HOW TO MAKe ARMY FORCE GENERATION WORK

FOR THE ARMY’S RESERVE COMPONENTS

Joseph E. Whitlock

August 2006

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of 

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; 

distribution is unlimited.

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This paper is the result of my Army War College Fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Technology at The University 

of Texas at Austin. Several people assisted me in this effort. Special thanks are due to four people in particular. Lieutenant 

Colonel Michael Fortune, an Army National Guard fellow and friend here, was a continuous sounding board and excellent 

source for feedback and ideas. Colonel Robert Hodges—a colleague, friend, and former Plans Division Chief at the U.S. 

Army Reserve Command—also provided me the most up-to-date products and information coming out of the Army 

staff related to Army Force Generation, as well as shared insightful comments on my earliest draft. Mr. Robert Riffle, my 

coordinating advisor, deserves special recognition and thanks, too. Finally, Dr. Dallas Owens of the U.S. Army War College 

deserves special credit for motivating me to write this paper, and for serving as my Senior Service College Fellow mentor.

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ISBN 1-58487-252-7
iii

PREFACE

 The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and 

government civilians to reflect and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic 

issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War College students is available to Army and 

Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its “Carlisle 

Papers in Security Strategy” Series.

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

Director of Research

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOSEPH E. WHITLOCK is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves and was a 2006 Army War 

College Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin.
v

ABSTRACT

The Army needs to implement Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) in addition to its ongoing 

transformation and move to a more modular force. To achieve a campaign quality Army with joint and 

expeditionary qualities fully, the Army must do so quickly, while also keeping its Reserve Components 

full partners throughout this process. Without ARFORGEN, the Army will continue to be challenged 

seriously or even be unable to fulfill its current global force requirements. Fully integrating the Army’s 

RCs into ARFORGEN is essential and critical for the Army to succeed. 

This paper describes ARFORGEN, discusses some of its critical assumptions related to RC units, 

and explains what changes are required at the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Army 

(DA), and the individual RC levels so that the Army can integrate its RC units fully into ARFORGEN. 

The paper details needed changes at both the institutional and operational levels at DA and DoD. 

DA institutional change includes improving the structure, equipping, training, manning, and 

resourcing functions related to RC units. The institutional Army also must synchronize other 

well-established institutional processes with ARFORGEN. The operational Army must improve 

communication with the institutional Army, develop robust automation support for all aspects of 

ARFORGEN, and increase planning horizons to the maximum extent possible for RC units.

Needed DoD institutional change includes providing the Army better and more timely mobilization 

strategic guidance; focusing DoD implementation policy on the long-term requirements needed to fight 

a long war; focusing less on individual servicemember and RC unit management issues; and providing 

additional resources to the Army’s RCs. DoD operational change includes communicating better with 

the institutional chain of command and working to establish a well-defined system to manage and 

execute its joint force provider responsibilities.

HOW TO MAKE ARMY FORCE GENERATION WORK

FOR THE ARMY’S RESERVE COMPONENTS

INTRODUCTION

The Strategic Context and Modern Use of the Reserve Components.

The traditional, visible distinction between war and peace is less clear at the start of the 21st century. In a long war, 

the United States expects to face large and small contingencies at unpredictable intervals. To fight the long war 

and conduct other future contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to 

the Total Force. In particular, the Reserve Component must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units 

are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.

Quadrennial Defense Review Report1

Over the last 2 decades, our nation has moved from using its Reserve Components (RCs) as a 

strategic reserve to an operational reserve that is critical to accomplishing the day-to-day requirements 

of our national security. Certainly, the reliance on the RCs was on the rise prior to the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Beginning with the first Gulf War buildup in 1990 and through the 

subsequent post-Cold War draw down years until now, the RCs increasingly and routinely have been 

called upon to support war, peacetime missions, and other foreign and domestic contingencies. The 

RCs of America’s Armed Forces are in greater demand today than at any time since World War II. This 

overall demand, depicted in Figure 1 as millions of duty days performed by the RCs, demonstrates 

how this demand has been on a steady rise since the late 1980s.2

The U.S. Armed Forces, both its active and RCs, have been extremely taxed since the terrorist attacks 

on 9/11. Moreover, these increased demands are expected to continue for the foreseeable future. As 

Lewis Sorley, a noted scholar of American military history, wrote, “What seems undeniable is that for 

whatever reasons—fiscal, political, or strategic—the nation is unwilling to maintain an active force that 

is adequate to current missions and operational tempo.”3 Sorley goes on to say that as a consequence, 

the RCs “not only supplement or reinforce the active force but often act as a surrogate for it” and that 

doing so “stands the concept of Reserve forces on its head.”4 This paper will not enter into this ongoing 

debate. Rather, it is premised on there being no significant increase or decrease in the size of the Army’s 

active or two RCs. The paper, however, will illuminate that, to make effective use of its RCs, and 

particularly the Army’s RCs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) must focus more resources on 

the Army and make a number of policy changes to make the Army’s RCs more accessible and readily 

deployable.

In response to the sharply increased demands over the last 4 years, the Department of Defense 

(DoD) has articulated consistently that it desires to move the services’ RCs from a strategic reserve 

to an operational reserve. In actuality, DoD has been deploying the RCs like an operational reserve 

for years now. Noticeably lacking in DoD’s desire to have an operational reserve, though, are the 

corresponding new policies, directives, and budget required for it to function as such. Essentially, DoD’s 

new operational reserve is still being managed by Cold War-era policies, directives, and systems—

all designed and implemented when the RCs were still viewed as a strategic reserve. Most policies 

and practices governing the RCs have failed to keep pace with the rising use and changing nature of 

reserve service. They need to move away quickly from the Industrial Age and into the Information Age. 

DoD also must provide the services a sufficient degree of strategic guidance, while focusing less on 

individual RC servicemember management issues, so that the services can manage their RCs effectively.
Figure 1. Total Force Reserve Components Contributions Over Time

Expressed in Millions (M) of Duty Days.

This means providing the services new, clear, and timely policies for their RCs, as well as increased 

management flexibility, so they can truly function as an operational reserve. Otherwise, individual 

service efforts to “operationalize” their reserve components will only be of marginal benefit. For the 

last 4 years, this has been an especially crucial need for the Army to employ effectively and efficiently 

the Army Reserve and Army National Guard in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)—what has now 

become known as the long war. 

Service Composition and Size Does Matter.

The Army, both its active and RCs, has been called upon more than any other service since 9/11. The 

Army, the largest of all the services, has a greater percentage of its total Selected Reserve manpower 

in its two RCs (53 percent) than its active component (47 percent).5 As depicted in Figure 2, this differs 

significantly from any of the others, where no service even comes close to having a majority of its 

manpower in the reserve.6. The Air Force, a distant second, has only 34 percent of its total manpower 

in its two reserve components.

The Army also has far many more soldiers in its Selected Reserve than any other service, as seen 

in Figure 3. Since 1994 the Army alone has accounted for over 65 percent of the total Selected Reserve 

manpower strength. In other words, the combined total of all other Selected Reserve servicemembers in 

the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps comprises just over half of that serving in the Army’s Selected 

Reserve. At the end of fiscal year 2004, the Army had a total of 547,049 soldiers serving in the Selected 

Reserve as compared to a grand total of only 304,346 in all the other services combined (Navy 82,558, 

Air Force 182,144, Marine Corps 39,644).7 This trend is clear, as seen in Figure 4, and is not expected to 

change.8 Additionally, over 72 percent of the total number of troops mobilized from all of the services’ 

reserve components since 9/11 have come from the Army.9 In the long war ahead, the Army has the
Figure 2. Percentages of Active versus Selected Reserve Manpower in Each Service.

Figure 3. Fiscal Year 2006 Authorized Service Strength

Indicated by Selected Reserve Component.

most compelling need, as well as the most to gain, in both supporting DoD’s efforts to move the RCs 

from a strategic to operational reserve while also pursuing its own initiatives, which will be discussed 

next.

Recent Army Initiatives.

Over the last decade, the Army has been in a continuous transformation. The Army Campaign 

Plan is the overarching document that provides the guiding direction for this most recent period of 

transformation. It describes how both the institutional and operational Army is changing in a number 

of ways to meet the nation’s national security requirements.10 The Department of the Army (DA) 

is pursuing aggressively many initiatives to better posture itself to fight a long war. These include 
Figure 4. Selected Reserve Strength by Service from Fiscal Year 1994 to 2004.

increasing the size of the operational Army while decreasing the institutional Army, building a modular 

force based on brigade combat teams, planning for future modernization through development of 

Future Combat Systems and other advanced technologies, and also by implementing Army Force 

Generation (ARFORGEN). The total size of the active Army will not likely change as it implements 

these initiatives. Most of these initiatives are focused and integrated across all three components of the 

Army, and completing any one of them is a multiyear endeavor that depends on both the nation’s and 

DoD’s resources and support.

Of all these initiatives, it is imperative that the Army quickly and completely implement 

ARFORGEN. Without ARFORGEN, the Army will continue to be challenged seriously or even unable 

to fulfill its global force requirements. Fully integrating the Army’s RCs into ARFORGEN is essential 

for ARFORGEN to succeed.

The purpose of ARFORGEN is to generate a pool of rapidly deployable Army forces continuously, 

from all three of the Army’s components—Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve—

to meet the worldwide requirements of civil authorities and combatant commanders via a managed, 

cyclic process. The Army refers to ARFORGEN as a model, but it could be better thought of as a process 

and forum to plan, manage, prioritize, and allocate limited resources to meet all worldwide Army force 

requirements. In June 2005, the Army leadership approved the use of ARFORGEN and designated 

Forces Command (FORSCOM) as the executive agent.11

Since the start of the GWOT over 4 years ago, the Army’s worldwide force requirements 

consistently have been out of balance with its current force capabilities. In other words, total annual 

force requirements have exceeded the supply and capability to generate the numbers and types of 

trained and readily available forces needed under ideal ARFORGEN conditions. This imbalance is not 

anticipated to change in the near future. The result has been that many units, both AC and RC, have 

been called upon multiple times in a short period of time to support the war effort.

Problem Statement.

 Because the Army’s RCs comprise such a large percentage of overall Army forces, the Army will not 

be able to fulfill its worldwide force requirements by implementing ARFORGEN for active component 
(AC) units alone. Fully to achieve a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary qualities, 

the Army must institute ARFORGEN quickly, while also keeping its RCs full partners throughout 

this process. In order for ARFORGEN to work for the RCs, the Army requires both institutional and 

operational change, not only within DA but also at the DoD level. This paper describes ARFORGEN 

and explains what changes are required at the DoD, DA, and the individual RC levels so that the Army 

can integrate its RC units fully into ARFORGEN.

The paper begins with a brief but necessary description of ARFORGEN and some critical assumptions 

that pertain to the RCs. Next, it addresses the need to make institutional and operational changes within 

the individual RCs, at DA, and then DoD. At each of these levels, the current situation is described, and 

specific recommendations are offered. The paper concludes with a summary of these recommendations, 

all of which must be implemented in order for the Army to integrate its RCs in ARFORGEN fully.

ARFORGEN

What is ARFORGEN?

The Army defines ARFORGEN as “the structured progression of increased unit readiness over 

time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for 

operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements.”12

ARFORGEN is designed to work for both the Army’s AC and two RCs. All units progress through 

a series of three successive force pools: Reset/Train, Ready, and Available. Units move through the 

Reset/Train and Ready force Pools based only on an event, not time. The Available Force Pool is the 

only time-based pool, where a unit will remain available for up to 1 year for deployment, if not deployed 

sooner. As early in the process as possible, ARFORGEN focuses units in both the AC and RCs on future 

missions and then task organizes them into one of three Expeditionary Force Packages: the Deployment 

Expeditionary Force (DEF), Ready Expeditionary Force (REF), or Contingency Expeditionary Force 

(CEF). Figure 5 is a graphic depiction of how units flow through the ARFORGEN process.13 After 

deployment, or 1 year in the available force pool, all units are returned to the Reset/Train pool where 

this cyclic process begins again.

The goal for how fast a particular unit moves through this ARFORGEN cyclic rotation is different 

for the AC and RCs. For an AC unit, it is one deployment in every 3 years. For an RC unit, it is one 

deployment in every 6 years.14 However, in many instances this cycle also depends on the type and 

availability of forces in demand from combatant commanders or civil authorities. For example, a military 

police company is considered a high demand/low density (HD/LD) unit, so high worldwide demands 

for these relatively few type units may require them to move through this ARFORGEN cyclic rotation 

at a much faster rate. Ongoing changes to the Army’s force structure will address these problems to an 

extent. Nevertheless, Army force requirements are expected to remain high for several years, so these 

HD/LD force gaps are still several years away from being resolved.15

Implementing ARFORGEN.

In September 2005 the Army published the second change to its Army Campaign Plan. This change 

added ARFORGEN implementation as one of the campaign’s major objectives. It also directed that 

ARFORGEN be implemented no later than fiscal year 2006, and designated the FORSCOM commander 

as the supported commander for implementation and the Army G-3 as the lead for policy.16 In March 2006, 

the Army G-3 further refined this objective by issuing a planning directive that assigned responsibilities
Figure 5. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model.

and a timeline for preparation and approval of the Army’s ARFORGEN Implementation Plan. This 

directive stated that the Army would implement ARFORGEN over the next several years in three 

phases: the Current State, the Bridging State, and the Objective State.17

It is critical that the Army establish the ARFORGEN model concurrently for both AC and RC units 

during all three of these phases so that it can continue to meet all operational requirements. Not doing 

so will cause the RCs to continue operating in a crisis management mode, with increasingly fewer 

soldiers, equipment, and units available for deployment. Moreover, the institutional and operational 

Army will not have incorporated the necessary changes needed to support the RCs. The combination 

of these two effects will cause the RCs to falter and become unable to provide a continuous stream of 

citizen-soldiers to support the long war. In turn, this would create a situation where deploying units 

would be comprised almost entirely of AC units and troops, and without citizen-soldiers, the public 

awareness and support for this long war will dwindle.18

Validating ARFORGEN Critical Assumptions.

In developing the initial ARFORGEN design, FORSCOM made some base assumptions that were 

obviously not within its control. The following three are critical assumptions that pertain to the RCs:

1. Under Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC), the Army has assured, predictable access to RC 

forces in the Available Force Pool;

2. The RCs can man units at Force Pool standards; and,

3. Institutional processes will support ARFORGEN.19

ARFORGEN will not work for the RCs unless these three FORSCOM assumptions prove to be 

valid. The Army is working diligently to change institutional processes and validate FORSCOM’s third 

assumption; however, it will be difficult for the Army to validate FORSCOM’s second assumption, 
and impossible for it to validate their first. Only senior leaders in DoD will be able to validate the first 

assumption of assured and predictable access to RC forces.

The Army has since formulated 11 of its own ARFORGEN planning assumptions. Similarly, the 

following two are critical assumptions pertaining to the RCs:

1. The Army will organize, man, train, equip, source, mobilize, and deploy cohesive AC and RC 

units to meet operational requirements and support civil authorities; and,

2. The Army will continue to have assured, predictable access to RC units to meet future operational 

requirements for continuous operations.20

The Army is working to validate its first assumption through a series of deliberate actions that are 

best represented in the lines of operation, decision points, and many objectives in the Army Campaign 

Plan. Once again, only DoD can validate that the Army has assured, predictable access to its RC units, no 

matter what specific mobilization authorities are used to do so. ARFORGEN will not work for RC units 

unless it does. The following paragraphs expand on these two important ARFORGEN assumptions.

Assumption 1—Manning RC Units. Of the many tasks associated with Army’s first assumption, 

clearly the most difficult challenge for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard will be manning 

their units with trained and qualified soldiers. Excessive soldier cross-leveling into deploying units over 

the last 4 years, the geographic constraints associated with assigning citizen-soldiers to units, low fulltime support (FTS) manning, and the chronic and growing shortages in company grade officers across 

both RCs are all very serious problems affecting the RCs’ ability to man units. Additionally, manning 

RC units has been further complicated by an absence of direction on what long-term mobilization 

authority will be in effect, and by policies and other actions that overly restrict access RC soldiers. 

Assumption 2—Obtaining Assured, Predictable Access to RC Units. FORSCOM’s working definition of 

“assured access” is as follows:

The approved legislative authority, policy guidance, and DoD procedures in place (and approved) which allows 

and guarantees access to the Reserve Component (RC) units in the Available Force Pool for rapid mobilization in 

support of national military requirements. It is the ability to source, mobilize, and deploy cohesive RC units within 

the ARFORGEN process.21

Access to RC units is anything but assured in today’s environment. This may have been acceptable 

years ago in a peacetime environment, but assured access is an unavoidable necessity now during 

a protracted war. Currently, adequate policy guidance is not in place during the early planning and 

sourcing phases. Much later, during operational execution, the previously approved mobilization 

authority is overly managed and scrutinized at both DA and DoD during the staffing for approval 

of each RC unit alert and mobilization order. This continues to be a very tedious, inefficient, and 

cumbersome process despite recent efforts to automate and provide secure web-based access to it. 

Ideally, FORSCOM should be able to approve and publish RC unit alert and mobilization orders once a 

mobilization authority is approved, and DoD and DA have published clear supporting policy guidance 

on the use of RC units and soldiers. Minimally, DA should be able to approve these actions.

ARFORGEN planning horizons require sufficient policy guidance, procedures, and systems all to 

be in place early on to achieve assured and predictable access to its RC units. For example, other than 

policy prohibiting it, DoD has not developed nor published any clear remobilization or dwell time 

policies for RC units or soldiers, despite the nation being over 4 years into this long war. The absence of 

these polices will hinder any attempt to implement an ARFORGEN process that is designed to source, 

resource, train, mobilize, and deploy cohesive RC units.

The urgent need for immediate DoD action for ARFORGEN to be implemented and work for the 

Army’s RCs looms large over this entire process. DoD needs to validate Army’s critical assumption 
of continued assured, predictable access now and provide timely policy guidance that supports it; 

however, these are not the only changes needed. The next section identifies institutional and operational 

changes required at all levels so that RC units actually can become an operational reserve that is more 

accessible and more readily deployable.

MANAGING INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGE NEEDED FOR ARFORGEN

[Operation] IRAQI FREEDOM showed that there is room to improve Reserve and Guard readiness and mobilization. 

Because the war on terrorism will likely take a long time to win, we need to be as predictable as we can in callups; we owe that to the Guardsmen and women and Reservists, their families, and their employers. This is also 

a recruiting and retention concern. More predictability—where we can be predictable—is therefore important on 

many levels.

General Richard B. Myers

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.22

General Myers wrote these remarks in the December 2004 Joint Force Quarterly journal, an issue 

that was devoted almost entirely to the future of reserve forces. His remarks span the range of issues 

confronting the U.S. military at all levels, from DoD, to DA, and down to the individual RCs. How 

senior leaders in the military choose to address and resolve these issues also is fundamental to the 

future of sustaining the all-volunteer force because they heavily impact the decision of individual 

citizen-soldiers to serve.

While RC units have been employed like an operational reserve for years now, RC management 

practices are still locked in the old strategic reserve context of the Cold War. DoD polices consistently 

have limited RC management practices across all services. This is especially hurtful to the Army and 

its RCs. As shown earlier, the Army’s RCs are far larger than any other service, they comprise a greater 

percentage of the total Army, are predominantly organized as stand alone units, and, along with the 

Marines, are the most heavily taxed service in the GWOT. This is in contrast to all other service RCs that 

are not nearly as large, comprise much less than half of the total manpower in that particular service, 

and, with few exceptions, are organized mostly as augmented or integrated multicomponent units. 

Additionally, the Army’s individual RCs are rather limited in their ability to affect meaningful change 

in the institutional and operational Army. Both DA and DoD need to revamp management, as well as 

integrate and synchronize institutional and operational changes to implement ARFORGEN fully for 

RC units. The subsequent sections of this paper detail what each organization needs to accomplish so 

that Army RC management practices reflect the way the nation employs its operational reserve force. 

It also expands the discussion on those critical ARFORGEN assumptions of manning RC units and 

obtaining assured, predictable access to RC units.

CHANGE IN THE INDIVIDUAL RESERVE COMPONENTS

Historically, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were only considered part-time forces. 

They were manned and equipped according to a tiered readiness system whereby a select few units 

would be manned and equipped fully at high levels (now often referred to as “eagles”), and all the 

remaining units (affectionately known as “ducks”) were left undermanned and underequipped. Both 

the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have undertaken sweeping initiatives to change so that 

they are better able to meet Army requirements. The Army Reserve’s 5-year and National Guard’s 6-year 

rotational plans for their respective units essentially came about as a result of almost perpetual crisis 

management since 9/11.23 These rotational plans may even be the genesis behind the Army’s decision 

to move to ARFORGEN. Several years ago, the Chief of the Army Reserve, Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau, and Director of the Army National Guard realized the compelling reasons for quick change 

and also knew that doing nothing would be a recipe for disaster.24

The Army Reserve and Army National Guard, however, do not have the ability to make significant 

changes in the institutional and operational Army on their own. To be successful, they need support, 

resources, and authority from DA and DoD. Their greatest successes since 9/11 have been changing 

the culture and expectations associated with reserve service in the 21st century, working to eliminate 

excessive RC unit structure that far exceeded authorized end strength, rebalancing force structure, and 

most importantly, making ready for deployment literally hundreds of thousands of soldiers in their 

mobilizing units. For the most part, these units were previously only funded for low readiness levels 

and were chronically short of soldiers and equipment when asked to mobilize. The RCs readied these 

units for deployment primarily by cross-leveling other soldiers and equipment from nonmobilizing 

units into these mobilizing units. For example, from September 2001 through March 2005, the Army 

Reserve mobilized about 118,270 soldiers. Of that total number mobilized, about 53,000 (or 45 percent) 

were cross-leveled to fill shortages in mobilizing units. Similarly, from September 2001 to April 2005, 

the Army Reserve transferred about 235,900 pieces of equipment among units.25

Focusing on the immediate needs of units called to mobilize decreased the readiness and cohesion of 

those remaining units. Later, in subsequent rotations, these depleted units also were called to mobilize, 

so the personnel and equipment cross-leveling process repeated itself. Each time this cross-leveling 

process took place, it continued to shrink the pool of remaining manpower and available equipment, 

while also increasing strategic risk to the nation and the specific risk associated with deploying a fully 

trained and cohesive RC unit on time to meet the combatant commander’s requirement. Another 

problem is that a large portion of the equipment deployed in early rotations to Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM (OIF) also was retained in theater for use by other units from the AC, RC, and even other 

services. This left those RC units with no equipment to train on when they returned home, or use as 

part of an unforeseen homeland security or homeland defense mission. Additionally, in the ensuing 4 

years since 9/11, many citizen-soldiers have been mobilized, and only in rare instances have any one 

of these soldiers been mobilized again involuntarily under current DoD and DA policies.

Current DoD and DA policies have caused the RCs’ increasing difficulty in manning their mobilizing 

units and have, paradoxically, created far less mobilization predictability for individual citizen-soldiers. 

These policies also run counter to building unit cohesion prior to mobilization, because they cause the 

RCs continually to seek volunteers to mobilize again or search across all other units to find soldiers that 

have not yet mobilized to cross-level into mobilizing units. On any given day, any citizen-soldier with 

mobilization time may well be called away from his/her family and civilian employer on short notice 

to join a mobilizing RC unit anywhere in the country. When notified, this citizen-soldier usually is 

ordered to report to this new unit within a few days, even though current policy says 30 days minimum 

is highly desired, if not required. These short notice mobilization call-ups are disastrous for the 

retention of affected soldiers and in recruiting new soldiers. Strategic guidance and policy are required 

immediately from DA and DoD so that the RCs can support ongoing operations in a more efficient and 

predictable manner in the near term, and also provide more predictable future mobilization windows 

for their citizen-soldiers. Otherwise, the inability to replenish units with deployable manpower and 

replace equipment shortages will hamper the RCs’ ability to prepare even a fraction of their units for 

future missions under ARFORGEN.

While it may be time for the RCs to gain even better representation, possibly at the four-star level, 

in DoD, that discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the RCs must continue to manage 

within their abilities concurrently, while DA and DoD provide timely strategic guidance, policy, and 

direction needed to manage an operational reserve force that has become such an integral part in 

fighting this long war.
10

ARMY INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGE

Overall, the Army has demonstrated its ability to manage both institutional and operational change 

successfully since 9/11. The Army Campaign Plan increasingly has become the mechanism whereby 

the senior Army leaders, like the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff, provide the mission, 

intent and assign execution responsibilities throughout the Army. Still, the Army needs to focus 

attention and resources on ARFORGEN implementation for it to work for RC units.

Today, the Army’s RCs must be manned and equipped so they can continue to serve as an integral 

partner in accomplishing the Army’s operational requirements. In his testimony before the Senate on 

the Army’s 2006 Posture Statement, Army Secretary Francis Harvey stated, “[I]n essence, the Army 

National Guard and the Army Reserve are transforming and modernizing from an under-resourced 

stand-by force to fully equipped, manned, and trained operational ready units.”26 This is an obvious 

acknowledgement of past practices, with a much different plan for the future of the RCs. The Army 

leadership seems intent on building deployable RC units that, like their AC counterparts, are fully 

manned, trained, equipped, and led for the missions they will face in the this long war. It is important 

that this commitment be extended to all RC units, not just those select RC units that are aligned in a 

DEF. Otherwise, the majority of RC units will still be considered unready “ducks” in a newer version 

of the tiered readiness system.

Figure 6 shows a conceptual depiction of how the Army has moved its RCs toward a more operational 

reserve force over the last several years. To attain the more operational reserve force it requires, the 

Army needs to move the RCs up to top right of this graph. The lower left corner is the most undesirable 

location and reflects having a purely strategic reserve, where change in both the institutional (vertical 

axis) and operational Army (horizontal axis) are very low. Moving from a low point to a high point 

along only one axis will increase marginally the RCs’ ability to serve as an operational reserve. The 

most desirable action, however, is to move to a higher location along both axes, which represents a 

high degree of change in both the institutional and operational Army. Specific changes required will be 

addressed in the following sections.

Figure 6. A Conceptual DA Institutional and Operational Change Continuum

for Managing their Reserve Components.
11

On 9/11, the Army’s RCs were at point A on the graph, where both institutional and operational 

change were low and thus resulted in a strategic reserve that was not very capable of being employed 

as an operational reserve. Over the next 4 years, the Army moved to point B, where change in the 

Operational Army (movement right along the horizontal axis) had increased significantly to a relatively 

high point. An example representing this high degree of operational change is the tremendous number 

of soldiers and pieces of equipment that were cross-leveled into undermanned and underequipped RC 

units and then quickly trained and validated for deployment to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

(OEF) and OIF. Similarly, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have implemented institutional 

changes such as reducing force structure allowance and establishing a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, 

and Students account. Both of these actions will allow RC units to achieve and maintain higher manning 

and readiness levels. Point C on the graph represents where the Army must transition to over the next 

several years. Moving from point B to C requires a much higher degree of change in the institutional 

Army. These changes are discussed in detail next.

Institutional Army Change.

DA must update and implement several institutional Army functions to better manage the RCs. These 

functions include structuring, manning, equipping, training, and resourcing RC units. Developing an 

integrated method and supporting automated systems that seamlessly can plan, direct, prioritize, and 

synchronize these functions across both the AC and RCs are integral components for overall success. 

Aside from manning the force, the institutional Army’s biggest challenge will be trying to program and 

resource a force structure effectively multiple years into the future, all while the operational Army uses 

ARFORGEN to source the immediate and near-term force requirements of combatant commanders.

Structure. The Army needs to identify a structure for the RCs that represents their anticipated 

deployment needs for this current war, while also considering what will be needed for the next major 

conflict. This structure obviously needs to be based on the type and number of RC units needed in the 

modular force.27 It also must be matched to the type and number of RC units that the Army desires to 

maintain continually in the ARFORGEN available force pool. As an oversimplified example, the Army 

could not structure the RCs with only four civil affairs battalions if it requires three of them to always 

be deployed or remain in that 1-year-long ARFORGEN available force pool at all times. This, in turn, 

will reduce the fluctuation in those skills needed to recruit, train, and retain in RC units. As a first step 

in developing a notional force-sizing construct, the Army force management community might simply 

match current and anticipated force requirements with the ARFORGEN deployment planning goals of 

one deployment in 3 years for AC forces and one deployment every 6 years for RC forces.

Manning. Clearly the most difficult challenge for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard 

will be manning their units with trained and qualified soldiers. Excessive sldier cross-leveling into 

deploying units over the last 4 years, the geographic constraints associated with assigning citizensoldiers to units, low full-time support (FTS) manning, and the chronic and growing shortages in 

company grade officers across both RCs hamper the RCs’ability to man units.

Manning units is the center of gravity for ARFORGEN to work for the RCs. Currently, no 

comprehensive manning strategy is in place in either the Army Reserve or Army National Guard that 

can support the ARFORGEN cyclic unit rotation model. There should be a focused RC unit life cycle 

manning plan for each RC unit in ARFORGEN that specifically has targeted recruiting and retention 

incentives and affiliation bonuses set for that unit. Minimally, when an RC unit enters the ARFORGEN 

ready force pool, in either a DEF or REF, it should do so fully manned with soldiers that are all contracted 

for service throughout the remainder of that cyclic rotation. Fully manning RC units in this manner is 

essential to provide trained, ready, and cohesive RC units for deployment.
12

Unlike AC units, no centralized RC personnel assignment and replacement system exists. Essentially 

everything related to RC unit assignments is decentralized and based on geographic proximity. A 

citizen-soldier usually affiliates with a particular RC unit based on the geographic proximity to his/her 

home. Similarly, vacancies in an RC unit also are a function of not having a qualified soldier within 

the local area or within a reasonable commuting distance. An effective RC unit life cycle manning 

plan needs incentives targeted to fill vacancies, especially those caused by geographic constraints. 

Accordingly, Army policies and resources should allow the RCs to:

• Fully man all RC units in ARFORGEN on a time-based unit life cycle of 6 years28; 

• Fund travel costs for all training of soldiers who live outside a reasonable commuting distance 

from an RC unit;

• Pay a substantial bonus to any soldier willing to retrain into another specialty that resides within 

commuting distance of an RC unit vacancy;

• Increase and fund full-time manning levels to 100 percent of requirements in RC units; and,

• Find ways to reduce and eliminate the growing company grade officer shortage.

The Army needs to man all RC units in ARFORGEN fully on a time-based unit life cycle of 6 

years. Doing this synchronizes the manning function with the ARFORGEN cyclic rotation goal of one 

deployment in every 6 years for RC units. This also will require RC units to move through the Reset/

Train and Ready force pools based on time, not just an event as currently planned. The Available force 

pool is already a time-based pool of up to 1 year if units are not deployed sooner. Fully manning RC 

units is so challenging and crucial to achieving unit cohesion and effective collective training that this 

proposal should be a readily accepted modification to the ARFORGEN model.

Funding travel costs for all training of soldiers that live outside a reasonable commuting distance 

from an RC unit will help to fill vacancies in that ARFORGEN designated unit. This is especially critical 

to fill key leader and staff positions as early as possible—even when the RC unit enters the Reset/Train 

force pool, and increasingly more important for all other remaining vacancies as an RC unit nears the 

Ready force pool.

Similarly, the Army needs to pay a substantial bonus to any soldier, willing to retrain into another 

specialty, who resides within commuting distance of an RC unit yet does not possess the specialty 

required for any vacancy in that unit. For instance, if the Army Reserve needs truck drivers to fill 

vacancies in a transportation company being formed in Utah, then it should be able to offer a retraining 

bonus of, say $6,000, to other soldiers in low demand specialties who reside nearby. Doing so also would 

reduce the travel costs incurred to pay qualified soldiers who join a unit and live outside a reasonable 

commuting distance. The Army Reserve has started doing this to a limited extent with selected soldiers 

it needs to retrain into high-demand, critical-skill specialties. These retraining bonuses, however, are 

not specifically tied to soldiers living near these vacancies. In addition to its limited availability, this 

retraining bonus is only $2,000, so it is not going to be very attractive to a large number of soldiers.29

The Army needs to increase and fund full-time manning levels to 100 percent of authorized 

requirements in RC units. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard have the lowest proportion 

of full-time manning among all the other reserve services.30 Additionally, even though not authorized 

the number of full-time support (FTS) personnel necessary to meet its requirements, the number of 

full-time personnel available for duty is being reduced further because of departures related to other 

ongoing requirements for these active duty and reserve personnel.31 By remedying this situation, FTS 

in the Army’s RCs will be on par with all other reserve services and will not continually be drained for 

other missions. Full-time manning enhances RC unit readiness and is necessary for success in the high 

operational tempo environment RC units have experienced since 9/11. Minimally, every RC unit in 
13

ARFORGEN should to be assigned all of its full-time manning before it reaches the Ready force pool. 

Historically, both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have not been authorized all of the fulltime support staff they require because, under the tiered readiness system, it was assumed that many 

units would not need to deploy quickly, and thus the risk associated with lowered unit readiness was 

acceptable. This risk is no longer acceptable for RC units in ARFORGEN.

Finally, the Army will never have the leaders it needs to man RC units adequately unless it finds 

ways to reduce and eliminate the growing shortage of company grade officers. This shortage—crucial 

in manning and readying RC units that will be called upon to deploy—is becoming an increasingly 

vulnerable center of gravity for the Army. Figure 7 depicts this shortage of captains and lieutenants 

in RC units over the last 10 years.32 Both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have a severe 

shortage of captains. At the end of fiscal year 2005, this shortage was 10,619 officers. Essentially, this 

shortage came about as a result of low accessions and poor company grade officer management over at 

least the last 10 years.33 These officers fill vital small unit leadership and other key staff positions.

Figure 7. The Reserve Components Shortage of Company Grade Officers Over Time.

Minimally, it will take another decade of deliberate actions to overcome this shortage if the Army 

immediately starts to recruit significantly more officers and retains a greater percentage of the company 

grade officers that it has. This means increasing the annual number of lieutenants it accessions into 

the RCs through all sources, which include the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer 

Candidate School (OCS), and direct commissions. The Army is providing many incentives to retain its 

AC company grade officers.34 Additionally, it is decreasingly less likely that company grade officers 

leaving active duty will join an RC unit. This trend needs to be reversed quickly. Though a $6,000 

affiliation bonus is available to encourage AC officers to transition to RC units, in reality it was too 

late to be implemented and it also is too small to attract any meaningful participation.35 Why would a 

captain leaving active duty after repeated year-long deployments to Iraq want to join an RC unit, and 

then be highly vulnerable to being called right back as a cross-leveled asset for yet another deployment 

with any RC unit because he/she technically has no mobilized time as a newly-arrived RC soldier? A 

combination of thoughtful policy and greater incentives can reverse this dangerous trend. An alternate 

strategy used regularly and effectively by the Marines might be to assign hundreds of AC company 

grade officers to RC units. It has the dual benefit of filling critical shortages in RC units while AC 

officers benefit from the experience of an RC assignment early in their career.36
14

Equipping. Long before 9/11, the RCs were short of equipment. The high operational tempo since 

then has only exacerbated a bad situation. Late in 2005, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) made the following observations on the plans needed to improve equipment readiness in the 

Army National Guard.

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying 

these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units and threatens the Guard’s 

ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant 

equipment shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time levels with the assumption that they 

could obtain additional resources prior to deployment, and (2) current operations have created an unanticipated 

high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles.37

The Army’s sound plan in place to equip deploying RC units provides them adequate training equipment 

in the ramp up prior to those deployments. The most critical challenge here will be equipping the Army 

National Guard, so it can fulfill its dual state role in homeland security and defense missions while 

at home station. In the past, when the Army National Guard stayed at home as a strategic reserve, 

governors could turn to them whenever they needed troops for disaster relief or security. Increasingly, 

these Guard units have little or no equipment for long periods of time after returning home from 

overseas deployments.

Obviously, the answer to RC equipping troubles is to buy more critically short equipment over 

time. These equipping expenses might be optimized and minimized by a more predicable ARFORGEN 

rotation cycle of one deployment every 6 years, combined with expanded state-to-state agreements 

that allow for temporary sharing and/or transfers of equipment needed for those dual missions while 

at home station.

Training. The Army is undertaking a paradigm shift in unit training and readiness as it implements 

ARFORGEN. Unit training, and the readiness reporting related to that, will move from the AC band of 

excellence and RC tiered readiness concept to one of progressive and increasing capability over time. 

FORSCOM is now developing and validating unit training and readiness templates for all types of 

units, both AC and RC, that will be managed in ARFORGEN.38 The Army also desires to move RC units 

away from the alert-mobilize-train-deploy scenario that has been so common to date to one where RC 

units only need to train-alert-deploy.39 As the Army moves to this new paradigm, it must align and 

integrate RC units against future missions as early as possible and fully man them before they undergo 

collective training.

FORSCOM must align and integrate RC units against future missions as early as possible in 

ARFORGEN. Aligning RC units against future missions early allows the individual RCs to prioritize 

resources for these select RC units, so they are fully manned and minimally equipped before they 

undergo pre-mobilization collective training. It also is important that RC units be integrated early 

into the task organization they expect to deploy under. For example, if FORSCOM minimally task 

organizes all AC and RC units within the DEF, then these AC and RC units can train together before 

being deployed. Similarly, wherever possible, FORSCOM should tentatively align AC and RC units in 

the REF and CEF force packages.

. . . Because both of the USAR units were significantly under strength before being deployed to Iraq, they received 

many soldiers from other USAR units country-wide to fill up their ranks. This process is known as “cross-leveling.” 

Although it has the benefit of filling the ranks, it has the disadvantage of inserting soldiers into units shortly before 

deployment who had never trained with those units. The soldiers did not know the unit. The unit and the unit 

leadership did not know the soldiers. The Army has always stressed “you train as you fight.” As COL [deleted] 

began to focus his efforts on interrogation operations, all he had were disparate elements of units and individuals, 

including civilians, that had never trained together, but now were going to have to fight together.

Excerpt from the Article 15-6 

 Report on the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal.

40
15

Foremost among training reforms is the necessity to man RC units fully before they can undergo 

any meaningful collective training. RC units that are not fully manned early in the ARFORGEN 

process always will remain frozen in that alert-mobilize-train-deploy scenario. Since 9/11, the RCs 

have needed to increase the manning levels of almost all of their deploying units significantly, and 

that, in turn, required extensive collective training after these units mobilized. This has not always 

resulted in a positive outcome, as the excerpt above from the Article 15-6 Report on the Abu Ghraib Prison 

Scandal indicates.41 Significant training and manning level increases also were required in RC units 

that mobilized during the first Gulf War in 1990-91.42 Currently, the only way the RCs can fully man 

units, short of soldiers volunteering, is via soldier cross-leveling actions that can only begin after DA 

publishes a unit’s alert order. RC units will never be able to transform to a train-alert-deploy scenario 

unless they achieve unprecedented levels of pre-mobilization training, and that depends on fully 

manning a unit long before it is alerted. One recent paper suggests that the Army look to apply Lean 

Six Sigma techniques to the RC unit training process, where unit manning and equipping are viewed 

as “suppliers” to the collective training process.43 This novel approach might be the impetus needed for 

the Army to achieve higher collective training proficiency in RC units prior to alert.

Resourcing. The RCs currently are not resourced to serve as an operational reserve. The tiered 

readiness system that provided more resources to high priority units and much less to others has been 

thrown out; however, nothing has replaced it. The budgeting cycle needs to be well ahead of the unit 

manning, equipping, and training functions for RC units, or otherwise crisis management prevails 

during the period shortly before mobilization. If the ARFORGEN sourcing process identifies RC units 

early, then, ideally, funding already has been programmed and is in place on R-Day when an RC unit 

enters the Reset/Train force pool. Minimally, necessary funding must precede an RC unit’s movement 

from the Reset/Train into the Ready force pool. This resourcing process also needs to be dynamic 

enough to adjust to changing ARFORGEN requirements that, for instance, cause a corresponding unit 

move from the CEF to the DEF.

Operational Army Changes.

While shaping and rapidly implementing institutional Army decisions that pertain to RC units 

and personnel policies, the operational Army also should communicate anticipated RC unit force 

requirements back up to the institutional Army. Changes the operational Army needs to make include 

communicating better with the institutional Army, developing robust automation support for all 

aspects of ARFORGEN, and increasing the planning horizons to the maximum extent possible for the 

Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

Communication between the operational Army and the institutional Army is the single biggest area 

for change. This is especially important on all issues and/or decisions related to RC unit mobilization 

and individual RC soldier mobilization policies. Often times, these policy decisions seem to occur in a 

vacuum, are not properly informed by operational Army input, or there seems simply to be a breakdown 

in communications between senior operational Army uniformed leaders and senior institutional DA 

civilians. For example, while operating within the current Partial Mobilization authority, a senior 

military member might view no restrictions on mobilizing an RC soldier, who, by his very presence in 

uniform, is considered a volunteer. On the other hand, a senior civilian counterpart is likely to view 

this mobilization action in an entirely different manner, requiring extensive proof that this soldier 

either had not previously mobilized since 9/11, or be provided a signed volunteer statement from this 

soldier specifically agreeing to another mobilization. Where the operational Army sees no issue, the 

institutional Army consumes valuable RC unit time preparing and staffing these documents. This is 

especially cumbersome for the RC unit alert and mobilization orders processing system.44
16

The Army also must develop robust and integrated automation support that covers all aspects of 

the ARFORGEN process. This includes automation support that synchronizes the planning, resourcing, 

sourcing, manning, equipping, training, and mobilizing functions that are all related and interconnected 

in ARFORGEN. This web-based automation support needs to be integrated, minimally, across 

Headquarters DA, FORSCOM, Training and Doctrine Command, First Army, and the headquarters of 

both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

ARFORGEN automation support also needs to be integrated with other well-established institutional 

Army processes like the Total Army Analysis (TAA) and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 

and Execution (PPBE) process. This is probably the area of greatest challenge because ARFORGEN is 

designed to meet the operational deployment requirements of combatant commanders who are only 

looking about 18 months out at best, and often need forces within only a few weeks of presenting a new 

request for forces. Contrast these short combatant commander timelines with institutional process like 

TAA, and one can quickly see these processes are not influenced by sharp increases up or down in force 

requirements. This is especially problematic with HD/LD units and/or specialty force requirements, 

like military police, where institutional Army processes might have assumed risk years ago by not 

choosing to source these type units in sufficient quantities that are needed today to meet current 

combatant commander requirements. ARFORGEN, and the automation support developed for it, 

should inform and shape institutional Army processes. Recently, the Army said that it would develop 

what it is calling the ARFORGEN Synchronization Tool (AST) and integrate automation systems to 

better support information management.45 This is a very promising sign, even though it will take years 

to develop and implement such a tool.

 The last way the operational Army can better integrate RC units in ARFORGEN is to increase the 

planning horizons to the maximum extent possible for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. 

Practical ways of doing this would be to assign RC units to a DEF expeditionary force package as early 

as possible, with 3 years out or more before that deployment being the optimal. Being in a DEF, verses 

the REF or CEF expeditionary force packages, provides a definite deployment window for RC units to 

backward plan against.

If ARFORGEN is to work for RC units, the Army must make these institutional and operational 

changes. Changes in these structuring, manning, equipping, training, and resourcing functions, 

combined with better communication and automation, will posture the Army for success. The Army’s 

best efforts will only result in marginal success in integrating RC units in ARFORGEN unless there is 

commensurate change within DoD.

DOD INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGE

The role of our Reserve forces is changing in the United States. We have seen their traditional role, which was to 

serve as manpower replacements in the event of some cataclysmic crisis, utterly transformed. They are no longer 

serving as the force of last resort, but as vital contributors on a day-to-day basis around the world.46

Charles Cragin, the then serving Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, made the 

remarks above in 2000, more than a year before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. He was acknowledging 

that the state and nature of America’s military had been shaped profoundly by the end of the Cold 

War, the corresponding reduction in the size of the military, and the dramatic increase in the number of 

missions the military was being called upon to perform. Mr. Cragin went on to say that the military had 

been able to accomplish more missions than ever by relying increasingly on the reserve components 

and predicted “this will continue for the foreseeable future—this will be steady state from now on” 

because “we simply cannot get the job done without them.”47 Six years later Cragin’s comments are 

more relevant than ever—and probably far beyond what anyone could have predicted or imagined at 
17

that time. Nothing significant has yet been done to overhaul the policies and directives needed to fund 

and manage the RCs as an integral day-to-day contributor to our national defense. 

To complete the transition to an operational reserve, institutional and operational change at the DoD 

level is needed. The combination of smaller active services and increased operational tempo necessitate 

more frequent and routine use of RCs. This is especially true for the Army, where the percentage of 

reserve manpower and total number of RC soldiers far exceeds any other service, and the Army’s 

operational tempo is expected to remain high for many more years.

Figure 8 shows the conceptual DA institutional and operational change spectrum (shown earlier 

in Figure 6) superimposed on the DoD institutional and operational change spectrum. The intent here 

is to illustrate that DA’s best efforts to move its RCs from a strategic to an operational reserve will 

result only in marginal increases without similar changes at the DoD level. If Army makes all of the 

previously mentioned institutional and operational changes, it will only get its RCs to point C on this 

graph. DoD institutional and operational change is required to move the Army’s RCs from point C to 

D, where they can truly be managed and employed as an operational reserve. These DoD changes are 

discussed in detail next.

Figure 8. The Institutional and Operational Change Spectrum as it Pertains to Moving 

the Army’s Reserve Components from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve.

DoD Institutional Change.

DoD needs to make the following institutional changes so that Army can implement ARFORGEN 

for its RCs:

• Provide the Army better and timelier mobilization strategic guidance, and then let it manage 

within that authority;

• Focus DoD implementation policy on the long-term requirements needed to fight this long 

war; 
18

• Focus less on individual servicemember and RC unit decisions; and,

• Provide additional resources to the Army’s RCs.

Provide the Army Better and Timelier Mobilization Strategic Guidance, and then Let it Manage within 

that Authority. The Army needs timely strategic guidance and policy, as well as greater autonomy to 

manage within that authority, for ARFORGEN to work for RC units. The GAO made the following 

observations related to this in 2004.

Many of DoD’s policies that affect mobilized reserve component personnel were implemented in a piecemeal 

manner and were not linked within the context of a strategic framework to meet the organizational goals. Overall, 

the policies reflected DoD’s past use of the reserve components as a strategic force rather than DoD’s current use 

of the reserve component as an operational force to respond to the increased requirements of the Global War on 

Terrorism. Faced with some critical shortages, the policies focused on the short-term needs of the services and 

reserve component members rather than on long-term requirements and predictability.48

The findings from this GAO report are just as relevant or more so today, some 16 months after its 

publication. Many of DoD’s existing policies that affect mobilized Army Reserve and Army National 

Guard units and soldiers continue to be either absent early on or are implemented in a piecemeal 

manner that is not linked within the strategic context of this long war.

DoD needs to provide the Army well-thought-out and more timely strategic guidance. Foremost is 

the need to provide mobilization guidance to the services on how their RCs can be utilized to fight this 

protracted war. Will the mobilization authority for the next several OIF/OEF rotations be a continuation 

of the partial mobilization (PM) declared by the President on September 14, 2001, that has been in 

existence for over 4 years now? If so, then DoD should address the growing disconnect between that 

PM authority and the DoD policy constraint related to it. For example, PM, covered under Title 10, 

U.S. Code, Section 12302, states a maximum of mobilization period of 24 consecutive months, but DoD 

policy limits this to only 24 cumulative months.49 It has been 4 1/2 years since this PM was declared, 

and still no new guidance is out. For Army to manage its RCs adequately, it needs new DoD guidance 

in this area. 

Will DoD decide to move away from PM and use a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority 

instead? If so, then when and how will this transition period begin? Will DoD obtain legislation to 

increase the PRC duration from 270 to 365 days.50]? Answers to these fundamental questions also are 

required for the Army to manage its RCs like the operational reserve that they have become.

This situation is complicated further by an unwillingness to differentiate a soldier’s mobilized time 

under either PRC or PM since on or shortly before 9/11. When will the Army receive new guidance and/

or authority from DoD so that ARFORGEN can function for the Army’s RCs on the minimal planning, 

sourcing, and resourcing horizons needed to be successful? When will DoD provide instructions on 

how a Soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine resets his/her mobilization clock? This guidance needs to 

come soon for the Army’s RCs. Timely mobilization policy is critical for the Army to man, resource, 

and train those RC units adequately under the ARFORGEN process.

Once DoD has provided the Army better and more timely strategic guidance and direction on RC 

mobilization, it should let Army fully manage and execute within that authority. This translates into 

setting mobilization caps and policy that allow the Army to man and mobilize cohesive RC units, not 

just individual citizen-soldiers.
19

Focus DoD Implementation Policy on the Long-Term Requirements 

Needed to Fight This Long War.

DoD’s implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and 

personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. Involuntary 

mobilizations are currently limited to a cumulative total of 24 months under DoD’s implementation of the partial 

mobilization authority. Faced with some critical shortages, DoD changed a number of its personnel policies to 

increase force availability. However, these changes addressed immediate needs and did not take place within a 

strategic framework that linked human capital goals with DoD’s organizational goals to fight the Global War on 

Terrorism.51

If the DoD policy of 24 months cumulative mobilization time remains in effect, versus the legal 24 

consecutive months, the Army will never be able to mobilize involuntarily RC soldiers that have been 

previously mobilized. This is of special concern because the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief 

of Staff recently said at the Association of the U.S. Army annual conference that, for the indefinite 

future, Army units would continue to spend 1 year “boots-on-the-ground” in Iraq and Afghanistan.52

Therefore, the only courses of action left are either a wholesale withdrawal of RC units participating 

in these operations, or continued ad hoc manning actions where RC units literally are put together 

from soldiers cross-leveled across the entire force. To pursue either course would be near-sighted and 

self-defeating, and would negate the very basis for implementing ARFORGEN. New mobilization 

implementation policy and guidance are required from DoD for ARFORGEN to work for the Army’s 

RCs.

In their September 2004 report, GAO was critical of the DoD and service policies that encouraged 

the use of paid unit volunteers and generally discouraged the involuntary mobilization of unpaid 

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members. The GAO stated “these policies were disruptive to the 

integrity of Army units because there was a steady flow of personnel among units” as soldiers were 

cross-leveled from nonmobilizing units into mobilizing units, and then those nonmobilizing units were 

later called to mobilize.53 The Army soon will find itself in a new, yet similar, dilemma when attempting 

to mobilize an RC unit. The twist this time will be that an RC unit will be at or over 100 percent strength; 

however, the individual mobilization history of each assigned soldier will span anywhere from 0 to 24 

months. What soldier deploys or stays behind in this situation? If it has been 4, 5, or even 6 years since 

an RC soldier completed a mobilization, at what point can he/she be required to mobilize again under 

a new or existing authority? Current DoD policy fails to address this, other than to say no involuntary 

remobilizations and no more than 24 months cumulative mobilization time under the PM that has been 

in effect since September 14, 2001. The Army Reserve recently conducted an analysis that accounted for 

all of these DoD restrictions and concluded that almost two-thirds of their citizen-soldiers remaining for 

involuntary mobilization were recently recruited soldiers in the lowest enlisted grades of E1 to E4. The 

Army Reserve also concluded that, even after extensive retraining of all remaining soldiers who had 

not yet mobilized, they still would be “completely dependant on volunteerism” to fill their leadership 

requirements in higher grades (E5 to E9 and O1 to O6) that they projected to mobilize in fiscal year 

2006.54 This clearly shows the need now for new and specific DoD mobilization implementation policy 

and guidance, so the Army can plan, man, and resource an increasing level of RC unit readiness well 

before these units are called to mobilize and deploy.

Focus Less on Individual Servicemember and RC Unit Decisions. As an institution, DoD’s focus should be 

less on individual servicemember and individual RC unit management issues, and more on strategically 

thinking and planning for the future. Reserving minor decisions for high-level decisionmakers is 

neither efficient nor effective. It causes unneeded delays, suggests mistrust of others, and hampers 

decentralized execution. These decisions should be decentralized to Army as long as they are within 

current policy.
20

Another area that needs far less DoD focus is the insistent pursuit and expansion of individual 

volunteerism. The luster of volunteerism wore off long ago in the Army’s RCs. Simply put, the Army 

cannot fight a protracted war if volunteerism becomes the nation’s primary means of mobilizing 

and deploying RC units. Volunteerism is increasingly less capable of filling the strategic guidance 

void on mobilization authority and the new DoD implementation guidance needed to fight this long 

war. While volunteerism may be expedient politically, it places unneeded obstacles in the way of 

operational planners by increasingly hindering the Army’s ability to form and deploy cohesive RC 

units. As General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, recently testified, this results in 

“cobbling together” units, “but more importantly, you are putting the burden [of fighting this war] on 

the Soldier.” He goes on to say that “these Soldiers are volunteers” and that “we should not put that 

burden on them because that breaks up unit integrity, it breaks up unit cohesiveness, and it breaks up 

the leadership.”55 Volunteerism may work well for filling the increasing individual staffing needs of 

stateside administrative headquarters. It fails to work when trying to build and train cohesive RC units 

for deployments to OIF and OEF.

Additionally, tracking the mobilization clock of every RC servicemember is not a valuable metric for 

gauging when to publish new strategic mobilization policy. For example, a recent OSD chart showed 

only 46 percent of the total 829,005 selected reserve force had ever been mobilized since 9/11, and the 

other 54 percent had not mobilized to date.56 This metric does not account for the different individual 

RC services and also the geographic constraints that limit an RC soldier’s ability to affiliate with any unit 

within his/her RC service. It also presumes that every RC soldier, from private to colonel and in any 

specialty, is a perfectly interchangeable mobilization asset for any position in an RC unit. Lastly, it is an 

educated guess at best, because the Army has no personnel system that tracks RC soldier mobilization 

time. Since 9/11, the Army’s RCs have been able only to provide educated guesses on this by divining 

information from their soldier’s pay files in the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS).

Provide Additional Resources to the Army’s RCs. The nation and DoD will field the quality of RC force 

that it resources. All of the service RCs combined constitute 43 percent of the total force, yet only account 

for 7 percent of its budget.57 In short, DoD must provide additional resources to the Army Reserve and 

Army National Guard. Having an operational reserve is more expensive than a strategic one. It entails 

more frequent mobilizations, combined with the expectation that RC units maintain higher levels of 

readiness so that they are able to deploy quickly. Of all the services, this need for additional resources 

is greatest in the Army’s RCs because, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, service composition and size does 

matter. The Army has accounted for over 72 percent of all troops mobilized to date. It has the largest 

number of RC soldiers, significantly larger than any other service. Combine this with the fact that a 

greater percentage of Army’s total manpower resides in its RCs, and one can quickly conclude that 

the Army requires more resources be devoted to its personnel, equipment, and training readiness. 

Because much of it was already underequipped, undermanned, and under-resourced, no significant 

cost savings will be achieved after the Army’s RCs have completed their force structure reductions. 

Over time, as current critical shortages in RC equipment and personnel are overcome, it will be easier 

to manage costs as RC units progressively increase in readiness as they move through the ARFORGEN 

cyclic rotation.

DoD Operational Change.

The DoD operational chain of command, best represented as the Joint Staff, should aid in shaping 

and informing DoD institutional decisions that pertain to RC use, while it also works to establish a 

better system to manage and execute its Joint Force Provider (JFP) responsibilities. 

The DoD operational chain of command needs to communicate better with the institutional chain of 

command. There are essentially two separate chains of command in DoD that terminate at the Office of 
21

the Secretary of Defense: the operational chain that runs from combatant commanders to the Joint Staff, 

and the administrative chain that runs from the secretary of each service and agencies to the OSD. The 

operational chain of command is comprised largely of military members, whereas the administrative 

chain is comprised mostly of civilians. The Joint Staff should shape and inform OSD discussions related 

to the employment of RC units and those policies it derives controlling it. In effect, this means being 

more engaged and involved in policy discussions and debates, so DoD institutional policy decisions 

related to the RCs more reflect their operational use.58

On March 11, 2004, the Secretary of Defense directed implementation of the Global Force Management 

(GFM) process and gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for developing policy 

and guidance in support of this effort. In this memo, he also designated the commander of Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM) as the primary Joint Force Provider (JFP).59 The Joint Staff’s operational change 

is to establish a system that can better organize and carry out the chairman’s GFM responsibilities. 

This includes developing and publishing timely GFM policy and guidance, as well as shaping OSD 

policy related to the employment of RC units. Lastly, the Joint Staff needs to bring JFCOM quickly 

up to speed in its JFP role, while also developing supporting systems to manage and execute these 

responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is imperative that there be a coordinated approach among DoD, DA, and the individual RCs for 

RC units to be integrated successfully in ARFORGEN. Continued change in the Army Reserve and 

Army National Guard, as well as institutional and operational changes at both the DA and DoD levels, 

will be required.

The Army Reserve and Army National Guard must continue to change the culture and expectations 

associated with reserve service in the 21st century. They also must continue eliminating excessive unit 

structure so that structure does not exceed authorized end strength, complete rebalancing their force 

structure, and most importantly, continue to make ready for deployment of their soldiers and units 

called to mobilize. Both also need to integrate their respective rotational plans fully into ARFORGEN. 

Lastly, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard should continue to manage within their abilities 

concurrently, while DA and DoD work to provide the timely strategic guidance, policy, and direction 

needed to manage their RC units like the operational reserve force that they have become.

When the institutional Army improves the structuring, equipping, training, manning, and 

resourcing functions, it can better manage RC units. The Army must identify a structure for the RCs 

that is more representative of their anticipated deployment needs now, while also considering what 

will be needed in the future. This also will reduce the fluctuation in those soldier skills the RCs need to 

recruit, train, and retain in RC units. The Army has a sound plan in place to equip deploying RC units; 

however, it needs to buy critically short equipment quickly and encourage expanded state-to-state 

equipment sharing so that Army National Guard units can fulfill their dual state role missions while at 

home station. The Army also must make a paradigm shift in unit training and readiness to implement 

ARFORGEN in RC units. This will require aligning and integrating RC units against future missions 

as early as possible and fully manning those RC units well before they are alerted for deployment. 

The resourcing and budgeting process must occur well ahead of the unit manning, equipping, and 

training functions for RC units, or crisis management will prevail. This resourcing process also should 

be dynamic enough to adjust to changing ARFORGEN conditions caused by new force requirements 

from combatant commanders that must be filled quickly. Of all these functions, manning units is the 

center of gravity and will prove the most difficult to accomplish. Accordingly, the Army needs new/

revised manning policies and resources in place that should allow the RCs to do the following:
22

• Fully man all RC units in ARFORGEN on a time-based unit life cycle of 6 years; 

• Fund travel costs for all training of soldiers that live outside a reasonable commuting distance 

from an RC unit;

• Pay a substantial bonus to any soldier willing to retrain into another specialty that resides within 

commuting distance of an RC unit vacancy;

• Increase and fund full-time manning levels to 100 percent of requirements in RC units; and,

• Find ways to reduce and eliminate the growing company grade officer shortage.

Finally, the Army must synchronize other well-established institutional Army processes like TAA and 

the PPBE process with ARFORGEN.

The operational Army must be able to shape and rapidly implement institutional Army decisions 

that pertain to RC units and personnel policies, while it also communicates anticipated RC unit force 

requirements back up to the institutional Army. Accordingly, the operational Army needs to improve 

communication with the institutional Army, develop robust automation support for all aspects of 

ARFORGEN, and increase planning horizons to the maximum extent possible for the Army Reserve 

and Army National Guard.

DoD needs to make the following institutional changes so that Army can implement ARFORGEN 

for its RCs:

• Provide the Army better and more timely mobilization strategic guidance, and then let it manage 

within that authority;

• Focus DoD implementation policy on the long-term requirements needed to fight this long 

war; 

• Focus less on individual servicemember and RC unit decisions; and,

• Provide additional resources to the Army’s RCs.

Finally, DoD operational changes include the Joint Staff helping to shape and fully inform DoD 

institutional decisions pertaining to RC use, as well as working to establish a better system to manage 

and execute its joint force provider responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

In the long war ahead, the Army has the most compelling need, and the most to gain, in both supporting the DoD effort to move its RCs from a strategic to an operational reserve. Of all the Army’s initiatives, implementing ARFORGEN is the most critical. The Army will not be able to fulfill its worldwide 

force requirements by implementing ARFORGEN for AC units alone. To achieve a campaign quality 

Army fully with joint and expeditionary qualities, the Army must implement ARFORGEN quickly 

while also keeping its RCs full partners throughout this process. Fully integrating the Army’s RCs into 

ARFORGEN is both essential and critical for ARFORGEN to succeed. The Army needs institutional 

and operational change within DA and also at the DoD level to make this happen. This paper detailed 

those changes required so that the Army can integrate its RC units fully into ARFORGEN.
23

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/

Report20060203.pdf, accessed February 6, 2006, p. 76.

2. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Information Brief, October 1, 2005, www.defenselink.

mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf accessed February 10, 2006, p. 24.

3. Lewis Sorley. “Reserve Components: Looking Back to Look Ahead,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 36, December 2004, 

p. 22.

4. Ibid.

5. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Information Brief, October 1, 2005, www.defenselink.

mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf, accessed February 10, 2006, p. 14.

6. This figure is constructed from data reported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 

Information Brief, October 1, 2005, www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf, accessed February 10, 2006.

7. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal Year 2004, p. 157.

8. Figure 3 was constructed from data provided in Ibid.

9. As of September 30, 2005, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve had mobilized a cumulative total of 235,155 

and 141,016 soldiers, respectively, for a grand total of 376,171. This represents 72.6 percent of the 517,863 total mobilizations 

across all reserve component services since September 11, 2001. For a detailed breakout, see Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Information Brief, October 1, 2005, p. 22.

10. For a detailed brief on the Army Campaign Plan, see www.army.mil/thewayahead/acp.html, accessed February 10, 

2006.

11. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, memo, Subject: Army Campaign Plan Change 2, 

Washington, DC, September 30, 2005, p. 2.

12. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, Subject: Planning Directive—Army 

Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Implementation Plan, March 14, 2006, p. 1.

13. Department of the Army, The Army Campaign Plan with Change 2, Washington, DC, August 25, 2005, Annex F, 

p. F-3.

14. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, pp. 2, 5. It is important to note here 

that DA simply recognizes the rotation cycle of one deployment every 6 years for any type of RC unit. It does not make a 

distinction between the Army National Guard’s plan, which is one deployment every 6 years, and the Army Reserve’s plan 

that calls for one deployment every 5 years. This would be very problematic if DA were to focus solely on Army National 

Guard Brigade Combat Teams, while it ignored the many smaller sized Army Reserve combat support and combat service 

support units, which have been in very high demand in both OIF and OEF. This one deployment every 6 years also may be 

a result of the Secretary of Defense directive to “Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than 

one in every 6 years.” See Donald Rumsfeld, July 9, 2003, Memorandum SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces, www.defenselink.

mil/ra/documents/quickwins/RebalancingForces.pdf , accessed February 11, 2006.

15. Ibid, pp. 2, 5-6. In its Planning Directive for the ARFORGEN implementation plan, the Army assumes that operational 

requirements and the pace of modular force transformation will not allow the Army to enter ARFORGEN implementation 

Phase 3 (Objective State) before fiscal year 2009. This is the first point in time where Army believes it generally can achieve 

its planning goals of one deployment in 3 years for AC units and one deployment in 6 years for RC units. Though not 

explicitly stated, the timeline in Figure 1 hints that this might not take place until as late as fiscal year 2012.

16. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, memo, p. 2.

17. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, pp. 5-6.

18. For a good discussion on the failure to use the Army’s reserve components during Vietnam, and then Army Chief of 

Staff General Creighton Abrams’ reactions to that and ultimately how it impacted the public opinion and perception of this 

war, see Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992, 

pp. 183-186, 360-364. For a review of reserve forces policy as it has evolved from Vietnam to now, and insights on possible 

revisions of that policy to accommodate for today’s realities, see Lewis Sorley, “Reserve Components: Looking Back to Look 

Ahead,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 36, December 2004, pp. 18-23; as well as Gary Khalil and Carl Rehberg, “W(h)ither the 

Abrams Doctrine: Good or Bad Policy?” The Officer, December 2003, pp. 21-27, 55. 
24

19. Unpublished HQDA ARFORGEN 101 brief, January 16, 2006, slide 11.

20. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, p. 2.

21. U.S. Army Forces Command, “US Army Forces Command Lexicon and Terminology,” Predecisional Draft, January 

25, 2006, p. 3.

22. Richard B. Myers, “A word from the Chairman,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 36, December 2004, p. 8.

23. For a concise summary of the Army Reserve’s 5-year plan, see Michelle Tan, “The Readiness Reshuffle: Plan Would 

Deploy Reservists Every 5 Years,” Army Times, February 20, 2006, p. S13. For a summary of the Army National Guard’s 6-

year plan, see Michelle Tan, “The Readiness Reshuffle: Guard Aims for 6-Year Cycle, Half Free for U.S. Emergencies,” Army 

Times, February 20, 2006, p. S13.

24. For early signs of this change, see Roger C. Schultz, “Citizen-Soldiers Protecting and Defending the U.S.A,” Army 

Magazine, October 2002, p. 103; and James R. Helmly, “Transforming While at War–Instilling a Culture of Change,” Army 

Magazine, October 2002, p. 111. For a concise update on recent progress and continuing change, see Clyde Vaughn, “Army 

National Guard–Always Ready, Always There,” Army Magazine, October 2005, p. 101; James R. Helmly, “Changing to a 

21st-Century Army Reserve,” Army Magazine, October 2005, p. 107; and Steven Blum, “A Vision for the National Guard,” 

Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 36, December 2004, p. 24.

25. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report #GAO-05-660, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to 

Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, July 12, 2005, www.gao.gov/new.items/d05660.pdf, accessed July 14, 

2005 , pp. 11, 14.

26. Steven Donald Smith, “Army Modernizing to Win Long War, Officials Tell Congress,” American Forces Press Service, 

February 15, 2006, www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060215_4212.html, accessed February 15, 2006.

27. For a detailed analysis of eight possible options for restructuring the Army, to include options that reduce dependence 

on personnel and units in the reserve components, see Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Restructuring the Army,” 

May 2005, www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/63xx/doc6348/05-10-RestructureArmy.pdf, accessed March 19, 2006.

28. This time-based unit life cycle could be adjusted to accommodate either the Army National Guard’s one deployment 

every 6 years or the Army Reserve’s one deployment every 5 years. In either case, the manning of RC units must be matched 

to this cycle time.

29. James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve: Focus on the Future,” Army Magazine, February 2006, p. 33.

30. For a good discussion on Army Reserve full-time manning, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report 

#GAO-05-660, p. 19. For a summary of Army National Guard full-time manning, see U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, GAO Report #GAO-04-670T, Reserve Forces. Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland 

Missions and Future Challenges, April 29, 2004, www.gao.gov/new.items/d04670t.pdf, accessed July 14, 2005, p. 21.

31. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report #GAO-05-660, p. 20.

32. U.S. Army G-1. Unpublished PowerPoint presentation titled “Fixing the Reserve Component Company Grade 

Shortages,” e-mailed to the author on November 9, 2005, slide 20.

33. For details on the Army Reserve Company Grade Officer shortage, see Joseph E. Whitlock, “Can the Army Reserve 

Overcome its Growing Company Grade Officer Shortage?” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, AY 01-02; and Hal Bernton, “Officer Crisis Hits Army Reserve,” Seattle Times, December 9, 2004, p. 

1. For more details on the Army National Guard Company Grade Officer shortage, see Sean D. Naylor, “Guard Borrows 

Lieutenants: Shortages Prompt Loan from Active Army,” Army Times, December 20, 2004, p. 23.

34. Dave Moniz, “Incentives Beefed Up To Keep Young Officers in the Army: Among Them: Cash Bonuses, Choice of 

Jobs and Location,” USA Today, November 7, 2005, p. 10.

35. Gary Sheftick, “$6K Bonuses Aim to Cut RC Officer Shortage,” Army News Service, February 16, 2005, www4.army.

mil/ocpa/print.php?story_id_key=6865, accessed July 14, 2005.

36. In 2004 the Army was forced to do this to fill about 50 lieutenant shortages in deploying Army National Guard units. 

See Sean D. Naylor, “Guard Borrows Lieutenants: Shortages Prompt Loan from Active Army,” Army Times, December 20, 

2004, p. 23.

37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report #GAO-06-111, Reserve Forces. Plans Needed to Improve Army 

National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation, October 2005, www.gao.gov/new.

items/d06111.pdf, accessed October 20, 2005, Highlights page. 

38. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, p. 4.
25

39. The two phrases “train-alert-deploy” and “train-mobilize-deploy” seem to be used interchangeably by senior Army 

leaders in all components. Nonetheless, the clear intent here is to move most of the RC unit training prior to the point where 

a unit is alerted and mobilizes shortly thereafter. For discussions related to this, see Steven Blum, “A Vision for the National 

Guard,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 36, December 2004, p. 24; Association of the US Army, “Train, Alert, Deploy; It’s How 

Guard, Reserve Operate,” www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptHome.nsf/byid/CTON-6FUSYT, March 5, 2004, accessed March 26, 2006; 

and John C. F. Tillson. “Landpower and the Reserve Components,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 36, December 2004, p. 41.

40. Department of the Army, Memorandum, SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility 

and 205th MI Brigade,” www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040825fay.pdf, Undated, accessed August 25, 2004, p. 32.

41. Ibid. 

42. For training and readiness issues in Army Reserve units, see Thomas F. Lippiatt, et al., “Mobilization and Train-Up 

Times for Army Reserve Component Support Units,” RAND, Arroyo Center, 1992; and Bruce R. Orvis, et al., “Ensuring 

Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components,” RAND, Arroyo Center, 1996. For training and readiness issues in 

the Army National Guard, see Thomas F. Lippiatt, et al., “Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat 

Units,” RAND, Arroyo Center, 1992; U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Report #GAO-NSIAD-91-263, National Guard—

Peacetime Training did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War, September 1991, archive.gao.gov/d19t9/144875.pdf, 

accessed October 25, 2004.

43. Michael D. Fortune, “Using the Army Force Generation Model as a Springboard to Transform Reserve Component 

Pre-Mobilization Collective Training,” U.S. Army War College, Senior Service College Fellowship Civilian Research Project, 

The University of Texas, Austin, March 2006. For a brief discussion on Lean Six Sigma, see Mike George, et al., What is Lean 

Six Sigma? New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004.

44. Since 9/11, the Department of the Army has created a classified, web-based automation system called Department 

of the Army Mobilization Processing System (DAMPS) to automate the staffing and approval of all unit/soldier alert and 

mobilization orders for reserve components. Even with DAMPS, this is still a very cumbersome and lengthy process that 

takes place for every single RC solider or unit, no matter what size, even when operating within current DoD and DA 

mobilization guidance and/or constraints.

45. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 memo, p. 3.

46. Charles L. Cragin, “Reserve Forces Role Changing,” The Officer, September 2000, p. 34.

47. Ibid.

48. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report #GAO-04-1031, Military Personnel. DoD Needs to Address Longterm Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues, September 2004, www.gao.gov/new.items/

d041031.pdf, accessed 25 October 2004, p. 19.

49. Jim Garamone, “DoD Doesn’t Plan on Extending Reserve Soldiers,” American Forces Press Service, Washington, DC, 

July 21, 2004.

50. Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/

Report20060203.pdf, accessed February 6, 2006, p. 76. In this 2006 QDR, DoD said that it would “Pursue authorities for 

increased access to the Reserve Component: to increase the period authorized for Presidential Reserve Call-up from 270 to 

365 days.” Additionally, in its 2006 posture statement, the Army has asked Congress for assistance in “Obtaining legislative 

authorities to assure predictable access to our Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers who have become, by 

necessity, our operational rather than our strategic reserve.” This may be an indirect request supporting the DoD desire to 

move the PRC from 270 to 365 days. See Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, “2006 Posture Statement,” February 10, 2006,

www.army.mil/aps/06/01_index.html, accessed February 16, 2006, p. 3.

51. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report #GAO-04-1031, Highlights page.

52. Ann Scott Tyson, “Army Reorganizes To Boost Its Combat Power,” Washington Post, October 7, 2005, p. 2.

53. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report #GAO-04-1031, pp. 19-20.

54. U.S. Army Reserve, “What’s Left in the Army Reserve,” Unpublished PowerPoint brief, March 6, 2006.

55. Unedited Transcript of the March 9, 2006, Hearing before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves on 

Roles and Missions of the National Guard and Reserves, www.cngr.gov/pdf/0309cngr.pdf, accessed March 14, 2006, p. 40.

56. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, PowerPoint presentation, “Introduction to the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,” February 1, 2006, www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/IntrotoRAFY06.

pdf, accessed February 11, 2006, p. 26.
26

57. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Information Brief, October 1, 2005, www.defenselink.

mil/ra/documents/RA101FY06.pdf, accessed February 10, 2006, p. 27.

58. For a recently documented example from Operation Iraqi Freedom, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. 

Trainor, COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Pantheon Books, 2006, pp. 99-100.

59. Donald Rumsfeld, June 25, 2004, Memorandum, SUBJECT: Policy Implementation to Establish Commander, JSJFCOM 

(CDRUSJFCOM) as the Primary Joint Force Provider (JFP).