and hatchets. Swinging his sword wildly, Prescott 

shouted orders for his soldiers to abandon the redoubt and to fall back to the safety of 

Bunker Hill at the western end of the Charlestown Peninsula. Before long, the British 

had complete control of the redoubt and counted the dead bodies of thirty militiamen they 

had run through with the bayonet. 

Hours later, with his coat and trousers ripped by British bayonets but otherwise 

unhurt, Colonel Prescott told his superiors he was willing to retake the Breed’s Hill 

redoubt if given command of three fresh regiments with sufficient ammunition and 

bayonets. Orders never came for the counterattack, but William Prescott and all of the 

militiamen on the Charlestown Peninsula forever remembered June 17, 1775 as the day 

they defied the British Regulars in open battle while inflicting twice as many casualties as 

they received. 

In 1782, a year before the end of the American Revolution, the French scholar 

Abbe de Mably wrote to the Patriot leader John Adams seeking his thoughts on the 

writing of a comprehensive history of the war. The future President of the United States 

replied that any study of the Revolution required an understanding of the key institutions 

that had created American greatness in the colonial period and served as the basis of 

45 
Army National Guard History

success during the recent war. To Adams, there were four critical institutions in 

American society: towns, religious congregations, schools, and the militia. Adams told 

the French scholar that the militia “comprehends the whole people...so that the whole 

country is ready to march for its own defense upon the first signal of alarm.” (1) 

Adams’s belief in the importance of the militia to America’s well-being was 

based upon a firsthand observation of citizen-soldiers during the American Revolution. 

The militia performed a myriad of functions during the eight years that marked 

America’s second longest war. The militia fought the war’s opening battles, formed the 

basis of the new Continental Army, reinforced the Continentals during crucial battles and 

campaigns, and performed other important auxiliary functions. Throughout all thirteen 

colonies, Patriot militiamen denied the British control of the countryside, stood their 

ground against Loyalist militia, and insured political support for their cause. However, 

the militia proved incapable of prevailing in battle alone against British Regulars and 

usually failed to provide sustained combat power during independent, extended 

operations. 

The militia’s predominant role in colonial society and its contributions during the 

American Revolution guaranteed the militia a permanent place as an enduring institution 

of the new United States. The creation of the Continental Army in 1775 resulted in a 

dual military system of American Regulars and militiamen that from the start was both 

complimentary and competitive. After the American Revolution, the proper place of 

Regulars and citizen-soldiers in a new national military establishment became a point of 

crucial debate between opposing political factions. The U.S. Constitution perpetuated a 

dual system of Regulars and citizen-soldiers for national defense and forever defined and 

affirmed the importance of the militia as an integral component of American society and 

government. 

The Battle of Bunker Hill 

In the days following the dramatic events of the battle of Lexington and Concord, 

a large, disparate collection of militiamen quickly gathered outside of Boston. The 

militiamen’s wild-eyed enthusiasm was matched in intensity only by complete confusion. 

When it became apparent that a rematch with the British was not imminent, 

Massachusetts turned to the business of raising a more permanent army to conduct the 

siege of Boston. The Provincial Congress sent appeals to the neighboring colonies for 

reinforcements and then set about the task of organizing a New England army with a 

proposed strength of 13,600 soldiers. General Artemus Ward, the senior ranking officer 

in the Massachusetts militia, became the commander of the new army. Ward’s first 

priority was to organize new regiments by recruiting men from existing minuteman and 

militia units who volunteered for service for the remainder of the year. On May 16th, 

Ward declared the first two regiments ready for service. By the second week in June, 

twenty-four regiments were organized, and the army mustered a total of 11,636 men. A 

dearth of quality leaders and chronic shortages of weapons, uniforms, and supplies 

greatly impeded training. The massive expenditure of ammunition on April 19th had 

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Army National Guard History

A gunner from the Rhode Island artillery in 

1776. Rhode Island artillerymen acted as the 

first siege artillery during the investiture of 

Boston, 1775-1776. (Anne Brown Collection) 

reduced gunpowder supplies to 

dangerously low levels. General Ward 

prohibited marksmanship training and 

remained content to keep the British 

bottled up in Boston until more 

ammunition was available. (2) 

The other New England colonies 

responded swiftly to the call for 

reinforcements. With a total strength of 

1,400 officers and men, three regiments 

arrived from New Hampshire under the 

overall command of Col. John Stark. Tall 

and lean, Stark was a leader of daring and 

skill who had served as a captain in 

Rogers’ Rangers during the French and 

Indian War. Perhaps more important than 

manpower, the New Hampshire 

militiamen brought with them the 

gunpowder they had captured at Fort 

William and Mary in advance of General 

Gage’s failed powder. Connecticut sent 

two regiments that included the only 

militia company in the entire New 

England army to wear recognizable 

uniforms. Brig. Gen. Israel Putnam, a 

gregarious, stocky man of boundless 

energy, commanded one of the 

Connecticut regiments and developed a 

reputation as a man not afraid to fight. At the head of three Rhode Island regiments 

arriving in Boston rode Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Greene, a self-educated soldier who walked 

with a noticeable limp. In addition to 1,500 infantrymen, Rhode Island contributed 

twelve heavy guns that became the army’s siege artillery. (3) 

While the New England militia reorganized around Boston, other militiamen 

carried out the first American attack of the war. On May 10th, a militia force composed 

of Ethan Allen’s Green Mountain Boys from Vermont and other militiamen under Col. 

Benedict Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga on the southern shores of Lake Champlain. 

In a stealthy night attack, the militiamen entered the fort through an unsecured door and 

were on the fort’s parade ground before a sentry challenged them. Ethan Allen received 

the fort’s surrender from a surprised garrison commander still dressed in his nightshirt. 

The Americans eventually transported Fort Ticonderoga’s heavy guns to Boston months 

later for use as siege artillery. (4) 

Inside Boston, British infantrymen recovered from the trauma of Lexington and 

Concord while General Gage considered his next move. Appeals to London for 

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Army National Guard History

additional troops fell on deaf ears. However, an unexpected form of aid appeared on 

May 26th when a warship arrived carrying Maj. Gens. William Howe, Henry Clinton, 

and John Burgoyne, a military triumvirate with considerable experience gained in Europe 

and America. In reality, the British government sent the commanders to goad Gage into 

action. On June 12th, acting under direct orders from London, Gage imposed martial 

law, declared the New Englanders traitors, and offered a full pardon to all those willing to 

lay down their arms. At the same time, Gage agreed to conduct a limited offensive to 

capture the dominating heights on the Charlestown Peninsula on the north side of Boston 

harbor and the prominent terrain at Dorchester below the city. By occupying the 

surrounding high ground, the British intended to stop the militia from emplacing artillery 

that could dominate Boston and its harbor. (5) 

Poor security in Boston allowed the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to learn 

of Gage’s plan in short order. Hoping to prevent the British from gaining the upper hand, 

legislators ordered General Ward to occupy and fortify Bunker Hill, the highest of three 

hills on the Charlestown Peninsula. The assignment went to a Massachusetts regiment 

commanded by Col. William Prescott and reinforced by a large detachment of 

Connecticut troops. The 1,000-man expedition assembled on Cambridge Common on the 

late afternoon of June 16th with a wagon loaded with entrenching tools and a full 

equipage of weapons, ammunition, and food. After the president of Harvard College 

offered a divine blessing, the column headed for its objective under the cover of darkness. 

At Bunker Hill the reinforced regiment halted, and a council of war ensued. For reasons 

that remain unknown, Colonel Prescott decided to advance further down the peninsula 

and to entrench atop Breed’s Hill, a steep, sixty-foot height on the outskirts of 

Charlestown. A supporting position was to be dug on Bunker Hill afterwards. Just 

before midnight the column reached Breed’s Hill, and a militia engineer staked out the 

trace of a square redoubt measuring 132 feet on each side. New England farmers who 

had experience in clearing farmlands of rocks, trees, and stumps worked feverishly with 

picks, axes, and spades to dig their redoubt. By sunrise, the fort had taken on enough 

shape to give the soldiers cover against British naval gunfire. (6) 

When General Gage learned of the surprise American encroachment, he 

abandoned his original plan for capturing the high ground above and below the city in 

favor of a single, strong riposte against the Charlestown Peninsula. Conferring with his 

other generals, they agreed that the Yankee militia’s forward position on Breed’s Hill 

presented an opportunity. The redoubt’s location exposed a portion of the American 

army to destruction, and a stinging defeat of the militiamen defending Breed’s Hill might 

spark the complete dissolution of the New England army and extinguish the entire 

rebellion. Gage committed five infantry regiments, a marine battalion and an artillery 

company — about 2,200 troops in all — to the assault and put General William Howe in 

overall command. Starting around one o’clock in the afternoon, British long boats began 

ferrying the assault force from Boston’s docks to a landing site on the eastern tip of the 

Charlestown Peninsula. (7) 

The sight of British troops moving into attack positions prompted General Ward 

to rush reinforcements to Colonel Prescott. By three o’clock, as many as 4,000 

48 
Army National Guard History

militiamen in various regiments and 

detachments from Massachusetts, 

Connecticut, and New Hampshire 

defended a line that stretched 

continuously for 600 yards across the 

waist of the peninsula. The American 

defense in the south was anchored on 

Prescott’s redoubt on Breed’s Hill, and 

to the north two regiments of New 

Hampshire troops under Colonel John 

Stark defended a series of stone and rail 

fences. Further back on Bunker Hill, 

General Israel Putnam organized a 

collection of troops to construct defenses 

to support the forward positions. (8) 

At half past three o’clock, 

General Howe launched his Redcoats in 

a main attack against John Stark’s 

regiments while a second, supporting 

attack went straight toward Breed’s Hill. 

High grass and broken terrain slowed the 

advance, and as the lines closed to within 

fifty yards, a sudden onslaught of

New England militiamen fight British grenadiers American firepower from Stark’s men 

at close quarters during the battle of Bunker Hill, posted behind a stone wall killed nearly June 17, 1775. (Anne Brown Collection) 100 British soldiers in short order. On 

Breed’s Hill, Prescott’s men successfully defended their redoubt. Howe pulled his 

soldiers back, regrouped and launched the depleted regiments in a single, powerful blow 

aimed at the center of the American lines. From their prepared defenses on high ground, 

the militia again prevailed. Howe withdrew a second time, and around four-thirty in the 

afternoon concentrated his depleted forces in a single blow against the redoubt on 

Breed’s Hill. Prescott’s militiamen waited until the British closed within twenty yards 

before unleashing their last ammunition in a final volley. (While the last gunfire was 

surely at close range, there are no reliable accounts of anyone commanding, “Don’t fire 

until you see the whites of their eyes!”) The Redcoats stormed into the redoubt and 

ejected the defenders at the point of the bayonet. Prescott’s withdrawal sparked a general 

retreat back to Bunker Hill all along the American line. Howe’s victorious and exhausted 

troops approached Bunker Hill but did not attack. By five o’clock the savage battle was 

over, and American units began withdrawing from Bunker Hill and the Charlestown 

Peninsula to the greater safety of the mainland. (9) 

The Redcoats had successfully pushed the stubborn militiamen off the 

Charlestown Peninsula but at a staggering price. British casualties for the two and a half 

hour struggle totaled 1,034 men, or nearly half of the attacking force. Yankee 

49 
Army National Guard History

marksmanship took a particularly heavy toll of British officers. Eighty-nine officers were 

killed or wounded, including all twelve members of General Howe’s staff. A chastened 

General Gage reported the bloody victory to London, noting, “the loss we have sustained 

is greater than we can bear.” The battle reinforced a healthy respect of the Yankee militia 

first gained at Lexington and Concord. “These people shew a Spirit and Conduct against 

us they never shewed against the French,” Gage wrote to his superiors. “They are now 

spirited up by a Rage and Enthousiasm, as great as ever People were possessed of, and 

you must proceed in earnest or give the business up...” (10) 

At Cambridge, General Ward reported American casualties as 450 killed, 

wounded, and captured, but total losses may have been higher. The militiamen had 

fought well by taking advantage of the terrain and demonstrating a surprising skill in 

fighting from hasty fortifications. Though forced to give up their defenses, the 

Americans took pride in the fact they had competed well in open battle against one of the 

best professional armies in the world while inflicting heavy losses. When the American 

Revolution ended eight years later, what became known as the battle of Bunker Hill 

remained the British Army’s bloodiest single engagement of the war and took the lives of 

more British officers than any other battle. (11) 

Congress Creates an Army 

Despite the valor of American citizen-soldiers at Bunker Hill, the action revealed 

near fatal shortcomings in the New England army’s discipline, staff work, and logistics. 

Obviously, a more professional fighting force was needed to compete on a level playing 

field with the British Army. The need was especially obvious to the Massachusetts 

Provincial Congress who nearly a month before Bunker Hill petitioned the Continental 

Congress to assume responsibility for “the regulation and general direction” of the army 

so that it might “more effectually answer the purpose designed.” (12) 

After lengthy debate, the Second Continental Congress acted on June 14, 1775 — 

three days before Bunker Hill — to create the Continental Army, America’s first standing 

force of Regulars. On that historic day in 1775, Congress voted to raise ten companies of 

riflemen from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia that became the first American 

troops to enlist directly into the Continental Army. (The designated birthday of the 

United States Army is June 14, 1775, nearly 150 years after the creation of the first 

militia regiments in 1636.) The following day, Congress appointed one of its own to 

serve as the commander in chief of the Continental Army. George Washington, a fortythree year old colonel in the Virginia militia and one of the Old Dominion’s delegates in 

Congress, had made a profound impression on his fellow legislators with his imposing 

appearance, confident manner, and competent work in congressional military committees. 

Congress soon moved to appoint twelve general officers to serve under Washington. The 

promotions went to recognized leaders and were allocated among the thirteen colonies in 

proportion to the number of troops each contributed to the war effort. In raising the rifle 

companies from colonies beyond New England, appointing an army commander from 

Virginia, and designating general officers from throughout the colonies, Congress 

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Army National Guard History

succeeded in creating broader support for the war and established the Continental Army 

as a national asset. (13) 

Though it authorized a new, standing army, Congress in no way proposed any 

dissolution of the militia. Citizen-soldiers in organized units represented a vast reservoir 

of manpower for the Continental Army and at crucial times were to muster and fight 

alongside the new, American Regulars. Furthermore, Washington’s army could not be in 

all places at any one time, and the militia would always be available to handle local 

emergencies wherever they might arise. Congress recommended to the colonies a 

number of plans for strengthening their militia that included the creation of minuteman 

units, the organization of standard regiments, and the creation of special committees in 

each of the colonial legislatures to oversee military matters. (14) 

The actions of the Second Continental Congress created a series of important, 

historic precedents in the relationship between the country’s highest legislative body and 

the military. Congress established itself as the country’s principle policymaking body in 

military affairs by involving itself in the organization, manning, and supply of the 

Continental Army. In its handling of military policy, Congress reinforced the concept of 

civilian control over the military first established by Parliament in Great Britain and then 

embraced by the colonial legislatures in their control of militia affairs. The clearest 

example of the exercise of civilian control was Congress’ selection of Washington as 

commander in chief followed by the appointment of subordinate general officers. In 

creating a Regular Army and maintaining a reliance on the militia, Congress produced a 

dual military system that would come to have a profound and enduring influence on 

nearly all matters of military policy. 

Washington left Philadelphia on June 23rd, headed for his new command outside 

of Boston and escorted by a mounted militia unit, the Philadelphia Light Horse that later 

became known as the First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry. (The First Troop, 

Philadelphia City Cavalry remains today as the U.S. Army’s oldest cavalry unit and 

serves in the Pennsylvania Army National Guard as Troop A, 104th Cavalry.) 

Washington arrived in Cambridge nine days later and quickly saw that building “a 

respectable army” would be a formidable task. All together, Washington’s army 

numbered little more than 14,000 troops, and the shortage of gunpowder allowed each 

infantryman to carry no more than nine rounds. Short on ammunition and with only a 

handful of heavy artillery pieces, a classic siege of Boston was impossible. The situation 

forced Washington to maintain a solid infantry ring about Boston where a weakened 

British Army, now under the command of General Howe, suffered from a lack of food 

and the ravages of disease. Throughout the siege, Washington labored to create an 

American Army that was a close approximation of the British forces he had admired 

during the French and Indian War. For weeks on end, the new commander in chief 

worked tirelessly to establish better organization, training, and discipline while 

overcoming nearly insurmountable problems in administration and supply. (15) 

Of all the obstacles Washington encountered, the most vexing was acquiring the 

manpower needed to maintain the Continental Army’s ranks. The enlistments of most of 

51 
Army National Guard History

the regiments in the New England army were set to expire at the end of December 1775. 

Efforts to recruit the militia into the Continental Army produced only 9,000 volunteers. 

The reluctance of militiamen to volunteer angered Washington. However, militiamen 

countered that they had born the burden of the struggle for nearly a year, starting with 

Gage’s powder alarms and extending through Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill, and 

the protracted siege of Boston, and that other fresh troops should volunteer to continue 

the struggle. (16) 

On January 1, 1776, Washington published a general order establishing a 

Continental Army in the field consisting of twenty-seven regiments. Still short of 

personnel, the New England colonies provided replacement militia units at Boston so that 

by March 1776, 5,000 of the 14,000 troops available to Washington were citizen-soldiers. 

Congress eventually required the colonies to raise, organize, and equip regiments for the 

Continental Army that became known collectively as the “Continental line.” For their 

efforts, the colonies were allowed to appoint regimental officers through the rank of 

colonel. Each colony maintained an interest in sustaining their Continental regiments as 

well as their local militia. The arrangement ensured that combinations of Continentals 

and militiamen would fight together in nearly all of the American Revolution’s major 

engagements. (17) 

The American Revolution in the North, 1775-1777 

Great Britain clearly comprehended the need to quash the rebellious American 

colonies but never clearly formulated a coherent, long-term strategy for winning the war. 

British planning and subsequent military operations focused alternately on capturing key, 

strategic points in America and in fomenting a general uprising among the Loyalist 

population. In general, British commanders believed that the occupation of major cities 

such as New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston would suffice to spark a Loyalist 

counterrevolution. British commanders counted on the Royal Navy to provide strategic 

mobility up and down the eastern seaboard and to control major river lines that provided 

easy access to the American interior. 

At first glance, the war between Great Britain and the rebellious colonies 

appeared as an unequal contest. A powerful nation of more than ten million people with 

vast wealth and a professional army and navy confronted a loose confederation of 

colonies numbering two and a half million people that possessed no navy, a host of 

militia, and only a handful of Regulars. However, the British government failed to grasp 

the difficulties of asserting its authority over a widely dispersed population that lived 

throughout a vast tract of wilderness largely devoid of decisive, strategic points. British 

supply lines extended 3,000 miles across the hazardous North Atlantic, and supplies that 

Redcoats required often did not survive the passage. Rugged terrain and long distances 

made communications difficult, and jealous, egotistical British commanders on different 

fronts often failed to coordinate their efforts. Time and time again, British commanders 

overestimated the numbers and intensity of Loyalist support while underestimating the 

staying power and fighting abilities of American Continentals and militiamen. Recruiting 

52 
Army National Guard History

adequate manpower for the British Army proved difficult, forcing London to resort to the 

widespread hiring of German mercenaries. (18) 

During the American Revolution, the militia played a vital role in the winning of 

battles and campaigns and in controlling the allegiance of the populations scattered 

throughout the colonies. The northern campaigns during the war’s early years 

demonstrate the important role the militia played in supporting conventional operations. 

While Washington formed the new Continental Army outside Boston, Congress 

authorized an ambitious venture against Canada designed to eliminate its use as a British 

base and perhaps lead to its assimilation as America’s fourteenth colony. 

Two American columns composed almost entirely of militiamen converged on the 

St. Lawrence River valley from different directions. Benedict Arnold, hero of Fort 

Ticonderoga and former commander of the Governor’s Foot Guard of Connecticut, led a 

column of New York and New England militia in a direct, overland advance against 

Quebec. The only Continental unit with Arnold was a battalion of riflemen under the 

command of Colonel Daniel Morgan of Virginia, a veteran of Braddock’s Defeat. With 

Washington’s blessing, Arnold’s troops left Massachusetts in mid-September and 

proceeded by boat to Maine. In one of the most grueling marches in American history, 

Arnold’s soldiers struggled northward over a rugged, barren wilderness while suffering 

through bitter, winter weather. On November 9th, after a march of 400 miles in forty 

days, Arnold’s haggard group of nearly 600 Continentals and militiamen reached the 

south bank of the St. Lawrence River across from Quebec. Despite the frigid weather, 

the energetic Arnold assembled a flotilla of small boats and began crossing the St. 

Lawrence on November 14th. As much as he wanted to capture Quebec, Arnold lacked 

the artillery and special equipment required to take the city. An impasse developed until 

reinforcements arrived from an unexpected quarter. (19) 

While Arnold marched on Quebec from the south, a second column of American 

militiamen commanded by General Richard Montgomery approached from the west. 

Using Fort Ticonderoga as a base of operations, Montgomery had assembled an army of 

militiamen by late August and then advanced northward to threaten Montreal. On 

November 11th, Montgomery’s troops captured Montreal and began preparations for a 

move on Quebec. Three weeks later, Montgomery and 300 men arrived at Quebec by 

ship carrying badly needed supplies, winter clothing, and weapons for Benedict Arnold’s 

tattered force. On December 5th, Montgomery and Arnold deployed their combined 

force of approximately 1,000 men to besiege Quebec, but the British garrison showed no 

signs of surrendering. (20) 

Aware that the militia’s enlistments would expire at the end of the year, 

Montgomery and Arnold conducted a desperate night attack on December 30th during a 

blinding snowstorm. The struggle continued throughout the night, but the British, 

fighting from prepared defenses, retained the upper hand. By daybreak, Montgomery 

was dead, Arnold wounded and Morgan captured; nearly half of their troops were 

casualties. Arnold withdrew the survivors, established defensive positions a few miles 

from Quebec and begged for reinforcements. During the following spring both sides sent 

53 
Army National Guard History

fresh troops to the St. Lawrence valley. Disease, starvation, and a series of setbacks at 

the hands of the British finally forced a withdrawal that ended with American troops 

returning to upstate New York in June 1776. For all its failures, the Canadian expedition 

showed that militiamen under proper leadership could fight during prolonged offensive 

operations. More importantly, the invasion bought precious time for the organization and 

training of the Continental Army and postponed British plans for an invasion of the 

colonies from Canada. (21) 

George Washington’s 1776 campaign illustrates the ways in which the 

Continental Army and the militia complemented each other. On March 17, 1776 the 

British finally evacuated Boston, and General William Howe sailed north to Halifax, 

Nova Scotia to organize British military and naval forces for a huge attack on New York 

City. Anticipating the British offensive, Washington moved his army from Boston to 

New York. The Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 buoyed recruiting, and 

Washington was able to put nearly 20,000 Continentals and militiamen into the field. 

During the ensuing battles around New York City, the performance of inexperienced 

Continentals and militia units ranged from the courageous to the ignominious. Maryland 

Continentals and the Delaware Regiment at the battle of Long Island first established 

their reputations as the hardest hitting troops of the Continental Line. In the last stages of 

the battle, the Marylanders counterattacked the British six times despite overwhelming 

odds. Watching the ardent effort from a short distance, an emotional George Washington 

exclaimed, “Good God! What brave fellows I must this day lose!” (Today the Maryland 

Continentals serve in the Maryland Army National Guard as the 175th Infantry, and the 

Delaware Regiment serves in the Delaware Army National Guard as the 198th Signal 

Battalion.) During the evacuation of Long Island, Washington relied upon the sturdy 

fishermen of Colonel John Glover’s Marblehead Regiment from Marblehead, 

Massachusetts to man the longboats used to ferry the army to safety. At the opposite end 

of the spectrum, raw Connecticut militia broke and ran during a British landing at Kip’s 

Bay on Manhattan despite the personal efforts of an enraged Washington to halt the rout. 

All throughout the New York campaign, the Americans suffered at the hands of superior 

British mobility and discipline while Washington took excessive risks that too often 

exposed his troops to unnecessary dangers. (22) 

By early November Washington admitted defeat in New York and began a 

difficult retreat southward across New Jersey with the British in hot pursuit. The 

enlistments of Continentals and militiamen were due to expire at the end of December, 

and as Washington moved south his army slowly melted away. It was at this low point in 

the war that a frustrated Washington vented his spleen on citizen-soldiers. The 

commander in chief wrote to Congress that the militia “come in you cannot tell how, go, 

you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where.” Additionally, he said they 

“consume your Provisions, exhaust your Stores, and leave you at least in a critical 

moment.” (23) 

In spite of Washington’s condemnations, the militia made important contributions 

during one of the bleakest periods of the Revolution. As the British ranged further from 

New York City, New Jersey militia harassed Redcoat and Hessian outposts and attacked 

54 
Army National Guard History

foraging parties. One British officer complained that the militia kept the army in a 

“perpetual harassment” and “lost us more men than the last campaign.” After 

Washington’s dwindling forces reached the safety of the Delaware River, an infusion of 

Pennsylvania militia and the arrival of detached Continentals raised the number of troops 

to 5,000. With the knowledge that his army might disappear at the end of the year, 

Washington planned a bold, surprise stroke against an isolated Hessian garrison at 

Trenton. Once again, Washington relied on the skills of John Glover’s Massachusetts’ 

fishermen to ferry his troops across the ice-choked Delaware River on Christmas night of 

1776. After the successful raid on Trenton, Washington defeated two isolated British 

regiments at Princeton on January 3, 1777. The twin victories offset the effects of earlier 

disasters around New York City and restored confidence in Washington’s abilities. The 

Continental Army went into winter quarters in Morristown, New Jersey to prepare for 

coming campaigns while the militia returned to their homes. (24) 

In 1777, the British Army moved by sea from New York City to the Chesapeake 

Bay, and Washington and Howe maneuvered against one another for several months in 

New Jersey, Delaware and outside Philadelphia, crossing swords at Brandywine and 

Germantown. Though Howe captured Philadelphia, Washington’s mixed force of 

Continentals and militia fought well for the most part. Washington relied heavily on the 

Continentals but gained a greater respect for his militiamen. Many militia units had 

experienced several battles, and under improved leadership, they achieved better 

confidence and discipline. (25) 

The militia’s greatest contribution in the Revolution’s northern theater occurred 

during the Saratoga campaign of 1777. Operating from Canada, a British army under 

General John Burgoyne aimed to attack southward along the line of Lake Champlain and 

the Hudson River valley to affect a juncture with British forces from New York City. By 

occupying the Hudson River valley, the British sought to split the colonies in two and to 

isolate New England, considered the hotbed of Patriot sentiment, from outside support. 

Burgoyne began his southward movement in June 1777 with a force of 7,200 British and 

Hessian Regulars and nearly 1,000 Loyalist militia and Indian allies. Fort Ticonderoga 

surrendered on June 27th, and Burgoyne decided in favor of a direct, overland advance 

on Saratoga nearly, one hundred miles away on the upper Hudson River. The British 

commander underestimated the transportation and logistical difficulties of moving and 

feeding a large force in the middle of a dense wilderness. (26) 

A gathering multitude of Continentals and militiamen at first slowed Burgoyne’s 

advance and finally forced the capitulation of the entire British force. As Burgoyne 

moved further southward, New York and the New England colonies realized the 

seriousness of the threat and sent militia units to upstate New York. The bad behavior of 

Burgoyne’s Indian allies in scalping civilians motivated many militiamen to oppose the 

invasion. New Hampshire called upon favorite son John Stark, the hero of Bunker Hill, 

who had quit the Continental Army piqued over his inability to gain a promotion to 

brigadier general. New Hampshire commissioned Stark as a brigadier general of militia, 

and he quickly recruited 2,000 men and set out for the Hudson River valley. Meanwhile, 

55 
Army National Guard History

Washington dispatched nearly 1,200 Continentals to the scene of the crisis, and General 

Horatio Gates assumed command of all American forces. (27) 

Meanwhile, Burgoyne encountered increasing difficulties in feeding his troops 

and animals. More and more, the army spent its time foraging. On August 11th, 

Burgoyne dispatched a column of 650 Hessians to gather cattle and supplies reported at 

Bennington in southern Vermont. Unbeknownst to the Hessians, John Stark’s army sat 

waiting for them at Bennington. On August 16th, the two forces collided in a sharp fight. 

Under Stark’s leadership the militia performed magnificently and carried out all planned 

maneuvers as intended. Every Hessian mercenary was killed, wounded or fled. Later in 

the day, the militiamen attacked and defeated a second column of Hessians that Burgoyne 

had dispatched to reinforce the first expedition. The battle of Bennington gained the 

initiative for the Americans, denied vital supplies to Burgoyne’s troops and eliminated 

about one-tenth of the enemy force. (28) 

Despite the Bennington debacle, Burgoyne stubbornly pressed southward toward 

Saratoga. A coordinated British advance from New York City never materialized, and 

militia units put increasing pressure on the Redcoat column. In early September, 

Burgoyne informed London that whenever he attempted to advance that “militia in the 

amount of three or four thousand assemble in twenty-four hours.” Burgoyne managed to 

reach Saratoga, but south of the town Continentals and militiaman dug in their heels and 

“There, my lads, are the Hessians!” General John Stark shouted at the beginning of the battle of 

Bennington. “Tonight our flag floats over yonder hill, or Molly Stark is a widow!” The fight on 

August 16, 1777 was one of the few times militiamen in the American Revolution defeated 

European professional troops in open battle. (Anne Brown Collection) 

56 
Army National Guard History

allowed no further advance. The battles of Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights 

convinced Burgoyne that further progress southward was hopeless. By October 8th, food 

supplies were low, forage was scarce, troops were deserting and the American militia had 

completely surrounded the Redcoats. Burgoyne finally surrendered his entire force of 

6,000 troops at Saratoga on October 17th. As a result of the great victory, France 

negotiated an alliance with America in February 1778 that was tantamount to a 

declaration of war against England and provided the colonies with badly needed supplies, 

money, and French troops. (29) 

The American Revolution in the South, 1778-1783 

With the defeat at Saratoga and the return of the British Army to New York City 

in 1778, Great Britain abandoned its strategy of winning the war by capturing key, 

strategic points. A new strategy emerged that focused on subjugating the southern 

colonies where the British believed most of the population held Loyalist tendencies. The 

British hoped to exploit the social and political divides between coastal planters and 

upcountry farmers while fomenting potential slave and Indian uprisings. After the British 

Army eliminated Continental and militia forces, Loyalist militia were to gain control of 

the countryside. The final phase of British strategy called for the reinstatement of Royal 

Governors. Starting in Georgia, the British hoped to spark a military and political 

British General John Burgoyne surrenders his sword and his army to General Horatio Gates and 

Colonel Daniel Morgan at Saratoga on October 17, 1777. (Anne Brown Collection) 

57 
Army National Guard History

groundswell that would allow them to reclaim the South and eventually all of the 

colonies. 

With a paucity of Continental troops available for service in the South, much of 

the fighting fell to the militia. From the beginning of the Revolution, the militia had 

played a large role in promoting the Patriot cause below the Mason-Dixon Line. 

Virginia’s Royalist Governor rallied sympathetic militiamen in an effort to retain the Old 

Dominion’s allegiance to the Crown, but Patriot militia smashed the counterrevolution in 

December 1775 at the battle of Great Bridge. Two months later, a force of 1,000 North 

Carolina militiamen killed or captured a similar sized force of Loyalist militia at the 

battle of Moore Creek’s Bridge and prevented North Carolina from falling back into 

British hands. The South Carolina militia bore the lion’s share of the burden of defeating 

a large British expedition against Charleston in June 1776. The linchpin of the American 

defenses was a sturdy fort on Sullivan’s Island that guarded access to the city’s inner 

harbor. Col. William Moultrie defended the fort with his 2nd Regiment of South 

Carolina infantry. During the battle of Sullivan’s Island on June 28, 1776, a combined 

force of militia and Continentals turned back a joint attack by British infantry and 

warships and prevented South Carolina from falling into enemy hands. (30) 

The British return to the South began with the capture of Savannah in December 

1778. By the end of the following summer a Royal Governor once again controlled 

Georgia, and the British began preparations for carrying the war into South Carolina. In 

the spring of 1780, a powerful British land and sea force clamped a tight hold around 

American troops defending Charleston. On May 12th, nearly 5,500 Continentals and 

militiamen surrendered in the greatest disaster to befall American arms during the entire 

war. Maj. Gen. Charles Cornwallis deployed his 8,000 British Regulars at outposts 

across South Carolina in an effort to reassert the Crown’s control throughout the colony. 

(31) 

The British occupation spawned a bloody guerilla war that pitted British Regulars 

and Loyalist militia against a dedicated contingent of South Carolina militiamen. 

Operating from secure bases in thick woodlands and gloomy swamps, gifted leaders such 

as Thomas Sumter, Andrew Pickens and Francis Marion led their militiamen in raids 

against British and Loyalist outposts and foraging parties. Bloody, destructive reprisals 

by Loyalist militia against Patriot officials and property turned much of the neutral 

population against the British and the Loyalists. An increasing escalation of violence 

occurred between the opposing parties with the British using terror as a weapon against 

the Patriot militia. The mounted forces of Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton gained an infamous 

reputation for brutality that included the execution of prisoners. In the Appalachian 

Mountains, the fear of spreading British control prompted small bands of militiamen to 

join forces with the South Carolina militia. On October 7, 1780 a small army of nearly 

1,200 frontier militiamen armed mostly with long rifles encircled a small Loyalist militia 

force at King’s Mountain in the northwest corner of South Carolina. The superior 

firepower and marksmanship of the frontier militia resulted in the eventual surrender of 

the entire Loyalist force. The Patriot militia proceeded to kill and scalp many of the 

prisoners mercilessly in retribution for Tarleton’s previous excesses in slaughtering 

58 
Army National Guard History

innocents and prisoners. King’s Mountain was the turning point of the bitter guerilla 

war: it buoyed Patriot morale and deterred Loyalists from continuing their support of the 

British Army. (32) 

While the guerilla war raged, General Cornwallis concentrated on defeating the 

Continentals. At the battle of Camden on August 16th, Cornwallis soundly defeated a 

mixed force of Continentals and militia attempting to advance into South Carolina. At 

the height of the battle, militiamen bolted in the face of vigorous attacks by British 

Regulars. After Camden, George Washington sent his trusted subordinate, Nathaniel 

Greene, southward with orders to redeem the situation. In a bold decision, Greene split 

his army in two to prevent its complete annihilation at the hand of Cornwallis’ Regulars 

and to buy time for the strengthening of his own forces. Greene put one wing of the army 

that headed into the interior under Daniel Morgan. In response, Cornwallis divided his 

own army and dispatched a fast-moving column of 1,100 infantry and cavalry under the 

ruthless Banastre Tarleton to destroy Morgan. (33) 

Tarleton caught up with Morgan on January 17, 1781 west of King’s Mountain at 

an open, sparsely wooded location known as the Cowpens. The unsuspecting Tarleton 

charged recklessly at the Americans, not knowing that Morgan had laid a trap for him 

through the clever deployment of his mixed force of Continentals and militiamen. In the 

tactical masterpiece of the American Revolution, Morgan utilized the terrain and 

effectively maneuvered his soldiers — who were two-thirds militia — to crush the British 

with a double envelopment. The Redcoats surrendered after suffering heavy losses, and 

Tarleton managed to escape with only a small band of cavalry. Together, the militia 

The successful defense of Fort Moultrie on Sullivan’s Island on June 28, 1776 during Great 

Britain’s first attempt to capture Charleston, South Carolina. (Anne Brown Collection) 

59 
Army National Guard History

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Green 

“Rise and Fight Again” 

Nathaniel Greene was a self-made soldier 

whose stellar military career began as a private 

in the Rhode Island militia. y the end of the 

American Revolution, he served as a major 

general with a reputation for leadership second 

only to George Washington. 

Nathaniel Greene was born in 1742 into a 

family of Rhode Island ironworkers. oung 

man in charge of the family foundry, he gained 

valuable anagerial ills. 

Raised a Quaker in the pacifist tradition, Greene 

nevertheless developed an avid interest in 

military affairs. n September 1773, Greene’s 

congregation expelled him for attending a militia 

parade. n October 1774, he helped to form a 

militia company called the Kentish Guards, but 

fellow militiamen ht unfit 

command because of a noticeable limp caused 

by a stiff knee. etermined to remain in the 

militia, Greene served as a private. e became 

deeply involved in revising Rhode Island’s 

militia laws and advising the General Assembly 

on defense matters. sland raised 

three regiments in anticipation of war with Great Britain, the legislature considered the hobbling 

private as the best-qualified military leader in the colony. fter Lexington and Concord, Greene 

became a brigadier general of militia and led Rhode Island’s troops to the aid of Massachusetts. 

During the siege of Boston, Greene displayed exceptional leadership and managerial skills. 

The Continental Congress recognized his talents by appointing Greene as a brigadier general in the 

Continental Army. reene served beside Washington during most of the army’s early battles. In 

March 1778, he became the army’s quartermaster general with the mission of improving a failed 

supply system. ground helped him immensely in improving the army’s 

transportation system and in establishing an effective network of field supply depots. 

After the battle of Camden, Greene became the senior American commander in the South. 

He skillfully combined the talents of militiamen and Regulars during a brilliant campaign that 

ultimately led to the exhaustion and withdrawal of the British Army. ht, get beat, rise and 

fight again,” he once wrote in describing the fighting in the South. ut Greene’s characterization 

perhaps applied to all militiamen and Continentals who stoically endured through the many highs 

and lows of the Revolution. 

Impoverished by the war, Greene accepted the ownership of a confiscated British estate near 

Savannah, Georgia in 1785. he following year, he died there unexpectedly of sunstroke at the age 

of only forty-four. 

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thoug him for 

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Greene’s business back

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60
Army National Guard History

victories at King’s Mountain and Cowpens stripped the British Army in the South of its 

most mobile troops, thus severely diminishing its ability to defeat the Americans. (34) 

After Cowpens, Morgan marched north at a blistering pace to rejoin Greene’s 

troops in central North Carolina. Cornwallis pursued the Americans as Greene withdrew 

his army northward into Virginia. Cornwallis pursued to the Virginia border but then 

retreated because of a lack of supplies. Greene followed the Redcoats back into North 

Carolina, and on March 5, 1781, the two armies collided at Guilford Court House. After 

a hard-fought battle, the British held the field but lost twice as many casualties as the 

Americans. With his ranks depleted and lacking supplies, Cornwallis withdrew to 

Wilmington on the coast and then decided to move his army northward by ship to 

Virginia. With the British Regulars out of action, Greene’s army moved into South 

Carolina. One by one, the scattered British outposts throughout the colony fell to 

Greene’s Continentals or to the militia. By October 1781, the British had withdrawn to 

the security of Charleston and Savannah as the Patriot militia reasserted its control over 

the countryside. Though Cornwallis had managed to defeat American forces in a number 

of standup battles, he never divined a way to overcome the militia. “I will not say much 

in praise of the militia of the Southern Colonies,” Cornwallis once admitted, “but the list 

of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them...proves but too fatally that 

they are not wholly contemptible.” (35) 

The victory of Continentals and militiamen in the Carolinas created conditions for 

the final British defeat at Yorktown. The successful coordination of French troops and 

warships, along with Washington’s march to the York-James Peninsula, resulted in the 

concentration of superior combat power against the British. With support from the 

Virginia militia, the Franco-American force hemmed the Redcoats in at Yorktown. After 

a short siege, Cornwallis surrendered his 8,000-man army on October 20, 1781. The 

largest British debacle of the war shook the British government and led to the suspension 

of military operations in America. Peace negotiations began in Paris in April 1782, but 

the participants did not reach a viable agreement until January 1783. The Continental 

Congress ratified the treaty in April, and the Peace of Paris ended the American 

Revolution on September 3, 1783. 

At the end of eight years of war, the Continental Army and the militia shared 

credit for the profound victory. George Washington’s cautious strategy of preserving the 

Continental Army as the most visible symbol and central rallying point of the American 

cause proved correct. Still, because of their persistently small numbers, Continentals did 

not win the war alone. The militia provided a vast reservoir of manpower for a 

multiplicity of military needs while fighting in a majority of the war’s 1,331 recognized 

engagements and forming the basis for each colony’s contribution to the Continental line. 

George Washington often condemned militiamen for their tendency to break in battle or 

to drift away at the end of a campaign. But during operations under his direct 

supervision, the militia provided valuable reinforcements at critical times and gave the 

commander in chief the numbers of troops required to mount successful, limited strikes 

against the British. Washington tended to ignore the militia’s successes that occurred 

beyond the scope of his immediate supervision. In fact, the Patriot cause in the South, 

61 
Army National Guard History

where Washington never served until the end at Yorktown, could not have succeeded 

without the militia. In most battles militiamen fought alongside Continentals, but the 

militia usually could not stand alone successfully in heads-on battle against British 

Regulars. The militia had a mixed record in open combat: for each militia rout, such as 

Kip’s Bay or Camden, there were corresponding victories at Bennington and Cowpens. 

The Continental Army and the militia represented the two sides of a double-edged sword, 

and the victory would not have been possible without the achievements of both. 

Away from the rattling musketry and booming cannon of deliberate battles, the 

militia performed essential work in sustaining the Patriot cause. More than anything else, 

the militia prevented native Loyalists from gaining the upper hand. Key Patriot militia 

victories at Moore’s Creek Bridge, Great Bridge, and King’s Mountain stopped the 

Loyalists from regaining control of several colonies. The Patriots used militia enrollment 

as a litmus test to guarantee the allegiance and cooperation of the population. Militia 

patrols harassed British outposts, attacked Redcoat foraging parties, quashed pro-British 

activities and monitored enemy movements. One of the militia’s greatest achievements 

in monitoring enemy activity came in September 1780 when a roving New York militia 

patrol captured Major John Andre and exposed Benedict Arnold’s plot to turn the 

American defenses at West Point over to the British. Other militia activities included 

suppressing occasional Indian uprisings, repelling British maritime raids, enforcing local 

laws, garrisoning forts, guarding prisoners of war, transporting supplies, and patrolling 

against slave insurrections. Much more than the Continental Army, the British 

considered the militia as the greatest obstacle to winning back the sympathies and 

allegiances of American colonists. William Lenoir, an officer in the North Carolina 

militia, was almost constantly in the field or on alert for eight years. After the war, 

Lenoir probably reflected the experience of many militiamen when he recalled that 

during the war years he “slept with my wife on one side and my rifle on the other.” (36) 

The Militia and the Constitution 

The Continental Congress remained the single ruling body over national affairs 

throughout the Revolution, but important changes in American government began well 

before the end of the war. In the Revolution’s early years several colonies drafted new 

constitutions that created State governments. In the same vein, Congress created the 

Articles of Confederation in 1777 as a blueprint for a new national government. The 

States did not approve the Articles until 1781, and with the end of the war two years later, 

political leaders turned their attention to the creation of a more permanent, national 

government. 

Two differing philosophies dominated the debate regarding the purpose and 

structure of a new government. The Federalists, led by Washington’s former aide-decamp Alexander Hamilton, believed that America needed a strong national government. 

To be successful, America had to become a vibrant nation-state, respected among foreign 

powers. The key ingredients in national success were a strong central government and a 

powerful, national bank to promote mercantilism and foreign trade. Thomas Jefferson, 

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Army National Guard History

author of the Declaration of Independence and Governor of Virginia, became the 

principle advocate of an opposing view. Republicans—first known as Anti-Federalists-­

favored a central government stronger than that allowed by the Articles of Confederation 

but much weaker than the monarchies of Europe. To Republicans, the majority of the 

power in America belonged to the States because strong, central authority invited 

despotism and warmongering. The Federalists favored a vision of a country highly 

commercial and concentrated in urban centers; Republicans wanted America to remain 

rural and agrarian. 

Differences between the two groups generated an acrimonious debate over the 

creation of a standing army that became a fundamental issue in the division of power 

between the States and the central government. The Federalists favored a strong defense 

establishment firmly under national control. They emphasized the militia’s shortcomings 

during the Revolution and believed that reliance on the militia would weaken the new 

nation politically as well as militarily. An adequate, standing army was needed to 

support westward expansion and to serve as a model for the militia. A Regular Army 

needed support from a military academy, a system of arsenals, and munitions production 

facilities. To create a larger army in wartime, the central government would order into 

federal service militia units made more effective by the imposition of strict national 

standards for discipline and training. In cases of civil insurrection, the army and the 

militia together would restore order. For the Federalists, a strong reliance on the militia 

was anathema. A prominent Federalist wrote that to rely primarily on the militia for 

national defense “was to lean on a broken reed.” (37) 

Republicans believed that for largely political reasons the nation had to trust its 

defense to citizen-soldiers rather than Regulars. The recent experience of the Revolution 

dominated Republican thinking. “Was it a standing army that gained the battles of 

Lexington and Bunker’s Hill, and took the ill-fated Burgoyne?” one asked. “Is not a well 

regulated militia sufficient for every purpose of internal defense?” Secure in North 

America and protected by the barrier of the Atlantic Ocean, America need not waste its 

precious resources or endanger its liberties with an expensive, standing army. If a major 

conflict erupted, the ocean barrier would buy enough time to raise a sufficient army. The 

entire people were armed and organized through the militia, and even though a small 

Regular Army might be needed to garrison western outposts, embattled citizens 

organized by the States could act in their own defense. Republicans argued that a large, 

standing army might lead to the neglect and even outright elimination of the militia, 

leaving the people with no armed bulwark to protect their liberties. The experience of the 

British Army in America reinforced and expanded fears of the evils of a standing army. 

In terms of internal security, Republicans believed that any government that relied on 

Regulars to enforce laws smacked of tyranny. The States were to institute laws and 

insure their compliance through a judicious use of the militia. “The militia...is our 

ultimate safety,” declared Patrick Henry of Virginia. “We can have no security without 

it.” (38) 

Events at the end of the Revolution fueled the debate over the power of the central 

government, civil-military relations and the need for a standing army. From the last 

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Army National Guard History

cantonment of the Continental Army at Newburgh, New York, officers sparked a civilmilitary crisis by threatening to march on Congress because of a long simmering dispute 

over pensions. Personal intervention by George Washington in March 1783 placated the 

officers and ended the Newburgh Conspiracy, but the episode provided Congress with a 

frightening example of a standing army’s potentially subversive nature. Two months 

later, the officer veterans of the Continental Army created a public furor when they 

announced the creation of the Society of the Cincinnati, a supposedly fraternal and 

charitable organization. Membership was hereditary, and Republicans wondered if the 

society was the first step toward a new American nobility. With a war chest garnered 

from charitable contributions and State auxiliaries established to exchange regular 

correspondence on public issues, suspicious onlookers wondered whether or not the 

veterans’ organization had sinister, political motives. In June 1783, another example of 

the possible dangers of a standing army occurred when Continental troops of the 

Pennsylvania line, bitter over pay problems, marched on the State House in Philadelphia 

where both Congress and the State government were in session. (39) 

In an effort to seek guidance on a proper military policy for the new nation, 

Congress appointed a special committee chaired by Alexander Hamilton who quickly 

sought the advice of the most prestigious military authority of the day. In May 1783, 

George Washington replied to Congress with his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” 

America’s first “white paper” on national defense. Washington opined that an effective 

military included at least four elements. The first, essential component was a small 

Regular Army to garrison posts on the frontier, to protect trade routes, to defend against 

raids from British Canada and Spanish Florida and to provide security against surprise 

attacks. An equally important component of defense was “a well organized Militia” that 

was to benefit from a series of recommended reforms. Washington proposed that the 

central government and the States establish a system of arsenals for stockpiling arms and 

equipment. Lastly, he urged the founding of one or more military academies to teach the 

more difficult aspects of military science, especially engineering and artillery. (40) 

Washington’s recommendations regarding citizen-soldiers called for a major 

overhaul of the colonial militia system with an aim toward creating a “National Militia” 

better prepared to respond to the fledgling nation’s needs. The former commander in 

chief called for the enrollment of all males 18 to 50 years of age. Perhaps inspired by the 

minuteman concept, every State was to form a special militia “Corps” by enrolling a 

small percentage of the most motivated and physically fit young men into elite units 

trained and prepared to “resist any sudden invasion.” Washington believed that during a 

national crisis a standing army could act in concert with the most prepared militiamen to 

buy time for the central government to raise additional Regular troops and for the States 

to ready the balance of the enrolled militia for active campaigning. Congress was to 

create national “Military Rules” that prescribed uniform standards for the organization, 

training and equipping of all State units in order to make them compatible with active 

forces. In a major departure from the colonial militia system, Washington argued that the 

government should pay militiamen for muster days and active service and provide 

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Army National Guard History

weapons, equipment, and uniforms. He called for the appointment of an “adjutant 

general” in each State to assist the Governor in administering the militia. (41) 

Washington’s “Sentiments” regarding the militia were clearly aimed at 

eliminating many of the shortcomings he had observed firsthand during the Revolution. 

Washington desired to refashion the militia into a more responsive and reliable institution 

by extending the central government’s controls at the expense of State authority. 

Standardizing the militia would allow citizen-soldiers of the several States to join 

together quicker and more effectively into a unified, national effort. At the same time, 

the former Virginia militiaman clearly understood the vital role the citizenry should play 

in national defense and recognized America’s strong militia tradition. Washington 

viewed a Regular Army and the militia as complimentary rather than competitive. It 

would fall to others in future years to recommend reductions in the militia as the means 

of supporting a larger, standing army. 

Washington’s great prestige and respected views proved inadequate to settle the 

differences between Federalists and Republicans on military matters. The final catalyst 

to reach some type of agreement over the shape and authority of a new, national 

government and its military institutions came from an unexpected quarter. Burdened by 

debts, taxes, and the threat of land seizures, yeoman farmers in western Massachusetts led 

by Daniel Shays rebelled against the State government in September 1786. Shays, a 

veteran of Bunker Hill and a former Continental Army officer who had served at 

Saratoga, convinced many militiamen to join in his cause against the government. Word 

of Shays’ Rebellion spread rapidly across the country, and political leaders feared the 

uprising was the harbinger of widespread anarchy. The inability of the Continental 

Congress to organize an effective defense of the national arsenal at Springfield and the 

willingness of local militiamen to side with the insurgents emphasized the central 

government’s impotence. In January 1787 an expedition of volunteer militia from 

eastern Massachusetts overwhelmed Shays’ men in an engagement at Springfield and 

finally ended the uprising. The specter of Shays’ Rebellion persuaded Congress and the 

States that an organized central government with the power and authority to deal 

effectively with political, economic, and military problems was a dire necessity. (42) 

The greatest showdown between Federalists and Republicans on defense matters 

occurred in the spring of 1787 when the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia to 

draft a constitution for the fledgling United States. The U.S. Constitution gave the 

republic a federal form of government with shared responsibilities between the central 

government and the States. Broadly speaking, the Founding Fathers agreed that the 

military authority of the new country needed strengthening, but they used a system of 

checks and balances to distribute and control power even in military matters. At the 

federal level, military authority was split between the president and Congress. The 

Constitution appointed the president as commander in chief of the armed forces to 

guarantee civilian control over the military and granted implied powers for the president 

to employ the military as needed during wartime. Congress reserved the right to declare 

war, to “raise and support Armies” and to control all military appropriations. 

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Army National Guard History

The Constitution’s militia clauses articulated a complex, balanced system of 

shared responsibilities within the federal government. The Republican Founding Fathers 

viewed the enrolled militia as a potential counterbalance against a repressive, standing 

army in the hands of a despotic leader. If the president served simultaneously as the 

commander in chief of the Regular Army and the militia, what would prevent a corrupt 

president from disbanding the militia and threatening the States with his professional 

army? To achieve a balance of power in the control of military forces, the Constitution 

gave primary responsibility for controlling the militia to Congress rather than the 

president. Congress retained for itself the powers for “organizing, arming and 

disciplining, the militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the 

service of the United States.” The Constitution granted Congress the power to call out 

the militia for three specific purposes. Article I, Section 8 reads: 

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute 

the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and 

repel Invasions. 

Article II, Section 2 describes the only direct relationship between the president 

and the militia. Once Congress ordered the militia “called into the actual service of the 

United States,” the president was to act as commander in chief “of the Militia of the 

several States.” 

The Constitution established a balance of power in militia affairs between the 

federal government and the States. Article II, Section 8 reserved to the States the right to 

appoint officers and the authority to train the militia “according to the discipline 

prescribed by Congress.” To insure the militia’s primacy and to prevent the States from 

creating extra-legal forces, Article II, Section 9 specified that no State could “keep 

troops” without “the consent of Congress.” Republican extremists resented the intrusion 

of the federal government into the previously unfettered authority of the States to 

administer the militia. In limiting State powers, some Republicans grumbled that the 

Constitution had relegated the States to a role little more than that of a “drill-sergeant.” 

(43) 

Starting with Delaware in December 1787, the States ratified the Constitution. In 

May 1790, Rhode Island was the last of the original thirteen colonies to grant approval. 

However, the States urged Congress to adopt a specific enumeration of individual 

freedoms, and in 1791, the Bill of Rights became the Constitution’s first amendments. 

Two of the ten amendments dealt specifically with military matters. Reflecting the recent 

experience of the British Army in America and acknowledging the potential abuses that 

might come with a standing army, the Third Amendment prohibited the quartering of 

troops in private homes without the “consent of the Owner” and only “in a manner to be 

prescribed by law.” 

The Republicans feared that the federal government might one day usurp 

excessive powers and dissolve the militia. In the minds of States’ rights advocates, the 

defining characteristic of the militia was an armed citizenry. A generation of leaders who 

had just fought the Revolution clearly understood that in the most dire circumstances 

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Army National Guard History

political authority ultimately came out of the barrel of a gun. A specific proviso 

guaranteeing the existence of an armed citizenry was designed to insure the militia’s 

continued survival even in the face of extreme abuses from the federal government. The 

Second Amendment states: 

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 

security of a free State, the right of the people to 

keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 

In the late 20th Century the Second Amendment became the center of a social and 

legal controversy between those wanting to restrict gun ownership and others who insist 

that Americans have the inalienable right to bear arms. In 1791, the Second 

Amendment’s reference to “a free State” pertained to the individual States rather than to 

the entire country or the population at large, and it seems very likely that the States 

intended the amendment to apply exclusively to the weapons in the hands of the enrolled 

militia. (44) 

The Militia Act of 1792 

In the years immediately following ratification of the Constitution, defense 

matters competed with other demands for the time and attention of the first president and 

the Congress. After his inauguration in April 1789, George Washington grappled with a 

number of crises beyond the Appalachians between early settlers and various Indian 

tribes. Washington pressed Congress to pass legislation that better defined the 

president’s military powers outlined in only general terms in the Constitution. In August 

1789, Congress created the Department of War and appointed Henry Knox, a former 

Massachusetts militiaman who had served as the Continental Army’s chief of artillery, as 

the first secretary of war. The Federalists continued to argue that if the American people 

were unwilling to support an adequate, standing army, more disciplined and reliable State 

forces were needed. As much as national legislators may have wanted to address military 

issues, questions over the nation’s finances, foreign affairs, and wrangling over the 

location of a new capitol city dominated the congressional agenda. 

In January 1790, the Washington Administration attempted to goad Congress into 

action by putting forth its own plan for militia reform. The brainchild of Secretary of 

War Knox, the plan’s principle objectives were to provide the militia with better training 

and organization and to bring State forces under increased federal control. A main 

feature of the plan was to organize the militia by age groupings so as to concentrate time 

and money on those segments of the militia best suited for field duty. Militiamen ages 

18-20 would undergo thirty days of instruction each year at “camps of discipline” 

intended to teach basic soldier skills and to impart the best values of citizenship. Only 

attendance at militia camps would qualify American youth to vote, hold office and 

exercise other legal rights. The bulk of the militia was to form a “main corps” consisting 

of all citizen-soldiers ages 21-45. This corps constituted a national manpower pool for 

the creation of armies for prolonged conflicts. Militiamen ages 46-60 were to belong to a 

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Army National Guard History

“reserve corps,” a kind of home defense force that mustered only twice each year and was 

to be called out only in the event of an actual invasion. Echoing Washington’s 

“Sentiments,” the Knox plan called for the federal government to provide the militia with 

all arms, equipment, and uniforms. State units were to become compatible with federal 

forces by conforming with standard, approved designs for unit organization. A final 

provision required senior militia officers to render periodic status reports to federal 

authorities. (45) 

Congress and much of the public greeted the Knox plan with skepticism and 

disbelief. The projected expense alone—a minimum of $400,000 annually—shocked 

most congressmen. Businessmen and craftsmen objected to sending young workers and 

artisans off to training camps for four weeks each year. The public feared that military 

camps would corrupt young men’s morals and militarize the entire nation. Many 

congressmen and State officials questioned the value of implementing national standards 

for service and unit organizations. For example, the southern States needed more militia 

cavalry units for slave patrols while no such need existed in the North. Republicans saw 

the plan as a huge intrusion into State affairs that ran contrary to the intent of the 

Constitution’s carefully crafted clauses regarding federal and State control over the 

militia. (46) 

In May 1792, Congress countered by enacting into law a militia plan of its own. 

The Militia Act of 1792 required all free, able-bodied men ages 18-45 to serve in the 

enrolled militia and to provide their own weapons and equipment. Federal and State 

elected officials were exempt from duty as were postmen, mariners, and a variety of other 

skilled workers. No federal monies were authorized for pay, equipment, training or any 

other purpose. Congress attempted to impose standard unit designs upon State units but 

stipulated that standard formations were to be created only “if convenient.” The law 

authorized an Adjutant General (AG) in each State to enact the orders of the Governor. 

The AG was to supervise unit training, discipline, and administration and to provide 

formal, periodic reports to the Governor on the militia’s “arms, accoutrements and 

ammunition” and on all matters relating to “the general advancement of good order and 

discipline.” The law’s greatest weakness was that it contained no sanctions for 

noncompliance. The act represented the triumph of the Republicans over the Federalists 

in militia affairs by reserving to the States near complete control over their soldiers. (47) 

In the same month, Congress passed another statute vital to the militia’s future. 

The “Calling Forth Act” clarified many of the Constitution’s powers and delegated to the 

president some of Congress’ authority to call the militia into federal service. Whenever 

the United States was invaded or a threat of invasion was imminent, the president 

received blanket authority to call out as many militiamen from as many States as 

necessary to meet the crisis. In the same manner, Congress gave the president power to 

call out the militia to suppress “insurrections in any State” but only after the legislature or 

the Governor of the affected State had requested federal assistance. However, the 

president had limited powers in using the militia to enforce federal laws. Before the 

president could dispatch militiamen for law enforcement, an associate justice or district 

judge had to inform the president that lawbreakers were too strong and pervasive for local 

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Army National Guard History

law enforcement to control. While in federal service, militiamen were to receive the 

same pay and allowances as Regulars but could not be compelled to serve more than 

three months per year. Unlike the Uniform Militia Act, the Calling Forth Act included 

sanctions to force compliance. Militiamen failing to follow the president’s orders “in any 

of the cases before cited” were subject to heavy fines and even courts martial. (48) 

All fifteen States — Vermont and Kentucky joined the Union in 1791 and 1792, 

respectively — enacted their own militia laws in response to congressional action. State 

laws confirmed the right of the people to bear arms, installed the Governor as the 

commander in chief of the militia and appointed a State AG. As a general rule, State 

constitutions and laws specified that militia units could not serve beyond State borders 

without specific authorization. Most States retained the colonial practice of electing 

junior officers, but the appointment of more senior officers was usually reserved to the 

Governor or the legislature. However, State laws varied in a number of ways. In States 

where threats from Indians and foreign troops were real, muster days remained frequent. 

Militia units in more secure areas trained as little as once a year. In New England, the 

States began supplying muskets to poor militiamen who lacked the means to purchase 

their own firearms. Some States allowed blacks, Indians, and other minorities to serve 

but not to bear arms. The southern States required militiamen to participate in slave 

patrols whose main purpose was to discourage runaways and prevent slave uprisings by 

insuring that slaves remained on their plantations. (49) 

The Militia in Federal Service, 1794 

At the end of the Revolution, Congress had quickly disbanded the Continental 

Army. In October 1783, only six months after the Peace of Paris, all national troops who 

had enlisted in the Continental Army for the duration of the war were discharged. Over 

the following months, Congress released troops serving under other conditions of 

enlistment. On June 2, 1784, national military forces reached an historic nadir: only 

eighty broken-down veterans remained to guard the military stores at West Point and Fort 

Pitt. By its actions, Congress established an important precedent. The immediate 

dismantling of the very forces that had achieved victory was to occur after every major 

conflict in American history. (50) 

Traditional fears over the evils of a standing army and the expense of maintaining 

Regular troops could not negate the growing need for some type of field force. The flow 

of settlers into the Ohio River valley and the threat from British forts in the Great Lakes 

region resulted in a national army of Regulars and militiamen. The focus of attention was 

the Northwest Territory, organized by Congress in 1787 and encompassing the region 

north of the Ohio River and east of the upper Mississippi River. A loose confederation of 

Indian tribes with British backing contested the white settlement of the territory. Treaties 

with the Indians attempted to restrict the white migration, but the great host of Americans 

floating down the Ohio River on flatboats to find new settlements resulted in deadly 

confrontations. Mounted Kentucky militiamen conducted frequent raids northward 

across the Ohio River in grim retribution for Indian attacks. 

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Army National Guard History

In June 1784 Congress asked the States to raise an army of 700 soldiers to 

intervene in the Northwest Territory. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and 

Pennsylvania supplied the soldiers, but only the Keystone State provided its full quota. 

Commanded by Lt. Col. Josiah Harmar of Pennsylvania, the “First American Regiment” 

deployed to the Ohio River valley and established a series of isolated forts extending 

down all the way to Fort Washington on the future site of Cincinnati, Ohio. A rising tide 

of white settlements resulted in open warfare with the Indians. In October 1790, Harmar 

launched a punitive raid into northern Ohio that met with disaster. The mixed force of 

320 Regulars and over 1,000 militiamen from Kentucky and Pennsylvania fell prey to a 

series of Indian ambushes. In most of the engagements, the ill-disciplined and untrained 

militia panicked and fled. The remnant of Harmar’s column retreated to Fort Washington 

to lick their wounds. The expedition suffered over 200 killed and wounded with most of 

its equipment and weapons lost or destroyed. A War Department inquiry put the blame 

for Harmar’s defeat squarely on the militia’s poor performance. Harmar’s own 

reputation survived the disaster, and after resigning from the Army in 1792, he returned 

home to Pennsylvania to become the commonwealth’s first AG. (51) 

Congress responded to Harmar’s defeat by raising an additional infantry regiment 

and authorizing the president to call out 2,000 militia cavalry with the intent of launching 

a reprisal raid. Overall command went to Arthur St. Clair, the Governor of the Northwest 

Territory. St. Clair assembled a 1,000-man, ragtag army of Regulars, militia, and shortterm levies. The force advanced cautiously northward from Fort Washington in August 

1791, but the mix of troops never formed a cohesive team. On November 4th, 1,000 

Indian braves descended on St. Clair’s unsuspecting force and inflicted one of the 

greatest defeats in American history. Untrained militiamen fled the battlefield, and 

Regulars were too few in number to survive the onslaught. The Indians killed 623 

soldiers and wounded another 258. St. Clair’s defeat shocked the nation and resulted in 

the first congressional inquiry into a military operation. The militia once again came in 

for heavy criticism, but Congress concluded that a combination of administrative and 

logistical blunders had caused the calamity. (52) 

The defeats in the Northwest Territory convinced even the Republicans of the 

need for a stronger standing army. The militia had built its reputation largely as a local, 

defense force, and the defeats in Ohio raised serious questions over the militia’s ability to 

participate effectively in extended, offensive strikes against the Indians. In March 1792, 

Congress authorized an expansion of the army and gave the president permission to call 

out as much militia cavalry as needed to protect the frontier. Maj. Gen. “Mad” Anthony 

Wayne took command of the “Legion of the United States” and took advantage of two 

years of peace negotiations to drill his Regular regiments into a trained fighting force. 

After peace talks with the Indians collapsed, Wayne advanced into northwestern Ohio 

with a combined force of 3,500 Regulars and mounted volunteers. At the battle of Fallen 

Timbers on August 20, 1794, Wayne’s “Legion” won a striking victory, opening Ohio 

and portions of Indiana to settlement and convincing congressional skeptics of the value 

of a small Regular Army. (53) 

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Army National Guard History

With all federal resources focused in the Northwest Territory, settlers south of the 

Ohio River relied on the militia for self-defense and to settle disputes with the Creek and 

Cherokee Indians. In 1790, North Carolina’s western lands were designated the 

Southwest Territory, a region that eventually became Tennessee. Faced with increasing 

numbers of settlers into the territory, Governor William Blount organized a territorial 

militia that by the fall of 1792 included fourteen infantry companies and a cavalry troop. 

Increasing violence between settlers and Indians, fueled by hard feelings on both sides 

over the defeats of Harmar and St. Clair, resulted in open warfare. Late in 1793, General 

John Sevier led a force of mounted militia deep into Creek lands, defeating the braves 

and destroying villages. In September 1794, Tennessee militiamen vanquished the 

Creeks and Cherokees at the battle of Nickojack, a success in the Southwest Territory 

that mirrored the results of Fallen Timbers in the Northwest Territory. In the summer of 

1794, the War Department finally authorized the construction of forts in the Southwest 

Territory manned by Regulars. With its lands secured by militia victories, Tennessee 

became the sixteenth State in June 1796 and the last State admitted to the Union in the 

18th Century. (54) 

In addition to Indian threats, the federal government faced a direct challenge to its 

obligation to enforce domestic laws. In 1791, Congress had passed an excise tax on 

distilled spirits to raise revenues to finance the national debt and to support the new 

government’s rising costs. Opposition to the tax was widespread but centered in western 

President George Washington reviews militiamen at Fort Cumberland, Maryland during the 

mobilization for the Whiskey Rebellion, 1794. (Anne Brown Collection) 

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Pennsylvania where angry distillers and consumers increasingly subjected tax collectors 

to threats and harassment. In the summer of 1794, mounting tensions exploded. A mob 

of 500 men looted and burned the home of a tax collector in mid-July and prompted 

6,000 enemies of the tax to assemble at Pittsburgh two weeks later. In an echo of Shays’ 

Rebellion, the enrolled militia of western Pennsylvania sided with the insurgents, making 

the restoration of order and the enforcement of laws in the region all but impossible. (55) 

George Washington realized that the Whiskey Rebellion was a direct challenge to 

the federal government’s power and credibility, and he refused to tolerate the escalating 

defiance of federal authority. With “Mad” Anthony Wayne’s Regulars engaged in the 

Northwest Territory, the president called upon the militia to enforce federal law. The 

Calling Forth Act of 1792 had required the president to receive the opinion of the 

judiciary before mobilizing the militia, and on August 4, 1794, Supreme Court Justice 

James Wilson informed Washington that the situation in western Pennsylvania was 

beyond the “ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” Three days later, the Washington 

Administration issued a proclamation ordering the rebels to disperse and stating its 

intention to call out the militia. The War Department issued orders to the Governors of 

Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey to prepare a combined force of 12,950 

militiamen to march on western Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, Washington sent official 

emissaries to Pittsburgh to offer amnesty to the lawbreakers in return for oaths of 

allegiance to the United States. However, the insurgents finally spurned the 

government’s offer, leaving the administration with no choice but to use force. (56) 

Widespread dissatisfaction with the whiskey tax existed throughout the country, 

and many militia units had problems filling their ranks. Pennsylvania had to resort to a 

militia draft, while New Jersey was the first State to provide its full complement of 

troops. Still, the States were successful in fielding the numbers of troops required. On 

September 9th, Washington ordered militiamen from four mid-Atlantic States to march to 

forward assembly points. Citizen-soldiers from Virginia and Maryland rallied at 

Cumberland, Maryland while Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops converged on Carlisle, 

Pennsylvania. The Governors of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey took their roles 

as militia commanders seriously and rode at the head of their contingents. On September 

25th, Washington ordered the troops westward. The commander in chief himself took to 

the field to review the militiamen and to see them off. Bad weather and rugged 

mountains slowed the advance, but resistance melted away in the face of the 

overwhelming show of force. The militia army restored order and apprehended several 

men but held only a few lawbreakers for trial. The courts convicted two insurgents of 

treason, but both eventually received presidential pardons. By late November the 

militia’s role in putting down the Whiskey Rebellion was essentially complete. Citizensoldiers returned home with the satisfaction of knowing that they alone had greatly 

legitimized the new federal government by enforcing compliance with the laws of the 

land. (57) 

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Conclusions 

The militia’s greatest achievement of the 18th Century was its role in winning the 

American Revolution. Starting with the battle of Bunker Hill, militiamen fought in 

nearly every major battle and minor engagement of the war. Citizen-soldiers particularly 

distinguished themselves at Bennington, Saratoga, King’s Mountain, and Cowpens. State 

commanders like John Stark, Francis Marion, and Charles Sumter provided militia 

leadership and influenced the outcome of the war. Of all the Revolution’s battles, Bunker 

Hill became the most prominent in the public mind because militia advocates believed 

the bitter fight on the Charlestown Peninsula best demonstrated the native fighting ability 

of patriotic citizen-soldiers. Beyond set piece battles, the militia confounded British 

efforts to win back the hearts and minds of American colonists. By controlling a vast 

majority of the population and the countryside, the militia insured that pro-British 

sentiments and activities were short-lived. 

The creation of the Continental Army in 1775 introduced a dual system of 

national defense that included both Regulars and citizen-soldiers. From the beginning, 

the relationship between Continentals and militiamen was both supportive and 

contemptuous. Washington welcomed militia augmentations to his army while 

complaining of the militia’s shortcomings and the strain they placed on his weak supply 

system. On the other hand, militiamen were willing to serve with the Continental Army 

but preferred to fight in their own State under the leadership of their own officers. State 

units of the Continental line established the practice of the States raising manpower in 

wartime for service with a national army. After the war, Washington’s “Sentiments” 

became the first of many documents throughout American history to call for a reformed 

national militia with diminished ties to the States and stronger, direct links to the federal 

government. 

The U.S. Constitution codified a dual national defense system of Regulars and 

citizen-soldiers and firmly established civilian control over the military. Federalist 

desires for strong, national military forces were unable to overcome America’s traditional 

fear of a standing army and the reluctance to shoulder the expense of maintaining large 

numbers of Regulars in peacetime. Within the federal government, Congress and the 

president shared powers and responsibilities in raising and commanding the Regular 

Army while Congress and the States had specified powers in administering and 

employing the militia. The Constitution chartered the militia as an institution to “execute 

the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” and all but explicitly 

identified the militia as an organization based on States’ rights. National leaders friendly 

to the militia were willing to accept a certain degree of inefficiency in State soldiers as 

the price they paid for insuring the active participation of an armed citizenry in the 

country’s defense. At the same time, the militia was to act as a check on federal powers 

and to curb the potentially dangerous machinations of a standing army. 

The Militia Act of 1792 and the Calling Forth Act enabled the enduring role of 

the citizen-soldier and guaranteed the States a continuing responsibility as the provider of 

manpower in times of national crisis. In the broadest sense, the Militia Act placed into 

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Army National Guard History

federal law the militia tradition transplanted from Europe and reflected the main features 

of the militia laws the various colonial legislatures had already enacted. The law clearly 

identified the militia as a State-run institution and governed the administration, 

organization, and training of State soldiers for more than a century. If Indian fights in the 

Northwest Territory called into question the militia’s worth as an offensive force, the 

Whiskey Rebellion identified the militia as a reliable instrument for domestic law 

enforcement. Ironically, the Federalists had to employ a force they largely derided in 

order to defend the credibility and power of the very government they sought to establish. 

The Whiskey Rebellion established an important precedent for the exercise of 

presidential power in calling upon the militia to enforce the laws of the land. 

In 1794, victorious Regulars at Fallen Timbers and militiamen rallying against the 

Whiskey Rebellion represented the twin foundations of America’s military establishment. 

As the population migrated westward into the Ohio and Mississippi River valleys, it was 

far from certain if America’s dual military system could meet the diverse threats sure to 

challenge the inevitable expansion across the North American continent. 

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CHAPTER 3 

The Volunteer Militia, 1795-1897 

Away off in the wilds of America a soldier had been found totally different from 

any that had ever walked a battlefield. Upon one day he was a citizen, quietly 

following the plow; upon the next he became a soldier, knowing no fear and 

carrying a whole destroying battery in his trusted rifle. He was a soldier from conviction 

to principle, from loyalty to his country, from duty to his family. 

Maj. Gen. John A. Logan in 

The Volunteer Soldier of America 

Introduction 

The soldiers of the 1st Minnesota Volunteer Infantry lay prone along the low crest 

of Cemetery Ridge watching intently as a military rout unfolded before them. Panicked 

Union soldiers of the Army of the Potomac’s III Corps came reeling back from their 

forward positions near the Peach Orchard and the Emmitsburg Turnpike. On the late 

afternoon of July 2, 1863, the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, James E. 

Longstreet’s I Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia had launched a massive attack 

designed to roll up the entire left flank of the Union army. To the men of the 1st 

Minnesota, Longstreet’s attack appeared on the verge of success. III Corps infantrymen 

streamed back in confusion and disorganization from their advanced positions. Hard on 

their heels came long, gray ranks of Confederate infantrymen firing volleys, brandishing 

bayonets, shouting the Rebel yell and waving battle flags as they advanced. 

It was not the first time the Minnesotans had seen Confederate infantry on the 

attack. At the outbreak of the American Civil War, Minnesota earned the distinction of 

becoming the first State to offer volunteer troops to the federal government in order to 

preserve the Union. The 1st Minnesota assembled for duty at Fort Snelling, six miles 

outside of St. Paul. Three volunteer militia companies — the Minnesota Pioneer Guard 

from St. Paul, the St. Anthony Zouaves, and the Stillwater Guard — formed the basis of 

the new regiment. By April 29, 1861, the regiment of nearly 800 soldiers had completed 

its organization and was mustered into federal service for three years. The 1st Minnesota 

soon headed east and received its baptism of fire at the Union defeat at First Bull Run, 

where it was the last organized regiment to leave the battlefield. During early 1862, the 

Minnesotans gained valuable experience during the Army of the Potomac’s first 

concerted effort to capture Richmond. In the last months of the year, they saw heavy 

fighting at the bloody stalemate at Antietam and the Union debacle at Fredericksburg. 

When Robert E. Lee’s soldiers marched north into Maryland and Pennsylvania in the 

early summer of 1863, the 1st Minnesota moved with the Union Army in pursuit. By the 

late afternoon of the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, the 1st Minnesota was 

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Army National Guard History

positioned at the very center of the Union line where Longstreet’s attack threatened to 

break through. 

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, the commander of the Union II Corps, arrived on 

the scene of the crisis on horseback as the Minnesotans attempted to halt the retreat of 

their fellow soldiers. Hancock realized only one Union regiment was available to stem 

the Confederate tide. The southerners were apparently disorganized by their own 

success and had paused for a few moments to reorganize. The II Corps commander 

urgently needed more time to rush Union reinforcements to the threatened sector. 

“What regiment is this?” Hancock asked, turning toward the Minnesotans. 

“First Minnesota!” replied Colonel William Colvill, the regimental commander. 

“Colonel, do you see those colors,” Hancock asked, pointing to the Confederate 

battle flags some two hundred yards distant. When Colvill replied, Hancock barked his 

orders: “Then take them!” Stepping in front of his regiment, Colonel Colvill asked in a 

loud voice if all of the soldiers would go forward with him, and they shouted back that 

they were ready. Reduced in strength to only 262 men by casualties and detached 

companies, the Minnesotans had no time to reflect on the grim task before them as they 

formed into a line of battle. 

“Forward, double quick!” Colvill shouted with his saber drawn high. With their 

National and regimental colors flying proudly and bayonets fixed, officers and men 

lunged forward, advancing in a line that extended nearly one hundred yards from end to 

end. The single attacking regiment soon attracted the attention of all the Confederate 

riflemen and artillery crews within sight. As the Midwesterners advanced, bullets and 

cannon shells buzzed and burst all about dropping men at a fearful rate. The regimental 

colors went down three times, and each time courageous men grabbed the fallen flagstaff 

and pressed ahead. In the regiment’s wake, nearly one hundred Minnesotans lay dead 

and wounded. 

“Charge!” Colonel Colvill shouted as the regiment neared the Confederate lines. 

With leveled bayonets and wild cries, the Minnesotans rushed forward at a full run and 

collided with the southerners. A savage, close quarters fight ensued with both sides 

exchanging musket fire at point-blank range. Colonel Colvill went down severely 

wounded. For fifteen minutes, the 1st Minnesota held its position alone against 

overwhelming odds. As evening darkness settled across the battlefield, a number of 

Union regiments advanced to help extract the 1st Minnesota from its precarious situation. 

Under the cover of darkness and the protection of other regiments, the Minnesotans 

finally withdrew. 

Once safe on Cemetery Ridge, the 1st Minnesota counted its losses. Of the 262 

men who made the charge, 215 lay dead or wounded. Not a soldier was missing, and all 

forty-seven survivors were still with the colors. With the loss of 82 percent of its soldiers, 

the 1st Minnesota endured the highest percentage of casualties suffered by any Union 

regiment in a single engagement in all of the American Civil War. Still, the attack had 

not been in vain; the reckless assault had bought time for General Hancock to rush 

reinforcements to the threatened sector and avert a catastrophe. Afterwards, Hancock 

recalled of the charge of the 1st Minnesota: “No soldiers on any field, in this or any other 

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country, ever displayed grander heroism... There is no more gallant deed recorded in 

history.” 

The 1st Minnesota’s fearless attack at Gettysburg reflects only one aspect of the 

service militiamen provided throughout the 19th Century. Citizen-soldiers continued to 

serve their States as a local defense force in peacetime while fighting alongside Regulars 

during war. At the same time, the militia underwent profound changes. Political, social, 

and economic conditions resulted in the demise of the enrolled militia and fostered an 

increasing number of volunteer militia companies. Concurrently, an even deeper divide 

developed between Regulars and militiamen. After the War of 1812, the federal 

government preferred to raise volunteer units for foreign duty, and militiamen fought in 

many of the federal volunteer regiments that served in the Mexican War. At the outbreak 

of the American Civil War, volunteer militia companies formed the first fledgling units 

for the opposing armies, and throughout America’s bloodiest conflict, militia units, North 

and South, performed important, auxiliary functions. 

Following the Civil War and Reconstruction, militiamen helped to settle the 

American West and became involved in bitter, long-running labor disputes. Post-bellum 

volunteer militia units placed increasing emphasis on military training rather than social 

functions, and militiamen sought improved representation and financial support by 

forming a national association. As the sectional crisis faded in memory, Regulars and 

citizen-soldiers pondered the possibilities of overseas service. Within the States, the 

continuous use of militia units for law enforcement prompted progressive citizen-soldiers 

to seek a new mission as the principle reserve force to the U.S. Army. As the 19th 

Century came to a close, Army and militia officers envisioned a closer working 

relationship between Regulars and citizen-soldiers. 

The Jeffersonian Era 

Following the passage of the Militia Act of 1792 and the Whiskey Rebellion, the 

States took some actions to place the militia on a more permanent footing. A common 

practice was to partition a State into militia “divisions” that were geographic recruiting 

districts rather than tactical organizations. In addition to the State AG, Governors 

appointed militia generals to oversee recruiting and training in each district. Although 

general officers received no pay, the positions carried genuine prestige and were often a 

stepping-stone for ambitious leaders bent on becoming a Governor or congressman. The 

local company remained the backbone of the militia system. As in colonial times, towns 

in the North and counties in the South remained the basis of company organizations. 

Because more and more militiamen lived in an urban setting, the widespread ownership 

of weapons declined. States began to purchase weapons and to issue them from arsenals. 

Burdened by the cost of weapons procurement, the States charged the federal government 

with delinquency in supporting the militia. (1) 

The election of Thomas Jefferson, in 1800 as the third President, brought about 

significant changes in military policy. An ardent Republican, Jefferson sought to roll 

back the great expansion of the central government that had occurred under the 

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Army National Guard History

Federalists. In military affairs, the former Governor of Virginia was a strong supporter of 

the militia. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1801, Jefferson identified the militia as 

one of the “essential principles of our government.” The key tenets of Jefferson’s 

military policy were “the supremacy of the civil over the military authority” and “a welldisciplined militia — our best reliance in peace and for the first months of war, till 

Regulars may relieve them.” (2) 

Jefferson’s defense policy evolved into a combination of Republican ideals mixed 

with hard realities. Persistent conflicts with the British on the high seas and along the 

Canadian border, disputes with Indians in the Northwest Territory, wars of the French 

Revolution, and the rise of Napoleonic France made renewed armed conflict a near 

certainty. Jefferson forged defense plans that relied on a strong Navy, coastal defenses, 

the militia, and a small Regular Army. In the event of war, the Navy would protect 

America on the high seas and prevent the approach of enemy fleets. The nation 

constructed a substantial flotilla of small gunboats to protect its coastlines and built 

strong, masonry forts to defend its premier harbors. In the event of an enemy landing, 

local militia forces were to contain the invaders until Regulars arrived. Together, 

Regulars and militiamen would push the enemy back into the sea. (3) 

Rather than eliminating the Regular Army, Jefferson set about to reduce its ranks, 

improve its professionalism and imbue its officers with Republican values. Congress 

obliged him in 1802 by cutting the Regulars from 4,051 to 2,873, a reduction that allowed 

the removal of officers whom Jefferson considered Federalist partisans. The same act 

founded the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York; a national educational 

asset intended to imbue young officers with a rigorous, scientific education and to lessen 

the influence of partisanship in the Regular Army. The States reacted to the founding of 

West Point by creating military schools of their own for the training of militia officers 

and the grooming of civic leaders. Norwich University in Vermont, the Virginia Military 

Institute, and The Citadel in South Carolina were among the most prominent State 

military academies. (4) 

Jefferson’s espousal of the militia as one of the country’s defensive pillars 

prompted an appraisal of its preparedness. The War Department reported that the States 

had failed to comply with requirements to submit annual militia reports. Not until 1804 

was it able to determine that 525,000 men were enrolled and organized into a 

hodgepodge of regiments and brigades. Proper weapons were not available to arm units 

adequately. While militiamen often performed ably as a local force to protect property or 

to enforce laws, it became clear that State soldiers were far from ready to perform as a 

coherent, national defense force. The militia did make one significant advance during the 

period that occurred literally under Jefferson’s direct supervision. In 1803, Congress 

authorized a militia in the new District of Columbia and designated the president as 

commander in chief with the authority to appoint officers. Jefferson often presided over 

reviews and ceremonies but wore civilian attire to emphasize civilian control over the 

military. The first permanent bridge over the Potomac River was constructed to facilitate 

the rapid assembly of the District’s militia, originally consisting of companies in 

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Army National Guard History

Georgetown, Maryland and Alexandria, Virginia that were on opposite banks of the river. 

(5) 

Throughout his eight years in office, Jefferson pressed for militia reforms. States’ 

righters in Congress thwarted or evaded recommendations to classify the State soldiery 

along age lines. In 1807, the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, a violent conflict on the open 

seas between an American and a British warship, raised the specter of war. The 

following year, Congress again rejected substantive militia reforms but did approve an 

annual allotment of $200,000 for the purchase and distribution of weapons to the States 

on the basis of annual strength reports. At the going rate of $13 dollars per musket, the 

appropriation purchased approximately 15,000 new weapons each year. (6) 

The War of 1812 

In the decades following the Revolution, many Americans believed that England 

sought to humiliate and limit the growth of the United States. The main point of 

contention was on the high seas, where America attempted to retain its neutrality as a 

trading partner to the belligerents engaged in the Napoleonic Wars. English warships 

regularly stopped American vessels and impressed Yankee seamen into the British Navy. 

At the same time, British forts in lower Canada openly supported the Indians in the 

Northwest Territory. When economic and political initiatives failed to improve AngloAmerican relations, Congress reluctantly declared war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812. 

The War of 1812 revealed glaring inadequacies in the militia system and raised 

serious questions regarding the responsibilities the federal government and the States 

shared for the common defense. Before the outbreak of war, a successful commander in 

the New York militia had observed that the Regular Army was the sword of the republic 

and that the militia was its shield. Canada was the closest British possession vulnerable 

to American military and naval power, but both were pitifully small. With a Regular 

Army that numbered only 6,686 officers and men in 1812, military leaders concluded that 

the “sword of the republic” by itself was too small to mount major attacks against Canada 

and that offensives could only take place with substantial participation from the militia. 

(7) 

From the beginning, the New England Governors seriously hampered the war 

effort. The region’s economy depended heavily on trade with Great Britain, and as a 

political block, the New England States opposed the war and refused to support military 

operations. Governor John C. Smith of Connecticut maintained that British challenges on 

the high seas did not constitute an invasion, and since there was no need to enforce laws 

or to suppress insurrections, he declared President James Madison’s call for militia forces 

as unconstitutional. The Governor of Massachusetts made a similar argument, and both 

States refused to send militiamen off to war. In 1814, Connecticut and Massachusetts 

finally placed their militia into federal service, but only to guard their own coasts and 

with the agreement that the federal government would pay all expenses. The defiance of 

the New England States denied the country of some of its best-organized militia units and 

greatly affected American strategy. Unable to mount an offensive from New England 

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Army National Guard History

against Montreal or Quebec, the U.S. resorted to attacks against British forces around the 

Great Lakes. New England’s reaction to an unpopular war demonstrated all of the 

weaknesses of divided federal and State control over the militia. When the president and 

the Governors disagreed on policy, the militia could not function as an effective national 

reserve. 

Operations along the Canadian border revealed additional weaknesses in the 

militia system. From the beginning, relations between Regular Army and militia generals 

suffered from petty jealousies and an unwillingness to cooperate. Senior officers vied for 

command positions and authority in the field based on their date of rank rather than 

experience and demonstrated competence. Regular and militia generals alike refused to 

relinquish control of their troops for the sake of fostering better unity of effort and 

simplicity of command. Elderly generals who had gained their experience and formed 

fixed opinions as young Continental and militia officers in the Revolution harbored hard 

feelings toward one another throughout the War of 1812. Brig. Gen. Peter B. Porter of 

the New York militia summed up the strained relations between Regular and State 

general officers. “It is certain,” General Porter declared, “that no militia general is to 

gain any military fame while united to a Regular force and commanded by their officers.” 

When an American force surrendered to the British near Detroit in August 1812, the 

Regular Army commanding general blamed the war’s first fiasco on the militia’s 

ineptness, ill discipline and insubordination. 

Specific campaigns and battles revealed the weaknesses and strengths of Regulars 

and militiamen alike. On as many as half a dozen occasions, Ohio and New York militia 

units refused to cross into Canada to attack British positions. The New York militia’s 

reputation suffered two black eyes in the summer of 1813 when citizen-soldiers failed to 

turn out in sufficient numbers to prevent British raiding parties from looting Plattsburgh 

and Buffalo. The incidents embarrassed militia advocates who had long argued that 

citizen-soldiers would fight to the death to defend home and hearth. However, under 

competent and aggressive leadership, militiamen performed creditably. William Henry 

Harrison, who had led a militia army to victory over the Indians at the battle of 

Tippecanoe in central Indiana in 1811, again arose as an effective militia leader. In 

September 1813, Harrison led a large, mixed force of 3,500 Regulars and militiamen into 

Ontario and smashed the British and their Indian allies on October 5th at the battle of the 

Thames River. Meanwhile, Army officers were busy proving that their fledgling force of 

Regulars could stand up to the British. In July 1814, Regular troops under Brig. Gen. 

Winfield Scott stood their ground against the Redcoats during the battle of Chippewa, 

supposedly prompting a surprised British commander to exclaim, “Those are Regulars, 

by God!” 

With the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain transferred seasoned troops to 

America in 1814. On August 19th, 4,000 Redcoats landed on the western shores of 

Chesapeake Bay and marched on Washington, DC. A general alarm across Maryland, 

Virginia and the District of Columbia resulted in the concentration of an odd assortment 

of 5,000 militiamen and Regulars near Bladensburg, Maryland. In the ensuing battle on 

August 24th, a number of Army Regulars, Marines, and militiamen stood their ground 

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Army National Guard History

until overrun, but a majority of the ill-trained militia units retreated with such ease that 

the action became known as the “Bladensburg Races.” The British entered Washington 

and torched the Capitol Building, the White House, and a number of other public 

buildings. 

The Redcoats experienced an altogether different reception when they attacked 

Baltimore two weeks later. Under determined leadership and with more time to prepare, 

Regulars and militiamen presented an effective defense. When British infantry landed 

north of Baltimore, militiamen blocked their advance from a formidable line of field 

fortifications. At the battle of North Point on September 13th, the Maryland militia turned 

back the invaders and inflicted considerable casualties including the death of the British 

commander, Maj. Gen. Robert Ross, the victor at Bladensburg. Meanwhile, a garrison of 

Regulars stubbornly manned Fort McHenry against a punishing British naval 

bombardment that went on for twenty-four hours. When Francis Scott Key saw the 

American flag still flying defiantly above Fort McHenry in the “dawn’s early light” on 

September 14th, the panorama inspired him to jot down verses that eventually became the 

“Star Spangled Banner.” 

The militia’s most dramatic display of bravery came at New Orleans under the 

command of Andrew Jackson. A combat veteran at the age of thirteen, “Old Hickory” 

Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson leads a largely militia army in an overwhelming victory over British 

invaders at the battle of New Orleans on January 8, 1815. (National Guard Education 

Foundation) 

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Army National Guard History

established a well-deserved reputation as the resourceful and iron-willed leader of the 

Tennessee militia. At the beginning of the War of 1812, the combative Jackson offered 

President Madison the freedom to employ the Tennessee militia “without Constitutional 

scruples of any boundaries.” In March 1814, Jackson’s militiamen delivered a 

devastating blow to the Creek Indians at the battle of Horseshoe Bend in central 

Alabama. The victory imbued Jackson with a national reputation and resulted in his 

selection as a Regular Army major general responsible for defending the Gulf Coast 

region. 

In a daring bid to capture New Orleans and possibly sever Louisiana from U.S. 

control, the British landed 5,300 troops under Maj. Gen. Sir Edward Pakenham just 

below New Orleans. To defend the Crescent City, Jackson cobbled together a diverse 

fighting force of 4,700 soldiers that included two regiments of Regulars, militiamen from 

Tennessee, Kentucky and Louisiana, aristocratic gentry and free Blacks from New 

Orleans, a band of Choctaw Indians, and pirates under Jean Lafitte. After a series of 

preliminary skirmishes against the Americans, Pakenham decided to carry out a direct 

frontal assault with massed infantry against Jackson’s main defenses. Attacking in an 

early morning fog on January 8, 1815, the Redcoats made little headway against 

Jackson’s strong earthworks. Sheltered behind bales of cotton, the Americans achieved a 

concentration of firepower that mowed down the orderly British ranks and killed 

Pakenham. In the end, the Redcoats suffered 2,400 casualties while Jackson lost about 

70 soldiers. Ten days later the shattered remnant of the British Army embarked on 

transports and sailed away. Word soon arrived in Louisiana that the War of 1812 had 

ended on December 24, 1814 with the Treaty of Ghent, a full two weeks before the battle 

of New Orleans. 

Overall, the militia was crucial to the successful outcome of the war. However, 

critics pointed out that the militia still exhibited significant deficiencies more than twenty 

years after the implementation of the Constitution’s militia clauses, the Militia and 

Calling Forth Acts of 1792, and individual State statutes. The most enduring legacy of 

the war for senior political leaders was the success of a few Governors in limiting militia 

participation and in the refusal of many citizen-soldiers to cross an international border. 

If the militia could not be depended upon to implement national policy, some leaders 

asked, might not a larger Regular Army better serve the common defense? On the 

battlefield, distinct highs and lows marked the militia’s performance; for every 

Bladensburg there was a New Orleans. The key to the militia’s successes was forceful 

leadership. William Henry Harrison and Andrew Jackson were two outstanding leaders 

whose reputations propelled them to national fame and eventually the presidency. The 

significance of the battle of New Orleans equaled that of Bunker Hill by adding to the 

ethos of the natural abilities and fighting spirit of the American citizen-soldier. In the 

popular mind, Jackson’s lopsided victory reinforced the notion that American militiamen, 

hastily assembled and with scant training, could easily triumph over a better prepared 

enemy. 

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Army National Guard History

The Expansible Army Plan 

Congress moved quickly after the War of 1812 to pare the military to acceptable 

levels. However, national pride over the second victory over Great Britain and good 

feelings regarding the performance of Regular troops motivated Congress to set the 

Army’s peacetime strength at 10,000 officers and men. In the eyes of the fledgling U.S. 

Army, the victory of the Regulars at Chippewa--rather than the triumph of Jackson’s 

militiamen at New Orleans--foreshadowed the future direction of defense planning. 

The War of 1812 had revealed glaring financial irresponsibility and managerial 

incompetence in the War Department. In October 1817, President Monroe appointed 

John C. Calhoun, an ambitious congressman from South Carolina, as the nation’s tenth 

secretary of war. He completed the organization of a General Staff system that had 

begun during the war by creating powerful bureaus responsible for the Army’s 

quartermaster, medical, ordnance, and inspector general functions. In reality, the bureaus 

were a menagerie of experts that divided the Army’s management into distinct 

compartments, bickered among themselves, and created a gulf between the general staff 

and field commanders. Calhoun was successful in getting Congress to recognize 

formally the position of Commanding General of the Army, although the relationships 

between subsequent commanding generals and the Secretary of War and the commanders 

of the nation’s military districts remained nebulous. (8) 

Secretary Calhoun’s most enduring legacy came in 1820 with the unveiling of a 

novel plan to retain an effective Regular Army in peacetime while reducing the nation’s 

reliance on citizen-soldiers. The Panic of 1819 resulted in deep cuts in federal spending, 

and Congress directed Calhoun to slash the Army to 6,000 enlisted men. The secretary of 

war informed Congress that the War of 1812 contained enough examples of militia 

ineptitude that the Regular Army and not the enrolled militia should become the proper 

instrument for fighting wars. Calhoun advocated a peacetime “expansible” Army that 

could rapidly grow in wartime without diluting its capabilities. In peacetime, the Army 

would maintain a complete organization of companies and regiments with a full 

compliment of unit and staff officers but with reduced numbers of enlisted men. In 

wartime, the Army would quickly recruit and train young soldiers to fill the ranks of 

cadre units while experienced Regulars provided leadership, training, and staff planning. 

Calhoun proposed a peacetime Army of 6,316 expansible to 11,558 in wartime without 

adding a single officer or new unit. He argued that the expansible Army would eliminate 

the “confusion and disorder” of 1775 and 1812 and that at the “commencement of 

hostilities” the country would possess a Regular force “adequate to the emergencies.” 

Congress rejected the creation of cadre units top-heavy with officers and a reduced 

reliance on the militia and scuttled the whole proposal. Legislators then cut the Army to 

6,183 soldiers, eliminated a number of regiments and reduced the size of the officer 

corps. (9) 

Despite its rejection, Calhoun’s expansible Army plan was an important 

benchmark in military policy that developed a strong and enduring legacy. For the first 

time, the federal government had put forth a defense plan that repudiated the militia 

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Army National Guard History

tradition and acknowledged the primacy of Regulars. Calhoun’s proposal encouraged 

Regulars to view themselves, rather than the militia, as the focus of planning for future 

wars. 

The Demise of the Enrolled Militia 

Following the War of 1812, the enrolled militia entered a period of neglect and 

decline, and by the late 1840s, the entire system was all but defunct. The second victory 

over Great Britain and the continued elimination of serious Indian threats against western 

expansion caused most Americans to question the value of mandatory military service. 

The militia’s uneven record in the war convinced a larger segment of society that the 

protection of the nation might rightly belong to professional soldiers. Despite the Militia 

Act of 1792 and the federal government’s annual distribution of arms, the enrolled militia 

system simply became unmanageable. Increases in population from immigration and 

high birth rates resulted in a massive, theoretical militia enrollment that neither the 

federal government nor the States could adequately resource or administer. A 

congressional study in 1836 found that within two weeks of a declaration of war, nearly 

one million militiamen could be available for duty, a number far in excess of any national 

need that might arise. Ironically, the notion of universal, obligated service that was at the 

very heart of the enrolled militia concept finally produced a situation of near universal 

unreadiness. (10) 

Broader political, social, and economic developments worked in combination to 

render the enrolled militia system ineffective. Jacksonian America was a country on the 

move. Old Hickory’s populist movement gave a wider range of Americans a voice in 

politics, and men no longer interested in militia service shared their opinions with elected 

officials. The coming of the Industrial Revolution and the introduction of the steamship 

and the railroad as means of mass transit introduced social mobility and dislocation 

unlike anything the country had ever seen. Throughout the enrolled militia’s ranks, 

shopkeepers and factory workers supplanted yeoman farmers as the typical citizensoldier. As the country’s labor force changed, the profit motive and higher wages 

became the driving forces in the private sector. Mercantilists, factory managers, and 

laborers viewed musters as a waste of time and energy, and the purchase of arms and 

equipment as an unnecessary burden. 

A number of specific problems degraded the enrolled militia’s effectiveness and 

social standing. In general, the States expanded the list of authorized exemptions from 

military duty available to the wealthy and professionals until the working class and the 

poor perceived militia service as their particular burden. Officers serving for short 

periods were exempt from further militia service for the rest of their lives, and the 

revolving roster of officers in many States damaged unit effectiveness and became the 

most visible abuse of authorized exemptions. Fines imposed for absences from musters 

and training days became the target of national outrage. Prosperous individuals with 

deep pockets often preferred to pay a fine rather than to appear at musters. For poorer 

Americans, an unpaid militia fine became a form of indebtedness to the State punishable 

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by imprisonment. Progressive reformers seeking improvements in the prison system 

worked to abolish the incarceration of poor militiamen who could not pay fines. New 

Jersey in 1844 was the first State to abolish imprisonment for non-payment of militia 

fines, and Iowa, California, and Michigan followed suite by 1850. (11) 

The failure of many State AGs to administer the system also hastened its demise. 

The position of AG was often the object of political patronage and bestowed upon men 

with little or no military experience. The compensation and recognition the States 

afforded the office ranged from the generous to the niggardly. In 1846, a visitor to 

Indiana was surprised to find that the office of the Hoosier State’s senior soldier was 

located in the front room of the AG’s private residence. State AGs and militia generals 

failed to insure that musters remained valuable training events. In many States, muster 

days started with the roll call and quickly degenerated into a daylong indulgence of heavy 

drinking, wild gambling, and crude profanity. The festive training days of the colonial 

militia had by the 19th Century become attended with the taint of social vices, and many 

citizens regarded militia musters as worthless and a source of immorality. The AGs 

struggled to submit proper reports of the enrolled militia’s strength to the War 

Department. Starting in the late 1820s, slightly more than half of the States submitted 

annual reports, and thirty years later fewer than one in five reported strength numbers. 

By failing to report annual enrollments, States lost their portion of the federal 

government’s annual allotment. In 1855, the distribution of the $200,000 yearly 

expenditure became based on the number of members each State had in Congress rather 

than upon militia muster rolls. (12) 

In 1826, Secretary of War James Barbour undertook a systematic analysis of the 

enrolled militia with an aim toward implementing reforms. The Barbour Board, 

composed of five Regular Army and three militia generals, produced the most 

comprehensive review ever done of the 19th Century militia. The members concluded 

that the worst defect of the militia system was that it produced far more men than the 

States could possibly manage and train. Other deficiencies included a lack of serviceable 

weapons, insufficient numbers of qualified trainers, abuses of exemptions and the 

difficulties of forming effective units in thinly populated areas. To reverse the enrolled 

militia’s decline, the Barbour Board recommended capping the militia’s strength at 

400,000 men and allocating quotas to the States based on population density. Other 

reforms included the creation of a national AG in the War Department to preside over 

militia affairs, requiring the States to form standard tactical units, the distribution of 

Army training manuals to all militia officers and the creation of ten-day, paid camps each 

year for officer instruction. Secretary Barbour forwarded his recommendations to 

Congress in 1827, but States’ rights advocates did nothing to translate the plan into 

action. A second reform initiative in 1840 called for classifying the militia by age and 

recommended ordering citizen-soldiers to active duty for annual training during which 

they would receive full pay. Congress condemned the 1840 reform plan, stating that the 

Constitution made no provision for calling the militia into federal service for training and 

judging that the cost of paying militiamen a stipend for annual training was prohibitive. 

(13) 

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Army National Guard History 

The creeping rot that afflicted the enrolled militia after the War of 1812 

accelerated with each passing decade. In 1831, Delaware completely abolished 

mandatory service. Massachusetts eliminated compulsory service in 1840, while Indiana 

that same year classified its men by age and required only the youngest to attend musters 

and training. Maine, Ohio, and Vermont eliminated the enrolled militia in 1844, 

Connecticut and New York in 1846, Missouri in 1847 and New Hampshire in 1851. By 

the middle of the 1840s, the enrolled militia system had all but faded away into 

obsolescence. (14) 

The Rise of the Volunteer Militia 

As the enrolled militia system collapsed, an expanded network of volunteer 

militia companies emerged to infuse the concept of the citizen-soldier with renewed 

vigor. Volunteer militia companies were as old as the country itself. The first volunteer 

company formed in America was the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of 

Boston modeled on London’s Honorable Artillery Company whose charter dated from 

1537. After the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay colony were assured that the volunteer 

militia company posed no threat to civil liberties and would be subject to all laws, they 

chartered the Boston company in 1638. Other colonies chartered militia units of willing 

and often handpicked volunteers that strove to remain distinct from the enrolled militia. 

The Governor’s Foot and Horse Guard units in Connecticut and the First Corps of Cadets 

in Boston served as escort troops during official functions for their respective Governors. 

The First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry is perhaps the best example of an early 

volunteer company that accumulated a combat record with its service in the Revolution. 

(15) 

Table 1 

VOLUNTEER MILITIA COMPANIES FORMED PRIOR TO 1792 

WITH CONTINUOUS SERVICE TO 1903 

UNIT LOCATION YEAR 

CHARTERED 

Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company Boston, MA 1638 

Georgia Hussars Savannah, GA 1736 

Newport Artillery Company 

1st Corps of Cadets 

Newport, RI 

Boston, MA 

1741 

1741 

Charleston Light Dragoons 

1st Company, Governor’s Foot Guard 

1st Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry 

Charleston, SC 

Hartford, CT 

Philadelphia, PA 

1753 

1771 

1774 

Kentish Guards East Greenwich, RI 1774 

United Train of Artillery 

2nd Company, Governor’s Foot Guard 

Providence, RI 

New Haven, CT 

1775 

1775 

German Fusiliers Charleston, SC 1775 

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Army National Guard History

Liberty Independent Troop Walthonville, GA 1776 

1st Company, Governor’s Horse Guard Hartford, CT 1778 

Roxbury City Guard Boston, MA 1784 

2nd Corps of Cadets Salem, MA 1785 

8th Regiment of Infantry New York, NY 1786 

Chatham Artillery Company Savannah, GA 1786 

Richmond Light Infantry Blues Richmond, VA 1789 

Veteran Corps of Artillery New York, NY 1790 

(Source: War Department, Report of the Military Secretary of the Army relative to The 

Militia of the United States, June 30, 1906, 111-14.) 

The masthead of an enlistment certificate of the Newark, New Jersey “City Guard” from 1845. 

The uniforms and headgear were typical of the volunteer militia companies of the period. (Anne 

Brown Collection) 

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Army National Guard History

Ironically, the same conditions in Jacksonian America that led to the demise of 

the enrolled militia fostered the growth of volunteer companies. An increasingly mobile 

society, the Industrial Revolution’s new work practices, massive waves of immigration 

and the explosive growth of cities generated complex changes in America that prompted 

segments of the population to seek meaning, stability, and enjoyment through voluntary 

association with like-minded individuals. Volunteer militia companies sprang up as part 

of a broader social phenomenon among segments of society that because of class, 

profession, or ethnicity shared common interests in the face of the bewildering changes 

sweeping the country. Volunteer militiamen were a mostly conservative subset of society 

that desired continuity rather than change and embraced the values of patriotism, duty, 

camaraderie, and honor rather than individualism and greed. Volunteer companies drew 

together those with an affinity for the military lifestyle and the pomp and circumstance of 

the parade route and the drill field. At the same time, militia officers viewed their 

leadership positions and activities as an avenue for political and social advancement, and 

many officers used their military titles long after they had left the militia. (16) 

Volunteer militia companies all shared a number of common traits. New 

members required some form of sponsorship, and permission to join the unit was subject 

to the approval of existing members. By-laws governed membership requirements, the 

election of officers, unit organization, the wear of uniforms, the types of weaponry and 

equipment required and the frequency of social and military activities. Volunteer 

companies were largely self-sustaining; members normally paid dues and bore all of the 

expenses of uniforms, weapons, and accoutrements. The enrolled militia system included 

men wherever they dwelled, but the volunteer militia was concentrated mostly in urban 

centers. Enrolled militia musters usually occurred semiannually, but because volunteer 

companies were a source of camaraderie and hosted scheduled activities, unit musters 

occurred at least monthly or as often as one night per week. The frequency of unit 

meetings produced the tradition of State soldiers conducting drill periods on one night of 

the workweek. Increased unit activity resulted in a demand for adequate facilities, and 

volunteer companies sought public buildings suitable for meetings, social activities, and 

the storage of weapons and equipment. A few wealthy companies bought or constructed 

their own accommodations. For the first time, unit armories appeared in local 

communities. 

Though volunteer companies touted their independence, distinct ties to the State 

governments and the enrolled militia existed. The States reserved the right to approve 

company charters as the means of asserting civilian control over all military 

organizations. The States granted volunteer militiamen with at least seven years of 

service an exemption from further duty in the enrolled militia. Specialized volunteer 

companies provided valuable augmentation to the enrolled militia’s infantry fighting 

power. The States welcomed cavalry and artillery units because maintaining such 

organizations in the enrolled militia was difficult and expensive. The States often 

provided funds to defray the greater costs of purchasing and maintaining special weapons 

and equipment such as horses, cannons, saddles, and ammunition. As the elite troops of 

the armies of the day, grenadiers and light infantrymen formed the flank companies of 

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Army National Guard History

regiments deployed in battle and assumed the position of honor at ceremonies and 

parades. Volunteer infantry companies organized as grenadiers and light infantry 

stressed that they did not belong to the undifferentiated masses of enrolled militia 

infantry and jealously protected their position of honor at public ceremonies. The 

Richmond Light Infantry Blues of Richmond, Virginia and the Washington Light 

Infantry of Charleston, South Carolina were typical of volunteer infantry units that 

emphasized their elite status. 

Perhaps the most widely recognized characteristic of volunteer militia companies 

was martial ardor that found its expression in extravagant uniforms and dramatic unit 

names. With the Regular Army wearing dark blue, State soldiers often wore some shade 

of gray, and company names often hinted at the color and style of the uniform volunteers 

sported. Ethnicity often determined the type of dress, and companies of Irishmen in 

green jackets, Highlanders in kilts, Germans in hunting hats and Frenchmen in full, red 

trousers tramped down America’s streets. For example, the Pioneer Rifles of Rochester, 

New York appeared at parades sporting a tall beaver hat, a green, swallowtail coat with 

large cuffs and a high collar, and white pants. Elite infantry units adopted uniforms and 

headgear — towering bearskin hats were a favorite — which accentuated their height and 

physical presence. One method of controlling unit membership was the extravagance of 

the uniform; the more exclusive the company, the more expensive the uniform. Titles of 

most units were descriptive, such as Rifles, Guards, and Cadets, while names like 

Invincibles, Avengers, and Terribles were intended to instill unit pride. 

In addition to offering an outlet for patriotism, camaraderie, and social enjoyment, 

volunteer companies formed along occupational and ethnic lines. Skilled workers often 

banded together to emphasize their status in society. The Mechanic Phalanx of Lowell, 

Massachusetts, adorned in gray uniforms with yellow trimmings, is but one example. 

Volunteer companies proliferated among immigrants, especially the Germans and the 

Irish. The meeting halls and armories of immigrant companies allowed an environment 

that recreated their European roots. Gathered together in their militia company, 

immigrants could speak their native tongue without embarrassment, drink the spirits of 

the home country, and enjoy a congenial, familiar atmosphere. Immigrants considered 

membership in an American volunteer company as the soundest possible display of 

patriotism toward their adopted country. New York City included a rich variety of 

minority and ethnic units: the Napper Tandy Artillery (Irish), the Jefferson Riflemen 

(German), Gardes Lafayette (French), the Hannibal Guards (African-American), and the 

Empire Hussars (Jewish). By 1853, two-thirds of the 6,000 volunteer militiamen in New 

York City were foreign-born. Only New Orleans matched New York for its ethnic 

diversity and boasted of German Jaegers, Spanish Cazadores, French Lancers, and Creole 

Grenadiers. As a backlash to the rise of ethnic companies, native-born Americans 

formed their own exclusive units whose names and uniforms stressed the history and 

culture of the United States. For example, Milwaukee hosted two Irish companies, five 

German units and one native-born American outfit, the Milwaukee Light Guard. (17) 

Volunteer companies fostered a sense of community through frequent social and 

philanthropic activities. Opportunities for fellowship, entertainment, and carousing were 

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Army National Guard History

critical to maintaining membership and garnering the support of local communities. 

Among the more popular events were gala balls, where citizen-soldiers, resplendent in 

their distinctive uniforms, feasted and danced the night away with wives and sweethearts. 

The Washington Light Infantry of Charleston, South Carolina held an annual ball to 

honor the Washington’s Birthday national holiday, and the gala of the Rock City Guards 

in Nashville, Tennessee was regarded as the highlight of the city’s social season. 

Theatrical performances and concerts were popular social events and effective 

fundraisers. In addition, companies raised money for orphans and destitute families. 

When unit members died unexpectedly, other militiamen often became the guardians of 

the surviving children. Many companies acted as burial societies, securing plots for 

deceased members and conducting funerals with full military honors. 

Volunteer companies were prominent at public ceremonies and celebrations. 

Citizen-soldiers marched and performed intricate drills to the amazement of onlookers. 

Companies frequently turned out at solemn occasions to honor the exploits of past 

militiamen. Boston and New York companies were present at the dedication of the 

Bunker Hill memorial in 1834, and South Carolina companies were on hand at the 

unveiling of a monument on the Cowpens battlefield in 1856. The nation’s growing 

railroad system permitted frequent unit visits. In the South, Charleston, Columbia, 

Augusta and Savannah formed an axis for the routine exchange of unit members. 

A volunteer unit was the first military organization in the United States to adopt 

the title “National Guard.” The use of the name came about as the result of a visit to New 

York by the Marquis de Lafayette, the famous French hero of the American Revolution. 

Volunteer militiamen from the 2nd Battalion, 11th Regiment of Artillery comprised the 

honor guard for Lafayette. In observance of his visit on August 25, 1824, the battalion 

voted to rename itself the “Battalion of National Guards” in tribute to Lafayette’s 

command of the Parisian militia, the Garde Nationale. (The battalion later became the 

famous 7th New York Regiment in 1847 and serves in the New York Army National 

Guard today as the 107th Support Group.) (18) 

Despite the emphasis on social and ceremonial events, militiamen recognized that 

volunteer companies were primarily military organizations. The most common 

manifestation of military training was weekly drill periods in which citizen-soldiers 

practiced the intricate tactical maneuvers of the day. To acquire qualified instructors, 

companies often hired professional soldiers, veterans, and military retirees to serve as 

drillmasters. Militia officers frequently purchased military texts for their own studies. 

Parades and drill competitions provided an opportunity for companies to compare their 

relative strength and proficiency. Marksmanship training was a popular training event, 

especially when held as a competition between units. One of the most unusual 

competitive shoots occurred in 1843 as an artillery duel between the Alabama State 

Artillery of Mobile and the Native American Artillery of New Orleans. After each unit 

fired fifty rounds from their smoothbore, six-pound cannons at a target nearly 500 yards 

away, the Alabamans registered thirty-two hits to win the competition and a silver medal. 

Encampments that included groupings of volunteer companies were important training 

events that in many States eventually supplanted the enrolled militia’s semiannual muster 

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Army National Guard History

days. The typical encampment lasted a few days and included extensive drill periods and 

long road marches. Militiamen conducted parades and sham battles to the delight of 

large crowds of spectators. 

Beyond social and training events, volunteer companies often responded to local 

crises. In the early 19th Century, police departments were organized in only the largest 

cities, and State police forces did not yet exist. Militiamen frequently served under the 

direction of sheriffs and marshals to enforce laws, act as posses, guard prisoners, and 

quell agitated mobs. Ethnic and religious violence, labor unrest, and abolitionist agitation 

created volatile conditions in many cities that precipitated rioting, and some volunteer 

companies gained extensive experience in controlling crowds. In the South, militia units 

continued with slave patrols. Virginia’s volunteer companies played a major role in 

putting down the bloody Nat Turner’s Revolt in 1831. Between 1834 and 1864, civil 

authorities in New York City called out the 7th New York Regiment on at least eighteen 

occasions to preserve the peace. The most sensational civil disturbance of the antebellum period was the Astor Place Riot of 1849 in New York. Sparked by an ethnic 

incident, an angry mob of 20,000 gathered outside the city opera house, and the mayor 

called out the 7th New York Regiment. Civil authorities finally authorized the militiamen 

to open fire, and they cleared the streets with volleys of musketry. Before the bloody 

affair ended, at least forty protesters were killed and wounded and 150 militiamen 

injured. (19) 

The “Boston National Lancers” in 1850. Volunteer militia companies were often organized as 

elite units of grenadiers, light infantry, artillery, and cavalry. (Anne Brown Collection) 

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Army National Guard History

The Mexican War 

By the 1840s, many Americans believed that the United States should extend all 

the way from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. The concept of “Manifest Destiny” 

advanced the popular notion that divine providence mandated the expansion of the 

country from coast-to-coast. However, Mexico included most of the western lands not 

acquired under the Louisiana Purchase and blocked America’s westward expansion. A 

long simmering dispute between the United States and Mexico finally precipitated a 

major war. Citizen-soldiers of the Republic of Texas had gained independence from 

Mexico with bloody fighting at the Alamo and the battle of San Jacinto in the spring of 

1836. Nearly a decade later, the U.S. offered statehood to Texas, and it was admitted to 

the Union as the twenty-eighth State in December 1845. Mexico, however, had never 

fully recognized Texan independence and broke diplomatic relations with the United 

States. By May 1846, a state of war existed between the two powers. 

For the first time, the United States waged a war on foreign soil. The demise of 

the enrolled militia system and memories of citizen-soldiers refusing to cross the border 

and of a few States unwilling to support the War of 1812 prompted a major change in 

defense policy. While combinations of Regulars and militiamen had fought all previous 

wars, the administration of President James K. Polk relied for the largest part on 

volunteer regiments. In simplest terms, volunteer regiments were citizen-soldier units 

raised by the States for federal service. Unlike the militia, volunteer regiments did not 

exist in peacetime. However, militia traditions and laws hung heavy over the raising of 

volunteer units. The States assumed the responsibility for mobilizing volunteer 

regiments, volunteers elected their own company officers, and the Governors appointed 

more senior officers up to the rank of colonel. The Polk Administration levied troop 

requirements on the States, and eventually fifty-eight volunteer regiments and sixty-eight 

separate companies and battalions were raised. All together, the United States mobilized 

just short of 116,000 Regulars, volunteers, and militiamen. Of the total manpower effort, 

75 percent — 58 percent volunteers and 12 percent militiamen — were citizen-soldiers 

who served alongside Regular Army units. (20) 

Despite the preponderance of volunteer units, the militia made significant 

contributions. At the outbreak of war, Texas and Louisiana provided 12,601 militiamen 

for immediate service, and many of these subsequently joined volunteer and Regular 

Army units as individuals. In many cases, the States first turned to volunteer militia 

companies to form their federal volunteer regiments. Nine volunteer militia companies in 

Georgia combined to create the 1st Georgia Regiment. The commander of the Little Rock 

Guards rallied nine other volunteer militia companies in Arkansas to form an Arkansas 

volunteer regiment. In Pittsburgh, the city’s leading volunteer militia companies — the 

Dusquesne Grays, the Jackson Blues and the Irish Greens — mustered into federal 

service to form the foundation of Pennsylvania’s 2nd Regiment. (21) 

Perhaps the best example of a federal volunteer regiment raised from State troops 

was the Mississippi Rifles. Commanded by Jefferson Davis and led by hard-fighting 

officers who were the sons of wealthy planters, the Mississippi Rifles established a 

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Army National Guard History

combat record comparable to that of the best Regular Army regiments. Competent 

leadership, strict discipline, thorough training, modern weapons, and complete uniforms 

created a regiment that Army leaders cited for conspicuous gallantry and steadiness. At 

the battle of Buena Vista, where 90 percent of the American army was volunteer units, an 

unwavering performance by the Mississippi Rifles and two Indiana regiments, together 

with the superior fire of Regular Army artillery, broke the main Mexican attack. (Today 

the Mississippi Rifles still serve in the Mississippi Army National Guard as the 155th 

Infantry.) (22) 

A number of the senior commanders in the Mexican War came from the militia, 

and President Polk appointed several militia generals to command large volunteer 

formations. Maj. Gen. William O. Butler from Kentucky, a veteran of the War of 1812, 

received command of the 1st Division of volunteers composed of regiments from 

Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana. Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson, the senior militia general in 

Pennsylvania, took command of the 2nd Division of volunteers with regiments from 

Illinois, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. Other militia brigadier generals effectively 

led brigades in the Mexican campaigns. Brig. Gen. John A. Quitman of Mississippi was 

perhaps the best militia brigade commander of the war. (23) 

The successful outcome of the Mexican War had significant influences on the 

growth of the United States and its future military policy. At the cost of $100 million and 

the loss of 10,000 soldiers, the United States annexed about half of Mexico, a vast tract of 

land that eventually comprised the States of California, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, 

Colorado, and Utah. By 1848, America was a continental power stretching from sea to 

sea and ever closer to fulfilling its mandate of Manifest Destiny. In military policy, the 

Mexican War marked the debut of federal volunteer regiments as the best means of 

augmenting the Regular Army in wartime. Volunteer militia companies certainly 

hastened the raising of federal regiments, but for the first time, the United States relied on 

volunteers to augment the Regular Army rather than militiamen serving in pre-existing 

militia organizations. Volunteer regiments permitted the prosecution of the war without 

permanent increases in the size of the Regular Army. And to the delight of national 

political leaders, volunteer citizen-soldiers gladly returned to civilian society at the end of 

hostilities. 

The victory in the Mexican War sparked renewed interest across the country in 

military affairs, and volunteer militia companies prospered. At the same time, a looming 

sectional crisis over States’ rights and slavery heightened a sense of awareness regarding 

military preparedness. The militia’s greatest advocate in the 1850s was Elmer Ellsworth. 

While a struggling law student in Chicago, Ellsworth eked out a living as a militia 

drillmaster. Though laboring in obscurity, the energetic Ellsworth was determined to 

make a name for himself as a militia leader. It was at this time that he met a Frenchman 

who had served with a Zouave regiment in the Crimea, and the soldier of fortune taught 

Ellsworth the intricate, peculiar commands and motions of Zouave drill routines. In 

1859, Ellsworth was elected to the command of a volunteer militia company that he 

reorganized as the United States Zouave Cadets of Chicago. Ellsworth’s men learned the 

rapid, gymnastics-like movements of the Zouave drills, and adopted a picturesque 

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Army National Guard History

costume complete with red cap, sash, and baggy trousers. The Zouave Cadets filled 

Chicago’s streets with crowds anxious to watch their rapid, intricate drills. One Chicago 

newspaper described the drills as soldiers forming “figures of crosses, double crosses, 

squares and triangles, like the dissolving figures of the kaleidoscope.” (24) 

Ellsworth’s fortunes changed dramatically when he gained employment as a legal 

clerk in the firm of Lincoln & Herndon in Springfield, Illinois. Abraham Lincoln and 

Ellsworth became friends and discussed possible militia reforms for Illinois. The Zouave 

leader also believed that the War Department needed a special bureau for militia affairs. 

In the summer of 1860, Ellsworth, now a colonel in the Illinois militia, gained national 

notoriety when the Zouave Cadets undertook a tour of twenty cities. At each stop, the 

Zouaves challenged the best local militia companies to a drill competition, and in cities 

across the Midwest and the Northeast, they dazzled crowds with drilling, marching, firing 

and wild bayonet exercises. Dozens of Zouave militia companies formed in the wake of 

the national tour. At the end of the excursion, Ellsworth returned to Illinois as the most 

renowned militiaman in the nation. In November, Abraham Lincoln was elected 

president. When he left for Washington early in 1861, Ellsworth accompanied Lincoln as 

a bodyguard. Neither could have imagined that both of them were destined to become 

national martyrs during the bloodiest war in American history. (25) 

Civil War and Reconstruction, 1861-1877 

On the crest of a bald hill outside Charlestown, Virginia at noon on December 2, 

1859, a formation of nearly 1,500 militiamen surrounded a newly constructed gallows. 

On the platform stood the rabid abolitionist John Brown with the executioner’s noose 

already tight around his neck. The Commonwealth of Virginia had found Brown guilty 

of treason for his deadly raid against the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry and sentenced 

him to death by hanging. Fearful that radical abolitionists might attempt to rescue Brown 

on the day of his execution, Virginia’s Governor had called out 1,500 militiamen to 

provide security. In the ranks of the Richmond Grays stood Private John Wilkes Booth, 

and for several minutes, the man destined to fire the last shot of the American Civil War 

studied the man who had fired the first shots in anger. Without warning, the executioner 

released the platform beneath John Brown, and the guerilla leader fell to his death. 

Afterwards, a jailer revealed the contents of a note Brown had slipped to him earlier that 

morning. “I, John Brown,” the trembling handwriting said, “am now quite certain that 

the crimes of this guilty land will never be purged away but with blood...” (26) 

John Brown’s raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry was the first of a violent 

chain of events that finally caused the outbreak of the American Civil War. For nearly 

thirty years, the North and the South had drifted farther apart politically and socially on 

the issues of States’ rights and slavery. Staunch abolitionists in the North believed that 

moral suasion and political action had failed to stem the spread of slavery and that 

violence was the only remaining remedy. On the night of October 16, 1859, Brown had 

led a band of eighteen men to seize the arsenal’s weapons as the means to arm an 

anticipated slave uprising. Casualties occurred on both sides as Brown’s raiders captured 

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Army National Guard History

the facility. The next day, Virginia militia companies acting under the supervision of the 

town sheriff cornered Brown and a small number of followers in a stout, fire engine 

house. On the morning of October 18th, a platoon of U.S. Marines commanded by 

Colonel Robert E. Lee of the Regular Army stormed the engine house and took John 

Brown prisoner. 

News of the raid hardened opposing views above and below the Mason-Dixon 

line. Across the South, planters and politicians explained that northern radicals had 

intended all along to use force to limit the rights of the States, destroy slavery and 

threaten the southern way of life. Many southerners believed that John Brown’s raid was 

only the opening blow in a larger, more violent contest. After Harpers Ferry, both sides 

anticipated war, and new militia companies sprang up all over the country that focused on 

preparedness rather than pageantry. The election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860 

on a platform that severely restricted the expansion of slavery deepened the nation’s 

political divide. South Carolina responded to Lincoln’s election by seceding from the 

Union, and by February 1861, six other southern States had left the Union and banded 

together to create the Confederate States of America. On April 12, 1861, Confederate 

troops fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor. After the fort’s surrender, four 

additional States joined the Confederacy, and the Confederate government, headed by 

President Jefferson Davis, established its capitol in Richmond. 

As America split in two, volunteer militia companies across the South were the 

primary agents of State governments in seizing control of federal forts, arsenals, customs 

houses, and mints. In Charleston, militiamen seized a federal arsenal and occupied 

fortifications that Union troops abandoned when they had evacuated to Fort Sumter. 

Georgia volunteer companies took Fort Pulaski at the mouth of the Savannah River, and 

Alabama State soldiers occupied the U.S. arsenal at Mount Vernon and two Union forts 

that controlled the entrance to Mobile Bay. In Florida and Louisiana, militia units 

captured the arsenals at Apalachicola and Baton Rouge, respectively. Virginia 

militiamen took control of the Norfolk Navy Yard, and in Arkansas, four militia 

companies forced federal troops to abandon Fort Smith without a fight. (27) 

As the Union disintegrated, local leaders in the North hesitated to begin serious 

military preparations. Many hoped that war could be averted; others believed 

provocative actions might disrupt peace efforts. However, the blatant attack on Fort 

Sumter galvanized the North. On April 15th, President Lincoln invoked the Calling Forth 

Act of 1792 and ordered 75,000 militiamen into federal service for ninety days to put 

down an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial 

proceedings.” The War Department apportioned troop quotas to the States, established 

mobilization sites and set May 20th as the final muster day for all units. The Governors 

of States that had not yet declared neutrality or joined the Confederacy exercised their 

executive powers and spurned Lincoln’s call for troops. Kentucky’s Governor replied: 

“Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no 

troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.” (28) 

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Army National Guard History

Militiamen of the 7th New York Infantry outside 

of Washington, DC in 1861. The 7th New York 

was the first unit to adopt the title “National 

Guard,” and the letters “NGB” appeared on 

their uniforms and equipment during the Civil 

War. Note the “NG” sign at top center. (U.S. 

Army Military History Institute) 

The top priority for the North was 

to secure its capitol, and the first troops to 

provide for Washington’s defense were 

thirty-eight militia companies from the 

District of Columbia. Five companies 

from Pennsylvania — the Ringgold Light 

Artillery of Reading; the Washington 

Artillery and the National Light Infantry of 

Pottsville; the Logan Guards of Lewiston; 

and the Allen Rifles of Allentown — were 

the first State troops to reach Washington. 

Massachusetts was the first State to 

forward a complete regiment to the capital. 

The 6th Regiment, Massachusetts 

Volunteer Militia reached Washington by 

rail on April 18th after fighting its way 

through a secessionist mob during a 

change of trains in Baltimore. (29) 

Throughout the spring of 1861 

most northern States rushed regiments in 

various degrees of preparedness to 

Washington. Several regiments adopted 

the Zouave uniforms and drill methods that 

Elmer Ellsworth had promoted before the 

war. By early summer, thirty-five 

regiments consisting of 37,000 troops were 

encamped near the nation’s capitol. In northern Virginia, the Confederacy managed to 

concentrate an army of its own: thirty-two regiments numbering 33,000 troops. Volunteer 

militia companies formed the basis for a significant number of the regiments on both 

sides. While the two armies watched one another, an army of Ohio troops composed 

mostly of militiamen advanced into the rugged mountains of western Virginia. Unionist 

sentiment was strong in the region, and the Ohio soldiers cleared the region of southern 

troops. Consequently, West Virginia was admitted to the Union on June 19, 1863 as the 

thirty-fifth State. (30) 

The concentration of Union troops around Washington produced the North’s first 

national hero. When Elmer Ellsworth failed in a scheme to create and lead a new Militia 

Bureau in the War Department, he left Washington seeking a field command of his own. 

Ellsworth’s national reputation permitted him to recruit quickly a Zouave regiment from 

New York. The 11th New York Volunteers entered federal service under Ellsworth’s 

command and moved to Washington. On May 24, 1861, the 11th New York crossed into 

Virginia to occupy Alexandria. Colonel Ellsworth noticed a Confederate flag waving 

defiantly from the roof of a hotel in the heart of town. Accompanied by a detachment, 

the regimental commander hurried to the hotel, climbed to the roof and cut the flag down. 

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Army National Guard History

The hotel’s incensed proprietor, armed with a shotgun, confronted Ellsworth as he 

descended a staircase with his trophy. A point-blank blast from the shotgun killed 

Ellsworth instantly, and New York Zouaves shot and bayoneted the proprietor in return. 

As the first northern regimental commander killed in the Civil War, Ellsworth’s death 

created a national sensation. A bereaved Abraham Lincoln hosted the funeral at the 

White House, and songs and poems across the nation celebrated Ellsworth’s exploits. 

The 11th New York adopted the battle cry “Remember Ellsworth!” Throughout the 

country, Elmer Ellsworth’s life and death personified the dedication and sacrifices of 

militiamen. (31) 

By early summer, the buildup of Union forces around Washington prompted 

Lincoln’s generals to consider an offensive. On July 21, 1861, northern troops attacked 

the southern army at the battle of First Bull Run. By any standard, the war’s first major 

battle was a confused, amateur affair. The ranks of ante-bellum militiamen and raw 

volunteers displayed poor discipline, and officers demonstrated their inexperience in 

handling formations under fire. The convention of Union blue and Confederate gray 

uniforms did not yet exist, and the tendency of militia units to wear blue or gray without 

regard to regional affiliation resulted in friendly fire incidents. The small number of 

Regular Army units in the Union ranks performed not much better than green citizensoldiers and did little to influence the outcome. What could have been an orderly retreat 

for the North turned into a rout as inexperienced soldiers panicked. Equally unseasoned 

southern troops were too exhausted and confused to exploit their victory. (32) 

The defeat at First Bull Run shocked the North and prompted even greater efforts. 

Realizing that the small Regular Army and regiments based on volunteer militia 

companies were inadequate for a broader war, on July 25, 1861 President Lincoln called 

up 500,000 volunteers for up to three years of service. It was the first of a series of 

federal callups that eventually brought nearly 2.7 million men into the Union Army. 

Many of the militia-based regiments that had responded to the first callup after Fort 

Sumter immediately reformed as volunteer regiments. The War Department made the 

decision to keep the Regular Army together as a dependable reserve rather than to 

disperse its officers and men as training cadres for volunteer regiments, but the 

overwhelming number of volunteer regiments soon swallowed up the Regular Army. In 

the South, a similar pattern emerged as militia units and volunteers combined to create 

Confederate regiments. Many southern States formed their own troops for local duty, but 

as the war progressed, the Confederate government took control of these troops as well. 

In the end, the Civil War was fought by neither Regulars nor militiamen, but by the 

overwhelming number of volunteers who rallied to defend “Old Glory” and the “Stars 

and Bars.” (33) 

The exact number of Civil War regiments formed from ante-bellum militia units 

is almost impossible to determine, but usually the lower numbered regiments in each 

State contained significant numbers of militiamen. In the North, the 69th New York was 

among the very best of the militia-based regiments that earned outstanding combat 

records. Irish immigrants had originally formed the 69th New York Regiment in October 

1851. The regiment created two opportunities for the Irish – new immigrants publicly 

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Army National Guard History

demonstrated their allegiance to the United States by participating in musters, and the 

regiment provided training to a cadre of young men who hoped to return home one day to 

fight for Irish independence. Immediately after Lincoln’s call for 75,000 militia, the 69th 

deployed to Washington and was among the first Union regiments to occupy southern 

soil in Virginia. At First Bull Run, the Irish fought stubbornly but were eventually 

caught up in the northern retreat. The 69th New York fought in fourteen campaigns in the 

East as part of Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher’s famed Irish Brigade. The regiment’s 

dash and gallantry during desperate assaults against Confederate defenses at the Bloody 

Lane at Antietam and Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg are indeed the stuff of military 

legend. It was Robert E. Lee who gave the 69th New York its colorful nickname. Upon 

learning once that the Irish were among the troops opposing his rebel infantry, Lee 

nodded and said, “Ah, yes...that fighting 69th.” Out of the approximately 2,000 

regiments that served in the Union Army, the “Fighting 69th ” ranked sixth in terms of 

soldiers killed. (The “Fighting 69th ” still serves in the New York Army National Guard 

as the 69th Infantry.) (34) 

The Washington Artillery from Louisiana was among the premier militia-based 

organizations in the Confederate Army and developed a reputation as one of the South’s 

best artillery units. Originally formed in New Orleans in 1838 as a single battery, the 

Washington Artillery fought in the Mexican War and expanded into a full battalion at the 

outbreak of the Civil War. At First Bull Run, the Washington Artillery’s batteries were 

in the thick of the heaviest fighting. On August 30, 1861, the Washington Artillery 

became the first American artillery unit to fire rounds in an air defense role. When Union 

balloonists went aloft for the first time in the Civil War to observe Confederate troop 

movements, the Washington Artillery’s guns opened fire on the balloonists and forced 

them to the ground. Before the war ended, the Louisiana gunners participated in fourteen 

campaigns, and friends and foes alike developed a healthy respect for them. After one 

particularly sharp fight, the captured commander of a Union battery asked what southern 

guns had opposed him. Upon learning that it was the Louisianans, the northern officer 

growled: “Damn that Washington Artillery! I have been looking for it for three years and 

have found it at last!” The Louisianans stayed with Lee’s army until the very end but 

refused to surrender. On the final day of the war at Appomattox Court House, the 

artillerymen evaded capture, destroyed their gun carriages, buried their bronze gun tubes 

in the woods and vanished into the surrounding hills. By ones and twos, the proud 

veterans made their way home to New Orleans. (The Washington Artillery serves today 

as the 141st Field Artillery of the Louisiana Army National Guard.) (35) 

Ante-bellum militia units provided a wealth of military experience to the armies 

and often served as a training base. Early in the war the Hoosier State organized the 

“Indiana Legion,” a militia command with the express purpose of providing rudimentary 

training to volunteers bound for federal regiments and militiamen remaining in State 

units. Prewar militiamen were prepared to drill and maneuver troops and often rose to 

high command and staff positions. New York’s 7th Regiment provided six hundred 

officers to the Union Army. The Artillery Corps and the First Troop, City Cavalry of 

Philadelphia together provided nearly 250 officers. A number of militia officers rose to 

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Army National Guard History

Militiamen of the Clinch Rifles formed Company A, 5th Georgia Infantry. The first pattern 

Confederate national flag is suspended from the tent pole, and a slave stands third from right. 

The photographic process of the day makes the “CR” for Clinch Rifles appear in reverse. 

(U.S. Army Military History Institute) 

senior command. Frank Cheatham was Tennessee’s senior militia general before the war, 

and he rose to the rank of lieutenant general and corps commander while amassing a 

reputation as one of the top division commanders in the Confederate Army. The famous 

Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan was active in the ante-bellum Kentucky militia and 

in 1857 raised the Lexington Rifles. Phil Kearny, Lew Wallace, Alpheus Smith, Dan 

Butterfield, Alfred Terry, and Benjamin Butler were prominent Union generals with 

militia backgrounds. (36) 

As in previous wars, conflicts and jealousies developed between Regulars and 

citizen-soldiers. Volunteer and militia officers were increasingly critical of the growing 

numbers of West Pointers in the Regular Army who allegedly arrayed themselves as a 

tight-knit group against citizen-soldiers. The most outspoken critic of professional 

officers was John A. “Black Jack” Logan of Illinois. A citizen-soldier who eventually 

rose to temporary command of the Army of the Tennessee during the Atlanta campaign, 

General William T. Sherman refused to give Logan permanent, army-level command. 

After the war, Logan became a vocal critic of professional officers and a staunch 

supporter of citizen-soldiers. In The Volunteer Soldier of America, Logan denounced 

West Pointers and other full-time soldiers as undemocratic, cliquish, and wasteful while 

citizen-soldiers remained the embodiment of America’s native military genius. (37) 

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Army National Guard History

The State militia systems provided significant service throughout the war. 

Northern States furnished militia units that served independently or in conjunction with 

federal troops to hold forts, protect coastlines and the Canadian border, garrison the 

Indian frontier and guard Confederate prisoners. In performing these functions, the 

militia relieved federal troops for duty elsewhere. Militiamen also monitored subversive 

political activities, tracked down deserters and helped put down violent draft 

demonstrations. To ensure enough manpower for the war, Massachusetts once again 

instituted the enrolled militia in 1864 for men ages 18-24. Rhode Island, West Virginia, 

Ohio, and Indiana also instituted forms of compulsory militia service at various times. In 

1861, Connecticut became the first State to adopt the title “National Guard” for its militia 

units, and the following year, the Empire State officially changed the designation of its 

militia forces to “The National Guard of the State of New York.” Pennsylvania and Ohio 

raised State regiments for limited, local service that bore the title “National Guard” in 

their designations. In the South, militiamen manned coastal defenses, guarded northern 

prisoners and maintained aggressive patrols that tracked down runaway slaves and 

deserters. As Union troops advanced further into the South, militiamen more and more 

fought alongside the volunteer regiments of the Confederate Army. (38) 

The States produced large numbers of militiamen on short notice in response to 

unexpected emergencies. When the Confederate Army invaded Kentucky in the fall of 

1862, the Governor of Ohio declared a militia levee, and 15,000 militiamen rallied to 

defend Cincinnati. Further east, the Pennsylvania militia served on active duty for two 

weeks during the Antietam campaign. The summer of 1863 was a particularly busy time 

for northern militia units. In response to Lee’s second invasion of the North, militiamen 

from Pennsylvania, New York and Rhode Island augmented the Army of the Potomac 

during the Gettysburg campaign. Ohio and Indiana militiamen turned out in large 

numbers to repel a raid north of the Ohio River by southern marauders under John Hunt 

Morgan. (39) 

Because of the devastating effects of disease and the ghastly casualty rates of 

severe battles, the Civil War armies had a voracious appetite for manpower. Within a 

year of First Bull Run, both sides realized that the traditional approach of raising 

manpower by levying quotas against the States for volunteer and militia regiments was 

inadequate. Ironically, the Confederacy, based on the premise of States’ rights, was the 

first to implement national conscription. In April 1862, the Confederacy enacted the first 

national draft law in American history. All white males ages 18-35 had to serve for three 

years and reenlistments were mandatory. By the summer of 1862, the North needed 

additional manpower, and the Militia Act of 1862 authorized a militia draft designed to 

stimulate recruiting in volunteer regiments. Less than a year later, the North resorted to 

full conscription when Congress passed the Enrollment Act of 1863. In reality, both 

sides enacted draft laws to spur recruiting and volunteerism; only 6 percent of Union and 

20 percent of Confederate troops entered the military through conscription. Still, 

conscription was intensely unpopular, and anti-draft riots in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, 

and New York required armed troops to restore order. (40) 

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Army National Guard History

In many ways, the key provisions of national draft legislation drew heavily from 

State militia laws. First and foremost, Union and Confederate laws embraced the ideal of 

universal military service that had started with the earliest American settlements. 

Colonial militia ordinances had allowed substitutes, exemptions, and the payment of 

commutation fines, and, to varying degrees, Civil War conscription laws embraced all of 

these methods. At the same time, national draft laws represented an important, new 

change in military policy. Both Confederate and Union draft procedures largely ignored 

the States. Another significant change was the reliance on compulsory rather than 

voluntary enlistments as the basis for mobilization. While draft laws sought a more 

efficient use of manpower, they ignored the ties most citizens felt toward their States and 

local communities. (41) 

Three weeks after Appomattox, the strength of the Union Army stood at just over 

one million men. Tired of four years of war, volunteer soldiers wanted to go home, and 

Congress obliged them by launching a massive demobilization. Within six months, 

nearly 800,000 citizen-soldiers were mustered out, and by August 1867, the Regular 

Army stood at 56,815 officers and men. Most of the Army deployed below the MasonDixon line to become the government’s executive agent for the occupation of the South 

while other units went west of the Mississippi River to deal with the Indian nations. The 

period of Reconstruction saw the readmission of the former Confederate states into the 

Union and necessary adjustments in southern society to permit the assimilation of freed 

blacks. (42) 

The volunteer militia’s lowest ebb occurred during 1865-1877. At first, the 

militia in the northern States all but ceased to exist. Exhausted by the bloodiest war in 

American history, men were not interested in voluntary military service. No threat 

seemed imminent, and the Regular Army appeared entirely capable of handling Indian 

affairs in the West and the occupation of the South without assistance from the militia. In 

the unlikely event of a serious threat, a vast reservoir of experienced veterans was 

available for military service. The States maintained their AG offices that were primarily 

responsible for organizing and storing Civil War records and for handling veterans’ 

affairs. By one count, less than one-third of all the States maintained any semblance of a 

viable militia. (43) 

In the South, however, the status and control of the militia was often central to 

Reconstruction policies. At first, southern States readmitted to the Union were free to 

reconstitute their militias. Confederate veterans dominated the postwar militias and were 

intent upon undermining Reconstruction policies, intimidating freed blacks and 

restraining Union occupation forces. Several southern States passed “Black Codes,” laws 

designed to regulate the political, social, and economic rights of freed blacks. Southern 

militia units became the primary agents for enforcing the codes. Angered by southern 

actions, Congress passed civil rights legislation to negate the codes, and a rider to the 

Army Appropriations Act of 1867 disbanded the southern militias. White southerners 

refusing to bend to the forces of Reconstruction founded the Ku Klux Klan. Using 

nocturnal, hit-and-run guerilla tactics meant to instill terror, the Klan was determined to 

defeat Reconstruction and maintain control of the black population. (44) 

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Army National Guard History

In response to white terrorism, Congress allowed States readmitted to the Union 

to form militia units. The only criterion for militia membership was loyalty to the Union, 

and black militia units sprang up across the South. In 1866, the Regular Army had 

established four black regiments — the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry 

— commanded by white officers. The creation of black militia units followed this trend 

except that they were free to elect black officers. In some states, African-American 

militia units played an important role in advancing Reconstruction policies and insuring 

black civil rights. South Carolina and Louisiana had black general officers in the early 

post-bellum period, and in 1870, Maj. Gen. Robert B. Elliott of South Carolina became 

the first African-American AG in the militia’s history. The Governors of Arkansas, 

Tennessee, and North Carolina successfully used militia units to break the back of the Ku 

Klux Klan. In 1877, Reconstruction ended with the withdrawal of the Union Army from 

the South. (45) 

Militiamen as Strikebreakers 

Ten years after the Civil War, a semblance of National Guard organization 

appeared in most States. Perhaps nostalgic for the excitement and camaraderie of field 

duty, veterans banded together in volunteer militia units. Like their ante-bellum 

predecessors, militiamen sought a venue for the exercise of a military lifestyle and 

opportunities for self-improvement, recreation, and service to their community. By 1875, 

volunteer militia strength stood at 90,865 nationwide with more than half of the soldiers 

concentrated in the Northeast. Ten of the thirty-seven States in 1875 reported no 

organized militia forces. (46) 

The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 thrust the militia back onto the national scene. 

Increased industrialization heightened tensions between ever larger companies and 

organized labor, especially among the growing railroads. After a decade of labor unrest 

and four years of economic depression, railroad employees launched violent protests in 

reaction to wage cuts. Workers shut down the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in West 

Virginia in July 1877, and the strike spread spontaneously throughout the Northeast and 

Midwest, snarling rail traffic from St. Louis to Boston. (47) 

Intent on restoring rail service and curbing violence, fifteen States called out 

approximately 45,000 militiamen. The militia’s performance varied widely. Overall, 

citizen-soldiers remained loyal to their officers and civil authorities. In some cases, 

militiamen fired on strikers while in other instances they united with the workers. The 

failure of militiamen to control violence in West Virginia led to the commitment of 

federal troops. One thousand Regulars and 9,000 militiamen broke the strike in 

Pennsylvania, where it was the most violent and prolonged. Regulars also served in 

Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri. Federal troops, police forces, and militiamen 

finally brought the situation under control by the first week in August. At least one 

hundred people lost their lives and hundreds more were injured. (48) 

The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 served as a watershed event in the 

transformation of the State militias into the National Guard. In response to the violence, 

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Army National Guard History

a number of States increased militia budgets and raised additional units. Pennsylvania 

increased its annual military budget to $200,000 and initiated a battery of reforms aimed 

at eliminating inefficiency and unqualified soldiers. New York boosted appropriations 

and placed a new emphasis on military readiness. The greatest changes occurred in the 

Midwest where a large number of new Guard units appeared with the backing of public 

and private monies. Two infantry regiments and a cavalry squadron were organized in 

Chicago and supported by an annual stipend of $100,000 from the Chicago Citizens’ 

Association, an interest group of businessmen and industrialists. In Indiana, eleven new 

companies formed after the 1877 strike, and for the first time, Iowa created a separate 

military budget. State AGs entered into discussions regarding the relative efficiency of 

cavalry and artillery versus infantry in breaking up massed rioters. “There can be no 

question of the efficiency of the artillery of the National Guard in putting down riots,” 

Pennsylvania’s AG noted, “...a battery loaded with grape and canister has a most 

discouraging effect upon a body of rioters.” Civil War veterans agreed that horses and 

cannon were most effective against massed protesters, though those units were vastly 

more expensive to equip, train, and maintain than infantry formations. (49) 

The continued involvement of State troops in labor disputes throughout the 1880s 

and 1890s came to identify the National Guard as the protectors of big business. Guard 

The Chickasaw Guards of Memphis, Tennessee drilling in front of their armory in July 1881. 

Larger sized units and armory buildings differentiated militia organizations after the Civil War 

from their ante-bellum predecessors (Anne Brown Collection) 

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Army National Guard History

leaders promoted the role of citizen-soldiers as strikebreakers in order to curry favor and 

financial support from elected officials. The industrial “robber barons” saw the Guard as 

the defenders of their established order and provided direct, private funding. On the other 

hand, organized labor branded the Guard as a tool of corporate capitalists and prohibited 

members of labor unions from serving as citizen-soldiers. Between 1865 and 1906, the 

Governors called out their troops 481 times; almost one-third of the calls stemmed from 

labor troubles. (50) 

Concerns over the Regular Army’s employment during Reconstruction and the 

strikes of 1877 resulted in benchmark legislation that forever altered the relationship 

between federal troops and civil authorities. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibited 

the Army from aiding civil authorities unless ordered to do so by the president. The 

legislation prohibited the established practice of Regulars acting under the jurisdiction of 

U.S. marshals and judges. Army officers welcomed the change because they preferred to 

assert authority over civilians only when acting under presidential orders. On the other 

hand, the Posse Comitatus Act insured that the Governors would continue to rely upon 

National Guard units for law enforcement. The law left citizen-soldiers free to enforce 

laws in the States unless the president ordered the Guard into active, federal service. The 

Posse Comitatus Act remains the key legislation governing the employment of Regular 

and National Guard soldiers during domestic emergencies. 

Creation of the National Guard Association 

The poor performance of some State units in 1877 resulted in the introduction in 

Congress of proposals for militia reform legislation. Citizen-soldiers were in a poor 

position to produce a reform bill of their own. While a number of States had their own 

militia associations at the time, no such national organization existed. Under the guiding 

leadership of an ex-Confederate, Maj. Gen. Dabney H. Maury, concerned militia leaders 

met for the first time in Richmond in 1878 to discuss militia reforms and the creation of a 

national lobbying group. The intent of the fledgling organization was to develop national 

positions on policy issues affecting the militia and to find remedies for nationwide militia 

problems. Unlike members of the Regular Army who eschewed political involvement, 

militia leaders believed that their unique status as both citizens and soldiers gave them an 

inalienable right to form opinions on military matters and to discuss them openly with 

their elected officials. Out of the original discussions in Richmond arose the National 

Guard Association (NGA), the nation’s oldest and most successful military lobbying 

organization. (51) 

The NGA held its first national conference in St. Louis in October 1879 at the 

armory of the 1st Missouri Infantry. The purpose of the NGA was to promote “military 

efficiency” in the militia and to develop national legislation for militia reform. Delegates 

from fourteen States sat on various panels that addressed a range of issues. Before the 

conference ended, participants elected a slate of NGA officers. Brig. Gen. George W. 

Wingate of New York became the NGA’s first president, a position he held until 1890. 

(52) 

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Army National Guard History

Two issues dominated the first convention: achieving a substantial increase in the 

federal militia appropriation and consideration of the specifics of a militia reform bill. 

Since 1808, the annual federal militia allotment had remained at $200,000. The NGA 

believed that with the growth of the national population and the effects of inflation that 

Congress should increase the appropriation to $1 million and allow the States to use 

funds for items beyond weaponry. One delegate pointed out that the Regular Army of 

26,000 officers and men cost the government $40 million each year, making the militia a 

rich return on the nation’s investment. Proposed legislation intended to replace the 

Militia Act of 1792 included several key reforms. First and foremost, the National Guard 

was to supplant completely the old enrolled militia. (By 1879, many States had adopted 

the title “National Guard,” but a formal name change at the national level was still nearly 

forty years in the future.) The National Guard was to consist of two groups: soldiers in 

organized units readily available for active duty, and a reserve force comprised of older 

citizen-soldiers subject to service only during the most severe emergencies. Other 

provisions called for mandatory annual encampments, the construction of rifle ranges for 

marksmanship training, and the assignment of Regular Army officers to senior staff 

positions in National Guard regiments and brigades. (53) 

Militia officers traveling to Washington had difficulty convincing Congress of the 

Company D, 1st Minnesota Infantry at the National Encampment in Washington, DC in May 1887. 

The descendants of the 1st Minnesota that gained fame for its charge at Gettysburg in 1863 won 

second place in the 1887 national drill competition. (John Listman Collection) 

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Army National Guard History

need for reforms. A combination of apathy, antimilitarism and a devotion to States’ 

rights prevented militia leaders from gaining approval for their bill. In a repeat of the 

political concerns of the 1780s, several Congressmen viewed the bill as an unnecessary 

intrusion into State affairs. Finally, the NGA dropped the reform bill and concentrated its 

efforts on increasing militia funding. On this point, the Army lent its support. Increased 

appropriations for the militia meant that the Army could more quickly displace its aging 

inventories of weapons and equipment to the States and hasten the modernization of its 

own units. The NGA’s lobbying efforts finally bore fruit in 1887 when Congress 

doubled the militia’s annual allotment to $400,000. (54) 

The Militia and Westward Expansion 

The Louisiana Purchase in 1802 and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ending the 

Mexican War in 1848 gained for the United States the huge landmass that eventually 

constituted the States of the West and the Plains. As settlers pushed westward beyond the 

Mississippi River to carve new States and Territories from the wilderness, they formed 

militia groups. Citizen-soldiers provided protection against bandits and vigilantes, 

guarded prisoners, acted as posses, controlled riots in the cities, safeguarded officials and 

helped to settle disputes over ranch, water, and mining claims. A principle function of 

local militias was to provide security against Indian attacks and to launch reprisal raids. 

In August 1862, Minnesota citizen-soldiers put down a Sioux uprising that cost the lives 

of more than 600 whites. Perhaps the most bloodthirsty moment in the militia’s history 

occurred in southeastern Colorado in November 1864 at the Sand Creek Massacre. The 

Third Regiment of Colorado Volunteer Cavalry, led by Colonel John M. Chivington, 

attacked a mixed settlement of Cheyennes and Arapahos. Many of the braves were away 

hunting, and Chivington’s men destroyed the village, killing and mutilating nearly 150 

Native Americans, most of who were women and children. The militiamen returned to 

Denver with one hundred scalps they displayed for public viewing. In New Mexico, 

Colonel Kit Carson used the militia to humble the Apaches. In 1868, a band of fifty-one 

militiamen suffered 55 percent losses while repelling a large Indian attack against 

Beecher’s Island on the Arkansas River. After the 1860s, the Regular Army took up the 

primary burden of Indian fighting. (55) 

On the Pacific coast, California created the most substantial militia forces in the 

West. Mexico ceded California to the United States in 1848, and two years later, it 

became the thirty-first State. California’s first militia unit predated Statehood. Citizens 

organized the 1st California Guard in San Francisco in 1849 to subdue lawless gangs. At 

the ceremony marking California’s admission to the Union, the 1st California Guard fired 

the necessary salutes. The unit drilled frequently at the Presidio of San Francisco, and in 

1850, built the Military Hall as its own armory building. That same year, the legislature 

created the position of AG, divided the State into four militia districts and authorized the 

creation of volunteer militia companies. With the State’s population and economic 

activity centered on San Francisco, Sacramento, and the gold mines of the Sierra Nevada, 

most militia companies formed in northern California. Within five years, the number of 

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Army National Guard History

militia organizations had grown to thirty-four, and on the eve of the Civil War, “The 

Golden State” included seventy-four companies. Though no California regiments served 

in the Civil War’s principle theaters, Californians volunteered as individuals for eastern 

regiments, formed regiments for duty in the West and joined local militia companies. At 

the end of the war, 164 militia companies existed. In 1866, the legislature changed the 

name of the militia to the “National Guard of the State of California” and directed all 

units to adopt the Regular Army’s field uniform. After the Civil War, California 

maintained the largest State soldiery in the West. By 1885, California included 3,217 

Guardsmen, and within ten years, strength had increased to 4,364 soldiers. (56) 

Kansas developed the most respectable militia organization on the Plains. The 

establishment of the Kansas Territory in 1854 required the creation of a militia to enforce 

laws and deal with the Indians. After Kansas entered the Union in 1861, militia units 

became embroiled in a deadly struggle to determine the State’s ultimate fate as a free or 

slaveholding entity. The most intense fighting occurred along the Kansas-Missouri 

border where proslavery and abolitionist militia units engaged in a savage and protracted 

guerilla war. The 7th Kansas Cavalry became known as “The Jayhawkers,” a term 

synonymous with indiscriminate destruction and looting. After the Civil War, the Kansas 

militia languished until the late 1870s when the State soldiery was revitalized by a 

dramatic increase in population, strike duty, and the action of veterans. In May 1879, ten 

volunteer militia companies combined to create the 1st Kansas Regiment, and within 

months, a second regiment was activated. Nearly two-thirds of all officers were Civil 

War veterans, and Kansas soldiers adopted the Army’s field uniform. In 1880, Kansas 

created a State chapter of the NGA. The Militia Law of 1885 created a Military Board to 

administer units, provided funds for summer camp and armory rental, and renamed the 

militia as the “Kansas National Guard.” By 1895, Kansas included 1,815 Guardsmen and 

was the largest Guard organization on the Plains. (57) 

In the Southwest, the New Mexico Territory relied upon its Spanish milicia roots 

to develop a credible force of citizen-soldiers. The earliest militia forces came to New 

Mexico in April 1598 when Spanish adventurers first crossed the Rio Grande and took 

formal possession of the region. A system of citizen-soldiers — Vecinos — was in effect 

for the next two and a half centuries under Spanish rule. In 1846, U.S. troops occupied 

Santa Fe and established America’s claim to New Mexico. The first territorial militia 

was organized that year, and in 1851, the legislature formally sanctioned the militia and 

created the position of AG. Under the command of the famous Indian scout, Colonel Kit 

Carson, the militia routed rival Indian tribes. During the Civil War, New Mexico fielded 

four militia regiments that fought successfully to retain New Mexico for the Union. At 

the battle of Glorietta Pass on March 28, 1862, a combined force of Union troops and 

New Mexico militia turned back an invading Confederate column and ended southern 

hopes for gaining control of the territory. In 1885, militia strength stood at nearly 1,500 

soldiers, but territorial governors began to rely more on local law enforcement and less 

on citizen-soldiers to keep the peace. A decade later, the militia was down to 500 men, 

and the legislature renamed them the “New Mexico National Guard.” (58) 

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Army National Guard History

The Rise of the National Guard 

On April 30, 1889, New York City hosted elaborate ceremonies honoring the 

centennial of George Washington’s first inauguration as president. More than a million 

astonished spectators watched nearly 30,000 State soldiers paraded along New York’s 

streets. The massed ranks of citizen-soldiers constituted the largest body of armed men 

assembled since the Civil War and the largest force of militiamen ever gathered in 

America. The parading units gave the appearance of a well armed, equipped, and 

disciplined force ready for immediate service. Perhaps more than any other event, the 

National Guard’s participation at the centennial celebration demonstrated that the 

volunteer militia system that had flourished after the War of 1812 was fading away. (59) 

The Guard’s highly visible role in strikebreaking revived debates of the proper 

role of State soldiers in national military policy. Many Guardsmen disliked their role as 

industrial policemen and realized that in order to prosper they could not become 

identified solely as strikebreakers and the enemy of the working class. More and more, 

State soldiers eschewed their involvement in labor disputes and promoted themselves as 

an organized combat reserve of the Army. By the late 1890s, Guard spokesmen were 

strongly affirming their desire for a combat reserve role. Colonel James M. Rice of 

Illinois wrote that State soldiers would “be very much pained...to find that they were only 

organized to do police duty” and that service to the nation in wartime was the “pride and 

life of the National Guard.” In a clever twist of public perceptions, Guardsmen presented 

themselves as the institutional embodiment of all citizen-soldiers, including the 

volunteers of the Civil War. But unlike volunteers called from the population at large, 

Guardsmen stressed that they were an organized, partially trained and equipped force 

available for duty at the outbreak of hostilities. (60) 

The Guard’s emerging vision of itself coincided with the Army’s search for a new 

mission. The close of the American West and improved communications and advancing 

industrialization around the globe prompted the Army to consider overseas campaigning 

as its new raison d’etre. Army reformers believed that ultimately America would 

become involved in a war with one of the major European powers. In such a conflict, 

America would face an army manned by well-trained professionals and organized 

reserves. Progressive officers wanted the U.S. Army reorganized along European lines 

with a proficient general staff and a large, trained reserve force. In a war against a major 

adversary, America would not have the time to raise a volunteer-based, mass army after 

the outbreak of hostilities. (61) 

One way the National Guard promoted itself as a national reserve was by taking 

on an appearance more like that of the Regular Army. The increase in the nation’s 

population and the experience of the Civil War convinced citizen-soldiers to make 

regiments the basis of their post-bellum organizations rather than separate companies. 

Most States adopted the Regular Army’s plain field uniform for normal duty and retained 

their extravagant uniforms for formal occasions. In 1871, New York Guardsmen had 

been instrumental in forming the National Rifle Association, and competitive 

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Army National Guard History

marksmanship events became a hallmark of 

National Guard training. While Guard units 

still thrived as social organizations, they 

placed more emphasis on readiness. (62) 

Pennsylvania citizen-soldiers became 

the personification of the Guard’s new 

orientation. In 1879, the Keystone State 

eliminated its enrolled militia districts and 

reorganized itself into a single, tactical 

division with a headquarters and three 

brigades. Pennsylvania troops drilled one 

night per week, stood for periodic 

inspections and participated in an annual, 

six-day summer encampment. In 1884, the 

Pennsylvania division held its first 

encampment on the battlefield at 

Gettysburg. (By forming the nation’s first 

organized division in peacetime in 1879, the 

U.S. Army officially recognizes what 

eventually became Pennsylvania’s 28th 

Infantry Division as its oldest, permanently 

organized combat division.) (63) 

Unlike the ante-bellum volunteer 

militia, the States supported the Guard with 

funding after 1877. Financial support was 

greatest in the industrialized and more 

The National Guard armory in Worcester, 

Massachusetts, with its stone turrets and 

battlements, was typical of the castellated 

armories of the day. Dedicated in 1887, the 

building still serves as the National Guard 

Archives and Museum for the Bay State. 

(Massachusetts National Guard Archives and 

Museum) 

populated States of the Northeast and Midwest. In general, the States recognized the 

sacrifices Guardsmen made by offering modest uniform allowances and stipends for 

attendance at summer camp. In 1895, State military budgets reached an aggregate of 

$2.7 million, far overshadowing the annual federal allocation of $400,000. Still, in the 

southern and western states with small military budgets, federal monies were significant 

in supporting Guard organizations struggling to survive. At the local level, officers and 

soldiers still contributed a great deal of the money needed to sustain their units. (64) 

The bulk of State budgets went toward armory construction. State legislators 

welcomed the awarding of lucrative labor and construction contracts for the building of 

armories in their districts. In some cases, elite units with wealthy benefactors provided 

funding for the construction of their own armories. Across the nation, Guard units 

abandoned borrowed public facilities and rented space in private buildings and moved to 

new armory buildings. State and Guard officials agreed that armories had to be large 

enough to support a unit’s administrative, training, and recreational activities. Armories 

were to have a distinct, military look, and architects adopted a “castellated” style that 

employed towers, turrets and parapets of heavy stone to make armories an imposing sight 

and a formidable defensive position. Soldiers and civilians alike believed that castellated 

109 
Army National Guard History

armories constituted safe sanctuaries in urban centers from which Guardsmen would 

emerge to quell labor disturbances and urban rioting. Perhaps the most imposing and 

elaborate armory in the nation’s history was the 7th New York’s facility that was built 

with private funds and opened in 1879 to great fanfare. (65) 

The mutual interest Army and Guard officers had in creating a trained, national 

reserve resulted in closer cooperation between the States and the War Department. The 

National Rifle Association sponsored competitive shooting events that pitted Guardsmen 

against Regulars. Beginning in 1880, the War Department detailed Regular officers to 

inspect Guard summer encampments whenever the States requested such assistance. 

Guardsmen and Regulars came into direct contact through the assignment of active duty 

officers to inspect and instruct State troops. By the late 1890s, nearly fifty Army officers 

were assigned full-time to the States, and during the summer training season, many more 

were on temporary duty. Increased exposure to State soldiers convinced many Regulars 

that instructing the Guard should become one of their principle functions. (66) 

However, the era was not one of complete harmony. Some Army reformers 

openly questioned the Guard’s value as a viable reserve and stubbornly pushed for an 

expansion of Regular forces and the creation of a new, federally controlled reserve. 

Many Regulars complained of the Guard’s lack of discipline and skills and viewed the 

Citizen-soldiers of the “Tacoma Guard,” Company C, 1st Infantry, of the Washington State 

National Guard during their summer encampment in July 1891. The use of federal uniforms and 

equipment reflects the National Guard’s desire to become a combat reserve to the U.S. Army. 

(Washington State Historical Society) 

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Army National Guard History

militia’s tradition of electing company officers as detrimental to unit effectiveness. An 

attitude developed that Guard units deserved their own leaders in peacetime, but when 

called to active duty, trained professionals should lead them into battle. At the same 

time, many Guardsmen resented federal intrusion into their affairs. The States refused to 

reorganize their units to make them conform to Regular Army standards. In general, the 

Guard wanted the best of both worlds--federal aid without interference from the War 

Department. By the 1890s, progressive Guardsmen understood that to become an 

effective reserve force they would have to accept some degree of federal supervision. 

(67) 

In 1895, the National Guard was well established across the country. Personnel 

strength stood at 115,699, making the Guard more than four times larger than the Regular 

Army. All forty-three States and three of the four territories – Alaska excepted – 

maintained Guard units. African-Americans established a presence in the Guard, and 

between 1865 and 1914, at least twenty-two States and the District of Columbia at some 

time maintained black units that ranged in size from separate companies to complete 

regiments. The strongest States included New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, 

Georgia, South Carolina, Illinois, Ohio, and California with more than 4,000 Guardsmen 

each. Only three States still used the term “militia.” In terms of capabilities, the Guard 

included approximately 94,000 infantrymen, 5,500 artillerymen, and 7,000 cavalrymen. 

One observer calculated that the annual cost of maintaining one Regular was $1,000 

while a Guardsman cost $24 annually, with the States and individual citizen-soldiers 

shouldering 80 percent of the financial burden. (68) 

Conclusions 

During the 19th Century, State soldiers underwent a metamorphosis that forever 

changed the militia. After the War of 1812, political, social, and economic conditions 

rendered the enrolled militia ineffective. In its place, volunteer militia companies arose 

that performed both social and military functions. The cataclysm of the Civil War swept 

the volunteer militia away, and it resurfaced only sporadically prior to 1877. Duty as 

strikebreakers returned the volunteer militia to the national scene. Citizen-soldiers tired 

of their role as industrial policemen, and as the 1800s came to a close, progressive State 

soldiers envisioned a new National Guard whose mission was to serve as the primary 

combat reserve of the U.S. Army. 

Despite the demise of the enrolled militia, State soldiers still performed valuable 

service that was consistent with their constitutional mandate to “execute the Laws of the 

Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” In the War of 1812, militiamen 

provided the final victory at New Orleans that salvaged their reputation and begged 

comparisons with the battle of Bunker Hill. Militiamen guarded America’s southern 

border and provided troops for volunteer regiments during the Mexican War. Militia 

regiments executed the opening moves of the Civil War and fought the first major battle 

at Bull Run. During the opening of the American West, militiamen dealt with Indians, 

protected settlements and provided valuable service to federal, territorial, and State 

111 
Army National Guard History

officials. Beginning in 1877, State soldiers were involved in increasingly frequent and 

violent labor disputes between captains of industry and their workers. 

Important policy changes profoundly affected defense plans. During the War of 

1812 the refusal of key Governors to make their troops available for federal service and 

the unwillingness of certain militia units to invade Canada tarnished the militia’s 

credibility as a reliable reserve force. Calhoun’s Expansible Army Plan was the first 

proposal designed to create a Regular Army that did not require wartime augmentation 

from the militia. When America’s first foreign war erupted, the War Department relied 

upon volunteers rather than militiamen to defeat Mexico, even though large numbers of 

State troops filled the ranks of volunteer regiments. The early crisis of the Civil War 

brought militiamen to the forefront again, but ultimately the North and the South relied 

upon volunteers and conscripts to man their armies. After the Civil War, the NGA 

appeared as a permanent lobbying organization to promote policies favorable to the 

Guard. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibited federal troops from engaging in law 

enforcement missions unless acting under presidential orders. With Regulars largely 

excluded from domestic missions, the militia became even more important in providing 

support to civil authorities during State emergencies. 

In the 1890s, three separate groups were at work to create a more effective 

National Guard. The federal government had doubled its overall appropriation, and 

Army officers were available to inspect and train Guard units. The States supported 

citizen-soldiers with revised militia laws and increased funding that allowed the 

construction of armories, reimbursed individuals for uniforms and provided modest pay 

for summer encampments. Guard officers pressed for a new role as the Army’s combat 

reserve while State soldiers still gave freely of their time, money, and efforts in order to 

maintain their units. The Militia Act of 1792 remained the enabling militia legislation 

between the States and the federal government, and until it was repealed or amended, 

efforts to improve the Guard’s effectiveness would remain limited and incremental. In 

the end, the catalyst for reform did not come from the federal government, the States or 

serving Guardsmen, but from an unexpected, catastrophic explosion in Havana harbor 

that plunged the country into war. 

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Army National Guard History

The American Civil War, 1861-1865 

The Militia Presidents 

Abraham Lincoln 

Abraham Lincoln was born into poverty in a log 

cabin in Hodgenville, Kentucky in 1809. 

with his family to Indiana in 1816 and finally to Illinois 

in 1830. ears later, the Governor of Illinois called 

out the militia in a campaign against the Indians. 

chieftain Black Hawk led the Sacs in a series of actions 

to reclaim territories they had given up by treaty. 

Young Abraham Lincoln joined a militia company and 

was elected captain. hen it appeared that his unit 

would not see service, many of its members disbanded 

and went home. Lincoln volunteered as a 

private in a militia scout unit, sometimes called the 

“Independent Spy Battalion.” Lincoln said later that no success gave him as much 

personal satisfaction as his time in the Illinois militia. 

After the Black Hawk War, Lincoln successfully pursued law and politics and 

maintained an interest in militia affairs. the Illinois legislature in 1834-

1841 and in the U.S. House of Representatives during 1847-1849. n 1860, Lincoln was 

elected the 16th president of the United States and became perhaps the most outstanding 

president in American history. Guided by great wisdom, sound judgment, and 

extraordinary common sense, Lincoln led the country through its darkest hours and was 

successful in preserving the Union and freeing the slaves. As commander in chief, 

Lincoln proved an adept strategist who realized that destroying the armies of the 

Confederacy was more important than capturing Richmond or seizing other strategic 

points. 

On April 14, 1865, John Wilkes Booth, a former member of the Richmond Grays, 

became the most infamous militiaman of the 19th Century when he assassinated President 

Lincoln at Ford’s Theater in Washington, DC. ooth broke into the presidential box 

during a play and shot the most prestigious citizen-soldier to ever serve in the Illinois 

militia. ooth jumped from the presidential box to the stage below, but as he leaped, he 

caught a spur on the flag of the Treasury Guards, a militia unit organized in the District of 

Columbia during the Civil War. Knocked off balance by the militia flag, Booth landed 

awkwardly on the stage and broke a bone in his ankle. inadvertently caused 

by the militia flag hastened Booth’s capture and death. flag of the Treasury Guards 

still hangs in the presidential box at Ford's Theater and bears the tear caused by John 

Wilkes Booth's spur. 

He moved 

Two y

The 

W

However,

He served with 

I

B

B

The injury

The

113
Army National Guard History

Jefferson Davis 

Jefferson Davis dedicated much of his life to public 

service as a soldier-statesman with military experience as 

both a Regular Army officer and a leader of citizensoldiers. Born in 1808 in Fairview, Kentucky, the Davis 

family eventually moved to Mississippi where they 

accumulated considerable wealth as planters. 

Jefferson Davis attended West Point, graduated in 1828, 

and served in the Northwest Territory as a lieutenant of 

dragoons before resigning his commission in 1835. or 

the next ten years, he concentrated on his plantation and 

State politics. 

In 1845, Davis was elected to the U.S. House of 

Representatives but resigned his seat to command troops in the Mexican War. Returning 

to Mississippi, he led the citizen-soldiers of the Mississippi Rifles with distinction at the 

battles of Monterrey and Buena Vista. vis’ insistence on good order and discipline 

and the arming of his soldiers with the best-rifled weapons available made the 

Mississippi Rifles one of the premier regiments of the Mexican War. The returning war 

hero was appointed as a U.S. senator in 1847, and during 1853-1857, Davis served 

effectively as secretary of war. rned to the Senate in 1857, but resigned his 

seat in January 1861 after Mississippi seceded from the Union. mmediately upon his 

return home, the Governor appointed Davis as commander of the Mississippi militia with 

the rank of major general. 

The provisional government of the Confederate States of America selected Jefferson 

Davis as its president, and he was inaugurated at Montgomery, Alabama in February 

1861. As president of the Confederacy, Davis encountered a bewildering array of 

political, economic, and military challenges. h no one ever questioned Davis’ 

moral and physical courage, an imperious temper, icy formality, and failing health 

eventually reduced his effectiveness. spite his complete dedication, Davis never 

proved as politically able or publicly inspiring as his opponent, Abraham Lincoln. 

As the Confederacy collapsed, Davis fled the southern capital at Richmond. 

10, 1865, a Union cavalry patrol captured Davis at Irwinville, Georgia, and he was 

imprisoned at Fort Monroe, Virginia for two years on the charge of treason. 

released on bail in May 1867 after his physical and emotional health had deteriorated. 

returned to Mississippi, refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and 

eventually took up residence on the Gulf coast at Biloxi. n 1881, Davis published The 

Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. The Confederacy’s only president died in 

1889 and is buried in Hollywood Cemetery in Richmond. 

Young 

F

Da

Davis retu

I

Thoug

De

On May 

Davis was 

He 

I

114
Army National Guard History

CHAPTER 4 

The Birth of the Modern 

National Guard, 1898-1916 

The time is now near at hand when by Federal statute the organization, 

armament and discipline of the Organized Militia in the several States 

and Territories shall be the same as that prescribed for the Regular Army 

of the United States. 

Senator Charles Dick, 

National Guard magazine, 

January 1910 

Introduction 

Maj. Gen. John F. O’Ryan of the New York National Guard took great pride in 

the performance of his soldiers during the past few weeks. The United States and Mexico 

were on the brink of war, and in the summer of 1916, President Woodrow Wilson had 

ordered the National Guard to active duty to protect the nation’s southwestern border. 

As commander of the National Guard’s 6th Division, O’Ryan had supervised its rail 

movement from mobilization camps in the Empire State to cantonment areas in south 

Texas. During the long trek, Guardsmen had chalked “Get Villa!” and other patriotic 

slogans on the rail cars indicating that they were ready for a fight. From his 

headquarters near Laredo, General O’Ryan monitored the activities of the 6th Division’s 

regiments deployed along the banks of the lower Rio Grande. 

John O’Ryan marveled at the transformation that had occurred within the 

National Guard since he had enlisted as a private in Company G, 7th New York Infantry 

in 1897. After accepting a transfer to the artillery, he rose through the ranks to 

command his own battery in 1907. O’Ryan embraced the National Guard’s new role as 

a combat reserve to the Regular Army. When he took command, he removed the billiard 

and ping-pong tables from the armory, told soldiers that weekly drill was mandatory and 

launched a strict training program. O’Ryan enjoyed the new summer maneuvers with the 

Regulars, and he became widely recognized for his aptitude in military matters. In 1912, 

the Governor of New York selected him to command one of the National Guard’s new 

combat divisions. Two years later, O’Ryan was the first National Guard officer to 

graduate from the new Army War College. 

Despite all of the changes, O’Ryan suspected even more challenges in the coming 

months. A grisly war of attrition raged in Europe, and if the United States became 

involved, New York’s division would surely be sent to the fighting. The 6th Division had 

procured four machine guns, and troops spent their days under the hot, Texas sun 

learning all they could about the weapons’ devastating firepower. If called to fight in 

115 
Army National Guard History

Europe, John F. O’Ryan was determined that his soldiers would be as ready as 

possible... 

In the first two decades of the 20th Century, the United States exerted its authority 

more decisively beyond the borders of North America. New foreign policy interests in 

Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific prompted the commitment of American 

armed forces overseas. At home, military reformers pressed for bolder, more robust 

defense policies. The Army faced the challenge of transforming itself from a force 

organized for domestic constabulary duty to one prepared for overseas campaigning. 

Both Regulars and citizen-soldiers needed capabilities commensurate with America’s 

new status as an emerging world power. At the same time, a revolution in military 

technology occurred centered around the battleship, the airplane, and the internal 

combustion engine. Within the Army, improved weapons and equipment prompted 

changes in doctrine, organization, and tactics. 

Military reforms of the early 20th Century forever altered the face of the citizensoldier. The volunteer militia of the 19th Century, with deep roots in most States, gave 

way to a reformed National Guard with closer ties to the federal government. Benchmark 

legislation provided additional funding to Guardsmen, mandated tighter federal controls 

over State soldiers and established the National Guard’s rightful place in U.S. military 

policy. The Guard changed fundamentally in terms of its funding, organization, training, 

and administration. By the end of the period, the National Guard was an active 

instrument of American foreign policy and a more effective combat reserve of the U.S. 

Army. 

The Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection 

When the U.S.S. Maine exploded and sank in Havana harbor in Cuba on the 

morning of February 15, 1898, it ignited a long simmering conflict between Spain and the 

United States over Cuban independence. Americans blamed the explosion on Spanish 

sabotage, and war cries were heard across the country. Spain maintained a large army in 

Cuba in order to deter a growing independence movement. The actions of Spanish 

colonial authorities were often brutal, and sensational press reports about alleged 

atrocities outraged the American people. Congress declared war against Spain on April 

22, 1898 with the goal of securing Cuban independence. By war’s end, America was set 

upon the world stage as an imperial power with colonies in the Caribbean, the central 

Pacific, and the Far East. (1) 

Within days, word arrived of Commodore George Dewey’s quick and decisive 

naval victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in the Philippines, a key Spanish 

possession in the southwest Pacific. Dewey's victory on May 1st added more energy to 

the great wave of war excitement already running through the country. At the time, the 

Army numbered only 28,000 men, far too few to invade the major Spanish colonies in the 

Caribbean--Cuba and Puerto Rico -- and to occupy the Philippines. President William 

McKinley called upon the States to raise 125,000 men for overseas service. As in the 

Civil War, the federal government called upon the Governors to raise volunteer 

116 
Army National Guard History

regiments. Subsequent calls raised 58,000 more men, bringing the number of volunteers 

to 182,687. (2) 

However, the presidential callup of April 22nd stipulated that all men filling the 

first volunteer units had to come from existing militia organizations. To negate concerns 

over the possible illegalities of militia service overseas, all State soldiers had to volunteer 

for foreign duty. With the popularity of the war, entire regiments of enthusiastic 

militiamen mustered into the Army for two years. A total of 194 militia units served 

during the period. Perhaps the most famous American unit of the war, the 1st U.S. 

Volunteer Cavalry, popularly known as the “Rough Riders,” included one New Mexico 

National Guard cavalry squadron and two troops from the Arizona Guard. Theodore 

Roosevelt, a former New York Guardsman, was instrumental in raising the regiment and 

served as its lieutenant colonel. The Army in 1898 remained racially segregated, with 

African-American soldiers allowed to serve in only four regiments, and the militia 

followed this same pattern. Of the sixteen States with black commands, just eight offered 

up black units for service. (3) 

By early May, troops quickly moved from their armories to induction camps at 

the State capitals. After completing preliminary mobilization procedures, the volunteer 

regiments boarded trains for hastily constructed training camps either in the South or near 

San Francisco, locations that allowed easy deployment to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 

Philippines. The major criterion used to select campsites was railroad accessibility. 

Health concerns were not seriously considered, and troops arrived to find poor drinking 

water and unsanitary conditions. These factors led to the biggest killer of the war, 

disease. Far more American soldiers died from malaria, yellow fever, typhoid, and 

typhus than from bullets. For example, New York had 436 men die in service, only 

fifteen of whom were killed in combat. (4) 

As training regimes began, a number of problems became apparent. Many of the 

militia officers lacked the qualifications and experience to properly train their soldiers. 

With help from Army advisors, most gained an acceptable level of competence, and 

talented men from the ranks replaced those who fell short. In training camps militiamen 

spent almost all of their time drilling, marching, and learning the proper handling and 

care of their arms and equipment. Target practice and bayonet drills were regular 

activities. To toughen up the men, units conducted cross-country marches and field 

exercises. Within weeks, militiamen from all walks of life gained confidence in 

themselves and their leaders. The greatest problem facing enlisted men was the poor 

condition of their uniforms and equipment. Most States had adopted the Army blue 

fatigue uniform. However, the rapid increase of all units to wartime strength soon 

exhausted uniform stockpiles. Many men had to wait until they arrived at the camps to 

get their issues of clothing and equipment. The militia carried the obsolete .45-caliber 

Springfield rifle developed right after the Civil War. Ammunition for the .45 Springfield 

still used black powder that created puffs of gray smoke when fired and exposed soldiers’ 

positions in combat. In contrast, the Regulars carried the more modern, magazine-fed 

Krag-Jorgensen rifle. While some militiamen deployed overseas with Krags, most 

carried their obsolete Springfields. (5) 

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Army National Guard History

By June many of the regiments in the East coast camps were completely 

equipped, trained, and ready to go to Cuba. War plans called for the capture of Santiago, 

the base of the Spanish fleet, from the landside to compel the fleet to sail out and engage 

the much stronger American Navy. With the capture of Santiago, U.S. troops would then 

invest Havana and end Spanish rule. Most of the units identified to sail first were 

Regular Army commands of the newly organized U.S. V Corps that included Guard units 

from the District of Columbia, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York. 

These units massed at Tampa, Florida to await transportation to Cuba. Due to the 

quickness of the mobilization there was not enough shipping to carry the whole corps at 

once. Most of the vessels used were hired tramp freighters, often in poor condition and 

meant to carry goods, not soldiers and horses. So few horses could be taken that almost 

all of the cavalry ended up fighting dismounted. The first convoy sailed on June 14th and 

dropped anchor off Santiago on the 21st

. Due to the shipping shortage only two State 

units, the 2nd Massachusetts and the 71st New York, sailed for Cuba with the V Corps. (6) 

By June 24th most of the men had been off-loaded while advance parties probed 

toward Santiago. An engagement occurred at Las Guasimas between U.S. cavalry and 

Spanish defenders. After a sharp fight the Spanish withdrew; American casualties 

included sixteen killed and fifty-two wounded Rough Riders. The Spanish then took up 

good defensive positions along a series of heights protecting Santiago, including Kettle 

and San Juan Hills. On July 1st, American troops assaulted the entrenched defenders. The 

attacks started at El Caney, a village with in depth defenses. Among the assault troops 

was the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry. After a six-hour fight, the Spanish withdrew, leaving 

eighty-one Americans dead, five of them militiamen. While the fight at El Caney 

continued, the battle to capture Kettle and San Juan Hills began. Teddy Roosevelt and 

the Rough Riders first charged up Kettle Hill and then against San Juan Hill, gaining 

fame for themselves. Among the first to reach the top of Kettle Hill were Guardsmen 

from two New Mexico cavalry troops. The cost was high; twenty Rough Riders died, as 

did fifteen members of the 71st New York Infantry, the only other militia unit in the 

assault. After the capture of the heights, U.S. artillery bombarded Santiago harbor and 

compelled the Spanish fleet to sally forth, whereupon the U.S. Navy quickly destroyed it. 

(7) 

Santiago surrendered on July 17th. While investing the city Americans troops fell 

ill with yellow fever. Nearly 80 percent of the soldiers were sick, with many dying each 

day. To prevent further deaths, President McKinley ordered the newly arrived VII Corps 

to garrison the city while the troops of the V Corps sailed to New York to recover their 

health. With the signing of a general armistice on August 12th, a number of militia 

regiments deployed to Havana to garrison the capital. They returned home after the 

peace treaty granting Cuban independence was ratified in March 1899. (8) 

As the fighting ended in Cuba, the U.S. I Corps prepared to invade Puerto Rico. 

Most of the corps’ units were from the militia, including eight of its ten infantry 

regiments, plus an artillery battalion composed of batteries from four States. The cavalry 

included units from New York and Pennsylvania, and two militia engineer companies 

were among the corps’ troops. On July 25th, the first elements landed on the southern 

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Army National Guard History

part of the island, met no resistance and marched to the port of Ponce, Puerto Rico's 

second largest city. Two days later a direct landing was made at Ponce that encountered 

no enemy soldiers. These two forces linked up on July 31st. The next day a third landing 

occurred on the western portion of the island. According to plan these groups moved 

cross-country toward the capital of San Juan, to besiege it from the land side while the 

Navy blockaded from the sea. (9) 

The only significant engagement of the campaign occurred at a mountain pass 

named Coamo, on the line of march toward San Juan. Here the Spanish built six 

blockhouses to delay the American advance. Before the 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin Infantry 

launched their frontal attacks against the defenses, the 16th Pennsylvania Infantry 

succeeded in scaling the mountain on the Spanish right, coming down behind a startled 

enemy. As soon as the Pennsylvanians opened fire the two Wisconsin units charged. 

The battle lasted less than two hours, resulting in one soldier killed and ten wounded. 

Following the general armistice of August 12th, the Americans quickly occupied San 

Juan. The Army immediately established permanent garrisons, with all of the militia units 

returning home by the end of 1898. (10) 

With the campaigns in Cuba and Puerto Rico completed, only one theater of 

operations remained. The Philippines in the southwest Pacific were of particular strategic 

value to the United States. The McKinley Administration was intent on occupying the 

Soldiers of the 2nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry enter Ponce, Puerto Rico on July 29, 1898. 

(Library of Congress) 

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islands and establishing a permanent base there for the Navy in the Far East. The 

Philippine archipelago is composed of more than 1,000 islands, with the capital of Manila 

located on the large, central island of Luzon. Before the war, the Filipinos had an 

independence movement directed against the Spanish authorities. General Emilo 

Aguinaldo commanded 15,000 guerilla fighters on Luzon who waged a hit-and-run war 

against the Spanish. (11) 

In May 1898, the first of five convoys carrying the U.S. VIII Corps to the 

Philippines sailed from San Francisco. This increment consisted of 2,500 men, including 

the 1st California and 2nd Oregon Infantry plus two batteries of artillery. Part of the 

convoy was diverted to Guam, a Spanish colony, where Company A, 2nd Oregon landed 

with U.S. Marines to claim the island as an American territory. The main convoy arrived 

off Manila on June 30th and disembarked troops near Cavite, a peninsula seven miles 

south of the city. The soldiers quickly moved to the defensive lines near Manila and 

joined Aguinaldo's guerillas. There was great tension between the two forces, but they 

decided to act together. Reinforcements arrived before the end of July, including the 1st 

Colorado, 1st Nebraska, 10th Pennsylvania, 1st Idaho, 1st North Dakota and 13th Minnesota 

Infantry regiments and the 1st Battalion, 1st Wyoming Infantry. Added to these were two 

batteries of Utah artillery. With their arrival the American force numbered more than 

11,000 men and twenty-two field guns. (12) 

The Americans were strong enough to take the city and desired no participation 

from Aguinaldo's forces. It was feared the guerillas might capture portions of the city 

and hold them against advancing U.S. troops. The Americans opened secret talks with 

the Spanish governor, reminding him of deadly reprisals against Spanish civilians if the 

guerillas joined in the attack. On August 11th, the governor agreed to surrender Manila to 

the Americans, but only after token resistance designed to preserve Spanish honor. The 

plan called for a preliminary naval bombardment and an American waterborne landing 

while other U.S. troops rushed the city's land defenses. To prepare for the assault, the 1st 

California and 10th Pennsylvania Infantry moved into trenches occupied by Aguinaldo’s 

men without incident. The guerillas were to be kept out of the city. (13) 

Aguinaldo was warned not to interfere in the coming action. On the morning of 

August 13th, the Navy opened fire against the fortress protecting the old portion of the 

capital. No Spanish guns replied, and the Americans soon ceased fire. As planned, the 

2nd Oregon rowed ashore to surround and occupy the governor's palace and government 

buildings to prevent any guerillas from entering. The land assault met little resistance 

until troops reached the city’s center. Some Spaniards fired on the advancing militiamen 

who quickly overcame the resistance. Manila was soon under American control at a cost 

of six killed and ninety-two wounded. Unknown to anyone, the belligerents had signed 

an armistice ending the war the day before the attack. (14) 

Over the next months, an uneasy alliance developed between U.S. authorities and 

Aguinaldo as the Spanish withdrew and the new American colonial government was 

established. During this time the last two VIII Corps convoys arrived with heavy militia 

reinforcements: the 51st Iowa, 20th Kansas, 1st Montana, 1st South Dakota, 1st Tennessee, 

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and 1st Washington Infantry plus a battery of artillery from Wyoming and 1st Troop, 

Nevada Cavalry. Many of these units occupied the outer ring of defenses around Manila. 

After months of stalemate, Aguinaldo's forces finally launched coordinated attacks on 

several American outposts on the night of February 5, 1899. The insurgents hit positions 

held by the 10th Pennsylvania and 1st Nebraska. Militiamen repelled these attacks with 

few casualties. Soon, other U.S. forces joined the defenders, and by morning the rebels 

broke off their assaults. Then the militiamen went on the attack, taking many insurgent 

positions. By day's end, fifty-nine Americans were dead and 278 wounded. More than 

600 guerillas were killed. (15) 

Over the next few weeks the Americans and Filipinos took turns launching hitand- run raids against each other, resulting in increased losses on both sides. On March 

25th, the Americans went on the offensive. Their plan was to capture the rebel capital at 

Malolos, sixty miles north of Manila. While there were several sharp engagements, the 

main cause of losses for the Americans was the hot, humid climate. Many more soldiers 

lost their lives from sunstroke than from combat. After a grueling six-day advance, the 

Americans captured the smoldering ruins of Malolos. The rebels had fallen back to their 

new capital at San Isidro. (16) 

In mid-April the Americans advanced toward San Isidro. During this march, 

twenty soldiers made National Guard history by earning the Medal of Honor. The first 

three medals were awarded to members of the 20th Kansas. Colonel Frederick Funston 

A skirmish line of the 2nd Oregon Volunteer Infantry in the Philippines in 1898. Three members 

of the regiment were among the twenty Guardsmen awarded the Medal of Honor in the 

Philippines. (National Archives) 

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Army National Guard History

and two men braved intense enemy fire to swim a river with a guide rope that was used to 

pull rafts loaded with troops across in the face of the enemy. Once enough men were 

across, Funston led them in a charge, quickly overrunning the position and capturing 

twelve cannon. Soon after, a group of volunteers drawn from the 1st North Dakota and 

2nd Oregon became the vanguard of the column, leading the advance under the command 

of a local American civilian, William Young. Known as “Young's Scouts” they first 

stormed across a burning bridge under intense enemy fire, saving it for the American 

advance. Later they were surrounded and cut off in a small village. During several hours 

of desperate fighting, Young’s Scouts repelled numerous enemy assaults. When finally 

relieved, every man was wounded at least once. All thirteen survivors were awarded the 

Medal of Honor, and four additional State soldiers earned the Medal of Honor during the 

campaign. (17) 

At home, operations in the Philippines generated sharp debates. Many Americans 

did not favor involvement in the Philippines, and they demanded that citizen-soldiers 

come home. The men had enlisted to fight for Cuban independence, not to subdue the 

Philippines. The Army decided to organize four new regiments known as the “Federal 

Volunteer Force” for use exclusively in the Philippines. By offering a $500 bonus to any 

man willing to enlist for two years, the Army managed to fill the ranks with former 

militiamen. The remaining State soldiers moved back to Manila to await shipment home. 

By August 1899, all militia units arrived back in their States where enthusiastic crowds 

greeted them. In all, the militia had made the occupation of Puerto Rico and the capture 

of the Philippines possible, adding greatly to American gains during the war. (18) 

The Root Reforms 

Although the United States was victorious in the Spanish-American War, 

inefficiency, waste, and scandal characterized the mobilization and the logistical support 

of field forces. Newspaper reporters investigated the mobilization thoroughly and 

presented their readers with graphic illustrations of poor planning and outright 

incompetence. Filthy, disease infested mobilization camps, huge transportation jams at 

major rail yards and port facilities, and allegations that troops received embalmed and 

maggot-ridden beef rations -- later proven untrue -- were among the most egregious 

deficiencies. A presidential commission investigated the mobilization, found that most 

problems were due to poor leadership and excessive paperwork rather than malfeasance, 

and recommended major changes within the War Department. (19) 

On August 1, 1899, President McKinley appointed Elihu Root as the new 

secretary of war. A celebrated Wall Street lawyer, Root was intimately familiar with 

corporate reorganization and international law. McKinley wanted a secretary of war who 

could handle the complexities of administering America’s new overseas possessions 

while at the same time reorganizing and modernizing the War Department. In Elihu 

Root, the president found a public servant capable of both. Root proved himself as a 

competent administrator and an effective reformer who led the Army into a new era. (20) 

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Army National Guard History

The new secretary of war instinctively understood that America’s emerging role 

in foreign policy required a larger and more capable Regular Army backed by effective 

reserves. Root held forth the “fundamental proposition” that “the real object of having an 

army is to prepare for war.” The Army and the militia would have to make a huge, 

cultural shift from their more recent roles of frontier constabulary and strikebreakers to 

an effective instrument for overseas service. The Spanish-American War thus created an 

opportunity for progressive Regular and Guard officers who had sought closer 

cooperation since 1877. The old ways of doing business, that included a division of 

authority between the secretary of war and the commanding general, the nearly 

independent authority of the various bureau chiefs, and the iron grip of bureaucratic red 

tape that existed during peacetime, were no longer acceptable. 

The first target of Root’s reformist agenda was the Army’s schools system. Just 

after the Spanish-American War, one-third of Regular Army officers possessed no formal 

military education whatsoever, and Root set out to create a more professional officer 

corps with the intellectual and technical skills to administer the new colonies and to serve 

in overseas campaigns. On November 27, 1901, the War Department announced a 

reorganization that brought integration and order to the military education system. Every 

post of any significant size formed an officers’ school of instruction. Officers 

demonstrating notable skills and potential for increased responsibilities went on to 

advanced schools at Army posts designated as the home of the various arms and services. 

Many of these schools predated Root’s tenure, and prominent among them were the 

Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, the Coast Artillery School at Fort 

Monroe, and the Engineer and Medical Schools near Washington, DC. 

At the apex of the new schools system sat an embryonic Army War College, first 

established in the nation’s capital. Root intended for the War College to train the Army’s 

best officers while directing the military’s intellectual activities, gathering information 

related to policy matters and devising plans and alternatives for the War Department’s 

consideration. Originally consisting of only five senior officers, the War College 

nevertheless made credible studies of the daunting tasks of organizing and equipping 

field armies as large as 250,000 soldiers. From its humble beginnings, the War College 

flourished over time and finally established itself as the Army’s premier educational 

institution. 

Root also enacted a permanent reorganization and expansion of the Regular 

Army. Victories in a recent war, the ongoing guerilla uprising in the Philippines and the 

specter of future overseas commitments paved the way for a larger Army. In February 

1901, Congress authorized an expansion from twenty-five to thirty infantry regiments, 

and for the first time, regiments were organized into three battalions comprised of three 

companies each. Cavalry regiments grew from ten to fifteen. The Army’s artillery forces 

were entirely reorganized into two factions; field artillery and coast artillery. The field 

artillery consisted of thirty batteries, while the coast artillery’s 126 companies manned 

the country’s coastal defenses. Three engineer battalions became a standing part of the 

Army. Not counting indigenous forces in the new territories--a regiment of Filipino 

scouts and a Puerto Rico regiment--the Army’s new authorized strength stood at 88,619 

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Army National Guard History

officers and men. This new girth stood in stark contrast to the Army’s size of around 

27,000 during the 1880s and 1890s. 

A task more daunting than educational reform or organizational expansion was 

Root’s drive to create a modern general staff system. Drawing upon his legal and 

business background, Root concluded that the War Department lacked the strong 

leadership that America’s new status as a rising world power required. “Our system,” he 

observed, “makes no adequate provision for the directing brain which every army must 

have, to work successfully.” Because no precedent for such a controlling authority 

existed in America, Root turned to the study of Europe’s armies. The acknowledged 

paradigm of military efficiency at the time was Germany’s Great General Staff that had 

quickly mobilized a massive and victorious army during the Franco-Prussian War of 

1870-1871. Root realized that directly grafting the methods of the Prussian Army onto 

American society would not work. Still, the German General Staff had several 

characteristics worthy of emulation. A new American General Staff would be the 

Army’s central planning body and prove its worth by preparing war plans for all possible 

contingencies. His concept for a general staff developed over time and often encountered 

substantial opposition from the Army’s own commanding general, Nelson A. Miles. 

The General Staff Act of 1903 converted Root’s vision into a reality. The 

legislation authorized the creation of a General Staff Corps limited to forty-five officers 

assigned to the War Department. The commanding general’s position was abolished and 

replaced with an Army chief of staff whose main duties were to supervise the new staff 

and to serve as the principal military advisor to the secretary of war. Officers were to 

rotate periodically between field and staff assignments in order to gain a broad base of 

military experience. The act officially sanctioned the Army War College and reaffirmed 

its importance. The law gave only supervisory and coordinating authority over the War 

Department’s various offices and bureaus, and outright opposition to the new General 

Staff was not uncommon. Even with limited powers, the new staff made significant gains 

in improving officer education, field maneuvers, intelligence gathering, and mobilization 

planning. Army deployments to the Caribbean and Central America in 1906, 1911, and 

1913 went much smoother than the mobilization of 1898. 

The Root reforms eventually had a profound affect on both Regulars and citizensoldiers. In coming decades, the National Guard benefited from the creation of the 

General Staff and the improvements in Army schools. The reforms firmly established 

Elihu Root as one of the most significant and influential secretaries of war in American 

history. In addition, Root had an abiding interest and an important role in developing 

new policies that affected the militia. However, many of the principles and attitudes 

affecting militia reform after the Spanish-American War came from a man that Elihu 

Root and most of the American officer corps had never met. 

The Influence of Emory Upton 

The Army’s progressive reformers after the Spanish-American War drew most of 

their inspiration from the writings of Emory Upton. An 1861 graduate of West Point, 

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Army National Guard History

Upton proved a remarkable combat leader during the Civil War, rising to the rank of 

brevet major general by war’s end. After commanding a Regular artillery battery and 

serving on a division staff, he became the colonel of the 121st New York Infantry in 

October 1862. Upton’s most famous moment of the war came on May 10, 1864 during 

the brutal battle of Spotsylvania. A heavy assault column of twelve regiments under his 

command successfully breached the Confederate salient known as the Mule Shoe. 

Though unable to exploit the success, Upton’s assault on the Southern works was widely 

recognized for its novel tactics and daring execution. Two days later, he was promoted to 

brigadier general. After recovering from a wound received in September 1864, Upton led 

a Union cavalry division until the end of the war and achieved the rank of brevet major 

general just short of his twenty-sixth birthday. (21) 

Upton’s most immediate influence on the Army came after the Civil War when he 

became an earnest and articulate advocate for organizational change and policy reform. 

With the blessing of General Sherman, Upton revised the Army’s infantry, cavalry and 

artillery tactics to reflect lessons learned 

during the Civil War. Upton’s new 

infantry tactics replaced the volley firing, 

linear formations of the 19th Century with 

open order, fire and maneuver tactics that 

placed a premium on the individual 

soldier’s initiative and marksmanship. In 

various forms, Upton’s tactical system has 

endured throughout the 20th Century. (22) 

During 1875-1876, Upton went on 

a global tour to observe the armies of 

other world powers and to bring home 

recommendations for reforms. Upton 

published his findings in 1877 as The 

Armies of Asia and Europe in which he 

advocated a system of officers’ schools 

and an Army general staff based on the 

German model. In addition, he pressed 

hard for sweeping policy reforms that 

reduced the nation’s reliance on citizensoldiers and expanded and strengthened 

the Regular Army while freeing it from 

what Upton considered meddlesome 

civilian control. Though his tactical and 

organizational changes took hold quickly 

throughout the Army, as a policy reformer 

Upton clearly failed. Discouraged by the 

apparent rejection of some of his best 

ideas for policy reform, possibly 

Maj. Gen. Emory Upton in 1865. His writings 

challenged the contribution of he American 

citizen-soldier tradition and argued that a 

professional army was the only proper 

foundation for national defense. (U.S. Army 

Military History Institute) 

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Army National Guard History

despondent over his wife’s death and in failing health, on March 14, 1881 Upton penned 

his resignation from the Army in his private quarters at the Presidio of San Francisco. 

Moments later, he picked up a service revolver and put a bullet through his head. The 

suicide horrified the Army and added to Upton’s prestige as a dedicated reformer. (23) 

Upton’s most significant and enduring contributions to American military policy 

appeared in The Military Policy of the United States, an unpublished manuscript at the 

time of his death. In it, Upton focused on civil-military relations, the checkered 

battlefield performance of citizen-soldiers, and the waste and amateurism that he believed 

cast a dark cloud over America’s military history. He was the first to advance the notion 

that the U.S. Army should consist of three components--Regulars, volunteers, and the 

militia--with the militia relegated to a minor, domestic role. Upton believed that a variant 

of the reserve systems used by European armies was suitable for the United States. 

Instead of State soldiers acting as the Army’s primary combat reserve, America needed a 

robust national reserve under direct, federal control to support a larger Regular Army led 

by professional officers. The call for a federal reserve was not far removed from 

Calhoun’s Expansible Army Plan. Upton disdained political influence in military affairs 

and believed that officers should be apolitical and loyal only to the president and the 

Constitution. Conversely, politicians should be denied access into the officer corps by 

means of cronyism and political patronage. (24) 

Upton saved his cruelest cuts of all for the militia. He argued that one of the chief 

weaknesses in the nation’s defense was an excess expenditure of money and lives that 

resulted from a reliance on an ineffective militia system. Based on his own Civil War 

experience, Upton scorned the employment of militia troops led by officers utterly 

ignorant of the art of war. The power of the Governors and the AGs was an “intrusion” 

into the nation’s military affairs, and Upton lamented the power of the States in the 

appointment of officers. He rejected outright the proposals in Washington’s Sentiments 

and the Knox Plan of 1790 for making the militia a more reliable, reserve force. 

Emphasizing the failures of militia troops at Bladensburg and Bull Run, Upton ignored 

the successes at Bunker Hill, Bennington, Saratoga, Cowpens, and New Orleans. Upton 

stated flatly that if the Union army at Gettysburg had been comprised of only militiamen 

that Robert E. Lee’s troops would have prevailed with Washington, DC captured and the 

federal government “hopelessly destroyed.” Short of promoting the militia’s outright 

elimination, Upton argued that the militia should restrict itself to domestic missions and 

receive no federal financial support. In Upton’s world, the militia’s roles were limited to 

State service and occasionally assisting the Army and the new federal reserve in 

enforcing the nation’s laws, suppressing rebellions, and repelling invasions. (25) 

Upton’s philosophies were well known throughout the officer corps, but not until 

twenty years after his death did they appeared in a final, published format. Reformers 

brought Upton’s unpublished manuscript to the attention of Elihu Root who directed that 

it be printed and disseminated. In fact, many of Upton’s greatest ideas — the creation of 

a general staff, improved military education and the three-battalion system for regiments 

— came to fruition during Root’s tenure. Though he admired Upton’s writings, the 

reform minded secretary of war realized that Upton was naive when it came to the 

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Army National Guard History

realities of national politics and the formulation of policy. To Root, Upton wrote “from a 

purely military point of view” and failed “to appreciate difficulties arising from our form 

of government” and the force of public opinion “with which civil government has 

necessarily to deal in its direction” of the military. Regardless of such shortcomings, 

Upton’s disdain for the militia and the machinations of partisan politics were assimilated 

into the collective consciousness of the American officer corps. The full-time 

professionals who adopted Upton’s dour views on State soldiers became known as 

“Uptonians,” and they became a powerful influence in military planning for the 

remainder of the 20th Century. (26) 

The Militia Act of 1903 

Elihu Root had managed to expand the Army considerably, but pleas for 

additional increases in the number of Regular troops fell on deaf ears. Congress viewed a 

larger Army as too expensive, too militaristic and inconsistent with America’s long 

political tradition. Denied huge increases in the Regular Army, the War Department still 

lacked sound plans for raising a mass, national Army for a possible war against one of the 

European powers. At first, Root endorsed an Uptonian view that eschewed the 

employment of the militia. Instead of fighting, the militia would serve as a training base 

for a larger Army, perform home defense duties during peacetime and provide willing 

volunteers during a national crisis. However, two key developments finally convinced 

the secretary of war that the militia was a viable, credible military force he could no 

longer ignore. (27) 

Perhaps more than any other factor, the militia’s achievements in the SpanishAmerican War put citizen-soldiers in high standing with the American people. Militia 

volunteers had formed the bulk of the forces sent to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. In 

fact, without the militia volunteers who agreed to remain in the southwest Pacific, the 

Army would have been hard pressed to put down the Filipino insurrection. Militiamen 

felt they had done their full share while suffering the abuses of a poorly organized 

mobilization. They had endured disease-ridden camps, improper uniforms, and poor food 

while carrying antiquated weapons into battle. (28) 

After the war, militiamen across the country hastily reconstituted their units. 

Most militia organizations that had entered federal service as volunteer regiments had 

returned home by late 1898. Military reorganization in the States was at the grass roots 

without any direction from the War Department. For example, Vermont’s 1st Infantry 

came home after the war, quickly reoccupied its vacant armories and reclaimed its title as 

the 1st Infantry Regiment, Vermont National Guard. Texas reorganized the bulk of its 

units into two infantry brigades that were better manned than comparable brigades in the 

Regular Army. New York, the largest militia State with an aggregate strength of 13,869 

soldiers, organized itself into a balanced force of infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer, and 

signal units. Nevada claimed the smallest number of citizen-soldiers while mustering 

two infantry companies. By 1903, the total strength of the militia organized in the forty127 
Army National Guard History

five States stood at 116,542 officers and men. All served without promise of federal pay; 

most still remitted unit dues and provided their own uniforms. (29) 

Elihu Root’s reforms convinced the NGA and militia leaders that the time had 

finally come to press for legislation that would fundamentally redefine the State soldiery 

and its ties to the federal government. The conduct of the Spanish-American War and the 

closing of the American West convinced senior National Guard leaders that their real 

value at the dawn of the 20th Century was as a federal reserve to the Army. While the 

National Guard would certainly continue to meet the needs of the Governors, its best 

future was to become an indispensable adjunct of the Regular Army. The time had come 

to replace the Militia Act of 1792 and to position the National Guard in America’s first 

line of defense. For their service, National Guard soldiers were to receive federal funding 

and personal pay instead of continuing the traditional practice of providing for 

themselves. National Guard units properly trained and equipped were to constitute a low 

cost alternative to a larger, standing Army. (30) 

By 1903, Elihu Root recognized the need for a trained reserve and took 

affirmative steps in that direction. With Root’s endorsement, the NGA successfully 

lobbied Congress to increase the Guard’s annual appropriation in 1900 from $400,000 to 

$1 million. Root put forward his own version of a militia reform bill as a platform for 

debate toward final legislation that Congress could support. The NGA was fully prepared 

with militia legislation of its own. Root frequently conferred with Congressional and 

NGA leaders on the legislative proposal. On Capitol Hill, Representative Charles Dick 

from Ohio, a longtime member of the Ohio Guard, Spanish-American War veteran, and 

Chairman of the House Militia Affairs Committee, championed the final bill. Due to the 

careful cultivation of support by Secretary Root, Congressman Dick, the NGA, and State 

soldiers, the legislation moved through Congress without significant opposition and 

became law on January 21, 1903. (31) 

The Militia Act of 1903 was benchmark legislation that repealed the antiquated 

Militia Act of 1792 and converted the volunteer militia into the National Guard. In 

simplest terms, Guard units received increased funding and equipment, and in return, 

they were to conform to federal standards for training and organization within five years. 

The law recognized two classes of militia; the Organized Militia (National Guard) under 

joint federal-State control and the Reserve Militia, the mass of 18-45 year old males 

otherwise available for military service. The Dick Act required Guardsmen to attend 

twenty-four drill periods per year and five days of summer camp. For the first time, 

Guardsmen received pay for summer camp but not for drill periods. The law called for 

Guard units to conduct maneuvers with the Army and to receive training assistance and 

formal inspections from Regulars. The Guard was subject to federal callups for nine 

months, though its service was restricted to within U.S. borders. The participation of 

Guard members in national callups was no longer discretionary; any soldier not reporting 

to his armory during a federal mobilization was subject to court martial. (32) 

It is hard to overstate the significance of the Dick Act for the National Guard. 

The practices of the volunteer militia as a self-supporting and largely independent entity 

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Army National Guard History

gave way to a new military force with significant federal funding and subject to the 

administrative controls of the War Department. The days of the ill-defined relationship 

between the federal government and the militia were gone. For the first time, the States 

and the AGs had a formal relationship with the War Department. While the Dick Act 

was a new beginning for the Guard, in many ways it was the end of a twenty-six year 

crusade by the NGA and progressive Guard leaders. Since the beginning of labor 

disputes in 1877 and the founding of the NGA two years later, Guardsmen had sought 

recognition as a viable, federal reserve to the Regular Army. The Dick Act, with its 

provisions for a better trained and equipped National Guard, partially fulfilled the vision 

of reform minded Guardsmen. 

At the same time, the Dick Act had it limitations. While the legislation addressed 

the internal workings and administration of the Guard, it made little mention of the 

National Guard’s intended roles and missions, nor did it clarify the specific nature of the 

relationship between the Guard and the Regular Army. Charles Dick and the NGA 

included important provisions that allowed Guard troops to be called up for as long as 

nine months while remaining together as distinct units under the leadership of Guard 

officers. This stopgap measure was designed to prevent an initial, short-term callup of 

the Guard followed by the widespread dissolution of its units, the dismissal of State 

officers, and the complete assimilation of Guardsmen into the Army as individuals. (In 

addition, the strategic thinking of the period held that future wars would be short, lasting 

not longer than one year.) As military policy, the Dick Act did not provide adequate 

means for raising a massed, citizen-soldier Army for overseas campaigns. The 

mechanism for providing for such an Army would not materialize for another thirteen 

years. 

A New National Guard Takes Shape 

The passage of the Dick Act set in motion a number of developments that caused 

a gradual transformation of the National Guard. At first, the activities of Guard units 

were little affected, but over time, units reorganized and began to comply with federal 

oversight. Additional resources resulted in better weapons, equipment and facilities, and 

Guardsmen embraced their new role as an important, ready adjunct to the Army. The 

most dramatic and immediate affect on the Guard came in the form of federal financial 

aid. Starting in 1900, the Guard received an annual, federal appropriation of $1million. 

A provision of the Dick Act allowed a one-time additional disbursement of $2 million in 

1903. Under pressure from the NGA and the States, Congress doubled the annual 

appropriation to $2 million in 1906. Two years later, the NGA gained a separate $2 

million annual disbursement that rose the total amount of annual federal aid to $4 million. 

By 1908, Congress had increased the amount of annual federal expenditures to the 

National Guard nearly tenfold from what they had been just a decade earlier. Federal 

funding following the Dick Act was particularly generous considering the fact that the 

U.S. government had expended only $22 million on the militia during the entire 1800s. 

(33) 

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Army National Guard History 

Increased appropriations improved the preparedness of Guard units and greatly 

augmented State military budgets. Federal monies were allocated to the States on the basis of 

one hundred Guard enlisted men per congressional district. Federal funds allowed the States to 

draw standard Army weapons, uniforms, and equipment and to requisition supplies and other 

property. Federal appropriations were no longer restricted to the issue of weapons, clothing, 

and camp equipment. States used federal dollars to fund training camps, usually the largest 

item in their military budgets. Money from the War Department covered transportation, 

subsistence, and pay for soldiers attending summer camp. (34) 

Federal monies proved invaluable to States with small military budgets and bolstered 

the Guard budgets in richer States. At the time of the Dick Act’s passage, eighteen States and 

Territories received half or more of their combined military budgets from Washington. 

Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Ohio provided the lion’s share of monies for their 

own units, while Arkansas, Nevada, and Oklahoma depended almost exclusively on federal 

monies. State military budgets roughly doubled during 1903-1913 but this was not enough to 

keep pace with the flow of increased federal appropriations. By 1913, federal dollars 

accounted for half or more of the combined military budgets of twenty-eight States. (35) 

Ironically, efforts to increase the Guard’s effectiveness initially resulted in a loss of 

personnel. Four years after the Dick Act, manpower fell below the levels of 1903. Federal 

inspections and the new emphasis on military readiness drove some men from the ranks and 

made recruiting more difficult. New Jersey’s AG, Wilbur F. Sandler, Jr., noted that federal 

oversight “greatly retarded recruiting.” Guardsmen who viewed summer encampments as part 

vacation and part social outing resented War Department intruders. Junior officers especially 

felt the burden of increased regulations and higher standards, and many AGs reported that 

fewer men demonstrated an interest in becoming officers. In the South, the States used federal 

regulations as a bludgeon to eliminate nearly 8,000 black Guardsmen during a period of 

strained race relations. By 1906, several States in the South had disbanded black units to 

prevent them from receiving federal monies. Afterwards, only the District of Columbia and 

five other States maintained black units. (36) 

Table 2 

NATIONAL GUARD STRENGTH, 1903-1916 

YEAR TOTAL YEAR TOTAL 

1903 116,547 1910 119,660 

1904 115,110 1911 117,988 

1905 111,057 1912 121,852 

1906 105,693 1913 120,802 

1907 105,213 1914 128,043 

1908 110,941 1915 129,398 

1909 118,926 1916 132,194 

(Source: Militia Bureau, Annual Report, 1916.) 

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For many in the Guard, the antidote to personnel losses was pay beyond the 

summer camp allowance contained in the Dick Act. In fact, several States recognized the 

new demands on soldiers by instituting compensation schedules of their own. Utah 

offered troops $1.50 per drill period, and Massachusetts paid a flat, annual rate of $32 

while other States offered much less. Starting in 1910, the NGA launched a sustained 

lobbying effort for drill pay. If the federal government wanted increased efficiency and 

more reliable service from soldiers, the association argued, then it should have to pay. 

Guard leaders reasoned that drill pay was little more than compensation for past national 

service. Drill pay became a major point of contention between the Guard and the War 

Department. Federal officials had no objections to drill pay as long as the Guard 

submitted to even more stringent controls, a proposition that Guard leaders refused to 

accept. A major impasse developed that was not resolved until 1916. (37) 

The increased flow of weapons, equipment, and property to the States generated 

the need for more and better armories. Federal regulations mandated new, stringent 

requirements for properly storing arms and equipment and accounting for government 

property even though armory construction remained a State responsibility. To comply 

with federal guidelines, an armory construction boom started in the Northeast and swept 

across most of the country. Between 1905 and 1915, Massachusetts spent $3.2 million to 

put nearly all of its units in State owned armories. New York launched a similar building 

program with Pennsylvania and Connecticut not far behind. In the Midwest, Ohio and 

Illinois initiated armory construction efforts while on the West coast Washington and 

California led the way. States not building armories allocated annual grants for the rent 

of suitable facilities. The southern States, still recovering from the economic devastation 

of the Civil War and Reconstruction, allocated few funds for armories. In Arkansas and 

Mississippi, no funds were available. Where State monies were wanting, local 

governments, private benefactors, and soldiers’ ingenuity made up the difference. 

Clinging to the practices of the old volunteer militia, Guardsmen rented their armories to 

community groups for special events and organized dinners, dances, theatricals, and 

military demonstrations as fundraisers. The Indiana Guard still allowed dues paying 

businessmen to use armories as gentlemen’s clubs and gymnasiums. (38) 

Starting in the early 1900s, National Guard armories took on a new look. 

Castellated armories that included floor space appropriate for social clubs gave way to 

more contemporary designs that advanced military training and the storage and 

maintenance of weapons and equipment. Armory floor space was divided along 

functional lines; one portion of the armory contained a main entrance with administrative 

offices, classrooms, and an arms room while the other included large drill halls or stables. 

In the major cities of the northeast and the Midwest where a single, large armory might 

house an entire regiment, ample space was needed for training, especially during 

inclement weather. Spacious drill halls with huge vaulted ceilings supported by large 

steel trusses provided enough room for an entire regiment to practice close order drill. 

Baltimore’s 5th Regiment armory was one of many built early in the 20th Century with a 

large drill hall. (39) 

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Army National Guard History

The southern and western States lacking adequate military construction budgets 

used innovative management techniques to build and sustain armory facilities. In 

Virginia, the new Richmond Light Infantry Blues armory built in 1910 included groundfloor public markets that generated revenues to support both the unit and the building. 

Throughout the South, sparse construction budgets allowed for only modest armories, 

and the use of rented space abounded. In the West, Guard units met in the upper floors of 

commercial buildings, fair ground exhibition halls, and fraternal halls. Unable to build 

large drill halls, units took advantage of the warmer climates of the South and West to 

train and drill outdoors on established parade grounds. (40) 

For the average Guard soldier, the most visible demonstration of the Guard’s new 

status was joint exercises with the Regular Army. Guard units began a challenging 

transition from semiprivate organizations based on fellowship and recreation to public 

institutions dedicated to training and military preparedness. Starting in 1904, joint 

maneuvers were held each year until 1916. In 1904, over 25,000 Guardsmen and 10,000 

Regulars participated in the first joint maneuvers at American Lake, Washington, 

Altascadero, California and Manassas, Virginia. The massing of nearly 26,000 

Guardsmen and Regulars in northern Virginia resulted in the greatest military maneuvers 

since the Civil War. Regular officers supported the exercises by serving as umpires, 

observers, and instructors and by performing required staff work. The New York Times 

noted that the exercises were a “necessary complement for the Militia, and indeed for the 

An infantry company of the Arkansas National Guard at mess during annual training at Fort 

Riley, Kansas in August 1906. The nation’s mature railroad system allowed National Guard 

units to journey to Regular Army installations for summer training. (U.S. Army Military History 

Institute) 

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Army National Guard History

Regular Army.” By 1912, over 125,000 Guardsmen and Regulars went to combined, 

annual encampments. Large maneuvers proved too expensive and their tactical scenarios 

unrealistic, so smaller encampments became more common. The States sent a portion of 

their units to federal maneuvers biannually while the balance of the units attended State 

encampments at local training areas. (41) 

The joint maneuvers and summer encampments mandated by the Dick Act 

benefited both Regulars and Guardsmen. All officers profited from the experience of 

leading and supporting large numbers of troops. In contrast to sterile classroom map 

exercises, commanders had to cope with the specific challenges of maneuvering major 

formations while logisticians responded to the feeding, transport, and supply of a 

substantial field force. Professional soldiers imparted their expertise to citizen-soldiers 

while becoming more comfortable with the Guard. It was not uncommon for Regular 

officers to work with the same Guard units over a long period or to serve as instructors 

during State encampments. (42) 

Guard officers attempted to take advantage of the rejuvenated Army schools 

system, but the results were mixed. Guard officers received the best training at local 

Army posts and at branch schools. In 1912, the War Department reported that over 3,000 

National Guard officers attended “camps of instruction” and that another seventy-six 

received resident training at the Army’s branch and specialty schools. Attendance and 

student performance at the more demanding schools at Fort Leavenworth and the Army 

War College were disappointing. Most Guard officers could not afford to take a year 

away from their jobs to attend full-time schooling, while others failed to pass admissions 

tests. Those few who did attend complained of a blatant prejudice against citizen-soldiers 

among the instructors. In turn, Regulars lamented the lack of military knowledge 

displayed by Guard officers. The most noteworthy student of the period was John F. 

O’Ryan of New York, the first Guard officer to graduate from the Army War College. A 

lawyer by training, O’Ryan’s first love was the military, and he went on to a stellar career 

as an outstanding combat leader during World War I. (43) 

Perhaps the best cooperation between Regulars and Guardsmen occurred during 

the manning of America’s coastal defenses. The new overseas possessions acquired 

during the Spanish-American War placed a greater burden on the Army’s limited coastal 

defense resources. In 1907, the Army admitted that it needed additional forces to man 

the increased number of coastal defenses overseas and at home. Congress soon passed 

legislation authorizing the National Guard to serve in the Coast Artillery. The War 

Department specified that Regular Coast Artillery units would man all overseas defenses 

and half of the fortifications in the United States while Guard units assumed 

responsibility for the remaining defenses. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, 

Guard units had prior experience in manning coastal defenses and were the first 

Guardsmen to man fortifications around Boston and New York harbors. Twelve other 

States created Coast Artillery companies. Regular Army instructors provided training 

and certified new units as ready for duty. Once proficient, Guard companies took over 

the manning and maintenance of defenses and maintained close ties with the nearest 

Regular Coast Artillery unit. By 1912, the Guard had created 126 Coast Artillery 

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Army National Guard History

companies with a total strength of 8,186 soldiers that manned fortifications along the 

East, West and Gulf coasts. (44) 

The Dick Act became law eleven months prior to the Wright Brothers’ historic 

first flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, and the National Guard took an avid interest in 

the harnessing of powered flight for military purposes. New York’s 1st Signal Company 

had experimented with balloons since 1908, and it was natural for the Empire State to 

take the lead in heavier-than-air flight. The first Guard aviator went aloft in 1911, when 

Beckwith Havens of New York took to the skies in an early Curtis aircraft. The New 

York National Guard activated the 1st Aero Company in 1915, and the following year, 

formed a second aviation company in Buffalo. At the same time, Guard aviators in 

California, Ohio, and Michigan made progress in organizing flying units and obtaining 

pilot ratings. On May 22, 1912, Lt. Col. Charles B. Winder of Ohio became the first 

Guard officer to obtain a reserve military aviator rating. (45) 

The Militia Act of 1908 

The years following the 1903 Dick Act demonstrated important internal changes 

within the Guard. At the same time, officials in the War Department and senior officers 

in the Regular Army opined that a heavy reliance on the National Guard might jeopardize 

national security. The Dick Act had authorized Guard service for only nine months and 

restricted its employment to within U.S. borders. Emory Upton’s sentiments against the 

militia cast a long shadow over War Department thinking that maintained national 

security could not safely depend upon forces with a dual allegiance to the States and the 

federal government. To the Uptonians, State powers inherent in the National Guard 

system restricted federal authority. Might not the Governors inhibit the raising and 

employment of State troops as they had done in 1812 and 1861? Instead, hardliners 

pressed for a large federal reserve rather than a more capable National Guard. (46) 

Determined that the National Guard was to become indispensable and integral to 

the nation’s defense, Guard advocates sought important legislative changes designed to 

mute the Uptonians. Charles Dick, now an Ohio Senator, sponsored a revised Militia Act 

that became law on May 27, 1908. The president was given full authority to call out the 

Guard during national emergencies. The Militia Act of 1908 removed limits on the 

Guard’s length of service and geographic employment. In return, Congress directed that 

the National Guard would be called to active duty before the raising of any volunteer 

units. The time allowed for Guard units to conform to Army standards was extended for 

an additional two years. (47) 

Another important development came with the creation of the Division of Militia 

Affairs (DMA), the precursor of the modern National Guard Bureau (NGB). Since the 

passage of the 1903 act, administrative duties related to the National Guard had been 

spread among the Army’s bureaus. In February 1908, the DMA came into existence to 

oversee administrative duties related to the National Guard’s “armament, equipment, 

discipline and organization.” Other functions included oversight of field exercises and 

mobilization planning. Lt. Col. Erasmus M. Weaver, a Regular Army Coast Artillery 

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Army National Guard History

officer, was appointed the first chief of the DMA and given a staff of fourteen clerks. 

Like many Guard units in the States, the DMA sought shelter in a leased facility. The 

National Guard’s first federal offices were located on the third floor of an office building 

at the corner of 18th and G Streets in northwest Washington, DC. Originally organized as 

an office under the direct charge of the secretary of war, in 1910 the DMA became the 

responsibility of the Army chief of staff, and the following year, Congress elevated the 

Chief of the DMA to flag rank. Brig. Gen. Albert L. Mills, an old cavalry Regular who 

had received the Medal of Honor in the Spanish-American War and served as the 

Superintendent of West Point, became the first general officer on the Army Staff 

responsible for Guard affairs. Under Mills’ supervision, the DMA grew and expanded its 

influence with the War Department and the States. (48) 

Assured somewhat by the Militia Act of 1908 that the Guard would be available 

for service beyond America’s borders, the War Department began an historic realignment 

of the nation’s military command structure. The U.S. military had always used 

geographic districts for peacetime command and administration, but the arrangement had 

little to do with organizing forces into a major field army. By creating new military 

regions responsible for the training of designated Regular and National Guard forces, the 

War Department hoped to create in peacetime the basic framework for a large field army. 

New plans called for the consolidation of small Army garrisons across the country into 

larger, more centralized posts for ease of training and administration. A second reform 

that raised the hackles of many old soldiers was the substitution of the regiment with the 

division as the Army’s major tactical headquarters. The outcome of field exercises in 

1911 emphasized the need for change; it took the Regulars more than ninety days to 

concentrate 13,000 troops at San Antonio, Texas and to organize them into a patchwork 

divisional configuration. (49) 

In some respects, the National Guard was ahead of the Regulars in forming 

combat divisions. As early as 1879, Pennsylvania had organized its units into a division 

rich in infantry but short of support troops. In the same fashion, New York formed a 

division in 1908 with its headquarters at Albany. In 1910, the War Department published 

orders for the creation of the Army’s first units composed of both Regular and Guard 

troops. Plans called for the creation of three composite divisions stationed between 

Maine and New York with a desired troop composition each of 25 percent Regulars and 

75 percent National Guard. However, within two years, the War Department scuttled the 

plan. Renewed thinking held that divisions manned by Regulars alone would be more 

ready and could deploy faster. However, the 1910 proposal was the beginning of force 

structure actions regarding mixed Regular and Guard units that would continue on and 

off again for the remainder of the century. (50) 

The War Department’s publication in 1912 of “The Organization of the Land 

Forces of the United States” broke important, new ground in defense planning. The War 

Department rejected the notion of an expansible peacetime Army in favor of a standing 

force ready for combat. The plan called for the organization of the Regular Army into 

three infantry divisions and one cavalry division “ready for immediate use as an 

expeditionary force.” In a major war, Regular divisions would deploy and fight while 

135 
Army National Guard History

divisions of National Guard and volunteers mobilized. The plan divided the United 

States into four military departments — Eastern, Southern, Central, and Western — with 

each department responsible for the organization of one Regular division and a full 

complement of support troops. For the first time, the Army specified the division’s main 

components; three infantry brigades, a field artillery brigade, a cavalry regiment, and 

support troops that included engineer, signal, medical, and supply units. The National 

Guard was to organize its 139 infantry regiments into sixteen divisions under the 

supervision of the new military departments. Other provisions called for the raising of 

additional divisions of volunteers. In the end, the new policy outlined a three-tiered 

force; Regular divisions ready for immediate deployment, National Guard divisions 

prepared to reinforce the Regulars and an army of volunteers “organized under 

prearranged plans” for use when additional forces were required. (51) 

However, the creation of Guard divisions across the country was easier said than 

done. The DMA organized the entire Guard into twelve division districts, each 

responsible for forming a division. Arrayed from east to west and numbered 5-16, the 

districts ranged in size from one to seven States. (The Army retained the designations 1-

4 for the four active divisions aligned with the new, military departments.) Unity of 

command allowed New York (6th Division) and Pennsylvania (7th Division) to make 

good progress in creating true tactical divisions, but both States lacked artillery, cavalry, 

and support troops. The multi-State districts made little headway toward organizing 

divisions because no single authority was appointed to coordinate the effort. The Militia 

Acts required existing Guard units to conform to Army standards, but the War 

Department could not compel the States to create specific types of units. When told to 

raise artillery and cavalry units, the States replied that equipping, training, and quartering 

such units was too expensive. Except in New York and Pennsylvania, the Guard 

divisions existed largely on paper. (52) 

The War Department influenced other aspects of State planning. In 1912, the 

DMA established the first outlines for State headquarters. The AG was authorized the 

rank of brigadier general and was authorized a staff of twelve to seventy-five officers 

depending upon the extent of State forces. The War Department, in coordination with the 

States, established the first peacetime mobilization stations. States had always created 

impromptu mobilization camps during wartime, but new plans established predetermined 

rallying points for established Guard units even before they entered federal service. The 

main purpose for units moving to mobilization stations was to complete their issue of 

weapons, equipment, and uniforms; training was to occur at other sites. Each State 

designated one primary mobilization site, and most selected the State capitol, a Regular 

Army post, or a prominent training camp. The AGs developed mobilization plans, but 

they were little more than an extension of the same procedures used in getting units to 

summer camp. (53) 

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Army National Guard History

The Continental Army Plan 

Even with the Guard’s continued development, the Army General Staff did not 

yet consider State soldiers as a viable federal reserve. The deeply ingrained philosophies 

of Emory Upton, negative reports from Army inspectors on Guard preparedness and 

increased concerns with overseas threats convinced the Army that a full-fledged federal 

reserve was indispensable. Political turmoil in Mexico raised concerns over U.S. 

interests in Latin America. Across the Atlantic, Germany and France had completed the 

enlargement of their standing and reserve forces that gave the two countries armies of 

1.75 million and 1.5 million men, respectively. How was a tiny American Army of 

approximately 200,000 Regulars and Guardsmen ever to compete with the armies of 

Europe? To the War Department, the Army had to create a large pool of trained 

reservists under direct federal control instead of a more robust National Guard. (54) 

In fact, the Army had already begun the process. Rightly concerned over its lack 

of physicians during the Spanish-American War, the Army sought legislation to create a 

reserve corps of medical officers it could mobilize during an emergency. Congressional 

action on April 23, 1908 created the Medical Reserve Corps, the first group of citizensoldiers placed under the Army’s direct supervision in peacetime. Within weeks, the 

Medical Reserve Corps included 160 physicians, and by 1916, the corps had grown to 

1,903 officers, four times the number of physicians on active duty. The creation of the 

Medical Reserve Corps put the Guard on notice as to the Army’s intentions to create an 

even broader, federal reserve. (55) 

Even as late as 1912, serious questions lingered over the legality of National 

Guard service overseas. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson asked Army Judge 

Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder to study the issue. Crowder found that the Guard 

was bound in its operations by the specific language of the Constitution and was not a 

substitute for a federal reserve force. He also opined that Congress had erred in the 

Militia Act of 1908 by authorizing the Guard’s use abroad. (56) 

Secretary Stimson forwarded Crowder’s findings to the Department of Justice for 

a formal legal opinion. On February 12, 1912, U.S. Attorney General George W. 

Wickersham rendered an opinion that was potentially devastating to the Guard. 

Wickersham followed a strict interpretation of the Constitution and ruled that the federal 

government was forbidden from employing the National Guard for purposes beyond 

those enumerated in the Constitution’s militia clauses. The attorney general declared that 

provisions of the Militia Act of 1908 authorizing the Guard’s overseas service were 

unconstitutional, and furthermore, that the Guard could not serve as part of an army of 

occupation on foreign soil “under conditions short of actual warfare.” The Wickersham 

decision meant that the federal government could not order State troops overseas as long 

as they retained their status in the National Guard. In the War Department, the attorney 

general’s ruling destroyed the Guard’s value as a viable, federal reserve. (57) 

According to one prominent National Guard historian, the Wickersham decision 

gave the Guard “a severe jolt.” Guard veterans who had fought overseas in the Spanish137 
Army National Guard History

American War must have scoffed at the decision. To some senior leaders, the ruling put 

the Guard’s legal status back to where it had been prior to the Dick Act. Others rightly 

declared that the time had come to secure a full and final legislative solution to the 

problems posed by the Guard’s dual status as both State and federal troops. The ruling set 

the stage for bitter confrontations between the War Department and the National Guard 

during 1912-1916, an historic nadir in Army-Guard relations. (58) 

The Wickersham decision galvanized the National Guard leadership. Since the 

Spanish-American War, an internal schism had divided the NGA over the question of the 

Guard’s federal role. The AGs in the industrial northeast and Midwest stressed the 

Guard’s domestic role in law enforcement. A competing group of AGs from the Plains 

States and the South, who benefited more directly from increased federal funding, 

identified their splinter group as the “Interstate National Guard Association” and argued 

stridently for the Guard as a combat reserve. Under the leadership of Charles Dick, who 

served as NGA President during 1902-1909, the schism narrowed. In 1911, a new, 

stronger organization emerged from the discord and adopted the name “The National 

Guard Association of the United States” (NGAUS). Another primary interest group soon 

formed. Brig. Gen. Charles I. Martin of Kansas engineered the creation of “The 

Adjutants General Association of the United States” (AGAUS). The AGs had been 

active during 1912 to gain drill pay for soldiers and to negate the Wickersham decision, 

and the creation of AGAUS gave additional impetus to their efforts. Henceforth, 

AGAUS would help in developing the best plans and policies for the Guard and work 

with NGAUS in securing favorable legislation. (59) 

Another challenge to the Guard came in 1913 with the rising tide of the 

Preparedness Movement. With the increasing likelihood of American intervention in 

crises abroad, the Preparedness Movement advocated universal military training (UMT) 

for all able-bodied young men as well as reserve officer training. The movement’s 

principle public advocates were former President Teddy Roosevelt and Army Chief of 

Staff Leonard Wood. An ambitious, outspoken maverick who served as chief of staff 

during 1910-1914, Wood envisioned a large, wartime Army composed almost entirely of 

volunteers and conscripts. In Wood’s mind, the National Guard’s proper role was as a 

domestic security force. His most enduring contribution to the Preparedness Movement 

was the creation of summer training camps for college students and civic-minded 

business and professional men. The most publicized of the summer encampments came 

in 1915 in Plattsburg, New York. With war raging in Europe, the training camps became 

increasingly popular; in the summer of 1916, 10,000 volunteers attended ten different 

camps across the country. (60) 

Legal decisions against the Guard’s use overseas, rising public awareness 

regarding military preparedness and the unending desire among full-time professionals 

for a standing, federal reserve found their ultimate expression in the War Department’s 

“Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States.” Published in 1915 and 

prepared under the leadership of Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, the new policy 

became known as the “Continental Army Plan” because it provided a blueprint for a 

million-man national army. At its heart, the plan advocated an American Army of 

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Army National Guard History

500,000 troops comprised of 121,000 Regulars and 379,00 reservists with two years of 

prior service in the active Army. An additional pool of 500,000 trained reservists was to 

give added depth to the field army. (61) 

As military policy, the Continental Army Plan all but ignored the 129,398 

Guardsmen serving in 1915. The plan fully endorsed the Wickersham decision and 

declared that “no force can be considered a portion of our first line” whose training, 

manning, and equipping were not fully subject to federal authority. Accordingly, the 

Guard’s wartime service was restricted to manning coastal defenses and guarding key 

strategic points and lines of communications within the United States. Adding insult to 

injury, the War Department called for the repeal of the provisions of the Militia Acts of 

1903 and 1908 that required the full mobilization of Guardsmen prior to the callup of 

volunteers. Perhaps as a foil to deflect certain outrage, the plan recommended an 

increase in the Guard’s annual appropriation from $6.6 to $10 million. Many in the 

Guard considered the War Department’s newfound generosity as little more than a 

cynical effort toward a buy off. (62) 

The National Defense Act of 1916 

The unveiling of the Continental Army Plan came at a time of increasing 

international tensions. Starting in August 1914, Americans had soberly watched the 

unfolding nightmare of trench warfare in Western Europe as the major powers struggled 

for Continental domination. In Mexico, a major political revolution was underway, and 

President Woodrow Wilson sent U.S. forces to occupy Veracruz as a forceful sign of 

America’s hostility toward a dictatorial government. Calls for intervention in the 

European war reached a fever pitch when a German U-boat sank the British liner 

Lusitania on May 7, 1915, killing 1,000 British and 128 American civilians. Problems 

abroad and credible promises of drill pay promoted Guard recruiting starting in 1914. 

Within two years, the Guard included 132,914 soldiers, an all time high for peacetime 

strength. 

International tensions caused growing political and social divides within the 

country. The Wilson Administration preached nonintervention in the European war 

while advocating democratic ideals, international law, and the rational cooperation of 

nations. President Wilson repeatedly assured the American people that intervention in 

Europe was unnecessary, and even as late as 1916, he responded with anger to newspaper 

reports that the War Department was preparing contingency plans for a war against 

Germany. On the other hand, many Americans believed that war was inevitable and 

accused the Wilson Administration of pacifism and neglect in defense matters. The 

Preparedness Movement was the popular counterbalance to the belief that the president 

was soft on defense. To assure the country that his administration did have a blueprint 

for national defense, Wilson encouraged the development of the Continental Army Plan. 

However, the plan’s public release ignited a serious political firestorm. The 

president’s supporters felt betrayed that the War Department had developed a specific 

plan for the raising of a million-man Army while the administration preached 

139 
Army National Guard History

nonintervention. Wilson’s detractors claimed that the Continental Army Plan proved that 

the President intended all along to send troops to fight in the trenches. Guard advocates 

pointed out the folly of a plan that ignored the country’s only available reserve fighting 

force. The greatest opposition developed on Capitol Hill where Representative James 

Hay, the Chairman of the powerful House Military Affairs Committee, led the campaign 

against Secretary Garrison and the War Department. (Charles Dick had left the Senate in 

1911.) To Congressman Hay, the Continental Army Plan gave too much power to the 

federal government, reduced the role of the States in national defense and denigrated the 

National Guard. Congress balked at the costs of doubling the size of the active Army and 

questioned the military’s ability to recruit the large numbers of men needed for the 

federal reserve. Chairman Hay informed the president that the Continental Army Plan 

did not have sufficient congressional support and that new legislation more friendly to the 

National Guard was needed. President Wilson withdrew his support for the War 

Department’s plan, and in protest, Secretary of War Garrison resigned. (63) 

The political imbroglio over the Continental Army Plan resulted in the most 

comprehensive defense legislation the U.S. Congress had yet passed. On June 3, 1916, 

Congress stepped into the void caused by the scuttling of the Continental Army Plan and 

the resignation of Secretary Garrison to approve a sweeping reorganization of the Army. 

The National Defense Act of 1916 called for a composite Army of Regulars, Guardsmen, 

and Army Reservists with the potential to compete against Europe’s mass armies. The 

Regular Army’s peacetime strength was increased to 175,000 soldiers and authorized a 

wartime strength of 286,000. The National Guard would comprise the Army’s principle, 

trained reserve. Its maximum strength was set at 435,800 soldiers based on an allocation 

of 800 Guardsmen for each member of Congress. To assuage concerns in the States and 

in the War Department, Congress increased Guard funding and approved tighter federal 

controls over the States. Legislators acknowledged the need for a federal reserve. 

Summer civilian training camps and student military training on college campuses were 

to continue and become permanent with the creation of the Officers’ Reserve Corps 

(ORC) and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). An Enlisted Reserve Corps 

(ERC) was to serve as a repository for reserve enlisted talent in a number of combat 

support specialties. (64) 

The National Defense Act of 1916 established remedies for many of the problems 

the Guard had encountered since the passage of the Dick Act. Congress quashed the 

controversy over the legality of Guard service overseas by stipulating that during a 

national emergency Guardsmen would be drafted into the Army as individuals and then 

serve in their State units as part of the Regular Army. To facilitate such a transition, all 

Guardsmen would take an enlistment oath to obey the president and to defend the U.S. 

Constitution. The DMA was elevated to a new status as the Militia Bureau on the Army 

General Staff. Guard officers were authorized to serve in the Militia Bureau, and Lt. Col. 

Frank M. Rumbold of Missouri became the first Guard officer assigned to the Militia 

Bureau. The Secretary of War was empowered to withdraw funding from States not 

complying with federal regulations. The States surrendered to increased federal control in 

order to receive additional funding, and the term “National Guard” became the official 

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Army National Guard History

Rhode Island cavalrymen load their horses aboard a train for deployment to the Mexican border 

in Jun 1916. (National Archives) 

designation for all organized militia forces. Congress addressed the Army’s frustrations 

in managing the Guard’s force structure by giving it the authority to prescribe the 

numbers and types of State units. NGAUS and AGAUS won a major victory over drill 

pay; soldiers were to receive full pay for attending forty-eight drill periods and fifteen 

days of field training each year. To account for the increased flow of money, weapons 

and equipment to the Guard, each State was to appoint a “property and disbursing 

officer” responsible for the accountability of federal property and funds. (65) 

The Mexican Border Crisis 

The National Defense Act of 1916 became law concurrent with a growing 

international crisis south of the border. Tensions between Washington and Mexico City 

had increased steadily, and by early 1916, a civil war raged within Mexico. Hoping to 

solidify his position as a dominant Mexican warlord, Francisco “Pancho” Villa conducted 

a cross-border raid against Columbus, New Mexico on the night of March 9, 1916, killing 

seventeen Americans. In response, President Wilson ordered a large punitive expedition 

into northern Mexico to track down the bandits. The Army assembled a strike column of 

10,000 Regulars under the command of Brigadier General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing 

that soon splashed across the Rio Grande into Mexico. 

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Army National Guard History

With the bulk of the active forces in the Southwest absent, border towns feared 

additional Mexican raids. The Governors of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona expressed 

grave concerns over the security of their citizens. On May 9th, the president ordered 

those Governors to deploy Guardsmen for border protection, and two days later, 5,260 

State troops headed for the border. Meanwhile, with hostile terrain and an elusive enemy 

frustrating its efforts, Pershing’s expedition pushed further into Mexico. On June 16th, 

the Mexican government warned Pershing to advance no further. Fearing a growing 

crisis, President Wilson ordered a partial callup of the National Guard on June 18th. Only 

fifteen days after the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, the National Guard 

responded to its first call to active, federal service in the 20th Century. For the first time, 

the War Department activated Guardsmen by specific type of unit rather than sending 

numerical quotas to each State. The response was swift. The first unit to reach the 

border was the 1st Illinois Infantry that endured a grueling, 48-hour train ride from 

Springfield to arrive in San Antonio on the evening of June 30th. The hauling capacity of 

America’s mature railroad network allowed a rapid buildup. The Connecticut Guard 

endured the longest movement; 2,916 rail miles from Hartford to Houston. On July 4th, 

nearly 25,000 Guardsmen observed Independence Day at camps in Texas. By August 

31st, 111,954 Guard troops were in close proximity to the border, including the two 

divisions from New York and Pennsylvania. To add to the logistical accomplishment, 

the railroads hauled the 60,000 horses and mules required to support Guard cavalry, 

artillery, and supply units. The mobilization included one important milestone; New 

York’s 1st Aero Company was the first Guard flying unit to be called to active duty 

though it did not serve on the border. (66) 

Despite the rapid buildup, there were significant problems. More than anything 

else, too many unfit soldiers filled the ranks. The States had been lax in enforcing 

physical standards; more than 10,000 soldiers failed physical examinations and were 

discharged. Commanders had not strongly enough impressed upon soldiers that their 

service was no longer voluntary and that enlistments had the full force of a legal, binding 

contract. As a result, thousands of Guardsmen requested discharges upon mobilization. 

The States approved more than 6,000 hardship discharges before the War Department 

forced a curtailment. The Guard’s force structure still contained too many infantry units, 

and other types of combat and non-combat units were not available to form division-like 

formations in the Southwest. Those units not mobilized consisted mostly of coast 

artillery and excess infantry. In one case, an infantry unit voluntarily converted to 

cavalry to qualify for border duty. The Richmond Light Infantry Blues became the 1st 

Squadron, Virginia Cavalry, traded in their rifles for pistols and sabers, underwent 

elementary cavalry training and deployed to Texas without mounts. (67) 

The utilization of mobilization camps remained the callup’s most controversial 

aspect. The growing crisis prompted the War Department to send Guardsmen directly to 

the border, bypassing most State facilities and negating pre-mobilization planning. 

Preparations that should have occurred at mobilization camps were postponed until units 

arrived in the southwest where the Army had done next to nothing to prepare for the 

Guard’s arrival. In many cases, Guardsmen built their own cantonments from scratch. 

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Poor facilities, intense heat, and dusty winds added to soldiers’ frustrations. As 

Guardsmen discerned that security duty was their primary mission rather than combat 

below the Rio Grande, grumbling and loud protests became common. In all, 158,664 

Guardsmen saw duty. Regular Army reports on the Guard’s performance were mixed. 

Guard commanders certainly made mistakes regarding personnel matters, but many 

deficiencies were due to poor planning by the General Staff. At least one War 

Department observer took a broader view of the Guard’s efforts. “When one considers 

the number of men moved and distances they were moved,” wrote a young Major 

Douglas MacArthur, “the recent mobilization...was the best job of its kind done by any 

country.” (68) 

Though far from perfect, the mobilization was a political and military success and 

a vast improvement over the incompetence and bungling of 1898. No Guard unit saw 

combat, but citizen-soldiers provided valuable protection to U.S. borders and constituted 

a ready reserve while Pershing’s column operated directly against the Mexicans. 

Guardsmen fulfilled their intended role as the Army’s primary combat reserve instead of 

the federal volunteers favored by the Uptonians. The States became familiar with the 

complexities of moving great numbers of troops, and the AGs learned the value of 

recruiting soldiers who met fitness standards and understood the obligations of their 

enlistment. Senior commanders received experience in handling large troop formations 

New York’s 1st Aero Company became the first National Guard flying unit ordered to active 

duty when it was mobilized in 1916 for the Mexican Border Crisis. (National Archives) 

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Army National Guard History

while soldiers benefited from training and physical conditioning. Still, significant 

improvements were needed in training, manpower, and equipment. 

By the early spring of 1917, the crisis had passed, and the Guard started to return 

home. Across the country, local communities enthusiastically welcomed the troops. In 

Richmond, the long-suffering 1st Virginia Cavalry experienced a gala reception at its 

downtown armory on Sunday, March 18, 1917. But the troopers had little time to bask in 

their accomplishments; eighteen days later the United States declared war on Germany. 

Conclusions 

The years 1898-1916 were a period of significant transformation for the National 

Guard. Guardsmen began and ended the period with calls to active, federal service. In 

the sun kissed Caribbean, the cities and jungles of the Philippines and along the hot, 

dusty southwestern border, the National Guard conducted important military operations 

that effectively supported American foreign policy. In the process, a new National Guard 

replaced the volunteer militia. 

The National Defense Act of 1916 was the final destination in a near forty-year 

journey of change that had begun during the labor disputes of 1877. The arguments of 

NGAUS, AGAUS, and congressional leaders promoting the Guard’s use as the primary 

provider of reserve combat forces to the Army prevailed over those in the War 

Department hoping to restrict State soldiers to domestic defense. Legal support for the 

traditional practice of raising federal, volunteer regiments was greatly diminished. 

Though the Guard had found a permanent place in the defense establishment, whether or 

not the Regular Army and the National Guard alone could produce a major American 

field army remained a serious question. The creation of the ORC, the ERC, and ROTC in 

1916 indicated that individual reservists and even conscripts would be required to create 

a citizen army capable of competing with the European powers. Despite the important 

legislative benchmark achieved in 1916, verbal dueling between Guardsmen and 

Uptonians over the merits of State soldiers continued unabated. Federal funding had 

improved the Guard, but adequate time for training beyond basic soldier skills was still 

lacking. 

By the end of the Mexican border mobilization, the Guard’s internal workings had 

changed significantly. The Guard embraced the new missions of military aviation and 

coast artillery. While enlistment in Guard units remained on a voluntary basis, 

participation at summer camps and drill periods was no longer discretionary. Federal 

service during national emergencies was compulsory, and soldiers received individual 

pay for drill periods and summer camp. Increased federal funding produced a better 

trained and equipped force. In return for the infusion of federal monies, the Guard 

surrendered much of its autonomy. For the first time, the AGs had a formal relationship 

with the War Department. The Guard became subject to federal inspections, agreed to 

new qualifications for officer selection and conformed to Army standards for unit 

organization. Joint maneuvers and inspections may have produced animosity between 

the States and the War Department, but they had benefits as well. Regulars observed the 

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Army National Guard History

capabilities and limitations of citizen-soldiers while Guardsmen learned the art and 

practice of war from professionals. 

However, much in the Guard remained the same. The Governors retained final 

authority over the commissioning, promotion, and assignment of officers. The Guard 

endured as a volunteer organization with unit commanders responsible for the recruiting 

and retention of qualified soldiers. Guard members still attended drill periods one night 

each week where training focused on the teaching of basic, individual soldier skills rather 

than unit maneuvers. Units retained close ties with local communities. Uniforms, 

insignia, and unit designations reflected local, regional, and State pride. Unit 

organization and force structure in many cases mirrored the desires and interests of the 

AGs and senior commanders rather than the needs of the War Department. More work 

was needed to shape the Guard into a national fighting force of combat divisions, and the 

Mexican border callup indicated that the States and the War Department lacked detailed 

mobilization plans. 

At the beginning of 1917, U.S. involvement in the war in Europe was all but 

certain. What was not so foreseeable was the critical role the National Guard would 

eventually play during two World Wars fought on bloody battlefields in Europe and in 

the Pacific. 

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Army National Guard History

Senator Charles W. F. Dick: 

Father of the Modern National 

Guard 

Charles William Frederick Dick enjoyed 

a long life of public service dedicated to the 

National Guard and the nation. 

in Akron, Ohio in November 1858 where he 

attended public schools and studied law. n 

1894, Dick opened his own law practice and 

became active in politics. 

Charles Dick’s military career began in 

1885 when he volunteered in Company B, 

Eighth Regiment, Ohio Infantry. ear 

later, he became the Company B commander. 

Over the next fourteen years, Dick rose to the 

rank of lieutenant colonel, and in 1898, he 

served with the Eighth Ohio in Cuba. 

After the Spanish-American War, Dick was elected to the U.S. House of 

Representatives in November 1898. n March 1904, he was elected to the U.S. Senate 

and served there until losing a reelection bid in 1911. It was during his years as a 

member of Congress that Dick championed the 1903 Dick Act and its 1908 amendments. 

During Dick’s service in Congress, his military career flourished. n 1900 he became the 

commander of the Ohio Division, National Guard, with the rank of major general. In 

1902, he was elected president of the NGA and held that position for seven years. 

After leaving the Senate in 1911, Dick resumed his law practice. 

Senate in 1922 but lost the election. s Dick lived long enough to see his labors 

bear great fruit during the massive National Guard mobilizations for World Wars I and II. 

He died in Akron, Ohio on March 13, 1945 at age eighty-six and is buried in Glendale 

Cemetery. 

He was born 

I

One y

I

I

He ran for the U.S. 

Charle

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Army National Guard History

CHAPTER 5 

The National Guard In 

The World Wars, 1917-1945 

I

f American citizen armies, extemporized after the outbreak of war, could do as well as 

the citizen armies of Grant and Lee, what might they not do if organized and trained 

in time of peace? 

Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer 

Introduction 

Fifteen minutes after sunrise on June 6, 1944, the landing craft carrying soldiers 

of the 29th Infantry Division deployed into their final assault formations off the coast of 

France. Still 4,000 yards offshore, the coxswains pointed their vessels squarely at the 

beach ahead and gunned the engines. In a ragged line one and one-half miles long, the 

twenty-four boats carrying the 116th Infantry’s four assault companies headed for the 

beach. Off to the east, the assault craft carrying the first wave of the 1st Infantry Division 

also headed for the hostile shore. As the bobbing craft plowed toward the beach, the 

land ahead and the ocean all around shook with the ferocity of the Allied bombardment. 

The battleships “Texas” and “Arkansas,” with their supporting cruisers and destroyers, 

blazed away at the German defenses. Not far away special landing craft fitted with 

multiple rocket launchers let loose with a torrent of missiles that rained down on the 

bluffs and beaches. Out in front of the infantry landing craft, heavier vessels deposited 

tanks onto the beach that added the noise and firepower of their cannons and machine 

guns to the crescendo. 

From inside the landing craft, the Virginia Guardsmen of the 116th Infantry 

attempted to identify the prominent features of the Normandy coastline they had studied 

so intently on maps and models. As the vessels moved closer to shore, the soldiers could 

make out the white sands of Omaha Beach and the green grass of the tall bluffs beyond. 

Each boat carried a thirty-one-man assault team commanded by an officer. Different 

soldiers carried rifles, automatic weapons, bazookas, light mortars, demolitions, and a 

flamethrower. Besides their weapons, the troops carried enough to sustain them for two 

days of combat — ammunition, food, life vests, and gas masks. In all, each man was 

burdened with nearly sixty pounds of gear and supplies. The landing craft were so filled 

that everyone had to stand; the men in the center of the boat could see little more than the 

backs of their buddies. Inside the vessels some men prayed and others cursed, but most 

were too frightened and miserable to say anything. Soaked to the bone by frigid seawater 

and suffering from seasickness, the men stoically endured the nearly fifteen-minute, final 

approach to the beach. The Virginia Guardsmen traced their heritage to the Stonewall 

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Army National Guard History

Brigade of the Civil War, and they were about to add to their proud traditions by 

enduring fighting just as bloody and ferocious as anything their forefathers had faced at 

Gettysburg in 1863 or in the Meuse-Argonne in 1918. 

With a sudden jolt, the assault craft ran aground. The front ramps dropped 

forward onto the beach, and the soldiers rushed ahead. From defensive positions along 

the beach and bluffs, German small arms, machine guns, mortars, and artillery opened 

up with a vengeance. Enemy bullets tore at the landing craft, and killed and wounded 

GIs fell face forward onto the sand. On the right side of Omaha Beach, Company A was 

nearly destroyed. One landing craft swamped and sank before it hit the beach, and a 

German shell scored a direct hit on another, killing every man on board. Before the day 

was over, Company A’s home community of Bedford, Virginia would lose nineteen of its 

native sons to enemy action. At other locations, the infantry struggled across the beach 

seeking cover behind German beach obstacles. Finally, a number of men dashed through 

the deadly fire toward the protection of a sea wall at the base of the cliffs. Across the 

entire landing zone, small unit leaders struggled to get their men out of the water, across 

the beach and inland. Capt. Lawrence Madill, the Company E commander, moved boldly 

among the beach obstacles shouting for his men to move off the beach. Enemy fire 

inflicted a serious shoulder wound that nearly tore Madill’s left arm from his torso, but 

he kept moving among his troops. Finally, a burst of machine gun fire knocked him to 

the ground. As he lay dying on Omaha Beach, Captain Madill cried, “Senior noncom, 

take the men off the beach!” By the end of the day, the 116th Infantry was off the beach 

and inland. The cost of victory was high; one-third of the regiment — about 1,000 

soldiers — were killed and wounded. The shallow toehold the 116th Infantry helped to 

create on D-Day eventually enabled a powerful Allied army to launch a series of major 

offensives directly into the heart of Nazi Germany. 

Dramatic events such as the Normandy invasion thrust the United States onto the 

center stage of world affairs between 1917 and 1945. In World War I, the country 

mobilized a vast amount of men and material in order to fight its first coalition war since 

the American Revolution. U.S. military power in France helped guarantee the defeat of 

Imperial Germany and placed America in the role of erstwhile peace negotiator. During 

the interwar years, an uneasy quiet settled over Europe, the pall of economic depression 

gripped the globe and isolationism became a potent political force in America. The 

events of 1941 drew the United States into an even larger and more destructive war 

against totalitarian regimes in Europe and Asia. By the end of World War II, American 

forces stood victorious among the cooling ashes of Berlin and Tokyo, and America found 

itself without a serious, international competitor. 

The National Guard played a key role in the events of the World Wars and the 

interwar period. The Guard’s trained personnel and standing units permitted the United 

States to project substantial combat power quickly onto the Western Front in 1918. 

Between the World Wars, the Guard more firmly established itself as a permanent 

component of the common defense and was a source of social stability amidst the 

suffering and dislocation of the Great Depression. The Guard’s participation in the 

national mobilization of 1940-1941 helped to prepare America for even greater exertions. 

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Army National Guard History

During World War II, Guard soldiers and airmen enabled vigorous American ripostes to 

the aggression of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy. By 1945, the National 

Guard had contributed greatly to the concentration of U.S. combat power in Europe and 

the Pacific during the most destructive war in human history. 

America Goes to War 

On the evening of April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson addressed an 

emergency, joint session of Congress to ask for a declaration of war against Imperial 

Germany. The drama of the moment filled the air; a troop of mounted cavalry escorted 

the president from the White House to Capitol Hill, and when the commander in chief 

entered the chamber of the House of Representatives, nearly every legislator was holding 

or wearing a tiny American flag. In a somber, succinct address, the president reviewed 

the international situation and established the nation’s idealistic war aims. In Wilson’s 

words, America would fight to make the world “safe for democracy.” At the end of the 

speech the legislators gave the president a standing ovation, and four days later they 

declared war on Germany. (1) 

War came at the United States with the certainty and sureness of a German 

torpedo slicing straight through the cold, churning waters of the North Atlantic. After the 

sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915, war fever in America reached new heights until the 

German High Command promised to suspend its campaign of unrestricted submarine 

warfare. In the spring of 1917, Germany decided to risk U.S. intervention in the war by 

unleashing the U-boat menace once again in a final gamble to knock Great Britain out of 

the war. Woodrow Wilson responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with Berlin. 

With an executive order, the president authorized the arming of U.S. merchant shipping. 

American diplomats acknowledged the existence of the Zimmerman telegram, a secret 

diplomatic cable from Berlin to Mexico City, in which Germany sought a military 

alliance with Mexico against the United States. In the middle of March 1917, German Uboats sank three American merchant ships, and the president decided to ask Congress for 

a declaration of war. (2) 

While a national consensus existed for going to war, there was little agreement as 

to the extent and type of the nation’s commitment. Many Americans assumed that 

sending troops to France was unnecessary and that destroying the U-boat menace and 

supplying the Allies with food, supplies, and munitions would be enough to tip the scales 

against Germany. British and French diplomatic missions to Washington, DC in late 

April 1917 delivered a blunt message: America must send troops directly to the Western 

Front to bolster the Allied armies. The British High Command recommended that U.S. 

troops move immediately to Europe and fight as individual replacements in British and 

French divisions, a proposal that turned stomachs in the War Department. The French 

delegation, headed by the hero of the battle of the Marne in 1914, Marshal Joseph Joffre, 

pressed for the commitment of a U.S. combat division. During a May 2nd meeting with 

Marshal Joffre, President Wilson pledged to dispatch an American division to France 

within the month. Before long, the War Department concluded that the best means of 

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Army National Guard History

fulfilling the country’s diplomatic and military objectives was to commit the American 

Expeditionary Forces (AEF) directly into the trenches. To command the AEF, the 

president selected the stern and taciturn “Black Jack” Pershing who was a new national 

hero for leading the Army’s punitive expedition into Mexico during the previous year. (3) 

For various social, political, and economic reasons, the president and the War 

Department decided even before the declaration of war that conscription was the most 

effective technique for raising a national army. The most compelling argument in favor 

of the draft was economic; conscription was the most efficient method of raising a mass 

army without disrupting the economy, especially in agriculture and in those sectors 

dedicated to wartime production. At the president’s direction, the War Department 

composed a conscription bill that repaired the defects of the Civil War draft system. The 

Selective Service Act of 1917 prohibited enlistment bounties and the hiring of substitutes 

but authorized deferments on the grounds of dependency or essential work in industry 

and agriculture. A Selective Service System composed of some 4,600 local draft boards 

staffed by civilian volunteers made final decisions on the induction or deferment of 

particular individuals. After an intense debate, a final draft bill passed Congress, and 

President Wilson signed it into law on May 18, 1917. With a stroke of the president’s 

pen, the techniques used since colonial times for creating volunteer armies based on State 

quotas died a quiet death. The Selective Service Act of 1917 was the first effort at 

gearing all of the manpower of the U.S. not already serving in the Regular Army, the 

National Guard, and the organized Reserves into a coordinated pool of obligated 

manpower directed toward a single, national purpose. (4) 

Intense prewar concerns in the War Department regarding the manning of a large 

Army stood in stark contrast to a near total neglect of industrial mobilization planning. 

American industry had provided the Allied armies in Europe with some munitions, 

weapons, and equipment, but the industrial base was woefully unprepared to entirely 

clothe, arm, equip, and sustain a large field army. The need to get troops to the Western 

Front quickly before the Allied armies collapsed outpaced the ability of the government 

and corporate leaders to retool the industrial base. In the end, Regulars, Guardsmen, 

Reservists, and draftees went to war armed largely with weaponry of foreign 

manufacture. (5) 

The Mobilization of 1917 

On July 20, 1917, young men all across America focused their attention on a 

hearing room of the Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill. At the appointed hour, 

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker donned a blindfold, reached into a large glass jar 

filled with capsules and randomly selected number 258. Six weeks prior, on June 5th, 

nearly 9.5 million men ages 21-30 had complied with the Selective Service Act by 

registering for the draft. The number in Secretary Baker’s hand corresponded to a 

number assigned to a draft registrant in each of the nation’s local draft board areas. 

Throughout the remainder of the day, the random drawing continued until enough 

numbers were chosen to meet the demands of the initial draft call. The Governors were 

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Army National Guard History

A Washington State National Guard recruiting station seeks volunteers in the days following 

America’s entry into World War I. The sign reads: ”General Pershing says all young men 

should be encouraged to join a unit either of the National Guard or of the Organized Reserves. 

The most appropriate place for such first service is in the National Guard.” 

responsible for implementing the draft law, and they delegated the authority to their AGs 

and State military headquarters. The primary responsibility of the AGs was to oversee 

the establishment of district and local draft boards, to provide administrative and medical 

support as needed and to facilitate successful public relations. (6) 

In the War Department, decisions for utilizing the nation’s manpower moved 

forward rapidly. By necessity, the soldiers in any major field force would come from 

three sources: Regulars, Guardsmen, and draftees. In general, Army Reservists served as 

individual officer replacements, physicians, and in other skilled specialties. The Army 

would continue the creation of combat divisions on active duty and in the Guard while 

draftees were to serve in new divisions designated as “National Army.” Months would 

pass before draftees could be converted into soldiers, and America’s initial response 

came from Regulars and Guardsmen. On April 1, 1917, the Regular Army numbered 

127,588 officers and enlisted men. To meet President Wilson’s pledge of sending a 

division to Europe, the Army hastily assembled a reinforced regiment for shipment to 

France. On July 4, 1917, one battalion of the U.S. 16th Infantry paraded through the 

streets of Paris, the first contingent of Pershing’s AEF to arrive in France. Later that day 

at a welcoming ceremony, an American officer uttered the immortal phrase, “Lafayette, 

we are here!” (7) 

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Army National Guard History

While draftees waited for their numbers to come up and the Army rushed to 

establish a presence in France, the National Guard worked diligently to build the 

backbone of a major field army. At the declaration of war on April 6th, 66,694 

Guardsmen were still on active duty from the Mexican border mobilization. Most of 

these Guardsmen would remain away from their homes and jobs until the middle of 1919. 

Included in the group were some units previously released from active duty and then 

recalled as war approached. Within days after the declaration of war, the War 

Department dispersed serving Guard units across the country to protect key transportation 

hubs, industrial facilities, and utilities against German saboteurs and sympathizers. (8) 

In the States, recruiting became the top priority. The national crisis cleared the 

way for increasing the Guard’s strength to nearly 435,800 men, the maximum amount 

allowed by the National Defense Act of 1916. The Guard’s local roots and talk of an 

impending draft spurred volunteerism. Guard commanders struck a chord with 

prospective recruits by pointing out that those joining the Guard would serve with friends 

and families from local communities rather than fighting with total strangers in draftee 

units. The argument worked; between April and July 1917 the Guard recruited 

approximately 200,000 new soldiers and nearly doubled its size. Intent on avoiding the 

confusion over obligatory service that had occurred during the Mexican Border callup, 

commanders stressed that men were legally bound to report for duty. Capt. Fred Ellis of 

Company D, 2d Kansas Infantry told recruits that future calls would mean “business” and 

those failing to report would be tried for desertion. (9) 

On July 15, 1917, President Wilson ordered the Guard to active federal service for 

the second time in as many years. To ease the administrative and logistical burdens of 

mustering nearly 400,000 troops all at once, the War Department mobilized the Guard in 

two increments. The initial presidential callup affected the Guard in eleven States, and 

on July 25th the remainder of the Guard received mobilization orders. On August 5th, 

President Wilson exercised the authority granted by the National Defense Act of 1916 

and the Selective Service Act of 1917 to draft the National Guard into federal service as 

individuals. The commander in chief did this to clarify the federal government’s powers 

over the State soldiery. By drafting the entire National Guard into the Army, the 

government removed any lingering questions pertaining to the Guard’s geographic 

employment and time of service. Once drafted, State soldiers ceased to have any legal 

connection with the National Guard and instead became individual members of the U.S. 

Army. For the duration of the war, Guardsmen strove to retain their distinctive character 

derived from State and local roots but did so with only mixed results. (10) 

With the Guard’s tremendous expansion, the War Department built on its prewar 

force structure planning to increase the number of Guard divisions from twelve to 

sixteen. On May 5, 1917, the Militia Bureau sent to the States details enumerating the 

composition of the sixteen divisions by State and type of unit. At the time, only New 

York and Pennsylvania had fully organized divisions, and Ohio’s 11th Division lacked 

only one artillery regiment. (11) 

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Army National Guard History

Converting nearly 400,000 Guardsmen into a combat-ready force proved to be a 

formidable task. Draftee divisions would not be formed for several months, but 

Guardsmen were ready to begin training immediately. No training camps with 

permanent facilities were available, but the Army did have enough tentage to create 

sixteen canvas cantonments in the South and Southwest, one for each of the Guard 

divisions. The division commanders understood the necessity for the expedient. State 

troops were better organized and prepared than raw draftees to sustain themselves while 

living in tents, and most Guardsmen expected to be in France before the full onset of 

winter. Between August and October, the Guard’s sixteen divisions moved by rail to an 

equal number of tent cities spread along a large arc that extended westward through the 

Southern and Southwestern States from Charlotte, North Carolina to Palo Alto, 

California. Texas contained three camps, more than any other State, and Waco, Houston 

and Fort Worth became the temporary homes of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Divisions, 

respectively, that were formed from Guardsmen from the Plains States. (12) 

Guard commanders hoping to focus entirely on training at the new cantonments 

received a rude surprise shortly after their arrival. The War Department’s announcement 

of a major reorganization of all divisions threw training plans into chaos. After 

consultation with the Allies, General Pershing concluded that the existing structure of the 

Army’s divisions could not generate the sustained combat power needed for trench 

warfare. Instead, Pershing favored a larger “square” division consisting of four infantry 

regiments organized into two brigades. In addition to the infantry, the square division 

included two artillery regiments, an engineer regiment, a signal battalion, and supply and 

medical units for a total strength of 28,061 soldiers. (13) 

The immediate result of converting Guard divisions to the square configuration 

was confusion and frustration. The greatest challenge was converting infantry and 

cavalry units to support troops, a process the Militia Bureau described as “fraught with 

considerable difficulty.” Resentment ran high in proud infantry regiments broken up to 

create other types of combat and support units. A major in Pennsylvania’s 30th Infantry 

went to his quarters and wept after discovering his proud regiment was selected for 

“mutilation.” Two hundred enlisted men from Oklahoma’s 1st Infantry went absent 

without leave in protest upon learning their regiment was to become support troops for 

the Texas division. At the direction of the Militia Bureau, the entire Utah Guard in 1916 

had converted from infantry and artillery units to a cavalry regiment. Then in June 1917, 

the Militia Bureau ordered Utah to switch all of its cavalry to artillery. In Virginia, the 

Richmond Light Infantry Blues, who had converted from infantry to cavalry in order to 

serve on the Mexican border, received orders to become an artillery unit. At one camp, 

Guard cavalrymen held a mock funeral to bury their distinctive uniforms before 

converting to another type of unit. (14) 

Another blow to the Guard’s pride came with the mandatory redesignation and 

renumbering of all units. In the Army’s mind, the AEF in France was to become a single, 

integrated whole with no differentiation between Regular, Guard and National Army 

divisions. Toward this end, the Army set aside numbers 1-25 for Regular divisions and 

26-75 for Guard divisions. Draftee divisions had numerical designations beginning with 

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Army National Guard History

76. The National Guard divisions numbered 5th – 20th became the Army’s 26th – 41st 

Divisions. In the same manner, the two brigades in each square division took on 

sequential numerical designations. The 26th Division included the 51st and 52nd Brigades 

while the new 41st Division’s brigades were numbered 81st and 82nd. A regimental 

numbering system replaced all State and local unit identifications. Regiments of all arms 

as well as separate battalions and companies received numerical designations from 101-

300 that ran sequentially throughout the Guard’s force structure. The 6th Massachusetts 

Infantry, whose origins dated back to the earliest enrolled militia units in the 

Massachusetts Bay Colony, was broken up to provide troops to the new 101st, 102nd, and 

104th Infantry. New York’s famous “Fighting 69th” became the 165th Infantry. 

Guardsmen countered the impersonal numbering system by devising unit slogans and 

nicknames that reflected State and local ties. For example, Ohio’s 37th Division adapted 

the nickname “Buckeye” while the 30th Division, with troops from Tennessee and the 

Carolinas, became “Old Hickory” in honor of Andrew Jackson. (15) 

The reorganization of the Guard into square divisions resulted in surplus units in a 

majority of the States. In the War Department, Major Douglas MacArthur seized upon 

the opportunity to propose the creation of a combat unit singularly unique in Guard 

history. MacArthur argued for the creation of an additional Guard division drawn from 

the surplus units. In MacArthur’s own words, such a division would cover America “like 

a rainbow” and diffuse competition among the States for gaining the honor of sending the 

first Guardsmen to France. Secretary Baker approved the proposal and promoted 

MacArthur to lieutenant colonel, assigning him as the new division’s acting chief of staff. 

The Chief of the Militia Bureau, Maj. Gen. William A. Mann of the Regular Army, left 

his post to become the commander of the newly designated 42nd “Rainbow” Division, a 

move that outraged many Guard generals who considered themselves qualified for the 

position. By late August 1917, troops from twenty-six States and the District of 

Columbia were assembled at Camp Mills near Mineola, New York, where training began 

in earnest. (16) 

The utilization of black Guardsmen was far different from their white 

counterparts and yielded the eighteenth Guard division to serve in the war. At first, the 

Militia Bureau delayed the callup of black units, but finally ordered them to active duty 

with the proviso that they would serve only within their own State. The Army’s policy of 

racial segregation prohibited black troops from serving in the Guard divisions. At the 

time, the Guard’s African-American combat units included the 15th New York and 8th 

Illinois Infantry as well as a number of separate battalions and companies of infantry in 

five other States and the District of Columbia. Unlike units in the Regular Army, most 

African-American Guard units had their own black officers. Over time, black Guard 

units received orders to move to mobilization camps. The Militia Bureau proposed the 

formation of an African-American separate brigade composed of three infantry 

regiments, but Secretary of War Baker approved the creation of a provisional black 

division composed of three regiments of Guardsmen and a regiment of black draftees. 

The 15th New York became the 369th Infantry; the 8th Illinois the 370th Infantry, and the 

other black Guard units were consolidated to form the 372nd Infantry. The 371st Infantry, 

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all black draftees, formed the fourth regiment. Heightened racial tensions at black 

training camps in the South hastened the creation of the new division. On January 5, 

1918, the 93rd Division (Provisional) formed at Camp Stuart near Newport News, 

Virginia. The 93rd Division lacked any units other than its four infantry regiments, but it 

soon received orders to board shipping for France. (17) 

Life in the training camps often exposed Guardsmen to a variety of unfamiliar 

professional and social attitudes. At Camp MacArthur in Waco, Texas, local residents 

tried to convince the Wisconsin and Michigan men of the 32nd Division that “damn 

Yankee” was really one word. Despite the obvious regional differences, a great affection 

soon developed between the soldiers and the Texans. Hard feelings that lingered from 

the Civil War led to a huge brawl between the old 4th Alabama and 69th New York at the 

42nd Division’s training camp on Long Island. The Army assigned Regular officers to 

Guard units whenever State officers were found physically unfit, lacking in military 

knowledge or deficient in leadership. Guardsmen deeply resented this intrusion into what 

was considered their own internal affairs. An infusion of ORC officers and draftees was 

required to bring the Guard divisions to full strength, and State soldiers remained 

suspicious of outsiders. The assignment of two Jewish lieutenants from the North to the 

2nd South Carolina concerned Palmetto State soldiers. Similarly, Guard enlisted men 

looked askance at new draftees assigned to their squads and platoons. An Army 

hierarchy formed quickly in the training camps that endured throughout World War I; 

Regulars looked down on Guardsmen who in turn scorned the green draftees. (18) 

The extent and effectiveness of training varied widely. On Long Island, the 

Rainbow Division implemented a training regime that emphasized unit cohesion, 

physical fitness, and basic combat skills even though most of the troops lacked uniforms 

and shoes. In general, noncommissioned officers trained their soldiers while officers 

huddled together to master the details of tactics and staff work. The 32nd Division held 

an officers’ school each evening while brigade, regimental, and battalion commanders 

attended classes on combat operations taught personally by the division commander. 

Shortages of weapons and equipment hampered training in every division. Artillerymen 

of the 33rd Division trained with dummy, wooden guns for the first weeks, and two 

months passed before “Prairie” Division machine gunners received their weapons. At 

Camp Wadsworth in Spartanburg, South Carolina, New York’s 27th Division reached a 

high level of training that included tactical maneuvers during live fire exercises. The 32nd 

Division constructed an elaborate system of trenches to train assault teams in the tactics 

of trench warfare. In the fall of 1917, the 36th Division at Camp Bowie near Fort Worth, 

Texas welcomed a contingent of British and French officers who passed on lessons 

learned from the Western Front. (19) 

One unintended consequence of the 1917 mobilization was to leave the States 

without troops for domestic emergencies, a circumstance neither the Militia Acts of 1903 

and 1908 nor the National Defense Act of 1916 had addressed. Two expedients emerged, 

one from the federal government and the other from the States, to provide troops for 

domestic missions. The War Department authorized the creation of “United States 

Guards” to provide security at key installations and sites in order to free up all Regular 

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Army National Guard History

and Guard troops for training and overseas service. The United States Guards fell under 

the administrative control of the Militia Bureau, but operated under the command of the 

Army’s geographic departments. This force eventually grew to 26,284 troops organized 

into forty-eight separate battalions with soldiers coming from those men not qualified for 

the draft or overseas duty. The United States Guards provided security at shipyards, rail 

hubs, arsenals, and federal installations in thirty-two States before their dissolution at 

war’s end. (20) 

With their National Guard units on active duty, the Governors moved to create 

their own State forces. Organizations varied greatly from established infantry companies 

serving under the AG to county posses under the local sheriff. In all, twenty-seven States 

organized some type of State Guards with an approximate strength of 79,000. State 

Guard units maintained National Guard armories, responded to natural disasters, 

supported local law enforcement, kept watch on possible saboteurs, and monitored the 

activities of various social and labor groups suspected of sympathizing with the Germans 

and the Bolsheviks. (21) 

The Guard Goes “Over There!” 

On June 13, 1917 General Pershing and a small staff arrived in France to begin 

planning for the commitment of U.S. troops to the Western Front. Pershing soon made 

several policy decisions that established the broad 

parameters of American conduct during the entire 

war. Despite intense pressure from the Allies, 

Pershing remained adamant that American 

doughboys would not be amalgamated into the 

Allied armies and would charge into battle only 

under American commanders. Pershing resisted 

the temptation to throw his troops into action 

prematurely and insisted that they receive thorough 

training in offensive operations before going up 

against the German Army. Logistical factors 

largely determined that the AEF would take shape 

in the Lorraine province southeast of Paris. A 

relatively quiet sector, the AEF would complete its 

training in Lorraine, occupy a wide sector of the 

front below Paris and then launch a series of 

offensives to convince the German High Command 

that it could not win the war. Pershing’s staff 

estimated that ultimately the AEF would require as 

many as one hundred divisions and that it would 

not be ready for offensive operations until 1919. Soldiers of the 26th Division wait to 

(22) board shipping for France on September 

25, 1917. (Massachusetts National 

While Pershing’s staff developed their Guard Archives and Museum) 

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Army National Guard History

plans, the first elements of the AEF arrived in France. The new 1st Division could claim 

it was the first to France, but the National Guard was fast on its heels. In perhaps the 

most unique unit movement in National Guard history, the 26th “Yankee” Division 

declined to move to its designated training camp in North Carolina and instead deployed 

directly to France. Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Edwards, a Regular assigned to command the 

division, made a series of unilateral agreements with port authorities in New York City 

and Montreal. The 26th Division, consisting of Guardsmen from the six New England 

States, completed its reorganization into a square division while still at State mobilization 

camps and moved directly to ports of embarkation. By the time a surprised War 

Department learned of the clandestine movement, the flow of troops was too far along to 

halt. The 26th Division headquarters arrived in France on October 28th. Close behind 

came the 42nd Division. In mid-October, the poorly clad soldiers of the Rainbow 

Division received heavy, knee length woolen overcoats, a sure sign they were headed 

overseas. By November 1st, lead elements of the 42d Division were in France. After 

rigorous training regimes, both divisions took control of their own trench lines in 

February 1918. Soon afterwards, a large German trench raid bloodied the Yankee 

Division, making it the first Guard division to see action. The 41st Division reached 

France in December 1917, and the 32nd Division arrived in February 1918, bringing the 

total of National Guard divisions overseas to five, including the provisional 93rd Division. 

After an extended training period, the 32nd Division occupied forward trench lines in May 

1918. (23) 

If Pershing and the Allies had plans for ending the war on favorable terms, so too 

did the enemy. In autumn of 1917, the war turned badly for the Allies. An AustroGerman army smashed the Italians at Caporetto, and the Bolshevik Revolution knocked 

Russia out of the war. Once faced with a three-front war, the German High Command 

focused all of its resources on the Western Front. The German generals knew the 

Americans were headed to France, and they developed plans for huge offensives to win 

the war before the AEF could bring its weight to bear. On March 21, 1918, the German 

Army launched its “Peace Offensive” against the British north of Paris and against 

French divisions below the capital. The Allied lines strained but held. The crisis 

prompted two changes in Allied planning. Pershing agreed to release a limited number of 

American units to assist the hard-pressed Allies, and the British committed additional 

shipping to expedite the flow of doughboys to France. Between May and July 1918, the 

War Department shipped more than 800,000 soldiers to Europe, the better part of twentyone divisions. Included in the movement were eight National Guard divisions — the 

27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 33rd, 35th, 36th and 37th — bringing the total number of Guard 

divisions in France to thirteen. Before the end of the war, the last five Guard divisions 

were in France, raising the National Guard’s total contribution to the AEF to eighteen 

divisions. (24) 

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Army National Guard History

Table 3 

NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS IN WORLD WAR I 

DIV STATES HQS IN FRANCE CASUALTIES 

26 CT, MA, ME, Oct 1917 13,664 

NH, RI, VT 

27 NY May 1918 8,334 

28 PA May 1918 14, 139 

29 NJ, VA, MD, Jun 1918 5, 570 

DE, DC 

30 NC, SC, TN May 1918 8,415 

31 GA, AL, FL Oct 1918 Depot Div 

32 MI, WI Feb 1918 13,261 

33 IL May 1918 6,864 

34 MN, IA, NE Oct 1918 Depot Div 

35 MO, KS May 1918 7,296 

36 TX, OK Jul 1918 2,584 

37 OH Jun 1918 5,387 

38 IN, KY, WV Oct 1918 Depot Div 

39 LA, MS, AR Aug 1918 Depot Div 

40 CA, NV, UT, Aug 1918 Depot Div 

CO, AZ, NM 

41 WA, OR, MT, WY Dec 1917 Depot Div 

42 26 States and DC Nov 1917 14,683 

NY, IL, OH, DC, Dec 1917 3,534 

MD, TN, MA 

Total casualties = 103, 731 

(Source: American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and Battlefields in 

Europe, 515-17; and Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War, 285.) 

True to his promise, Pershing released American divisions to go to the aid of the 

Allies. U.S. divisions had trained in Allied rear areas in order to make themselves readily 

available as an emergency reserve. North of Paris, the 27th, 30th and 33rd Divisions 

trained in the British sector. In late summer, the 27th and 30th Divisions deployed to the 

front and played an important role in successful British counterattacks along the Somme 

River. In the French sector south of Paris, the 26th and 28th Divisions fought dogged 

defensive battles along the Marne River that repulsed numerous German attacks. In a 

coordinated, massed Franco-American counterattack starting on July 18, 1918, four 

National Guard divisions — the 26th, 28th, 32nd, and 42nd — pushed the enemy back from 

the Marne and put the German Army on the defensive for the remainder of the war. (25) 

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Army National Guard History

The National Guard regiment with arguably the best combat record in the war was 

the 369th Infantry. After arriving in France, the AEF parceled out the 93rd Division’s 

African-American regiments to shore up the French Army. The 369th was assigned to the 

French 16th Division on March 8, 1918 and over the next eight months earned the title 

“Hell Fighters” for its determined and daring performance on the battlefield. When the 

armistice came on November 11, 1918, the 369th was the American unit closest to the 

German border. Six days later, the Hell Fighters became the first Allied troops to reach 

the Rhine River since the beginning of the war. The 369th served in combat for 191 days, 

longer than any other U.S. regiment, and during that time it never lost a prisoner or a 

trench line to enemy action. On December 13, 1918, the French government recognized 

the Hell Fighters with the award of the coveted Croix de Guerre. On February 17, 1919, 

the 369th Infantry returned to New York City and marched up Fifth Avenue toward 

Harlem in a welcome home parade. At the head of the proud regiment waved the flag of 

the 15th New York. (26) 

Though no National Guard aviation unit went to war, Guard flyers made 

important contributions. At the beginning of the war, approximately one hundred 

qualified Guard pilots were available for service. Colonel Raynal C. Bolling, the original 

commander of New York’s 1st Aero Company, helped to establish training centers in 

Europe for American fliers. Other Guard officers filled important aviation staff positions. 

Four Guardsmen became aces during aerial combat. 2nd Lt. Erwin B. Bleckley, a Kansas 

artilleryman who volunteered for duty as an aerial observer, became the first Guard 

aviator to receive the Medal of Honor when German ground fire downed his aircraft 

during a desperate mission over the Argonne Forest. (27) 

Once in France, Guardsmen suffered another blow to their identity as State 

soldiers. On July 13, 1918, the Army issued General Order No. 73 stating that “this 

country has but one Army,” the Army of the United States. Henceforth, there was to be 

no distinction between Regulars, Guardsmen, Reservists, and draftees. The order 

directed Guardsmen to remove all distinctive State or National Guard markings and to 

replace them with Regular Army insignia. At the same time, the Army instituted the 

wear of new division patches on the left shoulder of each field uniform, though most 

patches were not actually worn until near the end of the war or until after the armistice. 

The creation of division patches presented Guardsmen with an opportunity to put their 

heritage on display daily. Every division patch contained letters or symbols indicative of 

State ties. The 26th Division developed a shoulder patch that contained the letters Y and 

D as a constant reminder of the Yankee Division’s roots in New England. Pennsylvania’s 

28th Division adapted a red keystone as its shoulder patch. The 40th and 41st Division 

patches included images of the sun that reflected the healthy lifestyle and weather of the 

West coast. Perhaps the most unique patch came from New York’s 27th Division. The 

curved letters N and Y stood for New York, and arrayed behind them were the stars of 

the constellation Orion, a visual pun that paid tribute to the division’s beloved 

commander, John F. O’Ryan. (28) 

Not all Guard divisions saw combat. With all Allied shipping dedicated to 

bringing new units to France, Pershing decided that for every two divisions fighting on 

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Army National Guard History

the line, another division had to provide replacements. The AEF designated two Regular, 

six National Guard, and five National Army divisions as “Depot Divisions.” These 

divisions principally provided individual replacements to combat units and served as a 

training base. The 31st, 34th, 38th, 39th, 40th, and 41st Divisions served for the entire war 

as depot divisions. Individual Guardsmen shipped to France with depot divisions 

eventually fought in other Regular, National Guard, or National Army divisions as 

replacements. The improvised replacement system shattered the expectations of 

Guardsmen desiring to serve with soldiers from their own units and communities. 

However, the emergency of the moment and the craven bloodlust of the trenches 

rendered other alternatives impractical. (29) 

The Army’s habit of relieving Guard leaders and replacing them with Regular 

officers generated deep resentment among State soldiers. Many Guardsmen believed that 

removals were not done on the grounds of improving combat readiness but to provide 

Regular officers opportunities for promotion and fame. The process began in the 

stateside training camps and continued in France. Eleven Guard generals who had been 

considered fit for service on the Mexican border were immediately declared physically 

unfit for overseas service. In 1917, 12,115 Guard officers entered active duty, and within 

one year, 1,480 were sent home or reclassified. Guard soldiers often considered junior 

officer replacements from the ORC as less experienced and capable than their former 

leaders. (30) 

In France, General Pershing set a stern and disciplined tone for the Army and was 

intolerant of officer incompetence. The number of officers relieved, whether Regulars, 

Guardsmen, or Reservists, ran extremely high. Combat officers losing their posts were 

often reassigned to support units, and it is no coincidence that the AEF’s supply system 

performed poorly. Emotions over the relief of Guard officers ran high, especially 

regarding the leadership of the divisions. Regulars usually filled three of the four senior 

command positions in a division. Guard officer filled secondary assignments on the 

division staffs while Regulars served in the principle positions. Guardsmen noted the 

regularity with which the Army relieved their senior commanders just prior to major 

operations. Brig. Gen. Charles I. Martin of Kansas, the founder of AGAUS, lost his 

position as commander of the 70th Brigade, 35th Division on the eve of the MeuseArgonne offensive. Martin was popular with his soldiers, and afterwards the 35th 

Division historian lamented that “more of us would have come out of the Argonne with 

[Martin] in command of the 70th Brigade.” General O’Ryan of the 27th Division was the 

youngest division commander in the entire AEF and the only Guard division commander 

to remain in command for the entire war. (31) 

By the late summer of 1918 the German Army was permanently on the defensive, 

and with the continuous buildup of American doughboys, Pershing was finally able to 

implement his plan for ending the war. During September 12-16th, the AEF reduced the 

St. Mihiel salient. In a classic pincer movement, American divisions attacked the 

salient’s northern and southern faces. In the northern sector, the Yankee Division 

distinguished itself by punching through German defenses, running roughshod 

throughout the enemy’s rear area and gaining contact with the U.S. 1st Division far ahead 

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Army National Guard History

Battery C, 130th Field Artillery, 35th Division prepares to open fire in September 1918. The 130th 

was organized from the 1st Regiment, Field Artillery of the Kansas National Guard. (National 

Archives) 

of schedule. The main American effort began in the difficult Meuse-Argonne sector on 

September 26th. Pershing’s ultimate objective was to reach Sedan on the Meuse River, a 

vital railroad link in the German supply lines. Nearly 600,000 Americans backed by 

4,000 guns bulled their way forward against a determined enemy in the largest military 

operation yet seen in American history. Eight National Guard divisions played a vital 

role during the difficult, bloody advance. The 29th Division in particular earned a 

reputation as an outstanding fighting unit. By November 6th, American troops threatened 

Sedan, and four days later the AEF opened a mass offensive that ruptured German 

defenses along the entire Meuse River. Forced with disaster on the Western front and the 

defection of its remaining allies, the Germans accepted armistice terms. On November 

11, 1918, exhausted American doughboys climbed from their muddy trenches, lit 

warming fires and reflected on the high cost of their victory. In 200 days of combat, 

50,280 men had been killed and over 200,000 wounded. (32) 

If America’s participation in the war effort meant victory for the Allies, the 

National Guard contributed significantly to that end. Throughout World War I, the 

Guard fought in America’s first line of defense. The 433,478 Guardsmen who served 

represented a modest percentage of the 2.8 million soldiers who eventually wore the 

Army uniform, but the Guard’s contribution was much more significant than the numbers 

indicate. The standing Guard divisions allowed the United States to respond rapidly and 

decisively after the declaration of war. Without the divisions, America’s initial response 

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Army National Guard History

would have been timid with little impact on either Allied or enemy morale. Guard 

combat units filled the lapse in time and capabilities between the early deployment of 

Regulars and the delayed flow of draftees. In all probability, the absence of the Guard 

divisions would have seriously postponed Pershing’s 1918 offensives and greatly 

prolonged the war. 

On the Western Front, the Guard divisions distinguished themselves in combat. 

Of the forty-three American divisions sent to France, 18 of them — about 40 percent of 

the entire AEF — were National Guard. The Guard divisions accumulated a total 

number of days in combat that exceeded that of either Regular or National Army 

divisions. The Yankee Division had the dubious distinction of accumulating 205 days in 

combat, more than any other Guard division. Guard divisions suffered a total of 103,721 

killed and wounded--approximately 43 percent of American casualties--and nearly the 

equivalent manpower of the entire National Guard in 1903. Pennsylvania’s 28th Division 

suffered the most losses with 14,139 killed and wounded. As Guardsmen fell in alarming 

numbers, thousands of draftees filled the depleted ranks thereby diluting the distinctive 

character of each Guard division. (33) 

In battle, Guardsmen proved themselves the equivalent to Regulars, Reservists, 

draftees, and Allied soldiers and demonstrated their superiority over the Germans. The 

Guard’s performance fully vindicated the improvements in training, manning, and 

Officers of the 372nd Infantry call the roll dockside prior to their men boarding ships to return 

home after World War I. The 372nd, composed of African-American units from six states, was one 

of three all-black National Guard regiments in the 93rd Division during World War I. (National 

Archives) 

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Army National Guard History

equipping that had occurred since the 1903 Dick Act and refuted the notions of Regulars 

who believed that Guardsmen were only capable of limited, domestic missions. Guard 

soldiers in the 30th Division received twelve Medals of Honor, more than any other 

division in the AEF. Perhaps the best tribute to Guardsmen came from their adversary. 

The German High Command considered eight American divisions especially effective – 

six of those were National Guard d. An incisive assessment of Guardsmen in battle came 

from one of their Regular Army leaders, Col. John “Gatling Gun” Parker, who 

commanded the 102nd Infantry in the 26th Division. On February 28, 1918, a large 

German trench raid hit the 102nd Infantry’s defensive positions and was repulsed only 

after the most savage fighting. Awed by the determination and esprit of his Guard troops, 

Colonel Parker wrote afterwards: “The American militiaman, when he is properly led, is 

the finest soldier who ever wore shoe leather.” (34) 

The Influence of John McAuley Palmer 

If Emory Upton’s dim views of the militia influenced defense planners before 

World War I, the more positive attitudes of John McAuley Palmer toward citizen-soldiers 

helped to shape policy after the war. A Regular Army officer from the West Point Class 

of 1892, Palmer’s early career reflected the changing nature of service in the Army at the 

turn of the century. An infantryman, he served in various assignments in Cuba, the 

Philippines, and China. Palmer felt the influence of the Root reforms when he attended 

the School of the Line and the new Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 1908. In 

Kansas, Palmer struck up a close personal friendship with Lieutenant George C. Marshall 

that endured for decades. When the Army assembled its first peacetime division in Texas 

in 1911, Palmer served as a brigade adjutant. The following year, he worked in the War 

College Division of the Army General Staff and authored the War Department’s 

“Organization of the Land Forces of the United States.” With the outbreak of war, 

Palmer became the head of the AEF’s operations section in France until incapacitated by 

a nervous breakdown. Following his recovery, he commanded the 58th Brigade of the 

29th Division during the last three months of the war. (35) 

Palmer’s views on citizen-soldiers took shape even before he entered West Point. 

His grandfather, Maj. Gen. John McAuley Palmer, was a citizen-soldier who rose through 

the ranks to corps command in the western theater during the Civil War. The elder 

Palmer held a distinct bias against the narrow professional views of Regular Army 

officers and believed that positions of military leadership should remain open to able 

civilians. General Palmer told his grandson that if left only to professional officers the 

military might evolve into a privileged “samurai” caste entirely inconsistent with 

American ideals. The younger Palmer’s own observations in subsequent years reinforced 

a favorable opinion of citizen-soldiers. He formed a positive view of the National Guard 

during the 1909 joint maneuvers held in Missouri, and during World War I, Palmer was 

impressed by the competence and leadership of Colonel Milton A. Reckord of Maryland 

who commanded the 115th Infantry in the 58th Brigade. (36) 

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Army National Guard History

In numerous staff reports and magazine articles before World War I, Palmer 

argued that the “most important military problem” facing the country was to devise the 

most effective means for preparing “great armies of citizen soldiers” to meet the demands 

of modern war. Armies possessed dynamic and political aspects. An army’s dynamic 

characteristic was simply its ability to project and generate combat power while political 

traits included social attitudes and political and military traditions. Sound solutions to the 

challenges of raising a modern, mass army could not ignore either aspect. At the heart of 

Palmer’s ideas was the notion that a small, Regular Army formed on the expansible army 

concept was no longer appropriate for the Industrial Age. He argued that taxpayers 

would never support a Regular force large enough to serve as the mainstay for a major 

field army. On the other hand, a small Regular Army incapable of rapid expansion would 

prove inadequate during a national emergency. Palmer realized that a vast pool of 

individual, trained reservists, like that favored by advocates of UMT and the 

Preparedness Movement, could not easily provide the organized units required. The 

solution was to build a reliable, organized citizen reserve and provide it with additional 

training after mobilization. Palmer considered the National Guard vital to the country’s 

defense while recognizing the role of the Army Reservist as well. (37) 

The philosophies of Emory Upton and John McAuley Palmer stood in stark 

contrast. Upton used military history, and the Civil War in particular, to advocate 

manpower policies that eschewed the militia, called for a larger Regular Army and relied 

heavily upon volunteers. Palmer drew from the militia tradition to support the idea of a 

trained and ready National Guard that was an organized reserve to a smaller Regular 

Army organized for overseas campaigning and occupation duty. While Upton advocated 

the formation of an army of volunteers created after the outbreak of war, Palmer 

promoted the creation and training of organized citizen-soldier units in peacetime. Upton 

abhorred political influence in military affairs and cautioned the officer corps to remain 

politically aloof. Palmer recognized the inherent, positive role politics played in 

democratic military institutions and believed officers had the responsibility to educate 

and inform the nation’s elected leaders. Palmer’s policies combined history and current 

events to recommend defense plans suitable for the new demands of Industrial Age 

warfare. Upton’s advocates failed to realize that changes in American society and 

foreign policy rendered anachronistic most of the Civil War general’s policy reform 

initiatives. War Department policies prior to World War I that attempted to organize 

Regular and National Guard units into a standing force signaled an end to a reliance on 

the expansible army concept, and the Selective Service Act of 1917 forever demolished 

the system of volunteers. How little Upton’s disciples understood the changing world 

around them became readily apparent in the months following World War I. 

The National Defense Act of 1920 

Entire National Guard units had entered federal service in 1917 with great fanfare, 

but at the end of the war Guardsmen returned home as individuals. Once Guard soldiers 

were drafted into federal service in August 1917, the Army’s bureaucratic personnel 

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Army National Guard History

system treated each man as an individual without regard to prewar unit or State 

affiliation. Units returned from France to demobilization camps across the country, and 

Guardsmen returned home with individual discharge papers in hand free of any federal or 

State obligations. In most large cities and local communities, Guard units reformed on 

their own to participate in parades and welcoming home ceremonies. Once back in 

civilian life, Guardsmen received little information on the future of the National Guard or 

the status of their old units. (38) 

At the annual NGAUS convention in Richmond in November 1918, the chief of 

the Militia Bureau delivered an ominous message about the Guard’s future. Speaking 

only four days after the armistice, Brig. Gen. John S. Heavey, a Regular general officer, 

told NGAUS members not to claim too much credit for the victory in Europe. Though 

the Guard had thrown itself entirely into the war effort, Heavey pointed out that Guard 

troops comprised only about 10 percent of the Army’s total strength. The bureau chief 

ended his speech by announcing that the Army would be better served in future wars by a 

wholly federal reserve without State ties. A hushed audience allowed the 

pronouncements to pass without comment from the convention hall floor. (39) 

General Heavey’s remarks merely reflected the sentiments of the Uptonians in the 

War Department and on the General Staff. They hoped to ignore or diminish the Guard’s 

contributions during the war and to resume the prewar legislative bid for the creation of a 

large, standing Army and an organized federal reserve sustained by UMT. In January 

1919, the War Department forwarded to Congress a proposal for the postwar military 

establishment. The plan called for a standing force of 500,000 Regulars backed by a vast 

reservoir of 500,000 trained reservists and made no mention of the National Guard. In 

essence, the proposed bill flatly rejected the key provisions of the National Defense Act 

of 1916 and was little more than a warmed over version of the 1915 Continental Army 

Plan. On Capitol Hill, yet another War Department proposal appeared too militaristic 

and expensive. One congressman labeled the plan “an outrage,” and another declared 

that he had had “a bellyful of the damned Army.” (40) 

The development of a sound military policy fell to Senator James W. Wadsworth 

of New York, a former Guardsman and chairman of the Senate Military Affairs 

Committee. During hearings throughout 1919, Wadsworth’s committee heard from 

various experts. The most impressive Guard leader to testify was New York’s John 

O’Ryan, who pressed for the Guard’s full involvement in national defense but proposed 

to turn the Guard into a predominantly federal force organized under the Constitution’s 

Army clauses. Wadsworth’s panel also heard from General Pershing, who acknowledged 

the friction between Regulars and Guardsmen. After complimenting the Guard’s 

excellent service during the war, Pershing declared, “The National Guard never received 

the wholehearted support of the Regular Army during the World War. There was always 

more or less a prejudice against them...” (41) 

The most remarkable testimony came on October 9, 1919 from Col. John 

McAuley Palmer of the Army’s War Plans Division. Already a recognized expert on 

Army organization, Palmer articulately analyzed all aspects of the pending legislation 

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Army National Guard History

before Congress and put forth his own opinions based on his extensive reading, writing, 

and firsthand experiences. Palmer argued that a small Regular Army backed by a large, 

organized citizen reserve sustained by UMT was most consistent with American military 

tradition and capable of meeting the country’s expanded defense needs. The citizen 

reserve would be organized regionally into divisions, and the charter members would be 

those Guardsmen and draftees with recent combat experience. New recruits would enter 

the reserves through UMT. Impressed with Palmer’s knowledge and candor, Senator 

Wadsworth asked for his reassignment as an advisor to the Military Affairs Committee. 

In the end, Palmer was deeply involved with the writing of new legislation. (42) 

NGAUS and AGAUS exerted their influence on Capitol Hill as well. With its 

members on active duty, NGAUS was largely dormant during World War I, but starting 

in 1919 the association revitalized. Lt. Col. Bennett C. Clark of Missouri was elected 

president, an officer widely known for his extreme views favoring the Guard. Clark soon 

declared that the aim of NGAUS was “to build up the National Guard and smash the 

Regular Army.” Many Guardsmen harbored resentment against the Army for the way it 

had treated them during the war, but such hyperbole drew protests from many senior 

association members and generated negative comments in the press. Behind the heated 

rhetoric, NGAUS took a largely defensive stance and desired an affirmation of the 

Guard’s status as defined in the National Defense Act of 1916. The association was not 

opposed to the ORC as a coexisting, volunteer agency as long as the Army did not use it 

as a subterfuge to reduce or eliminate the Guard. AGAUS sought solutions to specific 

problems. As a group, they wanted a stronger voice in the formulation of federal 

regulations governing the Guard. Additional Guard officers should serve in the Militia 

Bureau, and the AGs maintained that the bureau chief should be a Guard general officer. 

(43) 

In its final form, the National Defense Act of 1920 created a multi-tiered force 

with varying degrees of readiness. Congress firmly rejected the notion of a large, 

Regular Army backed by an immense pool of trained reserves created through UMT. 

Instead, it favored a smaller, active force reinforced by standing units of the National 

Guard and individuals of the Organized Reserves. Congress created the “Army of the 

United States” to consist of the Regular Army, the National Guard “while in the service 

of the United States” and the Organized Reserves. The active Army was authorized 

298,000 soldiers and assigned the missions of defending overseas possessions, 

expeditionary duty, and border protection. The Defense Act authorized the postwar 

reorganization of the National Guard, designated the Guard as the primary Federal 

reserve force and set its strength at a maximum of 435,000 soldiers. The Organized 

Reserves would provide a pool of officers in wartime and man nine Reserve Divisions to 

absorb and train conscripts during national emergencies. (44) 

Key provisions addressed specific Guard concerns. To ensure that the Army 

would never again discharge Guardsmen as individuals, the law specified that in the 

future Guardsmen released from active service would revert to their status as State 

soldiers. To better represent the Guard’s interests in the War Department, the chief of the 

Militia Bureau would be a National Guard major general appointed by the president to a 

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four-year term. Maj. Gen. George C. Rickards of Pennsylvania became the first Guard 

general officer to serve as chief of the Militia Bureau. The number of Guard officers to 

serve in the Militia Bureau was increased. In addition, the law stipulated that Guard 

officers would serve on the General Staff and established a committee of senior Guard 

leaders to review and recommend policies affecting the entire National Guard. (45) 

The Interwar Years 

Prior to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, a bewildering set of 

issues thwarted the National Guard’s reorganization. Without clear guidance from the 

War Department, the States moved slowly to reform units. Most Governors were willing 

to await the outcome of defense debates in Washington before expending scarce 

resources on the Guard. Hostility from labor unions and a generation of young men 

appalled by the horrors of trench warfare made recruiting difficult. The press was full of 

reports of Guard veterans with grievances toward the Army. In some locations, State 

Guard forces hoped to usurp the National Guard and retain possession of armories. (46) 

Several States clearly understood the importance of having a peacetime force for 

domestic disturbances and natural disasters. By the summer of 1919, the States reported 

the organization of 37,210 troops into National Guard units. A year later, Guard strength 

stood at 56,090 soldiers in thirty-four States. In the absence of guidance from the War 

Department, Guard units grew from the ground up without supervision from higher 

command levels. Company-sized units of infantry and cavalry were normal with troop 

strength ranging from 50-100 soldiers. The passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 

removed all ambiguity regarding the future, and a recruiting boom resulted. In less than 

two years, manpower nearly tripled to an all time high of 159,658 soldiers. By the 

summer of 1922, all States except Nevada had organized Guard units, and twenty States 

had completed the organization of all units authorized. (47) 

The 1920 Act directed the peacetime organization of the Army into corps areas. 

In August 1920, the War Department divided the country into nine corps areas, with each 

corps to contain one Regular, two National Guard and three Reserve divisions giving the 

Army a total of fifty-four divisions. The priority for manning, equipping and training 

within the Guard went to the new, eighteen divisions, two separate infantry regiments in 

Hawaii and Puerto Rico and a Coast Artillery corps of 11,600 soldiers. The eighteen 

divisions reverted to the unit nicknames and designations adopted during World War I 

with the divisional numbers 26-38 and 40-45 but excluding the 42nd and 93rd Divisions. 

In 1922, the Guard received authority to raise four cavalry divisions numbered 21-24. 

Guard historians worked to integrate the lineage and honors of old historic units into 

modern designations. For example, the Bay State’s 181st and 182nd Infantry traced their 

heritage all the way back to the Massachusetts North Regiment of 1636. Units adopted 

distinctive regimental crests and shoulder patches that emphasized local ties and long 

traditions of service. For the first time, the War Department issued standard divisional 

and brigade flags, regimental colors, and company guidons to Guard units. By 1927, the 

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Army National Guard History

organization of all units assigned to the eighteen infantry divisions was 85 percent 

complete while the cavalry divisions still lacked one-third of their units. (48) 

The growth of the Guard presented new management challenges to the AGs and 

the Militia Bureau. To improve the management of the officer corps, the Militia Bureau 

in 1922 began publication of the National Guard Register that contained a summary of 

every Guard officer’s service record. The National Defense Act of 1920 had authorized 

435,800 Guardsmen, but congressional appropriations never allowed Guard strength to 

rise much above 180,000 throughout the 1920s. AGs managed their units in terms of 

numbers of troop spaces authorized versus the actual manning levels allowed by 

appropriations. To enhance recruiting, the States dispersed units as broadly as possible 

and placed armories in a maximum number of communities. For the first time, the AGs 

split company-sized units between towns. By 1922, the Guard had formed 2,200 units in 

1,250 towns and cities. The States decided it was better to have a maximum number of 

organized units partially filled than fewer units at full strength. The manpower 

experience of the recent war hung heavy over management decisions; the AGs assumed 

that upon mobilization new Guard recruits or draftees would fill their understrength units. 

Still, the Militia Bureau established hard rules for managing the force. Units of less than 

fifty soldiers were to be organized and manned exactly the same as Regular outfits. No 

armory was to house less than fifty soldiers. For units of more than fifty soldiers, the 

Militia Bureau established manning levels of 65-80 percent. Guard organizations 

throughout the country ranged in size from single armories of fifty men scattered across 

the Plains to 13,000 Guardsmen concentrated in New York City. (49) 

New types of units and weapons reflected the changing nature of modern warfare. 

The first tanks appeared in the Guard, with one tank company assigned to each infantry 

division. The 34th Division’s tank company from Duluth, Minnesota became the Guard’s 

first armor unit on May 25, 1920. Tank unit activations increased steadily until the 

Guard armor force included eighteen tank companies. The Guard received motor 

vehicles from World War I stocks, but by 1933 old sedans and transports were falling 

apart. New trucks appeared that afforded Guard units increased training opportunities. 

Reliable wheeled transport allowed units to use training areas that were formerly 

inaccessible because of the time and distances of foot marches. During the summer, 

National Guard wheeled convoys headed to annual training became an enduring image on 

America’s highways. Throughout the entire interwar period, the horse still served many 

units. The Army chief of artillery managed to motorize most of the Guard’s horse-drawn 

artillery regiments, but these units did not disappear until 1941. As late as 1940, half of 

Guard cavalrymen were on horseback, and the cavalry was not fully mechanized until 

April 1942. (50) 

The most dramatic advances in technology occurred with the activation of flying 

units. A large number of Air Service pilots, crewmen, and support personnel left the 

Army after World War I, and the National Guard was eager to take advantage of their 

special skills. The organization of each Army division called for an observation squadron 

for air reconnaissance missions. The first aviation unit after World War I to receive 

federal recognition occurred in January 1921 when Minnesota’s 109th Observation 

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Squadron became part of the 34th Division. Within months, Maryland and Indiana had 

organized their own divisional aviation units. By 1930, eighteen National Guard 

observation squadrons were on duty. The most dramatic accomplishment of any Guard 

aviator came on May 20, 1927 when Captain Charles A. Lindbergh of Missouri’s 110th 

Observation Squadron became the first pilot to fly solo across the hazardous North 

Atlantic. For his incredible passage between New York and Paris, Lindbergh received 

the Medal of Honor. (51) 

Combat experience from World War I prompted Guard commanders to make 

dramatic changes in training. They placed emphasis on getting troops out of sterile 

classrooms and into the field for firsthand experience. Marksmanship training dominated 

weekly drill periods for enlisted men while officers held command post exercises. 

During summer encampments, commanders stressed live fire exercises, force-on-force 

maneuvers and terrain walks. Five Guard divisions managed to assemble and train as 

entire units during the summer of 1928. The Regular Army struggled to provide barely 

half of the officers and senior sergeant instructors required because of its own budget and 

manning constraints. In 1927 the Army initiated a new, innovative, and cost saving 

instruction technique; correspondence courses. Within six years, two-thirds of Guard 

officers were enrolled in some type of correspondence course. (52) 

The stock market crash of October 29, 1929 set in motion an economic calamity 

that affected all Americans. Social dislocation and unemployment spread rapidly; by the 

summer of 1932, nearly one-third of the American work force was idle. National Guard 

service provided badly needed income. An unemployed worker who was a private in the 

Guard earned $75 a year by attending armory drills and summer camp. The lure of pay 

created a surge in volunteerism. For the first time, many units had waiting lists of men 

wanting to volunteer. At the lowest point of the Great Depression in 1932, National 

Guard strength stood at an historic, peacetime high of 187,413 soldiers. Attendance at 

both armory drill and summer camp exceeded 90 percent during 1932-1933. In 1934, 

Congress reduced the number of paid drills from 48 to 36 as a cost savings measure. 

Many Guard units continued a full regime of weekly drills, calling the unpaid assemblies 

“free drills.” Despite the reduction in pay, drill attendance stood at 91.5 percent. The 

chief of the Militia Bureau reported that it no longer took “any particular effort” to 

maintain strength. On the contrary, the challenge was to restrict manpower to within “the 

limits permitted by appropriations.” (53) 

Table 4 

NATIONAL GUARD STRENGTH, 1919-1940 

Year Total Year Total 

1919 37,210 1930 182,715 

1920 56,106 1931 187,386 

1921 113,640 1932 187,413 

1922 159,658 1933 185,925 

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Army National Guard History 

1923 160,598 1934 184,791 

1924 176,332 1935 185,915 

1925 177,525 1936 189,174 

1926 174,969 1937 192,161 

1927 181,142 1938 197,188 

1928 181,221 1939 199,491 

1929 176,988 1940 242,402 

(Source: Militia Bureau and National Guard Bureau, Annual Reports, 1919-1940.) 

The National Guard helped the nation endure the Great Depression’s rigors in 

other ways. Armory construction and camp improvements performed by the Works 

Progress Administration constituted the first federal dollars expended on Guard facilities 

in the States. Government contracts to vehicle and weapons producers stimulated the 

economy. As a public institution, the Guard provided stability and refuge to families and 

communities whose social and economic well being were threatened. With little money 

available for entertainment, townspeople went to local armories for free social activities 

that included dances, concerts, parades, marksmanship contests, and athletic events. A 

number of Guard cavalry units opened their armories to make horse back riding available 

for families on Sundays. For a period, social activities overshadowed military 

preparedness, and some of the romantic uniforms of the old, volunteer militia reappeared 

during parades and ceremonies. 

The Guard earned a reputation during the Great Depression as a reliable 

instrument of State power in enforcing laws. On several occasions, Guard units became 

involved in bitter labor disputes. During the San Francisco longshoremen’s strike of July 

1934, the California Guard restored order after rioting killed and injured nearly twentyfive policemen and bystanders. During violent protests by steel workers in Ohio, several 

Guardsmen were killed, and Ohio Guard flying units dropped tear gas from the air to 

disperse angry crowds. (54) 

An important amendment to previous National Guard legislation came in 1933. 

Since the passage of the Dick Act thirty years prior, the Guard’s dual nature—its role as 

both a State and federal force—had confused and confounded many soldiers and 

legislators alike. Under the leadership of Milton Reckord, NGAUS and Guard supporters 

drafted and passed into law an amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916 that 

defined and institutionalized the Guard’s unique status. The legislation established the 

“National Guard of the United States” as a permanent “reserve component” of the Army 

consisting of federally recognized National Guard units. At the same time, the law 

identified the “National Guard of the several States” consisting of the voluntary members 

of the State militias that served under the Governors. In simplest terms, the “National 

Guard of the United States” pertained to the Guard’s federal role as a deployable asset of 

the Army, while the “National Guard of the several States” recognized the role of 

Guardsmen on State active duty. Henceforth, officers would take a dual oath to both the 

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The last mounted color guard of Virginia’s 111th Field Artillery in 1933. By the late 1930s, the 

National Guard’s field artillery units had traded their horses for trucks. (Virginia National 

Guard Historical Collection) 

nation and their State. The legislation also changed the name of the Militia Bureau to the 

National Guard Bureau (NGB). (55) 

The same year that Milton Reckord championed new legislation, Adolf Hitler 

became the chancellor of Germany at the head of the National Socialist Party. Soon after 

the Nazis came to power, they rearmed the German military. Hitler’s inflammatory 

rhetoric that promoted a 1,000-year Third Reich based on racial purity and military power 

caused alarm in Europe. Eventually, the European powers launched rearmament 

programs of their own while keeping a wary eye on the Nazis. The disturbing 

developments in Europe and Asia created favorable conditions for Gen. Douglas 

MacArthur, the new Army chief of staff, to argue for much needed increases in defense 

spending. Throughout his tenure, MacArthur stressed the Army’s deficiencies in 

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Army National Guard History

personnel and materiel while presiding over the development of plans for manpower and 

industrial mobilization. 

MacArthur’s appeals resulted in limited but important increases in defense 

spending. For the first time in nearly twenty years, Regular and Guard units held joint 

maneuvers during 1935. Starting that same year, Congress increased appropriations that 

allowed the Guard to add manpower at an annual rate of 5,000 soldiers. By early 1940, 

Guard strength stood at over 200,000 troops. Personnel increases allowed the Guard 

divisions to complete their unit organization even though actual manning levels remained 

below full strength. At the same time, the Guard created hundreds of combat and support 

units that would serve at the corps and army level in wartime. As a percentage of the 

U.S. armed forces, the Guard’s twenty-two infantry and cavalry divisions and separate 

units represented a substantial portion of America’s combat capability on the eve of 

World War II. (56) 

The Mobilization of 1940-1941 

In the late 1930s, diplomatic and military events in Europe and Asia set the stage 

for a second global conflict. Between 1936-1939, Hitler occupied the Rhineland, 

annexed Austria and seized control of the Sudetenland. The Italians extended their 

African empire into Ethiopia, and the Germans and Italians supported fascists in the 

Spanish Civil War. In the Far East, the Japanese invaded China and inflicted brutal 

atrocities upon the Chinese people. Militarists in Tokyo spoke of expansion throughout 

Southeast Asia to create an economic sphere to support Imperial Japan’s ambitions. The 

leaders of Western Europe appeased Hitler, prompting the German Fuehrer to accelerate 

his plans of conquest and expansion. On September 1, 1939, Hitler’s legions attacked 

Poland and started World War II. The stage was set for an epic struggle that ultimately 

pitted the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan against the Allied countries of Great 

Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. 

Ironically, one of the men most responsible for the ultimate Axis defeat came to 

power the very day World War II started. On September 1, 1939, General George C. 

Marshall was sworn in as the fifteenth Army chief of staff. A Pershing protégé, Marshall 

brought to the job long years of experience and a widely recognized reputation for 

superior intellect and character. Marshall had a healthy respect for citizen-soldiers based 

on his service as a senior staff officer in World War I and during assignments with the 

National Guard in the interwar years. Considering the state of America’s defenses in 

1939, Marshall had to muster all of his considerable skills and talents to meet the 

impending crisis. 

At the beginning of World War II, the U.S. Army was ranked the 17th largest in 

the world with only 190,000 Regulars, just behind the Rumanian Army. More than a 

quarter of the active Army’s manpower occupied the overseas possessions, and the 

140,000 soldiers in the U.S. were scattered among 130 posts that housed battalion-sized 

units. The Army’s nine divisions existed mostly on paper. Only the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 

Infantry Divisions had even a semblance of divisional organization, and the other six 

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Army National Guard History

divisions were in reality small brigades. The 1st and 2nd Cavalry divisions numbered 

only 1,200 soldiers each. In most respects, the Army of 1939 closely resembled the AEF 

of World War I in its organization and equipment. The infantryman remained the core of 

the Army’s combat capability. Because of the isolationism and austere military budgets 

of the interwar years, the Army had done little to promote military aviation or 

mechanized warfare. (57) 

The ORC was perhaps in better shape than the Regular Army given its limited 

goals. Like the National Guard, the ORC organized in earnest after the passage of the 

National Defense Act of 1920. A large number of World War I veterans joined the ORC, 

and its strength stood at 68,232 by the summer of 1921. In June 1923 the Army General 

Staff created the Reserve Officers’ Section to “handle questions pertaining to the 

Reserves.” During the interwar years, students commissioned from ROTC constituted 

the bulk of ORC membership. The ORC manned the officer positions in twenty-seven 

infantry and six cavalry divisions at approximately 80 percent strength. Officers attended 

drills and enjoyed periods of active duty on an intermittent basis. An opportunity came 

during the Great Depression with the ORC’s management of the Civilian Conservation 

Corps, a Federal public works program. The total number of ORC members to work with 

the corps was in excess of 30,000. By 1939, the number of active ORC officers had 

grown to 104,575. (58) 

The outbreak of war in Europe spurred new measures to increase the Army’s 

readiness. On September 8, 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared a national 

emergency and directed increases in the Regular Army and the National Guard by 

presidential executive order. The Regular Army was authorized an increase of 17,000 to 

a strength of 227,000 soldiers. The Guard was directed to expand its ranks by 43,000 to 

an aggregate strength of 235,000. Nearly three-quarters of the growth was intended to 

bring the Guard’s eighteen infantry divisions to full strength. In addition, annual armory 

drills increased from 48 to 60 and summer encampments expanded from 15 to 21 days. 

Between June 1939 and June 1940, the Guard added nearly 40,000 men, and manpower 

in the summer of 1940 stood at a peacetime, historic high of 242,402 soldiers. (59) 

Hitler’s military machine achieved a string of dazzling victories in 1940 that 

shocked the world. In a series of lightning strikes in April, German troops occupied 

Denmark and Norway. On May 10, 1940, Germany unleashed a blitzkrieg against 

Western Europe. The Lowlands countries surrendered quickly, and German troops 

forced the evacuation of the British from Dunkirk. In a series of rapid thrusts, German 

troops swept into France, occupied Paris and destroyed the French Army. On June 22nd, 

Hitler accepted the surrender of a humiliated France. Soon afterwards, the German 

Luftwaffe opened an air campaign against Great Britain. In less than three months, most 

of Western Europe except England had fallen under the Nazi boot, and an invasion of the 

British Isles appeared imminent. 

German aggression drew an unusually sharp response from the United States. 

Even before France’s final capitulation in late June, Congress authorized a full expansion 

of the Regular Army to 280,000 troops. Meanwhile, a national debate ensued over the 

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Army National Guard History

callup of the Guard and the implementation of a peacetime draft. Before ordering the 

National Guard to active duty short of a declaration of war, President Roosevelt wanted 

Congress to provide additional funding for the Guard and to authorize its use beyond U.S. 

borders. Prominent civilian leaders pressed for conscription as the best means of 

preparing the country for war and transmitting American resolve to the Axis powers. On 

August 27, 1940, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the president to order the 

National Guard and the Reserves to active duty for twelve months but restricting their 

employment to the Western hemisphere. Three weeks later, Congress passed the 

Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, and on September 16th President Roosevelt 

signed into law America’s first peacetime draft. (60) 

Even before the National Guard entered active duty, certain provisions of the draft 

law profoundly affected Guard manpower. Because Guardsmen and draftees were to 

enter active service in peacetime, the War Department decided that the same induction 

standards should apply to both groups. The Selective Service Act called for the drafting 

of men over age 21 without dependents who did not hold critical jobs in agriculture or 

war production. NGB issued similar implementing instructions for discharges to the 

States on July 23rd. Over the ensuing months a mass exodus took place. Guardsmen 

with good jobs knew that enlisted pay would not suffice to support their families. Nearly 

51,000 Guard enlisted men — 20 percent of the total — received dependency 

separations. The Guard released another 4,906 underage soldiers who had enlisted 

without parental consent. In an incredible dint of effort, the Guard, in only a few weeks, 

recruited enough volunteers to make up for the huge losses. In the twelve months 

following June 1940, the Guard released another 40,000 troops for defense and 

agriculture related jobs. Though the Guard did manage to maintain its overall strength, 

the loss in experienced soldiers was severe and imposed on units the huge task of 

providing initial training to large numbers of new recruits. (61) 

On August 31st, President Roosevelt signed an executive order initiating the 

Guard mobilization of 1940. The first increment of 63,346 soldiers ordered to active duty 

on September 16th included the 30th, 41st, 44th, and 45th Divisions, eighteen Coast 

Artillery regiments, and four observation squadrons. The entire mobilization eventually 

comprised twenty-five increments over thirteen months with the last callup occurring on 

October 6, 1941. The phased mobilization was intended to allow the smooth assimilation 

of Guardsmen onto active duty, but the rapid and simultaneous inflow of Regulars, 

Guardsmen, Reservists, and draftees into the Army created chaos. (62) 

Guardsmen reporting to their armories in the fall of 1940 encountered various 

degrees of confusion. To ease logistical burdens, commanders told soldiers to eat 

breakfast at home each morning until units moved to training camps. In most instances, a 

chronic shortage of uniforms and shoes forced new unit members to report each day in 

civilian clothes. The uniforms that were available were a mixed, ill-fitting lot, mostly 

dating from World War I. Newly promoted sergeants spent their time learning their 

duties and drilling fresh recruits. When not training, soldiers prepared for movement by 

filling out required forms, undergoing physical examinations and manning work details. 

(63) 

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Army National Guard History

When the Guard divisions reported to their training camps in late 1940, few sites 

were ready. At Fort Dix, New Jersey the 44th Division found barracks for only 1,500 of 

its nearly 11,000 soldiers, and 200 carpenters labored to construct 2,700 wooden tent 

pads. The 45th Division’s designated training site was so ill prepared that the Army 

switched it to Fort Sill. Throughout the winter, “Thunderbird” Division soldiers lived in 

harsh, cold conditions under tents. Private Bill Mauldin of Arizona’s 120th 

Quartermaster Regiment indulged his love of drawing to portray the dismal conditions in 

Oklahoma. Before the end of the war, Mauldin’s cartoon characters “Willy and Joe” 

would become the most beloved GIs of World War II. All of the divisions had similar 

experiences with inadequate training sites. On March 5, 1941, Illinois’ 33rd Division 

was the last Guard division to enter active duty. (64) 

As in 1917, significant problems hampered post-mobilization training. The most 

serious deficiencies were shortages of weapons and equipment. In some cases, units 

surrendered precious equipment for shipment to the hard-pressed Allies under the Lend 

Lease Program. Turbulence in unit organization and personnel turnover disrupted 

training plans. The Guard’s four cavalry divisions were immediately converted into 

artillery, antitank, and mechanized cavalry units. Another 500 units converted to other 

types of organization. On average, each Guard division required an infusion of 6,000 

draftees to bring it to full strength, and the influx of untrained soldiers kept training 

focused on individual soldier skills rather than unit maneuvers. Organizations often had 

to surrender their most experienced personnel to form the nucleus for new draftee 

divisions. Guard leaders chafed at critical Army inspectors who pointed out training 

deficiencies but seemed unable or unwilling to provide assistance. (65) 

The Guard and Army collided head-on over officer assignments, promotions, and 

dismissals. The focal point for the Guard’s frustrations became Lt. Gen. Leslie J. 

McNair. As commander of the Army Ground Forces, McNair was responsible for all 

Army training in the United States. A long serving Regular, McNair was an avowed 

Uptonian who made no secret of his disdain for the Guard and citizen-soldiers in general. 

After visiting the 30th Division early in the mobilization, McNair characterized the 

Guard’s leadership as “the blind leading the blind.” In 1944, McNair complained to 

General Marshall that Guard generals were unprofessional and “not competent to 

exercise the command appropriate to their rank.” Just before his untimely death by 

friendly fire in Normandy in July 1944, McNair wrote that in his opinion the National 

Guard had contributed little to national defense. (66) 

The most contentious personnel issue centered on the relief of the Guard’s 

division commanders. Of the eighteen division commanders assigned in 1940, only two 

went on to lead their troops in combat. The main reasons for relief were age and 

infirmities; seven commanders were age sixty or older. Recent scholarship has put new 

light on the controversy by comparing the fate of Regular and Guard division 

commanders in 1940. Much like the Guard generals, few of the original fourteen Regular 

division commanders survived the mobilization. None took their divisions into battle, 

and only three went on to higher command. Four of the Guard’s division commanders 

had been in command for ten or more years, and the common denominator among 

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Army National Guard History

Regular and Guard commanders was the military’s stagnant, peacetime seniority system 

that permitted the eldest generals to retain command. In fact, of the original thirty-two 

division commanders, only Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler, the commander of Ohio’s 37th 

Division, remained in command for the entire war. In retrospect, it appears that the fate 

of the original group of Guard division commanders was not much different from their 

active duty counterparts. (67) 

By the spring of 1941, conditions had improved in the mobilization camps and 

unit training began in earnest. However, troop morale suffered because of an uncertain 

future. Guardsmen, Reservists and draftees had entered active duty for twelve months to 

defend the western hemisphere, and Axis ambitions appeared satisfied for the moment. 

Unless another international crisis loomed, citizen-soldiers expected to head home 

starting in the fall and most wanted to make family and employment arrangements 

toward that end. Congress reserved the right to extend conscription and the reserve 

callup, but the political debates dragged on inconclusively. Citizen-soldiers exercised 

their perceived right of self-expression and wrote their elected representatives urging a 

quick solution to the impasse. Throughout the Army, disgruntled troops scrawled the 

acronym “OHIO” — Over the Hill In October — on barracks walls and on the sides of 

Missouri Guardsmen of the 203rd Coast Artillery prepare to open fire at a target drone during 

the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers. (National Archives) 

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Army National Guard History

vehicles, signifying that the first troops ordered to active duty wanted to head home in the 

fall. In May 1941, the Chief , NGB (CNGB) cited national security needs to recommend 

the Guard’s indefinite retention on active duty. One month later the War Department 

took the same position. On June 22, 1941 Hitler attacked Russia, and an expansion of the 

European crisis seemed all but certain. After an intense debate, Congress passed a sixmonth extension of the reserve component mobilization and conscription on August 12, 

1941 by only one vote in the House of Representatives. The Guard would remain on 

active duty until April 1942. (68) 

With all uncertainties removed regarding the availability of troops, the Army 

launched the largest peacetime training exercises in the nation’s history. The maneuvers 

of the fall of 1941 involved nearly half a million soldiers and riveted the nation’s 

attention. The Guard divisions fully participated in the maneuvers in Louisiana, 

Tennessee, California, and the Carolinas. The ranks most remembered the primitive 

living conditions and the embarrassing shortages of weapons and equipment. Guardsmen 

used stove pipes to simulate cannons and mortars, carried sticks and brooms for rifles and 

pretended that pine logs were machine guns. Trucks and jeeps with signs marked 

“TANK” simulated enemy armored vehicles, and low flying aircraft dropped sacks of 

flour instead of bombs. Despite the obvious deficiencies, the maneuvers provided 

valuable training for staffs and commanders, revealed unfit leaders and identified rising 

stars ready for more senior commands. (69) 

Unfortunately, the renewal of the draft and the Guard mobilization by only a 

single vote in Congress sent a strong signal to Japanese militarists in Tokyo. Bent on 

expansion in the Pacific, they believed the United States would be an easy opponent; 

Americans apparently did not want war and had no stomach for suffering large casualties. 

One swift, powerful blow would surely send the Yankees reeling. On Thanksgiving Day 

1941, as America enjoyed a traditional holiday meal, the Imperial Japanese Navy set sail 

from northern Japan, steaming east toward Hawaii under a shroud of secrecy to deliver an 

audacious, surprise attack against the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

The Opening Shots of World War II 

“AIR RAID, PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT A DRILL!” This short, dramatic 

message from Hawaii on the morning of December 7, 1941 plunged the United States 

into World War II. The next day, President Roosevelt proclaimed December 7th as “a 

date which will live in infamy,” and Congress declared war on Japan. In response, 

Germany and Italy promptly declared war on the United States. With all of the major 

participants finally engaged, World War II escalated to new levels of fury and 

destruction. 

Even as Congress declared war on Japan, National Guardsmen were already in 

combat. On October 15, 1940, the Hawaii National Guard’s 298th and 299th Infantry 

entered active duty at Schofield Barracks on Oahu; the 298th was assigned to the Regular 

Army’s 25th Infantry Division and the 298th to the 24th Infantry Division. A month later, 

California’s 251st Coast Artillery arrived in Hawaii from Los Angeles, the first Guard 

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Army National Guard History

unit to leave the U.S. for overseas duty in World War II. When the Japanese attacked 

Pearl Harbor, the 298th and 299th Infantry and the 251st Coast Artillery took part in the 

defense of Oahu and fired the National Guard’s first shots of World War II. (70) 

On December 7, 1941, Guardsmen were already on duty in the Philippines. The 

month before, three Guard units with troops from seven States arrived in the Philippines 

to bolster the island defenses. The largest was New Mexico’s 200th Coast Artillery 

consisting of 1,800 men, many of them Hispanic. During the 1940 mobilization, the 

Army had consolidated the tank companies assigned to each Guard division into four 

composite tank battalions. The 192nd Tank Battalion, with troops from Wisconsin, 

Illinois, Ohio, and Kentucky, and the 194th Tank Battalion, consisting of companies from 

Minnesota and California with a sprinkling of Guardsmen from Missouri, added their 

firepower to the Philippine defenses. The 200th Coast Artillery valiantly defended against 

Japanese aerial attacks at Clark Field on December 8th. During the battle, the New 

Mexicans fired the first shots in defense of the Philippines and suffered a number of 

casualties while downing five enemy planes. The Japanese Army invaded the 

Philippines, backing the Americans and Filipinos onto the Bataan Peninsula and the 

island fortress of Corregidor. Cut off from supplies and reinforcements, the defenders 

held on for four months. Throughout the defensive battles, Guard units fought 

stubbornly. Finally, with their backs to the sea and low on all commodities except 

courage, the “Battling Bastards of Bataan” surrendered on April 9, 1942. The defenders 

suffered through the horrors of the Bataan “Death March” and went on to endure over 

three years of deprivations and brutality in Japanese prisoner of war camps. (71) 

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor set into motion a chain of events that 

resulted in the National Guard’s “Lost Battalion” of World War II. On December 7, 

1941, the 2-131st Field Artillery of the Texas National Guard was aboard a ship in the 

south Pacific and headed to reinforce the American garrison in the Philippines. Because 

of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the ship diverted first to Australia and then to 

Java in the Dutch East Indies where the battalion was to provide fire support to Dutch, 

British, and Australian defenders. The Japanese soon invaded Java and the Dutch 

surrendered after token resistance; the entire 2-131st Field Artillery was taken prisoner. 

For the next three years, Texas Guardsmen worked as slave laborers in Japan and 

throughout Southeast Asia, including the construction of the infamous Burma-Siam 

railroad. Altogether, 163 Guardsmen died in captivity before they were liberated. 

Because no one heard from the unit for three years, the 2-131st became known as the 

Guard’s “Lost Battalion.” (72) 

While fighting raged in the Philippines, Guardsmen at home reorganized for 

combat. Hitler’s blitzkrieg victories convinced the Army of the effectiveness of 

maneuver warfare and prompted the abandonment of the square infantry division as the 

primary combat formation. Earlier in 1941, the Army had created a “triangular division” 

based on the employment of three infantry regiments, and active duty divisions converted 

to the new design. Stripped of all unnecessary combat and support units, the smaller 

triangular division was designed for agility and responsiveness on the fluid battlefields of 

mechanized warfare. After Pearl Harbor, the Army directed the Guard divisions to 

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Army National Guard History

convert from the square to the triangular configuration. The end result of the 

reorganization was to release eighteen separate infantry regiments for duty elsewhere. 

Guard leaders viewed the detachment of eighteen regiments as yet another effort to 

degrade the National Guard’s size and autonomy. A few of the separate regiments went 

on to fight with Regular or draftee divisions, but most assumed security missions at 

various locations worldwide. At the same time, the Army officially recognized the 

existence of different type of divisions within the Army and added branch identifications 

to each division’s official title. (73) 

The outbreak of war precipitated other changes in the States and at NGB. The 

Guard mobilization left the Governors without troops, and as in World War I, the States 

created State Guard forces. Throughout the war, State Guards performed disaster relief, 

aid to civil authorities and security missions. Overall control of the State Guards fell to 

NGB, and at their peak strength in June 1943, the State Guards numbered 170,403 troops 

in forty-four States. With all National Guard units on active duty during the war, NGB’s 

authority was greatly diminished. In March 1942, NGB ceased to exist as a special staff 

and came under the authority of the Army’s Adjutant General. Before the end of the war, 

the NGB staff was reduced to forty-nine civilian workers who served as a subordinate 

agency of the Personnel Division of the Army Service Forces. (74) 

A Japanese whirlwind overran Southeast Asia and the central Pacific in early 

1942. The miraculous victory at Midway in May 1942 gave the United States the 

strategic initiative, but the Japanese continued to occupy key terrain. Japanese forces in 

New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands threatened Australia and the sea routes linking 

Australia and Hawaii. National Guard infantry was at the center of early American 

victories on Guadalcanal and in New Guinea. Three infantry regiments — the 132nd 

(Illinois), 164th (North Dakota), and the 182nd (Massachusetts) — made available by the 

triangular division conversion were rushed to New Caledonia in March 1942. The three 

regiments formed the basis for the activation of the “Americal” Division on May 27, 

1942, the nineteenth Guard division to serve in World War II. (“Americal” is an 

abbreviation of “America” and “New Caledonia.”) The 164th Infantry deployed to 

Guadalcanal in October to reinforce the U.S. Marines. The North Dakotans became the 

first Army troops to go on the offensive in World War II. The remainder of the division 

soon arrived on the island and played a major role in the Japanese defeat. For its actions 

on Guadalcanal, the Americal Division became the only Army division to be awarded the 

Navy Presidential Unit Citation. In the last stages of the Guadalcanal campaign, Ohio’s 

37th Division entered the fight and saw action in April 1943. (75) 

The 32nd Division from Wisconsin and Michigan was set to deploy to Europe 

when it received orders to head for the port of embarkation at San Francisco. By May 

1942, the “Red Arrow” Division was in Australia, and before the end of the summer it 

was in New Guinea fighting alongside the Australians. General MacArthur ordered the 

32nd Division to take Buna, a critical Japanese enclave on the northern tip of New 

Guinea. In one of the most grueling campaigns of the war, Guardsmen attacked heavily 

defended Japanese pillboxes in the thick, sweltering jungles. Short on supplies, troops 

ate half rations and suffered through bouts of malaria. The Americans absorbed crippling 

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losses but finally captured Buna in January 1943. The 41st Division, manned by 

Guardsmen from the Pacific Northwest, relieved the 32nd Division on New Guinea, and 

the Red Arrow division returned to Australia for rest and refit. 

The War in Europe 

Though American naval and ground forces in the Pacific were battling the 

Japanese with positive results, the priority for operations shifted to Europe. In 

consultation with the Allies, the Roosevelt Administration determined that Nazi Germany 

posed a more serious threat than Japan and adopted a national strategy of “Germany 

First.” Initially, General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advocated a direct 

attack against Nazi-occupied Western Europe across the English Channel from bases in 

Great Britain. However, it soon became evident that American troops were not yet ready 

for such an ambitious undertaking. President Roosevelt insisted that American troops 

engage the Germans before the end of 1942 and decided to support Allied operations in 

the Mediterranean. For American troops, the road to Berlin would begin in the sands of 

North Africa. 

During 1942-1943, Guardsmen were in the thick of the fighting in the 

Mediterranean. The 34th Infantry Division was the first American combat division to 

deploy overseas following Pearl Harbor. The “Red Bull” Division sailed to Ireland in 

February 1942 to train for the invasion of Western Europe. Reflecting Allied strategic 

decisions, the 34th Division was reassigned to the landing forces for Operation TORCH, 

the invasion of North Africa. On November 8, 1942, the 34th Division made an assault 

landing on the Algerian coast, and with other U.S. divisions, fought its way across the 

sands and mountains of Tunisia against Germany’s Afrika Korps. The enemy 

surrendered in May 1943, with the 34th Division suffering 4,200 casualties. The 45th 

Division had its baptism of fire on June 8, 1943 during the amphibious invasion of Sicily. 

In twenty-two days of continuous combat, the Thunderbird Division covered more 

ground that any other Army division. The 36th Division from Texas became the third 

Guard division to see action in the Mediterranean when it landed at Salerno on the Italian 

peninsula on September 9, 1943. Stiff enemy resistance nearly doomed the landing, and 

the 45th Division quickly deployed into the Salerno beachhead to strengthen the Allied 

defenses. The invaders finally captured Naples and began a slow, bloody advance up the 

Italian peninsula against rugged, mountainous terrain, abysmal weather, and a determined 

enemy. The 34th, 36th, and 45th Divisions participated in every major campaign in Italy, 

including the assault of the German Winter Line, the bloody crossing of the Rapido 

River, desperate fighting at Anzio and the liberation of Rome on June 5, 1944. To 

increase pressure on Nazi forces, the Allies landed in southern France on August 15th. 

Both the 36th and 45th Divisions splashed ashore in the French Riviera, were at the 

forefront of the offensive up the Rhone River valley, fought their way through to the 

German frontier and helped to overrun Germany in the spring of 1945. Meanwhile, the 

34th Division continued fighting in northern Italy until German forces surrendered there 

on May 2, 1945. 

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Army National Guard History

The 28th Infantry Division marches triumphantly down the Champs Elysees to mark the 

liberation of Paris on August 29, 1944. (National Archives) 

On June 6, 1944, Allied land, sea, and air forces invaded Western Europe in the 

largest amphibious assault of all time. After airborne landings and preparatory 

bombardments by air and naval forces, Allied ground troops assaulted five separate 

invasion beaches in Normandy. The most difficult fighting occurred on Omaha Beach 

where elements of the 1st and 29th Infantry divisions landed abreast. German defenses, 

high bluffs, and rough seas made the assault precarious. By the end of the day, the 

divisions had a viable toehold on the French coastline. The 29th Division went on to 

accumulate an impressive combat record in Europe, though at a high cost. Veterans 

grimly recalled that in reality three separate 29th Divisions existed during the war -- one 

on the front lines, one in the hospital, and one in the cemetery. 

Five other National Guard divisions proved their mettle in Europe. The 30th 

Division arrived in Normandy ten days after D-Day and went on to a stellar combat 

career. At the battle of Mortain the Old Hickory Division blunted a strong German 

counterattack intended to thwart the American breakout from Normandy and in the fall of 

1944 was one of the first American divisions to breach the vaunted Siegfried Line. The 

35th Division received its baptism of fire in Normandy while helping to capture the vital 

road junction at St. Lo in July 1944. After Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s dash across 

France, the “Santa Fe” Division liberated the city of Nancy, took part in the American 

offensive following the battle of the Bulge and ended the war on the banks of the Elbe 

River. The 28th Division stumbled badly during the ill-fated attack against the small town 

of Schmidt in the Huertgen Forest. Because of punishing casualties, veterans referred to 

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the division’s red, keystone shoulder patch as “the bloody bucket.” After a period of rest 

and retraining, the 28th Division redeemed its reputation during a series of stubborn 

defensive battles in the opening days of the Bulge. The 26th Division entered combat in 

Lorraine in the late summer of 1944 and led the advance to capture the fortress complex 

at Metz. In December, the Yankee Division participated in Patton’s attack to relieve the 

hard-pressed defenders at Bastogne. The 26th Division drove across Germany the 

following spring, captured Linz, Austria and ended the war in Czechoslovakia. The 44th 

Division did not arrive in Europe until October 1944 and fought in the difficult Vosges 

Mountains. In the last months of the war, the “Four by Four” Division breached the 

Siegfried Line, captured Mannheim and ended the war in Austria. All together, the nine 

National Guard divisions serving in Europe suffered losses of 125,630. (76) 

Of the nearly seventy American divisions that fought in Europe, the 45th Division 

compiled a combat record perhaps second to none. The Thunderbird Division endured 

511 days in combat in Sicily, Italy, France, and Germany and conducted three 

amphibious assault landings. After observing the division in action in Sicily, General 

Patton declared: “Born at sea, baptized in blood, your fame shall never die.” One of the 

Guard’s most distinguished soldiers from World War II came from the 45th Division. 

Raymond S. McLain had joined the Oklahoma National Guard in 1912 and was a veteran 

of the Mexican Border mobilization and World War I. By 1940, he was a brigadier 

general and commander of the 45th Division artillery. In the Mediterranean campaigns, 

he was noted for conspicuous bravery in Sicily and at Salerno. After D-Day, McLain 

took command of the troubled 90th Infantry Division in France and transformed it into an 

effective fighting unit. In October 1944, McLain became the commander of the U.S. 

XIX Corps and the first citizen-soldier corps commander since the Civil War. By war’s 

end, the 45th Division had captured 103,000 enemy soldiers and suffered a total of 62,563 

casualties. Eight soldiers received the Medal of Honor. In April 1945, the Thunderbird 

Division had the dubious distinction of liberating the infamous Nazi death camp at 

Dachau. When it occupied Munich at the end of the war, the division’s ranks included 

soldiers from forty-one States, yet the leadership was still predominantly National Guard, 

except for the most senior positions. (77) 

Compared to World War I, black Guardsmen saw little combat in World War II. 

The War Department failed to address racial inequality in the military and supported 

policies of segregation and discrimination. Cognizant of racial injustice, AfricanAmerican Guardsmen fought constantly for victory at home and abroad. Black units that 

had served with distinction in 1917-1918 were mostly converted to artillery and engineer 

units. New York’s 369th Infantry became the 369th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion that 

garrisoned Hawaii and ended the war as part of the occupation forces on Okinawa. The 

only black Guard units to see combat were the 1698th and 1699th Engineer Battalions 

(Combat) that were formed from Illinois’ 370th Infantry and saw action in Europe near 

the end of the war. Only the 372nd Infantry retained its original organization throughout 

the war while performing guard and security mission in the New York City area. In early 

1945, the 372nd shipped out to Schofield Barracks and became part of Hawaii’s garrison 

until January 1946. (78) 

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Army National Guard History 

National Guard flying units contributed to the war effort. After Pearl Harbor, 

Guardsmen flew anti-submarine patrols along both coasts. The Army Air Forces were 

desperately short of trained pilot instructors, and eight National Guard squadrons spent 

the entire war in stateside training camps. Three of the first observation squadrons to 

depart the U.S. were the 111th (Texas), 122nd (Louisiana) and the 154th (Arkansas). They 

sailed for the Mediterranean as part of the 68th Observation Group and took part in the 

invasion of North Africa. Other squadrons that saw early combat were Michigan’s 107th 

Observation Squadron and the 109th from Minnesota. Redesignated as tactical 

reconnaissance squadrons, the two units flew photo-reconnaissance missions for the 

Normandy invasion planners. In July 1944, the 107th became the first U.S. Army Air 

Forces unit to operate from French soil. (79) 

Table 5 

NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS IN WORLD WAR II 

DIV STATES THEATER NICKNAME 

26 MA Europe Yankee 

27 NY Pacific Empire 

28 PA Europe Keystone 

29 VA, MD, DC Europe Blue and Gray 

30 NC, SC, TN Europe Old Hickory 

31 FL, AL, LA, MS Pacific Dixie 

32 MI, WI Pacific Red Arrow 

33 IL Pacific Prairie 

34 ND, SD, MN, IA Europe Red Bull 

35 KS, MO, NE Europe Santa Fe 

36 TX Europe Texas 

37 OH Pacific Buckeye 

38 IN, KY, WV Pacific Cyclone 

40 CA, UT, NV Pacific Sunshine 

41 OR, WA, ID Pacific Sunset 

MT, WY 

43 CT, ME, VT, RI Pacific Winged Victory 

44 NJ, NY Europe Four by Four 

45 OK, AZ, CO, NM Europe Thunderbird 

Americal IL, MA, ND Pacific Americal 

(Source: Adapted from Headquarters, Department of the Army, 50th Anniversary of 

World War II Commemoration Committee, Fact Sheet, “The National Guard in World 

War II,” 1.) 

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Army National Guard History

The War in the Pacific 

While Allied operations in Europe focused ultimately on the invasion of Western 

Europe and the occupation of Nazi Germany, American strategy in the Pacific sought to 

isolate Japan geographically as a prelude to the invasion of its home islands. After the 

initial operations on Guadalcanal and New Guinea in 1942, the availability of Navy and 

Marine forces insured that the United States would maintain pressure against Japan even 

while implementing a “Germany First” strategy. The main objective of all operations 

was to strangle Japan’s economy and make the home islands vulnerable to direct attack 

by occupying a triangle formed by Formosa, China, and the Philippines. A strategy 

finally emerged that employed dual offensives directed westward across the Pacific’s vast 

reaches. In the Southwest Pacific, Douglas MacArthur would command U.S. and 

Australian divisions, with supporting air and naval forces, in attacks aimed at recapturing 

the Philippines. In the central Pacific, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz would attack with 

considerable naval forces as well as Marine and Army divisions. Nimitz’ goals were to 

destroy the Japanese Navy, capture island airfields that would allow the strategic air 

bombardment of Japan and place ground forces within reach of the home islands. 

Throughout the Pacific campaigns the National Guard contributed ten divisions 

that played an important role in Japan’s final defeat. New York’s 27th Infantry Division 

was the only Guard outfit to support Nimitz’ Central Pacific drive, but its combat role 

had several significant outcomes. Sent to Hawaii in March 1942, the 27th Division 

formed regimental combat teams that participated in Nimitz’ opening blows. While the 

Marine Corps attacked Tarawa in November 1943, the 27th Division seized nearby Makin 

Island after three days of combat. Only three months later, the 27th captured Eniwetok in 

the Marshall Islands. In both instances, Marine commanders criticized the Army’s 

cautious tactics and complained of poor leadership and inadequate training in the 27th 

Division. 

The Army-Marine confrontation came to a head during fighting on Saipan in the 

Marianas Islands in June 1944. Dissatisfied with the 27th Division’s conduct during some 

of the most vicious fighting yet encountered in the island campaigns, the Marine Corps 

general in overall command of the invasion force relieved the 27th’s commander, a 

Regular Army general. The relief initiated bitter recriminations between marines and 

soldiers that had repercussions far beyond Saipan’s shores. The incident poisoned Army 

and Marine Corps relations for the remainder of the war and fueled interservice rivalry 

afterwards. After Saipan, the 27th Division participated in the bloody capture of Okinawa 

and was preparing for the invasion of Japan when the war ended. The division suffered 

6,800 battle casualties, but its most enduring legacy from the war occurred on Saipan. 

The roots of the uneasy rivalry that has existed between the Army and the Marine Corps 

since World War II can be traced to the relief of the 27th Division’s commander on 

Saipan. (80) 

Nine Guard divisions played a key role in MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific 

campaigns that traversed the mountainous jungles of New Guinea and liberated the 

Philippines. During the last half of 1943, the 37th, 40th, 43rd and Americal Divisions 

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Army National Guard History

fought in the Solomon Islands. Fighting raged in New Georgia and Bougainville, and the 

40th Division played a vital role in eliminating the Japanese bastion at Rabaul. Starting in 

early 1944, MacArthur conducted a brilliant air, land, and sea offensive along the 

northern coast on New Guinea. Superior mobility allowed American forces either to 

bypass completely enemy strongpoints or to concentrate overwhelming combat power 

against isolated Japanese defenses. The 31st, 33rd, 41st, and 43rd Divisions saw action at 

Aitape, Hollandia, Wakde, and Biak, sometimes hitting together and other times striking 

singly against more distant targets. By September 1944, the 31st Division had occupied 

Morotai, and MacArthur’s forces were well toward Singapore and the southern tip of the 

Philippines. (81) 

With the Navy’s successes in the Central Pacific, MacArthur received permission 

to carry out his return to the Philippines. In November 1944, the 32nd and Americal 

Divisions landed on Leyte followed not long afterwards by the 31st and 41st Divisions. 

After the Leyte invasion, MacArthur planned major attacks on Luzon and Mindanao. 

The 31st and 41st Divisions landed on Mindanao in early 1945, and the 40th Division soon 

joined them. By late summer, American forces had entirely surrounded the last defenders 

Under heavy enemy machine gun fire, men of the 41st Infantry Division crouch low in a bomb 

crater on Jolo Island in the Philippines, April 1945. (National Archives) 

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Army National Guard History

on the island. Four Guard divisions — the 32nd, 37th, 40th and 43rd — were in the 

vanguard of MacArthur’s main blow against Luzon. The offensive slashed through 

Luzon’s low lands to capture Manila in the Army’s most difficult urban fighting of the 

entire war. Meanwhile, the 38th Division landed on the Bataan Peninsula and recaptured 

Corregidor. Facing defeat, the Japanese withdrew into northern Luzon for a 

characteristic last stand. The 33rd and 37th Divisions plunged northward into the tropical 

mountains to defeat the Japanese and complete the conquest of the Philippines. (82) 

Seven National Guard observation squadrons fought in the Pacific. Two 

squadrons — the 106th (Alabama) and the 110th (Missouri) — fought in the southwestern 

Pacific theatre. The 106th flew from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal in July 1943. The 

110th flew reconnaissance missions out of New Guinea, the Philippines, and Okinawa. 

Five National Guard squadrons saw action in the China-Burma-India Theater, performing 

photo-reconnaissance missions over Burma’s mountainous jungles and flying 

observation, light transport, and evacuation missions for British, Chinese, and American 

troops. (83) 

The ten Guard divisions in the Pacific bore a significant portion of the burden of 

Army operations while suffering 48,521casualties. Combat losses and disease depleted 

the numbers of Guardsmen in the ranks, but many of the divisions retained a Guard flavor 

in terms of leadership style and command positions. General Beightler commanded 

Ohio’s 37th Division for all of World War II and retained Guard officers as the chief of 

staff and division artillery commander. In addition, the 37th Division’s principle staff 

officers were Guardsmen, and most infantry regiments had Guard commanders. 

Compared to outfits in Europe where casualties were significantly higher, Guard 

divisions in the Pacific better retained their State and regional identities. (84) 

Preparations for the invasion of Japan came to an abrupt halt after the atomic 

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. World War II ended with Japanese surrender 

ceremonies aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. Though 

the troops thought only of returning home, several Guard divisions remained in Japan on 

occupation duty. The 40th Division went to Korea to assist in the repatriation of Japanese 

prisoners. In April 1946, the “Sunshine” Division was the last Guard division released 

from active duty. At the end of the war, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson summed 

up the Guard’s service: 

The National Guard took to the field 18 infantry divisions, 300,000 

men. Those State troops doubled the strength of the Army at once, and 

their presence in the field gave the country a sense that it had passed the 

lowest ebb of its weakness...Nine of those divisions crossed the Atlantic to 

Europe and Africa and nine went to the far reaches of the Pacific. The 

soldiers of the Guard fought in every action in which the Army participated 

from Bataan to Okinawa. They made a brilliant record on every fighting 

front. They proved once more the value of the trained citizen-soldier. (85) 

Perhaps more than any other event, the homecoming of New Mexico’s 200th 

Coast Artillery reflected the service and sacrifices of Guardsmen during World war II. 

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Army National Guard History

The 200th had proudly gone off to war, fought bravely on the Bataan Peninsula and 

endured three horrid years in Japanese prison camps. In mid-1945, a hospital train 

carried the frail, gaunt survivors from Phoenix to Albuquerque. During a brief stop at 

Gallup, New Mexico, those men well enough stepped from the train, dropped to their 

knees and kissed New Mexico’s white sands. Most went on to long convalescent stays at 

Bruns General Hospital in Santa Fe. On November 13, 1945 — “Bataan Day” in New 

Mexico—the regiment’s survivors gathered to celebrate Catholic mass in historic St. 

Francis Cathedral in downtown Santa Fe. As the service progressed, the regiment’s 

veterans and the families of men killed in the Pacific filled the cathedral with prayers for 

the souls of those Guardsmen who did not return from World War II. (86) 

Conclusions 

National Guard units were integral to America’s victories in the World Wars. In 

both conflicts, the Guard divisions were a ready, standing force that deployed soon after 

the outbreak of hostilities. Without them, America’s initial ground response might have 

taken years instead of months. In total numbers, the clear burden of the fighting in the 

World Wars fell upon draftees, but the Guard’s real contribution was in buying precious 

time for draftee units to form and train. The 26th and 42nd Divisions deployed quickly to 

France in World War I, and the 34th and 32nd Divisions were among the first divisions to 

go to Europe and the Pacific in World War II. The divisions brought with them 

experienced officers and enlisted men who often helped to organize other units. Guard 

divisions bore their share of the fighting, leading the way or battling alongside Regular 

and draftee divisions. Guardsmen quickly adapted to new technologies including tanks, 

airplanes, machine guns, rapid-fire artillery, and wheeled vehicles. The divisions’ leaders 

proved they were capable of fighting and coordinating combined arms forces during 

tough fighting in the Meuse-Argonne, Normandy, and the Philippines. 

The Army’s handling of Guardsmen during both major mobilizations generated a 

lingering, institutional bias among State soldiers against Regulars. More than anything 

else, the Army’s release of Guardsmen as individual soldiers rather than units after World 

War I signaled the deep institutional divide that still existed between the Army and the 

National Guard. Another epicenter of controversy was the relief and reassignment of 

Guard officers in favor of Regulars. Clearly, some Guard officers encountered blatant 

bias from Regulars like General McNair, but at the same time, too many Guard officers 

were unqualified for command due to advanced age, physical infirmities, poor leadership 

skills, and a lack of knowledge. At the same time, a number of talented Guard officers, 

such as General O’Ryan in World War I and Generals McLain and Beightler in World 

War II, showed that they were equal if not superior to many of their counterparts on 

active duty. Guardsmen resented the Army’s efforts to amalgamate them with active 

forces during extended active duty. State soldiers complied with the letter of Army 

regulations in the redesignation of long serving units but retained their identity through 

the wear of distinctive shoulder patches and insignia. Overall, Guard units tried to retain 

a distinct style of leadership and administration that reflected prewar State and local ties. 

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Army National Guard History

Legislation during the interwar years gained the Guard a permanent place in the 

defense establishment. The National Defense Act of 1920 settled planning and manpower 

differences that had dogged Army-Guard relations since 1903 and became one of the 

most enduring and significant pieces of military legislation in the 20th Century. Congress 

embraced the idea that to guarantee the readiness of the Army for war, its organization 

must be established in peace. The Regular Army would be the professional component 

for a larger, national force of Guardsmen and Reservists and not a cadre or skeleton to be 

expanded in war. As military policy, the ideas of John McAuley Palmer won out over 

those of Emory Upton. The act ended the Uptonian notion that large wartime forces 

should consist of masses of individual, federal reservists led by professional soldiers. In 

a similar fashion, national conscription during the World Wars forever demolished the 

concept of volunteer units raised by the States for federal service. The National Guard 

became the Army’s sole, standing combat reserve, and additional legislation in 1933 

further clarified the Guard’s status in war and peace while strengthening its position in 

policy matters. 

In many ways, the interwar years were the National Guard’s Gilded Age. 

Isolationism, economic hardships, and a paucity of defense dollars made security issues a 

low priority for most Americans. A new National Guard used the hiatus to dig its roots 

deeply into local communities and the States. Largely based on the Guard’s World War I 

combat record, citizens came to regard it as a serious, modern military force. The social 

image of the volunteer militia quickly faded in the public mind. Stability in force 

structure permitted units to concentrate on training and providing services to their local 

communities. For the first time in the Guard’s history, units maintained waiting lists for 

men desiring to join, a phenomenon that would not occur again until the 1960s. 

Guardsmen came home at the end of World War II knowing that they had helped 

to secure freedom throughout the world while greatly elevating America’s status as a 

world power. Yet, no one was certain of the shape of the postwar world. The mushroom 

clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki signaled that a new age was at hand, but lingering 

tensions between democracy and communism suggested that many animosities had 

survived the war intact. If the World Wars were any indicator, Guardsmen knew they 

would be square in the middle of any new dangers that emerged. 

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Army National Guard History

Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord: 

Service to State and Nation 

Milton Atchison Reckord was an experienced 

veteran of two forms of combat; as a talented 

military leader during two World Wars and as a 

shrewd lobbyist in Washington, DC. He left a deep 

imprint on American military policy during a 

distinguished military career to Maryland and the 

nation that spanned sixty-four years. 

“Milt” Reckord joined the Maryland National 

Guard as a private in 1901. ithin two years, he 

was elected to company command, and in 1916 saw 

duty on the Mexican Border. n World War I, he 

commanded the 115th Infantry, 29th Division as well 

as two different brigades in the division. 

In 1920, General Reckord was appointed the AG of Maryland, a position he held for 

an unprecedented forty-five years. ilized Guard opinion in favor of the National 

Defense Act of 1920 and served as NGAUS president, 1923-1925. 

author of the 1933 legislation giving Guardsmen a permanent status as both State and 

federal troops. Reckord commanded the 29th Division from 1934-1941, and 

during World War II, he served as the Provost Marshal of the European Theater. n 

1945, he helped lay the groundwork for the establishment of the postwar National Guard. 

After his retirement in 1965, Reckord maintained an interest in Guard affairs. 

was the first recipient of the NGAUS Distinguished Service Medal and a life member of 

the NGAUS Executive Council. Baltimore in September 1975 at the age of 

ninety-five and is buried in Fallston, Maryland. 

W

I

He mob

Reckord was the 

General 

I

He 

He died in 

189
Army National Guard History

CHAPTER 6 

The Early Cold War, 1946-1970 

We know that the country cannot support a standing Regular Army of sufficient 

size to perform all essential missions in the early stages of a war of the future. 

Thus, the existence of trained National Guard units in an adequate state of 

readiness is vitally essential to the success of our whole program. 

Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, 

War Department Information Chief, 

October 1947 

Introduction 

Sergeant Herbert R. Temple, Jr. stood in the darkness with other soldiers at the 

railing of the dilapidated troop transport “Private Joe P. Martinez” awaiting orders to 

go over the side. Dressed in a long, woolen olive drab overcoat and a helmet, Temple 

carried a full field pack, extra ammunition, and a rifle. Moments before, the ship had 

glided into the South Korean port of Inchon loaded with infantry replacements 

desperately needed on the front lines. In the middle of the night, the port facilities and 

the entire town were blacked out for protection. The only illumination came from 

intermittent bursts of orange light low on the distant horizon, the muzzle flashes of 

American artillery shelling North Korean and Chinese positions. Finally orders came, 

and the soldiers clambered over the ship’s railing, working their way slowly down cargo 

nets onto the deck of a waiting barge. When the loading was complete, the barge pulled 

away from the transport and headed for Inchon’s docks. Moments later, the 

replacements stepped onto Korean soil for the first time. 

Three years earlier Herbert Temple had been a teenager growing up in post-war 

Los Angeles when a friend encouraged him to volunteer in the California National 

Guard. On June 2, 1947, he enlisted in Headquarters Company, 160th Infantry that was 

reforming after World War II. A proud Guard infantry regiment with a long history of 

service, the 160th cherished its motto, “Los Angeles’ Own”. At first, the young Temple 

took his military duties casually, but his attitude changed when he was promoted and 

assigned as the unit supply sergeant. More and more, he spent his free time working at 

the armory and was finally hired as a full-time unit caretaker. With the outbreak of war 

in Korea, Sergeant Temple mobilized with California’s 40th Infantry Division in 

September 1950. At first, he was assigned to supply duties in the installation 

headquarters at Camp Cooke, the 40th Division’s mobilization station. Weeks later, 

Temple received orders assigning him as an individual infantry replacement in Korea. 

Sergeant Temple had never attended either individual basic or infantry advanced 

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training and only possessed the rudimentary infantry skills he had learned in the 

California Guard. He made the Pacific passage to Japan on a decrepit freighter and was 

assigned to the replacement depot of the 25th Infantry Division. After additional training, 

a group of replacements boarded the “Private Joe P. Martinez” for passage to Korea. 

Standing in the pitch black on the dock at Inchon, Sergeant Temple and the others 

learned to their dismay that they were no longer assigned to the 25th Division. Days 

before, the 24th Infantry Division had taken heavy casualties and was in dire need of 

replacements. In the darkness, the heavily burdened soldiers trudged to a waiting train 

for shipment north to the 24th Division. Sergeant Temple served with Company B, 5th 

Regimental Combat Team, first as a rifleman and then as a squad leader. During weeks 

of combat, Herb Temple honed his fighting and survival skills despite serious bouts of 

malaria and frostbite. At one point, the Army learned that the California Guardsman had 

not received formal infantry training and offered a new assignment, but Sergeant Temple 

declined to leave his comrades in Company B. Finally, the 5th Regimental Combat Team 

pulled off the front lines for much needed rest and refit. While leaving the mountains of 

Korea, Sergeant Temple vowed to himself that if he was ever in a position of influence 

that he would do everything possible to ensure that other Guardsmen would never again 

go into combat without adequate preparation. A simple promise made in Korea turned 

into a lifelong commitment that motivated Sergeant Temple for decades until he was 

appointed as CNGB with the rank of lieutenant general in the mid-1980s. 

At the dawn of the Nuclear Age, Americans speculated on the new international 

order emerging from the ashes of World War II. Despite the decisive victories in Europe 

and Asia, an age of peace seemed improbable. In retrospect, postwar concerns over the 

world’s future were more than justified. No sooner had World War II ended than the 

U.S. found itself ensnared in a global, ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, China, 

and their surrogates. Communist challenges came fast and furious. In 1948, the Russians 

invaded Czechoslovakia and blockaded the land routes to Berlin, forcing the Allies to 

supply the city with a massive, sustained airlift. The following year, the Soviets 

exploded their own atomic bomb, and communists took control of the Chinese mainland. 

Military planners found few precedents upon which to build a viable, national 

security strategy for the Cold War. For more than 150 years, the United States had 

anchored its security on two solid pillars: the defensive barriers of the oceans and the 

mobilization of mass, citizen-soldier armies. New, nuclear bombers and heightened 

tensions between East and West negated America’s sole reliance on oceanic defenses and 

large, mobilized armies. The U.S. adapted a strategy of containment against communist 

expansion along a vaguely defined perimeter that ran through central Europe and Asia. 

America and its allies fostered the United Nations (UN) for collective security, and at the 

same time, created regional, defensive alliances all along the length of the global 

perimeter. Forward deployed land, sea, and air forces guarded the line, backed by longrange, nuclear bombers capable of striking the Soviet homeland. The Army maintained a 

strong constabulary force in central Europe and an even larger occupation force in Japan. 

While the anticipated uses of nuclear weapons dominated military thinking, missiles, jet 

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aircraft, helicopters, and other modern weapons changed the face of conventional 

warfare. 

The early challenges of the Cold War prompted the creation of a more modern 

and ready Army National Guard (ARNG). In the early years of the Cold War, the ARNG 

fought in two Asian wars, played a key role in defending America against nuclear attack 

and helped to maintain domestic law and order during periods of social unrest. At the 

same time, it became a more professional and capable organization by greatly improving 

training, readiness, and deployability. 

Plans for the Postwar Guard 

In many ways, the National Guard’s status following World War II was 

determined even before the war began. As Army chief of staff, General Marshall held 

views and established principles favorable toward the Guard. Marshall was determined 

to avoid the bitter animosities that had marred Army-Guard relations during and after 

World War I. Marshall had developed his attitudes toward the Guard during intermittent 

duty as an inspector and instructor of State soldiers before World War I and throughout 

the interwar period. A long, close friendship with John McAuley Palmer enhanced the 

future chief of staff’s broad understanding of citizen-soldiers’ strengths and weaknesses. 

Marshall’s last tour with the Guard occurred during 1933-36 when he served as chief of 

staff of Illinois’ 33rd Division. Only three years after leaving the Illinois Guard as a 

newly promoted brigadier general, Marshall was a full general and Army chief of staff. 

During World War II, Marshall recognized the Guard’s shortcomings but rejected the 

extreme, anti-Guard views of General McNair and others. He understood that to depend 

upon citizen-soldiers was to accept in advance a less than ideal level of military 

preparedness but at a cost acceptable to taxpayers. Marshall favored a prominent position 

for the Guard in the postwar military establishment based on the National Guard’s long 

tradition of service and its contributions during World War II. To avoid the bickering 

among Congress, the War Department, and the States that had occurred after World War 

I, Marshall laid the groundwork for the post-World War II Guard even before the war 

was won. (1) 

Marshall turned to his old friend John McAuley Palmer for help in forging 

specific plans and policies for the postwar military. Palmer had retired in 1926 as a 

brigadier general after thirty-seven years of military service. Retreating to the mountains 

of New Hampshire, Palmer had spent most of his time with his family and indulged 

himself in writing. In retirement he held fast to his favorable views on citizen-soldiers 

and became more passionate regarding the need for peacetime UMT. In 1941, the 

synthesis of Palmer’s beliefs appeared in his book America in Arms. Because peacetime 

conscription had already started in 1940, Palmer’s advocacy for UMT and the role of the 

citizen-soldier struck a chord with the public in general and senior military leaders in 

particular. The CNGB, Maj. Gen. John F. Williams, purchased fifty copies for 

distribution to selected AGs and Guard division commanders. Subsequently, General 

Williams invited Palmer to Washington to advise Guard leaders on future defense 

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planning. General Marshall was in the same line of thinking as the CNGB but went one 

step further. The chief of staff recalled Palmer to active duty and arranged an office for 

him in a study room in the Library of Congress, an environment conducive to 

contemplation and free of the War Department’s daily turmoil. (2) 

Preliminary staff work toward a future defense establishment came to a sudden 

halt with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Burdened down with the war effort, the Army staff 

suspended all work on postwar organizations. In March 1942, the War Department 

rejected the Guard’s request to form an Army-Guard planning committee. From 

observation posts in Washington, DC and around the country, senior Guard officers grew 

alarmed from 1943 on over the Guard’s uncertain future. Their concerns were many. 

The relief of Guard officers and the random reassignment of infantry regiments freed up 

by the conversion to the triangular division design smacked of the Army’s heavy-handed 

methods of 1917-1918. The reduction and reassignment of the NGB staff as a 

subordinate office of the Army Service Forces was interpreted as a sign of things to 

come. The War Department had raised the ire of Guardsmen by largely excluding Guard 

representation on key staff groups. The Uptonian views expressed by General McNair 

were well known, and Guardsmen feared that without fair representation, similar negative 

sentiments would dominate staff thinking. For Guardsmen wanting to discuss their 

concerns with a War Department representative, their only recourse was to meet 

informally with John McAuley Palmer in the Library of Congress building. (3) 

Guard leaders remaining in the U.S. agreed that NGAUS should be the focal point 

for efforts to restore the postwar Guard. In April 1943, a small conference of influential 

Guard leaders met in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Though the conference numbered only 

sixty-five attendees, it was one of the most significant meetings in National Guard 

history. The attendees bestowed the presidency of NGAUS upon Maj. Gen. Ellard A. 

Walsh, the AG of Minnesota who had served in the National Guard since 1905. Walsh 

had commanded the 34th Division when it entered active federal service in February 

1941, but chronic ulcers forced him from command, and he had returned to Minnesota. 

(4) 

Small in stature but vigorous in action, Walsh seemed particularly suited to 

become the Guard’s principal advocate. He held strong opinions in favor of the merits 

and abilities of Guard soldiers and against those wanting to dismantle the Guard. Based 

on his own military career of over thirty-five years, Walsh believed the War Department 

had never overlooked an opportunity “to destroy the National Guard.” With great energy 

and focus, Walsh never missed an opportunity to write or to speak on the Guard’s behalf. 

Walsh’s position on the Guard’s proper standing after the war was simple; citizensoldiers who had fought valiantly in Europe and Asia should have full representation in 

the postwar Army. To make his voice heard in the larger, more bureaucratic Washington, 

D.C. that resulted from the war effort, Walsh realized that NGAUS needed significant 

enhancement. With only limited association funds available, he used personal money to 

place a small, full-time staff in a more presentable NGAUS headquarters in an office 

building in downtown Washington. A major NGAUS transformation had begun that 

would continue under Walsh’s leadership for fourteen years. (5) 

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Army National Guard History

Despite the heavy burdens of coordinating a global war, General Marshall 

remained keenly aware of the importance of having a blueprint for a postwar military 

even before hostilities ended. Less than ninety days after Ellard Walsh was elected 

president of NGAUS, Marshall created a unique War Department staff called the 

“Special Planning Division.” The group became the forum for National Guard leaders 

and the Army staff to address their various concerns. John McAuley Palmer served as 

the Special Planning Division’s primary advisor and elder statesman. The staff’s first 

achievement occurred in August 1944 with the publication of War Department Circular 

No. 347 that established the principles for a postwar military establishment. The staff 

rejected a large standing army that concentrated military planning and policy in a small 

caste of professional soldiers. Such an army had no place “among the institutions of a 

modern, democratic state,” and the circular boldly reminded its readers that insular, 

professional armies had thrived in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Instead, the staff 

favored a mix of Regulars and citizen-soldiers as the basis for the postwar Army. 6

 The 

circular’s entries regarding a citizen-soldier army are worth quoting at length: 

The second type of military institution through which the national 

manpower can be developed is based upon the conception of a 

professional peace establishment (no larger than necessary to meet normal 

peacetime requirements) to be reinforced in time of emergency by 

organized units drawn from a citizen army reserve, effectively organized 

for this purpose in time of peace; with full opportunity for competent 

citizen soldiers to acquire practical experience through temporary active 

service and to rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can 

definitely qualify; and with specific facilities for such practical 

experience, qualification, and advancement definitely organized as 

essential and predominating characteristics of the peace establishment... 

And finally, as all of our great wars have been fought in the main by 

citizen armies, the proposal for an organized citizen army reserve in time 

of peace is merely a proposal for perfecting a traditional national 

institution to meet modern requirements that no longer permit 

extemporization after the outbreak of war. This is the type of army that 

President Washington proposed to the first Congress as one of the 

essential foundations of the new American Republic... 

Details of military organization change with changes in weapons, 

modes of transportation, and international relations. But the type of our 

military institutions was determined in the beginning by the form of our 

government and has not changed since Washington’s Administration. It 

will therefore be made the basis for all plans for a post-war peace 

establishment. (7) 

Authored by John McAuley Palmer and issued over the signature of George C. 

Marshall, the policy achieved the chief of staff’s objectives regarding Army-Guard 

relations. The end of World War II would not precipitate a huge, public showdown 

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Army National Guard History

between Congress, the War Department, the 

Army and the National Guard over military 

policy. 

Armed with approved principles for a 

postwar Army, the Special Planning Division 

went to work to hammer out a viable plan. 

General Walsh became a critical participant in 

the deliberations. General Milton Reckord 

returned to Washington from his wartime duties 

as the Provost Marshal of the European Theater 

to help the Army and NGAUS develop a 

workable plan. Unfortunately, implementation 

of peacetime conscription and the huge growth 

of the wartime Army infused the group with 

unrealistic expectations for the future. Key 

planning assumptions included a huge, postwar 

Army and UMT. NGAUS encouraged UMT, 

viewing it as the best means to infuse Guard 

units with personnel already trained in the ever 

increasing, complex tasks of modern warfare. 

(8) 

Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer, 1945. As a final result of discussions (Library of Congress) between NGAUS and the Army leadership, 

the War Department in October 1945 issued a directive that specified the Guard’s 

purpose, mission, and force structure. The National Guard would be “an integral part and 

a first line Reserve component” of the military. The directive fully acknowledged the 

Guard’s dual nature and clearly identified federal and State missions. The War 

Department authorized an initial strength of 425,000 enlisted soldiers for NGB to allocate 

to the States based on the available male population ages 18-35. Unit manning levels 

were set at 80 percent. Each State was to receive sufficient units for disaster relief and 

support to civil authorities. The first priority for the rebuilding of the Guard was the 

activation of eighteen divisions. Second and third priorities were to regimental combat 

teams (RCT) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) battalions. Fourth priority for activation 

was non-divisional combat units and other support units. The War Department specified 

that all units of regimental size and below would be stationed within the same State. (9) 

Army Demobilization 

The greatest victory in U.S. military history resulted in the country’s most rapid 

demobilization. After four years of war, GIs were anxious to come home, and Congress 

was even more anxious to remove them from the payrolls. Demobilization occurred at a 

dizzying pace. At the end of World War II, the Army’s strength stood at a whopping 8.3 

million soldiers and airmen. All together, the Army included eighty-nine combat 

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Army National Guard History

divisions. By the summer of 1948, the Army’s strength had dropped to little more than 

550,000 soldiers, and only ten divisions remained on active duty. (10) 

The postwar Army was underfunded and stretched far beyond its capabilities. In 

response to communist threats, the principle mission of the Army’s ten active divisions 

was the occupation of central Europe and the Far East. The 1st Infantry Division, backed 

up by three armored cavalry regiments (ACRs), garrisoned Germany and Austria. Four 

understrength divisions were stationed in Japan, and in all cases except the 1st Division in 

Germany, all of the Army’s major combat units were severely below strength. In Japan, 

several combat battalions were unmanned with their weapons, vehicles and equipment 

placed in storage. To make matters worse, the day-to-day demands of rebuilding and 

maintaining order in war ravaged countries made unit training nearly impossible. (11) 

Instead of returning entire units home from overseas after World War II, the 

Army implemented a system of individual rotation based on the accumulation of points 

for the length and types of duty each soldier had performed. Veterans with the highest 

point totals were consolidated into units for early shipment home. As happened at the 

end of World War I, Guardsmen left active duty with individual discharge papers in hand. 

Guardsmen returning home in 1945 had been in active, continuous service since the 

mobilization of 1940, and their State enlistments had expired. Legally, the Army could 

not have returned Guard units to the States because prewar Guardsmen were free of any 

obligation to serve and draftees filled the ranks of many units. Until the War Department 

and NGB determined the allocation of units to the States, the Army retained the colors of 

Guard units that had served during the war. (12) 

The National Guard Rebuilds, 1946-1947 

Assuming that Congress would pass some sort of UMT legislation and not 

dramatically slash defense budgets, the War Department drafted plans for a peacetime 

Army of 1.4 million men. The National Guard received authorization for nearly 655,000 

personnel, though based on demographics, the NGB staff estimated only 425,000 enlisted 

men would volunteer for service. Bolstered by the efforts of NGAUS and guided by new 

War Department policies, the NGB staff began the difficult tasks of defining the Guard’s 

postwar organization and allocating units to the States. Plans called for the National 

Guard to include twenty-five infantry divisions, two armored divisions, twenty-one 

RCTs, and hundreds of other separate companies and battalions. (13) 

The first postwar National Guard unit, the 120th Fighter Squadron from Colorado, 

received federal recognition on June 30, 1946. Thereafter, the Guard’s reorganization 

was rapid and widespread. By the end of the first year of reconstitution, personnel 

strength stood at 97,526 soldiers organized into 2,615 units. Nearly two-thirds of 

volunteers were World War II veterans. Unlike after World War I when the Guard 

reconstituted from the bottom up, the advance planning by the War Department allowed 

the establishment of major commands followed by the organization of subordinate units. 

Officers seeking positions in new units often discovered that enough billets were not 

available commensurate with the rank they had attained during the war. Many took 

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Army National Guard History

reductions in rank to serve in the Guard. As a result, a dedicated cadre of combat 

experienced officers emerged to lead the Guard for nearly twenty years. (14) 

Early recruiting efforts reflected the Guard’s strong ties with communities and 

among family members. In Batavia, New York, the commander of Battery B, 72nd AAA 

Gun Battalion must have set an all time recruiting record. Over a four-day period he 

completed his battery’s organization by enlisting 117 officers and men. (There was a 

great irony here--Batavia was Emory Upton’s hometown.) In Chicago, the five Plum 

brothers, who together had seventeen years of combat experience in World War II, 

enlisted in Company H, 129th Infantry to form the core of the unit’s noncommissioned 

officer leadership. In New Mexico, eleven pairs of father-sons enlisted in a single 

antiaircraft battalion. In Pennsylvania, the Provost Marshal of the 28th Infantry Division 

proudly enlisted his nephew and two sons-in-law in the 28th Military Police Company. 

At the armory of Headquarters Company, 1/117th Infantry in Henderson, Tennessee, the 

five Orr brothers arrived on the first night of post-World War II drill to volunteer in the 

Tennessee Guard. And in Baltimore, Maryland, Mrs. George Bailey lined up her five 

sons in the family parlor for uniform inspection before they went off to drill with 

Company D, 175th Infantry of the 29th Infantry Division. (15) 

Veterans’ Day 1946 was a particularly significant day in the Guard’s history. On 

November 11, 1946 the Army returned to the States the guidons and battle flags of 

National Guard units that had fought in World War II. In huge, military ceremonies and 

galas held in forty-five States, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, the National Guard’s revered 

battle flags passed from active Army color guards into the waiting hands of Guardsmen. 

Officials held colorful and impressive parades around the State capitols as radio stations 

broadcast the ceremonies. At Arlington National Cemetery, President Harry S Truman 

laid a memorial wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and in comments 

afterwards, marked the day’s significance: 

It is my pleasure this morning symbolically to hand back the 

colors of the National Guard in the various states. It gives me a 

great deal of pleasure to do that. I was a National Guardsman 

myself in the First World War... 

I return these colors to the National Guard. I hope they will 

use them to train young men in the interests of peace and the 

welfare of the country. And I am sure they will do just that. (16) 

The Armed Forces Reorganize 

The many incidents of interservice rivalry during World War II and the new 

demands of the Cold War prompted a major reorganization of America’s defense 

establishment. Senior civilian and military leaders wanted increased cooperation 

between the armed services to counter a growing communist threat. The National 

Security Act of 1947 created a National Military Establishment in the Executive Branch. 

At the Pentagon, the position of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) was created to 

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Army National Guard History

coordinate the efforts of the armed forces. Three military departments--Army, Navy, and 

the newly created Air Force--were established with their own service secretaries and 

staffs. Subsequent legislation in 1949 renamed the National Military Establishment to 

the Department of Defense (DOD), strengthened the powers of the SECDEF and created 

the new position of Chairman, JCS (CJCS). In that same year, the U.S. banded with the 

European powers to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a collective 

security arrangement to deter Soviet aggression against western Europe. (17) 

The National Security Act of 1947 had an immediate and dramatic impact on the 

National Guard. With the creation of a new Air Force, the legislation charged NGB to 

become the channel of communications between the Department of the Air Force and the 

States on all matters pertaining to the Air National Guard. Prior to 1947, the coordination 

of air activities had been the responsibility of an “Aviation Group” in NGB. On October 

1, 1948, the modern NGB headquarters came into being. CNGB retained several staff 

sections to coordinate legislative concerns, public affairs, the budget, and other 

administrative functions. Army and Air Divisions, both under the direction of National 

Guard major generals, handled matters for their respective services. The first chief of the 

Army Division was Maj. Gen. Raymond H. Fleming, a thirty-two year Guard veteran 

who had served continuously as Louisiana’s AG since 1928. To maintain positive 

control over the expanding ARNG, Fleming had a staff of several dozen civilians and 

forty-one officers--a mix of Regular, Guard and ORC--organized into staff groups 

responsible for organization and training, budget, personnel, plans, and logistics. (18) 

While the Truman Administration reorganized the country’s defense 

establishment, Congress addressed peacetime manpower. As World War II drew to a 

close, the War Department stated its support for UMT, arguing that the National Guard 

and the Organized Reserves together had not met wartime manpower requirements. 

President Truman and a number of Congressmen endorsed UMT in principle, but specific 

proposals floundered. In Congress, legislators paid more attention to unification matters, 

frowned upon the projected costs of peacetime UMT and more and more came to favor a 

continuation of the draft rather than creating a new program. Tired of more than fifteen 

years of Depression and global war, the American people wanted to enjoy peace and 

prosperity without further obligations to the government. Indeed, many Americans 

believed the era of industrialized, mass armies was over; conventional air power and the 

atomic bomb would surely decide the outcome of future wars. UMT eventually died 

from neglect on Capitol Hill, and Congress extended the Selective Service Act of 1940 

through March 1947. However, the Berlin airlift prompted a revival of the draft, and in 

June 1948, a new selective service act went into effect calling for the drafting of all males 

19-26 years of age. A number of exemptions were allowed, including those who were 

veterans or already members of the Guard or reserves. (19) 

Like the Guard, the Army’s Organized Reserves had to rebuild from the ground 

up. By January 1946, more than half of the Reserve officers who had served in World 

War II had accepted commissions in the ORC. Two years after the war, ORC strength 

stood at 274,839 officers. The War Department authorized the activation of nearly 6,800 

officer cadre units with only fifty-nine units manned at full strength. Recruitment for the 

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Army National Guard History

ERC went much better than during the interwar years. By June 1948, ERC strength stood 

at 467,608 soldiers. However, the lack of positions for enlisted men in Reserve cadre 

units prompted the War Department to assign Reserve soldiers to a huge manpower pool. 

The amorphous manpower reservoir very nearly resembled Emory Upton’s 

recommendation for organizing a federal reserve, but the pool’s effectiveness during 

wartime remained uncertain. (20) 

Late in 1947, the first SECDEF, James Forrestal, chartered a special board to 

examine the best use of the country’s reserve forces. The recent unification of the armed 

forces prompted inquiries from several quarters regarding the amalgamation of the 

National Guard and the Reserves. ORC leaders argued that there was no longer any need 

for federally supported State troops and that the merging of the Guard and Reserves 

would produce military and fiscal efficiencies. Headed by Gordon Gray, the assistant 

secretary of the army, the board concluded that the National Guard system, with its dual 

federal and State allegiances, was not adequate for the needs of the Cold War. In 

addition, board members discerned that the more tightly controlled units in the Organized 

Reserve might be more prepared for national crises than Guardsmen. As a result, the 

Gray Board recommended the merging of the National Guard and the Reserves into a 

force directly under federal control with the name “National Guard of the United States.” 

Senior Guard leaders and NGAUS fought the proposal with all of their energy. Ellard 

Walsh labeled the Gray Board findings as “just another effort over a long period of time 

by the War Department and the Regular establishment to supplant the National Guard 

system with a Federal Reserve or Militia.” In the end, NGAUS successfully appealed to 

Congress who quickly dismissed the Gray Board’s findings. (21) 

Final Growth of the ARNG, 1948-1950 

Under the supervision of a reinvigorated NGB headquarters and the AGs, the 

ARNG continued to expand and develop. In 1948, the ARNG experienced its greatest 

increases ever in personnel and units. By 1948, 288,427 Army Guardsmen were 

organized into 4,646 federally recognized units. In the summer of that year, units 

conducted large-scale field training for the first time since the mobilization of 1940. As 

reorganization and training continued at a steady clip, units drew equipment from excess 

World War II stocks or received equipment NGB had purchased from the Army’s 

technical services. Within two years, the ARNG reached peak strength of nearly 325,000 

soldiers. Twenty-one States and Hawaii had completed their reorganizations by 1950. 

Forty-two States founded their own military academies where 3,000 officer candidates 

were in training. The organization of twenty-seven divisions and twenty RCTs was 

complete, and seven new ACRs were in the process of forming. During summer field 

exercises in 1950, all of the ARNG divisions trained as complete units. In addition, 

14,551 civilian employees supported the ARNG throughout the States in positions as 

clerks, accountants, and caretakers at armories, training sites, and maintenance shops. 

(22) 

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Army National Guard History

During postwar reorganization, the greatest impediment to rebuilding the ARNG 

— other than recruitment — was a lack of adequate facilities. Most of the armories and 

buildings that had housed the Guard prior to World War II were unable to accommodate 

greater numbers of more modern combat units. At the local level, ARNG leaders 

improvised to provide roofs over their units. Soldiers moved into the attics and cellars of 

courthouses, schools, and other public buildings. In one town, a persuasive Guard officer 

convinced a local banker to secure his unit’s ammunition in the local bank vault. The 

infusion of tanks, half-tracks and trucks required storage and maintenance facilities that 

were beyond the ability of the States to provide. In Hastings, Nebraska, Captain Francis 

S. Greenlief did not have enough room to park the 2-1/2 ton trucks assigned to his 

Company G, 134th Infantry. The future CNGB took the trucks home and parked them in 

front of his house even though their weight eventually damaged his driveway. (23) 

In 1950, Congress enacted legislation that called for federal assistance for new 

armory construction for all reserve components. For the Guard, the States had to 

contribute 25 percent of construction costs, provide the necessary real estate, equipment, 

and furnishings and defray all maintenance and operations costs. In addition, Congress 

authorized the SECDEF to allocate funds to the States for the expansion and repair of the 

ARNG’s 2,316 existing armories. Despite the legislators’ good intentions, two years 

passed before Congress appropriated money for new armories. (24) 

A new wave of armory construction began in 1952 that had a profound affect on 

the ARNG. With an appropriation of $16 million, new brick, steel and glass armories 

based on standard, approved designs for single and multiple units began to appear across 

the country. The first, postwar armory was completed in Arizona in 1952, and by the end 

of the following year, sixty-six additional armories were under construction. The new 

armories were a radical departure from previous experience; large, vaulted drill halls and 

castellated designs became a sign of the past. Guardsmen no longer looked upon 

armories as places for unit meetings or social events. While armories did continue to 

support community activities, they increasingly became fully equipped training centers. 

The postwar Guard was no longer primarily an infantry force, and new training regimes 

addressed the increasingly complex training requirements of mechanized and support 

forces. Tank turret trainers, sub-caliber devices for mortars and bazookas and a wide 

range of training aides appeared on drill floors. Builders installed power connectors that 

provided electric power to radios for use during civil emergencies and command post 

exercises. (25) 

While the States worked to rebuild their units, NGAUS focused on obtaining a 

new, significant benefit for all Guardsmen: military retirement. Ellard Walsh and Milton 

Reckord combined their legislative skills to get a National Guard retirement provision 

enacted into law on June 29, 1948. The law established a modest system of retirement 

benefits for Guardsmen who had served for twenty years and had reached sixty years of 

age. A point system was created to establish eligibility based on years of service. Retiree 

pay was calculated and capped at 75 percent using the annual base pay of the highest 

grade held. The law gave all Guardsmen retirement credit for service dating back to the 

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Army National Guard History

1916 Mexican Border mobilization, and in 1953, Congress amended the law to include 

all Guard service since 1903. (26) 

The Korean War, 1950-1953 

On the morning of June 25, 1950, America awoke to the shocking news that a 

90,000-man North Korean army had launched a sudden, massive invasion against South 

Korea. Americans compared North Korea’s actions to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 

and wondered how the fighting on the Korean peninsula would change their lives. 

Within days, President Truman announced his intention to commit American land, sea, 

and air forces as part of a broader UN effort to blunt the communist attack. The U.S. 24th 

Infantry Division immediately sent reinforcements from Japan to assist the hard pressed 

South Korean Army in stopping the communists. Unfortunately, the 24th Division was 

unprepared for battle. Its earliest combat actions resulted in the division commander’s 

capture and the ruin of “Task Force Smith,” a name that in U.S. military annals has 

become synonymous with defeat due to unpreparedness. Despite their best efforts, the 

South Koreans and U.S. reinforcements were unable to stop the communists. By late 

summer, American and South Korean units, now under the overall UN command of 

Douglas MacArthur, were backed into a defensive perimeter surrounding the port city of 

Pusan at the southern tip of the Korean peninsula. 

The magnitude of the crisis in Korea, coupled with the determination of the UN 

and President Truman to punish communist aggression, resulted in a broadening of the 

war effort. Within a month of the North Korean attack, it was clear that additional forces 

were needed. In an address to the nation on July 19th, President Truman announced a 

partial mobilization of Guardsmen and Reservists for twenty-one months. Three days 

later, NGB received notice that many of the ARNG’s 325,000 soldiers would be 

mobilized, and the first units called to active, federal service reported to their armories on 

August 14th. In a reflection of the anxiety of the period, NGAUS canceled its annual 

conference scheduled for late September in Houston. (27) 

As Guardsmen prepared for deployment, the Korean crisis depleted their 

resources. Because active Army units needed additional space and facilities to prepare 

individual replacements and units for deployment to Korea, the ARNG was denied or 

given only limited access to eight major training sites. The heaviest burden was the 

transfer of equipment to units headed for Asia. In the summer of 1950, the ARNG 

possessed only 46 percent of its authorized equipment, but the need for weapons, 

vehicles, and equipment in Korea overrode all other considerations. The Guard turned 

over 748 tanks, 5,595 tactical vehicles, and 95 light aircraft. Within the year, the ARNG 

had surrendered nearly one-quarter of its equipment, prompting CNGB to report that 

equipment transfers resulted in “training limitations” for Guard units attempting to 

prepare for service in Korea. (28) 

In August and September 1950, thousands of Army Guardsmen reported for 

active duty. The lion’s share of soldiers came from four infantry divisions; the 28th 

(Pennsylvania), the 40th (California), the 43rd (Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont), 

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and the 45th (Oklahoma). In addition, hundreds of separate combat, combat support, and 

combat service support units were mobilized. By the summer of 1951, nearly 110,000 

ARNG soldiers in 1,457 units were on active duty. (29) 

A significant number of ARNG units deployed very quickly to Korea. The 936th 

Field Artillery Battalion from Arkansas was the first ARNG unit to enter combat in 

Korea. Armed with towed, 155-mm. howitzers, the battalion entered active duty on 

August 21, 1950 and transferred to Camp Carson, Colorado for five months of training. 

The Arkansans embarked from California and arrived at Pusan on February 10, 1951. 

The 936th Field Artillery fired its first round against the Communists on March 29th while 

supporting the U.S. 7th Infantry Division during the counterattack to restore the 38th 

Parallel. In 100 days of heavy fire support to the U.S. I Corps, the Arkansas artillerymen 

fired a staggering 50,000 rounds, approximately one-third of the shells they had fired 

during 500 days of combat in World War II. (30) 

Though the early crisis in Korea required a large and immediate response, it was 

evident to senior civilian and military leaders that a total, national mobilization was not 

necessary. This attitude was particularly prevalent after the stunning reversal of fortunes 

in Korea following MacArthur’s successful landing at Inchon on September 15th. In a 

matter of days, the North Koreans were in headlong retreat, the bitter defeats of late 

summer faded in memory, and the most optimistic soldiers believed the war would be 

over by year’s end. In November 1950, NGAUS held the position that the fighting in 

Korea was essentially the responsibility of active forces which “might necessitate” the 

call up of “certain elements” of the ARNG and other reserve components. General 

Walsh argued that full mobilization might affect the economy, and he feared that too 

many ARNG units would be mobilized only to sit in their armories for extended periods. 

However, the Chinese Communist counterattack in late 1950 and the headlong retreat of 

UN forces back below the 38th Parallel created an international crisis. On December 

15th, President Truman declared a national emergency, and China’s entry into the war 

changed the expectation that ARNG units would not go overseas. (31) 

A nation accustomed to full mobilizations and clear cut, absolute objectives 

during two World Wars now fought a war under the spectrum of the nuclear umbrella 

that was to be limited in scope, duration, and outcome. As an alternative to full 

manpower mobilization, planners settled on a personnel rotation policy based on the use 

of Regulars, Guardsmen, Army Reservists, and draftees as individual replacements. In 

simplest terms, the Army maintained a rather constant group of units in Korea through 

which it rotated combatants and support personnel. All together, the United States 

sustained eight fighting divisions in Korea — seven Army and one Marine — with the 

ARNG providing two of the Army’s seven divisions. Though a controversial policy, the 

reasons for rotating soldiers were compelling. The army wanted to avoid the chronic 

combat exhaustion casualties suffered during World War II by limiting a soldier’s time in 

battle. A strong desire existed to spread the burden of fighting among all available 

manpower and to minimize the burden placed on World War II veterans. An elaborate 

point system developed that determined a soldier’s eligibility for rotation home from 

Korea, though the service of most Guardsmen on active duty was determined by the 

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president’s call up of twenty-one months that was extended to twenty-four months in July 

1951. (32) 

The effects of the limited mobilization and rotation policies on the ARNG were 

immediate and widespread. Guard leaders reluctantly adjusted to partial mobilization. In 

April 1951, the AGs argued for a phased mobilization of the entire ARNG so units could 

better plan and prepare for mobilization and deployment. They also demanded unit 

integrity; ARNG units were to be mobilized and returned to the States without being 

broken up. However, the Army’s rotation policy carried the day. From the very 

beginning of the mobilization, large numbers of units lost over half of their most 

experienced officer and enlisted leaders for quick deployment to Korea. As a result, a 

significant number of Guardsmen served in Korea as individual replacements. Wholesale 

stripping of units severely tested morale among Guardsmen who had been promised they 

would serve and fight with men from their own communities. Army training evaluators 

angered senior ARNG leaders by declaring stripped units unready for combat. (33) 

ARNG units called up for Korea fulfilled three important missions. First, Guard 

units deployed to Korea served in combat, combat support, and combat service support 

roles. A second, important mission of the ARNG was to bolster NATO. Constabulary 

forces in Germany had been drained of personnel for Korea, and it fell to Guardsmen to 

deter against a feared Soviet attack in central Europe. Similarly, the Army’s strategic 

reserve in the U.S. had been depleted, and mobilized ARNG units replenished the 

A 155-mm. Howitzer from Arkansas’ 937th Field Artillery lights up the cold, Korean night during 

a fire mission on February 21, 1951. (National Archives) 

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strategic reserve while acting as training and replacement depots for individual soldiers 

going to and from Korea. 

The service of the eight ARNG divisions illustrates the missions Guardsmen 

performed. The 40th and 45th Divisions were selected for service in Korea, and after 

extensive post-mobilization training in the continental United States (CONUS) and 

Japan, entered combat in early 1952. The 28th and 43rd Divisions went to Europe in the 

fall of 1951, taking up defensive positions in central and southern Germany. Four more 

infantry divisions were called out in January 1952 to support the strategic reserve; the 31st 

(Alabama and Mississippi), the 37th (Ohio), the 44th (Illinois), and the 47th (Minnesota 

and North Dakota). The 31st Division remained on active duty at Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina while the 37th Division went to Fort Polk, Louisiana and the 47th Division 

trained at Camp Rucker in Alabama. In anticipation of possible service in Korea, the 44th 

Division deployed to California for post-mobilization training. (34) 

The service of California’s 40th Division was not much different from the 

experiences of most ARNG units. On August 1, 1950, the “Sunshine Division” received 

notification that it was to be ordered to active duty. The 40th Division was among the 

first divisions called for several reasons. The Army leadership desired to mobilize major 

ARNG combat units from across the nation, and with the 28th and 43rd Divisions coming 

from the East coast and the 45th Division from the heartland, it became necessary to call 

up a western combat unit. Of the divisions available in the West, the 40th Division in 

southern California had the highest readiness. The division also had recent service in 

Korea. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, it had assumed occupation duties in Korea 

and did not return to the United States until April 1946, the last Guard division to leave 

active duty in World War II. (35) 

On August 22, 1950, an advance party of 185 officers and enlisted men from the 

40th Division entered active service and began preparations for mobilizing the entire 

division. On September 1st, the division received orders to mobilize, and by the end of 

the day, 9,461 Guardsmen had reported to their armories. This still left the division more 

than 9,000 men short of its authorized wartime strength of 18,600. As the rank and file 

moved through in-processing stations at their armories, plans unfolded to move the entire 

division to its post-mobilization training site at Camp Cooke, 130 miles up the coast from 

Los Angeles and the present-day location of Vandenburg Air Force Base. Camp Cooke 

had been abandoned after 1946 and reflected the neglect of the military after World War 

II. Though the wood plank barracks were dirty but livable, thieves had stripped the 

buildings of all telephone lines and plumbing fixtures that had to be replaced. (36) 

After the division consolidated at Camp Cooke, it began a twenty-eight week 

training program. Unfortunately, training had just started when the division lost many of 

its World War II veterans, who shipped out immediately to Korea as individual 

replacements. At about the same time, hundreds of new soldiers—nearly all draftees 

with no training whatsoever—arrived at Camp Cooke to bring the division to full 

strength. Between October 1950 and February 1951, 14,273 recruits joined the division. 

Once again, the division was stripped of experienced soldiers for duty in Korea. The 

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constant flow of men entering and leaving caused severe training problems. All new 

draftees had to receive basic training as well as schooling in their combat specialties. The 

40th Division was compelled to run several basic and advanced individual training cycles 

instead of division exercises. Though the number of prewar Guardsmen in the division 

had diminished, enough remained to give it a distinct California, citizen-soldier identity. 

(37) 

In March 1951, the 40th Division shipped out for Japan and its new home at a 

training site near Yokohama in the shadow of Mt. Fuji. With the initial training of it new 

soldiers completed, the Sunshine Division concentrated solely on preparing for war. For 

the first time, the division trained as a single unit. The infantry practiced offensive and 

defensive maneuvers as well as amphibious landings and cold weather training. The 

division artillery, which had only limited training at Camp Cooke, spent many days and 

nights in live fire training. By the close of 1951, the Army rated the division ready for 

combat. (38) 

In dire need of manpower to support the war of attrition taking place in the 

mountains and along the ridgelines of central Korea, the 160th Infantry Regiment received 

orders to move to Korea immediately and to begin the relief of the 24th Division. By 

January 12, 1952, the 160th Infantry was in Korea, and two days later, the regiment 

occupied bunkers and trenches manned by soldiers of the 24th Division. Within a week, 

the 40th Division suffered its first battle death when mortar shell fragments killed 

Sergeant First Class Kenneth Kaiser, a Guardsman from Los Angeles. The division’s 

main body soon followed the 160th to Korea, landing at Inchon on February 4th. Each 

unit quickly moved to the front by truck, and within eleven days, the Sunshine Division 

had completed the relief of the 24th Division without incident. Much to the chagrin of the 

California Guardsmen, they had left their heavy weapons and equipment behind in Japan 

to fall in on the 24th Division’s battle worn vehicles and weapons. (39) 

The 40th Division quickly took up the routines of trench warfare. The men 

occupied bunkers and trenches situated along the crests of ridgelines. Occasionally, 

engagements broke out along the lines as Americans, Chinese, and North Koreans fought 

to gain a slight advantage in their sector. Artillery duels were common and often resulted 

in significant casualties on both sides. The infantry mounted frequent trench raids in an 

effort to bag prisoners for questioning. The soldiers manned their positions during long 

days and bitter nights of sub-zero temperature and were rotated to the rear on a regular 

basis for hot food, showers, and a comfortable rest. (40) 

In less than a month, the first group of Guardsmen became eligible for rotation 

back to the United States and discharge from active duty. In twenty-one months, the 

division members had mobilized and trained for war only to find them ready to return 

home. On March 15, 1952, nearly 5,400 Guardsmen were still in the division, and nearly 

400 of them departed before the end of the month, their service in the Korean War 

finished. Over the next three months, all of the Guardsmen who did not voluntarily 

extend their tours returned home. A few Guard volunteers stayed with the division 

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through tough fighting until the end of the war and the division’s inactivation in June 

1954. (41) 

Individual Guardsmen returning home from active duty often discovered they did 

not have a State unit to join. The Army and NGB agreed to expand the organization of 

ARNG units on active duty to permit the retention of Guardsmen returning home. The 

ARNG activated new units in each State that carried the same designation as Guard units 

on active duty but added the suffix “NGUS” to designate the redundant State units. This 

unorthodox solution permitted a Guardsman from the 28th Division returning home from 

Germany to join a unit of the 28th Division (NGUS) at his home armory in Pennsylvania. 

All together, the ARNG created 1,384 NGUS units that accommodated returning 

Guardsmen and at the same time provided forces to meet the needs of the Governors. 

Over time, all Guardsmen returned home, and ARNG units were released from federal 

control and returned to the States. By 1955, the ARNG had inactivated all of its NGUS 

units. (42) 

Though peace negotiations between communist and UN forces had started at 

Panmunjon in November 1951, the war of attrition dragged on until the signing of an 

armistice in July 1953. The opposing sides ceased fire and held their positions with 

loaded weapons, creating the conditions of an uneasy peace that have not changed 

significantly since the signing of the armistice. In 1954, six of the eight ARNG Divisions 

were released from active duty, and the ARNG’s involvement in the war ended in 

February 1956 when the last four units on active duty returned to State control. By the 

end of the war, 138,600 Army Guardsmen organized into 1,698 units of company or 

detachment size — approximately 33 percent of the ARNG — had answered the call to 

arms. (43) 

The Korean mobilization remains one of the ARNG’s most significant 

achievements after World War II. Despite problems caused by partial mobilization and 

individual soldier rotation, the ARNG performed several key functions. Guard units 

provided the means for rapid expansion of the Army to a larger, wartime posture. ARNG 

units served around the globe, from the defense of NATO to combat operations in Korea. 

Four ARNG divisions remained in strategic reserve, acting as a training base and an 

insurance policy against further communist aggression. In addition, the Guardsmen who 

did not serve on active duty remained a ready reserve of untapped manpower available 

for both domestic and overseas employment. However, the continuation of the peacetime 

draft after World War II provided the bulk of the manpower for the Korean War and 

reduced the Army’s reliance on the ARNG as an important combat reserve. Near the end 

of the war, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins wrote to the Governors 

expressing his “heartfelt gratitude” for the “magnificent service” of ARNG units and 

stating that Guardsmen had added “another brilliant chapter” to their long history. (44) 

Important Developments After Korea 

The most significant, strategic result of the Korean War was to strengthen 

America’s defenses for the long-term prosecution of the Cold War. Reversing the neglect 

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of conventional ground forces that had occurred after World War II, the Army saw 

improvements in all of its components. While the active Army expanded to fifteen 

divisions, the ARNG increased its strength to nearly 405,000 soldiers by 1956. Combat 

in Korea and increasing concerns over a Soviet blitzkrieg in Europe convinced the Army 

to add heavier units to its force structure. The ARNG activated nine ACRs and converted 

four infantry divisions to armored divisions, giving it a mix of twenty-one infantry and 

six armored divisions. The helicopter had proven its worth in Korea, and in April 1953, 

the first ARNG helicopter was issued to the Alabama Guard. In subsequent years, the 

numbers of helicopters in the ARNG increased, though a lack of pilots and maintenance 

personnel constrained the growth of aviation units. (45) 

The Korean War mobilization led to renewed congressional interest in the reserve 

components and to the passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. The 

legislation’s overall intent was to consolidate many of the existing laws regarding the 

reserve components and to establish in greater detail the composition, responsibilities, 

and regulations of the Guard and reserves. The law formally specified the seven 

categories of reserve component forces with the ARNG placed in the highest order of 

precedence. The ORC and the ERC were discontinued, and the Army’s Organized 

Reserves were renamed the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). Congress established three 

levels of reserves: Ready, Standby, and Retired. The Ready Reserve consisted of all units 

and individuals liable for active service in case of war or a national emergency while 

Standby and Retired Reserve members were subject to involuntary recall only by 

Congressional action. (46) 

After the Korean War, Congress set out to organize and consolidate all laws 

pertaining to the branches of the federal government. In August 1956, Congress created 

Title 10, U.S. Code to contain all laws pertaining to federal military forces. Title 10 

legislation included all laws governing the employment and administration of the Regular 

Army, those ARNG soldiers serving in a full-time, federal status and all Guardsmen 

ordered to active duty during national emergencies. Later that same year, Congress 

created Title 32, U.S. Code that consolidated all laws governing the administration and 

regulations of the National Guard while in State service. The chapters of Title 32 

addressed topics including organization, personnel, training, service, supply, and 

procurement. Since 1956, Regulars and citizen-soldiers have recognized Title 10 as the 

federal government’s responsibilities toward active duty forces while Title 32 pertains to 

State obligations in the national defense. (47) 

Several important changes within the ARNG resulted in a training renaissance. 

The Korean mobilization highlighted the shortfall of an army practice that had endured 

for nearly 200 years--unit basic training for recruits. The need for combat units manned 

with fully trained soldiers who could respond immediately to Cold War crises prompted 

the active Army to initiate a system of centralized basic training for all soldiers. 

Legislation passed in 1955 required Guardsmen and Reservists to attend basic training on 

active Army installations. For the first time, individual Guardsmen entered active duty for 

extended training periods. In 1956, 4,400 Guardsmen attended an eight-week basic 

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training program while another 3,600 Guardsmen received advanced, individual training. 

(48) 

Free of the burden of imbuing new soldiers with fundamental skills, ARNG 

leaders sought larger blocks of time that would allow them to conduct unit training. In 

September 1955, CNGB authorized the substitution of two paid, four-hour assemblies 

conducted on a single calendar day for two, regular two-hour armory drill assemblies. 

Subsistence funds were made available to feed Guardsmen during the new eight-hour 

drill periods. Many units used multiple drills to increase the limited number of available 

training hours. For the first time, Guardsmen drilled on the weekends rather than during 

the traditional, weeknight periods. By the end of 1958, 16 percent of the ARNG drilled 

on weekends, though NGB did not mandate weekend drill until 1966. For the first time, 

the American people began to refer to Guardsmen as “weekend warriors.” (49) 

With more time to train, ARNG units honed their skills at the squad and platoon 

level. In the parlance of the day, Guardsmen referred to collective training as “unit basic 

training.” Aware that the ARNG was free from the burden for individual basic training 

and had more hours available for training, the Army altered the ARNG’s training goals. 

In October 1958, the Army declared that the focus of ARNG training would be at the unit 

level, “starting at squads or comparable unit” and progressing to “larger units.” Thus, 

over a three-year period, the ARNG’s training plans changed from two-hour drill periods 

on week nights that focused on individual soldier skills to extended, weekend drill 

periods aimed at unit training. (50) 

In October 1957, an era of National Guard leadership came to an end with the 

retirement of Ellard Walsh as NGAUS president. Before his departure, Walsh put into 

motion the construction of a new National Guard Memorial Building at One 

Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, DC that was dedicated two years later in 

ceremonies presided over by former President Truman. The closing minutes of the 

NGAUS General Conference in Louisville, Kentucky on October 4, 1957 were 

particularly memorable. While the attendees expected to see General Walsh retire that 

day, they were not ready for the sensational news that rocked the entire Western world 

that morning: the Soviets had put the first space satellite into orbit. The launch of 

Sputnik and the end of Walsh’s NGAUS presidency marked the beginning of an era of 

increased missions and high technology for the ARNG. (51) 

Missile Age Minutemen 

Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman Administration had 

undertaken a comprehensive review of America’s defense strategy. An outcome of the 

process was the recognition of growing Soviet nuclear capabilities. The administration 

believed that by 1954 the Russians would possess a substantial, long-range bomber fleet 

capable of delivering a widespread nuclear attack against America’s centers of population 

and industry. Suddenly, the defense of the American homeland became a top priority. 

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The Air Force created the Air Defense Command in 1951 to develop an integrated 

defensive system of interceptors, antiaircraft artillery, missiles, and radar early warning. 

As a counterpart to Air Defense Command, the Army Air Defense Command 

(ARADCOM) became responsible for the placement and functioning of antiaircraft sites 

around strategic locations throughout CONUS. ARADCOM’s plan called for the 

perimeter defense of the northeastern U.S. and a point defense of key areas in the 

Midwest and on the West coast. The defense zones integrated short and long-range air 

defense weapons and anticipated the use of missile technology still in development. 

ARADCOM designated the antiaircraft battalions assigned to its air defense plans as the 

“Special Security Force.” (52) 

By May 1953, all ARNG AAA battalions mobilized for the Korean War were 

released from active duty to prepare for the CONUS defense mission. Battalions were 

authorized to recruit 100 percent of their officers and 75 percent of their enlisted strength 

in anticipation of joining the Special Security Force. ARADCOM plans called for the 

employment of ninety ARNG AAA battalions in CONUS. In 1954, the 340th AAA Gun 

Battalion (120-mm.) of the District of Columbia ARNG took up a firing position outside 

of Washington, the first ARNG unit to participate in CONUS defense. Within a year, 

fifty ARNG AAA batteries were deployed, and 105 ARNG AAA batteries eventually 

served in the Special Security Force. (53) 

The CONUS air defense mission was a major change for the ARNG. For the first 

time, units in a State status were assigned a full-time, federal mission. In an arrangement 

worked out by ARADCOM, ARNG air defense units were instantly ordered to active 

duty whenever an enemy air threat appeared. To meet the requirements for round-theclock preparedness, fifteen Guard technicians manned each battery-sized site on a fulltime basis. Upon alert, all members of the unit reported directly to their battle stations 

from homes and work places. Not since the colonial minutemen had Guardsmen been 

called upon to make such a sudden transition from peace to war. (54) 

New missile technology radically altered the ARNG’s role in the Special Security 

Force. In May 1954, the Army fielded the first NIKE missile battery at Fort Meade, 

Maryland. Named for the winged, Greek goddess of victory, NIKE was a radar 

controlled, antiaircraft rocket designed to protect large areas from bomber attack. The 

NIKE-AJAX missile, with a range of twenty-five miles and a ceiling of 70,000 feet, 

carried a high explosive fragmentation warhead. While active Army gun batteries trained 

to convert to NIKE-AJAX, ARNG AAA battalions assumed their defensive roles. (55) 

California’s 720th Missile Battalion became the ARNG’s first NIKE-AJAX unit in 

June 1957. Stationed at Long Beach, the battalion’s mission was the area defense of 

Navy facilities and aircraft production plants. After an extensive training period of nearly 

a year, the 720th became operational on September 14, 1958. To man its four NIKEAJAX sites full-time, the battalion relied upon 191 technicians. The 720th’s commander, 

Lt. Col. Julian A. Phillipson, was a typical Guard officer of the period. Phillipson had 

enlisted in the California Guard in 1933 and entered active duty as a first lieutenant 

during the mobilization of 1940. During World War II, he fought in the Pacific and 

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rejoined the California Guard in 1947 where he served in a number of command and staff 

positions. Command of the 720th Missile Battalion was Phillipson’s third battalion 

command. (56) 

The success of the 720th Missile Battalion in manning its NIKE-AJAX sites set 

the precedent for an extension of the ARNG’s participation in the missile defense 

program. By 1961, eighty-two ARNG NIKE-AJAX batteries were operational in fifteen 

States. At the program’s peak in 1962, 17,000 Guardsmen--including some 4,936 

technicians--manned missile sites. As early as 1958, the Army began to replace NIKEAJAX with the NIKE-HERCULES, a missile of increased speed, range, ceiling, and 

payload. In 1962, the first ARNG air defense units received the NIKE-HERCULES in 

Hawaii where the missile’s increased capabilities seemed ideal for the protection of the 

high concentration of U.S. military facilities on Oahu. By 1964, the NIKE-AJAX was 

retired, fully replaced by the NIKE-HERCULES. Under pressure to provide soldiers for 

an escalating military presence in Southeast Asia, the Army handed more and more 

missile sites over to the ARNG. At the peak of the NIKE-HERCULES program, Army 

Guardsmen manned forty-eight of the 112 NIKE-HERCULES sites defending CONUS. 

(57) 

By the early 1970s, changes in the strategic situation resulted in the elimination of 

the NIKE-HERCULES program. Intelligence estimates in the late 1960s put less 

emphasis on the significance of Soviet bombers. Instead, the Soviets were developing 

Sergeant Earl Pritchard inspects a NICK-AJAX missile in 1964 at one of the missile sites 

manned by the Virginia ARNG (Virginia Guard Historical Collection) 

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Army National Guard History

intercontinental ballistic missiles and threatening to take the lead in the construction and 

deployment of heavy missiles. Rather than relying further on missile defense for 

protection, the U.S. decided to deploy its own heavy missiles that could survive a surprise 

nuclear attack and still inflict enormous damage on the Soviets. American planners 

believed that “mutual assured destruction” could protect their cities just as effectively as 

defensive missile sites. In August 1973, DOD announced the end of the NIKEHERCULES program. On September 14, 1974 — sixteen years to the day after the 702nd 

Missile Battalion had gone operational — the ARNG retired the colors of all its NIKE 

missile units during impressive ceremonies at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. (58) 

The ARNG’s long-term success in the missile defense of CONUS established 

several important precedents for the Guard’s role in future defense programs. First, 

Guardsmen established themselves as a readily accessible asset, fully capable of 

participating in the first line of defense against the nation’s most dangerous threats. As 

such, Guardsmen shared federal responsibility with active forces for the execution of a 

key component of the nation’s military strategy. Second, Guardsmen proved themselves 

of quickly and confidently mastering high technology weaponry. ARNG air defenders at 

NIKE-AJAX and NIKE-HERCULES sites debunked the myth that citizen-soldiers could 

not master the intricacies of new, computer age weapons. Third, Guard participation in 

the missile defense program resulted in significant manpower and dollar savings for the 

active Army. At a time when the Army was attempting to maintain an active force of 

fifteen divisions, ARNG missile units each year yielded an annual cost savings of $11.9 

million and enough personnel spaces to man nearly two combat brigades. (59) 

The Pentomic Era 

While missile technology prompted the ARNG’s role in homeland defense, the 

emergence of new, nuclear technology affected the Guard’s mission, force structure, and 

training. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the Eisenhower Administration adopted a 

national security strategy based on “massive retaliation.” Hoping to avoid another 

bloody and indecisive war like Korea, President Eisenhower vowed to employ nuclear 

weapons in any crisis that threatened U.S. security. 

However, advances in nuclear weapons quickly altered the massive retaliation 

policy. By the late 1950s, a new generation of smaller nuclear weapons was available 

that possessed sufficient firepower to influence the outcome of large battles or entire 

campaigns. The Army viewed tactical nuclear weapons as the ideal, economical response 

to a conventional, Soviet blitzkrieg. While the threat of massive retaliation with strategic, 

nuclear weapons lacked credibility in many circles, the prosecution of a large ground war 

with tactical nuclear weapons seemed all too possible. Looking for a way to participate 

in nuclear warfare on an equal footing with the Air Force and the Navy, the Army eagerly 

took up the cause of tactical nuclear warfare and fielded a whole range of delivery 

systems including missiles, heavy artillery, and even mortars. 

The expected demands of the tactical nuclear battlefield resulted in the most 

massive Army reorganization in twenty years. The triangular division, that had been the 

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Army National Guard History

Army’s workhorse in World War II and Korea, gave way to a new “pentomic” division. 

Army planners believed that in the chaos and confusion of a nuclear battlefield, divisions 

would fight independently and respond to threats from any direction. The linear 

battlefield became an anachronism. On the attack, pentomic divisions were to exploit 

gaps in the enemy’s lines created by nuclear firepower, and on the defensive, the division 

would fight from a huge, circular battle position. At each level of divisional 

organization, units existed in groups of five, a recurrence that led to the designation 

“pentomic.” Companies consisted of five platoons, five companies made up a “battle 

group,” and each division had five battle groups. A pentomic battle group was smaller 

than a traditional infantry regiment but much larger than a single battalion.(60) 

The active Army converted its infantry and airborne divisions to the pentomic 

design in 1956-1957, and the ARNG followed suite a year later. By October 1959, the 

Guard had completed a massive reorganization of its twenty-one infantry and six armored 

divisions. The transition complete, the ARNG considered itself “light, mobile, hardhitting and ready to fight on nuclear or conventional battlefields.” Concurrent with the 

pentomic reorganization, the ARNG followed the Army’s lead in the historical 

redesignation of units with the implementation of the Combat Arms Regimental System. 

Though the ARNG did lose the traditional designations of some of its oldest units, the 

Guard retained the lineage and honors of its oldest regiments while active Army units 

traced their history to individual battalions. (61) 

As an outgrowth of its emphasis on tactical nuclear warfare, the Army created the 

Special Forces (SF). Originally intended to operate amidst the confusion of the nuclear 

battlefield, SF units quickly became identified with the task of supporting native peoples. 

In late 1959, SF units entered the ARNG’s troop structure. By the summer of 1960, 

1,000 SF Guardsmen were in detachments in five different States, and the Army 

authorized the creation of four ARNG SF Groups. The mission of the SF was to infiltrate 

hostile areas and to arm and organize the indigenous peoples for guerrilla warfare. (62) 

With the Army facing the real possibility of fighting wars in Europe and Asia, 

planners began to allocate forces to specific theaters. Before World War II, the War 

Department had developed broad plans based on possible conflicts with particular foreign 

powers, but not until the late 1950s were Army units designated to enter combat in a 

specific theater. Based on the system of America’s diplomatic, defensive alliances 

created after World War II, the Army identified four potential fighting fronts; Europe, 

Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Korea. With Army divisions already stationed in 

Europe and Korea, the divisions in CONUS received the missions of reinforcing forwarddeployed divisions or entering the Middle East or Southeast Asia to defend America’s 

interests. 

For the first time, ARNG units received critical missions in support of the 

overseas theaters. Top priority ARNG units were assigned to the Army’s Strategic 

Reserve Force (STRAF), an active duty corps that was to deploy overseas quickly in an 

emergency. Without its Guard units, the STRAF was incomplete. Army planners 

admitted that the ARNG “rounded out” the STRAF, and for the first time, “round out” 

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became part of the language of Army force structure. Six ARNG divisions formed a 

priority, army-sized force available for overseas service. The remaining units constituted 

a strategic reserve to facilitate full national mobilization. (63) 

The ARNG developed training plans to better support possible deployment 

timelines. All units were to attain a sufficient training level so they would be combat 

ready with only a minimum of training after mobilization. At NGB, training experts 

determined that a pentomic division battle group would be ready for overseas service 

following a thirty-six week training program. The program’s first sixteen weeks were 

dedicated to a soldier’s basic and individual training followed by ten weeks of 

rudimentary unit training. After mobilization, ARNG units would require an additional 

ten weeks of field exercises and maneuvers prior to commitment to battle. Thus, the 

ARNG concluded that its divisions could be ready for combat within thirty-six weeks and 

that non-divisional units would “require less time.” (64) 

The Struggle Against Segregation 

New developments within American society in the late 1950s and early 1960s had 

a profound affect on the ARNG. The civil rights movement gathered momentum as 

blacks sought equality at the ballot box and strove to tear down the barriers of 

segregation throughout America. In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that separate 

schools for the races were unconstitutional and ordered schools across the nation to 

integrate. 

The first use of National Guard troops to enforce integration occurred at Clinton, 

Tennessee in September 1956. The Ku Klux Klan rallied at Clinton to enforce the 

segregation of a local school, and Tennessee’s Governor decided to enforce integration 

laws and deter violence with the intimidating presence of an ARNG tank company. 

Under the personal supervision of the Tennessee AG, the overwhelming show of force by 

a fully armed tank company had the desired affect, and black children attended the local 

school without incident. To the north, the Governor of Kentucky turned out the ARNG 

to enforce integration at schools in the towns of Sturgis and Clay in western Kentucky. 

Some violence did erupt at Sturgis that resulted in minor injuries, but once again, the 

ARNG proved an effective instrument in providing support to State law enforcement 

authorities. (65) 

The National Guard found itself in the middle of a much more serious racial 

incident during the integration of the public school system in Little Rock, Arkansas in 

1957. Governor Orville Faubus of Arkansas was a staunch segregationist and decided to 

use the National Guard to block the integration of schools in the State’s capital. On 

September 2, 1957, Governor Faubus stood in the front door of Central High School in 

Little Rock and called out the Arkansas ARNG to enforce segregation. Faubus informed 

Arkansans that he intended to use the National Guard to maintain law and order by 

preventing the violence that he believed would surely come with school integration. (66) 

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From the White House, President Eisenhower watched the growing racial crisis in 

Arkansas with increased alarm. After much deliberation, the president decided that 

integration laws would be enforced, even at the point of the bayonet. Eisenhower 

trumped Governor Faubus’ use of the Arkansas ARNG as a segregationist force by 

ordering the entire Arkansas National Guard into active federal service on September 24, 

1957. The president bypassed the Governor’s office, sending the mobilization order 

directly to the Arkansas AG. Presented with orders straight from the federal commander 

in chief, the Arkansas National Guard responded by disregarding further directions from 

Governor Faubus. Angered by Eisenhower’s move, Faubus referred to his own Arkansas 

National Guard as “occupation troops.” (67) 

Concurrent with federalizing the National Guard, the President dispatched a 

battalion of the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Little Rock. 

From a staging area at Camp Robinson in North Little Rock, the paratroopers and nearly 

1,800 Arkansas Guardsmen moved to Central High School. For nearly a month, a joint 

task force of Regular and ARNG soldiers maintained peace while enforcing school 

integration. All the while, the balance of the 8,504 officers and enlisted men in the 

Arkansas National Guard remained on full alert at their armories and air facilities. In 

November, with the main crisis passed, federal troops returned to Fort Campbell, and the 

Arkansas Guard began to demobilize. At Central High School, Guardsmen remained to 

provide personal security for the nine black students in attendance. A large detachment 

of Army Guardsmen remained on active duty at the school throughout the entire year 

until commencement exercises in May 1958. (68) 

The ARNG’s most publicized involvement with school integration came six years 

later at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa. Governor George Wallace, a staunch 

segregationist, hoped to use racial issues to propel him onto the national political scene. 

In the early summer of 1963, Wallace announced that he intended to defy the court 

ordered integration of Alabama’s universities by refusing to admit blacks. On Sunday, 

June 9th, Wallace ordered 700 Guardsmen to report to armories in the Tuscaloosa area to 

make them readily available “to maintain law and order” on the University of Alabama 

campus. Governor Wallace publicly declared that he would personally “stand in the 

school house door” to prevent the enrollment of blacks. Two days later, the confrontation 

came to a head. On the morning of June 11, 1963, senior Department of Justice officials 

escorted black students to the university administration building where Governor Wallace 

himself refused them entry. (69) 

President John F. Kennedy’s response was swift and dramatic. An immediate 

presidential executive order federalized the entire Alabama National Guard with the 

purpose of assisting Department of Justice officials in maintaining order, quelling civil 

disturbances and enforcing court ordered integration. Later that same afternoon, federal 

officials in Tuscaloosa decided to enforce the court’s orders with the full backing of the 

Alabama ARNG. Around 3:00 p.m. on June 11th, a force of one hundred Alabama 

Guardsmen from Companies A and B of the 20th SF Group escorted federal officials and 

black students onto the campus. Wearing steel helmets and carrying rifles with fixed 

bayonets, the SF soldiers made a strong impression. At the head of the column walked 

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Brig. Gen. Henry V. Graham, the assistant division commander of the 31st Infantry 

Division. General Graham was a twenty-six year Alabama ARNG veteran with active 

service in both World War II and Korea and had served as the Alabama AG from 1959-

1963 when he reverted to one-star rank to serve as the second-in-command of the Dixie 

Division. Under the intense scrutiny of network television cameras, General Graham led 

the Department of Justice officials and the black students up the stairs of the 

administration building where Governor Wallace stood waiting. Graham saluted the 

Governor and asked him to step aside. Wallace returned the salute and asked for 

permission to make a short statement. Graham granted the Governor’s request, and after 

reading a statement in which he vowed to continue the fight against integration, Wallace 

left the campus. (70) 

Throughout the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, the use of ARNG 

units in civil disturbances proved effective. The improvements in National Guard 

training and equipping that occurred after Korea made the ARNG an effective and 

reliable instrument that did not question federal control, even at the local level. During 

the civil rights crises in the South, there were additional political advantages in removing 

Guardsmen from State control and using them rather than Regulars to enforce federal 

integration laws. 

Integration in the ARNG 

On July 26, 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order No. 9981, directing 

the integration of America’s armed forces. The order declared that “equality of treatment 

and opportunity” would exist for all service members without regard to “race, color, 

religion or national origin” and established a presidential committee to oversee service 

integration. Despite President Truman’s historic order, integration occurred slowly. 

When the Army’s 24th Infantry Regiment went to Korea two years after the integration 

order, it fought as an all-black unit led by mostly white officers. Regular Army field 

artillery, engineer, and military police units also went to Korea fully segregated. Three 

all-black ARNG transportation units from Maryland and the District of Columbia 

deployed to Korea, the last fully segregated Guard units ever to enter active, federal 

service. While both units integrated in Korea with the receipt of replacements, they 

segregated once again after returning home. (71) 

A small number of States did integrate their units, but overall the ARNG made 

little progress toward integration throughout the 1950s. Since the president’s integration 

order only referred to federal units, most Guardsmen argued the order did not apply to 

them. While the active Army utilized a diverse pool of draftees to integrate its units, the 

tradition of voluntary recruitment in the Guard restricted progress toward full integration. 

Meanwhile, serving black Guardsmen in selected States continued their tradition of 

service. In several locations, demographics caused segregated ARNG units. Spanishspeaking natives filled entire units in Puerto Rico, and a similar situation existed in 

Hawaii. In Alaska, the Eskimo Scouts consisted of native enlisted men led by white 

officers. Still, some States had fully integrated units. In the Southwest, Native 

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Americans, Hispanics, and Asians had served in integrated ARNG units since before 

World War II. 

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ARNG’s national exposure during race riots 

and anti-war protests during the Vietnam era prompted integration. In 1965, CNGB 

declared that federal recognition could be withdrawn from National Guard units denying 

an individual membership or promotion on the grounds of race, color, religion, or 

national origin. The following year, NGB issued the first regulations dealing with 

integration and established a staff section to address equal opportunity and civil rights 

issues. Slowly, States began to recruit blacks actively. New Jersey and New York 

conducted aggressive recruiting campaigns for minorities with modest results. In the 

South, many States repealed “white only” militia laws that were still on the books from 

Reconstruction in order to recruit African-Americans. By the mid-1960s, the ARNG in 

the southern States had only a small, minority representation. (72) 

Table 6 

ARNG STRENGTH, 1947-1970 

1947 87,421 1959 399,427 

1948 288,427 1960 401,765 

1949 315,042 1961 393,807 

1950 324,761 1962 360,970* 

1951 226,636* 1963 361,080* 

1952 215,341* 1964 381,546 

1953 255,522* 1965 378,985 

1954 318,006* 1966 420,924 

1955 357,542 1967 418,074 

1956 404,403 1968 389,182* 

1957 422,178 1969 388,954* 

1958 394,329 1970 409,192 

(Source: National Guard Bureau, Annual Reports, 1947-1970.) 

*ARNG troops ordered to active duty are normally not included with annual 

Guard troop strengths and instead are counted along with Regular Army strength 

figures. Reduced strength levels for the designated years reflect the ARNG 

mobilizations for Korea, Berlin, and Vietnam. 

Though a variety of minorities had always served in the ARNG, the role of 

women did not begin until the late 1950s. No women had served in the Guard before 

World War II, and females were not authorized to serve in the postwar period. However, 

the Regular Army did retain the Women’s Army Corps after the war, and job openings in 

many non-medical fields became available to women on active duty. Increasing numbers 

of women joined the USAR to serve in support positions, but because the ARNG 

remained mostly a combat organization, few positions were available that allowed female 

service. (73) 

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Starting in the early 1950’s, NGB allowed the Air National Guard to use female 

augmentees from the Air Force Reserve to work in medical units. The policy allowed 

female officers to work and train in military medical facilities, but did not permit women 

to mobilize and deploy with their National Guard units. To improve the Guard’s medical 

readiness, women would have to serve directly in units. In May 1956, NGAUS endorsed 

legislation allowing female nurses and women in medical specialties to join the ARNG. 

(74) 

While waiting for the approval of pending legislation, several States granted 

commissions to nurse officers. In the summer of 1956, Congress passed a law permitting 

female officers in the National Guard. The first ARNG woman granted federal 

recognition was 1st Lt. Sylvia Marie St. Charles Law. Appointed in a temporary federal 

recognition status on January 21, 1957, she joined Alabama’s 190th Evacuation Hospital 

in Birmingham. After completing the Army’s six-week military orientation course at 

Fort Sam Houston, Texas--the first Guardswoman to do so--Lieutenant Law returned to 

her unit and received federal recognition. (75) 

Over the next few years, a small but growing number of women entered the 

ARNG. In 1957, eleven female nurses served, though 468 available positions existed in 

hospital units. Three years later, only fifty-six women served out of a total ARNG 

strength of 401,765 personnel. During the Berlin Crisis in October 1961, seventeen 

female nurses mobilized and became the first Guardswomen ever ordered to active duty. 

Through the 1960s, the jobs open to females were in officer positions, and no enlisted 

women served. But the status of Guardswomen changed under the influence of the civil 

rights and women’s movements. On November 8, 1967, Congress finally passed 

legislation that allowed enlistment women to serve in the National Guard. After four 

years of planning for the introduction of women, CNGB announced in September 1971 

that prior service enlisted women could join the ARNG, and the authority to enlist female 

recruits without previous military experience came in May 1972. (76) 

The Berlin Crisis 

The Kennedy Administration entered office in January 1961 with a new vision for 

America’s national defense. Rejecting Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation, 

President Kennedy favored a new strategy of “flexible response.” The young president 

wanted a military capable of responding to a whole host of threats, ranging from nuclear 

to guerrilla warfare. Kennedy favored a broader use of conventional forces, especially 

the Army’s new SF units that were to lead efforts at defeating communist “wars of 

national liberation” threatening southeast Asia. 

In the summer of 1961, flexible response was put to a severe test. Soviet Premier 

Nikita Khrushchev announced the end of the European powers’ established rights to 

occupy portions of Berlin and threatened the city’s complete isolation. As a shocked 

world looked on, the Soviets constructed a solid wall of steel, concrete, and barbed wire 

that divided east and west Berlin. In an instant, Berlin became the focal point where U.S. 

commitments to NATO and Soviet ambitions met in open confrontation. On July 25, 

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1961, Kennedy addressed the nation, outlining the nature of the Berlin crisis, putting the 

U.S. military on high alert and asking for authority to mobilize the National Guard and 

the reserves. A rapid buildup of conventional forces was intended to demonstrate U.S. 

resolve and to cool Soviet ambitions. In lieu of a declaration of national emergency, on 

July 31st Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the callup of 250,000 Guardsmen 

and reservists for twelve months. (77) 

Within two weeks, Army planners and the NGB staff had drawn up a list of 

prospective units for mobilization, and on August 25th, NGB alerted 107 ARNG units for 

mobilization. A week later, four ARNG Divisions were placed on accelerated training 

schedules to increase their combat readiness. On September 19th, DOD published an 

even more expansive alert order. Units on alert status used precious time to complete 

physical exams, update personnel records and to prepare vehicles and equipment for 

movement to mobilization stations. (78) 

During the first two weeks of October 1961, 44,371 ARNG soldiers from thirtynine states and the District of Columbia entered active duty. Three major combat units 

contained the lion’s share of troops; the 32nd Infantry Division (Wisconsin), the 49th 

Armored Division (Texas) and the 150th Armored Cavalry (West Virginia). In addition, 

264 non-divisional units were mobilized. The 32nd Division quickly moved from 

Wisconsin to its mobilization station at Fort Lewis, Washington, while the 49th Armored 

Division began post-mobilization training at Fort Hood, Texas. The mission of the two 

Tracked vehicles of the 150th Armored Cavalry, West Virginia ARNG, participate in amphibious 

training at Fort Miles, Delaware in May 1962 during the Berlin Crisis. (National Guard 

Education Foundation) 

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Army National Guard History

ARNG divisions was to replace two active divisions in the CONUS strategic reserve--the 

4th Infantry and the 2nd Armored--should they deploy to bolster the five Army divisions 

already in Europe. The 32nd and 49th Divisions launched into an ambitious eight-week 

training program that included exercises for all levels of organization. Active Army 

inspectors declared the two divisions combat ready only four months after mobilization. 

During the spring and summer of 1962, all mobilized ARNG units continued to train and 

to provide support to other ARNG and USAR units engaged in annual training. (79) 

Despite the apparent success of the Berlin mobilization, a number of significant 

problems dogged the buildup. The personnel problems of the Korean mobilization from 

a decade earlier reappeared. Though the 32nd and 49th Divisions reported to their 

mobilization stations with nearly 100 percent of their authorized strength, manpower 

levels were far short of wartime requirements. The 32nd Division required 3,850 fillers 

and the 49th Division an additional 5,500 troops to reach full strength. Like the Korean 

mobilization, a large percentage of fillers were individual Army Reservists not in a paid 

drill status. These 28,000 Reservists complained long and hard that they had been called 

before hundreds of thousands of Guardsmen and Reservists in paid, drilling units. The 

complaints fell on fertile ground, resulting in broad press coverage and congressional 

hearings. The mobilization revealed great shortages of equipment in the ARNG. 

Logisticians withdrew over 10,500 items of equipment from the States to support 

mobilized units. Many Guardsmen questioned the validity of the callup, feeling that 

stateside duty alone did not justify major disruptions in their professional and personal 

lives. The following year, ARNG retention and NGAUS membership suffered. (80) 

American resolve finally convinced the Soviets to back down in Berlin, and 

ARNG units returned home during the summer of 1962. Despite acknowledged 

problems, Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr. called the mobilization “the most 

efficient in the history of the country,” and NGB declared it “the most successful ever 

conducted.” Though no ARNG unit deployed overseas, the mobilization achieved its 

desired results. For the first time in American history, a reserve component mobilization 

was used as a political instrument to deter war. And in the event deterrence had failed, 

ARNG divisions were immediately available for combat. Guard units achieved combat 

readiness in a relatively short time and successfully bolstered the nation’s strategic 

reserve. However, a series of important reforms soon completely overshadow the 

ARNG’s contributions during the Berlin Crisis. (81) 

The McNamara Reforms 

From his office in the Pentagon, President Kennedy’s new secretary of defense, 

Robert S. McNamara, had watched the Berlin mobilization with deep concern. Though 

acknowledging the sacrifices and service of individual Guardsmen and reservists, 

McNamara was not satisfied with the callup’s overall results. To implement flexible 

response with its heavy reliance on conventional forces, McNamara knew that increases 

in the efficiency and readiness of both Regular and reserve component forces were 

needed. Relying upon his background as a statistical analyst, Harvard Business School 

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graduate, and senior corporate executive, McNamara embarked upon a program of 

reforms that changed the ARNG in ways not seen since World War I. 

While McNamara and his systems analysts--the advisors known as the “Whiz 

Kids”--pondered alternatives for improving the military’s readiness, the Army underwent 

a profound change. To the Army’s relief, the era of massive retaliation and pentomic 

divisions came to an end. Looking to fight the conventional battles implicit in the 

strategy of flexible response, the Army reverted to a more traditional, divisional 

organization. The pentomic design gave way to the new “Reorganization Objectives 

Army Division,” or more simply, the ROAD division. In many ways, the ROAD division 

concept resembled the former triangular division except that three brigades rather than 

three regiments formed the division’s backbone. The brigade organization allowed 

tactical flexibility for the creation of combined arms task forces to meet the demands of 

specific situations and missions. The Army began conversion to the ROAD design in the 

early 1960s. In a prodigious effort, the ARNG’s twenty-three infantry and armored 

divisions completed the ROAD reorganization between January and May 1963. The 

ROAD structure proved sound, and with only minimal, incremental changes, continues to 

serve the Army. (82) 

The Berlin crisis had revealed several personnel and equipping shortcomings that 

Secretary McNamara set out to repair. By the end of 1962, the active Army’s strength 

had increased to more than one million soldiers organized into sixteen divisions. A 

growing defense budget permitted increases in stocks of supplies, equipment and 

ammunition. McNamara realized the need for greater strategic mobility and implemented 

an aggressive acquisition program for new, long-range aircraft capable of transporting 

large numbers of troops and light equipment to trouble spots anywhere in the world. For 

the first time, the U.S. prepositioned heavy equipment in Europe for use by units airlifted 

to help defend NATO in a crisis and established floating stocks aboard ships anchored in 

the Far East. (83) 

McNamara’s modernization program resulted in many ARNG enhancements. In 

the early 1960s, a flood of new equipment entered units. The Guard modernized to the 

M48 tank, the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, the M109 self-propelled howitzer, the 

M60 machine gun and the M14 rifle. Bolstered by improvements in training and 

modernization, Guard capabilities increased. In 1960, a Utah ARNG field artillery 

battalion flew to Puerto Rico for annual training aboard Air Guard transports, the first 

time Guardsmen had deployed to an overseas training location. Four years later, over 

10,000 ARNG soldiers flew on Air Guard transports from CONUS to overseas sites for 

annual training. In May 1964, two ARNG armored brigades participated in major 

exercises with active Army units in the California desert, the first time since World War 

II that such training had occurred. (84) 

As McNamara’s Whiz Kids took a firmer hold on the Pentagon, DOD and the 

Army increased their needs for statistical information. New, quantitative management 

methods required a more rapid collection and analysis of accurate data. In short order, 

the ARNG entered the computer age. In 1958, the ARNG had implemented a crude 

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Army National Guard History

system of manual punch card operations under a contract awarded to the growing IBM 

Corporation. The first punch cards allowed the receipt and transfer of a host of personnel 

reports with the promise of eliminating the writing or typing of reports at unit level and 

the manual compilation of data at State headquarters. By 1963, newer automatic data 

processing equipment was at work at NGB and in the States. Two years later, the 

growing ARNG computer facility moved from the Pentagon to a new National Guard 

Computer Center located in the Nassif Building in Arlington, Virginia. (85) 

Secretary McNamara sought to increase reserve component readiness through 

drastic force structure reductions. Since 1946, the ARNG had retained a force structure 

of 655,000 while maintaining an actual strength of approximately 350,000 soldiers. 

Consequently, ARNG units recruited and manned at 100 percent of their authorized 

strength remained far short of their required, wartime strength. The imbalance between 

force structure and manning became most evident during the Korean and Berlin 

mobilizations when Guard units needed significant infusions of Guard recruits, Army 

Reservists, and draftees to bring them to wartime strength. By reducing the number of 

ARNG units, McNamara aimed to bring the ARNG’s force structure more in line with its 

authorized manpower levels. The first round of unit inactivations came in May 1963. 

The ARNG lost four infantry divisions: the 34th (Iowa and Nebraska), the 35th (Kansas 

and Missouri), the 43rd (Connecticut, Rhode Island and Vermont), and the 51st (South 

Carolina and Florida). In return, the ARNG activated four, new separate infantry 

brigades. By 1964, the ARNG included a wide array of combat units; seventeen infantry 

divisions, six armored divisions, seven separate brigades and seven ACRs. (86) 

On December 12, 1964, McNamara shocked the defense establishment by 

unveiling a bold, sweeping plan to increase reserve readiness. Taking the exact opposite 

stance of the Gray Board in 1948, the SECDEF announced he intended to merge the 

USAR into the ARNG while carrying out additional, significant reforms. The Army 

Reserve would lose all of its units and consist only of individuals, while the ARNG 

inactivated fifteen more divisions. McNamara argued that in terms of management and 

practice, America’s dual, military reserve system was too cumbersome and expensive. 

To implement flexible response, the U.S. no longer needed large numbers of reserve 

component soldiers for a mass mobilization, but a smaller reserve force of more ready, 

efficient, and responsive units. (87) 

McNamara’s merger plan faced bitter opposition. Proponents for and against the 

ARNG-USAR merger expressed their concerns during tense congressional hearings. 

Congressman challenged the SECDEF’s authority in unilaterally announcing and 

implementing such a drastic plan. Both Guard and Reserve leaders believed turmoil in 

the reserve components was not desirable in light of the buildup in Vietnam. NGAUS, 

AGAUS, and NGB supported the merger despite the difficulties that would come with 

the acceptance of USAR soldiers and proposed Guard force structure cuts. The USAR 

and the Reserve Officer’s Association exercised a new level of organization and 

influence on Capitol Hill against the merger. Uniting the ARNG and the USAR proved 

too divisive, and Congress expressly forbade the merger with language in the Defense 

Appropriations Act of 1966. (88) 

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Army National Guard History

Undaunted by congressional opposition, McNamara initiated deep cuts in the 

Guard and the Army Reserve. On June 2, 1967, the SECDEF announced a major 

realignment of ARNG and USAR units. All combat and combat support units would 

transfer to the Guard, while the USAR would contain only combat service support units. 

At the heart of McNamara’s plan for the ARNG was the inactivation of fifteen divisions 

and the creation of a like number of separate brigades. In the aggregate, the ARNG faced 

a reduction of 1,000 units and 18,500 personnel authorizations. Though concerned over 

the strain the massive reorganization would impose on the Guard, NGAUS, NGB and the 

AGs understood that a smaller, better prepared ARNG was in the national interest. In 

light of the civil disturbances of the early 1960s, the Governors demanded the retention 

of enough military police, medical, aviation, and logistics units to provide their States 

with the resources to respond adequately to natural disasters and civil unrest. At the same 

time, DOD authorized significant increases in the State headquarters to offset command 

and control losses resulting from the elimination of fifteen division headquarters. (89) 

Between December 1967 and June 1968, the ARNG quickly implemented the 

most sweeping reorganization in its history. When it was all over, the Guard retained 

only eight divisions: the 26th Infantry (Massachusetts and Connecticut); the 28th Infantry 

(Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia); the 30th Mechanized Infantry (North Carolina, 

South Carolina, and Georgia); the 38th Infantry (Indiana and Pennsylvania); the 42d 

Infantry (New York, Michigan, and Ohio); the 47th Infantry (Minnesota, Iowa, and 

Illinois); the 30th Armored (Alabama and Mississippi); and the 50th Armored (New York, 

New Jersey, and Vermont). In addition, the ARNG included eighteen separate brigades, 

four ACRs, and two SF Groups. True to its promise, DOD assigned each ARNG unit to a 

specific war plan and provided the resources needed to maintain readiness. 

Unfortunately, Guardsmen had little time to adjust to their reorganization. Escalating 

levels of violence in the rice paddies of Vietnam and on America’s streets and college 

campuses soon placed new, difficult demands on all Guardsmen. (90) 

The Vietnam War 

Since the French defeat in Indochina and the splitting of Vietnam along the 17th 

Parallel in 1954, the U.S. had actively supported the survival of a free South Vietnam. 

However, the communists in North Vietnam were determined to reunite their country. In 

1960, the North Vietnamese commenced operations to conquer the opposition leadership 

in Saigon along with their American patrons. The campaign took on two forms; 

conventional attacks by units of the North Vietnamese Army and guerilla operations by 

the Viet Cong. Like Truman in Korea, President Kennedy took a stand against 

communist expansion. Military advisors moved to South Vietnam, and by 1963, 16,000 

Americans were active throughout the country. After Kennedy’s assassination and a 

coup in Saigon in November 1963, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong stepped up 

operations in hope of scoring a quick victory. (91) 

President Lyndon B. Johnson inherited a war for which he had little enthusiasm. 

Unwilling to hand the communists an easy victory, Johnson reaffirmed American backing 

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for South Vietnam. After North Vietnamese gunboats attacked U.S. vessels in early 

August 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, giving Johnson the 

authority “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force” to defend South 

Vietnam. The president deployed American air power to Vietnam that bombed the Viet 

Cong, the North Vietnamese, and their supply lines. In response, the Viet Cong mounted 

strong raids against air bases in the south, and their attacks prompted a major escalation 

of the war. (92) 

In 1965, the U.S. committed 20,000 Army and Marine combat troops to South 

Vietnam to prop up the government and defend military installations. Against the 

recommendations of his top advisors, Johnson refused to mobilize the National Guard 

and the Reserves. While the President wanted to resist aggression, he had no desire to 

provoke a major war in southeast Asia. Calling out the National Guard and Reserves, 

Johnson argued, might prompt the Soviets and the Chinese to enter the fighting. In the 

end, the President decided not to disrupt American society with a major mobilization; he 

would prosecute the war with expanded active forces and draftees. Throughout 1966 and 

1967, DOD pressed for a reserve callup to bolster NATO and the weakened U.S. strategic 

reserve, but the White House remained adamant against a National Guard and reserve 

mobilization. (93) 

As an alternative to a reserve component callup, DOD announced in September 

1965 the creation of the Selected Reserve Force (SRF), a 150,000-man composite force 

of ARNG and USAR units. The SRF’s mission was to provide additional, ready forces to 

offset the deployment of active Army units to Vietnam and to act as a strategic hedge 

against threats in Korea, Europe, and elsewhere. The Army established high readiness 

goals for the SRF; units were to mobilize within seven days of alert at 93 percent strength 

and to deploy overseas with a minimum of post-mobilization training. The ARNG 

provided nearly 120,000 combat and combat support troops to the SRF in three 

composite infantry divisions, six separate brigades and an ACR. (94) 

Bolstered by huge increases in training and recruiting budgets, ARNG SRF units 

worked mightily to improve readiness. Training long hours during extended drill periods, 

Guardsmen in the SRF proudly called themselves the “Super Ready Force” and believed 

they were preparing for eventual deployment to Vietnam. By July 1966, 88 percent of 

Guard SRF units had passed readiness tests qualifying them for mobilization only seven 

days after initial alert. Senior ARNG leaders believed the SRF’s divisions would be 

combat ready only eight weeks after mobilization. To sustain their high readiness, 

ARNG leaders consciously diverted resources from lower priority organizations to units 

designated for early deployment. Many States transferred their best soldiers and 

equipment into SRF units. Low priority units provided training and evaluation support to 

the SRF while their own training suffered. For the first time, Guardsmen grumbled about 

two sets of units; the “haves” and the “have nots.” (95) 

Despite the widely recognized success of the SRF, DOD terminated the program 

in September 1969. The rising demand for resources to support the Vietnam War 

precluded the continued funding of SRF readiness. At the same time, the control of 

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Army National Guard History

widespread race riots and antiwar demonstrations diverted more and more of the Guard’s 

attention away from normal training. Four years after it began, DOD believed that the 

strategic uncertainties that had called for the SRF’s creation no longer existed. Still, the 

SRF had increased reserve component readiness and provided a ready, strategic reserve 

during the peak years of involvement in Vietnam. (96) 

Denied the opportunity to serve in Vietnam with their units, individual 

Guardsmen volunteered for overseas service. In the war’s early years, approximately 

2,000 ARNG soldiers fought in Vietnam, half of them officers. In all, the group provided 

distinguished service, and twenty-three were killed in action. Major Homer L. Pease of 

Johnson City, Tennessee personified the service and dedication of Guardsmen. An 

adolescent at the beginning of World War II, Pease lied about his age to fight as a 

paratrooper in the 101st Airborne Division. By age sixteen, Pease had earned two Bronze 

Stars, two Purple Hearts, the Senior Parachute Badge and the Combat Infantryman’s 

Badge. Joining the Tennessee Guard after the war, Pease earned his officer’s 

commission and volunteered to go to Vietnam where he was awarded the Silver Star and 

a third Purple Heart. Homer Pease died in the Mekong Delta on November 16, 1966 

while battling against a massive Viet Cong attack that wiped out his entire unit with the 

exception of one sole survivor. Nearly 200 ARNG aviators volunteered for Vietnam and 

received high praise for their daring and skill. Warrant Officer Jerome Daly was perhaps 

the ARNG’s most illustrious aviator in Vietnam. Daly earned his wings in 1958 as a 

member of the Pennsylvania Guard and volunteered for two tours of duty in Vietnam. 

Flying nearly 5,000 total hours, Daly logged over 2,000 hours as a gunship helicopter 

pilot. In a remarkable combat career, Daly was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, 

two Silver stars, three Distinguished Flying Crosses, two Purple Hearts, and seventy Air 

Medals. In 1967, the Army Aviation Association of America honored Daly as the “Army 

Aviator of the Year.” (97) 

The decision to fight the war with draftees had a profound affect on ARNG 

manpower, and by the end of the war, many Americans considered the Guard a haven for 

draft dodgers. The Selective Service Act of 1967 contained numerous educational and 

professional deferments and exclusions that permitted young men to avoid the draft. A 

popular exclusion was membership in the reserves. Anyone entering the ARNG could 

avoid the draft but had to serve for six years in a drill status. As the war dragged on, 

young men increasingly sought ARNG service. Unit recruiters maintained long waiting 

lists of eager volunteers, and commanders closely managed unit vacancies. The ARNG’s 

end strength skyrocketed, reaching a peak strength of 466,000. To curb the Guard’s 

growth, a strength ceiling of 400,000 was imposed in 1968, and CNGB suspended the 

enlistment of all individuals without prior military service. (98) 

The reserve component draft exclusion created bitter feelings among many long 

serving Guardsmen who were already disappointed that their units had not been 

mobilized. Their displeasure turned to dismay when units began to fill with young men 

openly opposed to America’s involvement in Vietnam. Many professional Guardsmen 

who had trained and sacrificed to defend their country became disgusted as more and 

more men with a strong desire to avoid active military service filled their units. On the 

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Army National Guard History

other hand, a NGAUS survey in 1970 revealed that men seeking to avoid the draft did so 

largely for expedient reasons rather than antiwar sentiments. To the new Guardsmen, 

joining the ARNG fulfilled their military obligation with the least interference to their 

personal lives. (99) 

Unexpected events in early 1968 finally prompted a reserve mobilization. On 

January 23rd, the North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo and imprisoned its crew. Only 

eight days later, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong launched the Tet Offensive, a 

massive effort to defeat American and South Vietnamese forces. The strength, intensity 

and duration of the Tet Offensive surprised American commanders. Though U.S. forces 

finally turned the offensive back with heavy losses to the enemy, it became necessary to 

rush additional troops to Vietnam. Concerns over the Pueblo incident, the Tet Offensive, 

possible Soviet action in Berlin and the weakened U.S. strategic reserve convinced 

President Johnson to mobilize the reserves. On April 11th, the president issued an 

executive order calling to active duty 24,500 National Guardsmen and reservists. (100) 

On May 13, 1968, 13,633 Guardsmen from seventeen States reported to their 

armories for active duty. To augment the 

forces in Vietnam as well as the CONUS 

reserve, the ARNG mobilized a balanced 

force of thirty-four combat, combat 

support, and combat service support units. 

Two ARNG brigades were ordered to 

active duty. The 29th Infantry Brigade in 

Hawaii, reinforced by an infantry 

battalion from the USAR, consolidated at 

Schofield Barracks on Oahu for postmobilization training. The 69th Infantry 

Brigade from Kansas, bolstered by Iowa’s 

2-133rd Infantry, reported to Fort Carson, 

Colorado. California’s 1st Squadron, 18th 

Cavalry also mobilized and reported for 

duty at Fort Lewis, Washington. Twentytwo combat support and nine combat 

service support units quickly deployed to 

various Army posts for extended duty or 

for pre-deployment training. (101) 

Of the Guardsmen mobilized, 

2,729 soldiers in eight units went to 

Vietnam. After three months of stateside 

training, Alabama’s 650th Medical 

Two members of Company D, 151st Infantry Detachment was the first ARNG unit to 

(Ranger), Indiana ARNG on patrol in South reach Vietnam, arriving on August 27, 

Vietnam on January 23, 1969. (National Guard 1968. The following week, Idaho’s 116th 

Education Foundation) Combat Engineer Battalion arrived to 

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Army National Guard History

begin a year’s tour of duty constructing defenses and maintaining important supply 

routes. The first ARNG combat unit in Vietnam was New Hampshire’s 3-197th Field 

Artillery armed with 155-mm. towed howitzers. The only ARNG ground maneuver unit 

sent to Vietnam was Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry from Indiana. A special unit 

with nearly every member parachute and jungle warfare qualified, the Rangers reached 

Vietnam in November 1968. Operating from a base camp they named “Camp Atterbury 

East,” the Rangers conducted extensive patrolling and reconnaissance missions. By the 

end of their tour, 65 percent of the Indiana Rangers were awarded the Combat 

Infantryman’s Badge. In addition to the eight units deployed to Vietnam, another 4,000 

soldiers from the 29th and 69th Brigades served as individual replacements. Army leaders 

in Vietnam recognized the enthusiasm and esprit of Guardsmen whom they considered 

more mature, experienced, and better educated than the typical draftee. The ARNG’s 

most unfortunate moment in South Vietnam occurred on June 19, 1969 when Viet Cong 

sappers launched a massive attack against an American fire base. Battery C, 2-138th 

Field Artillery of the Kentucky ARNG helped to defeat the enemy attack but suffered 

heavy losses. Bardstown, Kentucky was shocked to learn that thirteen of its ARNG 

native sons had been killed and wounded in the attack. (102) 

On December 12, 1969, the last mobilized Guardsman returned home. All 

together, over 9,000 Guardsmen served in Vietnam, either in units or as individual 

volunteers and replacements. The smooth mobilization and quick deployment to 

Vietnam vindicated the McNamara reforms and proved that if properly manned and 

equipped, ARNG units could serve overseas shortly after mobilization. The ARNG’s 

Vietnam veterans performed another important service for the Guard. From their ranks 

developed a group of seasoned officers at the state and national level who would become 

the ARNG’s senior leadership during the century’s last two decades. (103) 

Domestic Strife, 1965-1970 

During the Vietnam War, America coped with violence on two fronts. While 

Regulars chased an elusive enemy in South Vietnam, the ARNG engaged in the difficult 

and divisive task of controlling riots in American cities and on college campuses. While 

the reasons for social discontent were complex, two key issues prompted widespread civil 

disturbances. The civil rights activism of nonviolence championed by Martin Luther 

King, Jr. faced a challenge from militant black leaders who advocated violence and 

forceful self-defense as agents of change, a position that caused increasing concerns 

among the white population. At the same time, society grew disillusioned with the 

Vietnam War. College students and young Americans subject to the draft became the 

shock troops of the antiwar movement that reached its peak in 1970. The National Guard 

was the only organization in each State with sufficient manpower and equipment to assist 

local law enforcement in riot control. 

The first major civil disturbance in an American city since World War II took 

place in the Watts section of Los Angeles in August 1965. On the evening of August 

11th, a confrontation between the California Highway Patrol and two black youths 

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Army National Guard History

Guardsmen of California’s 40th Armored Division direct traffic away from the riot-torn area of 

Watts, Los Angeles in the summer of 1965. (National Guard Education Foundation) 

sparked widespread rioting. The following day, city and State law enforcement agencies 

attempted to stop the rioting, but elected officials realized they needed the National 

Guard. By noon on August 13th, California Guardsmen from the 40th Armored Division 

were in Watts. A quick deployment of troops was possible because the division was 

ready for movement to Camp Roberts for summer training. As the violence escalated, 

Guardsmen occupied roadblocks, confronted angry crowds, and provided protection to 

firefighters. To augment the 40th Armored’s efforts, the California Air Guard airlifted 

5,200 Guardsmen from the 49th Infantry Division from northern California to Los 

Angeles. Over the following week, rioting killed 35 people, injured 1,000, and another 

4,000 were arrested. Fires and looters damaged or destroyed nearly 1,000 businesses, 

and property losses were put at $200 million. By the time it was all over on August 22nd, 

13,393 Guardsmen had seen duty in Watts. The police chief of Los Angeles later told 

reporters: “Guardsmen can hold their heads just a little higher today for a job well done.” 

(104) 

Another major challenge to civil authority in Detroit in July 1967 required the 

involvement of Regular and National Guard troops. A police raid on a black nightclub in 

the early morning hours of July 23rd sparked widespread rioting that quickly escalated out 

of control. By evening the next day, 8,000 Guardsmen from the 46th Infantry Division 

who had been at summer training at Camp Grayling were in Detroit. The Guard’s quick 

deployment was possible due to detailed, prior planning by the Michigan ARNG and 

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Army National Guard History

Detroit law enforcement. Looting, arson, and vandalism spread and intensified even 

though over 10,000 Guardsmen were on duty. Casualties from sniper gunfire prompted 

Guardsmen to load their rifles and shoot back. Finally, Michigan’s Governor appealed 

for federal troops, and President Johnson ordered 5,000 paratroopers from the 101st and 

82nd Airborne Divisions to Detroit. The paratroopers took charge of one half of the riot 

zone while the Michigan ARNG retained control over the remainder. The overwhelming 

show of force restored order by the end of the month. The final tally of the Detroit riot 

was shocking: 42 dead, 1,000 injured, 3,700 under arrest and $500 million in property 

damage. (105) 

Disturbed by the race riots, President Johnson appointed a National Advisory 

Commission on Civil Disorders headed by Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois. The Kerner 

Commission studied the genesis of race riots and made recommendations for eliminating 

the causes of unrest and improving riot control training and preparations by law 

enforcement, the Army, and the National Guard. While the Guard’s performance had 

usually pleased Governors and local officials, the Kerner Commission took a more 

critical view. The panel recommended that Guardsmen receive additional riot control 

training and special equipment. The commission questioned the individual performance 

of a number of Guard officers on riot duty and pushed for a comprehensive review of 

officer selection standards. The image of a largely white National Guard confronting 

black rioters caught the Kerner Commission’s attention, and it encouraged increased 

black participation in the ARNG. (106) 

The Kerner Commission’s findings were not lost on the active Army or the 

ARNG. A flurry of directives emanated from the Pentagon to the states. Beginning in 

August 1967, every Guardsman participated in a vigorous, thirty-two hour training 

program on crowd control and urban combat. Officers received instruction on proper 

decision-making techniques during riots. Forty States that included large cities 

developed civil disturbance plans. Many States adjusted annual training schedules to 

insure that large units would always be available for riot duty. Guard officers held 

conferences and training exercises with elected officials and law enforcement agencies. 

ARNG units received a wide array of new equipment; searchlights, emergency radios, 

bull horns, nightsticks, body armor, and face shields. Special weapons issued included 

shotguns and the new M79 grenade launcher capable of lofting tear gas projectiles. (107) 

Fortunately, riot training occurred just before a particularly violent year. In 1968, 

nearly 105,000 Guardsmen were committed on seventy-seven different occasions to riot 

duty in twenty-nine States and the District of Columbia. The worst civil disturbances 

occurred in April 1968 in the aftermath of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination. To 

help control riots in Detroit, Washington, Chicago, and Baltimore, 25,000 Guardsmen 

were called to active federal service. During 1969 and 1970, race riots and antiwar 

demonstrations continued, but their frequency and intensity waned. More importantly, 

Guardsmen on State active duty controlled riots without assistance from Regulars. 

Senior Guard leaders believed that the lack of federal intervention was testimony to the 

ARNG’s riot control preparations and experience. (108) 

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Army National Guard History

Perhaps the most unfortunate moment in modern ARNG history came at Kent 

State University in Ohio on May 4, 1970. The previous month, President Richard M. 

Nixon had ordered the invasion of Cambodia, a move many Americans believed was an 

unnecessary expansion of the Vietnam War. Violent antiwar protests erupted on college 

campuses. In Ohio, rioting caused by the Cambodian incursion capped the end of an 

especially violent month. Racial incidents, antiwar protests and a wildcat truckers strike 

had prompted the Governor to put nearly the entire Ohio ARNG on State active duty. A 

fierce antiwar protest broke out at Kent, Ohio on Saturday night, May 2nd, when students 

burned the ROTC building on the Kent State University campus. 

The following day was relatively quiet as 1,400 Guardsmen converged on Kent 

State and coordinated their efforts with local law enforcement. When classes resumed on 

the morning of Monday, May 4th, students gathered at mid-morning to chant antiwar 

slogans. Before long, 2,500 students shouted obscenities and insults at the Guardsmen. 

Afraid that the situation could get out of control, the police ordered the large crowd to 

disperse or face arrest. The students pelted police with rocks, and orders were given for 

the Guardsmen to disperse the crowd. (109) 

At noon, 115 Guardsmen from Companies A and B, 1-145th Infantry and Troop 

G, 107th Armored Cavalry donned gas masks and deployed into formation. While most 

Ohio ARNG soldiers confront antiwar protesters on the campus of Kent State University, May 4, 

1970. After fifty Guardsmen were injured by rocks and other projectiles, they opened fire, killing 

four students and wounding nine others. (Kent State University Archives) 

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Army National Guard History

soldiers carried M-1 rifles with fixed bayonets, others carried shotguns and tear gas 

launchers. The advancing soldiers pushed the rioters back with bayonets and strong 

doses of tear gas. In response, the students hurled rocks, bricks, and bottles that inflicted 

dozens of injuries. Just as they were about to disperse the crowd, the soldiers ran out of 

tear gas. Sensing the Guardsmen’s helplessness and confusion, the protesters intensified 

their attacks. Afraid for their lives and angered by the students’ actions, approximately 

thirty Guardsmen opened fire. In only thirteen seconds, a fusillade of nearly sixty bullets 

swept across the campus, killing four protesters and wounding nine others. Afterwards, 

the soldiers slowly withdrew, and the crowd dispersed. The Guardsmen looked after 

their wounded; nearly sixty had suffered severe cuts and bruises. The president of Kent 

State University closed the campus and ordered all students to leave. (110) 

By May 8th, calm returned, and the Guardsmen went home. The shooting resulted 

in a number of federal, State and private investigations. In 1973, the federal government 

indicted eight Guardsmen for violating the students’ civil rights, but the charges were 

eventually dropped. In the end, no Guardsmen were ever convicted for the Kent State 

shootings, and no students were charged for the injuries that they had inflicted. (111) 

Perhaps in retribution for the Kent State shootings, violence came to the NGAUS 

headquarters building in Washington, DC. In the early morning hours of Sunday, May 

10th, vandals placed a twenty-pound satchel charge of black powder against the building’s 

marble and glass outer walls. Though no one was injured, a huge explosion did 

considerable harm, shattering seventy glass doors and windows. Flying glass damaged 

several marble and stainless steel plaques and tore holes in the numerous State flags on 

display. (112) 

Conclusions 

In the early decades of the Cold War, the ARNG proved itself as a consistent, 

reliable instrument of national power. On three occasions, Guardsmen mobilized in 

response to communist threats. The ARNG divisions provided valuable service during 

the Korean War by fighting in Asia, supporting the defense of NATO and bolstering the 

U.S. strategic reserve. A lesser number of Guardsmen performed similar functions 

during the Vietnam War. For the first time, Guardsmen mobilized to help deter war 

during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. A select group of Guardsmen trained in the use of the 

latest high-technology weaponry participated in a key aspect of America’s defense 

strategy for nearly twenty years. The NIKE missile program remains the ARNG’s 

longest, sustained effort in the direct defense of the American homeland. Domestically, 

the ARNG acted in concert with civil authorities to implement the nation’s laws and to 

maintain order. Despite personal views they may have held on integration and Vietnam, 

Guardsmen remained loyal to their government during the turbulent 1960s. 

While the basic concept of citizen-soldiers serving both State and nation remained 

intact after World War II, nearly every other aspect of National Guard service changed. 

The federal government provided additional resources for training, equipment, pay, and 

armories, and in return, the ARNG became more ready and deployable. The substitution 

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Army National Guard History

of extended, weekend drill periods in place of frequent, weeknight drill and mandatory, 

initial training for all soldiers changed the face of the Guard. No longer simply the basis 

for all-out mobilization, ARNG units focused exclusively on preparedness for overseas 

campaigning while building stronger, closer ties with the active Army. Realistic field 

exercises replaced armory classroom instruction, and by the mid-1960s, the ARNG 

manned its units at 70 percent of wartime strength or higher. The cumulative affect of 

reforms and improvements on the individual soldier was significant. Guardsmen began 

to view their service as a career instead of a leisure or social activity and believed that 

lifelong involvement in ARNG activities constituted valuable service to the nation. 

The ARNG’s transformation took place against the backdrop of turbulent times. 

In 1948 and 1964, the National Guard avoided two concerted attempts at amalgamation 

with the USAR. The Army’s frustration in finding a larger, more viable mission in the 

Nuclear Age prompted the ARNG into major reorganizations to the pentomic and then to 

the ROAD division design. In the 1960s, the ARNG went through a major downsizing 

but came out for the better. The McNamara force reductions foreshadowed another, 

more painful cut in ARNG forces that was to come thirty years later. 

The ARNG ended the early years of the Cold War with its historical reputation 

intact. The American people continued to rely on Guardsmen for national defense and 

for assistance during natural disasters and domestic disturbances. At the same time, 

important concerns remained. The ARNG continued as a largely white, male institution 

despite the nation’s move toward racial integration. Questions lingered over the Guard’s 

role in domestic disturbances, and perceptions persisted that it was a haven for draft 

dodgers. Still, the National Guard avoided the severe crisis of confidence and the loss of 

public approval that shook the Regular Army following Vietnam. As the 1970s began, 

whether or not the ARNG could sustain the great advances made in readiness and training 

since World War II remained an open question. 

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Army National Guard History

Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh 

Father of the Modern NGAUS 

Ellard A. Walsh was born in Canada in October 

1887, and his family moved to Minneapolis, Minnesota 

while he was still a child. His military career began in 

1905 when he enlisted in the 1st Minnesota Infantry. For 

the next fifty-two years, Walsh served in National Guard 

leadership positions ranging from squad leader to division 

commander, Minnesota AG, and president of NGAUS. 

Ellard Walsh served in the 1st Minnesota as a first 

sergeant during the Mexican Border Crisis of 1916, 

returned home for a month and entered active duty again 

in April 1917 for World War I. He received an officer’s 

commission in the 135th Infantry and served with the 34th 

Division in France. After the war, he remained active in 

the Minnesota Guard, and by 1924 he served as the 

Assistant AG and chief of staff of the 34th Division. n 1927, Walsh was promoted to 

brigadier general and appointed as Minnesota’s AG, a position he held for forty-two 

years. sting contribution to the Minnesota National Guard was the acquisition 

and development of Camp Ripley, a legacy that remains to this day. 

After he became AG of Minnesota, Walsh developed into an even stronger 

advocate of the National Guard, and he served a two-year term as president of NGAUS 

starting in 1928. n July 1940, he was promoted to major general, became the 

commander of the 34th Division, and entered active duty with the division in February 

1941. d him from command, and he returned to 

Minnesota and his post as AG. With the entire National Guard on active duty for World 

War II, Ellard Walsh took an active role in promoting the Guard’s long-term interests. n 

1943, he was reelected as president of NGAUS, a position he held for fourteen years. 

Walsh provided the leadership that transferred NGAUS into a premier lobbying 

organization in Washington, DC with a full-time staff, an imposing headquarters 

building, and a monthly magazine. He was an articulate, tireless advocate who worked 

with Congress and the Defense Department to insure that the National Guard retained a 

prominent role in the nation’s defense after World War II and in the early years of the 

Cold War. In addition to putting NGAUS on a more sure footing, he considered a federal 

armory building program and military retirement for long serving Guardsmen as his 

greatest legacies. 

Walsh retired from public life in 1957 and returned to Minnesota to spend more 

time with his family and his hobby of gardening. He died in August 1975 at the age of 

eighty-seven. , the “Walsh-Reckord Hall of States” in the National Guard 

Memorial in Washington, DC stands as a permanent monument to his tireless efforts in 

promoting NGAUS and the National Guard. 

I

His most la

I

However, chronic ulcers disqualifie

I

Today

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Army National Guard History

CHAPTER 7 

The Era Of Total Force Policy, 

1970-1990 

We have to make our reliance on the Guard and the Reserves real. No 

longer will the lyrics be any good. If we make it real in the eyes of 

the reserve components, then it will be real for the country. 

General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. 

Introduction 

Plumes of thick, black diesel exhaust shot skyward from the smokestacks of ARNG 

D-8 bulldozers as they strained to break the red earth of Panama. Working in sweltering 

heat and stifling humidity, Guard engineers from Louisiana’s 225th Engineer Group 

skillfully employed their bulldozers to cut down a hill and fill in a valley to create a 

viable roadbed. Road graders moved back and forth methodically, kicking up thick 

clouds of red dust as they leveled the road surface. Engineer dump trucks came and went 

continuously, delivering gravel from distant rock quarries that would make the new road 

weatherproof year-round. While the Guard engineers labored, soldiers from the Panama 

Defense Force provided local security and often worked alongside the Americans to 

learn critical engineering skills. Throughout the early spring of 1984, ARNG engineers 

labored to complete the construction of an improved road network on the Azuero 

Peninsula in central Panama. 

The Louisiana engineers lived in a nearby base camp where other Guard soldiers 

from Puerto Rico and Florida staffed a mess hall and a dispensary and operated laundry 

and bath facilities. The base camp’s remote location in the jungles of Panama made 

communications and transportation difficult. A daily helicopter shuttle between the base 

camp and an Army installation near Panama City that brought supplies, rations, and 

spare parts was the only routine contact with the outside world. A high technology, 

satellite communications system allowed the ARNG soldiers who were deployed for their 

annual training to make long distance phone calls back to their families. When the 

nearly 400 Guard soldiers assembled for their evening meal at the base camp, their ranks 

reflected the ever increasing presence of blacks, women, and Hispanics in the ARNG. An 

occasional movie was available for evening entertainment, but the day’s work was 

sufficiently strenuous and the heat so oppressive and exhausting that most soldiers turned 

in for the night not long after sundown. Before their exertions were completed weeks 

later, Guard engineers from the 225th Group had blazed a nine-mile trail through the 

steep hills and deep ravines of the Panamanian countryside. 

233 
Army National Guard History

Seventy years earlier, the War Department and the Army had questioned the 

legality of any National Guard service beyond America’s shores. By the early 1980s, 

ARNG units routinely deployed overseas during annual training periods to participate in 

exercises and to provide assistance to America’s allies. In 1984, the Army had 

authorized the ARNG to undertake road building operations in Panama as part of a 

broader effort to provide military assistance to Central American governments. The first 

phase of the project was the completion of a stretch of road on the Azuero Peninsula 

meant to join the agricultural region with Panama’s established road network and 

commercial areas. 

After the close of the winter rainy season in 1984, ARNG engineers from 

Louisiana, Missouri, Wisconsin, and North Carolina returned to Panama early the next 

year to add another seventeen miles of gravel highway to the Azuero Peninsula. All 

together, ARNG engineers completed twelve bridges along the twenty-six mile span of 

highway. On May 17, 1985, the president of Panama officiated a ribbon cutting 

ceremony to celebrate the opening of the longest bridge that measured 360 feet. Near the 

bridge, the Panamanian government placed a permanent, roadside plaque honoring the 

ARNG’s work. Afterwards, Lt. Col. Charles Partin of Louisiana’s 527th Engineer 

Battalion recalled: “The training in that country has been invaluable... It’s the best 

training I’ve ever been through with the Guard. 

The commitment of ARNG troops to Central America in the 1980s was only one 

manifestation of the resurgence of the U.S. military following the bitter experience of the 

Vietnam War. Though direct American involvement in Southeast Asia ended with the 

signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, the lingering effects of the Vietnam War 

were widespread and persistent. In American foreign policy, retrenchment followed 

defeat. The Nixon Doctrine declared that the U.S. would honor its direct commitments to 

NATO, Japan, and Korea, but all other allies should expect only American air support, 

technical assistance, and weapons shipments while facing a crisis. Before his resignation 

in 1974, President Nixon initiated an era of détente that allowed for a broader 

accommodation with the Soviet Union and Red China. At the same time, cuts in military 

spending, the end of the draft and discipline problems further weakened the U.S. military. 

To compensate for dwindling manpower and materiel, the Defense Department 

announced the Total Force Policy, a move designed to better integrate reserve units with 

their active duty counterparts. 

American disarray and retrenchment encouraged communist boldness. While the 

U.S. military bled in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had modernized its nuclear and 

conventional forces. Armed with new tanks, artillery, and aircraft, the Soviet Army’s 

threat against Central Europe appeared more credible than ever. In the Middle East and 

Africa, the Soviets stretched their diplomatic and military muscle. In late 1979, two 

events marked the highpoint of American trouble in the Middle East: the capture of over 

200 American hostages by Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and the Soviet invasion of 

Afghanistan. Closer to home, trouble festered in the Caribbean and Central America as 

Cuba took a more aggressive role in supporting insurgencies. 

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Army National Guard History

In the 1980s, America reasserted its world influence under the leadership of 

President Ronald W. Reagan. Communist provocation around the globe demanded a 

vigorous response. Aided by increased defense spending, the armed forces modernized 

and solved their personnel problems. Increasing their presence around the world, 

American forces saw action in Lebanon, Libya, Grenada, and Panama. In the end, the 

Soviet Union collapsed, and the most serious threat to U.S. national security after the 

Cold War occurred in the Middle East, not in Europe. 

For the ARNG, the twenty years following the Vietnam War was a period of 

decline and resurgence. In 1970, the ARNG was adequately prepared to perform its role 

in a large, deliberate mobilization followed by eventual commitment to a war zone. 

Twenty years later, the ARNG was a combat ready, reserve force immediately available 

for deployment to hot spots around the globe. Improvements in training, equipment, and 

personnel gave the ARNG the wherewithal to participate fully in the nation’s first line of 

defense. Still, manning the Guard with sufficient numbers of quality troops proved a 

daunting task. The Total Force Policy established closer ties than ever before between 

the Regular Army and the ARNG. At the same time, force modernization proved 

difficult, and Guard soldiers found themselves training on older, less capable equipment. 

But ten years after Vietnam, the ARNG turned an important corner. In a buildup 

reminiscent of the military revival following the Korean War, the Guard expanded its 

ranks and received the resources necessary to improve readiness. Fully integrated into 

the Army’s war plans, Guardsmen prepared to fight a war in Europe while participating 

in training exercises and support missions around the globe. 

The Army After Vietnam 

Immediately following its withdrawal from Vietnam, the U.S. Army entered a 

period of self-analysis and renewal. The problems of ill discipline, drug abuse, and racial 

tensions that appeared during the last year of the Vietnam War soon engulfed the entire 

Army. In Europe, senior commanders lamented that discipline problems had rendered 

the once proud U.S. Seventh Army nearly combat ineffective. The commandant of the 

Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas publicly admitted that 

the Army “faces serious problems of manpower, morale, strategy and leadership.” Under 

the influence of its new chief of staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., the Army in 

1972 began a concerted effort to repair the institutional damage inflicted by the Vietnam 

War. (1) 

The first priority for Creighton Abrams was to identify the Army’s post-Vietnam 

missions. After examining the nation’s most likely security threats, the Army concluded 

that a mechanized war in Europe and a light infantry war elsewhere were the two most 

probable challenges. Even though a major war against the Soviets in Central Europe 

seemed unlikely, such a conflict represented the greatest challenge to U.S. national 

security. Striving to move beyond the specter of Vietnam, the Army focused on the 

defense of Europe as its major mission in the 1970s. (2) 

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Army National Guard History

In 1976, new Army doctrine outlined the concepts for defending NATO against 

the Soviets. The Army’s challenge was to fight and win the first battle of the next war by 

employing aggressive, defensive tactics that destroyed the enemy with maneuver and 

firepower. Facing vastly superior numbers, Americans were expected to fight 

outnumbered and win. Army strategists believed NATO could triumph in a short, violent 

and decisive war without having to resort to nuclear weapons. The 1973 Yom Kippur 

War seemed to verify the Army’s assumptions about future warfare. In a brief but bloody 

war, the Israeli victory demonstrated the effectiveness of new, more lethal weapons and 

the need for highly trained armies of Regulars and citizen-soldiers capable of conducting 

combined arms warfare. The Yom Kippur War convinced U.S. planners that future 

reserve component mobilizations would have to be more rapid than ever before. (3) 

Developing a strategy for the defense of Europe was easier than providing badly 

needed manpower and equipment. During Vietnam, the Army had done little 

modernization while the Soviets had substantially strengthened their forces. The Yom 

Kippur War warned of the need for new weapons and equipment. Despite a dwindling 

defense budget, the Army forged ahead with plans aimed at developing a wide range of 

new, more capable weapons systems. But new weapons and equipment programs would 

not bear fruit for nearly a decade, and in the meantime, older and less capable hardware 

remained in soldiers’ hands. 

The familiar pattern of rapid demobilization following a major war began even 

before the Army had withdrawn from Vietnam. At the height of the war in 1968, the 

Regular Army had grown to nearly 1.6 million soldiers organized into sixteen divisions. 

As the Army started its slow withdrawal from Vietnam in 1969, difficult personnel and 

unit cuts ensued. The Army inactivated three divisions, and many Vietnam veterans left 

the service. By the time of the Bicentennial of the American Revolution in 1976, budget 

cuts had reduced the Army by half. Only 775,000 soldiers remained on active duty in 

thirteen divisions posted in CONUS, Europe, Hawaii, and Korea. To make matters 

worse, the Army had to grapple with serious challenges posed by the end of the 

peacetime draft. (4) 

The All-Volunteer Force 

The end of conscription that had run almost continuously since 1940 came as a 

direct consequence of the nation’s bitter experience in Vietnam. During the presidential 

campaign of 1968, Richard Nixon indicated that terminating selective service was part of 

his overall plan to end the Vietnam War. The draft had become inextricably connected 

with the war effort and the object of sharp antiwar protests. In order for the country to 

pull free from the Vietnam debacle and heal its deep, internal wounds, the draft would 

have to go. After his election victory in November 1968, President Nixon moved quickly 

to fulfill his campaign promise. 

On March 27, 1969, Nixon established the Advisory Commission on the AllVolunteer Armed Force and appointed Thomas S. Gates, Jr., a former SECDEF, to head 

the effort. The Gates Commission was not to consider the merits of retaining or 

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Army National Guard History

eliminating the draft. Its mission was “to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating 

conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force.” After eleven months of intense 

study and analysis, the Gates Commission reported its findings to the president on February 6, 

1970. However necessary conscription had been during World War II and the Cold War’s 

early years, the Vietnam draft had been a “costly, inequitable, and divisive procedure for 

recruiting men.” The commission concluded that an all-volunteer military was both feasible 

and desirable. The panel endorsed three major initiatives to implement the all-volunteer force: 

a doubling of base pay for all enlisted personnel in the first two years of service, comprehensive 

improvements in the living conditions and lifestyle of service members and the establishment 

of a stand-by draft system. To the surprise of many, the Gates Commission recommended July 

1, 1971 as the date to end the draft and to initiate the all-volunteer military. (5) 

At the Pentagon, senior civilian and military leaders did not share the Gates 

Commission’s optimism. Military planners believed that recruiting enough quality people in 

the correct military specialties would be nearly impossible. Surely, they argued, an allvolunteer force would jeopardize national security and prove too expensive. A fear existed in 

the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill that the American people would consider well paid, allvolunteer soldiers as little more than mercenaries. Still, realizing that an all-volunteer force was 

all but inevitable, the Army initiated programs to ease the transition from the draft to 

volunteerism. The Army increased its recruiting force, started family and bachelor housing 

construction projects and increased educational benefits and opportunities. To the horror of 

many veterans and retirees, the Army abolished reveille and retreat formations, curbed the use 

of soldiers for work details, relaxed long established haircut and grooming standards, permitted 

single soldiers to decorate their living quarters and allowed beer in the barracks. (6) 

The winding down of the Vietnam War, reduced draft quotas, and public discussions 

on the end of selective service curbed the desire for membership in the Army Guard. By 1970, 

the ARNG included 409,412 soldiers formed into eight divisions, four ACRs, eighteen combat 

brigades and hundreds of support units. Lists of men waiting to join the Guard quickly 

diminished and finally disappeared. In January 1970, NGAUS came out strongly against the 

end of the draft, arguing that the National Guard could not maintain its forces “at anything 

approaching their current size and state of readiness by purely voluntary means, even with 

additional rewards and incentives.” At the same time, NGAUS prepared reports and conducted 

seminars to assist senior Guard commanders in the transition to an all-volunteer force. (7) 

The National Guard leadership enacted new recruiting programs in anticipation of the 

end of the draft. During 1970, the ARNG initiated a “Try One in the Guard” recruiting 

campaign to attract trained and experienced veterans. It provided prior service soldiers an 

opportunity to evaluate Guard membership for one year without a lengthy commitment. 

Additionally, the ARNG offered soldiers approaching the end of their six-year commitment a 

one-year extension to allow them additional time to make a final decision on choosing the 

Guard as a long-term career. Commanders put renewed emphasis on acquiring and retaining 

experienced soldiers because the cost of training a new recruit was the same as retaining three 

experienced soldiers. (8) 

Following World War II, young men had often sought service in the ARNG rather than 

subjecting themselves to the draft and active military service. In many respects, the ARNG no 

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longer possessed the recruiting skills and practices that had been prevalent before 1940. With 

the end of the draft looming and former incentives for Guard service about to evaporate, the 

ARNG developed its own skilled and dedicated recruiting force. A select group of 

noncommissioned officers with distinguished careers qualified for recruiting duty after 

attending lengthy schooling. NGB produced an array of recruiting materials that included 

pamphlets, brochures, posters, and special radio and television advertising. By the end of 1972, 

the ARNG had 6,000 trained recruiters, the equivalent of two full-time recruiters for each 

company-sized unit. In addition to recruiting efforts in armories and local communities, 

ARNG recruiters manned offices on thirty Army installations hoping to sign up soldiers 

leaving active duty. (9) 

Despite the Gates Commission’s recommendation to terminate the draft in 1971, DOD 

and congressional leaders convinced the Nixon Administration to extend the draft for two 

additional years. They argued successfully for additional time to implement new legislation 

and programs to ease the transition to a “zero draft” environment. The last draftee entered the 

Army in December 1972, and after a nearly continuous stint of thirty-three years, selective 

service terminated on July 1, 1973. Within six months, ARNG strength tumbled to just below 

388,000, and senior Guard leaders feared that the permanent crippling of the ARNG was at 

hand. However, innovative recruiting efforts by a professional recruiting force and increased 

benefits packages for volunteers helped to stem the tide. In 1977, the ARNG’s personnel 

strength fell to 355,721, the lowest level since the end of the Korean War. The greatest crisis 

ever in ARNG peacetime manpower came that same year when the termination of service by 

Vietnam era Guardsmen resulted in the mass exodus 104,000 soldiers. At the same time, 

commanders released large numbers of soldiers due to unsatisfactory performance. A 

concerted recruiting campaign sustained personnel numbers, but the worst was yet to come; 

ARNG strength bottomed out in 1979 at 346,974 soldiers. (10) 

Table 7 

ARNG Strength, 1971-1990 

1971 402,175 1981 390,659 

1972 387,539 1982 409,238 

1973 385,600 1983 417,178 

1974 410,682 1984 434,702 

1975 401,981 1985 440,778 

1976 375,706 1986 446,872 

1977 363,777 1987 451,858 

1978 347,340 1988 455,182 

1979 346,974 1989 456,960 

1980 368,254 1990 444,224* 

(Source: National Guard Bureau, Annual Reports and Reviews, 1971-1990.) 

*Decline in troop strength for 1990 reflects Guard soldiers initially ordered to active duty

for the Persian Gulf War. 

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Army National Guard History

The ARNG could not have maintained an acceptable manning level throughout the 1970s 

without the increased participation of minorities. Though the Guard’s roles in enforcing 

racial integration and controlling riots had exposed a lack of minorities in the ranks, 

widespread service by African-Americans and women began only with the end of the 

draft. The impact of new black Guardsmen was particularly significant. In July 1971, 

4,961 black soldiers comprised just over 1 percent of the ARNG. Though legislators had 

removed legal barriers to minority participation in all States, more was needed to bring 

blacks into uniform. In September 1971 at the annual NGAUS Conference in Honolulu, 

CNGB announced a major initiative on African-American recruiting. Maj. Gen. Francis 

S. Greenlief challenged National Guard commanders to double their black ranks within a 

year. In addition, the Guard established the long-term goal of having every unit reflect 

the racial composition of its local community. Within a year, the number of blacks in the 

ARNG increased to 7,680, and only five years later, 46,696 blacks comprised over 12 

percent of the ARNG. The procurement of African-American officers lagged, but the 

growth of black leadership did make progress. In 1972, Brig. Gen. Cunningham Bryant 

became the first African-American to receive federal recognition as an ARNG general 

officer when he became the commanding general of the District of Columbia National 

Guard. (11) 

Guard soldiers of the 1-104th Infantry, 26th Infantry Division paddle across a lake during 

training exercises at Fort Drum, New York in 1977. Not until the 1970s did the ARNG include 

significant minority participation. (National Guard Education Foundation) 

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Army National Guard History

In addition to African-Americans, increasing numbers of women filled the 

ARNG’s ranks. Previous legislation had authorized the service of enlisted women in the 

National Guard, but the recruiting of female soldiers did not begin in earnest until May 

1972. An internal ARNG study concluded that female soldiers could serve in 37 percent 

of the Guard’s authorized positions. In 1972, only fifty-six officers and enlisted women 

were in the ARNG, but within a year, the number of females had increased nearly tenfold 

to 518. Women made important advances in the early years. In August 1974, the first 

female warrant officer was appointed, and a year later, the first female ARNG aviator 

earned her flight wings. NGB established an informal goal of recruiting up to 20,000 

women into the ARNG, and within three years of the end of the draft, over 11,000 

females were on duty. (12) 

Total Force Policy 

In the early 1970s, the convergence of three significant trends--force reductions, 

public demands for smaller defense budgets, and the end of the draft--prompted a major 

change in U.S. defense policy. To fill the void in active forces caused by drastic cuts in 

resources, the Pentagon turned to the Guard and Reserves. In August 1970, Defense 

Secretary Melvin R. Laird espoused a “Total Force” concept that called for the reserves 

to bear more of the direct burden for national defense. In the absence of the draft, Laird 

called for the reserve components to become the “initial and primary source” for 

reinforcing Regulars in any emergency “requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of 

the active forces.” The Guard would resume its traditional role of providing ready 

combat units while the USAR furnished support units and augmented the Army’s training 

installations. The SECDEF ordered the service staffs to apply the Total Force concept 

“in all aspects of planning, programming, manning and equipping” the reserve 

components. Despite Laird’s guidance, the application of the Total Force concept across 

the services was inconsistent and uneven. (13) 

It fell to one of Melvin Laird’s successors, James R. Schlesinger, to convert the 

Total Force concept into more specific plans and programs. With a forceful 

memorandum issued on August 22, 1973, Secretary Schlesinger promulgated the “Total 

Force Policy.” Total Force was no longer only a concept; the services were to integrate 

their active and reserve forces “into a homogeneous whole.” Schlesinger emphasized 

that the Guard and the Reserves were the initial, primary, and sole augmentation to active 

forces. While he acknowledged that the services had made progress in reserve 

component integration, Schlesinger declared that reserve units had not yet achieved the 

readiness standards required for wartime contingencies. The SECDEF directed the Army 

and the other services to provide the resources necessary to improve reserve component 

readiness. (14) 

The Total Force Policy’s implications for the relationship between the Regular 

Army and the ARNG were profound. Overall, the policy called for an equal partnership 

between the Army and the Guard. Without the draft, the Army would once again have to 

rely heavily on the ARNG to provide additional, immediate combat power. Because of 

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Army National Guard History

force structure reductions and the end of conscription, the Army would require a 

significant portion of the ARNG in order to fight a major war in Europe or to respond to 

large emergencies elsewhere. The Total Force Policy required major institutional and 

cultural changes in the Regular Army and the ARNG unlike any that generation of 

soldiers had ever experienced. (15) 

In order to be an effective combat reserve, ARNG units had to mobilize on short 

notice, deploy overseas quickly, and enter combat with only a minimum of additional 

training. The Total Force Policy prompted a number of initiatives to improve ARNG 

readiness and to increase integration between Regulars and Guardsmen. In 1970, the 

Army arrayed Guard units on master priority lists that established the allocation of 

resources to all Army units consistent with wartime planning. At the same time, the 

management of manpower and equipment intensified. The ARNG became part of an 

Army centralized computer system that closely monitored personnel and equipment 

authorizations in every battalion and separate company. The organization of National 

Guard units had conformed to standard Army designs since 1916, but computer 

technology in the early 1970s permitted an improved system of monitoring and managing 

ARNG resources at the national and State levels. Aided by the power of computers that 

matched unit equipment inventories against equipment shortages throughout the entire 

ARNG, logisticians improved readiness by redistributing weapons, vehicles, and critical 

equipment items. Within a year, the Guard had achieved its highest equipment readiness 

in history; nearly 75 percent of high priority combat battalions had the essential 

equipment required for early deployment. The measurement of Guard combat readiness 

took on a completely new meaning as well. The first submission of formal ARNG 

readiness reports to the Army began in October 1973. For the first time, senior military 

leaders scrutinized quantitative readiness data on the Guard. The ARNG developed 

streamlined deployment procedures that allowed its units to meet stringent deployment 

timelines, and in 1975, Guard commanders participated in the Army’s first, post-Vietnam 

mobilization exercises. (16) 

The Total Force Policy increased training opportunities between active duty and 

Guard units. As early as 1970, a new Army Affiliation Program linked independent 

ARNG battalions with active Army divisions for training support. During annual 

summer training, affiliated ARNG battalions trained with Regulars from designated 

Army divisions. Units established a year-round program of training visits and 

coordinated administrative and logistical procedures, but the Affiliation Program stopped 

short of establishing a direct command relationship between ARNG battalions and Army 

division commanders. Overall, the Affiliation Program was a great success, and the 

belief that closer ties to the Regular Army increased Guard readiness set the stage for the 

program’s expansion. Over the next five years, thirty-six ARNG battalions formed 

affiliations with active units, creating perhaps the closest peacetime ties that had ever 

before existed between Regular and Guard units. By 1976, eighty-nine ARNG combat 

battalions had affiliations with active units. (17) 

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Army National Guard History

The Roundout Program 

The full implementation of the Total Force Policy and the ascension of General 

Abrams to the post of Army chief of staff created conditions for the beginning of the 

Army’s Roundout Program. The Total Force Policy called for increased utilization of the 

National Guard, a notion that Abrams embraced. In forty years of military service, 

Abrams had developed a healthy respect for citizen-soldiers. As one of the Army’s 

premier tank battalion commanders in World War II, Abrams had learned that American 

citizen-soldiers had the courage to fight and the ability to master the challenges of 

armored warfare. During the years of racial strife in the 1960s, Abrams had often served 

as the Army chief of staff’s personal representative during ARNG mobilizations, an 

assignment that brought him into close contact with ARNG leaders and units during 

difficult circumstances. Abrams developed a great deal of respect for Guardsmen, and as 

the overall commander of ground forces in Vietnam, he believed the failure to mobilize 

the Guard and the Reserves at the beginning of the war had been a crucial error. (18) 

After becoming chief of staff in October 1972, Abrams set out to revitalize a tired 

and demoralized Army. He advocated an expansion of the active Army from thirteen to 

sixteen divisions, a move designed to restore the Army’s prestige while providing the 

combat power needed to meet post-Vietnam, global commitments. DOD agreed to the 

activation of three new divisions, but required that the new commands had to come from 

existing Army assets and not from increases in personnel levels. The outcome of the 

Vietnam War had convinced Abrams that the Army should never again go to war without 

the full support of the American people. In his mind, the direct link between the active 

Army and the American people ran through the ARNG and the USAR. Faced with the 

challenges of increasing the number of active Army divisions while at the same time 

strengthening the Army’s ties to the American people, Abrams’s staff came up with a 

novel solution; the ARNG Roundout brigade. (19) 

Building on the successes of the Affiliation Program, Roundout brigades would 

be permanently assigned to active duty divisions for training and become a permanent 

and integral portion of the division’s structure. In peacetime, selected Army divisions 

were to have only two combat brigades, and upon mobilization, the addition of a 

Roundout brigade would bring a division to its full configuration. Roundout brigades 

were to deploy and fight as a division’s third combat maneuver brigade. The Roundout 

brigade’s peacetime commander, an ARNG brigadier general, would act as an assistant 

division commander in war. In addition, the Army assigned a number of active divisions 

a separate ARNG combat battalion to provide the tenth ground maneuver unit each 

division required. By reducing the standing size of selected active divisions, the Army 

would gain a portion of the manpower needed to create three new divisions. 

The Army’s first Roundout was the 29th Infantry Brigade in Hawaii. Upon 

redeployment from Vietnam, the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks had 

inactivated one brigade, and the Army’s Pacific Command asked to integrate the 29th 

Brigade into the “Tropical Lightning” Division. By 1973, the ARNG had reconfigured 

the Hawaii brigade to function as an organic element of the 25th Division. CNGB 

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Army National Guard History

reported that the new relationship was “most encouraging" and promised “new avenues” 

for shared training opportunities. (20) 

The Roundout experiment in Hawaii went well, and by the summer of 1976, the 

Army had added Roundout brigades to its three, newly activated divisions. In 1975, the 

Louisiana ARNG’s 256th Infantry Brigade became the Roundout to the 5th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) at Fort Polk, while Georgia’s 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) 

joined the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The following 

year, Oregon’s 41st Infantry Brigade became the Roundout to the 7th Infantry Division at 

Fort Ord, California. By 1977, the 256th Brigade had converted to mechanized infantry, 

and the ARNG had restructured all three brigades to make them an integral part of their 

parent divisions. (21) 

Equipping the new Roundout units challenged Army and ARNG logisticians. 

Equipment incompatibility between active and ARNG battalions had caused training 

restrictions in the Affiliation Program, and the Army did not want to repeat the mistake 

with the Roundout units. A concerted effort began to equip the Roundout brigades with 

the same weapons systems and equipment as their active duty divisions. The M60 tank, 

new anti-tank missile systems, and modern radios and wheeled vehicles went to the 

Roundouts. At the same time, Guard logisticians redirected excess vehicles and 

equipment to Roundout battalions. However, Roundout modernization soon slowed 

because of competing demands and the lack of an acquisition program for ARNG 

equipment. To keep the Guard’s readiness reporting levels high, the Army designated 

older equipment as authorized substitutes for more modern items. ARNG commanders 

believed that liberal substitutions masked readiness problems and that the Army had 

given them new missions and responsibilities but not the equipment necessary to get the 

job done. Out of frustration, some Guardsmen referred to the Total Force Policy as the 

“Total Farce.” (22) 

The Roundout Program achieved many of the positive results that General 

Abrams had intended. The close ties between active divisions and Roundout brigades 

increased ARNG readiness and gave Guardsmen a new sense of purpose. In making the 

Roundout brigades organic to active divisions, the Army was able to generate the 

manpower required to raise three new divisions and to place sixteen divisions on active 

duty once again. As designed, the Roundout program achieved one of Creighton 

Abrams’ most important goals. Linking the Roundout brigades to several active 

divisions ensured that the Army could never again go to war without a significant 

National Guard mobilization, an action that would require the full backing of the 

American people and the consent of Congress. Unfortunately, Abrams did not live to 

witness the full benefits of the Roundout Program; he succumbed to cancer in September 

1974, the only Army chief of staff ever to die on active duty. (23) 

Overseas Training and Mobilization Preparedness 

Under the Total Force Policy, the requirement for Guard and Reserve forces to 

deploy quickly to NATO and other regions prompted the Army to increase ARNG 

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Army National Guard History

A Guardsman from the 42nd Infantry Division 

receives instruction on British communications 

equipment from a member of the 5th Battalion 

(Territorial), Royal Anglican Regiment. Overseas 

exchange programs increased the ARNG’s 

integration with the Regular Army and NATO 

forces in the 1970s. (National Guard Education 

Foundation) 

participation in overseas training. Prior to 

the Vietnam War, Guardsmen had trained 

at sites in Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto 

Rico, and in the early 1970s, small groups 

of ARNG linguists and SF teams had 

deployed worldwide. The Army’s focus 

on the defense of Europe insured that 

most ARNG overseas training would take 

place in the NATO region. At first, 

overseas training consisted of foreign 

exchange programs with other NATO 

reserve forces and ARNG participation in 

major exercises. In both instances units 

deployed outside the U.S. during normal 

annual training periods. (24) 

The first foreign exchange 

program occurred between the Minnesota 

ARNG and the Norwegian Home Guard 

in 1972. A platoon from the 47th Infantry 

Division traveled to Norway for annual 

training while a force of Norwegians 

trained at Camp Ripley, Minnesota. The 

exchange’s success produced a 

longstanding relationship between 

Norwegians and Minnesotans. Other 

States began exchange programs with 

NATO forces. In 1977, one rifle 

company each from New York’s 42nd 

Infantry Division and Massachusetts’s 

26th Infantry Division traveled to South 

Wales for annual training with the British 

Territorial Army. Meanwhile, other ARNG units trained overseas outside the NATO 

region. Hawaii infantrymen flew to Australia for training, Puerto Rican Guardsmen 

hacked their way through Panamanian jungles, and detachments from the 19th SF Group 

deployed to Korea. In 1976, 2,400 Guardsmen participated in overseas training 

exercises. (27) 

ARNG participation in major exercises focused largely on the defense of Central 

Europe. Beginning in the mid-1970s, senior command and staff officers from ARNG 

high priority units regularly visited Army units and potential battlefields in Europe. The 

tours familiarized Guardsmen with the tactical and logistical plans of active units in 

Europe and allowed Guard commanders to study the terrain of their designated defensive 

sectors. The real thrust of European training became the annual Return of Forces to 

Germany (REFORGER) exercises in which Regular and ARNG units flew to Europe, 

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Army National Guard History

drew equipment from pre-positioned stocks, and participated in large maneuvers. 

REFORGER exercises trained ARNG leaders in mobilization and deployment procedures 

under realistic and stressful conditions and familiarized all soldiers with NATO 

operations. In 1980, fourteen ARNG units participated in REFORGER, including South 

Carolina’s 3-178th Field Artillery, the first, complete ARNG battalion to deploy directly 

from home armories to West Germany. That same year, 6,500 Guardsmen in seventythree units deployed overseas for training. (26) 

One of the Army’s most beneficial Total Force initiatives began in 1979 with the 

CAPSTONE Program. The Army identified all units required to fulfill wartime missions 

in the overseas theaters and to support full mobilization in CONUS and then aligned 

ARNG units with an appropriate Army headquarters. For ARNG commanders at all 

levels, their CAPSTONE alignment provided the basis for the development of training 

and planning associations with an active duty unit they would serve with in wartime. The 

CAPSTONE Program produced important results. First, ARNG units received a valid, 

wartime mission. Second, small unit commanders were able to direct their training 

toward a specific, tangible mission. For most Guardsmen, the CAPSTONE Program 

allowed detailed preparations for a defensive, mechanized war in Europe. But starting in 

1980, several ARNG units received notice of their CAPSTONE alignment to the newly 

formed Rapid Deployment Force, a major joint headquarters responsible for U.S. military 

operations in Southwest Asia. For the first time, Guardsmen prepared for a war in the 

Middle East, a prospect that must have seemed remote at the time. (27) 

In conjunction with the CAPSTONE Program, the Army developed detailed 

mobilization schedules for the overseas theaters. ARNG units appeared on classified 

deployment schedules for the first time in 1979. The schedules provided ARNG 

commanders with detailed, specific timelines that outlined the days required for 

mobilization, deployment from ports of embarkation, drawing of equipment from prepositioned stocks, and the expected date of availability for combat. Airlift and sealift 

were planned to quickly move CONUS based Regular and ARNG divisions to Europe to 

help defeat a Soviet offensive. With deployment dates that followed shortly after 

mobilization, Guard commanders made every effort to conduct realistic training toward 

the survival and early success of their units in a European war. (28) 

The new emphasis on short deployment schedules caused a reappraisal of the role 

of the States in a large, federal mobilization. A major reorganization of the State 

headquarters commenced in 1978 that placed more emphasis on the mobilization function 

of the AGs. The AGs received more resources that allowed them to control and to 

support mobilized ARNG units moving from local armories to federal mobilization 

stations or ports of embarkation. In 1980, mobilization exercises in various States 

evaluated the capabilities and effectiveness of the State headquarters to act as a 

mobilization asset. (29) 

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Army National Guard History

Other Important Developments in the 1970s 

A long-term, political legacy of the Vietnam War came with the enactment of the 

War Powers Act of 1973. Concerned that an excess of presidential power might one day 

plunge the country into another bloody, unpopular war, the law required congressional 

approval of troop deployments abroad in combat situations within sixty days of 

commitment. The act sparked an ongoing debate over the exercise of presidential power 

during national emergencies. Concerned it had overly restricted the president’s power to 

react quickly in a major crisis, Congress passed a new statute in 1976 giving the president 

authority to callup a limited number of Guardsmen and Reservists for short periods 

without congressional approval. In it final form, Section 673b authorized the 

mobilization of 200,000 National Guard and Reserve personnel for up to 180 days. (30) 

The era of Total Force Policy brought a number of important changes to the NGB 

command structure. In 1970, an adjustment of responsibilities and offices between the 

NGB staff and the Army and Air Divisions occurred. A new organization emerged 

consisting of a joint NGB headquarters with separate Army and Air National Guard 

Directorates. The major general responsible for the operations of the ARNG Directorate 

was designated as the Director, ARNG (DARNG). Increased reliance on the Guard 

brought more responsibility to the position of CNGB, and in 1978, DOD elevated the 

position to three stars, the same rank held by the principle general officers on the Army 

and Air Force Staffs. Lt. Gen. LaVern E. Weber, the former AG of Oklahoma, was the 

first CNGB to wear the new rank. (Another Oklahoman, Raymond S. McLain, had been 

the first Guardsman ever promoted to lieutenant general in June 1945.) The National 

Guard expanded across the country as well, adding new jurisdictions in the U.S. Virgin 

Islands in 1973 and in Guam in 1981. (31) 

The States believed their full-time technician force needed more training, and 

NGB searched for a suitable site for a new, centrally located, national training facility. 

Arkansas agreed to provide the land and partial funding for construction, and in 1975 the 

National Guard Professional Education Center opened at Camp Robinson in North Little 

Rock, remaining under the direct control of NGB. Within two years, the Professional 

Education Center became the central training facility for technicians with living 

accommodations for 240 students. In subsequent years, the center grew in size and 

prominence to become the ARNG’s most important instructional and conference facility, 

serving both full-time and traditional Guardsmen. (32) 

The inactivation of many Regular Army aviation units after Vietnam resulted in 

the creation of a robust ARNG aviation force. Helicopters, pilots, and aviation units too 

expensive to retain on active duty found a natural home in the Guard. In 1971 alone, a 

total of 320 helicopters flowed into the Guard, including the UH-1 “Huey,” the AH-1 

“Cobra,” and the CH-54 “Flying Crane,” and the ARNG aircraft inventory jumped to 

1,218 airframes. Officer and warrant officer pilots leaving active duty who wanted to 

maintain their flight certification flocked to the Guard. In 1972, the number of ARNG 

aviators surged from 2,826 to 3,617, and the Guard’s aircraft inventory expanded 

dramatically to 1,542 helicopters and 166 fixed wing aircraft. A separate staff group 

246 
Army National Guard History

became necessary to manage aviation assets, and in 1974, an Aviation Division appeared 

in the ARNG Directorate. In addition to managing pilots and aircraft, the division 

supervised safety, training, and maintenance programs. By 1980, nearly 30 percent of the 

Army’s total aviation assets were in the ARNG. (33) 

A second, organized group of Guardsmen added their voice to the public 

discussion of Guard issues in 1972 with the creation of the Enlisted Association of the 

National Guard of the United States (EANGUS). Two years earlier, a group of National 

Guard senior enlisted soldiers and airmen had met in South Dakota to create an 

organization that they hoped would make the National Guard a more influential arm of 

national defense by improving the status, welfare, and professionalism of the enlisted 

ranks. EANGUS received its charter as a national organization in 1972, established a 

headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia and eventually published an association magazine. 

In conjunction with NGAUS, EANGUS pushed legislation to increase the pay and 

benefits of enlisted soldiers and airmen while advocating better equipment, weapons, and 

facilities for all Guardsmen. Though serious proposals have been made to merge 

NGAUS and EANGUS, the two organizations remain separate advocates for the National 

Guard’s well being. (34) 

The decade of the 1970s saw the loss of the National Guard’s most visible 

supporters and the rise of its newest advocate. In December 1972, President Truman 

passed away. Since his entry into the Missouri National Guard in 1905, Truman had 

been a keen supporter of the National Guard and of citizen-soldiers. In an irony of 

history, the National Guard lost two of its principal advocates within days of one another. 

Ellard Walsh died at age eighty-eight on August 31,1975, and less than a week later, 

Milton Reckord passed away in Baltimore at the venerable age of ninety-one. But the 

National Guard did not have to wait long for a new champion. Congressman G.V. 

“Sonny” Montgomery of Mississippi became the Guard’s staunchest advocate on Capitol 

Hill. (35) 

The Reagan Buildup 

President Ronald Reagan entered office in January 1981 promising to restore 

national power and prestige to a country that had suffered significant social, political, 

economic, and military setbacks during the 1970s. Reagan came to power riding the crest 

of a conservative movement that emphasized increased defense spending, reductions in 

wasteful and unnecessary domestic programs, and tax cuts. Concerned over Soviet 

advances in the Middle East, Africa, and Central America, the Reagan Administration 

was determined to square off against the Soviets. In numerous speeches, Reagan spoke 

of an “evil empire” that was the “focus of evil in the modern world.” (36) 

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presided over the nation’s largest, 

peacetime military buildup. For his CJCS, President Reagan selected Army General John 

W. Vessey, Jr., a former Guardsman. General Vessey had enlisted in the Minnesota 

National Guard in May 1939 and was ordered to active duty in February 1941. He had 

served with the 34th Infantry Division throughout the campaigns in the Mediterranean and 

247 
Army National Guard History

was a first sergeant when he received a battlefield commission on May 6, 1944 at the 

Anzio beachhead in Italy. Spending during the Reagan Buildup even exceeded 

expenditures during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In its first five years in office, the 

Reagan Administration spent nearly $1 trillion on defense, an amount that almost equaled 

the combined defense budgets under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. The Pentagon’s 

budget doubled in five years, from $143.9 billion in 1980 to $294.7 billion in 1985. The 

clear bulk of the surge in defense spending went to the modernization and expansion of a 

whole range of large nuclear programs including the MX missile, the Trident submarine 

and the resurrection of the B-1 bomber. The balance of buildup dollars went to the 

military services’ personnel, operations, and modernization accounts. On March 23, 

1983, President Reagan surprised the nation with the announcement of his intention to 

develop and deploy a comprehensive defense against strategic nuclear missiles. Dubbed 

“Star Wars” by the media, Secretary Weinberger organized various missile defense 

programs into the Strategic Defense Initiative that became the most distinctive and 

innovative defense program of the Reagan years. (37) 

The Reagan Buildup began at a time when the U.S. military had deteriorated 

badly as a result of the turbulent and austere 1970s. The debacle at “Desert One” in Iran 

in April 1980, in which a raid to free American hostages in Tehran unraveled in its early 

stages, highlighted the need for renewal and reform in the military. The Army chief of 

staff, General Edward C. Meyer, spoke of a “hollow Army” in which inadequate 

logistical and support units backed up undermanned combat formations. The Army 

manned divisions in CONUS at low levels to ensure that forward deployed units had a 

full complement of soldiers. In 1981, General Meyer told Congress that fully two-thirds 

of the Army's logistical capabilities were in the reserve components and that the Regular 

Army could not sustain itself without Guardsmen and Reservists who would certainly see 

early service in both large and small contingencies. The invasion of Grenada in October 

1983 reflected improvements in combat forces but revealed some of the same 

shortcomings in intelligence, communications, and joint service planning that had 

doomed the Iranian rescue mission. (38) 

Despite its apparent shortcomings, President Reagan called on the Army to 

implement a new national security strategy that went far beyond the defense of Western 

Europe. The Reagan Administration advocated a comprehensive strategy for meeting 

head-on the “evil empire’s” multiple threats. In addition to the continued defense of 

NATO, the Army was expected to counter and defeat communist threats in the Middle 

East, Africa, and Central America. To enhance America’s global reach, DOD created the 

U.S. Central Command in January 1983. From its headquarters at MacDill Air Force 

base in Tampa, Florida, Central Command had responsibility for U.S. joint operations in 

the Middle East. Army planners retooled their strategic thinking and soon developed a 

new strategic paradigm that described a “spectrum of conflict” ranging from highintensity to low-intensity warfare. Nuclear warfare and large conventional battles posed 

the most serious threats while low-intensity conflict consisted of guerilla operations. The 

Army’s strategic thinking shifted from a single focus on the defense of Western Europe 

to countering a broader range of threats. Military leaders began to develop the doctrine, 

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forces, and weapons required to conduct operations along the entire spectrum of conflict. 

(39) 

The Army’s new doctrine for warfare in the 1980s became known as AirLand 

Battle. Two new concepts were key: the attack of enemy forces in depth and the 

synchronization of maximum combat power from all the military services into a 

coordinated, joint effort. To train armor and mechanized units in the tactics of AirLand 

Battle, the Army established the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California 

in 1983. Formerly an ARNG training installation, the Guard had returned Fort Irwin to 

the Army’s control in 1981. The arid, open spaces of the Mojave Desert permitted heavy 

combat battalions to train in realistic tactical situations against a highly proficient 

opposing force using Soviet style weapons and equipment. Sophisticated laser 

equipment, computer monitoring systems and massive live-fire exercises gave soldiers a 

“near combat” experience. By 1985 as many as twenty-eight tank and mechanized 

infantry battalions trained each year at the NTC. (40) 

Changes in the Army’s force structure occurred concurrently with the advent of 

new doctrine and tactics. A series of studies called “Army 86” examined the best ways to 

capitalize on new technology and weapons. Significant structural changes occurred in 

the Army’s heavy divisions, corps and at levels above the corps. The Army’s senior 

leadership determined that insufficient forces were available to meet communist threats 

across the entire spectrum of conflict. Prior emphasis on fighting the Soviet blitzkrieg in 

Europe had prevented the creation of lighter forces to confront communist insurgencies 

elsewhere. Under the leadership of Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr., 

the Army bolstered its SF and infantry units. Two new light infantry divisions brought 

the total number of divisions on active duty to eighteen. The 10th Mountain Division 

(Light) became active at Fort Drum, New York in 1985 and the following year the 6th 

Infantry Division (Light) was created at Fort Richardson, Alaska. The light infantry 

divisions were austere, air-transportable organizations capable of early commitment to 

threatening situations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. (41) 

By the late 1980s, the fruits of the Reagan Buildup were evident throughout the 

Army. A whole host of modernization programs initiated in the 1970s came to fruition 

and provided the means for implementing AirLand Battle. Increased defense spending 

accelerated the fielding and development of five, key weapons systems: the M-1 Abrams 

tank; the M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle; the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter; the UH-60 

Blackhawk utility helicopter; and the Patriot air defense system. Guided by the tenets of 

AirLand Battle, Army units trained on sophisticated, high-technology weaponry aided by 

training devices based on lasers and computer chips that added greater realism to field 

exercises. Significant changes in force structure permitted the maximum use of more 

destructive weapons systems requiring fewer numbers of operators. To meet the 

challenge of low-intensity conflict, SF and light infantrymen were available for rapid air 

transport to the world’s hot spots. The U.S. military’s swift and successful invasion of 

Panama in December 1989 demonstrated the efficacy of the Army’s internal reforms and 

improvements in joint operations made during the 1980s. (42) 

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The ARNG and the Reagan Buildup 

During the Reagan years, the ARNG had a firm supporter in John O. Marsh, Jr., 

the Secretary of the Army. He had enlisted in the Army as a private during World War 

II, received an officer’s commission in 1945, and served with American occupation 

forces in Germany from 1945-1947. In 1951, Marsh joined the Virginia ARNG, and for 

the next twenty-five years, served in various positions with the 116th Infantry, the 29th 

Division and State headquarters. Starting in 1963, he served four terms in the U.S. House 

of Representatives. While in Congress, Marsh served a thirty-day, voluntary tour of 

active duty in Vietnam as a major. After his service in the House, he was appointed to 

high positions in the Executive Branch, culminating in August 1974 with his appointment 

as Counselor with cabinet rank to President Gerald R. Ford. In January 1981, Marsh took 

the oath as Secretary of the Army. He instituted the concept of annual themes based on 

traditional, military values to motivate and inspire soldiers as the Army sought to heal the 

wounds of Vietnam and the austere 1970s. Marsh encouraged expansion and 

improvements in the ARNG during the Reagan Buildup. When he retired as Secretary of 

the Army in August 1989, Marsh’s tenure was the longest of any Secretary of the Army 

or Secretary of War in American history. (43) 

The most important gains in the ARNG during the Reagan years came in 

Though barred by law from serving in direct combat positions, by the 1980s women served in 

most ARNG combat support roles. Members of the Support Battalion, 116th Infantry Brigade of 

the Virginia ARNG prepare for training in the early 1980s. (Virginia National Guard Historical 

Collection) 

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manpower. From a low of 346,974 Guardsmen in 1979, ARNG strength grew steadily 

throughout the 1980s. Increased recruiting budgets, more generous incentive programs, 

flexible enlistment options, and a thoroughly professional recruiting force promoted 

volunteerism. Recruiters and commanders agreed that a more favorable recruiting 

climate existed due to society’s improved views on the military and a nationwide 

resurgence in patriotism. A centerpiece of the recruiting effort was the Montgomery G.I. 

Bill that became law in 1987 after a three-year test program. Sponsored by Sonny 

Montgomery and named in his honor, the bill provided partial college funding to high 

school graduates who enlisted in the military for six years and successfully completed 

their initial active duty training. Congressman Montgomery insisted that the benefits 

package should apply to the reserve components as well, and by the end of the decade, 

nearly 58,000 Guardsmen had utilized the Montgomery G.I. Bill. ARNG strength levels 

grew until reaching an historic, peacetime high in 1989 of 456,960 soldiers. Never 

before had so many Guardsmen filled the ranks. Across the country, Guardsman 

discussed the possibility of the ARNG growing to 500,000 soldiers. (44) 

The increasing presence of minorities explains much of the Guard’s growth. At 

the close of the 1980s, the ARNG’s minority strength stood at 111,973 soldiers, nearly 

one-quarter of the force. African-American participation doubled during the Reagan 

years, and by 1989, 75,000 black Guardsmen comprised over 16 percent of the force. 

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., Army Chief of Staff Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr. and 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau Lt. Gen. Emmett H. Walker, Jr. preside over the activation 

ceremony of the 29th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia on September 30, 1985. 

(Virginia National Guard Historical Collection) 

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Army National Guard History

Female membership grew precipitously early in the decade but reached a plateau in 1985. 

In an organization composed largely of combat units in which females were not 

authorized to serve, women faced limited opportunities for assignments and promotions. 

Positions for women eventually opened in more fields including vehicle operators, 

helicopter crew chiefs, and staff positions in field artillery units. By 1989, nearly 30,000 

female soldiers comprised over 6 percent of the ARNG. (45) 

Two innovative personnel programs began during the manpower increases of the 

1980s. The Key Personnel Upgrade Program provided selected Guard officers and 

enlisted soldiers in leadership positions the opportunity to train closely with an active 

duty counterpart during field training and command post exercises. Guardsmen learned 

improved military skills that added to the readiness of their units. From modest 

beginnings in 1981, the program grew steadily, and by 1987, over 7,500 Guardsmen on 

active duty for training participated in fourteen major exercises in thirteen different 

countries while another 2,900 accompanied Regular units to the NTC. The ARNG 

placed experienced officers, warrant officers and enlisted soldiers on active, Federal 

service starting in 1981 under the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program. Full-time 

AGR soldiers with experience, expertise, and knowledge of ARNG programs and 

policies served as advisors, coordinators, and staff officers in the Pentagon and at major 

Army installations throughout CONUS and overseas. By 1986, 1,266 AGRs were 

serving at Army installations worldwide. (46) 

With the growth in ARNG manpower came an increase in units. The greatest 

boon to the Guard’s force structure came with the addition of two new divisions. To add 

depth to the strategic reserve of combat heavy forces, the ARNG reactivated the 35th 

Infantry Division (Mechanized) in ceremonies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on August 

25, 1984. The Santa Fe Division drew its units from five states: Kansas, Nebraska, 

Kentucky, Colorado, and Missouri. As part of General Wickham’s initiative to increase 

the number of light infantry forces, the ARNG received authority to raise a light infantry 

division. On September 30, 1985, the 29th Infantry Division (Light) was restored to the 

ARNG’s force structure during ceremonies at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The “Blue and 

Gray” Division remained true to its World War II heritage by drawing its units from 

Virginia and Maryland and by reviving its distinctive shoulder patch and traditional 

nickname. The addition of the 35th and 29th Divisions gave the ARNG a total of ten 

combat divisions. (47) 

The Reagan Buildup also saw significant increases in the Roundout Program as 

the Army placed greater reliance on ARNG combat units. In 1984, Mississippi’s 155th 

Armored Brigade became a Roundout to the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood. Two 

years later, the ARNG assigned New York’s 27th Infantry Brigade as Roundout to the 

new 10th Mountain Division. Independent ARNG tank and mechanized infantry 

battalions from Minnesota, North Carolina, Alabama, and Texas became separate 

Roundout battalions to active, heavy divisions in CONUS. In 1989, Alaska’s 6-297 

Infantry Battalion (Light) became part of the 6th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort 

Richardson. The following year, the Army asked the ARNG for a group of units to 

Roundout the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado. The newly 

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Army National Guard History

organized 116th Cavalry Brigade, with units in Idaho, Oregon, and Nevada, and North 

Carolina’s 2-120th Infantry became the last units to achieve Roundout status under the 

Total Force Policy. The Roundout Program flourished in the 1980s. The Commanding 

General of the 5th Infantry Division stated in 1987 that he would take Louisiana’s 256th 

Brigade to war “tomorrow, if necessary.” At Fort Stewart, then Maj. Gen. H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf said of the Georgia ARNG’s 48th Brigade: “Roundout is a fact of life...I 

expect them to fight alongside us...They are, in fact, combat ready.” (48) 

With President Reagan’s increased defense budgets, the ARNG’s equipment 

posture improved significantly, both in quantity and quality. The Army initiated a new 

equipping policy that changed the face of the ARNG; Roundout units would receive the 

same, new modern equipment as their active divisions. The first M-1 tanks appeared in 

the ARNG in 1983, going to North Carolina’s 1-252 Armor, a separate Roundout 

battalion to the 2d Armored Division. In 1985 alone, Roundout units received 180 M-1 

Abrams tanks, sixty-four M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, advanced artillery computers 

and radars, and large numbers of new, light tactical vehicles and heavy trucks. The 

steady flow of new equipment into Roundout brigades made displaced equipment 

available to upgrade the weapons and equipment of lower priority units. (49) 

The combined efforts of NGAUS, EANGUS, and AGAUS raised concerns in 

Congress over ARNG equipping. Starting in 1983, Congress authorized funding in a 

Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP) for the specific purchase of National Guard 

weapons and equipment. The first year’s funding of $113.9 million went toward the 

purchase of heavy trucks, tracked vehicles, radios, and aircraft. DPP funding increased 

throughout the Reagan years, reaching a level of $248 million by 1989. An equipping 

record was set in 1988 when the ARNG received a total of $2.7 billion in new, displaced 

and refurbished equipment. By the end of the decade, the Apache and Blackhawk 

helicopters and the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) had been added to the 

inventory. Commanders believed that the ARNG was finally eliminating the equipment 

shortfalls that had dogged their units since the early 1970s. (50) 

Increased participation in overseas deployments became the foundation of ARNG 

training in the 1980s. The ARNG’s role in REFORGER increased each year. In 1981, 

Indiana’s 2-152d Infantry was the first ARNG maneuver unit to go to REFORGER. Two 

years later, the 1-198th Armor from Mississippi’s 155th Armored Brigade deployed with 

the 1st Cavalry Division to Germany, drew prepositioned equipment and conducted 

extensive maneuvers. The Guard’s greatest participation in REFORGER occurred in 

1986 when the entire 32d Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Wisconsin deployed to 

Germany with all of its equipment and personnel. North Carolina’s 30th Infantry Brigade 

(Mechanized) deployed a task force to Italy in 1983 for NATO exercises, the first time a 

Guard unit had shipped its equipment overseas for training. Starting in 1980, the U.S. 

began BRIGHT STAR exercises, the biennial deployment of forces to Egypt and the 

Sudan. Two years later, the first Guardsmen went to the Middle East for training and felt 

the sand, heat, and wind of the Egyptian desert. In the Pacific, Guardsmen deployed to 

Korea on TEAM SPIRIT, an annual exercise designed to test America’s response to the 

sudden outbreak of war in Asia. An infantry task force from California’s 40th Division 

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Army National Guard History

Engineers construct a bridge in Central America in the 1980s as part of the ARNG’s deployments 

to the region. (National Guard Education Foundation) 

deployed to Korea in 1986 as part of TEAM SPIRIT, marking the Sunshine Division’s 

first return since the end of the Korean War. (51) 

ARNG soldiers experienced the best training during tough, realistic exercises at 

the NTC. The first Guard combat unit to train at Fort Irwin was a Roundout battalion, 

Georgia’s 1-108th Armor, which went to the NTC with the 24th Infantry Division in 

September 1983. The following spring another Roundout battalion, Minnesota’s 2-136th 

Infantry, went to the NTC with Regulars from the 1st Infantry Division. Private First 

Class Daren Wickline, a member of the 2-136th Infantry and a farmer from Verges, 

Minnesota, summed up the attitudes of Guardsmen training at Fort Irwin: “It was as close 

as you can get to real combat without actually being shot at.” In 1985, 2,700 Guardsmen 

in five Roundout battalions went to the NTC with their parent divisions. Later that year, 

the ARNG Directorate published a training schedule that required all Roundout units to 

rotate through Fort Irwin once every three years. In August 1987, Louisiana’s 256th 

Brigade became the first ARNG unit to act as the controlling headquarters during an NTC 

rotation. Dozens of ARNG support units received valuable training at Fort Irwin while 

providing logistical, maintenance, and transportation services to field exercises and the 

installation. (52) 

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Army National Guard History

The Perpich Lawsuit 

Beginning in 1983, the ARNG participated in extensive training and humanitarian 

support missions in Central America. Under the auspices of the U.S. Southern 

Command, ARNG engineers began a series of road building and repair exercises in 

Panama in conjunction with active Army units and the Panama Defense Force. In 1984, 

a combined task force of Puerto Rico, Florida, and Louisiana Guardsmen as well as U.S. 

Army and Panamanian soldiers constructed a nine-mile gravel road in the interior of 

Panama. (53) 

Training exercises in Central America soon changed dramatically in size and 

scope. The road building program, dubbed Fuertes Caminos or “Blazing Trails,” became 

larger and more ambitious. Between January and May 1985, battalions of Guard, 

Regular and Panamanian engineers repaired and constructed another seventeen-mile 

section of road on the western coast of the Azuero Peninsula, 150 miles from the Panama 

Canal. In addition to engineer activities, the 10,000 Guardsmen who deployed to Panama 

in 1985 repaired school buildings, distributed clothing and supplies, and provided 

medical assistance. ARNG medical units from North Carolina and Illinois deployed to 

Honduras and Ecuador to train and to provide health care. ARNG combat units also 

headed to Central America. A Texas armored task force trained with the Honduran Army 

and conducted anti-armor exercises only three miles from Nicaragua’s border. At the 

same time, Illinois’ 2-132d Field Artillery worked with the Hondurans to organize 

several joint, live fire exercises. (54) 

Political leaders opposed to the Reagan Administration’s policy of confrontation 

with the Soviet Union and its surrogates raised eyebrows at the use of ARNG troops in 

Central America. Though the Pentagon argued that the deployments trained Guardsmen 

to perform difficult engineering feats in mountains and jungles and provided 

humanitarian aid to important allies in the region, several Governors objected. 

Opponents believed that the Guard’s presence was little more than a thinly veiled threat 

of American power against authoritarian regimes in Central America, especially against 

the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. These Governors threatened to withhold their consent to 

Guardsmen training in the region. Hoping to avert a showdown over the deployments, 

Congressman Sonny Montgomery attached an important amendment to the 1986 Defense 

Authorization Act. The “Montgomery Amendment” declared that the consent of a 

Governor to call Guardsmen to active duty training might not be withheld with regard to 

active duty outside the United States “because of any objection to the location, purpose, 

type or schedule of such active duty.” (55) 

A three-year court battle over the rights of the Governors to deny their consent to 

overseas National Guard training soon ensued. After Minnesota Guardsmen returned 

from training in Central America in early 1987, Governor Rudy Perpich of Minnesota 

and six other Governors filed suit against DOD. Perpich argued that the Montgomery 

Amendment was unconstitutional and that the Governors had the authority to withhold 

consent to peacetime Guard training conducted overseas. After a series of decisions and 

appeals within the 8th U.S. Circuit Court, the full court in June 1989 upheld the 

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Army National Guard History

Montgomery Amendment and decided that the Constitution did not require gubernatorial 

consent for National Guard training. Governor Perpich appealed the decision to the U.S. 

Supreme Court who rendered a final ruling on June 11, 1990. The court decided that the 

Montgomery Amendment was constitutional and that the authority of the States to train 

the militia did not limit the Army’s authority to train personnel on federal active duty as 

reserves of the Army. However, the court did recognize the power of the Governors to 

withhold consent to National Guard active duty training whenever a State had an 

immediate need for the Guard’s presence during an emergency. (56) 

The End of the Cold War 

The stage was set for dramatic changes in the international order when Mikhail 

Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. A visionary and a progressive, 

Gorbachev realized the Soviet Union had forfeited its economic power and influence in 

order to build a massive military machine. In Gorbachev’s mind, the cost of maintaining 

and modernizing the Soviet military had become prohibitive, and he set the Soviet Union 

on a new course of reform and renewal. A lessening of tensions between East and West 

ensued as the Soviets turned away from international adventures to concentrate on 

domestic social and economic reforms. At the same time, centralized control over the 

Soviet Empire weakened. 

President George H. W. Bush entered office in January 1989, and in his inaugural 

address, he spoke of a “new breeze of freedom” blowing around the world. By the end of 

1989, the breeze had swelled into a tremendous hurricane that swept away most visages 

of the Cold War. The greatest changes came in eastern Europe where countries threw off 

the yokes of communism and Soviet control. The most dramatic developments came in 

October and early November when the East German government collapsed and the Berlin 

Wall fell. By the end of the year, a violent revolution in Romania and free elections in 

Czechoslovakia had ushered in new governments. To the delight of New Year’s revelers 

ringing in a new decade on January 1, 1990, the protracted Cold War was finally over. 

In the United States, cuts in the growth of defense spending had started as early as 

1987, but relief over the end of the Cold War produced quick calls for even deeper cuts. 

The American people and many in Congress anticipated a “peace dividend,” the expected 

savings from defense cutbacks. President Bush’s Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney, 

ordered the military services to formulate plans for cutting $180 billion from the 

Pentagon’s multi-year budget. Despite the president’s warnings that the world situation 

still posed significant threats, public opinion demanded reductions in defense and 

increased spending for social programs. In public opinion polls in 1990, defense ranked 

last on the public's list of the ten most important spending priorities. Bowing to public 

pressure, the Bush Administration made plans for a 25 percent reduction in military 

forces across the board. (57) 

The post-Cold War demobilization began with a vengeance. Planned cuts in 

Army forces were deep and widespread. Secretary Cheney recommended that the 

number of Army divisions be reduced from twenty-eight to eighteen by 1995 with 

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Army National Guard History

commensurate cuts in Regular, ARNG, USAR and Army civilian personnel. The Army 

developed and set in motion an extensive plan dubbed “Quicksilver” that outlined an 

orderly progression of budget and personnel cuts throughout the 1990s. DOD directed 

the Army to lose 20,000 active duty soldiers in 1990 alone, thus bringing the Regular 

Army down to 744,169 soldiers, the lowest manning level since before the Korean War. 

To save money, the Army cancelled REFORGER for the first time since its inception in 

1966. (58) 

Even before budget cuts developed as a serious threat, the National Guard 

addressed readiness problems that appeared in the late 1980s by implementing the largest 

unit reorganizations since 1968. ARNG units concentrated in the northeast had difficulty 

meeting required manning levels. The demographic recruiting pool of available young 

men and women had shifted from the northeast to the “Sunbelt,” a vaguely defined tier of 

southern and southwestern States enjoying economic prosperity that stretched from the 

Carolinas, through the Deep South, across Texas and into Arizona. The 26th Infantry 

Division (Massachusetts and Connecticut) and the 50th Armored Division (New Jersey 

and Vermont) had particular problems in maintaining strength. In 1988, the ARNG 

transferred a brigade of the 50th Armored Division from Vermont to Texas, inactivated a 

brigade of the 26th Division in Massachusetts and realigned the brigades of both 

divisions in an effort to improve their personnel posture. Concerned that further cuts in 

the northeast might be needed, NGB developed a plan for eliminating the majority of the 

50th and 26th Divisions and integrating the remaining units into a single, more robust 

division stationed in the northeast. (62) 

After reaching an all time, historic peak of 456,980 soldiers in 1989, the Guard 

braced for personnel cuts. In January 1990, the Army notified the ARNG that a cut of 

10,000 soldiers over the next nine months was required to meet budget targets. For the 

first time since 1970, recruiters abandoned the practice of unconstrained growth and 

targeted their efforts on only the very best recruits. At the same time, ARNG 

commanders improved readiness by selectively retaining only their best soldiers. The 

ARNG Directorate assigned reduced strength targets to each State that had to be met by 

September 30, 1990. However, disturbing news suddenly interrupted deliberations in the 

Pentagon over defense cuts. On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi Army invaded the tiny 

kingdom of Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf. Within days, Iraqi soldiers took up 

positions from which they could threaten the world’s main petroleum reserves just across 

the border in Saudi Arabia. (60) 

Conclusions 

The era of Total Force Policy caused the significant transformation of the ARNG 

from a strategic reserve, mobilization force to a combat ready organization focused on 

early deployment. Prior to 1970, the Guard had been adequately prepared to carry out its 

role in large, deliberate mobilizations followed by eventual deployment to a war zone. 

By the end of the Reagan Buildup, the ARNG was a combat-ready, reserve force 

immediately available for deployment to hot spots around the globe. Improvements in 

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training, equipment, and personnel gave the Guard the wherewithal to participate fully in 

the nation’s first line of defense. 

A key result of the Total Force Policy was the development of closer, more 

functional ties between the Regular Army and the ARNG. The Roundout Program built 

the strongest possible ties between Regulars and citizen-soldiers. The Army’s equipping 

policies put Roundout units on an equal footing with their parent, active divisions. 

Training opportunities at the NTC placed active and Roundout battalions together in the 

toughest, most realistic training exercises possible. The CAPSTONE Program imparted 

Guardsmen with a renewed sense of purpose by giving them a clearly defined, wartime 

mission and direct ties to active units they would serve beside in a future conflict. 

Overseas training exercises built confidence as Guardsmen demonstrated time after time 

their ability to quickly muster and deploy combat ready units. 

The Total Force Policy’s success in improving the overall capabilities of the 

active Army and the ARNG were readily apparent by the end of the 1980s. Still, 

Regulars and Guardsmen had not yet demonstrated the effectiveness of their newly 

acquired relationships and capabilities in war. The ultimate test of the Total Force Policy 

was to come in the sands of Southwest Asia. 

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Army National Guard History

CHAPTER 8 

The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991 

This victory belongs...to the Regulars, to the Reserves, to the National Guard. This 

victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation has ever known in its 

history. 

President George Bush, Address to 

Congress, March 6, 1991 

Introduction 

Sergeant First Class Palmer Burchstead emerged from the dark, cavernous interior 

of the huge C-141 transport and stepped out onto the bright, hot tarmac of the Riyadh 

airport on the afternoon of August 9, 1990. Moments later, Sergeant First Class Timothy 

Hester joined Burchstead outside the large transport. On their hips were 9-mm. pistols, 

and attached to their web gear were full magazines of pistol ammunition. Not knowing 

what lay ahead on the ground in Saudi Arabia, the soldiers on board the C-141 had 

broken open ammunition boxes and distributed the pistol rounds before landing in 

Riyadh. The two Guardsmen were relieved to be free of the C-141s confined spaces after 

a long, grueling flight from Atlanta, Georgia with only a short refueling stop in Spain. 

Less than forty-eight hours earlier, they had received orders to report immediately to 

Third Army Headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia for rapid deployment to Saudi 

Arabia. The two men were a long way from home; their normal duty station was the 

armory of Headquarters Company, 228th Signal Brigade in Spartanburg, South Carolina 

where both served as full-time AGRs. 

Before long, ninety-four soldiers from Headquarters, U.S. Third Army stood on 

the tarmac and watched as the C-141 crew and Saudi stevedores off-loaded pallets of 

cargo from the transport. On board the airplane was one of the 228th Signal Brigade’s 

single channel tactical satellite sets. The following day, Sergeants Burchstead and Hester 

used their high technology communications equipment to establish a direct line from the 

Saudi Defense Ministry in Riyadh to Third Army Headquarters at Fort McPherson. A 

few days later, the South Carolina Guardsmen deployed north to King Khalid Military 

City where their satellite communications set eventually became part of the most 

elaborate and advanced communications system ever deployed in a theater of war. 

What Sergeants Burchstead and Hester did not know on the afternoon of August 

9, 1990 is that they were the first soldiers of an eventual deployment of over 37,000 

Army Guardsmen to Saudi Arabia. By the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm on 

February 28, 1991, Guard combat, combat support, and combat service support units had 

seen extensive service in the Persian Gulf. Overall, more than 62,000ARNG soldiers 

participated in Operation Desert Shield, the largest National Guard mobilization since the 

Korean War. In addition to the troops deployed to Southwest Asia, another 25,000 

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Army National Guard History

Guardsmen trained and provided support in Europe and CONUS. In all respects, 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm tested the effectiveness of the Total Force 

Policy and the improvements in the Army and the ARNG made during the 1980s. 

The ARNG in 1990 

By nearly all measures, the ARNG in the summer of 1990 had never been in 

better shape. At the beginning of the year, Guard strength in organized units stood at an 

all time high of 456,960 soldiers. The ranks reflected the recruiting policies and 

environment that had emerged since the end of the draft in 1973. Nearly one-quarter of 

the ARNG consisted of minorities. Black soldiers numbered 71,334, or 16 percent of the 

force, while 31,456 female soldiers comprised 7 percent of the ARNG. A combined total 

of 54,621 full-time AGRs and military technicians manned the fifty-four State and 

Territorial headquarters, nearly 2,500 armories, scores of training and maintenance sites 

and represented the Guard at major Army commands world-wide. (1) 

While the ARNG was primarily a combat force, it included a large segment of the 

Army’s total combat support and combat service support units. In Washington, DC, the 

ARNG Directorate acted as the central, controlling headquarters for the allocation and 

distribution of Guard resources. Maj. Gen. Donald Burdick, a Georgia Guardsman, 

served as DARNG. In the States, the majority of Guardsmen manned the ARNG’s major 

combat units that included 10 divisions, 6 Roundout brigades, 14 separate brigades, 2 

ACRs, and 2 SF Groups. In addition, the Guard contained 39 brigade-level headquarters 

that controlled a wide range of combat, combat support, and combat service support 

units. 

In terms of operations and readiness, the ARNG was at peak proficiency. By the 

end of the first half of 1990, thousands of Guardsmen had trained in hundreds of different 

exercises both in CONUS and overseas. During the year, 25,000 ARNG soldiers had 

responded to emergencies in thirty-eight States by providing support to civil authorities 

during 6 civil disturbances, 77 natural disasters and over 200 relief missions. In addition, 

an average of 2,400 Guardsmen per day actively supported law enforcement agencies in 

counter-drug operations. As for its ability to go to war, General Burdick reported that the 

ARNG’s readiness “has never been better.” Even in terms of equipment, the Guard’s 

traditional impediment to readiness, the ARNG was in great condition. Receipt of 

equipment from Army procurement and the DPP Program drove equipment levels to 75 

percent of wartime needs, the highest in the Guard’s history. Overall, nearly 92 percent 

of all units had the minimum, essential equipment required to go to war. Still, the Guard 

remained critically short of wheeled vehicles, radios, and high technology test sets and 

repair equipment in many combat support units. 

Despite the ARNG’s overall excellent condition, a number of deep concerns 

clouded its future. Budget cuts had already curtailed some training exercises, and the 

cancellation of other training events was all but certain. Guard commanders feared that 

shrinking defense budgets would inevitably reverse positive trends in personnel and 

equipment readiness. With the Cold War over, opinions in Congress and DOD were 

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Army National Guard History

divided over the proper role, size, and missions of the reserve components. Early in 

1990, the Army directed the ARNG to plan for force structure cuts as large as 76,000 

soldiers by 1995. However, concerns over long-term problems faded in early August 

when the U.S. military suddenly focused its attention on the very real prospects of a 

major war in the Middle East. 

The Road to War 

Prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Southwest Asia had been in 

turmoil for more than a decade. In 1979, Islamic fundamentalists had overthrown the 

government of Iran and captured American hostages. Later in the year, the Soviet Army 

invaded Afghanistan, starting a brutal, protracted war in which Afghan freedom fighters 

eventually forced a Soviet withdrawal. In 1980, a bloody war of attrition broke out 

between Iran and Iraq that dragged on for eight years and included the use of chemical 

weapons. Near the end of the decade, Iran sought to exert its influence in the region by 

attacking oil tankers in the Persian Gulf shipping lanes with anti-ship missiles. The U.S. 

Navy and other European powers increased their presence in the Persian Gulf. (2) 

The American response to turmoil in Southwest Asia had been swift but not 

decisive. In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan, 

President Jimmy Carter announced a new policy for Southwest Asia. The Carter 

Doctrine declared any invasion in the region to be a threat to America’s vital national 

interests. The U.S. created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, a headquarters 

responsible for military planning in the Persian Gulf region. In January 1983, the Rapid 

Deployment Force became the U.S. Central Command, America’s sixth major 

headquarters responsible for overseas operations. Unlike the other overseas theaters, 

Central Command had no troops stationed in its area of responsibility. The Arab nations 

were willing to accept U.S. equipment and training assistance but balked at a permanent 

American presence on their soil. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf became the Central 

Command commander on November 23, 1988 and began to study likely options for the 

use of American power in the Persian Gulf. During 1990, Schwarzkopf’s staff conducted 

an extensive planning exercise in which Central Command reacted to a major invasion of 

Saudi Arabia by the large armored formations of the Iraqi Army. 

Central Command’s concerns over Iraqi aggression were based on recent 

developments emanating from Baghdad. Saddam Hussein sought to fill the power 

vacuum created in the Persian Gulf region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 

increasing his hold on neighboring oilfields and attacking Kuwait, the Iraqi dictator 

hoped to become the region’s undisputed leader and to relieve his country’s debts by 

raising the price of crude oil. After several threats against Kuwait, the Iraqi Army 

launched its offensive before dawn on August 2, 1990. Over 100,000 troops and 1,000 

tanks overran Kuwait’s meager border defenses and advanced on Kuwait City. Within 

forty-eight hours, Saddam’s forces had occupied the entire country. In the following 

days, Iraqi reinforcements poured into Kuwait to tighten their hold on the country and to 

take up threatening positions along the Saudi border. 

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Army National Guard History

In Washington, DC, President George Bush and his national security advisors 

monitored the developments at the head of the Persian Gulf with deep concern. After 

consultations with senior U.S. defense officials, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia requested 

American assistance in defending his realm. On August 7th, Central Command set into 

motion Operation Desert Shield, the massive buildup of Allied combat power in the 

Persian Gulf. The next day, President Bush publicly announced the commitment of U.S. 

ground troops to Saudi Arabia. Paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division departed 

Fort Bragg immediately, and within seven days, nearly 5,000 soldiers and all of their 

equipment were on the ground and ready to fight. By August 24th, all of the 82d 

Airborne’s parachute battalions had deployed to Southwest Asia. 

To support the lightly armed paratroopers positioned in the desert, Central 

Command issued orders for the rapid deployment of the 101st Airborne and 24th Infantry 

Divisions. The 101st began deployment from Fort Campbell, Kentucky by strategic airlift 

on August 17th, and by the end of the month, half of the division was in defensive 

positions in Saudi Arabia. By early September, two heavy brigades from the 24th 

Division were moving into forward positions in northern Saudi Arabia. By September 

14th, the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Fort Benning, Georgia had arrived in 

the desert to fight as the “Victory” Division’s third brigade. The 24th Division’s 

Roundout unit, Georgia’s 48th Brigade, remained in CONUS awaiting mobilization 

orders. 

The rapid buildup of Allied forces in Saudi Arabia and Saddam Hussein’s 

reinforcement of his army in southern Kuwait and Iraq made a quick resolution to the 

escalating crisis unlikely. To prepare for a protracted military campaign, Central 

Command planners recognized the need for an adequate logistical base in Saudi Arabia 

capable of sustaining and supporting a large, fighting force. The lack of host nation 

support in the desert exacerbated the acute need for additional support units. Before long, 

Central Command realized that the creation of a much-needed logistical system would be 

impossible without the immediate callup of ARNG and USAR units. 

Operation Desert Shield 

On the same day the 82nd Airborne started its deployment to Saudi Arabia, the 

ARNG Directorate began preparations for a major mobilization. A twenty-four hour a 

day operations center opened to coordinate mobilization efforts and to act as an 

information center for the ARNG Directorate and the AGs. On August 7th, the Army 

requested Guard volunteers for active duty. Of foremost concern were Arabic- speaking 

linguists. The ARNG identified fifty-three qualified personnel, and thirteen Arabic 

linguists from Utah’s 142nd Military Intelligence Battalion volunteered immediately. The 

remainder of the Arabic-speaking Guardsmen entered active duty with their units. Other 

specialties in immediate demand included military lawyers, chaplains, and aviation 

support personnel. By September 4th, 171 Guard volunteers were on active duty serving 

in a variety of operational, training, and support positions. By war’s end, over 1,200 

volunteers had contributed to the effort. (3) 

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The Bush Administration chose to take an incremental approach to the reserve 

component callup. The President refused to institute a partial mobilization, which would 

allow up to one million National Guard and Reserve personnel to serve for as long as two 

years. Instead, the White House used the 1976 mobilization authority contained in 

Section 673b, Title 10, U.S. Code that permitted the mobilization of 200,000 reserve 

component personnel for ninety days, renewable for a second ninety days. Any extension 

of service beyond the initial 180 days required congressional approval. Under the 

parameters of Section 673b, DOD had created a predetermined list of 200,000 

Guardsmen and Reservists by type unit from all services for immediate callup. With 

President Bush’s decision on August 8th to send U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia, the Army 

released its portion of the 200,000 list to the ARNG. Staff divisions within the ARNG 

Directorate analyzed the list to determine which specific units were best prepared for 

active duty. (4) 

While the ARNG prepared to mobilize selected units, it took action to keep others 

ready for callup. The ARNG Directorate ordered units scheduled for inactivation due to 

planned force structure cuts to take no further actions until the Army better determined 

the complete requirements for Desert Shield. Other organizations slated for conversion, 

often to a different branch requiring retraining of personnel and turning in old equipment 

for new, were maintained in their existing configuration. Along with the Army, the 

ARNG implemented a “Stop Loss” personnel policy that prevented all soldiers from 

voluntarily leaving the service. DOD cancelled several training exercises to make more 

strategic airlift available for moving troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf and 

redirected training funds to cover the mounting costs of Desert Shield. On September 5th 

the Army cancelled the scheduled NTC rotation of Tennessee’s 278th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment to allow an active unit to train at Fort Irwin. (5) 

On August 22nd, President Bush signed Executive Order No. 12727 authorizing 

DOD to commence the reserve component mobilization. In addition to Central 

Command’s urgent requests for Guard and Reserve units, citizen-soldiers were needed at 

other locations worldwide to replace Regulars heading to the Persian Gulf. However, 

Secretary Cheney’s message of August 23rd to

 the JCS and the military departments 

specified that the ARNG was to provide only combat support and combat service support 

units. No authority was granted for mobilizing ARNG combat units. On August 24th , 

CNGB sent an alert order notifying selected States of the first sixty-nine ARNG units 

identified for mobilization. As in previous major mobilizations, units were federalized in 

increments to insure an orderly transition to active duty. The first nineteen units, 

consisting of 482 personnel from thirteen States, were ordered to active duty on August 

27th. For the first time since March 1970, when soldiers of the 42nd Infantry Division had 

been mobilized to react to a postal workers strike in New York, Guardsmen entered 

active duty. Ironically, a coin toss determined which organization received the honor of 

being the first ARNG unit called to active duty. Two mobilization orders arrived 

simultaneously at the operations center of the Alabama ARNG in the early morning hours 

of August 27th. Realizing the significance of the occasion, the officers on duty flipped a 

coin to determine which unit they would notify first. Thus, Alabama’s 1241st Adjutant 

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Army National Guard History

General Company (Postal) received the first call to duty followed by the 1207th 

Quartermaster Detachment (Water Purification). (6) 

Before the Persian Gulf crisis ended, 62,411 Guardsmen in 398 units saw active 

service. Soldiers from forty-eight States, the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto 

Rico were called to active duty in thirty-six different increments. In the early stages of 

Desert Shield, 129 units mobilized between August 27th and November 17th. As the 

prospects for war increased, the buildup accelerated. The largest increment occurred on 

November 21st, when sixty units were mobilized. Between November 21st and the 

opening of hostilities on January 17, 1991, another 233 units were ordered to active duty. 

Units ranged in size from three-man military history detachments to the 863-man 3-141st 

Infantry (Mechanized) from Texas. A full 97 percent of the units activated met or 

exceeded Army deployment standards. Guardsmen moved promptly from home armories 

to mobilization stations to overseas duty. Over a quarter of all units left CONUS within 

twenty days of callup; two-thirds deployed within forty-five days. (7) 

Despite doubts by some in the press and in the Army, all of the Guard soldiers 

called reported for duty, and 94 percent were immediately available for overseas service. 

Of the 6 percent rejected, most lacked required training or had medical conditions 

ranging from pregnancy to heart problems. Large numbers of Guardsmen with dental 

Delaware’s 736th Supply and Service Battalion processes through a mobilization station during 

Desert Shield prior to deploying to the Persian Gulf in December 1990. (National Guard 

Bureau) 

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Army National Guard History

problems caused serious concerns. Dentists identified nearly 14,000 soldiers as requiring 

dental work in the next thirteen months; however, only two Guardsmen were rejected for 

deployment due to dental problems. (8) 

Starting with the first ARNG units mobilized, a fairly uniform set of activities that 

soldiers had practiced during mobilization exercises took place at home armories. 

Soldiers checked their personnel records, updated wills, and reviewed important pay 

documents. Commanders insured soldiers had all of their personal equipment and 

identified Guardsmen with problems that might prohibit them from serving on active 

duty. Troops packed unit equipment for overseas shipment. While at home station, 

Guard spouses and families learned firsthand of their rights and benefits from Family 

Support officers dispatched from State headquarters. Each State had one or more Family 

Support officers to assist family members in coordinating pay and medical benefits, and 

they gave aid to the families of active duty and USAR service members as well. Desert 

Shield marked the first use of Family Support officers, and they proved a quick remedy in 

most cases. In addition, military lawyers and chaplains addressed family problems. 

Despite the best efforts, pay problems and family issues dogged the mobilization. In 

many cases, Guard and Regular Army administrative systems did not integrate well, and 

spouses often had difficulty resolving pay and medical issues. (9) 

After a short stay of three to five days at home armories, Guardsmen moved to 

designated mobilization stations. Soldiers and equipment most often traveled by military 

convoy, and many Guardsmen headed to mobilization stations aboard leased commercial 

buses. As in past mobilizations, Guard units received rousing farewells from their local 

communities. State and local leaders organized elaborate farewell ceremonies in many 

towns that drew extensive regional and national media coverage. On the day of 

departure, large crowds of well-wishers lined the streets and stood along the major 

highways and interstates heading toward mobilization stations. All cheered, some cried, 

and many waved American flags and sported yellow ribbons to show their support. 

Mobilization stations were usually active duty installations with all of the 

necessary training and support facilities required to certify individual soldiers and units as 

ready for overseas deployment. Soldiers qualified on personal and crew served weapons, 

conducted chemical warfare training and took physical fitness tests. A series of physical 

and dental exams identified soldiers with treatable medical problems before they 

deployed to remote desert locations. A great deal of time was spent preparing vehicles 

and equipment for movement to ports of embarkation and shipment overseas. Most 

vehicles bound for Saudi Arabia were camouflaged with desert sand paint. Small units 

with only light equipment stayed only a few days at mobilization stations. Other units 

waiting for their heavy vehicles and equipment to reach Saudi Arabia by ship remained at 

mobilization stations for up to a month. When troops departed for overseas duty 

assignments, they usually flew from civilian or military airfields closest to their 

mobilization station. Guardsmen boarded military or leased civilian aircraft for long 

flights to new duty stations in either Europe or Saudi Arabia. (10) 

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Some units in the early increments reached their mobilization stations to find that 

the Army had made few preparations for their arrival. The speed and size of the 

mobilization caught some posts unprepared. Despite plans that had been drawn up to 

support large mobilizations during the Cold War, many installations did not have 

adequate housing, bedding, and dining facilities. In part, the shortages were due to 

reduced civilian work forces caused by budget cuts of the late 1980s. Insufficient 

transportation to move Guardsmen from barracks to ranges and training areas was a 

serious problem. While ARNG units normally used their own organic wheeled transport 

to support training, vehicles were often unavailable because they were already enroute 

overseas. Most posts solved the problem by hiring civilian buses. Two significant 

supply problems persisted throughout Desert Shield. Many posts lacked the stocks of 

rifle and machine gun ammunition needed to qualify soldiers on their weapons. The 

Army rushed some additional ammunition to needy posts, but most stockpiles of 

ammunition were already on their way to Saudi Arabia to support training or to constitute 

an ammunition reserve for a ground campaign. Shortages of the desert pattern, 

camouflaged battle dress uniform never eased. Soldiers in the first ARNG units 

mobilized received at least one or two sets of desert uniforms and one pair of desert 

boots. However, troops in later increments served in the desert wearing their normal, 

forest green camouflaged uniforms. Fortunately, the Army had solved most problems by 

early November, just in time for the largest troop callups. (11) 

The scope of Desert Shield changed dramatically on November 5th when 

President Bush signed Executive Order No. 12733 authorizing the mobilization of Guard 

and Reserve combat units for possible use in a ground offensive to eject the Iraqis from 

Kuwait. Throughout the autumn, diplomatic efforts to compel Saddam Hussein to 

withdraw had failed, and by early November, it was clear that the Iraqi Army had no 

intention of leaving Kuwait. In fact, the Iraqis were busy constructing a vast network of 

defensive positions along the Saudi border. Senior military commanders informed 

President Bush that American and Allied troops could not sit in the desert indefinitely. 

The Guard and Reserve units federalized in August were already near the midpoint of the 

180 days of service allowed under Section 673b, and any further service would require 

congressional action. President Bush believed the only way to increase pressure on 

Saddam Hussein was to place a military force into Saudi Arabia capable of credible, 

offensive action. Guardsmen entering active duty after November 5th realized they might 

soon be involved in a shooting war. Between November 21-30th, a total of ninety-nine 

ARNG units entered active federal service, including most of the elements of three 

Roundout brigades. (12) 

Colorado’s 1158th Transportation Detachment (Movement Control) arrived in 

Saudi Arabia on September 9th, the first of 297 ARNG units that eventually served in the 

theater. Other early deploying Guardsmen soon followed, dispersing across the desert to 

perform missions as diverse as logistics, transportation, traffic control, water purification, 

and military police. Kentucky’s 217th Quartermaster Detachment (Water Purification) 

landed on October 9th, and after some quick refresher training, was assigned to a forward 

logistics base where it supplied potable water until returning home in May 1991. 

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Army National Guard History

Virginia’s Headquarters, 1030th Engineer 

Battalion moved to Khobar Towers near 

Dhahran. The towers were a large 

apartment complex that served as a 

permanent barracks for several thousand 

troops and provided additional, temporary 

billeting for units awaiting the arrival of 

equipment by ship. The 1030th kept the 

facilities working, seeing that mess halls 

were properly run and providing all of the 

other amenities necessary to make living 

conditions as comfortable as possible for 

transient troops. (13) 

Guardsmen arriving in the Persian 

Gulf region entered a strange environment 

with alien customs and traditions. Saudi 

Arabia holds the holiest sites in the Muslim 

world, and the government feared an Arab 

backlash against the introduction of western 

influences. One of the earliest problems 

involved the role of women in uniform. Soldiers of the Maryland ARNG arrive in Saudi 

Saudi heritage holds women to the Arabia on a commercial airliner during Desert 

traditional roles of wife and mother, Shield in 1990. (National Guard Bureau) 

requiring women to appear in public 

covered from head to toe except for their eyes and hands. Saudi soldiers were shocked to 

observe American women in positions of authority, working in tee shirts with their arms 

bared and giving orders to men. To prevent a cultural clash, the Army quickly 

established a policy that women in camp could work in their tee shirts, but off-post they 

had to wear headgear and shirts with long sleeves rolled down at all times. Other 

problems centered on the display of the American flag and religious articles. The flying 

of the U.S. flag was initially restricted to American compounds in the major cities, but as 

the threat of war grew closer, the Saudis permitted American units to display their flags 

in the border areas. Many ARNG units carried State flags, and Guardsmen proudly 

displayed their State colors in the Saudi desert for all to see. Under Saudi pressure, the 

outward display of the Bible was forbidden, even though private reading of the Scriptures 

was not prohibited. Christian and Jewish church services were allowed, but could only 

be held in American camps away from the public scrutiny of the Saudi people. Living 

conditions for Guardsmen ranged from air-conditioned quarters in the cities to tents in the 

wind swept desert. But for most Guard troops, their home in Saudi Arabia was a tent. 

Fine, grainy sand filled and caked their clothing, equipment, and personal possessions. 

Though expecting blistering heat and dryness, the chilly, wet Arabian winter and cold, 

desert nights surprised most Americans. As the Allied buildup continued into December 

and January, low clouds and scattered, cold rains dominated the weather pattern. (14) 

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Army National Guard History

During Desert Shield, the nation’s attention remained focused on events in the 

Persian Gulf and the continuing buildup of Allied forces. Little notice was given to those 

101 ARNG units that remained in CONUS or deployed to Europe to replace active forces 

rushing to Saudi Arabia. Sixteen ARNG units, ranging in size from engineer battalions to 

medical detachments, went to Europe to perform a variety of support missions. Of 

particular note was the service of Florida’s 108th Public Affairs Detachment. Sent to 

Turkey, the detachment performed public affairs functions during the post-Desert Storm 

Allied effort to feed Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. The 3,378 Guardsmen who 

deployed to Europe provided valuable but largely unrecognized service for the war effort. 

(15) 

Eighty-five Guard units that remained in CONUS contained a cross section of 

specialties, including medical, transportation, aviation, and military police. These 

support units served on active duty posts performing duties usually done by Regulars. In 

many cases, Guardsmen assisted with the mobilization of other ARNG and USAR units. 

Of the 21,185 mobilized Guardsmen who remained in CONUS during the war, nearly 

13,000 were assigned to three Roundout brigades. (16) 

The ARNG Roundout Brigades 

After the presidential callup of National Guardsmen and Reservists on August 

22nd, Operation Desert Shield intensified greatly. While the Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps received authority to activate combat troops, Secretary Cheney restricted the Army 

reserve component mobilization to only combat support and combat service support 

troops. In the early weeks of Desert Shield, Army divisions deploying to Saudi Arabia 

went without their assigned Roundout brigades. The 24th Division had already deployed 

without Georgia’s 48th Brigade. In early September the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort 

Hood, Texas shipped out to the Persian Gulf with a brigade from the 2d Armored 

Division in lieu of Mississippi’s 155th Armored Brigade. For nearly three months, the 

two Roundout brigades remained at home awaiting orders. (17) 

Over time, DOD and the Army offered four reasons for not mobilizing the 

Roundout brigades. First, the immediate objective of Desert Shield was to deter and 

defend against a possible Iraqi attack. Facing a real threat in Saudi Arabia, the Army 

believed that only active component units were capable of rapidly deploying and facing 

immediate combat. Second, General Schwarzkopf had requested two, full-strength heavy 

divisions in early August. With little time available for the Roundout brigades to join 

their parent divisions, the Army had substituted two active duty brigades. Third, the 

Central Command request for heavy forces had come on August 6th, sixteen days before 

President Bush authorized a reserve component callup. The Army maintained that even 

if they had wanted to deploy the Roundout brigades, no authority existed. Finally, the 

Section 673b mobilization statute allowed Guardsmen to remain on active duty for a 

maximum of 180 days. The Army refused to acknowledge that one of the purposes of 

Section 673b was to provide for a transition to a national mobilization and insisted that 

the six-month utilization period precluded the effective use of Roundout brigades. By the 

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Army National Guard History

time the two brigades could complete their training and deploy, the Army argued, 

Guardsmen would either face demobilization or require congressional approval to extend 

their service. (18) 

By early September, members of Congress, CNGB, and NGAUS were extremely 

concerned over the Roundout brigades. On September 6th, Congressman Les Aspin, the 

powerful chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Sonny 

Montgomery, and two other committee members sent Secretary Cheney a sharp, candid 

letter criticizing the Pentagon’s handling of the brigades. The Congressmen wrote that 

while Capitol Hill had clearly demonstrated its support of the Total Force Policy, DOD’s 

commitment was “far less clear,” and they urged the SECDEF to reconsider the decision 

not to mobilize the brigades. Secretary Cheney replied that his senior military advisors 

had not recommended the brigades’ mobilization and that only Congress could remove 

the 180-day callup limitation imposed by Section 673b. Still, Congressman Montgomery 

kept up the pressure with speeches on the House floor and a series of letters to President 

Bush and the Pentagon. In Saudi Arabia, General Schwarzkopf told CNBG, Lt. Gen. 

John B. Conaway, that activating the brigades was an issue “for the politicians back in 

Washington to figure out” and that what he really needed was more ARNG support units. 

On October 31st, the senior leadership of NGAUS met with Secretary Cheney and made 

an emotional appeal for an immediate, brigade callup. The Defense Secretary explained 

the reasons why the brigades had not been mobilized and indicated he had not ruled out 

their eventual use. (19) 

The fate of the Roundout brigades changed in early November with the 

president’s decision to double the size of American forces in the Persian Gulf. At a press 

conference on November 8th, Secretary Cheney and General Colin L. Powell, chairman of 

the JCS, announced the mobilization of three Roundout brigades. General Powell stated 

that the brigades would undergo extensive training to ensure they were fully combat 

ready, including a rotation at the NTC. In addition to the 48th and 155th Brigades, 

Louisiana’s 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), the Roundout unit to the 5th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, would be called to active duty along with 

the separate Roundout battalions of the 24th Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 5th Infantry 

Divisions. All units would be alerted on November 15th and called to active duty within 

weeks. (20) 

Three factors combined to convince Secretary Cheney and General Powell to 

mobilize the Roundout units. First, when the military mission in the Persian Gulf 

changed from defensive to offensive, the Pentagon needed to increase the number of 

combat troops available to reinforce Central Command in the event of a protracted 

ground war. Second, Desert Shield had severely depleted the U.S. strategic reserve, and 

third, the Roundout brigades were needed in case a second regional crisis developed that 

required U.S. ground troops. Congressional action also relieved concerns over the 180-

day limit on reserve component availability. The 1991 Defense Appropriations Act 

contained language authorizing the president to order reserve component combat units to 

active duty for up to 360 days. When President Bush signed the bill into law on 

November 5th, limits on reserve component usage were all but eliminated. (21) 

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Army National Guard History

In November 1990, Georgia’s 48th Brigade included nearly 4,000 Guardsmen 

under the command of Brig. Gen. William A. Holland. The brigade had undergone 

extensive training in recent years. During 1986-1988, the 48th had modernized to the M1 Abrams and the M-2 Bradley. For years, command post exercises and training with the 

24th Division took place on a regular basis. Since 1983, elements of the 48th had 

participated in four training rotations at the NTC. The most recent rotation had occurred 

in July 1990, only four months prior to mobilization. The commander at the NTC, thenBrig. Gen. Wesley Clarke, who would go on to become Supreme Allied Commander in 

Europe and leader of NATO’s war against Yugoslavia in 1999, declared that the 

Georgians had performed “as well or better than most active component units that have 

come through.” (22) 

During the early stages of Desert Shield, the 48th Brigade anticipated mobilization 

by identifying personnel and equipment shortages and preparing detailed, postmobilization training plans. All tracked vehicles and heavy equipment were transported 

to Fort Stewart. South Carolina’s 1-263rd Armor served as the 24th Division’s separate 

Roundout battalion. The South Carolina battalion established direct communications 

with the Georgia brigade to coordinate mobilization and training. By the time of the 

callup, the 48th Brigade had coordinated extensive preparations for mobilization with Fort 

Stewart and other major Army headquarters at Fort McPherson and Fort Gillem in 

Georgia. With the 24th Division already in the Gulf, the Pentagon directed Headquarters, 

Second Army at Fort Gillem to oversee the mobilization and training of the 48th Brigade. 

Upon receipt of the mobilization order on November 30th, soldiers moved 

immediately to armories in Georgia and South Carolina. In anticipation of the 

mobilization, most Guardsmen had their administrative and personal affairs in good 

order. In staggered intervals during December 2-4th, the brigade’s units headed for Fort 

Stewart after emotional farewells in their local communities. By sundown on December 

4th, the 48th Brigade and the 1-263rd Armor were at their mobilization station. From 

December 5- 23rd, an intense training regime ensued that included tank and artillery 

gunnery, small arms qualification, dismounted infantry drills, and specialized individual 

training for support troops. Persistent rains and fog reduced range availability, so 

Bradley crews traveled to Fort Benning for live fire training. Medical screening 

disqualified a significant number of soldiers for overseas duty, especially among the fulltime AGR force. Training at Fort Stewart identified several, critical problems. Soldiers 

were not knowledgeable regarding vehicle and equipment maintenance. While most 

Guardsmen could perform basic soldiering tasks, too many junior officers and sergeants 

lacked adequate leadership skills. Officers on the brigade and battalion staffs displayed 

insufficient knowledge of the difficult tasks of coordinating combined arms operations. 

After a four-day Christmas pass, the 48th Brigade deployed to Fort Irwin. While 

junior officers supervised the movement to California and the draw of training 

equipment, brigade and battalion staff officers attended an eight-day course at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, designed to teach critical, battlefield coordination skills. While 

Guard officers believed the training was valuable, the Fort Leavenworth period initiated 

friction between the brigade’s leadership and Regulars. Some Guard officers believed 

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Army National Guard History

instructors were attempting to identify staff members for elimination. The Army insisted 

that the brigade abandon its standing operating procedures that had worked well with the 

24th Division and adopt new, unfamiliar practices. The directed change in operating 

procedures created confusion, generated resentment, and broke down staff cohesion. 

On January 5th, the staff officers rejoined the troops at Fort Irwin, and the brigade 

deployed to the desert to begin the longest NTC rotation ever recorded. Initial training 

focused on individual soldier skills and then advanced to crew, section, squad, and 

platoon training. In many cases, platoons needed refresher training because of personnel 

turnover and the addition of new soldiers. Tankers, mechanized infantrymen, and 

artillery soldiers fired extensive gunnery exercises. The brigade staff received tactical 

instruction and learned new techniques for the more rapid preparation and dissemination 

of improved operations orders. By late January, the 48th Brigade began maneuver 

exercises in the Mojave Desert. An interesting aspect of training was the attack of 

simulated Iraqi defenses. The Georgians experimented with mine plows and mine rollers 

designed to eliminate minefields and worked their way through tank traps and deep 

ditches searching for the best tactics and techniques to use against Iraqi obstacles. The 

Army forwarded the lessons learned to Saudi Arabia where American heavy forces were 

preparing to attack real Iraqi defenses. During the last two weeks of February, the 48th 

Brigade conducted several maneuver exercises against the NTC’s opposing force. For 

the first time at Fort Irwin, a brigade headquarters maneuvered three combined arms task 

forces in the open desert. On February 28th, the same day the ground war ended, Army 

leaders certified the 48th Brigade as combat ready and prepared for deployment. 

Despite the value of NTC training, a number of problems dogged the brigade. 

Poor leadership skills among junior officers and sergeants held back many small units. 

Too often, promising junior leaders were thrust into positions of greater responsibility for 

which they were not prepared. At the top, the brigade’s leadership changed when 

General Holland was recalled to Georgia and replaced by the brigade’s second-incommand, Colonel James D. Davis. Over time, the brigade’s leadership and staff 

proficiency improved. Many Guardsmen thought an excess of active duty trainers 

smothered their units, subverted the chain of command, and often gave contradictory and 

conflicting training assistance. Vehicle maintenance was a particular Achilles heel. The 

NTC staff admitted the equipment issued to the brigade was worn and torn. Still, vehicle 

operators and crews showed little aptitude for preventive maintenance, and unit 

maintenance sections failed to adequately perform vehicle repairs. 

On November 30th, Louisiana’s 256th Infantry Brigade and Alabama’s 2-152nd 

Armor were called to active duty to join the 5th Infantry Division. Within days, Louisiana 

and Alabama Guardsmen had closed on their mobilization station at Fort Polk where the 

5th Division was to oversee their training. On December 7th, the Roundout units to the 1st 

Cavalry Division, Mississippi’s 155th Armored Brigade and the 3-141st Infantry 

(Mechanized) from Texas, were mobilized. The 155th and the 3-141st reported to their 

mobilization station at Fort Hood. Because the 1st Cavalry Division had already deployed 

to the Persian Gulf, the Army assigned the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort 

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Carson, Colorado as the parent division responsible for training the Mississippians and 

Texans. (23) 

For several weeks, both brigades remained at their mobilization stations 

conducting individual and small unit training. By late January, the 256th and 155th 

Brigades had concentrated at Fort Hood for large-scale maneuvers and live fire exercises. 

The 256th’s infantrymen underwent modernization training from older vehicles to the M2 

Bradley. On February 3rd, fifty-three soldiers from the 256th Brigade went absent without 

leave from Fort Hood to protest poor training and living conditions. All but one of the 

soldiers voluntarily returned from Shreveport, Louisiana to Fort Hood where they 

received non-judicial punishment. (24) 

Operation Desert Storm 

Western diplomatic efforts to avert war in the Persian Gulf continued into the late 

fall of 1990. Allied demands toward Saddam Hussein remained constant: withdraw the 

Iraqi army from Kuwait and allow the return of the emirate’s legitimate leaders. On 

November 29th, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing the Allied 

coalition to use “all necessary means” to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait and setting 

January 15, 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to comply with Allied demands. Still, Saddam 

Hussein refused to budge. On January 9th, the U.S. secretary of state met with the Iraqi 

foreign minister in Geneva, Switzerland in last-ditch talks to avert war. After nearly 

seven hours, the discussions collapsed. On January 12th, after three days of somber, 

eloquent debate, the U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the use of 

military force. The January 15th deadline passed without any reaction from Saddam 

Hussein. The world watched and waited for the Allied response. (25) 

Allied air forces fired the opening shots of Operation Desert Storm with raids 

against downtown Baghdad and other key military sites throughout Iraq in the early 

morning hours of January 17th. Over the next six weeks, the Allies conducted a 

relentless bombing campaign designed to gain air superiority, degrade enemy air 

defenses, destroy Scud missile sites, and wear down Iraqi ground forces. As the air war 

progressed, pilots turned their attention more and more to the attack of enemy armor and 

artillery units arrayed against Allied troops. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts sought to 

avert what many feared would be a costly and destructive ground war. When Saddam 

Hussein displayed continued intransigence, President Bush reacted with a final 

ultimatum. Speaking from the White House lawn on February 22nd, the president told the 

world that Iraqi forces had until twelve noon the next day to withdraw or be attacked. 

During the next twenty-four hours, the Iraqi army did not move. 

Before dawn on February 24th, American ground forces launched General 

Schwarzkopf’s “Hail Mary” play, a huge turning movement against the right flank of 

Saddam Hussein’s troops designed to liberate Kuwait and destroy the Iraqi army. The 

gigantic offensive reflected the many reforms and improvements in the Army that had 

occurred since the Vietnam War. Using high technology weapons and equipment, 

motivated troops who had experienced tough, realistic training at the NTC and in Europe 

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routed the Iraqis. Compared with past American wars, the first battle of the Persian Gulf 

War was a resounding success. In many places, tired and demoralized enemy soldiers 

surrendered en masse. In one hundred hours of mobile warfare, Allied ground forces 

routed the Iraqis and freed Kuwait. American air power and heavy ground forces 

eventually engaged and destroyed Iraq’s elite, mechanized units. On February 28th, 

Allied leaders declared a cease-fire, and negotiations for a final peace settlement ensued. 

When Allied airmen fired the opening shots of Desert Storm on January 17th, 

more than 23,000 ARNG soldiers in 201 units were on duty in Saudi Arabia. The next 

day, President Bush declared a partial mobilization and invoked his authority to mobilize 

nearly 1 million reservists for two years. The opening of hostilities accelerated the 

deployment of Guardsmen. After January 17th, another fifty-six ARNG units were 

mobilized. When a cease-fire came six weeks later, the number of Guard personnel in 

the war zone had increased to more than 37,000 soldiers in 296 units. Eventually, sixty 

units commanded by either ARNG colonels or lieutenant colonels served in the Gulf. 

Two field artillery brigades—Arkansas’s 142nd and Tennessee’s 196th—were the only 

ARNG combat troops to see action. Nine other brigade and group headquarters and 

twelve hospitals deployed. Throughout the theater of operations, a balanced force of 

thirty battalions ranging from field artillery to quartermaster provided a diverse range of 

combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities. Desert Storm 

Guardsmen saw action in all respects. In fact, the credit for the first American unit to 

breech the Iraqi defensive zone went to Tennessee’s 212th Engineer Company. (26) 

The service of Arkansas’s 142nd Field Artillery Brigade best illustrates the 

performance of ARNG combat units. On the afternoon of November 15th, Col. Charles 

Linch, the commander of the 142nd Brigade, received the unit’s alert order for 

mobilization at the brigade headquarters in Fayetteville, Arkansas. The 142nd Brigade’s 

wartime mission was to provide command and control for field artillery battalions in 

support of assigned missions from a corps artillery headquarters. Subordinate to the 

142nd Brigade were two Arkansas artillery battalions, the 1-142nd Field Artillery 

headquartered in Harrison and the 2-142nd Field Artillery stationed in Fort Smith. At the 

same time, another alert order went to the ARNG’s only MLRS battalion, the 1-158th 

Field Artillery (MLRS) in Lawton, Oklahoma. Only five MLRS artillery battalions were 

in the entire Army at the time, and Central Command insisted on having all MLRS 

battalions deployed to Saudi Arabia. The 1-158th Artillery became the third battalion 

assigned to the 142nd Brigade. The Arkansas and Oklahoma artillery units had a long 

history of distinguished service. Arkansas’s 1-142nd Field Artillery traced its origins 

back to 1893 and had seen service in the Mexican Border crisis and in both World Wars. 

Ironically, the 1-142nd had been the first ARNG artillery unit to enter combat in Korea 

under its previous designation as the 936th Field Artillery. The 1-158th Field Artillery had 

been in the Oklahoma Guard since 1920 and fought in World War II and Korea with the 

45th Division. (27) 

On the late afternoon of November 15th, all full-time support personnel reported 

to their armories in Arkansas and Oklahoma. By the next day, 10 percent of all unit 

personnel were on duty to begin preparations for movement to the brigade’s mobilization 

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station at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Six days later, the brigade received its mobilization 

orders, and all Guardsmen reported to their armories. For three days, armories in 

Arkansas and Oklahoma hummed with activity. Artillerymen checked their personnel 

records while commanders reassigned soldiers into the most pressing unit vacancies. 

Troops maintained, inventoried, and uploaded both personal and unit equipment. On 

November 24th, the 142nd Brigade and its three subordinate battalions departed their 

armories by commercial bus and military convoy. By day’s end, the entire brigade had 

closed on Fort Sill. 

Initial mobilizations steps went smoothly because Fort Sill had already processed 

many units heading to the Gulf. III Corps Artillery Headquarters at Fort Sill took a 

particular interest in supporting the 142nd Brigade and in helping the Guardsmen to 

acquire critical shortages of equipment. Administrative processing and training in 

common soldier skills consumed the first days, but an even larger training and equipping 

challenge soon confronted the artillerymen. The 142nd Brigade did not have automated 

artillery computers and communications equipment and had to rely on slower, manual 

computations and voice radio communications. In Saudi Arabia, the 142nd would face 

the near impossible task of interfacing with other artillery commands possessing more 

sophisticated equipment. In an intense, whirlwind training program, the brigade 

modernized to new artillery computers and radios. Assisted by III Corps trainers and 

civilian contractors, Guardsmen went through classroom training and two, rigorous field 

exercises. In less than a month, the Arkansans mastered skills normally taught in thirteen 

weeks. Meanwhile, other soldiers prepared the brigade’s guns and equipment for 

shipment overseas. By December 15th, all howitzers and heavy equipment had departed 

Fort Sill by rail for ports of embarkation. 

Meanwhile, the 1-158th Artillery prepared for deployment. The battalion had 

reported to Fort Sill with only 80 percent of its required personnel. The addition of 39 

ARNG volunteers and the assignment of 54 Regulars brought the battalion to near its full 

strength of 463 soldiers. Training sessions stressed artillery skills, first aid, and chemical 

defense. During sixty hours of continuous painting operations, the battalion covered 253 

pieces of rolling stock with desert sand camouflage paint. After little more than two 

weeks at Fort Sill, the 1-158th loaded its vehicles and equipment on rail cars. A long 

freight train pulled out of Fort Sill on December 9th, heading for the port of Galveston, 

Texas where the rocket launchers sat for more than a month awaiting shipment. 

Impatient with the slow sealift of MLRS assets, Central Command ordered the 

immediate, aerial deployment of one battery from the 1-158th. On January 21st, the nine 

launchers, support vehicles, equipment, and 122 soldiers of Battery A flew on five C-5A 

Galaxies from Ellington Field near Houston, Texas directly to King Khalid Military City 

in Saudi Arabia. The Guardsmen arrived in the early morning hours of January 23rd, after 

completing the longest, direct deployment in history of an ARNG unit from CONUS to a 

theater of war. Battery A deployed north toward the Kuwaiti border and prepared to 

assist in the launching of artillery raids prior to the beginning of the ground campaign. 

On February 16th, Battery A became the first ARNG unit to fire on Iraqi forces. The 

MLRS launchers let fly with ninety-eight rockets that delivered over 63,000 explosive 

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bomblets against six enemy targets. Over the next four days, the battery launched 

another 119 rockets. On the receiving end, Iraqi soldiers referred to the devastating hail 

of MLRS bomblets as “steel rain.” 

While Battery A was making history, the balance of the 1-158th Artillery was 

arriving in the desert and moving into firing positions. By February 16th, the remainder 

of the 1-158th had flown to Saudi Arabia, and its equipment had arrived in port. In a 

prodigious effort, the Oklahoma Guardsmen deployed north toward the Saudi-Kuwaiti 

border and took up firing positions only four days after their equipment had arrived in 

country. On February 22d, Batteries B and C fired sixty-seven rockets against Iraqi 

positions. 

On January 15th, the 142nd Brigade headquarters arrived in Saudi Arabia and 

prepared for the arrival of its subordinate battalions. The 142nd’s initial mission was to 

support the U.S. 1st Infantry Division’s attack on the Iraqi defensive zone. Unfortunately, 

the 8-in. howitzers of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 142nd Artillery did not arrive until 

February 19th due to shipping delays. Within seventy-two hours of receiving their 

howitzers, the battalions had deployed 314 miles north and taken up firing positions. On 

February 22nd, the entire 142d Brigade opened up in a vigorous artillery preparation. 

In the early morning hours of February 24th, the 1st Division advanced against the 

A self-propelled howitzer of the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade from Arkansas moves into Iraq 

during the ground attack phase of Desert Storm in 1991. The inscription on the gun tub -- It’s 

Personal -- expresses the artillerymen’s sentiments about the conflict. (National Guard 

Education Foundation) 

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Army National Guard History

Iraqis after the 142nd delivered a punishing thirty-minute artillery bombardment 

consisting of both cannon and missile fire. Troops from the “Big Red One” rolled 

through the enemy defenses largely unopposed. VII Corps then assigned the Arkansas 

self-propelled battalions and Battery A, 1-158th to support the British 1st Armoured 

Division during its advance into Kuwait. Meanwhile, the balance of the 1-158th stayed 

with the 1st Division until reassigned to support the 2d Armored Cavalry. The 100-hour 

war was one dizzying, nonstop period of movement and fire missions for the 142nd 

Brigade. In one unusual incident, fifty-five Iraqi prisoners surrendered to an officer in 

the 1-158th. By the end of the fighting, the brigade had fired over 1,000 rounds of 8-in. 

and MLRS munitions. Continuous fire support to the 1st Division, 2d Armored Cavalry, 

and British 1st Armoured Division undoubtedly reduced Allied casualties. After the war, 

the British division commander commended the 142nd Brigade for its “timely and 

accurate fire” that “contributed significantly” to light casualties and the division’s “swift 

and crushing victory.” The commander of the 1-158th Artillery, Lt. Col. Larry Haub, 

proudly proclaimed after the war that his troops had “never missed a start point, a fire 

mission, or a release point.” (28) 

Iowa’s 1133rd Transportation Company demonstrated the tremendous capabilities 

of ARNG combat support units. On September 19th, Capt. Daniel A. Thorsen received 

orders to mobilize his company. Eight days later, all soldiers reported to their armory in 

Mason City. In three days of intense activity, troops inventoried and packed equipment, 

performed vehicle maintenance, filled out required paperwork and tended to last minute 

personal matters. The 1133rd had recently returned from an overseas deployment to 

Korea and was well prepared for wartime service. The soldiers of the 1133rd were the 

descendants of a proud militia heritage. In August 1862, they had first formed in Mason 

City as Company B, 32nd Iowa Volunteer Infantry and saw combat in the Civil War’s 

western theater. For nearly 150 years the company had maintained a National Guard 

presence in Mason City under various unit configurations and had served in the SpanishAmerican War, the Mexican Border Crisis and with the 34th Division in World Wars I 

and II. (29) 

Just after noon on September 30th, the 162 soldiers and sixty-four wheeled 

vehicles of the 1133rd Transportation Company departed Mason City to the cheers of over 

10,000 well-wishers. The convoy headed east across the American heartland toward its 

mobilization station at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Army inspectors at Fort McCoy declared 

the 1133rd at the highest possible state of readiness and ready for immediate deployment. 

By October 11th, all vehicles were painted desert sand and loaded on rail cars for 

transportation to the port of embarkation at Bayonne, New Jersey. At Fort McCoy, the 

1133rd learned it would operate in Saudi Arabia under control of the 68th Transportation 

Battalion, an active Army headquarters controlling two Regular, four ARNG, and two 

USAR transportation units. 

On November 13th, the 1133rd arrived at Dhahran airport in Saudi Arabia after an 

exhausting trip from Volk Field, Wisconsin aboard two C-141 transports. Three days 

later its trucks and trailers arrived in country, and the company began long haul transport 

missions of ammunition and medical supplies from the port of Damman. During Desert 

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Army National Guard History

Soldiers from the 1776th Military Police Company of the Michigan ARNG prepare to receive 

Iraqi prisoners of war during Desert Storm. (National Guard Education Foundation) 

Shield, the 1133rd continued trailer transfer and over-the-road long haul of supplies and 

equipment from rear area supply points to forward deployed units and supply points. On 

Thanksgiving Day, the soldiers enjoyed a traditional Thanksgiving meal and received a 

visit from President and Mrs. Bush who spent the holiday with American troops. On 

December 19th, the 1133rd began operations from a temporary motor pool in the Saudi 

desert, and for the next 148 days, all personnel lived in tents or slept in the open. After 

New Years, signs of impending war were everywhere. Soldiers mounted machine guns 

on their vehicles, and nerve agent pills were distributed. The day after the opening of the 

air war, the company received anthrax shots. On January 20th, an Iraqi Scud missile 

exploded in the air above one of the company’s trailer transfer points. In early February, 

the Iowa Guardsmen deployed further north near the Kuwaiti border where ammunition 

distribution continued at a rapid pace. 

In the first forty-eight hours of the ground war, the 1133rd hauled priority 

ammunition loads until receiving orders for a new, unexpected mission. On February 

27th, the company reported to a pickup site near the Kuwaiti border to begin the transport 

of Iraqi prisoners from a forward prisoner collection point to a holding area in the rear. 

Guards were supposed to be on hand to escort the prisoners, but none were available. 

Nearly 4,000 Iraqi prisoners stood in the open desert awaiting orders. The lack of guards 

did not deter the 1133rd. The Iowans trained their M-16s and M-60 machine guns on the 

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Army National Guard History

prisoners while crowding them onto trucks and trailers. The company successfully 

transported the Iraqis to the rear while providing the security force. 

The end of the ground war presented new challenges to the 1133rd. On March 1st

, 

the company became part of a large relief effort to transport badly needed humanitarian 

supplies to Kuwait City. The trucks moved north in convoy over heavily bombed roads 

littered with unexploded ordnance. Thick, black smoke and heavy fumes from burning 

oil wells filled the air. In Kuwait City, the inhabitants wildly greeted the 1133rd as 

liberators. For ten days, the company hauled food, water, fire fighting equipment, and 

other necessities through Kuwait City and ventured north into Iraq to deliver 

humanitarian supplies to a Red Cross refugee camp. On March 12th, Captain Thorsen 

wrote to the AG of Iowa that his company had logged nearly 200 missions while carrying 

72,026 tons of material over a distance of 1.3 million miles. Two days later, the 1133rd 

was told to return to Saudi Arabia for administrative hauling missions. 

Duty by Guardsmen assigned to combat service support units is personified in the 

service of Idaho’s 148th Public Affairs Detachment (PAD). The 148th was a thirteenmember unit designed to provide military journalistic skills and media relations to an 

army corps or division. The Idaho PAD had a long history of overseas experience with 

deployments to Germany and Panama. In February 1990, the 148th underwent three 

weeks of annual training in Germany while supporting its CAPSTONE unit, the 3rd 

A team of the 103rd Public Affairs Detachment from the Montana ARNG raises the Montana State 

flag inside Iraq thirty minutes after the cease-fire on February 28, 1991. Throughout the Persian 

Gulf War, ARNG units flew their State flags in the Arabian Desert for the first time. (National 

Guard Education Foundation) 

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Army National Guard History

Armored Division. (30) 

The 148th PAD, commanded by Capt. Kim P. Wortham, was activated on 

December 7th. The days following mobilization involved a flurry of administrative 

activity and cross leveling of personnel and equipment. The unit had one vacancy and 

two members were unavailable because they had not yet attended required training. Staff 

Sergeant Gail Seaman volunteered to leave his slot in the 116th Cavalry Brigade to return 

to the 148th PAD for duty. Specialist Edgar Morrison, a newspaper copy editor who had 

already moved to a new civilian job in South Carolina but had not yet left the Idaho 

Guard, returned to Boise for duty. 

On December 12th, the 148th PAD, with a complement of twelve soldiers, reported 

to its mobilization station at Fort Lewis, Washington. The PAD was declared fully ready 

for overseas duty even though two members were medically disqualified for deployment. 

Meanwhile, the 3rd Armored Division in Germany was beginning its deployment to Saudi 

Arabia and had requested that the 148th serve as their PAD. The good relations that had 

developed between the 148th and the division during exercises ten months earlier had 

prompted the request. Before leaving Fort Lewis, the Idaho Guardsmen learned that they 

would support the “Spearhead” Division in the coming weeks. 

The 148th PAD arrived at Dhahran airport on January 12th and was taken to 

temporary living quarters in dilapidated warehouses near the Dhahran port facilities. To 

their great surprise, the Idaho soldiers discovered thousands of soldiers from the 3rd 

Armored Division jammed into the warehouses awaiting the arrival of vehicles and heavy 

equipment from Europe. The next day, the 148th joined the 3rd Armored Division 

headquarters. The short stay in Dhahran saw several tense moments. On the first night 

of Desert Storm, loudspeakers announced a Scud alert, and the entire division donned 

chemical suits and protective masks against an attack that never came. The next night, 

the 148th witnessed the first combat launch of a Patriot missile that intercepted an 

incoming Scud at low altitude. The burning debris from the Scud landed only blocks 

away. 

By the end of January, the 3rd Armored Division started to deploy to positions 

near the Kuwaiti border. The Idaho Guardsmen watched as column after column of 

tanks, personnel carriers, and other heavy equipment and vehicles assembled in the 

desert. Operating out of two large tents located near the main division command post, 

the 148th escorted reporters and published a weekly division newsletter, the “Saudi 

Spearhead.” To accomplish this, the 148th transported their stories and photographs by 

vehicle to Dhahran twelve hours away. In Dhahran, a rear detachment of the 148th 

produced a camera-ready layout of the newsletter’s pages that were then flown to 

Germany for printing. Stacks of the newsletter were flown back to Saudi Arabia for 

eventual distribution in the field. By the time of the ground war, the 148th had 

established excellent working relations with the division staff, and nearly a dozen civilian 

journalists had moved in with the Guardsmen. 

With the beginning of the ground war, the 148th accompanied the 3rd Armored 

Division into the largest American tank battles since World War II. Journalists from 

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Army National Guard History

Time, ABC News, AFRN radio, the Wall Street Journal and other media organizations 

filmed and reported on the war assisted by the 148th PAD. After the cease-fire, the PAD 

escorted the media into refugee camps in occupied Iraq. To create a record of the 

division’s service in Desert Storm, the 148th wrote, designed, and published a special, 

twenty-four page commemorative edition of “Spearhead Magazine.” During the war, the 

148th gained the distinction as the most forward deployed PAD in the theater and the only 

PAD to publish a wartime, divisional newsletter. On May 16th, the 148th returned to Fort 

Lewis and left active duty five days later. 

Redeployment and Demobilization 

Even before Desert Storm was over, the Army began preparations to smooth the 

return of troops and equipment. On Feb 1st, the Army issued guidelines for mobilization 

stations to use in outprocessing units and returning them to State control. Soon after the 

end of the ground war, ARNG units began to demobilize. Outprocessing at mobilization 

stations usually required four or five days, but some units required more than a week. 

Each soldier underwent a physical examination to document service-incurred problems. 

Officers and sergeants received efficiency reports reflecting their wartime service, and at 

separation, all Guardsmen received important documents giving them credit for 

retirement points and future benefits. Guardsmen were advised of their reemployment 

rights and the availability of family assistance programs to help in the transition back to 

civilian life. On July 23rd, the 119th Medical Company from Lakeland, Florida was the 

last ARNG unit to leave active duty. (31) 

After returning to their home armories, Guardsmen began to recover fully from 

the war effort. Many units initially returned without their vehicles and equipment that 

had been loaded on ships for the long journey to the United States. Some units received 

their equipment in a few weeks, while others received it several months later. In some 

cases, equipment never returned or was damaged in transit. Desert Storm units resumed 

weekend drill within the first month of their return. However, few conducted annual 

training in 1991 in order to save money and to ease employers’ concerns over losing 

workers for an additional, extended period. (32) 

With Desert Storm over, the Roundout brigades demobilized. On March 2d, the 

48th Brigade began to turn in its training equipment at Fort Irwin and to redeploy back to 

Georgia. The majority of the brigade reached Fort Stewart by March 11th, and four days 

later, the last Guardsman departed the NTC. The brigade retained 10 percent of its key 

personnel on active duty to assist with demobilization and to write after action reports. 

By April 10th, the entire brigade was back under State control. On March 11th, the 155th 

Brigade reached the NTC and began a two-week training rotation. The 256th and the 

155th Brigades went on to complete their post-mobilization training regimes and were 

released from active duty by May 14, 1991. (33) 

The ARNG’s combat battalions initially remained in Saudi Arabia to assist in the 

enforcement of an uneasy armistice, but eventually they started for home. On May 14th, 

Arkansas’s 142nd Brigade departed Saudi Arabia by commercial airliner, landing at Altus 

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Army National Guard History

Infantrymen of the 3-141st Infantry, Texas ARNG, train in the dust and heat of Fort Hood, Texas 

during Desert Shield. The battalion was assigned to Mississippi’s 155th Armored Brigade 

during the callup for the Persian Gulf War. (National Guard Education Foundation) 

Air Force Base, Oklahoma at 0100 hours the following morning. The soldiers expected 

little in the way of a welcome because of the early hour. However, as they made the 

sixty-mile journey to Fort Sill by commercial bus, hundreds of fellow Guardsmen and 

family members stood along the route cheering and waving flags in the darkness. At Fort 

Sill, a large crowd of 6,000 people turned out at 2 o’clock in the morning to greet the 

brigade. (34) 

A number of ARNG support units stayed in the Persian Gulf after the cease-fire to 

assist with humanitarian efforts and to transfer equipment and supplies. Iowa’s 1133rd 

Transportation Company remained in the Persian Gulf for nearly four more months, 

redistributing ammunition from forward caches to more secure holding areas. Special 

missions included a second relief effort to Kuwait City and the transport of Air Force 

ordnance from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. After a week spent preparing its vehicles and 

equipment for shipment home, the 1133rd departed Dhahran airport on June 7th and 

received a rousing welcome at Volk Field, Wisconsin. Over 10,000 people turned out in 

Mason City, Iowa on June 12th to welcome the 1133rd back to its home armory. In all, the 

1133rd served a whopping 261 days on active duty. During 207 days of operations in the 

Persian Gulf, the Iowans hauled 112,000 tons of material over 2.1 million miles 

throughout four different Arabic countries. (35) 

On May 20-21st

, the ARNG Directorate conducted an extensive debriefing in 

Alexandria, Virginia with brigade and battalion commanders from Desert Storm. All 

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Army National Guard History

agreed that the high levels of manning and equipping that resulted from the Total Force 

Policy and the Reagan Buildup contributed to the great success in mobilizing and 

deploying their units. The CAPSTONE Program received high praise. Even though 

CAPSTONE relations had been developed with Army units in Europe in anticipation of a 

Soviet blitzkrieg, the working relationships facilitated smooth operations in the 

unfamiliar and challenging Saudi desert. Commanders unanimously agreed that overseas 

deployment training was a key ingredient to their success. Experience gained during 

mobilization exercises, deployments, and realistic, overseas training exercises paid great 

dividends. Commanders praised the Key Personnel Upgrade Program for providing 

officers and sergeants with increased tactical and technical knowledge. A common 

complaint was that several Army installations slowed the mobilization by repeating many 

of the administrative tasks previously completed at home armories. (36) 

As in all wars, victory came with a price. All together, thirty-four Guardsmen 

gave their lives during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Eighteen died in Southwest Asia, 

though none died as a result of direct enemy action. Common causes of death included 

vehicle accidents, aircraft crashes, and heart attacks. For the first time, ARNG women 

died in wartime; of the thirty-four soldiers who perished, eight were female. (37) 

The country experienced an outpouring of patriotism after the Persian Gulf 

victory. After units returned home, victory parades occurred in large cities and small 

New York’s 719th Transportation Company marches up Broadway during New York City’s 

Persian Gulf War Victory Parade on June 10, 1991. (National Guard Bureau) 

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Army National Guard History

towns across the nation. Pride, gratitude, and humility filled the hearts of Guardsmen 

marching in victory parades. For ARNG Vietnam veterans who had served in Desert 

Storm, the parades and ceremonies were a much-delayed welcome home from Southeast 

Asia. On June 8th, Guardsmen marched down Constitution Avenue in Washington, DC 

as part of a huge National Victory Celebration. A long parade of troops and vehicles 

from all the services passed in review before President Bush and Desert Storm’s most 

senior military commanders. 

Conclusions 

In almost all respects, the Persian Gulf War was a resounding success for the 

ARNG. Desert Shield marked the thirteenth federal callup in National Guard history and 

the eighth time Guardsmen had been ordered to active duty in the 20th Century. All 

together, 62,411 ARNG soldiers in 398 units answered the call to arms. Not since the 

Korean War forty years earlier had so many Guardsmen served on active duty. In the 

Persian Gulf, 37,484 ARNG soldiers in 297 units performed valuable combat, combat 

support, and combat service support missions. The Guardsmen who deployed to Europe 

or remained in the U.S. provided important support and security capabilities, received 

valuable training, and constituted a ready reserve. All Guardsmen reported for duty, and 

only those who were not available for medical reasons or a lack of required training did 

not serve. The wisdom of the Total Force Policy was vindicated, and the investments in 

personnel and equipment made during the Reagan Buildup generated a quick military 

victory with a minimal loss of life. 

A number of broad, crucial lessons emerged from Desert Storm. Of greatest 

significance, the ARNG mobilization helped to generate widespread, sustained public 

support for the war. In this respect, Creighton Abrams’ vision was vindicated; the 

National Guard callup helped cement the bond between the American people and the 

armed forces in wartime. The ARNG proved its units could deploy and carry out their 

assigned missions with little advance notice. Rapid, organized unit movements were a 

particular Guard strength. The greatest impediments to Guard deployments were not 

shortages of training, personnel or equipment, but the lack of available sealift. 

Guardsmen displayed a mastery of complicated, high technology equipment ranging from 

advanced communication devices and tactical computers to the revolutionary Global 

Positioning System that made land navigation possible in the open desert. For the first 

time, ARNG female soldiers proved their worth while performing worldwide, wartime 

missions. The State headquarters performed valuable service by assisting units with 

rapid mobilizations and quick movements to federal mobilization stations. 

At the same time, Desert Shield identified a number of areas for remedial action. 

While the States were at the forefront of providing support and assistance to deploying 

soldiers and their families, it was clear that a larger, more coordinated and comprehensive 

Family Support Program was needed. The mobilization surfaced new problems 

associated with child custody, dual military parenting and related issues that had come 

with the inception of the all-volunteer military. National Guardsmen required additional 

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Army National Guard History

health and dental care and medical screening. Too many soldiers who met standards for 

recruiting and retention were not medically qualified for deployment. At mobilization 

stations, electronic computer programs conflicted with paper forms and records. Poor 

administration slowed the mobilization process by creating extra work, frustrating 

soldiers and their families, and distracting leaders from command responsibilities. 

The performance of the Roundout brigades revealed several positive aspects about 

the Roundout concept and the Total Force Policy. Upon mobilization, the 48th Brigade 

was a modernized unit fully structured to complete the organization of its parent division 

and manned by trained soldiers that met established readiness standards. The fact that the 

48th Brigade existed in such a high state of readiness testified to the effectiveness of the 

Total Force Policy and the Reagan Buildup. Compared to previous National Guard 

mobilizations, the Roundout brigades achieved deployment readiness standards in record 

time. Only ninety-one days after mobilization, the Army declared the 48th ready for 

deployment, and the 155th and 256th Brigades were near the end of their training when 

Desert Storm ended. Though they did not deploy, the brigades constituted a ready 

reserve in the event of a longer war in the Gulf or the outbreak of a second, unexpected 

regional crisis. 

A closer look at the 48th Brigade’s training regime reveals a unit that was more 

ready than many believe. Of the ninety-one days between mobilization and the 

declaration of combat readiness, seventy-six days were fully dedicated to training. 

Administration and unit movements consumed the remaining days. Out of seventy-six 

training days, thirty were devoted to attacks against Iraqi defenses, the same training 

conducted by active divisions in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the 48th Brigade required 

forty-six days to achieve established readiness standards for training. The brigade 

estimated before the callup that it would require a maximum of forty-two days of 

additional training after mobilization. Considering the brigade had not counted on 

training without support from the 24th Division, its pre-Desert Shield training estimate 

very closely approximated the actual training program that unfolded at Fort Stewart and 

the NTC. (38) 

The mobilization revealed significant weaknesses in Roundout planning. First, a 

number of conflicting perceptions existed throughout DOD, the Army, the National 

Guard and on Capitol Hill regarding missions and readiness. Many believed Roundout 

brigades should be ready for immediate deployment with their parent divisions and 

require little or no training after mobilization. Others held the more accurate view that 

the brigades were never intended to deploy immediately with their divisions and would 

require additional training. Second, specific mobilization plans prepared before Desert 

Shield proved nearly worthless. Even with war looming and time running short, the 

Army imposed new, post-mobilization training plans and unique readiness standards for 

deployment. The changes forced Guardsmen to adjust to new operating procedures and a 

lengthy, unscheduled rotation at the NTC. In its rush to assist the brigades, the Army 

may have done too much; to help train the 13,000 Guardsmen in the three brigades, the 

Army committed nearly 9,000 troops. The poor relations that developed between some 

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Guard leaders and Army trainers smacked of the bitterness generated during previous 

mobilizations. (39) 

For the first time in modern history, the Army prosecuted a major war without 

using a single National Guard ground maneuver unit. Of all the services, only the Army 

experienced major difficulties in integrating its combat reserve components during Desert 

Storm. The reasons for the delay in calling out the brigades left lingering doubts in the 

ARNG and on Capitol Hill regarding the Army’s motives. NGAUS argued that several 

Regular units less well trained, manned, and equipped than the 48th Brigade had gone to 

Saudi Arabia. If the 180-day limit imposed by Section 673b prevented the use of 

Roundout brigades, it did not keep the Army from sending over 200 ARNG support units 

to Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield. The media raised the specter that the Army 

believed the brigades would fail and cause a military setback reminiscent of Task Force 

Smith in the Korean War. Others suspected that successful ARNG combat units would 

threaten the existence of active combat forces during the post-Cold War demobilization. 

In the end, the Roundout brigades would have better served the nation with a timelier 

callup, deployment to the Persian Gulf, training in the Saudi desert, and combat with their 

parent divisions. 

In the end, the wisest assessment of the 48th Brigade’s service came from its own 

commander. Soon after returning to Georgia, Col. James D. Davis told his troops: 

Even though we were denied the opportunity to join forces overseas, we 

made a significant contribution to the overall war effort...It doesn’t matter that 

we didn’t get a chance to fight. We won our own victory at the NTC. Sixty 

days in the harshest environment of America at a constant, non-stop pace 

challenged our stamina. Never once did we falter. The strength of this 

brigade, from start to finish, has been your attitude, your grit and your 

physical courage. (40) 

American military history repeated itself after Desert Storm as the armed forces 

returned home to face steep force reductions. For the ARNG, the 1990s would prove to 

be one of the most difficult and contentious periods in its long history. 

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Army National Guard History

Congressman G.V. “Sonny” Montgomery 

National Guard Soldier and Statesman 

Congressman G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery 

stands as one of the National Guard’s most 

important advocates in the second half of the 20th 

Century. During World War II, he served as a 

lieutenant in the 12th Armored Division in Europe. 

After the war, he returned home to Mississippi and 

joined the National Guard. omery was 

mobilized with the 31st Infantry Division for the 

Korean War and remained on active duty until 

1952. 

After the Korean War, Sonny Montgomery 

was elected to the Mississippi legislature and 

served there for ten years. He had his first national 

exposure in 1962 while commanding a detachment of Mississippi Guardsmen ordered to 

safeguard Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Freedom Ride” to Jackson, Mississippi. 

from the Mississippi Guard with the State rank of major general. 

In 1966, Sonny Montgomery was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives 

where he became a principal advocate for personnel in the all-volunteer military. n the 

early 1980s, he sponsored a new G.I. Bill that gave service members important enlistment 

and education benefits. d men and women eventually took 

advantage of the program. n 1987, Congress formalized the Montgomery G.I. Bill. 

same year, he sponsored the Montgomery Amendment, a key piece of legislation that 

supported overseas training for Guardsmen and paved the way for the U.S. Supreme 

Court’s 1990 Perpich Decision. During the Persian Gulf War, Congressman 

Montgomery was a key supporter for the mobilization and deployment of ARNG combat 

units. 

Sonny Montgomery retired from Congress in 1996 after thirty years of 

distinguished service. The impressive Montgomery Room in the National Guard 

Memorial in Washington, DC is a fitting tribute to this outstanding soldier-statesman. 

Because of his long-term advocacy for National Guard issues, Sonny Montgomery stands 

as the most important Guard legislator since the end of World War II. 

Montg

He retired 

I

Tens of thousands of Guar

I The 

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Army National Guard History

CHAPTER 9 

A New World Order, 1991-2000 

Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new 

responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom but threatened still 

by ancient hatreds and new plagues. 

President William J. Clinton, 

Inaugural Address, January 1993 

Introduction 

Capt. Michael E. Patterson walked in full battle gear along the cold, wind-swept 

roadway of a long, concrete bridge spanning the Sava River on the border between 

Croatia and Bosnia. Moments before, Company C, 3-116th Infantry of the Virginia 

ARNG had assumed responsibility for guarding the Sava River bridge from the U.S. 

Army’s 10th Mountain Division. A platoon of heavily armed Guardsmen occupied 

defensive positions on the bridge while the company’s other platoons remained in reserve 

nearby. Captain Patterson was pleased with his company’s performance; the transfer of 

responsibility had taken place without incident. On November 1, 1997, Company C, 3-

116th Infantry became the first ARNG ground maneuver unit to go in harm’s way since 

the Indiana Rangers had fought in Vietnam in 1968. 

Charlie Company was an ocean away from its armory in Leesburg, Virginia. The 

bridge defense mission was a small portion of a much larger effort, Operation Joint 

Guard, the NATO peacekeeping initiative to bring peace and stability to the war-torn, 

former Yugoslavia. After mobilization on September 3, 1997, the company had deployed 

to Fort Polk, Louisiana for extensive training before heading to Europe. Since October 

22nd, the company had completed final preparations at the main NATO staging area in 

Tazar, Hungary before moving to the Sava River Bridge on November 1st

. 

The first day of duty was not without its tense moments, as buses filled with 

Croatian pilgrims crossed into Bosnia to visit the gravesites of deceased relatives in 

observance of All Saint’s Day. A hostile crowd of Serbs protested the crossings at the 

Bosnian end of the bridge. Several busloads of pilgrims crossed the bridge without 

incident, but sporadic gunfire was heard on the far side of the bridge. Before the day 

was over, Captain Patterson coordinated the efforts of American attack helicopters and 

Norwegian mechanized infantrymen sent to bolster the bridge’s defenses. Before 

sundown the vehicles returned with frightened passengers; angry Serbs had shattered the 

windows on at least two buses. The show of force by the disciplined, heavily armed 

Guardsmen had helped to maintain order throughout a tense, difficult day. Afterwards, 

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Captain Patterson remembered the company’s first day of guard duty on the Sava River 

Bridge as one of its most successful. 

The peacekeeping mission of Company C, 3-116th Infantry is but one example of 

the manner in which the ARNG adapted in the 1990s to the New World Order, the 

complex and fragmented international environment that emerged following the Cold 

War. Three key developments dominated activities throughout the decade: the lessons 

learned from the Persian Gulf War, post-Cold War force structure reductions, and the 

determination of the Guard’s new roles and missions within the framework of a new, 

evolving American defense strategy. 

The lessons of Desert Storm sparked a number of new initiatives and caused 

controversial changes in the Army’s implementation of critical aspects of the Total Force 

Policy. The deep military cuts first articulated in the months preceding Desert Storm 

finally came to pass when the ARNG underwent the most painful unit and personnel 

reductions in its history. At the same time, the Pentagon struggled to define a new 

national security strategy. Confounded by the New World Order, deep budget and 

personnel reductions, and a revolution in military affairs wrought by the computer and 

the microchip, the nation’s civilian and uniformed military leaders labored to develop a 

coherent military strategy that utilized a smaller, balanced force of Regulars, Guardsmen 

and Reservists. In a span of less than seven years, DOD conducted no less than four 

major defense reviews. As the 1990s ended, the Guard emerged as an integral part of the 

nation’s defense while striving to retain its traditional role as the Army’s primary combat 

reserve. 

The Search for a New Strategy 

Ironically, the basis for American strategic thinking that emerged after the Persian 

Gulf War was first articulated on the very day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. In a 

speech in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, President Bush announced the “Base 

Force,” the new shape of America’s armed forces and a new strategy for national defense 

that marked the end of America’s forty-year reliance on the strategy of containment. The 

plan’s principal architect and advocate was General Colin Powell, the CJCS. General 

Powell defined the Base Force as the minimum troop levels required among all of the 

uniformed services that still allowed the U.S. to maintain its superpower status and to 

meet worldwide responsibilities. The Base Force shifted away from a strategy 

concentrated solely on defeating the Soviet Union to one focused on lesser, known threats 

and the retention of sufficient forces to maintain critical military capabilities. He 

envisioned four basic missions for the military; the ongoing defense of NATO, the 

preservation of peace in the Pacific, the creation of a CONUS-based contingency force 

capable of rapidly deploying to overseas trouble spots, and continued nuclear deterrence. 

(1) 

The Army soon articulated a new strategic vision that conformed to the Base 

Force. With the Soviet Union gone, the Army’s principle missions were to deter or 

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defeat aggression, maintain America’s global influence, promote regional stability, 

staunch the flow of illicit drugs into the United States, and combat terrorism. Throughout 

the Cold War, the Army had maintained a large, forward defense along the containment 

perimeter. Now it planned for a much smaller overseas presence backed by mobile 

forces based in CONUS. The new strategy placed a premium on the ability to project 

combat forces rapidly from CONUS or from other forward deployed locations in Europe 

and Asia. A CONUS-based contingency corps capable of rapid deployment to overseas 

trouble spots and made up of more than five Regular Army divisions became central to 

strategic planning. (2) 

Like General Powell and the Army leadership, the ARNG searched for its proper 

role in the New World Order following the Persian Gulf War. NGAUS and AGAUS 

collaborated in an examination of new Guard roles and missions for the 1990s and into 

the 21st Century. In their analysis, senior leaders emphasized the worth of the Guard’s 

traditional federal and State missions. In November 1992, the Guard leadership 

identified four enduring missions. The National Guard should remain the nation’s 

primary federal reserve, maintain combat forces in the first line of defense, and continue 

its role as the nation’s primary domestic disaster response force. In addition, the Guard 

was to engage in domestic missions that contributed to the “social and moral fabric of the 

nation.” (3) 

The Aftermath of Desert Storm 

Despite early initiatives to reshape the nation’s defenses, the first real changes to 

the ARNG occurred as a direct result of lessons from the Persian Gulf War. Two Army 

reforms struck directly at programs that had been at the heart of the Total Force Policy 

for nearly twenty years. The Roundout Program was perhaps the ARNG’s most visible 

casualty following Desert Storm. The precedent of not deploying the 48th and 155th 

Brigades to the Persian Gulf with their parent divisions and the Army’s new emphasis on 

force projection from CONUS generated the new concept of “Roundup” brigades. The 

five divisions in the new contingency corps would be composed entirely of active troops 

in order to facilitate rapid deployment and the invasion of a hostile war zone. 

Reinforcements for subsequent operations would come from a fourth, ARNG Roundup 

brigade assigned to each heavy division. By 1992, the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry 

Divisions had three active brigades, and the 48th and 155th Brigades were assigned as 

Roundups, respectively. At the same time, the Army retained five other Roundout 

brigade and active division pairings that had existed prior to Desert Storm. Still, many 

Guardsmen saw the reduced role of the 48th and 155th Brigades as the first step in the 

eventual elimination of the Roundout Program and as the means for the active Army to 

protect more of its combat units from expected force cuts. (4) 

The shift from forward deployed divisions to a CONUS-based force caused a 

major restructuring of the successful CAPSTONE Program in which each ARNG unit 

had a direct, wartime assignment to a Regular Army organization. In August 1992, the 

Army determined that major changes in the CAPSTONE Program were necessary. The 

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Army National Guard History

prospect of multiple, regional wars and the smaller number of available support units due 

to downsizing prompted the Army to assign ARNG combat support and combat service 

support units to more than one overseas command. The CAPSTONE Program that had 

laid the foundation for much of the ARNG’s success in the Persian Gulf War vanished in 

short order. The new WARTRACE Program stressed training relationships between 

active and Guard units instead of strict, wartime alignments. Over time, Guard 

commanders lost the advantages of focusing training and deployment activities on a 

single, specific theater and were forced to plan for multiple contingencies. (5) 

The reserve component callup for Desert Shield convinced Pentagon planners that 

the presidential 180-day mobilization limit for Guardsmen and Reservists imposed by 

Section 673b was too restrictive. An initial mobilization of 90 days followed by a second 

90-day period before Congress granted authority for extended active duty inhibited long 

range planning and created unnecessary confusion among citizen-soldiers and their 

families. Longer mobilization periods were needed in the 1990s in light of the mounting 

number of overseas humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. In October 1994, DOD 

convinced Congress to amend Section 673b to permit a reserve component, presidential 

callup of 270 days. (6) 

Despite the ARNG’s successes in Desert Storm, Congress implemented modest 

reforms to improve the Guard’s overall readiness. Members of the House Armed 

Services Committee composed legislation that addressed a number of concerns. Overall, 

the bill’s provisions were designed to enhance Guard deployability, improve the Regular 

Army’s capacity to measure Guard readiness, make ARNG units more compatible with 

active forces, facilitate the development of Guard leaders, and improve the Guard’s 

medical preparedness. In its final form, the “Army National Guard Combat Readiness 

Reform Act of 1992” became Title XI of the 1993 Defense Authorization Act. Overall, 

Title XI contained eighteen sections that outlined specific measures to improve Guard 

readiness. Nine initiatives were designed to increase Guard deployability by enhancing 

leadership skills and improving personnel, medical, and dental programs. A key 

provision sought to increase the level of military experience. By September 1997, 65 

percent of the Guard’s officers and one-half of its enlisted soldiers were to have had 

prior, active service of not less than two years. The Army was given the latitude to 

review officer promotions and to enforce stricter noncommissioned officer education 

requirements. Congress ordered more frequent medical screening and dental checkups to 

avoid deployment problems that had surfaced during Desert Shield. Title XI specified 

changes to the Army’s readiness reporting system that permitted a more detailed and 

accurate portrayal of a unit’s readiness posture. Other key provisions were designed to 

minimize the Guard’s post-mobilization training by increasing the Army’s oversight and 

involvement in peacetime training. As many as 5,000 Regulars would be assigned to 

Guard units with the aim of improving readiness. Lastly, the Army was to create 

compatible personnel, supply, maintenance, and financial administrative systems across 

all Army components by 1997. (7) 

While Pentagon staffs worked to implement Title XI’s administrative changes, the 

Army revamped ARNG training. A new readiness enhancement program called “Bold 

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Army National Guard History

Shift” complied with Title XI initiatives by seeking to increase reserve component 

readiness and facilitating more positive interactions between Regulars and the Guard. 

Desert Shield had revealed weaknesses in the chain of command of several ARNG units, 

and Bold Shift included new initiatives for improving the training of commanders, staffs, 

and small unit leaders. A key objective was to enable ARNG combat brigades to be 

ready for deployment in a shorter time period than the three Roundout brigades had 

required during Desert Storm. The Army assigned 1,300 Regulars to Bold Shift training 

evaluation teams and as advisors to the Roundout and Roundup brigades. (8) 

Unit training was the aspect of Bold Shift that most affected Guardsmen. Before 

the Persian Gulf War, ARNG units sought to train at the highest level organized, but the 

Bold Shift training philosophy was to train Guard units to a higher standard at the lowest 

levels of organization. New training plans targeted the skills of individual soldiers, 

crews, squads, and platoons. Training exercises focused primarily on gunnery skills for 

vehicle crews in tank and mechanized infantry battalions and platoon level maneuvers for 

all combat arms. Platoon exercises were conducted during “lanes training” in which 

Guardsmen maneuvered through a predetermined training site while reacting to various 

tactical scenarios. A “crawl-walk-run” training philosophy emphasized the mastery of 

simpler, basic skills before advancing to more demanding tasks. Regular Army advisors 

closely monitored training and facilitated a detailed discussion and critique after each 

training session. In addition, active duty personnel organized training sites and provided 

logistical support to allow Guard units to concentrate solely on training. Bold Shift also 

The crew of an M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle engages a target with their 25-mm. Cannon at 

Yakima Training Center, Washington. (National Guard Bureau) 

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Army National Guard History

established the operational readiness evaluation, an inspection and training exercise that 

took stock of a Guard unit’s readiness and its ability to deploy quickly. (9) 

The Army’s rationale for emphasizing training at the lowest levels caused 

considerable concern in the ARNG. To the Army, Desert Shield had demonstrated that 

the three Roundout brigades were not immediately prepared for combat. ARNG soldiers, 

crews, and platoons may have performed well, but the Army believed brigade and 

battalions staffs were inadequately trained. Regulars maintained that the complex tasks 

of coordinating the combat arms into an integrated combined arms team on a fast paced, 

high technology battlefield was beyond the ability of Guard officers with limited time for 

training. By emphasizing small unit training in peacetime, the Army hoped to maximize 

the amount of training time available after mobilization to permit Guardsmen to master 

the difficulties of combined arms warfare. 

Many Guardsmen interpreted the Army’s arguments and new training strategy as 

a cynical ploy to discredit their major combat units at a time when massive force 

structure reductions were the hot topic at the Pentagon. By maligning the ARNG’s 

combat brigades and divisions, Guardsmen believed that the active Army was building 

the case for eliminating a peer competitor while retaining more of its own divisions on 

active duty. Guard commanders did not understand why the new training strategy 

focused on the small unit level — where soldiers’ jobs were the least complex and 

personnel turnover was the highest — instead of on higher staffs where tasks were more 

complicated and personnel stability more pronounced. Some suspected that by restricting 

Guard training to the small unit level, the Army was anticipating the wholesale stripping 

of Guard organizations for replacements in a national emergency as had occurred during 

the opening stages of the Korean War. At the same time, many Guard commanders 

welcomed Bold Shift’s emphasis on providing training support. Burdened by stressful 

personnel reductions and widespread unit reorganizations, many States were relieved to 

be free of the mundane tasks of preparing training plans and organizing training sites. 

Within three years, the Army reported near full compliance with most of Title 

XI’s provisions. However, personnel readiness still posed a significant challenge. The 

elimination of medical units and facilities during the post-Cold War drawdown made 

periodic medical and dental screening throughout the Guard impossible. In the end, 

medical resources were primarily focused on Guardsmen in early deploying units. 

Acquiring sufficient numbers of former active duty personnel to raise the experience 

level throughout the ARNG proved difficult. The accession of commissioned officers 

above the grade of captain, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel above the grade of 

sergeant became the priority. Soldiers leaving active duty during the drawdown were 

often attracted to the Guard, but as the pace of personnel cuts slowed, this source of 

manpower evaporated. (10) 

Project Standard Bearer 

In response to the flurry of post-Desert Storm reforms, the ARNG Directorate 

established Project Standard Bearer on November 1, 1991. The project’s purpose was to 

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Army National Guard History

develop, coordinate, and institutionalize policies and programs to ensure high priority 

Guard units were ready and fully capable of early deployment. In addition, Project 

Standard Bearer controlled many aspects of the Guard’s involvement in Title XI and 

Bold Shift. The original focus of Standard Bearer’s attention was the Roundout and 

Roundup brigades, but the project eventually included a large pool of combat support and 

combat service support units. (11) 

Standard Bearer initiated important personnel and equipment policies that resulted 

in the shifting of declining resources to high priority units. Standard Bearer required high 

priority units to maintain a 95 percent manning level of fully trained soldiers, and 

innovative recruiting and retention policies supported robust manning. By 1993, new 

recruits signing up in early deploying units received a $2,000 enlistment bonus. Standard 

Bearer units were required to have 100 percent of their equipment instead of the lesser 

equipping levels normally acceptable for deployment. Vehicles, weapons, and equipment 

from inactivating Regular and ARNG units filled armories and motor pools as 

logisticians further adjusted national equipment inventories to fill high priority units. In 

the States, Guardsmen in low priority units watched helplessly as increasingly scarce 

personnel and equipment resources migrated toward Standard Bearer units. Across the 

nation, Guardsmen once again complained of the “haves” and the “have nots,” the 

perceived disparity on resources between high and low priority units. (12) 

After Desert Storm, the Army organized its total inventory of support units to 

better sustain combat brigades and divisions deploying from CONUS. Desert Shield had 

taught planners the huge logistical demands of supporting a regional contingency, 

especially where weather and terrain were difficult and host nation support lacking. The 

Army developed the Contingency Force Pool to support the early deployment of the 

contingency corps and the movement of reinforcements. A key function of Project 

Standard Bearer was the selection and management of the Guard’s portion of new 

contingency force support units. The ARNG at first provided 192 combat support and 

combat service support units, but its complete commitment finally tallied 389 units. 

Initially, only 84 percent of selected units met the Army’s readiness standards for 

deployment, but Standard Bearer initiatives eventually allowed 97 percent of units to 

become mission ready. By 1993, the readiness of the ARNG’s contingency force support 

units exceeded that of those in the Regular Army or the USAR. Throughout the 1990s, 

the readiness of contingency force units remained a top ARNG priority. (13) 

The Counter-Drug War 

In the face of budget cuts at the end of the Cold War, senior military leaders were 

eager to consider alternative missions to increase the military’s value in the eyes of 

American taxpayers. At the end of the 1980s, Americans were deeply troubled over 

mounting crime and social ills attributed to increased drug usage and the massive flow of 

illicit narcotics into the country. President Bush declared a “war on drugs,” appointed a 

national “Drug Czar” and ordered DOD to bring its full weight to bear against the drug 

epidemic. At first, the Pentagon was a reluctant warrior. Military leaders were 

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Army National Guard History

concerned over the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 that prohibited 

Regulars from arresting drug offenders. Many commanders argued that full-time, 

counter-drug operations would divert their units from the primary mission of combat 

readiness. However, political and social pressures that favored the military’s 

involvement in the drug war finally prevailed. 

In reality, the Guard was already on the drug war’s front lines. As early as 1977, 

the Hawaii Guard had operated with State law enforcement officials to detect and 

eradicate marijuana fields. Four States reported ARNG counter-drug missions in 1983, 

and by 1988, thirty-two States had committed 4,042 Guardsmen to 456 counter-drug 

missions. With President Bush’s declaration of a war on drugs, it was natural for the 

National Guard to become DOD’s primary agency in providing domestic support to law 

enforcement agencies. The AGs and Guard commanders developed arrangements to 

accommodate the constraints of Posse Comitatus. No Guardsmen were to participate 

directly in making arrests or confiscating property but could provide direct support to 

police activities. (14) 

In 1989, Congress appropriated $300 million for the Pentagon’s drug war; $40 

million was specifically earmarked for the Guard. Several congressional provisos came 

with the funding. Each State was to develop drug interdiction plans for the use of ARNG 

soldiers and equipment subject to approval by DOD. Counter-drug operations were not 

to interfere with normal unit training, and no more than 4,000 Guard soldiers nationwide 

could participate at one time. To comply with the Posse Comitatus Act, only Guardsmen 

on State active duty would assist law enforcement. NGB established a Counter-Drug 

Directorate to provide guidance to the States, to manage a budget, and to perform longrange planning. Each State appointed a senior officer to coordinate Guard efforts with 

law enforcement agencies. (15) 

In 1990, the ARNG’s counter-drug activities increased dramatically. During the 

peak marijuana eradication season as many as 2,400 Guardsmen were on duty on any 

given day. All together, Guard troops participated in over 5,000 missions across the 

nation, including aerial and ground reconnaissance and surveillance and the inspection of 

commercial cargo at land border entry points, seaports, and international airports. Other 

support missions included the transport of law enforcement personnel and contraband, 

equipment loans and the use of high technology communications equipment, radar, night 

vision devices, and thermal imaging sights. In 1990 alone, Guard troops supported 

operations that resulted in 1,318 arrests, the eradication of 6.7 million marijuana plants, 

confiscation of $18 million in drug money, and the seizure of 34,000 pounds of cocaine. 

(16) 

The peak year for National Guard counter-drug activities was 1993. Congress 

dedicated $260 million in counter-drug funding to the Guard. To facilitate planning, 

DOD issued a list of sixteen standard missions the States could perform ranging from 

surveillance and interdiction to border crossing inspections. The States astride the major 

drug routes leading from Mexico, the Caribbean and Latin America into the country — 

Florida, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California — were at the forefront of the 

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Army National Guard History

counter-drug war. The ARNG Aviation Division organized special reconnaissance and 

interdiction flying units to support law enforcement agencies, and in 1993, ARNG aviators 

flew 46,000 hours during counter-drug missions. In 1993 alone, Guardsmen assisted law 

enforcement in arresting 69,000 drug traffickers and seizing caches of drugs with a total, 

estimated street value of $150 billion. The Guard’s successes prompted the conclusion that 

the inflow of drugs could be interrupted when adequate resources were available and 

effectively employed. (17) 

Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, the level of ARNG counter-drug activity 

remained nearly constant. Congressional funding averaged just over $200 million each year. 

Guard troops remained fully engaged in reconnaissance and surveillance and performed 

search and seizure missions at border crossings. New activities included the construction and 

improvement of roads along the southwestern border to assist the U.S. Border Patrol. 

Guardsmen became fully involved with drug demand reduction educational programs in their 

local communities. The ARNG instituted it own aggressive substance abuse program that 

used random, surprise drug testing to insure that soldiers remained drug free. (18) 

The Drawdown of 1992-1997 

President Bush’s Base Force speech on August 2, 1990 outlined steep cuts in the 

armed forces to accompany the change in the nation’s military strategy. The president called 

for cuts of up to 25 percent in the military, with active forces declining from 2.1 to 1.6 

million. President Bush assured the audience that reserves would still be important but “in 

new ways.” The need for a massive, national mobilization was diminished, argued the 

president, and adjustments in the “size, structure and readiness of our reserve forces” were 

necessary. (19) 

The Base Force outlined steep reductions in Army forces. At its post-Vietnam peak, 

the Army included eighteen Regular and ten Guard divisions organized into five corps. The 

Base Force demanded that the Army’s divisions be reduced by the mid-1990s to a total of 

twenty divisions in four corps. The number of active divisions was to fall from eighteen 

down to twelve, and ARNG divisions would decline from ten to eight. The Army “strongly 

believed” that twenty divisions was the “minimum force” required to meet the commitments 

inherent in the national defense. (20) 

The Base Force’s implications for the ARNG were ominous. Expected cuts would 

eliminate the gains made during the Reagan buildup and then some. Before the end of 1990, 

the Army directed the ARNG to plan for cuts of up to 137,000 troop billets. After Desert 

Storm, NGAUS and AGAUS reacted to planned Army Guard cuts by calling for the 

maintenance of the ARNG at a strength of 420,000 soldiers. At the same time, the Guard 

built a consensus in the States and on Capitol Hill against widespread Guard reductions. (21) 

Despite strong opposition to DOD’s plans, the Guard had already started to reduce 

troop levels. Before the Persian Gulf War, the ARNG Directorate had reduced troop strength 

in the northeast where shifting demographics no longer supported recruiting efforts. The 

ARNG’s three divisions in the northeast — the 42d Infantry (New York), the 26th Infantry 

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Army National Guard History 

(Massachusetts and Connecticut), and the 50th Armored (New Jersey and Vermont) — 

lagged in unit manning. A brigade of the 50th Armored was transferred from Vermont to 

Texas in 1988. A broader plan known as the “3 into 1” soon emerged that broke up two of 

the divisions, inactivated or restationed weak units and merged all remaining commands into 

a single division. To comply with Base Force cuts, the headquarters of the 26th and 50th 

Divisions were eliminated in 1993 and subordinate units either inactivated or reassigned. 

The 42d Division, with subordinate units from surrounding States, remained the only existing 

ARNG division between New York and Maine. (22) 

Much of the planning and execution of ARNG cuts occurred under the leadership of 

Maj. Gen. Raymond F. Rees, the new DARNG. A West Pointer and Vietnam veteran, 

General Rees came to the Pentagon from his post as the AG of Oregon. The Guard 

leadership in Washington, DC believed that significant cuts were inevitable and established 

criteria for unit reductions. Combat brigades with high readiness would be retained while 

organizations unable to maintain personnel strength would go. While General Rees sought to 

spread the pain of unit reductions equitably across the States, several powerful congressional 

delegations engineered minor cuts in their own districts. During 1991-1995, the ARNG was 

forced to cut over 70,000 citizen-soldiers. Unlike the McNamara reductions of the late 1960s 

that trimmed Guard troop authorizations, the post-Cold War cuts forced the outright 

elimination of units and personnel. In most States, unit reductions caused the near endless 

shuffling of remaining units and personnel among existing armories. For example, the 

elimination of the 30th Armored Brigade in western Tennessee forced the reorganization or 

relocation of nearly every unit in the Tennessee ARNG. (23) 

Table 8 

ARNG STRENGTH, 1991-2000 

YEAR STRENGTH 

1991 446,121 

1992 426,528 

1993 409,919 

1994 396,928 

1995 374,930 

1996 369,976 

1997 370,046 

1998 362,459 

1999 357,469 

2000 353,045 

PERSONNEL CHANGES 

-19,593 

-16,609 

-12,991 

-21,998 

-4,954 

+70 

-7,587 

-4,990 

-4,424 

(Source: National Guard Bureau, Annual Review, 1991-2000.) 

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One benefit of military downsizing was an increased flow of modern equipment 

to the ARNG. All types of vehicles, weapons, and equipment from Army divisions 

inactivating in Europe returned stateside for redistribution to active, Guard and Reserve 

units. In 1992, the ARNG opened six maintenance sites across the country where all 

types of equipment returning from Europe went for inspection, repair, refurbishment, and 

eventual redistribution. By the time the program terminated in 1998, Guard technicians 

had repaired and redistributed 6,948 vehicles and 11,850 items of equipment valued at 

$2.6 billion. Overall, the flow of excess equipment from Regular units to the ARNG, and 

the reallocation of Guard equipment inventories from inactivating to remaining units, 

greatly improved the Guard’s equipment readiness posture. By the end of the 1990s, the 

ARNG’s equipment readiness was at near peak levels. (24) 

Even as inactivating Guard units folded their colors, wrangling over the aggregate 

amount of ARNG reductions continued. However, by the end of 1993, the Army reached 

a preliminary consensus over the drawdown’s final extent. In a series of meetings known 

as “off-sites” because of their location in Washington, DC at various places outside the 

Pentagon, senior leaders from the active Army, the Guard, and the Reserves agreed on 

force structure and manning levels for the remainder of the decade. To create wide 

support and acceptance for the decisions reached, representatives from NGAUS, the 

Association of the United States Army, and the Reserve Officers’ Association attended 

the sessions as well. Off-site negotiations were the product of the Army’s self-interests. 

By 1993, many members of Congress had voiced their frustrations over the Army’s 

inability to resolve contentious issues and insisted that it was time for the Army to settle 

its own internal problems rather than using Capitol Hill as an arbitration forum. (25) 

Maj. Gen. John R. D’Araujo, Jr., the acting CNGB and the new DARNG 

established the Guard’s goals for the off-sites. A proud infantryman, General D’Araujo 

was a Vietnam veteran, the former commander of Hawaii’s 29th Infantry Brigade and an 

experienced Pentagon insider. His principle objective was to retain 367,000 Guardsmen 

on the rolls through the year 2000. The Army had threatened to decimate ARNG flying 

units, and General D’Araujo was determined to save the Guard’s critical helicopter assets 

and SF units. Last, he hoped to establish a precedent for insuring that Guard leaders were 

included in all Pentagon decision-making forums affecting the Guard. (26) 

The Regulars and the Army Reserve had their own goals. The active Army saw 

the opportunity to achieve reductions in the USAR and the ARNG, though not to the 

lower levels it desired. With reserve component reductions identified for the next several 

years, the Army could make better choices as to the number of troops and units to be 

retained on active duty. The Army Reserve wanted to refocus efforts on its primary role 

as a provider of combat support and combat service support assets and divest itself of 

unwanted combat units. (27) 

In October 1993, the Pentagon announced the results of the “Off-Site Agreement” 

during a televised press conference. The off-site’s final form gave much needed stability 

to the Guard’s future. Reserve component troop levels were to fall to a total of 575,000 

troops by 1999 and remain constant. The ARNG was allocated 367,000 soldiers and the 

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Army National Guard History

USAR 208,000. The Guard would provide the Army’s reserve combat forces while 

retaining an overall balanced force of combat, combat support, and combat service 

support units. The USAR was to surrender nearly all of its aviation and SF units to the 

ARNG, and in return, would receive many Guard support units. In all, the two reserve 

components agreed to swap nearly 12,000 troop billets. (28) 

The migration of units began in 1994 when the ARNG assumed responsibility for 

all reserve component SF Groups. A total of twenty-two combat and twenty-eight 

aviation units went from the USAR to the ARNG, and the Guard transferred 128 support 

units to the Reserves. By 1997, the ARNG had implemented the provisions of the OffSite Agreement. In the end, the ARNG retained its traditional posture as a balanced force 

that provided the nation’s reserve, ground combat power. (29) 

A major exception to the many contentious issues surrounding the drawdown was 

the migration of a large amount of the Army’s field artillery to the Guard. Desert 

Storm’s 100-hour war and the artillery bombardments that preceded it convinced the 

Army’s senior leaders of the necessity of retaining as much artillery as possible in the 

smaller, post-Cold War Army. But budget realities made it readily apparent that the 

retention of non-divisional artillery units on active duty was not affordable. A consensus 

developed in the artillery community that the Guard was fully capable of assuming the 

support, general support, and general support reinforcing artillery missions. The 

performance of ARNG artillery battalions in Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm bore 

Post-Cold War downsizing resulted in additional ARNG artillery units. Three M-109 selfpropelled howitzers from the New Jersey ARNG in action during annual training. (National 

Guard Bureau) 

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Army National Guard History

witness to the Guard’s artillery proficiency. Starting in 1995, the migration of 

nearly all of the Army’s non-divisional artillery into the ARNG commenced. In 

addition to retaining units identified for inactivation, the number of Guard artillery 

battalions actually grew, including two brigades that migrated from the USAR. By 

the time the realignment of artillery force structure was complete, approximately 70 

percent of the Army’s entire artillery assets were at home in the Guard. (30) 

The bulk of the ARNG’s force structure and personnel reductions were over 

by 1997. By any measure, the post-Cold War drawdown had been devastating. The 

ARNG lost 90,000 troops, shrinking from an all-time, historic high of 457,000 

soldiers in 1989 down to 367,000 personnel. The Guard lost the equivalent of two 

divisions and eleven combat brigades. Still, due to intense lobbying efforts in 

Washington and across the country, the Guard lost 64,000 authorized billets as 

opposed to the original, proposed cuts of 137,000. General Colin Powell later 

observed: 

Cutting the National Guard and the Reserves was even harder than base 

closings...When we tried to cut back to sensible levels, however, we had our 

heads handed to us by the National Guard and Reserve associations and 

their congressional supporters. We were threatening part-time jobs, 

armories and money going into communities. We managed some 

reductions, but could still save much more money on the Guard and 

Reserves without hurting national security. (31) 

However, the Guard’s success in avoiding or delaying cuts had its 

disadvantages. While saving units and soldiers’ careers, the extended drawdown 

challenged morale, hampered the recruitment and retention of quality personnel, and 

reduced opportunities for military education and promotions. 

The Bottom-Up Review 

General Powell’s strategic vision had provided the basis for defense planning 

starting in August 1990, but changing world events and the presidential election of 

1992 resulted in the Base Force’s hasty demise. In little more than three years, 

historic events forever changed the international order. The Soviet Union 

completely collapsed, Germany reunified, democracy took hold in Eastern Europe 

and Central America, and an Allied coalition successfully reversed Iraqi aggression. 

In 1992, Governor William J. Clinton of Arkansas challenged George Bush for the 

presidency. Regarding defense matters, Clinton pledged his support of reserve 

forces and the restructuring of military forces for a new era while promising 

additional cuts of billions of dollars from the defense budget along with 200,000 

more active duty personnel. 

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Army National Guard History

The Defense Department’s first, comprehensive critique of American 

strategy in the post-Cold War era came in September 1993 with the release of the 

“Bottom-Up Review” (BUR). Though General Powell remained on duty at the 

Pentagon, the BUR was clearly the product of the Clinton Administration’s new 

SECDEF, former Congressman Les Aspin. As the chairman of the House Armed 

Services Committee, Aspin had been a frequent, active critic of the Pentagon who 

took very seriously Congress’ constitutional responsibility for raising and 

maintaining the armed forces. Though a brilliant intellect, Aspin lacked the 

managerial and executive skills required to run the Pentagon. After a short, stormy 

tenure, Aspin resigned as SECDEF in February 1994 over the controversial conduct 

of American peacekeeping operations in Somalia. 

The BUR displaced the Base Force and provided a new focus for defense 

planning. With the threat from the Soviet Union gone, the BUR recognized four 

new dangers. First, the threat from the use and proliferation of nuclear, biological, 

and chemical weapons remained constant. A range of regional dangers persisted, 

from aggression by regional powers against their neighbors to internal conflicts 

prompted by ancient religious and ethnic animosities. The possible failure of 

democratic reforms in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere 

posed a danger to U.S. interests. Finally, America had to build a strong, 

competitive, and growing economy to reduce economic dangers that might threaten 

national security. (32) 

As the future basis for defense planning, the BUR declared that the U.S. had 

to field forces sufficient to fight and win “two nearly simultaneous regional 

conflicts.” North Korea and Iraq posed the most likely regional threats. The forces 

necessary to fight two wars were smaller than those contained in the Base Force. 

Overall, the armed forces would lose another 160,000 personnel, with the Army 

shrinking further from 12 to 10 active duty divisions. The BUR assumed Regulars 

alone could win one regional conflict, but ARNG combat brigades were required as 

reinforcements in order to deter or fight a second regional war. Aspin’s plan called 

for Guard combat units to be “better trained, more capable and more ready” than 

ever before. However, the BUR remained vague regarding the overall size of the 

ARNG. In a press briefing on September 1, 1993, Secretary Aspin announced the 

ARNG was to contribute 15 “enhanced readiness brigades” to the national defense 

while the number of ARNG “division equivalents” was to shrink from eight to 

something more than five. In the end, the BUR recommended that the ARNG should 

contain “about 37 brigades.” (33) 

In one fell swoop, the BUR eliminated the last remnants of the ARNG 

Roundout Program that had formed a key link between the ARNG and the Regular 

Army. Many Guard leaders saw the end of the Roundout Program as the logical but 

unfortunate conclusion to the Army’s handling of the 48th, 155th, and 256th Brigades 

during the Persian Gulf War. Disappointment over the elimination of the Roundout 

Program was compounded by the BUR’s lack of details regarding the composition 

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Army National Guard History

and missions of the new Enhanced Brigades (EB). Indeed, Les Aspin’s unveiling of 

the EBs surprised the ARNG Directorate in Washington, DC. (34) 

If the BUR ended the Roundout Program, subsequent action by the Pentagon 

in 1994 partly reaffirmed the ARNG’s historical role as the principle combat reserve 

of the Army. The Army authorized the retention of fifteen EBs and established the 

parameters for their employment. The EBs were to be organized and provided with 

the resources in order to train, mobilize, and deploy to a war zone within ninety 

days of mobilization. To fulfill the term “enhanced,” the brigades were to receive 

priority for manning, modernization, and training resources over the ARNG’s other 

major combat units. (35) 

The ARNG moved to select its fifteen EBs based on the criteria of readiness, 

modernization, manning, location, and past relationships with Army divisions. The 

first brigades selected were the former Roundout and Roundup brigades. Seven 

additional brigades and the ARNG’s only ACR filled out the remaining openings. 

In a mimic of the Roundout Program, a flow of new equipment, weapons, and 

vehicles into the EBs insured their compatibility with active divisions. The ARNG 

set optimum readiness goals for the brigades. By the end of 1999, all EBs were to 

achieve the highest readiness posture possible and be capable of deployment within 

ninety days of mobilization. (36) 

An M1 Abrams main battle tank from one of the ARNG’s Enhanced Brigades, South Carolina’s 

218th Brigade, prepares for action at the NTC. (National Guard Bureau) 

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Army National Guard History

Table 9 

THE ARNG’S FIFTEEN ENHANCED BRIGADES 

27th Infantry (NY) 53rd Infantry (FL) 

29th Infantry (HI, CA, OR) 76th Infantry (IN) 

30th Mechanized (NC) 81st Mechanized (WA) 

39th Infantry (AR) 155th Armored (MS) 

41st Infantry (OR) 218th Mechanized (SC) 

45th Infantry (OK) 256th Mechanized (LA) 

48th Mechanized (GA) 278th Armored Cav. Regt. (TN) 

116th Cavalry (ID, OR, MT, WY) 

(Source: NGB, Annual Review, 1994.) 

Less than two years after the release of the BUR, Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, 

General Powell’s successor as CJCS, outlined the specific details of America’s new 

military strategy. Shalikashvili advocated a plan of flexible and selective engagement to 

promote stability and thwart aggression around the globe. In addition to retaining their 

traditional missions of deterring and fighting wars, America’s armed forces would 

undertake the new mission of “peacetime engagement.” In short, peacetime engagement 

included a broad range of “non-combat” activities that demonstrated American 

commitment, improved collective security, promoted democratic ideals, relieved human 

suffering, and enhanced regional stability. To implement Shalikashvili’s vision, the U.S. 

military was to establish direct military-to-military contacts with foreign armies, continue 

participation in counter-drug and counterterrorism programs, conduct humanitarian relief 

operations, and take a more active role in international peacekeeping. (37) 

In reality, Shalikashvili’s strategy advocated many programs in which the ARNG 

was already fully engaged, including the counter-drug war and regional assistance to 

Central America. Dr. William J. Perry, the Clinton Administration’s new SECDEF after 

Les Aspin’s departure, was a great advocate of peacetime engagement and direct, 

military-to-military contacts. The National Guard’s involvement with other foreign 

military institutions, a trend that had started in the 1970s, expanded greatly. Lt. Gen. 

Edward D. Baca, the former AG of New Mexico and the first Guard general officer 

appointed directly from the position of State AG to CNGB, came to the Pentagon in 1994 

and advocated increased involvement with foreign armies through the National Guard’s 

State Partnership Program. By 1996, the ARNG in twenty-one States had created formal 

partnerships with an equal number of Central and Eastern European countries. To the 

military institutions of Europe’s new democracies, Guardsmen personified the desired 

ideal of a military force subject to civil authority. Guardsmen instructed their 

counterparts on the best ways to respond to civil emergencies and natural disasters, and 

European military leaders listened to advice on the methods of establishing reliable 

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Army National Guard History

reserve forces, recruiting quality soldiers, and coordinating activities with full-time 

forces. (38) 

Guardsmen as Peacekeepers 

Even before General Shalikashvili’s declaration of the strategy of peacetime 

engagement in 1995, Guardsmen had participated in peacekeeping operations. In 

December 1992, U.S. forces went to Somalia on the horn of Africa on a massive, 

humanitarian relief effort against starvation that quickly turned into a peacekeeping 

mission between warring clans. Before it was all over, U.S. ground forces became 

engaged in a series of intense firefights on the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital. 

American casualties generated congressional opposition that finally led to a withdrawal 

by May 1994. The ARNG became involved at the close of the Somali effort when 

special training teams deployed to Africa to instruct UN peacekeepers on the operation of 

older weapons systems, including the M-60 series tank and the AH-1 attack helicopter. 

Guard aviation specialists also assisted in the shrink-wrapping of helicopters for shipment 

home. (39) 

The ARNG‘s first significant involvement in peacekeeping occurred much closer 

to home. In 1994, the Clinton Administration moved to restore the legitimacy of the 

Missouri Guard soldiers from the 1107th Aviation Classification Repair Activity shrink-wrap an 

AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter in Haiti before shipment back to the United States. (National 

Guard Bureau) 

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Army National Guard History

president of Haiti who had been overthrown in a coup. A large, joint U.S. task force 

assembled off the coast of Haiti ready for an armed invasion. Fortunately, last minute 

negotiations by Clinton Administration peace envoys averted a conflict. American forces 

stormed into Haiti without firing a shot and deployed into rural and urban areas to restore 

order to a country wracked by anarchy. 

For the first time since the Persian Gulf War, the president exercised his authority 

to order Guard and Reserve soldiers to active duty. Hoping to minimize the effects of the 

callup on citizen-soldiers and their communities, the Pentagon directed that units be filled 

with volunteers before soldiers were involuntarily called. At the same time, the ARNG 

was eager to demonstrate that its units were entirely available and capable of deployment, 

even during a period of continued downsizing. Three ARNG military police companies, 

all completely filled with volunteers, served at CONUS Army posts performing the 

missions of Regular military policemen who had shipped out to Haiti. The Puerto Rico 

ARNG supported the Haiti mission by providing Camp Santiago as a training site for 

Caribbean coalition forces and other multi-national peacekeepers preparing for duty in 

Haiti. As the effort increased in size and duration, Guardsmen finally deployed to the 

Caribbean. Starting in February 1995, Guard soldiers from the 19th and 20th SF Groups 

and several aviation units served in Haiti. Guard aviators flew helicopter transport and 

observation missions while aviation support troops performed maintenance, air traffic 

control, and aircraft shrink wrap functions. SF citizen-soldiers served alongside their 

active duty counterparts, providing peace and security to the Haitian people. (40) 

With declining numbers of units and personnel on active duty, the Army explored 

the use of Guardsmen and Reservists to meet global peacekeeping obligations. As part of 

the Camp David Peace Accords of 1979, the U.S. had maintained a peacekeeping 

battalion along the Israeli-Egyptian border in the Sinai Desert since 1982. Over thirty 

infantry battalions had rotated through the Sinai on six-month peacekeeping tours 

designated as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO-Sinai). The Army’s new 

peacekeeping concept called for a composite battalion of Regular, Guard, and Reserve 

soldiers to go to the Sinai for six months. Reserve component soldiers would serve in a 

volunteer status, and the 29th Infantry Division assumed the responsibility for recruiting 

the nearly 400 Guard volunteers required. (41) 

Starting in February 1994, the composite unit formed and began training at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina. The Army designated the battalion as the 4-505th Parachute 

Infantry, and it formally activated on November 4th. Over 70 percent of the MFO-Sinai 

battalion consisted of Guardsmen. In the end, 401 Guardsmen from twenty-four States 

participated. The 4-505th Infantry served in the Sinai January-July 1995. Overall, the 

composite battalion was a genuine success largely due to extensive pre-deployment 

training and the effective blending of Regulars and citizen-soldiers. The MFO-Sinai 

battalion’s training regime eventually became a model for other Army units to emulate 

while preparing for peacekeeping duty. The 4-505th Infantry proved that ARNG 

peacekeepers were an effective means for the Army to meet its expanding peacekeeping 

commitments. (42) 

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Army National Guard History

The composite MFO-Sinai peacekeeping battalion on parade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina prior 

to deployment. (National Guard Bureau) 

Missions to Haiti and the Sinai foreshadowed the expanded use of Guard 

peacekeepers in the war torn Balkans. After the collapse of communism and the demise 

of the Soviet Empire, the multi-ethnic Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved. In June 1991, 

Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia, and months later 

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia seceded as well. In Belgrade, Serbian President 

Slobodan Milosevic was determined to impose his will on the seceding states through 

force of arms. Milosevic resolved to retain control over traditionally Serbian territory in 

the new, independent states while carving out a larger, united Serbia in the Balkans. 

Brutal conflict fed by ancient racial, religious, and ethnic hatreds erupted in 

Bosnia and Croatia. The world watched in horror as Serb forces encircled the Bosnian 

capital of Sarajevo and subjected the civilian population to shelling and small arms fire. 

In order to gain complete control of certain areas, the Serbs employed “ethnic cleansing,” 

the deliberate removal or elimination of the native Croat and Bosnian populations. World 

opinion, fueled by graphic media images that conjured up parallels between Serbian 

actions and Nazi atrocities during World War II, demanded an end to the fighting. The 

Clinton Administration exercised its political and military influence to get the warring 

factions to the peace table. On November 11, 1995, the belligerents finally agreed to a 

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Army National Guard History

Bundled up against the winter cold, ARNG peacekeepers go on patrol in the Balkans in 

December 1997. (Michael J. Kacmarcik) 

resolution of territorial disputes and initialed the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the 

fighting. The signing of a formal peace treaty occurred in Paris on December 14, 1995. 

A key aspect of the Dayton Peace Accords was the use of UN peacekeepers to 

oversee the enforcement of treaty provisions. Almost immediately, American heavy 

forces from Germany moved to staging areas in Hungary and deployed into Bosnia and 

Croatia. The UN supervised implementation of the Dayton Accords, was expected to last 

for twelve months. The extent of the Balkan commitment and the deep cuts in active 

forces since Desert Storm prompted the use of citizen-soldier peacekeepers. President 

Clinton ordered Guardsmen and Reservists to the Balkans for as long as 270 days, the 

maximum extent allowed under the revised presidential callup authority. In all, the 

Pentagon activated nearly 8,200 citizen-soldiers from all services, and the Army received 

authority to callup 7,800 reserve component soldiers. 

Beginning on December 14, 1995, the ARNG mobilized 2,087 troops in fiftythree different units from twenty-eight States. The majority of troops were in eight 

military police and two maintenance companies as well as nine public affairs 

detachments. The first units arrived in Europe as early as December 24th and prepared to 

stay on active duty for a full 270 days. Guard peacekeepers in Europe during 1996 

served at duty stations in Germany, Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia. (43) 

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Army National Guard History

To no one’s surprise, the Balkan peacekeeping effort extended into 1997 as the 

mission changed from treaty implementation to stability operations. The constant 

engagement of Regular Army forces in the Balkans required an even larger commitment 

of Guard soldiers to Europe. During 1997, 3,482 ARNG soldiers from forty-two States 

deployed to Europe, and their peacekeeping effort included several unique aspects. In 

August, sixty-five Guard aviators journeyed to Macedonia to lend support to active Army 

peacekeepers stationed on the Macedonian-Serbian border. In September, Company C, 

3-116th Infantry from the Virginia ARNG mobilized and began training for a bridge 

security mission at the town of Slavonski Brod on the Sava River between Croatia and 

Bosnia. The infantrymen eventually deployed to Europe and assumed responsibility for 

guarding the Sava River Bridge on November 1st. In April 1998, Company C 

successfully completed its mission and returned home to a rousing welcome in Leesburg, 

Virginia. One unit serving in Germany in 1997 — Oregon’s 41st Personnel Services 

Company — had deployed directly from Oregon to Europe. All reserve component units 

had previously moved to mobilization stations at either Fort Benning, Georgia or Fort 

Dix, New Jersey. However, NGB asked for and received permission to mobilize and 

deploy one unit under the control of a State headquarters. The home station mobilization 

of the 41st Personnel Services Company from Salem, Oregon proved that a State 

headquarters could serve as an effective mobilization platform while saving precious time 

and relieving the Army of a portion of its mobilization responsibilities. In subsequent 

callups for peacekeeping, home station mobilizations became routine. (44) 

The last two years of the 1990s saw the ARNG’s sustained commitment to 

peacekeeping operations in both the Balkans and the Persian Gulf. In 1998, nearly 2,000 

Guardsmen served in Bosnia. An additional 200 Guard aviators deployed to Kuwait to 

assist Allied forces in keeping an eye on Saddam Hussein. Peacekeeping efforts 

continued in 1999 with 865 Guard soldiers serving in Bosnia. Building on the success of 

Company C, 3-116th Infantry in Bosnia, the ARNG deployed four infantry companies — 

three from Arkansas’ 39th Brigade and one from Oregon’s 41st Brigade — to the Persian 

Gulf. The infantrymen served as the security force for Army Patriot air defense batteries 

stationed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. ARNG attack and utility helicopter units also 

deployed to the Gulf. Between 1994 and 1999, approximately 13,400 Guardsmen served 

in Haiti, the Sinai, the Balkans, and the Persian Gulf as peacekeepers, and world events 

all but insured that Guardsmen would remain fully engaged as global peacekeepers. (45) 

Increased Domestic Missions 

A nearly continuous string of natural disasters and domestic emergencies in the 

1990s kept the ARNG busy providing military support to civil authorities. While the 

Guard had always responded to domestic crises, the difficulties of the 1990s had unique 

aspects. A number of disasters were so remarkable for their size and intensity that, in 

some cases, they required a regional ARNG response rather than action by a single State. 

Additionally, a string of terrorist acts increased the ARNG’s role in combating domestic 

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Army National Guard History

terrorism and set the stage for the Guard’s increased involvement in defending the 

American people at home. 

The Guard’s first major challenge in domestic responses came in Los Angeles in 

April 1992 during the most violent and widespread urban rioting in America since the 

late 1960s. Racial tensions increased during the trial of several Los Angeles policemen 

charged with the roadside beating of African-American motorist Rodney King. When the 

jury rendered an acquittal in the case on April 29th, south central Los Angeles erupted. 

Governor Pete Wilson called out 10,336 California Guardsmen who performed valuable 

service in restoring order. Before the Guardsmen withdrew on May 10th, fifty-three 

people were dead and property loss was estimated at more than $800 million. Unlike the 

Watts riots of 1965 when less than 1 percent of the ARNG consisted of minorities, Guard 

units included a cross section of minority soldiers that reflected the racial diversity of 

southern California, a factor that many believed increased the Guard’s effectiveness in 

dealing with the citizenry. (46) 

Just four months later, the Florida National Guard found itself confronting one of 

America’s most serious natural disasters. On August 23, 1992, Hurricane Andrew tore 

across the southern tip of the Florida peninsula causing the most extensive property 

damage of any storm in U.S. history. Guardsmen on State active duty rushed in after the 

storm passed, and eventually 6,000 ARNG soldiers did important work in restoring order 

and preventing looting. The Regular Army deployed 20,000 troops to the region to 

provide shelter, medical care, food, and water. The Army wanted to federalize the 

Florida Guard to simplify the command structure and to increase the efficiency of federal 

operations. However, Guardsmen were performing important law enforcement work, and 

an order to active federal service would have invoked the Posse Comitatus Act and 

prevented Guardsmen from arresting lawbreakers. In the end, Florida Governor Lawton 

Chiles and CNGB won the argument, and Florida Guardsmen remained under State 

control until the recovery from the hurricane was complete. (47) 

Unusual weather conditions produced the Great Flood of 1993, the most severe 

flooding along the upper Mississippi River in the past 500 years. Before the waters 

subsided, a huge, inland lake flooded much of the upper Midwest, inundating farmlands 

and either sweeping away or threatening hundreds of communities. The Great Flood 

resulted in the mobilization of nearly 8,400 Guard troops from the Midwestern states 

bordering the Mississippi. Whether piling sandbags to reinforce levees or purifying a 

town’s drinking water, the presence of Guard soldiers had a significant, positive impact 

on flood ravaged areas. One effect of the large natural disasters of 1992-1993 was the 

creation of a nationwide network of interstate compacts between the states. The 

agreements allowed for the employment of Guards troops across State lines for mutual 

aid and support, and the Guard was given the legal authority to provide regional 

responses to acute disasters, whether natural or manmade. (48) 

Domestic terrorism emerged in the 1990s as a real threat to America’s internal 

security. The first dose of domestic terrorism occurred in February 1993 when Islamic 

fundamentalists exploded a powerful truck bomb at the World Trade Center complex in 

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Army National Guard History

lower Manhattan. At the same time, a white supremacist movement emerged in America 

that scorned gun control laws and expressed contempt for federal law enforcement 

agencies and various international organizations. Heavily armed, radical elements 

organized themselves into scattered “militia” groups that emphasized weapons handling, 

military tactics, and survival techniques. On April 19, 1993, a sensational, fiery assault 

by federal law enforcement agencies against the compound of the Branch Davidian 

religious cult in Waco, Texas became a symbolic rallying cry for radical groups opposed 

to the federal government. 

Two years to the day after the Waco assault, America experienced its worst act of 

domestic terrorism conceived and executed by a white militant with links to a militia 

group. On April 19, 1995, a truck bomb exploded outside of the Alfred P. Murrah 

Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City. A huge blast collapsed nearly half of the 

building, injuring over 400 and killing 168. Within hours, the Oklahoma National Guard 

was fully engaged. Military policemen cordoned off the area around the building while 

other Guard soldiers provided medical assistance and special equipment. Guard 

chaplains and family support officers helped grief stricken families cope with their losses. 

Staff Sergeant George Dugan, a member of the 445th Military Police Company from 

McAlester, Oklahoma, summed up a common sentiment: “I served in both Vietnam and 

Desert Storm, but neither compares to this destruction. We fought half a world away to 

stop things like this, and now it hits home right here in Oklahoma City.” Before it was all 

over, the Oklahoma National Guard had participated in every aspect of the rescue and 

recovery effort. (49) 

The following year, security for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta was 

unusually tight. To provide broad assistance and to deter further acts of terrorism, over 

13,000 National Guard personnel from forty-seven States supported the Centennial 

Olympic Games. Despite heightened security, a pipe bomb exploded during an evening 

concert killing one bystander and wounding several others. The Olympic bombing was 

another reminder of America’s vulnerability to domestic terrorism. (50) 

In response to the rising terrorist threat, Congress passed legislation in 1996 

charging DOD with the new mission of domestic antiterrorism. Of particular concern 

was the ability to respond quickly to terrorist acts employing chemical, biological, and 

explosive weapons of mass destruction against the civilian population. The National 

Guard was to support State and local organizations in the early stages of a catastrophic 

terrorist attack. With a wide variety of communications and logistics capabilities and 

trained personnel in each State and Territory, the ARNG was particularly well suited for 

the terrorist response mission. In nearly half the States, the AG was the primary 

executive for emergency management. A key component of the counter-terrorist mission 

was the creation near America’s major metropolitan areas of highly specialized ARNG 

Civil Support Teams that included chemical reconnaissance and decontamination 

capabilities. (51) 

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Army National Guard History

The ARNG in the Information Age 

Perhaps the most significant trend affecting American society throughout the 

1990s was the emergence of new computer and information management technologies. 

Americans spoke of the demise of the Industrial Age with its assembly lines and 

smokestack factories in favor of a new, computer based Information Age that ushered in 

improved communications and promoted electronic commerce. The personal computer, 

improved telecommunications equipment, and the Internet changed the way Americans 

worked and lived. In military circles, discussions about future warfare focused on an 

alleged “revolution in military affairs” wrought by the harnessing of computer power to 

warfare’s myriad tasks. The influence of technological advances on field forces and 

military administration was not restricted to active forces. New technologies improved 

ARNG training and allowed NGB to more effectively fulfill its mission as the channel of 

communication between the States and DOD. 

The first technological improvement to have a widespread affect on the National 

Guard was the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS). First proposed in 1988, 

the purpose of RCAS was to fully computerize mobilization planning and unit 

administration for both the ARNG and the USAR. The many administrative problems 

identified during Desert Shield highlighted the need for more compatible computer 

systems throughout the Army. Full fielding of RCAS hardware and software commenced 

in 1997 and is scheduled for completion by 2002. In its final configuration, RCAS is to 

be a fully automated information system that provides timely and accurate information 

for mobilization planning and improved administration. RCAS will ultimately link over 

10,500 ARNG and USAR units at over 4,000 sites in the fifty-four States and Territories 

as well as Europe and the Far East. RCAS has enabled ARNG peacekeepers in Bosnia to 

communicate directly with their States and has quickened more effective responses to 

domestic emergencies. (52) 

A major step forward in the ARNG’s harnessing of information technology 

occurred on April 22, 1993 with the opening of the new ARNG Readiness Center at 

Arlington Hall, Virginia. In addition to consolidating most ARNG functions in the 

Washington, DC area under one roof the Readiness Center serves as the high technology 

platform for all ARNG information systems. The modern building houses six mainframe 

computers and a network control center that manages the ARNG’s local area network, 

electronic mail, and data processing functions. The Arlington Hall complex serves as the 

nexus for fiber-optic cable communications and contains a state of the art video 

teleconferencing center with the ability to network with any other fiber-optic based 

facility in the world. (53) 

New technology has had a dramatic affect on ARNG training. Technological 

innovations have reduced the costs of increasingly expensive training and live fire 

exercises and made maximum use of limited training time. Guard soldiers have benefited 

from a wide variety of new simulators ranging from computer-driven conduct of fire 

trainers for tank and helicopter crews to command post exercises based on sophisticated 

software programs. A major step forward in harnessing new technology was the creation 

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Army National Guard History

of the ARNG Distance Learning Network that brought soldiers and instructors together 

through the power of fiber-optic cable. The advanced network allowed a shift from 

traditional classroom instruction conducted at a centralized location to the high 

technology distribution of quality instruction via fiber-optic cable that is accessible to 

troops in their local armories. By the end of the 1990s, the ARNG possessed one of the 

most advanced distance learning networks in the entire country. (54) 

A Rift Over Roles and Missions 

The stresses and strains of the military drawdown of the 1990s eventually caused 

the most serious deterioration in Army-Guard relations since the mobilization of 1940-

1941. Disputes between the Regular Army and the ARNG were the natural byproduct of 

intense competition for scarce resources. Despite the successes of the 1993 Off-Site 

Agreement, the smooth migration of Regular field artillery units to the Guard, and the 

respected performance of ARNG peacekeepers, wrangling over the final size and 

assigned missions of the post-Cold War ARNG all but unhinged the Total Force Policy. 

Any stability gained from the Off-Site proved short-lived; as it turned out, the agreement 

was only the first in a series of related steps to further reduce the Guard. Beginning in 

1995, Army-Guard relations sank to dangerous lows before improving at the end of the 

decade. 

The Army National Guard Readiness Center in Arlington, Virginia. (National Guard Bureau) 

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Army National Guard History

Significant disagreements stemmed from plans and policies regarding the 

ARNG’s fifteen EBs and eight divisions. Guardsmen believed that in a period of 

sustained force cuts and declining defense budgets that the Army viewed the ARNG as a 

peer competitor rather than a partner. To protect the number of its divisions remaining on 

active duty, Guardsmen believed the Army promoted the elimination of the ARNG’s 

major combat units. The Army’s treatment of the three Roundout brigades during the 

Persian Gulf War provided the basis for Guard leaders to question the Army’s motives. 

Despite the BUR’s guidelines for utilizing the EBs, the Army was slow to assign them to 

war plans, and even after the improvements of the Bold Shift Program, the Army 

questioned the brigades’ ability to be ready for deployment within ninety days. Guard 

senior commanders chafed at this barb against their units, especially when the Army had 

declared the 48th Brigade combat ready ninety-one days after mobilization during Desert 

Storm, well before the Bold Shift Program had come into being. During 1991-1996, no 

ARNG brigades were permitted to train at the NTC, an exclusionary policy that 

convinced Guard commanders of the Army’s bias against ARNG combat brigades and 

deepened the growing divide between Regulars and Guardsmen. (55) 

The Army ignored any suggestions for employing the Guard divisions, insisting 

they were little more than Cold War relics. Training resources for the divisions were 

constantly reduced. General Gordon R. Sullivan, the Army chief of staff, told the House 

Armed Services Committee early in 1992 that the Army “cannot train [ARNG] divisions 

to fight in less that 365 days.” In light of the various short war scenarios that formed the 

basis for most defense planning, the Army was implying that the Guard divisions would 

be irrelevant in future conflicts. Furthermore, General Sullivan’s pronouncement of “365 

days” to train a Guard division became a near mantra in the Pentagon, though the 

empirical evidence supporting the assertion was sparse. (56) 

Other factors contributed to the growing divide. In Washington, NGAUS and 

NGB leaders were routinely excluded from crucial decision making forums. In the 

States, a divisive “us and them” mentality often developed between Guardsmen and 

Regular Army advisers. Guard leaders maintained that full-time soldiers did not 

understand the unique difficulties of citizen-soldiers and often expected too much. Army 

advisers countered that Guard commanders did not understand Army training procedures 

and were not objective in their readiness evaluations. (57) 

Certain findings of DOD’s Commission on Roles and Missions in May 1995 

confirmed the Army’s suspicions about the relevance of ARNG fighting units. The 

commission confirmed that the Army questioned the readiness of the EBs and 

recommended policy changes and the commitment of additional resources to improve EB 

readiness. However, the commission stated that the eight Guard divisions “are not 

needed for the current national security strategy” and advocated their elimination or 

reorganization. The Army maintained that a shortage of 60,000 support troops existed to 

implement the BUR’s “nearly simultaneous” two-war strategy. All together, the Guard 

divisions included approximately 110,000 personnel spaces. The Commission on Roles 

and Missions recommended that the Army convert 60,000 troop billets in the Guard 

divisions to support units and eliminate the remaining 50,000 positions. (58) 

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Army National Guard History

The commission’s recommendations left Guard leaders breathless. The 26th and 

50th Divisions had already been eliminated earlier in the decade, and the outright loss of 

the remaining eight divisions was unthinkable. Still, two separate views emerged on the 

need for the ARNG to provide more support units. One group clung fast to the Guard’s 

traditional role as the Army’s primary combat reserve. The Guard divisions were needed 

as a strategic reserve, to respond to domestic emergencies, and to provide forces for 

extended peacekeeping operations. Reduced training budgets for divisional units and the 

Army’s need for more support troops were interpreted as ploys to eliminate the Guard 

divisions. Others argued for the continued relevance of the ARNG in defense planning 

by converting a portion of the divisions to support units. Both sides agreed that the 

ARNG could not be relegated to the marginal role of a home constabulary called out only 

for natural disasters and domestic emergencies. (59) 

In the end, Guard senior leaders decided to provide more support units and 

formed the ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS) to examine the conversion of low 

priority, divisional combat units to more critical support forces. The ADRS group 

concluded that up to twelve combat brigades — the equivalent of four divisions — were 

available for conversion. The Army approved the ADRS plan in May 1996, but the $5 

billion needed to implement the conversions was slow to appear. In December 1998, the 

ARNG identified combat brigades from California, Nebraska, and Indiana as the first 

three to convert to support units starting in 2001. (60) 

In 1997, the Defense Department conducted the congressionally mandated 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the fourth comprehensive analysis of defense 

planning since the end of the Cold War. The QDR, under the leadership of Defense 

Secretary William S. Cohen, built upon previous reviews to examine America’s defense 

needs through 2015. While endorsing the basic strategy of fighting two “nearly 

simultaneous” regional conflicts, the QDR offered a broader strategic vision. DOD 

outlined three tenets of American strategy; to shape the strategic environment in 

accordance with U.S. interest, to respond to a full spectrum of threats, and to prepare for 

future dangers. American forces were to exploit the advantages of new computer 

technology to dominate the battlefield. At the same time, the services were to find the 

resources to continue important modernization initiatives even as more and more defense 

dollars were diverted to peacekeeping operations. (61) 

The QDR’s findings regarding the Army and the ARNG set off a storm of 

controversy that eventually beat a path to the White House. The Army was to retain ten 

divisions on active duty while absorbing losses of an additional 15,000 soldiers. At the 

same time, the ARNG and the USAR were to lose 45,000 more troops. The QDR 

reaffirmed the role of the fifteen EBs as outlined in the BUR but stopped short of 

endorsing the elimination of ARNG divisions. Instead, the QDR recognized combat 

support, strategic reserve, and domestic missions for the divisions while still mandating 

the elimination of thousands of Guard personnel slots. (62) 

Hopeful that the drawdown of the 1990s was finally behind them, the Guard’s 

senior leaders were chagrined with the QDR’s recommendations for additional cuts. In 

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Washington, the Guard’s primary response came from a new DARNG, Maj. Gen. 

William A. Navas, Jr. A Vietnam veteran and Puerto Rico Guardsman, General Navas 

had been instrumental in creating the successful Fuertes Caminos program in Central 

America in the 1980s and became DARNG after serving nearly ten years in various 

senior staff assignments within NGB and DOD. He was disturbed that while the ARNG 

had been allowed to participate in some aspects of the Army’s QDR staffing process it 

had been completely excluded from any meaningful role in the Army’s actual decision 

making process. Furthermore, he suspected that the Army intended to use resources 

garnered from reserve component cuts to fund its own modernization programs. NGAUS 

had warned that without Guard participation, the QDR results might be “extremely 

detrimental” and “possibly disastrous” for the Guard. Five former CNGBs wrote to 

Secretary Cohen asking that Guard officers be included in QDR study groups. 

Congressman Sonny Montgomery had retired in 1996, and Guard leaders suspected that 

the Army sensed an opportunity to cut the ARNG further while its influence on Capitol 

Hill was weakened. (63) 

A showdown between the Guard and the active Army occurred at Oklahoma City 

on May 2, 1997 when senior Army generals announced the details of proposed QDR cuts 

at an annual meeting of AGAUS. The vice chief of staff of the Army informed the 

assembled AGs that the Defense Department had directed Guard cuts of 67,000 troops. 

The AGs objected vehemently, arguing that neither DOD nor the Army had provided 

rationale or justification for such large and disproportionate cuts and demanded a meeting 

with Secretary Cohen. Furthermore, the AGs suspected that the real impetus for the 

recommended cuts had come from the Army’s senior leadership and not from DOD. 

Perhaps not fully aware of the consequences of their own words, the Army’s 

representatives insisted that the AGs “go through their chain of command” and avoid a 

meeting with the Defense Secretary. The AGs returned home, reported to their civilian 

leaders, and within a week, a letter went to President Clinton signed by a large number of 

Governors inquiring as to why DOD was making questionable decisions without proper 

analysis and consultation with the Guard. (64) 

The result of the AGs’ protests was another off-site meeting between senior 

Guard and Army leaders at Fort McNair in Washington, DC during June 2-4, 1997. The 

CNGB. Lt. Gen. Baca, and the DARNG, Maj. Gen. Navas, represented the Guard during 

negotiations to determine force cuts among the Regular Army, the ARNG, and the 

USAR. Maj. Gen. Ronald O. Harrison, the AG of Florida, and Maj. Gen. Richard C. 

Alexander, the AG of Ohio, represented the interests of the States. (General Harrison 

would eventually serve as NGAUS president and General Alexander as the full-time, 

executive director of the association.) The main issue was the allocation of 45,000 troop 

losses among the two reserve components. The Army proposed that 38,000 cuts come 

from the ARNG and 7,000 from the USAR. Regular and Army Reserve generals argued 

that the USAR had absorbed disproportionate cuts and divested itself of irrelevant units 

in the 1993 Off-Site Agreement; now it was time for the ARNG to do the same. After 

tough and tense negotiations, the participants reached a compromise. Between 1997 and 

2000, the USAR would surrender 3,000 troop spaces and the ARNG 17,000. Army 

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Army National Guard History

The National Guard Memorial at One Massachusetts Avenue in downtown Washington, DC 

servers as NGAUS headquarters. (National Guard Education Foundation) 

planning processes that considered programs for the years beyond 2001 would determine 

the disposition of the remaining 25,000 troop reductions between the Guard and the 

Reserves. By 2000, the ARNG honored the QDR off-site agreement by trimming an 

additional 17,000 troop spaces from its force structure without inactivating any large 

units and by sharing the burden among the States and Territories. (65) 

The ARNG in 2000 

At the very end of the 20th Century, the ARNG consisted of 353,045 soldiers 

assigned to fifteen EBs, eight divisions, two separate brigades, two SF Groups, one Scout 

Group and hundreds of combat support and combat service support units. The EBs and 

contingency force support units remained the ARNG’s highest priority units. In sharp 

contrast to previous periods, the ARNG had a high level of experience in the ranks; 

nearly 60 percent of Guard soldiers had prior service in the Regular Army. Of the entire 

force, minority participation stood at 25.9 percent. Black troops represented nearly 16 

percent of the ARNG while women comprised just under 10 percent and Hispanics 7 

percent. Significant gains occurred in the 1990s in minority representation among the 

Guard’s senior leadership. By the end of the decade, six AGs were either black or 

Hispanic, and in 1997, the National Guard received its first female AG when the Vermont 

legislature selected Air National Guard Maj. Gen. Martha T. Rainville as the State’s AG. 

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Army National Guard History

Lt. Gen. Baca served as the first Hispanic CNGB during 1994-1998, and in August 1998, 

Lt. Gen. Russell C. Davis, an Air National Guard general officer and the former 

commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard, became the first black 

general officer to serve as CNGB. (66) 

Despite the ARNG’s important contributions to national defense in the 1990s, it 

finished the decade a much smaller force. Out of a total defense appropriation of $280.9 

billion in 2000, ARNG funding was only $7 billion, representing less than 10 percent of 

the Army’s entire budget and only 2.5 percent of DOD’s. In force structure and manning, 

the ARNG was much smaller than before the Persian Gulf War. Authorized troop 

positions declined from 477,000 in 1989 down to 388,000, a loss of nearly 19 percent. 

Cuts in actual troop strength were even greater. From an all time high manpower level of 

457,000 in 1989, the ARNG lost 107,000 personnel by 2000, a reduction of over 23 

percent. Because of increasing concerns over declining military readiness, DOD 

announced in December 1999 that the 25,000 reserve component troop reductions 

remaining from the QDR would be deferred. (67) 

The ARNG remains vital to U.S. peacekeeping efforts around the globe. A total 

of 2,652 Guardsmen performed peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Southwest Asia 

during 2000. Several hundred Guard soldiers also deployed into Kosovo in the aftermath 

of NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia and Serb forces in Kosovo. The most 

significant development occurred on March 7th when the 49th Armored Division 

Headquarters from Texas assumed command responsibilities for the American sector in 

Bosnia. The 49th Armored Division was the first ARNG division headquarters to deploy 

to Europe on an operational mission in nearly fifty years. Not since the Korean War, 

when the 28th and 43rd Divisions deployed to West Germany, had a Guard division seen 

service in Europe. Pentagon planners have scheduled the deployment of additional 

ARNG combat forces to the Balkans by the end of 2002. (68) 

At the beginning of a new millennium, the ARNG Directorate in Washington, DC 

continues its work under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Roger C. Schultz. An Iowa 

Guardsman, General Schultz became the first DARNG to wear three stars with his 

promotion to lieutenant general on June 13, 2001. The increase in rank was intended to 

make the position of DARNG commensurate with the principle general officer staff 

positions on the Army Staff and to give the ARNG improved access to Army 

deliberations. Across the nation, the ARNG is engaged in a number of other important 

missions. The EBs and high priority support units focus their planning and training on 

possible participation in two “nearly simultaneous” regional conflicts. Guard soldiers 

continue to participate in the counter-drug war and perform valuable service in the States 

during emergencies. The Guard’s role in defending the American people against terrorist 

attacks employing weapons of mass destruction continues to increase. (69) 

For the most part, Army-ARNG relations appear to be improving. The Guard 

plans to convert as many as nine additional combat brigades to support structure by 2012 

in order to meet the Army’s need for more support units. In 1999, the Army activated 

two “Integrated Divisions” that placed six EBs under the training and readiness oversight 

316 
Army National Guard History

of two Regular Army headquarters. The “Division Teaming” concept has created direct 

training affiliations between four ARNG and four active duty divisions. The creation of 

composite support units, consisting of Regulars, Guardsmen, and Reservists, has brought 

the Army’s components into closer harmony. In 1996, a command exchange program 

began when a Regular officer took command of a Guard artillery battalion. The initiative 

proved mutually beneficial, and in January 2000, an ARNG armor officer assumed 

command of an active duty tank battalion. (70) 

Beyond the 1990s, the ARNG’s service to the nation and the States will remain 

vital. However, the ARNG’s future contributions to the common defense can only be 

fully understood within the context of a broader analysis of the National Guard’s 

development and service during the past 400 years. 

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Army National Guard History

Mr. Thomas A. Hill 

A Lifetime of Guard Service 

Thomas A. Hill has proven over a lifetime of 

distinguished service that the functioning of the 

National Guard depends very much upon its civilian 

work force. He has been a civilian employee of 

NGB from the earliest days of the Cold War and has 

served in the ARNG Directorate during every 

national emergency since the Korean War. 

Tommy Hill was born in Wilkes-Barre, 

Pennsylvania in 1919. raduating from high 

school he eventually worked for the Department of 

the Interior in Washington, DC. n 1940, he took a 

position with the War Department but soon left to 

enlist in the Army. . Hill got his first experience 

with the National Guard when he was assigned to 

the 29th Infantry Division. he observed the 

close-knit in Guard units. 

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, his regiment moved to Washington to provide security 

around federal buildings. n April 1942, he was assigned to the War Department where 

he served for the remainder of the war. 

In July 1946, Tommy Hill accepted civilian employment with the Army in the 

Pentagon. officers were so impressed with his expertise and enthusiasm that they 

offered him a job. at work with the ARNG was October 1, 1948, the same 

day the NGB staff was split into Army and Air National Guard components. 

than fifty years of continuous service, Mr. Hill still guides training activities. While he 

has supervised a number of projects, he is proudest of the role he played in establishing 

State Officer Candidate Schools. n 1950, only four States had their own commissioning 

programs, and by the early 1960s, each State had its own school. Tommy Hill also 

contributed to the success of overseas training exercises by developing goals and 

guidelines used to make the deployments a more rewarding experience for ARNG 

soldiers. 

In addition, to his formal duties, Tommy Hill has been friend and mentor to 

generations of Guard officers and civilian employees, and has served as advisor and 

confidant to senior NGB leaders. r person has served longer or made greater 

contributions to the ARNG Directorate. 

After g

I

Mr

Here 

ties that abound 

I

NGB

His first day

After more 

I

No othe

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Army National Guard History

CHAPTER 10 

The National Guard In Review 

Sound military institutions are organic growths and not structures. A sound national 

defense system is not like a tower of brick and stone that can be built de novo on 

the surface of the ground. It is, rather, like a living tree with roots deep in the 

political tradition and history of a nation. It is the province of the military statesman, not 

to invent something new, but to improve a living thing that already exists. 

Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer 

The National Guard’s Core Characteristics 

Since the creation of the first militia regiments in 1636, the National Guard has 

been a continuous and substantial presence in the American defense establishment. 

Borrowing from John McAuley Palmer’s metaphor that likens military institutions to 

living organisms, today’s ARNG stands as the oldest and most mature living tree among 

the country’s military organizations. The physical components of a strong, flourishing 

tree aptly correspond to the ARNG’s past, present, and future. The roots of the 

organization dig deep into American history, providing an immovable anchor and 

drawing nourishment from the Guard’s long traditions, values, and service. The trunk 

represents the current generation of Guard soldiers who provide steady, reliable service 

and protect the main body of the organization by responding resolutely to various 

challenges. Outstretched limbs that shoot skyward seeking sunlight and nourishment, all 

the while buffeted by the winds of change, are symbolic of the ARNG’s journey toward a 

hopeful future. 

An awareness of the National Guard’s core characteristics is necessary for a 

thorough understanding and appreciation of the full significance of the Guard’s important 

role in history. First and foremost, the National Guard has almost always relied upon 

volunteer citizen-soldiers to fill its ranks. Only the enrolled militia derived its 

membership from mandatory service. Since the 1840s, when volunteer militia companies 

became widespread, citizen-soldiers have offered freely of their time and service. 

Throughout the Guard’s history, motivated citizen-soldiers have volunteered for many of 

the same reasons--the fondness of a military lifestyle, opportunities for self-improvement 

and adventure, a sense of camaraderie and friendship, family traditions, and the 

satisfaction of genuine service to their local community, State and nation. In all 

probability, if today’s ARNG men and women had the opportunity to mingle with the 

minutemen of Lexington and Concord, both groups might be surprised at the common 

values of duty, patriotism, and selfless service shared among them. 

ARNG members are volunteer citizen-soldiers who covet their rights as citizens 

as much as they do their responsibilities as soldiers. As citizens, they exercise the right to 

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Army National Guard History

share views on defense matters with the American people and their elected 

representatives. In contrast, Regulars accept restraints on their full right of citizenship in 

order to honor the sacred tradition of civilian control over the military. As soldiers, 

Guard men and women willingly sacrifice a portion of their work and personal lives to 

participate in the training required to learn and hone soldier skills. The early militiaman 

was a symbol of public virtue, a citizen-soldier willing to lay aside private concerns in 

times of public need and to risk all, even his life, for the general welfare. Militia service 

demonstrated a commitment to the community and to the maintenance and protection of 

social order and values. Today, the men and women of the ARNG cling just as proudly 

to their status as citizen-soldiers as did the early militia. 

Civic and military leaders desiring to better understand the fundamental reasons 

for the ARNG’s existence have no further to look than the U.S. Constitution. Article I, 

Section 8 authorizes the militia “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections 

and repel Invasions.” Since 1789, all efforts to maintain and employ the militia, the 

National Guard and the ARNG have related directly to the three missions mandated in the 

Constitution. Starting with the Militia Act of 1903, key legislation, executive orders, and 

court rulings throughout the 20th Century have allowed the National Guard to mobilize in 

a timely manner and deploy anywhere in the world in support of the nation’s military 

strategy. Short of war, the president’s current executive authority to mobilize Guard 

soldiers for up to 270 days assures their full participation in Army operations worldwide. 

From the time of the earliest English settlements, American citizen-soldiers have 

engaged in local and national defense matters. The colonial militia protected local 

settlements and formed units for more ambitious military ventures. Since the ratification 

of the Constitution, the National Guard has enjoyed a formal, dual status as a federal and 

a State force. As a federal force, the Guard provides ready, trained units as an integral 

part of America’s field forces. In its State role, the Guard protects life and property and 

preserves peace, order, and public safety under the direction of State and federal 

authorities. In times of peace, the Governors serve as the commanders in chief of their 

respective National Guards. ARNG soldiers ordered to active duty during national 

emergencies serve under the federal chain of command that ultimately ends with the 

president. The dual nature of the ARNG has always been and still remains one of its 

fundamental pillars. 

The Guard’s Greatest Contributions 

As America’s oldest military institution, the National Guard has contributed to the 

nation’s defense by consistently providing additional troops and units during national 

crises. Early Spanish troops and milicias in Puerto Rico, Florida, and New Mexico were 

the first to introduce European military systems to North America. However, it was the 

English militia system that took root and ultimately determined the shape of the country’s 

policies and practices regarding citizen-soldiers. During the colonial period, militiamen 

acted as a local defense force to protect new settlements against Indian attacks. When a 

state of war existed between whites and Native Americans, the militia conducted reprisal 

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Army National Guard History

raids. Local militiamen formed the basis of colonial provincial units organized for 

sustained offensive operations against the French and Spanish. By protecting settlements 

in the New World, the militia guaranteed the successful English colonization of North 

America. 

The enrolled militia played a central role in the winning of the American 

Revolution and in the establishment of the United States. The militia in New England 

opened the war with the fights at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Afterwards, 

militiamen provided the troops for the creation of the Continental Army, and State troops 

from the various Continental lines sustained the Army throughout eight years of war. 

The militia excelled at turning out large numbers of troops on short notice, a 

characteristic that successfully foiled British plans at Boston and Saratoga. Militiamen 

provide vital augmentation to the Continental Army at crucial periods and formed the 

bulk of the American forces in the bloody, southern campaigns. In addition to the 

opening blows in New England, Saratoga, Bennington, Cowpens, and King’s Mountain 

were important militia victories. Militia outposts and raiding parties constantly nipped at 

the heels of the British Army. By controlling the populations and the countryside, the 

militia sustained support for the Patriot cause and dampened Loyalist sentiments. The 

militia’s greatest contribution was its part in the winning of the American Revolution. 

Perhaps no other group of American citizen-soldiers has achieved so much by continuing 

to fight under the most arduous circumstances. 

Throughout the 19th Century, the militia continuously performed a wide range of 

functions. As Americans moved west, citizen-soldiers provided security to settlers, first 

beyond the Appalachians and then into the vast expanses west of the Mississippi. Despite 

its mixed performance in the War of 1812, the militia helped to put to rest once and for 

all the question of resurgent British influence over America. Militiamen provided the 

basis for many of the volunteer regiments that fought the Mexican and Civil Wars. In 

1861, volunteer militia companies were the first to take up arms for the North and the 

South and largely fought the Civil War’s first major battle at Bull Run. State soldiers 

rallied at crucial times during America’s bloodiest war to defend their home territories. 

Starting in 1877, militiamen performed long-term service as strikebreakers, distasteful 

duty that caused many State soldiers to seek a new role as the primary combat reserve of 

the Army. During the Spanish-American War, State soldiers formed the bulk of the 

troops sent to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The performance of militiamen in the 

Caribbean and the southwest Pacific made a convincing argument that State soldiers 

could participate effectively in extended, overseas campaigning. 

In the first half of the 20th Century, the National Guard provided large numbers of 

troop units for bloody battles fought in Europe and the Pacific. Even before the World 

Wars, Guardsmen manned the nation’s coastal defenses and in 1916 protected American 

interests during a serious confrontation with Mexico. After America’s entry into World 

War I, Guard units deployed to Western Europe to help support the exhausted Allies. 

Eighteen Guard divisions constituted a significant portion of the AEF’s combat power in 

France, and in savage operations around Paris, at St. Mihiel, and in the Meuse-Argonne, 

Guardsmen helped to convince Germany’s war lords that they could not win the war. 

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Army National Guard History

Guard units deeply embedded in America’s local communities provided social stability 

during the Great Depression and helped the country to endure severe economic 

deprivations. During World War II, Guardsmen in nineteen divisions and countless 

numbers of separate combat, combat support, and combat service support units saw 

action in every major campaign. Guard units bore a high share of the burden of the 

initial, bloody fighting in the Philippines, New Guinea, North Africa, and Sicily and 

fought on to total victory in Europe and the Pacific. 

The ARNG participated to varying degrees in all of the armed conflicts of the 

Cold War and helped to prevent the outbreak of a third, global war. During the Korean 

War, Guardsmen fought in Korea, bolstered NATO’s defenses in Europe, and enhanced 

the Army’s strategic reserve in CONUS. During the Berlin Crisis, President Kennedy 

mobilized Guardsmen as a political signal to the Soviets of U.S. resolve. Missile Age 

minutemen manned air defense sights to detect and intercept possible attacks by Soviet 

bombers against the American homeland. Individual Guard volunteers served in Vietnam 

during the war’s early years, and the Johnson Administration called up a limited number 

of ARNG units after the Pueblo crisis and the Tet Offensive in 1968. As the war raged in 

Southeast Asia, Guardsmen controlled race and anti-war riots in many of America’s 

major cities. In a period akin to the militia’s long involvement with labor strife starting 

in 1877, the ARNG served extensively as a domestic law enforcement agency between 

1957 and 1970. Starting with the mobilization of the Arkansas National Guard in 1957 

and ending with the tragic Kent State shootings in 1970, Guardsmen enforced integration 

laws, controlled race riots, and endured the abuses of antiwar protesters for nearly fifteen 

years. In the 1980s, a revitalized ARNG with more modern weapons and equipment and 

the highest personnel levels in its history trained to defeat a Soviet blitzkrieg in Central 

Europe. At the same time, Guard support units maintained an important presence that 

promoted democracy in Central America. 

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union three 

years later ended the Cold War and ushered in an era of international relations rife with 

complexities and uncertainties. During the Persian Gulf War, ARNG units served in 

Southwest Asia, reinforced Europe, and strengthened the nation’s strategic reserve 

against surprises elsewhere around the globe. A new, national security strategy of 

peacetime engagement required the Army to deploy troops to global trouble spots, and 

Guard soldiers served as peacekeepers in Haiti, Somalia, and in the Sinai Desert. Starting 

in 1996, Guard units deployed to the Balkans to support UN efforts to bring peace to one 

of the world’s most conflicted regions. Since then, the ARNG has greatly expanded its 

peacekeeping commitment to the Balkans, deploying troops into war torn Kosovo and 

acting as the Army’s controlling headquarters in the region. At the same time, 

Guardsmen participated fully in the recoveries from the largest domestic calamities of the 

1990s: Hurricane Andrew, the Midwestern floods, and the Oklahoma City bombing. As 

the 20th Century comes to a close, the ARNG maintains peacekeepers in the Balkans and 

in Southwest Asia, trains to keep its combat and support units ready for unexpected 

emergencies, and is increasing its ability to protect the American people against attacks 

from weapons of mass destruction. 

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The National Guard’s Transformation 

Since the nation’s earliest beginnings, citizen-soldiers have displayed an innate 

ability to adapt to constantly changing circumstances while providing meaningful 

capabilities to America’s defense needs. For nearly 400 years, State soldiers have 

successfully responded to the dynamic social, political, and economic conditions that 

fashion and shape American society. The constant evolution of defense policy and steady 

advances in the technology and methods of warfare have always prompted Guard soldiers 

to implement a bewildering array of changes in unit organization, weapons, equipment, 

logistics, administration, and training. 

The early militia system served as both a training base and a reservoir of 

manpower and required the service of all available, white males ages 16-60. The typical 

militiaman was a yeoman farmer tilling the soil in an effort to eke out a living for himself 

and his family. The local company was the militia’s organizational foundation, and the 

company commander served as the chief recruiting officer and provided the most vital 

leadership. Citizen-soldiers elected their company officers while the Governors 

appointed more senior officers up to the rank of colonel. The central focus of militia 

training was to produce an armed, equipped, and trained individual for local defense. 

Rudimentary training occurred during periodic, local musters. On less frequent training 

days, battalions and even regiments assembled to practice the battle tactics of the day. 

Village commons and designated training fields outside of towns served as muster sites 

and training facilities in the days before local armories and Army training centers. 

During combat operations, militiamen adapted their tactics to the terrain of the 

New World and to the capabilities of Native Americans and European competitors. 

Originally armed with mostly blade weapons, the enrolled militia quickly adopted 

flintlock muskets when they appeared. The militia was a local defense force, and in an 

agrarian society, citizen-soldiers were able to mount only limited offensive operations 

timed around the annual planting and harvesting cycles. As the population grew and the 

economy became more complex, men were available either through volunteerism or a 

militia draft, and the colonies mounted more extended operations against competing 

European powers. Militiamen joining provincial units may have received additional 

training from more experienced leaders before embarking on an expedition. The New 

England militia army that captured the French bastion at Louisbourg in 1745 personified 

the militia’s ability to generate offensive power when needed. Massachusetts’ citizensoldiers at Lexington and Concord in April 1775 represented the zenith of the militia as a 

local defense force. 

The evolution of the early militia into the modern ARNG has occurred during 

three major periods of transformation. The first major evolution was the decline of the 

enrolled militia and the rise of the volunteer militia. The Industrial Revolution and 

Jacksonian democracy created major social, political, and economic shifts that the 

enrolled militia was unable to withstand. As longstanding threats from Native Americans 

and other European powers diminished, urban laborers viewed militia service as 

burdensome and unnecessary. The States proved either unwilling or unable to manage 

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effectively the large numbers of enrolled militiamen that compulsory service produced. 

By the 1840s, volunteer militia companies had replaced the enrolled militia as an 

effective military force. Instead of being compelled to participate in musters and 

training, volunteer militiamen shared a fondness for a military lifestyle and an interest in 

service to their local community. Groups that shared common values and social status 

bonded together in militia companies for enjoyment and camaraderie as much as military 

service. Just as in the enrolled militia, the company was the backbone of the volunteer 

militia, and members elected their officers. Volunteer militiamen distanced themselves 

from the undifferentiated masses of the last remnants of the enrolled militia by forming 

specialized units such as grenadiers, light infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Companies 

adopted extravagant uniforms and inspirational names that stressed their martial ardor. 

City dwellers replaced the yeoman farmer as the typical militiaman, and companies were 

located largely in urban centers. With only limited assistance from the federal and State 

governments, militiamen paid dues, provided their own uniforms and equipment, and 

hosted fundraising events to garner the necessary resources to sustain their units. 

Because volunteer companies were recreational and social outlets as much as military 

organizations, units met frequently to plan events, and the practice of militiamen 

gathering at a central location one night per week became commonplace. For the first 

time, militiamen sought suitable housing in public buildings or rented floor space in 

private facilities to store weapons and equipment and to hold meetings. Units conducted 

training and participated in limited exercises, but the focus of training remained on the 

individual citizen-soldier. The greatest contribution of volunteer militia companies was 

to provide the basis for the volunteer regiments of the Civil War. 

In the last decades of the 19th Century, the volunteer militia transformed itself into 

the National Guard. Tired of repeated service as a strikebreaking force, State soldiers 

sought a new identity as the Army’s recognized combat reserve. The creation of NGAUS 

in 1879 helped State soldiers to acquire the funding and legislation needed to become an 

effective reserve. The basic tactical organization of the National Guard changed from the 

local company to regiments, brigades and even divisions, and the Guard remained a 

largely infantry force. Armories in urban centers and smaller towns served as storage 

facilities and training centers and were symbolic of the Guard’s presence in local 

communities. Though the Guard was organized into larger tactical units and had 

adequate facilities, the focus of training was still on the individual soldier. Guardsmen 

trained one night per week on individual soldier skills, and rudimentary, small unit 

training occurred only at annual summer encampments. The Army and the Guard 

acknowledged that State units would need much additional training after mobilization to 

make them ready for battle. The Militia Act of 1903 replaced the Militia Act of 1792 and 

marked the beginning of the National Guard as a formal, federal reserve. The National 

Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 specifically established the National Guard as the Army’s 

primary combat reserve and further clarified the relationship between the States and the 

War Department. The National Guard proved its worth in the World Wars by providing 

combat divisions that greatly expanded the Army’s fighting power. 

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The early decades of the Cold War witnessed the dramatic transformation of the 

National Guard into the modern ARNG. With the dawn of the Nuclear Age and the 

threat of worldwide communism, sufficient time was no longer available to provide 

Guard units additional training after mobilization. The new challenge for the ARNG was 

to create units capable of deploying immediately to the world’s hotspots without 

undertaking extensive, additional training. The focus of peacetime training shifted from 

individual soldiers to entire units. To create large blocks of time for unit training, the 

ARNG discontinued weeknight drill periods and implemented weekend training. 

Recruits attended active duty basic training, relieving local units of the burden of 

imparting fundamental skills to new Guardsmen. A massive infusion of the latest 

weapons and equipment changed the ARNG from a largely infantry force to a modern 

combined arms team with adequate logistical support. For the first time, federal monies 

were available to fund armory construction. Large, consolidated maintenance and repair 

facilities appeared to support fleets of airframes and tracked and wheeled vehicles. 

Overseas training exercises imparted valuable deployment skills, brought ARNG and 

Regular units into closer contact, and allowed Guardsmen to become intimately familiar 

with potential combat zones. An historic change occurred in the 1970s with the 

introduction of greater numbers of minority soldiers. The inclusion of more minorities 

and females allowed the ARNG to weather the declines in manpower that occurred after 

the Vietnam War and reflected the greater participation of minorities throughout 

American society. The Reagan Buildup further increased the lethality and staying power 

of Guard units with an infusion of modern tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled 

and missile artillery, helicopters, radios and fleets of wheeled vehicles. The quick 

deployment and full participation of Guard units in the Persian Gulf War clearly 

demonstrated the ARNG’s new, modern capabilities. 

Armories have always been a powerful symbol of the National Guard’s presence 

in local communities, and the design and construction of armories says much about the 

Guard’s transformation through the centuries. For the early militia, village commons and 

training fields adjacent to local communities served as muster sites and training grounds. 

As the volunteer militia developed in urban locations, militiamen took up part-time 

residence in public facilities and private buildings. Starting in 1877, large, masonry 

armories appeared across the nation that identified the fledgling National Guard as an 

organization dedicated to protecting the nation and the social order. Castellated armories 

were as much social clubs as military installations and reflected the Guard’s martial and 

social nature. In the early 20th Century, the appearance of large, vaulted armories with 

cavernous drill halls used to train battalions and entire regiments reflected the growing 

emphasis on military preparedness. After World War II, armories of brick, steel, and 

glass were built with an emphasis on military administration and efficiency. At the same 

time, the mechanization of warfare resulted in the addition of concrete pads and motor 

pools for the storage of vehicles needed to support weekend training. Centralized vehicle 

maintenance and repair facilities became an important component of each State’s Guard 

infrastructure. In the Information Age, the computer has once again transformed the 

local armory. Classrooms filled with computer terminals and special rooms for videoteleconferences are linked by distance learning capabilities that ease unit administration, 

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improve command and control, promote the use of training simulators, and invite the use 

of more advanced software. 

Two distinct cycles of change that had a profound influence on the creation of the 

modern ARNG merit closer scrutiny. Starting with the Militia Act of 1903 and ending 

with the National Defense Act of 1916, the Guard’s internal dynamics and relations with 

the federal government changed fundamentally. The National Guard received federal 

funds and in return surrendered much of the autonomy that States’ righters had jealously 

protected since the ratification of the Constitution. The AGs for the first time had a 

formal relationship with the War Department and were responsible for submitting 

periodic reports and implementing new personnel and training standards. Guardsmen 

accepted the assistance and occasional intrusion of Regular Army inspectors and trainers 

and complied with federal standards for the commissioning of officers and the 

recruitment of enlisted volunteers. The organization of regiments, brigades, and divisions 

diminished the influence of company commanders and inserted additional command 

layers between the local armory and the AG’s office. At the same time, company 

commanders bore the brunt of a host of new burdens caused by the implementation of 

federal standards for equipment accountability, recruitment, and training. The National 

Guard’s acceptance of federal controls in return for funding and legal recognition of its 

status as the Army’s combat reserve constitute an historic change in the relationship 

between State soldiers and the federal government. 

The two decades following the Korean War represented a second cycle of change 

that created the modern ARNG. State soldiers accepted further levels of federal control 

in return for additional funding that provided retirement benefits, recruiting incentives, 

modern armories, new facilities, and improved weapons and equipment. For the first 

time, the Army integrated ARNG units into comprehensive war plans for specific 

overseas theaters. The Roundout Program, overseas training, and the CAPSTONE 

Program brought Regulars and Guardsmen into closer harmony. The ARNG willingly 

made the shift from individual to unit training and increasingly submitted to controls 

emanating from the Pentagon. In the late 1960s, the Guard leadership acquiesced to the 

massive force structure reductions imposed by Secretary McNamara that greatly reduced 

the number of combat divisions and created a large pool of separate brigades. The cuts 

improved the ARNG’s readiness by reducing personnel authorizations more in line with 

actual strength levels. However, the McNamara drawdown served as a stark reminder 

that the driving force in National Guard interests was shifting dramatically from Capitol 

Hill and the State houses to the Pentagon. The advent of recruiting incentives in the late 

1970s had a subtler but no less significant influence on Guard membership. While 

payments for college education undoubtedly helped the ARNG to recruit quality soldiers, 

the incentives brought men and women into the Guard for other than traditional reasons. 

The first decade following the end of the Cold War indicates that dynamic forces 

are at work that might propel the ARNG into yet another historic cycle of change. A 

possibility exists that the ARNG might lose its enduring mission as the Army’s primary 

combat reserve and place more emphasis on support units. A legacy of Desert Storm was 

the Army’s willingness to integrate the ARNG’s support units into plans and contingency 

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operations but to denigrate the value of its combat units. The continuous defense policy 

revisions that occurred throughout the 1990s placed a higher premium on support units 

rather than combat formations. When large defense cuts came, the ARNG was forced to 

reduce its combat brigades. In addition, the strategy of peacetime engagement has 

required the extended presence of American peacekeepers at various points around the 

globe. A new challenge for the ARNG will be to determine whether or not it is capable 

of sustaining operational deployments in peacetime for extended periods. New social, 

technological, and strategic conditions are affecting the ARNG as well. The increase in 

minority populations assures that the Guard’s ranks will become even more diverse. 

Information Age technology that promotes distance learning and high-speed 

communications on the battlefield and in armories is causing a revolution in tactics and 

administration and prompting Guard soldiers to master novel computer skills. The 

possibility of new threats from terrorist groups and rogue nations armed with weapons of 

mass destruction might compel the Guard to shift more time and resources away from its 

traditional combat role and into programs designed to protect the American people on 

their own soil. 

Regulars and Guardsmen 

Since the creation of the Continental Army in 1775, the American military has 

relied upon a dual system of Regulars and citizen-soldiers. Federal and State troops have 

argued back and forth for centuries regarding the relative merits each brings to the 

common defense. For the most part, relations between the Army and the National Guard 

have seen alternating periods of mutual support and mutual competition. During the 

worst times, Regulars have argued for a much smaller National Guard with only 

diminished, domestic roles. During the best relations, professionals and citizen-soldiers 

have worked closely together in peace and war. Regulars have too often clung to false 

hopes that the American people will support a large, standing Army in peacetime or 

permit the creation of an extensive, federal reserve under the Army’s direct control. 

Resources expended on State soldiers, Regulars have argued, would be better invested in 

full-time forces or a wholly federal reserve force. These persistent arguments reveal an 

officer corps that has never fully comprehended a fundamental truth; a system of citizensoldiers inevitably contains military inefficiencies but prompts the broader participation 

of the American people in national defense. On the other hand, Guard leaders have often 

overstated the abilities of citizen-soldiers, especially at the beginning of a war. Guard 

commanders are slow to admit that citizen-soldiers with only thirty-nine days of training 

available each year require additional training to place them on more equal footing with 

Regulars who operate and train year-round. In addition, Guardsmen can be overly 

sensitive to valid criticisms of inadequate discipline, training, and leadership in their 

units. 

Distinct attitudes and policies have determined the working relationship between 

Regulars and Guardsmen at various times. Friction between Regulars and citizensoldiers predates the founding of the American Army and first occurred with the posting 

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of the British Army to North America. British officers developed a loathing for colonial 

provincial troops during the French and Indian War but failed to realize that militiamen in 

provincial units did not represent the best of the enrolled militia. The British Army’s 

misplaced contempt for the Yankee militia created a false confidence that helped the 

minutemen to prevail at Lexington and Concord and for the New England militia to 

inflict huge casualties on the Redcoats at Bunker Hill. Within weeks of the creation of 

the Continental Army, animosities that had existed between Redcoats and militiamen 

quickly took root in the relations between Continentals and State soldiers. Throughout 

the Revolution, George Washington’s often quoted condemnations of the militia were not 

so much aimed at the institution itself but at the militia’s inability to suddenly transform 

itself in the middle of a war from a local defense force into a coherent, national reserve. 

Following the Revolution, the mixed performance of militia units in the Northwest 

Territory fueled Federalist arguments for a larger, standing Army. 

Policies in the nation’s early years more sharply defined the delineation between 

Regulars and citizen-soldiers. Washington’s Sentiments advocated militia reforms and 

increased federal controls to make State units more uniform and reliable as a coherent 

national reserve. The Constitution codified a dual system of Regulars and State soldiers. 

In the minds of States’ right advocates, the militia was to act as a counterbalance against 

federal power and possible abuses from a strong, standing Army. The Second 

Amendment, guaranteeing the right of citizens to bear arms, was largely a mechanism to 

guarantee the existence of an armed citizenry for militia service. In 1790, Secretary of 

War Henry Knox put forth a plan for the classification of the militia by age group. In 

pressing for militia reforms, the federal government indicated that the enrolled militia 

was not a viable combat reserve, a notion that found support among advocates of a 

standing Army. The Militia Act of 1792 further established the militia as integral to the 

national defense and codified its administration and organization for more than a century. 

In 1802, the founding of West Point led to the creation of a cadre of professional, trained 

officers whose personal fortunes were inextricably linked to those of the Regular Army. 

After the War of 1812, Secretary of War Calhoun’s Expansible Army Plan placed the 

focus of planning for war on Regulars rather than militiamen. Calhoun hoped to create a 

standing Army of cadre units that would quickly reach its wartime potential with the 

infusion of eager men joining the ranks in the opening stages of a national emergency. 

Influential political leaders and State soldiers countered each initiative aimed at 

reforming or diminishing the militia by pointing to the past, credible performances of 

citizen-soldiers and refusing to surrender the rights of the States to maintain and train 

militia units. 

Bickering between Regular Army and militia generals during the War of 1812 

highlighted institutional biases and hinted at the early decay of the enrolled militia. 

Starting with the Mexican and Civil Wars, volunteers supplanted the militia as the 

principle means of raising large field forces. During the Civil War, senior volunteer 

soldiers echoed the militia’s earlier charges of bias on the part of Regular officers who 

openly criticized the inefficiency and ill discipline of volunteer regiments. Progressive 

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Regulars and Guardsmen explored the possibilities of closer cooperation after the Civil 

War in anticipation of conflict with the European powers. 

The Spanish-American War thrust the United States onto the world stage, and the 

need for a larger, peacetime Army backed by trained reserves was no longer rhetoric but 

a stark reality. The performance of citizen-soldiers in Puerto Rico and the Philippines 

paved the way for the passage of the 1903 Dick Act that established the National Guard 

as a credible, national reserve. Guardsmen learned to comply with new federal standards 

for training, education, and unit organization but bristled at those wanting to reduce the 

Guard’s importance or to diminish its State ties. Many Regulars believed the Guard was 

not up to the task and began to espouse the effectiveness of a national reserve separate 

from State troops and directly under the Army’s control. The writings of Emory Upton 

condemned the militia system as wasteful and riddled with political influence and became 

the philosophical basis Regulars used in attempts to reduce the Guard to a purely State 

constabulary. While State soldiers promoted the capabilities of their units, the National 

Guard was unable to provide all of the special skills that a larger and more complex 

Army required. In 1908, the Medical Reserve Corps became the Army’s first, federally 

controlled reserve force and marked the earliest beginnings of the USAR. 

Throughout the 1910s, Army-Guard relations sank to an historic nadir as Regulars 

made repeated attempts to reduce the National Guard to little more than a State defense 

force. The Wickersham Decision of 1912 and the Continental Army Plan of 1915 were 

the most deliberate efforts to destroy the Guard’s value as a viable, federal reserve. 

Increasing international tensions with Europe and Mexico compelled Congress to 

exercise its constitutional powers and intervene in the Army-Guard feud. The National 

Defense Act of 1916 created an integrated Army of Regulars, Guardsmen, and Reservists 

and established the Guard as the Army’s principle combat reserve. Guardsmen in World 

War I resented a massive Army reorganization that stripped units of their traditional 

designations and bristled at the Army's tendency to replace their commanders with 

Regular officers. Despite the National Guard’s vital contributions in World War I, the 

Army used its enormous size and prestige at the end of the war to advance yet another 

plan for eliminating State soldiers. The arguments of John McAuley Palmer who 

believed in a regionally based, citizen reserve won out over those of Emory Upton, and 

Congress favored the nation’s continued reliance on citizen-soldiers. The National 

Defense Act of 1920 rejected the notion of a large, Regular Army backed by an immense 

pool of trained reserves in favor of a smaller Army reinforced by National Guard units 

and individual officers in the ORC. 

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Regular Army and the National Guard 

coexisted in relative harmony. Apathy, parsimonious defense budgets, and economic 

depression caused Regulars and Guardsmen to concentrate on maintaining their 

respective forces rather than seeking an advantage over one another. The approach of 

World War II and the mobilization of 1940 brought the Army and the National Guard 

back into conflict. In general, Regulars lamented the unpreparedness of State units 

entering active duty and the inadequacies of the Guard’s senior leadership. The 

widespread relief of Guard general officers caused the most serious rift in Army-Guard 

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relations since the end of World War I. In reality, the Guard’s seniority system permitted 

too many generals past their prime to retain their posts as division commanders in 

peacetime. General George C. Marshall represented the views of moderates in the Army 

who valued the tradition of America’s citizen-soldiers while admitting that Guardsmen 

needed significant, additional training before entering combat. General McNair 

personified the Army’s remaining Uptonians who decried the National Guard as an 

organization riddled with waste and incompetence that added little to national defense. 

While many State units were not ready for the challenges of World War II’s fluid 

battlefields, a number of Guard commanders distinguished themselves in Europe and the 

Pacific. Robert Beightler and Raymond McLain were among the Guard generals who 

proved equal to their Regular Army peers and superior to Axis opponents. 

The onset of the Cold War resulted in fundamental changes in the historic ArmyARNG relationship. The threat of warfare with the Soviet Union and other communist 

regimes after World War II prompted the continuation of the draft and the maintenance of 

a large, standing Army. Sustained by a fresh flow of draftees, the Army’s peacetime 

strength remained at unprecedented, high levels. Draftees came to replace the National 

Guard as the de facto combat reserve of the Army. Guardsmen fought in Korea but not in 

numbers comparable to that of the World Wars. The Vietnam War in particular had a 

corrosive affect on Army-Guard relations. Because Guardsmen were not mobilized until 

1968, and then in only small numbers, the Vietnam War was the first in American history 

fought without significant involvement from State soldiers. Unlike the World Wars and 

Korea, Regulars did not have the opportunity to serve beside Guardsmen in combat. 

Instead, many Army officers and the American people at large came to view the ARNG 

as militarily ineffective and as a haven for draft dodgers. The ARNG’s role in controlling 

race and anti-war riots during the 1960s identified it as a domestic constabulary, further 

diminishing its reputation as a combat reserve. The decision not to send the ARNG to 

Vietnam in significant numbers prompted Regular officers to focus more inwardly on the 

problems and policies of the active Army and fostered a growing ignorance regarding the 

Guard’s capabilities and characteristics. 

The end of the Vietnam War, the cessation of the draft and the implementation of 

the volunteer Army forced Regulars and Guardsmen to attempt reconciliation. Both 

institutions closed ranks against the threat of world communism and worked to repair 

internal damage caused by volatile race relations, poor discipline, and widespread drug 

use. A major purpose of the Total Force Policy was to wean the Army from its reliance 

on draftees and to once again create a dependency on the National Guard as its primary 

combat reserve. However, more than thirty years of the draft and the trauma of the 

Vietnam War made reconciliation slow and only partially successful. Because of the 

bitter Vietnam experience, General Abrams was determined to structure the active Army 

so it could never again go to war without the full support of the American people. The 

Roundout Program made ARNG combat brigades the vital link between the American 

people and the Army. The generation of senior Army leaders that included Generals 

Creighton Abrams and John Vessey had served with Guardsmen in World War II and 

Korea and knew citizen-soldiers could fight. However, younger Regular officers who 

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Army National Guard History

had little firsthand experience with the ARNG in combat or otherwise shared the public’s 

poor perception of State soldiers and questioned the Guard’s effectiveness as a combat 

reserve. Once again, many of Emory Upton’s historical criticisms emerged. A new 

generation of Regular officers often failed to understand the Army’s responsibility in 

training Guard units and did not comprehend the significance of the National Guard’s 

dual nature as a federal and State force. An attitude developed among Regulars that time 

and money expended on the ARNG would be better used to sustain the largest peacetime 

Army in American history. 

The robust defense budgets of the Reagan Buildup allowed the Army and the 

ARNG to repair much of the damage of the Vietnam War, guaranteed the success of the 

volunteer Army, and fostered better interservice relations. The Roundout Program 

flourished, and ARNG units widened their participation in overseas training events and 

debuted at the NTC. Guardsmen became engrossed in planning and training for the 

defense of Europe. In the event of a Soviet attack, the Army was to rely heavily on early 

deploying ARNG combat divisions to reinforce NATO’s Central Region. By the late 

1980s, the Army and the ARNG had reached peak strength levels and enjoyed the best 

working relations since World War II. For a short span of years, the ARNG seemed to 

have resumed its historical position as the Army’s primary combat reserve. 

The Persian Gulf War created a serious rift in Army-Guard relations. While 

active duty and Guard support units worked extremely well together in Saudi Arabia, a 

lack of conviction on the part of DOD and the Army to mobilize selected Roundout 

brigades seriously upset Army-Guard relations. For many Guardsmen, the slowness in 

ordering the brigades to active duty and the unwillingness to deploy them overseas 

constituted a serious breach of the Army’s faith in the ARNG. Instead of deploying to 

the Gulf for combat operations, the three Roundout brigades remained stateside to train at 

Fort Hood and the NTC. With no ARNG combat maneuver brigades in Southwest Asia, 

Desert Storm became the first and only war in American history fought without National 

Guard ground maneuver units. 

The end of the Cold War and sharp reductions in the armed forces made the 1990s 

the most contentious period in Army-Guard relations since the 1910s. The Persian Gulf 

War simply delayed deep cuts of 25 percent in defense spending that were announced 

well before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The depth of the losses set the Army and 

the ARNG’s senior leadership at cross-purposes as both struggled to avoid severe losses 

in units and manpower. At first, the Army argued that active forces and the Guard had 

similarly benefited during the Reagan Buildup and that both should experience 

proportional declines. However, as the actual depth of the losses became painfully 

apparent, some Army leaders viewed the Guard as a peer competitor for dwindling 

resources. A generation of leaders that only knew the large, standing Army of the Cold 

War and carried negative stereotypes of the ARNG from the Vietnam years advocated 

deep cuts in the Guard as the best means of garnering defense dollars to avoid losses in 

active duty forces. The Army’s handling of the Roundout brigades during Desert Storm 

created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion within the ARNG toward the Army’s 

motives. Subsequent Army decisions to eliminate the Roundout Program, the labeling of 

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Army National Guard History

large parts of the ARNG’s combat force structure as irrelevant, and suggestions that 

ARNG divisions could not be ready for combat in less than a year further deepened the 

divide. The Army’s senior leaders appeared willing to accept the risks of going it alone 

in a new and uncertain world by maintaining a large standing force free of support from 

ARNG combat reserves. 

In the end, defense cuts were large enough to impose huge reductions in the Army 

and the ARNG not seen since the 1970s. The number of active duty combat divisions 

plummeted from eighteen to ten. For the first time ever, the ARNG leadership and the 

AGs made tough decisions to eliminate selected units and to release soldiers from Guard 

service. The National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 had imposed finality on War 

Department bickering in the 1910s, but a lack of political resolve and interest at the end 

of the Cold War failed to produce defining legislation that addressed vexing strategic and 

policy questions regarding the roles and missions of the Army and the Guard. Instead, 

Congress and DOD embarked upon a series of alphabet soup studies—the BUR, QDR, 

and others—that failed to generate a binding consensus on major issues and provided 

only temporary solutions to long-term, perplexing questions. 

The strategy of peacetime engagement in the latter half of the 1990s has had the 

unintended consequence of bringing the Army and the Guard once again into closer 

accord. For the first time since the Korean War, Regulars and citizen-soldiers have 

worked together well during extended overseas operations in the Caribbean, the Middle 

East, and in the Balkans. New initiatives such as the Integrated Divisions and command 

exchange programs are once again creating familiarity between Regular and Guard 

soldiers. The high number of prior service personnel now serving in the ARNG gives 

States soldiers increased credibility in the eyes of the Army. Anecdotal evidence 

suggests that a new generation of Army officers that has worked closely with the ARNG 

during Desert Storm and in peacekeeping operations is developing a more positive view 

of citizen-soldiers. 

Army and National Guard Integration 

Since 1775, Regulars and citizen-soldiers have combined their efforts during 

national emergencies. State soldiers have time and time again successfully augmented 

and expanded the capabilities of standing forces or have made their employment 

unnecessary. For the most part, the Army and the National Guard have laid aside their 

policy differences during actual operations, especially during overseas campaigns, and 

Guardsmen have often formed an important part of the defenses assigned to protect the 

American homeland. 

Militiamen and Continentals were the first to combine efforts during the 

American Revolution. While Continentals for the most part stood up in open battle 

against British Regulars, militia units supported the Patriot population, battled Loyalist 

militia and harassed Redcoat outposts. Outstanding commanders like Nathaniel Greene 

and Daniel Morgan learned the best techniques of combining the complementary skills of 

Continentals and militiamen. After the Revolution, the pattern of complementary 

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Army National Guard History

employment continued. In 1794, the militia rallied under President Washington to 

suppress the Whiskey Rebellion while most of the embryonic Regular Army was 

deployed against the Indians in the Northwest Territory. 

During the War of 1812, the militia added significantly to the nation’s combat 

power, albeit with mixed results. The British repulse at Baltimore in 1814, with militia 

fighting from field fortifications while Regulars defended the thick, masonry walls at Fort 

McHenry, is a particular example of integrated Army operations. In 1846, militiamen 

hurried to defend the southwestern border and to join volunteer regiments that made 

possible the successful campaigns of the Mexican War. At the outbreak of the Civil War, 

militia companies executed the opening moves by the North and South, fought with 

Regular units at First Bull Run, and went on to form volunteer regiments on both sides. 

Militiamen and Regulars often pooled their resources or divided responsibilities to 

provide security for settlers moving beyond the Appalachians and then into the West. 

After 1877, Regulars and State soldiers combined efforts during nearly twenty years of 

continuous labor strife. 

The Spanish-American War fostered a new era of Army-Guard integration. Faced 

with the operational and logistical challenges of conducting a war on opposite sides of the 

globe, the Army implemented a policy of shared responsibilities. While Regulars 

focused on the main prize in Cuba, Guardsmen constituted the bulk of the troops sent to 

Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Without State troops, neither the occupation of the 

Philippines nor the suppression of the Philippine Insurrection would have occurred. 

Stretched beyond its normal capabilities by requirements to garrison new overseas 

possessions, the Army relied on the National Guard for homeland defense. For more than 

thirty years, Guard coast artillerymen successfully defended the majority of the East, 

West, and Gulf coasts from attack, thereby freeing Regulars to defend strategic points in 

the Caribbean and the Pacific. It was no coincidence that the first head of the DMA in 

1908 was a Regular Army coast artillery officer, Col. Erasmus Weaver. After leaving his 

position with the militia’s fledgling federal headquarters, Weaver was promoted to 

brigadier general and became Chief of the Coast Artillery Corps. 

During the Mexican Border callup, Guard units defended the line of the Rio 

Grande and allowed the Army to concentrate its forces for a punitive expedition into 

northern Mexico. In the opening months of the World Wars, Guard combat divisions 

rushed overseas in equal numbers with Regular divisions until the nation could raise even 

larger citizen-soldier armies. On distant battlefields, Regular and Guard combat units 

fought in tandem to generate quantities of combat power the enemy could not withstand. 

The efforts of the 1st and 26th Infantry Divisions in reducing the St. Mihiel salient in 

September 1918 and the coordinated landing by the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions on 

Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944 are the best examples of Regulars and Guardsmen 

working closely together in battle. 

The onset of the Cold War demanded even closer integration between 

professionals and citizen-soldiers. With a large portion of the Army posted overseas to 

man a defensive perimeter intended to contain the spread of communism, the ARNG 

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served as a ready reserve force. During the Korean War, Guardsmen fought alongside 

Regulars in the Far East, augmented Army units defending Europe, and strengthened the 

CONUS strategic reserve. The practice of Guardsmen serving in a war zone, reinforcing 

other forward deployed active duty units, and augmenting the strategic reserve became a 

familiar pattern during Cold War conflicts. The threat of Soviet nuclear bombers 

attacking America’s centers of population and industry drew the ARNG into the NIKE 

Missile Program. In one of the very best examples of Army-ARNG integration, 

Guardsmen manned missile sites to defend the American homeland against possible 

nuclear attacks for more than twenty years. While U.S. combat units deployed to 

Vietnam starting in 1965, selected Guard units participated in the SRF, a ready reserve 

capable of responding to unexpected threats and quickly expanding the Army’s 

capabilities. In many respects, the Vietnam War was fought on two fronts; the rice 

paddies of Southeast Asia and the streets of America. While Regulars and draftees 

fought and died in Vietnam, the ARNG attempted to keep the peace in America’s major 

cities. 

The era of Total Force Policy increased the number of Army-ARNG initiatives. 

Roundout brigades trained on a continuous basis with their parent divisions. Overseas 

training programs allowed Guardsmen to deploy to the NATO region and to the Pacific to 

coordinate logistics and to train with active duty units. The CAPSTONE Program 

matched Army and Guard organizations on contingency war plans and fostered direct 

contacts between units. Throughout the Reagan Buildup, Army and Guard commands 

worked together closely to prepare and train for the defense of Europe. In Central 

America, DOD effectively used the ARNG to expand America’s influence. 

The Persian Gulf War represented a double-edged sword in Army-ARNG 

integration. The Army lauded the work of ARNG support units and artillery brigades 

sent to the Gulf. Without the stellar support of ARNG and USAR support units, the 

Army could not have sustained itself or fought in the hostile Arabian Desert. Instead of 

deploying to the Gulf for combat, three mobilized Roundout brigades remained stateside 

to train at Fort Hood and the NTC. The Army’s decision not to deploy the Roundout 

brigades to Saudi Arabia stands in stark contrast to the integration other armed services 

implemented with their reserve component combat units. 

As the Regular Army shrank after the Cold War, the ARNG made packages of 

support units available whose mission was to sustain active duty combat troops in the 

opening weeks of a conflict. At the same time, ARNG units and personnel meshed well 

with other Army and DOD assets in the war on drugs. The peacekeeping operations of 

the 1990s helped to restore operational integration between the Army and the ARNG. 

Guard peacekeepers have served alongside active duty soldiers in Somalia, Haiti and the 

Sinai Desert. ARNG infantry companies in Kuwait guarded pre-positioned equipment 

and air defense sites. Starting in 1996, ARNG units maintained a constant and substantial 

presence during UN peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans. ARNG responsibilities in the 

Balkans increased in 2000 when the 49th Armored Division from Texas served as the 

region’s controlling headquarters. 

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Army National Guard History

The Army and the National Guard have had considerable success in integrating 

whole units into larger organizations. After the Spanish-American War, Guard coast 

artillery units operated smoothly as part of the Army’s Coast Artillery Corps. Army 

plans in the late 1910s called for the first joining of Regular and Guard brigades into 

Integrated Divisions though the plan was never fully implemented. In the interwar years, 

Guard divisions fit well into Army corps areas established in CONUS. In the Cold War’s 

early decades, ARNG NIKE missile units were an integral component of the 

ARADCOM. After Vietnam, the Roundout brigades and even separate Roundout 

battalions became an integral part of active duty divisions. In the 1990s, selected EBs 

have successfully joined under the control of active Army headquarters to create 

Integrated Divisions. However, the Army and the ARNG must insure that the policies, 

plans, and procedures for the mobilization and deployment of the EBs is well understood 

throughout Congress and DOD. In this way, the Army can avoid the confusion over 

expectations that clouded the mobilization and training of the Roundout brigades during 

the Persian Gulf War. 

In contrast to the successful integration of entire units, the Army and the Guard 

have not favored the use of cadre and other reduced strength units. Organizations 

structured to increase to full strength upon mobilization have never been popular or 

numerous nor have they existed for extended periods. In general, Congress has been 

reluctant to tolerate incomplete organizations heavy with officers and noncommissioned 

officers whose readiness in peacetime cannot be adequately measured. Instead, U.S. 

defense policy has preferred complete, standing units ready for deployment on short 

notice. The idea of partially structured units that increase to full strength in emergencies 

has endured since Calhoun’s Expansible Army Plan of the 1820s but has never taken full 

root in defense planning and likely never will. 

A number of patterns emerge from the experience of Army-Guard integration. As 

a general rule, whenever a clear danger is capable of threatening the American homeland, 

the National Guard shares in the defensive role. Initially, the Army carries the main onus 

of homeland defense, but as new threats emerge or conditions change, the Army 

determines that additional resources are required. At this time, the ARNG assumes 

responsibility for a portion of the mission. Eventually, the Army’s priorities and 

attentions are drawn toward new threats, and citizen-soldiers assume the responsibility 

for nearly all of the original effort. In due time, the perceived threat recedes, and the 

Army terminates the program in order to pursue new priorities. Such was the overall 

pattern of Army-Guard integration during the coast artillery defense of America’s shores 

and the NIKE Missile Program. The final outcome of the ARNG’s participation in the 

drug war remains in the future. The life cycle of CONUS defensive missions may also 

apply to the Army’s overseas presence. Since 1996, the ARNG has assumed more of the 

peacekeeping burden in the Balkans as the Army concentrates on transforming itself for 

future warfare. Experience suggests that Guard soldiers will comprise the majority of the 

last remnant of Balkan peacekeepers whenever America withdraws from the region. . 

Only in Central America has the ARNG consistently served as the dominant exercise 

participant. 

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National Guard Mobilizations and Preparedness 

Supporters and critics of National Guardsmen have always expressed an interest 

in two aspects of their performance. First, will Guardsmen show up in a crisis? And 

secondly, assuming that State soldiers successfully mobilize, will they be ready? The 

history of the National Guard indicates that the nation can always count on State soldiers 

stepping forward in a national emergency. However, the readiness of units at the earliest 

stages of a crisis usually reflects the degrees of funding, leadership, training, and 

manning provided in peacetime. Since 1636, the readiness of the National Guard has 

been measured largely by the preparedness of its major combat units. 

Since the earliest times, the States have acted as the nation’s mobilization base, 

and the AGs have maintained a central role in the mobilization and deployment of 

Guardsmen, volunteers, and draftees. In the colonial period, the separate colonies 

supported the enrolled militia for local defense, formed provincial units for extended 

operations and sometimes combined their units into broader, regional efforts. During the 

Revolution, the thirteen colonies provided troops to the Continental Army while 

maintaining the enrolled militia. After the ratification of the Constitution, the common 

method of raising armies was for the federal government to levy troop quotas against the 

States. Once the States received the numbers of troops the government required, the 

Governors and the AGs were free to conduct the mobilization. In the War of 1812, the 

States provide portions of the enrolled militia for operations against the British. 

Militiamen formed the basis of many regiments that fought in the Mexican and Civil 

Wars, and the States raised large numbers of purely volunteer regiments for both 

conflicts. In the Spanish-American War, Guardsmen filled the ranks of volunteer 

regiments before new volunteers were accepted for federal service. 

Between 1903 and 1917, military reforms altered most of the aspects of Guard 

mobilizations. The War Department’s increased management over the number and types 

of State units ended mobilizations based on troop quotas alone. The Mexican Border 

mobilization of 1916 was the first time the War Department issued mobilization orders to 

specific units instead of quotas to the States for round numbers of soldiers. With better 

knowledge of State units, the War Department was able to pick and choose the outfits 

that deployed to the border. The Guard was still largely an infantry force, and a 

significant number of excess infantry units remained at home or were compelled to 

convert to new types of units before deploying. The War Department and the States had 

created a series of mobilization camps, and though these were not widely used in 1916, a 

precedent was established for Guard units to report to mobilization stations upon entering 

active duty. Supplies and facilities were not available to accommodate all Guardsmen at 

once, and the Army devised a system of calling out Guard units in a controlled fashion by 

specific increments. For the first time, Guardsmen had to meet medical standards for 

service and underwent thorough physical examinations. The significant numbers of 

Guardsmen declared unfit for duty in 1916 and in subsequent mobilizations reflected lax 

adherence to recruiting standards, changing mobilization standards, poor records keeping, 

and a tendency to allow limited numbers of unqualified Guardsmen to remain in uniform 

336 
Army National Guard History

for various reasons. In 1917, conscription became the main method for raising 

manpower. Though the federal government initiated conscription, the administration of 

local draft and medical boards became the responsibility of the Governors and the AGs. 

Throughout the wars of the 20th Century, Guardsmen have served proudly. At the 

beginning of World War I, Guardsmen were formed into eighteen combat divisions that 

served in France. The National Guard mobilization of 1940 helped America to prepare 

for even greater exertions after Pearl Harbor. Starting in 1942, a total of nineteen Guard 

divisions entered combat. During the Korean War, eight Guard divisions and hundreds 

of support units served in Korea, Europe and in CONUS. Two mobilized divisions and 

one ACR were a symbol of America’s political resolve during the Berlin Crisis. In 1968, 

a smaller number of Guard units entered active duty including two combat brigades that 

provided thousands of troops for service in Vietnam even though the brigades remained 

stateside. The Indiana Rangers were the only ARNG ground maneuver unit to fight in 

Southeast Asia. During the Persian Gulf War, over 65,000 Guard men and women 

served in Southwest Asia, Europe, and CONUS. Support units and Guard artillery 

brigades deployed to Saudi Arabia helped to prosecute the war, but three Roundout 

brigades busied themselves with stateside training. After the Cold War, a steady stream 

of unit ARNG mobilizations has sustained American peacekeeping efforts around the 

globe. 

The pattern of National Guard mobilizations in the 20th Century raises questions 

regarding the ARNG’s future as the Army’s primary combat reserve. Between 1917 and 

1990, the number of Guard combat units ordered to active duty during national 

emergencies has steadily declined. The onset of limited conflicts during the Cold War 

and the infusion of draftees reduced the Army’s need for support from Guard combat 

formations. Between 1973 and 1989, American diplomacy and military preparedness 

successfully deterred a major war with the Soviet Union and China. When war broke out 

in the Middle East in 1990, the latent power of the Army’s heavy combat divisions 

intended for a major war in Europe was enough to achieve victory without significant 

augmentation from ARNG combat units. For the first time since 1775, the U.S. Army 

conducted a major campaign without the presence of a single National Guard ground 

maneuver unit. Throughout the 1990s, the Army has largely depended upon ARNG 

support units to sustain peacekeeping efforts. In 1996, the ARNG sent its first ground 

maneuver unit in harm’s way since the Vietnam War, and the Army has planned the 

deployment of portions of Guard brigades and divisions to the Balkans in coming years. 

Overall, as the 20th Century progressed, the Army has depended more and more upon 

smaller Guard support organizations rather than major combat units. 

National conscription has had a profound influence on the employment of Guard 

soldiers. In the 20th Century, conscription has been in affect for every national 

emergency except two; the Mexican Border Crisis and the Persian Gulf War. In both 

1916 and 1990, the National Guard played a vital role. Starting in 1917, draftees 

supplanted militiamen and volunteers as the main source of military manpower. During 

the World Wars, the National Guard’s major combat units formed a vital link between the 

Regular Army and the untapped resources of the American people. The Guard divisions 

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deployed overseas in late 1917 and after Pearl Harbor bought the precious time required 

to convert draftee manpower into additional combat divisions. With the continuation of 

the draft in peacetime, the Guard’s physical and psychological value as a bridging 

mechanism between the Army and the people diminished. Instead of retaining its historic 

position as the Army’s primary combat reserve, draftees pushed the Guard to second 

place. Conscription allowed the U.S. to fight in Korea and especially Vietnam without a 

full reserve component mobilization. Fortunately, Saddam Hussein’s ineptness as a 

strategist prompted him to prosecute a war at a time when Regulars and Guardsmen were 

at their zenith of power from the Reagan Buildup and were able to achieve the nation’s 

objectives without an infusion of draftee manpower. Surely, in the absence of renewed 

conscription, the Regular Army will not be able to go it alone in the next major regional 

conflict. The ability of a much smaller, post-Cold War Army to fight a major regional 

contingency successfully without the support of major ARNG combat and support units 

seems unlikely. 

The mobilization of State soldiers depends not only on their willingness to serve, 

but also on the legality of their service. Various laws and legal opinions have restricted 

and advanced the service of State troops. In colonial times, the Governors jealously 

protected their power to call out the militia and were generally unwilling to surrender 

operational control of their militia units to other colonies. The Calling Forth Act of 1792 

granted presidential authority to order the militia into federal service, and two years later, 

the Whiskey Rebellion established an important precedent for the president’s use of the 

militia in maintaining domestic order. The New England Governors disrupted plans for 

the War of 1812 by refusing to allow their militiamen to enter active duty. In the opening 

months of the Civil War, Governors of States declaring neutrality refused to respond to 

Lincoln’s call for militiamen to put down the rebellion. Following Reconstruction and 

the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, the Posse Comitatus Act restricted the authority of the 

Regular Army to act as a domestic police force, leaving State soldiers as the only 

instrument available to the Governors to deal with large emergencies. 

After the Spanish-American War, the War Department questioned the legality of 

National Guard service beyond America’s borders, but the National Defense Act of 1916 

permitted the federal government free use of the Guard for overseas campaigning. A 

number of southern Governors attempted to use their soldiers to continue segregation 

during the early civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, but several presidents 

successfully employed the Guard to enforce integration and civil rights legislation. A 

special mobilization compact allowed Guardsmen manning NIKE missile sites to enter 

active duty instantly whenever enemy aircraft appeared on their radar screens. During 

the 1980s, a number of Governors opposed the deployment of Guard soldiers to Central 

America. In its 1990 Perpich Decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the States 

did not have the authority to limit the Army’s ability to train citizen-soldiers as federal 

reserves. The War Powers Act of 1973 curbed presidential powers to commit American 

troops overseas without congressional approval. In subsequent years, Congress allowed 

the president-limited authority to commit troops in the early weeks of a crisis. The 

presidential callup authority allowed the Bush Administration to conduct Operation 

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Desert Shield well before Congress voted to authorize the use of force in Desert Storm. 

Additional presidential callups have allowed the extended deployment of Guard 

peacekeepers in the Balkans. 

The National Guard has always operated in an environment of constrained 

resources, and a practice of tiered resourcing has helped to maintain higher readiness. 

Tiered resourcing refers to the strategy of allocating additional, scarce resources to 

improve the readiness of a select group of units identified for early deployment or 

immediate action. Units that benefit from tiered resourcing are usually intended to 

respond to those threats that pose the greatest dangers to the military or possess the 

ability to attack the American homeland. The earliest example of tiered resourcing was 

the Massachusetts minutemen who before Lexington and Concord received priority for 

the receipt of ammunition and equipment and were required to participate in additional 

musters. George Washington’s Sentiments recommended the classification of the 

enrolled militia by age, with the youngest militiamen organized for immediate use and 

older citizen-soldiers filling a reserve role. The Knox Plan of 1790 was the first time the 

War Department recommended tiered resourcing in the militia by concentrating scarce 

monies and limited time on the youngest and most energetic citizen-soldiers. 

Classification of the militia by age was proposed several times throughout the 19th 

Century, but the States successfully challenged all attempts at reforms. The coast 

artillery defense mission was the first example of tiered resourcing in the 20th Century 

when Guard coast artillery units received priority for manning, training, and ammunition. 

The Cold War created immediate threats that America had never before experienced, and 

the ARNG consistently utilized tiered resourcing throughout the era. The NIKE Missile 

Program created a subset of ARNG units that required additional resources so that they 

could respond instantly to air attacks against CONUS. During Vietnam, Guard SRF units 

received additional resources that improved their readiness and made them more effective 

as a strategic reserve. The Total Force Policy resulted in the designation of Roundout 

brigades that became the focal point of Guard readiness. Roundout brigades received 

modern weapons and equipment that made them compatible with their parent, active duty 

divisions. After the Persian Gulf War, the ARNG directed additional resources to high 

priority combat support and combat service support units that were subject to early 

deployment in a national emergency. Similarly, the ARNG EBs received priority for 

additional resources to prepare them for possible employment in near simultaneous 

regional wars in the Persian Gulf and the Far East. 

Major mobilizations have often exposed National Guard units to periods of chaos 

and confusion. The U.S. Army has a marked propensity to reorganize at the beginning of 

wars. In 1917, the Army mobilized the Guard divisions and immediately reorganized 

them into the square division design for trench warfare. In addition, all Guard units lost 

their traditional, State designations and were numbered using a national system. Both 

events were major distractions from training. The relief of a significant number of senior 

commanders early in World War II disrupted unit cohesion. After Pearl Harbor, the 

Army converted National Guard divisions to the triangular configuration, a move that 

once again disrupted training and resulted in a number of regiments serving far afield 

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from other Guard units. Guard divisions mobilized in the Korean War surrendered large 

numbers of personnel and quantities of equipment for immediate action in the Far East. 

Guardsmen resented the fact that Army inspectors criticized them as not ready for battle 

after they had willingly given up large amounts of precious resources. The Berlin Crisis 

taught the Army that Guardsmen must be gainfully employed once they are ordered to 

active duty. Mobilized citizen-soldiers complained that overseas duty was preferable to 

stateside training and that service only in CONUS did not justify major disruptions in 

their professional and personal lives. During the Persian Gulf War, the Army imposed 

major changes in the 48th Brigade’s operational and logistical procedures that afforded 

commanders and staffs little time to learn new practices and placed them at a 

disadvantage. 

Service in local communities generates unit cohesion and creates close bonds 

between Guardsmen and the American people. However, in war a system of regionally 

based units can produce unfortunate circumstances in wartime. Whenever a citizensoldier unit suffers heavy casualties, a disproportionate share of the losses can fall on a 

single community. On April 19, 1775, Lexington, Massachusetts suffered ten killed out 

of a total of fifty militiamen who died on that fateful day. In World War II, Bedford, 

Virginia lost nineteen of its native sons from Company A, 116th Infantry during the DDay landing on Omaha Beach. During the mobilization for the Korean War, an 

unfortunate railroad disaster resulted in the deaths of over thirty Guardsmen from WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania. On June 19, 1969, a Viet Cong sapper attack against an American 

firebase resulted in heavy casualties, and Bardstown, Kentucky mourned the loss of five 

men killed and eight wounded from Battery C, 2-138th Field Artillery. Subsequent 

generations in these same communities have embraced Guard service, and no locality in 

America has ever rejected the presence of a Guard unit in its midst because it was 

unwilling to pay the often heavy price of freedom. 

National Guard readiness is strongly tied to leadership. While State and federal 

governments can provide resources to create reliable units, the critical element of 

leadership is unregulated and must come from the Guard’s own ranks. Ever since 

Captain John Smith’s service as a militia leader at Jamestown in 1607, competent, 

assertive leadership has been essential to the success of citizen-soldier units. The 

resolute, determined leadership of Colonel William Prescott in defending the militia 

redoubt on the Charlestown Peninsula made Bunker Hill one of America’s most famous 

battles. William Henry Harrison’s gift of persuasion and Andrew Jackson’s iron-willed 

determination inspired militiamen in the War of 1812. The leadership of Jefferson Davis 

made the Mississippi Rifles one of the premier volunteer regiments of the Mexican War. 

Elmer Ellsworth’s violent death at the opening of the Civil War inspired northern 

soldiers. General Dabney Maury provided the leadership that resulted in the creation of 

NGAUS, and Senator Charles Dick was a Guard leader in peace and war whose 

legislative abilities made an indelible stamp on citizen-soldiers. Competent division 

commanders like John O’Ryan in World War I and Robert Beightler and Raymond 

McLain in World War II were role models of inspirational leadership. After World War 

II, Generals Ellard Walsh and Milton Reckord were the foremost champions of ARNG 

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Army National Guard History

soldiers. At the height of the Cold War, Congressman Sonny Montgomery emerged as a 

great advocate of citizen-soldiers on Capitol Hill. 

An unfounded criticism of citizen-soldiers is that they are slow to adapt to the 

new technologies of warfare. Only professionals, the argument goes, have the time and 

expertise to learn the intricacies of new weapons and tactics. However, successive 

generations of citizen-soldiers have demonstrated their ability to master new technologies 

from the musket to the microprocessor without degrading their readiness. The earliest 

militiamen advanced from blade to gunpowder weapons while discarding the linear 

tactics of European warfare and employing stealthy raids and ambushes against Native 

Americans. In the 19th Century, militiamen adjusted to changes in tactics wrought by the 

rifled weapons and became marksmanship experts. During World War I, Guardsmen 

embraced the great military advances of the day; the machine gun, the tank, and the 

airplane. Citizen-soldiers mastered the tactics and logistics of employing a combined 

arms team of infantry, armor and artillery in combat. Guard flyers quickly embraced 

military aviation that laid the foundation for the creation of the Air National Guard and 

led to the placement of a substantial, modern helicopter fleet in the ARNG. The 

introduction of the military truck increased the numbers and capabilities of Guard 

transport and logistics units. In World War II, Guardsmen again mastered new weapons 

and tactics. Vast advances in military technology during the Cold War were not a 

deterrent to ARNG readiness. Guard soldiers mastered a range of skills, from operating 

and maintaining huge fleets of tracked and wheeled vehicles to manning the sophisticated 

radar and communications systems at NIKE missile sites. By the end of the Cold War, 

Guard soldiers routinely operated the Army’s most sophisticated weapons systems 

including the M-1 tank, the Apache helicopter, and the MLRS artillery system. In 2000, 

a new generation of ARNG men and women is embracing rapid changes in information 

technologies that are revolutionizing training and administration. 

Towards the 21st Century 

The end of the 20th Century marks a convenient stopping point for the ARNG to 

pause and consider its accomplishments and evolutions since 1636. After nearly 400 

years of continuous service, the National Guard still does best what it has done from the 

beginning—to bring the capabilities of trained and ready citizen-soldiers to bear in times 

of national emergencies. 

In the year 2100, historians will look back and evaluate the ARNG’s greatest 

contributions of the past century. If past is prelude, they will find unchanged many of the 

characteristics that have defined the Guard since its first regimental muster in colonial 

Massachusetts. Guard men and women will come forward to serve as volunteers in 

America’s first line of defense. The ARNG will continue as a force with dual allegiances 

to the States and the federal government. At the same time, Guard soldiers in local 

communities will form a critical bridge between the American people and the federal 

government and the Army. Guard missions will find their origins in the Constitution, and 

citizen-soldiers will still mobilize “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 

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Insurrections and repel Invasions.” Feuds between Regulars and Guardsmen will ebb and 

flow, but in the face of national challenges they will combine efforts during emergencies 

and cooperate in plans designed to protect the American people from attack. A broad 

host of participants that have determined past defense policies — Congress, the 

Governors, DOD, the Army, NGB, NGAUS, AGAUS, and EANGUS — will collectively 

determine the ARNG’s proper place in the common defense. The ARNG will most likely 

continue to use some form of tiered resourcing to improve its overall readiness while 

some portion of the Guard is assigned to provide security for the American homeland. 

While the National Guard clings dearly to its core characteristics, it is an 

organization unafraid of change and will undoubtedly evolve in the coming decades. At 

the beginning of the 21st Century, strong winds of change are blowing that will surely 

steer the ARNG in new directions. The continuing transformation from the Industrial 

Age to the Information Age will produce new threats and forms of warfare that will affect 

the Guard’s force structure and training. Future generations of Guard soldiers will master 

technologies and techniques that would have befuddled their forebears. Technology 

might change the whole face of training with drill periods becoming more fragmented 

rather than centralized. Such a shift in training techniques would be comparable to the 

change that occurred when the Guard instituted weekend drill in order to facilitate unit 

training at the beginning of the Cold War. The increased participation of minorities in 

American society will introduce greater social and ethnic diversity among citizensoldiers. New educational and work habits may change the entire face of recruiting and 

retention and alter the demographic base available for service. 

The most serious and challenging role for the ARNG in the coming century will 

most likely be full participation in a major, regional war. With smaller active duty and 

reserve forces and little prospects for a return to national conscription, ARNG manpower 

will be especially critical in the next war. The Guard’s high priority support units, field 

artillery and attack helicopter battalions, and EBs will be the first exposed to hostile 

action. Other units will be ordered to active duty to relieve Army units for service in the 

theater of war and to bolster the strategic reserve in CONUS. Depending upon the 

severity of the crisis, the stripping of ARNG units of personnel and equipment for 

immediate overseas service might once again occur. The Guard’s role in the early stages 

of the next regional conflict may not be too dissimilar from its functions at the beginning 

of the World Wars and the Korean War. 

While defense rhetoric at the end of the 20th Century often espouses a return to the 

concept of America as a militia nation, real progress has been slow. A major inhibitor to 

the creation and implementation of the concept has been a disturbing lack of knowledge 

as to what exactly constitutes a militia nation. Political and military leaders alike would 

benefit from a better understanding of the concept. Like the Clausewitzian trinity of war, 

the militia nation demands the involvement of the American people, the government, and 

the armed forces. The American people have the responsibility to choose qualified 

leaders who establish sound defense policies, provide the necessary resources, and retain 

ultimate control over the military. A standing Army properly sized to meet immediate 

needs and to protect the nation’s vital interests during the opening stages of a national 

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emergency is a crucial portion of the militia nation’s military capabilities. All units not 

required on active duty must be placed in the reserves. Historically, America has been 

unwilling to pay the price of maintaining large, standing forces in order to provide an 

ironclad guarantee against all unforeseen risks. The additional forces America requires to 

impose its will on a stubborn enemy come from a ready, citizen-soldier reserve such as 

the ARNG. The American people through the centuries have understood that even 

though reserve forces are not always as militarily effective as Regulars in the opening 

stages of a war, they nevertheless reflect the willingness of American society to go to war 

and are a more cost effective method of providing for the common defense. The citizensoldier units of a militia nation are geographically based and serve under their own 

leadership, which has the opportunity to rise to command levels commensurate with their 

demonstrated abilities. In the event finite numbers of Regulars and Guardsmen prove 

inadequate for protecting the nation’s vital interests, the American people must be 

prepared to participate directly in the nation’s defense through volunteerism or 

conscription. 

However, a change in social attitudes since the end of the draft in 1973 is 

problematic for all American soldiers. For centuries the predominating emotion of the 

American people toward standing armies was fear. In the last thirty years, ignorance has 

replaced fear as the prevailing emotion regarding defense matters. From the founding of 

the republic, an informed citizenry has been a critical component of the common defense. 

The absence of knowledge and interest regarding military affairs constitutes a major 

cultural challenge for the Army and the ARNG as more and more Americans, including 

elected officials, have less and less firsthand knowledge of the military. In coming 

decades, the Army and the National Guard must work together to educate the public on 

defense matters. The ARNG must not lose focus of its vital role as a presence in local 

communities and as a bridging mechanism between Regulars and American society. 

Concerned soldiers point to the reinstatement of the draft as the best means of restoring 

diminished ties to the American people. However, advocating a return to the draft is too 

simplistic a solution, especially since the American people have not demonstrated a 

propensity toward public service, military or otherwise. 

At the end of the 21st Century, scholars and soldiers will undoubtedly take stock 

of the military organizations that provide for the common defense. In studying the 

evolutions and growth of the military, pundits will perhaps find themselves agreeing with 

John McAuley Palmer’s belief that military organizations are living organisms akin to 

strong trees rather than fixed structures. If the past is any indicator, the stand of healthy 

trees providing for the common defense one hundred years from now will contain one 

that is particularly strong and vibrant. Upon the thick bark of that tree’s rugged trunk 

will appear the inscription: “Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War...I AM THE GUARD.” 

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Army National Guard History

Glossary 

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment 

AEF American Expeditionary Forces 

AG Adjutant General 

AGAUS Adjutants General Association of the United States 

AGR Active Guard/Reserve 

ARADCOM Army Air Defense Command 

ARNG Army National Guard 

ARNGRC Army National Guard Readiness Center 

BUR Bottom-Up Review

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau 

CONUS Continental United States 

DARNG Director, Army National Guard 

DMA Division of Militia Affairs 

DOD Department of Defense

DPP Dedicated Procurement Program

EANGUS Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States 

EB Enhanced Brigade 

ERC Enlisted Reserve Corps 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NGA National Guard Association 

NGAUS National Guard Association of the United States 

NGUS National Guard of the United States 

NTC National Training Center 

OCS Officer Candidate School 

OR Organized Reserves 

ORC Officers’ Reserve Corps 

PAD Public Affairs Detachment 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

RCAS Reserve Component Automation System 

REFORGER Return of Forces to Germany

ROAD Reorganization Objectives Army Division 

ROTC Reserve Officer Training Course 

SECDEF Secretary of Defense 

SF Special Forces 

SRF Selected Reserve Force 

STRAF Strategic Reserve Force 

UMT Universal Military Training

UN United Nations 

USAR United States Army Reserve 

344 
Army National Guard History

Appendix 1 

Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau 

Col. Erasmus M. Weaver 1908-1911 

Brig. Gen. Robert K. Evans 1911-1912 

Maj. Gen. Albert L. Mills 1912-1916 

Maj. Gen. William A. Mann 1916-1917 

Maj. Gen. Jessie McI. Carter 1917-1918 

Brig. Gen. John C. Heavey (Acting) 1918-1919 

Maj. Gen. George C. Rickards 1921-1925 

Maj. Gen. Creed C. Hammond 1925-1929 

Col. Ernest R. Redmond (Acting) 1929-1929 

Maj. Gen. William G. Everson 1929-1931 

Maj. Gen. George E. Leach 1931-1935 

Col. Harold J. Weiler (Acting) 1935-1936 

Col. John F. Williams (Acting) 1936-1936 

Maj. Gen. Albert Blanding 1936-1940 

Maj. Gen. John F. Williams 1940-1946 

Maj. Gen. Butler B. Miltonberger 1946-1947 

Maj. Gen. Kenneth F. Cramer 1947-1950 

Maj. Gen. Raymond H. Fleming 1950-1953 

Maj. Gen. Earl T. Ricks (Acting) 1953-1953 

Maj. Gen. Edgar C. Erickson 1953-1959 

Maj. Gen. Donald W. McGowan 1959-1963 

Maj. Gen. Winston P. Wilson* 1963-1971 

Maj. Gen. Francis S. Greenlief 1971-1974 

Lt. Gen. LaVern E. Weber 1974-1982 

Lt. Gen. Emmett H. Walker, Jr. 1982-1986 

Lt. Gen. Herbert R. Temple, Jr. 1986-1990 

Lt. Gen. John B. Conaway* 1990-1993 

Maj. Gen. Philip G. Killey (Acting)* 1993-1994 

Maj. Gen. Raymond F. Rees (Acting) 1994-1994 

Maj. Gen. John R. D’Araujo, Jr. (Acting) 1994-1994 

Lt. Gen. Edward D. Baca 1994-1998 

Lt. Gen. Russell C. Davis* 1998-Present 

*CNGBs appointed from the Air National Guard 

345 
Army National Guard History

Appendix 2 

Directors of the ARNG 

Maj. Gen. Raymond H. Fleming 1948-1950 

Maj. Gen. William H. Abendroth 1951-1955 

Maj. Gen. Donald W. McGowan 1955-1959 

Maj. Gen. Clayton P. Kerr 1959-1962 

Brig. Gen. Francis S. Greenlief 1962-1963 

Brig. Gen. Charles L. Southward 1964-1967 

Brig. Gen. Leonard C. Ward 1968-1970 

Maj. Gen. Francis S. Greenlief 1970-1971 

Maj. Gen. LaVern E. Weber 1971-1974 

Maj. Gen. Charles A. Ott, Jr. 1974-1978 

Maj. Gen. Emmett H. Walker, Jr. 1978-1982 

Maj. Gen. Herbert R. Temple, Jr. 1982-1986 

Maj. Gen. Donald Burdick 1986-1991 

Maj. Gen. Raymond F. Rees 1991-1992 

Maj. Gen. John R. D’Araujo, Jr. 1993-1995 

Maj. Gen. William A. Navas, Jr. 1995-1998 

Lt. Gen. Roger C. Schultz 1998-Present 

346 
Army National Guard History

Notes 

Chapter 1 The Colonial Militia, 1636-1775 

1. Martin W. Andresen, The New England Colonial Militia and Its English Heritage, 1620-1675 

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, 1979), Ch. 1 passim. Precious little 

scholarship has been done on the earliest origins of the militia prior to the settlement of North America. 

The cited reference is one of the best summaries available, and all materials on the militia’s English origins 

are drawn from this source unless otherwise noted. 

2. John Shy, “Armed Force in Colonial America,” in Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, 

Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present 

(New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 5; and Douglas E. Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the 

British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 1-2. 

3. National Guard Education Foundation Library, Puerto Rico Territory File, “The Puerto Rico 

National Guard,” n.d., 1-3. 

4. Robert Hawk, Florida’s Army (Englewood, FL: Pineapple Press, 1986), 13-20. 

5. Shy, 6-7. 

6. William L. Shea, The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana 

State University Press, 1983), Ch. 1 passim. All material on the early Virginia militia is from the cited 

source unless otherwise noted. 

7. Darrett B. Rutman, “A Militant New World, 1607-1640” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 

1959), 80-95. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Leach, 2-3. 

10. Shea, 25-35. 

11. William L. Shea, “The First American Militia,” Military Affairs, February 1982, 15-18. 

12. Andresen, Ch. 2, passim. All material on the Plymouth militia is from the cited source unless 

otherwise noted. 

13. Ibid., 37 

14. Ibid., 38. 

15. Ibid., 51-52; and Robert K. Wright, “Massachusetts Military Roots: A Study Prepared for the 

Chief, National Guard Bureau,” (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Division, 

1986), 2-3. 

16. Andresen, 55-61; and Wright, 2-3. 

17. Records of Massachusetts, I, 186-87; David R. Millar, “The Militia, the Army and Independency 

in Colonial Massachusetts” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1967), 41-42; and Wright, 8-9. 

18. Leach, 45-46. 

19. John R. Galvin, The Minute Men: The First Fight, Myths and Realities of the American 

Revolution (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), 10-11. 

20. National Guard Education Foundation Library, Connecticut State File, “History of the 

Connecticut National Guard,” n.d., passim; Robert W. Kinney, The Citizen Soldier: A Brief History of the 

National Guard of Rhode Island, Rhode Island National Guard, March 1977, 1; and NGB Historical 

Services Division, Information Paper, “Historical Sketch of the New Hampshire National Guard,” n.d., xixii. 

21. Leach, 59-66. 

22. Ibid. 

23. The Army and Air National Guard and Naval Militia Association of the State of New York, 

“Minute Men of the Empire State,” September 1957, 6-7; and New Jersey Department of Defense, 

Information Office, “Three Centuries of Service”, June 1977, 1. 

24. Joseph M. Balkoski, The Maryland National Guard: A History of Maryland’s Military Forces, 

1634-1991 (Baltimore, MD: Maryland National Guard, 1991), 3; and Donn Devine, The Delaware 

347 
Army National Guard History

National Guard: A Historical Sketch (Wilmington, DE: The Adjutant General’s Office, State of Delaware, 

1968), 6-8. 

25. Jean Martin Flynn, The Militia in Antebellum South Carolina Society (Spartanburg, SC: The 

Reprint Company, 1991), 31-33. 

26. James M. Johnson, Militiamen, Rangers and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754-1776 

(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1992), 159-63. 

27. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the 

United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 4-9. 

28. Ibid. 

29. Leach, 224-41. 

30. Charles Johnson, Jr. African American Soldiers in the National Guard: Recruitment and 

Deployment during Peacetime and War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 1-3. 

31. Millett and Maslowski, 36-45. All material on the French and Indian War is from the cited 

reference unless otherwise noted. 

32. Samuel J. Newland, The Pennsylvania Militia: The Early Years, 1669-1792 (Annville, PA: 

Department of Military and Veterans Affairs, 1997), 70-83. 

33. Frederick P. Todd, “Our National Guard,” Military Affairs, Summer 1941, 75-76. 

34. Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies and 

Practice, 1763-1789 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1971), 46. 

35. David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 51. 

36. Galvin, Chs. 7-8 passim. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Galvin, 59-62; and Higginbotham, 47-48. 

39. Galvin, 55. 

40. Fischer, 43-65. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Ibid., 75-77. 

44. Ibid. 

45. Fischer, 174-260; and Galvin, Chs. 13-26 passim. The best modern accounts of the battle of 

Lexington and Concord are found in Fischer and Galvin. All material on the battle of Lexington and 

Concord is from the cited sources unless otherwise noted. 

46. Fischer, 254, 320-21. 

Chapter 2 Revolution and Early Nationhood, 1775-1794 

1. John Adams to Abbe de Mably, in Charles Francis Adams, ed., Works of John Adams, V: 494. 

2. John R. Elting, The Battle of Bunker’s Hill (Monmouth Beach, NJ: Philip Freneau Press, 1975), 

10-13. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Martin K. Gordon, Imprint on the Nation: Stories Reflecting the National Guard’s Impact on a 

Changing Nation (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1983), 55. 

5. Higginbotham, 68-70. 

6. Elting, 19-21. 

7. Higginbotham, 71-73. 

8. Elting, 29-30. 

9. Ibid., 30-37. 

10. Ibid., 37-39. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Higginbotham, 83. 

13. Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1969), 46-49. 

14. Higginbotham, 94. 

348 
Army National Guard History

15. Ibid., 98-99. 

16. Ibid., 104-05. 

17. Ibid.; Robert K. Wright, Jr., The Continental Army (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Center of 

Military History, 1983), 51-56; and Matloff, 55. 

18. Millett and Maslowski, 51-53. 

19. James B. Deerin, The Militia in the Revolutionary War (Washington, DC: The Historical Society 

of the Militia and National Guard, 1976), 14-19. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Ibid., 22; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 

36; and Matloff, 65. 

23. George Washington to the President of Congress, December 20, 1776, in Fitzpatrick, ed., 

Writings of George Washington, 4:403. 

24. Don Higginbotham, “The American Militia: A Traditional Institution with Revolutionary 

Responsibilities,” in Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays, ed. Don Higginbotham 

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 98-99;and Deerin, 23-24. 

25. Deerin, 25. 

26. Matloff, 75-79. 

27. Ibid. 

28. Deerin, 26. 

29. Matloff, 78-79. 

30. Millett and Maslowski, 53; and Deerin, 19-21. 

31. Matloff, 87. 

32. Deerin, 21, 29-30. 

33. Matloff, 90-93. 

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid; and Higginbotham, “American Militia,” 99. 

36. Gordon, 5; and Higginbotham, “American Militia,” 98. Another excellent summary of the militia 

in the American Revolution is John Shy, “The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War” in A 

People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for Independence (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1976), Ch. 9. 

37. Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military 

Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 86, 77. 

38. Ibid., 83, 87. 

39. Millett and Maslowski, 84-85. 

40. George Washington, Memorandum, “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” to Lt. Col. 

Alexander Hamilton, Chairman of Congressional Committee, May 2, 1783, passim. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Kohn, 74-75; and Millett and Maslowski, 87. 

43. Kohn, 79. 

44. John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 49. 

45. Kohn, 128-133. 

46. Ibid. 

47. 2nd Congress, Session I, “An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by 

establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States,” May 8, 1792, passim; and Mahon, 51-53. 

48. 2nd Congress, Session I, “An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the 

Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions,” May 2, 1792, passim; and Mahon, 53. 

49. Mahon, 53-54. 

50. Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-

1846 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 4-6. 

51. Ibid., 20-21. 

52. Ibid., 22-27. 

53. Ibid., 28-38. 

349 
Army National Guard History

54. Ibid., 43-49. 

55. Kohn, 157-70. 

56. Ibid. 

57. Ibid.; and Mahon, 54. 

Chapter 3 The Volunteer Militia, 1795-1878 

1. John K. Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789-1800 (Gainesville, FL: 

University of Florida Press, 1960), 32-46. 

2. Albert E. Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: The Thomas 

Jefferson Memorial Association, 1907), 3:317-24. 

3. Millett and Maslowski, 99-102. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 63-64; and Martin K. Gordon, “The Militia of the District of 

Columbia, 1790-1815” (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1975), 100-05. 

6. C. Edward Skeen, Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 (Lexington, KY: University Press of 

Kentucky, 1999), 10-12.) 

7. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 67-77. All material on the War of 1812 is from the cited 

reference unless otherwise noted. 

8. Weigley, 134-43. 

9. Ibid.; and Millett and Maslowski, 121-22. 

10. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 80. 

11. William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 28-29; and Lena London, 

“The Militia Fine, 1830-1860,” Military Affairs, Fall 1951, 118-29. 

12. Paul Tincher Smith, “Militia of the United States from 1846 to 1860,” Indiana Magazine of 

History, 1919, 24; London, 120; and Riker, 24-26. 

13. John K. Mahon, “A Board of Officers Considers the Condition of the Militia in 1826,” Military 

Affairs, Summer 1951, 106-15; and London, 124-25. 

14. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 83. 

15. Kenneth O. McCreedy, “Palladium of Liberty: The American Militia System, 1815-1861” (Ph.D. 

diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1991), 269-71; Millett and Maslowski, 7-8; and Rutman, 732-33. 

16. Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers & Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865 (New York: 

The Free Press, 1973), Ch. 7, passim; and McCreedy, Ch. 11, passim. The volunteer militia companies of 

the 19th Century still lack a comprehensive, analytical treatment. The two chapters from Cunliffe and 

McCreedy are the best secondary sources currently available. All information on the rise of the volunteer 

militia companies is from the cited references unless otherwise noted. 

17. Gordon, Imprint on the Nation, 53. 

18. National Guard Almanac, 2000 (Falls Church, VA: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 2000), 

139-40. 

19. Todd, 82-86. 

20. Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, 

PA: Stackpole Books, 1964), 19-24; and Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 

No. 20-212, 1955), 62-78. 

21. McCreedy, 355-56. 

22. Todd, 84; and McCreedy, 360. 

23. McCreedy, 358-59. 

24. Cunliffe, 241-47. 

25. Ibid. 

26. Burke Davis, They Called Him Stonewall (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 3-8. 

27. McCreedy, 371-72. 

350 
Army National Guard History

28. James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Alfred A. 

Knopf, 1982), 149; and Kreidberg and Henry, 93. 

29. McCreedy, 392-93; and Jim Dan Hill, “Those Civil War Regiments,” National Guardsman, April 

1961, 2-5, 28. 

30. McCreedy, 401-08; and Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 101. 

31. Cunliffe, 246-47; and Gordon, Imprint on the Nation, 9. 

32. McCreedy, 402; and Cunliffe, 3-15. 

33. Kreidberg and Henry, 90-97. 

34. William F. S. Root, The 69th Regiment in Peace and War (New York: Blanchard Press, 1905), 9-

17; and National Guard Education Foundation, New York State file, Kenneth H. Powers, “The Fighting 

Sixty-Ninth of New York: Its History, Heraldry, Traditions and Customs,” n.d., 1. 

35. Louisiana Civil War Centennial Commission, The Washington Artillery (New Orleans: Office of 

the Adjutant General, Louisiana, 1961), 1-6. 

36. Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 

47-48, 220-21; McCreedy, 402-03; and Cunliffe, 20-22, 235-41. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Robert S. Chamberlain, “The Northern State Militia,” Civil War History, June 1958, 107-09; and 

National Guard, September 1980, 48. 

39. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 101-02. 

40. Millett and Maslowski, 196-201. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Hill, Minute Man, 100-01. 

43. Riker, 44-47. 

44. McPherson, 564-65; and Johnson, 12-13. 

45. Ibid.; and John W. Listman, Jr., “Not to be Denied,” National Guard, February 2001, 14-19. 

46. Jerry Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920 

(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 21-31. 

47. McPherson, 586-88; and Cooper, 49. 

48. Ibid.; and Riker, 47-48. 

49. Cooper, 50-51; and Riker, 51-52. 

50. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 116-18; Riker, 51-55; and Cooper, 52-60. 

51. Hill, Minute Man, 320-23. 

52. Ibid. 

53. National Guard Association, Proceedings, 1st Annual Conference, St. Louis, MO, October 1879, 

8-12; and Hill, Minute Man, 323. 

54. Martha Derthick, The National Guard In Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 

1965) 21-22; and Cooper, 87. 

55. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 119. 

56. Frederic P. Todd, American Military Equipage, 1851-1872. 3 vols. (Westbrook, CT: Company of 

Military Historians, 1978), 2:655-59; California National Guard’s 150th Anniversary (Sacramento, CA: 

Office of the Adjutant General, California National Guard, 1999), 9-12; and Cooper, 36. 

57. Brian Dexter Fowles, A Guard in Peace and War: The History of the Kansas National Guard, 

1854-1987 (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1989), Chaps. 1-3, passim, and Cooper, 35. 

58. NGB Historical Services Division, Information Paper, “New Mexico,” n.d., 1-2; and Cooper, 36-

37. 

59. Francis V. Greene, “The New National Guard,” Century Magazine, February 1892, 483-98. 

60. Cooper, 88-95. 

61. Ibid. 

62. Cooper, 87-88; and Greene, 493-94. 

63. Ibid. 

64. Cooper, 39-43. 

65. Dianna Everett, Historic National Guard Armories: A Brief, Illustrated Review of the Past Two 

Centuries (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Division, n.d.), 14-22. 

351 
Army National Guard History

66. Cooper, 89-97. 

67. Ibid. 

68. Greene, 483-98; Cooper, 30-31; and Listman, 14-19. 

Chapter 4 The Birth of the Modern National Guard, 1898-1916 

1. Hill, Minute Man, 151-153. 

2. Frank Friedel, The Splendid Little War (New York: Dell Publishing, 1962), 19-26; Hill, 154-158; 

and Adjutant General of the Army, Statistical Exhibit of the Strength of Volunteer Forces Called Into 

service During the War With Spain With Losses From All Causes (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1899), passim. 

3. Hill, Minute Man, 154-158; Adjutant General of the Army, Statistical, passim; and Department 

of the Army, Lineage and Honors Certificate, “200th Air Defense Artillery (First New Mexico)”; and NGB 

Historical Services, Information Paper, “Historical Sketch of the Arizona National Guard,” n.d., 18-19. 

4. Hill, Minute Man, 160-163; and Adjutant General of the Army, Statistical, passim. 

5. Hill, Minute Man, 160-164. 

6. Adjutant General of the Army, Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain, Including the 

Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902, 2 

Volumes (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902; reprint, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1993) I: 37-64. 

7. Freidel, 56-61, 72-94; Adjutant General of the Army, Correspondence, I: 84-105; and Hill, 167-

168. 

8. Hill, Minute Man, 168-169. 

9. Ibid.; and Adjutant General of the Army, Correspondence, I: 147-165. 

10. Hill, Minute Man, 162-185. 

11. Ibid.; and Adjutant General of the Army, Correspondence, II: 236-278. 

12. Ibid.; and Douglas R. Hartman, Nebraska’s Militia: The History of the Army and Air National 

Guard, 1854-1991 (Virginia Beach, VA: The Donning Company, 1994), 62-63. 

13. Adjutant General of the Army, Correspondence, II: 278-310 

14. Ibid. 

15. Ibid., II: 310-341; and Hartman, 66-71. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Committee On Veterans’ Affairs, United States Senate, Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863-1978 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979) Twenty individual citations in Philippine 

Insurrection section; National Guardsman, April 1953, 2-4; and National Guardsman, November 1960, 14-

15, 30. 

18. Adjutant General of the Army, Correspondence, Vol. 2, 417-432. 

19. Millet and Maslowski, 285-286. 

20. Ibid., 309-310; and Weigley, 313-320. All information related to the Root Reforms is from the 

cited references unless otherwise noted. 

21. Ezra J. Warner, Generals In Blue (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 

519-520. 

22. Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 

1964), 56-63. 

23. Ibid., 98-111, 147-150. 

24. Ibid., 122-123. 

25. Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. War Department, 

1907), xiii-xv. 

26. Ibid., iv. 

27. Hill, Minute Man, 180-184. 

28. Ibid., 179-180. 

29. Ibid., 184-186. 

30. Cooper, 108-09. 

352 
Army National Guard History

31. Ibid. 

32. Fifty-fifth Congress, 1901-1902, “An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia, and for other 

Purposes,” Public Law No. 33, January 21, 1903. 

33. Cooper, 109-111. 

34. Ibid. 

35. Cooper, 130-133. 

36. Derthick, 29-32; Johnson, African Americans, 77-78; and Cooper 134-141. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Ibid., 135-136. 

39. Everett, 14-26. 

40. Ibid. 

41. National Guard, November 1992, 16-20; and Timothy K. Nenninger, “The Army Enters the 

Twentieth Century, 1904-1917,” in Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts Against All Enemies: 

Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Greenwood 

Press, 1986), 220-222. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Report of the Secretary of War, 1912, 27; and Nenninger, 220. 

44. War Department, Annual Report, 1912, “Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, “ 975-977; and 

Division of Militia Affairs, Annual Report, 1908, 25-27. (Reports of the Division of Militia Affairs are 

hereafter cited as “DMA, Annual Report” followed by the appropriate year and page entry.) 

45. Charles J. Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard: 1943-1969 (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Air Force, Office of Air Force History, 1985), 1-2. 

46. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 142. 

47. War Department, General Orders No. 99, “Reprint of the Militia Act of May 27, 1908 to Amend 

the Militia Act of 1903,” June 11, 1908. 

48. DMA, Annual Report, 1908, 5-7; Julius Rothstein, The History of the National Guard Bureau 

(Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, n.d.), 1-2; and Hill, Minute Man, 209-210. 

49. Weigley, 333-334. 

50. DMA, Annual Report, 1910, 15-20. 

51. War Department, Annual Report, 1912, Appendix A, “Report on the Organization of the Land 

Forces of the United States,” 87, 108, 114, 123-125; and Weigley, 339-341. 

52. DMA, Annual Report, 1913, 197-211; DMA, Annual Report, 1914, 199-201; and DMA, Annual 

Report, 1915, 8-9. 

53. DMA, Annual Report, 1912, 32-34; and Militia Bureau, Report on the Mobilization of the 

Organized Militia and the National Guard of the United States, 1916, 21-35. 

54. Weigley, 335-336. 

55. James T. Currie and Richard B. Crossland, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United State Army 

Reserve, 1908-1995 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Department of the Army 

Pamphlet No. 140-14, 1997), 17-19. 

56. Cooper, 114. 

57. Ibid.; and U.S. Attorney General George W. Wickersham to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, 

Memorandum, February 17, 1912, 1-4. 

58. Hill, Minute Man, 205. 

59. Bruce Jacobs, “The Adjutants General Association: Origins, 1912-1923,” January 14, 1978, 1-5; 

National Guard, September 1988, 57; and Hill, 327-329. 

60. Weigley, 342-344; and Millett and Maslowski, 323-324. 

61. War Department, Annual Report, 1915, 133-135. 

62. Ibid.; and Hill, Minute Man, 220. 

63. Weigley, 344-350. 

64. Ibid. 

65. Ibid.; Militia Bureau, Mobilization of the Organized Militia, “Extracts from the National Defense 

Act,” 156-169; and Militia Bureau, Annual Report, 1916, 45, 57-58. Reports of the Militia Bureau are 

hereafter cited as “MB, Annual Report” followed by the appropriate year and page entry. 

353 
Army National Guard History

66. Militia Bureau, Mobilization of the Organized Militia, 12, 65, 156. 

67. Ibid.155; and Hill, Minute Man, 234-237. 

68. Hill, Minute Man, 237-243. 

Chapter 5 The National Guard in the World Wars, 1917-1945 

1. Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World 

War I (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), 6-8. 

2. Ibid. 

3. Ibid., 8-9, 42-43 

4. John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New 

York: The Free Press, 1987), Chs. 5 and 6 passim; and Hill, Minute Man, 258. 

5. Millett and Maslowski, 333-37. 

6. Coffman, 28-29; and Kreidberg and Henry, 256. 

7. Ibid., 3-4, 18. 

8. Hill, Minute Man, 261-63. 

9. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 154-57; and Cooper, 168. 

10. Ibid.; and MB, Annual Report, 1917, Appendix C. 

11. MB, Annual Report, 1917, 8-10. 

12. Ibid.; and Hill, Minute Man, 257-58. 

13. Weigley, 385-86. 

14. Cooper, 168-71; and Coffman, 65. 

15. Hill, Minute Man, 265-67; and MB, Annual Report, 1918, Appendix A. (Appendix A of the 

MB’s 1918 report is a detailed listing of all unit redesignations and an indispensable source for those 

interested in tracing the lineage and honors of specific National Guard units.) 

16. James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 

1994), 1-5; Hill, 269; and MB, Annual Report, 1918, 9-10. 

17. Johnson, African Americans, 97-104; and MB, Annual Report, 1918, 10. 

18. Joint War History Commission of Michigan and Wisconsin, The 32nd Division in the World War, 

1917-1919 (Madison, WI: Wisconsin War History Commission, 1920), 30-32; Coffman, 84; and Cooper, 

169. 

19. Kenny Franks, Citizen Soldiers: Oklahoma’s National Guard (Norman, OK: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1984), 23-26; Cooke, 13, 18; and Coffman, 66-68. 

20. MB, Annual Report, 1919, 18-21. 

21. Ibid.; and Barry M. Stentiford, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century (Ph.D. diss., University 

of Alabama, 1998), Ch. 2, passim. 

22. Allan R. Millett, “Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918” in 

Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military 

History from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 235-39. 

23. Elbridge Colby, “The National Guard of the United States,” unpublished manuscript, n.d., VII-22 

thru VII-23; Hill, 269-72; Cooke, 18-19; and Mahon, 159-60. (The Colby manuscript is in possession of the 

National Guard Education Foundation Library in Washington, D.C.) 

24. Millett, “Over Where?”, 239-43; and Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 159-60. 

25. Colby, VII-23 thru VII-24. 

26. Johnson, 108-111. 

27. Charles J. Gross, The Air National Guard: A Short History (Washington, D.C.: NGB Historical 

Services Division, 1994), 7-9. 

28. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 161. 

29. Hill, Minute Man, 280-83. 

30. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 162-64. 

31. Ibid.; and Hill, Minute Man, 265, 269, 275, 296. 

32. Colby, VII-24 thru VII-28; and Millett and Maslowski, 354-58. 

33. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 159-60; and Hill, Minute Man, 285-84. 

354 
Army National Guard History

34. Colby, VII-28; and Col. John H. Parker, Commander, 102nd Infantry, Letter to General J. G. 

Harbord, March 16, 1918 located in the holdings of the National Guard Bureau Historical Services 

Division. 

35. I.B. Holley, Jr., General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy 

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 182-87, 195-99, 202-06, 274, 304, 364. 

36. Ibid., 31, 187, 370. 

37. Ibid., 203; and War Department, Annual Report, 1912, 77-78. 

38. Hill, Minute Man, 298-300. 

39. Stentiford, 107-13. 

40. Millett and Maslowski, 366. 

41. Holley, 432-33, 456; and Hill, Minute Man, 305. 

42. Holley, 430-39. 

43. Ibid., 423-25; and Hill, Minute Man, 293, 307. 

44. Sixty-sixth Congress, Public Law 66-242, June 4, 1920, Chapter I, passim. 

45. Ibid. 

46. MB, Annual Report, 1920, 5. 

47. Ibid., 5-8, 26; and MB, Annual Report, 1922, 5. 

48. MB, Annual Report, 1921, 13; MB, Annual Report, 1922, 5; MB, Annual Report, 1927, 18; and 

Colby, IX-3. 

49. MB, Annual Report, 1921, 9; MB, Annual Report, 1922, 5; and MB, Annual Report, 1925, 11. 

50. MB, Annual Report, 1921, 16; National Guard Bureau, Annual Report, 1936, 1; National Guard 

Bureau, Annual Report, 1941, 11-13; and Colby, IX-17 thru IX-20. (Reports of the National Guard Bureau 

are hereafter cited as “NGB, Annual Report” followed by the appropriate year and page entry.) 

51. Gross, Short History, 8-10. 

52. Colby, IX-11 thru IX-17. 

53. MB, Annual Report, 1931, 1; MB, Annual Report, 1932, 1; and Colby, IX-14. 

54. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 176-77. 

55. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 174-75; and NGB, Annual Report, 1935, 6. 

56. Colby, IX-3, IX-8. 

57. Weigley, 419. 

58. Currie and Crossland, Ch. 3, passim. 

59. Kreidberg and Henry, 555; and NGB, Annual Report, 1941, 1, 4, 14-15. 

60. Kreidberg and Henry, 575-80. 

61. NGB, Annual Report, 1941, 15-19. 

62. Presidential Executive Order No. 8530, August 31, 1940. 

63. W. D. McGlasson, “Mobilization, 1940,” National Guard, September 1980, 10-21. 

64. Ibid. 

65. Ibid.; and Colby, X-9. 

66. Bruce Jacobs, Tensions Between the National Guard and the Regular Army (Washington, DC: 

Historical Society of the Militia and National Guard, 1990), 1-12. 

67. Ibid. 

68. NGB, Annual Report, 1941, 29-31; and Earl Rickard, “The Crowded Foxhole: Citizen Soldiers 

and Regulars From World War I to Pearl Harbor,” unpublished ms., 1999, Ch. 5, passim. 

69. Hill, Minute Man, 430-33. 

70. Headquarters, Department of the Army, 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration 

Committee, Fact Sheet, “The National Guard in World War II,” n.d., 1; Shelby L. Stanton, Order of Battle, 

U.S. Army, World War II (Novato, CA: Praeger, 1984), 240, 471; and National Guard Bureau, Historical 

Services Division, Information Paper, “The National Guard at the Time of Pearl Harbor, 7 December 

1941,” September 17, 1991, 1. 

71. Lest We Forget...New Mexico’s National Guard Heroes on Bataan, 1941-42 (Washington, DC: 

Historical Society of the Militia and National Guard, 1992), 1-10; and Stanton, 299, 467. 

72. Office of the Adjutant General of Texas, Department Historian, Information Paper, “The Lost 

Battalion,” November 11, 2000. 

355 
Army National Guard History

73. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 185; and NGB, Annual Report, 1942, 51-52. 

74. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 186; Rothstein, National Guard Bureau, 5-6; and NGB, 

Annual Report, 1946, 5, 38-40. 

75. NGB, Annual Report, 1946, 26; and Stanton, 184-85. (Shelby Stanton’s magnificent Order of 

Battle is the definitive overview of American ground units in World War II, including the National Guard. 

Unless otherwise noted, the details of National Guard divisional operations are from the appropriate entries 

in Order of Battle.) 

76. NGB, Annual Report, 1946, 31-32. 

77. Colby, X-16; Franks, 70, 113, 139; and National Guard, March 1987, 22-24. 

78. Johnson, 156-57; Stanton, 254; and National Guard, February 2001, 19. 

79. Gross, Short History, 10. 

80. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: The 

Free Press, 1980), 413; and NGB, Annual Report, 1946, 32. 

81. Colby, X-20 thru X-22. 

82. Ibid. 

83. Gross, Short History, 10. 

84. Colby, X-22; and NGB, Annual Report, 1946, 31-32. 

85. Hill, Minute Man, 480-81. 

86. Dorothy Cave, Beyond Courage: One Regiment Against Japan, 1941-45 (Las Cruces, NM: 

Yucca Tree Press, 1992), 390. 

Chapter 6 The Early Cold War, 1946-1970 

1. Holley, 622-23. 

2. Ibid., 541, 618-20. 

3. Holley, 623; and Hill, Minute Man, 489-92. 

4. Hill, Minute Man, 342-45; and National Guardsman, October 1975, 25, 27. 

5. Ibid.; Holley, 653; and Derthick, 69-71. 

6. Holley, 631, 659-60; Hill, Minute Man, 492-97; and War Department, Circular No. 347, 25 

August 1944. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Holley, 679, 686; and NGB, Annual Report, 1946, 62-67. 

9. NGB, Annual Report, 1946, Appendix O. 

10. Weigley, 569. 

11. Hill, Minute Man, 501-02. 

12. Ibid., 483-85. 

13. NGB, Annual Report, 1946, 61, 71 and Appendix P. 

14. Hill, Minute Man, 497-98. 

15. National Guardsman, March 1947, 10; National Guardsman, May 1948, 28; National 

Guardsman, March 1949, 28; National Guardsman, April 1949, 30; and National Guardsman, May 1952, 

28. 

16. NGB, Annual Report, 1947, 9-10. 

17. Millett and Maslowski, 480-82. 

18. NGB, Annual Report, 1949, 2. 

19. Weigley, 500-01; and NGB, Annual Report, 1948, 10. 

20. Currie and Crossland, 83-90. 

21. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 201-02; and Currie and Crossland, 90-91. 

22. NGB, Annual Report, 1948, 2, 31-32; NGB, Annual Report, 1950, 1, 7-9; and Mahon, 221. 

23. NGB, Annual Report, 1951, 17-20; and Maj. Gen. Francis S. Greenlief (Ret.), Interview by Lt. 

Col. Franklin D. Simmons, Jr., Senior Officers Oral History Program, Program 82-C (Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1982), 118. 

24. Ibid. 

25. NGB, Annual Report, 1952, 10; and NGB, Annual Report, 1953, 19. 

356 
Army National Guard History

26. National Guardsman, July 1948, 4-5; and National Guardsman, February 1953, 1. 

27. NGB, Annual Report, 1951, 1, 11-12. 

28. Ibid., 22. 

29. Ibid., 11-12. 

30. National Guardsman, September 1951, 16-17. 

31. National Guardsman, November 1951, 30-33. 

32. National Guardsman, January 1952, 8; and National Guardsman, March 1952, 2-6. 

33. National Guardsman, April 1951, 2; and National Guardsman, September 1951, 1,8. 

34. NGB, Annual Report, 1952, 9. 

35. William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953 

(Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1996), 176-77. 

36. Ibid., 180-88; and McGlasson Papers, “Summary of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea,” 1-3. 

(The McGlasson Papers were written and compiled by Cpt. Wilford F. McGlasson who served as the 

Public Relations Officer of the 40th Infantry Division in 1950. He stayed with the division through its 

training and deployment to Korea in 1952. McGlasson forwarded news reports to southern California 

newspapers throughout the mobilization, keeping the homefront informed as to the California Guard’s 

activities. The papers are located in the National Guard Education Foundation Library.) 

37. Ibid 

38. Berebitsky, 194-208; and McGlasson Papers, 1-3. 

39. Berebitsky, 208-13; and McGlasson Papers, 1-3. 

40. Berebitsky, 214-16; and McGlasson Papers, 1-3. 

41. Berebitsky, 216-36; and McGlasson Papers, 1-3. 

42. NGB, Annual Report, 1953, 2-3, 10. 

43. NGB, Annual Report, 1954, 10; and NGB, Annual Report, 1956, 15. 

44. National Guardsman, February 1953, 10. 

45. NGB, Annual Report, 1956, 15. 

46. Weigley, 530; and Currie and Crossland, 100-01. 

47. Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 1041, paragraph 1, August 10, 1956; and U.S. Congress, Public Law 

85-861, Title 32, U.S. Code, 1956. 

48. NGB, Annual Report, 1956, 24. 

49. NGB, Annual Report, 1956, 3; and NGB, Annual Report, 1958, 338. 

50. NGB, Annual Report, 1958, 338. 

51. National Guardsman, October 1975, 27. 

52. Millett and Maslowski, 495. 

53. AEROMK, Nike Quick Look III, Fort Worth, TX, June 1990, 1-4; and National Guardsman, 

April 1952, 10. 

54. NGB, Annual Report, 1954, 10. 

55. Nike Quick Look III, 1-4. 

56. National Guard Education Foundation Library, Information Paper, “Facts on the 720th Missile 

Battalion,” n.d., 1-2. 

57. National Guardsman, November 1974, 2-8. 

58. Ibid. 

59. Timothy Osato, Militia Missilemen: The Army National Guard in Air Defense, 1951-1967 (Ent 

Air Force Base, CO: U.S. Army Air Defense Command, 1968), 99. 

60. A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), Ch. 5, passim. 

61. NGB, Annual Report, 1960, 6-9. 

62. NGB, Annual Report, 1960, 33-34. 

63. NGB, Annual Report, 1960, 12. 

64. Ibid, 35. 

65. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 224-26. 

66. Ibid. 

67. Ibid.; and NGB, Annual Report, 1958, 28. 

357 
Army National Guard History

68. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 225-26. 

69. National Guardsman, August 1963, 9-10. 

70. Ibid. 

71. Presidential Executive Order No. 9981, July 26, 1948; and Berebitsky, 27. 

72. NGB, Annual Report, 1965, 61-62; and NGB, Annual Report, 1967, 14. 

73. Bettie J. Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 1945-1978 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Center of 

Military History, 1990), 292-296. 

74. National Guardsman, July 1956, 6. 

75. NGB, Annual Report, 1956, 5; and Personnel Record of First Lieutenant Sylvia Law; National 

Guardsman, March 1957, 6. (Portions of Lieutenant Law’s personnel records were made available from the 

Historical Records Branch, Adjutant General’s Office, Alabama National Guard.) 

76. NGB, Annual Report, 1957, 26; NGB, Annual Report, 1960, 28, 32; NGB, Annual Report, 1962, 

47; NGB, Annual Report, 1968, 46; NGB, Annual Report, 1972, 25, 29; and Morden, 292. 

77. NGB, Annual Report, 1962, 9-13. 

78. Ibid. 

79. Ibid.; and Hill, Minute Man, 548. 

80. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 229; and John D. Stuckey and Joseph H. Pistorius, 

“Mobilization of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and Vietnam 

War” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 1984), 18-25. 

81. Ibid.; and NGB, Annual Report, 1962, 10. 

82. NGB, Annual Report, 1963, 27. 

83. Weigley, 538. 

84. NGB, Annual Report, 1960, 24; and NGB, Annual Report, 1964, 21. 

85. NGB, Annual Report, 1958, 35; and NGB, Annual Report, 1965, 15. 

86. NGB, Annual Report, 1963, 6, 38; and NGB, Annual Report, 1964, 31. 

87. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 231-35. 

88. Ibid. 

89. NGB, Annual Report, 1968, 1, 3, 27-34. 

90. Ibid. 

91. Millett and Maslowski, 544-50. 

92. Ibid. 

93. Stuckey and Pistorius, 41-48. 

94. National Guardsman, September 1969, 12-21; National Guardsman, September 1966, 3-11; and 

Stuckey and Pistorius, 29. 

95. Ibid. 

96. Ibid. 

97. National Guardsman, March 1968, 22-27. 

98. NGB, Annual Report, 1968, 29. 

99. National Guardsman, July 1970, 26. 

100. Stuckey and Pistorius, 58-63, 67. 

101. NGB, Annual Report, 1968, 10. 

102. NGB, Annual Report, 1969, 2; Stuckey and Pistorius, 77-79; and Headquarters, 2-138th Field 

Artillery, “Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period ending 31 July 1969.” 

103. NGB, Annual Report, 1970, 2, 9. 

104. NGB, Annual Report, 1968, 17; National Guardsman, October 1965, 8-13, 40; and Higham, 101-

09. 

105. National Guardsman, September 1967, 6-7, 40; and Higham, 187-202. 

106. National Guardsman, April 1968, 12-19, 40. 

107. NGB, Annual Report, 1968, 13-17. 

108. Ibid.; NGB, Annual Report, 1969, 20; and NGB, Annual Report, 1970, 3. 

109. James A. Michener, Kent State: What Happened and Why (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Crest Books, 

1971), 294-98; and National Guardsman, June 1970, 3-4. 

358 
Army National Guard History

110. Adjutant General of Ohio, After Action Report, “Kent State University, 2-8 May 1970,” 6; 

Krause vs. Rhodes Exhibits; Michener, 296-97, 305; and National Guardsman, June 1970, 3. (The exhibits 

cited in “Krause vs. Rhodes” are taken from evidence contained in the court transcripts of “Arthur Krause, 

et al. Plaintiff vs. James A. Rhodes, et al., Defendants, Case No. C 70-544, United States District Court, 

Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, 1974.) 

111. Adjutant General of Ohio, After Action Report, “Kent State University, 2-8 May 1970,” 5; and 

Stang, “American Opinion” June 1974, 1-21. 

112. National Guardsman, June 1970, 8. 

Chapter 7 The Era of Total Force Policy, 1970-1990 

1. Major Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, August 1979), 40-46 ; and General Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-

Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (New York: Touchstone Books, a division of Simon & 

Schuster, Inc., 1984), 170. 

2. Doughty, 40-46. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Weigley, 568-69. 

5. U.S. President’s Commission On An All-Volunteer Armed Force 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1970), vii, 8-10. 

6. Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, Ending the Draft-The Story of the All Volunteer Force 

(Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, April 1977), 50-74. 

7. National Guardsman, January 1970, 10; National Guardsman, April 1973, 1; and NGB, Annual 

Report, 1970, 7. 

8. NGB, Annual Report, 1970, 21. 

9. NGB, Annual Report, 1972, 28-29. 

10. NGB, Annual Report, 1972, 26; NGB, Annual Review, 1977, 22; and NGB, Annual Review, 

1979, 1. (Starting in 1976, the name of the NGB Annual Report was revised to the NGB Annual Review; 

all subsequent references to NGB’s annual summary of activities reflects this name change. Also note that 

the NGB summary for 1976 included the period known as “Transition Quarter.” The Transition Quarter 

represented the federal government’s change of the beginning of the fiscal year from July 1st to October 1st 

starting in 1976.) 

11. NGB, Annual Report, 1972, 3; NGB, Annual Report, 1973, 3; and NGB, Annual Review, 1976 

and Transition Quarter, 31. 

12. NGB, Annual Report, 1972, 25, 29; NGB, Annual Report, 1973, 3; NGB, Annual Report, 1975, 

29; and NGB, Annual Review, 1976 and Transition Quarter, 31. 

13. Robert W. Sennewald and James D. Blundell, The Active and Reserve Components: Partners in 

the Total Army, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, December 1989), 9-10. 

14. Secretary of Defense, “Readiness of the Selected Reserve,” Memorandum, August 23, 1973. 

15. Sennewald and Blundell, Active and Reserve Components, 9-10. 

16. NGB, Annual Report, 1970, 33-34; NGB, Annual Report, 1974, 127, 142; NGB, Annual Report, 

1975, 35, 39; and NGB, Annual Review, 1976 and Transition Quarter, 13, 42. 

17. Greenlief interview, 203-05. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 

The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, June 1975, 2; and National Guardsman, October 1970, 12-17. 

18. National Guard Association of the United States, “The Abrams Doctrine: Then, Now and in the 

Future” Symposium Proceedings, July 16, 1993, 8-9. 

19. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times (New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 1992), 360-366. 

20. NGB, Annual Report, 1973, 3. 

21. NGB, Annual Report, 1975, 2; and NGB, Annual Review, 1976 and Transition Quarter, 1. 22. 

Greenlief interview, 306. 

23. Sorley, 375. 

24. National Guardsman, December 1977, 22-24. 

359 
Army National Guard History

25. Ibid. 

26. NGB, Annual Review, 1980, 34-39. 

27. National Guard, July 1983, 1. 

28. NGB, Annual Review, 1979, 44. 

29. Ibid.; and NGB, Annual Review, 1980, 1. 

30. Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors: America’s National Guard and Reserve Forces and the 

Politics of National Security (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1977), 6. 

31. NGB, Annual Report, 1970, 14; NGB, Annual Report, 1973, 10; NGB, Annual Review, 1979, 4; 

and NGB, Annual Review, 1981, 1. 

32. National Guard, June 1985, 10. 

33. NGB, Annual Report, 1971, 3; NGB, Annual Report, 1972, 36; and NGB, Annual Report, 1974, 

145. 

34. Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States, fact sheet, n.d., 1. 

35. Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 257. 

36. Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 1992), 31-41. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Department of the Army, “The Posture of the Army and Department of the Army Budget 

Estimates for Fiscal Year 1982,” 4; and Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf 

War (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997), 29-31. 

39. Wirls, 40-43. 

40. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell 

Publishing, 1992), 142; and Department of the Army, “The Posture of the Army and Department of the 

Army Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 1986,” 15, 51. 

41. Department of the Army, “Posture Statement, 1986,” 17-20. 

42. Wirls, 42-43. 

43. Office, Chief of Public Affairs, United States Army, Biography, John O. Marsh, Jr., 1981; and 

National Guard Education Foundation Library, Biographical File, John O. Marsh, Jr. 

44. NGB, Annual Review, 1981, 1; and NGB, Annual Review, 1989, 23, 25. 

45. NGB, Annual Review, 1989, 23. 

46. NGB, Annual Review, 1981, 1; NGB, Annual Review, 1982, 47; NGB, Annual Review, 1986, 32; 

and NGB, Annual Review,1987, 24. 

47. NGB, Annual Review, 1984, 18, 23; and NGB, Annual Review, 1985, 19, 26. 

48. NGB, Annual Review, 1984, 18; NGB, Annual Review, 1986, 22; NGB, Annual Review, 1989, 

26; NGB, Annual Review, 1990, 26; FY 1988 Department of Defense Appropriations Hearings, I: 340; and 

National Guard, May 1991, 12. 

49. NGB, Annual Review, 1985, 29, 35. 

50. NGB, Annual Review, 1983, 30; NGB, Annual Review, 1988, 37, 41; and NGB, Annual Review, 

1989, 31, 39. 

51. NGB, Annual Review, 1981, 1; NGB, Annual Review, 1983, 16; and NGB, Annual Review, 1986, 

16; and National Guard, November 1985, 20-27. 

52. NGB, Annual Review, 1983, 16; NGB, Annual Review, 1984, 18; National Guard, January, 1986, 

29; and National Guard, February, 1988, 24-29. 

53. NGB, Annual Review, 1984, 24. 

54. NGB, Annual Review, 1985, 30-31. 

55. National Guard Association of the United States, “On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States 

Court of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit, Rudy Perpich, Governor of Minnesota, et al., Petitioners v. 

Department of Defense, et al., Respondents, In the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 

1989, No. 89-542,” 8. 

56. NGB, Annual Review, 1990, 8; Supreme Court Decision, No. 89-542, “Rudy Perpich, Governor 

of Minnesota, et al., v. Department of Defense, et al., June 11, 1990”; and National Guard Association of 

the United States, fact sheet, “Court Upholds Montgomery Amendment,” n.d., 1-2. 

57. Wirls, 220-223. 

360 
Army National Guard History

58. Ibid.; and Department of the Army, “Posture Statement, 1991,” Appendix X. 

59. National Guard, April 1988, 34-38. 

60. NGB, Annual Review, 1990, 20. 

Chapter 8 The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991 

1. NGB, Annual Review, 1990, passim. Unless otherwise noted, all background information 

pertaining to the ARNG’s status in 1990 is from the cited reference. 

2. Scales, Certain Victory, Chapter 2, passim. Unless otherwise noted, all background information 

on the Persian Gulf War and the beginning of Operation Desert Shield is from the cited reference. 

3. NGB-AAR, Army National Guard After Action Report, Operation Desert Shield, Operation 

Desert Storm, 2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991 (Arlington, VA: Army National Guard, June 28, 1991), 

2, 116, 126, 132 and 135 (hereafter cited as ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report); and ARNG 

Operations and Training Division, Emergency Operations Center, Daily Log, 12 August 1990. 

4. Emergency Operations Center, Daily Log, 10 August; and Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Milestones, n.d. 

5. Emergency Operations Center, Daily Log, 14 August; ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 

121, 133; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Message, August 24, 1990, “Suspension of 

Voluntary Separation of Officer and Enlisted Personnel (STOP LOSS) for Reserve and National Guard.” 

6. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 125-127; Lineage and Honors Certificate, Headquarters 

and Headquarters Company, 42nd Infantry Division, 1980; and LTG John B. Conaway (Ret.) with Jeff 

Nelligan, Call Out the Guard (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1997), 168. 

7. NGB-AAR, Memorandum, “ARNG Unit Federalization Dates,” May 30, 1991; and ARNG 

Desert Storm After Action Report, 1-5. 

8. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 6, 17, 69. 

9. Department of Defense, What Now?, A Guide for Reserve Component Families, September 1990; 

and Desert Shield/Desert Storm Experiences Questionnaire (hereafter Questionnaires), 1073rd Maintenance 

Company, Michigan ARNG. NGB Historical Services Division distributed questionnaires to each 

mobilized Guard unit for completion and return. The completed forms are held in the offices of the NGB 

Historical Services Division. 

10. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 69; and Questionnaires, passim. 

11. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 82-85. 

12. Presidential Executive Order No. 12733, November 13, 1991; and ARNG Desert Storm After 

Action Report, 149. 

13. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 134; After Action Report, 217th Quartermaster 

Detachment, Kentucky ARNG; and After Action Report, 1030th Engineer Battalion, Virginia ARNG, on 

file with Command Historian, Virginia ARNG. 

14. Department of the Army, A Soldier’s Guide to Saudi Arabia, November 1990, 18, 22. 

15. NGB-AAR, Information Paper, “ARNG Units Assigned to U.S. Army, Europe During Operation 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” November 14, 1991. 

16. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, Table 181. 

17. Scales, 53, 131. 

18. Congressional Research Service, The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War, 

October 22, 1991, 9-10; and Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, July 1991, 11-1 

thru 11-5. 

19. Letter, House Armed Services Committee Members to Secretary of Defense, September 6, 1990; 

Conaway, 172; and Duncan, 62-63, 67-69. 

20. National Guard, May 1991, 13-14. 

21. Congressional Research Service, Roundout Concept, 12. 

22. “After Action Report, 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized),” June 25 1991, 1-16, E-1 thru E-15; 

“The 48th Brigade, A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization,” National Guard, May 1991, 12-15; 

Congressional Research Service, Roundout Concept, 1-25; and United States General Accounting Office, 

Report to the Secretary of the Army, Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades 

361 
Army National Guard History

for Gulf War, September 1991, 1-30. Unless otherwise noted, the narrative of the 48th Brigade is from the 

cited references. 

23. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 6-7; and U.S. Army, Forces Command, Message, 

“Roundout Brigade Mobilization,” November 21, 1990. 

24. NGB-AAR, Information Paper, “Absent Without Leave Incident, 256th Infantry Brigade 

(Mechanized), LA ARNG,” October 28, 1991; and National Guard, “48th Brigade Chronology,” May 1991, 

15. 

25. U.S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory (New York: Random House, 1992), 197-

207, and Appendix A, 429-430. 

26. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 1-3. 

27. Questionnaire, 142d Field Artillery Brigade, n.d., 1-4; After Action Review, 2-142d Field 

Artillery, 21 October 1991; Demobilization Report, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Headquarters, 142d 

Field Artillery Brigade, 20 June 1991; National Guard, “Oklahoma’s 1-158th Field Artillery Engages the 

Enemy,” August 1991, 32-36; 100 Hours with Light TACFIRE, Major Russell Graves and Captain Richard 

Needham, 142d Field Artillery Brigade; and Desert Shield/Storm unit narrative, 1-158th Field Artillery 

(MLRS), n.d. Unless otherwise noted, the narrative of the 142d Field Artillery Brigade and its subordinate 

units is from the cited references. 

28. Maj. Gen. R. A. Smith, Commander, 1st U.K. Armoured Division, Letter to Colonel Charles 

Linch, Commander, 142d Field Artillery Brigade, March 9, 1991; and NGB-AAR, Information Paper, 

“Oklahoma ARNG Success Stories: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” 3. 

29. Staff Sergeant Carl P. Jungbluth, Jr. and Specialist Michelle L. Rhodes, History of the 1133rd 

Transportation Company, Mobilization and Deployment for Operation Desert Shield –Operation Desert 

Storm, September 1990-June 1991, n.d., 19-34. Unless otherwise noted, the narrative of the 1133rd 

Transportation Company is from the cited reference. 

30. Orlan J. Svingen, ed., The History of the Idaho National Guard (Boise, Idaho; Idaho National 

Guard, 1995), 180-185; NGB-AAR, Information Paper, “Idaho Army National Guard Success Stories: 

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” August 8, 1991, 1-2; and NGB-ARG, Information Paper, 

“Idaho Army National Guard Success Stories: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” March 17, 

1992, 1. Unless otherwise noted, the narrative of the 148th Public Affairs Detachment is from the cited 

references. 

31. U.S. Army, Forces Command, “Demobilization Plan” February 1, 1991, 9-10; Questionnaires, 

passim; and ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 190. 

32. Questionnaires, passim. 

33. “After Action Report, 48th Infantry Brigade,” 14-16; National Guard, May 1991, 15; and ARNG 

Desert Storm After Action Report, 186-87. 

34. Desert Shield/Storm narrative, 1-158th Field Artillery (MLRS), 11. 

35. Jungbluth and Rhodes, 27-31. 

36. ARNG Desert Storm After Action Report, 26-27. 

37. Historical Survey, “ARNG Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” November 1998. In 

the files of the NGB Historical Services Division. 

38. Colonel D. Allen Youngman, Citizen-Soldiers, Combat and the Future: America’s Army at War 

With Itself (Washington, DC: American Defense Coalition, March 1998), 15. 

39. General Accounting Office, Peacetime Training, 27. 

40. Georgia National Guard, 48th Brigade, Mojave Patriot, April 24, 1991, 9. 

Chapter 9 A New World Order, 1991-2000 

1. Colin L. Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 

1995), 451. 

2. Army Posture Statement, 1994, 7. 

3. NGAUS and AGAUS, Roles and Missions of the National Guard, November 1992, 6. 

4. Army, “The Mission and the Base Force,” October 1992, 50-61. 

5. NGB, Annual Review, 1993, 39-40. 

362 
Army National Guard History

6. U.S. Congress, Public Law 103-337, October 5, 1994. 

7. U.S. Congress, Public Law 102-484, National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1993, 

Title XI, “Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative”; and Army Posture Statement, 1995, 2; Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, DAMO-TRR, “Title XI, FY 93 Defense Authorization Act, Army National Guard 

Combat Readiness Reform Act,” Information Briefing, n.d. 

8. Army, “The Mission and the Base Force,” October 1992, 50-61; RAND, Arroyo Center, Training 

Readiness in the Army Reserve Components, 1994, 107-11; and Army Posture Statement, 1995, 62. 

9. RAND, Training Readiness, 107-11. 

10. HQDA, DAMO-TRR, “Active Component-Reserve Component Senior Leaders Offsite, Title XI 

Update Briefing,” January 3, 1996. 

11. NGB, Annual Review, 992, 30-32, 38. 

12. Ibid. 

13. NGB, Annual Review, 1993, 37-40. 

14. National Guard, July 1989, 4; and National Guard, August 1989, 22. 

15. Ibid.; and Nickey W. Philpot, “National Guard Involvement in Counterdrug Operations and Its 

Impact on Readiness,” U.S. Army War College, Strategy Research Project, September 11, 1998, 1-7. 

16. NGB, Annual Review, 1990, 17. 

17. NGB, Annual Review, 1993, 27-30, 60, 116; and Philpot, 11. 

18. NGB, Annual Review, 1998, 22-24; and ARNG, Posture Statement, 2000, 3-4. 

19. Duncan, 4. 

20. Chairman, JCS, National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992, 19; and Army 

Posture Statement, 1994, 19. 

21. NGAUS and AGAUS, Roles and Missions, 6. 

22. National Guard, April 1988, 34-36; Director, ARNG, All-States Memorandum #I90-0385, “FY 

91-94 Force Structure Reductions,” September 10, 1990; NGB, Annual Review, 1992, 36; and NGB, 

Annual Review, 1993, 37. 

23. NGB, Annual Review, 1993, 37; ARNG Force Management Division, Information Paper, “Army 

National Guard Force Structure Allowance and End Strength, FY ‘87-’03,” n.d.; and ARNG Force 

Management Division, Information Paper, “ARNG Combat Brigades Inactivated Since FY 1991,” n.d. 

24. NGB, Annual Review, 1993, 45-46; and NGB, Annual Review, 1998, 45-46. 

25. John R. D’Araujo, Jr. “Off-Site Agreement,” Informal Memorandum, October 25, 1999, 1-4. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Ibid. 

28. NGB, Annual Review, 1994, 50. 

29. NGB, Annual Review, 1995, 39; and Army Posture Statement, 1997, 26. 

30. William C. Bilo, interview by the author, “Artillery Transfer to the Army National Guard,” 

December 9, 1999, Army National Guard Readiness Center, Arlington, VA. 

31. Powell, 550. 

32. Department of Defense, The Bottom-Up Review, September 1, 1993, 1-2. 

33. Ibid, 10-12, 94; and Department of Defense, The Bottom-Up Review Press Briefing, September 1, 

1993, Charts 14, 18. 

34. Author’s personal knowledge 

35. NGB, Annual Review, 1994, 49-50. 

36. NGB, Annual Review, 1996, 35. 

37. Chairman, JCS, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of 

Flexible and Selective Engagement, 1995, i-iii, 8-9. 

38. NGB, Annual Review, 1996, 3-4; and NGB, Annual Review, 1997, 30. 

39. NGB, Annual Review, 1994, 37. 

40. Ibid.; NGB, Annual Review, 1995, 29; and NGB, Annual Review, 1996, 26. 

41. NGB, Annual Review, 1995, 1, 29, 36; and Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers, viixxii, 1-12. 

42. Ibid. 

363 
Army National Guard History

43. Home Station Mobilization: An Assessment of the Direct Deployment of the 41st Personnel 

Services Company (Oregon Army National Guard) in the Second Rotation of Operation JOINT 

ENDEAVOR (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, January 6, 1997), 1; and 

ARCNGB, 1996, i and Appendix E, Table 2. 

44. NGB, Annual Review, 1997, 28 and Appendix E, Table 2; Home Station Mobilization, iii-viii and 

Annex A (Chronology); and Mobilizing an Infantry Company: The Experience of Calling Up C/3-116th 

Infantry (Virginia Army National Guard) for Operation JOINT GUARD (McLean, VA: Science 

Applications International Corporation, August 25, 1998), v-vi, 1-5 and Annex A (Chronology). 

45. NGB, Annual Review, 1998, 27-28; and ARNG Mobilization Readiness Division, Information 

Paper, “The Army National Guard in Stability and Support Contingency Operations,” February 17, 2000, 

1-9. 

46. Conaway, 204-210; NGB, Annual Review, 1992, 89; and National Guard, January 1993, 128. 

47. Conaway, 210-212; and NGB, Annual Review, 1992, 29, 89. 

48. Conaway, 225-227; NGB, Annual Review, 1993, 3, Appendix G; and ARNG Posture Statement, 

1996, 5-6. 

49. National Guard, June 1995, 14-20, 23-24. 

50. NGB, Annual Review, 1996, 36. 

51. ARNG Posture Statement, 1999, 3-5. 

52. Conaway, 201; NGB, Annual Review, 1991, 8-9; NGB, Annual Review, 1993, 10; and ARNG 

Posture Statement, 2000, 42-43. 

53. NGB, Annual Review, 1993, 3, 33. 

54. ARNG Posture Statement, 2000, 46-50. 

55. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Secretary of the Army, Army National Guard: 

Combat Brigades Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain, June 1995, 1-7; Youngman, 2-4, 

16-19; and NGB, Annual Review, 1995, 38. 

56. Ibid.; and U.S. Congress, “Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 

and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs,” Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives, 22 February 1992, 347. 

57. Ibid. 

58. Department of Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces: 

Directions for Defense, May 24, 1995, i-viii, 2-23 – 2-25. 

59. ARNG Posture Statement, 1996, 11; and NGB, Annual Review, 1998, 31. 

60. NGB, Annual Review, 1998, 39. 

61. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1977, i-x. 

62. Ibid., 29, 32-33. 

63. William A. Navas, Jr., “Input for the ARNG Official History: 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR),” Informal Memorandum, January 16, 2000, 1-4; and National Guard, December 1996, 8, 30-31. 

64. Ibid. 

65. Ibid.; and Director, ARNG, All-States Memorandum #I99-0063, “Army National Guard (ARNG) 

17K Force Structure Adjustment Impacts,” May 3, 1999, 1-2 and Enclosure. 

66. ARNG Posture Statement, 2001, 17; and National Guard, February 2000, 18-19. 

67. ARNG Posture Statement, 2001, 44; and Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense, Press Release, “Cohen Defers Decision to Cut Army Reserve Components,” 

December 20, 1999. 

68. National Guard, January 2000, 18-19; and ARNG Mobilization Readiness Division, Information 

Paper, “Stability and Support,” n.d., 3-6. 

69. ARNG Posture Statement, 2001, 2-7. 

70. Ibid. 

364 
Army National Guard History

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