J-S35028-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAMON FELICIANO-ALACAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 635 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered April 27, 2021,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001977-2017.

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: JANUARY 21, 2022

Ramon Feliciano-Alacan appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following the entry of his guilty pleas for indecent assault (person 

less than 13 years of age) and endangering the welfare of a child.

1

 

Specifically, Feliciano-Alacan challenges the trial court’s finding that he is a 

sexually violent predator (“SVP”) subject to notification requirements under 

Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. After careful consideration, we affirm. 

Between 2002 and 2010, Feliciano-Alacan had indecent contact with his 

minor daughter, R.S., on multiple occasions from the time R.S. was 6 or 7 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), 4303(a)(1).
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years of age until she was thirteen or fourteen years of age. Among other 

sexual abuses, Feliciano-Alacan rubbed his penis against R.S.’s vagina while 

she was unclothed, touched her vagina with his hands, masturbated and 

ejaculated on her on numerous occasions, sucked her breasts when they 

began to develop, and, on at least one occasion, penetrated her vagina with 

his penis.

In March 2017, Feliciano-Alacan was arrested and charged with 

numerous sexual offenses, including rape of a child. On June 15, 2018, 

Feliciano-Alacan pleaded guilty to indecent assault (person less than 13 years 

of age) and endangering the welfare of a child. The trial court ordered an 

assessment by the Sex Offender Assessment Board (“SOAB”) as to whether 

Feliciano-Alacan should be designated as an SVP pursuant to SORNA. 

Feliciano-Alacan elected not to participate in the assessment. In September 

2018, the SOAB issued its recommendation that Feliciano-Alacan be 

designated as an SVP. The Commonwealth motioned the trial court to conduct 

a hearing on the matter. In response, Feliciano-Alacan filed motions to bar 

an SVP hearing and to prevent the imposition of sex offender notification 

requirements pursuant to SORNA. The trial court deferred an SVP hearing 

while certain cases challenging the constitutionality of SORNA’s registration, 

notification, and counseling requirements were pending before our Supreme 
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Court. On August 28, 2020, following the High Court’s resolution of certain of 

those cases,2the trial court denied Feliciano-Alacan’s motions.

On March 17, 2021, the trial court conducted an SVP hearing. The 

Commonwealth presented the expert report and testimony of Veronique 

Valliere, Psy.D., a licensed psychologist and SOAB member. Feliciano-Alacan 

presented the expert report and testimony of Christopher Lorah, Ph.D., a 

licensed psychologist.

3

 The trial court summarized the testimony provided by 

the experts at the SVP hearing as follows:

Dr. Veronique Valliere opined that [Feliciano-Alacan] meets 

the criteria for Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder to children and 

frotte[u]rism that served as the impetus to his offending and that

he engaged in predatory behavior as delineated in her report.

She opined that his disorder is related to a future likelihood of reoffense. The sexual attraction was to his prepubescent daughter 

when she was between the ages of six and thirteen. When an 

attraction turns into behavior that disrupts somebody’s life or is 

causing the individual mental and emotional distress, it becomes 

a disorder. Not only was [Feliciano-Alacan] in this case attracted 

to a prepubescent, but the victim was his daughter. Further, in 

spite of knowing the potential consequences to himself and/or the 

victim, [Feliciano-Alacan] repeated[ly] engaged in the sexual 

behavior with a prepubescent child, even after being confronted 

by the victim; showing that the disorder overrode his volitional

control. [Feliciano-Alacan] was willing to risk legal, social, and 

familial consequences which meets the diagnostic criteria for a 

paraphilic disorder. This disorder is a lifetime disorder than can 

be managed but not cured. Dr. Valliere further indicated that 

while this disorder may go into remission, the person still 

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2 See Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972 (Pa. 2020) (holding that the 

statutory lifetime registration, notification, and counseling requirements 

applicable to SVPs did not constitute criminal punishment, and the statutory 

procedure for designating SVPs was constitutionally permissible).

3 Both expert reports were admitted into evidence.
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possesses a predisposition or a likelihood to be reactivated if the

individual experiences internal or external situations or a lack of 

structure or access to victims. The particular cognitive limitations 

of [Feliciano-Alacan] were discussed as making complex selfmanagement more difficult and noting his treatment needs are 

more particular than offenders without those limitations. Dr. 

Valliere pointed out that [Feliciano-Alacan] promoted a 

relationship that was secretive, assaulting his daughter while she 

slept and abdicated a caretaking role to promote a relationship 

for the facilitation of his sexual aggression toward her. She found 

that this behavior met the statutory definition of predatory 

behavior. After vigorous cross examination, Dr. Valliere 

ultimately stood firm with her opinion that based on the statutory

definition, [Feliciano-Alacan] met the qualifications to be 

designated a [SVP].

Dr. Lorah similarly testified as to his report. He opined that 

Dr. Valliere’s diagnosis of Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder to 

children and frotte[u]rism was incorrect and that the most

appropriate diagnosis is Pedophilic disorder. He found that 

[Feliciano-Alacan] did not have a mental health abnormality that 

satisfies the longevity and likelihood prongs of the statute which 

must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to classify a 

person as a [SVP]. He testified that . . . Feliciano-Alacan would 

be considered in behavioral remission because he has 

successfully lived in the community for over five years after the 

last (known) assault of his daughter in approximately 2010. Dr. 

Lorah also indicated [Feliciano-Alacan] was less than likely to 

sexually re-offend because the onset of his diagnosis was when 

he was in his fifties and he is now over sixty years old, an age 

where statistically there is a reduced risk of sexual violence.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/21, at unnumbered 5-6 (footnotes omitted).

Approximately one week after the hearing, on March 25, 2021, the trial 

court entered an order designating Feliciano-Alacan as an SVP. On April 27, 

2021, the trial court sentenced Feliciano-Alacan. In accordance with a 

negotiated plea agreement, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 

eleven and one-half months to twenty-three months in prison, followed by 
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twelve years of probation. The trial court also informed Feliciano-Alacan of 

his registration requirements under SORNA. Feliciano-Alacan filed a timely 

notice of appeal.4 Both Feliciano-Alacan and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Feliciano-Alacan raises the following issue for our review:

Whether the lower court erred in designating [FelicianoAlacan] as a[n SVP] where the evidence was insufficient to support 

a finding that [Feliciano-Alacan] has a mental abnormality or 

personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in predatory 

sexually violent offenses?

Feliciano-Alacan’s Brief at 12.

5

A challenge to a trial court’s SVP designation is a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, for which our standard of review is de novo and 

our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 

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4 Feliciano-Alacan indicated in his notice of appeal that he was appealing “from 

the denial of the motion to bar hearing to determine if [Feliciano-Alacan] is 

[an SVP] entered on August 28, 2020, the order determining [FelicianoAlacan] is a[n SVP] and subject to the notification requirements of SORNA 

entered on March 25, 2021, and the judgment of sentence in this matter 

entered on April 27, 2021.” Notice of Appeal, 6/8/21, at unnumbered 1

(unnecessary capitalization omitted). However, in a criminal action, an appeal 

properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial of postsentence motions. See Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 658 A.2d 395, 

397 (Pa. Super 1995). We have corrected the caption accordingly.

5

In his concise statement, Feliciano-Alacan stated his sufficiency challenge 

somewhat differently, averring that “the Commonwealth’s expert’s diagnosis 

of Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder to children and frotteurism, is not a 

mental abnormality that qualifies as a lifelong condition and does not allow for 

likelihood of re-offense when evaluating [his] characteristics and the facts of 

this case.” Concise Statement, 5/31/21, at 1.
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213, 218 (Pa. 2006). When reviewing a trial court’s SVP determination, we 

must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth and 

may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial 

court. Id. “We will reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if 

the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that each 

element of the statute has been satisfied.” Commonwealth v. Geiter, 929 

A.2d 648, 650 (Pa. Super. 2007).

The procedure for “determining SVP status is statutorily-mandated and 

well-defined.” Commonwealth v. Dixon, 907 A.2d 533, 535 (Pa. Super. 

2006). Under Revised Subchapter I of SORNA,6 after a person has been 

convicted of an offense listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55, the trial court orders 

an assessment by the SOAB. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.58(a). The SOAB must 

assess all individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses to determine 

whether they should be classified as an SVP and subject to increased 

registration, notification, and counseling requirements. See id. § 9799.58(b). 

When assessing whether a particular offender should be classified as an 

SVP, the SOAB conducts a fifteen-factor analysis pursuant to § 9799.58(b); 

see also Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(holding that while no single factor is required or dispositive, the SOAB must 

consider all factors in § 9799.58(b) in making its assessment). Specifically, 

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6 Revised Subchapter I of SORNA applies to sexually violent offenses 

committed on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012.
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the SOAB must examine the facts of the current offense, including (i) whether 

the offense involved multiple victims; (ii) whether the individual exceeded the 

means necessary to achieve the offense; (iii) the nature of the sexual contact 

with the victim; (iv) the relationship of the individual to the victim; (v) the 

age of the victim; (vi) whether the offense included a display of unusual

cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime; and (vii) the 

mental capacity of the victim. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.58(b)(1). The SOAB 

must also consider the defendant’s prior offense history, including (i) the 

defendant’s prior criminal record; (ii) whether the defendant completed any 

prior sentences; and (iii) whether the defendant participated in available 

programs for sexual offenders. Id. § 9799.58(b)(2). Additionally, the SOAB 

must consider the characteristics of the defendant, including (i) age; (ii) use 

of illegal drugs; (iii) any mental illness, mental disability or mental 

abnormality; and (iv) behavioral characteristics that contribute to the 

defendant’s conduct. Id. § 9799.58(b)(3). Finally, the SOAB must consider 

factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment field as criteria 

reasonably related to the risk of re-offense. Id. § 9799.58(b)(4). After 

considering these factors, the SOAB must prepare and submit a written report 

of its assessment to the district attorney, who may file a praecipe for a hearing 

on the matter. Id. § 9799.58(d), (e)(1). 

The trial court’s inquiry at an SVP hearing is different from the SOAB’s 

assessment. Whereas the SOAB must consider the fifteen factors listed in § 
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9799.58(b), the trial court must determine whether the Commonwealth has 

proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is “a person who 

has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who is determined to be 

a sexually violent predator under § 9799.58 (relating to assessments) due to 

a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to 

engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.” Id. § 9799.53; see also 

Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972, 992 (Pa. 2020) (stating, an SVP, 

in addition to having been convicted of a sexually violent offense, is a person 

“who [has] been individually determined to suffer from a mental abnormality 

or personality disorder such that they are highly likely to continue to commit 

sexually violent offenses”). A “mental abnormality” is defined as “[a] 

congenital or acquired condition . . . that affects the emotional or volitional 

capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the 

commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a 

menace to the health and safety of other persons.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.53.

“Predatory” is defined as “[a]n act directed at a stranger or at a person with 

whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or promoted, 

in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” Id. A

“sexually violent offense” is defined as “a criminal offense specified in section 
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9799.55 (relating to registration) committed on or after April 22, 1996, but 

before December 20, 2012, for which the individual was convicted.” Id.

7

Here, Feliciano-Alacan does not dispute that his guilty plea to the charge 

of indecent assault (person less than 13 years of age) constitutes a conviction

for a sexually violent offense under § 9799.55. Instead, Feliciano-Alacan

claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it found him to be an SVP 

based on the testimony of Dr. Valliere. Feliciano-Alacan argues that Dr. 

Valliere’s opinions were flawed, biased, and based on assumptions that were 

not supported by the evidence. He claims that Dr. Valliere made assumptions 

regarding when R.S.’s breasts developed, that Feliciano-Alacan’s arousal to 

children can transgress prepubescence, and that Feliciano-Alacan might not 

be in remission even though he had been in the community for several years 

without any reports of reoffending. Feliciano-Alacan further asserts that, by 

opining that all sex offenders have unknown victims, Dr. Valliere essentially 

concluded that he has committed undetected sexual offenses. FelicianoAlacan points out that, although Dr. Valliere testified that she is not able to 

determine remission unless she specifically speaks with the offender or has 

done further diagnostic assessments, she nevertheless opined that he is not 

in remission even though she never met with him. Feliciano-Alacan contends 

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7 “[T]he statute does not require proof of a standard or diagnosis that is 

commonly found and/or accepted in a mental health diagnostic paradigm.”

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 190 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted).
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that, while Dr. Valliere conceded that she did not have enough information 

about him to know what kind of relationship he had with his daughter, she 

opined that his actions were predatory because “he advocated a parental 

relationship and promoted a new relationship with [R.S.] in order to facilitate 

victimization.” Feliciano-Alacan’s Brief at 18 (quoting N.T., 3/17/21, at 12, 

18).

Finally, Feliciano-Alacan asserts that Dr. Valliere’s report conceded the 

absence of several of the factors listed in § 9799.58(b), including: that his

offenses did not involve multiple victims; he did not do more than was 

necessary to gain compliance from R.S.; there is nothing in the offense 

information to suggest that pain, cruelty, terror, or humiliation of R.S. were 

sources of arousal for him; R.S. was not unusually compromised; he had no 

prior criminal records, criminal sentences, or history of failed treatment; and 

drugs and alcohol played no role in his offenses. Based on these arguments, 

Feliciano-Alacan contends that Dr. Valliere’s assessment was not 

individualized and consisted of sweeping generalizations based on the 

offenders she treated in the past and the assumptions she makes about all 

sex offenders. 

Importantly, on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

an SVP determination, “an expert’s opinion, which is rendered to a reasonable 

degree of professional certainty, is itself evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935, 944 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc); see also
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Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding 

that “a [SOAB] report or opinion that the individual has an abnormality 

indicating the likelihood of predatory sexually violent offenses is itself 

evidence”). Therefore, an argument that the expert’s diagnosis was not fully 

explained, did not square with accepted analyses of the disorder, or was 

simply erroneous, would affect the weight, and not the sufficiency, of the 

expert’s evidence. See Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 223 (Pa. 

2006).

Here, Dr. Valliere’s expert report and opinions, which were rendered to 

a reasonable degree of professional certainty, were, in fact, evidence. Thus, 

Feliciano-Alacan’s arguments that Dr. Valliere’s opinions were flawed, biased, 

and based on assumptions that were not supported by the evidence go to the 

weight, and not the sufficiency, of the evidence. See Feucht, 955 A.2d at

382 (holding that “while a defendant is surely entitled to challenge [a report 

or opinion by a member of SOAB] by contesting its credibility or reliability 

before the SVP court, such efforts affect the weight, not the sufficiency of the 

Commonwealth’s case”); see also Fuentes, 991 A.2d at 944-45 (holding that 

a challenge to an expert opinion rendered with a reasonable degree of 

professional certainty implicates the weight of the evidence, which is properly 

addressed by the trial court). As Feliciano-Alacan has not preserved any

weight of the evidence claim, his challenge to the weight to be accorded to 

Dr. Valliere’s opinions is waived. 
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Moreover, after a careful review, and viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude the 

evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s designation of FelcianoAlacan as an SVP. In undertaking her assessment, Dr. Valliere reviewed 

numerous documents, including the report of suspected child abuse to law 

enforcement, the Childline Report of Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, the 

criminal investigation, the affidavit of probable cause, the criminal complaint, 

R.S.’s journal entries, the presentence investigation report, and psychological 

reports prepared by other professionals. SOAB Report, 8/22/18, at 1. Dr. 

Valliere explained that, even though Feliciano-Alacan declined to participate 

in the SOAB’s assessment, the absence of an interview did not preclude the 

SOAB’s ability to assess his behavior through a review of the records

documenting his repeated sexual behaviors. Id. at 2-3. Dr. Valliere discussed 

each of the fifteen factors listed in § 9799.58(b). Id. at 4-5.

Based on her review, Dr. Valliere concluded that Feliciano-Alacan meets 

the criteria for a paraphilic disorder (mental abnormality), given that he 

sought sexual gratification from a child repeatedly over six years. Id. at 5. 

Dr. Valliere explained that this behavior is diagnostic of a deviant sexual 

arousal pattern to children. Id. Dr. Valliere further explained that the 

diagnosis of Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder to Children requires both a 

deviant sexual arousal pattern to children that has persisted for six or more 

months and that this disorder has motivated behavior that has victimized 
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another. Id. Based on Feliciano-Alacan’s history of sexually assaulting his 

daughter over six years, Dr. Valliere concluded that he met the diagnosis for 

Specified Paraphilic Disorder to Children, which is considered a congenital or 

acquired condition. Id. Dr. Valliere further concluded that Feliciano-Alacan’s 

behavior also demonstrated an arousal to the non-consensual rubbing of his 

genitals against another, which is referred to a frotteurism. Id. In making 

these diagnoses, Dr. Valliere concluded that Feliciano-Alacan’s paraphilic 

disorder is a lifetime condition that can be managed but not cured. Id. at 6. 

She further concluded that Feliciano-Alacan’s condition overrode his emotional 

and volitional control because he repeatedly engaged in sexual behavior with 

a prepubescent child despite being confronted by R.S., and knowing the 

potential consequences to her and to himself. Id. Finally, Dr. Valliere

concluded that Felicino-Alacan’s indecent contact with his daughter fit the 

statutory definition of predatory behavior, and that he had a disorder related 

to a future likelihood of re-offense. Id.

Dr. Valliere’s report, along with her testimony at the SVP hearing,

8

provided the trial court with an expert opinion that Feliciano-Alacan met each 

of the elements required to classify him as an SVP. Where, as here, “the 

expert’s report and testimony support the trial court’s finding that [an 

appellant] was an SVP, there is no basis for granting sufficiency relief.” 

____________________________________________

8 See N.T., 3/17/21, at 7-22.
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Fuentes, 991 A.2d at 944 (quoting Meals, 912 A.2d at 223); see also 

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 194 (holding it would not disturb trial court’s 

decision to credit Commonwealth’s expert witness over defense expert witness 

on a challenge to the sufficiency of an SVP determination).

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court designating FelicianoAlacan as an SVP.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/21/2022