NATO STRATEGY IN THE 1990s:

REAPING THE PEACE DIVIDEND OR THE WHIRLWIND?

William T. Johnsen

May 25, 1995
ii

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

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This study was originally presented at the U.S. Army War

College Sixth Annual Strategy Conference held April 26-28, 1995,

with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish the paper as

part of its Conference Series.
iii

FOREWORD

Each April the Strategic Studies Institute hosts a

conference that addresses key strategic issues facing the Armed

Forces and the Nation. This year's theme, "Strategy During the

Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought

together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and

civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and

the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of

penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.

Dr. William T. Johnsen, Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies

at the U.S. Army War College and a former NATO staff officer,

examines The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Released in

November 1991, the Strategic Concept represents NATO's response

to the dramatically changed security environment in Europe, and

the intense desire to reap the resultant "peace dividend." Dr.

Johnsen argues that a close reading of the strategy and

subsequent implementing initiatives refutes critics who claim

that NATO has failed to respond adequately to Europe's new

security conditions. The Strategic Concept dramatically expands

the scope of the Alliance's security objectives and functions,

takes NATO "out of area," and lays the foundation for massive

forces cuts, as well as for a fundamental restructuring of

Alliance military forces and command structures.

In Dr. Johnsen's opinion, however, the Alliance has been

less than successful in the practical implementation of its

Strategic Concept. These difficulties stem predominately from

confusion within the Alliance over NATO's ultimate function:

Should it remain a collective defense organization or should it

evolve into a collective security body? Dr. Johnsen argues that

for the foreseeable future NATO must remain focused on collective

defense. This recommendation has a number of consequences for the

Alliance, most notably for the pace of expanding its membership,

NATO's future role in crisis management and conflict resolution--

especially peace operations, the conduct of other "non-Article V"

operations, and the degree to which nations can garner the peace

dividend.

For policymakers to grasp successfully the thorny strategic

issues facing them in an era of increasingly constrained

resources requires informed debate. The Strategic Studies
iv

Institute, therefore, offers this report as part of its

contributions to the ongoing discussions.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991

and currently serves as an Associate Research Professor of

National Security Affairs. He has also held the Elihu Root Chair

of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994. An

infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen

served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff

assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry

Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of

History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control

Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy,

an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University, and is a

graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or

coauthored numerous Strategic Studies Institute studies, as well

as articles in a variety of policy journals, that focus on U.S.-

European security issues.
1

NATO STRATEGY IN THE 1990s:

REAPING THE PEACE DIVIDEND OR THE WHIRLWIND?

INTRODUCTION

In November 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

released "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" (hereafter

Strategic Concept), the first significant revision of NATO

strategy since the Alliance adopted the strategy of Flexible

Response in 1967. In this new document, NATO acknowledged the

dramatic improvements in the European security environment, and

positioned the Alliance for the post-Cold War era. Since 1991,

the Strategic Concept has guided NATO as it absorbed a unified

Germany, massively reduced allied forces, partially overhauled

its command and control structures, undertook peace operations in

the former Yugoslavia under the aegis of the U.N., conducted

combat operations for the first time in its history, and started

to tackle the difficult question of enlarging the Alliance.

Despite these accomplishments, pundits have subjected the

Alliance to a constant barrage of criticism. While individual

critiques fall across a wide spectrum, an overarching complaint

is that the Alliance has not adapted sufficiently to the changed

conditions in Europe.1

 Because the Strategic Concept sets out the

basic principles of the Alliance and serves as the guide for

NATO's future direction, these criticisms also call into question

the validity of the Alliance's current strategy. This monograph,

therefore, will examine the elements of "The Alliance's New

Strategic Concept," to include its implementation and follow-on

initiatives, and assess whether these efforts adequately prepare

NATO to meet the 21st century.

This assessment begins with a brief description of the key

elements of the Strategic Concept to inform those who may have

been unable to examine it in detail because of the press of other

international and European crises. The study next assesses NATO's

numerous political and military initiatives for implementing the

Strategic Concept, with emphasis on evaluating their success.

Particular emphasis will be devoted to the issue of NATO's

growing participation in collective security activities, and the

inherent contradiction this holds for NATO's continued existence-

-specified in the Strategic Concept and routinely reiterated

thereafter--as a collective defense organization. The report
2

closes with conclusions and recommendations for further Alliance

action.

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Before outlining the critical provisions of the Strategic

Concept, several preliminary points need to be raised. First,

"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" is NATO's first

unclassified strategy; no small point. Second, previous strategic

concepts were published by the NATO Military Committee (MC). As a

consequence, while past strategies touched on political issues

and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the documents, they

had a decidedly military thrust. In "The Alliance's New Strategic

Concept," on the other hand, the political element clearly

predominates.2 Third, because of the considerable political

content, France participated in the strategy review and approved

the Strategic Concept despite not belonging to the Alliance's

integrated military structure.3 Again, no small accomplishment

for the Alliance. Finally, while the strategy reflects

significant changes from the past, a number of continuities

remain.

The Strategic Context.

The Strategic Concept opens with "The Strategic Context,"

which chronicles the significant changes in Europe and assesses

their effects on the Alliance. This section contains three major

conclusions. First, the changed security environment alters

neither the purpose nor security functions of the Alliance.

Second, while the Alliance no longer confronts a massive,

specific threat (i.e., the Warsaw Pact), it still faces risks,

albeit unspecified. Third, the new security conditions offer ". .

. new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within

a broad approach to security."4

 In short, this section provides

the contextual and philosophical underpinnings for the principles

of NATO strategy that followed.

These conclusions have important consequences for the

Alliance. On the one hand, unspecified risks extend well beyond

traditional threats to the territorial integrity and political

independence of its members, and now include "Alliance security

interests [which] can be affected by other risks of a wider

nature, . . . proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
3

disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of

terrorism and sabotage."5 Protecting those interests implies that

the Alliance must be prepared, for the first time, to operate

outside the traditional NATO Treaty area.6 These consequences, in

turn, justify NATO involvement in crisis management and conflict

prevention. Finally, participation in crisis management and

conflict prevention activities provides the rationale for NATO

rapid reaction forces.7 Thus, this portion of the Strategic

Concept establishes precedents for expanding dramatically the

scope of the Alliance's security objectives and functions, takes

NATO "out of area," and lays down the requirement for a

fundamental restructuring of NATO forces; points that many

observers apparently have overlooked.

Alliance Objectives and Security Functions.

Despite establishing new missions for the Alliance, NATO

members strongly reaffirmed the essential purpose of the Alliance

originally laid out in the Washington Treaty (1949): ". . . to

safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by

political and military means in accordance with the principles of

the United Nations Charter."8 To achieve these objectives, the

Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's long-standing policies of

credible deterrence and, if necessary, an effective defense.

Reflecting the new emphasis on crisis management, the allies

added the requirement to ". . . [maintain] an overall capability

to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its

members."9 To achieve these objectives, NATO members reiterated

the fundamental security tasks facing the Alliance:

• To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a

stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of

democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution

of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or

coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the

threat or use of force.

• To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North

Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied

consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests,

including possible developments posing risks for members

security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in

fields of common concern.
4

• To deter and defend against any threat of aggression

against the territory of any NATO member state.

• To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.10

A Broad Approach to Security.

To fulfill these tasks, the Alliance has broadened its

approach to security to include dialogue, cooperation, collective

defense, and crisis management and conflict prevention. Granted,

these elements have their roots in the concepts of defense and

dialogue first articulated in the Harmel Report (1967), but key

differences exist.11 On the one hand, the Strategic Concept

reverses the priority of Alliance functions; i.e., political

means henceforth will predominate over military considerations.

More profoundly, provisions for crisis management and conflict

prevention took on new meanings.

Some might argue that NATO has long practiced crisis

management procedures. While true, the new call for participation

in crisis management and conflict prevention differs vastly from

Cold War procedures intended to avert a full-scale conventional

and, perhaps, nuclear confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw

Pact. The new provisions establish that security is no longer a

matter of the 16 NATO members only, but is intertwined with

Europe as a whole. While this was true during the Cold War, the

critical difference is that the collapse of communism and the

Warsaw Pact now makes it possible for NATO to exercise its

security functions outside NATO territory. This circumstance

allows NATO to work in conjunction with regional (e.g., European

Union [EU], Western European Union [WEU], Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] [formerly CSCE]) or

international (e.g., U.N.) organizations.

But, this new "opportunity" to cooperate with these

frequently duplicative security organizations has not been

without its problems. The critical issue concerns: Which

institution is responsible for what? The short answer is that no

one knows.12 Worse yet, no one appears to be working out the

details that will delimit roles and responsibilities, eliminate

unnecessary overlap, or close the gaps between these supposedly

interlocking institutions. As a result, crisis management
5

activities are cobbled together inefficiently (e.g., the WEU/NATO

maritime enforcement of the Yugoslav embargo), are confused

(e.g., the U.N. and NATO in Bosnia-Hercegovina), or simply fall

through the gaps (e.g., EU and OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova,

or Chechenya).

If NATO is to defend its interests (e.g., European

stability, resolving crises on NATO's periphery thus preventing

spillover onto NATO territory) effectively through crisis

management activities, then NATO must take the lead--now--in

defining the parameters of organizational roles and

responsibilities of the various European security institutions.

To do so, requires answers to the following questions:

• What shall be the current division of labor between NATO

and the EU/WEU?

• Will NATO continue in the future to act as a security arm

of the OSCE?

• What shall be the role between NATO and a future European

Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)?

• Given the NATO experience in Bosnia-Hercegovina, under

what conditions will the Alliance be willing to cooperate with

the U.N.?

Certainly, answers to these difficult questions will be

neither simply nor quickly found. Ideally, NATO would first build

internal consensus on its future role, and then on how NATO would

interact with other European institutions. After hammering out

its internal difficulties, NATO would then work out comprehensive

definitions of responsibility with each European institution

having a stake in security issues.

But these are not ideal times. Many NATO members have

differing views on these issues, as well as differing national

agendas and objectives for the various competing institutions

that will further complicate consensus-building efforts.13

Furthermore, NATO will have to handle these prickly issues

concurrently--in terms of dealing with institutions, as well as

responding to crises. If NATO is to succeed in these efforts,

then the Alliance will have to take the lead. No other
6

institution has the degree of necessary consensus or the apparent

willingness to confront these issues. Equally important, within

NATO, the United States must take a stronger role and resolve the

many differences among the major European powers, as well as

between the United States and its NATO allies. This will require

the United States to demonstrate forethought, patience, and

improved leadership qualities.

Guidelines for Defense.

Principles of Alliance Strategy. Despite an increased

reliance on political means, the Strategic Concept retains a

significant military component. The Alliance remains purely

defensive in purpose, and retains deterrence, and, if necessary

defense, as key military elements of NATO strategy. The enduring

role of Alliance military forces is to assure the territorial

integrity and political independence of NATO members. The

collective nature of NATO continues to apply to the equitable

sharing of roles, risks, and responsibilities. Lastly, collective

defense remains the best means to preclude the renationalization

of defense policies.14

One strategic principle has drawn remarkably little comment,

especially given the usual sensitivity of nuclear issues in

Europe. The Strategic Concept retains the Alliance's reliance on

an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear weapons, and

reaffirms the continued importance of nuclear weapons in

supporting the Alliance's policy of deterrence. Moreover, NATO

allies remain committed to continued modernization of its nuclear

systems, another issue that usually has generated considerable

controversy.15

The Alliance's New Force Posture.

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces. While Alliance

military forces must remain capable of conducting large-scale

warfare that provides the final insurance against a general war,

NATO authorities consider such an outcome highly unlikely. As a

result, the Alliance posed additional missions for NATO military

forces. And, in keeping with the Alliance's increased

participation in crisis management and conflict prevention, as

well as defense of Alliance interests, NATO forces would no

longer have solely a wartime role. Forces would be required to
7

perform different functions in peace, crisis, and war.16 In peace,

NATO forces would promote stability and provide strategic

balance, as well as contribute toward dialogue and cooperation.

In crises, Alliance forces ". . . can complement and reinforce

political actions within a broad approach to security, and

thereby contribute to the management of crises and their peaceful

resolution."17

How NATO forces will accomplish this difficult task has not

yet been answered. To ensure that the use of military force

contributes to, rather than detracts from, crisis management and

resolution requires detailed military strategic guidance and

operational level planning. Before such comprehensive planning

can occur in NATO, members must reach a political consensus on

such key points as; NATO versus national interests involved, the

degree of military participation nations are willing to

underwrite, funding provisions, and command and control

arrangements, to name only a few.

NATO members, however, traditionally have been averse to

obligating themselves militarily in advance of a crisis. And, as

the NATO experience in the Balkans clearly indicates, nations may

be equally reluctant to commit when the fuller parameters of a

crisis are unknown. Until such time, therefore, that realistic

military planning and capabilities, and, more importantly, the

political will to employ those capabilities, provide credible

muscle to the lofty rhetoric of the Strategic Concept, the words

will remain little more than empty promises.

This conclusion does not imply that the Alliance should

simply shrug its collective shoulders and wait for the next

crisis to catch it unaware and unprepared. Alternative steps are

available for the Alliance to pursue. First, NATO nations must

face up to the fact that the Alliance is not likely to underwrite

substantial preplanning for military participation in crisis

management. Second, to compensate for the absence of preplanning,

the Alliance--individually and collectively--must provide

capabilities such as those suggested below that will ensure a

rapid response to an emerging crisis:

• Subordinate headquarters that will likely be charged with

carrying out such missions must receive detailed military

strategic and operational level guidance that is essential for
8

effective planning.18

• Increased intelligence gathering capabilities and staffs

to monitor conditions, track emerging events, and provide rapid

assessments of an emerging crisis. Because of the importance of

political issues in crisis management, intelligence efforts must

go beyond strictly military intelligence functions and provide

for a thorough understanding of political-military issues.

• Sufficient communications capabilities (e.g., strategic

level communications, mobile ground stations, access to

satellites) to ensure adequate command and control of operations.

• Planning staffs in the various Major Subordinate Command

(MSC) and Principle Subordinate Command (PSC) headquarters need

to be augmented to provide the "surge" capability necessary to

respond to a quickly rising crisis, as well as to keep pace with

rapidly changing conditions and contingencies. This may

especially apply to logistics planning staffs, who habitually

have been under-represented in many NATO headquarters because

logistics has always been a national responsibility.

• Mobile, deployable staff cells need to be created within

the various headquarters. These cells must be physically and

intellectually capable of responding to rapidly changing

situations. Personnel readiness requirements may have to be

altered in some nations to comply with these requirements.

• Redundancies need to build into staffs to provide for

sufficient numbers and types of personnel in the event a nation

chooses not to participate in an operation.

• Redundancies also need to be integrated into each

headquarters to ensure that in the event of a deployment,

sufficient personnel are on hand within the primary headquarters

to perform daily requirements, as well as to ensure rotation of

deployed personnel.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture. To fulfill

their charge to support political efforts to manage or resolve

crises, NATO forces must ". . . have a capability for measured

and timely responses . . .; the capability to deter action

against an Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to
9

respond to and repel it as well as establish the territorial

integrity of member states."19 Consequently, the Strategic Concept

stipulates that the size, readiness, and deployment of Alliance

forces would vary according to their geographic locality, their

mission, and their deployment requirements. The overall size of

NATO forces has been greatly decreased and, in many cases,

readiness has been significantly (perhaps imprudently) reduced.

The idea of "Forward Defense" along Alliance frontiers,

particularly the linear defense of the Central Region, has been

replaced with a reduced forward presence. That said, the

Strategic Concept acknowledges that the northern and southern

tiers of Allied Command Europe (ACE) face greater risks and

shorter warning times, and that national and NATO force postures

must reflect these differences.20

To ensure that lower residual force levels would be capable

of participating effectively in crisis management and conflict

prevention, as well as fulfilling their traditional defense

missions, the Strategic Concept provides more detailed guidance.

Specifically, the Alliance would require ". . . limited, but

militarily significant . . . ground, air, and sea immediate and

rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of

eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable."21 Importantly,

these forces also must be able to deter a limited attack, and, if

necessary, defend Alliance territory until additional forces

arrived.22

To provide those additional forces, the Strategic Concept

establishes the requirement to build up forces through

mobilization, reinforcement, and reconstitution, and deploy them

quickly. Interestingly, the Strategic Concept notes that such

forces must also possess the ability to draw down ". . . quickly

and discriminately . . . [through] flexible and timely responses

in order to reduce and defuse tensions."23 Finally, while

acknowledging the long-held tradition of close political control

of crisis management actions, the strategy calls for a review of

crisis management procedures in light of the new security

environment.24

Characteristics of Conventional Forces. In addition to

immediate and rapid reaction forces mentioned above, the

Strategic Concept calls for the Alliance's military structure to

include main defense and augmentation forces which are composed
10

of active and mobilizable elements. It also describes the

requisite capabilities of ground, maritime, and air forces, which

largely reiterate traditional requirements. Of greater interest

is the recognition that significantly reduced force structures

would require increased reliance on integrated military

structures, as well as the establishment of multinational

formations--particularly among ground forces.25

The Allies also articulated the capabilities--to be

maintained or created--necessary to underwrite crisis management

and rapid reaction capabilities: effective surveillance and

intelligence, adequate command and control organizations and

procedures, strategic mobility between regions--to include units

capable of rapid deployment, the air and sea assets to transport

them, and improved logistics capabilities. Further, NATO

authorities underscored the requirement that forces from all

three elements--reaction, main defense, and augmentation--must be

prepared for intra-European reinforcement roles.26

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces. The Strategic Concept

also outlines the characteristics of NATO's future nuclear

forces. First, nuclear weapons would remain political instruments

". . . to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of

war."27 Second, to demonstrate Alliance solidarity and strengthen

nuclear deterrence, nations would continue to share burdens,

roles, and responsibilities--to include collective defense

planning in nuclear roles, as well as peacetime basing of nuclear

forces on their territory.28 Third, NATO nuclear forces would ". .

. need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate

flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and

effective element of the Allies strategy for preventing war."29 In

short, nuclear forces will remain the deterrent force of ultimate

resort.

At the same time, the Alliance recognized that the changed

security environment in Europe permitted radical changes in the

Alliance nuclear force posture. As a result, they agreed to

maintain nuclear forces at ". . . the minimum level sufficient to

preserve peace and stability," to reduce significantly the number

of sub-strategic nuclear systems, and to eliminate all nuclear

artillery and ground launched short-range nuclear missiles.30

While these provisions seem a radical departure from past NATO

strategy, they nonetheless reflect continuity with more recent
11

initiatives to reduce NATO's nuclear stockpiles.31

IMPLEMENTATION AND FOLLOW-ON INITIATIVES

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept represents a beginning,

not an end. Thus, despite the charges of some critics, the

Alliance has not sat on its collective hands since November

1991.32 To the contrary, NATO not only has implemented its

Strategic Concept, it has undertaken a number of significant

political and military initiatives to effect the letter and

intent of its strategy. The report next turns to an examination

and assessment of these efforts.

Political Initiatives.

• Dialogue and Cooperation.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). On the

political side, NATO has widened significantly the scope of

cooperation and dialogue that has been long underway. In December

1991, for example, the NACC convened for the first time. Composed

of all NATO members, Central and Eastern European states that

formerly belonged to the former Warsaw Pact, and the successor

states to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the NACC

is a forum for the Atlantic Alliance and its new partners.

Although criticized by some as a mere "talk shop," the NACC

provides an essential interface between NATO and its former

adversaries.33 Within the NACC, members can raise and explore

issues of mutual interest in a common forum that promotes

confidence building and trust. Additionally, the NACC has

undertaken a substantive yearly work program that has addressed

such issues as policy and security, defense planning, defense

conversion, economics, science, and air traffic management.34 Most

important, perhaps, the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in

Peacekeeping has sought to harmonize peacekeeping doctrines,

practices, and procedures.35

• Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE). NATO allies have continued to be the driving force in the

OSCE (formerly CSCE) process begun in Helsinki in 1975. OSCE

signatories implemented the provisions of the Charter of Paris

(November 1990)--to include the new structures and institutions

of the OSCE process--and the Vienna Document 90 on Confidence and
12

Security Building Measures (CSBMs)(November 1990). Implementing

the Vienna Document 92 on CSBMs signed in March 1992 has enhanced

these efforts.36 Follow-on OSCE conferences in Helsinki (1992) and

Budapest (1994) that set forth additional initiatives to improve

trust, confidence, and stability in Europe have reinforced

Alliance efforts at enhancing dialogue and cooperation within

Europe.37

• Arms Control Initiatives. The Alliance also continues its

arms control efforts, and with considerable success. NATO allies

and their partners in Central and Eastern Europe are in the midst

of implementing the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

that is on track to eliminate nearly 70,000 items of treaty

limited equipment by the end of 1995.38 The Alliance and its

Central and East European interlocutors also concluded the CFE IA

agreement that set national limits on the personnel strength of

conventional armed forces in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU)

area (July 1992).39 NATO has also taken up the important cause of

nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.40 Finally,

although they are bilateral U.S.-Russian initiatives, the

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) enjoy Alliance

support.

NATO's intense focus on arms control treaties and their

implementation had unexpected, but significant, consequences for

the Alliance's ability to respond to the post-Cold War security

environment. Because of the massive reductions in force

structures and the reorganizations which they generated, national

and NATO military planners were absorbed in revamping national

and NATO force structures and command and control arrangements.

Consequently, they were neither well-prepared for events in the

Balkans nor were they able to devote the attention necessary to

respond effectively to the demands of the accelerating crisis.

Had NATO military authorities been able to devote their full

attention to this issue, the Alliance probably would have

responded in a more effective manner.

• Partnership for Peace (PfP). NATO further reinforced its

commitment to cooperation and dialogue at the January 1994 Summit

in Brussels, when the Alliance established the PfP program. In

the words of the official invitation, PfP will ". . . expand and

intensify political and military cooperation within Europe,

increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build
13

strengthened relationships . . . ."41 Under the authority of the

North Atlantic Council (NAC) and within the framework of the

NACC, NATO invited new partners, on an individual basis and at

their own pace, to participate in key political and military

activities within NATO headquarters. Such activities include but

are not limited to peacekeeping exercises, increased transparency

of defense budgets, democratic control of armed forces,

cooperative military relations, ". . . and the development, over

the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with

those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance."42

Significantly, the PfP invitation also stipulated that the

Alliance would ". . . consult with any active participant in the

Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its

territorial integrity, political independence, or security;"43

effectively extending, de facto, provisions of Article IV of the

Washington Treaty to those states that join PfP.44 Importantly,

this consultation would take place at "16 +1" (i.e., with NATO

and the affected state), rather than at 36 (NACC) or 53 (OSCE)

where efforts to arrive at a rapid solution obviously would be

more complicated.

Despite the charges that PfP does not go far enough,45 PfP

must be recognized for what it is: the best means, to date, to

prepare states for potential NATO membership. By offering,

implicitly at least, a potential pathway to NATO membership to

those nations committed to joining the Alliance, PfP represents a

significant step beyond simple cooperation and dialogue. And,

when PfP is viewed together with other Alliance initiatives,

there can be little doubt that the Alliance has more than

fulfilled its commitment to increased dialogue and cooperation.

• Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention.

The Alliance took another significant step in implementing

the Strategic Concept when NATO foreign ministers agreed at Oslo

in June 1992 ". . . to support, on a case-by-case basis in

accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under

the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available

Alliance resources and expertise."46 More importantly, the

Alliance quickly turned theory into action, as NATO undertook

support of U.N. efforts to resolve the ongoing crisis in the

former Yugoslavia.
14

NATO participation in efforts to mitigate the war in BosniaHercegovina and to assist in crisis management has been

extensive, if not entirely successful. In conjunction with the

WEU, NATO began conducting maritime operations in support of U.N.

mandates in July 1992 (currently named Operation SHARP GUARD). In

October 1992, the Alliance began monitoring the air space over

the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, in November 1992, NATO had

dispatched a substantial portion of Headquarters, Northern Army

Group to serve as the core of the U.N. Protection Force

(UNPROFOR) command and control structure in the former

Yugoslavia. In April 1993, air monitoring operations turned to

enforcing the U.N. "no-fly" zone over the former Yugoslavia

(Operation DENY FLIGHT).47 Shortly thereafter NATO's role expanded

to include providing close air support to defend UNPROFOR, as

well as U.N. "safe areas" in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Alliance

later expanded its efforts to include close air support of

humanitarian assistance operations.49

On February 28, 1994, NATO involvement deepened

significantly when Alliance aircraft shot down four fixed-wing

aircraft violating the "no-fly" zone. Close on the heels of this

event, NATO aircraft responded to the first UNPROFOR request for

close air support on March 12, 1994 (although the aircraft

attacked no ground targets). NATO participation continued to

escalate as the threat of NATO air strikes was used to halt

ethnic Serbian attacks on U.N.-declared "safe areas" in eastern

Bosnia.49 In August and September 1994, NATO aircraft attacked

ground targets, as Bosnian Serbs refused to abide by U.N.

resolutions regarding the "heavy weapons exclusion" zone around

Sarajevo. Continuing Serbian violations of U.N. resolutions

resulted in NATO aircraft, at the request of UNPROFOR, attacking

the Bosnian Serb air base at Ubdina, Croatia, on November 21,

1994. Finally, on November 23, 1994, NATO aircraft struck

surface-to-air missile sites that had illuminated NATO

reconnaissance aircraft with their target acquisition radars.50

By this point, however, serious strains had been growing

within the Alliance for some time, and internal consensus over

the Alliance's further role in conflict management in BosniaHercegovina broke down. On the one hand, the United States

advocated tougher military action, especially air strikes (but

without offering to provide U.S. ground troops), to retaliate

against ethnic Serbian acts, and to force the pace of
15

negotiations to end the conflict. On the other hand, the

principal providers of UNPROFOR forces (especially key NATO

members France and Britain) supported a more restrained approach.

Tensions built for several months until the unilateral U.S.

withdrawal from enforcing U.N. maritime sanctions openly split

the Alliance, perhaps most seriously since the Suez Crisis

(1956), and shattered the fragile consensus for muscular NATO

support of U.N. operations within Bosnia-Hercegovina.51 Moreover,

it called into question NATO's support of peace operations in

general.

This result should come as no surprise. NATO may have rushed

to judgement on the issue of participation in peace operations,

pushed too early into a decision by the advocates of "out of area

or out of business."52 As a result, NATO engaged in peace

operations before its members had fully debated and agreed on its

future role, much less on its function in peace operations.

Indeed, little consensus exists within key Alliance countries

about their participation in such efforts. For example, within

the United States (despite Presidential Decision Directive [PDD]

25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming

Multilateral Peace Operations"), the Executive Branch and

Congress continue to debate the extent of future U.S. engagement

in peace operations.53 Similarly, within Germany the

constitutional issue of German forces conducting operations

outside of national territory has been legally resolved, but the

extent of future German participation in peace operations is a

political question that remains unanswered.54 Moreover, France and

Britain, two critical actors in Bosnian peacekeeping efforts are

reviewing their potential future roles in peacekeeping

operations.55 Finally, for many of the smaller members of the

Alliance, force structure cuts and reduced readiness may render

moot the question of participating in peace operations.

Thus, while the situation in Bosnia may be unique, the

strains resulting from NATO participation in the crisis go beyond

the bounds of this one issue, and strike at the core of whether

NATO members, individually or collectively, possess the political

will to participate in peace operations. Moreover, the Alliance

is spending too much time and effort on this issue that should be

spent on more compelling concerns facing the Alliance. The

Alliance should, therefore, defer further participation in OSCE

or U.N. peace operations until such time that it can reach
16

internal consensus on the extent of NATO support for peace

operations, as well as a more precise division of labor between

the various interlocking European security organizations.

Military Initiatives.

• Defense Policy Guidance.

NATO military authorities also have been actively engaged in

implementing the Alliance's strategic vision. In conjunction with

the publication of the Strategic Concept, the NATO Military

Committee (MC) announced the December 1991 promulgation of MC

400, Military Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance's

Strategic Concept.56 The guidance stipulated the requirement for

highly mobile forces that had access to timely and accurate

intelligence, and were supported by adequate transport,

logistics, and infrastructure. Without going into specifics, the

document outlined reinforcement, mobilization, and reconstitution

requirements, addressed peacetime positioning of forces, and

framed readiness and training requirements and responsibilities.57

• Restructuring Alliance Forces.

New Force Structures. In accordance with the Strategic

Concept, Alliance forces have been divided into reaction forces,

main defense forces, and augmentation forces. Reaction forces are

composed of active duty formations maintained at high levels of

readiness that give NATO military authorities the capability to

respond quickly and flexibly to crisis developments on land, in

the air, and on the sea.58 Reaction forces consist of immediate

reaction forces (IRF) and rapid reaction forces (RRF). Immediate

reaction forces include the ACE Mobile Force (AMF)--Land and Air

(long-standing NATO forces, but augmented from their past

structures), and, for the first time, Standing Allied Naval

Forces: Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Minesweepers (STANAVFORMIN),

and Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), a new organization.59 (See

Figure 1.)

Rapid reaction forces also contain air, sea, and land

elements. Air and maritime components needed beyond those

available in the IRF will be provided by nations on an asrequired basis. Land rapid reaction forces will come from the ACE

Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (See Figure 2). Commander, ARRC can
17

draw from a pool of national units, but current plans anticipate

that no more than four divisions plus corps troops would be

deployed at any one time. The composition of the deployed force

would depend upon the mission, the geographic area for

deployment, and the forces that nations make available.60

Main defense forces provide the bulk of NATO's force

structure. These forces are charged, in conjunction with he

Reaction Forces, with the immediate defense of Alliance

territory.61 Built around a combination of national and

multinational units, main defense forces would consist of a

mixture of active and mobilizable formations.62 On NATO's northern

and southern borders, the size and readiness of main defense

forces could vary considerably--smaller forces in the north and

increasing numbers as one progresses from west to east along

NATO's southern tier.63 Within the Central Region, main defense

forces--reduced significantly from Cold War levels--will rely

more heavily on mobilizable units with longer readiness times,

and are organized into five multinational corps and one German

national corps in eastern Germany that falls under NATO command

and control (Figure 3).

Augmentation forces provide operational and strategic

reserves for the Alliance, and, therefore, are not dedicated to a

particular region. These forces consist largely of national

forces not charged with rapid reaction or main defense missions,

and will be capable of reinforcing rapidly from less threatened

areas of the Alliance. Formations are held in varying states of

readiness, but NATO will depend heavily on mobilizable forces.

And, while augmentation forces could come from anywhere within

the Alliance, NATO will continue to rely heavily on the United

States.64

As indicated earlier, multinational formations will play an

important role in Alliance force structures. In the case of

reaction forces, multinational formations promote cohesion,

reinforce transatlantic links, and demonstrate Alliance

solidarity and commitment to collective defense.65 For main

defense forces, NATO leaders envisaged that the establishment of

standing multinational formations would manifest continued

Alliance solidarity.66 Moreover, they hoped to demonstrate that

the Alliance had moved away from the Cold War alignment of

national corps along the now defunct Inter-German Border.67
18

Finally, an unstated but fervent hope of many NATO planners was

that reliance on multinational forces might impede the "force

structure free fall" already underway, particularly in the

Central Region, as nations sought to maximize the peace dividend.

While the merits of multinationality are appealing, one

should not forget the difficulties inherent in transforming

political initiatives into military reality. Differing languages,

force structures, doctrines, readiness requirements, training

standards, and organizational cultures can severely complicate

the role of the multinational commander and his subordinates.

Moreover, reliance on multinational formations will only

exacerbate the nettlesome problem of interoperability of

procedures, equipment, communications, repair parts, and

ammunition that has long plagued NATO. Finally, the always

sensitive issue of command and control arrangements--particularly

the differences between Article V and non-Article V operations--

will require resolution.68 This is not to argue against the use of

multinational formations. The intent is simply to ensure that

NATO authorities understand the time, energy, and resources that

will be required to ensure such units are capable of implementing

the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

Force Reductions and Their Implications. Concomitant with

establishing new structures, military authorities have overseen

significant reductions in Alliance forces (at aggregate, as well

as national levels).69 To a large extent, these reductions turned

necessity into virtue as the Strategic Concept simply ratified

arms control agreements and the changed security environment.

Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, Alliance reductions amount to:

tanks (18 percent); artillery (7 percent), and armored combat

vehicles (7.7 percent).70 Furthermore, provisions of the CFE IA

Treaty (in which nations declared ceilings on the number of

personnel in their respective armed forces) reinforced equipment

reductions.

Many nations, however, have taken cuts much deeper than

required under the CFE Treaties in an effort to reap the maximum

possible peace dividend. By 1997, according to NATO sources, the

overall military strength of the Alliance will have fallen 25

percent from 1990 levels. But this figure conceals significant

disparities. Norway, for example, will cut its total mobilizable

ground strength from 160,000 to 100,000 personnel, and reduce its
19

ground force structure from 13 to 6 brigades.71 In the Central

Region, air and ground forces will realize reductions of about 45

percent.72 Across NATO's southern tier, Spain will cut its armed

forces by approximately 44 percent and Italy plans a reduction of

roughly 25 percent. Portugal plans moderate reductions, while

Greece will make little or none, and Turkey will reduce

significantly personnel strengths (620,000 to 350,000 personnel)

while increasing items of modern equipment.73

While these reductions may make sense from a national

perspective (i.e., the reduced threat in Europe and, in some

cases, the perceived diminished need to employ forces outside

Europe), the magnitude of the cutbacks may not make sense given

the requirements outlined in the Strategic Concept. In short,

because military forces ultimately guarantee key provisions of

the political element of the strategy (e.g., deterrence, crisis

management and resolution), insufficient forces call into

question the viability of the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

Indeed, as early as December 1992, the severity of planned

reductions in main defense forces, particularly in the Central

Region, precipitated the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) to

order ". . . a review of the implications of changing force

levels for the new force structure."74 A year later, Defense

Ministers noted the defense savings achieved, but emphasized that

NATO members must provide the financial means necessary to

underwrite defense plans.75 Specifically, the DPC highlighted the

importance of ". . . modernization and improvements in strategic

mobility, command and control, and sustainability . . . [as well

as forces] properly trained and equipped for the full range of

missions and tasks they may be called upon to fulfill."76

The DPC has been concerned because, in designing their postCold War force structures, nations have failed to take into

account other demands that could require larger national

contributions than apparently envisaged.77 For example, Central

Region countries must retain sufficient forces to meet their NATO

requirements for main defense units in Central Europe. At the

same time, they must maintain forces to meet national objectives

inside (e.g., the UK in Northern Ireland; or the UK, France,

Netherlands, and Spain in Bosnia), as well as outside Europe

(e.g., Belgium and France in Africa; or any number of European

states in the Middle East). Finally, NATO members, for the first
20

time, must be prepared to dispatch reinforcements from their

normal peacetime deployment locations to areas where risks exceed

the capabilities of national and ACE Rapid Reaction Forces.78

Failure to provide forces sufficient to achieve these goals not

only calls into question the ability of NATO to execute its

Strategic Concept, but also the fundamental purpose of collective

defense.

The size of residual forces is not the only concern. In

December 1994, the DPC ". . . noted shortfalls in certain

capabilities, especially related to support for reaction forces,

ground based air defense, and strategic mobility, which could

have important implications for the implementation of all aspects

of Alliance strategy."79 To ensure these capabilities, units from

many nations will have to be structured differently than in the

past to meet new and challenging deployment and sustainment

requirements. This may be especially true of Central Region

formations that habitually have lacked adequate combat support

elements (e.g., artillery, air defense, intelligence). Moreover,

many of these countries relied on area support commands and civil

resources that have resulted in units with inadequate internal

logistics capability to support a prolonged deployment away from

home territory.

Finally, these numerous changes must be accomplished in a

time of increasing fiscal austerity. But restructuring,

especially if it entails substantial reorganization, acquisition

of new equipment or capabilities, or repositioning of peacetime

stationing, can be very expensive. At the same time, day-to-day

operational costs are rising, as the employment of national and

NATO forces has increased significantly over Cold War levels.80

Moreover, many nations failed to comprehend the considerable

hidden costs in force reductions (e.g., severance or early

retirement payments, destruction of equipment, increased unit

costs of equipment, and environmental clean up) that must be

added to normal operating costs.81 Thus, caught in the squeeze

between force restructuring costs, daily operational

expenditures, and shrinking defense budgets, many NATO nations

may be mortgaging the future in order to pay current bills.82 This

holds the significant potential, over the short- and long-term,

to frustrate implementation of the Strategic Concept. More

importantly, it holds the potential to undermine the long-term

viability of the Alliance.
21

INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In a simple, but not simplistic, sense, the art of strategy

constitutes the continuous balancing of objectives, implementing

concepts, and resources (also known as ends, ways, and means).

Thus, while significant, NATO's promulgation of its Strategic

Concept represents only a first step. Equally important are the

implementing concepts that provide concrete ways to achieve

strategic ends, and, especially, the human and fiscal means--and

as importantly, the political will to expend those means--that

breathe life into those options. An assessment of these points,

and their critical interrelationships may provide, therefore, a

helpful construct for assessing whether NATO's Strategic Concept

can meet the demands of the 21st century.

Ends.

Numerous critics complain that with the demise of the Soviet

Union, the rationale for NATO has disappeared.83 Granted, members

founded the Alliance in response to the threat posed by

communism, but the principles of the Washington Treaty are more

enduring than many critics admit. NATO, undoubtedly, will have to

respond to changed strategic circumstances; but the requirement

is to adapt, not to dissolve a vital element of European

security. The question that should be the focus of attention,

then, should not be whether NATO should survive, but how shall

the Alliance adapt? This, in turn, leads to the issue of what, in

the absence of the Communist threat, should be NATO's primary

purpose?

The Strategic Concept began the process of answering that

question by reaffirming the principles of the Washington Treaty,

and stipulating that NATO shall remain a collective defense

organization. But the Alliance's New Strategic Concept also

indicates that NATO increasingly will be involved in collective

security type tasks which can undermine the ability to perform

collective defense functions. To complicate matters further,

numerous influential commentators have posed additional roles for

the Alliance to consider that, together, offer a broad and

frequently contradictory menu of choices for the Alliance to

pursue:
22

• A collective defense organization;

• A collective security organization for Europe: e.g., the

military arm of the OSCE (loosely, the "out of area or out of

business" option);

• A regional collective security organization for the United

Nations;

• A means to unite the two former adversarial blocs.84

Recent events, predominantly the imbroglio over NATO's role

in the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, indicate that a NATO

role as a collective security organization or the military arm of

the OSCE or the U.N. is becoming less likely. Nor do shrinking

budgets, and increasing distractions from other demanding issues

(e.g., national preoccupation with economics and demographics, EU

expansion, war in the Balkans, perceived risks from the

Mediterranean, or the rising crises in the former Soviet Union)

auger the rapid development of a consensus for the Alliance

becoming a purely collective security organ. That said, pressures

for NATO to assume a collective security role are not

insignificant and could continue to vex NATO for some time.

Using NATO as a means to unite the former adversarial blocs

is equally problematic. For example, does NATO want to expand

significantly its membership? How does the Alliance ensure

adherence to the membership criteria specified in Article II of

the Washington Treaty? At what point would the Alliance cease to

be a collective defense organization and become a collective

security organization? How does the Alliance ensure that each

former adversary is fully prepared for NATO membership? How does

the Alliance incorporate former constituent parts of the Soviet

Union without offending Russia? Finally, uniting former

adversaries implies addressing possible Russian membership in

NATO. How the Alliance could absorb a state the size of Russia,

with its security concerns far beyond the bounds of Europe (i.e.,

the Middle East, Central Asia, and Asia) is a very difficult

question.

Almost by default, logic leads one to conclude that NATO

should remain focused solely on its collective defense dimension.

But such a conclusion does the Alliance an injustice, for even in
23

the absence of the massive threat that spawned it, NATO can play

a number of vital continuing roles. First, the Alliance can

sustain stability in Western and Southern Europe that will

promote continued economic well-being--no small contribution.

Second, it can extend the stability and improved prosperity that

usually flows from a sturdy security environment into the

emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Third, the

Alliance can continue to perform its long-standing internal

collective security function at the political level: e.g.,

integration first of West Germany into Cold War Europe, and then

a united Germany into the new Europe; denationalization of

defense and security policies; and dampening of tensions and

conflicts between member states (the most notable example being

Greece and Turkey).

The Alliance must decide quickly the fundamental nature of

its future role. Current debates over NATO's role in BosniaHercegovina, future participation in peace operations, and the

precise boundaries between NATO and the other security

institutions in Europe sap considerable NATO energy and divert

the Alliance from other critical issues. NATO, therefore, must

squarely confront the issue of whether it will remain a

collective defense organization, and devote the time and effort

necessary to achieve consensus. This may require the Alliance to

defer, for the foreseeable future, participation in peace

operations or other missions that fall outside the parameters of

collective defense. Nor does this argue for strict limits of

territorial defense. In keeping with the precepts of the

Strategic Concept, the defense of NATO interests should guide

discussions, not simply the traditional mission of guaranteeing

the territorial integrity of Alliance members.

Ways.

In an ideal sense, the various concepts proposed to

implement the Strategic Concept appear highly suitable. For

example, dialogue and cooperation continue apace. The Alliance

continues to implement arms control and disarmament treaties or

agreements, most notably the CFE Treaty and the various Vienna

CSBM documents. The NACC has expanded its responsibilities and,

more importantly, increased the results of its labors. The PfP

Program now includes 25 members. Finally, the Alliance is

examining potential pathways and timings for expanded NATO
24

membership for those partners that meet NATO's as yet unforeseen

criteria.

But reality intrudes. PfP participation and expanded

membership have run into obstacles that may delay expansion of

the Alliance. Importantly, these hurdles result not from the lack

of commitment of potential members to adapt to NATO requirements,

but from the Alliance's inability to forge a short-term consensus

over the parameters for, or even the desirability of, adding new

members. Indeed, efforts to date have been more effective at

undermining NATO than in buttressing the security of the

Alliance.85

How enlargement proceeds also hinges significantly on the

type of organization the Alliance will remain or become. If the

Alliance continues to add new members, it will at some point

cease to be a collective defense organization. Where or when that

point might be reached cannot be forecast with any accuracy, but

some indicators include:

• Expanded membership that retards or precludes rapid

consensus-building and decisionmaking;

• Addition of Central and East European states that have

intramural conflicts (similar to Greece and Turkey) which

constrain or paralyze Alliance decisionmaking; and,

• Russian membership which, given the size of Russia, would

dwarf the remaining European members, as well as add massive

additional NATO defense commitments along Russia's turbulent

frontiers.

Thus, key questions about who is offered membership, under

what conditions, when, and with what timetable will have to be

answered after NATO has decided the strategic objectives and

purpose of the Alliance. These conditions, therefore, argue for a

slower NATO expansion that contributes to the continued stability

of the Alliance and Europe rather than rapid incorporation of new

states that may add little beyond burdensome security

requirements. Moreover, this implies that NATO membership should

be kept small for the foreseeable future.

As part of this procedure, the Alliance must assess how new
25

members might affect the equilibrium within NATO, upon which

hinges the stability of the remainder of Europe. This process may

require more time than many currently anticipate or desire. Until

NATO sorts out these issues, however, progress will necessarily

be slow, and PfP will likely remain a holding pen for aspirants.

This result is not entirely negative. While delays will not

assuage the security concerns of potential members, they will

permit them time to prepare for the rigors and responsibilities

of membership, while granting NATO a needed respite to forge the

consensus required for 16 separate and sovereign nations to be

able to ratify--individually or collectively--any accessions.

One final point on expanded NATO membership. Russia's

leaders have become vocal in their opposition to NATO adding new

members, particularly former Warsaw Pact countries.86 In

responding to these concerns, the Alliance must first take note

of and assuage Russian fears, but without giving Moscow a droit

de regard over NATO membership or policies. Second, regardless of

how membership increases, new lines will be drawn in European

security. The question should be not whether there will be new

lines, but how to prevent those lines from becoming impermeable.

And, even if these lines harden, that result may be preferable to

a security vacuum that leaves Central and Eastern European states

twisting in the wind. Finally, notwithstanding NATO actions,

Russian leaders will make the final decision on how to respond.

Given this fact and the historical failure of appeasement,87 NATO

should carefully consider the cost-benefit calculus of placating

Russia on this issue.

Efforts to engage the Alliance in crisis management and

conflict prevention also have been problematical. Indeed, ongoing

NATO efforts in the Balkans have caused the greatest crisis in

the Alliance since NATO's "dual track" nuclear decision in the

early-1980s or, perhaps, since the Suez Crisis (1956).88 If press

reports are to be believed, fissure lines between major allies

run long and deep.89 And, there are no signs that these issues

will abate anytime soon. Thus, despite the rhetoric of involving

NATO in such operations as a means to promote European stability,

recent events have not borne out that assumption. Moreover, the

animus created by these efforts indicates that such operations

will not be easily undertaken in the future. As a result, the

concept of crisis management and conflict prevention will likely

remain unfulfilled for the foreseeable future.
26

In summary, although adequate in an ideal sense, NATO

implementing concepts need to be tempered with reality. Most

importantly, NATO, whether at the national or Alliance level,

must create the internal consensus necessary to provide the

requisite political will to proceed with the new tasks contained

in the Strategic Concept. Until such time that such consensus

becomes more manifest, the Alliance should heed the following

admonitions:

• Proceed with enlargement, but at a measured pace. While

recognizing that there may be some urgency in adding new members,

NATO should not move precipitously. Those who advocate "enlarge

or become irrelevant" may kill the Alliance if membership is

expanded so rapidly that the ability to achieve consensus on

critical issues is destroyed, and with it the Alliance's

effectiveness.

• Continue the PfP process, which represents the best

methodology, in terms of preparing potential candidates, as well

as the Alliance, to accept additional members.

• Defer collective security missions for OSCE and the U.N.

until such time as the Alliance has achieved consensus on the

parameters for these difficult missions. After having been pushed

into the decision by the "out of area or out of business" crowd,

it is time to reconsider that choice in light of the evolving

European security environment, and the apparent unwillingness of

some members of the Alliance to underwrite such operations. This

does not argue that the Alliance should forego peace operations,

only that it must take the time necessary to debate the issues

more fully, and establish a firmer Alliance consensus on what

NATO is or is not willing to do.

• Postpone non-Article V missions until a greater consensus

can be achieved within the Alliance on how to proceed with such

operations. This is not to say that non-Article V missions should

be shelved or that the Alliance should ignore the issue. But,

before NATO undertakes such operations, increased consultation is

necessary to work out the basic issues of Alliance participation

and to establish procedures for the conduct of operations.

• If NATO decides to engage in crisis management and
27

conflict prevention operations, the Alliance should clearly

delimit how far it is willing to go--before it engages in such a

mission. For instance, should NATO only engage in peacekeeping

operations to enforce a settlement, or should it undertake all

forms of peace operations, to include peace enforcement?

Conversely, should the Alliance only undertake humanitarian

support operations? If the Alliance fails to consider this

calculus before intervention, it runs the risk of mission

failure, if not the collapse of Alliance consensus.

Means.

Whether sufficient resources are available to turn concepts

into reality is also an open-ended question. Despite the end of

the Cold War, cuts in NATO force structure may have gone too

deep. Moreover, force reductions have not been spread evenly, and

nations in the Central Region may have taken a disproportionate

share. At the same time, the Alliance has taken on new missions:

peace operations in support of OSCE or the U.N., non-Article V

missions, defense of NATO interests vice strictly NATO territory.

Such operations tend to be ground force and personnel intensive.

Further, several nations maintain national commitments that are

stretching their militaries.90 Thus, while individually "minor"

(relative to the Cold War threat), the cumulative demands of

these operations may stress residual force structures beyond

their ability to fulfill their numerous and diverse missions,

thereby undercutting the credibility of the Alliance.

To prevent such a result, the Alliance must fix the mismatch

between its stated objectives and concepts and its force

structures. This admonition does not advocate stopping payment on

the "peace dividend" by halting force reductions. It may require

revising or restraining implementation of certain elements of the

Strategic Concept. And, it calls for a more rational expenditure

of national and Alliance funds for force structure. Individual

nations and the Alliance will be better served if they fund

adequately a smaller amount of remaining forces tailored to more

limited objectives, rather than maintaining larger force

structures that cannot be adequately supported and, therefore,

are incapable of fulfilling the Strategic Concept.

While nations may reduce their forces overall, some states

will have to restructure their armed forces to be more deployable
28

and sustainable. Others will also require greater capabilities in

their combat support and combat service support units. In these

reorganizations, priority should go to rapid reaction forces,

even if this means reductions in the size and readiness of main

defense forces in the Central Region, many of which have been

stripped nearly bare.

To compensate for overall reductions in forces and readiness

of main defense and augmentation forces, the Strategic Concept

stipulated the requirement for interregional reinforcement. To

fulfill this condition will require more mobile forces, capable

of rapid strategic transport to the point of crisis. This may

require the purchase of, or the ability to "rent," strategic lift

assets, particularly aircraft. Furthermore, interregional

reinforcements must be highly interoperable and possess logistics

capabilities sufficient to sustain prolonged operations. They

also will require a greater capacity for combat support and

combat service support units. To achieve the capability of rapid

interregional reinforcement will also require a combination of

prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and improved

infrastructure--particularly in the Southern Region--to support

the receipt, storage and forward movement of forces and supplies.

In short, to effect the interregional reinforcement missions

laid out in the Strategic Concept will require the Alliance,

individually and collectively, to undertake a number of painful

initiatives:

• Ensuring strategic mobility, including aircraft and

shipping, sufficient to transport reinforcements to the point of

crisis in a timely fashion.

• Adequate infrastructure within the Central Region to

facilitate the rapid dispatch of forces, and on the flanks,

particularly NATO's southern tier, to permit the rapid receipt,

forward movement and sustainment of reinforcing formations.

• Strategic level command and control structures--at the

theater of war and theater of operations level, as well as

operational command and control headquarters (e.g., CJTF, ARRC)

that can be deployed to supervise operations anywhere in or out

of the NATO area.
29

• Improved intelligence gathering and dissemination

capabilities at the strategic and operational levels of war.

• Improved Host Nation Support capabilities, particularly to

support operations along NATO's southern tier, whether in or out

of NATO area.

• At the operational level of war, NATO military authorities

need to ensure common, or at least compatible doctrines;

standardization and rationalization, interoperability and

interchange-ability of equipment and spare parts. The formation

of a new NATO Standardization Organization is a good start, but

nations must demonstrate the political will that permits these

efforts must bear fruit quickly.91

• Reorganization of residual formations to provide adequate

combat support and combat service support units and capabilities.

This is especially true for many nations in the Central Region,

which heretofore relied upon area support commands that were once

suitable for operations in the Central Region, but which are tied

to a geographic area and are not capable of being deployed

outside Central Europe.

• Nations must not only provide their combat formations with

suitable levels of combat support and combat service support,

they must also construct logistics systems capable of sustaining

those forces after they have been deployed beyond national

boundaries. The high expenses entailed in creating such systems

and the constrained defense budgets of most NATO nations argue

for the creation of a NATO logistics command and support

structure. This would overturn the longstanding--and ineffective-

-dictum that logistics are a national responsibility. It would

also require increased standardization and interoperability of

equipment and resources. Undoubtedly, such a suggestion will

generate considerable controversy, but if the Alliance is serious

about the capability to execute inter-regional reinforcement,

such steps must be taken.

CONCLUSIONS

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept represents a dramatic

departure from past strategies, and, in an ideal sense, offers an

excellent starting point for preparing NATO for the considerable
30

demands of the 21st century. But lofty goals and idealistic

implementing concepts ring hollow without the military means to

bring the Strategic Concept to fruition. This conclusion does not

imply that a focus on military forces will rectify NATO's

strategic dilemma. Inadequate force levels and capabilities and

an absence of detailed military planning are not the core

problem; these are merely manifestations of the lack of political

will--individual and collective--necessary within the Alliance to

undertake the painful steps needed to turn rhetoric into reality.

Creating the requisite political will is a progressive

process. First, the Alliance must firmly decide on its

fundamental purpose. While the Strategic Concept and subsequent

pronouncements have reaffirmed that collective defense remains

the core function of the Alliance,92 core does not mean sole, and

the Alliance has increasingly looked to assume a collective

security function in Europe.93 But simply put, NATO can no longer

straddle the fence between collective defense and collective

security. Collective security missions run the risk of fatally

undermining NATO's ability to carry out its collective defense

function:

• Limited residual force structure may well be consumed with

peace support operations, and may not be available to respond to

collective defense requirements (e.g., an Article IV mission that

suddenly spills over into an Article V mission).

• Limited funds being spent on collective security

operations could result in long-term modernization being

postponed in order to pay for short-term collective security

operations.

• Most importantly, internal political conflicts over NATO's

role in peace support operations (e.g., the current row over

Bosnia-Hercegovina) could destroy consensus within the Alliance.

The Alliance, therefore, must focus on and protect its

stated core function of collective defense. But this is not the

collective defense of the Cold War. As the Strategic Concept

indicates, NATO must now protect not only its territorial

integrity, but also its interests. This will require NATO to

retain adequate forces that possess the capabilities to execute

key provisions of the Strategic Concept, specifically: adequate
31

numbers and types of forces able to conduct modern operations,

the ability to transport those forces to the point of crisis and

to sustain them, and a command and control organization that

ensures effective and efficient application of Alliance military

power to achieve desired strategic aims. Most importantly, it

will require the political will to provide, employ, and sustain

these forces. Without these requisite means and the political

will to employ them, the lofty rhetoric of the Strategic Concept

will remain exactly that and NATO will slip into irrelevancy.

Notes:

1. Criticism began even before the publication of the

Strategic Concept (see, e.g., Otfried Nassauer and Daniel Plesch,

"NATO Strategy Review: Out of Step with Events," Armed Forces

Journal International, October 1991, pp. 50-52.), and has

continued on a broad scale ever since. For samples of criticism,

see Richard Perle, "The Charade in Brussels," The New York Times,

January 11, 1993, p. A21; Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugeler,

and F. Scott Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 72, No. 4, September-October 1993; Senator Richard G. Lugar,

"America's `Near Abroad' and NATO's Future," address to the AEI

Conference on the Clinton Administration's Foreign Policy,

November 2, 1993; or the literally hundreds of articles debating

the pros and cons of NATO expansion.

2. J.M. Legge, "NATO's New Strategic Concept," RUSI Journal,

Vol. 137, No. 3, June 1992, p. 11. Michael Legge chaired NATO's

Strategy Review Group that drafted the Strategic Concept.

3. Ibid., pp. 11-12. France withdrew from NATO's integrated

military structure in 1966 as part of the debates over adoption

of the strategy of Flexible Response.

4. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," NATO Press

Communique S-1(91)85, November 7, 1991, paragraph 15. Cited

hereafter as Strategic Concept.

5. Ibid., paragraph 13. Emphasis added in the text.

6. The stipulation that "Arrangements exist within the

Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the

Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their
32

efforts including their responses to such risks," reinforces this

conclusion. Strategic Concept, paragraph 13.

7. Ibid., paragraph 14.

8. Ibid., paragraph 16.

9. Ibid., paragraph 20.

10. Ibid., paragraph 21. NATO foreign ministers first

articulated these tasks at Copenhagen in June 1991. See NATO

Press Communique M-1(91)44, June 7, 1991. Again, it bears

repeating that the political element of the strategy

predominates.

11. Strategic Concept, paragraphs 24-26, and Legge, "NATO's

New Strategic Concept," p. 12. "The Future Tasks of the Alliance"

(or the Harmel Report after its principal drafter) was issued in

December 1967 in conjunction with the NATO's adoption of Flexible

Response. Harmel argued that the Alliance should take a dualtracked approach to ensuring its security: defense and dialogue.

The report has guided NATO since 1967, and obviously continues to

exert a strong influence on Alliance security thinking. A copy of

the report may be found in The North Atlantic Treaty

Organization: Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO Information

Service, 1989, Appendix 1, No. 7.

12. For brief discussions of the problems inherent in the

multiplicity of European security institutions, see, e.g., Peter

Schmidt, "European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI): A Brief

Analysis form the German Point of View," SWP-IP 2883, Ebenhausen,

FRG: Stiftung Wissensschaft und Politik, January 1995, and

Christopher Anstis, "Situation and Future of the European

Security Structure," Commentary, No. 51, Ottawa: Canadian

Security Intelligence Service, February 1995.

13. For example, widening versus deepening of the EU, the

future role of the WEU, and what role for the ESDI.

14. Strategic Concept, paragraphs 36-38.

15. Ibid., paragraph 39. One need only recall the

controversies surrounding the "Dual Track" decision to field
33

cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in the early 1980s. The

lack of attention paid to the nuclear portions of the concept may

have been due to previous Alliance announcements that it would

cut its nuclear stockpile by as much as 80 percent. NATO Nuclear

Planning Group, NATO Press Communique M-NPG-2(91)75, October 18,

1991, paragraph 5.

16. Ibid., paragraph 41.

17. Ibid., paragraphs 42-43. Quote from paragraph 43.

18. MC 400, "Military Guidance for the Implementation of the

Alliance's Strategic Concept," December 1991, for example, offers

only extremely general guidance, bordering on platitudes, that

are of little practical use to planners charged with detailed

planning.

19. Strategic Concept, paragraph 43.

20. Ibid., paragraphs 45-46.

21. Ibid., paragraph 47.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., paragraphs 48-52.

26. Ibid., paragraph 53.

27. Ibid., paragraph 55.

28. Ibid., paragraph 56.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., paragraph 57.

31. See, e.g., the series of announcements concerning

reductions in the Alliance nuclear weapons stockpile:
34

"Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating

in the North Atlantic Council in Brussels," NATO Press Communique

M-1(89)21, May 30, 1989, paragraph 19, which announced a onethird reduction of nuclear weapons since 1979; "London

Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," NATO Press

Communique S-1(90)36, July 6, 1990, paragraph 16, which called

for negotiations on reductions in sub-strategic nuclear weapons

and the reciprocal elimination of all nuclear artillery shells;

NATO Nuclear Planning Group, NATO Press Communique M-NPG-2(91)75,

October 18, 1991, paragraph 5, which announced an 80 percent

reduction in sub-strategic weapons.

32. See, for example, Robert Keatley, "NATO Embarks on a

Search for a New Mission," The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1992,

p. A9; Daniel T. Plesch and David Schorr, "NATO, Down and (Soon)

Out," The New York Times, July 24, 1992, p. A25; and Marc Rogers,

"NATO defies criticism over impotence . . .," Jane's Defence

Weekly, December 10, 1994, p. 13.

33. Examples of criticisms may be found in Theresa Hitchens,

"East Perplexes NATO," Defense News, July 16-22, 1993, p. 4, 29;

and William Drozdiak, "NATO Balks at Opening Pact to E. Europe,"

The Washington Post, September 1, 1993, p. A25. Senator William

S. Cohen, on the other hand, notes that "While the NACC was

initially a hand-holding forum in which to ease concerns

resulting from the collapse of the Pact, it has moved on to

practical, concrete cooperation through the activities of NATO's

working institutions." William S. Cohen, "Expand NATO Step by

Step," The Washington Post, December 7, 1993, p. A25.

34. See the details contained in "Work Plan for Dialogue,

Partnership, and Cooperation, 1993," contained in NATO Review,

Vol. 41, No. 1, February 1993, pp. 30ff., and "Statement Issued

at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council," NATO

Press Communique M-NACC-2(93)71, December 3, 1993. For the most

recent work plan, see NATO Press Communique M-NACC-2(94)121,

December 2, 1994.

35. See "Report to Ministers By the NACC Ad Hoc Group on

Cooperation in Peacekeeping," NATO Press Communique, M-NACC1(93)40, June 11, 1993, and "Progress Report to Ministers by the

NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping," NATO Press

Communique M-NACC-2(93)73, December 3, 1993, for examples of work
35

undertaken and accomplished. See, also, NATO Press Communique MNAC-1(93)38, June 10, 1993, paragraph 7. While these steps

indicate major progress, the equally important task of developing

militarily significant planning that implements these principles

remains to be accomplished.

36. Copies of these documents may be found in SIPRI, SIPRI

Yearbook, 1991, World Armaments and Disarmaments, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1991, Appendix 17B; Appendix 13B; and U.S.

Department of State Dispatch, Supplement, Vol. 3, No. 3, July

1992, respectively.

37. For results of these conferences, see Helsinki Document

1992, in SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook, 1993, Oxford, Oxford University

Press, 1993, Appendix 5A; and CSCE Budapest Document 1994,

Brussels, NATO Public Data Service, December 12, 1994,

respectively. These documents contain a wealth of detail of

ongoing efforts to improve dialogue and cooperation.

38. By the end of 1995, total cuts in treaty limited items

of equipment (TLE) will amount to 69,928. See SIPRI, SIPRI

Yearbook, 1991, p. 423.

39. For treaty provisions, see U.S. Department of State

Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 28, July 13, 1992, pp. 561-562.

40. See, e.g., "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation

of Weapons of Mass Destruction," NATO Press Communique M-NAC1(94)45, June 9, 1994.

41. "Partnership for Peace: An Invitation," NATO Press

Communique M-1(94)2, January 10, 1994, pp. 1-2. For an assessment

of PfP, see William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, "NATO

Expansion and Partnership for Peace: Assessing the Facts," The

RUSI Journal, Vol. 139, No. 6, December 1994, pp. 47-53.

42. "Partnership for Peace: An Invitation," pp. 1-2.

43. Ibid., p. 3.

44. Paul R.S. Gebhard, The United States and European

Security, Adelphi Paper 286, London: International Instituted for

Strategic Studies, February 1994, p. 73. This is no small offer,
36

and refutes those critics who have chided the Alliance for

failing to take seriously Central and Eastern European security

concerns.

45. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, "Not This Partnership," The

Washington Post, November 24, 1993, p. A17; "Official Attacks

NATO's Partnership for Peace Plan," in Foreign Broadcast

Information Service (hereafter FBIS)-WEU-94-022, February 2,

1994, p. 33; Gary L. Gelpel, "Partnership for Peace Already Needs

Overhaul," The Christian Science Monitor, January 12, 1994, p.

23; and, importantly, the views of partners who aspire to NATO

membership, in David B. Ottaway, "War Games in Poland Proposed:

E. European Officials Reluctantly Endorse NATO `Partnership,'"

The Washington Post, January 8, 1994, p. A1.

46. NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(92)51, June 4, 1992,

paragraph 11.

47. NATO provision of portions of the Northern Army Group

(NORTHAG) headquarters to supplement the U.N. Protective Force in

Bosnia-Hercegovina is found in NATO Press Communique M-DPC2(92)102, December 11, 1992, paragraph 3. For a chronology of

NATO air activity, see AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, Operation DENY FLIGHT,

March 30, 1995. Maritime operations are summarized in AFSOUTH

Fact Sheet, Operation SHARP GUARD, March 30, 1995. NATO and WEU

Maritime operations began as MARITIME GUARD and SHARP FENCE,

respectively, and were combined into Operation SHARP GUARD on

June 15, 1993. NATO air monitoring began as Operation SKY

MONITOR, and became Operation DENY FLIGHT on April 12, 1993.

48. NATO Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-1(93)36, May 26, 1993,

paragraphs 3ff; NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(93)38, June 10,

1993, paragraph 3; and Press Statement by the SECGEN Following

the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on

August 2, 1993.

49. This chronology is taken from AFSOUTH Fact Sheet,

Operation DENY FLIGHT, March 30, 1995. Commentary and analysis of

the implications of these events may be found in any of the major

U.S. or international media on dates surrounding these events.

50. This chronology is taken from AFSOUTH Fact Sheet,

Operation DENY FLIGHT, March 30, 1995. Commentary and analysis of
37

the implications of these events may be found in any of the major

U.S. or international media on dates surrounding these events.

For operations against Ubdina, see NATODATA, Press Briefing,

Admiral Leighton W. Smith, November 23, 1994.

51. For a concise description of various positions within

NATO, see Craig R. Whitney, "A Testing of NATO," The New York

Times, November 2, 1994, p. A8. For U.S. withdrawal from maritime

operations and its consequences, see Douglas Jehl, "Clinton

Defends Halting Arms Embargo Enforcement," The New York Times,

November 15, 1994, p. A12; "Patching Up NATO," The Economist,

November 19, 1994, p.18; Laura Silber and Bruce Clark, "UN

Condemns Fighting in Bihac," London Financial Times, November 14,

1994, p. 4; and Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont, "US Spells Out

Ban on Intelligence Sharing with NATO," Sunday Observer (UK),

November 13, 1994, p. 16. Examples of reporting of the rifts in

the Alliance in the wake of the bombing attacks may be found in

William Drozdiak, "U.S. and Europe in Serious Rift Over Bosnia

War," The Washington Post, November 27, 1994, p. A1; Joseph

Joffe, "Bosnia: From Farce to Tragedy?," U.S. News and World

Report, December 5, 1994, p. 69; and Richard W. Stevenson,

"Britain and France Criticize U.S. on Bosnia Positions," The New

York Times, November 29, 1994, p. A16. These examples represent

only a tiny fraction of the reporting.

52. For example, Asmus, et al., "Building a New NATO," and

Senator Richard G. Lugar, "America's `Near Abroad' and NATO's

Future," November 2, 1993.

53. For examples, see Senator Robert C. Byrd, "The Perils of

Peacekeeping," The New York Times, August 19, 1993, p. A23; Trudy

Rubin, "It's too soon to put U.S. troops under foreign U.N.

Commanders," The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 20, 1993, p. 23;

Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts

Concerns" The New York Times, July 31, 1994, p. A3; and Dana

Priest, "GOP Split Surfaces on Bosnia War," The Washington Post,

December 6, 1994, p. 34.

54. Rick Atkinson, "Court Rules Constitution Allows Sending

Troops Abroad, The Washington Post, July 13, 1994, p. A1.

Continued German hesitance is reflected in, e.g., "Kinkel:

Foreign Action Last Resort," in FBIS-WEU-94-134, July 13, 1994,

pp. 19-20; and Craig R. Whitney, "Bonn Ponders Air Support for
38

U.N. Exit," The New York Times, December 18, 1994, p. A25.

55. French and British reappraisals are described in William

Drozdiak, "Paris Asks Plan to Pull Troops Out of Bosnia," The

Washington Post, December 8, 1994, p. A31; and Peter Beaumont and

Paul Beaver, "Bosnia Pullout in Works," The Washington Times,

December 5, 1994, p. 1.

56. MC 400 is a classified document. However, NATO publicly

released key elements of the guidance. See SRG(91)59, Ad Hoc

Group on Review of NATO's Military Strategy, "Public Line to Take

on Military Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance's

Strategic Concept,' December 10, 1991; and BASIC Reports on

European Arms Control, No. 20, February 19, 1992, pp. 6-7.

57. BASIC Reports on European Arms Control, No. 20, February

19, 1992, pp. 6-7.

58. Immediate Reaction Force units must be available for

deployment within 72 hours. "Cold War Battle Orders Make Way for

a New NATO Era," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 8, 1991, p. 961. The

ACE Rapid Reaction Corps standard requires lead elements to be

available for movement (not deployed) within 7 days and the

remainder in 15 days. AFJI Interview, Lt. Gen. Sir Jeremy

Mackenzie, Armed Force Journal International, April 1993, p. 25.

59. The force posture was originally announced in NATO Press

Communique M-DPC/NPG-1(91)38, May 29, 1991, paragraph 9. The

Alliance formed AMF Air and Land in 1960. STANAVAFORMIN is the

former STANAVFORCHAN. STANAVFORLANT (1967) and STANAVFORCHAN

(1973) have long existed, but have not been part of any reaction

forces. STANAVFORMED replaced the On Call Naval Forces

Mediterranean that has existed since 1969. For a brief synopsis

of these forces, see NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of

Information and Press, 1992, pp. 111-113.

60. For a brief description of the ARRC, see, for example,

Peter Saracino, "ARRC at the Sharp End," International Defense

Review, Vol. 27, No. 5, May 1994, p. 33.

61. Dirk Weissleder, "NATO's Future Force Structures,"

NATO's Sixteen Nations, December 1991, p. 21.
39

62. The ultimate ratio of national and multinational

formations, as well as active and mobilizable forces, would

depend on specific circumstances. Within the Southern Region,

larger numbers of active duty forces would be supplemented with

smaller numbers of mobilizable units. In the Central Region, main

defense forces would consist of largely conscript and reserve

formations with longer mobilization times than was previously the

case during the Cold War. In AFNORTHWEST, Norway, for instance,

will continue to rely on almost total mobilization.

63. Norway will cut its regular personnel from 28,000 to

21,500, its total mobilizable ground strength from 160,000 to

100,000 personnel, and reduce its ground force structure from 13

to 6 brigades. (John Berg, "Cuts Are Threat to Norway's Defense,"

Jane's Defense Weekly, March 28, 1992, p. 503; John Berg, "Holst

Cuts Threaten Norwegian Defence," Jane's Defence Weekly, January

23, 1993, p. 9; Helsinki Suomen Yleisadio Network, in "Defense

Forces to be Cut by 37 Percent by 2000," FBIS-WEU-93-100, May 26,

1993, pp. 48-49.) Within the Southern region, Spain will cut its

armed forces by approximately 44 percent (ABC [Madrid], February

21, 1993, pp. 35-36, in "Armed Forces Reorganization, Cuts

Viewed," in FBIS-WEU-93-040, March 3, 1993, pp. 37-38) and Italy

plans a reduction of roughly 25 percent. (Ansamail [Rome]

September 9, 1994, in "Armed Forces Restructuring Detailed,"

FBIS-WEU-94-179A, September 15, 1994, pp. 14-15.) Portugal plans

moderate reductions (Expresso [Lisbon], October 23, 1993, pp.

25R-33R, in "Armed Forces Capabilities Discussed," FBIS-WEU-93-

229, December 1, 1993, pp. 30-36), Greece will make little or no

reductions (see "Country Survey: Greece," Jane's Defence Weekly,

July 4, 1992, pp. 28ff) and Turkey will reduce significantly

personnel strengths (620,000 to 350,000 personnel) while

undergoing increases in items of modern equipment. (Lale

Sariibrahimoglu, "Regular Officers--Top Recruitment Priority,"

Jane's Defence Weekly, January 23, 1993, p. 8.)

64. Weissleder, "NATO's Future Force Structures," p. 21. It

is also worth noting that U.S. and limited Canadian augmentation

forces are the only NATO forces not restricted by the CFE Treaty.

65. Strategic Concept, paragraph 54.

66. See, "JDW Interview, General John Galvin," Jane's

Defence Weekly, June 29, 1991, p. 1196; and, Roy Wilde,
40

"Multinational Forces--Integration for National Security," NATO's

Sixteen Nations, December 1991, p. 26.

67. For an initial description and analysis of NATO's new

force structure and command organization, see Christian

Tuschhoff, "The Political Consequences of NATO Armed Forces

Reforms," unpublished paper, American Institute for Contemporary

German Studies, Washington, DC, Spring 1993, reprinted in FBISWEU-93-121-S, June 25, 1993, pp. 1-8. For a more recent

assessment, see William T. Johnsen, Reorganizing NATO Command and

Control Structures: More Work in the Augean Stables?, in ThomasDurell Young, ed., NATO Command and Control Reorganization,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, forthcoming.

68. For example, the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff

have grappled with this thorny issue and produced The

Multinational Force Commanders Command Authority Report, August

1994. However, a variety of command and control arrangements were

developed to accommodate national positions (i.e., the United

States and the nations participating in the Multinational

Division Center [Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and United

Kingdom]).

69. These reductions were due, in part, to requirements

mandated by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

(1990), as well as the changed security environment in Europe. It

is also important to point out that these reductions took place

simultaneously, and in a coordinated fashion, with the

development of the Strategic Concept--no easy task.

70. Fixed wing combat aircraft (1.7%), and combat

helicopters (0%) are the other two items. Figures derived from

data contained in International Institute for Strategic Studies,

The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London: Brassey's, 1992, p. 244.

71. Berg, "Cuts Are Threat to Norway's Defense," p. 503;

Berg, "Holst Cuts Threaten Norwegian Defence," p. 9; Helsinki

Suomen Yleisadio Network, in "Defense Forces to be Cut by 37

Percent by 2000," FBIS-WEU-93-100, May 26, 1993, pp. 48-49.

72. As reported in, La Liberation (Paris), May 28, 1993. For

a somewhat dated, but still pertinent description of planned

reductions in the Central Region, as well as throughout the
41

remainder of the Alliance, see Rafael Estrella, North Atlantic

Assembly Report AK 229, DSC/AF (93)2, "Military Trends Within the

Atlantic Alliance," October 1993, pp. 10-27.

73. See, for example, ABC (Madrid), February 21, 1993, pp.

35-36, in "Armed Forces Reorganization, Cuts Viewed," in FBISWEU-93-040, March 3, 1993, pp. 37-38; Ansamail (Rome) September

9, 1994, in "Armed Forces Restructuring Detailed," FBIS-WEU-94-

179A, September 15, 1994, pp. 14-15; Expresso (Lisbon), October

23, 1993, pp. 25R-33R, in "Armed Forces Capabilities Discussed,"

FBIS-WEU-93-229, December 1, 1993, pp. 30-36; "Country Survey:

Greece," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 4, 1992, pp. 28ff; Lale

Sariibrahimoglu, "Regular Officers--Top Recruitment Priority,"

Jane's Defence Weekly, January 23, 1993, p. 8. Spanish figures

may have to be readjusted in light of recent announcements of

further budget cuts. Giovanni de Briganti, "Spain Minister

Decries Cuts," Defense News, February 20-26, 1995, p. 1, 25.

74. NATO Press Communique M-DPC-2(92)102, December 11, 1992,

paragraph 9. Two years later, these efforts are still ongoing.

See NATO Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-1 (94) 38, paragraph 13.

75. NATO Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-2(93), December 9, 1993,

paragraph 9.

76. Ibid., paragraph 8.

77. Nor is the DPC alone in this concern, See Michael

Inacker, Welt am Sontag, January 1, 1995, pp. 1,2 in "SACEUR

Concerned About NATO Strength," FBIS-WEU-95-001, January 3, 1995,

pp. 2-4.

78. "Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and

resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of

critical importance." Moreover, the New Strategic Concept

stipulates that "The Allies will maintain military strength

adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of

force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet

collective and effective action by all of them . . . ." [emphasis

added]. Strategic Concept, paragraphs 47(b) and 36, respectively.

79. NATO Press Communique DPC-NPG-2(94)126, December 15,

1994, paragraph 12. Emphasis added.
42

80. See, for example, "America and Europe: The TransAtlantic Alliance," Norfolk, VA: Headquarters, Supreme Allied

Commander Atlantic, n.d., p. 1.

81. By way of example, the U.S. Department of Defense

estimates that environmental clean-up will eventually cost

approximately $41 billion. "Pentagon's Cleanup Bill Is

Escalating," The Washington Post, March 27, 1995, p. 17.

82. The reporting on countries struggling with this

conundrum is extensive. For representative samples, see: Denmark

("Soldiers Association Chief Criticizes Military," FBIS-WEU-95-

027, February 9, 1995, pp. 30-31); France (Francis Tusa, "France

and Germany Face Tough Budget Decisions," Armed Forces Journal

International, January 1994,,p. 7); Germany (Michael Inacker,

Welt am Sontag, May 1, 1994, p, 5, in "Planned Changes in

Bundeswehr Viewed," FBIS-WEU-94-086, May 4, 1994, pp. 13-14, and

Ruediger Moniac, Die Welt, August 27, 1994, p. 3 in "Defense

Ministry: Tight Budget Endangers Readiness," FBIS-WEU-94-167, p.

19); the Netherlands (Algemeen Dagblad [Rotterdam], August 16,

1994, p. 1 in "Chief of Staff Resigns in Protest of Defense

Cuts," FBIS-WEU-94-159, August 17, 1994, p. 9.); United Kingdom

(Bruce Clark, "Some Fight Left in Them," Financial Times

[London], July 22, 1994, p. 14); and United States (Eric Schmitt,

"For Better Troop Living, $2.7 Billion Is Shifted from Weapons,"

The New York Times, November 11, 1994, p. A24; Philip Finnegan,

"Republicans Attack Weapon-Spending Free Fall," Defense News,

February 13, 1995, p. 8; and Eric Schmitt, "Worries About

Military Readiness Grows," The New York Times, April 3, 1995, p.

B7.).

83. See, e.g., Dick Polman, "Where Does NATO Go After

Bosnia?," The Philadelphia Inquirer, March 6, 1994, p. D1; and

Irving Kristol, "Who Now Cares About NATO?," The Wall Street

Journal, February 6, 1995, p. A12. For an alternate viewpoint,

see John T. Tyler, Jr.'s Op-ed piece in The Wall Street Journal,

March 1, 1995, p. 15.

84. Several of these points are taken from Henry Kissinger,

"Expand NATO Now," The Washington Post, December 19, 1994, p.

A27.
43

85. See, for example, Craig R. Whitney, "Expand NATO? Yes,

Say Most Experts, But What Does the Public Think?," The New York

Times, February 10, 1995, A6; Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Fight for

Uzbeks? No Way, Pentagon Says," The New York Times, February 10,

1995, p. A6; Dana Priest "Not All Partners Will Join NATO, Perry

Concedes," The Washington Post, February 9, 1995, p. A26; Steve

Erlanger, "Pressure on NATO to Expand," The New York Times,

February 8, 1995, p. A11; and Congressman Robert G. Torricelli,

"A Promise Best Not Kept," Los Angeles Times (Washington ed.),

February 8, 1995, p. 11. It is important to note, that this

represents a small sample of only three days. And, while solely

U.S. sources are listed here, similar circumstances apply to

individual NATO members and to the Alliance as a whole.

86. See, for example, Craig R. Whitney, "Expand NATO? Yes,

Say Most Experts, But What Does the Public Think?," The New York

Times, February 10, 1995, A6; Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Fight for

Uzbeks? No Way, Pentagon Says," The New York Times, February 10,

1995, p. A6; Dana Priest "Not All Partners Will Join NATO, Perry

Concedes," The Washington Post, February 9, 1995, p. A26; Steve

Erlanger, "Pressure on NATO to Expand," The New York Times,

February 8, 1995, p. A11; and Congressman Robert G. Torricelli,

"A Promise Best Not Kept," Los Angeles Times (Washington ed.),

February 8, 1995, p. 11. It is important to note, that this

represents a small sample of only three days. And, while solely

U.S. sources are listed here, similar circumstances apply to

individual NATO members and to the Alliance as a whole.

87. See, e.g., Kagan's insightful discussion of the

appeasement before World War II. Donald Kagan, The Origins of War

and the Preservation of the Peace, New York: Doubleday, 1995,

Chapter 4, especially, pp. 413-417.

88. See Jeffrey McCausland, "Dual Track or Double

Paralysis?," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring

1986, pp. 431-452. Reference to Suez Crisis is from Kissinger,

"Expand NATO Now."

89. See, e.g., Justin Burke, "A Pushy US on Bosnia Rips

NATO: An Analysis," The Christian Science Monitor, November 15,

1994, p. 1; "Bosnian Arms: It's Now a Killer Question," The Los

Angeles Times (Washington ed.), November 15, 1994, p. 10; Craig

R. Whitney, "NATO Keeps Bosnia Arms Blockade as U.S. Drops Role,"
44

The New York Times, November 16, 1994, p. A3; and William

Drozdiak, "France, Russia Warn U.S. on Tilt Toward Bosnia," The

Washington Post, November 18, 1994, p. A3.

90. For example, the UK in Northern Ireland and the former

Yugoslavia; Belgium in Africa; France in Africa and the former

Yugoslavia; Spain and the Netherlands in Bosnia-Hercegovina; and

the United States throughout the world.

91. "NATO Council Agrees to Set Up New Alliance

Standardization Organization," NATO Press Release 4(95), January

24, 1995.

92. Strategic Concept, paragraphs 16 and 31; and, for

example, NATO Press Communique M-1(94)3, January 11, 1994,

paragraph 7 (Brussels Summit).

93. NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(92)51, June 4, 1992,

paragraph 11, and NATO Press Communique M-1(94)3, January 11,

1994, paragraph 7.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. William T. Johnsen

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler