The Implementation of 

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i The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Message from the Director, 

Office of Force Transformation

Warfare is about human behavior in a context of organized violence directed toward political ends. So,

network-centric warfare (NCW) is about human behavior within a networked environment. “The network” is

a noun, the information technology, and can only be the enabler. “To network” is the verb, the human behavior,

the action, and the main focus. So, implementation of NCW must look beyond the acquisition of the technical enablers to individual and organizational behavior, e.g., organizational structure, processes, tactics,

and the way choices are made. In other words, all elements of the enterprise are in play.

The U.S. Armed Forces’ progress in transforming from the Industrial Age to the Information Age, though

far from complete, has been illustrated during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. These

campaigns, mounted against determined, potent foes in Afghanistan and Iraq, were characterized by the

conduct of highly effective, network-centric operations by coalitions organized and led by the U.S. Central

Command.

Our military is embracing NCW. All of the Service and Joint Transformation Roadmaps are based on a 

central principle. This is helping to create and maintain a decisive warfighting advantage for U.S. forces. In

the Information Age, power is increasingly derived from information sharing, information access, and speed,

all of which are facilitated by networked forces. NCW involves a new way of thinking about how we accomplish our missions and how we organize and interrelate within and among all echelons and at all levels of

warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical.

Modern technology and new operational concepts enable networked units and individual platforms to

operate together in ways not possible just a few years ago. NCW is characterized by the ability of 

geographically dispersed forces to attain a high level of shared battlespace awareness that is exploited to

achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent. This

linking of people, platforms, weapons, sensors, and decision aids into a single network creates a whole

that is clearly greater than the sum of its parts. The results are networked forces that operate with increased
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare ii

speed and synchronization and are capable of achieving massed effects, in many situations, without the

physical massing of forces required in the past. This increased speed and synchronization directly impacts

operations across the battlespace, from support areas through combat zones.

In sum, NCW enhances the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to combine into a seamless, joint, coalition

warfighting force. When implemented, it takes full advantage of the trust we place in our junior and 

noncommissioned officers. As information moves down echelon, so does decision making. Thus, smaller

joint force packages can possess more flexibility and agility and are able to wield greater combat power

than before. NCW generates new and extraordinary levels of operational effectiveness. It enables and

leverages new military capabilities while allowing the United States and our multinational partners to use

traditional capabilities with more speed and precision.

Recent progress in developing network-centric capabilities throughout the U.S. Armed Forces, evident in

Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, is most encouraging, but we must not rest on our laurels. A great deal of

work remains to be done. If we are to retain our competitive advantage in the 21st century, the Department

must continue to move ahead in this vital area of military transformation.

How are the profound increases in capability and performance attributed to NCW implementation being

attained from the perspective of force building and actual operations? This booklet will point to some of 

the answers.

A. K. Cebrowski

Director, Office of Force Transformation

Office of the Secretary of Defense
iii The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Introduction

• Purpose........................................................................................................................................3

• What Is Network-Centric Warfare? ................................................................................................3

• Origins of Network-Centric Warfare ................................................................................................5

• Central Role in Force Transformation..............................................................................................5

• Tenets and Principles of Network-Centric Warfare ..........................................................................7

• Strategy for Implementation..........................................................................................................11

Theory and Practice of Network-Centric Warfare

• An Emerging Theory of War ........................................................................................................15

• Information Age Warfare ..............................................................................................................17

• Network-Centric Warfare and the Domains of Conflict ..................................................................19

• Benefits of Network-Centric Warfare ............................................................................................21

• A Source of Warfighting Advantage..............................................................................................23

Network-Centric Operations

• NCO and the Joint Operations Concepts......................................................................................27

• NCO in Afghanistan and Iraq ......................................................................................................29

• NCO Conceptual Framework ........................................................................................................31

• NCO Case Studies......................................................................................................................33

Contents
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare iv

NCW Implementation

• Joint NCW Implementation..........................................................................................................44

– FBCB2–Blue Force Tracking ..............................................................................................44

– Horizontal Fusion—a Catalyst for Net-Centric Transformation ..............................................45

– Sense and Respond Logistics ............................................................................................46

– Cultural Change and Education ..........................................................................................48

– Other Joint NCW Initiatives ................................................................................................48

• Service NCW Implementation ......................................................................................................49

– Army ................................................................................................................................50

– Navy and Marine Corps......................................................................................................53

– Air Force ..........................................................................................................................55

• Allies and Multinational Partners ................................................................................................58

Conclusions—Network-Centric Warfare in Perspective

• Towards a Network-Enabled Force: the 1990s ............................................................................65

• Building Transformational Capabilities in the 21st Century ............................................................67

• Implementing NCW—Three Cautions..........................................................................................68

Sources..................................................................................................................................69

Notes ........................................................................................................................................72

Introduction

“... we must achieve: fundamentally

joint, network-centric, distributed forces

capable of rapid decision superiority and

massed effects across the battlespace.

Realizing these capabilities will require

transforming our people, processes, and

military forces.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,

Transformation Planning Guidance

April 2003 
3 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

second chapter. The third chapter focuses on 

network-centric operations (NCO), including the

relationship of NCO to the overarching Joint

Operations Concepts (JOpsC), the NCO experience

in Afghanistan and Iraq, the development of the

NCO Conceptual Framework, and the conduct of

NCO case studies. An overview of Joint and

Service plans and initiatives to develop and implement network-centric capabilities and the growing

investment in these capabilities by our allies and

multinational partners are provided in the fourth

chapter.

What Is Network-Centric

Warfare?

Network-centric warfare is an emerging theory of

war in the Information Age. It is also a concept

that, at the highest level, constitutes the military’s

response to the Information Age.2 The term 

network-centric warfare broadly describes the

combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a

fully or even a partially networked force can employ

to create a decisive warfighting advantage.3

The implementation of NCW is first of all about

human behavior as opposed to information technology. While “network” is a noun, “to network” is

a verb. Thus, when we examine the degree to

which a particular military organization, or the

Department as a whole, is exploiting the power of

NCW, our focus should be on human behavior in

the networked environment. How do military forces

behave, perform, and organize themselves when

they are networked? As illustrated in the next

chapter, experience with networked forces to date

indicates that Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and

Introduction

Purpose

As the world enters a new millennium, our military

simultaneously enters a new era in warfare—an

era in which warfare is affected by a changing

strategic environment and rapid technological

change. The United States and our multinational

partners are experiencing a transition from 

the Industrial Age to the Information Age.

Simultaneously, we are fully engaged in a global

war on terrorism set in a new period of globalization. These changes, as well as the experiences

gained during recent and ongoing military operations, have resulted in the current drive to transform the force with network-centric warfare (NCW)

as the centerpiece of this effort.

To better understand why NCW is so important to

the force transformation process underway in the

U.S. Armed Forces,1 this document provides

answers to some of the fundamental questions

regarding NCW as an emerging theory of war in

the Information Age. It also describes how the

tenets and principles of NCW are providing the

foundation for developing new warfighting concepts, organizations, and processes that will allow

our forces to maintain a competitive advantage

over potential adversaries, now and in the future. In

sum, the purpose of this brochure is to provide an

overview of the ongoing implementation of NCW in

the Department of Defense (DoD).

A brief description of NCW, including its origins, its

central role in force transformation, its tenets and

principles, and an implementation strategy, are

provided in this first chapter. An examination of

NCW as an emerging theory of war, its relationship

to the four domains of Information Age warfare, the

growing evidence of its benefits, and the warfighting advantages it can provide, are examined in the
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

Marines conducting military operations at the tactical and operational levels of war gain a significant

advantage over adversaries because of shared situational awareness. NCW theory has applicability

at all three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—and across the full range of

military operations from major combat operations

to stability and peacekeeping operations.

A networked force conducting network-centric

operations (NCO) is an essential enabler for the

conduct of effects-based operations by U.S.

forces. Effects-based operations (EBO) are “sets of

actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends,

neutrals, and foes in peace, crisis, and war.”4 EBO

is not a new form of warfighting, nor does it displace any of the currently recognized forms of warfare. Throughout history, decision makers have

sought to create conditions that would achieve

their objectives and policy goals. Military commanders and planners have attempted to plan and

execute campaigns to create these conditions—

an approach that would be

considered “effects-based”

in today’s terminology. EBO

in the 21st century, enabled

by networked forces, is a

methodology for planning,

executing, and assessing

military operations designed

to attain specific effects

that achieve desired national

security outcomes.

The armed forces of many

of our allies and multinational partners are moving

rapidly into the NCW arena

and developing networkcentric capabilities of their own to be able to 

conduct EBO. When we conduct military operations

with our allies and multinational partners today and

in the future, we seek to obtain maximum advantage derived from the power of NCW. At the same

time, it should not surprise us that our enemies and

potential adversaries around the world, including

international terrorist organizations like al Qaeda,

may seek to acquire network-centric capabilities

on their own terms in order to use them against us

when conducting surveillance, planning operations,

or actually carrying out attacks. It is reasonable to

expect that terrorist organizations are also analyzing the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of our 

networks and planning to exploit them in the future.

NCW generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to

achieve shared awareness, increased speed of

command, high tempo of operations, greater

lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of

self-synchronization (figure 1). In essence, it

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Figure 1: Information Age Transformation: Network-Centric Warfare
5 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

translates information advantage into combat

power by effectively linking friendly forces within

the battlespace, providing a much improved

shared awareness of the situation, enabling more

rapid and effective decision making at all levels of

military operations, and thereby allowing for

increased speed of execution. This “network” is

underpinned by information technology systems,

but is exploited by the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,

and Marines that use the network and, at the same

time, are part of it.

Origins of Network-Centric

Warfare

One of the first clear, compelling descriptions of

“network-centric warfare” was published in a 1998

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article. The authors

compared the potential impact of NCW today with

the transformational impact of the French concept

of the levee en masse during the Napoleonic period.

“NCW and all of its associated revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) grow out of and draw their

power from the fundamental changes in American

society. These changes have been dominated by

the co-evolution of economics, information technology, and business processes and organizations and

they are linked by three themes:

• The shift in focus from the platform to the 

network;

• The shift from viewing actors as independent

to viewing them as part of a continuously

adapting ecosystem; and 

• The importance of making strategic choices to adapt or even survive in such changing ecosystems.”5

These ideas have not only changed the nature of

American business today—they have changed

and will continue to change the way military operations are conducted.

The development of the intellectual foundation of

NCW within the DoD continued with the

Information Age Transformation Series of books

published by the Department of Defense

Command and Control Research Program (CCRP)

under the auspices of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Networks and Information Integration

(ASD [NII]). The first book in this series, Network

Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging

Information Superiority, provided the first detailed

articulation of the tenets that link a robustly networked force to dramatically increased combat

power.6 It also described how information, coupled

with changes in command and control (C2), could

transform military organizations. Two additional

volumes completed the three-volume set,

Information Age Anthology: Understanding Information

Age Warfare and Information Age Transformation.7

Another important book published by the CCRP,

Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric

Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War, explored the 

link between network-centric organizations and

processes and mission outcomes.8

Central Role in Force

Transformation

The President and the Secretary of Defense have

frequently emphasized that the transformation of the

Department of Defense lies at the heart of U.S.

defense strategy. As one of the seven major interconnected tenets of our strategy, transformation

supports the four major defense policy goals: assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military

competition; deterring threats and coercion against

U.S. interests; and, if deterrence fails, decisively

defeating any adversary.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

Overall, DoD’s transformation addresses three

major areas—how we do business inside the

Department, how we work with our interagency

and multinational partners, and how we fight.

While all three areas are vital in the Department’s

ongoing transformation to the Information Age, the

concepts of NCW and our steadily improving 

network-centric capabilities are transforming how

we fight. Thus, NCW is at the very center of force

transformation.

Force transformation includes new technologies

but also depends on the development of new operational concepts, organizational structures, and

relationships. The development of network-centric

capabilities depends on all of these. The ongoing

shift from platform-centric to network-centric

thinking and NCW is key to force transformation

and an evolving approach to the conduct of joint

warfare in the Information Age.9

The development of network-centric organizations

and the growing capability of U.S. forces to conduct

NCO are not ends in themselves, but a means to

generate increased combat power by:

• Better synchronizing events and their consequences in the battlespace;

• Achieving greater speed of command; and

• Increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness.

As already mentioned, the capability to conduct

NCO is a key enabler of effects-based operations

(EBO). Unless our forces are able to apply their network-centric capabilities to achieve the effects that

result in attaining strategic, operational, or tactical

objectives, the full value of these capabilities will

not be realized. In addition, without a robust network structure and the phenomena that result from

the application of network-centric capabilities, it

will be far more difficult, if not impossible, for the

U.S. and our multinational partners to conduct NCO

and EBO against our adversaries.

6
7 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

“Throughout history, warfare has assumed the

characteristics of its age and the technology of

its age. Today we see this trend continuing as

we move from the Industrial Age warfare with

its emphasis on mass to Information Age warfare, which highlights the power of networked

distributed forces and shared situational

awareness ... Within this wider context of military transformation, network-centric warfare

is one of the key concepts for thinking about

how we will operate in the future.”

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,

July 2001.

Tenets and Principles of

Network-Centric Warfare

Four basic tenets of NCW and a set of governing

principles for a network-centric force have been

identified. Together, these tenets and principles

comprise the core of NCW as an emerging theory

of war in the Information Age. The four tenets of

NCW help us understand the enhanced power of

networked forces. At the same time, they constitute a working hypothesis about NCW as a source

of warfighting advantage:

• A robustly networked force improves information sharing.

• Information sharing enhances the quality of

information and shared situational awareness.

• Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances

sustainability and speed of command.

• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission

effectiveness.10

The governing principles for a network-centric

force are summarized in figure 2 and discussed in

more detail below. These principles, still evolving

and subject to further refinement, are guiding the

application of NCW as an emerging theory of war.

In effect, they constitute the new rules by which a network-centric force organizes, trains, and operates.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

While it is not suggested that the governing principles for a network-centric force have supplanted or

are going to replace the time-tested principles of

war—mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, simplicity—they provide added direction for

executing military operations in the Information

Age. They are guiding the development and refinement of the overarching JOpsC and the four subordinate Joint Operating Concepts (JOC):

Homeland Security; Major Combat Operations;

Stability Operations; and Strategic Deterrence.

Fight First for Information

Superiority: Generate an information advantage through better timeliness, accuracy, and relevance of information.

• Increase an enemy’s information needs,

reduce his ability to access information, and

raise his uncertainty.

• Assure our own information access through a

well networked and interoperable force and

protection of our information systems, including sensor systems.

• Decrease our own information needs, especially in volume, by increasing our ability to

exploit all of our collectors.

Shared Awareness: Routinely translate

information and knowledge into the requisite level

of common understanding and situational awareness across the spectrum of participants in joint

and combined operations.

• Build a collaborative network of networks,

populated and refreshed with quality intelligence and non-intelligence data, both raw and

processed, to enable forces to build a shared

awareness relevant to their needs.

• Information users must also become information suppliers, responsible for posting information without delay. Allow access to the data

regardless of location.

• High-quality shared awareness requires

secure and assured networks and information

that can be defended.

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Figure 2: Governing Principles of a Network-Centric Force
9 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Speed of Command and Decision

Making: Recognize an information advantage

and convert it into a competitive advantage by 

creating processes and procedures otherwise

impossible (within prudent risk).

• Through battlefield innovation and adaptation,

compress decision timelines to turn information advantage into decision superiority and

decisive effects.

• Progressively lock out an adversary’s options

and ultimately achieve option dominance.

Self-Synchronization: Increase the

opportunity for low-level forces to operate nearly

autonomously and to re-task themselves through

exploitation of shared awareness and the commander’s intent.

• Increase the value of subordinate initiative to

produce a meaningful increase in operational

tempo and responsiveness.

• Assist in the execution of the “commander’s

intent.” Exploit the advantages of a highly

trained, professional force.

• Rapidly adapt when important developments

occur in the battlespace and eliminate the

step function character of traditional military

operations.

Dispersed Forces: Move combat power

from the linear battlespace to non-contiguous

operations.

• Emphasize functional control vice physical

occupation of the battlespace and generate

effective combat power at the proper time

and place.

• Be non-linear in both time and space, but

achieve the requisite density of power on

demand.

• Increase close coupling of intelligence, operations, and logistics to achieve precise effects

and gain temporal advantage with dispersed

forces.

Demassification: Move from an approach

based on geographically contiguous massing of

forces to one based upon achieving effects.

• Use information to achieve desired effects,

limiting the need to mass physical forces within a specific geographical location.

• Increase the tempo and speed of movement

throughout the battlespace to complicate an

opponent’s targeting problem.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

Deep Sensor Reach: Expand use of

deployable, distributed, and networked sensors,

both distant and proximate, that detect actionable

information on items of interest at operationally

relevant ranges to achieve decisive effects.

• Leverage increasingly persistent intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

• Use sensors as a maneuver element to gain

and maintain information superiority.

• Exploit sensors as a deterrent when employed

visibly as part of an overt display of intent.

• Enable every weapon platform to be a sensor,

from the individual soldier to a satellite.

Alter Initial Conditions at Higher

Rates of Change: Exploit the principles of

high-quality shared awareness, dynamic selfsynchronization, dispersed and de-massed forces,

deep sensor reach, compressed operations and

levels of war, and rapid speed of command to

enable the joint force to swiftly identify, adapt to,

and change an opponent’s operating context to our

advantage. Warfare is highly path-dependent;

hence, the imperative to control the initial conditions. The close coupling in time of critical events

has been shown historically to have profound

impact both psychologically and in locking out

potential responses.

Compressed Operations and

Levels of War: Eliminate procedural boundaries between Services and within processes so

that joint operations are conducted at the lowest

organizational levels possible to achieve rapid and

decisive effects.

• Increase the convergence in speed of deployment, speed of employment, and speed of

sustainment.

• Eliminate the compartmentalization of processes

(e.g., organize, deploy, employ, and sustain)

and functional areas (e.g., operations, intelligence, and logistics).

• Eliminate structural boundaries to merge

capabilities at the lowest possible organizational levels, e.g., joint operations at the

company/sub-squadron/task unit level.

10
11 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Strategy for Implementation

The Department’s overall strategy for NCW implementation is based upon: 1) Setting priorities to

enable, develop, and implement network-centric

concepts and capabilities; 2) Establishing specific

goals and measuring progress toward these goals;

and 3) Overcoming impediments to progress.

Setting Priorities: A critical mass of the

Joint Force must be robustly networked as the

“entry fee” for NCW and transformation. This

requires a focus on interoperability which must not

be sacrificed for near-term considerations.

Battlespace entities (platforms, units, sensors,

shooters) must be designed “net-ready.” In 

addition, increased emphasis must be placed 

upon research in developing shared situational

awareness and new organizational approaches 

to achieving synchronization. Research must continue to improve our ability to accurately represent

NCW-related concepts and capabilities in models

and simulations and to help us understand and

manage complex networks.

Establishing Goals and Measuring

Progress: The Department recognizes the

need to establish measurable NCW goals, to develop an investment and implementation plan to

achieve these goals, and to measure progress. An

immediate goal must be the availability of a robustly

networked joint force that can experiment with 

network-centric concepts and capabilities accompanied by a campaign of experimentation focused

on discovery. To measure progress, metrics are

needed. Ongoing efforts to develop measures of

key aspects of NCW, including the quality of information, collaboration, awareness, and shared 

situational awareness, have been given more

emphasis and related to measures of command

and control, synchronization, and, ultimately, to

measures of mission effectiveness.

Overcoming Impediments to

Progress: Technical, cultural, and organizational impediments to accelerating the

Department’s progress in fully implementing NCW

remain. Each can be overcome through focused

efforts in areas such as network security, network

interoperability, an understanding of human and

organizational behavior, and key NCW-enabling

technologies. The creation of a DoD environment

that supports innovation will enable us to reap the

full potential of NCW, just as better understanding

of individual, team, organizational, and cultural

behaviors will significantly accelerate our progress

in implementing NCW.11

Key Elements of Proposed NCW

Implementation Strategy: The DoD

strategy for the implementation of NCW includes

seven key elements:12

• Get the Theory Right: The new rules of

Information Age warfare and the theory of

NCW must be continually refined through the

process of experimentation and testing and

from the real world experience of U.S. forces

engaged in combat and other military operations worldwide, including ongoing stability

operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and

Bosnia.

• Apply the Theory Enterprise Wide: It will

not be enough to implement network-centric

capabilities, conduct network-centric operations (NCO), and test the theory of NCW only in

a “critical mass of the joint force” or in certain

high priority units. Instead, the capabilities

must be developed and the theory applied

enterprise wide, i.e., throughout the DoD.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

• Accelerate Networking of the

Joint Force: Understandably, much

of the effort to network U.S. forces

to date has been undertaken by the

Services. In the future, however,

joint forces must be networked not

only at the strategic and operational

levels, but also at the tactical level.

• Accelerate Deployment of

Network-Centric Systems,

Concepts, and Capabilities: As

new network-centric systems,

concepts, and capabilities are

developed by the Services and

Combatant Commands, they

should be deployed to the units

and geographical areas where

they can be refined and employed

when needed.

• Experiment with NetworkCentric Concepts and Capabilities: The role of experimentation in

advancing the implementation of networkcentric concepts and capabilities is absolutely

critical. The Department depends upon a 

rigorous program of Joint and Service experimentation to nurture new and better ways to

conduct NCO.

• Address Challenges of Allied and Coalition

NCO: As discussed in the third chapter, U.S.

allies and multinational partners are developing their own concepts and capabilities for the

conduct of NCO. Some of the challenges of

conducting NCO within the NATO alliance have

already surfaced during operations in Bosnia

and Kosovo and to some extent in Afghanistan

and Iraq. These challenges should be

addressed and overcome as soon as possible.

• Develop Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures (TTP) for NCO: In order to

maximize the potential for increased combat

power from NCW, Joint and Service warfighting

doctrines must evolve as network-centric

capabilities are implemented in U.S. forces.

Simultaneously, mature TTPs will be needed to

facilitate the effective conduct of NCO by U.S.,

allied, and multinational forces during combined military operations.

The Department’s strategy for implementing NCW,

as outlined above, is having a major impact on key

force development and investment decisions by the

Department and the Services. Figure 3 illustrates

how the application of NCW theory can support key

DoD investment decisions.

12

Networking the Force

Decision

Makers

Regardless

of Location

Warfighting Effects

Forces Applied

Sensors

Regardless

of Platform

Effectors

Regardless

of Service Mission Area "A"

Mission Area "B"

Mission Area "C" Information

Advantage

Combat

Power

Information

Richness

Information

Reach

Shared

Awareness

(Cognitive)

Lethality

(Value)

Operational

Tempo

(Value)

Survivability

(Value)

Degree of

Collaboration 

(Process)

Degree of

Synchronization (Process)

Platform-Centric

Network-Centric Platform-Centric

Network-Centric

Figure 3: Applying NCW Theory to Support Key Force Development

and Investment Decisions

Theory and Practice

of Network-Centric

Warfare

“What we are seeing, in moving from

the Industrial Age to the Information

Age, is what amounts to a new theory of

war: power comes from a different

place, it is used in different ways, it

achieves different effects than it did

before. During the Industrial Age, power

came from mass. Now power tends to

come from information, access, and

speed. We have come to call that new

theory of war network-centric warfare. It

is not only about networks, but also

about how wars are fought—how

power is developed.”

Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski,

Director, Office of Force Transformation,

IEEE Spectrum,

July 2002.
15 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

An Emerging Theory of War

A theory is “a hypothesis assumed for the sake of

argument or investigation, an unproved assumption.”13 It is also “a formulation of apparent 

relationships or underlying principles of certain

observed phenomena which has been verified to

some degree.”14 The working hypothesis of 

network-centric warfare (NCW) as an emerging

theory of war, simply stated, is that the behavior of

forces, i.e. their choices of organizational relationships and processes, when in the networked 

condition, will outperform forces that are not. The

four basic tenets of NCW, introduced in the preceding chapter, elaborate on this basic premise.

The governing principles of a network-centric force

guide the application of this emerging theory of

war and help to explain its power.

A theory of war must account for new sources of

power, relations among them, and how they are

brought to bear across the entire spectrum of military competition from peacekeeping, deterrence,

and dissuasion to violent clashes and sustained,

high-intensity conflict, and from force building and

countering traditional threats to countering irregular,

catastrophic, and disruptive threats. The basis of

NCW as an emerging theory

of war is that power flows

from society and society’s

methods of creating power

and wealth and that there

has been a fundamental shift

in sources of power from

industry to information. This

is comparable to the earlier

shift from the Agrarian Age to

the Industrial Age. In the

Industrial Age, land was still

important, but it was no longer the primary source of

power and wealth. In the Information Age, industrial

power remains important, but it has been replaced

by information as the most important source of

power and wealth. NCW is in a different competitive

space from Industrial Age warfare and, therefore,

has some different competitive attributes.

NCW is an emerging theory of war because it identifies new sources of power (information sharing,

information access, speed), how those sources

relate to each other, how they are brought to bear

to gain the desired outcome, and how they link to

political objectives (figure 4). It explains how one

side uses violence to compel an opponent to do

what it would not otherwise do and eliminate the

opponent’s ability to do the same to them. It

speaks to the character of war, not to its nature,

accepting that war by nature is a form of intense

human competition and involves violence, profound risk, and mutual danger. The NCW emerging

theory of war accepts the notion that it is the

nature of war to be nasty, brutish, and very complex, however short a conflict, campaign, or battle

may be. Some have said that NCW applies only to

“high-end” traditional warfare. This says more

	




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Figure 4: Network-Centric Warfare ... An Emerging Theory of War

Theory and Practice of Network-Centric Warfare
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

about our preference for “high-end” traditional

warfare than it does about NCW, an emerging theory of war that applies to all levels and modes of

competition.

Many of the recent and ongoing efforts to enhance

the network-centric capabilities of U.S. forces have

focused on the tactical and operational levels of war.

However, the relevance of NCW extends to the

strategic level. Strategy involves choices that control

the scope, pace, and intensity of a conflict.As shown

during the major combat operations phase of

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the capabilities of the

forces in the networked environment gave senior

civilian leaders a broader array of options not otherwise possible.

As with other, earlier theories of war15, NCW has its

competitive space, rule sets, and metrics. Where

the competitive space of industrial warfare was the

capacity to produce heavy weapons and get them

to where they could be most destructive, the competitive space in NCW is the capability to obtain

and integrate information into military operations.

The metrics used to gauge the relative power of

military forces in the Industrial Age were generally

input measures. We measured and compared 

military mass, expressed in terms of numbers of

weapons, ton-miles per day, military manpower,

and units. Our planning focused on achieving a

superior advantage in each of these areas,

whether in individual battles or larger campaigns.

But the metrics of NCW seek to describe the relative ability to create an information advantage and

turn it into a military advantage. These metrics are

generally output measures like speed, rates of

change, operational and tactical innovation, how

fast one side can couple events together and act

on the information, and achieve political outcomes.

Where Industrial Age warfare revolved around

efforts to obtain overwhelming force and attrition,

NCW revolves around information superiority16 and

precision violence to dismantle an opposing force.

Assuming NCW gains wide acceptance as a new or

emerging theory of war, is it likely to render the

works of Carl von Clausewitz and other classical

strategic thinkers obsolete? Michael Handel of the

Naval War College, one of the foremost contemporary students of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tsetung, Jomini, and others, concluded that while the

classic strategic theories of war may require adaptation to a changing environment such as we are

experiencing in the Information Age and in the 

conduct of the global war on terror, they remain

fundamentally intact. The logic of waging war and

of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as

human nature itself.

Observing that for many students of war today, “the

advantages offered by advanced military technology represent the realization of a long-awaited

panacea for the complex political and strategic

problems of waging war,” Handel adds a useful

note of caution for those involved in the implementation of NCW. “Many of the latest military theories

and doctrines assume tacitly or explicitly that the

wars of the future will be waged with perfect or

nearly perfect information and intelligence (‘information dominance’) ... This vision is a chimera,

because it implies that friction in war will be greatly reduced if not eliminated.”17 This will not be the

case. Rather, the issue is how one creates and

exploits an information advantage within the 

context of the fog and friction of war.

16
17 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

A survey of recent and emerging military theories

and the future of war has led to the observation

that, “In the 1990s, military theory reflected the

rapid diffusion of conflict following the end of the

bipolar Cold War world.” These theories ranged

from John Mueller’s “obsolescence of major war”

theory and Martin van Creveld’s argument that

Western military theory derived from classical warfare had become obsolescent to Alvin and Heidi

Toffler’s theory of “third wave” high-technology

information warfare. According to the Tofflers and

the Information Age theorists who followed them,

the Gulf War of 1990–91 had provided a glimpse

of postmodern war as the realm of high technology. On the other hand, military writers like Ralph

Peters, Robert Kaplan, and Philip Cerny have

offered visions of future war involving the “coming

anarchy” of a world of failed states or a struggle by

the West against a world of warrior cultures and

paramilitaries. The intellectual challenge facing

military professionals in the early 21st century is

not, as some are suggesting, “to consign Carl von

Clausewitz to the dustbin of history. Rather the task

is to learn how to fight effectively across the spectrum of conflict.”18 The NCW theory of war, as it is

implemented throughout the U.S. Armed Forces,

addresses this formidable task.

Information Age Warfare

Network-centric warfare (NCW) offers a unique

approach to the conduct of joint warfare in the

Information Age. Constructed around the tenets of

NCW and the governing principles of a networkcentric force and emphasizing high-quality shared

awareness, dispersed forces, speed of command,

and flexibility in planning and execution, the application of this emerging theory of war is giving U.S.

forces the capability to conduct immensely powerful effects-based operations (EBO) to achieve

strategic, operational, and tactical objectives

across the full range of military operations.

The recent performance of U.S. forces in the 

successful conduct of Operations Enduring

Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan, 2001–2002) and Iraqi

Freedom (OIF, Iraq, 2003) has provided a glimpse

of its potential. As General Tommy Franks, USA

(Ret.), commander of coalition forces during OEF

and OIF, observed recently, “I believe one of the

lessons well identified as enduring is the power of

a net-centric approach, which [lends itself] to the

effects of munitions, actions, and information

rather than the old way of stove-piping activities.”

When reflecting on OIF and his ability to see the

accurate locations of his forces in near-real-time,

thanks to the Blue Force Tracking (BFT) system
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

used by ground forces, General Franks described

his feelings at the time: “... I’ve died and gone to

heaven and seen the first bit of net-centric 

warfare at work!”19

Information technology advances in the areas of

command and control (C2); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and precision

weapons delivery are dramatically reshaping the

conduct of warfare in the 21st century, as General

Franks and many others witnessed in Afghanistan

and Iraq. The principles of NCW provide a new

foundation with which to examine and consider

changes in military missions, operations, and

organizations in the Information Age. The full application of these principles will accelerate the decision cycle by linking sensors, communications networks, and weapons systems via an interconnected

grid, thereby enhancing our ability to achieve information and decision superiority over an adversary

during the conduct of military operations.

As a new source of power, NCW has a profound

impact on the planning and conduct of war by

allowing forces to increase the pace and quality of

decision making, in effect changing the rules and

pace of military operations. A warfighting force

with networked capabilities allows a commander to

more quickly develop situational awareness and

understanding, rapidly communicate critical information to friendly combat forces, and marshal the

appropriate capabilities to exert massed effects

against an adversary.

As mentioned previously, NCW provides the foundation for transforming the way U.S. forces will

organize and fight in the Information Age. While

NCW is the theory, network-centric operations

(NCO) is the theory put into action. In other words,

the conduct of NCO represents the implementation

of NCW. Military operations will emphasize gaining

and maintaining information superiority to provide a

competitive advantage based on the implementation of NCW and its principles. The objective of

decision superiority is to turn an information advantage into a competitive advantage.

18
19 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

“Information Superiority is an imbalance in

one’s favor in the information domain with

respect to an adversary. The power of superiority in the information domain mandates that

the United States fight for it as a first priority

even before hostilities begin ... The quality of

the information position depends on the accuracy, timeliness, and relevance of information

from all sources ... The continuous sharing of

information from a variety of sources enables

the fully networked Joint Force to achieve the

shared situational awareness necessary for

decision superiority.”

Department of Defense,

Joint Operations Concepts,

November 2003, p. 17.

This competitive advantage is readily apparent

when comparing forces conducting NCO and those

operating under the old paradigm of platformcentric operations. Platform-centric forces lack the

ability to leverage the synergies created through a

networked force. A force implementing NCW is

more adaptive, ready to respond to uncertainty in

the very dynamic environment of the future at all

levels of warfare and across the range of military

operations. When we consider the most recent

combat experience of U.S. forces in Afghanistan

and Iraq, it is apparent that platforms retained a

central focus, but the networking of those platforms and organizations greatly enhanced their

lethality and survivability.

Network-Centric Warfare

and the Domains of Conflict

To successfully implement the emerging theory of

war and the NCW capabilities now being developed by the U.S. and our multinational partners,

the four domains of warfare—physical, information, cognitive, and

social—must be understood, as well as the

intersections, or areas

of overlap, between the

domains. As stated earlier, the four basic tenets

of NCW constitute a

hypothesis regarding

NCW as a source of

power. Figure 5 illustrates how this hypothesis may be explored at 

a high level across the

domains of Information

Age warfare.

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Figure 5: Tenets of NCW ... the New Value Chain
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

The overarching Joint Operations Concepts

(JOpsC) and its subordinate Joint Operating

Concepts (JOCs), Joint Functional Concepts

(JFCs), Joint Integrating Concepts (JICs), architectures, requirements, and capabilities are based

upon the vision of a transforming network-centric

joint force and a capabilities-based defense strategy designed to attain the six operational goals

established by the Secretary of Defense in the

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The required attributes and capabilities of a new

joint force capable of conducting NCO must be

carefully considered for each of these four

domains.

Physical Domain: The physical domain is

the traditional domain of warfare where a force is

moved through time and space. It spans the land,

sea, air, and space environments where military

forces execute the range of military operations and

where the physical platforms and communications

networks that connect them reside. Comparatively,

the elements of this domain are the easiest to

measure and, consequently, combat power has

traditionally been measured in the physical

domain.

Information Domain: The information

domain is the domain where information is created, manipulated, and shared. It is the domain that

facilitates the communication of information

among warfighters. This is the domain of sensors

and the processes for sharing and accessing sensor products as well as “finished” intelligence. It is

where C2 of military forces is communicated

and the commander’s intent is conveyed.

Consequently, it is increasingly the information

domain that must be protected and defended to

enable a force to generate combat power in the

face of offensive actions by an adversary.

Cognitive Domain: The cognitive domain

is in the mind of the warfighter. This is the realm of

EBO. Many, though not all, battles, campaigns, and

wars are won in this domain. The intangibles of

leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training

and experience, and situational awareness are elements of this domain. This is the domain where

commander’s intent, doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and procedures reside. This is also where decisive

battlespace concepts and tactics emerge.

Social Domain: The social domain

describes the necessary elements of any human

enterprise. It is where humans interact, exchange

information, form shared awareness and understandings, and make collaborative decisions. This

is also the domain of culture, the set of values,

attitudes, and beliefs held and conveyed by leaders

to the society, whether military or civil. It overlaps

with the information and cognitive domains, but is

distinct from both. Cognitive activities by their

nature are individualistic; they occur in the minds

of individuals. However, shared sensemaking—the

process of going from shared awareness to shared

understanding to collaborative decision making—

is a socio-cognitive activity because the individual’s

cognitive activities are directly impacted by the

social nature of the exchange and vice versa.20

20
21 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

As illustrated in figure 6, the domain intersections

represent important, dynamic areas within which

concept-focused experimentation should be conducted. The precision force so vital to the conduct

of successful joint operations is created at the

intersection of the information and physical

domains. Shared awareness and tactical innovation occur at the intersection between the information and cognitive domains. Since many battles

and campaigns are actually won or lost in the cognitive domain, this intersection is enormously

important. The intersection between the physical

and cognitive domains is where the time compression and “lock-out” phenomenon occur, where 

tactics achieve operational and even strategic

effects, and where high rates of change are developed. NCW exists at the very center where all four

domains intersect.

Benefits of

Network-Centric

Warfare

Evidence accumulated from a

wide range of U.S. military activities, including combat operations, training events, exercises,

and demonstrations, has strongly

supported the validity of NCW as

an emerging theory of war and

illustrated the power of networked forces. In general, the

outcomes have consistently been

decisive in favor of forces that

are robustly networked. When

both sides have similar networking capabilities, competition

shifts to other attributes. This

is discussed further in the

final chapter, “Conclusions—

Network-Centric Warfare in Perspective.”

In some tactical engagements, “superior” platforms were decisively defeated by “less capable”

platforms that were able to leverage order-ofmagnitude improvements in information sharing

enabled by networking. In other engagements,

digitized and networked ground forces with a

reduced number of “platforms” were able to “substitute information for mass” and outperform units

equipped with a larger number of “platforms” not

similarly digitized and networked. Even more

impressively, the combination of networked and

digitized ground and air forces was able to decisively defeat an opposition force (OPFOR) with

unprecedented lethality by creating and leveraging

an information advantage.

	
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Figure 6: Information Age Warfare ... Domains of Conflict
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

Air-to-Air Mission Area: Some of the

most thoroughly documented and convincing

examples of the power of NCW have been drawn

from the air-to-air mission area. Increased situational awareness and enhanced situational understanding are major contributors to enhanced survivability and lethality in this mission area. With

audio-only communications, pilots and controllers

must share information on adversary forces generated by onboard sensors, as well as their own position and status, via voice. Communicating the minimum essential information by voice takes time

and the resulting situational awareness often differs significantly from reality.

In contrast, when datalinks are employed on fighter aircraft, digital information on blue and red

forces is shared instantaneously, enabling all participants to share a common tactical picture. This

improved information position constitutes a

significant “information advantage” as

compared to an adversary fighting with only

voice communications. This information

advantage, in turn, enables a cognitive

advantage, in the form of dramatically

increased shared situational awareness

and enhanced situational understanding.

The result is that pilots flying datalinkequipped aircraft can translate these

advantages into increased survivability

and lethality.21

The same sort of evidence of increased

warfighting effectiveness enabled by networking during air-to-air combat has been

demonstrated in other important mission

areas including combined arms maneuver

warfare and close air support (Division

Capstone Exercise—Phase I); counter antiaccess (Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot);

counter-special operations forces (SOF) (Fleet

Battle Experiment Delta); and multinational rapid

reaction forces (Allied Command Europe Mobile

Force—Land) (figure 7).

Combined Arms Maneuver and

Close Air Support: One of the most 

powerful, well documented examples of increased

warfighting advantage achieved through NCW was

provided by the U.S. Army’s Division Capstone

Exercise—Phase I (DCX-1), conducted in the

spring of 2001 at the National Training Center at Ft.

Irwin, California. During this exercise, the Blue

Force, consisting of two brigade combat teams

(BCT) of the 4th Infantry Division with close air support (CAS) provided by F-16 and A/OA-10s from

the Arizona Air National Guard, was digitized and

networked to a degree never before achieved in a

major joint exercise.

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Figure 7: Understanding the Evidence for 

NCW Warfighting Advantage
23 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

During DCX-1, digitized and networked forces

demonstrated significantly improved warfighting

capabilities and prevailed over the opposing force

(OPFOR) in multiple engagements. The Arizona Air

National Guard F-16s and A/OA-10s providing CAS

to the ground forces were equipped with the

Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL), enabling

them to exchange real-time targeting information

and receive a current forward trace of the Blue

Forces on the ground situation. The result of this

networking was more than an order-of-magnitude

improvement in the ability of ground and air forces

to work together through more effective sharing of

information.22 As a direct result, the networked

joint force employing combined arms maneuver

during DCX-1 decisively defeated an experienced,

well-trained OPFOR (figure 8).

In the words of a mechanized infantry company

commander whose unit participated in DCX-1,

“When fighting at night, these systems are

unmatched. My Bradleys made direct fire kills routinely at 3700 meters and beyond. Additionally, the

FBCB2 increased our situational awareness 

dramatically. We were able to conduct bold

maneuvers at night that we would normally only

do during daylight.”23

A Source of Warfighting

Advantage

Over thousands of years of recorded history, the

vast majority of innovations that created significant

warfighting advantages were concentrated in the

physical domain as opposed to the information

domain. These innovations translated primarily into

advantages at the tactical level of warfare, but they

also had an impact on what are now generally

referred to as the operational and strategic levels

of warfare. They resulted in such battlefield advantages as: increased range of engagement (composite bow, rifled musket, long-range artillery,

long-range bombers, guided and ballistic missiles);

increased lethality (gunpowder, musket, rifle,

machine gun, rocket launcher, chemical warhead,

nuclear weapon); increased speed of maneuver

(chariot, horse cavalry, steam propulsion for 

ships, railroads, combustion engine, tanks, jet

engine, nuclear propulsion); and increased protection and survivability

(body armor, fortifications,

trench warfare, battleships, submarines, tanks,

armored personnel carriers, armored fighting 

vehicles, low observable

“stealthy” aircraft and

ships).

While all of these examples of innovation are considered platform-centric,

the past century has also

Robustly

Networked

Force

Precise

Application of

Force

Precision Effects

Information Domain Cognitive and 

Social Domains Physical Domain

Mission

Effectiveness

Shared

Situational

Awareness

Quality

of Organic

Information

Individual

Situational

Awareness

Collaboration Quality of Shared

Information

Information

Sharing

Common

Tactical Picture

Information Sharing

● Blue Force Information: “Trace” of Blue Forces

● Red Force Information: “Sensor Points of Interest”

Quality of Information Enhanced

Networked Force

● Air

● Ground

Output Measure:

Decisive Defeat

of OPFOR

Figure 8: Exploiting Order of Magnitude Change (DCX-1)
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

seen many innovations focused on creating advantage in the information domain. The ability to

develop and exploit an information advantage has

always been important in warfare, hence the timelessness of security and surprise as important

principles of war. Examples of innovations that 

created information advantages in warfare have

included couriers on horseback, signal flags,

encryption and code breaking, telegraph, wireless

radio, aerial reconnaissance and photography,

radar, electronic warfare, satellites (communications, reconnaissance), and advances in navigation

(magnetic compass, Global Positioning System

[GPS]). While the importance of innovation in the

information domain in the past has been great,

its importance has gained critical significance in

warfare today.

Today, the implementation of NCW through the

conduct of NCO is creating a warfighting advantage for those who pursue it. At the most basic

level of warfare, there has always been a critical

need to be able to distinguish

friend from foe on the battlefield, day and night and in all

sorts of terrain and weather

conditions. The introduction

and widespread use of night

vision equipment has provided

our forces with a very important advantage. Similarly, the

combination of digitization and

networking can be employed

to develop a common tactical

picture that reduces the fog of

war to clearly identify the positions of friendly forces and the

known positions of the enemy.

The ability to provide such a

picture provides an example of

developing an information advantage through 

NCW. Combat power can be increased sharply by

successfully exploiting this advantage.

Across a broad spectrum of mission areas,

evidence collected to date indicates that the development of a common operational picture (COP),

such as that depicted in figure 9, can significantly

increase the warfighter’s awareness and understanding of tactical and operational situations. The

sharing of information obviously contributes to

shared situational awareness and understanding.

The ability to develop a higher level of situational

awareness, in less time than an adversary,

combined with the ability to act on it, is a source of

considerable warfighting advantage. This advantage

is not intuitive, but its impact is profound.

24

Figure 9: OIF Screen Capture – Common Operational Picture

Network-Centric

Operations

“A networked Joint Force is able to

maintain a more accurate presentation

of the battlespace built on the ability to

integrate intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance, information and total

asset visibility. This integrated picture

allows the JFC to better employ the

right capabilities, at the right place and

at the right time. Fully networked forces

are better able to conduct distributed

operations.”

Department of Defense,

Joint Operations Concepts,

November 2003, p. 16.
27 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

NCO and the Joint

Operations Concepts

Network-centric operations (NCO) involve the

application of the tenets and principles of NCW to

military operations across the spectrum of conflict

from peace, to crisis, to war. The development of

network-centric forces by the U.S. Armed Forces

and the increasing readiness of commanders at all

levels to apply the principles of NCW to the planning and execution of military operations are

resulting in new capabilities of our joint, land,

naval, air, space, and special operations forces.

Due in part to rapidly evolving concepts about how

NCO will be conducted, perspectives are changing

about how wars and other military operations will

be conducted by the U.S. and our allies. As mentioned in the first chapter, NCW is central to the

Department’s force transformation efforts. The

basic tenets and governing principles of NCW had

a significant impact on the development of the

Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) approved by the

Secretary of Defense in November 2003.24 They

have also influenced the development and refinement of the subordinate Joint Operating Concepts

(JOC), Joint Functional Concepts (JFC), and Joint

Integrating Concepts (JIC).

“Networked” is one of the seven attributes, identified by the JOpsC, that the future Joint Force must

possess, the others being “fully integrated,” “expeditionary,” “decentralized,” “adaptable,” “decision

superiority,” and “lethality.” Networked, according

to the JOpsC, “describes a Joint Force that is linked

and synchronized in time and purpose. The Joint

Force capitalizes on information and near simultaneous dissemination to turn information into

actions. Networked joint forces will increase operational effectiveness by allowing dispersed forces

to more efficiently communicate, share a common

operating picture, and achieve the desired endstate. A networked Joint Force expands its reach.

Reachback is the ability of the Joint Force to

extend beyond organic capabilities to include 

fire support, sustainment, and information. This

network includes interagency, designated multinational partners, academic and industrial sources,

and includes both technical linkages and personal

relationships developed through training and

habitual association.”25

As stated in the April 2003 Transformation Planning

Guidance (TPG), the key to the Department’s transformation strategy is the development of future

JOCs.26 These concepts must be specific enough

to permit identification and prioritization of transformation requirements inside the defense program, yet flexible enough to absorb valuable new

ideas as they emerge. The overarching JOpsC

provides the operational context for military transformation by linking strategic guidance with the

integrated application of Joint Force capabilities.

Network-Centric Operations
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

JOCs are further developing key areas of the

JOpsC. Focusing at the operational level and

above, JOCs describe how a Joint Force

Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and

sustain a joint force given a specific operation or

combination of operations. As shown in figure 10,

four initial cornerstone JOCs have been developed:

Homeland Security, Major Combat Operations,

Stability Operations, and Strategic Deterrence.

Like the JOpsC, the JOCs are expected to evolve

over time to reflect insights gained from experimentation and actual operations. All are based, at

least in part, on the availability of networked forces

and the implementation of the NCW theory by joint

forces. The Service transformation roadmaps have

identified the desired operational capabilities

needed to implement the JOCs and the preferred

means of obtaining those capabilities, including

the essential capabilities for conducting NCO.

As an example of a JOC explicitly taking into

account the availability of network-centric capabilities and the ongoing implementation of NCW theory, Version 1.10 of the Major Combat Operations

(MCO) JOC identifies “seven core building blocks

that form the foundation for U.S. success in future

major combat operations.” One of the seven is:

“Use a coherent joint force that decides and acts

based upon pervasive knowledge.” This particular

core building block involves the employment “of a

network-centric method to collect, fuse, analyze,

then provide access to information supporting

leader decision requirements” and “a joint military/interagency decision making process that

uses a collaborative information environment and

functions with coalition partners ... The network

tools of the Information Age allow a degree of interdependence among Service forces that had always

been desired but had never been achievable.

Interdependence, to be sure, relies upon technical

connectivity that maximizes machine-to-machine

interface when and how that makes sense, but

even more importantly it relies upon breaking down

long-developed cultural positions and barriers.”27

Joint Functional Concepts articulate how the future

Joint Force Commander will integrate a set of

related military tasks to attain capabilities required

across the range of military operations. They are

broad, but derive specific context from the JOCs.

Existing JFCs include: Battlespace Awareness,

Command and Control, Force Application, Focused

Logistics, and Protection. Joint Integrating Concepts

are intended to be building

blocks for JOCs or JFCs 

and will describe how a 

commander integrates functional means to achieve 

operational ends. Existing

JICs include Forcible Entry

Operations and Undersea

Superiority; JICs for Global

Strike Operations, Sea-Basing

Operations, Integrated Missile

Defense, Joint Logistics,

and Joint C2 are being

developed.

28

	

	

	
	



							

	

	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	

		


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Figure 10: Joint Operations Concepts
29 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

NCO in Afghanistan and Iraq

“You are looking at the implementation of

network-centric warfare, which is a growing

implementation and will go on for a very long

time. We are looking at a shift in sources of

power. . . when the lessons learned (from

Operation Iraqi Freedom) come out, one of the

things we are probably going to see is a new

air-land dynamic. . . we will have discovered

a new ‘sweet spot’ in the relationship between

land and air warfare, and a tighter integration

between those. The things that compel that

are good sensors, networked with good intelligence, disseminated through a robust network of systems which then increases

speed.”

Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski,

Director, Force Transformation

From remarks to the Defense Writers Group,

April 23, 2003.

The real-world experience of partially networked

U.S. and coalition forces during recent combat

operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring

Freedom, 2001–2002) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi

Freedom, 2003) has provided preliminary, yet

powerful, evidence about the value of NCW and

the conduct of NCO. More extensive studies and

assessments are expected to follow.

Operation Enduring Freedom

(2001–02): The network-centric capabilities

of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) elements

during the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom

in Afghanistan proved vital to the defeat of Taliban

and al Qaeda forces throughout the country. U.S.

forces conducted operations in a mountainous,

landlocked country the size of Texas that presented an extremely challenging environment. The

long-sought goal of networking weapons platforms

with sensor platforms came to fruition in this austere environment where both the need and the

advantages were readily apparent.

USCENTCOM employed Special Operations Forces

(SOF) teams on the ground working directly with

our Afghan allies. These SOF elements were networked with other friendly forces on the ground

and U.S. aircraft capable of delivering advanced

precision-guided munitions. This combination

proved extremely effective. Networking the sensors

and the shooters in real time was only part of the

requirement, however. Taliban and al Qaeda 

targets during Operation Enduring Freedom were

often fleeting and weapons platforms had to be

updated very quickly while in the air. In the case of

B-2 bombers flying from bases in Missouri and 

B-1 bombers flying from other bases far from the

theater of operations, this required a capability to

change mission-tasking enroute to the target area

in Afghanistan. Carrier-based aircraft needed a

similar capability to deal with the dynamic nature

of their targets.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) were used to a

greater degree than ever before. The ability to pass

information gathered by Predator and Global Hawk

UAVs to ground commanders in Afghanistan

enabled near-real-time battlefield situational

awareness. The geographic location of the combatant command headquarters presented some
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

challenges for network-centric operations.

Nevertheless, the USCENTCOM headquarters in

Tampa was successfully networked with a forward

headquarters in Kuwait and a subordinate forward

headquarters in Uzbekistan. Satellite communications and related technologies enabled this networking capability to a degree not previously

achievable.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003):

The impressive network-centric capabilities of U.S.

forces on display during OEF in Afghanistan were

clearly evident during the conduct of Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Many significant improvements in these capabilities were apparent by the

time OIF began in March 2003. Network-centric

capabilities provided, without question, a major

contribution to the decisive victory of U.S. and

coalition forces over Saddam Hussein’s forces during major combat operations in Iraq during March

and April 2003.

Network-centric capabilities evident in U.S. forces

during OIF included not only the technology and

systems that enabled the effective conduct of

NCO, but innovative new concepts for the employment of the technology and an enhanced understanding of the human side of the NCW equation

as well—highly trained, motivated Soldiers,

Sailors, Airmen, and Marines fighting as part of an

integrated, networked joint force. The implementation of NCW is, after all, about human behavior, not

just new technology.

The effectiveness of NCO as conducted by U.S.

and coalition forces during OIF has been strongly

praised by senior commanders, including General

(Ret.) Tommy Franks, Commander of the 

CENTCOM and coalition forces during OIF, and

other commanders at all echelons of command

down to battalion and company level.28

Most of the groundwork for the information 

network and other network-centric capabilities that

empowered our forces during OIF was actually

completed during OEF. After the success of U.S.

forces in Afghanistan in 2001–02, the gradual

buildup to the war in Iraq allowed careful planning

and positioning to provide the necessary technologies and systems that enabled commanders to

conduct high speed, non-contiguous NCO and,

when necessary, to change plans as rapidly as the

situation required. According to Brigadier General

Dennis Moran, then CENTCOM/J-6, “The rapid

sharing of information at all levels of command was

possible because of the technology we had in

place. The ability to move intelligence rapidly from

the sensor to either an analytical decision maker or

directly to the shooter was the best that we have

ever seen ... We validated the concept of networkcentric warfare and the need for communications,

C2, and ISR systems to be hooked up to, and interoperable with, the Global Information Grid and to be

adaptable to whatever circumstances are on the

battlefield.”

One of the biggest challenges during OIF, according to General Moran, involved sharing information

with coalition partners. “Our ability to take information drawn predominantly from systems on the

U.S.-only network, and then being able to rapidly,

seamlessly move those into a coalition network,

was extremely challenging. We had some workarounds that were less than fulfilling, but one of the

biggest challenges we faced was sharing timely

information in a seamless manner with our coalition partners. That’s one of the key take-aways of

this conflict.”29

30
31 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

The Director, OFT, in referring to the emerging

NCW capabilities that gave U.S. and coalition

forces a warfighting advantage during OEF and

OIF, observed that, “DoD (now) has experience in

network-centric warfare ... people have put their

hands on it, they have seen it in action. They 

realize that in western Iraq you couldn’t possibly

have done the non-contiguous battlespace operation without being very well networked. The

Department is, in fact, internalizing these lessons

and making the appropriate adjustments.”30

Among the lessons learned from OIF is a realization of how NCW works operationally and the

impacts this realization may have on materiel and

force organization. The Office of the Secretary of

Defense, JFCOM, the Services, and other DoD

organizations are likely to study networked capabilities and their role during OIF “not as a template for future action but as a model of some

capabilities that may be desirable to implement in

the future.”31

NCO Conceptual Framework

The Office of Force Transformation (OFT) and the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Networks and Information Integration (OASD [NII])

have collaborated for several years on an effort to

develop metrics to test the working hypothesis and

tenets of NCW. The primary objective has been to

develop a rich and comprehensive set of NCWrelated metrics that could be used in experimentation and other research endeavors to gather and

evaluate evidence concerning NCW and NCO.

Potentially, this evidence could then be used to

inform DoD investment decisions across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership

and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)

functional areas. Thus far, the results of this effort

have included the development of the NCO

Conceptual Framework (CF), the conduct of related case studies, and a variety of other NCO-related research, outreach efforts, and publications.32

The NCO CF identifies key concepts and linkages to

output measures in the NCO value chain in the

context of the four domains of Information Age

warfare: physical, information, cognitive, and

social. The NCO CF is intended to help guide and

measure NCW implementation in the Department

of Defense through its application to various 

mission sets or scenarios. The CF has been

designed to help answer the “why” question. One

of its main purposes is providing the means to

explain the dramatic increases in effectiveness

that are evident when network-centric capabilities are acquired and network-centric practices

are adopted by military forces.

Version 1.0 of the NCO CF was published in

November 2003; Version 2.0 (Draft) followed in

June 2004. An international team of government,
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

industry, and academic personnel organized by

OFT and OASD (NII) continues to evaluate and

refine the NCO CF and conduct a series of NCO

case studies. Figure 11 shows the current version

of the top-level NCO CF.33 An earlier version of the

CF was successfully applied and initially validated

using an air-to-air case study. In order to refine and

validate the NCO CF, it is being applied to a broad

range of mission areas in both combat and peacetime training environments.

Seven case studies of the CF have been completed, all involving its application to various

mission areas:

• Air-to-air operations; 

• Ground maneuver operations (Stryker Brigade

Combat Team); 

• US/UK coalition operations during Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF); 

• Air-to-ground operations (close air support); 

• Special operations (Naval

Special Warfare

Group One); 

• Multinational

operations

(NATO); and 

• Naval operations

(Commander

Task Force Fifty)

during Operation

Enduring

Freedom (OEF).

Additional case studies are currently in the planning or early initiation stages including: ground

maneuver operations (V Corps and 3rd Infantry

Division) during OIF; stability and restoration 

operations; and crisis management operations.

Version 2.0 of the NCO CF will be finalized, using

feedback from the case studies.

OFT’s effort, in partnership with OASD (NII), to

develop and refine the NCO CF is aimed at 

supporting two of the Director, OFT’s “Top Five

Goals”:

• Implement NCW as an emerging theory of war

for the Information Age and the organizing

principle for national military planning and joint

concepts, capabilities, and systems.

• Get the decision rules and metrics right and

cause them to be applied enterprise wide.

32

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Figure 11: Top-Level NCO Conceptual Framework, Version 1.0
33 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Specific near-term objectives associated with the

development of the NCO CF are:

• Develop and codify the underlying theory of

network-centric warfare through development

and refinement of an underlying conceptual

framework for analysis and assessment; 

• Apply the conceptual framework to a range of

mission areas and assess its ability to explain

key underlying relationships between input

variables and output measures;

• Support the application of the conceptual

framework to help facilitate requirements definition for network-centric concepts, capabilities, and systems (e.g., FORCEnet, C2

Constellation, Future Combat System);

• Develop analytic methodologies that can be

applied to enhance the planning and execution

of experiments that explore and validate network-centric concepts as well as the training

and evaluation of networked forces; and

• Develop an enhanced understanding of the

challenges associated with allied and coalition

network-centric operations.

NCO Case Studies

The NCO Conceptual Framework initiative is

enhancing our understanding of NCW and NCO by

gathering and analyzing evidence on NCO-related

technologies and practices. The seven completed

NCO case studies have provided the primary vehicle for applying the NCO CF, gathering the 

data, and analyzing the evidence. The following

summaries of four case studies illustrate the

progress to date.

Ground Operations (Stryker

Brigade Combat Team): The results of

the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) NCO

Case Study demonstrate the power of NCW capabilities. The Army’s SBCT is a new force design 

utilizing an information-centric concept of operations; enhanced vehicle speed and stealth based

on the Stryker wheeled fighting vehicle; improved

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities; and first-generation NCO

capabilities including interim mobile networks,

satellite communications, and evolving battle command systems.

The hypothesis explored by this case study was

that the NCO capabilities of the SBCT would enable

information and decision superiority and increase

force effectiveness. The study objective was to

understand how the Stryker Brigade’s NCO capabilities could actually provide these advantages

and if they could provide additional combat power.

The operational environment for the Stryker

Brigade case study was a small-scale contingency

involving early entry operations in a rapid response

and deployment scenario. The data collection and

analysis were focused on a Stryker Brigade Joint

Readiness Training Center (JRTC) exercise conducted in May 2003. The baseline for comparison
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

was a non-digitized light infantry brigade, the

SBCT’s “closest predecessor.” The quality of situational awareness, situational understanding, speed

of command, quality of decisions, and force selfsynchronization were used in the case study as

measures of command and control (C2) effectiveness. Similarly, force effectiveness and survivability

were used as measures of mission effectiveness

(MOEs).34

The results of the SBCT Case Study demonstrated

that the Stryker Brigade is significantly more agile

and capable than a non-digitized light infantry

brigade. Based on the analysis, the following

observations concerning the Stryker Brigade’s

NCO capabilities have been made:

• Several key NCW factors contribute to 

an order-of-magnitude increase in Stryker

Brigade force effectiveness:

–75% of SBCT with networked battle command systems;

–Selected high bandwidth beyond line-ofsight satellite communications links;

–Increase in individual/shared information

quality from 10% to 80%;

–Acceleration of speed of command from 24

to three hours in key engagements; and

–Ability to control speed of command.

• Key result from SBCT certification exercise at

JRTC—friendly vs. enemy casualty ratio

decreased from 10:1 to 1:1.

• Caveats:

–Stryker’s mobility—soldiers arrived fresh for

battle;

–Other factors contribute to increase in force

effectiveness—training, leader development,

personnel stabilization, and firepower; and

–Current results may underestimate future

potential of SBCT’s NCW capabilities in land

warfare.

In conclusion, significant NCW capabilities were

effectively demonstrated by the Stryker Brigade

mission capability package (MCP). The Brigade’s

new organizational structure, battle command and

networking capabilities, and evolving operational

concepts improved the quality of information available to soldiers throughout the unit. In turn,

improved information quality resulted in improved

interactions and collaboration, which led to

enhanced shared awareness and understanding.

Ultimately, the Brigade’s NCW capabilities provided

commanders with better decision options and

enabled better control of the speed of command.

Collectively, all of these information-based attributes made the Stryker Brigade’s decision-making

ability more agile. These qualities, along with

improved organizational, equipment, and training

capabilities, increased combat effectiveness.

34
35 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

US/UK Coalition Operations

During Operation Iraqi Freedom:

This case study examined United States/United

Kingdom coalition land combat operations during

OIF (February–April 2003). The focus was on the

use of NCO technologies and practices, specifically the use of the Force XXI Battle Command

Brigade and Below (FBCB2)/Blue Force Tracker

(BFT) system by ground forces. FBCB2/BFT is a

digital network that allows users to send and

receive information across the battlefield. It consists of a computer equipped with communication

and global positioning system (GPS) transceivers

and is designed to work with brigade-and-below

operators. It not only displays the location of blue

force elements, but also mapping and satellite

imagery. BFT is also capable of creating graphical

overlays, assisting in the conduct of terrain analysis, and providing text messaging.

The objective of this case study was to assess the

effectiveness of a networked force (relative to a

non-networked force) in high-intensity combat,

utilizing the NCO CF as the vehicle for research.

The study sought to identify levels of effectiveness

related to the degree of networking. The hypothesis

examined in the study was that during Operation

Iraqi Freedom, as compared to previous operations

and training without NCO capabilities, the direct

accessibility to NCO capabilities by U.S. and UK

units improved individual sensemaking, enhanced

the quality of interactions, improved shared sensemaking, and increased mission effectiveness.

The initial focus of the case study was on land

combat operations conducted by the UK’s 1st

Armored Division. Subsequently, land combat

operations of the 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT)

of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) were

also analyzed. Three key factors contributed to 

the degree to which FBCB2/BFT was successfully

employed and exploited by coalition forces: density of deployment, scheme of maneuver, and degree

of training.

The density of deployment varied between U.S. and

UK forces. The 3ID deployed approximately 150

units, which enabled deployment down to the 

company level. The UK 1st Armored Division

deployed 47 units, which translated to a significantly reduced deployment footprint. The scheme

of maneuver for the U.S. and UK forces also varied

significantly. The vast distances that the 3ID operated over in advancing from Kuwait to Baghdad

significantly stressed line-of-sight terrestrial communications capabilities and placed a premium on

the SATCOM-enabled digital communications. In

contrast, the UK 1st Armored Division’s scheme of

maneuver was geographically less dispersed and

its three major subordinate units (3rd Marine

Commando Brigade, 7th Armored Brigade, 16th

Air Assault Brigade) were able to use their terrestrial and SATCOM voice communications to develop situational awareness and perform command

and control. In key instances, FBCB2/BFT contributed to the development of enhanced situational awareness within the UK forces. The degree

of training with the new equipment also varied

between U.S. and UK forces, but both found the

system valuable during OIF.35
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

The employment of FBCB2/BFT by U.S. forces

(3ID’s 1BCT) during OIF had a dramatic effect on

the speed of command and effectiveness:

• FBCB2/BFT provided tactical commanders

with enhanced situational awareness relative

to previous operations and exercises when the

system was not available.

• The FBCB2/BFT system was primarily used to

augment situational awareness provided from

other systems.

• FBCB2/BFT was used as a tool for mission

planning and the conduct of operations.

• The FBCB2/BFT system improved “macro”

situational awareness.

• FBCB2/BFT provided a facilitating capability

for coalition operations.

The limited deployment, training, usage, and operation of FBCB2/BFT with UK units limited the 

contribution to overall situational awareness.

Evaluation of the UK forces’ use of BFT revealed

the following:

• Although the FBCB2/BFT was not used widely, it was perceived as providing a good, if 

limited, situational awareness picture.

• The currency, precision, and consistency of

information provided by FBCB2/BFT were

rated significantly higher than the baseline.

• Uncertainty in shared sensemaking using

FBCB2/BFT is much higher, largely because of

limited combat net radio interactions between

units and delays/errors in passing information

up and down the chain of command.

• Many UK participants agreed there was great

potential for utilizing FBCB2/BFT to communicate boundaries, command intent, and reports,

but none had done so during OIF.

Several lessons from the employment of

FBCB2/BFT during OIF were common to U.S. and

UK forces:

• FBCB2/BFT does not replace voice communications in ground combat operations—it augments it.

• A ground combat unit’s effectiveness also

depends on its combat support (CS) and 

combat service support (CSS) assets; like the

ground combat units they support, CS and CSS

units also require high-quality situational awareness. Thus, the FBCB2/BFT system should be

integrated with CS and CSS elements.

36
37 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Air-to-Ground Operations: This case

study focused on air-to-ground engagements, and

specifically examined the role of NCO technologies

and practices in support of close air support (CAS)

operations. The central focus of the study was to

answer three questions. First, what explained the

successful results of certain nighttime CAS missions during the U.S. Army’s Division Capstone

Exercise—Phase 1 (DCX-1) at the National

Training Center in 2001? Second, to what extent

were NCO technologies and practices, such as

those used in DCX-1, employed during Operations

Enduring Freedom (2001–2002) and Iraqi

Freedom (2003)? Third, what was the impact of

their use on mission effectiveness?

In analyzing the results of DCX-1, the study concluded that two factors directly contributed to the

dramatic success realized by CAS: The robust networking of both ground and air forces; and the

employment of precision engagement capabilities

by the CAS aircraft.

The evidence showed that the robust networking

enabled an order-of-magnitude improvement in

information sharing across the air-ground seam,

which in turn enabled CAS pilots to develop a common tactical picture of the Blue and Red ground

forces. This common picture in turn enabled the

CAS pilots to develop very high levels of shared

awareness, which, when combined with their precision engagement capabilities, enabled them to

decisively engage the opposing force (OPFOR) in

close proximity to Blue ground forces. The net result

was that the training exercise had to be stopped

and restarted to enable the Blue force to engage

the OPFOR and achieve their training objectives.

The study next examined CAS operations during

OEF and concluded that SADL use between air and

ground elements was limited due to ground unit

equipment constraints. However, SADL was effective in coordination among aircraft in support of

ground operations, and Litening Pods were effective in air-ground coordination. Preliminary findings

during OEF indicated that there was little airground networking at the tactical level.

Finally, the air-to-ground operations case study

examined CAS in OIF and determined that NCO

technologies and practices provided U.S. forces in

Iraq with the ability to reconcile air and ground perspectives and successfully attack ground targets in

a limited number of engagements. Most CAS missions conducted during OIF depended primarily on

legacy systems at the aviator-ground maneuver 

element level. Both Army and Marine ground units

usually called for CAS and guided CAS aircraft to the

target using voice communications. However, NCO

systems were used extensively between air and

ground components at the operational level and

within component chains at all levels.Multiple networkcentric systems supported networking between staffs.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

Overall, the results of this case study show that

there is room for much improvement in networking

CAS operations at the tactical level. In recognition

of this problem, the Services “are pursuing equipment, concepts, and experiments that leverage

NCO at the tactical level.” On the other hand, “the

use of relatively robust NCW systems” at the operational level provides a “a measurable improvement in the confidence and trust of the warfighters

and ultimately, improved combat effectiveness.”

When available to pilots and ground troops at 

the tactical level, network-centric systems will 

further enhance CAS engagements, reducing the

kill-chain timeline and contributing to improved

responsiveness and flexibility. Already, these NCW

systems are allowing air controllers at higher levels

of command to gain enhanced situational awareness; this, in turn, is beginning to change the traditional definitions of “tactical” and “operational.”36

Special Operations (Naval Special

Warfare Group 1): This case study focused

on the role of NCO in the activities of the Naval

Special Warfare Task Group 1 (NSWG-1), a U.S.

Navy special operations forces (SOF) unit, during

OEF and OIF. The manner in which NSWG-1 conducted its missions during OEF and OIF demonstrated its ability to exploit NCO technologies, organizational structures, and processes during combat

operations. Across all mission types, the Navy SEAL

teams of NSWG-1 overcame harsh operating conditions and were able to dramatically improve the

mission planning process, resulting in improved

force effectiveness. They did so by developing and

utilizing network-centric capabilities. NSWG-1’s

unprecedented success during OEF and OIF illustrated the tenets of NCO: better quality networking

leads to enhanced information sharing, improved

collaboration, and increased speed of command

and self-synchronization.

38
39 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

The purpose of the case study was to document

and explain the exceptional performance of

NSWG-1 during OEF and especially OIF. It focused

on NCO technologies and practices—the people,

processes, and technologies used in the conduct

of war planning and fighting. The basic hypothesis

explored was that the innovative co-evolution of

NSWG-1’s Mission Support Center (MSC), along

with the development, adoption, and adaptation of

new information technologies, improved mission

planning and execution.

The capabilities facilitated by NSWG-1’s MSC

clearly provided additional support to the forward

elements of NSWG-1, both the warfighters and

support staff. The MSC enabled enhanced collaboration among and between forward and rear SEAL

units. This collaboration was made possible by a

dramatically improved physical networking infrastructure and information management system.

Ultimately, the MSC was responsible for shared 

situational awareness that enabled SEAL planners

and warfighters to plan and execute successful

missions.

The results of this case study indicate that measurable improvements in speed of decision making

and synchronization at the unit and team level

were achieved with the evolution of the NSWG-1

mission capabilities between the beginning of OEF

and the end of OIF. The improvements evident during OIF were achieved as a result of more leveraging of reachback support at the MSC. Measurable

improvements in NSWG-1’s network-centric capabilities resulted in enhancements in information

sharing, collaboration, and the decision-making

process. Additionally, SEAL teams gained an

enhanced ability to conduct distributed, collaborative planning and were able to sustain a higher

operational tempo during OIF compared to OEF.37
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

NSWG-1 assessed the improvements achieved

between the beginning of OEF and the end of OIF.

They concluded that these improvements significantly increased NSWG-1’s combat power by

increasing the number of combat missions that

could be simultaneously conducted worldwide.

Other highlights of their findings included:

• Enhanced Command and Control (NSWG-1):

–Increased mobility of the commander and his

key battle staff;

–Effective information management provided

commander with rapid, tailored, decisionquality information; 

–Increased global situational awareness for

the operational commander;

–Increased consistency of global planning

efforts; and

–Increased survivability—reduced force protection concerns.

• Increased mission effectiveness (Naval Special

Warfare Task Unit [NSWTU]):

–Increased quality of information;

–Increased situational awareness at the unit

level;

–Increased time available for mission planning

and rehearsal; and

–Reduced risk—increased probability of mission success.

40

NCW Implementation 

“Transformation is yielding new sources

of power ... One such source is information sharing through robust network

structures. We have a mountain of 

evidence—from simulation, from experimentation, and from real world experience—that substantiate the power of

network behavior ... Each of the

Departments’ efforts reflects an understanding of this phenomenon ... These

efforts reflect the ongoing shift from platform-centric to network-centric thinking

that is key to transformation.”

Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski,

Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee,

March 14, 2003.
43 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Transformation, including the implementation of

NCW capabilities to enable the joint force and the

ongoing shift from platform-centric to network-centric thinking, is a continuing process with no discernible end point. Those involved in transformation

and NCW implementation in the Department of

Defense (DoD) must anticipate the future and wherever possible help create it.Transformation and NCW

implementation deal with the co-evolution of the

seven key functional areas of doctrine, organization,

training, materiel (technology), leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) (figure

12). Consequently, progress in implementing 

network-centric warfare cannot be measured 

solely by focusing on one dimension, such as technology or doctrine. Rather, progress must be

assessed in terms of the maturity of mission capabilities that integrate key elements of DOTMLPF.

A profound change in any one of these areas

necessitates changes in all. Ultimately, military

transformation and NCW implementation are about

changing the values, attitudes, and beliefs of the

U.S. Armed Forces concerning how combat power

is developed and employed.

At the Joint and Service levels, significant progress

is being made in developing NCW capabilities 

that leverage the power of order-of-magnitude

improvements in information sharing enabled by

networking. The NCW-related initiatives described

in the first two sections of this chapter, “Joint 

NCW Implementation” and “Service NCW Implementation,” provide a snapshot of the myriad of

activities that are being pursued across DoD to

help enable NCW. Therefore, the discussion of U.S.

NCW-related initiatives that follows is not meant to

be exhaustive, but rather representative.

To varying degrees, the U.S. Joint and

Service initiatives described in this chapter

are enabling the components of the NCW

value chain described previously in this

document by improving our forces’ capabilities to:

• Improve information sharing;

• Enhance the quality of information;

• Increase shared situational awareness;

• Enhance collaboration;

• Enable self-synchronization;

• Enhance sustainability;

• Increase speed of command; and

• Improve mission effectiveness.

NCW Implementation


	

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Figure 12: NCW Implementation—Co-Evolution of DOTMLPF

Functional Areas 
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

The third and final section of this chapter, “Allies

and Multinational Partners,” offers a brief look at

the impressive efforts of U.S. allies and multinational partners to develop or enhance their networkcentric capabilities. These international developments, including the ongoing efforts of NATO to

study a NATO Networked Enabled Capability (NNEC)

and develop an overarching Strategic Framework

and Concept for NNEC, are very promising for the

conduct of combined network-centric operations

(NCO) in the future.

Joint NCW Implementation

A number of new operational concepts, organizations, and systems are being developed to enable

a networked Joint Force. Impressive new networkcentric capabilities such as the Force XXI Battle

Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2/BFT)/Blue

Force Tracking (BFT) system, so valuable to 

Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations units

during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), are providing

significant enhancements in shared situational

awareness and other vital areas of NCW.

FBCB2/BFT and the other initiatives described in

this section are enabling U.S. forces to conduct

increasingly effective network-centric operations

(NCO) across the full range of military operations. In

addition, significant efforts are underway within the

Department to promote cultural change in the U.S.

military through training and education.

FBCB2—Blue Force Tracking: Joint

network-centric capabilities gave U.S. forces

unprecedented advantages during the conduct of

OIF in March–April 2003. A prime example was the

Army’s satellite-based FBCB2 system, also referred

to as the Blue Force Tracker, successfully employed

by Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces,

and British ground forces (1st UK Armored Division)

during OIF. The system uses Global Positioning

System (GPS) transmitters mounted in military

vehicles and aircraft to monitor their locations. The

information is combined with terrain maps and

intelligence on enemy positions to 

create a battlefield picture that can be

shared over commercial satellite networks

(figure 13).

General Tommy Franks, USA (Ret.), commander of U.S. Central Command and the

coalition forces during OIF, credited network-centric warfare, and the Blue Force

Tracker in particular, with enabling the

Army and Marine Corps’ ability to work

together and track each other’s progress

throughout the operation. It was by all

accounts a major factor in reducing incidents of friendly fire during OIF. According

to General Franks, FBCB2 gave ground

commanders a “precise sense of the 

location, capacity, and capability of the

44

“When my TF seized a key highway intersection south of Baghdad, 

I could see the company commander icons at each blocking 

position and I knew we had control of the objective.” 

- LTC John Charlton, Cdr Task Force 1-15 Inf, 3rd Infantry Division

M2A2

M1A1

HMMWV

Delivering Situational Awareness to 

3rd Infantry Division forces supporting 

stability operations in Baghdad

Figure 13: FBCB2—Blue Force Tracking
45 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

battlefield. What a powerful, powerful thing!” He

added that he personally used the Blue Force

Tracker to watch in “near-real-time” as leading elements of the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division

approached and entered Baghdad in early April.38

While FBCB2’s performance during OIF has been

widely praised, the Army is looking for ways to better collect data across the forces and feed it into

the system. In the words of Colonel Nick Justice,

USA, FBCB2 Program Manager prior to and during

OIF, “What we need is common, shared information

that I might use in different ways to meet everyone’s needs, whether they’re a logistician, a combat company commander, or a theater-level Army

commander.”39

Horizontal Fusion—a Catalyst for

Net-Centric Transformation: The

Horizontal Fusion Portfolio of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information

Integration (ASD [NII]) is one of DoD’s most comprehensive and promising efforts for advancing the

implementation of net-centric40 capabilities in the

U.S. Armed Forces. It was created in early 2003 to

respond to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s vision of

force transformation and to achieve “power to the

edge” in the new battlespace. Horizontal Fusion

equips warfighters, or “Edge-Users,” with the ability

to access the information they need at the right time

to make the right decisions. The initiative has 

integrated and demonstrated net-centric capabilities that will transition directly into operational

capabilities.

Horizontal Fusion is the catalyst for the net-centric

transformation of the DoD. It will provide real-time

situational awareness throughout the battlespace,

sensemaking tools, multi-community-of-interest

collaboration, and critical intelligence information

sharing. The Horizontal Fusion Portfolio integrates

advanced technologies to make the “Quantum

Leap” to NCO, with an emphasis on support to the

warfighter. Horizontal Fusion is one of the pillars of

the Department’s NCW/NCO transformation effort,

which includes Global Information Grid Bandwidth

Expansion (GIG-BE), Joint Tactical Radio System

(JTRS), Wideband Satellite Communications 

(SATCOM), Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES),

and Information Assurance (IA).

The term “horizontal” refers to the ability to reach

across traditionally stove-piped organizations; and

“fusion” refers to the process and applications that

allow net-centric “melding.” Users will be able to

seek the information they need across the battlespace through “smart-pull” and, in turn, information sharing. This process is described by the verbs

task, post, process, and use (TPPU). With TPPU, the

user can smart-pull information in seconds rather

than minutes. To be effective, the TPPU process

requires interoperable infrastructures within the

DoD and across external U.S. and coalition intelligence-gathering organizations. Real-time collaboration allows users, regardless of their respective

communities of interest, to share insights and 

add value to posted information; it will also allow

geographically separated commanders and units to

act as a cohesive team by sharing a common operational picture (COP).
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

The aim of Horizontal Fusion is to establish standards, policies, and procedures for future Webenabled capabilities. This represents a significant

change in culture for security, acquisition, and

fielding. As currently envisioned by the ASD (NII),

the Horizontal Fusion initiative will “end” in 2008,

leaving a new acquisition mindset among the

Services and Defense Agencies. Horizontal Fusion

has annual goals that touch all areas in net-centricity. Each year’s portfolio of initiatives expands

on the capabilities and standards of the previous

year. Ongoing and new capabilities that are ready

to be fielded are demonstrated through the annual

Quantum Leap demonstration, a proof-of-concept

demonstration of the operational Horizontal Fusion

capabilities at multiple geographical locations. It is the

graduation of the year’s capabilities to operations.

The 2003 Horizontal Fusion objectives included the

following: searching capabilities through edge computing power; providing users with the ability to publish to the GIG; sharing intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaisance (ISR) data; improving operations

within DoD and the intelligence community; and

exploiting diverse data sources. The 2004 Portfolio

expands the collateral space to more communities of

interest by integrating operational NCES with organizations and programs that hone capabilities and

services that can be readily adapted to the collateral space. Horizontal Fusion is working cross-domain

and secure wireless security issues using architectures designed by the National Security Agency

(NSA) and other intelligence and security organizations. The Horizontal Fusion Portfolio membership

includes DoD, industry, and multinational partner

programs. The sponsors of current initiatives now in

the Portfolio include the Army, Navy, and Air Force;

U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Strategic Command;

Defense Intelligence Agency; National GeospatialIntelligence Agency; National Security Agency;

Department of State; North Atlantic Treaty

Organization; and several DoD industry and education programs.

Sense and Respond Logistics: An

initiative sponsored by the Office of Force

Transformation (OFT), Sense and Respond Logistics

(SRL) is an emerging logistics concept tied closely

to NCW theory and practice, as evidenced by 

some of its main characteristics: shared awareness,

speed and coordination, dynamic synchronization,

adaptability and flexibility, and networked organization. In general, SRL is an adaptive method for

46
maintaining the operational availability of units by

managing their end-to-end support network. Units

operating under the SRL concept are networked and

dynamically synchronized to satisfy demand in

response to changes in the environment.

Therefore, all units within that network are potential consumers and providers of supply to and

from all other units in the network.

The development of SRL involves not only the

implementation of a new concept, but also the

infusion of key technologies, the realignment of the

logistics infrastructure, and the inclusion of new

processes that fully exploit the concept. Figure 14

highlights three approaches to logistics—MassBased, Just-in-Time, and Sense and Respond—

and the ongoing transformation of the logistics

function in military operations. As the SRL concept

evolves, it is intended to parallel the changes

underway in Joint Force operations. It relies on ITenhanced adaptation and learning; translating to a

distributed, adaptive systems capability; and

resulting in rapid planning, coherent execution, and

sustainment of military operations in complex,

uncertain environments.

47 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

The SRL initiative has three goals. First, increase

the robustness of logistics support to include the

ability of sense and respond (S&R) networks to

operate in an environment where communications

and node connectivity may be restricted and security is challenged. Second, provide more flexibility

to the commander; this flexibility is required by 

the more dynamic future battlespace. And third,

increase the adaptiveness of the logistics system

in order to decrease the reaction time required

responding to environmental changes or new

operational missions. In its ongoing efforts to help 

DoD achieve these goals, the OFT is sponsoring

several projects and initiatives to move SRL

from the concept phase to a new capability for

the warfighter.

Prime Metric: 

Days of Supply

Prime Metric: 

Flow Time

Prime Metric: 

Speed/Quality of Effects

Figure 14: Transforming Logistics
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

Cultural Change and Education:

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, military

transformation and NCW implementation require

changing the culture of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Much of this vital cultural change can be accomplished by the implementation of educational

reforms that will influence the attitudes, values,

and beliefs of future U.S. military leaders and

instill in them a sense of urgency to transform

and to be innovators. The education of our future

leaders will be crucial to the success of NCW

implementation and the overall force transformation

process in the DoD.

Accordingly, one of the highest priority objectives

of the Office of Force Transformation since its

establishment in late 2001 has been to act as 

a catalyst for cultural change within the

Department. OFT’s core initiative for facilitating

cultural change is “Education for Transformation.”

This initiative is focused on developing and

diffusing knowledge in areas that are key to

transformation.

Other Joint NCW Initiatives:

• Common Relevant Operational Picture for

Joint Forces: The Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP) will present timely, fused,

accurate, and relevant information that can be

tailored to meet the requirements of the Joint

Force Commander and the Joint Force. As the

lead agent for this program and the systems

engineer for the Joint Forces Command

(JFCOM) in coordinating joint battle management C2 programs, the Air Force is working 

to achieve the CROP for joint forces through

the Family of Interoperable Operational

Pictures (FIOP) program. The FIOP is a multiService program with new funding provided by

OSD that will close the seams between existing

legacy C4ISR systems and extend the capability of systems under development in order to

exploit the full data collection and management

abilities of current C4ISR assets. In order to

provide an all-source picture of the battlespace

containing actionable, decision-quality information to the warfighter through a fusion of existing databases, this program will implement

data-sharing and fusion among heterogeneous,

stove-piped systems in support of users at the

operational and tactical levels. It will facilitate

the establishment of interoperability standards

and architectures to guide future acquisitions.41

• Standing Joint Force Headquarters

(SJFHQ): DoD is strengthening joint operations through the establishment of Standing

Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) at the

Combatant Commands (COCOM). When fielded, each SJFHQ will provide a standing body of

planners, who possess the full range of skills

and training necessary to plan and conduct

effects-based, joint operations, while employing the tenets of NCW. With an initial capability to be fielded at each of the COCOMs in

FY05, the SJFHQ will provide the manning,

equipment, training, and procedural enhancements needed to become a core around which

the staff of a regional COCOM or a JTF commander can operate across the spectrum of

operations from daily routine, through precrisis, to crisis response. The Deployable Joint

C2 (DJC2) system will provide the material

component of the SJFHQ.42

48
49 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

• Collaborative Information Environment

(CIE): The CIE is the aggregation of hardware,

software, and procedures that leverages the

Global Information Grid (GIG) to enable sharing

of information and collaboration within and

among staffs, including interfaces with both

DoD and commercial communications pathways. USJFCOM will provide an interim CIE

toolset in conjunction with the initial fielding 

of the SJFHQ in FY0543 In general, the CIE

concept aims to provide common situational

awareness and understanding to all decision

makers by collaboratively linking the JTF staff

and its components with the COCOM, interagency participants, and allied or coalition

organizations.

• Distributed Common Ground/Surface

System: DCGS is the Department’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

network-centric enterprise that provides TaskPost-Process-Use (TPPU) capabilities for the

JTF and below. It is the key component for

providing fused ISR-based decision-quality

information for effective joint C2.44

• Dynamic Joint ISR Concept: The Dynamic

JISR Concept applies a net-centric approach

to the management of ISR capabilities to integrate sensors and processing capabilities into

a coherent whole and thus better support the

knowledge demands of the Joint Force

Commander and his staff, his components,

and multinational coalition forces. This concept supports and relies on collaborative planning and execution across the full range of

military operations among international agencies, the intelligence community, and the Joint

Force Commander and his Service components.45

• Joint Interagency Coordination Group

(JIACG): The JIACG will establish operational

connections between civilian and military

departments and agencies to improve planning and coordination within the government.

The JIACG will be a multi-functional, advisory

element providing perspective on civilian

agency capabilities, approaches, and limitations in the development of a coordinated use

of national power. This will ensure the best mix

of capabilities is employed to achieve the

desired effects that include the full range of

diplomatic, information, and economic activities. The potential requirements for achieving

a fully networked JIACG during future contingencies are formidable.

Service NCW Implementation

For some time, the Services have recognized the

tremendous leverage available to their personnel,

organizations, and platforms/systems from the

exploitation of NCW as an emerging theory of war

and the increasing implementation of joint and

Service NCW capabilities, not only for warfighting,

but also across all mission areas and throughout

the battlespace. Their progress and future plans in
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

this regard were evident in the first editions of the

Service Transformation Roadmaps, published in

2002, and are even more apparent in the annual

Roadmap updates of 2003 and 2004.46 Whereas

the authors of the 2002 Roadmaps were able to

incorporate some of the NCW lessons learned from

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the

2003 and 2004 Roadmaps have benefited from

the additional combat experience gained by U.S.

forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the

occupation of Iraq in the face of multiple threats,

continuing U.S. military operations in

Afghanistan, and the completion of the Joint

Operating Concepts (JOC).

The Services are accelerating their efforts to network their forces, develop innovative new concepts

of operations tied to NCW in support of the JOpsC

and the JOCs, experiment with new concepts and

technology, enhance the readiness of their personnel and organizations to participate in joint networked operations, and, in general, to capitalize on

the power of NCW theory and network behavior. The

material in this section is drawn almost entirely

from the 2003 Army Transformation Roadmap, the

Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003, and the Air

Force Transformation Flight Plan (November 2003).

Army

“Transforming our Nation’s military capabilities while at war requires a careful balance

between sustaining and enhancing the capabilities of current forces to fight wars and win

the peace while investing in the capabilities of

future forces. Joint concept development and

experimentation, science and technology

(S&T) investment, and future force design that

enables interdependent network-centric warfare will ensure future capabilities meet the

requirements of tomorrow’s Joint Force.”

R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, Chief of Staff

Foreword, 2003 Army Transformation Roadmap,

1 November 2003.

The Army, in coordination with the other Services, is

developing transformational capabilities from an

inherently joint perspective. In the near term, the

Army will maintain and improve capabilities to

enable the Current Force to conduct joint operations.

At the same time, it will develop transformational

capabilities for the Future Force.47 Although the

Future Force will be a hybrid force, one of the key

future elements of the hybrid mix will be the Future

Combat Systems-equipped Unit of Action. The

FCS-equipped Unit of Action encompasses more

than a new set of capabilities; rather, it reflects a

fundamentally transformed method of combat.48

50
51 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Enabling Interdependent NCW:

The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) identifies

seven Joint Force attributes that the future Joint Force

must embody to achieve “full-spectrum dominance.”

The 2003 Army Transformation Roadmap (2003 ATR)

describes how the Army is increasing its capabilities

to achieve these attributes and is implementing the

JOpsC and the JOCs.

As mentioned previously, “Networked” is one of the

seven Joint Force attributes identified in the

JOpsC.49 In discussing its plans for networking its

force and enabling interdependent NCW during the

conduct of joint operations, the Army Roadmap

states: “Information superiority and situational

understanding are critical enablers for future joint

operations. Operating in the collaborative information environment, Army forces will harness the

power of the ongoing revolution in information

technology to aid in the fusion of data and information to develop actionable and predictive intelligence and to link people and systems—horizontally and vertically—within the joint network to

increase situational understanding. Army battle

command capabilities will enable interdependent

network-centric warfare within joint, interagency,

and multinational full-spectrum operations.”50

The Army is planning to accelerate the Future

Force network to enhance the joint battle command capabilities of the Current Force. Building on

recent efforts to analyze the development of current network architecture and supporting systems,

the Army is reprioritizing development of the network to focus on top-down fielding to the Current

Force. It is also leveraging experiences and lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom

(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to

enhance joint battle command, including battle

command on-the-move (BCOTM) and Blue Force

Tracking (BFT) capabilities for select Current Force

units. To ensure operating forces have the most

advanced network capabilities, the Army is synchronizing the fielding of battle command capabilities with unit rotation schedules. Also, the Army

continues to partner with Defense Agencies, other

Services, the Joint Staff, and Joint Forces

Command (JFCOM) in all aspects of network

development.51

Future Combat System (FCS): The

FCS is the Army’s “multifunctional, multimission,

reconfigurable family of systems (FoS) designed to

maximize joint interoperability, strategic transportability, and commonality of mission roles.”52 It

is the core of the Future Force’s brigade-sized Unit

of Action (UA), comprised of 18 manned and

unmanned platforms centered around the Soldier

and integrated by a battle command network. FCS

will provide Soldiers with significantly enhanced

situational awareness, enabling them “to see first,

understand first, act first, and finish decisively.” An
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

FCS-equipped Army force will be capable of 

providing mobile, networked command, control,

communication and computer (C4) functionalities;

autonomous robotic systems; precision direct and

indirect fires; airborne and ground organic sensor

platforms; and adverse-weather reconnaissance,

surveillance, targeting, and acquisition.

The FCS program is developing network-centric

concepts for a multi-mission combat FoS that will

be lethal, strategically deployable, self-sustaining

and highly survivable in combat. The FCSequipped Army unit will be capable of adjusting to

a changing set of missions, ranging from humanitarian operations to peacekeeping to combat 

operations. Figure 15 illustrates how the networked communications subsystem will provide

the connectivity for the brigade-sized UA to interact/interface on the battlefield within the FCS FoS

and from the Army’s FCS platforms to the Unit of

Employment (UE), the Joint Force, the Multinational

Force, the Legacy Army, and Army Stryker units,

as well as government and nongovernmental

organizations.

Warfighter Information Network—

Tactical (WIN-T): Together, FCS and 

WIN-T will comprise the Army Future Force’s network-centric architecture, under the umbrella of

the DoD’s Global Information Grid (GIG). WIN-T is

the key enabler to execute the NCW capability of

the Army’s Future Force. It is the “tactical digital

communications system that will provide advanced

commercial-based networking capabilities to 

the warfighter,” replacing the current Mobile

Subscriber Equipment (MSE) and Tri-Services

Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) systems. The

WIN-T network will provide enhanced C4ISR capabilities that are mobile, secure, survivable, seamless, and capable of supporting multimedia tactical

information systems. The network’s capability to

support unit task reorganization and real-time

retasking of battlefield support elements provides a

vital enabler for the conduct of NCO.

As the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division prepares for its

upcoming deployment to Iraq, it is fielding the Joint

Network Transport Capability-Spiral (JNTC-S), a

capability that will eventually evolve into WIN-T.

In effect, JNTC-S,

which will also be

fielded to the 101st

Airborne Division, the

10th Mountain Division,

and the 4th Infantry

Division, is an interim

system intended to

bridge the gap between

the legacy Mobile

Subscriber Equipment

(MSE) and WIN-T.53

52

Figure 15: FCS-Enabled Integrated Unit of Action (UA) External Interfaces
53 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Navy and Marine Corps

“The transformation of naval forces is dedicated to greatly expanding the sovereign

options available worldwide to the President

across the full spectrum of warfare by exploiting our control of the sea. The result of our

transformation will be a Navy-Marine Corps

Team providing sustainable, immediately

employable U.S. combat power as part of a

transformed joint force ready to meet any

challenge.”

Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy,

Admiral Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations,

General Michael W. Hagee, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Foreword, Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003,

April 2004.

Seabasing is the overarching expression of the

Navy-Marine Corps Team’s shared vision, incorporating the initiatives that will allow the Joint Force

to fully exploit one of the United States’ asymmetric advantages—command of the sea. Seabasing

is the “overarching transformational operating

concept for projecting and sustaining naval power

and joint forces which assures joint access by

leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign,

distributed, and networked forces operating globally from the sea. The sea base of the future will

be an inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, networked platforms that

enable the global power projection of offensive

and defensive forces from the sea ... Seabasing

unites our capabilities for projecting offensive

power, defensive power, command and control,

mobility, and sustainment around the world.”54

Naval Capability Pillars: A series of

Navy-Marine Corps capabilities to operationalize

Seabasing are being developed through four interdependent and synergistic Naval Capability Pillars

(NCP): Sea Shield, Sea Strike, Sea Basing, and

FORCEnet. Each NCP represents a broad group of

naval capabilities. They summarize the naval tools

that will help Joint Force Commanders produce

and exploit a discontinuous battlespace within

which distributed and sustainable surface, subsurface, air, ground, and space elements form a

unified force that assures access and projects both

offensive power and defensive capability.

FORCEnet will enable these capabilities.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

FORCEnet: FORCEnet (figure 16) is the

operational construct and architectural framework

that will provide the Navy-Marine Corps team “with

the capability to deliver the persistent and comprehensive surveillance, rapid networked command,

and common, accurate battlespace picture necessary to support decision making at a tempo that

overwhelms an adversary’s capability to react and

respond ... FORCEnet is the enabling capability for

a fully networked naval force, connecting it 

to the similarly networked joint force that will 

be linked together by the Internet Protocol (IP)-

enabled Global Information Grid.” Navy and Marine

Corps systems “will be conceived, developed, and

implemented as truly joint, integrated capabilities—capable of generating improved coalition

effectiveness.”

“Implementing the FORCEnet

vision will link warfighters

ashore, at sea, and in the air

into a series of highly integrated distributed services networks that are capable of providing critical operational and

tactical information to specified users on a rapid and continuous basis. The ‘publish

and subscribe’ construct for

moving data within the network backplane will facilitate

greatly improved, shared battlespace awareness, rapid

dissemination of the Joint

Force Commander’s evolving campaign

plan/‘intent,’ and faster passing of information

about the enemy from surveillance systems

through controllers to ready forces with the right

weapons for attacking key targets. FORCEnet

enhances naval capabilities to quickly make and

execute decisions in the battlespace, to synchronize the activities of widely distributed forces to

mass effects on the enemy,” and to reduce threats

to friendly forces by providing broader situational

awareness. “The distributed services and specialized mission applications carried on FORCEnet are

as important to future naval combat capabilities as

the platforms and weapons they link. Thus,

FORCEnet is a critical enabler of naval force

transformation.”55

54

• NCW is the theory.

• NCO is the concept.

• FORCEnet is the architectural

framework to make the theory and

concept a reality.

Figure 16: FORCEnet — Enabling Capability for the Fully Networked Naval Force
55 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Air Force

“Our legacy aircraft systems were built with

specialized roles and they were very good. But

we have limited networking, limited all-weather delivery and limited stand off, and our sensors are only partially integrated ... We will

network these systems in ways that enable us

to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess in

timelines unimaginable just a few years ago. It

is our goal to have consistent, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,

and, once a decision to attack is made, we will

attack instantaneously.”

Dr. James Roche,

Secretary of the Air Force,

The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan,

November 2003.

The Secretary of the Air Force has identified networking and the enhancement of the Air Force’s

network-centric capabilities as a top priority in the

development of the “transformational capabilities”

needed to enable the Air Force’s six new concepts

of operations (CONOPS) and DoD’s transformation

goals. In The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan,

the Service’s transformation roadmap for 2004

and beyond, the Air Force embraces the key Joint

Force Attributes of the Joint Operations Concepts

(JOpsC), including fully integrated, networked,

decentralized, and adaptable, and is developing

concepts and capabilities to support them.56

The first five of 16 transformational capabilities

identified by the Air Force that it “cannot achieve

today or must be significantly improved to enable

the new JOCs, DoD’s transformation goals, and the

Air Force Vision and CONOPS” are clearly aimed at

enabling NCO:

• Seamless joint machine-to-machine integration

of all manned, unmanned, and space systems;

• Real-time picture of the battlespace;

• Predictive Battlespace Awareness;

• Ensured use of the information domain via

effective information assurance and information operations; and

• Denial of effective C4ISR to adversaries via

effective information operations.57
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

In the context of air and space operations, the Air

Force believes that the closely related concepts of

parallel warfare and effects-based operations (EBO)

are “the keys to threat avoidance and applying the

right force to the right place at the right time.”58

Network-centric capabilities will enable both.

Parallel Warfare: Parallel warfare refers to

the simultaneous attack of carefully selected targets to achieve specific effects, as opposed to

attacking targets in a more sequential fashion with

the goal of destroying everything on a target list.

Until the 1990–91 Gulf War, parallel warfare was

very difficult to execute because of the requirement for mass to compensate for a lack of precise

weaponry, the large number of assets needed to

suppress enemy air defenses, and a general lack

of understanding of EBO. The development of low

observable “stealthy” platforms, precision

weapons, and information operations capabilities,

along with a new concept of operations (i.e., EBO),

overcame these obstacles and made parallel warfare possible.

Effects-Based Operations: As explained

in The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, the main

idea of effects-based operations is to design campaign actions based on desired national security

outcomes, rather than merely attacking targets to

destroy adversary forces. The goal is to understand

the effect that is desired in the battlespace and

then create that effect more efficiently and effectively. EBO may enable striking fewer targets, using

fewer weapons, avoiding enemy threats, mitigating

the consequences of enemy action, and limiting the

potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties that might occur from a more traditional air

campaign. EBO also focuses on combining and

coordinating all elements of national power, military

and non-military, to achieve its goals by influencing

the will and perception of the adversary’s decision

makers. It requires intelligence analysis that

reveals what an adversary relies on to exert influence and conduct operations and the ability to get

that intelligence and all other relevant information

to the right place at the right time. It also requires

the ability to precisely conduct operations in the

right order, with a wide range of tools, to include

non-lethal weapons and information operations.59

Command and Control (C2)

Constellation: The centerpiece of the Air

Force’s NCW implementation efforts is the C2

Constellation initiative (figure 17). The Air Force is

transitioning from collecting data through a myriad

of independent systems (such as Rivet Joint,

AWACS, JSTARS, and space-based assets) to a C2

Constellation capable of providing the Joint Force

Commander with real-time, enhanced battlespace

awareness. It will provide Ground Moving Target

Indicator capabilities along with focused Air Moving

Target Indicator capabilities for Cruise Missile

56
57 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Defense. Additionally, every platform will be a 

sensor on the integrated network. Regardless of

mission function (C2, ISR, shooters, tankers, etc),

any data collected by a sensor will be passed to all

network recipients. This requires networking all air,

space, ground, and sea-based ISR systems, command and control nodes, and strike platforms to

achieve shared battlespace awareness and a 

synergy to maximize the ability to achieve the

JFC’s desired effects.60

Network Centric Collaborative

Targeting (NCCT): NCCT is an Advanced

Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) that

will demonstrate a network-centric operating 

system designed to horizontally integrate air,

space, and surface ISR assets at the digital level.

By providing a seamless, machine-to-machine

interface, this ACTD will improve geo-location

accuracy, timeliness, and combat identification of

time sensitive targets. With an enhanced wideband battle management C4ISR network, it will

ultimately enable a network-centric, distributed

processing environment by leveraging existing

sensors, communications, and processing systems to dramatically reduce the time required to

detect, identify, locate, and designate fleeting 

targets. The long-range goal is to expand this

capability to additional ISR sensor systems to 

create a greater network-centric approach to find,

fix, and track time-sensitive targets.61

Figure 17: C2 Constellation Interoperability with Maritime and Ground Battle

Management Command and Control (BMC2) Systems to Provide Joint BMC2
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 58

Allies and Multinational

Partners

Around the world, the armed forces of many

nations are developing their individual responses to

the challenges and opportunities of the Information

Age. A growing number of our allies and multinational partners are exploring new technologies and

operational concepts in order to develop or

enhance the network-centric capabilities of their

forces. Some have conducted NCO while working

together with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq,

Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere. The partial networking of coalition forces during recent combat

(and other multinational military) operations,

including OEF and OIF, has helped move NCW and

NCO to a central role in the Information Age transformation of military forces around the world.

Significantly, in November 2003, nine NATO

nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the

Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom,

and the United States) agreed to fund a feasibility

study on the NATO Networked Enabled Capability

(NNEC) as an important step towards NATO’s

transformation. Subsequently, three others

(Belgium, Denmark, and Turkey) joined this effort.

This study, which began in January 2004, is to be

completed by June 2005. It is being conducted by

the NATO Consultation, Command and Control

Agency (NC3A) “with the aim of examining issues

raised by the network-centric approach ... NNEC

is based on national and NATO capabilities (tactical

and strategic) being networked together in a ‘plug

and play’ fashion as required to support flexible

force structures such as the NATO Response

Force.62 The Allied Command Transformation 

(ACT) has established an integrated product

team for NNEC. It is also developing an NNEC

Strategic Framework including an overarching

NNEC Concept.

By way of example, the network-centric plans

and future capabilities of four U.S. allies are 

summarized below:

Australia: For the Australian Defence Force

(ADF), NCW is a means to achieving a more effective warfighting capacity and lies at the heart of the

ADF’s vision outlined in Force 2020. In the past,

the Australian Department of Defence focused primarily on the delivery of engagement or sensor

platforms, with minimal attention paid to an underlying networking infrastructure. Many platforms

have thus been “stand alone” in their ability to 

network with other force elements.

In embracing NCW, the ADF has established a concept-led, long-range, capabilities-based planning

view (in the context of achieving a joint system of

systems). The initial step in regard to NCW is to

enhance the ADF’s warfighting effectiveness

through improved collaboration and ability to share

situational awareness. The following initiatives are

being explored:

• Establish a network capability that will link

engagement systems with sensor and command and control systems and provide the

underlying information infrastructure upon

which the networked force will be developed.

This network will also provide information

interoperability with Australia’s allies and coalition partners.

• Examine new sensor technologies for their

ability to better cue engagement systems.

Notable technology areas being examined

include UAVs, high-frequency (HF) radar,

space-based surveillance, and unattended

ground sensors.
59 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

• Examine the human dimensions of the networked force and how doctrine, education,

and training may need to change.

• Accelerate the process of change and innovation through alternative partnering arrangements with defense industry.

It is the ADF’s aim that a well planned and implemented transition to an effective suite of NCW

capabilities will enable the conduct of EffectsBased Operations (EBO) as a centerpiece of the

Force of 2020.

Canada: The Canadian Forces (CF) have 

followed international concept development with

regards to NCW and EBO quite closely and undertaken a considerable amount of work in these two

related fields, both within Canada and with likeminded allies. The CF seeks to maximize the positive utility and transformational benefit of networkrelated phenomena and an effects-based

approach without overlooking their potential limits

and adverse consequences.

In order to do so, the CF seeks to maximize network-based interoperability both internally, with

other government departments and with allies. In

addition, it sees the full attainment of this potential

as extending beyond simply the technical and communications challenges, to include all elements of

capability, such as doctrine, organization, training

and culture, and the widest possible integration of

the elements of national power and influence. This

commitment was made clear in the most recent

annual report of the Chief of Defence Staff:

“First, we must transform the way we 

perceive and think ... We are moving from

an industrial, hierarchical mode of thinking

to a world powered by collaborative human

networks. We must learn to think, behave,

and act as a node in a collaborative network

that includes our warfighters, all three military environments, our civilian colleagues in

the department and broader public security

portfolio, as well as our allies.”

Moreover, this commitment is reflected at all levels

of command within the CF: NCW and EBO inform

force development planning at the strategic and

joint levels, and amongst the individual services.

As is the case for many of Canada’s allies, the

resource-related implications of military transformation compel a degree of pragmatism insofar as

implementation within the CF is concerned. Nearterm opportunities will be exploited and risk will be

tolerated; however, transformation is seen as a

journey rather than a destination, and evolutionary

adaptation will be the norm.

New Zealand: The four capability concepts

upon which New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)

force development is based require:

• A knowledge edge force;

• A force tailored for integrated joint operations; 

• A multi-mission force capable of tasks ranging

from civil emergency response through peacekeeping to combat; and 

• A networked force.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 60

There are likely to be few missions or tasks that the

NZDF of the future will undertake where it will not

be working at some level with other partners,

either the military forces of allies and coalition

partners or other national agencies in New

Zealand. To be effective in its tasks, the future

NZDF must be capable of flexible and versatile networking, with the ability to connect seamlessly

internally and with a wide range of other forces 

and agencies.

Networking activity is concentrated, therefore, on

achieving interoperability and the identification of

standards on which to base national initiatives.

NCW in the NZDF is the concept that will drive programs of work aimed at enabling the warfighter.

NCW programs are currently focused on projects

to provide the significant enhancement of connectivity out to and between deployed force elements

that are needed to support improved national and

coalition networking extending from the strategic

to tactical levels. Following on, new programs 

are underway to upgrade information exchange

services and capabilities, culminating with the

implementation of the NZDF Joint Command and

Control System over the 2005–2007 timeframe.

Participation in Joint Warrior Interoperability

Demonstration (JWID) and Combined Federated

Battle Lab Network (CFBLNet) experimentation

provides particular benefit in enabling the development of concepts and frameworks for NCW as well

as enhancing the investigation and implementation

of individual elements of NCW.

United Kingdom: The most recent United

Kingdom (UK) Strategic Defence Review underscored the importance of Network Enabled

Capability (NEC) (figure 18). It also lies at the heart

of the UK’s Joint High Level Operational Concept,

which outlines how the UK expects its forces and

methods of operation to develop.

The UK is moving from platform-centric planning to

a full NEC to exploit effects-based planning and

operations, using more adaptable forces, capable

of greater precision and rapid deployability. This will

change the way the UK plans and executes operations and place different demands on people,

equipment, infrastructure, and processes. This evolutionary process has three phases:

• Interconnection: Based on current doctrine,

organizations, processes, and equipment with

minor organizational changes and equipment

enhancements; 

• Integration: Drawing on current doctrine,

organizations, processes, and equipment with

improved capabilities from major organizational change and systems integration, giving

greatly improved, shared understanding; and

• Synchronization: Optimal information management and distribution, supporting developed

doctrine, organizations, processes, and equipment with agile mission groups formed

dynamically with collaborative working

enabled by system flexibility.
61 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

NEC is based on seven themes:

• Shared Understanding: Covering situational

awareness and command intent;

• Full Information Accessibility: Users able to

search, manipulate, and exchange relevant

information;

• Effects Synchronization: Achieving desired

effects through synchronizing activities;

• Agile Mission Grouping: Enabling the dynamic

creation/configuration of task-oriented Groups;

• Dynamic Collaborative Working: Enabling agile

C2 in a dynamic, continuous, and synchronized manner; 

• Resilient Information Infrastructure: Managed

coherent information across the battlespace

with secure/assured connectivity; and

• Inclusive Flexible Acquisition: Coordinated

Government/Industry action to promote rapid

technology insertion and an incremental

approach to “net-ready platforms.”

A vital NEC component is the UK’s Network

Integration, Test and Experimentation Capability

(NITEworks), an experimentation environment to

assess the benefits of NEC and the options for its

effective and timely delivery, focused on coordinating joint effects and improved targeting.

Figure 18: Network Enabled Capability (NEC)—Heart of the UK's Joint Vision
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 62

Conclusions— 

Network-Centric

Warfare in Perspective

“Here at the end of a millennium we are

driven to a new era in warfare. Society

has changed. The underlying economics

and technologies have changed.

American business has changed. We

would be surprised and shocked if

America’s military did not. For nearly 200

years, the tools and tactics of how we

fight have evolved with military technologies. Now, fundamental changes are

affecting the very character of war. Who

can make war is changing as a result of

weapons proliferation and the fact that

the tools of war increasingly are marketplace commodities. By extension, these

affect the where, the when, and the how

of war.”

Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka

“Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future”

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998.
65 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Towards a Network-Enabled

Force: The 1990s

“How can the [U.S.] military not change?” This simple, yet extraordinarily important question was

posed six years ago when discussions of networkcentric warfare were in their infancy. The answer is

abundantly clear today. The U.S. military is changing at an increasingly rapid pace in response to the

Information Age and changes in U.S. strategy, the

international environment, and technology.

Transformation is a vital component of U.S. defense

strategy and NCW occupies a central place within

the DoD’s force transformation process.

Many recognized, as the nation entered the

Information Age, that this new age was also influencing change within the U.S. military. However, in

the view of some, this change was not occurring

fast enough. They observed that a logical model for

implementing NCW was already emerging, but it

would require a high-performance information grid

to provide a backplane for dynamic computing and

communications. This information grid would

enable the operational architectures of sensor

grids and engagement grids. In turn, sensor grids

had the potential to generate high levels of battlespace awareness and synchronize awareness with

military operations. Engagement grids could then

exploit this awareness and translate it into

increased combat power for U.S. forces.63

Some very promising network-centric capabilities

had been developed, experimented with, and tested by U.S. forces by the late 1990s. Many key elements of the information, sensor, and engagement

grids were already in place or readily available by

that time. At the planning level, the elements of a

DoD-wide intranet were emerging. Joint interoperability could be achieved in large measure when all

elements of the three grids were compliant with the

Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) and the Defense

Information Infrastructure Common Operating

Environment (DII COE).

The Navy began experimenting with network-centric operations (NCO) during exercises at sea in the

late 1980s when the Cooperative Engagement

Capability (CEC) system of systems was developed

and initially tested. CEC, combining a high-performance sensor grid with a high-performance

engagement grid, was “enabled by a shift to network-centric operations.” In 1995, the Navy’s

Seventh Fleet, commanded by then Vice Admiral

Archie Clemins, employed rudimentary NCO to

Conclusions—Network-Centric Warfare in Perspective
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

excellent effect during the dangerous Taiwan

Straits crisis.64 CEC reached Initial Operational

Capability (IOC) in 1996 after a series of tests and

experiments during the early 1990s. Testing and

operational evaluations continued in the late

1990s and early 2000s. Today CEC, combined with

the Marine Corps’ CEC-based Composite Tracking

Network, is creating an effective, common network

of sensors and weapons that extends the naval air

defense capability over sea and shore. Thus, it is

an important capability of the Navy-Marine Corps’

overall C2 architecture, FORCEnet.65

Also in the 1990s, the Army was testing digitization

and network-centric concepts and making very

significant investments in the development of new

warfighting capabilities as it fielded and began to

experiment with the first digitized brigade in the

4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. Advanced

Warfighting Experiments (AWE) were conducted 

at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,

California, as well as Advanced Concept Technology

Demonstrations (ACTD) to demonstrate and test

new concepts and technologies. Eventually, the

entire 4th Infantry Division became the Army’s first

digitized division, which presented for the first time

an entire division that was truly networked with

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below

(FBCB2) providing the core capability. It was

deployed to Southwest Asia in 2003 for participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath.

Similarly, the Air Force used a combination of

Expeditionary Force Exercises (EBX) and ACTDs to

explore the potential of networking and digitization.

The power of information sharing to enable

increased survivability and lethality in the air-to-air

mission was substantiated by the Air Force in the

mid-1990s during the Joint Tactical Information

Distribution Systems (JTIDS) Operational Special

Project. Air Force Pilots flying F-15Cs with and

without data links clearly demonstrated the power

of information sharing enabled by data links. Now

the Air Force is developing a series of new

CONOPS based on improving network-centric and

other transformational capabilities while building

the Command and Control (C2) Constellation as

described in the previous chapter.

66
67 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

Building Transformational

Capabilities in the 21st

Century

What about the present and the future of NCW and

NCO? NCW as an emerging theory of war is

becoming more and more an integral part of how

the military is transforming and clearly impacted

the development of the Joint Operations Concepts

(JOpsC), the Joint Operating Concepts (JOC), and

the current Transformation Roadmaps of the Joint

Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Services. In

short, NCW theory and the governing principles of

a network-centric force are guiding, and will likely

continue to guide, the development of future warfighting concepts and the development of transformational capabilities within the U.S. Armed Forces.

As shown in this document, great strides have

been made in refining NCW theory, documenting

the benefits and warfighting advantages of NCW,

developing network-centric capabilities, and generally implementing NCW throughout the U.S.

Armed Forces in the first few years of the 21st

century. Indeed, the most visible and convincing

evidence of the validity of NCW theory and the

tremendous potential of networked, joint forces

(even partially networked joint forces) has been

provided by our experience, together with our

coalition partners, in Operations Enduring Freedom

and Iraqi Freedom from 2001 to the present.

And yet so much remains to be done. Like the

force transformation process itself, the development and implementation of NCW capabilities to

enable the Joint Force is likely to be a long-term,

continuous process with no clear end in sight.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

Implementing NCW—Three

Cautions

In implementing NCW, no matter how successfully,

we must consider that it is nearly impossible to

generate certainty on the battlefield with regard to

outcomes and consequences. Effects-based operations cannot deliver inviolate cause-effect relations, but they can put the odds on our side. That

may be as good as we can get. The multi-sided

dynamics of combat defy prediction. NCW is meant

to help with this reality, and it does.

Second, the military competition is continuous and

no military is as thoroughly studied as our own. As

we have become more formidable on the traditional battlefield, potential adversaries have moved to

the extremes of terrorism and irregular warfare at

one end and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

and catastrophic warfare at the other. Just as the

Department must shift its focus to these extremes,

so must it work to exploit NCW principles and

sources of power there.

Third, over time information technology and networking will become commodities. Everyone will

have them. At that point, the advantage will go to

those best able to exploit those commodities with

new organizations and the ability to rapidly change

organizations, new doctrine, the ability to create

and discard doctrine rapidly, and the ability to 

create and assimilate technologies within very

short cycle times.

68
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The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 72

1 For an understanding of the nature, purposes, and

direction of defense transformation, including force

transformation, see the Transformation Planning

Guidance document approved by Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld in April 2003. See also

Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, a document approved by the Director, Office of Force

Transformation, OSD, in November 2003.

2 Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director,

Office of Force Transformation, interview with Frank

Swofford, Defense AT&L, March-April 2004.

3 John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare Offers

Warfighting Advantage,” Signal, May 2003, p. 58.

4 Edward A. Smith, Jr., Effects-Based Operations:

Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis,

and War, Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2002, p. 108.

5 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J.

Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and

Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis,

Maryland: January 1998.

6 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P.

Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and

Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd edition

(revised). Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2000.

7 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Richard E.

Hayes, and David A. Signori, Understanding

Information Age Warfare, Washington, DC: DoD CCRP,

2001. David S. Alberts, Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military (revised),

Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, June 2002.

8 Edward A. Smith, Jr., Effects-Based Operations:

Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis,

and War, Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2002.

9 See the final chapter, “The Emerging Way of War,”

in Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, a

document published by the Director, Office of Force

Transformation, OSD in November 2003.

10 These four basic tenets of NCW were initially set

forth in Network-Centric Warfare: Department of

Defense Report to Congress, 27 July 2001.

11 Department of Defense. Network-Centric Warfare

Report to Congress. Washington, DC, 27 July 2001,

pp. ii-iii.

12 The “Key Elements of Strategy” for implementing

NCW in the Department were presented in a briefing,

“Defense Transformation and Network-Centric

Warfare,” by Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski

at the Network Centric Warfare 2004 conference on

22 January 2004, Washington, DC. They have also

been presented in numerous briefings by John

Garstka, Office of Force Transformation, 2002-2004.

See also the foldout brochure, “Network-Centric

Warfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage,”

published by the Director, Force Transformation,

Spring 2004.

13 Frederick C. Mish, Editor in Chief, Webster’s Ninth

New Collegiate Dictionary. New York: MerriamWebster, Inc., 1990, p. 1223.

14 David B. Guralnik, Editor in Chief, Webster’s New

World Dictionary of the American Language, Second

College Edition. New York: Prentice Hall, 1986, p. 1475.

15 The Art of War by Sun Tzu and On War by Carl von

Clausewitz are widely regarded as classic theoretical

works on war. Other well known theorists of war

include Niccolo Machiavelli (The Art of War), Baron

Antoine-Henri Jomini (The Art of War), Mao Tse-tung

(Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung), and

Alfred Thayer Mahan (The Influence of Sea Power

Upon History).

Notes
16 According to the DoD’s Joint Operations Concepts

(JOpsC) document approved by the Secretary of

Defense in November 2003, “Information Superiority

is an imbalance in one’s favor in the information

domain with respect to an adversary. The power of

superiority in the information domain mandates that

the United States fight for it as a first priority even

before hostilities begin.” See JOpsC, p. 17. For an indepth, scholarly examination of the term “information

superiority,” how information superiority can be

achieved, and whether it can be measured by assessing the performance of C4ISR systems during military

operations, see Walter P. Fairbanks, Information

Superiority: What Is It? How to Achieve It? Cambridge,

Massachusetts: Center for Information Policy

Research, Harvard University, June 1999.

17 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical

Strategic Thought (3rd revised and expanded edition).

London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. xx-xxiii. For a recent

critique of “the new American way of war” and

emerging NCW theory, see pp. 12-18 of Lieutenant

Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, U.S. Army. Toward An

American Way of War. Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War

College, March 2004. LTC Echevarria describes the

underlying concepts of the current American way of

war as “a polyglot of information-centric theories

such as network-centric warfare, rapid decisive operations, and shock and awe.” These concepts focus

“on ‘taking down’ an opponent quickly rather than

finding ways to apply military force in the pursuit of

broader political aims. Moreover, the characteristics

of the U.S. style of warfare—speed, jointness, knowledge, and precision—are better suited for strike

operations than for translating such operations into

strategic success. “

18 Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar:

Military Theory and the Future of War,” The Naval War

College Review, Summer 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 3, article 6.

19 “Impact of the Network on Operation Iraqi

Freedom,” a special presentation by General Tommy

Franks, USA (Ret.) at the Network-Centric Warfare

2004 conference on 22 January 2004,Washington, DC.

20 Office of Force Transformation, OSD, Network

Centric Operations Conceptual Framework, Version

1.0, November 2003, pp. 10-11. See also Network

Centric Operations Conceptual Framework, Version

2.0 (Draft), June 2004, pp. 24-25.

21 John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare Offers

Warfighting Advantage,” Signal, May 2003, p. 58-59.

22 Ibid., pp. 59-60.

23 Captain Dane Acord, Commander, B Company,

2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry, 2nd Brigade Combat Team,

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), DCX-1. (The

acronym, FBCB2 refers to the Army’s Force XXI Battle

Command Brigade and Below system.)

24 The Joint Operations Concepts is “an overarching

definition of how the future Joint Force will operate

across the entire range of military operations. It is the

unifying framework for developing subordinate joint

operating concepts, joint functional concepts,

enabling concepts, and integrated capabilities.”

Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts,

Washington, DC, November 2003, p. 5.

25 Ibid., pp. 15-18.

26 Department of Defense, Transformation Planning

Guidance, Washington, DC, April 2003, p. 15.

27 Department of Defense. Major Combat Operations

Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.10. Washington,

DC, 8 June 2004, pp. 12, 14-15.

28 “Impact of the Network on Operation Iraqi

Freedom,” keynote address by General Tommy Franks,

USA (Ret.) at the Network-Centric Warfare 2004 conference on 22 January 2004, Washington, DC.

73 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 74

29 Robert K. Ackerman, “Iraq War Operations

Validate Hotly Debated Theories,” Signal, July 2003,

p. 31-34.

30 Remarks by Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K.

Cebrowski, Director, OFT at the Network-Centric

Warfare 2004 conference on 22 January 2004,

Washington, DC.

31 Remarks by Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K.

Cebrowski, Director, OFT, at the Defense Writers

Group, 23 April 2003.

32 Office of Force Transformation, OSD, Network

Centric Operations Conceptual Framework, Version 2.0

(Draft), June 2004, p. 2. See also Network Centric

Operations Conceptual Framework, Version 1.0,

November 2003.

33 Ibid. p. 4.

34 Ibid. pp. 78-80. See also Director, Office of Force

Transformation, “Network Centric Operations Case

Study: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Draft.)”

May 2004.

35 Ibid. pp. 76-77. See also Director, OFT, “Network

Centric Operations Case Study: US/UK Coalition

Combat Operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom

(Draft).” June 2004.

36 Ibid. pp. 74-76. See also Director. OFT, “Network

Centric Operations Case Study: Air-to-Ground” (Draft).

Vienna, VA, June 2004.

37 Ibid. pp. 83-88. See also Director, OFT, “Network

Centric Operations Case Study: Naval Special Warfare

Group One (NSWG-1), Draft.” June 2004.

38 “Impact of the Network on Operation Iraqi

Freedom,” a special presentation by General Tommy

Franks, USA (Ret.) at the Network-Centric Warfare 2004

conference on 22 January 2004, Washington, DC.

39 “Situational Awareness in OIF via FBCB2 – Blue

Force Tracking: A Preview of Future Battle Command,” a

briefing by Colonel Nick Justice, USA and Colonel Curtis

McCoy, USA at the Network-Centric Warfare 2004

conference on 22 January 2004, Washington, DC.

40 “Net-Centric is an approach to exploitation of

advancing technology that moves from an approach

based on applications standards to one based on

data standards—that is, providing users the ability

to access applications and services that make sense

to them through a Web-enabled space, while simultaneously moving toward a Web-enabled user community in which each members can provide and

access data.” “About Net-Centricity” page on the

Horizontal Fusion website: http://www.horizontalfusion.dod.mil/vision.

41 U.S. Air Force, The Air Force Transformation Flight

Plan, Washington, DC, November 2003, p. B-4.

42 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Transformation

Roadmap, 21 January 2004, p. 10.

43 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

44 Ibid., p. 12.

45 Ibid.

46 The 2003 Service Transformation Roadmaps and

the Joint Transformation Roadmap prepared by USJFCOM were submitted to the Director of Force

Transformation in the fall of 2003 and forwarded to

the Secretary of Defense in early 2004. (Subsequent

Roadmaps will be approved by the Service

Secretaries.) The 2004 Service and Joint Transformation Roadmaps were submitted to the Director of

Force Transformation in July 2004, but have not yet

been reviewed by the Secretary of Defense.
75 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 

47 U.S. Army, 2003 United States Army

Transformation Roadmap, Washington, DC, November

2003, pp. 1-5, 1-6. The 2004 Army Transformation

Roadmap (ATR)“updates the 2003 ATR and describes

the execution of Army transformation strategy in the

context of evolving security challenges, continuing

high demand for operational forces, and lessons

learned from recent operations.” See 2004 ATR, 4

August 2004, p. ii.

48 U.S. Army, 2004 ATR, 4 August 2004, p. 56.

49 Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts,

Washington, DC, November 2003, pp. 15-18.

50 2003 United States Army Transformation

Roadmap, p. 1-7.

51 Ibid. pp. 1-12, 1-13. The 2004 ATR states that

“the Future Force is founded on six main operational

themes,” one of which is “networked-enabled Battle

Command.” See 2004 ATR, 4 August 2004, p. 55.

52 Ibid., p. B-3.

53 Emily Hsu, “Division Expects ‘Quantum Leap’ in

Communications Technologies in Iraq,” Inside the

Army, 23 August 2004.

54 Department of the Navy, Naval Transformation

Roadmap 2003: Assured Access & Power Projection

... From the Sea, Washington, DC, April 2004, p. 2.

For an updated discussion of the Joint Seabasing

concept, see Chapter II, “Transformational Concepts,”

of the Naval Transformation Roadmap 2004 (Draft),

Washington, DC, July 2004, pp. 6-8.

55 Ibid. pp. 3-4, 63-64. For an updated discussion of

the FORCEnet Naval Capability Pillar (NCP), see pp.

68-85 of the Naval Transformation Roadmap 2004

(Draft), Washington, DC, July 2004, pp. 6-8.

56 U.S. Air Force, The Air Force Transformation Flight

Plan, Washington, DC, November 2003, pp. 17-18, 45.

57 The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan

2004, Washington, DC, July 2004, p. ES-6. See also

The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, Washington,

DC, November 2003, p. 45.

58 Ibid, p. 6. See also The Air Force Transformation

Flight Plan, Washington, DC, November 2003, p. 6.

59 Ibid.

60 The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan,

Washington, DC, November 2003, p. B-6.

61 Ibid., p. B-7.

62 NATO, “Signing Ceremony to Initiate a Study on

NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), NATO HQ,

Brussels, 13 November 2003,” NATO Press Release

(2003) 135, 12 November 2003.

63 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J.

Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and

Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis,

Maryland: January 1998.

64 Ibid. By taking advantage of the capabilities of the

Global Network Initiative (GNI) he had developed and

implemented while commanding the Seventh Fleet,

Admiral Clemins and his subordinates reduced their

planning timelines from days to hours. This “order of

magnitude change” suggested to Clemins and others

who had witnessed it that “something very fundamental” was happening.

65 Department of the Navy, Naval Transformation

Roadmap 2003: Assured Access & Power Projection

... From the Sea, Washington, DC, April 2004.
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 76

Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense,

1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

www.oft.osd.mil

Date of Publication: January 5, 2005

Cleared for public release by Department of Defense 

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