U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

25–549 PDF 2006

HOMELAND SECURITY:

THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND THE COURSE AHEAD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2004

Serial No. 108–56

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin 

DAVID DREIER, California 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York 

JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

STEPHEN DEVINE, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

THOMAS DILENGE, Chief Counsel and Policy Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director 

MARK T. MAGEE, Democrat Deputy Staff Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on Homeland Security 1 

The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Michigan ........................................................................................................... 20

The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Maryland ................................................................................................ 39

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 32

The Honorble Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Oregon ..................................................................................................... 42

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 20

The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Washington ....................................................................................................... 21

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 51

The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Massachusetts .................................................................................................. 28

The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 37 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 20

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 44

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 35

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From the 

District of Columbia ............................................................................................. 21

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of North Carolina ....................................................................................... 4 

The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From the 

State Arizona ........................................................................................................ 41

The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Connecticut ............................................................................................. 27

The Honoralbe John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From the 

State New York .................................................................................................... 30

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi ....................................................................................... 2

WITNESS

The Honorable Tom Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8

FOR THE RECORD 

Questions and Responses Submitted: 

Responses from the Honorable Tom Ridge ........................................................ 54

(1)

HOMELAND SECURITY: 

THE 9/11 COMMISSION 

AND THE COURSE AHEAD 

Tuesday, September 14, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in Room 2318, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Cox, Dunn, Shays, Camp, Diaz-Balart, 

King, Linder, Shadegg, Souder, Granger, Sweeney, Turner, Thompson, Markey, Dicks, Frank, Harman, Cardin, DeFazio, Lowey, Andrews, Norton, McCarthy, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, 

Etheridge, Lucas, and Meek. 

Chairman COX. [Presiding.] The Select Committee on Homeland 

Security will come to order. 

Pursuant to notice, the committee will proceed today to hear testimony from the secretary of the department, Tom Ridge—

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman COX. —on the Department of Homeland Security’s response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations. 

The gentleman from Mississippi? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Motion for unanimous consent that opening 

statements be limited to the chair and ranking member. 

Chairman COX. Is there objection? Without objection, so ordered. 

Secretary Ridge, we welcome you once again to this committee, 

which is uniquely devoted to the department’s mission: protecting 

the United States of America from terrorist attack on our soil. 

I know that you are sincere when you say you appreciate being 

here because you do not appreciate to an equal extent having to go 

to 88 committees and subcommittees in the House and in the Senate. 

We have lots of ground to cover this afternoon. I will be very 

brief so we can move directly to our members’ questions. 

We have just observed the third anniversary of the September 11 

attacks. The memory is as raw as it ever was. 

Just a few weeks ago, in late July, the 9/11 Commission issued 

its long-awaited report. In its wake, we find ourselves compelled to 

focus our attention on the commission’s recommended reforms. 

That is the lens through which we in the Congress will in the immediate future view the horrific story of the 9/11 attacks themselves. That is not a bad thing because it demonstrates that we are 
2

focused on prevention, as we on this committee have always been 

focused. 

The objective of all of our efforts, of all reforms of the bureaucratic structures and processes that have burdened and balkanized 

our federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies, is to render 

this ability that the terrorists have had to succeed in destroying 

our country far, far more difficult than it was three years ago. 

Because the remarkable thing about the 9/11 attacks was how 

simple it was for a motley assortment of suicidal terrorists to brush 

past our defenses. That has changed. And I am confident of further 

and more significant changes in the near future. 

To date, though, the biggest change has been creation of the Department of Homeland Security, focused on a disparate array of 

over 22 formerly separate federal agencies and enterprises, on a 

new overriding mission: protecting us, our territory and our way of 

life. 

This committee has, ever since its inception, sought to encourage 

those who lead these efforts to greater and larger successes in 

meeting that central challenge to our civilization. 

But today, in the midst of a welter of well-meant but mutually 

exclusive proposals to reform our intelligence community and the 

Congress itself, we have a fundamental question to ask you, Mr. 

Secretary. And I am sure it will come up in a wide variety of factual contexts this afternoon. 

How does the Department of Homeland Security fit into the 

grand plan that the president has proposed? What is its unique 

contribution to ensuring our security? 

It is superfluous to add that we look forward to your testimony, 

and an understatement to note that we are grateful for your 

unstinting service. 

At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi for any 

opening statement that he might have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here with us, for all your exceptional service over the past three years. 

Mr. Secretary, as you know, there is strong bipartisan support 

for your department. Every member of this committee wants your 

department to succeed. And we strongly support virtually all of the 

initiatives that you have launched over the past 18 months. 

Our differences arise with respect to the speed and scope of the 

administration’s homeland security program. We realize that you 

cannot snap your fingers and instantly achieve all the security that 

our times demand. Yet we continue to have glaring gaps in our 

homeland security that could be addressed through a more aggressive and robust effort by the administration. 

Let me mention a few examples. 

Chemical plants have been characterized as prepositioned weapons of mass destruction. Yet the department has visited only a couple of dozen of the hundreds of chemical plants that present a serious threat to their surrounding communities. 

There has not been a single hearing in this House of Representatives on the administration’s proposal to strengthen security at 

these plants. 
3

Clearly, if this legislation were a priority for the administration, 

this bill would have passed the House long ago. 

Stopping a nuclear and radiological weapon from entering the 

United States should be our greatest homeland security priority. 

However, your department’s program to install technology to screen 

cargo container for these materials is woefully behind schedule. 

Radiation portal monitors would not be installed at all of our sea 

ports by December 2004 as promised. And under the current budget, it may be years before these devices are available on the southern borders. This is unacceptable. 

The 9/11 Commission identified the failure to screen air cargo as 

a serious vulnerability in our aviation security system. 

In response to the events in Russia, your department ordered 

that all air cargo be screened for flights to and from that country. 

Consistent with this measure, it seems that the 100 percent screening can be accomplished. It is just a matter of having the desire 

and will to devote the necessary resources to get it done. 

The administration often mentions that it has stockpiled enough 

smallpox vaccine for every person in America. It does not mention 

that the program to pre-vaccinate thousands of emergency workers 

was a dramatic failure. Consequently, I do not believe we have an 

effective program in place to vaccinate our population in the even 

of a smallpox outbreak. 

We also have only 159 vials on anthrax vaccine in the stockpile, 

even though a manufacturer has the capability to produce thousands of doses of this vaccine. 

Providing effective communication systems for our first responders has been identified as a top priority for your department. Special patch kits have been developed and additional frequencies 

identified. But improvements have still not been seen nationwide. 

Also, more resources are needed to ensure first responders can 

communicate with one another. Remarkably, the administration’s 

budget eliminated their only grant program for interoperable communications in existence and cut other programs that could be 

used to address this critical need. 

In sum, even though we know that Al-Qa‘ida continues to plot attacks against the homeland, we are not moving as quickly or as 

strongly as we should to close these security gaps. We have the resources to do so; it is just a matter of the administration’s priorities. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and that concludes my remarks. 

Chairman COX. I thank the gentleman. 

I would advise members that our witness, Secretary Ridge, is 

under a hard deadline and needs to depart at 4:30 p.m. today. 

I have conferred with the ranking member, and we have agreed 

that out of the previous consent order members who have statements may submit them for the record, and we will be proceeding 

under the 5-minute rule in putting questions to Secretary Ridge. 

In consideration of other members’ right to ask questions of the 

secretary, these 5 minutes should be understood to comprise both 

the question and the reply from the secretary. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, you saw what happened last time 

when we had witnesses before, during this hearing. We were not 

able to get to each of the members. Today the same thing is going 
4

to happen. We are going to have a vote in 15 minutes. There are 

three or four votes we will vote on. Same situation. 

With all due respect to the secretary’s schedule, can we ask the 

secretary to come back for a second round so that all of us can ask 

questions? 

Chairman COX. Well, I appreciate the gentleman’s comment, and 

we will do the following. 

First, we will be monitoring the hearing clock closely so that all 

member adhere to the 5-minute rule, which should, for those members who are present, give us the opportunity to put questions. 

And second, we will continue, with the secretary’s indulgence, 

questioning the witness even during votes, and a member will be 

here in the chair at all times to enable that to happen so that 

members can go to the floor to vote and back. 

With that understanding, Mr. Secretary, I will look forward to 

your testimony. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman COX. The gentleman—

Mr. PASCRELL. Can I have one second, please? I take your answer to be no, then, to my question. 

Chairman COX. Well, as I said, the secretary is under a hard 

deadline. Let us see what we can accomplish in this hearing. I 

know that the secretary and the department have been very, very 

cooperative with this committee and will continue to be such. The 

secretary is back again. We have had him several times before. 

And I know that this will not be the last time. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I am not questioning the cooperation of the secretary. The secretary is doing fine in cooperating. It is the Chair 

that is not doing fine. That is why I asked the question. 

We have a right to ask questions. We need the time. We are not 

going to be rushed through this. This is important to all of us, our 

families, our grandchildren. 

You have heard the speech, okay? And you continue to—basically 

the second half of the questioners never get a chance to ask a question. 

Chairman COX. In the interest of members—

Mr. PASCRELL. That is the record. 

Chairman COX. —having the time, I think the correct course just 

now is to proceed with the secretary’s testimony and the opportunity for members to put their questions. 

So, Secretary Ridge, please proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM RIDGE, SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, thank you for the opportunity to update the 

committee on the many recent improvements to our nation’s homeland security posture. 

As both the Chairman and Congressman Thompson have noted, 

it is particularly timely in the wake of the thoughtful and thorough 

recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission. Some of those recommendations, I suspect, will be the subject of our conversation 

here over the next several hours. 

With this committee’s bipartisan support, the Department of 

Homeland Security was established to bring together all of our 
5

scattered entities and capabilities under one central authority to 

better coordinate and better direct our homeland security efforts. 

In the span of our 18-months existence, I believe we have made 

significant progress. Yet there is certainly more to do. There is certainly greater capacity to build and more improvements to be 

made. 

Nowhere is this more important than with our intelligence operations. That is why improved coordination and cooperation across 

all elements of the intelligence community have been an absolute 

imperative of the homeland security mission and one which the 

president has fully embraced as well as addressed with many recent reform initiatives. 

Already we have improved intelligence capabilities and information sharing with our partners in the federal government, as well 

as with state, local and private-sector partners who work across 

America on the front line of homeland security. 

As an example, the president recently established the national 

counterterrorism center, consistent with the recommendation of the 

9/11 Commission. The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of 

Information Analysis will participate in the new center, which 

builds on the capabilities of the previous reform in the Terrorist 

Threat Integration Center. 

And as a member of the intelligence community, Homeland Security will have full access to a central repository of intelligence information. 

Just as importantly, we can effectively and efficiently channel 

that information to those who need it by using new communication 

tools, such as the Homeland Security Information Network. 

This network is a real-time, Internet-based collaboration system 

that allows multiple jurisdictions, disciplines and emergency-operations centers to receive and share the same intelligence, the same 

tactical information, and therefore, when need be, be operating 

around the same situational awareness. 

This year we have expanded the information network to include 

senior decision-makers, such as governors and state-wide homeland 

security advisers in all 50 states and territories, as well as into the 

50 largest major urban areas. 

In order to increase compatibility and reduce duplication, we are 

also working to integrate this information network with similar efforts of our partners in the federal government, including the law 

enforcement online and the regional information sharing system 

that operate within the FBI. 

And all of our federal partners, as well as many, many others, 

participate in the department’s new Homeland Security Operations 

Center. This 24-hour nerve center synthesizes information from a 

variety of sources and then distributes the information, bulletins 

and security recommendations, as necessary, to all levels of government. 

Our progress in intelligence and information sharing demonstrates the links we have made between both prevention and 

protection. 

By establishing a comprehensive strategy combining both vulnerability and threat assessments with infrastructure protection, we 
6

are taking steps daily to protect the public and mitigate the potential for an attack. 

We have significantly bolstered our nation’s security by implementing a layered system of protections at our entries and our 

ports, on our roadways, railways and waterways and even far from 

our borders and shores. 

Many of our initiatives and security measures were tracked 

closely—and were tracked closely with the recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission. 

With newly trained professional screeners, hardened cockpit 

doors, baggage X-rays and federal air marshals, we have made airline travel safer from the curb to the cockpit. 

The recently announced Secure Flight Program will allow the 

government to operate a more robust passenger prescreening system for domestic aviation, adding another layer of security for airline travelers. 

For most visitors to our country, the comprehensive screening 

process begins overseas at our consulates and embassies, where 

visa applicants often provide biometric information, such as their 

digital photograph and finger scans. 

This closely protected information is used in conjunction with 

US–VISIT, the entry/exit system which was implemented ahead of 

schedule earlier this year. 

In this case, one of the commission’s most important recommendations was also one of the department’s most significant 

accomplishments. 

More than 8.5 million people have been admitted to the United 

States through US–VISIT with biometric verification of their identity, and more than 100,000 have turned up on watch lists. 

Biometrics are an important tool for our security and will significantly improve screening procedures. It is one element that will be 

evaluated as part of the president’s recent homeland security directive to review screening procedures across the government. That is 

why I have asked for a complete evaluation of the current use and 

future potential of biometrics throughout the department. 

I might add—and hopefully our discussion will get into this later 

on, Mr. Chairman—it is not only our current and future use within 

our department within this country, it is actually finding a way to 

move the international community to accept international standards for biometrics. 

So that whether we are authenticating documents or verifying 

identities, the United States, in conjunction with its allies and 

partners around the world, will have one agreeable standard that, 

frankly, will enhance security for all of us. 

The use of biometrics for screening, access control, credentialing 

and identity verification adds a critical layer to our border security 

strategy. 

The Container Security Initiative helps push another layer of security even further outward, as we work with partners in foreign 

ports to help screen cargo before it reaches our country. 

With new, advanced manifest requirements, 100 percent of the 

incoming cargo is screened and prioritized using a risk-based system, which allows for expedited treatment of low-risk cargo, such 
7

as that shipped by members of our Customs Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism program. 

And the International Ship and Port Security Code is now in effect. The Coast Guard, along with port security grants, have helped 

every port in the United States increase their security measures. 

We have armed our nation’s first responders and first preventers 

with resources and tools they need to keep America safe in our 

towns and neighborhoods by allocating or awarding in excess of 

$8.5 billion to our state and local partners around the country. 

More than just money, we have launched the SAFECOM and 

RapidCom initiatives to provide both short-term health and longterm solutions to the problems of interoperability. We want to ensure that our first responders can communicate when necessary 

and across jurisdictions, regardless of the frequency or the mode of 

communication. 

To further help our heroes and our first responders, we have 

launched the National Incident Management System and published 

the nation’s first-ever comprehensive response plan, so we are all 

on the same page in the event of an attack or an emergency. And 

that includes our citizens, as well. 

We launched the Ready Campaign a little more than a year ago 

to encourage people to get prepared, and we will be adding the 

Ready for Business and Ready for Kids campaigns soon. 

All will encourage citizens to do a couple of simple, simple 

things: Make a communication plan with the people you care 

about. Have a little kit set aside and just stay informed. 

Many people have done so, but we need to spread the word even 

further and faster. So September is National Preparedness Month. 

This month, 82 organizations in all 50 states and territories are 

combining efforts to encourage millions of our fellow citizens to be 

prepared and get involved in the common effort for the common 

good. 

Unfortunately, we have seen in the past few weeks just how important preparedness can be. The people of Florida have been hit 

with two hurricanes, a third on the way, and the damage has been 

considerable. But the long lines at many of the outlets are indications that citizens know how to be ready. 

And the Federal Emergency Management Agency knows how to 

be ready, as well. They have helped thousands of Floridians recover, at least begin the process of recovery, from Charley and 

Frances by prepositioning disaster supplies so they can reach affected areas faster. 

It is very important to note, Mr. Chairman, just briefly, that 

there was some concern about bringing FEMA into a department 

because it had such a strong independent identity, and people were 

somewhat concerned that it would compromise their ability to respond to natural events. 

But, in fact, our ability as a department to respond to these 

pending natural disasters has taken us far beyond what I think 

anyone could have expected from FEMA acting independently. 

FEMA now working with the Coast Guard, working with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Frankly, they just recruited and 

we have sent down over a thousand volunteers from our citizen 

corps to help this effort. 
8

So by bringing FEMA in, remembering what its historic mission 

was, and that is responding to natural disasters, but then making 

available resources of the department within their partners in the 

department to it, I think have effectively added to, I think, a positive legacy of disaster relief for FEMA. 

Along with local authorities in Florida and volunteers from 

around the country, I think they have done a remarkable job. And 

I believe the people associated with the effort are to be commended 

for their effort. 

The spirit embodied by FEMA workers is not unusual to all the 

men and women that work in homeland security. We work with 

countless partners every day around the country to ensure that the 

country is protected. 

The breadth of issues I have covered, Mr. Chairman, and that 

are covered by the recommendations of the commission, are both 

indicative of yet also not sufficient to capture the full scope of this 

department and our mission. 

As we continue to evolve into a more agile agency, we look forward to continuing our close working relationship with Congress. 

We appreciate and value the mechanism for congressional oversight that has been laid out in the Constitution. 

However, we believe the relationship would be significantly enhanced, substantially improved—and here I know I am treading on 

some very thin ice, but will say it anyhow as a former member—

if there was an effort within Congress to reduce the number of 

committees and subcommittees that have oversight over this department. 

Working together is the only way we can accomplish our goals. 

And no doubt, those goals are the same: preserve our freedoms, 

protect America and secure our homeland. 

I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to share these few 

thoughts with you and look forward to the questioning period. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Ridge follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM RIDGE

Introduction 

Good morning, Chairman Cox, Congressman Turner, and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to update the Committee on the Department of Homeland Security’s (the Department or DHS) activities and tremendous progress in improving the security of America’s families and communities. This 

is particularly timely in the wake of the thoughtful and thorough recommendations 

made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 

9/11 Commission). 

As the 9/11 Commission recognized, in the aftermath of September 11th, it was 

clear that the Nation had no centralized effort to defend the country against terrorism, no single agency dedicated to our homeland security. While many of our Nation’s prevention and response capabilities existed, the Nation was not in a position 

to put the pieces together in a comprehensive manner to combat the scale of attacks 

we suffered on September 11th. 

Our enemies are relentless, and their desire to attack the American people and 

our way of life remains, though weakened by our successes in the global war on terrorism. To prepare our country for the future and these new realities, the President 

and the Congress worked together to create a centralized point of command for 

homeland security. Unified by a common mission, the 180,000 people of the Department are focused daily on one vision for a safe and secure America. 

I want to thank the Commission for recognizing the tremendous strides we have 

already made. Allow me to mention a few, which I will later elaborate upon further. 
9

First, the Administration’s progress is marked by dramatically increased intelligence capabilities and information sharing amongst not just Federal agencies but 

with our State, local, tribal and private sector partners on the front lines of homeland security. As an example, the President’s creation of both the Terrorist Threat 

Integration Center (TTIC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is centralizing 

terrorist-related information enabling significant coordination on the Federal level, 

ensuring that a comprehensive view is achieved. 

Further, we are dismantling roadblocks that once prevented communication between the Federal government and our partners in States, cities, counties and towns 

across America. Through systems like the Homeland Security Information Network 

(HSIN), we can share a common picture of events, recognize the patterns and take 

action to mitigate vulnerabilities and thwart our enemies. 

The Homeland Security Information Network also demonstrates the links we have 

made between prevention and protection. By integrating vulnerability and threat assessment data with infrastructure protection efforts, we work with the owners and 

operators of our critical assets nationwide to mitigate the potential for attack. 

Additionally, we have bolstered our Nation’s border and transportation security 

by turning the pre-existing patchwork of programs into a layered system, closing 

vulnerabilities with programs like US–VISIT and the Container Security Initiative 

(CSI) that start overseas and bring travelers and cargo more securely into the U.S. 

Finally, as you know, this month is National Preparedness Month. The men and 

women of the Department and our first responder partners across the Nation are 

keenly aware that preparedness is vital to our ability to prevent and respond to acts 

of terror and other emergencies. In addition to awarding over $8.5 billion to States 

and local governments, DHS has made great strides in improving the way we administer, award, and disburse critical Federal assistance to the police, fire, and 

EMS agencies within our communities. 

The President is seeking the same unity of command for intelligence and has recently asked Congress to create the position of a National Intelligence Director with 

full budgetary authority. The National Intelligence Director will assume the broader 

responsibility of leading the Intelligence Community across our government. 

The President has also announced that we will establish the National Counter–

Terrorism Center, which that will become our government’s shared knowledge bank 

for intelligence information on known or suspected terrorist and international terror 

groups. The new center builds on the capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration 

Center, and will ensure that all elements of our government receive the source information needed to execute effective joint action, and that our efforts are unified 

in priority and purpose.

Intelligence and Information Sharing 

With the introduction of intelligence reform in the interim and longer term 

through proposed legislation, the President took an important step to strengthen our 

Nation’s homeland security and further demonstrate his resolve in fighting the war 

on terror. On August 2, 2004, the President directed his Administration to take 

quick action on reform initiatives that would strengthen the intelligence community 

and improve our ability to find, track and stop dangerous terrorists. Two weeks ago, 

the President delivered on that tasking by signing a series of executive orders and 

Homeland Security Presidential Directives that will ensure that the people in government who are responsible for defending America and countering terrorism have 

the best possible information and support to identify threats and to protect the 

homeland. These executive orders and Homeland Security Presidential Directives 

are supported by the valuable recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, and 

build upon existing efforts within the Administration. 

The first of these executive orders substantially strengthens the management of 

the intelligence community by establishing interim powers for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Under this order, the DCI would perform the functions of 

the National Intelligence Director (NID), within the constraints of existing law, until 

the NID position is codified in law. Under the President’s order, the DCI will be 

able to develop and present, with advice from departments and agency heads, the 

national foreign intelligence program budget. The President also provided the Director of Central Intelligence expanded authority to coordinate policy within the Intelligence Community (IC). The DCI will now develop common objectives and goals 

that will ensure timely collection, processing and analysis of intelligence.

The President’s Executive Orders will provide better unity of effort in the IC and 

improved linkage with law enforcement, which will greatly enhance our ability to 

do our job of protecting Americans and securing the homeland. The new responsibilities of the DCI will ensure that DHS has what it needs from other intelligence 

agencies and that our efforts are properly integrated in the national intelligence pic-
10

ture. DHS and other members of the IC will now go to one person who will formulate an integrated approach to common goals and objectives. 

In addition, the President established the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC) by executive order. This new center builds on the capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which was created by the President more 

than a year ago. The NCTC will allow DHS to have a better focused intelligence 

interface, building off the successful integration efforts of TTIC. It will also allow 

my Department to have access to a central repository of intelligence information. 

The DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Intelligence Program, as the two national IC members within my Department, will 

participate in the NCTC and will continue to engage in support to State, local, and 

private sector officials from a broader knowledge base. Effective July 9, 2004, the 

Departments of Homeland Security, State and Justice together with intelligence 

agencies established the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center as 

an all-source information fusion center to support efforts against the linked national 

security threats of alien smuggling, trafficking in persons and smuggler support of 

clandestine terrorist travel. As the 9/11 Commission put it: ‘‘For terrorists, travel 

documents are as important as weapons.’’ An Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent is expected to become the first Director. 

This centralization is critical to ensuring that all DHS intelligence analysts have 

access to the work of the other IC analysts and vice versa. The DHS personnel assigned to the new NCTC will be an integral part of the success of the Center and 

will be the direct link to the 13 other IC members’ products, personnel, and other 

resources. This open flow of analysis will enable DHS to be better informed regarding terrorist threats and intentions, which will make America more secure. Only by 

working cooperatively will our borders be better secured, our skies be made safer, 

and our Nation be better protected. The exact impact of the NCTC will not be fully 

known for some time, but all involved members of the IC will work together to make 

it fully functional in the fastest manner possible. 

In addition to the NID and NCTC, the President ordered the DCI to ensure we 

have common standards and clear accountability measures for intelligence sharing 

across the agencies of our government.The President established the Information 

Systems Council to identify and break down any remaining barriers to the rapid 

sharing of threat information by America’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and State and local governments. DHS will participate on this Council. 

Within DHS, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate 

(IAIP) has the lead on intelligence and information sharing. At the direction of 

Under Secretary Frank Libutti, IAIP has invigorated the communications with our 

State, territorial, tribal, local, major city, and private sector partners. A guiding 

principle for this effort is that there is more to information sharing than one Federal 

agency talking to another. We must ensure that those on the front-lines of homeland 

security have the best information to safeguard our communities and critical infrastructure. To that end, DHS is working together with its partners to identify and 

provide effective and workable solutions to our most challenging information sharing needs. 

One information sharing initiative I would like to mention is the HSIN, which is 

the umbrella under which various information sharing programs fall. One such program, launched in February of this year, is the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES). The initial goal was to have all States and major urban 

areas in America connected to DHS by the end of summer. I am happy to say we 

met that goal. This low-cost system provides secure, real-time connectivity in a collaborative environment so vital homeland security information can be shared among 

appropriate Federal, State, and local officials. This growing system has been very 

successful and numerous investigations have resulted from its implementation. As 

a key factor in its success, it should be noted that this effort is not a federally run 

system, but rather a partnership with State and local officials. This is representative of how DHS approaches its mission—only by working as partners will we be 

most effective in securing our hometowns. 

To further integrate Federal efforts with State and local officials, the Department 

of Justice (DOJ) and DHS information sharing staffs are working hard to bring the 

HSIN, Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISSNET) together with the goal of making the systems more compatible, 

without duplicating efforts, as quickly as possible. 

Other HSIN efforts include establishing a Secret-level classified system to the 

States. It also will provide greater connectivity to critical infrastructure owners and 

operators to enhance opportunities for two-way information exchange. Surveillance 

activities by owners and operators at their own facilities often garner valuable information to identify potential terrorist activity. With the staffing of dedicated critical 
11

infrastructure sector specialists within IAIP, members of the private sector also now 

receive threat-related information enhanced by recommended protective actions, 

making threat information more meaningful and actionable. Through the HSIN system at the local community and regional level, private businesses receive alerts, 

warnings, and advisories directly from DHS. 

DHS is also working with its Federal partners to share information more effectively. Members of 35 different Federal agencies are now all co-located together in 

DHS’s new 24-hour Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), which allows incoming information coming from various sources to be synthesized and shared with 

other Federal partners such as the FBI and the Department of Defense. In addition, 

since March of last year, nearly 100 bulletins and other threat related communique ́s have been disseminated by DHS to homeland security professionals across the country. 

Another information sharing capability that was established in March of this year 

is the IAIP National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC). The NICC maintains operational awareness of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, 

and provides a comprehensive mechanism and process for information sharing and 

coordination between and among government, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other industry partners for 13 critical infrastructure sectors and 4 key 

resources. The NICC will be collocated with the Transportation Security Operations 

Center and includes the infrastructure coordination activity, the National Communications System National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCCTelecom ISAC), and the National Cyber Security Division US Computer Emergency 

Readiness Team (US–CERT). The NICC has the capability to fully integrate activities of ISAC partners and other industry and government representatives. Our efforts to develop improved information sharing procedures have involved cooperation 

with local DAs as well as our State and local partners.

Building International Partnerships 

Information sharing efforts within the U.S. Government related to anti-terrorism 

are not confined to our Nation’s physical borders. We have made significant 

progress, in cooperation with our international partners, in the global war on terror. 

Through bilateral mechanisms and multilateral forums, we have sought to share 

terrorist-related information to better secure international travel and trade and further impede and deter terrorist exploitation of that system. 

As a key example of these activities, the Department, in cooperation with the Departments of State and Justice, advanced the Secure and Facilitated International 

Travel Initiative (SAFTI), which was adopted by the President and other heads of 

state at the G8 Summit in June. The SAFTI Action Plan contains 28 specific action 

items that will advance our Nation’s security. Among those are efforts to:

• Accelerate development of international standards for the interoperability of 

smart-chip passports. 

• Develop mechanisms for real-time data exchange to validate travel documents. 

• Provide effective and timely information exchange on terrorist watchlists or 

lookout data of participating countries on a reciprocal basis. 

• Commence sharing lost and stolen passport data to an Interpol database that 

eventually will allow for real-time sharing of the data amongst member countries. 

• Develop a methodology for assessing airport vulnerability to MANPADS 

threats and effective countermeasures. 

• Improve methodologies to analyze data on passengers, crew, and cargo in advance of travel. 

• Develop best practices for the use of Air Marshals. 

• Examine ways to collaborate on the forward placement of document advisors. 

• Develop robust flight deck security measures. 

• Expand research and development on biometric technologies. 

• Enhance port and maritime security through implementation of international 

standards and compliance with International Maritime Organization (IMO) requirements as set forth in the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) 

Code. 

Working with the Department of State and other agencies, Department of Homeland Security agencies including the Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and others provide training, data sharing, help in procuring technology, mutual 

law enforcement cooperation and related assistance to Mexico, other key countries 

in our Hemisphere and around the world. These efforts not only fight terrorism directly, but help key countries counter-attack against trafficking in drugs, human 
12

beings, weapons, money and other crimes that terrorist organizations often rely 

upon. Helping other countries strengthen their homeland security is often critical 

to preventing threats from reaching the United States.

Terrorist Financing 

The U.S. government is using the information and intelligence gathered about terrorists to destroy the leadership of terrorist networks, eliminate sanctuaries found 

in the support of foreign governments, and disrupt their plans and financing. A 

partnership of Federal agencies, led by the Department of Treasury, and working 

in cooperation with the international community, are going after terrorists’ sources 

of financing. Together, we have frozen nearly $143 million in terrorist-related assets, designated 383 individuals and entities as terrorist supporters, apprehended 

or disrupted key terrorist facilitators, and deterred donors from supporting AlQa‘ida and other like-minded terrorist groups. America is safer today because we 

have made it harder and costlier for Al-Qa‘ida and other terrorist groups to raise 

and move money around the world. 

DHS has a role in these operations through U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Last year, DHS and DOJ signed a memorandum of agreement that 

greatly enhances the U.S. government’s ability to wage a seamless, coordinated campaign against sources of terrorist funding. This agreement, which established the 

F.B.I. as the lead agency for the investigation of terrorist financing cases, outlines 

a protocol for ICE and FBI coordination of these investigations under the auspices 

of the Joint Terrorist Task Forces (JTTF’s). The agreement also contains joint vetting procedures that allows ICE and the FBI to work collaboratively in determining 

roles and responsibilities regarding these cases. ICE, in turn, continues to play an 

important role in these investigations, utilizing its historic expertise in financial 

crime and money laundering, 

DHS also uses its expertise and jurisdiction in financial crimes, money laundering, and commercial fraud, within both ICE and the U.S. Secret Service, to work 

with other Federal agencies and with the financial sector to address vulnerabilities 

that are open to exploitation by terrorists and criminals. Addressing these 

vulnerabilities provides yet another layer, or avenue, of defense in identifying, preventing, and dismantling groups that seek to attack our economic security and undermine our way of life.

Border and Transportation Security 

As noted above, the Administration has worked extensively with its international 

partners to bolster our Nation’s homeland security by instituting prevention and 

protection measures overseas. It is important to recognize our programs are part of 

a layered approach to security. There is no silver bullet, no single security measure 

is foolproof, and the strategy lies in creating a systems approach, starting far from 

our borders. 

On the commercial side, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers and 

USCG personnel work with their foreign counterparts to instill a security mindset 

in the international supply chain through foreign port assessments and cargo 

screening through the Container Security Initiative. U.S. Officers are operating in 

24 international ports of trade working alongside our allies to target and screen 

cargo, helping to identify and even inspect high-risk cargo before it reaches our 

shores. Further, with advance manifest information requirements, 100 percent of 

cargo is screened through targeting using a set of specific indicators. These measures enable risk-based decisions regarding prioritizing inspections and use of technologies to inspect cargo. This is not only good for security, it is good for trade facilitation, allowing expedited treatment for low-risk cargoes, such as those shipped by 

members of our Customs–Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program (CT–PAT). 

A holistic view of maritime security includes a robust security planning regime. 

The U.S. worked hard within the IMO to implement the ISPS code—it is now in 

effect, and the USGC issued corresponding regulations to put in place a security 

planning regime for ports, facilities and vessels. As a result, new security measures 

are in place at every port in the United States. 

When it comes to foreign visitors, the comprehensive screening process begins at 

our U.S. consulates and embassies overseas, where visa applicants at most locations 

provide two fingerscans and a photograph along with their biographic data (By October 26, 2004, the Department of State will have this process in place at all locations). That personal information, closely protected, is screened against extensive 

terrorist-related information, to which consular officers now have direct access. 

Upon arrival at our air and sea ports of entry, these same visitors are matched with 

their biometric information through US–VISIT. US–VISIT will soon expand to cover 

individuals from visa waiver countries as well. 
13

The 9/11 Commission noted the importance of a strong entry exit system. And I 

want to underscore that point in elaborating on US–VISIT, as the implementation 

of this program is truly one of the Department’s greatest accomplishments. With the 

launch of US–VISIT in May of last year, we actually commenced the implementation of a comprehensive entry exit system, an idea that had languished for decades. 

US–VISIT, particularly including the biometrics component, adds a critical layer to 

our border security strategy. With great leadership from Under Secretary Asa 

Hutchinson and the head of the program team, Jim Williams, we have admitted 

more than 8.5 million people to the United States with biometric verification of their 

identity. This has resulted in more than 1,100 watch list matches as of September 

9 and the decision to deny more than 280 persons admission to this country. 

Our transportation sector is more secure than ever—across all modes. We are 

working diligently with the Department of Transportation and State, local and private sector stakeholders to protect critical infrastructures and deploy base security 

measures, as demonstrated in the security directives issued to passenger rail and 

transit operators in April. Certainly, the Federal responsibilities in aviation, historically and as a result of the 9/11 attacks, focused intense efforts on air travel. And, 

to that end, DHS has put in place a strong, layered security regime, upon which 

we are consistently building. This includes hardened cockpit doors on 100 percent 

of large passenger aircraft, vulnerability assessments at over 75 of the Nation’s largest airports, screening of 100 percent of all baggage, deployment of thousands of 

Federal air marshals, training of thousands of air crew under the Federal flight 

deck officer program, and development of a professionally trained screener workforce which has intercepted more than 12.4 million prohibited items since their inception. In addition, a robust screening system is in place for all international 

flights into the United States, and all passenger names for domestic flights are 

checked against expanded terrorist watch lists. 

We have also recently announced our intention to move forward on our plans for 

a more robust passenger pre-screening system for domestic commercial aviation. 

The Secure Flight program, which will be tested this fall and implemented early 

next year, will enable the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to better 

compare travelers to a list of known or suspected terrorists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. This list will expand dramatically upon the current No Fly

and Selectee lists now operated by the airlines and will be managed entirely by the 

government. TSA will also retain a modified set of CAPPS I criteria that will provide a better focused layer of security, and reduce the number of passengers selected 

for enhanced screening. 

In addition to these strides forward, we continue to seek opportunities for continued improvements in our terrorist-related screening processes. For this reason, the 

President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive–11 (HSPD–11) on August 27, which directed DHS to lead a Federal Government-wide effort to develop 

a strategy to ensure that an efficient and comprehensive framework exists for terrorist-related screening across the Government. The Directive requires development 

of a plan to implement enhanced comprehensive, coordinated government-wide, terrorist-related screening procedures to detect, identify, and interdict people, conveyances and cargo that pose a threat to homeland security. It also calls for the enhancement of terrorist-related screening in a manner that safeguards legal rights, 

including freedoms, civil liberties, and information privacy guaranteed by Federal 

law, while facilitating the efficient movement of people, conveyances and cargo. 

HSPD–11 builds upon the Department’s efforts in this area, as I recently directed 

a review of all biometrics programs within the Department with the same goals in 

mind. The use of biometrics provides improved security through application in identity verification, access control, credentialing and facilitation programs. 

With continued developments in the area of identification security, the President 

also signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive–12 (HSPD–12) two weeks ago, 

to set a common identification standard for Federal employees and contractors, 

which does the following:

• Mandates the expedited, public, and open development of a uniform standard 

for Federal employee and contractor identification that ensures security, reliability, and interoperability; 

• Closes security gaps and improves our ability to stop terrorists and others 

from accessing or attacking critical Federal facilities and information systems; 

and 

• Improves efficiency among Federal agencies through more consistent systems 

and practices. 

Secure identification is a priority for the United States. As noted by the 9/11 Commission, birth certificates, drivers’ licenses, and most other forms of identification 

have traditionally been issued by State and local governments, not the Federal Gov-
14

ernment. There are more than 240 different types of valid drivers’ licenses issued 

within the U.S. and more than 50,000 different versions of birth certificates issued 

by States, counties, and municipalities. 

At the Federal level, we are working closely with our State and local partners to 

find ways to strengthen the standards used to issue documents that people use to 

establish their identity without creating a national identity card. DHS has supported the efforts of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators 

(AAMVA) in looking at the security of drivers’ licenses and strongly supports the 

States in their endeavors to improve the security of these documents. 

When it comes to international travel, significant work has been done to combat 

fraudulent documents through information sharing with foreign governments and 

implementation of key programs, like US–VISIT, which use biometric identifiers to 

mitigate this risk. These efforts continue through the background checks conducted 

by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting immigration benefits.

Civil Liberties/Privacy 

In all of these initiatives, the President’s commitment to the protection of civil liberties and privacy is a guiding principle. The rights that are afforded not only to 

Americans but also to those who visit and live with us in this great Nation form 

the foundation of American society. Let me say simply that if we fail in this area, 

the terrorists will have won. 

The Department’s commitment to these ideals is further demonstrated by the appointment of our Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Dan Sutherland, and 

our Chief Privacy Officer, Nuala O’Connor Kelly. 

The Privacy Office has made privacy an integral part of DHS operations by working side-by-side on DHS initiatives with the senior policy leadership of the various 

directorates and components of DHS and with program staff across the Department. 

As a result, privacy values have been embedded into the culture and structure of 

DHS, ensuring that development of DHS programs is informed by thorough analysis 

of privacy impacts. And, once implemented, these programs are effective in protecting the homeland while protecting personal privacy. 

The Department also has made the preservation of civil liberties a priority, and 

relies on the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) to provide proactive 

legal and policy advice to senior leadership in the Department and its components. 

For example, CRCL worked closely with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate to craft positive policy changes in response to the issues raised by the DOJ 

Inspector General’s report on the 9/11 immigration detainees. CRCL has also developed policies to establish DHS as a model employer for people with disabilities and 

is helping me to implement President Bush’s recent Executive Order directing that 

people with disabilities be fully integrated into the emergency preparedness effort. 

The President stands firm on the protection of our fundamental freedoms and recognizes the importance of safeguarding our civil liberties and privacy in the war on 

terrorism. This was noted by the recent establishment, through Executive Order, of 

the President’s Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties (the Board). 

The Board will ensure that while the government takes all possible actions to prevent terrorist attacks on America’s families and communities, we continue to enhance this commitment to safeguard the legal rights of all Americans, including 

freedoms, civil liberties, and information privacy guaranteed by Federal law. It will 

advise the President on government-wide efforts, request reports and otherwise 

monitor progress, and refer credible information about possible violations for investigation, and is empowered to seek outside information, perspective, and advice. 

Chaired by the Deputy Attorney General, with the Under Secretary for Border and 

Transportation Security of the Department of Homeland Security serving as Vice 

Chair, and other senior officials drawn from across the Federal Government with 

central roles in both the War on Terror and in civil liberties and privacy issues, the 

Board held its first meeting yesterday.

Preparedness 

I am proud to speak of our significant gains in the area of national preparedness, 

particularly since it is National Preparedness Month. Throughout the month of September, hundreds of activities are planned to highlight the importance of individual 

emergency preparedness. Eighty-five partner organizations and all 56 States and 

territories are sponsoring events to encourage Americans to take simple steps now 

to prepare themselves and their families for any possible emergencies. In addition, 

the public education campaign Ready, and its Spanish language version Listo, educates and empowers American citizens to prepare for and respond to potential terrorist attacks and other emergencies. Ready is the most successful public service 

campaign launched in Ad Council history and is delivering its messages through the 
15

www.Ready.gov and www.Listo.gov websites, radio, television, print and outdoor 

public service announcements, brochures, and a variety of partnerships with private 

sector organizations. 

Business Ready will be launched later this month to encourage small to medium 

sized businesses to take steps to better protect their employees and their livelihood. 

Also, nearly 1,300 communities around the country, encompassing 50 percent of the 

U.S. population, have established Citizen Corps Councils to engage citizens in preparing, training and volunteering, including delivering the important messages of 

the Ready campaign. 

In our initiatives to educate the public on preparedness, we have had strong partners in the first responder community—those who have been on the front lines for 

a long time. The Department has many efforts underway to support our Nation’s 

first responders, particularly in the area of training and equipment. 

Since September 11th, the Department and its legacy agencies have directly pro- vided nearly $8.5 billion in grants for equipment, training, exercises, planning, and 

other assistance to our first responders and State and local partners. This is on top 

of the billions of dollars also provided by DOJ and the Department of Health and 

Human Services. This represents a dramatic increase in funding for State and local 

efforts in prevention, preparedness and response for terrorism and natural disasters. 

DHS is improving the way this assistance reaches the end users in the communities. Earlier this year, the Department consolidated all of its first responder and 

emergency preparedness grant and assistance programs into a single ‘‘One-Stop 

Shop’’—the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness 

(OSLGCP). OSLGCP offers the State and local government first responder agencies, 

seaports, rail and transit operators, dedicated research institutions, and citizen volunteer agencies with a single Federal Government portal for Federal assistance for 

terrorism preparedness. 

Without preparedness standards, the billions of dollars spent on these activities 

would not be the most efficient use of these limited resources. Therefore, in December of last year, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive–8 

(HSPD–8), which, among other things, establishes a national preparedness goal. 

OSLGCP is leading this effort and is devising plans to implement the 16 separate 

actions and capabilities identified to improve the mechanisms of administering Federal preparedness assistance, preparedness reporting, standards, and assessment of 

our Nation’s first responder capability. 

Further, the Department is engaged in significant training activities, covering the 

spectrum of all-hazards preparedness, with a special emphasis on terrorism prevention and weapons of mass destruction awareness. DHS programs have provided such 

training to more than 205,000 first responders in fiscal year 2004 alone (more than 

450,000 since fiscal year 2002). 

To address the critical communications needs of our first responder community, 

we are developing a new office to coordinate Federal, State, and local communications interoperability, leveraging both ongoing and new efforts to improve the compatibility of equipment, training, and procedures. Incorporated within the parameters of this new office are the SAFECOM and RapidCom initiatives. DHS’s 

SAFECOM program provides long-term technical assistance to Federal, State, tribal, and local programs that build and operate public safety communications, while 

RapidCom focuses on the immediate development of incident-level interoperable 

emergency communications in high-threat urban areas. 

Under DHS leadership, the SAFECOM program has made significant progress in 

achieving the goals of interoperability, including the release of the first ever consensus Statement of Requirements for Public Safety Wireless Communications and 

Interoperability. 

I am also pleased to report that as part of the RapidCom program, DHS is working with the State and local leadership in New York City, the DC Region, and eight 

other major urban areas to ensure that first responders can communicate by voice, 

regardless of frequency or mode during an emergency. RapidCom will ensure that 

high-threat urban areas have incident-level, interoperable emergency communications equipment by September 30, 2004. The program will support deployable communications capability in these urban areas for an incident area approximately the 

size of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers on September 11th. Thus, at 

the incident area, emergency personnel from various regional jurisdictions will be 

able to communicate using existing equipment that is made interoperable by a 

patch-panel device, interconnecting various models of equipment that would otherwise not be compatible. In addition to these targeted efforts, interoperable communications planning and equipment has been a high priority for Federal homeland 

security assistance to States and localities, particularly in high-risk urban areas. 
16

We have also achieved some tremendous milestones in implementing National Incident Management System (NIMS) and completing the essential core of the National Response Plan (NRP), which will ultimately consist of this base-plan and a 

number of supporting annexes to be finished this year. Required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD–5), issued by the President on February 28, 

2003, the NIMS ensures that Federal, State, and local governments and private-sector organizations all use the same criteria to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and 

recover from a terrorist attack, major disaster, or other domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. It builds upon well-established principles of the 

Incident Command System (ICS) including the unified command structure to provide organizational clarity and a common terminology that facilitates planning, coordination and cooperation at all levels of the responding community. A NIMS Integration Center, involving Federal, State, and local government representation, continues to develop and improve this system. DHS plans to conduct research in fiscal 

year 2005 to develop devices to locate first responders, and allow Incident Commanders to better understand where their resources are and how they are employed; and to provide virtual reality simulation training. The NRP applies the incident command concepts to include Federal support to States and local governments 

during disasters. It also establishes a framework for DHS to interact with the private sector in preparation for, response to, and recovery from terrorist attacks, 

major disasters and other emergencies. It will integrate operations into a seamless 

system and get help to victims more quickly and efficiently. 

Before moving away from the Department’s significant preparedness activities, I 

want to mention the devastating hurricanes that have hit this country recently. In 

addition to continuing to send our thoughts and prayers to all of the families who 

have been affected, the Department has been on the ground and fully engaged in 

providing emergency assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) pre-positioned emergency response teams and disaster relief supplies 

throughout the southeast region in preparation for anticipated response operations 

and continues to coordinate Federal response and recovery activities with State and 

local agencies. Further, President Bush ordered the release of Federal disaster 

funds and emergency resources for Florida to aid people battered in these disasters, 

requested additional funds from Congress as needed, and we continue to provide assistance to those who need Federal support in the wake of these disasters.

Oversight of DHS 

The breadth of issues covered in this testimony, while addressing many significant activities, does not speak to the entire scope of this Department’s great work. 

We have pulled together 22 agencies and 180,000 employees into a unified Department whose mission is to secure the homeland. We are operating as a single unit—

one team, one mission, one fight. Yet long term integration takes time—and we are 

daily challenged to ensure strong internal organization, as we continue building 

bridges with all of our partners in homeland security. 

As we continue to evolve into a more agile agency, we work closely with our partners in Congress. I appreciate the importance of our relationship and value the 

mechanism laid out in the Constitution, very appropriately, for Congressional oversight. However, this relationship would be significantly improved if there were an 

effort within Congress to reorganize itself, to enable more focus on homeland security, facilitate better oversight and ensure an even closer day-to-day relationship. 

Last year we testified before 145 committees and subcommittees, briefed members 

of Congress or committee staffs over 800 different times and met thousands of requests for information just from committee staffs. This year we’re already well beyond that. We still have pending over 300 General Accounting Office reports and 

we’ve already submitted at least that number. Again, the Department benefits from 

its relationship with Congress and an intense scrutiny of homeland security efforts, 

but these numbers demonstrate the need for a more effective structure.

Conclusion 

We are committed to leading the unified national effort to secure America. We 

have done so—and will continue to do so—by developing innovative methodologies 

to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, and protect against and respond to threats 

and hazards of all types. All the while we ensure we maintain safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free flow of commerce. Every day, the memories of September 11th inspire us in our efforts to preserve our freedoms and secure this great homeland. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to speak with you about the Department’s 

activities and respond to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I am happy 

to answer any questions you may have.
17

Chairman COX. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Secretary, the department and this committee have both 

worked to make prevention the priority from the outset. That 

meant within the Department of Homeland Security, bringing the 

information analysis portion, the intelligence arm of DHS, up to 

statutory full strength as quickly as possible. 

We knew, because experience had shown us, that if the department did not serve state and local and private-sector customers, 

nontraditional intelligence customers, with timely and reliable 

analysis, that possibly nobody else in the federal government would 

or could. 

The intelligence community surprised us, however. By all accounts, it did not even serve its traditional national security customers, as the 9/11 Commission pointed out. The president has noticed; so have voters. And so we find ourselves now in a highstakes, high-speed effort to reform the intelligence community. 

About a week ago the White House released its outline of the 

president’s own reform proposals. The commission’s report shows 

that the undersecretary of Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection in some way answers ultimately to a new national intelligence director. The McCain-Shays bill has a similar feature. 

I am hoping that you can help us understand at least what the 

department’s vision is for how this is all going to shape up or how 

it ought to shape up. 

First, what should be the IAIP role, the intelligence role, in the 

department in terrorism threat analysis? How would the president’s proposals change the status quo and change the role for information analysis for intelligence, as outlined in the Homeland Security Act? 

How should IAIP relate to the rest of the intelligence community? Should it be the lead federal agency—that is to say, should 

the department be the lead federal agency—in conveying terrorist 

threat information to state, local and private-sector officials, as is 

presently the case in practice and under statute? 

And finally, should IAIP continue to be responsible for the homeland security advisory system, even under this newly reorganized 

intelligence community plan that we are developing? 

Mr. RIDGE. Mr. Chairman, the Congress gave the new department a very specific, exclusive mission. And that was to take relevant threat information that related to domestic threats and use 

that information to map against the potential vulnerability to 

which the threat was directed, and shore up that vulnerability. 

So we take a look at the threat, map it against the potential target, and what have we done to reduce the vulnerability, to eliminate the likelihood of the prospects of being attacked, if it were attacked, to reduce or eliminate any damage? 

I believe that mission is and will remain one of the most strategic pieces, one of the most strategic roles that the new department would play. 

However, under the configuration, as I have read it, of the 9/11 

Commission, the relative bills, the president’s own initiative, the 

strategic threat assessment relating to the homeland would be 

done under the auspices of the national counterterrorism center. It 
18

would be doing strategic threat assessment for both foreign and domestic. 

That does not mean that we relocate all our analysts. We are 

still going to be assessments. We will still be providing competitive 

analysis. 

So I think, clearly, the mission that you, the Congress, specifically gave us is compatible with the reorganization that is contemplated by the pieces of legislation. 

I also believe that under any restructuring, IAIP should still 

have the primary and the sole responsibility to deal with the homeland security advisory system. Again, specific responsibility by statute. We undertake it. I think it is a system that is working, and 

nothing conflicts in any of the existing proposals with that mission. 

The third question you asked, however, I think is one that will 

need to be addressed, if not in the legislation, but sometime thereafter. And that is, who is to channel the threat assessment and 

these kinds of information down to the state and local partners? 

We are talking about the integration of the country. We are talking about improving information sharing side by side within the 

federal government, but from top to bottom, federal, state and 

local. 

We know that historically the FBI has done that with the law 

enforcement community. And we have built up, for the past two 

years, strong ongoing daily relationships, interaction, with the 

states and local communities through bulletins and advisories, 

most of them submitted with the support and collaboration of the 

FBI and with the Homeland Security Information Network, with a 

series of calls, hooking up our operations centers and secure videos 

to the states and the locals. 

So again, one of the challenges we will have, I believe, no matter 

how we reconfigure the national intelligence director and the national counterterrorism center, is to hopefully minimize the number 

of means of communication down to the state and locals, so they 

are not getting disparate messages from multiple federal agencies 

about the same thing. 

Again, that is a real challenge, and we think we are, obviously, 

the agency that is best suited to work in conjunction with the FBI 

to deliver that information. 

Chairman COX. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not take up the 

entire 5 minutes. 

Mr. Secretary, you are aware of the lack of inspections of chemical plants and the fact that we do not have any real security 

standards for our chemical plants at this point. 

Is there a reason why we have not taken stronger mandatory 

measures to protect chemical facilities up to this point? 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, to your point, there have been no mandatory measures that have been taken, but there have been many 

initiatives undertaken in conjunction with the chemical industry 

and hundreds of millions of dollars invested to add security and 

prevention. 

You are absolutely right. We literally have thousands and thousands of chemical facilities around the country. Within the unit of 
19

infrastructure protection, I dare say it is one of the top, if not the 

top priority. 

And what we have done is take a look at these facilities and, by 

and large, provide the homeland security adviser of each state, as 

well as the operators of the facilities, certain documents and planning tools as we beef up security. 

Characteristics and common vulnerabilities: Some of them 

have—many of them have the same kinds of vulnerabilities. So in 

a certain extent, one size does fit all. 

We have given them indicators of what the might look for, potential terrorist activity in terms of surveillance, reconnaissance, 

mindful of their need to limit access to critical areas within their 

facilities. 

And we have also given them buffer zone protection plans so they 

can begin working both internal, inside their operations, and external, outside the community, to protect these facilities. 

And in time, as these have all been distributed and we have 

begun working with some of the largest and most critical companies to see that the vulnerabilities are assessed and the buffer zone 

protection plans are put into place, and then working with the 

state, and particularly the local police and fire chiefs, go in and 

confirm that the vulnerability gaps have been closed and the buffer 

protection plans have been put in place. 

But we still have a long way to go, Congressman. There are thousands of those facilities out there. But we, frankly, started with 

those closest to the most densely populated areas that have the 

greatest potential for harm if they were turned from an economic 

asset into a weapon. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Of those thousands of facilities you mentioned, how many do you 

have knowledge that your department has actually visited? 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe your earlier comment with regard to a couple dozen is probably correct. I will get that number back to you. 

I think one of the challenges that we have is to understand, one, 

that there are common vulnerabilities among many of them; and, 

two, we are going to rely heavily upon those first responders at the 

state and local level to help us make some of these assessments 

and help us ensure that the buffer zone protection plans are put 

into place. 

After all, these are the men and women who are going to respond 

to it in the first place. And there have been a lot of initiatives that 

they have undertaken as well. 

So I can get back to you with a specific number that we have visited. But, again, part of our challenge in trying to deal with thousands and thousands of chemical locations, is building a standard, 

at certain levels, for protection. And that is our first effort, to create a standard of best practice for certain facilities that we want 

to see adopted across the board. 

To date, the chemical industry estimates they have invested 

about three-quarters of a billion dollars in security measures. I am 

not in a position to confirm it. But we are aware that we have gone 

into some of these chemical facilities where literally there have 

been hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of investments made. 
20

Mr. THOMPSON. So is it your department’s belief that the voluntary approach to working with chemical plants is working and 

it is better and having a mandatory situation with the chemical 

plant? 

Mr. RIDGE. Until such time as Congress mandates a specific approach, we will continue to work in collaboration not only with the 

chemical companies, but in collaboration with the first responders, 

who are the ones who are going to be called in the event something 

happens in that community, to see that the best practices are 

adopted and the appropriate investments are made. 

And we will continue to prioritize within all of these chemical 

companies and go out and personally visit and personally oversee 

the development of the protection zones around those, and just 

work our way down the list with the help of state and local first 

responders. 

Mr. CAMP. [Presiding.] The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Secretary, the need to improve border security and have a 

national strategy for the management of our border has been evident for some time, for decades, some might say. And your testimony goes to improvements that have been made in bringing—

Mr. DICKS. Will the Chairman yield just for a point of inquiry? 

Mr. CAMP. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Are we going to go vote at the end of the Chairman’s—

Mr. CAMP. We are going to continue to stay in session, and the 

Chairman has gone to vote and will come back, and we will continue to move forward. We are going to continue to question during 

the vote. 

There are 10 minutes of debate, we think, on a motion to recommit. And we will continue to question as long as we can during the 

votes. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. What time—

Mr. CAMP. I believe the Chairman said he had to leave at 4:30. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

In your testimony, obviously we have a lot of improvements that 

we need to make at our border. Your testimony goes to some of the 

changes in bringing travelers and cargo into the U.S. more safely. 

And as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Border and Infrastructure, we have had a lot of hearings on the progress that has 

been made there. 

But my question is this: In a single day—and there is a recent 

article in Time magazine that is coming out highlighting this—in 

a single day, more than 4,000 illegal aliens cross the 375-mile border between Arizona and Mexico, every single day. And as the article indicates, there are no searches for weapons, there is no shoe 

removal, there are no ID checks. 

Where are we in stopping that, and where is this administration 

on that specific issue? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, first of all, I am familiar with the article and 

regret that, at least to my knowledge, there was no effort to contact 

the department that has some statistics that might have been help-
21

ful to the author and to highlight some of the changes that we have 

made over the past 18 months. 

Having said that, I am not in a position to confirm any of their 

statistics, one way or the other. I am in a position to tell you, however, that we have got, because of congressional bipartisan support, 

we have got about 1,500 more agents, border patrol folks down 

there than we did before. 

We are not using unmanned aerial vehicles to get us to places 

where heretofore it has been pretty difficult for the border patrol 

to get to. We have adjusted our tactics accordingly. 

We have heightened particularly our effort in the areas that had 

previously been very, very porous. That is the Arizona Border Patrol Initiative where we continue to pick up, I think, probably 50 

percent more people than we did in previous years. 

And there is a list of initiatives that we have taken at the border 

that were not reflected in the article. I am not going to say to you, 

Mr. Chairman, that the border is no longer porous, there are no 

longer illegal immigrants coming across. But in the span of 18 

months, between more technology, more sensors, more border patrol agents, and frankly a better integration of effort, I think we 

are doing a lot better job in the past 18 months than we probably 

did in the past 18 years. 

We have still got more work to do, though. I am the first one to 

admit we still got more work to do. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I am going to yield the rest of my time to Ms. Dunn. 

Ms. DUNN. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. 

We are, as you can see, racing back and forth for votes. Has the 

gentlelady from Washington, D.C., asked her questions, or would 

you like to ask your questions now? 

Yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from Washington, D.C. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Madam. 

And thank you, Secretary Ridge, for your important work for our 

country. 

There is a growing sense of many of us that we may be fighting 

the last war, and I encourage you to continue to fight the last war, 

because I know that is not over yet. 

I would like to ask you about two very large vulnerabilities that 

some of us see as perhaps part of the next war which we would 

not like to see. One is protection for the much larger private sector 

of our country, the business sector, that produces the resources and 

revenue. And the other is about mass transit and rail. 

This city is typical of large cities, with its official sites protected 

and fortified, but most large cities have very small official sectors 

and huge business sectors. So, first, as to the private sector, you 

endorsed before the 9/11 Commission the national standards for 

the private sector. But you said you objected to the inclusion of 

such standards in a bill that has been introduced, and I was one 

of the sponsors of that bill. 

I am talking about NFPA–1600. You say you objected to it because there should be a number of different kinds of standards to 

draw on. Then you seem to end up saying that the NFPA–1600 

would be a good starting point, additional standards, guidelines 

and best practices. 
22

So are we reading from the same script here? Because far from 

pinning you down, all that this bill said was—it began, just as you 

say, you believe we should, with the American National Standards 

Institution and National Fire Protection, then it says, you know, 

anything else—and it says existing private sector emergency preparedness guidance or all best practices. 

And the reason I ask it is that we are sitting here with a wideopen federal sector. We went to your Web site and could not find 

anything on the Web site that gave guidance to the business sector, 

to the private sector. 

And so I want to ask you when such guidance will be coming forward, particularly since you objected to the bill which I think 

would do exactly what you testified before the 9/11 Commission you 

would be doing. 

And then, about rail security, just let me say how completely 

fearful I am about rail and mass transit. That is where the people 

are, Mr. Secretary. I went to a rail hearing here, sat in on a rail 

hearing here. And I was just astounded. 

Somebody from your department and somebody from the Federal 

Railroad Administration were both there. I could find no locus for 

who deals with rail and mass transit security in our country, no 

assessments going on, no national standards or plans even being 

thought of by these two officials. 

I did not expect something comparable to aviation, but it is very 

frightening to think that people get on Metro, get on the subways 

in New York, get on railroads, that there is no funding and not 

even any guidance in these two sectors. 

And the private sector is one, the mass transit sector is the 

other. And if you wanted to ask me where the American people are, 

it would not be on the airplanes, where we are beginning to fight 

the good fight, it would be on these two sectors which I believe are 

almost completely uncovered. 

Ms. DUNN. I remind the gentlelady—excuse me, Secretary 

Ridge—that there is only 1 minute left for the reply of the director. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. RIDGE. Let me respond, Congresswoman. 

First of all, I would like to personally get back to you, because 

the standards that I have endorsed before the 9/11 Commission, if 

it was communicated to you that somebody opposed them, I need 

to find that out, because I do not. 

But I would like to get back and deal with issue personally, because it was a voluntary standard, very appropriate for the private 

sector to review and certainly a strong recommendation on behalf 

of the 9/11 Commission. I stand by how I testified before the 9/11 

Commission. So I will get back to you on that. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Because they have endorsed what you 

have said. 

Mr. RIDGE. Absolutely. And I think endorse what you are saying. 

I mean, the point of it is, we throw some standards out there, get 

the private sector engaged. 

But you should also know that pursuant to our mission in infrastructure protection, as well as a presidential directive, we are 

presently working on sector-specific protection plans. Transpor-
23

tation is included as one of them. But this is across the entire private sector arena: transportation, financial services, chemical. 

Now, because we are working on a national strategy dealing with 

each of these sectors, does not mean that we are not taking steps 

now to add additional layers of security in those sectors; for example, mass transit. 

As you know, we are running pilot programs with regard to explosive technology on both passengers as well as baggage along 

with Amtrak’s route. We are also running some pilots on biological 

and chemical sensors that certainly, in time, potentially would be 

deployed both within the units and elsewhere along the mass transit line. 

We also know that we put in more canine teaMs. And a lot of 

the local communities, with our support, have more plain 

clothesmen and uniformed police providing greater security. 

We also know that on a matter of course the railroad and mass 

transit companies, on their own volition—because they are partners in this—often go out and review their infrastructure, go 

through certain tunnels or review the bridges for safety and security purposes. 

So there is a good partnership developing. And we will have by 

the end of this year a national transportation security plan, which 

will build on, hopefully, some of the technological advancements 

that we make, some of the initiatives that have already been undertaken. 

So I think, to your point, I will get back to you on the voluntary 

standards. Please know that we are required by presidential directive, as well as part of the mission the Congress gave us to come 

up with sector-specific protection plans. We are doing that across 

the country. 

And by the end of the year we are also obliged to have a critical 

infrastructure database. We are working with homeland security 

advisers in all the states and territories to list critical assets, many 

of which could be if they were destroyed could turn into weapons 

and others destroyed would have enormous economic and psychological impact. 

So, again, all that is a work in progress. 

Ms. DUNN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

My intent is not to cut off either of the speakers; it is to provide 

an opportunity for each of the folks on both sides to be able to ask 

questions. 

I now yield to myself 5 minutes for the purpose of questioning. 

Secretary Ridge, the 9/11 Commission report put a spotlight on 

some of the inefficiencies in congressional oversight. I think this is 

a very good time for us to look at our own responsibility and our 

effectiveness as an oversight body and take advantage of the increased will that we see coming out of the 9/11 Commission when 

it comes to reforming what our responsibility is. 

Do you agree with the 9/11 Commission report that there should 

be a permanent oversight committee in each body of the Congress? 

Mr. RIDGE. I certainly would appreciate the reduction in number 

of oversight committees. Whether or not in the wisdom of the leadership and the consensus of the bodies in the House and Senate, 

you could reduce it from 88 to one in each, I will leave it to you. 
24

But it is pretty clear from our perspective, just based on our very 

appropriate interaction with Congress. 

You have got the congressional oversight responsibility. We look 

to you for the appropriations. So we have to build this department. 

There has to be a partnership. I happen to think if there was more 

concentrated emphasis on oversight, we could have a more effective 

relationship. 

To give you an example, Madam Chairman, this year so far the 

secretary, the undersecretary and the assistant secretaries generally have appeared nearly 160 times at hearings. They have been 

involved and many of our staff have been involved on the hill over 

1,300 times for briefings. 

And literally we have hundreds and hundreds of General Accounting Office inquiries. And you know those are enormous, laborintensive responses that we have to provide, understandably. So 

anything that the House will do to reduce not the intensity of the 

oversight, but the number of committees and subcommittees to 

which we report for oversight would certainly, we think, improve 

the effectiveness of our interaction and frankly make us a stronger 

department and more secure country. 

Ms. DUNN. Do you think that the committee you are testifying 

before today has been useful to you in terms of advising you and 

working with you to protect our country? 

Mr. RIDGE. Yes. We have had a good interaction. And, again, how 

the leadership in both chambers decides to allocate those responsibilities, we have got to leave it to them. 

But and I would say to you in response to some of the concerns 

that some of your colleagues have, I am prepared to stay a little 

longer. I do want people to get a chance to ask their questions. I 

have sat on that side of the table myself and appreciate that. I will 

do as much as I can to accommodate the interest of colleagues on 

both sides of the aisle. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your sensitivity. 

Let me ask you a general question. What would be the two or 

three first things you would do or you would wish accomplished if 

there were unlimited funds and time and staffing? 

Mr. RIDGE. Much of what I would hope we could accomplish will 

not be driven as much by money as it will be by science. I mean, 

I think there are a lot of gaps and weaknesses out there that 

science and technology may help us fill. And Congress has been 

very, very generous in that regard. 

I suspect, because there continues to be concern about the borders and concern about immigration and concern about matters related to that, that at some point in time there would be additional 

dollars appropriated for enforcement. But that would require, I 

think, not only looking at the enforcement side, but what the policy 

might be relative to our borders. 

Ms. DUNN. In the early days of the Department of Homeland Security—and actually up to the current time—there has been discussion about TTIC, where it belongs, who should be overseeing it. 

Are you satisfied with the fact that TTIC is now housed with the 

CIA, or would you rather have that under the Department of 

Homeland Security? 
25

Mr. RIDGE. We were not initially looking to acquire more responsibility, inasmuch as we are just trying to integrate the responsibilities we had. And it just seems to me that that question has been 

answered by the embrace of the 9/11 Commission, Congress and 

the president of the national counterterrorism center. 

I think basically that threat integration center has evolved and 

is evolving into the national counterterrorism center. And as defined by the president and the role it would play according to the 

president’s proposal, frankly, it would provide us probably even 

better integration of foreign and domestic threat information that 

we can apply to our role to reduce vulnerabilities and secure the 

country. 

So it is a moot point, Madam Chairman. I think the national 

counterterrorism center is where the strategic threat assessment 

will go, and we are quite comfortable with that. 

Ms. DUNN. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

The Chair now yields 5 minutes to the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Secretary, good to see you back on the Hill. 

I am very concerned about one subject. Out in our part of the 

world, port and container security, is a major issue for the port of 

Seattle, Port of Tacoma. The Chairman has the port Los Angeles. 

As you know, the Coast Guard estimated last year that the ports 

need to make about $1.5 billion worth of improvements in the near 

term and roughly, $7.3 billion over 10 years to meet the security 

standards set by the Coast Guard, as instructed by Congress in the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act. 

The administration’s budget since September 11th have requested only $46 million for port security. 

And although Congress has provided additional money, there remains a billion-dollar funding gap to meet the immediate needs 

identified by the Coast Guard. 

The House approved $125 million for port security grants this 

year. 

But even that figure leaves us well short of where we need to be 

to ensure the security of our ports. 

And as you remember, just a year or so ago, there was a lockout on the West Coast of our longshoremen. And that immediately 

had economic implications. And if we ever got into a situation, 

heaven forbid, that a dirty bomb came in on one of those containers, was shipped to Chicago, it explodes, contamination 

spreads, there would be a problem, I think, bringing these containers into the ports of Tacoma, Seattle, Los Angeles and the 

other West Coast ports, with serious economic repercussions. 

Now, in light of that, I am concerned that we are still not putting 

enough money into port security and container security. We are 

also told that the number of people going abroad—a little group of 

five goes over for 120 days to get set up for the container inspection 

program and that the professional are telling us that that is not 

long enough to get the job done at these foreign ports. And I agree 

that we have to do this. But let us try to make this effective. 

Can you address these issues for me? 

Mr. RIDGE. Yes, Congressman, I would. Thank you. 
26

Our ports, appropriately viewed as a potential point of vulnerability, have been the highest priority within the Coast Guard. Obviously, they are the point of the sphere when it comes to maritime 

security. But they have worked in partnership with Customs and 

Border Patrol. 

And we try to do, once we have identified vulnerabilities, you try 

to lay in multiple layers, multiple systems so that you do not have 

a single point of failure. And so then in our job to manage the risk, 

we do it several different ways. 

You correctly pointed out that we begin that whole process with 

the Container Security Initiative, where today as you and I are 

having this conversation, we have DHS employees either working 

or on their way to 25 ports overseas where we work with our allies 

to use X-ray equipment to, once we have located and targeted highrisk cargo. 

The high-risk cargo is identified through a very, very sophisticated operation, based on kinds of data that is being accumulated 

by Customs. We know a lot about ships; we know a lot about shippers; we know a lot about ports. 

And every shipping container is required—everybody sending a 

container on a vessel to the United States electronically must send 

a manifest to us 24 hours in advance. If we do not get it 24 hours 

in advance of loading, it is not loaded. 

So we know we get that. We have had about 1,000 do-not-load 

orders, and they just sit on the side, regardless of the contents, because you did not comply with the regulation. 

Once we take a look at that, we have identified about 6 percent 

of these as high-risk cargo: there was something about the ship, 

the shipper, potential content, an anomaly in the manifest. There 

is an algorithm we put together, and we change it all the time. 

To give you an example, we had once situation where the manifest said frozen fish, obviously a commercial product, should be distributed from the Pacific to Central or South America. But we also 

had the ship registered on the manifest, and we knew it was not 

a refrigerated ship. 

Obviously, we opened it, and found hundreds of thousands dollars worth of illegal weapons. 

So just an anecdote, but 100 percent review of the manifest. 

High-risk cargo, we X-ray over there. The ship moves to the United 

States, we pick up more information about passengers and crew. 

The National Targeting Center vets the passengers and crew. And 

sometimes for intelligence purposes, in response to intelligence, we 

will board vessels before they come into the United States. And 

then there are security protocols in our states, as well. 

Congress said to the Coast Guard: You need to come up security 

plans at every port. One size does not fit all. You need to sit down 

and work with the private sector to develop your vulnerability assessments and bring in security measures. 

Mr. DICKS. But, Mr. Secretary—

Ms. DUNN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. RIDGE. I am sorry to be so long-winded, Congressman. 

I think the original estimate was correct, but it did not say the 

government necessarily has to pay for it. The government is spending billions and billions and billions of dollars on port security. It 
27

is not as if you have too many companies that cannot afford a little 

more money to help secure part of their distribution chain. It is a 

debate we need to have. But I do not think it is fair to say that 

the federal government is not contributing significantly to the security of our ports. We are. 

Ms. DUNN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair yields 5 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut, 

Mr. Shays. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. 

Mr. Ridge, you have done a very fine job in a very difficult position. I have a number of questions. I would like some shorter answers just to cover them as long as you feel like you can answer 

them. 

One, I would like to know what the public’s right to know is 

when we issue a threat. If we know, for instance, that a particular 

city is targeted, does the public have a right to know that? 

Mr. RIDGE. When we have had credible information, as we did 

about a month ago with regard to a particular community and particular sector in the community, we made it public. 

Mr. SHAYS. And is that the consistent policy of the administration? 

Mr. RIDGE. Yes. I must tell you that that was made public. There 

are times when we get threat information, the credibility of which 

may be questionable or undetermined—

Mr. SHAYS. Okay, I understand. 

Mr. RIDGE. —and then we will let those folks—

Mr. SHAYS. How about with cargo? That is not baggage on a passenger plane. Do you think the public has a right to know when 

cargo is on a plane that is not checked the same way that baggage 

is checked? 

Because 23 percent of all cargo goes in passenger planes. Does 

the public have a right to know when there is cargo on a plane that 

is a passenger plane? 

Mr. RIDGE. The public has a right to know the security protocols 

that we have undertaken in order to manage the risk of the cargo 

in the hull. They have a right to know that we have got a known 

shipper program. They have a right to know we have got random 

inspections, but we do not inspect every single item that is in the 

hull. 

They have a right to know we do background checks on crew 

members and employees have access to it. They have a right to 

know that we are working on explosive—

Mr. SHAYS. So the answer is kind of no, though, I am gathering 

from you. 

Mr. RIDGE. I think—

Mr. SHAYS. No, I mean, I would like to know if 50 percent of the 

cargo on a passenger plane is not checked the same way baggage 

is. I would want to know that. And I know that you believe—

Mr. RIDGE. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. —believe that the known shipper is important. I do 

not think it covers my need. 

Are you concerned about the assassination of any public official 

during this campaign season? There has been a lot of talk about 
28

this. Is there dialogue? Is there any threat that public officials are 

being targeted? 

Mr. RIDGE. The most frequent position mentioned in any threat 

reporting, and I dare say it is probably been historic, regardless of 

the administration, has been the president of the United States. 

But other than those threats that we get on a regular basis, and 

I dare say probably always have and always will from time to time, 

I do not believe there is any other—

Mr. SHAYS. What is the most important recommendation of the 

9/11 Commission, one or two of them, from your perspective, of 

homeland security? 

Mr. RIDGE. The direction to the national intelligence director to 

do everything they can to make sure that the information is necessary for both federal agencies, but the state and locals to help secure America is shared quickly and effectively. 

I think one of the most important responsibilities of this new national intelligence director is to ensure that information sharing 

continues to improve, and that, frankly, we go back over the old 

war, Cold War classification of information and the handing caveats that are attached to it, to scrub them to see if they are relevant 

in combating terrorism. Because I do think we need to get more information down to the state and locals. 

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to ask you, with the time I have left, 

what you think your biggest success is and what your biggest disappointment or biggest failure has been to date. 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe in totality gaining greater control over our 

borders from land, sea and air has been a significant accomplishment, and it has been done within the department with a lot of assistance from the federal agencies. Not the greatest disappointment, but the greatest challenge that it is still going to take us 

years to deal with is the integration of all the databases that we 

have to enhance that ability to protect ourselves at the border. 

We have the US–VISIT that is connected to multiple databases. 

But integrating all of that and then frankly the integration of 

broader information resources in time is I think the biggest challenge. Not a disappointment, it is just the greatest challenge. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for your responses. 

And thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. DUNN. The Chair yields 5 minutes to the gentleman from 

Massachusetts, Mr. Frank. 

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Secretary, in the immigration area, one of the 

things that struck me about the commission, they quite explicitly 

said in a staff report that the problem with people coming into this 

country who are dangerous is not the legal authority to exclude bad 

people, but the difficulty of administering that. 

Would you concur with that? Do we need to change the substantive law or do you now have in the department sufficient legal 

authority to keep people out; the problem being of course you do 

not always have the evidence right at hand, et cetera? 

Mr. RIDGE. I would dare say that I believe like any older statute, 

Congressman, Immigration and Naturalization Act is probably in 

need of review and modification, but there are basic authorities 

within that statute that are probably eternal that could be the 

basis for more rigorous enforcement. 
29

Mr. FRANK. Okay. The current law was redone in 1996, so it is 

not quite as old as some of the other things around here. But you 

are not aware of a major need to amend the law to tighten up your 

ability to exclude? 

Mr. RIDGE. That is a fair question. Not at this point, but we do 

have people with Citizenship and Immigration Services reviewing 

this statute for me presently. I cannot tell you today, but I might 

tell you tomorrow. 

Mr. FRANK. Actually, the commission staff report referred to 

what they said was the myth that the murderers of September 11 

came in legally. And the answer they said was, no, they were not. 

It was not that the law was not inadequate. 

I would be interested in that review. The Civil Liberties Board, 

I am glad to see the Civil Liberties Board that you referenced—and 

I appreciate the fact that the commission called for it. I think it 

is very important, we have this need to give law enforcement more 

vigorous powers. I think that is virtually, unanimously agreed to 

when you are dealing with people willing to kill themselves to kill 

others. 

But commensurate with that, you need to have better supervisory authority. And with the best one in the world, we have seen 

mistakes that were made by law enforcement. 

Here is my problem with the board, the board that is supposed 

to monitor what is done by, presumably, the Justice Department, 

the Department of Homeland Security and et cetera: It is a board 

that is composed of all the people that it is monitoring. It is entirely self-policing. It is kind of the like the House Ethics Committee. And that does not give me a lot of hope that it is going to 

be all that effective. 

It is chaired by the deputy attorney general, the undersecretary 

for border and transportation security. Shouldn’t we have some 

independence built into this? I mean, it is not a case of people 

being bad people, but it is very hard if you are in charge of an operation and you are in charge of these people, being given the supposedly independent authority to supervise them goes against what 

we know about human nature. Wouldn’t we be better off if we were 

able to have at least some independent capacity here? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, first of all, I think you know that whatever 

their deliberations or activity they take, it would be done in a very 

transparent way. So all those organizations with whom we work, 

who represent groups—frankly, they represent America’s interest 

in protecting privacy and civil liberties and freedom, will have access to that information. 

And, frankly, the make-up of that commission, I believe, exists 

primarily to establish a culture of privacy and awareness of that 

within the federal government. And they have plenty of opportunity for external groups to influence that—

Mr. FRANK. Well, I appreciate that about the culture. But I guess 

I disagree that having the external groups just be able to influence 

them. I mean, they can do that now. The notion of a board does, 

generally, suggest some independence from the agencies. 

The inspector general have given, for instance—the inspector 

general’s department has more independence from the department’s normal operation than this board would. And I am troubled 
30

by there being no—it really is people appealing to themselves and 

governing themselves. And it does not mean that they are, as I 

said, weak-minded or not committed, it is just very hard to wear 

two hats, to be the people running the agency. 

I mean, we are talking about the deputy attorney general and 

the undersecretary. These are people who help run the agency, and 

then they say, ‘‘Okay, now we are through running the agency, we 

are going put on our hat of monitoring the agency.’’ And I am just 

not persuaded that is easily done. 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, hopefully, at least, you are persuaded that, at 

least from your perspective, it is a very important first step for us 

to recognize what the Congress did as it relates to homeland security. 

You created that privacy officer with homeland security. And you 

created a mechanism within homeland security through that privacy officer that we have empowered whenever we begin to discuss 

anything within homeland security, Congressman, that has any impact on privacy or civil liberties, one or both of those individuals 

are brought in. 

Mr. FRANK. Are they on the board? 

Mr. RIDGE. This administration—yes. 

Mr. FRANK. Are the privacy officers—

Mr. RIDGE. Yes, yes. 

My recollection, Dan Sutherland, whose our civil liberties, and 

Nuala O’Connor, who is our privacy officer, will be part of that 

board. And I will tell you, the first time we had it tested in terms 

of monitoring our own process is when we had to deal with the European Union that had serious privacy concerns about our use of 

their passenger name records. They took a look at our process and 

procedures—

Mr. FRANK. But that proves my point because you had an independent entity there, the European Union, that was able to assert 

that privilege—their concerns. I do not see anything comparable if 

we are entirely domestic. 

Mr. SWEENEY. [Presiding.] The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Secretary, welcome. Thank you for being here. 

I have very little time because we are running out of time on a 

vote. But I wanted to get to a specific question I have asked you 

about in appropriations before. 

And as you know, I have spent the better part of the last year 

with others—Mrs. Lowey and other folks—trying to get a threatbased funding formula passed through Congress. 

We asked the 9/11 Commission to consider the change. They 

made it part of their recommendations. Their quote was: ‘‘Homeland security systems should be based strictly on an assessment of 

risks and vulnerabilities.’’

In this committee, an underlying first-responder bill has such a 

formula in place. There is a separate free-standing Bill that make 

threat, vulnerability and consequences the formula change. 

You retain significant authority, regardless of what we are able 

to do or not to do here in Congress. And if we do not pass such 

legislation in this next cycle, I am interested in hearing what recommendations you would make, what changes you could make to 
31

really ensure that the federal resources and funds are really getting to those places that are most threatened. 

And I hate to do this, because of the appearance of a ‘‘New York 

verses everybody else’’ proposition or a ‘‘rural verse urban’’ proposition. But I come form the 32nd largest rural district in America, 

and I do not think that is relevant at all. 

It really is not about New York. But New York is obviously a 

very threatened place. And we seemingly are going backward in 

terms of what resources we are able to send them. For example, 

in fiscal year 2003, we sent a total of $312 million. New York’s expenses were somewhere in the range of one billion dollars. We recognized that the federal government is not going to be able to cover 

everything for any particular jurisdiction. But that was the best we 

ever did. In 1994, it receded to about $183 million. 

Your Department, because you have political pressures, and I 

think there is a valid recognition of need in a lot of other places 

for some minimal level, of preparedness, has essentially taken the 

high-threat fund that we established in the supplemental in 2003 

and really deluded it at the expense of what I believe are the seven 

or eight jurisdictions that face the greatest threats. 

I am wondering if you have alternative plans in mind. What authorities would you use to ensure that those resources are going 

there? Because Mayor Bloomberg, in New York, as other big-city 

mayors have told me, they cannot sustain their level of security 

without bankrupting their jurisdictions. 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, I think the president outlined a compromise between the ideal and the real. The real is a recognition 

that within Congress, it is unlikely that we will get away from 

some kind of formula that effectively distributes a certain number 

of dollars to every state. 

And I think one can make an argument, a persuasive one, that 

every state is entitled to some modicum of support to build up an 

internal capacity, just given the random unpredictable nature of 

terrorism. 

However, as the president indicated in the 2005 budget submission, we would prefer to see a substantial number of those dollars 

removed from the funding formula side to the urban area security 

initiative side, where on an annual basis, not just population comes 

into the formula, but a vulnerability, critical infrastructure protection and threat. 

There is a certain fluidity to both the threat and the vulnerability. As communities and private sector companies have built up 

the security and preventive measures around their infrastructure, 

the vulnerability is reduced, the possibility of attack is reduced, 

perhaps the level of threat is reduced. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Is that the case in New York? 

Mr. RIDGE. Pardon me? 

Mr. SWEENEY. Is that the case in New York? 

Mr. RIDGE. I think there are some cities like New York City and 

Washington, D.C., and a few other major metropolitan areas that 

for the foreseeable future are going to require heavy support, no 

matter what the equation. No matter what the equation is for the 

Urban Area Security Initiative grants, New York is always going 

to be at the top of the list, by far. There is not even a close second. 
32

Mr. SWEENEY. Very quickly, we failed in this body in the appropriations process to put the President’s number back in, as you will 

recall, and failed pretty miserably. It puts you, I think, at a distinct 

disadvantage to really meet those highest threat area needs. And 

so what are you going to do if we do not change that in conference? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, again, we will take a look at whatever language 

you have given me, to determine whether or not the dollars that 

were available previously that we distributed to—we went from 30 

to 50 urban communities is compressed, so that fewer communities 

receive more dollars. It is a question of dollars and threat assessment. But we know there are two or three that are always going 

to be at the top of the list. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Well, I would like to work with you because we 

have a conference where we could do something. 

And I have run out of time. There are 4 minutes remaining in 

the vote. So we will recess for 10 minutes subject to the call of the 

Chair and come back. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman COX. [Presiding.] With the secretary’s indulgence, we 

will proceed with the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms. 

Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

I am going to hopefully get in three questions. The first one is 

a very basic one. 

Are all of the directorates, all of the offices, now fully housed and 

staffed within the department? 

Mr. RIDGE. They are fully established. We still have additional 

analysts to be hired for the information analytical group and more 

people for the IAIP group generally. 

But, by and large, with that and a few more people in the Office 

of Management, we are pretty much up to required staffing levels. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. Thank you. 

I am also glad to hear your focus on border security, because, as 

you may know, I have sponsored legislation to create a border patrol unit for the U.S. Virgin Islands to deal with both our human 

and narcotic smuggling that has been increasing in the area. And 

I am sure you can imagine that as you close the borders in one 

area, the focus will shift to another. And we are already seeing 

some increase. 

So I raise the issue to solicit your support or at the very least 

a commitment to work with me on that issue. 

Mr. RIDGE. Congresswoman, I would be pleased to take a look at 

your legislation specifically and see what we could do to support 

your objective. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Yes. Thank you. 

And, you know, as another part of that, from the very outset of 

your tenure as the secretary of homeland security, you have always 

stressed the fact that homeland security begins beyond the borders 

of the United States. 

We are also in the region of the Caribbean, and a lot of the network that we are involved with that send some of that human and 

narcotic traffic to our jurisdiction comes up through the Caribbean 

region. 
33

The United States has put a lot of demands on the countries of 

the Caribbean who are very close, long-term neighbors and friends, 

and they are really ill-prepared to bring their security up to the 

levels that we are requiring of them. And this country has provided 

decreasing amounts of aid to the Caribbean region. 

Are you aware of any initiative from the federal government to 

assist these countries in the Caribbean who are struggling right 

now just to meet their everyday requirements of their own citizens, 

to deal with the security needs that we are imposing on them to 

provide security for us? 

Mr. RIDGE. Congresswoman, I am not aware of any specific initiative. What I am aware of, however, is a growing recognition, certainly within our department and other places within the administration, that some of the concerns that you have addressed, the 

change in migration pattern for illegal aliens, drugs and others, is 

altered because when we close one gap—

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Right. 

Mr. RIDGE. —and do more in certain areas of the Caribbean, the 

same network that illegally pushes humans and drugs will find a 

weaker link or an opening. And to that end, we are taking a look 

at, even within our department, what we could do to bolster our 

efforts in that regard in the Caribbean. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Just this morning, the Joint Center for Political and Economic 

Studies and the New York Academy of Medicine released a report 

that says terrorism response plans will not protect many Americans. And what they are saying is that many Americans would not 

be safeguarded because existing terrorism response plans do not 

account for how people would behave, that current plans have been 

created in a top-down style, telling people what to do in the event 

of attacks, without considering all of the risks and concerns that 

drive people’s actions. 

So the study documents that only two-fifths of Americans, perhaps, would follow instructions to go to a public vaccination site, 

in the case of a smallpox outbreak, and only three-fifths would follow the instructions to stay inside an undamaged building other 

than their home after a dirty bomb explosion. 

How do you think the department in their planning can address, 

or have you begun to address the issue of how people behave under 

certain circumstances, in that they might not follow the instructions and therefore place more people at risk under events such as 

these? 

Mr. RIDGE. I am not familiar with the specifics of the report, but 

I dare say without reading it, I probably agree with their conclusions that the response that the emergency and medical community 

and first responder community would hope for in times of a crisis, 

a biological attack, a chemical attack, a radiological attack is not 

necessarily the one they are going to get from people in that community. 

And that is why one of our missions is to build and then sustain 

a public awareness and public education campaign. It was very interesting, I think back to all the political cartoons I have on my 

desk, when duck tape and sheeting was the subject of some humor. 

That was to be involved in the emergency kit only for very, very 
34

selective occasions, just a handful when we want you to shelter in 

place. But there was a reason that it was included. 

So the bottom line is that there are different responses to different kinds of attacks. And part of the mission of the Department 

of Homeland Security—and here is where we can work, I think, in 

collaboration with the Congress that has the ability to go out and 

educate as well—we have training responsibilities and we work 

with emergency management professionals, but to build up the response capability, build up the informational awareness and situational awareness so that the numbers of an appropriate response, 

of people who are prepared to take an appropriate response, will 

increase in the next survey. Because I dare say their conclusions 

are probably correct. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. All right, and I think the focus—what they 

are trying to say is that it is not just an education, a top-down education process, but communities want to be more involved in the 

planning themselves, and then the response would probably increase. 

You have been asked questions about the director of Central Intelligence, but I also wanted to raise a question about that. You assert that the president first gave the director of Central Intelligence expanded authority to coordinate policy and develop the 

budget for the entire intelligence community while he waits for us 

to change the law, set up the scope and authority of a national intelligence director. 

In light of this and your comments, is it your recommendation 

that President Bush should endorse or a president should endorse 

and pledge to sign legislation to establish a national intelligence director with budget and other authority over all of the various intelligence agencies throughout government? 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe the president during a congressional briefing 

last week indicated his total support not only of the concept and 

the office of national intelligence director, but also expressed publicly to the members, your colleagues assembled, both chambers, 

both sides of the aisle, that he thought individual should be vested 

with complete budget authority. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. But it would bring together all intelligence 

under that one director? 

Mr. RIDGE. Yes. The budget authority would be brought together 

under the national intelligence director. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. In light of this and your comments, is it your 

recommendation that President Bush should endorse, or that a 

president should endorse and pledge to sign legislation to establish 

a national intelligence director with budget and other authority 

over all of the various intelligence agencies throughout government? 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe the president, during a congressional briefing last week, indicated his total support not only of the concept 

and the office of national intelligence director, but also expressed 

publicly to the members, your colleagues assembled, both chambers, both sides of the aisles, that he thought that individual 

should be vested with complete budget authority. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. But it would bring together all intelligence 

under that one director? 
35

Mr. RIDGE. Yes. The budget authority would be brought together 

under the national intelligence director. But as part of the president’s proposal, you would have the national intelligence director. 

But you would also have a joint intelligence community council; 

that means those who have a legitimate reason to discuss with the 

intelligence director intelligence requirements, intelligence needs, 

budget priorities. There are a lot of operational issues that need to 

be vetted throughout the intelligence community. 

So the president has said, strong national intelligence director, 

but to be supported and to interact with the joint intelligence community council. And those are all Cabinet-level members who 

would rely upon the NID for collection and analysis and the like. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. One final question. I was not clear that you 

supported having one committee for oversight. For example, the establishment of this committee—

Mr. RIDGE. I will let you decide which one it should be. Obviously, from our perspective, Madam Congresswoman, the fewer the 

better. I guess the fewest is one. 

[Laughter.] 

But there might be something, however, understanding the 

unique nature of the intelligence role that we play, that at least for 

the information-analysis piece to be accountable, responsible and to 

have the oversight from the Intelligence Committee as well. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. SHAYS. [Presiding.] Mr. Markey? We will not hit the clock 

until you actually sit down and say your first word. 

Okay. Time has started. 

Mr. MARKEY. Can I appeal the Chair? 

[Laughter.] 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Secretary, could a Beslan occur in Boston or Birmingham or 

Baltimore? 

Mr. RIDGE. From what I know now, and we still do not have all 

the information relative to how several dozen terrorists gained control of the school, but based on preliminary information, I would 

say that it is very unlikely, but there are still probably some lessons to be learned. And right now, much of the information we 

have received is just through open-source reporting. 

But I think in this business, you never say never. And we do 

need to take a look at what transpired; how so many people managed to get their way, I think, surreptitiously; how so many explosive devices appear to have already been in place; how so many 

weapons may have already been inside the school. 

It is not as if the school was rushed by a platoon of terrorists. 

There is something else at work here, Congressman. And until I 

know and all of us know completely what happened, I think it 

would very difficult to draw conclusions. 

Having said that, I think I know where your line of questioning 

is going. And improving security around our educational system, 

regardless of Beslan, is something we need to do, and have done 

and will continue to do. 

Mr. MARKEY. Are you in the process of doing an examination of 

the lessons of this Russian catastrophe? 
36

Mr. RIDGE. Yes. We are, the intelligence community is, and the 

FBI is. 

Again, much of the initial information we received was, frankly, 

just through their TV commentary and press reports. We are getting more information from the government. But I do not think 

anyone would conclude that we have complete information yet, 

Congressman. 

But we try to learn from any of these incidents overseas involving a terrorist attack, see if there are lessons we can apply here. 

Mr. MARKEY. Obviously, we spend a lot of time talking here 

about chemical facilities and nuclear facilities, about New York 

City and Washington, D.C., being potential targets. 

Clearly, what has happened here is that the playing field has 

been broadened by these terrorists, and they realize the impact 

that they can have upon a country. And, obviously, on September 

11th there were 19 terrorists who were suicidal, potentially well 

armed. And if that kind of an incident occurred in a school, in a 

community in our country, it would be the most horrific event that 

we had ever witnessed. 

And I think it is very important for us to take all of the steps 

that are necessary and to articulate to the American people what 

a plan would be to make sure that we would not have a Beslan 

which happened in our country. 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, the horror associated with that incident speaks to the nature of the evil that we are trying to combat. 

The notion that children in school and their parents and their 

teachers, innocents all, would be subjected to the horror of the day, 

in our minds is unspeakable and unconscionable. So we agree on 

that. 

I think we also note, in response to smaller-scale but violence in 

our schools in the 1990s, there are a lot of schools that began, unfortunately, taking security precautions after Columbine and a series of shootings that occurred in our schools. 

A lot of our schools generally reduced the number of places you 

can enter and exit. Many of them now have uniformed, and some 

have un-uniformed police officers patrolling the halls. Unfortunately, some have metal detectors. So we already have a level of 

security. 

We have got a Ready for Kids program that is going to be part 

of our national preparedness campaign we are rolling out, working 

with the secretary of education. 

But we also have to—

Mr. MARKEY. Could I ask you just one more quick question? 

Mr. RIDGE. Sure. I am sorry. 

Mr. MARKEY. It is on a different subject. And it has to do with 

the direct flights from Moscow to the United States. 

A Washington Post report on September 3 indicated that TSA requires that all cargo loaded onto Delta and Aeroflot planes must 

also be screened for explosives. 

As you know, almost none of the cargo that is carried on U.S. 

passenger planes is inspected for explosives or other dangerous materials, which is a huge security loophole that puts airline passengers and crew members at risk. 
37

Other than the flights from Russia to the United States, are 

there any other instances where TSA is currently conducting full 

screening of all cargo on board? 

Chairman COX. The gentleman’s time is expired. But, Mr. Secretary, you can answer the question. 

Mr. RIDGE. I think, in answer to your question, Congressman, 

that is an emergency directive, whether or not it remains a permanent part of the security infrastructure remains to be seen. But 

given the circumstances around the loss of those two flights and 

what we believe to be the reasons, we decided temporarily we needed to bolster their security measures until such time we were satisfied that they had frankly ramped up to the level of security that 

they had professed to have achieved long before that incident occurred. 

Mr. MARKEY. So you may actually discontinue the inspection of 

cargo on those flights? 

Mr. RIDGE. As we try to manage the risk with regard to that and 

other flights, we continue to take a look at additional ways to 

screen cargo. There is a possibility that that would be discontinued, 

that is correct. 

Mr. MARKEY. I think it would be a big mistake not to screen 

those planes flying into the United States without ensuring that all 

potential explosives have been searched for on those planes. I do 

not think that we should run the risk. 

Mr. RIDGE. You and I have had some very good discussions with 

regard to air cargo, and I do not want to leave you the impression 

that the Russian incident is being ignored. 

We continue to require certain levels of inspection from foreign 

carriers coming in. We are continuing to explore explosive technology for our domestic air cargo to start with potential application 

overseas down the road. 

There are a lot of initiatives that we have undertaken, but I cannot tell you with absolute certainty today that for all time and for 

all purposes those four or five flights daily in the United States are 

going to have that technical requirement. We do not know yet. Depends on circumstances. 

Mr. MARKEY. Again, I think it is a mistake. 

Chairman COX. [Presiding.] The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 

Granger, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much, and thank you for being us 

again. 

When I first came to Congress eight years ago, the numbers that 

I heard were that we could reasonably accept 300,000 people coming into the United States a year, and we were getting about 1.2 

million. 

I am looking at a Time magazine article ‘‘Who Let the Door 

Open?’’ And they say that it is as many as 3 million now coming 

illegally in the United States, and said a small but growing number 

come from other countries, and said that 55,890 were apprehended, 

described officially as ‘‘other than Mexicans,’’ because more than 

often, it is Mexicans. 

First of all, I would ask do your numbers—to one side—do you 

believe those numbers? And the most important question is what 
38

are we going to do about it and what are we doing about our border? 

Mr. RIDGE. Our numbers would differ. Unfortunately, I believe, 

they have to guesstimate the number of people that are not apprehended. Coming in with a conclusive figure about the number of 

people if you do not actually know who cross the border, I think, 

is somewhat speculative. But having said that, we admit that we 

have not closed the border completely. 

But I would share with you, Congressman, that I think we have 

gained significant operational control over the border over the past 

18 months with the creation of the department. It is one of our 

highest priorities. And there is a variety of means that we have 

used to try to close the border. 

We certainly have more agents down there because of congressional appropriations. We have more sensor technology. We have 

begun to experiment with unmanned aerial vehicles so that we 

have basically an opportunity to see what is going on in some of 

the more perilous and difficult terrain that we have difficulty accessing, but illegal aliens use as a route into the United States 

We have much closer cooperation with our friends in the Mexican 

law enforcement community. So there are a variety of things at our 

land borders that we continue to promote to try to continue to close 

the gaps. 

Admittedly, we still have work to do. 

Ms. GRANGER. What more do you need? What more do you need 

from us? 

Mr. RIDGE. I think, in time, depending on how the experiment 

with the unmanned aerial vehicles works out, there may be need 

for more capital, equipment and more agents. 

One of the challenges we have is to continue to generate even 

greater support form our friends in Mexico with regard to really 

backing down and eliminating the alien smuggling network. 

Everyone has great empathy for those young men and women 

and families that try to come across our borders. We do not look 

at Mexicans as a terrorist nation or these folks as terrorists. They 

are coming in for the same reason immigrants did many, many 

years ago. 

But we do have a responsibility to protect our borders and try 

to ensure that any immigration is legal. And so to the extent that 

we can do more to break down the illegal network that has been 

established within Mexico that supports this effort, I think, frankly, we are doing better there, but more cooperation would be helpful. 

Ms. GRANGER. I will be going on a tour of the border this coming 

weekend. And I know what I will see. And they take you to the 

places where it is regulated crossing. But what we are hearing are 

the crossing that are certainly not regular crossings. 

And, you know, the border is so long, the number of agents—I 

do not see how we can ever get there from the number of agents. 

So it has to be technology, it seems to me. 

Mr. RIDGE. I think the biggest challenge we have is: What are 

the kinds of technology that we can deploy along the border that 

give us the information, the awareness, the alertness that we need 

to interdict. 
39

And we are experimenting with different kinds of sensors. And 

the latest experiment, I think, has high potential, great potential, 

the unmanned aerial vehicles. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman COX. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cardin, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you once again before our 

committee. 

I want to follow on the Chairman’s comments as to how the implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation for a national intelligence director could impact on the operations of your 

agency, particularly the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection Unit, in getting information that is shared particularly 

with local government. 

There is a concern that as Congress considers how to implement 

the national intelligence director, that there are changes being 

made or suggestions being made that may affect the Department 

of Defense and how it gathers information, et cetera. 

My concern is that your information analysis section within the 

Department of Homeland Security, which is of utmost importance 

for our domestic needs, particularly with local government, that 

that is not compromised, as it allows local governments to access 

the up-to-date information in order to protect their communities. 

So I just want to give you a little bit more time to express whether this is being carefully reviewed to make sure that the needs of 

local governments to access information for your department will 

not be compromised as we implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. 

Mr. RIDGE. Appreciate the additional time to amplify the earlier 

response. 

There is no doubt in the mind of our professionals within the 

agency that ceding to the counterterrorism center the responsibility 

and working with the NID to have a strategic assessment, as it relates to domestic threats, will not compromise the mission that you 

have given us; and that is to take a look at the domestic threat, 

match it or map it against either the potential target or the broader potential vulnerability, and make sure you do everything you 

can to protect the target or reduce the vulnerability. 

We will not forego, however, within our own information analysis 

unit, the responsibility and the obligation to do our own competitive analysis. So we will certainly take a look at the strategic 

threat, as it relates to the United States and as it relates to an attack, but we will also do our own analysis, just to make sure that 

we agree. 

And if we disagree, obviously, we have got to meet and resolve 

whatever the disagreement might be. 

What I think it does is I think it frees up that Infrastructure 

Analysis and Infrastructure Protection unit to develop and then 

sustain more thoroughly the kind of relationship I think Congress 

wanted the department to build with the state and locals; that is, 

get this threat information, credible threat information, and make 
40

sure that the right people receive it and that with your support or 

with your direction, they act upon it. 

And one of the challenges I think we have in the new intelligence 

structure is to determine the best way, the best means of communication of that threat assessment down to the state and locals. 

And, I mean, I think we are best equipped as a department or 

agency to do that because we have built and continued to build out 

relationship with governors, homeland security advisers, police and 

fire chiefs at the local level, and even into the private sector, 

through the Internet, video conferencing. 

There are a lot of ways. And we do a lot of it in conjunction with 

the FBI. But I do not think we need more than a couple of people 

communicating with the state and locals. 

Mr. CARDIN. I appreciate that response. I agree with that. 

I think that the Department of Homeland Security is in the best 

position to maintain those types of relationships with local governments. And if it is through the national intelligence director or 

through one of the collection agencies, it is a lot more difficult. 

So I think that your role needs to be maintained there. And I 

hope as we work to implement the provisions that that is maintained. 

I just want to raise the issue that was raised by Congresswoman 

Norton, and that is the rail security issues. It has not been as high 

a priority as some of the other modes of transportation. We do not 

do the same thing with rail security as we do with other; with air 

security, for sure. 

And I know you are implementing certain pilot demonstration 

programs. I would just urge you to try to develop a reasonable 

strategy as quickly as possible working with as many organizations 

as possible. Because I do think it is an area that cries out for just 

higher priority as we try to now deal with the vulnerabilities of our 

country. 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, I appreciate the comment. As you know, you 

gave us some discretion with some of the grant money. And we 

carved out some for mass transit a year or two ago. 

Actually, there were some very appropriate lessons learned 

there. And you should also know that we have on a daily basis an 

ongoing working relationship with the railroad industry, mass 

transit industry generally. And so we are not vetting these independently of their input. 

So as we develop our national transportation strategy and then 

focus in on mass transit, we are going to take a look at lessons 

learned in Madrid, take a look at the technology and the pilot programs we have been running, take a look at measures, some of the 

initiatives that some of the initiatives that have been undertaken 

without any federal support, and see the best combination of protective measures that exist so that we do not compromise the purpose and the use of mass transit. 

But I just do not think we are ever going to be able to line up, 

and you basically undermine the purpose of mass transit. But there 

is certainly more that we can do, and we are hopeful that technology can fill a substantial part of that security gap. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 
41

Chairman COX. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response, the gentleman from Arizona, 

Mr. Shadegg, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you very much for being here. I 

certainly appreciate your testimony here today and your efforts on 

our nation’s behalf. 

I particularly want to express my appreciation for your efforts on 

the Arizona border, for your visit there last December. As you will 

recall, we were able to spend the day in helicopters over the border 

and look at it, and had a great policy discussion thereafter. 

I also want to express my appreciation for your efforts on the Arizona Border Control Initiative. I think that, along with the additional allocation of resources to the problem in Arizona of smugglers particularly, the coyotes who bring in individuals for pay, and 

some of the safe houses that you have been able to go after. 

And I just want to make it clear that you understand I appreciate all of those efforts. It has made a material difference. And my 

constituents for I think the first time in many years see that the 

federal government is at least focusing on, if not yet solved the 

problem of an open border on the southern side of the nation. 

I think everybody understands this is an extremely difficult 

issue, but they also appreciate the fact that there are now resources being devoted to the Arizona-Mexico border, whereas in the 

past, those resources, at least in my district, were perceived as 

going to other states. So on behalf of the people of Arizona, I want 

to say thanks. 

As you know, there is an article in this week’s Time magazine 

and there has been some focus on the OTMs, other than Mexicans, 

that are crossing the border that have been intercepted. I wondered 

if you have a comment about that, as that directly implicates the 

issue of homeland security and the concern I have, which is of trying to prevent an attack before one occurs. 

Mr. RIDGE. The article did not refer to another new initiative. Actually, the article did not refer to anything that we are doing in 

the Department of Homeland Security, which is a point of frustration, but I guess that is literary license. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Here is your shot. 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, we are doing a lot. It is a shame some of it was 

not mentioned in the article. But with regard to the OTMs, other 

than Mexicans, we have a program now of expedited removal which 

we are working in two areas to determine the cost and to see how 

effective it is. 

But, frankly, until we had the department, and until we had this 

expedited removal program, if those illegals came in through a nonport of entry—in other words, if they did not walk up and try to 

get through one of the regular ports of entry, they came in through 

wilderness area—we had a difficult time in dealing with them. We 

sometimes apprehended them, sometimes let them go and said, 

‘‘Report back for a hearing.’’

Now, when we apprehend them, we want to them around and 

send them back to their country of origin. 
42

So I think, again, one of the new initiatives that we are working 

on dealing with other than Mexican illegals coming across the border at non-ports of entry is the expedited removal program. 

In time, I think we will probably look for additional dollars to accelerate the program. We do not want to just replace them across 

the border, we want to send them back home. 

Mr. SHADEGG. As you know, the administration has proposed or 

considered and is looking at seriously some type of a guest worker 

program. Those words, in my district, cause some consternation, 

and yet there are many of us who believe you can never completely 

seal that border. We have put a lot of people on it. 

And I think the prospect of sealing it when the economic pressure to come across is so great, it seems to me we could be better 

devoting our resources to the people who cross the border with evil 

intent, with animus, terrorists, if we had a program which set 

aside and enabled people who want to come here for the economic 

opportunity, just to get money and send it back home to their families. 

And I wondered if you had looked at that issue from that perspective. 

Mr. RIDGE. I think it is hugely important from a security perspective if you legitimize the presence of people coming to and from 

the United States, particularly Mexicans, for work, and accompany 

that with a much more vigorous enforcement, you will serve to, 

one, respect the economic needs of both the employee and the employer. 

And as the president said, not satisfactory if you are going to replace a job for which an American citizen might be hired, but you 

respect the economic need of employer and employee, but you also 

say to those who seek employment here, there is only one way to 

get it, one legitimate way to get employment. 

And I must say this: It is not just more border enforcement along 

the land border. We are going to have to have some rigorous enforcement within the business community—

Mr. SHADEGG. Absolutely. 

Mr. RIDGE. —for those, if we had the program, would seek to still 

go around the expressed intent of the policy, and that is to legitimize the presence of foreign nationals for employment purposes. 

So I can see it adding enormous benefit to our security measures 

at the border, so we can just focus our people and technology on 

those who are not legitimately present, period. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Those who are a real threat. I could not agree 

more. 

I do not know if I have time remaining. I would like to focus on 

intelligence for just a moment. A lot of recommendations have been 

made to us with regard to—

Chairman COX. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman COX. The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, good to see you again. Thank you. 

A quick note, before I get started here, after your last testimony 

before the committee, I had had some questions about disaster 
43

medical assistance teams and you asked I follow up in writing. I 

did on March 19th. But we have had no response. If you could prod 

your staff on that, it would be great. 

I think it is an important issue to better utilize them and to get 

their new chain of command straightened out. 

I have some questions relating to aviation, in particular, my concern in the aftermath of the Russian incident, which, actually, I 

have had a concern long before that about plastics explosives. 

Just week before last when I was flying back for a hearing of the 

aviation committee during the August break, I was flying out of a 

different airport—Medford—and I watched as a person who had 

been profiled with the black S’s, they took him aside for additional 

screening, including using a metal detector on the bottoms of his 

bare feet. He was not wearing socks. 

Now, here is the point. They wanded the bottoms of his bare feet. 

He had the black S’s. They did not frisk him. So if he was wearing 

a suicide belt, they got no clue. You are not going to find a suicide 

belt with a metal detector or a wand that is hand-held. 

And I feel very strongly about, sort of, our protocols here. I asked 

Admiral Stone that next day at that hearing about that, and said: 

Are you going to start frisking people who are selectees or otherwise looking for hidden plastics explosives? And at that point, he 

said, no. I think that is a grave error. 

You know, there will be no metal in a plastic explosives belt. I 

mean, because they are not trying to wound people like in Israel. 

They just want to take down a plane. It does not have to be in a 

belt either. It could be otherwise concealed, electronic devices the 

size of an iPod. 

There is technology out there. The staff of Homeland Security admitted in a meeting with aviation staff that the technology for portals is mature. There is no reason to pilot it as we are doing now 

in five airports this year and nine next year. It is mature. It has 

worked. It is used at defense installations and nuclear plants. 

Can you give me any idea if you are going to push a little here 

with your folks and maybe move us ahead more quickly on plastic 

explosives detection? 

Mr. RIDGE. Let me respond, I think, in two parts to your inquiry. 

First of all, I believe since the time you had the conversation with 

Admiral Stone, the whole issue of patting down folks, in secondary, 

has been revisited. 

And, you know, it is a matter that we constantly wrestle with 

with privacy, with decency or with how we can appropriately check 

passengers for the possibility of carrying on their person explosive 

devices—

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. 

Mr. RIDGE. We decided to change that policy and allow for a different and more vigorous body check, again, trying to respond to 

the concerns of privacy and decency and the like. 

Previous patting was actually with the external part of your—as 

crazy as it may sound, but we had people patting down the back 

of their hands. And that has been changed so that a more thorough 

and more routine patting down can occur. 
44

And of course, there is the gender-specific, as well. But we are 

going to try to address it in as delicate and as responsible and respectful a way as possible. 

I do not know the staff members that concluded that the technology is cost-effective and error prone, or at least it does not give 

us a false-positive rate at a level that would cause us to think twice 

about it, but I will personally get back to you within the next 10 

days on that issue, so that the delay between the last letter and 

now, which hopefully we will rectify by then, but I will get back 

to you personally on that issue. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, in addition to the trace portals, I have seen 

the ion scan at National; that is a good step forward. But there is 

also—

Mr. RIDGE. I am just not sure how accurate, I am not sure how—

I do not have the technical assessment with me. I will personally 

get back to you on that. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. There is another promising technology, too, 

which, again, I had demonstrated a couple years ago, which is a 

back scatter X-ray which exposes a person down to the skin. And 

what I heard two years ago from I think Admiral Loy at the time, 

or maybe it was still even Mr. McGaw, was, well, the potential for 

embarrassment. 

I said, ‘‘Well, you know, we can take care of that technologically. 

You give them whatever body they want. It just shows where on 

the body things are located.’’

And Admiral Stone said there is a big breakthrough and now 

they have developed it so they can do it with a stick figure. 

It should not have taken two years. 

And that also is very promising to find things concealed on the 

body. 

So I would hope that we can just move ahead with some sense 

of urgency, because I just think we are biding our time until we 

see a similar attempt on a U.S. flight. 

And given the fact that we are doing a much better job on baggage, even though that is not totally secure yet, I expect they may 

well try carry-on explosives, and we need to do what we can there. 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, I want to assure you, we share the 

sense of urgency. You have given us—been very generous to our 

science and technology unit, and we are looking precisely for those 

kind of technologies to add another layer of security to aviation. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman COX. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Lowey, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

While the focus in the media and in Congress with respect to the 

September 11 Commission report has been on the major structural 

changes recommended, I hope that we can focus for a moment on 

the recommendations that could be implemented immediately, in 

many cases without enacting legislation. 

Strengthening airport security, and I think it is appropriate that 

I am following my good friend Mr. DeFazio, because we have both 
45

been working in this area, and it has been one of the areas in 

which we have an identifiable failure and specific commonsense 

remedies at our disposal. 

We know that in the wake of September 11th we passed legislation requiring the physical screening of all airport workers. We 

know that airport workers have been implicated in plans to use 

their access to secure airport facilities for illegal operations. The 

most recent major case in the news was the drug smuggling ring 

at JFK Airport in New York. 

And as you may know, a June 2004 GAO report, a report with 

which TSA generally agreed, found that vulnerabilities in airport 

security remain, and that the most recent security directives failed 

to fully address these concerns. 

The 9/11 Commission report recommends clearly that a TSA security plan ‘‘take into consideration the full array of possible enemy 

tactics, such as the use of insiders.’’

When I asked Chairman Kean about worker screening, he replied firmly, ‘‘Everybody should go through metal detectors. Everybody should go through metal detectors. My belief, without exception.’’

Mr. Secretary, I was pleased before that, within another context, 

you referred to international standards. Many of my colleagues and 

I have repeatedly urged the adoption of stricter worker screening 

standards in our nation’s airports. We have repeatedly been told by 

TSA that they are too expensive, too inconvenient to implement. 

However, at Heathrow Airport in London, the busiest international airport in the world, 100 percent of workers are physically 

screened, and that at Charles de Gaulle in Paris, they are working 

to meet that standing. 

Well, first of all, to my understanding, no cost analysis of such 

a screening has ever been done. And even so, I would hope that 

cost and inconvenience would not be the deciding factor besides 

whether or not the TSA implements such a program. 

And just a few questions. How would you suggest I answer my 

constituents who ask why airport workers who are going into secure, sterile areas—food service workers, ramp worker, et cetera—

are not subject to the same physical screening standard as airline 

passengers? 

Are there other fundamental security procedures that have been 

considered and then rejected because of a perceived inconvenience? 

And will you, Mr. Secretary, perhaps we can make news today, 

will you issue a security directive requiring that all airport workers 

and their possessions receive the same physical screening as passengers? 

Now, I have to just tell you, I have a congressional badge. I expect that I am going to go through the metal detectors. But the 

workers, ramp workers, food caterers, had their background check, 

which might have been issued two years ago. They do not have to 

go through metal detectors. It is left up to the discretion of the airports. 

I think this is absurd. It is outrageous. Can you make a decision 

today directing the TSA to issue that order that everyone who has 

access to secure, sterile areas must go through the metal detectors? 
46

Mr. RIDGE. We have been in the process of reviewing some security directives that would subject employees to go through a physical inspection—

Mrs. LOWEY. Could I be rude and interrupt you? 

Mr. RIDGE. No, if you would just bear with me 30 seconds, so I 

can check. Along with a contract that we let out to an organization 

to begin to accelerate the process for transportation worker identification cards so we can do background checks, biometrics, et 

cetera, as well. 

I just need to confirm something. If you will excuse me, Madam 

Congresswoman. Bear with me. 

I ask the unanimous consent that the gentlelady have another 

however much time I am consuming by—

Chairman COX. The witness is out of order. 

Mr. RIDGE. Just wanted to make sure, Congresswoman. 

We have implemented additional screening requirements for airport workers that come into the secure areas so that they will be 

physically inspected. 

There are other zones, yet—and this is the worker who may be 

involved in one of the shops or the restaurants, et cetera, so when 

they come in, they are inspected. 

The secure area, the sterile area, that around the airplanes 

themselves, the ramp area, they are to be covered under the transportation worker program identification card where we do background checks, issue a biometrics, so we can make a decision that 

these are not terrorists. They are who they say they are. We have 

confirmed their identity not only with a background check, but 

with a security check. 

So we are not quite where you want us to be. But we have begun 

the process of running employees who work in the secured area 

through physical inspections. 

Mrs. LOWEY. If I may just continue for a moment—

Mr. RIDGE. Please. 

Mrs. LOWEY. —and I know Mr. DeFazio has been working on 

this, as I have, and he probably much longer. 

Number one, he has requested information from FAA and TSA 

that he has not received—we have not received—clearly outlining 

the security procedures in place at each airport. Because, as you 

well know, or your staff in consulting with you, it is up to the individual airport. 

I think this is outrageous. This has been going on—it is three 

years since 9/11—

Mr. DEFAZIO. Nita? Nita? Could I? I am sorry, it is over here. 

Actually, he did. And it is confusing because they talk about secure and sterile. The major focus of what I had been asking and 

they could not provide was about the secure areas and the workers 

going into the terminals. They now have a uniform rule that everybody has to go through screening. 

Now the other area in question is the one you are raising questions about, which is the sterile area—

Mrs. LOWEY. Correct. 

Mr. RIDGE. Which is access to the airplanes and the—

Chairman COX. The gentlelady’s time has expired. The time belongs to Mr. Pascrell. 
47

And I have already granted the gentlelady an additional minute 

and a half, but the secretary can certainly answer the question. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, let me just make, if I may, one, if you could 

get back to me, it is my understanding that airport workers are 

still going into sterile areas without going through metal detectors. 

And I have been told by the local airport and other airports, until 

it is mandated, until this cost is picked up, they cannot do it. 

I think this directive has to be put in place. I will keep going 

through metal detectors; you should; and everyone who could possibly put an explosive on a plane, seems to me, should be going 

through a metal detector. And it is so simple. We do not have to 

go through this great reorganization of our government. 

Chairman COX. Gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. And 

I hope we can continue the discussion. 

Chairman COX. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, there are a few areas in the 9/11 report which the 

Homeland Security Department does not have direct attention to, 

and that is in the area of our relationships with other countries. 

You brought up one of the examples of biometric standards, looking 

for a universal standard, because we are going to need the cooperation of other countries in order to employ that particular standard. 

How critical it is. 

And chapter 12 of the 9/11 report deals with the subject of our 

relationships with other countries. And you know that, Mr. Secretary, I am not asking you respond to this, you know our relationships with other countries in the last two years has gone south, 

whether we are talking about Ireland, whether we are talking 

about Greece, whether we are talking about a lot of other countries. 

Not only in the biometric standards are we seeking to have cooperation from other countries, but we need cooperation from other 

countries if we are going to check the containers that come into 

this country. 

We cannot—we cannot—we have been told over and over again, 

have enough of the state-of-the-art to check every container, the 

millions of containers that come into this country, from every port 

into our ports into this country, and that is why we have sought—

and some countries are cooperating; many countries are cooperating, from what I understand—that they are checking the container before it gets on the ship that is coming to the United States 

of America. 

And this is only part of the example. If we do not have the cooperation from other countries, we cannot do—you cannot do your 

job, we cannot do our job. 

Would you just briefly comment on that? 

Mr. RIDGE. First of all, in a broader context, Congressman, I 

think you are right. As we try to build a global response to a global 

threat, and we improve security around commercial aviation and 

commercial shipping, and to improve the process around where all 

countries are comfortable with people and cargo coming across 

their borders, therefore developing standards with regard to mari-
48

time safety, aviation safety, document authentication and identity 

verification is critically important. 

I would say there has been great cooperation in those areas 

among our allies. The Coast Guard took the lead in working with 

the International Maritime Organization to begin developing security measures relating to ports and vessels, and Congress followed 

on when it passed the Maritime Transportation and Safety Act. 

We have begun working with the European Union on getting advance passenger information, and along that process have begun 

discussions with them about biometric standards that will provide 

added layers of security so that we know the person that gets the 

document is the person that comes into this country. 

We are working a process right now within our own Department 

of State so that if a foreigner gets a visa, they will have their photograph taken, the finger scans given so that when they come into 

a port of entry here, we can match the photograph and the finger 

scans. That is helping us domestically; we need international 

standards like that across the board. 

The Container Security Initiative, we are in 25 countries. We are 

not there unless they agree. And matter of fact, most of those countries help pay for the technology. 

So with regard to some of the initiatives that we have undertaken, and certainly from a law enforcement and an information 

sharing-basis, I think the collaboration within the broader world 

community has been very, very good. And frankly I think it is getting better. 

Mr. PASCRELL. We need the international community, there are 

no two ways about it. And I hope that we can have damage control. 

And I hope with people like yourself—yourself—that you will 

have—you know, because Chapter 12 has been ignored by most 

folks who look into the commission report, and that is a critical 

part of this. 

You know, I have seen fear. I have seen terror in the faces of 

people, Mr. Secretary. We do not need folks attacking us, because 

we are talking about non-state terrorism, for the most part. But I 

have seen terror on the streets of America of folks who cannot look 

out their windows in areas that are consumed by illicit drugs. 

And I am very concerned about that terror that is just as real 

as the terror that you are doing such a wonderful job in. I am very 

concerned about drugs. They are off the map. We do not even talk 

about them. 

And you know you can go to most cities in this country, and 

there is terror, and it is spreading into the suburban communities, 

and it has been spreading for a long time. 

I am not making a political statement. I remember when we first 

started this committee. 

Chairman COX. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman may proceed with the balance of his question. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I remember when we first started this committee, we asked the 

Coast Guard and we asked the FBI if we were going to be taking 

away personnel and resources in looking at non-state terrorism and 

perhaps neglecting the interdiction which is so critical to more and 
49

more drugs which are getting into this country. That is, to me, part 

of homeland security, isn’t it? 

Mr. RIDGE. I think, number one, you should know that all the 

agencies that we inherited who had a role within our war to combat illicit drug traffic still participate aggressively and very, very 

effectively. 

You are right, Congressman, it is another form of chemical warfare, and we have been waging that battle for a long, long time, 

and it is a weapon of mass effect. 

But you should be assured that the resources we have—I mean, 

there is so much interplay between illicit drug networks and illegal 

human networks, smuggling networks and potential terrorist networks so that when we work with the Mexican community with regard to illegal human smuggling or drugs or others, you should 

know that that collaboration has improved significantly. 

And we have not lost sight of the fact that an historic mission 

or responsibility for the Coast Guard and for other elements within 

our department is combating drugs, and frankly, pulling these together—these units together under one department. 

And I would love to have Roger Mackin come up and spend some 

time with you. He has done a wonderful job in our department seeing to it that these resources have been integrated. We see change 

in the migratory pattern of drug traffic because of the interdictions 

in a certain part of the Caribbean and efforts we have undertaken 

both with all the assets we have and other resources within the 

federal government. We are seeing some of the drug flow patterns 

change because the interdiction is getting much, much better. 

So I am going to make it a point to have Roger come up and 

spend a little time with you. I think you would be very comforted 

and appreciate the fact that even within this Department of Homeland Security, this historic mission has—we have a sense of urgency about it, and we have made some significant changes in affecting the flow of drugs to the country. 

Chairman COX. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

Mr. Secretary, I think we to a one have said that you have done 

a very able job on a very, very tough task, and I thank you for it. 

I am going to try and run through this like a locomotive train. 

One, if you could refer to the Transportation Security Administration on this expedited card process where you had the five pilot 

airports that were engaging in it, where you get an ID card—can 

I ask you to extend on that? 

There was a 2,000 cap, meaning you enrolled 2,000 persons. I 

think it was a 90-day—and we are being asked all over the country 

if it could be extended for 30 days. And that is just a request. If 

you can get me an answer back. 

Houston happens to be one of the airports. And we would appreciate that extension, if you could do so. 

A quick question: Do we have enough money to fund the US–

VISIT program and have the proper staff? Also, would you comment on your understanding and support of the concept of the privacy office that was recommended by the 9/11 Commission? 
50

Three quick questions together. 

And the last one: I wrote a letter on March 19, 2004, where I inquired as to what security enhancements are reimbursable. A letter 

came back. But one of the concerns that was raised was this whole 

idea of the monies coming to the states—you have heard this 

many, many times—and then having to translate into smaller jurisdictions like cities. 

Houston happens to be the fourth largest city in the nation. And 

my concern is that in those instances, many time politics gets in 

the way sometimes of the generating of those dollars. Mayors have 

asked you, some of us have asked you—I happen to be one of those 

that believes dollars should go to the more vulnerable places—so 

I support the concepts of New York and California and Houston. 

Could you help us in how we can eliminate the politics when you 

start sending dollars to states and then local jurisdictions are 

somewhat inhibited by getting those dollars? Maybe you could just 

talk about the sort of fire wall that prevents any kind of negative 

politics from getting to—cities not getting dollars. 

The last two points are somewhat testimonial statements. Lou 

Dobbs, the Times, everyone has been talking about the trials and 

tribulations at the border. I just came back from the border, just 

a few weeks or so ago. There is just a great catastrophe, if you will. 

But I am glad to hear you mention the fact that the borders are 

more of concern than the 12 million to 14 million undocumented 

that are in this country that are already hear working and paying 

taxes and doing what they need to do, and that has to do with fixing the immigration system. 

How can we best work with the borders? How can we border 

states best work with you? How can we get more dollars for border 

patrol and technology and as well provide more beds for detainees 

when they actually are arrested? 

And I come to my last point, which has to do with the whole 

question of the organization of the Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to 9/11. 

One, give me your answer again about the structure of committees in the Congress, what is better suited for you in terms of committees. And give me an answer as it relates to the real reform of 

the intelligence system, how important that is for the Homeland 

Security Committee to get good intelligence in order to be able to 

secure the homeland. 

I would offer my own editorial comment and just say that I know 

that there is testimony going on today on a person nominated. I am 

not sure for what, because we do not know whether we are looking 

at a national intelligence director. 

But let me just say, with respect to Mr. Goss, my concern is that 

there is not a sense of independence; there is not a sense of being 

a reformer. And I might question someone who was averse to having an investigation of the CIA when there was questions about 

whether a covert agent had been uncovered. 

So I hope that you will weigh in, quietly, on how the intelligence 

will be effective and you working in the Homeland Security Department. 

But in any event, I know hopefully you will be able to answer, 

at least partially, some of my questions. 
51

Thank you. 

Mr. RIDGE. Congresswoman, let me see if I can respond quickly 

to all very appropriate questions. 

First of all, I will tell you that it is unlikely that you will see a 

30-day extension. Frankly, if there is good lessons learned, with regard to the registered traveler program—we think there will be—

we would like to expand it nationally, not on a pilot, but make it 

a national program. 

So I think it is unlikely—we felt 90 days was time enough—I 

think it is unlikely we will get the extension. 

Yes, we do have sufficient dollars coming, I think, in the fiscal 

year 2005 budget for US–VISIT. We will be asking for more as we 

prepare a budget for next year. 

The notion of a privacy council, given all the initiatives that this 

government has taken since 9/11 to enhance security I think is 

very consistent with what America would expect, what the president wants, and what the Congress frankly directed we do within 

Homeland Security; and that is we must continue to preserve the 

freedoms and liberties and the protections we have had as we combat terrorism. 

And we must generate and create a culture of awareness of these 

privacy concerns so that at the very outset, as we are thinking 

about new initiatives that would enhance security, we would be 

worried about the privacy, and we would be worried about civil liberties. 

And so I think it is a historic move. It is something that has been 

done in other parts of the world. And whatever the ultimate constitution of that committee might be, the president has taken I 

think a very appropriate bold step by saying, administration-wide, 

we are going to have this privacy council. 

I know the two extraordinary attorneys that I have on my staff, 

one dealing with civil liberties and freedom, the other dealing with 

privacy issues will be part of that group, so—

Ms. GRANGER. [Presiding.] I am going to interrupt you, Mr. Secretary. I am sorry. We have got a vote, and we have got one last 

person to ask questions, Mr. Etheridge. 

Mr. RIDGE. All right, well, let us let him go. And I am going to 

call you, Congresswoman, and answer the rest of the questions. 

Ms. GRANGER. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for staying. You 

have a huge challenge in the broad breadth of what you have to 

do. 

Let me return back to one. I have asked this question to a number of our witnesses when I have had the opportunity and—

Ms. GRANGER. We have 9 minutes left before the vote. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. —and I must confess, we have not gotten a resolution to it yet. You started on it, well, just let me return. 

Just last week, the America Preparedness Campaign released 

their report on the preparedness of America’s 20 largest school districts, by and large most of them are metropolitan, urban school 

districts, in their preparedness for security, terror, et cetera. 

And certainly the incidents in Russia shocked us all, shocked us 

to a new realization. And having served as a superintendent of 
52

schools in North Carolina, I think we have done a lot of things putting people in place. 

My question is, though in keeping with that, because it is not 

uniform across the country as you well know—urban as well as 

rural—do you think the schools should be added to the national 

critical infrastructure list of having enough information to be able 

to pull together a critical infrastructure of what needs to happen 

in response, or what ought to happen? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, I think, first of all, we know schools are certainly intellectually and emotionally part of our critical infrastructure. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Absolutely. 

Mr. RIDGE. I also think that we have said that out of the billions 

we are giving to state and local governments, some of those dollars 

are eligible to be used to enhance security around schools as well. 

So whether or not they are on a national list of private sector infrastructure, it is not as important as they are eligible for some of the 

dollars, the billions of dollars we distributed to the states and 

locals, depending on the need of that school district or that school—

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Let me follow that up—

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Etheridge, let me say, we have about 6 minutes left before the vote. And of course we promised Secretary 

Ridge that he would be out of here by 4:30. So if you can do it very 

quickly. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. I still I have a little time on my clock please. I 

was here for the last meeting and did not get to ask questions. 

Ms. GRANGER. All right. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Secretary, in keeping with that, we have a 

lot of schools that, in addition to that, children in a lot of trailers 

across America. And they are isolated from the main buildings for 

security purposes. 

And in addition to what you have just said, they add an additional vulnerability for principals and teachers and those who are 

in those buildings because I know of instances where we have had 

situations not like what happened in Russia. 

Would you care to comment on that? Because I think that is a 

critical piece as we look down the road, and not just say they are 

eligible. 

Mr. RIDGE. I must say, respectfully, to a former superintendent 

talking to a former governor, there is a shared responsibility—

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Absolutely. 

Mr. RIDGE. —when it comes to education. And the decision for 

whatever reason for a particular school district to isolate a building 

from the main school is certainly within the purview of that school 

district or that secretary of education. And if there is, frankly, if 

there are attendant security problems associated with that permanent isolation of the building, one could argue very appropriately 

that it is much more a responsibility of the local or the state government. 

Having said that, Ready for Kids will be part of our roll-out of 

our national preparedness campaign, working with the school districts to review security procedures, evacuation procedures, emergency procedures when the children might be required to stay at 
53

school, and under what circumstances not only do they stay, but 

how we support them. 

There are a large range of issues where I do think the federal 

government has a role to play and federal resources can be used. 

Not to get down in the weeds, but the kind of situation you described, I think, is much more local and state than federal. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Let me clarify that. I think you misunderstood 

my question. 

In some cases, you have school districts who are growing so rapidly or for lack of resources, they wind up being isolated unintentionally because they are in trailers rather than the main building. 

And this creates some additional problem. 

And if we can make resources available to those who are at least 

eligible, I think it would add a lot of security to those local jurisdictions. 

Mr. RIDGE. I think the first responsibility of the local school district and the state department of education is to educate and, secondly, to make sure they are being educated in a secure environment. 

There is a role that the federal government has in support of 

both of those missions. And we have made some progress in advancing those roles with the Ready for Kids, working with the Department of Education on some of the procedures that I mentioned. 

And from a personal point of view, I would love to continue the 

private conversation, since we ran out of time. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. I would like to do that, if we could, please. 

Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. GRANGER. I thank Secretary Ridge for his valuable testimony 

and the members for their questions and participation. 

The member of the committee may have some additional questions for the witness, and we will ask you to respond to those in 

writing. 

The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

FOR THE RECORD

THE HONORABLE TOM RIDGES’S RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM

THE HONORABLE JOHN E. SWEENEY

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS KAREN MORR SUBMITS

ON BEHALF OF DHS. 

If all the President’s announced intelligence reform initiatives and 

Executive Orders were fully implemented today, how would it strengthen:

Collection of terrorist network information: 

Response: The collection of terrorism information requires a robust collection capability that fully leverages the Homeland Security Community, Intelligence Community (IC), Law Enforcement (LE), and other Communities of Interest (COIs) collection and information-gathering resources. The collection of terrorism information 

is a matter of national concern and an area in which overarching collection guidelines would serve to ensure the integration of collection activities among Federal 

and non-federal collectors of terrorism information. The National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC) in concert with the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism 

(IICT)* will work to identify a common list of terrorism information needs to ensure 

collection is appropriately tasked to fulfill intelligence gaps and shortfalls. 

The DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA) has several efforts underway to increase reporting from within the Department and from nontraditional external part-
54

ners. Jointly with the FBI, IA produced Terrorist Threat Reporting Guides to improve information collection from state and local law enforcement and homeland security officials as well as from critical infrastructure owners, operators, and security 

managers. IA is also developing a cadre of reports officers who are exploiting DHSorigin information to publish that of counterterrorism interest and is of value to the 

greater communities of interest. 

* The IICT is the interagency forum for coordination and cooperation on counterterrorism-related intelligence

activities, including collection requirements. The IICT has representation from over 50 U.S. government agencies and

organizations from the intelligence, law enforcement, regulatory, defense, and consequence management communities.

The Committee currently reviews terrorism priorities on a quarterly basis.

Integration of intelligence and infrastructure vulnerability: 

Response: Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) 

Directorate is charged with ‘‘integrating relevant information, intelligence analyses, 

and vulnerability assessments (whether such information, analyses, or assessments 

are provided or produced by the Department or others) to identify protective priorities and support protective measures by the Department, by other executive agencies, by State and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, by the private sector, and by other entities.’’ IAIP fuses intelligence and infrastructure information by performing risk analysis and assessment activities, including the development of protective measures. 

As established by the Office of Infrastructure Protection and serving as an extension of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) maintains operational awareness of the nation’s 

critical infrastructures and key resources, and provides a mechanism and process 

for information sharing and coordination between and among government, critical 

infrastructure owners and operators, and other industry partners. In support of its 

mission and that of the IAIP, the NICC will continue to provide real-time operational and situational awareness of the nation’s critical infrastructures and key resources to IAIP and the HSOC, as well as between and across all infrastructure sectors. Real-time sector awareness information, fused with intelligence data and risk 

analyses from the directorate, will continue to enhance the domestic 

counterterrorism focus of IAIP and DHS. 

The creation of the NCTC re-emphasizes the critical national requirement to develop an environment for the fusion of information related to terrorism. The DHS 

IAIP responsibility under this construct is to ensure that its needs for all-source intelligence information and finished threat products are communicated to the NCTC. 

The Office of Information Analysis (IA) within IAIP is required under statute to 

mesh intelligence information with infrastructure vulnerability data and develop 

risk assessments for the homeland. While much of this work requires that IAIP 

have ‘raw’ intelligence access, some efforts can be completed by NCTC delivering 

products that respond specifically to IAIP’s needs. In addition, IA, as the DHS Departmental Intelligence Headquarters, must deliver DHS-origin information to the 

Intelligence Community that can support counterterrorism operational and analytic 

efforts. NCTC can be a supporting mechanism in this regard as well, as it continues 

to build out the infrastructure for disseminating information at all classification levels.

Productive competition in the analytic intelligence community: 

Response: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (the 

Act) will have a substantial impact strengthening competitive analysis (also known 

as ‘‘alternative analysis’’ or ‘‘red cell’’ or ‘‘red team’’ analysis) within the Intelligence 

Community (IC). The Act, for the first time, mandates the conduct of such analysis 

across the IC. It will give impetus to those IC components that do not currently conduct such analysis, and further spur those that do. 

The wording of the Act, however, is very general. It will have the greatest positive 

impact if it is implemented to encourage use of the broadest possible range of innovative alternative analysis/red team techniques to address intelligence and homeland security issues. It will have less positive impact if applied in a ‘‘cookie-cutter’’ 

way to require merely the provision of one alternative assessment for each mainline 

assessment (one potential interpretation of the Act). ompetitive analysis requires innovation and diverse approaches. 

In the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Analytic Red Cell is working with mainline analysts 

to constantly enhance the range of alternative, creative approaches to analysis to 

broaden thinking, challenge assumptions, prevent surprise, and ultimately explore 

ways to more rationally deploy security and intelligence resources. This includes 

conducting analysis on issues that mainline analysts have not yet focused on, pro-
55

viding outside independent perspectives that may or may not track with mainstream analysis, and conducting contrarian analysis. 

The Executive Order that preceded the Act may also benefit this kind of analysis 

in DHS and the homeland security community because it calls for the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to share information necessary for the conduct of 

alternative analysis in the IC. This will ensure that the DHS IAIP Analytic Red Cell 

can perform its function of providing and promoting alternative assessments based 

on the most up-to-date and pertinent information on threats, vulnerabilities, and 

countermeasures affecting the homeland.

Information sharing with State and local government entities, and 

Response: The Executive Orders and Intelligence Reform initiatives will help to 

strengthen the Department of Homeland Security’s ability to communicate with 

state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector officials in ways that protect the 

privacy and civil liberties of American citizens and legal permanent residents. The 

Secretary of DHS will work with other Federal agencies, including the Director of 

National Intelligence (DNI) to assure that terrorism information sharing and collaboration among all levels of government are executed in a manner to achieve enhanced fusion of information. Information sharing is far more extensive than simply 

intelligence. DHS and its leadership will continue to strive to provide a single, unified voice on behalf of the Federal government to our State, territorial, tribal, local, 

and private sector partners.

Information sharing with the private sector? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that approximately 85 percent of our critical infrastructure and key resources are owned or operated by the private sector. They are the front line in securing many of the nation’s 

critical infrastructure assets. The President’s proposed legislation, Executive Orders, 

and intelligence reform initiatives have identified that information sharing is critical to the exchange of terrorist threat and other homeland security information 

with the private sector, state and local governments and among federal governmental agencies. Strategic threat information enables owners and operators to focus. 

Actionable tactical threat information allows them to assess risk and respond appropriately in a timely manner. There are currently a number of ongoing successful 

programs for the two-way sharing of unclassified information with the private sector. Iplementation of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 and the establishment of the Homeland Security Information Network are two examples. Additionally, the Department continues to dedicate resources to the process of granting 

appropriate security clearances to private sector individuals. This furthers our ability to share classified terrorist threat information and other sensitive products that 

address the security of and potential threats to our critical infrastructure and key 

resources. 

Secretary Ridge, I have asked you repeatedly on the record, in questions for the 

record and of your senior staff the same question without resolution. The FY05 

House Homeland Security Appropriations bill advises you to stand up an Office of 

Geospatial Management within the CIO’s office to create a Department Wide 

Geospatial Information System capability. Specifically, when will you stand up this 

office and where will it be located organizationally? 

Response: The DHS Geospatial Management Office (GMO) has been established 

within the DHS Office of The Chief Information Officer (CIO) and is currently operational within the Department. The GMO is responsible within the Department to 

coordinate geospatial information needs, requirements and other related spatial 

data activities that support the Enterprise Geospatial Information System (E–GIS) 

capability. The GMO will provide clear and concise policy direction across the Department as needed for an E–GIS geospatial information capability. The GMO will 

guide the development and execution of the implementation plan for the geospatial 

enablement of DHS mission systems. The plan will provide a common set of 

geospatial data management and processing capabilities that will be incorporated 

into the emerging Homeland Security (HLS) Enterprise Architecture. This will allow 

the Department to further enable awareness, prevention, protection, response, recovery of the homeland security mission.

From the perspective of DHS, do you support the 9/11 recommendation 

to declassify the top line intelligence budget? 

Response: Both the 9/11 Commission and the United States Congress have done 

extensive and indispensable work in the area of intelligence reform and made valuable recommendations in reference to a Director of National Intelligence. Similarly, 

steps need to be taken to ensure sensitive information remain protected from our 
56

terrorist adversaries that have shown their desire and willingness to use all means 

possible to gain information about the United States Intelligence Community.

Mr. Secretary, do you agree with the 9/11 recommendation to establish an 

open source analysis center? If so, specifically how would DHS accomplish 

this task financially and organizationally? 

Response: In their quest to gain information from all possible sources, terrorists 

have proven willing and able to use open sources for their purposes. Intelligence 

Community (IC) members recognize this vulnerability and as a result, personnel are 

working daily to analyze this type of intelligence. The IC will address this issue, 

as well as the placement, organization, and financing of any future centers as plans 

for the reorganization of the IC continue to take shape. As we do so, it will be important to ensure that all actions are consistent with protecting privacy and the civil 

liberties of the American people.

With centralization of intelligence analysis production priorities, how 

will DHS keep a high priority on integration of intelligence and infrastructure vulnerability information? 

Response: The Office of Information Analysis (IA) will continue to act as the Office of Intelligence for DHS and will collaborate on intelligence related to the terrorist threat with NCTC elements. Specifically, IA will provide support to the Department by continuing to develop and execute information sharing relationships 

and procedures with State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector officials, will 

work with IP to support risk analysis and assessments and development of protective measures, will provide direct support to the Secretary and Department Senior 

Staff, and will support the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). IA will also 

continue to represent DHS component requirements to the Intelligence Community 

(IC), perform threat assessments on domestic terrorism, foster international agreements for information sharing, and perform alternative analysis. Additionally, the 

IA roles of developing a cadre of Homeland Security Analysts for DHS and the IC 

and developing an education and training program for DHS analysts and intelligence professionals will increase in scope. 

Further, the Intelligence Community works selectively with critical infrastructure 

and key resource sectors, depending on the nature of specific issues and the agencies involved. These relationships and processes are based primarily on past experience and existing relationships. In July 2004, the White House asked the National 

Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) to develop recommendations that would improve the utilization and effectiveness of intelligence capabilities to protect critical 

infrastructure. The NIAC members are appointed by the President and are supported by the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the 

Department. Specifically, the NIAC, comprised of private sector critical infrastructure and key resource business leaders, state and local government officials, emergency services officials and educators, was asked to explore ways to improve the information requirements definition processes and interaction between the intelligence 

community and critical infrastructure sectors. The NIAC plans to provide its recommendations to the President by the end of 2005.

From the perspective of DHS, do you believe that ‘‘Centers’’ in the intelligence community provide added value? 

Response: Yes. Centers within the Intelligence Community (IC) can, and in the 

case of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)—now the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—do provide important conduits for information 

sharing throughout the Federal Government and help to prevent the kind of 

miscommunication that occurred prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Do you believe a new National Center to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation is needed? 

Response: The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the ‘‘Robb-Silberman Commission’’), was 

created by Executive Order to examine the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community (IC) to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of such foreign powers 

relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century. 

The Commission has been tasked by the President to assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and 

resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States 

Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of 
57

Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats 

of the 21st Century and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, 

terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). The 

Commission has already done important work and will make valuable recommendations to the President regarding its findings in its report due March 31, 2005. 

Secretary Ridge, when the 9/11 Chair and Vice Chair were before this Committee, 

I spent time questioning witnesses about Congress’ intent when it established the 

Department of Homeland Security to solve the infrastructure information and intelligence integration problem. 

I am an advocate of lessening bureaucracy and avoiding duplicity of effort with 

taxpayer funds. DHS’ Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate has a clear statutory mandate, is putting its team together, and is distributing information to key customers through the Homeland Security Information 

Network. 

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was set up to have the primary 

responsibility in the U.S. Government for terrorism analysis (except information relating solely to purely domestic terrorism) and to be responsible for the day-to-day 

terrorism analysis provided to the President and other senior policymakers. All 

members of the intelligence community participate in its work, provide comprehensive information to its staff, and have a stake in its success.

What is the difference between your recommended National 

Counterterrorism Center and the TTIC? 

Response: The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) created through Executive Order on August 27, 2004 will build upon the capabilities of the Terrorist 

Threat Integration Center (TTIC). In addition to serving as the primary organization in the United States Government (USG) for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the USG pertaining to terrorism and 

counterterrorism (excepting purely domestic counterterrorism information), the 

NCTC will conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for counterterrorism activities, 

serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists 

and international terror groups, and ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to execute their 

counterterrorism plans or perform independent, alternative analysis.

Do you believe that DHS will play a central role in the new National 

Counterterrorism Center? 

Response: Yes. NCTC operates as a partnership of organizations, including the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS analysts contribute the unique ability to understand intelligence information and its impact on State, territorial, tribal, 

local, and private sector elements. Integration of DHS analysts allows the NCTC to 

leverage DHS partnerships with the aforementioned elements, and threat information developed at NCTC will support the homeland security mission—optimizing information developed by DHS to better understand the domestic condition.’’ The Department will also play an appropriate role in NCTC’s Strategic Operational Planning function.

How can you guarantee this? 

Response: NCTC’s success is dependent upon the contributions of its partners. 

DHS information expertise, personnel, and relationships are critical components of 

that success.

Æ