Hon.. Sam W. Davis 

District i.tt,ornsy 

Civil courts Building 

Houston 2, Texas 

Opinion No. V-1484 

Re: Several questions, relat; 

ing to the duties of the 

district clerk and the 

district attorney under 

the uniforrii Reciprocal 

Dear Sir: 

E;nforcerflent of Support 

Act. 

Your request for ‘an opinion of this office re- 

,lates to the official duties of the district clerk and 

district attorney under the Uniform Reci rocal Rnforoement of Support Act (Arts. 2328b-1 to 23 s ab3, v.c.s.1. 

The questions prese@ted by you for deter-ation are: 

“1. Did the Legislature intend that the 

district clerks of their courts should perform 

the same ,duties in these cases orlglnatlng 

out of the State without requiring deposits or 

security for costs? 

n2. Did ths Legislature, by the UIB oi “’ 

the phrase ‘notify the district or county attor- ~, : 

neyl intend that It be the mandatory duty of 

these officials to prosecute or try these aci 

tSons when received from the Initiating statee?U 

The Uniform Reciprocal Enfbrcement of Su port 

Act was enacted into ,Iaw by House Bl12 ,192, Aots 5 is nd 

Leg., R.S. 1951 ch. 

tic1es 2328b-1 to 232 iI b-j, V.C.S. Its purpose, ‘as qtated 

77 p. 643,,and is codified as 4rin Section I,, is to Improve and ‘extend by reolproati~ leg&. 

lslatlon the enforcement of duties of support and%&. ,&eke 

uniform the law with respect thereto* . 

There Is no provision & &e ‘Unifoim Act ielatb Ing to the payment of c’osts, nor Is ,there a~prpvls~on’expreosly authorizing the district clerk td’require a deposit or other security for aosts. 
. . hon.. Sam IJo Davis, page 2 (v&+@+) 

. 

Article 3927, V.C.S.,Tprovides that the district clerk shall receive certain fees for services 

performed ltin civil cases ,I’ and various other statutes 

set out fees and expenses which are taxable as costs 

in civil cases. The general provisions with respect 

to requiring the plaintiff In a civil action to give 

security for costs are contained ti the following rules 

of the Texas Bulds of, Civil Procedure: 

“Rule 142. Security for Cost .--The 

qlerk may require from the plaintiff security for costs before issuing any process, 

but shall file the petition and enter the 

same on the dooket. No attorney or other 

officer of the court shall be surety in 

any cause pending In the court, except under special leave of court.~~ 

“Rule 143. Rule for Costs.--Theplaintiff may be ruled to give security for costs 

at any time before final judgment, upon motion of the defendant or any officer of the 

court interested In the costs, accruing in 

suoh suit* arid+ ST &ch,rnle; be entered 

aga,inst the pLaintiff and he fall to comply 

therewith on or before twenty (20) days af-. 

ter knowledge or notice that such rule has 

been entered, the suit shall be dismissed.” 

“Rtie 146, Deposit for Costs.--In lieu 

of a bond for costs, the pafty required to 

give ,the same may deposit with the clerk of 

court or the justice of the peace such ‘sum 

as ,the. court or justice from time to time 

may designate ‘as sufficient to pay the accrued costs. (I 

Under‘Rule 145, the clerk may not require security where the party furnishes satisfactory proof of 

his inability to give security. Also, certain classes 

o.f parties are specifically exempted by statute from, 

giving security. See Arts. 118d (Sec. 6), 279a, 2072, 

2072a, 788o-126a, v.c.s.. Even though a party is exempted 

from giving security, costs are nevertheless assessable 

and the exemption does not relieve the party from the legal obli ation to pay costs. Roby 

23. 1108 if 

Hawthorne, 84 S.W. 

TeX. Olvr App. 1935, errorvdism.)E 
Hon. Sam W. ,DaViS, page 3 (V-1484) 

From the foregoing we think It may be stated 

as a’.general rule that the,pialntiff in a civil action 

may be required to give security for costs unless he Is 

expressly exempted from this requirement, and costs are 

assessable in all civil actions unless an applicable 

s~tatute ,expressly provides otherwise. 

InAtt’y Gen. Op. V-1409 (1952) this office 

i&that a proceeding under Article 2328b-3 is a civil 

action. Proceedings In the district courts of Texas 

when acting as the responding State are lnstltuted by 

the filing of a certified copy of a petitlo:, the party 

ipstituting the proceeding is called the pl In ifg and 

the .rrty against whom it is instituted is called &he 

e da& . This terminology indicates to us that the 

‘E~islature considered actions of this kind to be of the 

same general nature as other civil actions. 

Since the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 

Support Act does not contain a provision excepting these 

civil actions from the general rules relating to costs 

and security therefor, we agree with your conclusion that 

the district clerk may require the plaintiff to give security for costs in a suit filed under this act. 

In your second question you ask whether the 

Legislature intended that it be the,duty of the district 

or county attorney to try these actions when Texas is the 

responding State. Section 12 of House Bill 192, which 

comes under Part III entitled “Civil tinforcement,” reads: 

“When a court of this State, acting as a 

responding state, ,recelves from the court of 

an Initiating state the aforesaid copies, It 

shall (1) docket the cause, (2) notify the 

District or County Attorney, ( ) set a time 

and place for a hearing, and ( 2 ) take such action as is necessary in accordance with the 

laws of this State to obtain jurlsdiotlon.l’ 

This office held In Att’y Gen. Op. V-1409, SUDra, 

after reviewing the history of the statute, th::lt the Legislature intended to chnrge the district or county attorney 

with the duty of representing the obllgee in the Texas 

::.. . court . You have suggested in the brief accompanying your 

request that such a construction would render this PrOVislon of the statute unconstitutional, for two reasons: (1) 

Ii would be violative of Sections 50, 51 and 52 of Article 

III Constitution of Texas, which prohibit the granting of 

public mdney to an individual; (2) this subject matter is 
YOn. Sam ‘& .)avis, page 4 (V-1484) 

not embraced In the title of the act and the provision 

is therefore void under Section 35 oh Article III of 

the Constitution. 

With reference to th, first constitution,il objection, th3 argument is apranced thar the Constltl,rtion 

prohibits public officials -:50 Teceive their ~a)- r’r,:*:- 

the State or any ;olitil.:al sn~~‘.ivi;io~ the:sof, *:;k:.en acting in their official cspacities, fro:1 ,,lving :~-‘r ;TY.~ 

aid to an inr!ividual. But these constitutional i:~o~*isions Go not ::ro!litit the ex;;eUiture of public money for 

a public 2uiipose within tile Statels ,:overnmental :io-::ers, 

even though a class of in:LiviLvAs n;ly i:erive sqme henefit therefrom. JP2usi.n:: .kuthority of Cit.v oi 

Big* n t - 8 143 S.W.2d ‘/9 (1940) 

v. i&i’r” 1$;~‘~.‘:~?~~$2 [Tex. Civ. Agp. 1938 

& nls ob jectlon ?,:as ai:lswered in C,;,inion’V-1409, 

wherein it ;‘ds stated: 

“Since the enforcement of the dut,; of 

support is a matter of public AS well as 

private concern, and since the officers of 

this State will be porformin,g services only 

In Instances in which reciprocal services 

will be accorded to this State, -,!e are unable to say th:lt the expenditure of public 

funds in coq)ensating these offkers and 

their assistants for the services would not 

be for a public purpose.” 

reads: 

Section 35 of Article III, Constitution of Texas, 

“No bill, (except general ai>propriation 

bills, clhich may embrace the various subjects 

and accounts, for and on account of which 

moneys are appropriated) shall contain more 

than one subject 

In its title. 

, ,rhich shall be expressed 

ijut if any subject shall be 

embraced In 371. act which’ shall not be expressed in the tltie, such act shall be void 

‘only as to so much thereof, as shall not be 

so expressed.” 

In considering whether the title of a legislative 

act gives sufficient notice of its conten-ts to comply with 

this constitutional provision, several well-established 

rules must be kept in mind. In the first place, the provision should be construed illiberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness fs 
Hon. Sam W. Davis, page 5 (V-1484) 

unnecessary to the accomplishme:t of the beneficial pur- 

“to prevent 

urpose of the provision is 

embracing in an act having one ostensible 

object, provisions having no relevancy to that object.” 

Hamilton v. St. Louis. S.S. & T. By. 

475 ( 26) In the rS, 

-~- 115 Tex. 455, ; 283 

&i’aourt %d:’ 

nr ?%idateA Underdriteu case 

“It is we!.1 recognized that the purposes 

of this provision are. to advise the Legislature and the people of the nature of .each particular bill, so as to prevent the Insertion 

of obnoxious clauses which. otherwise might be 

Ingrafted on it and become the law, and to 

obviate legislation through the combination,, 

upon a composite bill, oi’ the votes of the proponeirts of different measures included in It, 

some of which would not pass upon their merits 

if separately considered.*’ 

Another rule,: equaiiy well eetabli’shed, is that 

the title need not recite all the details of the act. 

6, 102 S .w .2d 202 (1937). 

case stated the reason for 

guage : 

nBut it would be useless and impractioable’for the title to express all of the provlsions @f a partlculer act and the details of 

eadi provisitin,. PO*, in such a~:‘casei, this introduotory batter would amount. to ,k mere repetition of the legislation itself, atid would 

answer no purpose of abbreviated notice. . . .A 

264 S’.k. a612 (Tex. Clv. App. 1924) the 

is s&&ion of the Constitution ‘lmer:ly 

‘requires the subject of the proposed act to be expreasea 

in the title or caption; the details and machinery for effectually aiding the object of the bill need not be expressed. I’ It has also been held that the caption is not 

deficient because it does not contain a separate statement 

of purpose for each subdivision within the body of the act. 

V. VQn, 207 23.W. 368 (Tex. CiV, App. 1918). 

The Constitution provides for the offices of district, attorney and county attorney In Article V, entltl.ed 

. 

. . 
Eon. San Y. Davis, page 6 (V-1484) 

“Judicial Department .*I These officials are officers of 

the corilt, and the authority to establish courts and to 

prescribe the jurisdiction thereof, which is conferred 

on the Legislature by Section 1 of Article 0 of the Constitution, includes the authority to establish a district attornershlp as an adjunct to the 

functionin of a 

organization and 

as22 ii!!?&2 

&%.%;, @? A 

In VIBW of the close relationship between the 

functions performed by these officers and the functioning 

of the courts themselves, we are of the opinion that the 

portion of the caption of House Bill 192 which reads, 

“prescribing the duties of the court when this is responding state,” is sufficient to embrace the duties imposed 

upon the district and county attorneys. 

the language, 

Further, we think 

“providing the manner in which the duties 

of support are enforceable I1 also gives suffioient notice 

of this provision in the statute. As noted above, the 

madhinery for effectually aiding the, object of the bill 

need not be fully detailed in the caption. 

Your brief also raises a question as to whether 

this provision in House Bill 192 is in conflict with Rule 

308-A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended effecUve Karch 1, 1952, and, if so, whether the statute is 

thereby rendered intiffective. By the amendment, which w.~ 

adopted subsequent to the enactment of House Bill 192, 

Rule 308;~ authorizes the court to appoint a member of the 

bar of his court to represent the cLaimant in a contempt 

proceeding for enforcement of a support order. The suggested oonflict would arise from this variance in obtaining representation for the obligee, 

House Bill 192 makes provision for the enforo,ement of support orders of the courts of o e State through 

the aourts of a different State. Rule 30 8 -A, on the other 

hena, prescribes a procedure for enforcement by a court of 

this State, throt!gh contempt prooeedings, of its own orders 

for periodical 

ther as 

ayments for child support* The rule, eiorigina B ly adopted or as amende,d, did not Introduce 

a new’remedy; it merely simplified the proaadure for enforcing a remedy which already existed. 

In wcia v. 

App. 1951, error’ref. n. 

239 SrW.2d 169 (Tsxd c&v. 

1 s.W.2d 297), the Court 
Hon. Sam W. Davis, page 7 (v-1484) 

of Civil Appeals.intimated that the procedure set out in 

Rule 308-A, as well as the remedy, was available to a 

claimant under a foreign judgment. In reviewing the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, the Supreme Court held 

that the remedy of contempt was available under rules ,of 

comity and Public policyo It did not hold that Rule 308- 

A provided the exclusive procedure for enforcing the foreign judgment through contempt proceedings, nor did it 

hold that the procedure under Rule 308-A’was applicable 

at all to a claimant under a foreign judgment. 

Even if It were defixiitely settled that the procedure under Rule 308-A could be employed by an oblige8 

’ under a support order from another State, we would be lnclined to the view that the procedure prescribed in House 

Bill 192 is complementary to rather than in conflict with 

Rule 308-A. In the present state of the law, it Is our 

opinion that these enactments operate in different spheres: 

the rule in the sphere of domestic judgments and the statute in the sphere of foreign judgments. We therefore hold 

that they are not in conflict. In view of this holding, 

it becomes unnecessary to consider what effect a confl,ict 

would have on the statute ..,, 

The district clerk is authorized to require security for costs in suits filed under 

the Uniform Realprocal Bnforcement of Support 

Act wherein Texas is the responding State. 

Arts. 2328b4 to 2328b-3, V.C.S. 

The district attorney or county attorney 

is required to represent the obligee, in a 

support proceeding filed in a district court 

of Texas under Art* 2328b-3 wherein Texas is 

the responding State. 

APPROVRD: Yours very truly, 

J, C. Davis, Jr0 

County Affairs Division 

E. Jacobson 

Reviewing Assistant 

PRICE DARIRL 

Attorney General 

’ Charles D. Mathews 

First Assist&t 

BW:MKWawb Assistants 

_-